introduction review of european and russian affairs 11 (2), 2017 issn 1718-4835 introduction andrey margolin1 russian presidential academy of national economy and public administration the articles in this issue deal with urgent issues that result from the current practice of managerial decision-making concerning environmental policies and exploitation of natural resources. current policies, both in russia and elsewhere, are often based on a deep-rooted but unacknowledged misconception that the assimilatory capacity of the environment is virtually limitless. this has a number of implications:  companies strive to maximize immediate revenues at the expense of possible long-term environmental impacts.  the general assumption is that some environmental protection measures are sufficient to completely restore the damage that has already been inflicted on the environment.  the cost of environmental protection activities is determined based on the amount of damage to individual components of the environment, rather than taking into account externalities that impact other sectors or policy arenas.  efficiency indicators are calculated without regard to the sustainability of natural ecosystems. meanwhile, a much more advanced approach to the solution of environmental and economic problems of natural resource preservation and protection is needed. such an approach would be to view biological, social and environmental systems as complex open systems that may become irreversibly corrupted by the accumulation of negative impacts. in this perspective, it would be crucial to achieve equilibrium between expected material gain and preservation, or even improvement, of natural ecosystems. 1 andrey margolin is vice-rector at the russian presidential academy of national economy and public administration, moscow, russia. 2 review of european and russian affairs 11 (2), 2017 in this context, it is significant to note that environmental protection initiatives in the russian federation are currently severely underfunded, which is very likely to lead to the aggravation of environmental problems in the future. in fact, according to the russian federal state statistics service, the total amount of environmental expenditure decreased from 1.3% to 0.7% gdp in the period from 2003 to 2015, while the volume of environmental capital investment halved, going from 2% to 1% of total capital investment. with that in mind, the authors of the articles that make up this issue focus on highly topical issues in russia policy circles, which may have relevance in other countries as well. these include the development of methodologies and guidelines for evaluating the performance of environmental programs and investment projects; the accommodation of interests of the state, the private sector and civil society during policy implementation; and rationales for new approaches to global climate regulation, including various mechanisms of technology transfer that would contribute to a decrease of carbon emissions embodied in trade. in my article, “criteria and methodologies for assessing efficiency of environmental government programs in the russian federation,” i look at existing approaches to performance evaluation for environmental government programs in russia, and i suggest avenues for improvement of evaluation criteria. in the next article, i partner with co-author valentin krasnoshchekov in “accommodations of interests of the state, business, and civil society in environmental projects implemented through public private partnership in the russian federation,” to evaluate the social efficiency of public private partnerships (ppp), based environmental projects. finally, in their article, “carbon emissions embodied in russia’s trade: implications for climate policy,” igor a. makarov and anna k. sokolova explore how greenhouse gas (ghg) emissions that result from russia’s imports and exports impact russian national interests and trade policy writ large. while not exhaustive, the research findings in this issue enhance our understanding of current policy discussion in russia, as well as providing the foundation for comparative analysis. the authors hope that these articles will contribute to a better mutual understanding among policymakers and business leaders, civil society groups, and researchers worldwide who see the problems of environmental preservation as a top priority. after all, joint research and the creation of viable mechanisms for rational environmental management bring us closer to the successful implementation of a sustainable development strategy that will allow future generations to flourish and enjoy this planet in its best possible state. 3 review of european and russian affairs 11 (2), 2017 published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada available online at: journals.carleton.ca/rera/ rera is an electronic academic peer-reviewed journal. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is a joint project supported by the canada-europe transatlantic dialogue—a cross-canada research network supported by the social sciences and humanities research council of canada (sshrc)—along with the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies (carleton university) and its associated research unit, the centre for european studies. rera aims to provide an accessible forum for research, to promote high standards of research and scholarship, and to foster communication among young scholars. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada tel: +01 613 520-2600 ext. 3117; e-mail: rera-journal@carleton.ca creative commons license this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license (cc by-nc-nd 4.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, provided the source is acknowledged. no use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes. issn: 1718-4835 © 2017 the author(s) https://journals.carleton.ca/rera/ mailto:rera-journal@carleton.ca https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ why reforms fail: the role of ideas, interests and institutions review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 issn 1718-4835 transatlantic perspectives on citizenship and diversity: an introduction anke patzelt1 and elke winter2 university of ottawa while the movement of people is not new, international migration is gaining more importance in today’s globalized world. new and faster means of communication and transportation connect people around the world in completely new ways. ever increasing numbers of people are leaving their home countries and moving to foreign destinations to escape from hunger, persecution, war or environmental catastrophes; they migrate to seek a better life, find employment, study, enhance their careers or life styles, or to join a partner or family members who already live abroad. with increasing numbers of people being internationally mobile, ethnocultural diversity, integration, as well as (lived and formal) citizenship have become some of the most important topics in scholarship and policymaking alike. while it used to be popular to differentiate between europe’s “traditional nation-states” and the “settler societies” of the new world (milich and peck 1998), over the past years, scholars have noticed a convergence of immigration and citizenship policies on both sides of the atlantic (dauvergne 2016; joppke 2007; joppke 2010; triadafilopoulos 2012). according to one commentator, this development has even led to the “end” of settler societies (dauvergne 2016). in what follows, we briefly survey the literature that supports the claim that the countries on both sides of the atlantic are moving closer together in their treatment of immigration, diversity and citizenship (convergence theory). we then circumscribe the goals and cavea ts inherent to conducting transatlantic comparisons. finally, we provide an overview of the contributions to this special issue. scholars examining immigration and citizenship policies in western democratic states on both sides of the atlantic often refer to germany and canada. these two countries tend to be portrayed as being located at opposing poles of the definitions of nationhood and, thus, of immigration, integration, and citizenship policies (bauder 2011; brubaker 1989). existing differences notwithstanding, scholars like triadafilopoulos (2012), winter (2014), schmidtke (2014), and kolb (2014) underline the increasing convergence of both countries’ immigration, citizenship and integration policies. triadafilopoulos (2012), for example, holds that despite different national histories and approaches to migration, canada and germany have come to address questions of immigration and membership in strikingly similar – and increasingly multicultural – ways. this may be due to the fact that the migration and integration management in both countries, while being caused by different circumstances, has increasingly shifted to 1 anke patzelt is a ph.d. student in sociology at the university of ottawa 2 elke winter is associate professor of sociology at the university of ottawa, and research director at the centre for interdisciplinary research on citizenship and minorities (circem). 2 review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 subnational levels. according to schmidtke (2014), new initiatives and projects in the field of integration are increasingly initiated at the regional and local level (regions, municipalities, cities, and civil society engagement). additionally, winter (2014, 29) maintains that the debates surrounding two “of the most controversial citizenship legislation[s]” in both countries, namely the “optionspflicht [the duty to choose] in germany and the ‘first generation limitation’ in canada … seem to be more driven by political conjuncture – be it party ideology, electoral considerations, or the global fear about all things (rightly or wrongly) associated with islam – than with ancient traditions of nationhood” (winter 2014, 48). finally, there are also increasing similarities between germany’s and canada’s labor migration policies, especially with regard to highly skilled workers. canada recently introduced changes to its point system which make it harder to enter the country, e.g. applicants “must now prove a job offer or job experience in a specific, state-defined shortage occupation” and “a minimum language requirement” (kolb 2014, 63). germany, by contrast, makes it increasingly easier for highly skilled migrants to enter the country, e.g. by introducing the german green card and the european blue card, as well as by introducing the option for “a residence permit for job searching” (kolb 2014, 63–66). additional manifestations of the ongoing immigration/citizenship policy convergence between germany and canada will also be examined further below (see the contributions of schultz and weinmann in this issue). while the studies above concentrate on germany and canada, scholars such as joppke (2010) and dauvergne (2016) argue that this convergence is not limited to a few countries. rather, they see policy convergence as being embedded in a phenomenon that stretches over most parts of the western world, including all settler societies of the new world, i.e. the united states, canada, australia and new zealand, as well as the prosperous countries of western europe. specifically, joppke (2010, vii) observes the development towards “a liberal mode of inclusive citizenship with diminished rights implications and increasingly universalistic identities.” dauvergne (2016, 2), in her recent book3, goes even further. she argues that the convergence of migration politics in the “global north” has lead, on the one hand, to the end of "the era of settler societies,” and, on the other hand, to the emergence of “a new, mean-spirited politics of immigration” of global dimensions. three main factors are said to have caused this development, namely “the crisis of asylum,” “the fear of islamic fundamentalism,” and “the end of multiculturalism” 4 (dauvergne 2016, 7). according to dauvergne, due to these three factors, the traditional settler societies have lost the importance of two of their defining characteristics, which she identifies as “settlement” and “society”. the loss of permanent settlement as a defining characteristic of these countries’ immigration policies is best documented in the increasing “preference for temporary migration programs” promoted by settler states, as well as, more generally, the “decrease in ‘permanent’ migration numbers” in these countries (dauvergne 2016, 124). the loss of a cohesive and comprehensive society, by contrast, is deduced by the author from the rise of “ethnic enclaves and illegal migration,” two phenomena which are said to result in the exclusion not only of newcomers but also of ethnicized or racialized individuals who have been living in a country for a long time (dauvergne 2016, 134). as a consequence, the meaning of “immigration” in settler societies has been undermined. as dauvergne (2016, 2) formulates it: “[t]here is no longer any basis, other than history, for saying that settler societies are different in regard to migration than other western liberal democracies.” these changes, together with changes that have taken place in europe, e.g. the end of colonial linkages for many of the western european states, are said to have led to a new direction in the politics of migration which now “is grounded in sharp distinctions between sought-after highly mobile individuals on the one hand, and illegal migrants on the other” (dauvergne 2016, 8). 3 dauvergne, catherine. the new politics of immigration and the end of settler societies. 2016 4 for a slightly different argument, see joppke (2017), who argues that while there is a demise of multiculturalism in the political sphere, its ideas persist in liberal societies, although more at the individual than at the group level. 3 review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 in light of the situation, both the traditional settler societies and the prosperous nation-states of western europe fall back to “well-tried” policies to cope with new situations. as countries try to implement the strategies that have proven successful elsewhere, the aims and implementations of their migration policies become more and more alike. this is reflected both in immigration policies, as well as in policies concerning citizenship and integration (dauvergne 2016). in addition, dauvergne (2016, 2) observes that much of the vocabulary and theory we use to study citizenship and diversity on both sides of the atlantic is outdated. scholars are thereby adding to a “policy paralysis” or, at least, are not helping to overcome the latter. hence, it seems like we are currently experiencing a certain “impasse” in the field of comparative migration and citizenship studies. to help overcome this scholarly impasse and to stimulate fruitful learning from transnational comparison are two of the goals of this special issue. we hope that this will then also inspire new paths and ideas in policy. at a time when states are desperately trying to reorient their migration policies, comparative migration research has an important role to play. its goal “is to examine how structures, cultures, processes, norms, or institutions affect outcomes through the combination and intersection of causal mechanisms” (bloemraad 2013, 28). comparative immigration and citizenship research also allows us to “challenge conventional wisdom or show how existing academic theories might be wrong” (bloemraad 2013, 29). consequently, it allows for the exploration and comparison of new developments and trends in different countries with respect to the management of migration, ethnocultural diversity and citizenship. questions pertaining to the extent to which states open their doors for (which type of) migrants, and to how national sovereignty and solidarity are repositioned vis-à-vis increasing diversity and globalization are at the heart of this comparative endeavor, and thus also at the core of this special issue. said differently, many of the contributions to this special issue examine how various actors – governments, states, social movements, and migrants – negotiate processes of ethnic boundary (un-)making (wimmer 2013). particularly, the articles presented here examine policies and practices of citizenship in germany and other member states of the european union against the backdrop of recent developments in the canadian context. the first paper by thomas faist and christian ulbricht examines the social integration of immigrants in germany in terms of “communal relationships” (vergemeinschaftung) and “sociation” or “associative relationships” (vergesellschaftung). while the first part of the paper discusses the theoretical foundations of the argument, the second part examines german citizenship reforms since 2000 in light of this approach. as such, the paper does not only provides insight into recent changes in citizenship policies in germany, but also offers a fruitful theoretical foundation for more successfully analyzing immigrant incorporation, as well as debates around migration in germany and in other liberal nation-states. the authors insist that issues of migration and integration were hotly debated in germany over the past few years. within these debates, one prominent claim was to “de-culturalize” topics relating to migration and integration and to frame these issues in terms of participation rather than integration. however, as the authors convincingly argue, participation, which is defined along the lines of “associative relationships”, alone is not enough to ensure the successful integration or incorporation of immigrants. processes of “communal relationships”, which represent the more emotional components of incorporation, such as feelings of belonging, are at play in settlement processes and need to be considered. thus, the authors conclude that it is only by analyzing both the processes of “communal relationships” and “associative relationships” that the integration processes of immigrants can be understood and evaluated. furthermore, it is only by combining these two concepts that it becomes possible to fully understand the ways in which important institutions such as citizenship and welfare states function and execute their power. maria jakob’s paper continues this line of inquisition. the author investigates the question of how cultural belonging is promoted at newly introduced citizenship ceremonies in germany. placed in the broader discussion of citizenship reforms since the 2000s, the paper investigates what it means to be a german citizen. specifically, the paper asks whether the representations of culture produced and mobilized at citizenship ceremonies can be interpreted as a form of liberal assimilation or rather can be 4 review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 seen as a revival of the old idea that germany is a “kulturnation,” a cultural nation. to this end, the paper focuses on the connection between culture, citizenship, and national belonging. to analyze the nexus between these three terms, the author’s analysis draws on 95 speeches from citizenship ceremonies in different parts of germany, as well as on participant observations at 14 ceremonies. this rich empirical material makes it possible to gain an in-depth view into the mechanisms and actors at play in citizenship ceremonies. it also allows for an in-depth analysis of the ways in which cultural belonging is promoted at these events. the author highlights two specific ways in which culture is conceptualized at the ceremonies: firstly, as a universal feature that has a unifying impact on people, and secondly, as a folkloristic asset that individuals can use to promote diversity. jakob argues that this dual dimension of culture serves as a “modern solution” to problems of social integration. she concludes that this way of dealing with cultural belonging can be seen as an adaptation of the traditional concept of “kulturnation” to new social contexts. while most of the papers in this special issue either discuss issues of citizenship and diversity in germany, canada or both countries, eriselda shkopi’s and zana vathi’s paper presents a case study of albanian migrants in the italian city of padua, a group that is typically heavily stigmatized in italy. the authors examine the importance of naturalization for these migrants’ political integration. they also analyze how factors such as the age and educational background impact immigrants’ political engagement and participation, an aspect of migrant’s political integration which so far has only received limited attention. the case study is well embedded in the broader discussion around citizenship and integration in italy specifically, and research on the political integration of immigrants more generally. the analysis is based on 30 interviews, out of which 20 were conducted with naturalized albanians in padua and ten with key actors in politics and community activities from different cities across italy. it concentrates on the motivations and meanings lying behind the political integration of this population. by comparing the situation and the feelings that the interviewees had before and after naturalization, the paper demonstrates the importance of the passage from “merely being a permanent resident” to “becoming a full member of society through naturalization” for the immigrants’ political engagement. thus, naturalization, which entails full voting rights and representation at all levels, is seen as a prerequisite for the political integration of this group. however, interestingly, the authors also highlight that for the youngest and most well-educated of their interviewees, political participation is not necessarily attached to the formal acquisition of citizenship. this shows that political integration is not necessarily dependent on formal citizenship, but also involves variables such as age and socio-economic status. catherine frost’s and elke winter’s paper examines what kind of knowledge is called upon in distinguishing insiders from outsiders within naturalization and passport acquisition in canada. the authors suggest that bureaucratic requirements and procedures involved in these two processes are revealing in that seemingly innocuous knowledge about citizenship serves to sort outsiders from insiders, endorses specific behaviors over others, and empowers the state to redefine political membership. the paper identifies two major forms of knowledge that are involved in sorting insiders from outsiders in the two processes: on the one hand, mechanical knowledge, which “involves tests and evaluations driven by document-matching, biometrics and fact-checking exercises” and, on the other hand, moral knowledge, which refers to an interpersonal dimension and is defined as “the kind of lives we live among our peers and our intentions towards the political community.” the authors find that, in the canadian case, tensions exist between both kinds of knowledge. the state increasingly aspires to know the citizen “mechanically”, yet encounters limitations that require some form of “moral knowledge” to secure the validity of both bureaucratic procedures. ivana previsic’s paper discusses the ban of face coverings at citizenship ceremonies that was issued under the conservative government of canada in 2011. the ban, which has since been revoked, provoked major debates both in the political sphere as well as in canadian media and civil society. the ban is here examined from the perspective of gender (in)equality. based on a qualitative content analysis of 5 review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 mainstream media articles, the author investigates how different commentators – both muslim and nonmuslim ones – used the notion of gender equality “to argue their positions and conceptualize the meaning of canadian citizenship.” by analyzing the comments of muslim and non-muslim readers, the paper presents “both sides of the story.” the author demonstrates that both audiences entertain a neoliberal understanding of gender (in)equality. however, most non-muslim commentators interpret the wearing of the veil as practices of gender inequality, which they claim exists only among muslims. in contrast, muslim commentators tended to identify the wearing of the veil as a free individual choice by women and projected gender inequalities onto western societies. caroline schultz’s paper compares how canada and germany statistically measure the diversity of their populations. she argues that despite existing differences, the statistical approaches of both countries are converging “towards a new pragmatism.” this finding is striking, as canada and germany are often described as “antipods” in terms of their understanding of nationhood, as well as in their approaches toward immigration, citizenship, and integration. both countries’ strategies to statistically measure ethnic subgroups also differ significantly: canada explicitly asks questions about the “origins” of individuals and relies on self-identification. germany, by contrast, derives this information based on formal citizenship and place of birth. however, by embedding an historical overview of how both countries statistically measure diversity in an ideology-pragmatism continuum – where ideologically driven approaches are characterized by their close relation “to the respective idea or myth of nationhood” and pragmatic driven approaches by their consideration to efficiently measure integration – the author offers a compelling argument. specifically drawing upon the categories of “visible minority” in canada and “migration background” in germany, the paper concludes that the introduction of both categories can be seen as a shift towards a pragmatic approach of measuring diversity, as both of these categories were developed to track the impacts of integration and “counteract discrimination and inequalities.” finally, martin weinmanns’ paper discusses the similarities and differences between two legal clauses: section 3(3) of the canadian citizenship act, also known as the first generation limitation clause and section 4(4) of the german citizenship act, two “regulations that delimit the acquisition of citizenship abroad.” the first generation limitation clause, was implemented in 2009 and prevents the passing of canadian citizenship from the second generation born abroad onwards. in germany, section 4(4) likewise prevents the automatic acquisition of german citizenship for the second generation born abroad. while the focus of migration and citizenship studies is often placed on the process of immigration and, thus, acquiring citizenship, research on the processes of emigration, as well as on external citizens and their rights is on the rise. this paper fits perfectly into this stream of research, using a contextual description to make “an initial normative assessment” which can be used as a starting point for further research on this topic. throughout the paper, each regulation is placed in their respective legal and historic context, and their specific features as well as their differences are analyzed against this background. they are also analyzed in relation to the notion of ius connexio, the connection one has to a country. in fact, weinmann concludes by arguing that, from a normative perspective, ius connexio should be the determining factor for citizenship acquisition of generations born abroad. to put this into policy he recommends the introduction of requirements similar to those for naturalization (e.g. language and knowledge tests), to determine whether citizenship can be retained in the second or subsequent generations. taken together, the papers in this special issue offer a better understanding of new developments in diversity management, as well as in citizenship policies and practices on both sides of the atlantic. the recent case studies from canada, germany and italy underline the usefulness of comparative migration and citizenship studies. they help stimulate a new debate, which, we hope, will ultimately lead to overcoming the “policy paralysis” in european nation-states and settler societies that some commentators are observing. 6 review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 acknowledgments the idea for this special issue was born out of a workshop entitled citizenship, governance and diversity: perspectives on and from germany and canada that took place at the university of ottawa in june 2015. without generous support from the german academic exchange service (daad), the deutsche forschungsgemeinschaft (dfg), and the office of the vice-president, research of the university of ottawa neither the workshop nor this special issue would have been possible. many thanks also to clair bonello (http://clairebonello.com/proofreading/) for editorial help with this introduction, to the anonymous reviewers for their expertise and suggestions, and to the journal editors for making this publication possible in a timely manner despite obstacles. references bauder, harald. 2011. immigration dialectic imagining community, economy, and nation. toronto [ont.], toronto: university of toronto press. https://login.proxy.bib.uottawa.ca/login?url=http://books.scholarsportal.info/viewdoc.html?id=/eb ooks/ebooks2/utpress/2013-08-26/1/9781442687196. bloemraad, i. 2013. “the promise and pitfalls of comparative research design in the study of migration.” migration studies 1 (1): 27–46. doi:10.1093/migration/mns035. brubaker, william rogers. 1989. immigration and the politics of citizenship in europe and north america. edited by german marshall fund of the united states. lanham : [washington, d.c.]: university press of america ; german marshall fund of the united states. dauvergne, catherine. 2016. the new politics of immigration and the end of settler societies. cambridge: cambridge university press. https://login.proxy.bib.uottawa.ca/login?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/cbo9781107284357. joppke, christian. 2007. “beyond national models: civic integration policies for immigrants in western europe.” west european politics 30 (1): 1–22. doi:10.1080/01402380601019613. ———. 2010. citizenship and immigration. immigration & society. cambridge ; malden, ma: polity. ———. 2017. is multiculturalism dead?: crisis and persistence in the constitutional state. malden, ma: polity. kolb, holger. 2014. “when extremes converge: german and canadian labor migration policy compared.” comparative migration studies 2 (1): 57–75. doi:10.5117/cms2014.1.kolb. milich, klaus j., and jeffrey m. peck. 1998. multiculturalism in transit: a german-american exchange. international political currents ; v. 3. new york: berghahn books. http://clairebonello.com/proofreading/) 7 review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 schmidtke, oliver. 2014. “beyond national models?: governing migration and integration at the regional and local levels in canada and germany.” comparative migration studies 2 (1): 77– 99. doi:10.5117/cms2014.1.schm. triadafilopoulos, triadafilos. 2012. becoming multicultural: immigration and the politics of membership in canada and germany. ubc press. http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=8hr0jwz17yec&oi=fnd&pg=pp2&dq=%22conc lusion+/%22+%22maas,+catherine+frost,+tobias+vogel,+barbara+syrrakos,+leah%22+%22i +am+particularly+indebted+to+joe+carens+for+his+patience+in%22+%22wish+to+acknowledg e+and+express+my+gratitude+for+research%22+&ots=wrjs181zzu&sig=u1avgubefkyir_t5ygkvgc4kss. wimmer, andreas. 2013. ethnic boundary making: institutions, power, networks. new york: oxford university press. winter, elke. 2014. “traditions of nationhood or political conjuncture?: debating citizenship in canada and germany.” comparative migration studies 2 (1): 29–55. doi:10.5117/cms2014.1.wint. 8 review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada available online at: journals.carleton.ca/rera/index.php/rera rera is an electronic academic peer-reviewed journal. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is a joint project supported by the canada-europe transatlantic dialogue—a cross-canada research network supported by the social sciences and humanities research council of canada (sshrc)—along with the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies (carleton university) and its associated research unit, the centre for european studies. rera aims to provide an accessible forum for research, to promote high standards of research and scholarship, and to foster communication among young scholars. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada tel: +01 613 520-2600 ext. 3117; e-mail: rera-journal@carleton.ca creative commons license creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0 this working paper is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial no derivs 3.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 3.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, provided the source is acknowledged. no use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes. issn: 1718-4835 © 2017 the author(s) https://journals.carleton.ca/rera/index.php/rera mailto:rera-journal@carleton.ca http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ references available online at: journals.carleton.ca/rera/index.php/rera contact: carleton university tel: +01 613 520-2600 ext. 3117; e-mail: rera-journal@carleton.ca creative commons license issn: 1718-4835 institutionalising neoliberalism: the federal nature of european employment policy review of european and russian affairs vol. 1 no. 1 december 2005 © rera 2005 all rights reserved ………………………………………………………………… harmonisation through neglect the federal nature of european employment policy daniel v. preece abstract this paper proposes using the methodological perspective of critical federalism, constructed by merging the theoretical framework of critical political economy with the analytical approach of co-operative federalism, to understand the harmonisation and operation of employment policy within the eu. by choosing to not actively integrate employment policy, the ad hoc approach pursued by the member-states has led to a sharing of competency between the member-states and the eu that mimics the relationship found between central and regional governments in a federal system. in the first section, this paper outlines how the emphasis on national competence has shaped the integration of national employment policies into a nascent federal system. in the second section, this paper constructs the methodological perspective of critical federalism and in the final section, this paper concludes by identifying the federal characteristics of the current operation of european employment policy. journal of european and russian studies vol. 1 no. 1 december 2005 © jeurus 2005 all rights reserved 2 the european commission has classified the issue of structural unemployment as the “most serious economic and social problem” currently facing the european union [eu] (european commission, 2000, 8). over the last thirty-five years, unemployment rates among the current member-states have increased nearly five times, from an average of 2-3% in the late 1960s to an average of 10% throughout the 1990s (cameron 2001, 7). furthermore, of those individuals unemployed, over one-half of them have been without jobs for over one year, and over one-third have been unemployed for over two years (cameron 2001, 26-7). however, even though the eu has continued to be plagued by increasing levels of structural unemployment, there has been very minimal policy development specifically directed at job creation within the project of integration. reflecting a desire on the part of the member-states to enshrine employment policy within the exclusive realm of national competence, movement in this area has not been actively pursued. instead, integration has mainly been driven by efforts to integrate complementary policy areas, such as monetary integration, and rulings of the european court of justice surrounding issues of labour mobility. nevertheless, despite the fact that harmonisation has not been performed in a co-ordinated manner, the scope of autonomy that member-states have over the development of employment policy has been eroded over the last ten years by the twin pressures of globalisation and european integration. as a result, the member-states are now forced to combat ‘the most serious economic and social problem’ with a very limited range of policy options. in this paper, i propose that the theoretical framework of critical federalism is a new and important methodology for understanding the harmonisation and operation of employment policy within the eu. toward this end, this paper is divided into three journal of european and russian studies vol. 1 no. 1 december 2005 © jeurus 2005 all rights reserved 3 sections to demonstrate how the ad hoc manner though which employment policy has been integrated within the european union has served to institutionalise an order based upon the principles of neoliberalism. in the first section, i will identify the key points in the development of a regional employment strategy, outlining how the emphasis upon the principle of national competence throughout its formation has led to a nascent federal order at the regional level. following this discussion, i will construct the approach of critical federalism by merging the theoretical framework of critical political economy with the analytical approach of co-operative federalism. finally, i will conclude by identifying the federal characteristics of the current operation of european employment policy. the ad hoc regional harmonisation of employment policy the integration of employment policies has had a long history within the eu. beginning with the treaty of rome, the member-states have sought to improve the working conditions for their citizens without the development of enforcement mechanisms. moreover, in attempting to strike this balance between standards and enforcement, the eu concentrated on merely harmonising a minimum level of labour standards. while the eu did mandate pay equality for both genders and harmonised paid holiday schemes when they formed the ecsc in 1950, little more integration occurred over the following fifteen years. however, in the wake of the first wave of expansion in 1971, and the economic downturn in the early 1970s caused by the first oil shock, the member-states acted to expand labour standards in the community. initiating the first of a series of four-year social action programmes [sap], the eec attempted to develop a journal of european and russian studies vol. 1 no. 1 december 2005 © jeurus 2005 all rights reserved 4 plan of action to further deepen the scope of harmonisation. focusing on three areas, the sap sought to broaden gender equality, achieve full employment, and improve working and living conditions throughout the community (padoan 2001, 208). while these directives were once again limited to merely establishing the minimum standards for the community, the sap also led to a more permanent change by establishing the european social fund [esf]. focused on counteracting structural unemployment and creating jobs and training schemes for young people, the esf is still a significant component of employment strategies within the eu, and accounts for about 7 percent of the eu budget (mccormick 1996, 269). in 1989, eleven of the twelve member-states adopted the community charter of the fundamental social rights of the worker, or social charter, which brought together all of the social policy goals previously articulated by the community. while the goal of the social charter was to further augment the existing policy framework, the refusal of the united kingdom to sign on meant that only minimal progress was made, and the charter became relegated to merely broad-based goals and objectives (mccormick 1996, 269-71). the european community attempted to rectify this limitation with the maastricht treaty, by including a social charter in the negotiations. however, once again, the uk vetoed this provision. in response, the member-states agreed to append an agreement on social policy to the maastricht treaty, which exempted the uk from social issues. the primary contribution of the agreement was to extend qualified majority voting to a range of labour issues, including gender equality, working conditions, and labour rights (padoan 2001, 208). still, without the agreement of the uk, the integration of social issues only within this ad hoc ‘social community’ weakened the journal of european and russian studies vol. 1 no. 1 december 2005 © jeurus 2005 all rights reserved 5 extent to which the provisions could be legitimately applied. nevertheless, the uk finally signed the social agreement when the labour party was elected in 1997, allowing it to be included in the treaty of amsterdam as title xi. in addition to the provisions of the agreement, the social chapter also led to the adoption of four directives: the european works council directive; the parental leave directive; the directive on equal treatment for part-time employees; and the directive concerning sex discrimination at the workplace (padoan 2001, 209). finally, while the amsterdam amendments did lead to the development of an employment committee, charged with promoting “co-ordination between member states on employment and labour market policies” (tec, art. 130), the committee is only able to act in an advisory role. with no explicit provisions for enforcement, or any punishments outlined for non-compliance, there is a great concern that effective co-ordination on employment policy between member-states will not be achieved. as the preceding discussion suggests, the harmonisation of labour market strategies and employment policy in the european union is based upon the principle of national competence. through the use of directives, the eu has merely set standards for these policy areas and left the implementation of the policies up to the individual member-states. moreover, in most cases, the actual content of the directives are less sweeping than most existing national policies, and, even in those cases where european union law extends beyond national levels, the way in which the implementation is ultimately performed is up to the member-government (padoan 2001, 209). however, even though harmonisation was not produced in an active, co-ordinated manner, the resulting policy arrangement does reflect a coherent ideological position. the project of journal of european and russian studies vol. 1 no. 1 december 2005 © jeurus 2005 all rights reserved 6 european integration has largely been driven by the need to build an economic environment structured around ensuring investor confidence through expanding property rights and investor freedoms, while imposing “market discipline” on the actions of the state and on labour (gill 2001, 47). as a result, by subordinating employment policy behind the goal of perfecting the common market, the eu has pushed their labour market towards one governed by the principles of neo-liberalism. theoretical approach of critical federalism as a field of study, political economy seeks to encompass the academic disciplines of politics and economics by assuming that accurate analysis must include an understanding of the interrelated nature of these two aspects of social reality. in contrast to reductionist explanations found within the separate disciplines, political economy is concerned with demonstrating how political activity influences the economy and how the economy similarly influences political behaviour. nevertheless, within the field there is considerable debate over the relationship between economics and politics. while accepting the interrelated nature of the two arenas, most mainstream approaches suggest that one area tends to hold causal priority over the other (pistor 2005, 108-9). in other words, these theorists tend to conceptualise the power relationship between states and the market as a zero-sum game, whereby an increase of importance, authority, or power by one component necessitates a reduction in power by the other. alternatively, critical perspectives to political economy contend that the two areas are inherently and systematically intertwined, and that the assumed separation within contemporary discourse emerged through a historically contested process (gill and law 1988, xviii). journal of european and russian studies vol. 1 no. 1 december 2005 © jeurus 2005 all rights reserved 7 toward this end, the distinction between problem-solving and critical theories provided by robert cox is particularly helpful, and it is worth quoting him at length. for cox, a problem-solving theory, such as orthodox approaches to both political economy and european integration, takes the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social and power relations and the institutions into which they are organized, as the given framework for action. the general aim of problem solving is to make these relationships and institutions work smoothly by dealing effect with particular sources of trouble (cox 1996, 88). while problem-solving theories, due to their parsimonious nature, are extremely useful in the examination of particular problems, their ahistorical nature leads them to be very conservative and primarily focused on the maintenance and support of a given regime. in contrast, critical theory stands apart from the prevailing order of the world and asks how that order came about. critical theory … does not take institutions and social power relations for granted but calls them into question by concerning itself with their origins and how and whether they might be in the process of changing. it is directed toward an appraisal of the very framework for action, or problematic, which problemsolving theory accepts as its parameters (cox 1996, 88-9). while the use of critical political economy to analyse european integration has not been performed in an uniform manner, reflecting the preference for theoretical pluralism found within these perspectives (see morton 2001), the variant adopted in this study follows the york school of global political economy, and builds off of the critical realist framework developed by robert cox in the early 1980s. drawing upon the work of the italian marxist antonio gramsci, cox sought to explain both the operation of hegemony at the international level and the manner in which world order is transformed (bieler and morton 2001, 5). focusing their analysis upon societal institutions, forces, and ideas, theorists ascribing to this approach suggest that these elements generate journal of european and russian studies vol. 1 no. 1 december 2005 © jeurus 2005 all rights reserved 8 hegemony, which serves to structure the global political and economic environment into an order that is coherent with the aims of the dominant actors (caporaso 1993, 473). identifying the contemporary epoch as a neo-liberal order, these theorists look to the influence of such forces as multinational corporations and private financial institutions in promoting the ideology of neo-liberalism and in creating the material conditions of an extensive reward and punishment system that sustains its hegemony through ensuring compliance (helleiner 1994, 16). the principle theorist applying this school of thought to the examination of european integration is stephen gill, who argues that the resurgence of the integration in the 1980s must be viewed within “the context of global patterns of power and production, as aspects of the political economy of globalisation” (gill, 2001, 49). in this manner, european integration is understood as a manifestation of the global trend toward the institutionalisation of the ideology of disciplinary neo-liberalism through the “quasi-legal restructuring of state and international political forms” that gill labels new constitutionalism (gill 2003, 131). as part of a global trend, this movement towards institutionalisation is being performed within europe as different social forces seek to promote their particular image and reinforce their relative power. in identifying the emerging hegemonic order as disciplinary neo-liberalism, this approach seeks to demonstrate how the process involves the merger of the socio-economic ideology of neoliberalism with both the structural power of capital and the behavioural power of an enforced discipline that gill identifies as panopticism. for gill, panopticism refers to a form of social engineering whereby behaviour is modified into obedience and acquiescence of a dominant social order through the application of observation and journal of european and russian studies vol. 1 no. 1 december 2005 © jeurus 2005 all rights reserved 9 normalisation of discipline (gill 2003, 130-5). one of the key examples of this process is the institutional framework of the emu, which seeks to discipline governments into adopting new patterns of economic governance based upon strict fiscal discipline and focusing monetary policy on preventing inflation (gill 2001, 49-51). moreover, with its emphasises on establishing labour-market strategies through the establishment of benchmarking and the recognition of best practices, as well as the increased role of surveillance, transparency, and reporting through the requirement of national action plans, the european employment strategy acts to further reinforce the hegemonic order of disciplinary neo-liberalism. the european employment strategy as a form of nascent federalism within the realm of social policy, insights drawn from federalist approaches such as co-operative federalism, and its focus on how central and sub-central governments interact in a federal arrangement, can greatly aid in understanding how interaction occurs both between and within the member-states and the eu. if one begins with the premise that the current institutional arrangement of the european union reflects a form of nascent federalism,1 the conceptual definition of co-operative federalism is quite 1 a distinction must be made between federalism and a federation. it is not suggested that the eu is destined to be a supranational entity that will eventually compel the member-states to slowly wither away. however, the process of integration does act to continually redefine the relationship between the memberstates and the eu, and the (re) designation of competencies that has accompanied deeper integration has acted to develop an institutional relationship that is both new and familiar at the same time. within some policy areas, such as common security and foreign policy, the eu remains clearly intergovernmental. however, on other issues, such as employment policy, the act of sharing competency between memberjournal of european and russian studies vol. 1 no. 1 december 2005 © jeurus 2005 all rights reserved 10 applicable to european (union) governance, a point that may be elucidated by expanding upon the three key assumptions of this approach. first, while the various levels of government are understood to exist within a strict segregation of responsibilities and jurisdictions, this perspective emphasises the ability of the different levels to act in a manner that harmonises policies and encourages collaborative action (smith 1999, 71). currently, the institutional arrangement governing employment policies in the eu conforms to this approach; while employment policy is still placed within the realm of national competence, the inclusion of the employment chapter in the treaty framework declares it a matter of joint concern for the eu and compels the member-states to coordinate and harmonise their behaviour (scharpf 1999, 158-9). second, the concept of co-operative federalism implies that the entity under study is ultimately a mixed regime, where “different policy styles and decision-making philosophies” are held by different actors within the system, yet they are able to interact in a collaborative manner to develop mutually beneficial outcomes (o’neill 1996, 108). third, this approach accepts that the decisions made by any actor within the system cannot be decided in isolation, but are informed and redefined by the interests and actions of the opposing actors (o’neill 1996, 109-111). echoing the notion of the penetrated state proposed by charles pentland (1973), co-operative federalism also includes an understanding of how the interests of all of the actors within the european union are redefined through their social interactions with each other. as such, this framework assists in elucidating how competing social forces act to redefine structural power through the process of integration, and how that states and the eu has transformed the relationship in this area into one that mimics those found between central and regional governments in a federal system. journal of european and russian studies vol. 1 no. 1 december 2005 © jeurus 2005 all rights reserved 11 redefinition serves to further reorient the social forces themselves. in addition, through conceiving of the eu as a form of nascent federalism, we are able to observe how these social forces are interacting on a transnational level. when examined through the lens of critical political economy, the conceptual framework of co-operative federalism allows for a more nuanced understanding of the unequal levels of power found within a federal arrangement. as the central government maintains the ability to develop policy initiatives, as well as the authority over the distribution of financial resources, it is able to define the realm through which interaction proceeds by exerting a hegemonic influence over the federal relationship. moreover, rather than simply examining relations between two levels of government, this approach seeks to locate this interaction within the wider context of the predominant state/ society complex and the existing historical structure. adopting the tri-partite conception of hegemony suggested by robert cox, this manner of analysing federal relations involves the identification and examination of three categories of forces which interact to define the structure of the federal relationship: institutions, ideas, and material capabilities. certain developments have emerged to institutionalise the federal nature of employment policy within the eu. first, when the employment chapter was included in the treaty framework as title viii, and the objectives of the eu were redefined to include “a high level of employment and of social protection” (tec art. 2), employment policies became defined as a joint concern for the eu and the member-states. also, by establishing the employment committee, charged with promoting “co-ordination between member states on employment and labour market policies” (tec, art. 130), the eu institutionalised the process of co-ordination. finally, through the use of directives, journal of european and russian studies vol. 1 no. 1 december 2005 © jeurus 2005 all rights reserved 12 the eu further reinforced the pseudo-federal relationship that defines the harmonisation of employment policies. setting the goals and objectives at the eu-level, yet leaving the implementation of those policies up to the individual member-states, further strengthens the vertical division of power. the second force that acts to sustain the federal order is the promotion of a specific belief system that reinforces the principles upon which the order is based, and serves to convince individuals within the system that it is both natural and morally correct. within the eu, negotiations over employment policy are primarily defined by principles informed by the ideology of neo-liberalism. contending that the deregulation of the labour market is the most efficient way in which to lower the level of unemployment, the discourse of competitiveness prescribes the limitation of government in the creation of effective employment strategies (mcgiffen 2001, 92). stressing that the modern economic environment requires labour market flexibility, neo-liberalism argues that state regulation reduces the ability of companies to react to changing labour needs by enacting overly rigid rules and policies (esping-andersen 2000, 122). drawing a comparison between the unemployment rates in the us and in the eu, this explanation argues that high levels of taxation and unemployment benefits actually perpetuate an environment of long-term structural unemployment (hetemäki 2000, 91-2). by both lowering corporate taxes and labour standards, the solution provided by this perspective seeks to lower the employment rate by attracting private investment (hetemäki 2000, 104-6). in other words, the neo-liberal approach to job creation is based upon the principle of liberalising the labour market. with this discourse acting to define the realm of potential solutions for dominant policy-makers involved in the development of journal of european and russian studies vol. 1 no. 1 december 2005 © jeurus 2005 all rights reserved 13 employment strategies for the eu, the harmonisation of eu employment strategy has acted to further reinforce the neo-liberal perspective. thirdly, a federal order is also supported by a set of material capabilities that act as an enforcement mechanism and punish those members of the system who do not comply with its organising principles. within a traditional federal arrangement, central governments typically have authority over budget allocation and act to punish defiant or disobedient actors by withdrawing financial support. however, while the eu does not have the same authority over the distribution of financial resources that a central government would have within a traditional federal system, it does possess a series of material capabilities that allows for the enforcement of a particular type of employment regime. within the realm of employment policy, there are two primary enforcement mechanisms. first, the restrictions enshrined within the growth and stability pact serve to limit the range of polices that member-states may utilise to affect their labour market by effectively removing fiscal options. while the november 2003 agreement reached by the eurozone finance ministers to suspend the application of the enforcement mechanisms suggests that provisions in the growth and stability pact are not absolute, by reaching a compromise that superseded the treaty framework, the member-states have merely suggested that a more flexible interpretation and application is required. the second mechanism rests within the manner in which the european employment strategy has evolved. each year the eu issues a set of employment guidelines grouped around the four thematic pillars – employability, entrepreneurship, adaptability and equal opportunity – which reflect the priorities faced by the eu as a whole. in response to these priorities, each member-state must develop annual national employment action journal of european and russian studies vol. 1 no. 1 december 2005 © jeurus 2005 all rights reserved 14 plans, which demonstrate the progress it has made in implementing the objectives. in 1999, the commission took an increased role in the implementation of the ees by gaining the authority to assess and recommend alternative policy directions for memberstates to best facilitate the execution of the ees. moreover, performance is judged on the basis of 100 indicators that are set by the commission and only endorsed by the memberstates through the employment committee. in this manner, the eu both sets the objectives for ees and defines what types of performance may be classified as successful.2 as a result, even though the member-states are responsible for the implementation of the ees within their own domestic setting, the end result is to shift the labour market strategies towards a closer convergence with each other. while this increased convergence is not leading to policy homogenisation between the memberstates, by forcing all of the various labour market strategies to lead to the same ends, the eu has acted to further reinforce the hegemonic position of neo-liberalism within the process of european integration. conclusion by constructing critical federalism as a merger of the analytical approach of cooperative federalism and the theoretical framework of neo-gramscian thought, this perspective is specifically targeted toward explaining and understanding eu-level public 2 after the five-year review of the ees in 2003, the commission substantially revised the mechanisms surrounding the strategy, including the employment guidelines and the indicators. among other implications, these changes have further expanded the role of commission in monitoring and evaluating employment policies within member-states. journal of european and russian studies vol. 1 no. 1 december 2005 © jeurus 2005 all rights reserved 15 policy. in essence, this approach is an exercise in meszo-theorising and seeks to use contextual analysis to examine and account for specific developments (rosamond 2000, 173-4). rather than attempting to explain european integration in its entirety, the value of critical federalism lies in its focus on individual policy areas. by drawing on the insights of neo-gramscian thought and critical political economy, a more complex and nuanced understanding of both the social construction of the integration project and the unequal distribution of power between the various actors involved can be achieved. finally, by including the concept of co-operative federalism, this new approach is firmly centred on the examination of how public policy is developed within a federal system. premised on the belief that this negotiation is inherently contested – yet allows for an end result of collaborative action – this perspective considerable insight into the evolving process of european integration. journal of european and russian studies vol. 1 no. 1 december 2005 © jeurus 2005 all rights reserved 16 bibliography bieler, andreas and adam david morton. 2001. “introduction: neo-gramscian perspectives in international political economy and the relevance to european integration.” in social forces in the making of the new europe: the restructuring of european social relations in the global political economy, eds, andreas bieler and adam david morton. new york: palgrave. cameron, david. 2001. “unemployment, job creation, and economic and monetary union.” in unemployment in the new europe, ed., nancy bermeo. new york: cambridge university press. caporaso, james a. 1993. “global political economy.” in political science: the state of the discipline ii, ed., ada finifter. washington: american political science association. cox, robert w. 1996. “social forces, states, and world orders: beyond international relations theory (1981).” in approaches to world order, comps, robert w. cox with timothy j. sinclair. new york: cambridge university press. esping-andersen, gøsta. 2000. social foundations of postindustrial economies. oxford: oxford university press. european commission, directorate-general for education and culture. 2000. european employment and social policy: a policy for people. luxembourg: office for offical publications of the european communities. gill, stephen and david law. 1988. the global political economy: perspectives, problems and policies. baltimore: the john hopkins university press gill, stephen. 2001. “constitutionalising capital: emu and disciplinary neoliberalism.” in social forces in the making of the new europe: the restructuring of european social relations in the global political economy, eds, andreas bieler and adam david morton. new york: palgrave. gill, stephen. 2003 power and resistance in the new world order. new york: palgrave helleiner, eric 1994. states and the reemergence of global finance: from bretton woods to the 1990s. ithaca: cornell university press. hetemäki, martii. 2000. “tax policy, unemployment benefits and structural unemployment.” in policies towards full employment, published proceedings of the organization for economic co-operation and development helsinki conference in january 2000. mccormick, john. 1996. the european union: politics and policies. colorado: westview press. journal of european and russian studies vol. 1 no. 1 december 2005 © jeurus 2005 all rights reserved 17 mcgiffen, steven p. 2001. the european union: a critical guide. london: pluto press. morton, adam david. 2001. “the sociology of theorising and neo-gramscian perspectives: the problems of ‘school’ formation in ipe.” in social forces in the making of the new europe: the restructuring of european social relations in the global political economy, eds, andreas bieler and adam david morton. new york: palgrave. o’neill, micheal. 1996. the politics of european integration: a reader. new york: routledge. padoan, pier carlo. 2000. “eu employment and social policy after amsterdam: too little or too much?” in the european union after the treaty of amsterdam, eds. jorg monar and wolfgang wessels. new york: continuum. pentland, charles. 1973. international theory and european integration. new york: the free press. pistor, marcus. 2005 “agency, structure and european integration: critical political economy and the new regionalism in europe.” in the political economy of european integration: theory and analysis, eds, eric jones and amy verdun. new york: routledge. scharpf, fritz. 1999. governing in europe: effective and democratic? toronto: oxford univeristy press. smith, patrick j. 1999. law, politics, and the administration of justice: canadian cases, comparative perspectives. vancouver: pacific policy press. ………………………………………………………………… harmonisation through neglect the federal nature of european employment policy daniel v. preece abstract this paper proposes using the methodological perspective of critical federalism, constructed by merging the theoretical framework of critical political economy with the analytical approach of co-operative federalism, to understand the harmonisation an... the ad hoc regional harmonisation of employment policy theoretical approach of critical federalism the european employment strategy as a form of nascent federalism conclusion clara portela_volume3_issue2 review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 2/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 38 ………………………………………………………………… aid suspensions as coercive tools? the european union’s experience in the africancaribbean-pacific (acp) context clara portela 1 abstract since the signing of the cotonou agreement in 2000, the european union (eu) has suspended development aid towards a number of african caribbean and pacific (acp) countries in response to breaches of human rights and democratic principles by activating the so-called human rights clause (article 96). the present article analyses the use by the eu of aid suspensions as political tools and their efficacy in achieving the desired policy goals, in an attempt to identify and explain the determinants leading to the success of these measures. the investigation finds that the use of development aid suspensions is frequently effective. classical sanctions theory appears to account largely for their success, given that most targets display a significant degree of dependence on the eu as a donor or a trading partner. however, and without refuting the explanatory power of that approach, a closer look at this practice unveils a number of factors that contribute to facilitate success. one of them is the selective use of the tool: suspensions are applied predominantly in cases of interruptions of the democratic process, while they are rarely used in situations of violent conflict. the specificities of the consultations mechanism, and especially the attitude of acp neighbouring countriesoften openly supportive-, largely determine the final outcome. keywords: sanctions, eu development aid, acp aid suspensions, acp-eu relations 1 clara portela is a phd researcher at the european university institute. the author wishes to thank dr anna schmidt, jean-monet fellow at the robert schuman centre for advanced studies (florence), for her useful comments. review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 2/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 39 1. introduction over the past decade, the european union (eu) has suspended development cooperation with a number of african-caribbean–pacific (acp) countries. these suspensions have taken place within a specific legal-institutional regime: the partnership agreement between the eu and acp countries, the cotonou convention of 2000, which succeeded a series of lomé conventions embodying a privileged relationship between the eu and the former colonies of some of its member states. article 96 of the cotonou convention provides for a consultation procedure which can be invoked in cases of serious breaches of human rights and democratic principles, and which empowers the council of the eu to suspend development aid. the use of this tool has provoked some controversy: the eu has sometimes been accused of inconsistency in invoking article 96, and in particular in suspending aid. however, little is known about the efficacy of these measures: are development aid cut-offs effective in compelling acp leaders to comply with eu demands? eu officials have pointed to the limited knowledge the eu has about the use of sanctions (niño-pérez 2004). the commissioner for external relations and neighbourhood policy recognises that the use of sanctions “needs to be optimised” (ferrero-waldner 2006). this paper sets itself the objective of assessing the efficacy of development aid cut-offs in the framework of the cotonou agreement as a coercive instrument of eu foreign policy. it does so by reviewing the cases in which it has been wielded since the entry into force of the convention. the standard of success used here is that set by the eu itself: an episode is deemed “successful” here when the eu considered progress sufficiently satisfactory to resume aid. departing from general sanctions theory, the paper attempts to isolate and evaluate the factors accounting for their success and failure before drawing some conclusions for eu policy in this domain. 2. sanctions and their evaluation: the need for a fresh approach since the end of the cold war, the instrument of sanctions has been subject to a profound transformation. the classical general trade embargo has been replaced by so-called targeted or “smart” sanctions. they are designed to affect directly the leadership responsible for the objectionable behaviour, avoiding the adverse humanitarian consequences of comprehensive economic sanctions which provoked their unpopularity. the concept of targeted sanctions encompasses a diverse range of measures: travel bans, financial sanctions such as the freezing of assets or investment bans, arms embargoes, flight bans and embargoes on specific commodities (hufbauer and oegg 2000). the eu was at the forefront of the promotion of targeted sanctions at un level. it has officially embraced this notion (council 2004), and it has consistently applied only smart sanctions in its autonomous sanctions practice in the context of its common foreign and security policy (cfsp) since the early nineties. however, in parallel to its cfsp sanctions, the eu continues to impose some measures whose characteristics approximate those of economic sanctions. the suspensions of development aid as part of the “appropriate measures” foreseen in article 96 of the cotonou convention are measures of economic nature taken on political grounds and with a coercive intention. yet, the eu does not label these measures “sanctions”, and keeps this practice legally separate from cfsp measures. review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 2/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 40 the eu designs its suspensions in such a way as to spare the population of the country concerned from suffering deprivation: they only affect budget support provided directly to governments. nevertheless, the suspension of aid under article 96 remains an influence attempt in which a benefit (development aid) is withdrawn that would otherwise be available, and whose provision is made dependent on the fulfilment of a series of conditions defined by the sender (the eu) and the target on the basis of a mutual agreement. the objective of the present paper is to ascertain their coercive power, i.e. whether they managed to compel the desired behavioural change in the targeted leadership, and what conditions facilitate efficacy. efficacy is defined here as the capacity of the measures to produce the intended results. the standard of success is adopted from the eu itself: it is the imposing organisation that measures compliance internally and decides what degree of compliance suffices to resume aid. at first sight, an exploration of the efficacy of development aid cut-offs might appear to bear little connection to the current sanctions debate. however, the findings can reveal precisely how effective economic instruments remain in the era of targeted sanctions. determining the efficacy of aid cut-offs will enable us to ascertain how economic pressure fares in the overall sanctions toolbox. are targeted sanctions delivering better results in terms of target compliance than the traditional economic tool? the present paper looks into cases of eu suspension of aid to acp countries from 2000 to the present. the signing of the cotonou agreement in 2000 marks the starting year of the series of cases examined. political conditionality and development aid cutoffs predated the signing of the cotonou agreement. the suspension clause was first introduced with article 336a into the lomé iv convention as a provision to enhance the protection of human rights and democracy. previous to that date, development aid to acp countries had been suspended on several occasions; however, the unavailability of legal bases at the time makes the process leading to the decisions on these instances hard to trace (hazelzet 2005: 4). 3. development aid suspension: what kind of (eu) sanction? which place do development cut-offs occupy in the eu sanctions tool-box? from an eu institutional point of view, the suspension of development co-operation is not properly a “sanction”. in eu terminology, the term sanction is reserved for those measures decided under the common foreign and security policy (cfsp), which typically encompass arms embargoes, visa bans and the freezing of financial assets. in the present paper, i draw on the following definition of the notion: “sanctions” can be defined as the interruption of normal relations or the withdrawal of a benefit by a state (or group of states) in response to an objectionable action by another state or entity. the “sender” is the entity imposing the sanction and the “target” is the entity at the receiving end. the aim of the sanction is to compel the target to put an end to the undesirable behaviour. they are meant to withhold a benefit from the target until it complies with a demand by the sender that it would not otherwise have agreed to. therefore, the suspension of development aid fits into the academic definition of sanctions, even though in eu parlance it is not referred to as such. review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 2/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 41 the procedure leading to the suspension of development aid is highly institutionalised. the respect for human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law constitute essential elements of the acp partnership agreement. it foresees a consultation procedure under its article 96 in order to address violations of these principles by any of its parties. once a serious breach has been observed, the council of the eu invites the acp country concerned to participate in consultations under article 96. the decision is taken by the council on a commission’s proposal. consultations have to start no later than 15 days after the invitation is issued, and shall last for no longer than 60 days (120 days after the 2005 review of the agreement). the objective of the consultations is to agree on measures to rectify the situation in the country in question. the eu and the acp country shall adopt a list of commitments with a timetable to be fulfilled by the responsible government. when consultations are closed, the eu evaluates the progress made by the government in fulfilling the commitments entered into and might then decide on “appropriate measures”. these might entail, among others, the suspension of development cooperation. appropriate measures can also consist of positive measures, such as the release of new funds. suspension can be total, for which unanimity in the council is required, or partial, for which a qualified majority suffices. subsequently, the eu conducts regular monitoring, including the dispatch of missions to the country to assess progress in implementation. not even in cases where the suspension is total is the entire flow of aid interrupted. the suspension only affects one strand of development aid, namely the budget support administered directly by the state, mostly affecting infrastructure projects. moreover, the suspension is only meant for projects that are not yet in place, leaving ongoing programmes unaffected. the suspension often takes the form of the non-notification of the upcoming european development fund (edf) programme. humanitarian aid is expressly exempted, and development aid directly in support of the population and channelled through ngos is often left in place. this might include health and education programmes, food security, programmes in support of civil society, human rights and democracy, and rural development projects. regional projects involving several countries are not interrupted as a result of the suspension of development aid against one of the participants. finally, bilateral co-operation programmes remain unaffected by eu development aid suspensions, which only concern community funds. member states are free to continue bilateral aid despite eu suspension, and some of them often do. a tactic often used by the eu in order to signalise discontent with the policies of one of the beneficiaries of its development aid is the redirection of aid towards aims different to that it had been originally allocated to. the eu has taken this approach also in the context of article 96 suspensions – this has been the case e.g. with zimbabwe, where funds foreseen for budget support have been redirected towards humanitarian aid and projects in direct support of the population. 4. article 96 aid suspensions: actual usage an overview of the cases of article 96 consultations reveals that it is mostly imposed in cases of coups d’état (bradley 2005). most cases of suspension were officially justified as reactions to both human rights violations and to the interruption of democratic processes. however, there is a clear predominance of the democracy element: article 96 was invoked whenever the democratic process was interrupted – review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 2/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 42 such as in cases of flawed elections – even if no human rights breaches took place. by contrast, no cases can be found where human rights violations constituted the only motive for holding consultations. the predominance of interruptions of the democratic process might be ascribed to an implicit assumption that human rights are better protected under democratic regimes. also, the proposal to hold consultations is likely to prosper following a clear-cut violation such as a coup d’état or an illegal constitutional reform, while in the case of human rights, the nature and extent of the breaches are often more difficult to document. this type of violations might allow some members of the council to withhold their consent to the call for consultations, and the government at fault might contest the occurrence of the breaches be more easily. the fact that the suspension of development co-operation to acp countries takes place in the specific institutional framework of the “appropriate measures” that follow consultations invoked under article 96 bears important consequences. firstly, consultations provide a framework in which the country in question has an opportunity to present its plan to remedy the breach by entering into specific commitments and drafting a timetable jointly with the eu. the suspension of development cooperation is a measure of last resort: only in cases where the consultations fail to produce satisfactory results does the eu consider it. finally, the fact that the government in question maintains effective control over most of the territory of the country seems to be a pre-condition for the opening of consultations. hazelzet notes that the eu refrains from invoking article 96 in situations of violent conflict, such as “during a civil war, or when a country was on the verge of a peace agreement” (hazelzet 2005:12). in addition to the volatile character of conflict situations, the involvement of the un or other organisations in many of the countries in conflict makes article 96 consultations redundant (garcíapérez 2007:4). in most cases, the eu has become involved in these countries by participating in broader political processes, such as in the democratic republic of congo. in these situations, the eu has typically wielded cfsp tools like arms embargoes and the interruption of military co-operation, such as sudan in 1996 and ethiopia/eritrea in 1999. in sum, the eu invokes article 96 whenever it considers that it stands a reasonable chance of influencing the leadership responsible for the breaches. 5. sanctions operation: what does theory say? the operation of sanctions was originally formulated by galtung in what he labelled the “naïve” theory of sanctions. according to the naïve theory, the economic disruption caused by sanctions is expected to translate into political pressure that will eventually compel the leadership to change its policies, or lead to its overthrow (galtung 1967). sanctions are therefore expected to work in a similar way to military coercion. their aim is the “political disintegration of the enemy so that he gives up the pursuit of his goals. the method used is value-deprivation” (galtung 1967:386). the theory foresees a roughly proportionate relation between value-deprivation and political disintegration: “the idea is that there is a limit to how much value deprivation the system can stand, and that once this limit is reached (resulting in a split in leadership or between leadership and people), then political disintegration will proceed very rapidly and lead to surrender or willingness to negotiate” (galtung review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 2/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 43 1967:388). it presupposes that a “societal transmission belt” produces political pressure eventually leading to the ousting of the leaders, thereby turning economic damage into political pressure. subsequent scholarship has devised a broader formulation capable of accommodating the operation of non-economic sanctions, which are absent in the naïve theory’s account. pressure exerted by sanctions compels decision makers “to change their calculation of costs and benefits” (lindsay 1985:155; cortright and lopez 2000:22). the aim is to exert a sufficiently strong pressure on the offending state so that continuing to suffer the measures applied against it represents a higher cost than putting an end to its wrongful behaviour. in sum, two different ways of operation of sanctions can be discerned in sanctions theory: one foresees that the targeted leadership will comply with the demands of the sender as a result of a calculation in which the disutility caused to it outweighs the benefits of persisting in the objectionable policies. this disutility can either take the form of personal damage inflicted on policy-makers (as a consequence of blacklisting for a visa ban or the freezing of financial assets), or that of political pressure transmitted through the “societal conveyor belt” as a result of other measures. sanctions such as trade embargos can be geared at any of these two possible outcomes: the leadership is expected to be compelled to yield by the prospect of destabilisation, or else be overthrown. in many cases, it cannot be discerned whether the sender has only one of these outcomes in mind when levying the sanctions. due to the decline in use of multilateral comprehensive trade embargos, the scenario of “success by overthrow” has become less frequent. targeted measures generally cause less abrupt disruption to the target society, so that they are more likely to achieve “success by compliance”. the case of development aid suspension under article 96 of the cotonou agreement fits better with the mechanism of success by compliance than with the overthrowscenario. eu aid sanctions operate differently from the classical trade embargo. the eu does not intend to extort the population – on the contrary, it makes a dedicated effort to spare it from deprivation. humanitarian aid is maintained, and often even increased, notably through the redirection of the funds withheld to projects in support of the population. the disutility that the eu expects to inflict on the target arises from a series of interlinked considerations: the absence of new infrastructure projects creates a negative business environment in the country, thereby failing to attract foreign investment. moreover, given that donors co-ordinate their policies, the eu’s withdrawal is often accompanied by that of the international financial institutions and other eu member states. in the absence of donor support and private foreign investment, economic performance worsens. as a result, the government becomes increasingly unpopular domestic circles. while a population which is not suffering extreme deprivation is unlikely to conduct a revolt of the type foreseen by the naïve theory, the multiplying effects of aid suspension provides the concerned government with an incentive to avert it. 6. how are sanctions evaluated? a brief outline the landmark work evaluating sanctions efficacy, economic sanctions reconsidered (hufbauer et al. 1985; hse in the following) inspired subsequent scholarship, while it review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 2/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 44 also faced criticism on various accounts (hovi et al. 2005). in order to ascertain the determinants for the success of eu development aid suspensions, the present article has adapted hse’s variables. hse analyse two types of variables: economic and political. most of the economic variables are designed to ascertain the economic cost imposed on the target country and on the sender. in the case of acp countries, the importance of the eu to the target country in political and economic terms is closely interlinked. thus, hse’s distinction between the headings “political” and “economic variables” becomes blurred. the scope of the suspension of aid, or type of sanction (i) and the importance of the eu as a trading partner (ii) and as a donor (iii) will be taken into account, as they indicate not only the level of disutility created to the target, but also its vulnerability. hse’s political variables encompass a factor which is now obsolete: the presence of international assistance as an effort to undermine the sanctions regime – a phenomenon that belongs to the cold war confrontation. the motive triggering the suspension (iv) and the numbers of years the sanctions were in force (v) are also included. the neighbours’ attitude (vi), which has been highlighted as a factor of central importance in the literature, is also considered. the methodology outlined by hse contemplates two separate investigations: it first ascertains the “policy result” and then the “sanctions contribution” to the desired objective. the present investigation simplifies the analysis by creating a single table, in an attempt to identify which conditions are conducive to a successful conclusion of consultations. the selection of cases follows three criteria: the table features partial or total suspensions of aid resulting from consultations under article 96 of the cotonou agreement in which no mandatory sanctions were imposed simultaneously by the unsc. the case of liberia is therefore excluded. the following list features cases of consultations in which a suspension of aid was decided, leaving out all those instances in which progress was so smooth that the eu did not deem it necessary to use coercion in the first place. this is e.g. the case of consultations with guinea-bissau or the recent consultations with mauritania. review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 2/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 45 7. cases of article 96 aid suspensions measure years eu as partner eu as donor reason neighbour’s attitude resumption of aid central african republic partial suspension 2003-2005 (2) very high very high coup d’état none + ivory coast partial suspension 2000-2002 (2) very high high flawed elections none + fiji partial suspension 2001-2003 (2) high low coup d’état none + haiti (almost) total suspension 2001 (1) low high flawed elections oas/ consultative group + guineaconakry partial suspension 2003ongoing (4) high high coup d’état none +/(partial resumption) togo (almost) total suspension (1993-94); 1998 -2006 (13) illegal constitutional change acp supportive + zimbabwe partial suspension 2002 – ongoing (5) medium high flawed elections neighbours opposed 7.1 central african republic the central african republic has not been favoured by the donor community in spite of its heavy dependence on foreign aid. the eu has a prominent role among donors, especially since the imf cut budgetary support in 2001 (laakso et al. 2006). article 96 was invoked following a coup d’état by general bozizé in 2003, which overthrew president patassé. consultations, starting in june 2003, were not limited to the discussion of democracy and human rights, but addressed also economic governance and corruption, and even respect for the kimberly process concerning the export of diamonds. a monitoring mission in october 2003 concluded that, while dialogue on reconciliation had been successful, progress made regarding the freedom of the opposition, the timetable for elections and the reform of the military was unsatisfactory. therefore, the council decided a partial suspension of development co-operation encompassing some road projects, macro-economic support, and a progressive reduction of the 9th edf funds by 20% per year. cooperation was resumed following the flawless presidential and legislative elections in 2005. 7.2 ivory coast a comparison of the case of ivory coast with that of the central african republic shows that different former colonies often receive different treatment by the former metropolis. ivory coast has strong trade ties with france, partly maintained by a significant french business community. following the flawed elections in 2000, from which guei emerged as a successful candidate over his opponent gbagbo, the eu called for consultations pointing to unfulfilled commitments that had been agreed in previous rounds of consultations under article 366a of the lomé convention. however, guei was soon thrown away from office by a popular uprising and replaced by gbagbo. following the closure of consultations in july 2001, the eu decided to resume aid through a gradual and conditional approach, with an emphasis on funding review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 2/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 46 projects in support of the restoration of democracy, rule of law and good governance. co-operation was fully resumed in january 2002 in view of satisfactory progress by the ivorian government. however, the outbreak of violence compelled the eu not to sign the indicative programme agreed under the 9th edf, so that most of the substantial funds it had originally committed were never disbursed. only a few projects on rural development and good governance were financed. nevertheless, the commission expanded the scope of the humanitarian aid to encompass elections preparations and ddr programmes. consultations were again proposed by the commission in 2004 in view of the human rights breaches that followed the intensification of fighting in the north of the country that started in 2002. however, the council rejected the proposal arguing that the threat of civil war would render article 96 consultations ineffective. this decision was justified on the grounds that “the problem lay not in the nature of the reconciliation government per se but in the fact that this…not exist in any tangible sense as an interlocutor for the union” (youngs 2006:346). what followed was a period in which french bilateral activity gained pre-eminence, while eu assistance remained de facto suspended and other member states gradually winded down their bilateral programmes. 7.3 fiji fiji is one of the acp countries which is less dependent on european aid; indeed, it is barely eligible for aid. consultations under article 96 were initiated in october 2000, following a coup d’état in may of that year. during the consultations, power shifted from the original putschistes to the military, and eventually to a nominated president. the eu made the notification of 9th edf allocation and the financing of new programmes under the previous edf (6th to 8th) conditional upon the holding of elections and the appointment of a legitimate government. yet, regional projects, humanitarian aid and trade related preferences were left in place. once the conditions were fulfilled, the eu decided on a gradual resumption of cooperation in november 2001, consisting of projects in support of the rural population and on human rights and democracy. however, an irregularity observed in the allocation of seats in the parliament a number of elected mps of the labour party had been excluded left the eu unsatisfied. full co-operation was only resumed in november 2003 after the nomination of labour cabinet ministers. a new round of consultations was held in early 2007 following the military take-over that took place in fiji in december 2007. the leadership undertook a number of commitments, including the holding of elections no later than the march 2009. 7.4 haiti as the poorest country in the western hemisphere, haiti is heavily dependent on foreign aid. however, the importance of the eu as a trading partner is low due to the overwhelming commercial weight of the us. article 96 was invoked as a consequence of the electoral fraud observed in the may 2000 legislative elections. as a result of the consultations held in september 2000, the haitian government promised to arrange new elections for senators. review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 2/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 47 following the haitian failure to abide by its commitment, the eu decided the suspension of budget aid and food security and of the second instalment of the 8th edf, redirection of the remaining funds to projects in direct support of the population, civil society and private sector and the non-notification of the 9th edf. only humanitarian aid was left in place. in the following years, the eu modified its measures several times as a result of its participation in the consultative group of haiti, whose members encouraged the eu to lift the suspension. development aid was resumed in october 2005 as a result of the haitian commitment to hold elections, which eventually took place in february 2006. 7.5 guinea-conakry the democratic standards in the republic of guinea had been deteriorating for some time before the flawed presidential elections of december 2003 gave rise to consultations with the eu. these opened in july 2004 and concentrated on improvements to be made in the electoral process, such as freedom of the media and non-harassment of the opposition. in april 2005, the eu decided to redirect the unexpended balances of previous edf towards decentralisation, liberalisation of the media and economic governance, while 9th edf funds continued for programmes in direct support of the population. slight progress by the guinean authorities, for example with respect to the operation of independent radio senders has been reciprocated with a partial lifting of measures. however, as the current administration and the opposition have not yet agreed a programme for electoral reform, cooperation has not resumed fully. 7.6 togo the eu suspended part of its aid to togo already in 1993 as a consequence of an illegal change to the constitution made by president eyadema. cooperation was resumed after the constitution was restored in 1994, but it was interrupted again in 1998 due to flawed presidential elections. the eu supported financially the establishment of an independent national electoral commission for the 2003 election; however, eyadema dissolved it and the elections were again reported to be flawed. togo did not receive any eu funds of the 8th and 9th edf – it was only a recipient of humanitarian aid. following consultations in 2004, co-operation is now in place again. the case of togo is unusual in that the consultations that took place in 2004 were called at the request of its government. consultations started in march 2004 and were closed in november, with an agreement by the togolese authorities to implement a list of commitments, mainly related to the re-establishment of democratic rule. the resumption of full co-operation was made conditional on the holding of free elections. a number of problems surfaced at the implementation phase, so that the monitoring mission in june reported that despite the good will shown by the government, it was not possible to make a conclusive evaluation. however, the eu decided to release funds to support the preparation of elections, human rights programmes and justice reforms. following the signing of the global political agreement by government and the opposition and the announcement of elections in the following year, the eu fully resumed aid in 2006. 7.7 zimbabwe review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 2/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 48 the case of zimbabwe is exceptional in a number of respects: it is the only example in which a suspension of aid under article 96 has been complemented by cfsp sanctions. previous cases of development aid suspension combined with visa bans or arms embargoes (nigeria 1993 or sudan 1990) were handled outside the eu-acp framework, given the unavailability of the consultations procedure before 1995. zimbabwe has also been described as a deviant case in studies of governance, human rights and democracy in acp countries. it has been singled out as the only case in which, according to the relevant indicators, freedom of participation had improved in the year previous to consultations under article 96 (laakso et al. 2006). consultations were called following the refusal by the zimbabwean authorities to allow the entry into the country of eu electoral observers on the eve of the 2002 elections, and their harassment of the opposition. a central déclencheur of the crisis was president mugabe’s policy of illegal occupation of large farms and eviction of their white owners. the eu moved very quickly from the political dialogue under article 8 of the cotonou agreement to article 96 consultations, and these were apparently exceptionally short (interview: 2007). the suspension of co-operation that ensued left not only humanitarian aid in place, but also health and food security programmes. equally, programmes under the european initiative for democracy and human rights (eidhr) continued – over the past few years, more than seventeen projects have been conducted. immediately after the suspension, the eu imposed cfsp sanctions: an arms embargo along with a visa ban and a freezing of assets against one of the longest blacklists of the eu. this order was strictly respected: the eu only proceeded to impose cfsp sanctions once the consultations had been closed. at the time of writing, no progress has been made. zimbabwe’s neighbours continue to offer their political support to mugabe. on the contrary, the deep economic crisis has compelled the eu to increase the amount of humanitarian aid provided. the presence of cfsp sanctions does not seem to have made any noticeable impact on the situation (interviews 2007). if anything, the imposition of cfsp measures might have a negative effect on the behaviour of the leadership: zimbabwe is the only case of consultations under article 96 cotonou where no progress has been observed over a period of five years. 8. when do development aid suspensions ‘work’? five out of the seven cases display an unequivocally positive result. the large number of successes hardly comes as a surprise, given that consultations are called only in situations where the eu believes to stand a reasonable chance of influencing the leadership in breach. article 96 is not invoked in every case of violation of human rights and democratic principles. this selective approach partly accounts for the high level of success. nevertheless, the positive record stands in sharp contrast with the overall performance of cfsp sanctions, which features few successes. yet, the positive record of article 96 has to be qualified by a number of considerations. to start with, the eventually positive outcomes are often preceded by tortuous paths to resumption. the uncooperative haitian authorities, as opposed to the forthcoming central african republic, are a case in point. only in guinea-conakry, where results are still considered suboptimal despite some progresses, and zimbabwe aid has not review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 2/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 49 totally resumed. a number of failed consultations undertaken under lomé iv reveal that the co-operation of countries at breach cannot be taken for granted: ivory coast and togo had undergone consultations under lomé with poor results. thirdly, the degree of progress towards the eu demands to be achieved by the target in order to allow for a resumption of aid is decided by the eu itself, rather than by any independent evaluator. in certain cases such as guinea-conakry, it is doubtful that any external assessment would have considered that the meagre progress made by the leadership warranted the re-establishment of co-operation. thirdly, success has to be assessed against limited albeit not modest goals: the eu has largely achieved its goal of promoting a return to democratic rule. however, the fact that conditions were met to an extent that the eu considered sufficient to fully resume co-operation could not prevent a recurrence of violence and grave human rights breaches in ivory coast. indeed, none of the countries featured in the list have overcome the structural fragility of its institutions. countries like ivory coast, guinea-bissau and fiji present a pattern of recurrence of democratic crisis. consultations are highly useful instruments, but they do not go beyond solving the crises at hand. moreover, eu officials resent the fact that leaderships that proved very co-operative during the consultations were far more reluctant to implement reforms after these were terminated (interview 2007). lastly, the fact that the development aid suspensions under cfsp proved unsuccessful in compelling a behavioural change in the leaderships at fault – such as nigeria in 1993, sudan in 1994, or zimbabwe in 2002 – suggests that it is the intensive exchange between the parties that takes place during the procedure of consultations what provides for positive outcomes. in conclusion, the consultations constitute a highly useful tool for the reestablishment of democratic rule in emergency situations, but remain ill-suited to provide for lasting solutions to deep-rooted instability in weak states. the most often voiced criticism against the eu decisions to suspend development aid is its alleged lack of consistency. however, what becomes apparent in terms of the motives that compel the eu to invoke article 96 is the predominance of interruptions of the democratic process. human rights breaches are also omnipresent (although not explicitly displayed as such by the table). however, these are invariably linked to democratic flaws: a deterioration of the human rights situation alone has never triggered article 96 consultations. also, the human rights breaches that the eu reacts to through this mechanism are civil and political rights closely linked to the democratic process: freedom of speech, freedom of association and of peaceful demonstration. some of them are defined in terms of facilitating the holding of free and fair elections, such as the freedom of the press and the non-harassment of the opposition. interestingly, in the context of article 96 consultations acp leaderships are often encouraged to subscribe to commitments related to good governance such as anti-corruption measures, although they are formally protected by a different provision of the cotonou agreement, article 97. this article has only been invoked once, in the case of liberia, where consultations took place in parallel to article 96 consultations. in terms of efficacy, the most significant finding is that suspension works best as a coercive tool in cases where the eu is either an important trading partner or an important donor (or both), and crucially, whenever neighbouring countries are supportive of the eu. this is an intuitive finding, and it is possible to ascertain how review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 2/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 50 these factors are interrelated: neighbouring countries which do not are agree with eu suspension might be in a position to supply the country not only with political support, but also with essential supplies, which will reduce the importance of the eu as a donor and trading partner. from this point of view, the analysis tends to confirm the continued relevance of the determinant factors identified by traditional sanctions research: the eu has considerable economic weight as a donor or a trade partner in almost all the cases, and the co-operation of neighbours or like-minded countries proved highly relevant. in any case, the central determinant for the success of eu development aid cut-offs remains the attitude of the concerned leadership. in a number of cases, the coups d’état were conducted to unseat a leader whose own democratic record was poor with the unequivocal intention of restoring civilian democratic rule, therefore providing a favourable terrain for consultations. in these cases, the eu found itself in the role of “accompanying” some putschistes who were from the start ready to co-operate in a democratic transition. this is the case of the central african republic, and also of mauritania and guinea-bissau, whose forthcoming attitude prevented the eu from cutting-off aid. still, the fact that guinea-conakry presents the characteristics that would make it amenable to eu leverage has not prevented it from being still a relative failure. for its part, zimbabwe appears to be a veritable deviant case. it is wealthier than most of the other examples, at least measured by pre-crisis indicators. apart from the fact that the moves to consultations and subsequently to suspension seem to have taken place in a rush, the almost simultaneous imposition of cfsp sanctions signalise a more confrontational stance than in other cases. it should not be forgotten that the motive for suspension, the irregularities in the 2002 elections, generally garners less support from acp neighbours than military coups. support from its neighbours is central in zimbabwe’s resistance, both from an economic and symbolic point of view. the situation appears highly atypical also from a sender-target point of view. the unsound economic policies of the mugabe government have triggered a humanitarian crisis that compelled the eu to increase the amount of aid (interview 2007). finally, the low proportion of non-african cases in the sample might obscure the role played by the geographic location of the target. placed in the caribbean, haiti belongs to the sphere of influence of the us, which contrasts with the european pre-eminence in most of sub-saharan africa. while the result of the consultations was eventually positive, the haitian leadership proved less forthcoming than many of the other cases. the heavy involvement of the oas in the resolution of the haitian democratic crisis seems to have strongly influenced the behaviour of the eu – the decision to resume aid as been described a being motivated by the desire to appear as a “credible partner” in the consultative group on haiti (laakso 2006:37). in this case, the involvement of other interlocutors seems to have reduced the eu’s room of manoeuvre. 9. conclusions the use by the eu of development aid suspensions as a political tool to address breaches of democratic rule in acp countries is reasonably effective. the success of this instrument can be largely ascribed to the weight that the eu carries for the concerned countries as a donor and a trading partner, but also to the positive attitude of neighbours and fellow members of the acp group. the institutionalised and transparent nature of the consultation process is another factor contributing to article review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 2/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 51 96’s satisfactory performance. however, this success should be qualified by the selective use of this tool by the eu, which has generally refrained from calling consultations in cases of violent conflict, or in cases where it simply does not expect to dispose of sufficient leverage. review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 2/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 52 bibliography bradley, a. 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(2006) “the eu and conflict in west africa”, european foreign affairs review 11: 333352 speeches/ documents/ interviews review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 2/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 53 ferrero-waldner, b. (2006) “the eu in the world”, european policy centre breakfast briefing, brussels, 2 february 2006 interviews with eu officials, diplomats from eu member states and country experts (january/february 2007) council of the european union (2007) opening of consultations with the republic of fiji islands under article 96 of the cotonou agreement (brussels, 18 april 2007) conclusions of the european union, brussels, 19 april 2007, 8630/07 (presse 83) delegation of the european commission for the pacific (2007) “outcome statement on consultations between the eu and fiji held in brussels from 18-19 april, 2007, press release council of the european union (2004) “basic principles on the use of restrictive measures (sanctions)”, council doc. 10198/1/04 rev, brussels, 7 june 2004 council of the european union (2003) “guidelines on the implementation and evaluation of sanctions”, council doc. 15579/03, brussels, 3 december 2003 why reforms fail: the role of ideas, interests and institutions review of european and russian affairs 9 (1), 2015 issn 1718-4835 democratization in serbia: an analysis of rational choice and structuralist explanations dunja apostolov-dimitrijevic carleton university abstract this paper explains political democratization in post-milosevic serbia, utilizing two different accounts of the democratization process: one rooted in the rational choice framework and the other in structuralism. while rational choice explains the decisive role of political leadership in overcoming path dependence, the structuralist explanations show the transnational linkages that encourage democratization in the face of domestic setbacks. this particular debate between the two types of explanations represents the larger debate concerning the role of internal factors and external linkages in propelling democratization in transitional societies. the paper concludes by integrating the two sets of explanations offered by each theoretical perspective, in order to develop a coherent understanding of serbia's democratization. 2 review of european and russian affairs 9 (1), 2015 introduction since the ouster of slobodan milosevic from power in 2000, serbia has been on a path towards democratization. it has sought to introduce democratic principles through institutional reform, to protect human rights and secure the rule of law (european commission 2013). serbia has undertaken extensive liberalization and has begun to restructure its economy (ibid.), which has had direct political effects as new actors have emerged from these processes to contest political power. in addition, serbia has strengthened its ties with western democracies by joining or seeking membership in institutions such as the organization for security and cooperation in europe (osce), the european union (eu), the international monetary fund (imf), and the world trade organization (wto). membership in these organizations has been the key to pursuing political and economic reforms that have reinforced serbia's democratizing efforts. while the decisions to implement democratic reforms may seem straightforward given the extensive democracy promotion assistance during the milosevic era (presnall 2009; spoerri 2010) as well as subsequent democracy promotion initiatives (edmunds 2009, 129), it should not be taken for granted. key institutions have resisted democratic reform (edmunds 2008; bieber 2011) and segments of serbian society have expressed affinity for the values of authoritarian collectivism and redistributive statism (lazic and cvejic 2007). given the latter, this paper will outline two different accounts of the process of democratization in serbia one rooted in rational choice or voluntarism, the other in structuralism.1 the paper will argue that both approaches contribute to the understanding of democratization in serbia. explanations rooted in the rational choice framework give insight into the decisive role of political leadership in overcoming path dependence. structuralist explanations are well-attuned to the transnational linkages that encourage democratization in the face of domestic setbacks. as will be evident in the paper, these rational choice and structuralist explanations also speak to the larger debate concerning the role of internal factors and external linkages in propelling democratization in transitional societies (see: schimmelfennig and sedelmeier 2005; pridham 2005; vachudova 2005; levitsky and way 2010). in making the above argument, this paper will begin by outlining the major tenets of rational choice theory and will then provide an account of democratization in serbia through the latter lens. the paper will then briefly outline structuralist explanations, followed by an account of serbia's democratization through the structuralist lens. the paper will conclude with a discussion and analysis section, in which it will make the case for integrating the two sets of explanations, in order to develop a coherent understanding of serbia's democratization. 1 while it is difficult to separate the two accounts, to provide a perspective on the transition that is "entirely voluntarist" or "entirely structuralist," as both structures and purposive actors played some role in democratic transition and consolidation, the two theoretical orientations will be kept distinct for the purpose of this paper in order to highlight the contrasting points of emphasis in each perspective. 3 review of european and russian affairs 9 (1), 2015 rational choice theory and its explanations of democratization in serbia rational choice: tenets, assumptions, and implications barbara geddes (2003, 191) outlines the four defining features of rational choice as: (1) methodological individualism (applied to people and those organizations that can plausibly be expected to behave as unitary rational actors); (2) explicit identification of actors and their goals or preferences; (3) explicit identification of the institutions and other contextual features that determine options available to actors and the costs and benefits associated with different options; and, (4) deductive logic. in rational choice approaches, there is a focus on individualized actors/units, as opposed to social groups or institutional arrangements, which are the focus of the various strands of institutionalism 2. in contrast to holism, which holds that social structures cannot be reduced to independently-existing agents and their interactions, methodological individualism treats social scientific explanations as reducible to properties or interactions of independently-existing individuals (wendt 1999, 26). explaining social scientific phenomena from the perspective of methodological individualism implies that objects of study are a product of bottom-up voluntary processes. actors within this framework have agency and are intentional, purposive, and strategic. they are able to undertake a cost-benefit calculus on a potential course of action and take into consideration the choices and actions of others in pursuing their aims (levi 1997, 23). in addition, rational choice directs us towards an examination of actors in light of the goals that they wish to achieve. according to geddes (2003, 179), rational choice approaches assume that people choose the means most likely to result in desired ends, can order their goals, and hold consistent preferences. to say that actors are rational means that, given goals and alternative strategies from which to choose, actors will select those that maximize their chances of achieving their goals (levi 1997, 23). rational choice does not argue that actors will act on the basis of what is objectively and universally rational, or that they will act in such a way as to produce an efficient equilibrium. rather, it argues that individuals will act in a way that is consistent with their preferences. according to both levi (1997) and geddes (2003), rational choice recognizes constraints on behaviour (both societal and institutional). what it does not recognize is the ability of institutional and societal constraints to shape identities in such a way that actors are no longer seen as autonomous and analytically distinct from the structures that constrain them. within the literature that examines transitions to democracy, voluntarist approaches dominated explanations of the third wave of democratization (defined as the wave of transitions from autocracy in the capitalist world that began with portugal in 1974) (mcfaul, 2010). studies such as those conducted by o'donnell and schmitter (1986) de-emphasize structural characteristics in favour of an analysis of key actors, negotiations (or lack thereof) between them, and choices made at critical points in time. similarly, przeworski (1991) examines democratic development by looking at negotiations between those associated with the previous authoritarian regimes and allies in the struggle against democratization. more recently, voluntarist aspects have been considered in the study of diffusion effects (regarded as a structural determinant in transitions). here, weyland (2006; 2010) looks at the way in which domestic actors respond to the diffusion 2 for an overview of the various strands of institutionalism, see hall and taylor (1996). for an account of discursive institutionalism, see schmidt (2008). 4 review of european and russian affairs 9 (1), 2015 of ideas across borders, arguing that domestic actors can choose whether or not to respond and appropriate ideas that originate beyond their borders. a rational choice account of serbia's democratization while it must be emphasized that under geddes's account, understanding transitional democracies through rational choice accounts is problematic because “the rules and players have not become established and actors have had no time to learn about the new system” (geddes 2003, 185), this paper will nonetheless examine serbia's democratization through the lens of rational choice. i do this because i think that a rational choice perspective, through its focus on actors, preferences, strategic interaction, and the cost-benefit calculus, provides insight into the decisive role of leadership in initiating and encouraging democratization. as mentioned above, rational choice directs our attention towards actors and their goals. hence, under a rational choice account of democratization, i focus on the various illiberal elements in the political system, the pro-democracy faction, and its actions. in the immediate aftermath of milosevic's fall, the pro-democracy faction was brought to power, representing a shifting coalition of political parties that supported the eu's agenda in serbia (of democratization and liberalization). i treat the pro-democracy faction as a unitary entity for the purpose of detailing the rational choice explanation. however, i do not hold that the membership in the prodemocracy faction has been constant. this paper acknowledges that, from 2000 to 2003, kostunica and djindjic (who was assassinated on march 12, 2003) were the leaders of the prodemocracy faction; between 2003-2006, it was kostunica and tadic; and from 2006-2010, it was tadic alone, as kostunica became more closely associated with the anti-democracy faction (gordy 2001, 13). what this paper does hold is that the membership in the pro-democracy faction had a constant preference to pursue democratic reforms and further serbia's relationship with the eu, while the anti-democracy faction had anti-democratizing tendencies and preferred to cut off serbia's relations with the eu. following geddes’s point that rational choice approaches necessitate explicit identification of institutions, contextual features, and actors, it is important to note the institutional and social context within which the pro-democracy faction pursued its policies of democratization. 3 to understand why kostunica and djindjic were able to become the main leaders of the prodemocracy faction in the post-milosevic era, it is important to note the legitimacy they gained not only in leading the forces that toppled the milosevic regime, but also in their own opposition to authoritarianism (krnjevic-miskovic 2001, 97), which quickly allowed them to form and maintain the two largest pro-democracy parties in the country. the pro-democracy faction was opposed by a group of political parties (i.e. the anti-democracy faction referred to above) that were united primarily by a desire to avoid entry into the european union, and encompassing a variety of conservative, nationalist elements (pond 2009; krnjevic-miskovic 2001). other actors in the equation were the social and economic elite, which largely profited from the criminalization of the serbian state under milosevic (edmunds 2009, 130) and switched sides with the intent of preserving their own interests once the milosevic regime collapsed (gould and sickner 2008, 761). 3 for an overview of actor dynamics and context in the lead-up to the fall of the milosevic regime, see bunce and wolchik (2011). 5 review of european and russian affairs 9 (1), 2015 the voting public was divided into cleavages that could not be easily transferred into support for a liberal democratic system (for an overview of political cleavages in serbia in the 1990s, see jou 2010). on the one hand, society exhibited collectivist values and a preference for distributional social norms that were rooted in the previous socialist command economy and agrarian relations that persisted until world war ii (lazic and cvejic, 2007: 57). on the other hand, these attitudes were juxtaposed against emerging individualist values that were a product of the modernization of the socialist period and openness to the west (ibid.). it was argued that serbs saw elections as largely procedural, as a way to legitimize existing leadership, yet at the same time, popular mobilization was not uncommon as massive social protests were responsible for progressively weakening the milosevic regime (bunce and wolchik 2011). within this context, a rational choice approach would explain the implementation of democratic reforms in serbia as a result of the purposive action on the part of the pro-democracy faction. focusing on the micro-processes that were behind the implementation of the democratic reform package, it would stress the cost-benefit analysis of the pro-democracy faction. being able to align oneself with the pro-democracy social movements and civil society that toppled the milosevic regime (edmunds 2009, 138) meant harnessing the benefits of popular support at election time. reinstating serbia's membership in the united nations (un) and the osce, as well as joining the stability pact for southeast europe (and later, the stabilization and association process (sap), which offered serbia the prospect for eventual eu membership), the european bank for reconstruction and development (ebrd), the imf, and the council of europe, carried financial rewards and social prestige. these were especially important for a country that was treated as an international pariah and was in need of economic investment (bunce and wolchik 2011, 88). given that the anti-democracy faction was advocating a policy that would have contributed to serbia's isolation from the international community, one could say that the pro-democracy faction calculated that the benefits of democratization outweighed the costs. yet, it is not enough to postulate that actors behaved consistently with preferences; one must also show that actors were able to act strategically that is, with agency, and with attention to the choices and actions of others. several examples will illustrate the latter. first, major obstacles to democratization included the many state institutions, such as the state security and intelligence agencies, which contained illiberal elements (edmunds 2009; gordy 2004, 15). as noted by edmunds (2009, 128) even in the face of unprecedented internal and external pressures for democratic change, illiberal interests, actors, and networks found ways to survive, adapt, and even thrive. however, in the context of subsequent democratization efforts, the pro-democracy leadership was successful in negotiating a limited, secret pact with the serbian intelligence and security agencies in support of democratization (edmunds, 2008). the arrangement resulted in these institutions not directly interfering with political reforms, and passively supporting the leadership, so long as their own organizations and members were left alone (ibid.). thus, through negotiation with the various elements that opposed democratization, the pro-democracy leadership was able to create a precarious but viable equilibrium between themselves and their opponents. this equilibrium was based on purposive action in which a steady process of democracy promotion and state stability was prioritized to the outright elimination of antidemocratic elements. as part of a voluntarist account, one could argue that this equilibrium was an outcome of an assessment made by the pro-democracy faction to compromise with illiberal 6 review of european and russian affairs 9 (1), 2015 elements in the short run, in order to enable a more general implementation of the democratic package in the long run. this interpretation parallels the actor-centered explanations found in the seminal work of o'donnell and schmitter (1986) which notes the pacts made between the new pro-democracy regimes and the remnants of the authoritarian regime in order to ensure stability of the democratization process. another example of strategic interaction concerns serbia's relations with kosovo and the albanian ethnic minority in central serbia. the example is telling of the ability of the prodemocracy leadership to overcome political opponents and institutional resistance (e.g. state intelligence, the serbian orthodox church) towards progressively creating positive neighbourly relations with kosovo and improving minority rights in serbia. the modern source of ethnic tensions in kosovo between kosovo albanians and serbians is a result of political decisions and demographic trends that have their roots in the policies of the socialist federal republic of yugoslavia (djurdjev, 2000:133-138). in the post-milosevic period, the instability in kosovo had spillover effects within central serbia, as five districts with predominantly albanian populations have a similarly confrontational relationship with the serbian state. while many serbian policy-makers saw these domestic minority populations as a growing threat repeating the scenario that played out in kosovo, the pro-democracy leadership successfully took an alternative approach. between 2006 and 2010, the pro-democracy leadership integrated regional (ethnic) political parties into joining the pro-eu coalition, thus marginalizing key anti-eu parliamentarians to enable the implementation of minority rights laws within serbia and facilitate cooperation with kosovo’s separatist authorities (post-2007). the result of these actions was the beginning of a process of de-escalation of regional tensions, which supported the eu's requirement for good neighbourly relations among the former yugoslav republics. in fulfilling its political obligations towards the eu, the pro-democracy faction was able to reinforce the externally-supported democratization effort. taken together, the central aspects to these rational choice accounts are the centrality given to factions and the interaction between the pro-democracy actors and the various illiberal elements in serbia. what both of the previous examples emphasize is the pro-democracy faction acting autonomously from the anti-democratic structures, yet strategically, taking into account the presence of anti-democratic elements, such as the security apparatus and nationalist parliamentarians. harnessing public support, financial rewards, and social prestige were the benefits associated with the pro-democracy reforms. international isolation, especially at a time when serbia faced concurrent economic and social pressures, was a significant cost to not pursuing the democratizing initiatives and not engaging with the eu. structuralist accounts and their explanations of democratization in serbia structuralist accounts: tenets, assumptions, and implications just as rational choice assumptions have been adopted by a variety of frameworks, so structuralist assumptions are implicit within various theoretical frameworks. whether examining historical, sociological, or discursive institutionalism (hall and taylor 1996; march and olsen 1998; schmidt 2008), the common thread running through these structuralist perspectives are the 7 review of european and russian affairs 9 (1), 2015 patterns of social relations created through interaction. whereas, under a rational choice account, the starting point of analysis is the individuals or some analogue to the individual (geddes 2003, 177), structuralist accounts focus on the arrangements between the various components of the social system – the structure – and how these shape both the identities of actors and their behaviours. paralleling the individualist/holist distinction identified above, whereas rational choice assumes that social scientific phenomena can be explained through the interaction of individual actors acting voluntarily and autonomously, structuralist approaches argue for a top-down influence of structure on agents. actors may be differently positioned within the system of structural constraints, and this affects both the extent and nature of their agency. systemic constraints are regarded as rewarding behaviours that conform to existing patters of interaction, while discouraging those behaviours that disrupt, violate, and challenge existing patterns. moreover, voluntarist accounts' focus on purposive and strategic actors can be interpreted as a focus on the demand side of social relations – the various groups that promote, support, and implement prodemocracy reforms. structuralists, on the other hand, can be interpreted as emphasizing the supply side of the equation, such as a country's institutional arrangements or political economy, as they examine the extent to which respective environments are hospitable to democratization. while institutionalist approaches tend to be state-centric in focus4, international structures, such as structures of capital (see cox 1986; robinson 2004) or ideational structures (see wendt 1999), have also been argued for in the academic literature. like structures at the nation-state level, international structures make certain courses of action more difficult to implement than others. for example, waltz (1979) famously argued that the anarchical structure of the state system makes it difficult for states to overcome the imperatives of the security dilemma. however, unlike national structures, international structures focus on the patterns of interaction that take place beyond any one nation-state and work to shape the identities and behaviour of both states and individuals alike. structuralist explanations of democratization in transitional societies point to institutional structures and, especially with the fourth wave of democratization, the international system and its role in encouraging or discouraging democratization. hence, levitsky and way (2010, 23) argue that the capacity of competitive authoritarian incumbents to hold onto power hinges on two factors: (i) linkage to the west – density of economic, political, diplomatic, organizational, and social ties between particular countries and the united states or the eu; and (ii) incumbents' organizational power, or scope and cohesion of state and governing-party structures. mcfaul (2010), in his edited volume, democracy and authoritarianism in the postcommunist world, similarly focuses on international structures, but does so from the perspective of systemic structures (i.e. universus bi-polarity). he argues that the international system's causal role in encouraging democratization is the "missing variable" in much of the research on postcommunist transitions. in both accounts, the conduciveness of the international dimension (whether in terms of international institutions or systemic structures) to supporting democracy within nation states is a key independent variable. the international dimension in both accounts exercises a decisive 4 as an example of this, note the definition of historical institutionalism found in hall and taylor (1996, 938): “formal or informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in the organizational structure of the politu... [emphasis added].” 8 review of european and russian affairs 9 (1), 2015 influence on behaviour, so that the starting point of one's analysis can no longer be national actors acting on the basis of voluntary preferences. structuralist accounts of democratization in serbia a structuralist explanation of democratization in serbia would stress the way in which eu programs and conditionality on the one hand, and changes in political economy on the other, are conducive to democratization. an explanation that looks at the former would stress the linkages between the eu and serbia that are being formed through the eu's policy framework for the region – the aforementioned stabilization and association process (sap). the sap is a threefold instrument that offers potential candidates trade liberalization with the eu, financial assistance, and a possibility of eu membership, provided that countries party to the agreement meet the required conditions of membership (elbasani 2008, 269; 298-299). the conditions involve the adoption of democratic principles, protections of human rights and the rule of law, protection of minority rights and market reforms (as set out in the european commission’s “report on enlargement” [1993, 11-12]). a structuralist explanation would interpret these linkages as anchoring serbia to the norms, policies, and institutional arrangements of the eu, thereby limiting the scope of policy options available to domestic actors. to implement the sap, the eu integrates prospective members into various political, social, and economic networks that further consolidate the eu as a structural influence. various people-topeople contacts through visa-free travel for candidate countries, scholarships for students, and cooperation in areas of science and research, education, culture, youth, and media are offered. membership in expert networks, such as the regional centre for combating trans-border crime and the south eastern europe organized crime threat assessment, are facilitated under the sap. moreover, networking initiatives among civil society groups in the eu and candidate countries are encouraged.5 these opportunities together, and over time, forge connections that condition choices. they create constituencies whose interests and identities become aligned with those of the eu and their citizens. together, the patterns of relations established through membership in networks and the conditionality mechanism condition both the identities and choices available to domestic actors, allowing the eu to exert a structural influence over serbia. the progressive convergence in party platforms could be cited as an example of the way in which transnational linkages exercise a structural influence on domestic actors. in order to receive the manifold benefits of eu membership, serbia's governments need to make progress towards meeting eu membership criteria. the eu's good opinion is a key factor in the decisions of foreign investors; credit agencies adjust credit ratings in reaction to eu assessments and the release of eu progress reports (vachudova 2010, 101). as a result, whereas at the outset of the post-milosevic period, the main political parties in serbia diverged significantly over the question of democratization and eu membership (radeljic 2014), they have progressively converged over both. currently, the main political parties, including the governing party that had ties to the most ideologically and politically nationalist elements in serbia's political class (the radical party of vojislav seselj), are in favour of democratization and eu membership (balkans in europe 2014). structuralist explanations would state that the convergence in party platforms is 5 for an overview of the networks of eu connections being encouraged, see the european commission's "western balkans: enhancing the european perspective" (2008). 9 review of european and russian affairs 9 (1), 2015 not the result of political parties independently forging preferences towards democratization. rather, and as noted by vachudova (2005) in the case of east european states, it is a consequence of eu linkages that progressively condition the various parties towards adopting pro-democracy reforms. changes in political economy are equally important to note under structuralist explanations and are rarely acknowledged by voluntarist accounts. in serbia's case, liberalization and privatization of state assets altered the dynamics between international and domestic forces in the political system (for effects of privatization, see cerovic and mitrovic 2007). this, it could be argued, contributed to democratization through multiple effects. first, rapid and poorly implemented liberalization and privatization weakened the serbian state and further lowered its organizational capacity (bartlett 2009, 28) to resist external democratizing influences. or, to borrow the language of levitsky and way (2010) and vachudova (2010), liberalization and privatization increased the leverage that the west exercised over serbia to implement democratic reforms. second, the loss of state capacity could be attributed to subsequently blocking the possibility of a roll-back when factions opposed to democratizing influences were elected. third, through the privatization process, a new elite, which relies on the market instead of the state and can politically and economically compete against entrenched illiberal elements of the old elite, was created. beginning shortly after the fall of the milosevic regime, major market reforms were quickly implemented by the new leadership through a process of selling off national industries using a voucher model similar to the post-soviet model (milovanovic 2007). this resulted in the subpar valuation of firms sold to preferred insiders and foreign investors, thus creating a powerful new class of political and economic elites (ibid. 224-225) that benefit from those policies affiliated with eu integration. the latter changes are significant for structuralists because they altered the patterns of relations away from supporting nationalist elements, and towards those conducive to democratic reforms. along the lines of levitsky and way (2010), one could argue that changes to the political economy in serbia worked to weaken the statist elements of the serbian state, thereby supporting those liberalizing forces that facilitated linkages with the west. under a structuralist account, these changes, along with those introduced through closer relations with the eu, were central to creating path dependencies that encourage further and continual alignment with the institutions, norms, and policies of democratization, and discourage actions that jeopardize that alignment. these changes and partnerships work to constrain authoritarian elements and empower democratizing ones. the eu's influence is particularly strong due to the international system's unipolar structure that, along the lines of the argument presented by mcfaul (2010), suggested that there was no longer an international actor capable of skewing the domestic balance of power in favour of anti-democratic elements. integrating rational choice and structuralist explanations on the basis of the above accounts, i argue that both rational choice and structuralist explanations are necessary for a complete understanding of democratization in serbia. they explain democratization from different angles and emphasize different units and levels of analysis; hence, in order to understand democratization in serbia, the two approaches need to be 10 review of european and russian affairs 9 (1), 2015 brought into conversation with one another. rational choice approaches give insight into the decisive role political leadership played in overcoming path dependence. structuralist explanations are more attuned to the role of transnational linkages in facilitating democratization despite setbacks. in making this argument, this paper builds on the emerging literature that seeks to combine both structuralist and voluntarist accounts in explaining transitions to democracy. scholars such as schimmelfennig and sedelmeier (2005), vachudova (2005; 2010), and bunce and wolchik (2010; 2011) attempt to integrate the two theoretical orientations. although they vary in their success in doing so systematically, they nonetheless provide contours along which a case study such as this one can combine both structuralist perspectives and voluntarist approaches in accounting for the consolidation of democracy. as mentioned above, rational choice is necessary to explain the role of leadership in overcoming existing path dependencies and initiating the democratization process. for example, political liberalization at the outset of the reforms (after the fall of the milosevic regime) cannot be explained but with recourse to the actors that overcome existing power structures and societal norms that supported nationalist, statist, and collectivist orientations. it is true that outside actors played an important part in pressuring actors to adopt democratic measures, but this pressure was not structural at this early stage. instead, it worked to provide necessary resources (financial, technical) to the pro-democracy actors.6 at this stage of the reform process, structures were in flux; i hypothesize that this fluidity gave the pro-democracy faction/leadership decisive agency over the process. ascribing these changes to domestic institutions as opposed to actors would be problematic, given that the institutions themselves were largely undemocratic. thus, recourse to the role of actors is essential for understanding how reform was initiated in an illiberal context. moreover, the cost-benefit analysis that informs rational choice decision-making provides a rationale of why certain actors decided to pursue pro-democracy reforms. however, there are several ways in which the rational choice approach falls short of providing a complete understanding of democratization in serbia. first, while the cost-benefit calculus serves to paint a general picture of why political actors came to support democratization, this aggregate picture focuses on elite players to the neglect of wider determinants and trajectories of democratization. how and why did democratization continue after the initial way of popular uprisings, considering that significant segments of the population did not experience the direct benefits of democratization, especially at the time of initial implementation and restructuring? moreover, the pro-democracy faction has faced numerous setbacks over the years, the most significant of which was the assassination of prime minister djindjic. the benefits of reform were therefore accompanied by significant costs; yet, despite periodic setbacks, democratization efforts have been unfolding over the long run. some of the shortcomings within rational choice explanations can be addressed with reference to structuralist accounts that emphasize the role of transnational linkages in facilitating and sustaining democratization. under this account, once initial decisions were taken to join the 6 for a summary of the support provided by outside actors, see: vachudova, 2010; bunce and wolchik, 2011. 11 review of european and russian affairs 9 (1), 2015 stability pact and, consequently, the stabilization and association agreement, and new social patterns were established, it became difficult to completely reverse the democratizing trend. as noted by vachudova, once a candidate is on its way to joining the eu, “the cost of losing ground or reversing course becomes prohibitive for any government” (2010, 100). eu linkages laid the groundwork through, for example, creating vested interests and public expectations, the recourse to which was made in instances in which reforms were stalling. while periodic setbacks on the path to democratization have been encountered, and by the european union's own account, serbia is lacking on key reforms (see european commission 2013; european commission 2014), it is the pace of reforms that is in question, not their direction. the consistent reference to eu membership in public discourse and convergence of all major political players around this goal is an important testament to the strength of the eu's democratizing imperatives. the latter cannot be explained without reference to the structural inducements towards democratization, which are present in political and economic spheres and have been established through the various linkages that connect institutions and people in serbia to those of the eu. moreover, references to transnational linkages are particularly relevant in explaining how domestic institutional constraints were overcome past the initial exercise of agency. while actors were central in initiating reforms at the start of the process, particularly at the time of heightened popular mobilization, the reforms were sustained only with the eu discouraging alternative courses of action and making them more costly – both politically and financially (levitsky and way, 2010:112). while it was actors that initiated democratization in the context of a power vacuum, over time, the “positive conditionality” came to constitute an important incentivizing mechanism that made challenging the more formidable domestic constraints to democratization (e.g., institutional ones) possible. the eu assumed leverage over serbia, and it was this leverage that became not only a carrot, but a stick with which to encourage continuous reform (pippan 2004, 221-229). the external character of the structuralist explanation is also noteworthy because it can account for why democratization continued in a domestic institutional context that was not conducive on its own to sustained democratization. over the long run, democratic reforms continued to be implemented, even though segments of the population did not benefit from the reform effort (such as people employed in previously-state-owned industries), a critical juncture seemed to be reached with the djindjic assassination, and a campaign for pursuing an alternative to the eu characterized a considerable portion of the public discourse in the first few years of the 2000s (radeljic 2014). external actors and pressures were crucial in pushing serbia towards reform. therefore, whereas the pro-democracy leadership was instrumental in initiating reform, external structural constraints were central in sustaining the reform. structuralist approaches are complemented by a rational choice account in the latter's emphasis on agency in the course and pace of democratization. structuralist accounts can be deterministic, and in the case of international or eu structures, excessively focused on the macro scale without due attention to the interplay between actors at the domestic (meso) and individual (micro) level. hence, while the structuralist account is integral for emphasizing the patterns of relations between the eu and serbia, it needs to be supplemented with attention to actors and agency provided by voluntarist accounts. 12 review of european and russian affairs 9 (1), 2015 towards a more complete account of democratization in serbia what propels democratic transitions forward? what are the roles of political actors in the process? how do institutions and the international environment encourage or discourage democratization? answers to these questions have varied depending on the time under consideration and the case studies in question. whereas the literature on the third wave has tended to emphasise the role of actors and negotiations between factions in explaining outcomes, literature of the fourth wave has tended to focus on structural factors, particularly the role of the eu in supporting democratization in eastern and southeastern europe. in contrast to the emphasis in the literature on explaining regime change (specifically the electoral revolutions), this paper builds on the nascent literature that integrates both structuralist and rational choice explanations by focusing on the process of democratic consolidation. moreover, its contribution lies in detailing the experiences of democratic consolidation in a region whose experience with the legacies of civil war has undoubtedly made democratic consolidation more complex than was the case in the post-communist societies of eastern europe. focusing on serbia's experience with democratization and taking into consideration the role of political economy where appropriate, it has argued that rational choice approaches give insight into the decisive role of political leadership in overcoming illiberal institutions and undemocratic path dependencies. the structuralist explanations are well-attuned to the transnational linkages that encourage democratization despite domestic setbacks and consistently encourage reform over time. as both approaches focus on different 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peer-reviewed journal that publishes graduate, post-graduate, and young scholarly works. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is a joint project supported by the canada-europe transatlantic dialogue—a cross-canada research network supported by the social sciences and humanities research council of canada (sshrc)—along with the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies (carleton university) and its associated research unit, the centre for european studies. rera aims to provide an accessible forum for research, to promote high standards of research and scholarship, and to foster communication among young scholars. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada tel: +01 613 520-2600 ext. 3117; e-mail: rera-journal@carleton.ca creative commons license creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0 this working paper is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial no derivs 3.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 3.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, provided the source is acknowledged. no use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes. issn: 1718-4835 © 2015 the author(s) https://journals.carleton.ca/rera/index.php/rera mailto:rera-journal@carleton.ca http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ vicarious evaluation: how european integration changes national identities review of european and russian affairs 7 (2), 2012 issn 1718-4835 vicarious evaluation: how european integration changes national identities philip giurlando queen’s university abstract this paper explores how european integration impacts the national identities of member states. identity is an amorphous concept, and so this paper focuses on one dimension of it: the perception of the relative status of the nation that nationalized individuals possess. perceptions of relative national status flow from the fact that the international system is characterized by hierarchy, competition, and concerns for relative gains and losses. a key motivation for the foreign policies of lower status nations is equality with higher status ones, and for the former, european integration is often perceived in equalizing terms. but, this perception of europe as equalizer often does not correspond with objectively unequal power relations in europe. this paper focuses on why, among nationalized individuals, perceptions of power differentials change, even though objectively the unequal inter-state power relations may remain unchanged. the case study is italy entering the economic and monetary union of the european union in 1999, which was perceived by many italians in equalizing terms, even though the unequal power relations between italy and europe’s elite countries remained objectively the same. © 2012 the author(s) www.carleton.ca/rera 2 review of european and russian affairs 7 (2), 2012 introduction one of the principle ways in which europeanists have investigated the relationship between national identity and european integration is the strong/weak identity framework. the idea is that strong forms of national identity—with britain usually being the archetype—are not conducive to integration because it is felt that only the nation state can legitimately exercise sovereignty. conversely, those countries with a “weak” identity—and here, italy is often cited as an emblematic case—are more open to integration because it is presumed that there is a more flexible and open collectively held conception of the nation state (berezin 2009). in this framework, the causal arrow runs from the nation to the international system; the focus is on how national identity affects foreign policies towards european integration. yet, comparatively fewer europeanists explore the causal dynamics that flow in the other direction, that is, how international events like european integration impact national identity. there is a large body of literature that addresses the ways in which european integration impacts national institutions and economies, but the question of how national identities are impacted does not enjoy as much attention. one important element of identity that is influenced by european integration is the collective perception of the relative status of the nation. perceptions of relative status flow from the fact that one of the main features of the international order is hierarchy; nations define themselves, and are defined by their place in the international pecking order. entering europe, for many nations, is also perceived as a shift upwards in this pecking order; but, there is often a disjuncture between the real relative status of a nation and the perceived relative status that nationalized individuals believe their country enjoys. this distinction between real and perceived national status is important because perceptions of relative international status are elements of national identity; it follows that changes in perceptions of national status are useful for exploring how identity changes. this distinction is important for another reason relevant to this paper: often nationalized individuals hold exaggerated beliefs about the impact that “entering europe” can have on the relative status of their nation. the case study focus of this paper—italy, and more specifically italy entering the economic and monetary union (emu) in 1999—describes this precisely. italians had to make many sacrifices to enter emu, and politicians, to build support for these sacrifices, propagated narratives that did not correspond with actual policy. even though italy was one of the founders of the european project, and its belongingness to europe was not predicated on whether or not it entered the first round of euro countries, adopting the euro was framed as “entering europe.” perhaps more importantly, entering the eurozone was perceived as something that would solve italy’s marginalization in europe. many italians perceived that the relegation of their country to second class status—compared to the first class status enjoyed by germany, france, and the united kingdom (uk)—was unjust. adopting the euro, it was believed, would make italy a country of “serie a” in italian parlance (“serie a” refers to the premier italian soccer league that is above the lower status league of “serie b”). therefore, when italy joined the eurozone there was a widespread sense that the country had indeed entered the league of europe’s elite countries. there was one problem with this perception: it was wrong. why? because joining the eurozone did not fundamentally change italy’s relative status compared to europe’s elite countries. becoming a member of the eurozone was a great achievement: it modernized italian public finances by placing constraints on the capacity of the political class to use monetary review of european and russian affairs 7 (2), 2012 3 policy for promoting political objectives such as industrial peace between labour and capital and economic growth and by compelling the country to restrain public spending; and it demonstrated that italy, in times of crisis, is able to muster the political resources to get itself out of the morass (usually of its own making). yet, these efforts, impressive as they are, were not sufficient to change italy’s relative status due to the fact that in europe, a nation’s relative status depends on a host of other variables including the size and quality of the economy: its degree of modernization and its levels of inequality, social mobility, and corruption. one could add to the list technological sophistication and its socio-political-bureaucratic organization. in italy, these measures did not fundamentally change. indeed, these kinds of changes take years, even decades, and, in terms of a nation’s relative status, cannot be substituted by entering an economic and monetary union. the perception among italians of the shift of the country’s relative status was brief; it eventually became clear that the country did not really enter the club of elite nations. it thus becomes interesting to ask why the shift in italian perceptions did not correspond with the objective hierarchy that remained largely unchanged in europe. this paper strives to answer this question and finds it relevant for several reasons. first, it is useful to identify the nexus between mass perceptions and international relations: how citizens perceive their nation’s place in the international hierarchy matters because governments must build at least some democratic support for their foreign policies. to build this support, they often manipulate the prejudices, feelings, and beliefs of citizens, most of whom lack the information to impartially analyze the complexity of the international system. second, the research question is relevant to the current crisis afflicting the euro. polls from may 2012 highlight that a plurality of italians—40 percent—want to return to the lira (the telegraph, may 30 2012). one reason is that italians were made extravagant promises that were not kept; they were told that entering the eurozone would make italy one of europe’s top-tier countries. needless to say, this has not happened, and the widespread disillusionment in italy with the euro can be explained, at least in part, on the basis of the unrealistic expectations that were not met. the aforementioned research question can be operationalized with the following hypothesis: adopting the euro was not perceived simply as entering an economic and monetary union; it was perceived to have shifted italy’s place on the european pecking order because, for many italians, the euro meant that italy was now more “european” in the sense that it was up to the standards of europe’s top-tier countries. i call this phenomena “vicarious evaluation”—that is, the construction of the identity of the nation can change when it is perceived to have assimilated features of the “other” (here, the “other” refers to europe’s elite countries). to support this hypothesis i have examined both qualitative and quantitative data to determine whether immediately after adopting the euro, there was a change among italians’ perceptions regarding the relative status of their nation vis-à-vis europe’s elite countries. following this, i examine evidence regarding whether any change in perception was accompanied by a change in the country’s objective status in europe. to the best of this author’s knowledge, there are no polling agencies in italy that measure changes in perceptions of national status; therefore, this paper will rely on media sources to identify these changes. specifically, the results of a sample of 430 newspaper articles from italy’s most widely read dailies, published between 1996 and 2004 and coded to identify how perceptions of national status changed in the preand post-euro period, will be presented in the following pages. news clips that were aired immediately after italy had adopted the euro will 4 review of european and russian affairs 7 (2), 2012 also be presented. a small sample of news clips was obtained by the author from the archives of the rai, italy’s public broadcaster. theoretical framework it is useful to first explore some of the ways in which scholars have theorized the social comparisons that take place between the individual and society. one of the most influential frameworks comes from sociologist norbert elias (1978). elias observed that the self-evaluative aspects of the individual depend very much on the group to which he/she belongs just as much as, if not more, than his/her individual achievements. the originator of this idea may very well have been sigmund freud, who recognized that narcissistic tendencies are often a function not only of individual attributes, but also of the group to which the individual belongs (freud 1991). social psychologists have made similar observations: that the individual’s self esteem or positive self-evaluations often derive from the perceived status of the group rather than from personal attributes (billig and tajfel 1973; johnston and hewstone 1990). elias developed this idea further with the concept of “habitus,” which refers to the ways in which the development of an individual’s consciousness evolves and shifts co-extensively and co-relationally with the nation (elias 1991; elias 1996). elias then extended this framework to a widely acclaimed study that theorized links between individual consciousness, the group, and inter-group hierarchy (elias and scotson 1994). in a case study that is strikingly similar to the inter-group dynamics that are observable in europe, elias looked at two groups in scotland and how the individual members of each group internalized the belief that the “superior” group was more virtuous than the “inferior” group. elias makes a distinction between the “i” images and the “we” images, and shows how the hierarchy between the groups was maintained because the “we” images consisted of a series of stereotypes that depicted the “inferior” groups as less virtuous. these “we” images then changed the “i” images that form the basis of the self-evaluative aspects of the individuals who constituted the groups, which reifies the inter-group hierarchy. scholars have applied elias’ framework to europe’s inter-state relations. pablo jáuregui (1999) explores the nexus between individual self-esteem and national identity, arguing that individual self-esteem often shifts, not on the basis of individual achievements, but because of the changing fortunes of the nation within which one belongs. he focuses on two countries— spain and the uk—and explores how entering the european community had differential effects on these two nations: for spain, it was associated with greater self-esteem because joining the eu represented a move towards “modernity” and a distancing from the backwardness of the franco era, while for the uk it was associated with lowered self-esteem because it represented a further distancing of its role as a global empire. the dynamics that were present when spain entered the european community are similar to the dynamics present in italy when this country adopted the euro: it was perceived as elevating the nation’s self-esteem. however, there were important differences. in italy, the discourse was different because italians have a different conception of their nation’s place in europe. italy was one of the founders of the european project, and many of the greatest theorists of european unity were italian. moreover, in terms of territory, population, gross domestic product, and even membership to prestigious clubs like the group of 7, italy has some of the trappings of a “great power.” for these reasons, and others, many italians perceive their nation as one of europe’s great powers, and its actual relegation to second class status in europe is perceived to be unjust. review of european and russian affairs 7 (2), 2012 5 thus, the widespread desire for equality with europe’s elite countries strongly influenced the character of inter-group comparisons that took place before and during the adoption of the euro. the desire to enhance the self-esteem of the group is universal, and inter-group comparisons and differentiation are one of the ways in which members of groups satisfy this desire. however, for lower status groups, the dynamic is often different (abrams and hogg 1990, 52). rather than differentiation, the desire to produce positive self-distinction leads to the desire for psychological assimilation with the higher status group (hogg, terry and white 1995). that is, for low status groups, collective self-esteem depends on the possibility of the collective self becoming enmeshed with the higher status other. for low status groups who aim to enhance self-esteem through assimilation, the bias is upwards towards higher status groups. it is held, by many individuals who constitute the polity, that assimilating with the higher status group will mean adopting the virtues of this group. the stereotypes (wyer and carlston 1979, 17) of the higher status group are crucial. here, europe is perceived to be associated with “modernity” and “advancement” (heller 1992). these associations derive from the fact that europe is, in the minds of many, indissolubly linked to the standards that are present in europe’s elite countries. the idea that entering europe would produce european virtues was embedded in the discourses surrounding italy’s adoption of the euro. the origins of these discourses are many, some of which are deeply embedded in the nation’s culture. after world war ii, inclusion in the burgeoning institutions of the european community as an equal with the continent’s great powers was the principle foreign policy objective of the nation’s political class (brogi 2002). subsequently, in the sixties the christian democrats propagated the narrative that europe would modernize italy’s backward socio-economic structures (conti 2009, 133). moving forward to the nineties, after the treaty of maastricht had been signed, italian policy makers had to build support for the significant sacrifices that had to be made to meet the stringent public finance criteria that were required to enter the economic and monetary union. they made extravagant promises on the euro, promising that “entering europe” would produce paradise (corriere della sera, march 15 1998, 2) and green valleys (corriere della sera, oct 30 1998, 3), or even more hyperbolically, that it would eliminate italy’s defects by creating “mature” and “modern” european citizens (repubblica, dec 28 2011, 22). these were not the only discourses, of course. there were others that were more realistic, based on the actual substance of the policy, namely, that entering the eurozone only represented a beginning, that much effort and work would be required to truly make italy a “european” country. however, these other, more realistic, discourses were not dominant. politicians shrewdly recognized that being completely honest about the common currency would not help them to build the political support that they needed to implement the painful sacrifices required to enter. other politicians, (especially those on the left and centre-left) meanwhile, believed their own rhetoric: that the euro would make italy “european” (della porta and caiani 2007). nonetheless, whether they believed their own rhetoric or were merely being disingenuous, politicians played a key role in constructing the dominant discourse. discourses that resonate with audiences need to be communicated, which is why the theoretical picture presented would not be complete without an analysis of the media. scholars have recognized that the media constitutes social and political reality (altheide and snow 1974) through the use of narrative, metaphor, myth, and drama (eason 1981) rather than reasoned dispassionate discussion of policy alternatives (bennet 1980). 6 review of european and russian affairs 7 (2), 2012 during the period of italy’s entrance to the eurozone, italians were bombarded with information and images about this event. audiences obviously cannot consume all the information being produced, and so they have to be selective. this is particularly the case with issues that focus on the character of inter-state relations in europe. scholars who focus on the nexus between public opinion, the mass media, and international relations have discovered some interesting patterns in how audiences consume information on the international system. one of the main determinants of the actors’ selection of information in the media-created political environment is the drive for cognitive consistency: the strong tendency for people to see what they expect to see and to assimilate incoming information into existing images (jervis 1970, 118). expectations create dispositions that lead actors to notice certain things and neglect others and that makes it difficult to consider alternatives (bloom 1990, 4). many experiments provide support for this theory that actors’ expectations lead them to a kind of confirmation or verification bias in their consumption of information (pelham and swan 1994, 335; swan, steinseroussi and giesler 1992) not only from media sources, but also from social settings—in conversations with friends, family, even acquaintances at the local bar (davison 1958). in fact, social settings play an important part of the construction of political reality; because it is shared, the fantasy held by the group takes an aura of truth (nimmo and combs 1983, 11). the expectations that lead to this highly selective and misleading consumption of information of the international environment emerge from deeply embedded currents in the culture of the community. in this case study, there was the widespread belief and desire that adopting the euro would produce equality. this belief was often unarticulated, but when it was expressed it was often framed with metaphors that the common person could relate to—for example, the belief that entering emu would make italy a country of “serie a.” most italians were not informed about the substance of the economic and monetary union, but because soccer is part of the national culture, most know that “serie a” means “premier” and “elite.” this belief was felt to be real, in part because of the affectively charged discourses propagated by politicians, and also because of the way that information is consumed from the media and from social settings. ultimately, however, this idea relied on the theory that entering an economic and monetary union would undo the relegation of italy to second class status in europe. this theory, which relied on wholly unrealistic assumptions, also produced expectations that strongly influenced how information was selectively consumed. after italy joined the eurozone, these expectations led to the belief—which was held only temporarily—that italy was a top-tier country in europe. evidence due to the lack of survey research data that explores perceptions of their nation’s relative status, i undertook a media analysis, relying on the archives of the rai (italy’s public broadcaster); i examined clips of television news shows that were aired immediately after italy adopted the euro. 1 this data is qualitative in character but is an important source for identifying key symbols and expressions; humour, speeches, interviews by journalists of the common man on the street, can all convey those taken-for-granted beliefs that constitute a nation’s identity. most italians get their information from tv, but for a significant plurality, the impressions of europe are also formed from reading newspapers. 2 therefore, to identify the way that europe 1. all the clips obtained from the archives of the rai are available upon request. review of european and russian affairs 7 (2), 2012 7 was framed in print, i collected a sample of 430 newspaper articles that were published between 1996 and 2004 by two of italy’s most widely read newspapers: the corriere della sera and la repubblica. the articles were selected using key search terms such as “euro,” “europe,” “maastricht criteria,” and “italy.” while the search was restricted to the nine year period between 1996 and 2004, it produced over 1000 results. of these results, only articles that discussed the euro and its relation to italy’s position in europe were selected for the sample. these articles were then coded with a simple coding scheme that divided them on the basis of whether they presented italy as “inferior” to europe’s elite countries, and those that represented italy as being at the same level with europe’s elite countries. in the discourses through which the euro was interpreted, the euro was associated with the concept “equality” and/or “equalizer.” writing in repubblica (january 1, 2002) on the regional differences in italy, mario centorrino quotes a sicilian who says, “let’s be frank: the entire country has the euro and it is an enormous pleasure to feel equality between lombardy and sicily [emphasis mine].” in italy, the region of lombardy is associated with “modernity” and “advancement” because it is the country’s wealthiest and most powerful; meanwhile, sicily is associated with “backwardness” because it is part of the south and it also has notoriously high levels of corruption and criminality. that the euro created a feeling of equality between these regions makes sense in light of the meanings associated with the euro within italian discourse, i.e., as an “equalizer.” but, objectively speaking, the euro could not and did not create equality between lombardy and sicily. now let us look at how the “euro as equalizer” was applied to italy’s external relations. in january 1999, right after italy entered the eurozone, journalists from the rai interviewed citizens, asking them about their views on the new currency: journalist: the euro creates a unity and makes us [europeans] feel like a common people… respondent: yes…using the same currency means also feeling that we [europeans] are equal. (entrando nel euro, rai due, aired on jan 9 2001) the key idea here is that the euro produced feelings of equality among european nations. but other evidence shows that the association of “equality” with the euro helped to create exaggerated beliefs about the euro: that it would positively impact italy’s relative status. following italy’s adoption of the euro, prime minister prodi went on the air to give a congratulatory speech to the nation where he presented the event in the following way: italy enters europe [note the conflation of emu with europe] with all its history and culture without which europe would be poorer and less present in the world…we must look towards the south…the relationship between the christian world and the muslim world, and here, italy has the obligation to promote peace, and if we were not in europe, we would not be able to carry out this obligation. (dichiarazione di prodi, rai due, aired on may 2 1998) the meanings associated with the euro in this speech are “strength” and “influence” (these associations are also embedded in the popular italian expression that is often used to express support for european unity: “l’unione fa la forza,” which means: “together we are stronger”). this sense of new strength and influence was extended to the belief that entering “europe” for 8 review of european and russian affairs 7 (2), 2012 italy meant it would be a harbinger of geo-political change that would help to bridge the differences between europe and the muslim world. needless to say, the euro has had no such effect, nor could it, because italy’s capacity to bridge the differences between the muslim world and europe did not rest on its capacity to enter the first round of euro countries. nevertheless, this belief was held because of the extra-monetary meanings that were associated with the euro. it was believed that adopting the euro would increase the country’s relative status and influence in the unequal inter-state pecking order. the role of humour that only national audiences can understand is also a good source of the symbols that pertain to the intersubjective universe of the nation. humour also often reveals uncomfortable truths that are made palatable because they are expressed in jests. they often penetrate the psychological defences that prevent people from saying things that many believe but that few would openly express. one such joke was presented on a show called “mister euro,” moderated by alan friedman that was aired on january 8 2002. the show featured a panel of politicians, union and business leaders, and prominent figures who were interviewed by friedman and who debated one another on serious matters surrounding the euro. the show aimed to inject humour through one of the characters, the well-known italian actress/comedian syusy blady. in one of her comedic skits blady says, “for once we are like the germans, with the same currency!” the euro here meant more than just a new currency with which to go shopping; it was another way of saying, “for once italy is up to the standards of germany.” this allusion to germany is not a coincidence: it is the country that is the ideal for most italians when they engage in the social comparisons that reify the perceived defects of the italian nation state. it also highlights the upward bias of inter-group comparison: for lower status groups, it is important to feel equality with higher status groups. as mentioned above, a sample of newspaper articles were collected from italy’s major newspapers to provide a quantitative idea of how perceptions of italy’s relative status changed after adopting the euro. the articles were coded with a simple scheme that divided them on the basis of whether they presented italy as being at the “same level” as europe’s elite countries, or whether they presented italy as “inferior” to them in some way. regarding the latter, many articles represented italy as a member of the “club med” countries, a derogatory term that implies the division between the virtuous northern european countries and the non-virtuous nations of southern europe. articles that represented italy in terms of its specific problems that other nations presumably do not have were also coded as “inferior.” conversely, articles that presented italy as a grande paese of europe (which roughly translates to “great power”) were coded as “same level.” other articles that were coded in the “same level” category represented italy as sharing the same position in europe as germany and france, rather than, say, spain or portugal. the coded articles were plotted in figure a and were published in the time period between 1996 and 2004. the blue line shows the total number of articles in the sample that discussed the euro or the maastricht criteria in the context of italy’s place in europe. there is a huge spike between late 1996 and late 1997, and then again between late 1997 and 1998. there was a flurry of articles published in these periods because, at the time, italy’s adoption of the euro was very much in doubt as a result of comments from dutch and german officials who raised serious questions about italy’s ability to make the first round; many of the articles are attempts to interpret comments about italy made by these officials. the pink line represents the articles that depicted italy as one of europe’s “great powers” or that expressed the notion that italy was at the same level as europe’s elite countries. the yellow line depicts the articles that represent italy as review of european and russian affairs 7 (2), 2012 9 inferior to europe’s elite countries. the graph shows a shift that begins when it became official that italy would enter the eurozone. by around the middle of 2000, there are slightly more articles that represent italy as a great power at the same level as europe’s elite countries. the shift back to “inferior” starts to happen in 2004. figure a. perceptions of italy’s status relative to other european countries after entering the euro. the data is based on newspaper articles in la repubblica (209) and corriere della sera (221) from the period between 1996 to 2004. the coding scheme is available upon request. it is important to point out that these data are not representative of the population in the scientific sense. they tend to reflect the views of mainstream elites, as columnists in national dailies tend to be. therefore, it cannot be inferred that x percent of italians perceived these shifts; to make that sort of inference would require polling data based on representative samples. however, as previously mentioned, i was not able to find polling agencies that measure perceptions of italy’s relative status. the newspaper and television clips are nonetheless valuable sources for inferring how discourses shifted following italy’s adoption of the euro. although these sources represent the views of elites, national identities are mostly elite constructions. these constructions permeate the subjective universe of non-elites through the media, and hence it can be inferred that elite discourses expressed in national dailies and on television news programs do filter, at least in part, to non-elites. perception and reality status is an inter-subjective phenomenon. to measure it, one must rely on proxy indicators. one indicator, i argue, is exclusion from the major decisions and meetings that are attended by europe’s top-tier nations. thus italy’s exclusion from the major decisions made by europe’s “great powers” is a plausible source of empirical evidence that could be adduced to demonstrate that italy did not become a top-tier country in europe after it joined the eurozone. 10 review of european and russian affairs 7 (2), 2012 first, there is the basic fact that europe is still being led by germany and france. the current crisis in the eurozone has only accentuated this. for example, the fiscal pact that was signed in march 2012 was essentially established by france and germany and then presented to the other members, including italy, as a fait accompli. italy’s relative marginalization can be seen elsewhere in the region’s politics. the italian language is not used in europe’s patent system despite vociferous italian opposition (patents are only published in three languages: english, german, and french). what is more, italy was excluded from important meetings and conference calls during the recent conflict in libya, despite the fact that italy played a strategically crucial role in the military operations. finally, italy is not included in “e-3”, which is the forum of three european nations—germany, france, and the uk—actively working with the united states and russia to dissuade iran from building nuclear weapons, despite the fact that italy is one of iran’s most important european trading partners. the reason italy still suffers these types of exclusion may be related to a host of variables, and entering a prestigious economic and monetary union is probably one of the least important ones. one variable that affects national status is the absolute size of the economy (kennedy 1987). italy has a gross domestic product, in absolute and in pro-capita terms that is comparable to france. but this is only one factor; just as important in determining hierarchy in europe, i argue, are the qualitative aspects of the economy, such as inequality and the perceptions of corruption. high levels on these measures are associated with social injustice and third-worldism in europe’s intersubjective universe. in this sense, the degree of external equality between european nations depends, in part, on the levels of internal equality within nations. other determinants of europe’s pecking order are cultural, but not in the sense of the cultural treasures of the nation. in determining hierarchy, culture is important in a different sense: the beliefs and practices of its citizens which are understood to be proxies for their perceived honesty and sense of civic responsibility. the reason is that for large numbers of europeans, the quality of a nation’s socio-political and bureaucratic organization very much depends on its national culture. this is observable in the moralistic language that is often used to describe a nation’s relative status. those countries with efficient bureaucracies and credible political classes are often described as “virtuous,” while those on the other end of the spectrum are often described as “lazy,” “dishonest,” and “irresponsible.” although in europe, in 1999, italy began to be characterized as one of the “virtuous” nations because it met the stringent maastricht criteria, this change evaporated after the election of silvio berlusconi in 2001, which signalled to its partners that the country had not truly become one of europe’s “virtuous” nations (chevallard 2008, 50) the following graphs highlight that on indicators of corruption and inequality, italy did not improve after it entered emu. figure b displays data collected from transparency international, which ascribes a “score” from 0 (least corrupt) to 10 (most corrupt) to countries. the first line in figure b shows that italy’s score has been about 5 for the past nine years, which places it well below its peers in europe. its low position in the ranking of european countries can also be seen in figure b. there was a slight improvement between 1999 and 2001, which coincided with a small improvement in its score in the same period from 4.8 to 5.1. but this was short lived, and shortly after this period its score and ranking began to worsen again. finally, figure c shows that inequality, as measured by the share of national income going to the top 1 percent, has remained flat since roughly 1997. review of european and russian affairs 7 (2), 2012 11 italy and perceptions of corruption 0 5 10 15 20 25 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 year c o rr u p ti o n s c o re a n d e u ro p e a n r a n k in g corruption score ranking in universe of only european countries figure b: corruptions perceptions index survey of italy. score of 10 refers to least corrupt, score of 0 refers to most corrupt. source: transparencyinternationalarchives. available at http://archive.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi share of national income of top 1% in italy 0 2 4 6 8 10 1980 1990 2000 2001 2002 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 year p e rc e n t figure c: income inequality in italy. source: oecd. available at http://www.oecd.org/italy/49177743.pdf table 1 shows that italy is perceived by europe’s mass publics to have higher levels of corruption than other nations with comparably-sized economies. the data in table 1 dovetails with figure b. the latter presents data collected by transparency international, which relies on a sample of investors in italy who must deal with the italian bureaucracy to conduct their affairs. the data from table 1 relies on a representative sample of the citizens of those countries. the fact that both data sets arrive at similar conclusions gives weight to the observation that italy is and was perceived to be a very corrupt and that entering the eurozone did not fundamentally change these perceptions of the country, which is one of the reasons that it continues to be relegated to second-rate status in europe 12 review of european and russian affairs 7 (2), 2012 which is the most corrupt country in europe? according to citizens in: the most corrupt european country is: britain italy france italy germany italy spain spain/italy italy italy greece greece table 1: stereotypes in europe. adapted from: pew research centre, economist may 30 th 2012. available at: http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2012/05/greeks-say-they-are-hardest-working-european-nation status hierarchy among countries in europe is based on a complex interplay between material and ideational factors. the material factors are mostly economic and are rooted in the fact that europe, despite significant progress in integration, has not completely transcended the dynamics that other states are subject to: competition, and concerns with relative gains and losses in zerosum terms. the ideational elements derive from the values that have a high priority in europe: levels of internal inequality, and efficient and socially just bureaucracies, which are accurately perceived to reflect a nation’s culture. on both scores, italy’s relative position did not fundamentally change after admission to the eurozone, despite expectations created by politicians. it is partly for this reason that the very real improvements in public finance, the meeting of the maastricht criteria, and belonging to a prestigious economic and monetary union did not fundamentally change the nations’ place in the european inter-state hierarchy. conclusion much of the work on the role of identity in europe is based on the “strong” versus “weak” identity and how these different identities correlate with different national approaches towards europe. this paper focuses on a different aspect of identity: the perception of relative status that nationalized individuals perceive their country to possess. by focusing on this narrow element of identity, scholars can more easily detect how identities are impacted by external events and by the discourses through which these events are filtered. in the case study that is the focus of this paper, the political class in italy exploited its constituents’ desire for increased national status by selling integrationist measures, such as the euro, in these terms. this impacted mass perceptions of national status, especially because most citizens do not have sufficient information to evaluate the complexity of the international system. in addition, it led to the belief that italy was one of europe’s top-tier nations even though objectively it continued to rank in the level of second class countries. eventually, though, the majority of citizens realized that they had been oversold the policy and that it in fact had not had the intended effect. this highlights the fact that some aspects of national identity are not static; they are malleable in accordance with the shifting discourses which are propagated by the elite. the findings of this paper also have important political implications. there is widespread disillusionment with the euro in italy. political parties that explicitly reject the euro, like the comedian beppe grillo’s 5 star party, are surging in the polls, running in second place after the democratic party led by pier luigi bersani. even mainstream parties, such as silvio berlusconi’s people of freedom party, are starting to muse openly about leaving the euro, which http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2012/05/greeks-say-they-are-hardest-working-european-nation review of european and russian affairs 7 (2), 2012 13 would have been unthinkable only a year ago. one of the reasons for this increased anti-euro feeling is that the political class made extravagant promises that were not met, namely, that the entering the euro would make italy one of europe’s top-tier nations. now, some sections of the political class are trying to capitalize on the widespread disillusionment with the euro by telling the electorate that the return of the lira is possible. this messy situation should be a lesson to italy’s political class: when selling an integrationist policy to a largely uninformed electorate, they should be intellectually honest about the real ramifications of the policy, even if it comes at the expense of lower public support for it. acknowledgements the author would like to thank the social sciences and research council of canada (sshrc) for financing the research that was carried out for this paper. he would also like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their helpful 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http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/comment/jeremywarner/9301204/only-the-ecbcan save-the-euro-now.html. wyer, robert, and donal carlston. 1979. social cognition, inference, and attribution. hillsdale, nj: lawrence erlbaum associates. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/comment/jeremy-%09warner/9301204/only-the-ecb-%09can-%09save-the-euro-now.html http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/comment/jeremy-%09warner/9301204/only-the-ecb-%09can-%09save-the-euro-now.html correct citation: giurlando, philip. 2012. “vicarious evaluation: how european integration changes national identities.” review of european and russian affairs 7 (2): 1–14. published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada. available online at: www.carleton.ca/rera/ rera is an electronic academic peer-reviewed journal that publishes graduate, post-graduate, and young scholarly works. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is a joint project supported by the canada-europe transatlantic dialogue—a cross-canada research network supported by the social sciences and humanities research council of canada (sshrc)—along with the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies (carleton university) and its associated research unit, the centre for european studies. rera aims to provide an accessible forum for research, to promote high standards of research and scholarship, and to foster communication among young scholars. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada tel: +01 613 520-2600 ext. 1179; e-mail: rera-journal@carleton.ca creative commons license this working paper is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial no derivs 3.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 3.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced provided the source is acknowledged. no use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes. issn: 1718-4835 © 2012 the author(s) http://www.carleton.ca/rera/ mailto:rera-journal@carleton.ca why reforms fail: the role of ideas, interests and institutions review of european and russian affairs 12 (2), 2018 issn 1718-4835 transparency in commodity-rich countries: is state ownership to blame? domenico valenza college of europe – unu-cris abstract since the late 1990s, transparency has emerged as a major governance pillar helping resource-rich countries improve their performance and escape the resource curse. within this debate, a few scholars have pointed to the correlation between ownership structure and transparency, and have argued that under state ownership, transparency should not be expected, as government officials refrain from strengthening institutions to retain their discretionary power. this study attempts to challenge scholarly existing knowledge by comparing transparency performances in two resource-rich countries with similar ownership structures, norway and russia. to this end, it analyses data from the revenue governance index (2017). overall, such a correlation is not confirmed. while in some cases, state ownership can in fact generate greater opacity, the example of norway confirms that retaining control can also enhance transparency. as a result, it is suggested to look attentively at the features of state ownership, and in particular, at countries’ institutional quality. 2 review of european and russian affairs 12 (2), 2018 introduction since the late 1990s, transparency has rapidly emerged as an international norm (gillies, 2010) in political and economic arenas. scholars have highlighted the key role that transparency plays in strengthening public governance, and non-governmental organisations (ngos) have advocated for the implementation of more transparent policies. in the resource sector, the year 2003 saw the foundation of the extractive industries transparency initiative (eiti), an international standard aiming at enhancing transparency over payments and revenues from governments and enterprises. overall, it has been argued that enhanced transparency would save resource-rich countries from the so-called resource curse (auty, 1994) and improve their political and economic standards. however, within this broader academic and policy debate, little attention has been devoted to the correlation between state ownership and transparency in commodity-rich countries. as a partial exception, a few scholars (ascher, 1999; luong and weinthal, 2006a, 2006b, 2010) have generally suggested that state-owned resources are associated with reduced transparency and argued that, to retain their discretionary power government officials and bureaucrats refrain from strengthening institutions. as a result, they have concluded that under state ownership transparency should not be expected. this paper attempts to fill a void in the literature and challenge scholarly existing knowledge by critically assessing the correlation between state ownership and transparency. to do so, it compares transparency assessments in the resource sector in norway and russia. two reasons explain this selection. first, their consolidated history of state ownership provide multiple points of analysis on the evolution of their respective structures. second, insights from literature seem to suggest that, despite their common ‘state-owned fate’, the resource industry has generated contrasting political and economic outcomes. to compare the two ownership structures, transparency-related data, questionnaires and scores from the revenue governance index (2017) are analysed and discussed. overall, this paper finds that there is not an unfavourable correlation between state ownership and transparency. while in some cases state ownership can generate greater opacity, the example of norway confirms that retaining control over resources can also enhance transparency. as a result of this, and in line with findings from other scholars (stiglitz, 2002; thurber et al., 2011; khanna, 2017), it is suggested to look attentively at the features of state ownership, and in particular at commodity-rich countries’ institutional quality. the paper is organised as follows. first, a theoretical background on the resource curse literature, the concept of transparency and the relationship between state ownership and transparency is introduced and discussed. second, to compare russia and norway, this paper provides a brief historical introduction on state ownership in both countries; presents the methodology used and data from reports; and analyses the main findings and the reasons behind different levels of transparency in norway and russia. finally, a conclusion follows. 1. transparency and ownership structure in commodity-rich countries: a literature review studies on transparency in commodity-rich countries intersect with an extensive body of literature discussing the relationship between natural resources and political and economic outcomes (wheeler 1984; collier and hoeffler 2004; wantchekon 2002; ascher 1999; luong and weinthal 3 review of european and russian affairs 12 (2), 2018 2006a, 2006b, 2010). since the late 1980s, scholars have challenged older theories and pointed to the existence of a negative correlation between the possession of valuable commodities (oil, gas, etc.) and political and economic benefits. in other words, the so-called resource curse (auty 1994), or the paradox of plenty, refers to the observation that commodity-rich countries end up consistently with poor outcomes. while an extensive review of the literature is beyond the reach of the paper, it should be highlighted that natural resources abundance seems to have a number of major consequences. for instance, wheeler (1984) finds that sub-saharan countries relying on natural resources grew more slowly than their commodity-poor neighbours. also, wantchekon (2002) highlights a negative correlation between commodity-based authoritarian countries and democracy transitioning. similarly, ross (2001, 2012, 2015) stresses three important effects of petroleum: it strengthens authoritarian regimes, increases corruption, and triggers conflicts in low and middle-income countries. concerns on the correlation between resources and civil war are also shared by other scholars. for instance, collier and hoeffler (2004) observe that the presence of natural resources increases risks of secessionist wars, while doyle and sambanis (2000) find a negative correlation between resource abundance and the success of peace-building initiatives. to combat the resource curse, a number of economists and political scientists have stressed the role of transparency to address commodity-rich countries’ critical performances (ascher 1999; caspary 2012; corrigan 2014). however, while transparency has been promoted as an international norm in the resource sector, the review of existing literature confirms at present the absence of an agreed definition. vishwanath and kaufmann consider transparency as the “increased flow of timely and reliable economic, social and political information” (1999, 3). in stiglitz’s view, transparency relates to the basic right to know in order to correct the natural asymmetric information between agent and principal, respectively “those who govern and those whom they are supposed to serve” (2002, 27). whereas such definitions focus more on the access to information, other scholars have linked transparency to accountability processes. in other words, transparency is “the release of information by institutions that is relevant to evaluating those institutions” (florini 1999, 5). finel and lord (1999) stress that transparency can be fostered by any mechanism leading to public disclosure of information, such as free press, public hearings, and the presence of non-governmental watchdogs. when it comes to the resource sector, corporate transparency, defined as “the availability of firm-specific information to those outside publicly traded firms” (bushman et al. 2004, 207) has gained momentum, and ngos have called to oil and gas companies for increased openness about revenues and payments to governments. why is transparency supposed to play a key role in combating the resource curse? scholars have found a strong association between transparency and the overall quality of governance (islam 2006; stiglitz 2002). in his study, islam (2006) remarks that when freedom of information laws exist and governments disclose economic data, countries enjoy better governance. also, the correlation between higher levels of transparency and the decrease in corruption has been highlighted (stiglitz 2002; kolstad and wiig 2009). kolstad and wiig observe that a lack of transparency makes corruption more attractive: in an opaque system, the bribe is given to the bureaucrat so that he reports a higher cost to the oil company, thereby causing a reduction in the latter’s taxes. as such, the authors conclude that the more transparent the financial reporting of the company is, “the more difficult it is for the bureaucrat to distort information and the easier it is to be caught doing so” (2009, 522-3). for the purpose of this study, this analysis retains the general definition proposed by vishwanath and kaufmann (1999) and the formulation of corporate transparency suggested by bushman et al. (2004). 4 review of european and russian affairs 12 (2), 2018 within the broader debate over the resource curse, scholars have offered a number of different perspectives on the causes triggering commodity-rich countries’ poor performances. among those, in recent years a growing body of literature has proposed to look at the ownership structure adopted in commodity-rich countries (ascher 1999; luong and weinthal 2006a, 2006b, 2010; wolf 2009; eller et al. 2011). in a comparative analysis of performance of state and private oil companies, wolf (2009) finds that ownership does matter, and that private ownership seems to encourage greater efficiency in oil-rich countries. similarly, eller et al. (2011) observe that under state ownership, revenue inefficiencies are the results of rent-seeking governments. what about the correlation between state ownership and transparency? while scholars have generally suggested that state-owned resources are associated with reduced transparency, the study of this relationship has been largely neglected. as a partial exception, in his analysis on governments’ failure in the management of natural resources, ascher stresses that, in the income redistribution process, government officials use low-visibility tactics as defensive tools in their struggles for power. such a lack of transparency favours not only government officials, but also state enterprises, which gain in autonomy and act as “the state within the state” (1999, 17). in a broader reassessment of the resource curse arguments, luong and weinthal (2006a, 2006b, 2010) point out that, under state ownership, business-state relations are blurred; although the population as a whole is “the nominal principal whose interests are ostensibly served by a multitude of agents,” performance is not evaluated and “agents often act like principals, such that administrative tasks and political goals also become blurred” (2006a, 43). as a result of this, an implicit negotiation between both state elites and bureaucrats takes place and, to keep their discretionary power, they refrain from strengthening institutions and increasing transparency in the resource sector. luong and weinthal contrast state ownership and private domestic ownership, in which state and business need each other and commit themselves to enhance transparency. furthermore, in a study on the mena region comparing oil-rich and -poor countries, mohtadi et al. (2014) observe that revenues diminished incentives for the government to make their policies and institutions more transparent. on a similar note, by analysing corruption rates in china, zhan (2017) finds a positive correlation between natural resources and propensity for corruption by state employees. while studies of ownership structure in commodity-rich countries have provided new insights on poor economic and political performance, by treating ownership as the main variable, they have overlooked the quality of institutions as a key dimension. also, some of the comparative analyses have taken into account such regions as the post-soviet space and the mena, with similar political and economic standards, and excluded those countries that have been able to benefit consistently from commodities (e.g., norway and botswana). in an attempt to nuance conclusions from previous studies, khanna (2017) observes that the effect of commodity wealth on economic growth differs across ownership structures. in other words, she finds that, while ownership matters, the quality of pre-existing institutions is another key element. as such, when the institutional setting is strong, state leaders are not allowed to use socs for personal and political objectives. in line with these findings, this paper aims to fill a gap in the current literature by assessing the correlation between state ownership and transparency in commodity-rich countries. 5 review of european and russian affairs 12 (2), 2018 2. the state ownership in norway and russia: evidence from data to challenge and advance current knowledge, this section seeks to compare transparency performances of norway and russia in the resource sector, and also those of their state-owned companies (socs), equinor and gazprom. first, the evolution of the ownership structure in both countries is briefly presented. second, the methodology is discussed and data from recent reports are examined. finally, the last sub-section analyses the findings and attempts to explain the different levels of transparency found in norway and russia. 2.1 ownership structure in norway and russia since the end of world war ii, the state has become the major actor in the norwegian economy. while in the post-war period, norway was the poorest country compared to its scandinavian neighbours, a real breakthrough took place in the late 1960s and early 1970s, with the oil discovery and the beginning of extraction activities. not surprisingly, scholars have associated norway’s exceptional rise in gdp per capita to the flourishing of the oil industry (lange and garrett 1985; larsen 2006). in the 1970s, norway was one of the few countries outside of the organization of the petroleum exporting countries (opec) that aimed at keeping state control over the oil sector. this vision was better articulated by the storting (the norwegian parliament) in a white paper produced in 1971. the new petroleum policy, which would be later known as the ten oil commandments (npd 2010), stressed the importance of national management and control in order to benefit the entire norwegian society, and called for the establishment of a soc, named later statoil, in order to safeguard national economic interests. also, the white paper pointed out that the oil sector had national and international objectives, and that protection of the environment was a pillar of the new policy. together with the creation of a national company dealing with commercial interests at the national and international level, norwegian policy-makers designed a triangular model of governance in the oil sector. the model rested on two other cornerstones: a ministry of petroleum and energy that was in charge of petroleum legislation and policy making, and the norwegian petroleum directorate (npd), a regulatory body and delegated authority in oil-related areas. as such, since 1972, norway has had a separation model in the oil sector and granted policy, commercial, and regulatory responsibilities to three different bodies. in 2001 statoil became a publicly listed and partially privatized company. as noted by lie (2016), a consequence of partial privatisation was predominance of commercial aspects over politics. as a result, any decision should be admissible not only to the state, but also to other shareholders. despite these changes, the state majority ownership together with the system created in the 1970s implied that norway kept “a highly state regulated sector” (claes 2002). in 2018, statoil changed its name to equinor, to signal the concept of equality behind the company and also its norwegian roots. 6 review of european and russian affairs 12 (2), 2018 figure 1: equinor’s shareholders (equinor, 2018) similarly to norway, russia’s economy has relied heavily on the state, notably in the gas sector. the soviet gas industry expanded significantly throughout the 1970s, when neither soviet political leaders nor the state planning committee (gosplan) expected to find extensive oil and gas deposits in west siberia. with the expansion of its gas output, already by the 1980s the country had succeeded in answering its own needs and those of its satellites in eastern europe. russia’s ownership structure in the resource sector results to a large degree from the privatisation processes in the chaotic phase that followed the collapse of the soviet union. in this respect, oil and gas face two different destinies: while in the oil industry, a breakup of the former soviet structure took place, in the gas sector, such a process was successfully contained by two political leaders who acted pragmatically to keep the industry whole: viktor chernomyrdin, who headed the newly-created state corporate enterprise gazprom between 1989 and 1992 and was able to acquire soiuzgazexport, the company in charge of all gas export; and prime minister yegor gaidar, who averted the breakup (gustafson 2012). gazprom’s story is an exception rather than the rule after the break-up of the soviet union, as most former soviet ministries, including coal and electricity, were broken up into individual enterprises and encouraged to compete domestically and abroad. even if gazprom avoided the breakup that took place in the oil sector, it could not escape postsoviet privatizations. however, its story as a private company was a relatively short one. in 1993, gazprom became a joint-stock company and russian citizens received vouchers to purchase its shares. the state retained about 38 per cent of gazprom until the early 2000s, when president putin changed its management and succeeded in bringing the company back under kremlin control. today, the russian state controls slightly more than 50 per cent of gazprom’s share. figure 2: gazprom’s shareholders (gazprom 2018) 67% 3.2% 1.2% 1% 27.6% government of norway folketrygdfondet blackrock institutional trust company, dodge & cox other shareholders 38.3% 11.0% 0.9% 25.2% 24.6% federal agency for state property management rosneftegaz rosgazifikatsiya adr holders other legal entities and individuals 7 review of european and russian affairs 12 (2), 2018 2.2. methodology and data to compare the levels of transparency in the resource sector in norway and russia, this section analyses data from the resource governance index (rgi 2017a, 2017b, 2017c), assessing the quality of governance in 81 countries in the extractive sector. the index, which is designed by the national resource governance institute, includes 133 multiple-choice questions in each assessment with a score ranging 0-100. when the answer is ‘not applicable,’ a non-numerical value is assigned. three major governance components are assessed: value realization, revenue management, and enabling environment. for the purpose of this work, this section takes into account those sub-components that are directly related to transparency rules and practices in the extractive sector. the following sub-components are therefore analysed: licensing, taxation, local impact, national budgeting, and sovereign wealth funds. also, as seen earlier, theoretical explanations of state ownership take into account both ‘sides’ of the sector, the government and the soc. in line with these approaches, a sixth sub-component, reviewing equinor’s and gazprom’s performances at the transparency level, is included in the analysis. finally, as a methodology note, all the questions from these sub-components and related to transparency have been answered based on primary sources (legislation, policy documents, financial reports, and the like). supporting documents and additional information on the scores assigned are provided in the methodology section of the index (rgi 2017a). a. sub-component 1 – licensing under the first sub-component, the rgi measures to what extent citizens have access to information on the national licensing process. overall, norway performs slightly better than russia, even though both countries score 0 on financial interest disclosure, as senior public officials are not obliged by the law to publicly disclose their holdings in extractive companies. at the cadastre level, both countries maintain a publicly available registry including rights and license details, even though it does not provide information on unassigned areas. 8 review of european and russian affairs 12 (2), 2018 table 1: sub-component 1 – licensing (rgi 2017b and 2017c). norway russia reserves disclosure 93 0 cadastre 88 88 pre-licensing round rules 88 75 pre-licensing round practice 100 33 post-licensing round rules 25 50 post-licensing round practice 100 50 financial interest disclosure rules 0 10 financial interest disclosure practice 0 0 contract disclosure rules 0 0 contract disclosure 0 0 overall 49 31 furthermore, in the scandinavian country, the government has publicly communicated up-to-date data on reserves via its soc, while this has not taken place in russia. in the pre-licensing phase, the major difference between the countries relates to the presence of pre-defined criteria qualifying companies to participate in each licensing process: norway publicly discloses minimum criteria, while russia does not. also, in the post-license round, another significant difference involves the disclosure of submitted applications, the identity of the winning bidder, and also the list of areas allocated in the license. in a number of cases, russia’s licensing authority did not disclose information on each of these elements. b. sub-component 2 – taxation under sub-component 2, eight indicators are included in the index. this work analyses those five that take into account aspects of disclosure. on production, even though both countries disclose up-to-date data, norway performs slightly better than russia, as the latter provides only aggregated data on the volume of extractive resource production. aggregated data are also available at the export level in both countries. 9 review of european and russian affairs 12 (2), 2018 table 2: sub-component 2 – taxation (rgi 2017b and 2017c). norway russia production disclosure 93 77 export disclosure 80 77 company payment rules 100 0 company payment disclosure 100 67 eiti affiliation and reporting 85 30 overall 92 50 the most striking difference at the taxation level can be found on payment rules, as russia’s law does not require the government to disclose data on payments from extractive companies to the government. also, while norway provides information on the value of tax and payment receipts at the company level (and data are also disaggregated by payment type), in russia only aggregated data are publicly available. finally, on eiti affiliation, the different score can be explained by the fact that russia has not joined eiti (and does not plan to), while norway is a current member and has provided updated data in its most recent report. it should be noted that, to give a lower weight to the question in comparison to more crucial indicators, countries with no eiti affiliation were granted a score of 30 in the index instead of 0. this applies indeed to russia. c. sub-component 3 – local impact within value realization, the last sub-component relates to the effect of extraction activities on countries’ local environment. in this regard, four indicators assessing data disclosure are discussed in this work. the first two indicators involve the adoption of environmental impact assessments (eias) and socio-economic impact assessments (sias) in the framework of extraction activities. whereas in norway both eias and sias are required under law and have to be publicly available, in russia only eia is legally mandatory while sia has been practiced as part of environmental impact studies. perhaps more importantly, gulakov and vanklay have studied the issue in depth and assessed that the eia process in the russian federation “does not adequately address social issues” (2018, 11). as such, sias are de facto subordinated to environmental concerns and companies lack capacities to address the social impact of their activities. 10 review of european and russian affairs 12 (2), 2018 table 3: sub-component 3 – local impact (rgi 2017b and 2017c). norway russia eia/sia rules 100 70 eia/sia disclosure 100 50 environmental mitigation plan rules 100 25 environmental mitigation plan disclosure 100 0 overall 100 36 furthermore, russia performs consistently worse than norway on environmental mitigation. extractive companies are not obliged by the law to prepare mitigation plans prior to project development. as such, the absence of a legal framework has allowed companies to avoid preparation and disclosure of such plans. on the contrary, the index finds that norway provides clear rules and legal obligations for extractive companies. d. sub-component 4 – national budgeting three indicators on national budgeting have a direct relevance to transparency purposes. the first indicator relates to the presence of an online portal containing data on reserves, production, and exports in the extractive sector. while in russia such a governmental service does not exist, norway has produced an online and up-to-date database, with machine-readable data that is available under open license and with no restrictions on use. these parameters explain the countries’ different scores. high levels of disclosure are found in both countries when it comes to the national budget, while on debt, some concerns are expressed for moscow, as its level is not publicly disclosed and available information is not disaggregated by currency denomination. table 4: sub-component 4 – national budgeting (rgi 2017b and 2017c). norway russia online data portal 95 0 national budget disclosure 100 100 national debt disclosure 100 50 overall 98 50 11 review of european and russian affairs 12 (2), 2018 e. sub-component 5 – sovereign wealth funds a number of relevant indicators to information disclosure are included under sub-component 5. in line with the overall trend, norway seems to perform consistently better than russia on wealth fund transparency. on withdrawal practices, russia lacks rules governing the size of deposits into the fund, which in turn contributes to increased opacity in the broader process. on swf investment practices, while both countries have disclosed investment returns in their recent financial reports, russia’s most recent does not include a list of assets held. finally, when it comes to financial reporting rules and practices, in principle, in both countries, annual financial reports are legally required and accessible, but in the case of russia and contrary to norway, they are not subject to a periodic external audit or to a parliamentary review. table 5: sub-component 5 – sovereign wealth funds (rgi 2017b and 2017c). norway russia swf deposit and withdrawal practice 75 50 swf investment practice 100 50 swf financial reporting rules 100 50 swf financial reporting practice 100 33 overall 94 46 f. sub-component 6 – socs with an overall score of 80 in the index, equinor (referred as statoil in the index, as this was published before the name change) ranked fourth in the extractive ranking and third among oil and gas socs. the report highlighted that the company’s main weaknesses lie in the limited disclosure of commodity sales. at present equinor lacks rules on the selection of buyers and on the prices at which it should sell its production. similarly, according to the report the company would also need rules governing how the proceeds from the production sale should be transferred to the government. at the disclosure level, equinor publishes the value and volume of production sold only in the aggregate and not for each sale. it should be noted that all these issues are also identified in gazprom, which performs poorly when it comes to commodity sales. 12 review of european and russian affairs 12 (2), 2018 table 6: sub-component 6 – socs (rgi 2017b and 2017c). equinor gazprom soc-government transfers rules 100 100 soc-government transfers disclosure 100 50 soc financial reporting rules 67 67 soc non-commercial activity practice 100 0 soc financial reporting practice 100 100 soc production disclosure 100 100 commodity sale rules 25 0 commodity sale disclosures 25 25 soc joint ventures and subsidiaries disclosure 80 60 soc corporate governance practice 100 60 overall 80 56 furthermore, both companies show good performances on soc-government transfers, as in both countries the law specifies the rules governing fiscal transfers between the two parties. however, the index observes that in russia transfers disclosure is not two-way: in other words, while gazprom’s transferred revenue are publicly available, the government does not disclose how much it gets from the company. while socs receive the same score on financial reporting rules (and the report highlights as a weakness that both companies are not required to submit annual reports to the legislature on its activities), their methods differ on non-commercial activity practices, and so does their assessment. in particular and contrary to equinor, gazprom engages in non-commercial activities and does not disclose the amount allocated to any of them in russia and abroad. this may alert on the political and social role that gazprom plays in those areas where it enjoys a strong commercial presence. disclosure is high for both socs when it comes to production disclosure, but on joint ventures and subsidiaries the index assesses that gazprom lies behind when compared to other extractive companies. issues to be addressed are opacity on costs and revenues related to gazprom’s participation in joint ventures and also on those deriving from its subsidiaries. the first recommendation is also addressed to equinor. finally, as another key indicator, the index assesses corporate governance practices in socs on two questions: whether the soe has a publicly 13 review of european and russian affairs 12 (2), 2018 available code of conduct, and whether the majority of the soc’s board of directors is independent of the government. both socs have a publicly available code, but different scores are in fact provided on the second question. while equinor’s board is composed by a majority of independent members, on gazprom’s board, only a few representatives are independent, while most of them are tied to, or part of, the russian government. 2.3. analysis: explaining different levels of transparency under state ownership evidence from rgi data confirms that norway is at present a leader in resource transparency. it ranks first in the overall index, including other governance indicators, and appears to be particularly strong in most of the transparency-related sub-components. the country has paid special attention to the local impact of its extractive actions and developed sound legal requirements to deal with environmental concerns. despite a weaker performance in licensing, norway is one of the six countries of the index requiring and efficiently disclosing information on tax and other payments of extractive companies to governments. data are also disaggregated company to company and by payment type. the index stresses that this outcome is the result of both eiti membership and the adoption of a 2014 stricter regulation on payments to governments. on the soc level, equinor’s performance on transparency appears to be as strong as that of the government. the company ranks fourth in the index and demonstrates “good practice in financial reporting and transparency about government transfers, production, and subsidiaries” (rgi 2017b). this provides a first important finding: when a government ensures high levels of transparency, the soc also does so. as such, the domestic context in which a soc operates seems to greatly affect its disclosure performance. to further test this finding, one can look at russia’s and gazprom’s performances on transparency. overall, russia’s disclosure in the extractive sector is ranging from weak to very weak across the different sub-components. in light of its spectacular levels of inequality, even compared to other countries of the eurasian region, the rgi remarks a “troubling absence of transparency” (rgi 2017c) around public officials’ holdings in extractive companies and companies’ payments to the government. on the national wealth fund, the limited oversight by auditors or the parliament could further weaken disclosure of information, while the fund itself lacks clear rules on a number of points. similarly, concerns are raised on opacity regarding gazprom’s non-commercial activities and on board members’ governmental ties. gazprom’s overall score seems to confirm that where governments perform badly in terms of transparency, socs are not exempt from bad performance. bearing in mind scholars’ assumptions on the detrimental correlation between state ownership and transparency, while russia seems to confirm their concerns, norway’s case shows that the concentration of wealth, as it occurs under state ownership, can also enrich the state and lead to strong transparency mechanisms, even stronger than in other different ownership structures, as the report suggests. therefore, if state ownership is unable to explain such different levels of transparency in norway and russia, one should look at other factors. in recent years, increasing attention has been paid to the features of the norwegian extractive sector, as well as to its potential implementation in resource-rich developing countries. thurber et al. note that transparency in the norwegian separation model improves “the ability of the 14 review of european and russian affairs 12 (2), 2018 government to monitor and benchmark both the noc and other players in the sector, thereby improving performance” (2011, 3), and reduces any conflict of interest. while such a model accounts for a possible explanation, it has also been stressed that its effectiveness may be undermined by the overall political and institutional context, given that “a formal regulator […] may be powerless in practice and vulnerable to noc political lobbying and other forms of agency capture” (ibid.). the case of russia may be used for this purpose. while a formal separation exists and is highlighted by the rgi, and the federal tariff service has a clear regulatory role for gazprom, grigoryev notes, “in essence gazprom is a quasi-ministry that is regulating itself” (2007, 3041). also, thurber et al. (2011) remark that russia has low institutional quality and low political competition, and that these factors account for the failure of the separation model. as a matter of fact, the separation of functions can become a crucial gateway to enhance transparency only when excellent public management is already in place. in this respect, scholars (stiglitz 2002; melhum et al. 2006) have pointed out that this is crucial in the resource sector. thurber et al. have also added that institutional quality, coupled with political competition, “as the possibility that an executive and his or her political faction will lose power” (2011, 4), are the factors leading to an effective separation model. in this view, transparency is not only an outcome; rather, transparent state institutions enhance greater transparency in the resource sector. to provide some insights on institutional quality in norway and russia, one could refer to data from worldwide governance indicators (wgi), a research dataset summarizing the views on governance quality through six dimensions: voice and accountability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, control of corruption, and political stability. while scholars have highlighted a number of weaknesses in the dataset (see apaza 2009), including the fact that the overall study is based on perceptions, the wgi can nevertheless be useful to get a snapshot, albeit imperfect, of countries’ governance performance. figure 3: percentile rank among all countries (ranges from 0 (lowest) to 100 (highest) rank). data from worldwide governance indicators (wgi) project. data from figure 3 suggest that norway’s extractive sector greatly benefits from a strong enabling environment, with high scores for all indicators. when compared with those of russia, data seems to confirm that institutional capacity deserves a closer look in commodity-rich countries in order to enhance transparency and escape the resource curse. one should also remark that moscow’s 100 99 93 100 98 91 15 44 37 21 19 17 0 20 40 60 80 100 voice and accountability government effectiveness regulatory quality rule of law control of corruption political stability norway russia 15 review of european and russian affairs 12 (2), 2018 specific features further complicate the picture, as “russia’s strong vertical integration of political power reduces the space for any bottom-up transparency initiatives” (belyi and greene 2012, 2). in addition to the strong connection between the executive and the industry, and as the wgi score on ‘voice and accountability’ may suggest, russia’s civil society influence on transparency issues is significantly limited and “the lack of political opposition contributes to the opacity of the relationship between the extractive industry and political power” (ibid.). the key role of the industry for the executive at both domestic and international levels, coupled with russia’s authoritarian features since president putin’s rise to power, indicate that opacity, rather than transparency, is a strategic feature of russian state ownership. conclusion this paper attempted to demonstrate that state ownership in the resource sector is not always associated with opacity. while scholars’ cautions seem valid on russian ownership structure and confirm the need for a deeper look at state ownership as a variable and not a constant (luong and weinthal 2006b), in some cases, such as norway, state control over resources has led to improved performance and enhanced transparency. in this respect, this paper nuances those conclusions and stresses that the features of state ownership should be more investigated, and namely states’ capacity to effectively implement a separation of policy, commercial, and regulatory functions. also, this paper shares scholars’ focus (stiglitz 2002; melhum et al. 2006; thurber et al. 2011; khanna 2017) on the broader institutional and political framework within which state ownership is designed. to paraphrase a famous expression of the resource literature, this paper highlights the absence of a ‘state ownership curse’. as much as norway did in the 1970s, a number of resource-rich countries have retained control over resources and successfully committed themselves to strengthen their institutions (stiglitz 2002; thurber et al. 2011). if the effect of commodity wealth on transparency differs across state ownership structures, future studies should take into account not only state ownership, but also those institutional conditions under which commodity-rich countries can enjoy enhanced transparency and ultimately improve their political and economic outcomes. finally, to further test the correlation between ownership and transparency, other scholars could also analyse levels of disclosure under private ownership and assess whether privatisations produce a change in transparency and ultimately allow resource-rich countries to escape the curse. 16 review of european and russian 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indicators (wgi) project. http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#home accessed on 11 september 2018. zhan, j. v. 2017. do natural resources breed corruption? evidence from china. environmental and resource economics, 66(2), 237-259. https://www.resourcegovernanceindex.org/about/methodology https://www.resourcegovernanceindex.org/country-profiles/nor/oil-gas https://www.resourcegovernanceindex.org/country-profiles/rus/oil-gas https://www.ssrn.com/abstract=258978 http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#home 19 review of european and russian affairs 12 (2), 2018 published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada available online at: journals.carleton.ca/rera/index.php/rera rera is an open-access electronic academic double-blind peer-reviewed journal. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is a joint project of the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies (carleton university) and its associated research unit, the centre for european studies. rera aims to provide an accessible forum for research, to promote high standards of research and scholarship, and to foster communication among young scholars. rera aims to provide an accessible forum for research, to promote high standards of research and scholarship, and to foster communication among young scholars. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada tel: +01 613 520-2600 ext. 3117; e-mail: rera-journal@carleton.ca creative commons license creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0 this working paper is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial no derivs 3.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 3.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, provided the source is acknowledged. no use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes. issn: 1718-4835 © 2018 the author(s) https://journals.carleton.ca/rera/index.php/rera mailto:rera-journal@carleton.ca http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ chantal lavalle_volume3_issue2 review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 2/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 54 ………………………………………………………………… la gouvernance de la sécurité au sein de l’ue : un nouveau défi pour le canada chantal lavallée 1 abstract since 1976, canada and the eu developed and enlarged their relations including not only investment and trade, but also international security, environment, justice, culture, etc. during the last decade, the european union progressively became an actor in the field of security and defence with the adoption of the european security and defence policy (esdp). esdp is entering in the logic outside of the traditional framework analysis that conceives security as a natural input, linked to territorial defence and assumed only by the state via military means. if esdp entered in an intergovernmental logic, it is no longer the exclusive field of the member states, but rather the result of interactions between a broad variety of public and private actors. in this new eu security governance, canada is bound to face a major challenge, but it’s not sure that it is conscious of all the possibilities for its foreign and security policy! keywords: esdp, security governance, canada-eu relations. résumé depuis 1976, le canada et l’ue ont développé et élargi leurs relations qui ne concernent pas seulement l’investissement et le commerce, mais aussi la sécurité internationale, l’environnement, la justice, la culture, etc. au cours de la dernière décennie, l’ue est devenue un acteur dans le domaine de la sécurité et la défense avec l’adoption de la politique européenne de sécurité et de défense (pesd) ce qui a eu un impact sur les relations ue-canada. il faut dire que la portée de la pesd dépasse le cadre d’analyse traditionnel qui conçoit la sécurité comme une donnée naturelle, liée à la défense territoriale et assumée seulement par l’etat à l’aide de moyens essentiellement militaires. en effet, si la pesd s’inscrit officiellement dans une logique intergouvernementale, elle ne concerne pas que les etats, mais elle est plutôt le résultat d’interactions entre une grande variété d’acteurs publics et privés. dans cette nouvelle perspective de la gouvernance de la sécurité au sein de l’ue, le canada est confronté à un défi de taille, mais encore faudrait-il savoir s’il est conscient de toutes les possibilités pour sa politique étrangère et de sécurité ! mots clés : gouvernance de la sécurité,pesd, relations canada-ue. 1 doctorante rattachée au centre d’études des politiques étrangères et de sécurité (cepes), chercheuse associée à la chaire de recherche du canada en politiques étrangère et de défense canadiennes et chargée de cours au département de science politique de l’université du québec à montréal (uqàm). review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 2/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 55 1. introduction le canada et l’union européenne (ue) entretiennent, depuis 1976 et l'accord-cadre de coopération économique et commerciale2, des relations qui, au-delà du commerce et de l’investissement, ont été élargies au fil du temps à de nombreux domaines tels que la sécurité internationale, l’environnement, la justice, les migrations, l’éducation, la culture, etc. les relations entre le canada et l’ue ont ainsi su s’adapter à la nouvelle donne internationale.3 par ailleurs, l’intégration européenne a, elle aussi, bien progressé, particulièrement au cours de la dernière décennie. l’union européenne (ue) s’est, entre autres, progressivement affirmée sur la scène internationale, en se donnant les moyens d’assumer ses responsabilités en matière de politique étrangère, de sécurité et de défense. l’ue est ainsi passée de la coopération politique européenne (cpe), forum de discussion informelle en matière de politique étrangère, à l’adoption de politiques visant à coordonner son action également dans le domaine de la sécurité et de la défense. la politique européenne de sécurité et de défense (pesd) fait partie intégrante de la politique étrangère et de sécurité commune (pesc), et s’inscrit donc dans le second pilier de l’ue qui répond officiellement à une logique intergouvernementale. cependant, gisela müller-brandeckbocquet maintient que le processus décisionnel est beaucoup plus complexe et subtil qu’il n’y paraît. elle traduit cette complexité par la présence de quatre principes à l’œuvre au sein de la pesd, soit l’intergouvernementalisme, la souveraineté partagée, la « bruxellisation » et le supranationalisme. ce qui l’amène à conclure à l’émergence d’une troisième voie entre l’intergouvernementalisme et le supranationalisme.4 le phénomène d’« interpilarisation »5, soit d’une coopération entre les trois piliers sur lesquels repose l’ue, qui est de plus en plus à l’œuvre dans la gestion de cette politique, a sûrement contribué à cette transformation. il y a, en effet, plusieurs acteurs issus des différentes institutions européennes qui interviennent et interagissent en matière de pesd. en décloisonnant l’analyse de cette politique atypique à sa seule dimension intergouvernementale, müller-brandeck-bocquet ouvre un débat fort intéressant bien qu’elle ne s’attarde qu’aux acteurs officiels. il apparaît pourtant invraisemblable que les acteurs nationaux comme les acteurs européens travaillent en vase clos et qu’ils soient isolés des influences extérieures. nous assistons plutôt à l’émergence d’une nouvelle forme de gouvernance au sein de l’ue, en ce qui concerne la gestion de la sécurité. une situation nouvelle qui se présente également comme un défi pour les pays tiers tel que le canada. a ce propos, nous pouvons questionner le positionnement du canada à l’égard de l’europe. prend-t-il vraiment en compte la nouvelle dynamique au sein de l’ue et les possibilités qui s’offrent à lui en matière de politique étrangère, de sécurité et de défense dans l’élaboration de sa position vis-à-vis de l’europe? dans le cadre de cet article, j’essayerai, dans un premier temps, de montrer comment se traduit cette gouvernance européenne de la sécurité, qui sont les acteurs, quels sont les enjeux et les 2 a ce moment là, il s'agit du premier accord de coopération de la communauté avec un pays industrialisé. 3 l’accord-cadre de 1976 demeure la principale base juridique des relations formelles qu'entretiennent l'ue et le canada, mais des déclarations politiques ont été adoptées en 1990 et en 1996, de manière à faciliter la coopération dans un plus large éventail de domaines. 4 gisela müller-brandeck-bocquet, « the new cfsp and esdp decision-making system of the european union », european foreign affairs review, vol. 7, no. 3 (2002), pp. 257-282. 5 simon duke, « cesdp: nice’s overtrumped success? », european foreign affairs review, vol. 6, no. 2 (2001), p. 174. review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 2/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 56 processus qui l’animent? dans un deuxième temps, j’évaluerai l’impact de cette nouvelle donne européenne sur les relations transatlantiques, particulièrement entre le canada et l’ue. 2. la gouvernance de la sécurité au sein de l’ue un nouveau type de gouvernance a pris forme au sein de l’ue6, non pas en termes de niveaux hiérarchiques, où l’état est nécessaire au sommet, mais plutôt comme un système d’interactions entre différents réseaux d’acteurs. force est d’admettre que la décision finale est peut-être prise par les acteurs étatiques, mais la compréhension de la décision passe par l’étude du processus qui la précède. dès lors que nous parlons de gouvernance de la sécurité, il importe d’accorder une attention particulière aux acteurs publics et privés, à leur rôle, à leur trajectoire socioprofessionnel, à leurs interactions, aux possibles compétitions institutionnelles ou luttes de positionnement afin d’éviter que l’étude ne soit trop descriptive. cette approche sociologique est d’autant plus utile qu’elle révèle de nouvelles pratiques de sécurité tant au niveau des acteurs étatiques que non étatiques. les acteurs étatiques et européens au sein d’un processus décisionnel de plus en plus ouvert les prises de position des chefs d’état et de gouvernement au sein du conseil européen et des ministres des affaires étrangères au sein du conseil, sont le résultat d’interactions entre un ensemble d’individus. considérant que les ministres de la défense ne se réunissent pas au sein du conseil, mais seulement dans le cadre de rencontres informelles, il y a de nombreuses interactions entre les ministères de la défense et des affaires étrangères qui ne sont souvent pas dépourvues de compétitions bureaucratiques. s’inscrivant dans des contextes historiques spécifiques, la relation entre le politique et le militaire, voire ce rapport de force, varie d’un pays à l’autre et, dans certains cas, a un impact direct sur la prise de décision.7 également, ces prises de position sont issues des interactions entre les homologues des ministères des états membres de l’ue. au niveau des ministères, de nombreux échanges de fonctionnaires entre les différents pays de l’ue jouent aussi un rôle dans le rapprochement des positions, à tout le moins, ils favorisent une meilleure compréhension des visions de chacune des administrations.8 par exemple, la fonctionnaire rattachée à la délégation des affaires stratégiques (das) du ministère français de la défense et qui fut envoyée en échange pendant trois ans, au ministère de la défense britannique, y a été nommée l’officier responsable de la pesd, témoignant du sérieux et de la portée de ces échanges.9 les positions du conseil européen et du conseil des ministres résultent aussi de négociations intenses entre les fonctionnaires travaillant au sein des ambassades, mais surtout, et de plus en plus, au sein des représentations permanentes des états membres auprès de l’ue (rp). en effet, 6 mark webber et al., « the governance of european security », review of international studies, vol. 30, no. 1 (2004), pp. 3-26. dans cet article, nous pouvons lire une section sur la gouvernance de la sécurité avec la pesd, mais la perspective est plutôt descriptive que théorique. je pense que nous pouvons pousser la réflexion plus en profondeur sur les conséquences d’une telle gouvernance. 7 frédéric mérand, «social representations in the european security and defence policy », cooperation and conflict, vol. 41, no. 2 (2006), pp. 131-152. 8 jolyon howorth, «discourse, ideas and epistemic communities in european security and defence policy», west european politics, vol. 27, no. 2 (2004), p. 220. 9 entretien réalisé au ministère de la défense britannique, en mai 2005. review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 2/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 57 le centre d’action de l’ue se trouve indéniablement à bruxelles. situées au cœur de l’activité européenne, les représentations permanentes favorisent les rencontres sur une base régulière entre les représentants des pays membres. la socialisation y est particulièrement forte entre les homologues des représentations qui se connaissent très bien et se côtoient, aussi souvent que nécessaire. dans le cas des homologues français et britanniques, il n’est pas rare qu’ils se retrouvent dans un cadre informel, chacun muni de leur feuille de route afin de trouver un compromis et de faire converger les directives venant de leur gouvernement respectif.10 il faut préciser que les représentations permanentes abritent toute une équipe de fonctionnaires travaillant sur les questions de sécurité et de défense, sous la direction de l’ambassadeur au comité politique et de sécurité (cops) et du représentant au comité militaire de l’ue. les représentations permanentes jouent un rôle incontournable, d’autant plus qu’elles sont connectées aux réseaux d’acteurs transnationaux. en effet, l’état n’est plus le seul acteur à intervenir dans la gestion de la sécurité. michel barnier l’a bien compris, ancien commissaire européen, une fois nommé ministre français des affaires étrangères, il a voulu remédier à la perte d’influence de la france auprès de l’ue.11 pour lui, il est clair à ce moment que « si paris ne favorise pas très vite la création de think tanks indépendants, mais ouverts aux idées françaises, la france va perdre toute capacité de persuasion en europe. la représentation permanente de la france auprès de l’ue a depuis une attachée chargée des relations avec les think tanks… »12 nous retrouvons, à ce propos, sur son site internet, une section intitulée « cercles de réflexion/think tanks». « un dispositif de veille des activités des principaux think tanks traitant des questions européennes ainsi qu’une politique de contact »13 a été mis en place. des consultants, des acteurs issus d’organisations non gouvernementales (ong) et de think tanks ont ainsi des contacts réguliers avec les représentations permanentes qui, selon eux, jouent un rôle important dans la définition de la pesd et sont ainsi des lieux clés dans leur stratégie d’influence.14 de même, j’y reviendrai, mais ces acteurs non étatiques entretiennent des liens étroits avec les différentes institutions européennes. la pesd est dotée de structures qui lui sont propres, au sein de l’ue, permettant entre autres à l’ue de mener des missions civiles et militaires. il s’agit du cops, du comité militaire de l’ue (cmue) et de l’état-major de l’ue (emue). le sitcen et la direction générale-e du secrétariat viennent aussi appuyer le travail du secrétaire général du conseil javier solana qui, depuis 1999, occupe aussi le poste de haut représentant pour la pesc (hr). communément appelé monsieur pesc, javier solana, en plus de personnifier l’ue sur la scène internationale, joue un rôle non négligeable de négociateur, de facilitateur, de médiateur et détient un certain degré d’autonomie. pour ce qui est des autres institutions européennes, la 10 entretiens réalisés au sein des représentations permanentes britannique et française auprès de l’ue, en juin 2005. 11 « michel barnier estime néanmoins que la france doit réagir au changement d’environnement européen et mondial en revoyant son mode d’action. » rapportait henri de bresson dans son article « michel barnier : la diplomatie de la france passe par l’europe », le monde (en ligne), 27 août 2004, www.lemonde.fr/web/imprimer_article/0,1-0@23214,36-376747,0.html 12 stephen boucher et martine royo, les think tanks. cerveaux de la guerre des idées, paris, éditions du félin, 2006, p. 57. 13 la représentation permanente de la france auprès de l’ue, cercles de réflexion/think tanks, (en ligne) http://www.rpfrance.eu/article/imprim.php3?id_article=221 (page consultée le 7 septembre 2006). 14 entretiens réalisés avec des acteurs issus de think tanks et d’ong, en juillet 2006. review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 2/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 58 commission fait partie de la troïka15 et peut ainsi participer aux rencontres du conseil européen et du conseil des ministres concernant la pesc/pesd. dans l’esprit de la stratégie européenne de sécurité, c’est un véritable exercice de coordination qui se met en branle entre les directions générales du commerce, de l’aide humanitaire, du développement, de l’élargissement, des relations extérieures et des délégations de la commission à travers le monde; sans négliger le rôle de gestionnaire de la commission en matière du budget pesc/pesd, concernant les aspects administratifs et civils. le parlement européen, pour sa part, s’il joue un rôle marginal, doit néanmoins être régulièrement informé et consulté par la présidence de l’ue, le hr et la commission sur l’évolution de la pesc/pesd. il peut adresser des questions au conseil. au sein du parlement, la commission des affaires étrangères, assistée par la sous-commission « sécurité et défense », est ainsi chargée de suivre les dossiers de la pesc et de la pesd. cependant, le parlement n’exerce aucun pouvoir direct en la matière et son droit de recommandation est plus politique que juridique. le parlement est, par ailleurs, directement concerné au niveau des sommes allouées au budget de la pesc/pesd pour les aspects administratifs et civils. bref, voilà autant de points d’entrées et de lieux d’influence pour les acteurs non étatiques qui souhaitent participer au débat et peser sur les orientations données à la pesd. 3. l’émergence d’acteurs non étatiques au sein d’une nouvelle gouvernance, celle de la sécurité européenne il est vrai que le phénomène est encore très récent en europe, surtout si nous le comparons avec ce qui se passe aux états-unis, mais de plus en plus de think tanks, de consultants et d’ong vont s’installer à bruxelles; la capitale européenne est devenue un bon endroit pour développer et entretenir des contacts.16 le rôle grandissant de l’ue sur la scène internationale, n’est sûrement pas étranger à l’émergence de ces acteurs. la portée de l’action de ces acteurs est générale et globale, une conséquence de l’augmentation du pouvoir, du champ de compétences et du rôle de l’ue dans le monde. ainsi, les think tanks et les ong cherchent à jouer un rôle auprès de l’ue, à avoir un impact sur ses politiques et surtout, à avoir accès au débat européen.17 qu’ils mènent des études pour les gouvernements ou les institutions européennes, ils possèdent une expertise et cherchent, de plus en plus, à influencer quelque soit le domaine, y compris celui de la sécurité et la défense. le changement d’attitude des gouvernements qui, à la suite de la fin de la guerre froide, ont dû composer avec des coupures budgétaires importantes et le besoin de garder une maîtrise des dossiers, a ouvert le processus quant à l’ue, sa structure même bouscule les paramètres traditionnels de la gestion des dossiers, y compris celui de la sécurité. il faut, dès lors, repenser la gestion de la sécurité dans une perspective de gouvernance au sein de laquelle se déroulent des interactions entre acteurs publics et privés, organisant leurs intérêts communs et divergents. dans l’étude des acteurs de la société civile en europe, il faut souligner un cas d’exception, un think tank proprement européen. en effet, l’ue est la seule organisation régionale à avoir son 15 la troïka comprend la présidence en exercice de l’ue, le haut représentant pour la pesc et un représentant de la commission européenne. la troïka est surtout active sur la scène internationale. 16 comme en témoigne annuaire des think tanks traitant des questions européennes tel que présenté sur le site de la représentation permanente de la france auprès de l’ue, http://www.rpfrance.eu/article.php3?id_article=218 17 remarques faites par plusieurs acteurs qui travaillent à bruxelles et que j’ai rencontrés en entrevue, en juillet 2006. review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 2/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 59 propre think tank, une véritable boîte à penser sur l’europe. il s’agit de l’institut d’études de sécurité (ies) de l’union européenne, hérité de l’union de l’europe occidentale (ueo). cet institut de recherche invite, en rotation, des chercheurs venant des différents pays membres de l’ue. il est d’ailleurs surprenant que la première institution du genre se concentre sur les enjeux rattachés à la sécurité européenne alors que l’ue traite de milliers d’autres sujets. « l’ies contribue au développement de la pesc en assurant trois fonctions : la recherche et le débat sur les questions de sécurité pertinentes pour l’union; l’analyse prospective pour le conseil et le haut représentant de l’ue; le développement d’un dialogue transatlantique sur l’ensemble des questions de sécurité entre tous les pays européens, le canada et les états-unis. »18 le statut de l’institut d’études de sécurité donne aux chercheurs qui y travaillent un accès privilégié aux fonctionnaires et aux dirigeants européens, ce qui n’est pas donné à tous les think tanks. malgré l’aspect novateur entourant la mise en place de cette agence, il y a des limites à l’action de l’ies puisqu’elle n’a pas tout à fait le même rôle qu’un think tank « traditionnel ». en effet, les chercheurs n’y ont pas nécessairement la même marge de manœuvre bien qu’officiellement indépendante, l’ies n’en demeure pas moins une agence européenne. ceci étant dit, dans ce nouveau contexte européen, des réseaux transnationaux d’acteurs s’organisent de manière formelle et informelle. il est indéniable que «la disponibilité des fonds européens pour des think tanks qui établissent des partenariats de recherche avec d’autres think tanks et organisations à travers l’union a fait progresser la collaboration dans ce secteur. »19 par exemple, la commission européenne finance the conflict prevention partnership qui regroupe international crisis group, international alert, european policy centre et european peacebuilding office. ce partenariat vise, entre autres, à renforcer les capacités de l’ue et de ses membres dans la prévention de conflit, la gestion de crise et la reconstruction de la paix.20 un exemple de l’étroite collaboration entre ces acteurs issue de ce partenariat, gareth evans, président de l’international crisis group, est aussi membre du conseil de l’european policy centre (epc).21 à côté de ces partenariats officiels, nous retrouvons aussi des coopérations informelles entre thinks tanks, ong et consultants.22 ce qui confirme qu’il n’y a pas un réseau, mais bien des réseaux d’acteurs publics et privés qui se chevauchent et qui s’entrecroisent. les think tanks peuvent aussi servir de moyen d’influence pour les états membres, j’ai déjà noté le cas de la france qui souhaite relancer sa capacité d’influence à bruxelles, en encourageant l’émergence de think tanks, mais elle n’est pas la seule. « londres assure son influence auprès des institutions européennes notamment par l’envoi de diplomates extrêmement bien formés aux 18 institut d’études de sécurité de l’union européenne. sur l’ies, (en ligne). http://www.iss.europa.eu/ (page consultée le 28 février 2007) 19 stephen boucher (dir.), l’europe et ses think tanks : un potentiel inaccompli, paris, notre europe (en ligne), 2004, p. 12. http://www.notre-europe.asso.fr/article.php3?id_article=537&lang=fr 20conflict prevention partnership, about the partnership, (en ligne). http://www.conflictprevention.net/index.cfm?if=99 (page consultée le 22 juin 2006) 21 european policy centre, governance: advisory council, (en ligne). http://www.theepc.be/en/ae2.asp? (page consultée le 28 juin 2006) 22 entretiens réalisés avec différents acteurs issus de think tanks, d’ong et de consultants pour des entreprises privées, en 2006 et en 2007. review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 2/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 60 questions européennes. les think tanks sont (aussi) un relais de persuasion de la diplomatie intellectuelle britannique efficace. »23 les think tanks comme les ong gagnent également en importance et en crédibilité puisqu’ils deviennent des lieux de formation, de véritables « réservoir(s) d’experts »24. toutes les personnes qui y travaillent sont susceptibles d’être éventuellement embauchées comme fonctionnaire au niveau national ou au niveau européen. ceci vaut aussi dans l’autre sens, il n’est pas rare de voir d’anciens fonctionnaires ou des militaires à la retraite poursuivre leur carrière au sein de think tanks, d’ong ou à titre de consultant, mettant ainsi à profit leur expertise acquise sur le terrain et surtout leur réseau de contacts. désormais, ce sont des acteurs connus qui ont donc un lien de confiance avec les acteurs étatiques, grâce à leur passé professionnel, mais surtout grâce à leur expertise. il n’y a pas de surprise, nous sommes bien en présence de réseaux d’acteurs, où les frontières sont poreuses. une étude des trajectoires de ces acteurs s’impose donc pour saisir les dynamiques internes. en consultant la liste des membres des conseils de think tanks européens et d’ong, il est frappant de constater que la majorité de ces membres sont d’anciens fonctionnaires européens ayant occupé des postes de haut niveau, d’anciens premiers ministres et ministres issus des pays membres. par exemple, christopher patten qui a une longue carrière en tant que diplomate britannique, fut le commissaire responsable de la dg-relex de 1999 à 2004 et est, à présent, coprésident de l’international crisis group et son parcours est loin d’être atypique. s’il demeure difficile, voire impossible, de mesurer l’influence réelle de ces acteurs sur l’élaboration de la pesd, nous ne pouvons pas la nier pour autant. il faut consulter les sites internet de think tanks, d’ong, de consultants pour constater l’intérêt manifesté à l’égard de cette politique atypique. en plus, de la tenue d’événements d’envergure, nous y retrouvons des rapports dans lesquels des recommandations sont formulées à l’attention des fonctionnaires européens et des dirigeants des états membres de l’ue. d’autres acteurs cherchent aussi à influencer et à se positionner, il s’agit de consultants auprès d’entreprises privées ou de représentants des entreprises elles-mêmes qui répondent aux appels d’offres des institutions européennes, de l’agence européenne de défense ou des gouvernements des états membres. ces acteurs n’évoluent pas seuls, indépendamment les uns des autres, mais s’inserts plutôt dans les différents réseaux de conseil avec des liens très forts autant intellectuels que commerciaux. dans ces réseaux, nous retrouvons donc tant des think tanks, des ong que des consultants ou des entreprises privées. dès lors, il n’est pas rare de voir des représentants d’entreprises participer aux activités organisées par des think tanks ou des ong et publier des articles sur les sites internet ou dans les publications de ces organisations, autant de façon pour les acteurs privés de diffuser leurs idées et leurs visions de la sécurité et de la défense en europe par le biais des différents réseaux à leur disposition. 4. les relations canado-européennes dans une nouvelle géométrie il est, dès lors, pertinent de s’interroger sur l’impact de cette nouvelle gouvernance au sein de l’ue sur les relations transatlantiques, particulièrement entre l’ue et le canada. est-ce que le 23stephen boucher et martine royo, op.cit., pp. 66-67. 24 stephen boucher (dir.), l’europe et ses think tanks... op.cit., p. 37. review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 2/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 61 canada prend suffisamment en compte la transformation opérée du côté européen en matière de sécurité dans la gestion de ses relations avec l’ue? le gouvernement canadien s’est-il positionné de façon stratégique dans ce nouveau contexte? utilise-t-il tous les moyens à sa disposition pour se faire entendre auprès de bruxelles? l’ue et le canada entretiennent depuis longtemps des relations de manière formelle qui touchent, entre autres, la sécurité internationale. le dialogue de haut niveau est assuré par des sommets et des rencontres ministérielles, mais aussi par des contacts entre les directeurs politiques et entre les diplomates.25 a titre d’exemple, dans le domaine qui nous intéresse pour cet article, lors du sommet ue-canada, du 24 novembre 2005, un accord établissant un cadre pour la participation du canada aux opérations de gestion de crise menées par l’ue, a ainsi été signé. le canada a d’ailleurs participé à plusieurs missions européennes, depuis 2003, mais la base de cette collaboration fut jusque-là ad hoc bien que le gouvernement canadien a toujours souhaité un cadre juridique pour préciser les modalités de sa participation à ces missions, espérant y jouer un rôle accru.26 comment le gouvernement canadien est-il parvenu à un tel accord ? au-delà des sommets, des rencontres et réunions officielles entre les représentants de l’ue et du canada, il y a donc d’autres facettes de ces relations à prendre en compte afin de saisir comment le gouvernement canadien parvient à faire entendre sa position. a titre de bailleur de fonds ou de membre de think tanks et d’ong, nous retrouvons aussi des ministères des affaires étrangères ou des ressortissants d’états tiers. en effet, si les think tanks peuvent servir de moyen d’influence auprès de l’ue pour les états membres, les pays tiers ont bien compris qu’ils pouvaient eux aussi y recourir, d’autant plus qu’ils ne sont pas membres de l’ue. en s’associant avec ces acteurs, les états tiers cherchent à bénéficier des réseaux de contacts de ces organisations pour avoir accès aux décideurs européens, aux analyses des experts ou tout simplement pour suivre et participer aux débats au sein de l’ue, y compris sur les questions de sécurité et de défense. ces diverses organisations deviennent ainsi, pour la plupart, de véritables agences de réseautage, d’ailleurs ces acteurs se présentent souvent comme des joueurs clés à la croisée des chemins, à l’intersection entre les dirigeants européens et la société civile. dans ce nouveau contexte, le canada ne fait pas exception. ainsi, l’agence canadienne de développement international (acdi), le centre canadien de recherches pour le développement international et le ministère des affaires étrangères et du commerce international du canada contribuent au financement de l’international crisis group (icg). l’icg, dont j’ai déjà parlé, est une ong à but non lucratif qui fait partie de différents réseaux de recherche et d’influence et qui travaille à la prévention et la résolution des conflits, grâce à des envoyés sur le terrain et une équipe de représentants, entretenant des contacts étroits avec les décideurs. cette ong ne se concentre pas seulement sur l’ue, mais a une équipe à bruxelles et a réalisé différents rapports incluant des recommandations s’adressant à l’ue et concernant son rôle sur la scène internationale. à noter que deux canadiens se retrouvent dans le 25 conseil de l’ue, sommet ue-canada, ottawa, 18 mars 2004, 7431/04 (presse 83), pp. 5-6. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/fr/er/79509.pdf 26 conseil de l’ue, javier solana signs eu-canada agreement establishing a framework for the participation of canada in eu crisis management operations, bruxelles, 24 novembre 2005, s381/05, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/declarations/87119.pdf review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 2/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 62 comité exécutif de l’icg, soit frank giustra d’endeavour financial et kim campbell qui fut brièvement première ministre du canada, en 1993. par ailleurs, concernant les think tanks, jeremy kinsman, l’ancien ambassadeur à la mission du canada auprès de l’ue, fut pendant son mandat à bruxelles un membre du conseil de l’ european policy centre (epc), un think tank bruxellois.27 un rôle que son successeur ross hornby, en poste depuis août 2006, n’a cependant pas conservé. voilà qui m’amène à parler de la mission du canada auprès de l’ue qu’on peut comparer aux représentations permanentes des états membres auprès de l’ue, dans la mesure où elle devient aussi un lieu incontournable de socialisation pour les différents acteurs impliqués dans les relations entre le canada et l’ue. d’abord, à l’intention des diplomates canadiens provenant des diverses ambassades en europe et de ceux basés à ottawa, elle organise des séminaires sur le fonctionnement des institutions européennes et le rôle de l’ue en général.28 egalement, un fonctionnaire est assigné aux dossiers concernant la sécurité et la défense de l’ue et les relations avec le canada dans ce domaine. il est régulièrement en contact d’une part avec la direction de l’ue au sein du ministère des affaires étrangères et du commerce international (maeci), à ottawa et de l’autre, avec tous les acteurs nationaux, européens et transnationaux susceptibles de l’aider dans son travail.29 la mission du canada auprès de l’ue entretient des relations particulières avec deux think tanks situés à bruxelles, le centre for european policy studies (ceps) et l’epc. par exemple, lors de la visite de jean charest, à bruxelles, en mars 2005, le premier ministre québécois a participé avec jeremy kinsman et des représentants du conseil et de la commission européenne à une conférence intitulée « quebec/canada and the eu: a growing and strategic transatlantic relation » et organisée en collaboration et dans les locaux du ceps.30 de même, le 5 décembre 2006, la mission du canada en collaboration avec l’epc a réuni un groupe de discussion de haut niveau sur « le rôle de la sécurité humaine dans la politique étrangère : quelles leçons pour l’ue ? ». le panel comptait, entre autres, le nouvel ambassadeur ross hornby, mary kaldor qui a présidé le groupe d’étude qui a rédigé « a human security doctrine for europe » pour le hr et richard wright, directeur de la plateforme de crise pesc à la commission européenne.31 la mission du canada compte aussi parmi ses principaux partenaires le forum sur le commerce canada-europe (forcce) qui « a été créé en 1999 par différentes sociétés européennes et canadiennes cherchant à répondre au besoin d’un dialogue efficace entre le canada et l’europe sur les enjeux d’affaires, ouvrant la voie à une plus grande coopération transatlantique à tous les niveaux de la relation canada-ue. »32 dans cette perspective, il est intéressant de noter qu’un des quatre groupes de travail du forcce, celui concernant la recherche et le développement, est 27 european policy centre, governance: advisory council, (en ligne). http://www.theepc.be/en/ae2.asp? (page consultée le 28 juin 2006) 28 mission du canada auprès de l’ue, événements canada-ue, (en ligne). http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/canadaeuropa/eu/can_eu_events-fr.asp (page consultée le 1er mars 2007) 29 entretien réalisé à la mission du canada auprès de l’ue, bruxelles, mars 2005. 30 jean charest, jeremy kinsman, jim cloos et richard wright, « quebec/canada and the eu: a growing and strategic transatlantic relation», ceps, 3 mars 2005, http://www.ceps.be/event.php?event_id=102 31 « le rôle de la sécurité humaine dans la politique étrangère : quelles leçons pour l’ue? », epc, décembre 2006, http://www.epc.eu/en/er.asp?typ=er&lv=293&see=y&t=2&pg=er/en/detail&l=&ai=660 32 mission du canada auprès de l’ue, nos partenaires, (en ligne), http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/canadaeuropa/eu/partners-fr.asp (page consultée le 1er mars 2007) review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 2/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 63 présidé par bombardier et eads.33 pourtant, bombardier demeure peu présent dans les cercles de réflexion en europe, contrairement à d’autres compagnies du secteur tel que boeing. dans un autre ordre d’idées, il y a également l’association d’études sur la communauté européennecanada (ecsa-c) qui veille au développement d’échanges entre des chercheurs canadiens et européens sur leur activité de recherche portant sur l’ue, comme en témoigne la conférence transatlantique du réseau canadien des jeunes chercheurs en études européennes, intitulée « l'union européenne et le canada : défis communs et leurs réponses politiques » qui a eu lieu à l'institut universitaire européen (iue), à florence, en italie, le 27 avril 2007 et qui est à l’origine de ce numéro spécial de la revue des affaires européennes et russes. l’ecsa-c entretient des contacts étroits avec la délégation de l’ue à ottawa et le ministère canadien des affaires étrangères et du commerce international et se présente comme une plateforme de discussion entre les décideurs, les chercheurs, les médias et les entreprises.34 nous pouvons bien sûr nous interroger sur l’influence réelle de ces organisations, néanmoins nous assistons à une multiplication de lieux de débat, d’acteurs et de moyens à la disposition du canada, autant des acteurs étatiques que de ceux de la société civile pour faire entendre leur position et leurs attentes dans leurs relations avec l’ue. il a été question plus haut de la visite du premier ministre québécois jean charest, à bruxelles, il ne faut donc pas oublier la présence de la délégation générale du québec à bruxelles qui, depuis 1972, a pour mandat d'assurer le rayonnement du québec et la promotion de ses intérêts, entre autres, au sein des institutions européennes avec le service des affaires européennes qui veille « à ce que le québec constitue un interlocuteur actif dans le cadre de la coopération entre le canada et l’union européenne. »35 un autre acteur qu’il faut donc également prendre en considération dans les relations canada-ue sous l’angle essentiellement de la politique étrangère et non pas de la sécurité ni de la défense qui nous intéresse dans cet article puisqu’elles ne relèvent pas des compétences provinciales. la délégation générale du québec organise aussi des séminaires de formations et des missions pour des personnalités politiques, des représentants d’institutions ou organismes québécois, comme ce fut le cas lors de la visite de jean charest, en 2005. d’ailleurs, la délégation générale du québec possède un réseau de contacts impressionnant qui en surprend plusieurs, à commencer par les fonctionnaires travaillant à la mission du canada. il ne faut pas pour autant en déduire que la mission du canada et la délégation générale du québec sont en compétition, au contraire, elles sont amenées à coopérer dans la tenue d’événements.36 voilà qui ouvre un débat intéressant sur une nouvelle façon d’aborder les relations entre le canada et l’ue. si ces exemples laissent croire à un positionnement stratégique du canada à l’égard de la nouvelle réalité européenne en matière de politique étrangère, de sécurité et de défense, je m’interroge néanmoins sur l’absence de représentants canadiens, soit à titre de partenaires ou à titre de membre au sein du conseil d’ong et de think tanks stratégiques37, où 33 forum sur le commerce canada-europe, structure et fonctionnement, (en ligne), http://www.canadaeurope.org/fr/aboutus/operatingstructure.htm (page consultée le 2 mars 2007) 34 association d’études sur la communauté européenne-canada, about us (en ligne), http://web.uvic.ca/ecsac/about.html (page consultée le 5 avril 2006) 35 la délégation générale du québec à bruxelles, nos services (en ligne), http://www.mri.gouv.qc.ca/bruxelles/fr/delegation/qui_sommes_nous/services.asp, (page consultée le 3 mars 2007) 36 entrevue réalisée à la mission du canada auprès de l’ue, bruxelles, mars 2005. 37 à titre d’exemple, friends of europe/ les amis de l’europe qui se veut également un lieu de débat sur l’avenir de l’europe, mais a priori pas sur la défense, mettant en contact des acteurs publics et privés. entre autres activités, il review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 2/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 64 bon nombre de représentants de pays tiers sont pourtant présents, à commencer par ceux provenant des états-unis. de même, le canada est officiellement absent du security and defence agenda (sad) qui a succédé au new defence agenda, en février 2006. en effet, si des représentants de la mission canadienne participent régulièrement aux activités du sad, il n’y a pas de coopération formelle ou institutionnalisée. pourtant, le sad « se présente lui-même comme le seul forum régulier à bruxelles, où l’otan, l’ue, les représentants d’entreprises et les universitaires, les personnalités politiques et les journalistes peuvent discuter du futur des politiques de sécurité et de défense européennes et transatlantiques. le sad sert aussi de centre de réseautage de think tanks liés à la défense à travers l’europe. »38 il est présidé par le secrétaire général de l’otan jaap de hoop scheffer, par le hr javier solana, le commissaire pour la justice, liberté et sécurité franco frattini et la commissaire pour les relations extérieures benita ferrero-waldner. le sad est lié au forum europe qui, depuis 1989, se veut également une plateforme de débat entre acteurs publics et privés.39 dans le même ordre d’idées, les deux derniers séminaires de l’ies, qui veille, entre autres, au développement d’un dialogue transatlantique sur l’ensemble des questions de sécurité entre tous les pays européens, le canada et les états-unis, ont portés essentiellement sur les relations entre l’ue et les états-unis. il est vrai que le contexte international des dernières années peut expliquer en partie la situation, mais il n’en demeure pas moins que le canada se fait plutôt discret et qu’il pourrait jouer un rôle plus actif, pour élargir le dialogue transatlantique aussi à la réalité canadienne qui n’est pas nécessairement celle des états-unis. si les représentants canadiens sont moins présents dans les réseaux de la société civile en europe, ils privilégient peut-être davantage les contacts avec les acteurs officiels, de manière informelle, mais directement avec les personnes qui les intéressent. peut-être ont-ils la conviction que c’est de cette façon qu’ils ont le plus grand impact et qu’ils obtiennent satisfaction? au-delà des acteurs étatiques canadiens, ce sont aussi les entreprises privées, les think tanks et les ong canadiennes qui doivent se positionner dans ce nouveau paysage. la distinction entre ces acteurs s’impose en l’absence de concertation formelle, il demeure difficile de parler de la position du canada comme d’un tout homogène. puisque nous parlons des relations transatlantiques, il est frappant de voir des représentants d’entreprises privées, de think tanks américains occuper des postes stratégiques dans des think tanks et des ong concernés par les questions européennes, voire installer une antenne de leur organisation à bruxelles, particulièrement en matière de politique étrangère, de sécurité et de défense. est-ce dû à des stratégies, des intérêts ou des budgets différents si les acteurs canadiens étatiques et non étatiques ne se positionnent pas sur l’ensemble de l’échiquier face à l’europe d’aujourd’hui? cette situation s’explique peut-être par le fait qu’au canada les rapports entre le gouvernement et la société civile diffèrent de ceux aux états-unis, ce qui se répercute au niveau international. il existe aussi une grande variété d’acteurs issus de la société civile à bruxelles, avec des objectifs, des intérêts et des thématiques de travail qui ne rejoignent pas nécessairement ceux poursuivis par les acteurs canadiens. c’est peut-être ce qui explique l’approche sélective adoptée par la mission du canada. organise régulièrement des « atlantic rendez-vous » via satellite entre bruxelles et washington, regroupant des officiels et des experts européens et américains des enjeux abordés. voir http://www.friendsofeurope.org/whatwedo.asp (page consultée le 1er mars 2007) 38 security and defence agenda, what we do (en ligne), http://www.securitydefenceagenda.org/what_we_do.asp (page consultée le 27 février 2007) 39 forum europe, about us, (en ligne), http://www.forum-europe.com/about.asp (page consultée le 27 février 2007) review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 2/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 65 5. conclusion en somme, la gestion de la sécurité est entrée dans un processus de transformation voire d’adaptation à la nouvelle donne internationale. il n’est, dès lors, plus possible d’étudier l’élaboration de la pesc/pesd, les relations entre l’ue et le canada et le positionnement du canada en matière de politique étrangère et de sécurité, sans prendre en considération l’influence et l’intervention d’une grande variété d’acteurs publics et privés au niveau national, au niveau transnational et au niveau européen. la gouvernance au sein de l’ue en matière de sécurité avec la pesc/pesd, avec tout ce qu’elle sous-tend, prend bien sûr une signification particulière en europe en raison de l’intégration européenne. pour certains, l’ouverture du processus décisionnel à des acteurs de la société civile vient démocratiser le système en plus de dépolitiser le processus. un argument qui vient alimenter le débat sur la crise que traversent les démocraties à travers le monde. pour d’autres, ce changement d’attitude représente plutôt un risque pour la démocratie, en déstabilisant le contrôle de l’état et en remettant en question les fondements mêmes de ses prérogatives. le cas de la pesd est fort intéressant parce qu’il ouvre une brèche dans la gestion traditionnelle de la sécurité et que les paramètres de sa gestion viennent modifier la donne pour le canada, un état tiers qui entretient des relations avec l’ue, mais également pour les acteurs de la société civile canadienne qui espèrent jouer un rôle sur la scène internationale; pourtant les deux restent en bout ligne encore en retrait dans cette nouvelle géométrie. dans un contexte, où certains n’hésitent pas à parler de la « bataille des idées » et de lutte de positionnement, où les interactions entre les différents acteurs qui participent au processus de dialogue qui précède les décisions de la pesd peuvent mener à des résultats concrets, je pense que la problématique soulevée dans cet article se pose et mérite d’être débattue pour comprendre comment les acteurs canadiens publics et privés évaluent l’ue et surtout, font connaître leur position. c’est toute la visibilité du canada en europe qui en découle. si les acteurs canadiens étatiques et non étatiques semblent avoir pris acte de l’émergence de nouveaux acteurs publics et privés actifs au sein de l’ue, nous sommes à même de nous interroger : est-ce qu’ils en font suffisamment pour se positionner de façon stratégique en europe? encore faut-il savoir s’ils le souhaitent vraiment. le débat est ouvert! why reforms fail: the role of ideas, interests and institutions review of european and russian affairs 11 (2), 2017 issn 1718-4835 criteria and methodologies for assessing efficiency of environmental government programs in the russian federation andrey margolin1 russian presidential academy of national economy and public administration abstract existing approaches to performance evaluation for environmental government programs require improvement. in the russian context, the obstacles to objective evaluation include: target indicators for state programs are not set according to smart (specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, time-bound) criteria; the importance of budget efficiency indicators for investment decision-making is underestimated; and, some approaches to ex post evaluation of government programs are oversimplified. specific recommendations are given that would allow improvement of the methodology for ex ante appraisal and ex-post evaluation of environmental programs. a flowchart is developed to guide decision-making on whether to terminate or continue the program on the basis of its overall evaluation rating, which is calculated using a modified program assessment rating tool (part), and the degree of conformity between actual and planned volume of financing. the flowchart represents a formalized procedure for the adjustment of the program implementation period and schedules for the achievement of target values for individual indicators; review of target indicator values; funding amounts and schedules; and change of management. a case study of two russian environmental programs, pure water and water industry development, is used to test the approaches recommended by the author. 1 andrey margolin is vice-rector at the russian presidential academy of national economy and public administration, moscow, russia. 2 review of european and russian affairs 11 (2), 2017 the craving for immediate enjoyment will always be stronger than the voice of conscience. even the fear that their own children will have nothing to breathe does not stop people. ―bernard werber, french writer introduction despite the broad consensus among socially responsible politicians, researchers and public figures on the urgent necessity of remediating accumulated environmental problems, everyday managerial decisions made by most public officials and business people are more often focused on short-term gain at the expense of possible long-term ecological implications. the logic behind the well-known saying “after us, the deluge” is based on the common misconception that the assimilatory capacity of the environment is nearly limitless. it would not be an exaggeration to say that this contributes to the increased urgency of the issue in terms of the growing threat of a global environmental crisis. for example, over half of the planet’s population only has access to low-quality drinking water; moreover, according to the world health organization2, the number of deaths caused by air pollution is nearly 7 million people per year. one of the most effective ways to overcome these challenges is the development and implementation of government programs (gps). such programs require substantial investment resources and have no immediate effect; besides, in many cases their impact cannot be quantified in the usual monetary terms. to a large extent, this is why, despite the existence of extensive research in this area, as well as several approved evaluation methodologies and their practical applications demonstrated in various countries of the world, environmental problems are still far from being solved and the task of selecting objective criteria and methods for evaluation of environmental government programs retains its relevance. what is the right way to choose indicators that would best reflect the goals of environmental programs? which criteria should we focus on when substantiating the efficiency targets for a government program, especially if we take into account the importance of its non-financial outcomes? how can we objectively evaluate the degree to which a program’s intermediate results are achieved? how do the results of such evaluation affect the decision of whether program implementation should be continued or suspended? this article aims to search for answers to these questions, which are anything but simple. the recommendations provided in the article are illustrated by a case study of two government programs implemented in the russian federation. methodology state programs are one of principal tools in the implementation of socio-economic policy in various fields, and primarily in the so-called public sector. it is nearly impossible to deal with such issues as the development of education, healthcare, culture, sport, prevention of environmental emergencies, and improving the condition of the natural environment without research-backed planning and efficient implementation of gps. since budget funds are always limited, the valuefor-money requirements are rather strict and are usually reflected in relevant methodologies for 2 “7 million premature deaths annually linked to air pollution.” world health organization, media centre, 25 march 2014. accessed on november 25, 2016. http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/2014/air-pollution/en/ http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/2014/air-pollution/en/ 3 review of european and russian affairs 11 (2), 2017 the evaluation of gp performance developed with due regard to best international practices (robinson 2013; kuzmin, o’sullivan and kosheleva 2009; shepherd 2012; afanasiev and shash 2013). a similar approach is employed in the russian federation, where there are currently several methodologies approved by laws and regulations on the federal (metodicheskie ukazaniya 2013) and regional levels 3 . these and other documents reflect the consensus of government representatives who bear personal responsibility for gp quality and experts who are professionally involved in gp development and feasibility evaluation. an analysis of efficiency 4 evaluation methodologies for government programs requires consideration of the following three aspects or stages of evaluation: 1) selection of target indicators (tis), or the quantitative and qualitative characteristics reflecting a program’s objectives. tis serve as the baseline for ex ante appraisal and ex post evaluation of a program; 2) ex ante appraisal, which is carried out at the stage of program development in order to make the decision about the program’s viability; and, 3) ex post evaluation, which is performed in order to ascertain whether the implementation progress corresponds to initial plans, identify the reasons for possible deviations and underused resources, and ultimately to decide whether program funding should be ceased or continued. a short review of existing approaches to these tasks is presented below. the choice of target indicators target indicators (tis) of any gp are qualitative and quantitative characteristics reflecting the degree of achievement of its main objectives. the key principles of ti selection and their brief descriptions are presented in table 1 (compiled by the author using the data from metodicheskie ukazaniya 2013). ti values are normally calculated in one of the following ways: (1) using data obtained from governmental statistical surveys; (2) using methodologies adopted by international organizations; (3) using methodologies approved by regulation of the russian government or a specific agency in charge of the program; and (4) using methodologies included in the program itself. the possibility of complete achievement of target values of these indicators within the established time limit is seen as a necessary requirement in ex ante appraisal of program efficiency. the existing framework guidelines give developers a lot of leeway when selecting target indicators for a specific gp. such freedom seems excessive, especially since it often extends to the choice of efficiency criteria. in most cases, the developers focus on the ti construction methodologies included within the program itself. this approach may lead to the violation of the principles of 3 for example: government of saint petersburg. “poryadok prinyatiya reshenii o razrabotke gosudarstvennykh programm sankt-peterburga” [procedure for decision making on the development of government programs in saint petersburg] december 25, 2013, last amendment september 28, 2016. http://docs.cntd.ru/document/822402754 4 the term efficiency is used in this paper in its interpretation as the ratio between outputs produced and amount of inputs used. it should be noted that, unlike private sector investment projects, government programs often have outputs and objectives that cannot be represented in monetary terms. http://docs.cntd.ru/document/822402754 4 review of european and russian affairs 11 (2), 2017 objectivity, unambiguity and credibility of ti selection, while carrying the additional risk of questionable quality of the results of the assessment of the gp’s ex ante and ex post efficiency. table 1 key principles of target indicator selection principle description social significance all target indicators must reflect end users’ degree of satisfaction with the public services as well as the quality and scope which the program is meant to improve objectivity and unambiguity each target indicator must unambiguously reflect progress toward achievement of the program’s objectives; one ti cannot be improved at the cost of other tis credibility the accuracy of the source data used to calculate tis must be verifiable cost effectiveness existing data collection procedures must be used to minimize the costs of ti calculation comparability it must be possible to accumulate results of ti calculation and ensure their comparability throughout the whole implementation period source: author compiled data from metodicheskie ukazaniya 2013. ex ante appraisal of government programs ex ante appraisal for russian federal and regional government programs is carried out at the gp development stage using the following criteria: (1) economic efficiency, which reflects the contribution of the gp to the economic development of the russian federation and its expected impacts on various spheres of the economy; and (2) social efficiency, which reflects the expected impact of the gp on social development, and is usually impossible to measure in terms of cost indicators. since neither federal nor regional laws contain any guidelines on the threshold values of economic and social efficiency criteria, program developers lack the necessary tools to answer the essential question: ‘is the contribution of this gp into the economic and/or social development of the russian federation valuable enough to recognize it as efficient?’ this is why decisions on whether to launch or reject a certain program are often made regardless of its possible economic and/or social impact. essentially, a positive result of ex ante appraisal currently depends to a much higher degree on the correlation between the prospects of ti achievement and the financial possibilities of the program’s initiators (or, for a federal-level program, the capacity of the federal budget). 5 review of european and russian affairs 11 (2), 2017 as is the case with ti selection, the methodological approaches to ex ante gp appraisal require further elaboration. some suggestions are provided below in the results and discussion section. ex post evaluation of government programs the guidelines for government program evaluation (metodicheskie ukazaniya 2013) state that the quintessence of ex post evaluation is the need to assess the extent to which the goals and objectives of separate program activities and the government program as a whole are achieved, as well as the ratio of actual to planned budget expenditure. the methodology presented in table 2 is currently used for the evaluation of most gps funded from the federal budget. table 2 standard criteria and methods for government program evaluation area of evaluation indicators efficiency criteria 1. the degree of achievement of program goals and objectives, defined as the simple average between actual and planned ti values datotal = 1 𝑛 ∑ 𝐼𝑘 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑛 𝑘=1 where: datotal is the indicator of the degree of achievement of gp goals and objectives; n is the number of target indicators; 𝐼𝑘 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 is the ratio of actual to planned value of the kth target indicator datotal ≥ 1 (1) 2. ratio of actual to planned budget expenditure ri= 𝐹𝑎 𝐹𝑝 where riз is the indicator of the ratio of actual (fa) to planned (𝐹𝑝) volume of gp funding ri ≤ 1 (2) an advantage of this system of indicators is its simplicity. in fact, no other tools are required to evaluate a program except for direct comparisons between actual and planned values of target indicators. however, is such a simplified approach sufficient for the solution of such a complicated task as government program evaluation? for instance, in order for the indicator of the degree of achievement of gp goals and objectives to be greater than 1 (formula 1 in table 2), it is not at all necessary for all actual indicator values to meet or exceed target values. this means that if this methodology is applied, a program can be considered effective even if one or more of its indicators do not reach target values. the fact of 6 review of european and russian affairs 11 (2), 2017 non-achievement of individual indicators of a program is not in itself a reason to label it as inefficient; however, it signifies the necessity of a thorough analysis of the underlying reasons. but if a program is already accepted as efficient, the question of further analysis will never arise. it is also worth noting that this approach to the determination of datotal is based on the assumption of equal importance of all indicators. but in reality, this is often not the case. one of the more promising directions for the development of gp evaluation methodologies is part (program assessment rating tool), which was created in the usa and widely used in many countries, including the russian federation (gilmour 2007; margolin 2013). it is interesting to note that at the start of the part initiative about 50% of all federal programs in the usa were assigned an “inefficient” status. after a year, this number went down to 30%, indicating an improvement in overall quality and outcome orientation of federal programs. the part approach is based on a generalized multi-criteria evaluation of expert opinions presented as answers to a series of questions grouped into four topical areas: 1) program purpose and design – determines the clarity of program purpose and importance of the program, efficiency of the proposed problem solving mechanisms, and resource allocation; 2) strategic planning – determines the presence of long-term and interim program objectives and performance indicators; 3) program management – assesses the program’s management quality, including financial oversight and coordination of program activities; and, 4) program results – assesses program performance on achievement of intermediary outputs and long-term outcomes. individual ratings are calculated for each of these four areas and then combined into an overall rating used to assess the efficiency of a government program. on the whole, although program performance evaluation methodologies have been tried and tested in many countries of the world, in practice, they often do not protect against misuse and inefficient use of budgetary and extra-budgetary funds, followed by program implementation results that can only be described as dismal. in such spheres as natural resource management and environmental protection, design flaws, construction, and maintenance mistakes can lead to major environmental disasters. some examples worth mentioning are the industrial accident at the sayanoshushenskaya hydroelectric plant (yenisei river, russia, august 2009), the explosion on the deepwater horizon oil rig in the gulf of mexico (louisiana, usa, april 2010), the fukushima daiichi nuclear disaster (northeast japan, march 2011), and there are many others. nevertheless, the part approach still seems to be the most viable, which is why its modified version is used in this paper to improve the current russian methodology of ex post gp evaluation. results and discussion in order to formulate specific guidelines for the improvement of gp performance evaluation methodologies, let us look at the approved target indicators for two large-scale environmental 7 review of european and russian affairs 11 (2), 2017 government programs: pure water5 and water industry development6, presented in table 3. an analysis of the data in table 3 indicates the following: (1) by default, the target indicators are considered to be equally significant, which is by no means the case in reality. for example, the relative weight of such target indicators of the pure water program (column 1 in table 3) as “percentage of borrowed funds in the total volume of capital investment into water supply, disposal and wastewater treatment facilities” or “percentage of water supplied by utility providers operating on the basis of concession agreements” is significantly inferior to almost all indicators that are directly related to the performance and safety of water supply, disposal, and treatment facilities. on the contrary, such tis as availability of centralized water supply and disposal services should receive higher weighting coefficients in comparison to the others. moreover, the assessment of program performance based solely on the ration between actual and planned indicator values (see formula 1 in table 2) can be insufficiently objective since it barely takes into account the actual progress in objective completion during program implementation. for example, if the value of the ti “percentage of wastewater purified to meet approved standards in the total volume of wastewater passed through sewage treatment facilities” for the pure water program is 52%, a perfunctory consideration seems to indicate that the actual to planned ti value ratio is 52 / 53 = 0.981. however, if we take into account the fact that the ti value was 46% at the start of program implementation (see table 3), this ratio becomes lower: (52 – 46) / (53 – 46) = 0.857. in essence, the suggested approach to dealing with unequal values of a program’s tis is as follows (see also the corresponding analytical formulas7):  to use a weighted average rather than simple average to calculate the ratio of actual to planned ti values. this will solve the problem of unequal significance of different indicators and their corresponding impacts on the results of performance evaluation;  to use the incremental values of tis rather than their absolute values;  to take into account the expected dynamics of ti values when calculating the ratios of actual to planned values. for example, in the pure water program, the value of the ti “availability of centralized water supply services to the population” is supposed to 5 government of the russian federation. “federal'naya tselevaya programma “chistaya voda” na 2011 2017 gody” [federal target program “clear water” for 2011-2017]. december 22, 2010. http://docs.cntd.ru/document/902256587 6 government of the russian federation. ”federal'naya tselevaya programma “razvitie vodokhozyaistvennogo kompleksa rossiiskoi federatsii v 2012 2020 godakh” [federal target program “water industry development in the russian federation” for 2012-2020]. april 19, 2012. http://docs.cntd.ru/document/902343713 7 datotal = ∑ ∝𝒏 𝑵 𝒏=𝟏 × 𝐷𝐴𝑛 ; (𝑻𝑰𝒏 𝒂 − 𝑻𝑰𝒏 𝒔 ) (𝑻𝑰𝒏 𝒑 − 𝑻𝑰𝒏 𝒔 ) , if the ti value is supposed to increase 𝐷𝐴𝑛 = (3) (𝑻𝑰𝒏 𝒔 − 𝑻𝑰𝒏 𝒂 ) (𝑻𝑰𝒏 𝒔 − 𝑻𝑰𝒏 𝒑 ) , if the ti value is supposed to decrease where ∝n, tisn, tian, tipn are respectively, the weighting factor for the nth ti, the value of the ti at the start of gp implementation, its actual and planned value in the gp implementation year under consideration. http://docs.cntd.ru/document/902256587 http://docs.cntd.ru/document/902343713 8 review of european and russian affairs 11 (2), 2017 increase, whereas the value of the ti percentage of polluted wastewater in the total volume of wastewater released into surface water bodies in the water industry development program is supposed to decrease. (2) it is important to take into account the macroeconomic conditions of government program implementation. one objective of the pure water program was to increase the percentage of capital investment into water supply, wastewater disposal, and purification systems out of the total volume of water industry revenue from 10% in 2011 to 31% in 2017. however, this would lead to an imbalance of supply and demand, since it would require increasing the service tariffs to a level that customers would not be able to afford. the situation with the water industry development program is similar. for example, the significance of the ti “number of projects for the construction (reconstruction) of sewage disposal and water recirculation facilities implemented via the mechanism of interest rate subsidies” appears to be minimal, particularly in the context of a gradual reduction of inflation, investment risks and, therefore, of market interest rates8. it is also worth noting that in current russian conditions, which are characterized by increased risks to investment activity, subsidizing interest rates is far from being the only mechanism of state support. another such mechanism includes, among others, the provision of state guarantees on bonds issued for the implementation of priority projects or the conclusion of special investment contracts that include tax benefits received by investors for the duration of the project. 8 in the fisher equation, the nominal interest rate is represented as the sum of inflation rate and the real interest rate, which, in turn, has a certain dependency on investment risks. therefore, even in the hypothetical case in which the inflation rate is reduced to zero, the nominal interest rate can remain quite high if the investor considers the project to have a high enough level of risk to include a risk premium in calculations. 9 review of european and russian affairs 11 (2), 2017 table 3 target indicators for the pure water and water industry development government programs pure water water industry development in the russian federation values at the beginning and end of the implementation period values at the beginning and end of the implementation period 2011 2017 2012 2020 percentage of water samples taken from the water supply system that do not meet the sanitary requirements of hygienic standards, % 16.4 14.4 increase in the population provided with improved water resources, million people 0.3 6.3 percentage of water samples taken from the water supply system that do not meet the microbiological requirements of hygienic standards, % 5 4.4 percentage of polluted wastewater in the total volume of wastewater released into surface water bodies, % 88.6 45.2 percentage of outdoor water lines that require replacement, % 43 28 percentage of population covered by measures aimed at increasing protection from negative waterrelated impacts in the total population of areas affected by detrimental water-related impacts, % 68.3 85 percentage of outdoor sewage systems that require replacement, % 36 27 percentage of water facilities with unsatisfactory and dangerous safety levels restored to safe operating conditions, % 17.6 92.3 10 review of european and russian affairs 11 (2), 2017 pure water water industry development in the russian federation values at the beginning and end of the implementation period values at the beginning and end of the implementation period 2011 2017 2012 2020 percentage of wastewater purified to meet approved standards in the total volume of wastewater passed through sewage treatment facilities, % 46 53 ratio of renovated and new hydrological stations and laboratories out of the total requirement, % 7 83.8 volume of wastewater passed through sewage treatment facilities in the total volume of wastewater, % 93 100 number of newly created water reservoirs and hydrosystems on existing multipurpose reservoirs and water supply channels renovated to increase water yield, units 4 73 percentage of centralized water supply services available to the population, % 77 85 reconstruction and environmental rehabilitation of water objects, km 4010 percentage of centralized water disposal services available to the population, % 73 84 scope of new and renovated engineering protection and coast protection systems, km 31.5 1 763.9 percentage of capital investment into water supply, disposal and wastewater treatment out of the total revenue of water supply, disposal and wastewater treatment facilities, % 10 31 number of water facilities with unsatisfactory and dangerous safety levels restored to safe operating conditions, units 165 2 265 11 review of european and russian affairs 11 (2), 2017 pure water water industry development in the russian federation values at the beginning and end of the implementation period values at the beginning and end of the implementation period 2011 2017 2012 2020 percentage of borrowed funds out of the total volume of capital investment into water supply, disposal and wastewater treatment facilities, % 9 30 number of renovated or reopened hydrological stations and laboratories within the state monitoring network, units 90 3 347 percentage of water supplied by utility providers operating on the basis of concession agreements, % 2 35 percentage of water supplied by utility providers at tariffs set for the long-term regulation period, % 5 70 sources: government of the russian federation. “federal'naya tselevaya programma “chistaya voda” na 2011 2017 gody” [federal target program “clear water” for 2011-2017]; ”federal'naya tselevaya programma “razvitie vodokhozyaistvennogo kompleksa rossiiskoi federatsii v 2012 2020 godakh” [federal target program “water industry development in the russian federation” for 2012-2020]. 12 review of european and russian affairs 11 (2), 2017 from the point of view of gp implementation, the actual mechanism of state support is not as important as the achievement of target indicators. in this respect, the ti mentioned above could steer the program managers to use only the mechanism of interest rate subsidies, limiting their capacity to attract investment resources; this is the reason why this ti is excluded from further consideration. a necessary condition for the shortlist of target indicators is the exclusion of any indicators that lack macroeconomic prerequisites. the shortlist of tis formed according to the above guidelines is the foundation for ex ante appraisal of gp performance. besides obligatory achievement of tis, it seems advisable to supplement the methodology by including the calculation of budget performance indicators, and above all, net present budget value (npbv). essentially, this is the ratio between tax and non-tax budget revenues and budget payments (such as co-financing of investment into environmental programs, subsidizing interest rates on loans, energy payments, etc.) it is calculated similarly to net present value (npv), which is used to substantiate commercial efficiency of investment projects. however, while npv is used to select the best investment option, the scope of practical application of the npbv indicator is quite different: we believe it should be used not as a rigid criterion for acceptance or rejection of the program, but rather as an indicator that can increase the objectivity and validity of administrative decisions in the future. let us examine an algorithm of actions aimed at the coordination of long-term interests of all gp participants depending on npbv values (discussed in more detail in margolin 2012): 1. npbv > 0, which means that net budget revenue exceeds budget expenditure. this is quite a rare case, since the outcomes of a gp quite often cannot be reduced to quantitative indicators. nevertheless, this is possible if we take into account the multiplicative effects in related industries and cross-industry clusters that take the form of indirect tax payments from all program stakeholders9 into the consolidated budget. however, this situation is indicative of the fact that the possibilities of extra-budgetary funding attraction are far from being fully exploited, rather than of high program efficiency. therefore, if the npbv > 0 condition is met, it indicates the necessity to search for private sector investors and, possibly, to replace the initially planned budget funding by other instruments of state support (e.g. state guarantees, investment tax credits, interest rate subsidies on bank loans, etc.). 2. npbv < 0, that is, unlike the previous case, net budget revenue is lower than budget expenditure. in this case, the task of attracting extra-budgetary financing seems to be extremely difficult. however, individual activities within the program can still remain socially and economically efficient and may be implemented in partnership with private sector companies with some preliminary planning. in this context, the dynamic development of public private partnership (ppp) as an instrument of gp implementation in moscow and the moscow region is of particular interest. the pressing issue of waste management within the environmental protection program in the moscow region requires the closure of 29 landfills and the construction of waste treatment plants with an annual capacity of 4-5 million tons of garbage using the ppp model. a particular feature of such projects is their considerable multiplicative effect: besides the direct effect of termination of solid waste disposal in landfills, there are indirect effects, including the possibility of 9 these include: providers of materials and equipment for the construction of facilities specified in the program; suppliers of raw materials and components for the manufacturing of goods or provision of services during program implementation; and companies that are consumers of these products or services. 13 review of european and russian affairs 11 (2), 2017 producing and selling electricity and construction materials that are a byproduct of waste processing. an optimum balance between social, budgetary and commercial efficiency is obvious in this case. ppp models have substantial potential for use in government programs, even when the prospects of attracting private sector companies seem questionable at a first glance. if a partnership is achieved, it may be necessary to review the initial result of npbv calculation since its value can become positive due to the consideration of multiplicative effects. 3. npbv remains negative even after a thorough analysis of opportunities for private investment attraction. in this case, it is necessary to estimate the significance of longterm impacts of the government program. if it is high enough (for example, the implementation of the program may prevent an environmental disaster in the future), npbv is recalculated using a lowered discount rate (for example, equal to the refinancing rate divided by two10). it should be noted that this approach to the appraisal of socially significant projects is standard international practice and permits reduction of the effect of depreciation of cash receipts and payments over time. 4. npbv remains negative even if the discount rate is reduced. in this scenario, it is necessary to conduct a thorough analysis of positive social returns of the program that are not reducible to quantitative values. if the expert consensus on the significance of social effects of the program is favorable, the program may be considered feasible even with a negative npbv. if there are several options for program implementation that allow for the achievement of target indicator values within the stipulated time period, the preferable option is the one where npbv is the smallest absolute value. in accordance with the above arguments, we suggest that a key amendment to the current methodology of ex ante appraisal of government programs should be the addition of the npbv indicator in order to assess opportunities for extra-budgetary funding and select the best option for program implementation. if the ex ante efficiency of the government program is determined to be high enough to start funding, the public contracting authority faces the task of objectively evaluating intermediary outputs and determining the decision-making procedure with regard to whether to continue or to terminate the program. there is a need for insightful responses to the following questions:  is the program still relevant?  is it necessary to review the planned values of target indicators?  is it necessary to review the duration of the program and the timeline for the achievement of its target indicator values?  is it necessary to review the timeline and funding for program activities?  is it advisable to replace the managers responsible for program implementation? in order to answer these questions for environmental programs, we suggest using a modified part methodology, which, as mentioned above, is based on a generalized multi-criteria 10 the discount rate for gps with a high social significance should be set as either equal to the central bank refinancing rate, or the rate of return on state bonds with a long maturity (20-30 years). in this approach, two components of the risk premium are excluded from the calculation, one of which is associated with the risks of the company initiating the project and the other one with the risks of the project itself. 14 review of european and russian affairs 11 (2), 2017 evaluation of expert opinions presented as answers to a series of questions grouped into four topical areas (see also office of management and budget 2008). an individual rating is provided for each of these areas. for the first three sections, “program purpose and design,” ”strategic planning,” and “program management,” this rating is calculated based on experts’ answers to a number of evaluation questions recommended by the creators of part, with some amendments made by the author to reflect the peculiar aspects of development and implementation of environmental government programs in the russian federation. tables 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 below contain individual ratings calculated by the author for the water industry development program. of course, the list of questions provided here is not set in stone and can be reviewed. the yes/no format can be expanded to reflect partial achievement of goals. since environmental programs are difficult to evaluate in precise numerical terms, the approach used in these tables is to choose one of four answer options: “yes,” “to a large extent,” “to a small extent,” and “no.” on the one hand, this expansion does not change the general logic of the methodology while increasing the flexibility of individual ratings, but on the other hand, it could possibly lower the experts’ responsibility for their decisions. individual ratings (rp ) in tables 4.1-4.3 are determined by the following formula: rp = ∑ ∝𝑛× 𝐵𝑛 𝑁 𝑛=1 , (4) where ∝𝑛, 𝐵𝑛 are, respectively, the weight coefficient and the numerical score for the nth question (a detailed calculation is demonstrated in table 4.1). as for the program results section of part, it contains the following standard questions for the experts to answer:  has the program demonstrated adequate progress in achieving its long-term performance goals?  does the program (including program partners) achieve its annual performance goals?  does the program demonstrate improved financial performance indicators each year?  does the performance of this program compare favorably to other programs, including private projects, with similar goals?  do independent evaluations of sufficient scope and quality indicate that the program is effective and achieving results? as logical, non-contradictory, and relevant as there questions are, the answers overlook the actual target indicator values which reflect program performance more objectively than the opinions of even the most qualified experts. let us emphasize that it is not advisable to give up expert appraisal altogether; however, the focus should shift from simple yes/no answers to a set list of questions that determine weight coefficients for target indicators, allowing one to assess both the degree of progress and the relative significance for each indicator. with respect to the program under consideration, the final rating determined by formula 4 is presented in table 5. 15 review of european and russian affairs 11 (2), 2017 table 4.1 program assessment rating tool: section 1. program purpose and design questions reflecting the content of the evaluation procedures individual rating calculation weight coefficient answer numerical score share in total rating yes 1 large extent 2/3 small extent 1/3 no 0 yes 1 large extent 2/3 small extent 1/3 no 0 yes 1 large extent 2/3 small extent 1/3 no 0 yes 1 large extent 2/3 small extent 1/3 no 0 yes 1 large extent 2/3 small extent 1/3 no 0 total rating for section 1 0.634 11 smart stands for specific, measurable, achievable, result-oriented, time-bound. 16 review of european and russian affairs 11 (2), 2017 table 4.2 program assessment rating tool: section 2. strategic planning questions reflecting the content of the evaluation procedures individual rating calculation weight coefficient answer numerical score share in total rating yes 1 large extent 2/3 small extent 1/3 no 0 yes 1 large extent 2/3 small extent 1/3 no 0 yes 1 large extent 2/3 small extent 1/3 no 0 yes 1 large extent 2/3 small extent 1/3 no 0 yes 1 large extent 2/3 small extent 1/3 no 0 yes 1 large extent 2/3 small extent 1/3 no 0 total rating for section 2 0.633 17 review of european and russian affairs 11 (2), 2017 table 4.3 program assessment rating tool: section 3. program management questions reflecting the content of the evaluation procedures individual rating calculation weight coefficient answer numerical score share in total rating yes 1 large extent 2/3 small extent 1/3 no 0 yes 1 large extent 2/3 small extent 1/3 no 0 yes 1 large extent 2/3 small extent 1/3 no 0 yes 1 large extent 2/3 small extent 1/3 no 0 yes 1 large extent 2/3 small extent 1/3 no 0 yes 1 large extent 2/3 small extent 1/3 no 0 total rating for section 3 0.466 18 review of european and russian affairs 11 (2), 2017 table 5 calculating individual ratings: section 4. program results target indicators for the water industry development program target indicator values ti achievement ratio, as a decimal ∝𝒏 in formula 3 (expert appraisal) initial (from table 3) planned (for 2016) actual 1. increase in the population provided with improved water resources, million people 0.3 2.7 2.4 0.875 0.2 2. percentage of polluted wastewater in the total volume of wastewater released into surface water bodies, % 88.6 73 75 0.872 0.2 3. percentage of population covered by measures aimed at increasing protection from negative water-related impacts in the total population of areas affected by detrimental water-related impacts, % 68.3 75.9 74.8 0.855 0.2 4. percentage of water facilities with unsatisfactory and dangerous safety levels restored to safe operating conditions, % 17.6 47.5 42.7 0.839 0.1 5. ratio of renovated and new hydrological stations and laboratories out of the total requirement, % 7 34.8 29.4 0.806 0.05 6. number of newly created water reservoirs, hydrosystems on existing multipurpose reservoirs, and water supply channels renovated to increase water yield, units 4 25 21 0.81 0.05 7. scope of reconstruction and environmental rehabilitation of water objects, km 1 310 1 100 0.84 0.05 8. scope of new and renovated engineering protection and coast protection systems, km 31.5 763.9 640 0.831 0.05 9. number of water facilities with unsatisfactory and dangerous safety levels restored to safe operating conditions, units 165 1 005 850 0.815 0.05 10. number of renovated or reopened hydrological stations and laboratories within the state monitoring network, units 90 1 265 1 070 0.834 0.05 results of datotal calculation (formula 3) datotal = 0.2×(0.875+0.872+0.855)+0.1×0.839+ 0.05×(0.806+0.81+0.84+0.831+0.815+0.834) = 0.851 20 review of european and russian affairs 11 (2), 2017 since russian budget expenditures were cut by at least 10% in the wake of the 2014-2015 economic downfall, the calculations are based on the assumption that program objectives will be approximately 80-90% completed by the end of 2016. ultimately, neither estimated ti values nor expert appraisals of weighting coefficients are to be taken as completely accurate. the main purpose of the data in tables 4.1, 4.2, 4.3 and 5 is merely to illustrate the methodology proposed in this paper to evaluate gp performance. the last stage of ex post gp evaluation is to determine the overall integrated rating (see formula 4 and table 6) and compare it to the scale in table 6 (office of management and budget 2008). the result determines the decision of whether to continue or cease program implementation. rint = ∑ 𝜇𝑖 × 4 𝑖=1 𝑅𝑖 𝑝 , (5) where: 𝜇𝑖 , is the weighting coefficient for each individual rating; 𝑅𝑖 𝑝 is the individual rating for each of the 4 areas (i=1,2,3,4). the representative estimation of weighting coefficients is a substantive aspect of the methodology. the value ranges in table 7 are based on the original part guidelines; however, this is not the only possible approach. in fact, the author’s experience of gp evaluation case studies with various and representative groups of students shows that most russian specialists tend to increase the weighting coefficients for the program purpose and design and program management areas while lowering the coefficient for program results. the final choice is always determined by the specific features of the program under consideration and the expertise of the decision makers. table 6 overall rating calculation area of evaluation weighting coefficient individual ratings 1 program purpose and design 0.2 0.634 2 strategic planning 0.1 0.633 3 program management 0.2 0.466 4 program results 0.5 0.851 overall rating, rint 0.2×0.634 + 0.1×0.633 + 0.2×0.466 + 0.5×0.851 = 0.709 table 7 qualitative assessment of government program performance based on its overall rating quantitative rating (rint) qualitative assessment 𝑅 ≥ 85% effective 85% > 𝑅 ≥ 70% moderately effective 70% > 𝑅 ≥ 50% adequate 𝑅 < 50% ineffective the integrated overall rating in the above example is 0.709, which places the program into the moderately effective range. however, this conclusion is not definitive and requires detailed elaboration. for instance, it is advisable to consider the ratio of actual to planned volume of program funding (fa and fp in table 2). if this ratio substantially exceeds the rint rating (f a / fp >> 20 review of european and russian affairs 11 (2), 2017 rint), this means that program outputs are disproportionate to program funding, and the agency in charge of the program may make a justified decision to replace the program managers. conversely, if fa / fp << rint, we can come to the conclusion that the managers were able to maintain a high level of performance despite funding cuts, and the adopted program management approaches deserve replication. in the russian context, lowering administrative expenses often turns out to be an effective way to improve program performance, since this helps avoid the rather too common situation where a large part of the program budget is used to pay administrative personnel rather than to fund program activities. monitoring and control of gps is currently the responsibility of the ministry of economic development and the ministry of finance of the russian federation; a more scientifically grounded approach to the development of monitoring guidelines (such as metodicheskie ukazaniya 2013) would allow for early prevention of possible problems and deviations in program implementation. additionally, a system of citizen oversight would be beneficial, for example, in the form of an online platform that would accumulate, summarize, and systematize information received from the population, who are, after all, key stakeholders of government programs. the flowchart in figure 1 shows the overall process of decision-making by the agency responsible for program implementation based on intermediate program performance assessment at any given moment in time. while this particular flowchart is based on the assumption that the program qualifies as “moderately effective,” the overall logic of the approach will remain the same for any other performance range in table 7. it should be noted that using the algorithm represented in the flowchart would allow the program managers to avoid any significant deviation of actual ti values and expenditures from their planned values due to annual adjustment of planned ti values, timelines for their achievement, and required levels of funding based on the evaluation of intermediate program results. nevertheless, if by the end of program implementation the actual ti values turn out to be significantly lower than those initially planned, while the expenditures are significantly higher, there is every reason to conclude inefficient management of the program by the government agency in charge. 21 review of european and russian affairs 11 (2), 2017 figure 1 ex post evaluation of a government program conclusions 1) improving the quality and performance of environmental protection programs implemented by the government is one of the most important factors in preventing environmental disasters. using theoretically grounded methodologies for program evaluation would allow us to debunk the myth that the assimilative capacity of the natural environment is practically endless, and to minimize the chances of managerial decisions being focused on short-term gains rather than informed by the assessment of possible long-term impacts. 2) an examination of two russian government programs, pure water and water industry development, allows to identify specific drawbacks of the current approaches to ex ante appraisal and ex post evaluation of environmental programs, such as:  non-compliance of the target indicator selection methodology to the smart principle;  underestimation of the significance of budget efficiency indicators for funding-related decisionmaking; and,  application of insufficiently justified simplifications when evaluating the ex post performance of government programs. 22 review of european and russian affairs 11 (2), 2017 3) the key directions for the improvement of ex ante appraisal of government programs are as follows: 3.1. to expand the existing approaches to ti selection by:  shortlisting target indicators in a way that takes into account their relative weights and excludes overlaps both between indicators within a single program, and between indicators for different related programs;  departing from the common practice of using target indicators that lack macroeconomic prerequisites. 3.2. to include a new mandatory requirement into the ex ante appraisal methodology to calculate net present budget value (npbv) and use it as an indicator of possibilities for the attraction of extra-budgetary financing and one of the criteria for the selection of the optimum approach to program implementation. 4) the author proposes a modified part approach to the evaluation of environmental programs, which has not yet gained widespread acceptance in russia. the main differences between this modified approach and the original methodology are as follows: 4.1. to introduce additional answer options besides the traditional yes/no dichotomy for the first three part sections: program purpose and design, strategic planning, and program management. due to the particular nature of environmental programs, rigid adherence to the “yes or no” dilemma merely increases the degree of imprecision, which is why it is advisable to use multiple, more flexible options for expert appraisal. 4.2. to replace the expert survey by an analysis of ti values when evaluating direct program outputs. the individual rating score of the program results section at any point in its implementation (generally at the end of the calendar year) is calculated with due regard to the relative significance of different indicators, which is determined by expert appraisal of weighting coefficients for each of them at the planning stage of the program with the possibility of subsequent adjustment. 4.3. to introduce a flowchart to guide decision-making on whether to terminate or continue the program on the basis of its overall evaluation rating and the degree of conformity between actual and planned volume of financing. this logical algorithm illustrates a formalized procedure for the adjustment of the program implementation period and schedules for the achievement of target values for individual indicators; review of target indicator values, funding amounts and schedules; and for change of management. in most cases, the application of the proposed flowchart would prevent a significant mismatch between actual and planned ti values and expenditure by the end of program implementation. 5) in general, the proposed recommendations for improving the ex ante and ex post evaluation of environmental government programs are aimed at enhancing the objectivity of decisions taken by authorized government agencies concerning the advisability of budget funding of these programs, as well as the continuation or termination of their implementation. 23 review of european and russian affairs 11 (2), 2017 references afanasiev, mstislav and natalia shash. 2013. “instrumentarii otsenki effektivnosti byudzhetnykh programm.” [tools for evaluating the efficiency of budget programs]. voprosy gosudarstvennogo i munitsipal'nogo upravleniya 3. gilmour, john b. 2007. “implementing omb’s program assessment rating tool (part): meeting the challenges of integrating budget and performance,” oecd journal on budgeting 7(1). kuzmin, alexey, rita o’sullivan and natalia kosheleva (eds.). 2009. otsenka programm: metodologiya i praktika [program evaluation: methodology and practice]. moscow: prestork. margolin, andrey. 2012. “sovershenstvovanie metodov otsenki planiruemoi effektivnosti regional'nykh gosudarstvennykh program” [improving the methodology of ex ante appraisal of regional government programs]. gosudarstvennaya sluzhba, 6(80). ———. 2013. “kriterii effektivnosti pri realizatsii gosudarstvennykh program” [efficiency criteria in the implementation of government programs]. gosudarstvennaya sluzhba, 2(82). metodicheskie ukazaniya po razrabotke i realizatsii gosudarstvennykh programm rossiiskoi federatsii [guidelines for the development and implementation of government programs in the russian federation]. 2013. moscow. office of management and budget. 2008. guide to the program assessment rating tool (part). robinson, marc. 2013. program classification for performance-based budgeting: how to structure budgets to enable the use of evidence. washington: the world bank. shepherd, robert p. 2012. “in search of a balanced canadian evaluation function: getting to relevance.” the canadian journal of program evaluation 26(2): 1-45. 24 review of european and russian affairs 11 (2), 2017 published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada available online at: journals.carleton.ca/rera rera is an electronic academic peer-reviewed journal. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is a joint project supported by the canada-europe transatlantic dialogue—a cross-canada research network supported by the social sciences and humanities research council of canada (sshrc)—along with the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies (carleton university) and its associated research unit, the centre for european studies. rera aims to provide an accessible forum for research, to promote high standards of research and scholarship, and to foster communication among young scholars. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada tel: +01 613 520-2600 ext. 3117; e-mail: rera-journal@carleton.ca creative commons license this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license (cc by-nc-nd 4.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, provided the source is acknowledged. no use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes. issn: 1718-4835 © 2017 the author(s) mailto:rera-journal@carleton.ca https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ why reforms fail: the role of ideas, interests and institutions review of european and russian affairs 9 (2), 2015 issn 1718-4835 inscribing maternalism in the social investment perspective jane jenson université de montréal abstract beginning in the 1960s, second-wave feminists framed their claims against the discourses and policy practices in the male breadwinner model that was widespread at the time. they found it too maternalist, accepting the traditional role of women as mothers responsible for care. it is, therefore, ironic that the male breadwinner model is no longer promoted by public policy communities, and yet, maternalism has returned to policy practices. the social investment perspective, now dominant in european social policy, addresses women primarily as mothers and secondarily as workers. this article documents this return to maternalism and attributes the shift to two ideational mechanisms present in the universe of political discourse within which proponents of the social investment perspective act. one is a mechanism of “being aware of gender,” including differences generating inequalities, and the other is a mechanism of “writing out gender equality.” both drive the process of inscribing maternalism into policy and programmes. 2 review of european and russian affairs 9 (2), 2015 introduction during the first wave of feminism in the early decades of the 20th century, in europe as in north america, women often fashioned their demands around the status of “mother,” advocating a differentiated citizenship that recognised their contribution to the nation as different from that of men. others, however, called for full citizenship for “women” in the name of equal rights of the two sexes, as individuals in the liberal wing or as workers in the socialist stream of feminism.1 this tension between claims made in the name of “mothers” or in the name of “women” never disappeared in subsequent decades. nevertheless, by the second wave of feminism beginning in the 1960s, the dominant streams of feminism – whether radical, liberal, or socialist – framed their claims in the name of women, and indeed struggled against discourses and policy practices that they considered too maternalist. post-1945 welfare regimes incorporated and indeed reinforced the male-breadwinner model, however. many policies across european countries, from those of social care to those of urban design and transport, assumed that families were composed of a male worker and his dependents, including his wife who was the primary carer for children, elderly parents, and the house. women were assumed either not to be employed or, if they were, to have jobs and be working hours that would not interfere with their caring responsibilities. faced with such policies, second-wave feminists struggled against the widespread assumption that the mother responsible for care work in the home was the natural and desirable complement to the male breadwinner. it is therefore ironic that the male breadwinner model is no longer promoted by public policy communities, and yet maternalism has returned to policy practices, this time within a universe of discourse characterised by “gender awareness.” as welfare regimes have been reformed in the last two decades, an updated and modernised version of policy-promoted maternalism has become characteristic of much contemporary social policy. 2 while policy communities recognise the need to encourage, promote, and ensure high rates of female labour force participation, social policy emphasises the mother-child relationship. this is certainly the case of the increasingly popular social investment perspective, considered by leading social policy experts to be the “dominant paradigm” in europe now (cantillon and van lancker 2013, 553). this article argues that the return to maternalism is the result of two ideational mechanisms present in the universe of political discourse within which proponents of the social investment perspective act. one is a mechanism of “being aware of gender” and the other is a mechanism of “writing out gender equality.” both drive the process of inscribing maternalism into policy and programmes. 1 for an early overview of different meanings of feminism in these years, see offen (1988). for an overview of firstwave links between feminist claims and maternalist social policy, see koven and michel (1990). for more recent versions of maternalism, see mahon (2006). 2 i choose to use the term maternalism rather than familialism, as mary daly does (2011, for example). this is because it was the gender division of labour and the assignments of roles and values to mothers rather than the institution of the family that most disturbed second-wave feminists. second, with increased numbers of lone-parent families still overwhelmingly headed by women, as we will see in later sections, it is mothers who are often targets of policy discourse and interventions. 3 review of european and russian affairs 9 (2), 2015 the process of inscribing maternalism. discourse and mechanisms modifications of policy ideas never “fall from the sky” any more than public policies are an automatic response to new needs created by structural changes. new ideas expressed in policy discourse and practices of policy design are the result of policy-makers’ efforts to make sense of novel social and economic circumstances and challenges. in europe over the last decades, major socio-economic changes have remade economies and societies. these include economic restructuring in response to globalisation and liberalisation, altered family structures in reaction to profound changes in social norms, and rising inequalities in income (oecd 2011). new social risks have clearly been created (bonoli and natali 2012). but responses are not automatic. understanding the policies chosen requires attention to the assemblage of ideas in the universe of political discourse and particularly the ideational mechanisms in play. to understand such mechanisms and assemblages, this article uses the concept of a universe of political discourse that emphasises the association between discursive formulations and policy practices (jenson 1989).3 the universe of political discourse is a space in which socially-constructed meaning systems and practices jostle each other for social attention and legitimacy. it is also a terrain on which institutions engage in practices of “puzzling” about public policy directions, particularly in moments of uncertainty about the effectiveness of policy interventions and instruments.4 third, it is the terrain upon which actors struggle for recognition and representation. the triadic configuration of political discourse, institutional puzzling, and struggles for recognition provides greater representative legitimacy to some actors and their ideas than to others and, therefore, to their policy practices (jenson 1989, 238ff; 2012, 23-24; hall 1993, 289). the universe of political discourse sets discursive parameters and boundaries of debate, legitimises the participation of actors and claimants, and patterns interactions (smith 2007, 9). by observing such effects, certain mechanisms become visible. mechanisms are a key link to context, including the broad universe of political discourse (ancelovici and jenson 2013).5 the claim made here is that the two mechanisms identified (being aware of gender and writing out of gender equality) were deployed within the universe of political discourse as european policymakers at national and supranational levels engaged in puzzling about their responses to economic restructuring and social inequalities and as they gradually systematised their ideas about the social investment perspective. to support this argument the rest of the article describes the move towards the social investment perspective and the norm of the adult worker model. it then traces the contribution of the two mechanisms to this process. 3 the concept has frequently been used to understand social movement strategies (for example, smith 2007) as well as policy practices (for an overview, see padamsee 2009). 4 the notions of puzzling and powering are obviously a reference to hugh heclo’s (1974, 305) argument in his seminal study of social policy learning in britain and sweden: “tradition teaches that politics is about conflict and power. this is a blinkered view of politics... politics finds its sources not only in power, but also in uncertainty... policy making is a form of collective puzzlement on society’s behalf.” 5 mechanisms are distinct from variables in that they derive their effect not from changes in their value, but from their presence in combination with other mechanisms. the contemporary analytic turn to mechanisms brings a return to a focus on action (and therefore actors), and is associated with action verbs that suggest both agency and dynamism (paquet 2014). 4 review of european and russian affairs 9 (2), 2015 the method is, following mary daly (2011, 3), not an effort to reconstruct detailed national trajectories, but rather to identify developments across a range of european countries and in the european union. the primary objective is to identify what she calls “the lineaments of the models or sets of ideas,” or what are termed here the discourse of processes and mechanisms. there are “risks involved in this kind of overview exercise. one risk is of decontextualization… [while] the fact that reform is both wide ranging and quite rapid also exposes one to the danger of an analysis that quickly becomes outdated” (ibid.). the utility as well as the appeal of this method is that “in a time of change it is very important to put down a marker about what things were like at x point in time” (ibid.). this method is not unlike that used, for similar reasons, in other recent books that map the shifting contours of social policy in europe (for example, morel, palier, and palme 2012; bonoli and natali 2012; evers and guillemard 2012; hemerijck 2013). from the male breadwinner model to the social investment perspective scholars analysing social policy are familiar with the characterisation of the european universe of political discourse after 1945 as promoting the norm of the male breadwinner. jane lewis (2001, 153) summarises the norm this way: “the male breadwinner model also worked at the level of prescription. policy makers treated it as an ‘ought’ in terms of relationships between men and women, and in many countries it served to underpin both social policies that assumed female dependence on a male wage and family law.” there is no need to review the numerous studies that document the presence of the norm and its consequences for public policy design.6 it is important, nonetheless, to look back on it to clarify some vocabulary so as to be clear about the changes being described here. the complement to the male bread-winner that characterised much of social policy in the middle decades of the 20th century was the stay-at-home mother. in this universe of political discourse, women made their contribution as citizens primarily through their roles as carers – for children, for men, for the elderly, for the house. social policy provided support for women to perform those roles either directly (via, for example, mothers’ allowances, or survivor benefits and social assistance when a male wage was not available) or indirectly, by fostering conditions for a high male wage or replacement for it (collective bargaining, pensions, unemployment insurance, and so on). thus, social policy was most frequently designed to allow women – whether living in couples or as lone parents – to conform to a maternal norm. while there were always variations in access to such benefits and certainly in their generosity, there was a discursive consensus. social policy translated this discourse into practice via its benefit structures. this was true in the “people’s home” of sweden, the iconic example of a social democratic welfare regime (daunerichard and mahon 2001). the struggle against poverty dominated scandinavian social policy from the 1890s until the 1950s. this struggle was strictly genderized. it had as its starting point the male breadwinner model, with a working and supporting husband and a housewife, mainly responsible for housework and childcare. the construction of the social insurances presupposed this difference between men and women. the new social insurances were primarily directed towards wage earners and the labour 6 for one recent overview, see daly (2011). 5 review of european and russian affairs 9 (2), 2015 market, while other reforms were targeted to give support to women as mothers. (klas and ǻmark 2001, 159) only when women entered the labour force did the social insurance system become available to them (ibid.). in liberal regimes, the maternal role also shaped social policy; lone mothers were able to remain on social assistance with no employment obligation until the oldest child reached schoolleaving age (lewis et al. 2008, 275). in bismarckian regimes such as germany and the netherlands, the discourse of the male breadwinner was also solidly supported in political discourse and policy design (gottschall and bird 2003). however, by the 1990s, it was evident in several european countries that another model was displacing the male breadwinner norm in the universe of political discourse. this is what jane lewis and others have termed the “adult worker model” (lewis 2001). according to this new norm, women are no longer excused from participation in the labour force in order to care; they are expected to be able to “reconcile” work and family. there is little dispute that social policy discourse has moved towards the norm of the adult worker model, at both the national and european level.7 the changed norm was sometimes justified as a response to second-wave feminism’s claim for equality. decades of action by women’s movements and their allies spotlighted the structures of inequalities reproduced by the male breadwinner model and called for it to be replaced with employment and social policies. they also called for antidiscrimination protections that would promote women’s autonomy and employment, and more equal gender relations in all spheres. from the 1960s on, feminists advocated for full social citizenship rights, such as the right to equal pay for work of equal value, individualised taxation and pension rights, affordable and quality childcare, and so on. in particular, they demanded policy design for childcare and leaves from employment that assumed both parents “parented,” and social supports and services that were “parentalist” rather than maternalist (for example, mahon 2006, 178). the universe of political discourse filled with talk of gender equality, and policy changes were forthcoming in the form of new services (e.g., childcare), rights (e.g., parental leave, equal pay), and benefits (e.g., individuation of social insurance). the root causes of this shift in the universe of political discourse towards a new norm are numerous, from the mobilisations for equality by the second-wave women’s movement to the arrival of the post-industrial economy and its service sector that absorbed so many women workers. but also important by the 1980s were neoliberalism’s attack on welfare benefits and state spending and structural changes involving labour market restructuring, which rendered a single, even male, wage insufficient; changing family patterns that brought a rising number of female-headed lone-parent families; demographic shifts that threatened the fiscal foundations of social insurance policy instruments; and so on. the point here is not to document the reasons for this new norm of the adult worker model, but rather to acknowledge its existence. it is also important to identify its place in the larger change in political discourse into which it fit by the mid-1990s, that is, the elaboration of the social investment perspective on social policy. the social investment perspective and the policies associated with it are the products of epistemic communities composed of social policy experts and decision-makers puzzling over the discursive and practical foundations for reforms to social policy after the failed experiments of the neoliberal 7 via a comparative analysis, mary daly (2011) does dispute the full application of the model, however. 6 review of european and russian affairs 9 (2), 2015 moment (jenson 2010). three key ideas form the representational ensemble of this policy perspective (jenson and saint-martin 2006). first is the notion of constant learning, leading to a preoccupation with human capital, and especially with early childhood education and care. second is an orientation to the future; children are now already creating the future according to this discourse. this is sometimes called a child-centred strategy. 8 finally, there is the idea that successful individuals enrich our common future, and ensuring individuals’ success is beneficial for the community as a whole, now and into the future. incorporation of these three principles into social policy has consequences for policy design and state action. we can now identify two policy directions of the social investment perspective that build on these three principles.9 first, based on a diagnosis of the needs of the knowledge-based economy for trained workers and for higher employment rates in order to sustain social protection, especially pensions, the treatment applied is implementing policies and programmes that better prepare children for the future, including by breaking the intergenerational transmission of poverty. concretely, this perspective translates into sustained attention to education as an investment in human capital.10 in this way, the hope initially expressed via a book dedication has become a policy principle, most recently expressed in the eu’s 2013 social investment package: “focusing on children is vital for a sustainable, efficient, and competitive knowledge economy and an intergenerational fair society. the adequacy of future pensions depends on the human capital of those who are today children” (european commission 2013a, 13).11 second, because of the importance of the idea that parental employment is the way to break the intergenerational cycle of poverty, the second policy direction is to raise employment levels. from a social investment perspective, children do better when parents are employed, and therefore some public support may be necessary to allow them to move into the labour market. this was the mantra of post-1997 new labour, whose main idea about how to end child poverty was to combat “worklessness” by moving parents into employment, with various employment supports as well as income supplements made available to them to “make work pay,” and childcare credits and services (dobrowolsky and jenson 2005). it continues through the eu’s attention to avoiding “inactivity traps” into which parents may fall, as well as to increase labour force participation of 8 esping-andersen et al. (2002, chapter 2) use this expression, and it is now widely deployed. for example, a manifesto for a social investment pact binding european countries, published by influential think tank observatoire social européen (ose), says: “access to affordable quality childcare is a sine qua non [of] any workable future equilibrium. the emphasis on early-childhood education and development goes beyond the idea that childcare is necessary to allow mothers and fathers to reconcile work and family life. a ‘child-centred social investment strategy’ is needed to ensure that children become lifelong learners and strong contributors to their societies” (vandenbroucke, hemerijck, and palier 2011, 22). 9 this characterisation of the social investment perspective draws on, among others, jenson (2010; 2012). 10 the eu uses effective public education as the example of where social policy should be moving: “modernising social policies is a matter of common concern at [the] eu level, as ineffective social policies in one country can have consequences for others, particularly within the eurozone. insufficient investment in social policies that strengthen human capital development, for instance in early childhood education and care, is manifested in lower educational levels and overall lower skill development in some member states.” this is from the lead paragraph in section 2, “what is needed,” of the social investment package (european commission 2013a, 8). 11 the dedication is: “for today’s children who will provide for our welfare when we are old. it is for you – and hence for ourselves – that we desire the best possible welfare state” (esping-andersen et al. 2002, v). this analysis has been codified as the postulate that “good pension policies – like good health policies – begin at birth” (vandenbroucke, hemerijck, and palier 2011, 6). 7 review of european and russian affairs 9 (2), 2015 lone parents. thus, for the eu, early childhood education and care has a double mission of preparing the future labour force and promoting women’s employment. this can be said equally about numerous national understandings of early childhood education services (morel, palier, and palme 2012, 154-55). the social investment perspective’s macro-economic analysis retains the focus on the supply-side that neoliberalism instituted, and it is in this context that talk of social investment (rather than spending) provides discursive coherence. when enthusiastic about the market, it is of course natural to use a discourse of investing. individuals and their families are called upon “to invest in their own human capital” so as to succeed in the labour market. at the same time, they must invest in their own futures, via savings for their retirement pensions and their children’s education. but, in contrast to neoliberal ideas, the state is also meant to share some of this responsibility, by ensuring adequate services (for example, childcare) as well as by income transfers to make up for the fact that market incomes are often not high enough to meet family needs. nor is the perspective simply an anti-poverty measure; social investments are for the middle class, too. it is an understanding of public interventions, in other words, that rallies those who want social policy to focus on education (including early childhood education), on training, and on making work pay, as well as those who are concerned about child poverty. sharing the oecd’s discourse that emerged in the mid-1990s that social spending is not a burden but an investment in economic growth, the european union could move towards its own version, describing social policy as a productive factor in the late 1990s (morel, palier, and palme 2012, 11; chapter 2). it took time for national and supranational policy processes to generate consensus about the social investment perspective that now exists (kvist 2013; cantillon and van lancker 2013). indeed, it was only in 2013 that the eu finally brought forth its social investment package, after vacillating for more than a decade between a focus on poverty and social inclusion (daly 2006) and one on “social investments,” particularly in children (jenson 2008). some national governments moved more decisively, however, both deploying a discourse of social investments and adopting its programmes since the mid-1990s (jenson and saint-martin 2006; morel, palier, and palme 2012, 46). this perspective has most often been used to frame contemporary european policy interventions in nordic or liberal welfare regimes (kvist 2013, 92). bismarckian regimes have been slower, however, to move towards social investment (morel, palier, and palme 2012, 82). this ends the general characterisation of the social investment perspective. it is now time to describe the ways in which a process of reinscribing maternalism underpins its development and the two mechanisms that drive this process. maternalism in the social investment perspective the reinscription of maternalism in the social policy perspective and the universe of political discourse more broadly is a process that operates via two key social mechanisms. one can be labelled “being gender aware,” and a second is “writing out gender equality.” with respect to the second, issues of gender equality are simply left aside, even while gender awareness allows analysts to identify gender inequalities. writing out equality goals is sometimes very difficult to see precisely because there is, in the social investment discourse, so much “talk” about gender 8 review of european and russian affairs 9 (2), 2015 inequality following from gender awareness of women’s structured disadvantages. however, careful attention to the universe of political discourse can show how it works. being gender aware the social investment perspective is profoundly gender aware, and sensitivity to gender differences drives its implementation. as the official european definition puts it: “gender awareness is an understanding that there are socially determined differences between women and men based on learned behavior, which affect their ability to access and control resources. this awareness needs to be applied through gender analysis into programmes, policies and evaluation.”12 in the eu, promoting gender awareness is an integral part of the mainstreaming initiative.13 practices of gender awareness identify “understanding” as the objective; elimination of inequalities is not a goal. once sensitive to gender differences, policy can work around them to achieve its primary goals such as activation or social inclusion in ways that never ignore gender differences, but do not seek to eliminate them, either. currently, the social investment perspective deployed at both national and union level is very gender aware, with significant discursive and analytic attention going to women’s situations, particularly with respect to new social risks. however, arguments tend towards an instrumentalisation of women, with most attention going to the social contribution of women’s willingness to bear children and reconcile motherhood with employment. explicit gender awareness developed in conjunction with and as a driver of the systematisation of ideas about social investment. in a 1997 foundational analysis, oecd policy analysts presented all the elements of an embryonic social investment – explicitly named as such – approach to reforming social protection.14 this report of a high-level conference seeking to identify the social policy agenda for the new millennium listed the advantages of a “social investment approach” over piecemeal reforms. a good package would include early interventions (including the transition to school, that is, early education and care), support for employment activation rather than “passive” benefits, and support for carers (oecd 1997, 18-19). in particular, the demographic challenge of low fertility as well as postponed or precocious fertility and “family stability” received significant attention (ibid., 10). women were barely mentioned by name. the exception was the section on fertility. thus, when women were spotlighted, only their maternal roles received attention. the mechanism of being gender aware was clearly important, however, in the next foundational document of the social investment perspective, and it grounded a discourse of maternalism. an 12 from the glossary provided by the equality unit: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/glossary/index_en.htm accessed 24 november 2014. the concept of “gender awareness” is also widespread in literature on the global south (molyneux 2006). 13 see, for example, the european institute for gender equality (eige): http://eige.europa.eu/sites/default/files/good-practices-in-gender-mainstreaming-towards-effective-gendertraining_0.pdf, accessed 24 november 2014. the publication overviews national-level good practices for training and for raising public and decision-makers’ awareness of gender differences. 14 the article developed the analysis of social and demographic change leading to weaknesses in existing social protection systems. because, as the saying goes, a picture is always worth a thousand words, the oecd observer illustrated this important article with three photos: gustav möller and lord beveridge, “founders of the modern welfare state,” and a very young woman with two pre-school-age children, with the caption strongly suggesting she was a lone parent (pearson and scherer 1997, 7, 9). 9 review of european and russian affairs 9 (2), 2015 important report prepared for the belgian presidency of the european council in 2000 claimed “there is clearly a strong case for a new ‘women-friendly’ social contract because improving the welfare of women means improving the collective welfare of society at large” (esping-andersen et al. 2002, 20).15 being gender aware brought two prescriptions: solving the “compatibility problem” of women pursuing both careers and motherhood, and promoting gender equality by making men’s lives more like women’s. with the identification of the “compatibility problem,” we clearly see the use of an instrumentalist maternalist discourse; women’s social contribution is made via their fertility and child-raising. women-friendly family policies (leaves and childcare) are needed because women “place a strong priority on forming families” (ibid., 70). but only the first prescription was viable; the second solution was dismissed as unlikely (ibid., 95). this mechanism of being gender aware provides much of the coherence of the social investment perspective. another example from the 2011 publication of an important think-tank illustrates this. the observatoire social européen explained why europe (both the eu and member states) “needs a social investment pact” (vandenbroucke, hemerijck, and palier 2011). being aware of gender differences in both employment opportunities and family responsibilities – women have less access to employment and more family responsibilities – the publication proposed reducing the negative effects of this difference in a social investment pact that would include improved labour law and protections for part-time work. in other words, maternity was beginning to trump fulltime employment within the social investment perspective. such an emphasis on acknowledging and protecting a part-time employment track for mothers with children was not at all inimical to pursuing a social investment strategy, of course. often singled out as the initiator of the perspective (morel, palier, and palme 2012, 2, 17), sweden has traditionally had a high rate of female parttime employment. the mechanism of being gender aware similarly structured the discussion in the european union’s social investment package in 2013. the “continued gender disadvantage” merited its own section, and member states were urged to target the gender pay gap and discrimination in employment (european commission 2013a, 7, 11). the package was built on a staff working document that demonstrated solid awareness of gender disadvantage, identifying an “ageing population” due to low fertility as the first worrisome long-term trend that social investments would need to address. women were described as more vulnerable to poverty because of their responsibilities for caring for children, and also as reducing their child-bearing rates (european commission 2013b, 7-8, 25). having a gender-aware discourse supported the familiar reinscription of maternalism into the social investment perspective. despite the fact that the commission and its staff were clearly deploying the mechanism of being gender aware, another noticeable and important pattern emerged in these documents. attention to children, the intergenerational cycle of disadvantage and the need for investing in human capital far outweighed any attention going to gender inequalities between adults. this pattern mimicked closely that described by molyneux (2006, 438), as mexico used gender awareness to move toward the social investment perspective: “the new anti-poverty programmes may successfully identify some unmet needs within poor households and communities, but attending to the diverse needs of the women (the mothers) who are central to the functioning of these programmes is not their 15 this citation is from the more-readily accessible book that is a revised version of the 2000 report to the belgian presidency. the same sentence appeared in that report on p. 9. 10 review of european and russian affairs 9 (2), 2015 explicit aim, any more than is gender equality a consistently observed objective. the social construction of need in these programmes is child-centred, as is their overall organization.” in other words, being gender aware was reinforcing maternalism and actually closing down space for promotion of gender equality. a second mechanism was the operative driver here. writing out gender equality the second mechanism in the process of inscribing maternalism into the social investment perspective is that of writing out gender equality. this mechanism has been in play for well over a decade. in both national situations and the eu, there is an on-going tendency to talk gender equality, but to devote much less action than previously to strategies for promoting and achieving it. there has been a shift towards focusing on violence against women and the guarantee of sexual rights; they now preoccupy the institutional machinery originally designed to advance gender equality (jacquot 2014; jenson 2008). the result is that promoters of the social investment, all the while exhibiting awareness of gender inequalities, have ample space to actually do very little to promote equality. as an initiator of the social investment perspective, the oecd was also a leader in writing out gender equality for adult women from the universe of political discourse. this happened in two ways. the first was indirect, as women were relabelled with the gender-neutral term “parent” or “worker.” both terms were used in discourse advocating for “family-friendly” social policies. in its babies and bosses series, for example, the oecd’s analysis of the work-family balance nexus was originally driven by several concerns: declining fertility, poverty, and gender pay gaps.16 by the time of the synthesis report in 2007, however, the analysis had been pared down to demographic and labour supply questions, framed in a classic social investment discourse as concern with employment for all and the future of society. equality was invisible and maternalism a concern: if parents cannot achieve their desired work/family life balance, not only is their welfare lower, but economic development is also curtailed through reduced labour supply by parents. a reduction of birth rates has obvious implications for future labour supply as well as for the financial sustainability of social protection systems. as parenting is also crucial to child development, and thus the shape of future societies, policy makers have many reasons to want to help parents find a better work/family balance.17 even more striking was reliance by the oecd on the mechanism of directly writing out gender equality even while the organisation manifested new gender sensitivity. a careful analysis of the path-breaking closing the gender gap. act now reveals a pirouette-like flourish of writing out gender equality even while reporting massive amounts of data about inequalities between women and men. the three domains in which equality might be achieved, according to the oecd, are education, employment, and entrepreneurship. in the first case, there are quite specific policy proposals for “greater gender equality in educational attainment.” the target is girls. the expectation for adult women, however, is only “improved female labour market outcomes” 16 see the 2004 presentation of the three-country study (new zealand, portugal, and switzerland) at http://www.oecd.org/els/family/babiesandbossesreconcilingworkandfamilylifevol3newzealandportugalswitzerland.htm, accessed 24 november 2014. 17 this quote is from the presentation of the synthesis report on http://www.oecd.org/els/family/babies andbossesreconcilingworkandfamilylifeasynthesisoffindingsforoecdcountries.htm, accessed 24 november 2014. 11 review of european and russian affairs 9 (2), 2015 (oecd 2012, 18). despite the excellent diagnosis of gender disadvantages, in other words, when policy recommendations for adult women are proposed, equality is no longer explicitly the goal. the discussion turns almost exclusively on the hindrances – usually of values within the home or the workplace – that have generated the acknowledged inequalities. there are few strong policy prescriptions laid out. rather, employers should try harder because it is their own interest to do so and governments should remove disincentives to employment. this lack of a strategic push for gender equality by the promoters of social investment prescriptions sometimes comes with a strong dose of pessimism about achieving equality. as the foundational document quoted above put it, ultimately “true gender equality will not come about unless, somehow, men can be made to embrace a more feminine life course. whether or not such a scenario would truly conform to the prevailing choice set of today’s men and women is pretty unclear” (esping-andersen et al. 2002, 95).18 the policy conclusion is that motherhood requires support because equal parenting seems unlikely. in discussing women’s careers and maternity, in a later analysis than that presented above, espingandersen does not even gesture in the direction of one of the most important equality claims – equal pay. in his detailed calculations meant to convince economists and policy-makers of the payoffs from investments in non-parental childcare, he simply accepts the standard that women’s wages will be 67% of men’s (2009, 96). in his analysis, the most important policy instrument available to achieve an appropriate work-family balance is non-parental child care. 19 the defamilialisation of care for pre-school children will, according to the policy prescriptions, allow women successfully to combine employment and motherhood, and thereby avoid the demographic crisis facing europe. there is, as the calculation of the wage gap demonstrates, no attention to the actual quality of the job, in terms of the adequacy of earnings or career potential. equality between women and men is lost in the calculation. the mechanism of writing out was also clearly observable in the discourse of the eu as it moved towards the social investment perspective. for the past 40 years, the eu has consistently affirmed and reaffirmed that gender equality is a fundamental value. there has nonetheless also been a systematic weakening of the policy instruments that might achieve this equality.20 studies have tracked the steady erasing of gender equality goals from the european employment strategy (fagen, grimshaw, and rubery 2006; jenson 2008, 10; jacquot 2014, ch. 5). the employment guidelines were integrated with those of growth and jobs in the mid-2000s, and there were, for the first time, no targets for gender equality. there were, of course, targets for women’s employment rates and even services to support their achievement, but the notion of “good” or “better” jobs as a route to gender equality had disappeared. this writing-out of gender equality continued. villa and smith (2013) report that in the first draft of europe 2020 it was not mentioned; queries from 18 the pessimism is unabated and more elaborated in later work (esping-andersen 2009, 102). 19 as the books make clear, public spending is necessary because there is little chance of any real feminisation of masculine roles. the only route to completing the revolution is for the state to support masculinisation of women’s life roles. see this most clearly in the conclusion to esping-andersen (2009). 20 for example, stratigaki (2004) and jacquot (2014, ch. 3) describe how proponents of gender mainstreaming as a policy tool to replace interventions to promote equality prevailed in political competition within the european commission. 12 review of european and russian affairs 9 (2), 2015 some “mystified” member states brought the words back, but the commitment was minimal (jacquot 2014, 303ff). this writing-out of gender equality in economic strategy is made easier by a second modification of the eu’s approach to gender equality. the commission’s interventions on gender, via its gender administrative machinery, have moved from promotion to rhetorical enthusiasm, and this despite institutionalisation, including of mainstreaming (jacquot 2010, 2014). for example, between 1982 and 2006, the commission elaborated five action programmes for equal opportunities between women and men. as they developed through the years, they broadened the analysis of the structure underpinning gender inequalities. at first, they also deployed tools to overcome them, within the double perspective of equal treatment and equal opportunities. the first perspective led most often to using the power of legislation and the second to positive action via specific and targeted programmes. 21 however, by the decade of the lisbon strategy, with its emphasis on policy coordination rather than legislation, the framework strategy for equality between women and men (2001-05) and the roadmap for equality between women and men (2006-10) began to set out principles and call for member state action that did not mention policy instruments for action. the link to financing that shaped earlier programmes was also broken. no incentives were proposed. only the rhetorical commitment of the supranational institutions remained (jacquot 2014, 302, ch. 5). conclusion the two mechanisms of writing out gender equality and being gender aware worked together to reinscribe maternalism into the social investment perspective, now described as dominant in social policy across europe and at the european level. the presence of both was needed to give coherence to a social investment perspective that focused on women as mothers. being gender aware and sensitive to differences in care practices both traditionally and into the present, it was easy to arrive at an instrumentalisation of women’s lives as primarily ones of child-bearing and raising. this maternal nexus in the universe of political discourse marked a return to a discourse present in the first five decades of the 20th century: the acceptance of distinct gender roles, with women primarily responsible for children. nonetheless, and in contrast with those years when the norm of the male breadwinner held sway, in recent decades women are also expected to be employed. given the weight of the maternalist discourse, however, it is difficult to promote forms of employment that will be fully equal. thus, writing out gender 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in maria karamessini and jill rubery (eds), women and austerity. the economic crisis and the future for gender equality. milton park: routledge, 273-94. 17 review of european and russian affairs 9 (2), 2015 published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada available online at: journals.carleton.ca/rera/index.php/rera rera is an electronic academic peer-reviewed journal that publishes graduate, post-graduate, and young scholarly works. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is a joint project supported by the canadaeurope transatlantic dialogue — a cross-canada research network supported by the social sciences and humanities research council of canada (sshrc) — along with the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies (carleton university) and its associated research unit, the centre for european studies. rera aims to provide an accessible forum for research, to promote high standards of research and scholarship, and to foster communication among young scholars. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada tel: +01 613 520-2600 ext. 3117; e-mail: rera-journal@carleton.ca creative commons license creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0 this working paper is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial no derivs 3.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 3.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, provided the source is acknowledged. no use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes. issn: 1718-4835 © 2015 the author https://journals.carleton.ca/rera/index.php/rera mailto:rera-journal@carleton.ca http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ why reforms fail: the role of ideas, interests and institutions review of european and russian affairs 9 (1), 2015 issn 1718-4835 the role of italy in the development of energy cooperation between kazakhstan and the eu lyailya nurgaliyeva kyushu university abstract this paper focuses on the contribution of italy to the development of energy cooperation between kazakhstan and the eu, focusing on the specific case of the kashagan oil field. i argue that italy, as the largest importer of kazakhstan’s oil, can play a significant role in the diversification of energy export routes from kazakhstan and in the introduction of new european technologies. in turn, kazakhstan can play a prominent role in ensuring the energy security of the eu, especially after the 2014 crimea incident. i posit that recent italy-kazakhstan relations shows how a mediumsized power such as italy can be important in leading a larger block of countries into a new field of investment and development. 2 review of european and russian affairs 9 (1), 2015 introduction the purpose of this paper is to examine the role of italy, as the largest importer of kazakhstan oil, in developing kazakhstan-eu energy cooperation, and the possibility that these imports could lead to kazakhstan diversifying its oil export routes. this study attempts to fill a gap in the existing literature, as there is not yet an in-depth study on italy’s role in the development of energy cooperation between kazakhstan and the eu. although kazakhstan researchers kassenova nargis (kassenova 2011, 48-62) and laumulin murat (laumulin 2000) have argued that kazakhstan and the eu have attempted to enhance their energy dialogue, their focus was on the larger eu framework, rather than emphasizing particular actors. specifically, kassenova emphasized the interests, challenges, and opportunities of eucentral asian bilateral cooperation. she found that among all the central asian countries, kazakhstan has the most advanced relationship with the eu, including political, economic, energy, and regional security spheres (kassenova 2011, 48-59). laumulin, on the other hand, looked at eu-central asia cooperation from a different angle. he noted that, since the 2000s, the european commission has realized that caspian resources could play an important role in world energy supplies, as well as reduce the eu’s dependence on russian energy resources. nevertheless, there has been no strategy towards the central asian region because although the eu has had clear and ambitious interests, it has lacked the tools and funds to achieve them. the bulk of eu development has been limited to the countries directly on its eastern border (laumulin 2009, 124). while the eu as a whole had not been approaching the central asian region, italy had started to work actively to build bilateral basis through investments in the energy sector. thus, the fundamental hypothesis of this paper is that a “medium-sized power”1 such as italy can be important in leading a larger block of countries into a new field of investment and development in a less-developed region. this paper will look at the development of italian-led kazakhstan-eu energy cooperation, focusing on the specific case of the kashagan oil field. in order to explore my hypothesis, i will strive to answer this question: how has italy been able to contribute to the deepening of energy cooperation between kazakhstan and the eu? the paper is organized as follows: section 1 will be devoted to european energy security and kazakhstan’s hydrocarbon as a potential energy source for europe in light of the crimean incident of 2014. section 2 will analyze the state of european investment in kazakhstan energy, with a particular focus on italy as the leading eu partner of kazakhstan. section 3 will discuss the kashagan oil field, including a description of the participation of the largest italian company, agip (azienda generale italiana petroli), in that field. using kashagan as a case study, i will examine the development of kazakhstan-italy bilateral relations, which can stimulate the widening of energy cooperation between kazakhstan and the eu. i will look in particular at the role of the construction of a shipyard in kuryk port in promotion of kashagan’s oil exports via the bakutbilisi-ceyhan (btc) pipeline to european markets. the last section will present kazakhstan’s goal to attract investments and new technologies. 1 a medium-sized power is a power that is not a great power, but still has great influence and international recognition. 3 review of european and russian affairs 9 (1), 2015 european energy security first i will define “energy security.” arnold wolfers (1952, 485) defines security as, “a value . . . that has much in common . . . with power or wealth . . . [it] measures the absence of threats to acquired values.” john s. duffield explains the relationship between energy and security. he argues that there was no scholarly interest in the subject before the arab-israeli war of 1973-1974, when western powers were faced with the first major post-world war ii threat to their energy supplies. at that time, scholars started to express their concerns and worked to define the concept of energy security. duffield (2010, 1403) writes, “david deese was one of the first scholars to offer a definition of energy security . . . ‘as a condition in which a nation perceives a high probability that it will have adequate energy supplies at affordable prices.’” duffield says a similar point of view was expressed by danel yergin, who argued that “the objective of energy security is to assure adequate, reliable supplies of energy at reasonable prices and in ways that do not jeopardize major national values and objectives” (ibid.). according to duffield (2010, 1401-1402), the western countries were unsettled by two waves of oil shocks in the 1970s (the opec oil embargo of 1973-1974 and the iranian revolution of 19781979), and decided to respond by cooperating on energy security. in 1974, a group of industrialized countries led by the united states created the international energy agency (iea) (ibid.). the oil shocks helped shape the iea’s definition of energy security as “the uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable price” (international energy agency 2015). the oil shocks demonstrated the energy-importing countries’ vulnerability, which remains a key concern for those countries, and helped them realize “how important it is for modern societies to secure their supply of energy . . . securing energy resources has become a key aspect of foreign policy making since the 1970s” (özdamar 2010, 1415). the european union is not an exception. throughout the late 20th century the primary energy security concern was the west’s dependence on middle eastern oil. in the last decade, however, russia’s willingness to use its energy resources as a weapon in its aggressive foreign policy has become a second key area of energy security concern. the united states government has been concerned for several years with europe’s growing dependency on russian energy resources. according to a 2008 united states congressional report, the united states government had expressed its concern to europe regarding europe’s growing dependence and the willingness of moscow to use energy as a weapon to try to influence european foreign and economic policy. at an april 2007 us-eu summit, leaders agreed to work to cooperate on energy security and the reduction of dependence on russia, and yet, some eu member states continued to pursue long-term agreements with russian firms (belkin 2008, 2). the 2014 crimean incident, however, changed the situation significantly. russia’s seizure of crimea in 2014 and the resulting us and eu sanctions against russia have pressed the european union to much more seriously search for ways to decrease its dependence on russian energy supplies. richard weitz (2014) notes that the situation in the eu on energy security needs to be solved. on may 28, 2014, the european commission released its comprehensive energy security strategy, according to which the long-term objective is to reduce 4 review of european and russian affairs 9 (1), 2015 the eu’s reliance on vulnerable foreign energy supplies, especially from russia . . . one of europe’s core challenges is that its energy demand will rise by an estimated 27 percent by 2030, while eu domestic energy production is falling. eu members rely on external sources for 88% of their crude oil and 66% of their natural gas consumption.” the eu has traditionally not had a unified energy policy, with the exception of a package of energy reforms aimed at harmonizing member states’ energy markets. to enhance energy security, the eu commission is considering ways to deal with the disruption of gas supplies by diversifying energy supplies and transport routes, particularly developing and improving routes that would bring energy supplies into central asia without going through russia (weitz 2014). one way is to increase the energy supply being imported from kazakhstan. kazakhstan hydrocarbon as a potential energy source for europe kazakhstan’s hydrocarbon resources have the potential to help alleviate europe’s energy security concerns. kazakhstan is a major oil producer, with potentially vast untapped hydrocarbon reserves. the estimated total liquid production in 2013 was 1.64 million barrels per day (bbl/d), which, while significant, is still far below saudi arabia’s total 2013 oil production of 11.591 million barrels per day (us energy information administration 2013b). the main oil reserves of kazakhstan are concentrated in and around the caspian sea, a region that ranks second in the world in the presence of undeveloped oil and gas reserves. these data were presented at the third international oil and gas conference, development of the caspian shelf, which was held on june 20-21, 2013. aset magauov, the general director of the national energy company kazenergy, noted that “the potential of the kazakhstan sector is huge, and in the future, hydrocarbon production on the sea will reach volumes of oil extracted on kazakhstan’s land. today is the start of a rapidly growing energy market” (kulmagambetov 2013; author's translation). the significance of the caspian region in the world oil and gas market was confirmed by iea deputy director richard johnson at this conference. he said that “[t]he presence and the successful development of hydrocarbon resources of the caspian sea is of great importance not only for the economic prosperity of all caspian bordering countries, but also for the global energy balance” (johnson quoted in konyrova 2013; author's translation). for comparison, the data on oil and gas production in the countries of the caspian region are presented in table 1. while russia and iran are currently far ahead in proved oil and gas reserves in the region, kazakhstan and turkmenistan have the potential of outstripping both of those countries. the 2011-2015 strategic plan of the ministry of oil and gas of the republic of kazakhstan, approved by government decree on february 14, 2011, assessed the overall recoverable hydrocarbon resources. according to this document, the kazakhstan sector of the caspian sea has almost half of the oil reserves of the entire country (egemen kazakhstan 2011). kazakhstan’s estimated total petroleum production was 1.70 million barrels per day in 2014 (us energy information administration 2015). as noted in this document, there are 172 oil and 42 gas condensate fields in the republic, and 62% of kazakh territory lies over these fields. 5 review of european and russian affairs 9 (1), 2015 table 1: proven and prospective oil and gas reserves in the caspian region country proven oil reserve, 2 billions of barrels prospective oil reserve,3 billions of barrels proven gas reserves, trillions of cubic feet prospective gas reserves, trillions of cubic feet azerbaijan 7 32 30 35 iran 89.7 15 812.3 11 kazakhstan 8 92 65 88 russia 48.6 14 1680 no data turkmenistan 0.5 80 101 159 total 153.8 233 2688.3 293 source: british petroleum, bp statistical review of world energy, 2002 (ayvazyan 2013) the main reserves are concentrated in the 15 largest fields, the most prominent of which are tengiz, kashagan, and karachaganak. given the importance of the caspian region, president nazarbayev’s decree of may 16, 2003 (no. 1095) was approved as the state program of development of the kazakhstan sector of the caspian sea (ukaz 2003). this document defines the strategy of using energy resources in kazakhstan, and a large role is given to the caspian region due to the increase in oil demand in europe (ibid.). in order to meet the needs of both external and internal markets, kazakhstan had planned to increase its oil production. in the 2000s, crude oil exports saw steady annual increases (musabekova 2010). just as energy-importing countries value the security of importing from a variety of countries to reduce risk, for energy-exporting countries like kazakhstan, diversification of markets is important for security and economic growth stabilization. since becoming independent, kazakhstan has relied largely on pipelines through russia to export its hydrocarbons. to diversify export routes, kazakhstan has seen the development of the aforementioned btc oil pipeline as a critical component to getting around using russian pipelines, and thereby diversifying and expanding its export capability. the btc oil pipeline is a dedicated pipeline system designed to transport up to one million barrels per day of crude oil from baku in azerbaijan, through georgia, to a new marine terminal at ceyhan in turkey on the mediterranean coast. from ceyhan, the oil is transported by tankers to international markets. the 1,760 km pipeline became operational in early 2005 (european bank for reconstruction and development 2002). since 2013, kazakhstan has transferred 50-60 thousand barrels of oil daily through the btc pipeline (gusseinov 2014). the vast oil field kashagan, near the caspian sea, is kazakhstan’s main oil production site. kazakhstan produced about 82 million tons of oil in 2013, and one-third of it was exported via russian pipelines. kazakhstan’s oil and gas minister uzakbay karabalin said on april 7, 2014 that kazakhstan’s export potential via russian pipelines was threatened, and that there was a need 2 “proven” reserves are economically recoverable. 3 “prospective” reserves suggest a potential for much greater production. 6 review of european and russian affairs 9 (1), 2015 btc pipeline source: http://za-gonzalez.livejournal.com/349361.html?thread=4753585 to improve alternative routes, by which he meant increasing the amount of oil that could be exported through the btc (jafarova 2014). he discussed enlarging kazakhstan’s caspian sea eastern shore port at aktau, from which tankers transport oil across the caspian to baku, azerbaijan, the terminus of the btc pipeline, which would transport the oil to europe. aktau is currently undergoing massive expansion and renovation and could, according to karabalin, ship up to 20 million tons of oil annually within a couple of years (pannier 2014). kazakhstan is also building up its tanker fleet, as is turkmenistan, to increase the amount of oil shipped from aktau to baku (ibid.). to facilitate this increase, an agreement between kazakhstan and azerbaijan to ship kazakh oil through the btc pipeline was renewed. negotiations had been suspended over a pricing dispute in 2010, but the rising demand from europe spurred the countries to make an agreement. in 2014, kazakhstan was expected to export four million tons of oil through the btc pipeline (pannier 2014). kazakhstan’s oil production has grown rapidly in recent years. according to the world bank, however, kazakhstan’s real gdp growth slowed from 6 percent in 2013 to 3.9 percent during the first half of 2014, due to the decline in worldwide oil prices and the economic slowdown in russia (world bank 2015). kazakhstan officials have hinted at increasing oil production to offset financial losses, despite pressure from the opec countries to restrain production. increased production will require an increase in the transit of oil through pipelines. in late 2013, an agreement was signed between kazakhstan and azerbaijan for production to be raised, with the idea that in 2014, around 4.5 million tons of oil would be pumped from the tengiz field (gusseinov 2014). three million tons of this amount will be transported through the btc, and the rest will go by rail to the georgian kulevi terminal on the black sea (ia novosti-kazakhstan 2013). the issue of kazakhstan’s dependence on the russian pipeline system since independence has become especially acute since sanctions were placed on russia due to the crimean crisis. western sanctions on russia have limited kazakhstan’s ability to export oil through russia (ia novosti7 review of european and russian affairs 9 (1), 2015 kazakhstan 2013). this development provides further incentive for kazakhstan to increase its use of the btc and other alternative routes. european investment in kazakhstan energy the significant energy resources of central asia and the region’s desire to diversify energy routes have caught the attention of the eu. among the central asian countries, kazakhstan is the top priority for energy cooperation because about 76% of crude oil goes to europe (see graph below), and half of foreign investment in kazakhstan is of european origin. one example of this growing partnership is a preliminary agreement on an expanded partnership and cooperation between kazakhstan and the european union, concluded on january 20, 2015 in brussels. this document shows that europe is committed to stronger political and economic relations with kazakhstan, which will increase the flow of trade, services, and investment between the two sides. source: us energy information administration 2015 italy, the leading eu partner of kazakhstan italy, one of the eu member states, has been a leader in exchanges with kazakhstan. its geographic location makes it easy for hydrocarbons coming from the btc pipeline terminus in turkey and the black sea to enter its mediterranean sea ports. in the future, italy’s position as a key entry port for central asian hydrocarbons into europe is likely to continue. for example, the trans adriatic http://www.eia.gov/countries/analysisbriefs/kazakhstan/images/crude_exports.png 8 review of european and russian affairs 9 (1), 2015 pipeline (tap),4 which will connect with the southern gas corridor to bring black sea oil into europe, will have its terminus in italy. of all of the central asian countries with which italian energy companies have done business since the collapse of the soviet union in 1991, kazakhstan, with the largest oil reserves in the region, is their most frequent partner. the ambassador of kazakhstan in italy, elemesov, noted that: among other countries of ‘old europe,’ the most active in central asia is italy . . . italy has developed the practical dimension of its policy in the central asian region in a framework of a strategy for a new partnership between the eu and central asia, which was initiated in 2007. according to the stated (designated) priorities, the focus of the foreign policy of rome officially aims to develop bilateral and multilateral cooperation with central asian countries in various fields, including trade, cultural ties, cooperation on the level of public organizations, projects to promote democracy, and the rule of law. however, the strategic line of italy in the region was built in the field of energy and security. according to the majority of italian and european experts, the key economic and energy partner of rome in central asia is astana [kazakhstan]. (elemesov 2015, 46-49; author’s translation) the economic component takes a special place in the foreign policy of kazakhstan. in this respect, the interests of the two countries meet, which allows for the development of bilateral relations. this economic cooperation has provided a foundation for the formation of other foreign policy areas between the two countries in recent years. kursiv research rated the countries that were the biggest trade partners of kazakhstan at the end of 2013. the study found that italy was kazakhstan’s third largest trade partner, behind only kazakhstan’s largest neighbors, russia and china. trade turnover between the two countries amounted to $16.22 billion (kursiv research 2014). looking at oil exports alone, kazakhstan’s first deputy minister of energy karabalin reported that kazakhstan exported 62.5 million tons of oil in 2014, 25% of which was delivered to italy, 17% to china, 13% to the netherlands, 9% to france, and 7% to austria. in 2015, kazakh companies plan to increase oil production to as much as 80.5 million tons (italiya 2015). currently, italy-kazakhstan trade is very one-sided and one-dimensional. 93.87% of italykazakhstan trade is made up of kazakhstan exports to italy. out of those exports, 99.37% of it is crude oil and crude oil products. the imports coming from italy are primarily finished manufactured products, such as machinery, equipment, tools, and chemical industry products, including pharmaceuticals (kursiv research 2014). another important factor contributing to the promotion of trade and economic cooperation between the two countries, especially in the energy sector, was the coming to power of matteo renzi as prime minister of italy on february 22, 2014. renzi stressed the importance of kazakhstan to italy, noting that kazakhstan “is of great importance from an economic point of view, but above all, from the energy” (nakipova 2014; author’s translation). the italian company “ente nazionale idrocarburi” (eni) has been a major player in the energy sector in kazakhstan since the first years of independence, and has been involved in the development of the kashagan 4 the trans adriatic pipeline is a pipeline project to transport natural gas from the caspian sea (azerbaijan), going from greece via albania and the adriatic sea to italy and further into western europe. the construction of this project will be started in 2015 and is expected to begin operating in 2018. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/caspian_sea http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/azerbaijan http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/greece http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/albania http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/adriatic_sea http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/italy 9 review of european and russian affairs 9 (1), 2015 top 10 trading partners of the republic of kazakhstan in 2013 ($usd billions) no. country 2013 2012 changes 1 russia 23.49 23.10 1.71% 2 china 22.53 21.67 3.94% 3 italy 16.22 16.34 -0.75% 4 netherlands 10.09 4.57 33.25% 5 france 6.19 6.29 -1.57% 6 switzerland 4.45 5.14 -13.46% 7 austria 4.36 5.23 -16.67% 8 ukraine 4.28 5.31 -19.40% 9 turkey 3.50 3.51 -0.48% 10 germany 2.23 5.22 -38.07% agency of the republic of kazakhstan on statistics (kursiv research 2014) and karachaganak oil fields. in the medium term, italy has considered kazakhstan to be a more reliable provider of oil than azerbaijan. as christiani (2012) notes, in addition to the proven oil reserves of both countries, according to which kazakhstan has 1.8% of the world’s oil reserves, and azerbaijan only 0.4%, it is generally accepted that kazakhstan could be a more reliable partner for oil in the long term. in the first half of 2012, according to official data, the indicators of azerbaijan’s oil sector decreased by 7.1% and the associated exports declined by 8.2%. given these trends, the reliability of the oil industry in the medium term is a key element of political and economic calculations of italy in the region. the ongoing development of trade and economic relations between kazakhstan and italy has continued to grow. according to the kazakhstan statistics agency, the 2010 bilateral trade amounted to $11.1 billion, and in 2011, this figure increased to $16.1 billion. in 2012, the volume of trade between the two countries reached a record of $16.4 billion. kazakh-italian trade in the period from 1994 ($103 million) to 2012 increased 159-fold (elemesov 2015, 47). in recent times, major italian businesses in kazakhstan have focused mainly on the energy, raw materials, and construction sectors of kazakhstan’s economy. the leading italian companies are “eni,” “finmeccanica,” and “italcementi” (ibid.). paolo ghirelli, chairman of the chamber of commerce and industry of italy – kazakhstan, noted that “kazakhstan has launched a multi-billion program of investments in the oil and gas industry and infrastructure and is the most dynamic and interesting market in central asia for italian companies” (ghirelli 2009, 8-9). italy was a leader in implementing the energy roadmap in kazakhstan, an eu-central asian agreement adopted at the 2nd ministerial conference, which took place on 30 november 2006 (2nd ministerial conference 2006). the energy roadmap sets out a long-term action plan, 10 review of european and russian affairs 9 (1), 2015 including enhancing energy security by addressing the issues of energy export/import, diversification of supply, transit of energy, and demand management (ibid.). further steps to strengthen cooperation between the eu and kazakhstan were discussed at the event inogate5 as a successful energy cooperation programme: achievements in kazakhstan and the way forward in 2014 on june 18, 2014. as was noted, “kazakhstan has been and remains one of the key partners of the eu inogate, [and has] acted as beneficiary in 41 of the 69 projects of inogate” (kazakhstan and eu 2014). the eu ambassador aurelia bouchez stated that “europe shares with kazakhstan the conviction that our citizens need a secure supply of energy at internationally competitive prices” (ibid.). italy as the largest importer of kazakhstan’s oil according to kazakhstan’s customs control committee of the ministry of finance, the largest share of its exports was destined for italy in 2012 (at about 355,000bbl/d. other notable importers of kazakhstan’s liquid fuels included china, the netherlands, france, and austria (us energy information administration 2013a). the key to kazakhstan’s continued growth in liquids production will be the development of its giant tengiz, karachaganak, and kashagan fields. since the early years of independence, kazakhstan’s oil reserves have been the basis for the development of bilateral cooperation with a number of countries, including italy. one of the main and constant aims of italian foreign policy is to guarantee the stability of its energy supplies. around 63 italian companies currently do business in kazakhstan, including such major oil companies as the eni consortium companies agip kco atyrau and agip karachaganak bv. the 5 inogate is a regional energy cooperation programme between the european union and 11 partner countries in eastern europe, the caucasus, and central asia. 11 review of european and russian affairs 9 (1), 2015 agip companies have worked in the kazakhstan market for over 20 years and started the development of such fields as karachaganak and kashagan (kursiv research 2014). kashagan, an uplifted reef in the subsalt northern caspian, was explored by soviet geophysicists in the period from 1988 to 1991. later studies by western geophysical companies confirmed the soviet findings. the three primary masses were eventually named kashagan east, west, and southwest (mineraly 2014). on june 30, 2000, the “vostok-1” well in kashagan east was the first to produce oil. production at the west and southwest fields began in 2001 and 2003 respectively. the proved reserves amounted to about 35 billion barrels. however, despite possessing vast oil reserves, extraction at the kashagan field is complicated by climatic conditions. kashagan oil lies at a depth of 4,200 meters below the sea floor and is under high pressure. the oil deposit is located in the shallow part of the northern caspian, due to the low level of salinity (mineralization) caused by the influx of fresh water from the volga. furthermore, the temperature in winter drops to as low as -40°c, resulting in the north caspian sea being covered in ice for about 5 months of the year. (mendebayev 2014). kazakhstan could not independently develop a deposit with such complex climatic and geological conditions. in 1997, kazakhstan signed the “agreement on production-sharing in the north caspian sea,” a 40-year treaty with the consortium okioc (formerly known as agip kco). in 1998, the consortium okioc included such companies as: totalfinaelf, statoil, bp amaco, bc plc, royal dutch/shell, exxon mobil, philips petroleum, and inpex. in february 2001, the operator of the okioc became the company agip kko (kokovinets 2001). in january 2008, the kashagan project was transferred from agip kko to the new operating company, north caspian operating company (ncoc) (nomad.su 2008). the aforementioned agreement on production-sharing is made up of 7 companies consisting of the kazakh state-run oil company kazmunaigas (16.88%), agipkco (eni) (16.807%), royal dutch shell (16.807%), total s.a. (16.807%), exxonmobil (16.807%), china national petroleum corporation (8.333%, which was acquired from conocophillips for $5bn in 2013), and inpex (7.563%). eni is responsible for phase i of the field's development, while shell is responsible for production operations (nomad.su 2008). nevertheless, according to kazakhstan’s oil minister uzakbai karabalin, “the north caspian operating company is undergoing changes, a new managing system is being created, and the new operator ， which will include three organizations: agip, ncoc (north caspian operating company), and ncpoc (north caspian production operations company, which is a joint venture between shell kazakhstan development b.v. and kmg kashagan b.v. that sees both sides hold equal participation shares 50/50 will comprise specialists employed with member companies of the consortium” (tengrinews june 18, 2014a; author’s translation). he explained the change, noting that “both subcontractors and the ministry were dissatisfied with the system in place up to now. it has been too costly; decision-making has taken a lot of time due to the complexity of the hierarchy” (ibid.; author’s translation). a gas leak led to a suspension of production in october 2013, which resulted in a 0.5% decrease in gdp in 2014. vice minister of oil and gas magzum myrzagaliyev said that the giant kashagan oilfield should resume commercial production in late 2015 (ibid.). 12 review of european and russian affairs 9 (1), 2015 on june 11, 2014, in a meeting between kazakhstan’s president nursultan nazarbayev and the ceo of italian eni claudio descalzi, president nazarbayev expressed concern about the development of the kashagan oil and gas field, which has been hindered by multiple delays and cost overruns throughout its existence. nevertheless, they discussed the expansion of oil transportation networks in kazakhstan, as well as eni’s role in other oil and gas projects in kazakhstan (tengrinews june 13, 2014). after nazabayev’s meeting, the members of the ncoc signed a memorandum of understanding with the government of kazakhstan regarding further development and exploitation of the kashagan project, which also included an agreement on kazakhstan’s participation in the project and the field’s production capabilities (tengrinews june 18, 2014b). as we can see, the gas leak at the kashagan field had no effect on bilateral relations; in fact, it deepened the relationship. the oil exports from kazakhstan to italy between january and may 2014 increased by 21.5% in comparison with the same period in 2013 (kapital.kz 2014). in july, the figures were: italy 12.6 million tons equating $10.3 billion china 4.4 million tons equating $3.6 billion netherlands 5.2 million equating $4.2 billion (i-news.kz 2014). italy’s interests in kazakhstan are not restricted to the stable supply of energy resources, as there is also a keen interest in integrating with other sectors. italy intends to build a shipyard in the caspian sea. the contract for the establishment of the joint oil venture was signed by italy’s eni and the kazakh company kazmunaigas, and ensured that 50% of the shares will be owned by each party (mining news.kz 2014). the consortium eni is the largest integrated company in italy, and its activities are not limited to the oil and gas industry. eni together with kazmunaigas are building a shipyard in the kuryk port (ia novosti-kazakhstan 2012). this shipyard has the potential to play a significant role in the promotion of kashagan’s oil exports via the btc pipeline to european markets. thus, the role of italy in the development of kazakhstan-eu cooperation is enormous, due to its possible huge contribution to the transportation of kashagan oil along the btc pipeline. according to the us energy information administration (eia), kazakhstan is aiming to utilize foreign investment to construct the kazakhstan-caspian transportation system (kcts). the suggested plan is to export oil, primarily produced at kashagan and tengiz, to international markets. proposals would see the oil first transported through a new pipeline east of the caspian to a terminal at kuryk, and then shipped to baku, where it would enter the btc pipeline. initially, kcts is expected to supply 300,000 barrels per day to global markets through the btc; however, it is estimated that this figure will gradually increase to 800,000 barrels per day (us energy information administration 2013c). kazakhstan intends to expand its cooperation with italy as part of its policy of industrial development through attracting high technologies. kazakhstan chose italy as the main partner for oil development of kashagan due to its leading position in foreign direct investment (fdi), as well as its considerable political and economic weight within the european union. italy’s geographical location also plays an important role in the distribution of oil to other european countries, so in this respect, italy is considered to be the representative country of the european union. 13 review of european and russian affairs 9 (1), 2015 source: us energy information administration (2013) nonetheless, while kazakhstan has achieved substantial results in attracting foreign investments into priority sectors, fdi and exports have still been highly concentrated (more than 70%) in natural resources (organization for economic cooperation and development 2012). thus, kazakhstan decided to create the industrial and development program in order to diversify fdi into primary sectors and thereby become more advanced in the field of technological development; this will be discussed in the next section. kazakhstan’s goal to attract investments and new technologies kazakhstan’s intentions for further cooperation, as well as to attract investment and develop new technologies, were in evidence at the world petroleum congress, which was held in moscow in june 2014. investors took note when a representative from the oil industry, damiano ratti, noted that “special interest arose due to the fact that the government plans to compensate foreign investors by up to 30% of capital costs once in operation” (prikaspiyskaya kommuna 2014; author's translation). national plans to draw in investments to non-oil-related sectors of the kazakhstani economy, during the 2015-2020 period, aim to attract 81 companies that will contribute to the development of alternative forms of energy in kazakhstan (ministerstvo industrii i novykh tekhnologiy, 2011). an important factor in the development of kazakh-italian relations could be the eurasian economic union. at a conference on investment, legal and tax climate in the countries of the customs union held in rome on june 20, 2014, the president of the chamber of commerce of 14 review of european and russian affairs 9 (1), 2015 rome, giancarlo cremonesi, noted that “the creation of the eurasian union is a great chance for companies from our country who want to work and develop business in the region” (evraziyskii kommunikatsionnyi tsentr 2014; author's translation). italy, as a country with interests in the issue and in the region (italy imports 85% of its energy resources), could also assist in helping to strengthen cooperation regarding energy resources between kazakhstan and the eu. given that italy took over the eu presidency on july 1, 2014, it has the potential to play an even greater role in consolidating ties between kazakhstan and the eu. as sandro gozi, state secretary of the council of ministers responsible for european policy, said in an interview with itar-tass, we do not intend to assume a decisive role, but want to turn europe towards new political priorities through the introduction of more effective methods of management and decision-making. in our opinion, the renovation of europe, which is a topic that is greatly discussed in all countries, requires a change in approach. we hope to put new boundaries in place for the european leadership, set five year goals, and to help europe solve them. (zabrodina 2014; author's translation) at a joint press briefing on 12 september 2014, alexey volkov, deputy minister of foreign affairs of kazakhstan, noted that “we have completed negotiations on a new agreement on the expanded partnership and cooperation between kazakhstan and the eu. we hope that this document will promote our relationship and open a corridor for interaction, and create greater opportunities to access innovative projects and european technologies” (predstavitel'stvo es v kazakshtane 2014; author's translation). as noted by gunnar wiegand,6 “…we have an agreement that will allow us to create a new and better basis for our relations and further development. in the new agreement, we have significantly increased the area of cooperation, which will now cover 29 areas, including such important areas as the economy, trade, and investment… the scope of our cooperation significantly expands in the field of the economy, as european companies are the largest investors in kazakhstan” ibid.; author's translation). the expansion of cooperation between kazakhstan and the eu will undoubtedly have a positive impact on the expansion of cooperation between kazakhstan and italy, which cooperates not only on energy, trade, and economy, but also on such areas as research and innovation, education, transport, and communications, among others. conclusion despite its vast natural resources, the landlocked geographical position of kazakhstan makes it difficult to transport natural resources. just as energy-importing countries value the security of importing from a variety of countries to reduce risk, for energy-exporting countries like kazakhstan, diversification of markets is important for security and economic growth stabilization. since independence, kazakhstan has been largely dependent on pipelines through russia to export its hydrocarbons. to diversify export routes, kazakhstan has seen the development of the btc oil pipeline as a critical alternative. kazakhstan can now diversify its oil pipeline routes through utilizing tankers shipping to azerbaijan. nonetheless, the volume of oil that can be transmitted through tankers is limited. 6 director of the department for russia, eastern partnership of central asia, regional cooperation and the osce, european external action service 15 review of european and russian affairs 9 (1), 2015 italy, one of the eu member states, has been a leader both in efforts to deal with the recent economic crisis, and in exchanges with kazakhstan. italy, as the largest importer of kazakhstan’s oil, could use kazakhstan as a market for its services, as well as help kazakhstan diversify its routes by providing a destination for kashagan oil through the btc pipeline. it holds a highly important geographic location as a link to the rest of europe for hydrocarbons coming through the btc pipeline terminus in turkey and the black sea to ports on the mediterranean sea. moreover, italy has contributed to the development of kazakhstan-eu energy cooperation through adopting a more proactive foreign policy in the eu vis-à-vis kazakhstan. these interests are mutually beneficial for italy and other eu countries, especially after the crimea incident, which made eu countries more aware of their dependency on russian energy. in order to reduce their reliance on russian energy resources, the eu countries must also open new pipeline routes. kazakhstan’s hydrocarbon resources have the potential to help alleviate europe’s energy security concerns. kazakhstan is a major oil producer with potentially vast untapped hydrocarbon reserves. kazakhstan intends to expand its cooperation with italy as a part of its policy of industrial development through attracting investments in high technologies. while kazakhstan has achieved substantial results in attracting foreign investments into priority sectors, fdi and exports have still been highly concentrated in natural resources. against this backdrop, kazakhstan decided to create the industrial and development program in order to diversify the fdi in the renewable energy sector, and, through doing so, become more advanced with regards to technological development. both sides thus have mutually beneficial interests. kazakhstan expects to reinforce its cooperation with italy in the energy field not only in relation to energy security, but also in the acquisition of new and necessary technologies. 16 review of european and russian affairs 9 (1), 2015 acknowledgements the author gratefully acknowledges the in-depth analysis and helpful comments from two anonymous reviewers and dara marcus and marcel sangsari of the rera editorial team. the author would also like to express her deepest gratitude to professor andrew reed hall, who has made a significant contribution to improving the paper by providing kind help on this article. last, but not least, the author would like to thank her colleague zhannah voukitchevitch for invaluable suggestions and comments, and her colleague hiro hayashi for proofreading the article. 17 review of european and russian affairs 9 (1), 2015 references 2nd ministerial conference. 2006. enhancing energy co-operation between the eu, the littoral states of the black and caspian seas and their neighboring countries. 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(01.07.2014). retrieved october 14, 2014. http://www.rg.ru/2014/07/01/predsedatelstvo-site-anons.html 21 review of european and russian affairs 9 (1), 2015 published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada available online at: journals.carleton.ca/rera/index.php/rera rera is an electronic academic peer-reviewed journal that publishes graduate, post-graduate, and young scholarly works. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is a joint project supported by the canadaeurope transatlantic dialogue—a cross-canada research network supported by the social sciences and humanities research council of canada (sshrc)—along with the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies (carleton university) and its associated research unit, the centre for european studies. rera aims to provide an accessible forum for research, to promote high standards of research and scholarship, and to foster communication among young scholars. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada tel: +01 613 520-2600 ext. 3117; e-mail: rera-journal@carleton.ca creative commons license creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0 this working paper is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial no derivs 3.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 3.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, provided the source is acknowledged. no use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes. issn: 1718-4835 © 2015 the author https://journals.carleton.ca/rera/index.php/rera mailto:rera-journal@carleton.ca http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ why reforms fail: the role of ideas, interests and institutions review of european and russian affairs 12 (1), 2018 issn 1718-4835 introduction: integration through crises valerie j. d’erman and amy verdun (co-editors) university of victoria abstract the introductory paper to this special issue discusses the idea of crisis in relation to european integration from a historical perspective in order to contextualize four different current events in the european union (eu) in turn – euro area crisis, migration crisis, brexit, and the rise of populist responses to eu governance. we turn to the wider scholarly concept of ‘crisis’ and apply it to large-scale events affecting the eu, in order to relate events to broader theoretical discussions about the progression of the eu. existing literature on the topic highlights different varieties of crisis scenarios: those that undermine the basic integrity of the undertaking; those that threaten certain domains or the activities of certain groups; and those that reflect short-term, but acute dangers that may be overcome without structural damage. this introductory contribution situates each of the four above-mentioned ‘crises’ in the context of these varieties and offers suggestions for how each crisis might influence the future direction of european integration by using illustrations from each of the articles in this special issue. 2 review of european and russian affairs 12 (1), 2018 introduction this paper discusses the idea of crisis in relation to european integration from a historical perspective in order to contextualize four different current events in the european union (eu) in turn – euro area crisis, migration crisis, brexit, and the rise of populist responses to eu governance. it briefly discusses the specific nature of each event, or ‘crisis,’ and relates each event to broader theoretical discussions about progression of the eu. this special issue of the review of european and russian affairs presents the work of junior scholars who have each respectively examined different crisis-related situations affecting european countries and european integration. in this introduction, we turn to the wider scholarly concept of ‘crisis’ and apply it to large-scale events affecting the eu, some of which are not dealt with specifically in the articles that follow. existing literature on the topic highlights different varieties of crisis scenarios: those that undermine the basic integrity of the undertaking; those that threaten certain domains, or the activities of certain groups; and those that reflect short-term but acute dangers that may be overcome without structural damage. this introductory contribution situates each of the four above-mentioned ‘crises’ in the context of these varieties, and offers suggestions for how each crisis might influence the future direction of european integration, by using illustrations from each of the articles in this special issue. the central concept of ‘crisis’ in the eu underscores two important aspects of general understandings of european integration. the first is that the basic definition of the noun ‘crisis’ has three components: crisis as a time of intense difficulty or danger; crisis as a time when a difficult or important decision must be made; and crisis as the turning point of a disease when an important change takes place, indicating either recovery or death (oxford english dictionary 2017). these three components are interrelated in that they are not mutually incompatible in defining the same situation, and yet each of the three components suggests a different point or perspective of a situation. scholarly work on the concept of crisis as it relates to the contextualization of risk and responsibility is also relevant here, as such work highlights the social processes involved both in defining an event as a crisis and in assigning a level of severity to it. given the above definition and the recognition that the label ‘crisis’ is vulnerable to political machinations, we argue that, in practice, a crisis can be understood as existing on something of a spectrum whose extremes are identified as ‘a problem’ and ‘full chaos.’ analyses of events unfolding in the eu ought to be understood as comprising different points on this spectrum, with attendant possibilities of disaster and/or opportunities. the second aspect of crisis, in particular as it relates to the eu, is the notion that integration progresses in response to crises, frequently in unintended directions. this very idea has its roots in the monnet plan and in the schuman declaration, with the crises of war and reconstruction galvanizing the possibility of combining resources and leading to the 1951 treaty of paris. this process continues with major historical events in modern european integration that mark significant turning points in the development of supranational governance, such as the empty chair crisis in 1965, the constitutional crisis in 2005 (following the french and dutch referendums on the constitutional treaty), or short-term setbacks with treaty ratifications such as with maastricht in 1992 or lisbon in 2007 (stone sweet and sandholtz 1997; verdun 2000; dinan 2010). although the idea of crisis heralding progression is not a new one, the application of this idea to the four events discussed in this introduction serves to remind us that, in the case of the eu, 3 review of european and russian affairs 12 (1), 2018 progression is not necessarily movement toward a knowable defined finalité – meaning, the idea of progression should not be confused with the idea of eu governance arriving at the stage of full federation, or even as a consistent trajectory of increasing peace and prosperity. rather, the idea of progress can also simply be the movement of european integration in any positive or negative direction that heralds change (schmitter 1970: 840). this reminder is useful when analyzing current events in the eu, as it helps to situate each crisis in the context of movement, without adhering too strictly to normative prescriptions of how the status quo of integration ought to be maintained. this article begins with a review of the idea of crisis, both in a general policy context and in the narrower context of the eu. while most eu literature in this area arises from discussions of economic and monetary union (emu) and the euro area debt crises, the core arguments reflect the notion of a european response, and in doing so, the complexities of cultivating a shared response to the perception of a shared problem. also related is the idea of democratic deficit, which some scholars frequently present not as a moment of urgency, but rather as a slow-burning, longterm crisis of legitimacy. we apply the review to four different situations confronting the eu and its members in a framework that considers the durability and elasticity of the european integration project. we conclude by drawing parallels to each of the articles in this special issue, and by offering predictions on which crises are most likely to have significant structural impacts. survey of crisis in the eu the concept of crisis as it pertains to policy-oriented settings is inextricably linked to concepts of risk and regulation. risk in public settings is bound up with the idea of a ‘risk society,’ which giddens (1999) identifies as existing only in societies that have managed the majority of the natural world. in this sense, risk is distinct from hazard or danger, and comes only to societies that are post-tradition – meaning that people who live in worlds that are reasonably beyond the vagaries of nature are able to exercise the power of choice in areas that were previously left to fate alone. a risk can therefore also contain a positive element, as it engages with intentional brinksmanship in pursuit of values, and the strategies relevant to pursuing them, arising out of rational cost-benefit analyses. a risk society is “a society increasingly preoccupied with the future (and also with safety), which generates the notion of risk…the word refers to a world which we are both exploring and seeking to normalise and control” (ibid., 3). the ‘manufactured risk’ prevalent in post-traditional societies creates the need for a form of responsibility to attend to risk. regulations, in the form of policy, become the main proxy for responsibility – a central example here being welfare state policies as a form of security to mitigate the most salient risks in an industrial society. the field of sociology posits that the relationship between risk and crisis is embedded in the notion that a modern risk society should be equipped to manage the dangers of the world around us. modernity conceptualizes risks as being manageable, leading to the logic of regulatory governance as rational calculability. a ‘crisis’ thus becomes “an example of the social processes of defining and reacting to risk and risk events,” shaped in large part by the social construction of risk and the social perceptions of the event in question (hutter and lloyd-bostock 2013, 386). the extension of this logic is that when regulations have not been successful in mitigating the risks of an event – whether a natural disaster or a man-made disaster – an event becomes a crisis; the event itself is embedded in a particular social and cultural environment, which in turn shapes the tensions and 4 review of european and russian affairs 12 (1), 2018 political debates arising in response to the crisis. applying the risk society thesis to questions of crises in the eu offers a window into the process of how an event becomes a crisis. although trying to fit the mechanisms of eu governance into the idea of ‘society’ is obviously a stretch, the regulatory milieu of the eu provides a suitable example of how a crisis manifests itself, both practically and politically, through the social processes of risk and responsibility. literature on the history of european integration has generally upheld the notion that the eu itself progresses in response to crisis; that the predicament in question, more often than not, provides a critical juncture where key decision-makers are likely to be more open to alternative solutions. by this logic, depending on the nature of the crisis or the time-sensitivity surrounding its containment, the existence of crisis heightens the possibility of both national and supranational actors considering policy responses that either broaden or deepen the framework of european integration beyond the current status quo. in accordance with the risk society thesis, the value underlying the eu is of european integration providing solutions to the need for peace and prosperity. events that threaten to interrupt the direction of integration are socially processed at the supranational level as crises. the strategies initiated by policy-makers to protect the value of integration develop out of a rational understanding of responsibility – the need to regulate in order to mitigate the potential for future similar crises to unfold. one stream of research that alludes to the relationship between crisis and european integration focuses on events internal to the eu to include the empty chair crisis of 1965 (ludlow 1999; 2006), the constitutional crisis of 2005 (de witte 2005), and instances of ‘crisis’ when a member state rejected a eu treaty with a public referendum, such as denmark did with the maastricht treaty in 1992 (worre 1995), or ireland with the lisbon treaty in 2008 (özlem atikcan 2015). in all cases, the crisis moment is defined by a denial of the proposed trajectory of supranational political development. however, the treaty rejections came from the voting public, who in each instance took the opportunity to express dissatisfaction of some sort with eu governance, whereas the rejection in the empty chair crisis came from the french government’s objection to the financing plan proposed by the hallstein commission and the style of policy-making within the commission itself. this distinction is perhaps not particularly noteworthy, as each rejection broadly conveys a reaction to the perception of an unacceptable renunciation of sovereignty, but it does highlight that objections concerning the substance of european integration are not necessarily always about a public-versus-elite dichotomy – relevant to our later discussion of populism. each of the above crises was resolved with some form of political bargaining to appease the initial rejection. in the case of the failed constitutional treaty of 2005, the majority of french and dutch voted against it in two subsequent referendums, resulting in an abandonment of the rejected proposal. with the benefit of hindsight, crises in these instances were important temporary roadblocks that re-routed the path of integration by recalibrating expectations and conceding gains in supranational authority. another stream of research focuses on events external to the eu institutions – political upheavals that were not the result of actions taken at the supranational level, but were rather major international events that had direct bearing on the course of european integration. the two most prominent (and related) instances are the collapse of the soviet union and german reunification. each of these events generated immediate political action at both national and supranational levels of governance in member states with direct and visible consequences for the trajectory of the eu as a whole. in the case of the collapse of the soviet union, the sudden potential to enlarge the eu (then the european community) from a western european organization toward a pan-european entity fundamentally altered the course and content of integration (laursen and vanhoonacker 5 review of european and russian affairs 12 (1), 2018 1994). in the case of german reunification, the swift increase in the size and capability of one of the four large member states of the twelve ec member states, turning one of them into a clearly larger one, fundamentally changed the substances of policy proposals and the dynamics of political compromise, and was passed for political reasons without a treaty change (jacqué 1991). this point is worth noting simply because the size of a member state has (and has had) ramifications for various isolated areas of decision-making, such as the number of meps in the european parliament, or various incarnations of qualified majority voting in the council – although german reunification initially only led to a change in the number of meps (1994); voting weights in the council only changed much later (i.e., lisbon treaty). another eu development that was heavily affected by the change in intra-european power dynamics and geopolitical changes is the case of emu. the delors report, presented in april 1989 (verdun 1999), before there was a clear sign that the berlin wall would fall or that eastern europe would get rid of its communist regimes, was still ‘pie in the sky’ to many observers. however, once the geopolitical situation changed and germany was seeking approval from its allies and other eu member states to unify, some projects such as emu became more of a reality (italianer 1993; sandholtz 1993; dyson 1994; verdun 2000). though neither of these events is portrayed as a crisis in the literature, the level of opportunity and change that each event provided meets the criteria for a broader definition of crisis being also a time when difficult or important decisions must be made. as a current parallel, brexit provides another instance of a major change arising out of non-eu institutional dynamics that will have a direct impact on the future course of european integration. in many ways, the euro crisis offers the most emblematic example of crisis in the history of the eu to date. the financial crisis that originated in the united states (us) in 2007 quickly spread across global markets. once it fully hit the eu, it became clear that the eu was insufficiently prepared to deal with a crisis of this order of magnitude. the eu did not have the instruments to manage this multifaceted crisis and relied heavily on eu member states. when those member states did not agree with the path that needed to be taken to offset the crisis, it became a larger crisis that ended up putting the entire euro area at risk. at the height of the crisis, it seemed that greece might default and leave the euro area, possibly with the risk of breaking up the euro area, as others might follow its example. at the eleventh hour, the crisis was managed, if not resolved. in the interim, the eu gained more powers (in the form of new mechanisms such as the european semester, the ‘fiscal compact,’ and the european stability mechanism), but citizens became much less enthusiastic about the eu, with citizens in fall 2012 and spring 2013 dropping to their lowest support of the eu, in terms of the positive/negative image the eu conjures up. the topic of financial crisis may provide the clearest instance of all components of the above dictionary definition of ‘crisis’: a time of intense difficulty or danger (for some domestic euro area members and for the eu as a whole); a time when difficult or important decisions must be made (the immediacy of individual country bailouts, or larger decisions regarding the governance of emu); and a turning point of a disease when an important change takes place, indicating either recovery or death (new mechanism and institutions created in response to the euro crisis that attempt to bolster the stability and durability of emu). literature on this topic comprises pre-crisis works that were prescient of an eventual emu emergency, as well as more recent research on the immediate effects of the euro area financial crisis. the former comprises those who identified that the asymmetry of emu represented a nonoptimal currency area, recognizing that a monetary union without an accompanying fiscal union placed the euro area in a precarious position, should a significant economic downturn come to pass 6 review of european and russian affairs 12 (1), 2018 (bayoumi and eichengreen 1994, dyson 1994, krugman 1993, verdun 2000), as well as those who predicted that political conflicts between emu members over the scope and jurisdiction of the maastricht treaty in monetary affairs would be inevitable (feldstein 1997). the latter group, growing in scope, identifies a number of areas both political and economic that have been and continue to be affected by financial crisis within the euro area (menz and smith 2013). these include discussions of political legitimacy (schmidt 2014), analyses of domestic economies and the implications of austerity measures on these economies (matthijs and blyth 2015), and examinations of the panoply of eu responses to financial crisis in the context of theories of european integration (schimmelfennig 2015; jones et al. 2015; see also the special issue of the journal of european public policy on the theme “european integration in times of crisis: theoretical perspectives” and the introduction by its editors ioannou et al. 2015). in many ways, these two groups of scholarly work taken together drive home the argument that crisis is helpful, if not essential, to furthering movement in either direction in the process of european integration. indeed, research shows that the actors in the policy-making process were willing to move forward on emu despite the lack of an optimal currency area, precisely because of the perceived future spillover effects on economic policy-making (verdun 2000, 196). the findings here demonstrate that eu member states and policy-makers were at the time not only aware of the possibility of financial crisis (although perhaps not of its likely extent when it actually arrived in 2008), but were to some degree even relying on an economic downturn as motivation to strengthen and deepen the integration of the euro area. the paradox that the euro crisis presents is that, while its effects indeed demonstrate progress in institutional reforms targeting fiscal surveillance, banking union, and a degree of emergency funds, they also simultaneously reinforced debates over the effectiveness, appropriateness, and legitimacy of emu as a whole. however, in applying the risk society thesis, there is perhaps no paradox at all, as the institutional features of emu that galvanized the financial crisis in the euro area could instead be understood as a deliberate risk undertaken by eu policy-makers in order to attend to the greater perceived value of deeper integration. furthermore, given that many european nations have been built at the end of a period of war or during a time of nation-state formation, the eu is being created currently in a piecemeal fashion. there is no grand plan. hence, integration can only occur on a step-by-step basis. in the past, it has been clear that grand plans often lack support from a wider public or from key constituencies that need to approve it (e.g., the european defence community did not find support in the french parliament in august 1954; fifty years later, the 2004 treaty establishing a constitution for europe was voted down in referendums in france and the netherlands in spring 2005). thus, a proven strategy of european integration is to move step by step. the assumption is that when the limits of integration come to the fore, the politicians and publics will be better able to assess the issues at stake and why deeper integration is necessary. it could be argued that the crisis of legitimacy is in many ways the broad umbrella under which all large-scale events internal to the eu might fall. the question of whether a democratic deficit exists in supranational governance – and if it does exist, what to do about it – has been posed by academics, policy-makers, and commentators for decades (verdun 1998; stavridis and verdun 2001; crombez 2003; schmitter 2000). early modern efforts at european integration, beginning with the european coal and steel treaty, tend to be characterized as being supported by a ‘permissive consensus,’ whereby public perception of integrative efforts was markedly favourable and considered to be likely the result of direct memories of war, cold war international politics, and the optimistic climate resulting from the establishment of the common market in 1962 – or 7 review of european and russian affairs 12 (1), 2018 some combination of these three variables (inglehart 1967). the increased pace of integration set by the completion of the single market is one likely source of this crisis, as the post-war rationale for european integration collectively faded from being at the forefront of public consciousness concomitantly to eu governance becoming more tangibly visible to the public, as in the areas of citizenship, borders, and currency; the numerous national referendums held in response to the maastricht treaty and subsequent treaties reflect this slow trend, to some degree. the debate itself considers whether the eu has a sufficient democratic mandate from its citizens via indirect representation to govern at the supranational level, or whether the increase of eu-level governance has shaded into the realm of non-accountable technocracy. the eu’s specific institutional forms of supranational governance create an uneasy space for contestation; although it possesses more mechanisms of democratic input than any other global governance institution, its non-state character obfuscates the link between input and output, and the lack of familiar processes of direct democracy compound this problem (hurrelmann 2014). early post-war logic on the permissive consensus surrounding european integration does not extend to post-maastricht developments, or at least does not extend easily without visible and tangible societal gains: “functionalism is not antithetical to myth, but on the contrary invokes a powerful myth of its own, namely that of modernity as rationalization” (hansen and williams 1999, 235). exacerbating this problem are the new institutions created in response to financial crisis and the heavy-handed prescription of austerity measures accompanying bailout packages. both measures have been criticized by citizens and political parties alike for being overly intrusive into national policy-making and domestic welfare states (mény 2014). the tension arising from this perceived intrusion has led to more polarizing debates on potential solutions to democratic deficit: those that recommend increased fiscal federalism (hallerberg et al. 2012), or deeper political integration towards more effective transnational governance (habermas 2012), or both (schure and verdun 2018); and those that advocate diminishing the role of the eu and returning to more visible forms of sovereign governance (zielonka 2014). the latter argument has frequently shaded into political platforms labelled as ‘populist’ by observers from numerous academic and journalistic circles (offe 2015; müller 2016), as the underlying logic reflects the idea of nationalism providing an immediate solution to the eu’s democratic deficit. the next section briefly examines four current ‘crises’ in the eu, and attempts to situate each event in the context of challenge to the logic of integration. political, economic, and social crises in the eu in considering different varieties of crisis scenarios and the impact of significant events on the trajectory of european integration, we examine four different events (ongoing at some level at the time of writing) affecting the integrity of the eu as a supranational institution: the euro area crisis, the migrant crisis, the rise of populism across numerous eu member states, and brexit. while these four events are not all examined in equal depth in the articles of this special issue, we present them as significant to understanding the character and purpose of eu governance. the euro area crisis, discussed in more detail above, represents the biggest challenge to the very justification of the eu’s existence. although economic in its origin, the crisis and its aftermath have visibly affected social policies normally understood to be the purview of domestic decision8 review of european and russian affairs 12 (1), 2018 making, such as employment levels and welfare state benefits. the encroachment of the eu into national political economies has helped shift the public perception of emu from being a flagship success of the single market toward becoming the symbol of the downside of european integration (see also the recent special issue of government and opposition “democracy without solidarity: political dysfunction in hard times,” edited by erik jones and matthias matthijs, in particular their introduction, jones and matthijs 2017). the extent of the euro area crisis brings into question issues of democratic legitimacy and economic technocracy, and – perhaps most critically for the structural health of the eu – challenges the logic of community in the face of real and present economic dangers. in terms of the potential for a crisis to reach a level of danger that disrupts the eu’s entire undertaking, the euro area crisis poses a significant threat to the continued integrity of the union, when considering the arguments for technocratic decision-making systems across the euro area, and yet, it similarly meets the definition of crisis being a significant point of opportunity, when considering some of the new institutional mechanisms that have evolved in response to the crisis, such as the european semester (verdun and zeitlin 2017). the refugee crisis saw a massive influx of asylum seekers and other undocumented migrants coming into europe from northern africa via the mediterranean sea or overland from the middle east via southeast europe. the flow of refugees had started years ago, but came to full crisis when millions flocked to europe in 2015. the sheer numbers of migrants entering eu countries – which for many member states reflected a 100-800% increase in asylum applications from the previous year (eurostat 2016) – presented a difficult tension between humanitarian and economic considerations. the free movement of peoples within the schengen area, combined with the depth of economic integration achieved in the single market, meant that the massive influx of undocumented migrants could not be the problem of a single country or group of countries, as the fact of open borders meant that undocumented migrants could move easily between schengen countries. the lack of clear eu response to this crisis – indeed, the lack of consensus among member states whether there even ought to be a common eu response – caused further damage to the coherence of the european integration project. member states responded differently to the call for a common approach. some member states took on more refugees than others, in particular germany and sweden. various countries that joined the eu in 2004 were more reluctant and opposed the eu quota system. some member states reinstated border controls in an attempt to contain the flow of migrants from different directions. compounding these problems, the rise of identity politics in many places fuelled public discontent and reinforced political perceptions of muslim populations in europe. the migrant crisis on its own could theoretically represent a variety of crisis that is acute, but shortterm, and likely without long-term injury to the integrity of the eu as a supranational organization. three considerations would support this view. first, this crisis began with events external to the eu and its member states. as opposed to the euro area crisis, which is rooted in the structure of emu and thus in decisions made by european policy-makers, the migrant crisis is the result of externalities that lie much more beyond the eu’s purview or immediate control. this characteristic puts the pressure of the crisis on response tactics, but lessens the need to justify the entire undertaking of eu integration. put another way, the crisis may well have taken place whether the eu existed as a supranational entity or not. second, the variety of crisis in this case is inextricable from economics. the height of the migrant crisis during the summer of 2015 coincided with greece facing sovereign default and the euro dipping in confidence (otero-iglesias 2016); the theoretical flipside of this overlap is that economic growth and stability could buffer the impact of the crisis. 9 review of european and russian affairs 12 (1), 2018 as numerous scholars have demonstrated, public perceptions of immigrants are more negative during periods of economic stagnation or decline, and/or where the economic threat is subjectively perceived (sniderman et al. 2004; goldstein and peters 2014). third, and again in contrast with the euro area crisis, the substance of the eu’s response itself to the crisis has not yet significantly intruded into the domestic policy-making of most member states (with the exception of greece) (european commission 2017b). the migrant quota system proposed by the european commission in 2015 sought to redistribute asylum seekers among all eu member states. however, after swift and consistent opposition from the visegrád group (czech republic, hungary, poland, and slovakia), the redistribution system was all but abandoned in 2016 (gotev 2016). the reinstatement of border controls by numerous eu and schengen members, as a way of attempting to control the flow of migrants, has been met with concern. perhaps remarkably, the european commission did not intervene, and it did not even deliver outright criticism (the economist 2016). both of these examples illustrate the tenacity of national sovereignty. these examples are evidence of the fragility of the eu level of authority on certain topics such as the migrant crisis – although one reason might be that it has been framed as a disaster outside of the eu’s making. a central indirect effect of the migrant crisis has been the sharp rise of populism as a dynamic political platform across numerous european countries. the term “populism” here is that of a “thin ideology” used by mudde (2004), referring to a general framework that contrasts a pure people with a corrupt elite. the orientation of a populist political party can vary from nationalist to agrarian, far-right to socialist; the unifying strategy is that of appealing to the masses as a source of authority apart from existing institutions (müller 2016). in the context of the eu, where legitimacy rests almost entirely upon indirect representation and technocratic authority, the increase in popularity of populist ideologies presents a significant challenge by way of underlying objections to the status quo. this is most evident in the political parties that have given shape to populism across eu member states. the specific platforms of such parties vary according to national context (prominent examples here include anti-immigration, anti-islam, and the return to national protectionism), but one cohesive theme is the rejection of european integration. if populist sentiment represents opposition to globalist, cosmopolitan liberalism, the eu becomes clearly emblematic of all that populism rejects. the actual variety of crisis that the rise of populism represents is, however, unclear. while populism as an expression represents an ideological challenge, the level of threat is entirely contained in the substance of the practical challenge and in the actual possibility of change. the strength of the crisis of populism is that it is helpful in elucidating when and how the decisions of those in power appear to be disconnected from voters across the eu; or, put another way, the notion that populist expression itself presents a crisis is entirely rooted in the social construction of whether the status quo of democratic institutions is legitimate. in this sense, populism is perhaps the more recent incarnation of expression of discontent with a democratic deficit. in light of the oxford dictionary’s above definition of ‘crisis,’ the rise of populism could represent the “turning point of a disease when an important change takes place,” i.e., the ability of the eu to adapt to the challenges that populism elucidates could, in the long term, actually help strengthen the representative capacities of the eu in its experiment in successful transnational governance. at present, populist ideology serves as a powerful source of protest, but has yet to govern as the new status quo, or even to present viable alternatives. until such a turning point, the rise of populism could be understood in the eu context as a form of crisis that offers opportunities rather than full10 review of european and russian affairs 12 (1), 2018 scale chaos; however, the durability of these parties arguably reflects a shift in ideological acceptability within large swaths of european citizens, irrespective of electoral outcomes. the brexit crisis was connected to both the euro area crisis and the refugee crisis in that the united kingdom (uk) government and most of its citizens had, over the past years, been more skeptical about european integration, and in particular, about steps towards deepening it, than any of the other member states. national leaders and uk media were often quick to point a finger at the eu as the cause of any domestic issue. however, at the heart of brexit lies a domestic issue firmly rooted in the conservative party and in strategic moves taken by british politicians (staiger and martill 2018). the past year has shown that the uk has not been afraid to move towards a ‘hard brexit,’ which makes its break from the eu more monumental than if it had agreed to a relationship that resembles that of norway or switzerland. the variety of crisis with brexit is that of a shock, but one with potential for substantive change in how the remaining 27 member states are able to conceptualize the role of eu governance. by becoming the first eu member to invoke article 50 of the lisbon treaty (giving notice of its intent to withdraw from the eu), the uk has set a precedent. in this sense, brexit is more a crisis of the myth of ongoing and ‘successful’ european integration than foreshadowing necessarily a crisis of the eu (although the jury is still out; see cini and verdun 2018). in the early days after the brexit referendum, some also wondered whether it would have a domino effect, that is, if political movements in other member states would seek a referendum to leave the eu. but 18 months hence, such a scenario seems less likely in the short term. beyond this crisis of myth, the level of danger presented by brexit towards the structural and ideational integrity of the eu is nominal. rather, it offers opportunity for change in the style and substance of supranational governance. conclusion the notion that european integration adapts in response to crisis offers a different outlook on the four crises outlined above. the history of the eu offers numerous examples of how a major event affected the decisions of policy-makers and changed the previously-intended direction of european integration. the euro area crisis, migrant crisis, rise of populism, and brexit all fall into this broad category of events preceding change. the central difference is that all four of these events have been occurring at roughly the same time, and all are the result of many factors that are at once local, domestic, european, and global. as such, these particular four crises interact with each other, particularly when considering the depth and quality of legitimacy in european governance. taken together as a parcel in the current moment, these four crises may seem to paint a picture of the eu as a flailing experiment in supranational authority that cannot compete with the durability and reliability of a national government. but as has been seen when analysing other eu crises, the developments away from the eye-catching news headlines may still paint a different picture. the context of ‘variety of crises’ offers a different perspective on the challenges that each event presents. considering crisis as a spectrum ranging from problem to full chaos, and marrying the journalistic portrayal of crisis with the possibility for significant change, we can see that the euro area crisis, migrant crisis, rise of populism, and brexit in turn each offer different challenges and opportunities for the future direction of the eu. it should also be noted that the very idea of a crisis is frequently political and convenient; it is an idea used by political actors, those invested in the existence and the power of the eu, to draw attention to the need to have the eu and to enable it to 11 review of european and russian affairs 12 (1), 2018 be most effective. in so doing, it may also seek to turn the discussion away from basic intergovernmental accountability. as such, this type of construction of a crisis by eu leaders and their response is not that different from politics as usual in any self-contained nation-state. in this sense, the very notion of ‘crisis’ is ripe for critique in and of itself, and leaders are prone to use a crisis to draw power to the centre, either temporarily, or with a view to changing institutions for the longer term. the theme of this special issue is the consequences of crises in the current context of the eu. bookending this special issue, the pieces by both cherry and drago speak to the eu’s need to deal with contestation. cherry addresses the long-standing debate on democratic deficit to offer a novel strategy on bridging the gap between citizens and policy-makers – that of radical democratization while maintaining the strength of the supranational level. drago addresses the rise of populism across european countries, and suggests that, in order to survive, the eu must actually embrace populist tendencies to strengthen its own commitment to peace and prosperity. in addressing the crisis of the euro area, climie and foster each examine the institutional repercussions of financial crisis in europe. climie’s examination of the eu’s mimicking of imf institutional tools and foster’s comparative assessment of financial securities regulation tools developed as a euro area response both attend to the implications of basic economic decisions that affect society as a whole, which – in the eu case – are perceived to be removed from democratic choice, but that actually repeat institutional manoeuvres that have taken place in other countries in other parts of the world. the theme connecting this introduction with the articles contained in this special issue is the ongoing contestation of legitimate authority in each stage of each crisis. the public discomfort with supranational governance combined with the fragmented nature of european integration has resulted in the prioritization of legitimacy and subsidiarity over effectiveness. this “postfunctionalist” response (hooghe and marks 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by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada available online at: journals.carleton.ca/rera/index.php/rera rera is an electronic academic peer-reviewed journal that publishes graduate, post-graduate, and young scholarly works. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is a joint project supported by the canadaeurope transatlantic dialogue—a cross-canada research network supported by the social sciences and humanities research council of canada (sshrc)—along with the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies (carleton university) and its associated research unit, the centre for european studies. rera aims to provide an accessible forum for research, to promote high standards of research and scholarship, and to foster communication among young scholars. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada tel: +01 613 520-2600 ext. 3117; e-mail: rera-journal@carleton.ca creative commons license creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0 this working paper is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial no derivs 3.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 3.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, provided the source is acknowledged. no use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes. issn: 1718-4835 © 2018 the author(s) https://journals.carleton.ca/rera/index.php/rera mailto:rera-journal@carleton.ca http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ why reforms fail: the role of ideas, interests and institutions review of european and russian affairs 12 (1), 2018 issn 1718-4835 towards a new eu: why populism can save the european union alessandro giuseppe drago mcgill university abstract europe has seen an alarming increase of populist parties throughout the last two decades. the european debt crisis has only added to their strength and support, and eurosceptic attitudes have only increased, as exemplified by the recent brexit vote. however, this exploratory paper will argue that the crisis to which populism has given rise allows the eu to critically reflect on itself and fix many of the fatal flaws that the increase in populist support has pointed out. it will be argued that the eu needs to create a strong civic society to help mend its democratic deficit. finally, it will be argued that by incorporating particular elements of populist thought and critique (i.e., democratization and fairer economic policies), that is, implanting an “alter-europeanization,” that the ugly side of populism (its xenophobia and racism) will begin to lose support within european countries. 2 review of european and russian affairs 12 (1), 2018 introduction for the last twenty years, support for populist parties has dramatically increased throughout europe and has posed challenges for the consolidation of the european union (eu). many of these populist parties are right-wing and express xenophobic attitudes and beliefs. some of these populist parties also seem to hold liberal democracy in disregard, such as hungary’s fidesz, or poland’s law and justice (pis) party. populist support in europe ranges from very low in croatia and portugal to very high in italy (over 50% of italians voted for a populist party in 2013) (mcdonnell and bobba 2015, 163). the rise of populist support has created veritable crises for the eu and its member countries, most recently with the 2016 brexit referendum. the development of populism in europe is tied to the specific national/political circumstances and structural conditions in each country, which is why populism has not appeared at similar times and with similar intensity in every european country (kriesi 2016). though the rise of populism has alarmed politicians and academics alike, its surge gives us the ability to diagnose the very real problems plaguing the eu. the rise of populism (in particular, the very dangerous right-wing populist xenophobia) allows the european union the chance to critically reflect on itself in order to “fix” its various issues. populist strength and support – from either end of the political spectrum – needs to be viewed as a form of referendum on the eu’s performance. i argue that, in order to stem the tide and the recent successes of extreme populism, the eu needs to create a viable and thriving public sphere. this public sphere would help create and foster a european identity and the values that europe avows such as democracy, diversity, and tolerance – values that are being challenged by some of the current populist parties in european countries. this paper will first discuss the effect that the intertwined though distinct processes of globalization (in its economic, political, and cultural senses) and economic modernization have had on europe, and how this influences populist support. overall, this argument will draw heavily from the “globalization’s losers” thesis (kriesi et al. 2008), while also emphasising how the negative effects of economic modernization (which is an internal change to a country’s mode of production) help shed some valuable light on the rise of populism today. the following section discusses the idea of a democratic deficit at both the supranational (in the eu) and national levels. this paper argues that the “depoliticization” of political parties, as well as the perception that mainstream political parties in europe are mostly indistinguishable from one another, increases populist support. the final section uses three cases of left-wing populist victories in southern europe to suggest that political parties in europe need to return to organizing strategies that mobilize the masses. furthermore, the european union itself would benefit from creating a viable public sphere to facilitate debate and incorporate challenges, as well as to create a civic conception of european identity, something that is distinguished from the dangerous nativism of populist parties that tie nationalism to ethnicity. this all entails a strategy of alter-europeanization, whereby the eu should attempt to change the course of its european project to better reflect and incorporate the reality on the ground. this alter-europeanization is being put forward by recent social movements and by populist left parties in southern europe today. this essay will also discuss another aspect of the eu’s complicated relationship with the democratic norms usually associated with a state. the unprecedented and unfamiliar character of supranational governance has not mobilized a corresponding form of supranational social 3 review of european and russian affairs 12 (1), 2018 movements, that is, issue movements that are genuinely transnational in organization and in character. this lack of grassroots political mobilization should be seen as a failure of the european union to create a well-established/integrated public/civil sphere for europeans to voice their displeasure. because social movements focus primarily on national governments, those governments are more likely to create eurosceptic policies, and, in the process, states with large social movements are more likely to have eurosceptic parties arise. this idea builds on habermas’s (2016) belief that the creation of an economic union cannot supersede and should never precede the establishment of a civil society. it is important to preface the following discussion with some statistics from the eurobarometer survey, which found that only 40% of europeans trust the european union, while only 41% of europeans hold a positive view of the eu (eurobarometer 2015). these results indicate that the eu is widely unpopular (note that the rest of respondents either viewed the eu as “negative” or as “neutral”). definition of populism laclau (2005; 2006) created one of the more fruitful definitions of populism to date, despite its various criticisms (zizek 2006a; zizek 2006b, 197; moffitt 2015, 191). for laclau, all politics involves the discursive construction and articulation of the ‘people,’ and therefore, all politics is necessarily populist. ideologies as diverse as fascism, socialism, and communism can all be considered populist, since they all involve the articulation of a common social/political actor that is necessarily differentiated from some other. importantly, populism isn’t only about discourses of difference, since populist discourse is inherently antagonistic (laclau 1977, 174). not only are the ‘people’ different from the ‘others’ (usually those of a different class, social status, or ethnicity), but they are also in a battle to reclaim their democracy and their country from these antagonistic forces. the problem with populism, according to laclau, is that the “will of the people” is so heterogeneous that populism, which purports to represent the people, may not be the right ideological fit for all citizens (laclau 2005). other scholars state that populism should be considered as a “thin” ideology because of its ability to be used by fully-developed and already-established political principles (either right or left ideologies) (stanley 2008, 95). in other words, populism merges with a more “comprehensive” or “programmatic” ideological base (ibid., 99-100), and it should be considered as a “partner” that attaches itself to the traditional political ideologies of today (ibid., 107). this explains the wide diversity of policies, ideologies, and actions represented by populist parties throughout the world and why populism can be used in conjunction with both left and right-wing ideologies (albertazzi and mcdonnell 2008, 3). very generally, populists see themselves as the “true democrats,” who must rescue democracy from its abuse by corrupt politicians (albertazzi and mcdonnell 2008, 4). populists tend to claim that they cannot be placed on the ideological/political spectrum. the common denominator of populist parties is the articulation of the ‘people’ as a homogenous mass who are differentiated and confronted by some ‘other(s).’ populism puts the ‘people’ at the forefront of politics and wishes to bring democracy back into the hands of the ‘people’ and out of the hands of the corrupt elite (stanley 2008, 107). the specific characteristics of the ‘people’ referred to by populists depend on the economic, cultural, and political characteristics of the state in which they find themselves (pappas and kriesi 2015, 4). these ‘others’ can be politicians, corporations, and more 4 review of european and russian affairs 12 (1), 2018 recently, immigrants. importantly, because populism is a ‘thin’ ideology, the specific ‘others’ in populists’ discourse will depend on where they draw their ‘thick’ content from, i.e., if they draw from right-wing ideology, they are more likely to have an “ethnic view of the “people” (pappas and kriesi 2015, 5). populists also tend to appeal to the so-called ‘silent majority,’ who are taken for granted and fed up by their treatment by mainstream politicians. they believe that the democratic process is being hijacked by others who don’t have the interests of the population at large in mind. populists tend to reject representative democracy, claiming that it is corrupt, and instead are willing to experiment with direct democratic initiatives such as referendums or “citizen hearings” (von beyne 2011; biorcio 2014; hartleb 2015, 48). because of this conception of democracy, many scholars consider populists to be illiberal (pappas and kriesi 2015, 5; mcdonnell and bobba 2015, 165; pasquino 2008). liberal democracy ensures that there are checks and balances to guarantee that power is not monopolized by one single entity (such as the judiciary or the president) or by the people (montesquieu 1949). populists typically reject constitutional constraints and the power of unelected judges (zaslove 2008, 321). constitutional democracy prevents the tyranny of the majority from taking rights away from minority population (tocqueville 2000). however, populists in europe and the united states are often at odds with minority rights. therefore, populism rejects democracy with constraints (constitutional restraints, for example) (canovan 1999, 10). this presents a paradox of populist parties advocating for democracy while also implementing policies that will limit democratic freedoms for others (fryklund 2013, 268). two major theses this section discusses two primary theses that attempt to explain why populism has arisen in europe. first is the claim that, due to economic liberalization, citizens in european countries are now divided between those who benefit from globalization and those who do not. second is the idea that the perceived democratic deficit at both the eu and national levels has contributed to a rise in populist sentiment. these two contributing factors to populist support outline the problems inherent in the european union. populist parties are well-positioned to articulate these problems into political platforms, and are thus supported by individuals who are disgruntled by the eu. globalization’s ‘losers’ the first thesis deals with the processes associated with economic globalization, whereby national economies became gradually integrated with the rest of the world and economic competition for global market share increased. globalization is generally taken as one of the major causes of welfare/pension reform and cuts within countries (mouffe 2016). economic modernization, whereby the economy is continuously in a process of losing manual/industrial labour and placing more emphasis on non-manual labour, tends to occur at the expense of working class/blue-collar workers. in one of the most recent eurobarometer surveys, 42% of europeans believe that unemployment is the biggest issue facing their respective countries (eurobarometer 2015). 59% of europeans see the economy in their respective economies as being “totally bad,” which indeed reveals the dire economic situation europeans believe they are facing (ibid.). 5 review of european and russian affairs 12 (1), 2018 a growing body of research finds that supporters of populism are the so-called ‘losers’ of globalization. with the disruption of national economic boundaries, the nation-state is less able to guarantee a given level of job security and/or welfare state provision than it was in the immediate post-war economic period of growth (kriesi et al. 2006; 2008; 2012). furthermore, because of the slow erosion of economic sovereignty, national politicians and advisors are unable to problemsolve as efficiently as before the period of globalization, since the economy has become more intertwined with global economic forces. thus, those most affected by the ills of globalization will hold negative views of their politicians, since they seem powerless to change the status quo (kriesi et al. 2008). the integration of european states into an economic union, where “competitiveness” is one of the major guiding principles, poses problems for the consolidation of a state’s social programs (fontaine 2014). since the late 1970s, western european countries have increasingly experienced welfare retrenchment in the form of cuts to social services such as education and pensions. with these cuts to fundamental social programs, many individuals now find themselves without the proper support structures to allow them to cope with hardening economic times. the “globalization’s losers” thesis can be supplemented with the work of betz (1994), who has argued that the modernization of the economy has created a division within the working class. for betz, populism in europe emerged because of the effects on society of the shift from an industrial to a post-industrial economy. this shift created an economic underclass of individuals who felt that they were left behind by the economy (ibid., 33). this new post-fordist economy (virno 2004) increased the amount of non-manual labourers and the importance of the professional classes, at the expense of the traditional industrial worker. these processes have also led to an increase in the level of precariousness faced by traditional labourers, since their jobs are at the mercy of global economic forces. what betz’s (1994) thesis allows us to understand is that the lifestyles and opportunities of a worker in a fordist economy versus a post-fordist economy are radically different. consequently, the interests and concerns of workers formerly engaged with the manufacturing sectors will change, which is very likely to inform their voting habits. although kriesi et al. (2008) focus more on the integration (economic and cultural) of nation-states into the global sphere, while betz (1994) discusses the quantitative and qualitative shift in the composition of the labouring class in europe, these processes are overlapping, and can each be understood to have created large amounts of individuals with legitimate economic grievances. both theses find broad empirical support in the literature. france’s front national party attracts many voters exploited by globalization (wacquant and halimi 2002). they are able to attract them because the left has abandoned this segment of the population in favour of neoliberalism (ibid.). marine le pen has really positioned herself against globalization, neoliberalism, and adherence to the free market (betz 2015, 82). generally, right-wing populist parties have found a way to allow those who have suffered from globalization to “articulate their anger” better than left-leaning parties (pelinka 2013, 11). in the uk, those who felt “left behind” were more likely to vote for the independence party (ukip) (goodwin 2015, 284). the “globalization’s losers” thesis is also applicable in switzerland, since its economy has faltered, and neoliberal economic policies have reduced benefits and job security (albertazzi 2008, 115). populism only emerged once the swiss felt the pressures of globalization and felt threatened by it (albertazzi 2008, 115). 6 review of european and russian affairs 12 (1), 2018 furthermore, the main supporters of right-wing populists are workers who have suffered the most from globalization and from pension cuts (pelinka 2013, 11). in one study, production workers (factory workers, mechanics, etc.) were the most supportive of right-wing populist parties in their respective countries. service workers had the highest support for the front national in france, and small business owners were also more likely to support right-wing populist parties in all countries sampled. the populations that did not support these parties were the self-employed and the professional class (oesch 2008, 357). the economic foundation of the ethno-nationalist ideology that many european populist parties espouse may lie in the perceived link between rising unemployment and rising immigration. studies show that voters for right-wing parties were more concerned with cultural issues than economic ones. therefore, it appears as though the motivation to vote for a right-wing populist party stems more from cultural/moral issues. this is well evidenced by the fact that the two categories of people in the weakest and most perilous position in relation to globalization, production and service workers, are more likely to emphasize “cultural grievances over immigration” as the main factor dictating their voting choice, rather than economic ones (oesch 2008, 370). another study found that all right-wing populist parties mobilized anti-immigrant rhetoric during the elections of 2002-2003. this grievance was invoked more than others such as economic grievances by populist right parties (ivarsflaten 2008, 17). the one common denominator shared by all populist-right parties is their mobilization of anti-immigration rhetoric as their main grievance during elections (ibid., 18). this falls in line with much research done on specific populist parties, where cultural issues were more likely to be mobilized by the parties (bernhard et al. 2015, 133; yla-anttila and yla-anttila 2015, 68; mcdonnell and bobba 2015, 165). why are cultural issues such as immigration and islam dividing working class voters in europe? one answer seems to be that, on economic issues, the left can no longer distinguish itself from the right, and therefore, the real demarcation line between political parties is not on the economy, but on cultural values (maradal 2013, 51). this strategy was used by republicans in the united states during the “culture wars” of the late 1980s and 1990s in order to differentiate themselves from the democrats, since the two parties are virtually indistinguishable from each other on economic issues (ibid., 52). the economy and issues surrounding the economy become depoliticized while issues of immigration are prominently politicized (ibid., 53). as a strategy, maradal argues that the left should return to more welfare-based, democratic, and egalitarian politics to attract those who have stopped voting for them (ibid.). in conclusion, it appears that one of the reasons working class individuals will vote for right-wing populist parties is that the traditionally left-wing political parties have become – in the perception of some voters – neoliberals. because these parties have abandoned their traditional economic policies, in worsening economic conditions, the working class has become attracted to populist rhetoric and some of its xenophobic sentiments. finally, it is important to remember that populist right parties are likely to “reframe economic conflicts in cultural terms” (pappas and kriesi 2015, 8). the fear of immigrants stems not only from right wing populists’ fear of ethnic heterogeneity, but also from fears that immigrants are harming the economy by taking away jobs, for example, or being welfare-dependent. 7 review of european and russian affairs 12 (1), 2018 perceptions of democratic deficit populism is a reaction fueled by the belief that the democratic system has not responded to the needs and desires of its citizens. people who do not feel represented by the institutions that are in place are more likely to be attracted by populism (pelinka 2013, 4). this section of the paper will discuss the perceived democratic deficit found not only in the eu, but also within european national governments, and it will be argued that one of the main drivers of support for populism is the perceived democratic deficit in most political institutions today. this perceived democratic deficit in europe was partially created by the reduction of domestic power over economic issues. citizens have lower levels of trust that their governments have the capacity to make substantive decisions or the ability to fix problems as expediently as before (eurobarometer 2015). as we saw above, economic concerns are some of the biggest reasons why individuals vote for populist parties. the belief that economic issues are decided somewhat autonomously from national institutions tends to delegitimize ruling parties and creates the belief that these parties are powerless in the face of the eu. however, besides the issues raised above, there are two major factors that contribute to the perception of a democratic deficit in eu member states. the first deals with the end of mass-based organizational strategies in political parties today (zaslove 2008, 325), which tend to be highly bureaucratized, hierarchical, and run by a sophisticated team of “experts” with less input from citizens or supporters of the party (mastropaolo 2008, 46). a substantive change has slowly occurred in the organization of political parties, where they went from being open and highly participatory organizations to tightly controlled organizations with power increasingly vested in the hands of bureaucrats. the high levels of donations given by corporations and private donors further delegitimize political parties in the eyes of voters (ibid.). this represents a real failure on the part of representative democracy (which populist parties such as ukip criticize), in the way that politicians have been unable to respond to their constituents’ demands and seem to be favouring large corporations or special interest groups (pappas and kriesi 2015, 2; seymour 2015, 40). the second issue is that the perceived indistinguishability of the major parties on economic issues has led to electoral volatility and low voter turnout. this, in turn, has helped create the “space” for populists to exploit (zaslove 2008, 325). in other words, one of the main contributors to the perceived democratic deficit is the movement of the mainstream political left and right to the centre, making their economic policies relatively indistinguishable from one another. the impact of this movement is that the status quo is supported by all mainstream parties, with no real alternative viewpoints. for example, in response to the economic crisis, most mainstream parties implemented austerity measures regardless of where they fell on the political spectrum. voters who opposed austerity were stuck with limited options in terms of voting choice (löwry and sitel 2015, 59). having a conflation of indistinguishable parties makes it easy for populists to lump all politicians into one corrupt political class (ibid.). furthermore, when the response to the crisis of capitalism by most mainstream parties has been more neoliberalism, voter frustration is understandable (ibid.). a viable alternative party is unlikely to appear at the centre, since this political space is most often occupied by mainstream parties. in such political climates, extreme parties are more likely to gain political victories. 8 review of european and russian affairs 12 (1), 2018 laclau states that, because social democratic parties in europe accept the status quo and the implementation of austerity measures, and because there seems to be no alternative, voters increasingly support right-wing populist parties (2011, 2). the crisis of populism is therefore the indistinguishability of the centre-right and centre-left, since alternative debate is not presented and neoliberal globalization seems like the only option (mouffe 2016). all of the above contributes to a feeling of disenchantment with politics and causes withdrawal and disengagement from the political process, which might explain the reasons for the low voter turnout rates in elections in europe and north america. this might be why populist parties tend to be led by charismatic leaders who present themselves as outsiders from the political establishment and as members of the common people (albertazzi and mcdonnell 2008, 4). populists may be rejecting the depersonalized face of modern political parties and bureaucracies (weber 1978). democratic deficit in the european union mair argues that the absence of any “real” opposition in europe (since most mainstream parties accept european integration) has allowed more radical opposition to emerge (2007, 6). because of the status-quo belief that european integration was important and needed no debate, classical opposition gave way to anti-systemic opposition. therefore, instead of opposing the manner in which european integration was occurring, some political parties chose to oppose europe altogether (ibid., 7). this is caused by the fact that the eu is a depoliticized entity (mair 2007, 7). the potential political channels used to criticize or help reform the eu (the european parliament is one) are incapable of enabling citizens to hold the eu accountable for its actions (ibid., 12). opposition to the eu is also stunted by the fact that national governments have lost some of their capacity to make decisions in their countries since power is delegated to unelected “experts” – at the european commission, or at the european central bank, for example. furthermore, the policy options of national governments are also restricted, since the eu rejects policies that “interfere with the free market” (ibid., 13-14). for example, there was little internal debate over the eu accession membership referendum in 2004, and most of these referendums received record low turnouts for their respective countries, ranging from 45.62% to 64.04% (szczerbiak and taggart 2004, 559). the lack of debate indicates that, with the issues raised above, debate amongst mainstream political parties is limited. turnout at european elections is also very low, and only 42% of europeans believe that their voice counts in european elections (eurobarometer 2015). the installation of mario monti’s unelected technocratic government, which was supported by the eu, imposed widely unpopular austerity measures on the italian population (mcdonnell and bobba 2015, 170). the unelected institutions of the eu also dictate to national parties how they should behave and which policies they should implement. both pasok and new democracy (the two major greek parties at the time) were told by international and european creditors to end their populist rhetoric and become more liberal (pappas and aslanidis 2015, 188). furthermore, the lisbon treaty’s proceedings were “blatantly elitist,” given that ireland (after failing in a referendum to ratify the treaty) was asked to hold a second referendum in order to make the “right” choice (habermas 2009, 81). 9 review of european and russian affairs 12 (1), 2018 the clearest examples of how the european union is a depoliticized entity can be found in the study of social movements. the social movement literature finds that national governments are still the primary targets of protests rather than transnational entities such as the eu (imig and tarrow 2001, 34; bush and sini 2001, 102; ortiz et al. 2013, 34). like political parties, civil society organizations (social movements) can be placed on the hard/soft eurosceptic dimension. one author found that there are indeed plenty of eurosceptic civil society organizations in europe (fitzgibbon 2013, 118). however, a transnational social movement to protest the eu has not emerged, with many social movements lacking any kind of pan-european identity (klandermans et al. 2001, 94). one study found that the visibility of the eu and issues revolving around it in the public sphere in nine sampled european countries was low. newspaper coverage was predominantly focused on national issues, and even in countries deeply affected by austerity measures (such as greece), the visibility of the eu in public debates and in general media coverage was very low (monza and anduiza 2016, 518). this relative lack of dissent leveled directly towards the european union by social movements should not be celebrated as the public acceptance of integration, but rather as an indication that the eu has failed to implement and carry out its goal of creating a european public sphere. one of the reasons euroscepticism is so high and social actors petition their national governments for change is that they lack an adequate channel to challenge the eu and its policies. this has the unfortunate effect of causing national governments and political parties to take anti-eu stances because of the strong pressures they feel from their constituents. rather than the eu being able to listen to and implement some of the critiques articulated by these social movements, it is sheltered from them, leaving national governments to face the brunt of the critiques. because of this, national governments may try to deflect blame towards the eu, thus further undermining its legitimacy in the eyes of the european public. social movements, the public sphere, and saving the eu the anti-austerity protests which swept across europe from 2011 onwards were an indication that many europeans were disgruntled by their political and economic situations (della porta 2015). greece’s syriza, spain’s podemos, and italy’s five star movement emerged from these social/political protests against austerity. podemos’s rise is intimately tied with the 2011 indignados social movement in spain, which advocated more citizen control and more direct democratic initiatives (kioupkiolis 2016, 101). syriza and the five star movement also emerged and gained support through the massive mobilizations against the austerity measures of their respective governments (biorcio 2014, kartizis 2015, vampa 2015). one of the arguments being made in this essay is that, in order to combat the rise of right-wing populism and its corresponding xenophobia, political parties need to turn back towards civil society and the most marginalized. the radical left’s heavy ties with civil society (primarily with unions and social movements) in greece, as well as in spain and italy, have allowed them to consolidate and stay connected with their base. furthermore, because they refused to accept austerity and other government policies (though syriza did eventually accept these policies, which upset their supporters, of whom 80% of those in lower economic positions voted against the austerity measures) (ioakimoglou 2016), and actively supported the political/social mobilizations against these policies, they were spared the legitimacy crisis that greek/italian/spanish 10 review of european and russian affairs 12 (1), 2018 mainstream political parties suffered during the euro area crisis (tsakatika and eleftheriou 2013, 14). parties such as syriza were on the streets with the protestors and activists and were thus better able to gain visibility (stavrakakis and katsambekis 2014, 126). finally, and most importantly, syriza (as a left-wing populist party) acts as a check to the rise of golden dawn (a right-wing fascist/populist party), since without syriza, golden dawn support would have become much stronger (kartizis 2015, 379). ties to civil society and grassroots political activism are needed in order to attract people to conventional mainstream political parties. by reconnecting with the popular base, conventional political parties can channel some of the energy and critiques into their own political base rather than allowing them to go to right-wing populists. in spain, italy, and greece, three major left-wing populist parties created broad popular movements and held large rallies to energize voters. prominent european intellectuals have also weighed in on the recent populist phenomenon in europe. habermas and derrida, like negri (2009), view europe as a counterweight to american imperialism and unilateralism (habermas and derrida 2003, 293; habermas 2009, 89). for them, europeans have an affinity for justice and equality; they generally prefer and support welfare-state policies, and are suspicious of the market. these authors argue that the values europeans cherish, such as separation of church and state, liberalism, and equality, should instead form the basis of a common identity (habermas and derrida 2003, 295). europe needs to build a public/civic sphere similar to the one that nations inherently have within their own borders (ibid.). for habermas, the european union’s problems stem from its preference for creating an economic union before and over a european public sphere (habermas 2009). without creating a common public sphere for europeans, and by imposing unpopular economic policies, the eu lacks legitimacy in the eyes of europeans (ibid.). furthermore, habermas argues that nationalism and right-wing populism, as well as a general sense of resentment, which is increasing in europe, are all due to the failure of trickle-down economics to fulfill its promises (habermas 2016). this resentment is being channeled most by the populist right, which is thereby gaining votes from the most disenfranchised and marginalized (ibid.). as a result, the mainstream left finds itself in a dilemma that it needs to address. this paper raises two important points made by scholars analyzing the rise of right-wing populist sentiment in europe. first, on the supranational level, the eu needs to attend to the public perception of democratic deficit by implementing more open channels for debate and dissent (mouffe 2016) and ending unpopular economic/political actions when possible. this can be done by returning to the member states some of the control they once had over economic issues, and by giving national parliaments more control over the decisions and constitution of the european union (habermas 2016). second, on the national level, an alternative economic program must develop in order to sway the voters who are most disaffected by neoliberalism, precarious labour conditions, and welfare retrenchment; these economic programs have already been articulated by parties like podemos and syriza (laclau 2011, 3; habermas 2016). furthermore, left-wing parties should follow the example of southern european parties and attempt to reconnect with the popular base. this can be done through outreach initiatives, by establishing strong links with unions, grassroots organizations, and other elements of civil society. in addition, political parties can experiment with social media, explore online forms of democracy (as the italian five star movement has done), and re-energize their youth wings. this will cut the support of right-wing 11 review of european and russian affairs 12 (1), 2018 populists and leave them only with their xenophobic and anti-immigrant rhetoric to distinguish them from the left. finally, surveys of europeans found that 50% of them have some civic conception of a common european identity. this is more likely amongst people who speak more than one language, travel to other eu countries, or belong to pan-european organizations, as well as those with higher incomes (fligstein et al. 2012, 117). importantly, it is the “winners” of eu economic integration who have the highest levels of support for a collective european identity (ibid., 118). traditional (industrial) workers tend to hold negative views of the eu and demand that their national governments protect them from eu market forces; they are thus unlikely to support or to end up cultivating a collective european identity (ibid.). in conclusion, it is important to remember that these three examples of far-left populist parties are not against european integration as a whole. rather, they wish to establish a new “social europe” that accounts for the interests of those most marginalized (kriesi 2016, 43). these left parties wish to implement a “european-wide solidarity” (ibid., 45). for them, the european project seems most at risk from forces on the right, who typically reject both cultural integration and the economic integration of the european union. the habermasian project of creating an inclusive and democratic europe would seem to have its greatest potential in the form of left-wing populist parties. these may point the way to an alter-europeanization that would help the european union remain together and prosper. conclusion why can populism save the eu? because it allows the eu to reflect critically on itself and discover which elements need to be reformed. without any challenge, it would continue towards a path of economic liberalization without the corresponding social, political, and civic spheres required to create a common european identity. populism allows the eu to realize that it has failed to cultivate a european identity and to curb a dangerous form of nationalism that has increasingly been emerging. embarking on a process of alter-europeanization, one that left-wing populist parties are attempting to articulate today, might be a 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doi: 10.1086/505378 ———. 2006b. “schlagend, aber nicht treffend!” critical inquiry 33 (1): 185-211. doi: 10.1086/509751 http://www.homme-moderne.org/societe/socio/wacquant/socguar.html http://www.homme-moderne.org/societe/socio/wacquant/socguar.html 17 review of european and russian affairs 12 (1), 2018 published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada available online at: journals.carleton.ca/rera/index.php/rera rera is an electronic academic peer-reviewed journal that publishes graduate, post-graduate, and young scholarly works. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is a joint project supported by the canadaeurope transatlantic dialogue—a cross-canada research network supported by the social sciences and humanities research council of canada (sshrc)—along with the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies (carleton university) and its associated research unit, the centre for european studies. rera aims to provide an accessible forum for research, to promote high standards of research and scholarship, and to foster communication among young scholars. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada tel: +01 613 520-2600 ext. 3117; e-mail: rera-journal@carleton.ca creative commons license creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0 this working paper is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial no derivs 3.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 3.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, provided the source is acknowledged. no use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes. issn: 1718-4835 © 2018 the author(s) https://journals.carleton.ca/rera/index.php/rera mailto:rera-journal@carleton.ca http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ why reforms fail: the role of ideas, interests and institutions review of european and russian affairs 12 (1), 2018 issn 1718-4835 the european stability mechanism and the imf: from enhanced cooperation to embedded supervisor” cameron climie carleton university abstract this paper examines the role played by the international monetary fund (imf) in the european stability mechanism (esm), finding that the esm has greatly expanded the imf’s surveillance and oversight roles in the european monetary union (emu). building from a liberal intergovernmental framework of integration analysis, this paper argues that the imf’s function as a de facto emu supervisor in the esm, a significant break from prior european integration, stems from the alignment of crisis response preferences amongst the emu’s largest economies, the erosion of the credibility of the european commission as an enforcer of structural reforms, and the imf’s close fit with the preferred institutional arrangements that derived from the bargaining dynamics between euro members. 2 review of european and russian affairs 12 (1), 2018 introduction during the negotiation of the treaty of maastricht, the european commission undertook workinglevel discussions with the staff of the international monetary fund (imf) to determine what changes, if any, the creation of a common currency would have on the imf’s mandate and operations. however, in the face of significant opposition from the most powerful member governments in the european union (eu) (particularly the united kingdom), the imf’s relationship with its european members saw little change as a result of the euro: economic surveillance remained rooted at the state level, and the imf was not given an expanded role in the oversight of the european economy. what supervisory powers were created were delegated to the european commission, through both the stability and growth pact (sgp) and broad economic policy guidelines (bepgs). however, the euro area debt crisis has fundamentally changed the nature of the imf’s relationship with the european monetary union (emu). after partnering with the commission and the european central bank (ecb) to administer ad-hoc bailout funds in the early 2010s, the 2012 european stability mechanism (esm) codified a significant oversight role for the imf in the european economy. under the terms of the esm treaty, the imf’s “active participation…will be sought, both at a technical and financial level,” and the imf now even provides input and oversight in cases where the fund is not directly involved in lending to european governments (european stability mechanism 2012, 5). in effect, the imf has become a de facto institution of macroeconomic oversight within the euro area. building from a liberal intergovernmental framework of integration analysis, this paper seeks to unpack the decision to integrate the imf into the oversight and enforcement mechanisms of the esm, ultimately arguing that shifts in the policy positions and relative bargaining strength of emu states – particularly an alignment amongst the euro area’s core economies – broke prior resistance to incorporating an external agent into the emu’s governance structure. the decision to delegate significant oversight power to the imf also stemmed from the commission’s own lack of credibility following the failure of the sgp to constrain public spending in the euro area, and from the incrementalist approach of european policy evolution. this paper will be divided into four sections. in the first, i will outline the nature of the changes to the imf-emu relationship created by the esm. in the second, i will provide a brief outline of liberal intergovernmental (li) theory’s three-stage process analysis, before exploring, in the third, the factors at each stage that shaped the decision to incorporate the imf into european governance. in the fourth, i will outline a number of implications of the imf’s new role for our understanding of european governance and the future of emu oversight. from hungary to greece prior to the outbreak of the euro area crisis, the relationship between the imf and the organs of emu governance was minimal. the imf’s annual consultations with member states (article iv) had remained rooted at the state level, despite attempts in the 1990s to expand the imf’s oversight role in the euro area; the imf undertook informal annual discussions with the commission, and the ecb held observer status on the imf executive board for issues related to the european economy (broome 2013, 600). however, supervisory power in the euro area was invested in the commission, albeit in policy instruments that often lacked teeth in the fight to constrain national debt and public deficits (hodson 2011, 31). 3 review of european and russian affairs 12 (1), 2018 when the collapse of lehman brothers triggered an international liquidity crisis in october 2008, both the eu and imf moved to intervene in affected economies. lending to hungary, latvia, and romania in autumn 2008 worked according to the pre-crisis institutional model, with the eu and imf relying on separate policy conditions, sequencing of loan tranches, staff missions, and monitoring mechanisms (hodson 2015, 578). however, each lending programme also demonstrated an increasing degree of collaboration between the imf and the commission – medium-term assistance to hungary made disbursement of future eu loan tranches contingent on meeting the imf’s reform requirements, while staff from both institutions were involved in drafting romania’s budgetary management laws in december (lutz and kranke 2014, 311). collaboration between the imf, ecb, and commission was further deepened by greece’s financial collapse in october 2009 and the spread of fears around public debt to other european economies (mayer 2012, 107). when greece requested emergency financing in april 2010, the level of cooperation between the imf and emu increased dramatically; rather than build separate lending programmes, the imf, commission, and ecb negotiated a single $145bn lending facility for the greek government (joyce 2013, 183). programme monitoring was conducted jointly, and each of the three institutions was delegated specific powers in the loan facility agreement. while the euro institutions were invited to report on compliance, the imf’s surveillance reports were heavily drawn upon, and eurogroup agreements to disburse further loans to greece were made on the basis of joint commission-imf analysis (eurogroup 2011). in may 2010, european lending operations were further expanded by a pair of ad-hoc lending facilities that “embodied two distinctive approaches to programme monitoring” and the role of the imf in overseeing emu lending (hodson 2015, 579). the first, the european financial stability mechanism (efsm), tasked the commission with verifying that recipient states were complying with fiscal policy conditions placed on lending programmes, but did so noting that such lending would be “in the context of a joint eu/international monetary fund support” (ibid., 580). by contrast, the european financial stability facility (efsf) vested the delegation of surveillance and enforcement with euro area members. in practice, this meant mimicking the approach taken by the greek lending programmes: the troika’s members conducted joint reviews of programme compliance as part of joint imf-emu financing (ibid., 579-580). whether formally or informally, the first structured systems of crisis lending and policy enforcement in the aftermath of the euro area debt crisis relied upon a much closer imf-emu relationship than that envisioned by the maastricht treaty. in february 2012, the emu’s nineteen members signed the treaty establishing the european stability mechanism, creating a permanent €500 billion bailout facility. like the efsf, the esm “can lend to countries to fund adjustment programmes, give ‘precautionary financial assistance’ to countries in the form of a credit line, help in recapitalizing banks in emu member countries and intervene in the primary and secondary government bond markets” (mayer 2012, 147). significantly, the esm served to create a formal, embedded role for the imf in supranational economic surveillance, both as a lending institution and for broader macroeconomic oversight; the esm offered “the most explicit statement to date of the imf’s de facto role in eu monitoring” (hodson 2015, 580). the esm states in article 13 that “the commission, in liaison with the ecb and, wherever possible, together with the imf, shall be entrusted with monitoring compliance with the conditionality attached to the financial assistance facility [emphasis mine]” (european stability mechanism 2012, 29). rather than the imf simply acting as a co-lender, the esm established it as a monitor of compliance with the policy conditions attached to emergency lending, and as an 4 review of european and russian affairs 12 (1), 2018 advisor “on the design, implementation and monitoring of the fiscal adjustments and structural reforms that the afflicted nations undertook” (rato 2011, 89). yet, the esm’s framework of imf involvement went well beyond that of the efsf or efsm; even in cases where the imf was not a co-lender, the wording of the esm treaty enabled the fund to be involved in joint review missions with the commission and ecb. indeed, the esm requires agreement between the european council of finance ministers (ecofin) and the imf executive board on the specifics of loan arrangements and policy reforms (lutz and kranke 2014, 313). the case of spain is the most notable: in june 2012, spain requested financial assistance from the efsf (and later the esm) to recapitalize its debt-ridden banking sector. though financing the effort fell primarily to the ecb, the imf was involved in the initial assessment of the spanish banking sector, and concluded that spain met the requirements for lending assistance (european council 2012, 12). during the disbursement of funds, the imf conducted four independent monitoring missions on the implementation of banking sector reforms, and produced a final report for the european commission in november 2013, assessing reform progress. these missions occurred outside of the imf’s article iv process of bilateral surveillance. similarly, the imf has continued to engage in oversight and programme review in greece, even though its participation in subsequent rounds of financial assistance has been in question since 2015; eu officials have insisted on imf participation in the most recent tranches of lending, even in the face of significant disagreements among the troika institutions over the sustainability of greek austerity measures (spiegel and chazan 2016). while the imf’s role in pre-esm bailouts could be attributed to the need for oversight of its own lending, the experience of spain suggests an evolving role for the imf in euro area oversight. even when not acting as a co-lender, the fund now exists as a de facto emu institution. this integration of the imf into euro area governance represents a significant departure from the prior preferences of eu and emu member states, who have preferred to keep governance functions ‘in-house’ in institutions under their control. indeed, when the imf and commission had undertaken exploratory talks in 1993-94 on the possibility of a closer relationship between the imf and eu, both france and germany had vocally opposed delegating additional powers to an external institution. to understand this switch in time by the emu’s most powerful members, we must examine the dynamics of bargaining and state preferences during the negotiation of the esm, and how these preferences manifested themselves in the delegation of supranational competences. state preferences and bargaining dynamics of the esm when the possibility of enhanced eu-imf cooperation was first raised in the 1990s, proposals were scuttled by opposition from key european members of the imf executive board – most notably, germany and the uk. as such, the most likely explanation for the evolution of that relationship is a shift in state preferences on eu-imf cooperation. to analyze those preferences, this paper builds from a liberal intergovernmental framework of integration analysis. formulated by andrew moravcsik in the late 1980s and early 1990s, liberal intergovernmentalism (li) sees the deepening and broadening of supranational integration as the product of interstate bargaining based on the policy preferences of domestic political and economic actors. rather than seeing integration as the product of a pan-european elite, li argues that integration stems from rational bargaining choices based on the potential for gains from policy coordination and delegation (moravcsik 1993, 495-496). 5 review of european and russian affairs 12 (1), 2018 in analyzing the eu, li treats economic integration as a three-stage process. in the first, national governments construct policy preferences on the basis of input from domestic interest groups. though moravcsik identifies many possible inputs, li presumes that industry interests will override civil society or domestic party politics on the terms of economic integration. in the second, states negotiate on the basis of those preferences, with the dynamics of negotiation influenced by the ability of states to unilaterally opt out of bargaining, build alternative coalitions to exclude recalcitrant governments, or seek consensus through trade-offs or side-payments (either financial or otherwise) to reluctant negotiating parties (moravcsik 1993, 499-506). in the third, states delegate policymaking or enforcement authority to external agents; though states are reluctant to abrogate policymaking powers, they will do so if external institutions are deemed necessary to enforce commitments, in the case of incomplete intergovernmental contracts. when there are incentives to defect from agreements, states with strong preferences will push for institutional delegation as a means of “locking in” policy commitments (moravcsik 1998, 69). the formation of national preferences on the esm and its associated treaty reforms (i.e., the fiscal compact) has been documented by both mainstream and academic commentary. as schimmelfennig notes, the preferences of euro area members have been directly driven by a materialist, economic calculus that reflects “the macroeconomic preferences of ruling governmental coalitions” during the crisis (2015, 180). much of this lay in the immediate, material nature of the crisis that framed the interests of producers, financial interests, interest groups, and political institutions in fundamentally economic terms. but these preferences also reflected the reality that economic factors were the key differentiation between euro area countries; the asymmetry of the crisis’s effects stemmed from the asymmetry of economic policy strategies that had contributed to the crisis’s onset. as schimmelfennig notes, monetary union brought together a euro area ‘core’ – comprising central europe and france – pursuing supply-side or export-led growth “based on wage restraint, productivity, and competitiveness” and an emu ‘periphery’ – iberia, italy, greece, and ireland – pursuing demand-led growth reliant on fiscal expansion and wage inflation (hall 2012, 358-359). monetary union increased the divergence of those strategies, with southern european governments running larger current account and budget deficits while central europe pursued ever more aggressive supply-side strategies (schimmelfennig 2015, 180). euro member preferences were driven by a number of common factors that linked both core and periphery states. chief among these were the high consequences of stagnation or euro area disintegration for all its members. for peripheral countries like greece, dissolution would mean a sharp depreciation in the value of any replacement currency and a high possibility of sovereign default; for core members like germany, dissolution meant the onset of a banking crisis (french and german banks held significant sovereign debt) and the steep appreciation of either national currencies or a successor regional currency (lutz and kranke 2014, 314). consequently, all euro states had incentives to support integration policies that would prevent disintegration. however, the exact terms of policy integration were sharply contested by euro area members, reflecting a divergence of economic interests. generally speaking, solvent countries preferred nationally-based fiscal adjustment policies (such as deficit reduction and policy reform), while indebted governments preferred mutualized adjustment (such as debt restructuring or eurobonds). there are a number of specific state preferences worth identifying and unpacking. germany, as the state that would bear the heaviest financial burden of mutualized debt resolution, initially pushed to keep debt reduction nationalized. this preference was shared by austria, finland, and the netherlands, who pushed for debt resolution that did not require fiscal 6 review of european and russian affairs 12 (1), 2018 commitments from solvent emu members (francis 2010). when it became clear that financial resources would be required to prevent the crisis from escalating further, germany’s position shifted towards favouring strict conditions on emergency financing, due to both the german public’s opposition to financing what were seen as fiscally irresponsible periphery governments, and the deficit-averse economic orthodoxy that prevails among german, dutch, and austrian policy elites (glencross 2014, 59). governments in the euro area’s periphery – particularly those of greece and portugal – have favoured softer national adjustment targets, given the high economic and political costs of engaging in contractionary fiscal policy during demand-driven recessions. indeed, italy and greece were among the first countries to support the creation of eurobonds and a system of fiscal transfers between emu countries (reuters 2011). however, some indebted governments have also proven more willing to embrace strict conditionality, given that disintegration imposed even higher costs. france was ostensibly an outlier in policy preferences; though a significant contributor to both the efsf/efsm and esm bailout funds, france supported the “europeanization” of sovereign debt through a combination of eurobonds, expansionist ecb monetary policy, and ‘soft adjustment policies.’ however, french preferences for mutualized debt resolution likely stemmed from french banks’ high degree of exposure to greek, portuguese, irish, and spanish debt (fuhrmans and moffett 2010). given that successive french governments have viewed the demands of loan conditionality as unsustainable, mutualized debt reduction was seen as the only means of guaranteeing the stability of the french financial economy. thus, with the exception of france, state preferences on the structure of the euro area were firmly divided between solvent and insolvent states; though they were united by the prohibitively high costs of euro area disintegration, they disagreed significantly on how best to resolve the debt crisis. in deepening the processes and policies of integration, interstate bargaining is shaped by the pursuit of the optimal strategies of member states that policy preferences and external constraints allow. three new elements of interstate bargaining shaped negotiations over the esm treaty. first, as schimmelfennig notes, the supranational bargaining environment was shaped by the prohibitively high stakes of negotiation failure; states had incentives to preserve the euro area, even if that meant compromising on specific short-term preferences (2015, 184-185). this risk was perhaps best encapsulated by german chancellor angela merkel: “if the euro fails, europe fails” (mayer 2012, 16). the scale of potential damage drove states to engage in hard bargaining, defined by moravcsik as “credible threats to veto proposals, to withhold financial side-payments, and to form alternative alliances excluding recalcitrant governments” (moravcsik 1998, 3). as schimmelfennig notes, hard bargaining is most likely in circumstances with high stakes and a clear distribution of costs. for solvent governments, this meant withholding promises of financial assistance until indebted governments agreed to policy reforms; for indebted states, this meant invoking the reluctance of domestic interest groups to stomach unpopular reforms and delaying requests for financial assistance to exact better terms when debt panic escalated (schimmelfennig 2015, 185-186). the high cost of failure also meant that emu members had significant incentive to avoid the collapse of agreements, while also framing the consequences of negotiation failure in cataclysmic terms. in effect, euro members engaged in a game of “policy chicken”: to engage in brinkmanship was smart strategy; to do so to the point where negotiations broke down was not. the second important element of interstate bargaining was the asymmetry of interdependence within the euro area. while the consequences of disintegration were high for all euro members, the immediate consequences of withdrawal or ejection were far higher for indebted governments than 7 review of european and russian affairs 12 (1), 2018 creditor ones. this was particularly true for germany’s relationship with debtor governments. during the negotiation of the maastricht treaty and the sgp, germany’s economic position in the eu had been far weaker; still facing the high economic and financial costs of reunification, it lacked the material bargaining power to push for a system of hard enforcement mechanisms or credible checks on deficit spending that domestic interests demanded as the price for abandoning the deutschmark (teschner 2000, 64, 70). by contrast, germany in 2012 was characterized by strong economic growth and a position as the vital component of any emu reforms that required significant financial resources. however, germany also lacked a credible alternative to the euro, meaning that unilateral withdrawal from negotiations over the esm was unviable. while this precluded absolute leverage over negotiations, the scale of imbalance in the material terms of bargaining meant that germany was able “to shape the terms of integration in return for giving up its opposition to bailing out insolvent euro members” (schimmelfennig 2015, 187). this meant that the outcomes of interstate bargaining reflected german preferences more than in the maastricht treaty or sgp; proposals for eurobonds and debt mutualisation were both rejected, while financial assistance from solvent states was linked to strict fiscal austerity and extensive monitoring by supranational and international institutions for compliance (glencross 2014, 59). the final new factor that shaped esm bargaining was the convergence of policy preferences among creditor economies. during negotiations over previous additions to the euro architecture, the exact terms of integration were often disputed between the most economically powerful states – in particular, between the german-dutch axis and the french. such divergences created incentives for states to bargain to the lowest common denominator, particularly on contentious issues like the enforcement of the sgp and bepgs (moravcsik 1993, 503). by contrast, the alignment of creditor country preferences in the early 2010s created a voting bloc within ecofin sufficient to sway the course of negotiations. even france, which favoured mutualized debt reduction and softer policy enforcement mechanisms than germany, was sufficiently hampered by its own vulnerability to financial crisis to create a quiet, if begrudging, acceptance of german bargaining positions. delegation to the imf in the esm treaty: credibility, layering, and institutional structure it is the question of institutional delegation that is most pertinent to understanding the new role of the imf in european economic governance. when considering the imf’s expanded role, both through explicit treaty language and deliberate ambiguity, three factors contributed to the delegation of competences to the imf within the esm treaty. the first factor that influenced the decision to incorporate the imf into european governance was credibility – the input most readily identified by moravcsik as the key determinant of states’ willingness to delegate policymaking. given the common interest in preserving the euro area, schimmelfennig additionally notes that there was a common interest in creating institutional arrangements that would “enhance the commitment to the euro” (schimmelfennig 2015, 190). however, the crisis cast doubt on the credibility of prior arrangements – particularly on questions of policy oversight and enforcement. part of this gap was structural; as rogers notes, the european commission’s ability to provide effective oversight stemmed from the contractual limitations on its ability to engage in crisis management, as article 143 of the maastricht treaty prevented it and the ecb from providing emergency lending to euro area states (rogers 2012, 208). however, the 8 review of european and russian affairs 12 (1), 2018 more salient analysis is provided by hodson’s ‘multiple supervisor’ variation on jonas tallberg’s principal-agent-supervisor framework. tallberg (2003) argued that the eu’s executive has historically acted as an institutional supervisor, tasked with ensuring that eu and emu members comply with their own policy agenda; hodson frames the addition of a second supervisor as a means of overcoming contractual difficulties with the initial monitor or preventing collusion between member states and institutions (hodson 2015, 581-582). the european commission’s implementation of the stability and growth pact was both inconsistent and weak. designed to prevent the accumulation of debt that sparked the crisis, the sgp has proven “malleable and, ultimately, toothless ahead of the financial crisis” (schimmelfennig 2015, 189). throughout the 2000s, the commission routinely failed to enforce the sgp; only a handful of states were ever in full compliance with the limits on deficits and debt. even when proceedings were initiated, the commission proved flexible in its interpretation of deficit limits and restrained in its use of fiscal sanctions and similar enforcement mechanisms. most damningly, the commission routinely endorsed greece’s financial projections on deficit spending and public debt, which were found in october 2009 to have been repeatedly falsified (panagiotarea 2013, 129-130). the failure of the sgp compromised the commission’s credibility. indeed, the failure of pre-crisis institutional arrangements called european governance into question more broadly. in march 2010, german finance minister wolfgang schäuble called for the creation of a “european monetary fund,” which would function as a supranational version of the imf, while both the french and spanish governments preferred that crisis management remain a european matter. however, german chancellor angela merkel ultimately concluded that euro area governance “lacked credibility”; coupled with the commission’s lack of expertise in crisis management, this necessitated drawing on external knowledge and institutions to fill the gap. by contrast, the imf’s credibility in crisis management and enforcement had been bolstered by its handling of the 2008 financial crisis; the fund was widely praised for having acted “swiftly and decisively” to contain the spread of financial panic in east europe and central asia. the imf also had a long history of enforcing deeply unpopular policy reforms in south america and southeast asia, and was clearly perceived as a more credible monitor of policy reform than the commission (joyce 2013, 170171). the second important factor was the question of path dependency. institutional change can take one of three forms: incremental adjustments to policy, introduction of new policies, or radical changes to the overarching paradigms of policy discourse (schwarzer 2015, 7). in the process of european integration, the general pattern has been one of layering – that is, building on prior policies and improving existing mechanisms, rather than engaging in fundamental paradigm shifts. indeed, the very process of creating the euro confirms this: monetary union built on a series of exchange rate coordination schemes developed and improved throughout the preceding two decades, which themselves evolved from the complex fiscal transfers and monetary coordination needed to implement the common agricultural policy (tallberg 2003). this sequencing is often the result of collective learning, which occurs both nationally and supranationally as a result of inter-organizational deliberation, and different institutional perspectives processing similar information and experiences. however, the previous architecture of euro governance was such that, when the debt crisis began, european leaders were confronted by an “empty toolbox”: the ecb was statutorily barred from financing government debt, and the commission had very little experience with crisis management 9 review of european and russian affairs 12 (1), 2018 – balance of payments support for european governments having ended with the ratification of the maastricht treaty. as schwarzer notes, this left euro area leaders with four policy options in 2010: negotiate bilateral imf loans to member states, package imf lending with bilateral loans from other euro members, devise a crisis resolution mechanism that incorporated the imf, or provide financial aid and crisis management without the imf’s involvement (schwarzer 2015, 9). the first option proved unworkable; the scale of the crisis in greece, and its threatened escalation to italy and iberia, was such that exclusively imf lending could not stem market panic about euro area debt. thus, initial lending to both eu and emu governments occurred in line with the second option, with imf and eu lending packaged into a series of ad hoc emergency financing mechanisms (the aforementioned efsf and efsm). by 2010, however, both germany and france favoured the creation of a purely internal system for stemming the financial crisis. yet by march 2010, “the debate on how to cope with liquidity crisis in the euro area suddenly shifted towards an involvement of the imf” (schwarzer 2015, 10). several elements of the euro crisis made the creation of an emf challenging. first, the debt crisis was characterized by high levels of volatility, rapid “and unstructured flows of information and high interaction among policymakers who shared the need to devise day-to-day interpretations of events” (schwarzer 2015, 4). given the rapidity with which the situation evolved and interpretations of events changed, solutions to the escalating debt crisis were needed quickly – even when the worst of the initial crisis had been stemmed by the efsf and efsm. as a result, creating wholly new institutions was politically and mechanistically difficult, due both to the high degree of consensus required for european treaty modification and to the plodding nature of institutional creation – even if the crisis created the deep, systemic uncertainty that is often required for paradigmatic changes. given that nearly a decade passed between the ecb’s statutory founding and the full implementation of its mandate, starting from scratch was unworkable. that the commission, european council, and ecb’s mechanisms were seen as “underdeveloped” in comparison to the imf’s reinforced the case for incorporating the fund into governance structures. opting for the second best, yet more immediately feasible option was made more attractive by the nature of bureaucratic institutions; as keohane notes, the belief in sunk costs means that modifying existing institutions and processes is often seen as easier than creating new ones. bureaucracies also frequently engage in “satisficing” behaviour – embracing suboptimal policy solutions in the name of feasibility. moreover, interpretations of the crisis that undermined the commission’s credibility as a monitor and enforcer meant that building entirely on existing euro area mechanisms was equally unworkable. as a result, integrating external systems and institutions was seen as the most workable option. from the perspective of euro members, the imf’s history of crisis lending and oversight allowed for the best of both worlds. efsf and efsm lending and oversight policies were modelled on the imf’s own best practices, and the esm used the imf’s policy model as a reference point for its own programme design (schwarzer 2015, 13). yet, integrating the imf into european governance also stemmed from lessons learned about the reasons for the sgp’s failure. the imf offered a credible ‘exit threat’ – that is, the ability to simply withdraw from a lending programme – in a way that the commission or ecb, with their constitutional obligation to promote the welfare of the euro area, could not. indeed, the “political proximity” of the commission to euro members was seen as a barrier to its fulfilling the mandate of economic surveillance and policy enforcement (schwarzer 2015, 12). moreover, the unpopularity of the commission’s enforcement of the sgp meant the imf was a useful tool for ‘policy laundering,’ wherein the responsibility for unpopular 10 review of european and russian affairs 12 (1), 2018 decisions related to fiscal austerity was transferred to an external agent not reliant on the commitment of emu members to the same extent as the commission or ecb (rogers 2012). indeed, imf scholars have often seen the fund’s role as one of scapegoating – enabling governments to blame an external actor for the domestic costs of unpopular or painful reforms (vreeland 1999, 6). thus, while the integration of the imf into emu governance represented a fundamental shift from the perspective of the europeans, this was not the case for the imf; rather, the fund was fulfilling a useful policy role in europe that it had historically served in both the americas and asia. the third factor that influenced the decision to incorporate the imf into emu governance relates to the type of institutional structure that emu members were seeking. schimmelfennig notes that states are “more willing to centralize decision-making and delegate powers of monitoring and sanctioning” in the case of enforcement problems, “which produce incentives to defect unilaterally,” as opposed to problems of coordination (which do not) (2015, 188). however, the euro crisis confronted its members with two enforcement problems: how to ensure insolvent states implemented reforms, and how to ensure creditor states committed to bailing out debtor governments. at face value, the centralization of enforcement power resolves both problems – delegate to a credible enforcer, and centralize control of emergency lending to prevent reluctant creditor governments from opting out. however, the asymmetry of bargaining power meant that decisions around supranational delegation and enforcement were unbalanced. throughout negotiation of the efsf, efsm, and esm, germany and other creditor countries “sought to limit their own financial commitments, but to strengthen the credibility of indebted countries’ commitment to fiscal policy” (schimmelfennig 2015, 189). in such cases, li predicts that institutional choice would reflect a pattern wherein institutions responsible for overseeing financial assistance would preserve more state power than institutions of enforcement and supervision – germany would have the ability to opt out, while greece would not. it is in this dynamic of institutional choice that the delegation of enforcement and oversight powers to the imf becomes clearest. critically, the structure of the imf’s governance and operation aligns with the predicted pattern of institutional design. the fund retains significant autonomy in its conduct of economic surveillance, both due to the highly technical nature of its work, and also because such work largely occurs at the staff level. however, major decisions regarding the design of lending programmes, including required reforms and the flexibility of conditionality, require 85% consensus on the executive board. particularly from germany’s perspective, the ability of fund members to design and oversee the conditions attached to emergency lending was attractive. as chwieroth (2008) notes, there is a long-held view that german opposition to an imf programme is sufficient to prevent executive board consensus (even if germany lacks the formal veto power of the united states’ voting shares). as a result, delegation to the imf came to be favoured simply because its pre-existing governance structure closely aligned with the preferences of the euro area’s core members. the retaining of intergovernmental control of lending policy at the imf also enabled the fund to minimize the risks of forum-shopping between multiple supervisors, given that germany and france retained vetoes in both european institutions and the imf. delegating enforcement and lending power to the imf also fit with the preferences of a number of other european powers. france’s role and prominence on the executive board is similar to that of germany – both are part of the ‘g5’ of single-constituency members – and france was thus able to play a far greater role than on the european council or commission. most interesting was the 11 review of european and russian affairs 12 (1), 2018 uk’s preference for delegation; though not a euro member, britain’s position as one of the centres of european finance gave it significant weight in the resolution of issues surrounding the financial crisis. where the british government had stridently opposed greater imf-emu cooperation in the 1990s, the uk was also among the earliest european states to advocate for the imf’s involvement in emergency lending and crisis management, doing so at a february 2010 euro summit (hodson 2015, 586). however, this shift in preference is consistent with moravcsik’s analysis of the preferences of the british government during maastricht negotiations, where the uk generally opposed the deepening of economic integration, but also sought to avoid being shut out of decisionmaking fora or material benefits (moravcsik 1998, 417-419). viewed in this light, the uk’s insistence that the imf’s technical expertise and crisis management experience were necessary can be viewed as partly functional, but also as a means of guaranteeing british input on european governance through their single seat on the imf executive board. assessing alternatives: imf agency and entrepreneurship but what of the role the imf itself played in expanding its role in euro area governance? at both the executive and management levels, the fund has a long history of engaging in competencemaximizing behaviour: during michel camdessus’s tenure as managing director, efforts were made to expand the imf’s articles of agreement to include a commitment to capital account liberalization in the fund’s mandate. at varying points, the imf has also undergone substantial shifts in policy preferences and lending behaviour, be it the expansion of conditional lending facilities in the 1990s or the move towards national ‘ownership’ of policy reform in the 2000s. at the onset of the global financial crisis, the fund was seen to have worked to reassert its role in global financial governance, acting effectively to disburse emergency lending in asia and eastern europe to contain financial panic. in relation to europe, the imf’s staff had worked throughout the 1990s to expand the fund’s oversight role within the euro area, even under the restrictions placed on such expansion by anglo-german opposition to a greater imf-emu relationship (see broome 2013). given the prior attempts to deepen imf involvement in europe, it is possible that the fund, seeing an opportunity to upset the status quo of european governance, actively worked to integrate itself into that framework. there are several barriers to assessing the extent to which the imf’s leadership and staff consciously exploited an opportunity to play a larger role in european governance. chief among them is the difficulty of accessing the contents of executive board and staff meetings; board minutes remain classified for 3-5 years, while records related to “institutional archives” are classified for two decades. as such, a clear picture of the imf’s internal politics during the onset of the euro crisis is only beginning to emerge, and there is little scholarship on the fund’s inner dynamics during the period. however, there is institutional behavioural evidence to suggest that the imf may have been engaging in this type of mandate expansion in the early period of the financial crisis. in its published reviews of both the hungarian and latvian bailouts, the imf consistently sought to portray itself as a more credible actor than the commission in the realm of economic surveillance and crisis management. in discussing hungary, the imf’s review of its own lending programme suggested that “the eu’s governance procedures resulted from a lack of flexibility and insufficient haste when it came to crisis monitoring” (international monetary fund 2011, 35). the imf’s review of the greece standby arrangement was even more damning, arguing that “the commission has enjoyed limited success with implementing conditionality under the sgp, and had no experience with crisis management” (international monetary fund 2013, 31). 12 review of european and russian affairs 12 (1), 2018 the unwritten implication of “unlike the imf” hangs heavy over both reviews, suggesting an attempt by the fund to frame its own expertise as a vital component of any future lending and crisis management within europe. the extent to which these assessments represented a conscious effort by the imf to finish what it had started in 1993 is difficult to evaluate, but is an avenue of research that, as archival records of executive board and internal meetings are gradually declassified, is worthy of further examination. the role of dominique strauss-kahn in the european crisis is also notable – considered one of the ‘founding fathers’ of the euro, strauss-kahn’s efforts at supranational entrepreneurship “far exceeded” those of commission president jose manuel barroso in the early stages of the euro crisis (hodson 2015, 589-590). in april 2009, strauss-kahn called for central and eastern european countries to adopt the euro, irrespective of whether they met the convergence criteria, proposed the creation of a bank resolution authority in 2010, endorsed a system of fiscal transfers within the emu, and “vocally supported” both the banking union and ssm (ibid.). based on interviews with members of the imf executive board, there is also some evidence that strausskahn and the imf’s senior management sought to override the concerns of some executive directors about becoming involved in euro area lending and surveillance. again, the ability to evaluate the motives and strategies of the fund’s management in a methodologically rigorous manner is constrained by the limited access to necessary data, but is another avenue of research to pursue as such information becomes declassified. the imf’s gradual integration into the framework of european governance presents us with a similarly mixed assessment of the scale of policy change that has occurred. for the imf, the shift as a result of the european stability mechanism was not paradigmatic in nature. rather, the fund simply extended to europe the sorts of lending, surveillance, and monitoring functions that it had carried out in the global south in the 1980s and 1990s. from the imf’s perspective, the reasons for this change were largely functional – there was no need for a substantial fund role in europe until europe was the epicentre of economic crisis. however, from the perspective of europe, the role accorded the imf by the esm is a fundamental shift in the operation of european economic governance. given past state and institutional preferences for resolving policy problems internally, the decision to delegate surveillance and enforcement power to a non-eu institution was a radical break from the maastricht treaty and the prior history of european governance. there are a number of implications for our understanding of the imf-emu relationship, both for why the relationship evolved, and for what that evolution might mean in the future. clearly, the onset of the euro crisis drove the realignment of the imf-emu relationship, provoking the deep systemic uncertainty necessary to re-evaluate the imf’s role within european governance – the fund had been sidelined on the presumption that the commission’s mechanisms of oversight and enforcement were sufficient, and the crisis overwhelmingly revealed that to be false. consequently, the decision to involve the imf in european governance can also be seen as a function-driven one. the fund offered a policy toolset that the emu’s members felt was needed, and the erosion of the credibility of existing governance frameworks meant that drafting the imf into the efsf, efsm, and esm was the preferred option. moreover, the fund’s governance structure fit with the outcomes of esm bargaining; decisions on lending remain in the hands of the imf’s members, while enforcement and surveillance is carried out autonomously. if the fund’s toolset and institutional structure had been seen as unnecessary or undesirable in 1993-94, by 2012, the imf’s structure and functions were seen to align with what european leaders wanted from a supranational system of crisis management and economic surveillance. 13 review of european and russian affairs 12 (1), 2018 conclusion what this means for the future of the emu-imf relationship depends on a number of factors. in part, future involvement by the imf in euro area governance is contingent upon the fund’s functions still being required. the language of the esm treaty seems to allow for this sort of replacement. the fund is called upon to participate in lending programmes and reform oversight where necessary, and much of the imf’s work in bailouts to greece, portugal, and spain has relied upon deliberate ambiguity to involve the expertise of the imf’s technocratic staff. the nature of the fund’s de facto position as an emu institution also makes the development of internal alternatives an attractive policy option. the imf is not bound by eu treaty law or required to serve the interests of the european monetary union, nor is it subject to oversight by the commission, council, or european parliament. given the lack of binding oversight from other european institutions, the imf’s continued involvement in euro area governance is also contingent on the fund playing the role that euro members want it to. indeed, previous disagreements between imf and commission leadership have led to such an alignment being questioned. in 2013, the imf published a scathing ex-post facto analysis of fiscal austerity in greece, noting that the terms of the troika’s lending programme had actually worsened the fiscal and economic outlook for greece. the commission’s response was predictably defensive, with the commissioner for economic and monetary affairs criticizing the imf for “attempting to wash its hands and throw the dirty water on the europeans” (hodson 2015, 592). in june 2015, the imf threatened to withdraw from participation in lending to greece altogether, over deep disagreements concerning the possibility of debt relief for insolvent euro members; continued discord over the terms of future tranches of lending to greece have repeatedly delayed the implementation of esm programmes (spiegel and chazan 2016). were such disagreements over the necessity of austerity, or the structure of programme monitoring and surveillance, to deepen, this would likely disrupt the imf’s position as an external participant in the governance of the euro. the imf’s independent evaluation office (ieo) has also voiced concern that the imf’s collaboration with the commission and ecb subjected its technical analysis to undue political influence, and its 2016 report on lending during the euro crisis recommended developing clearer policies on cooperation with regional financial arrangements (i.e., the ecb) and preventing policy manipulation by external political concerns (independent evaluation office 2016, 2-3). the question of the imf’s continued participation as integrated supervisor within the euro area has been made more relevant by recent events. though the troika’s policy approach has not changed significantly, the anticipated conclusion of greek bailout programmes in 2018 is likely to reduce the perceived need for imf involvement in euro area governance. a strengthening european economy has also reduced the sense of urgency that necessitated building on existing governance approaches from 2009-11. more significantly, the prospects for significant eu reforms markedly improved in 2017. the election of emmanuel macron in france and growing support amongst german political leaders for turning the esm into a european monetary fund may lead to the development of internal crisis management frameworks and institutions that eliminate the need for future imf participation in euro area oversight. where an alignment of preferences among europe’s core economies led to the involvement of the imf during the euro crisis, a similar alignment may render it irrelevant in the years to come. 14 review of european and russian affairs 12 (1), 2018 references broome, andre. 2013. “the politics of imf-eu cooperation: institutional change from the maastricht treaty to the launch of the euro.” journal of european public policy, 20 (4): 589-605. chwieroth, jeffrey. 2008. capital ideas: the imf and the rise of financial liberalization. princeton, nj: princeton university press. eurogroup. 2011. “statement by the eurogroup.” brussels: council of ministers of the european union. july 2. european council. 2012. “spain: memorandum of understanding on financial sector policy conditionality.” july 20. european stability mechanism. 2012. treaty establishing the european stability mechanism. 2 february. https://www.esm.europa.eu/sites/default/files/20150203_-_esm_treaty_-_en.pdf francis, david. 2010. “merkel praised in germany for hard line on greece debt crisis.” christian science monitor, march 26. fuhrmans, vanessa, and sebastian moffett. 2010. “exposure to greece weighs on french, german banks.” the wall street journal, february 17. glencross, andrew. 2014. “the euro area crisis as a challenge to democracy and integration.” orbis, 58(1): 55-69. hall, peter a. 2012. “the economics and politics of the euro crisis.” german politics, 21 (4): 355-371. hodson, dermot. 2011. governing the euro area in good times and bad. new york: oxford university press. ———. 2015. “the imf as a de facto institution of the eu: a multiple supervisor approach.” review of international political economy 22 (3): 570-598. independent evaluation office. 2016. “the imf and the crises in greece, ireland, and portugal.” imf independent evaluation office. international monetary fund. 2011. “hungary: ex post evaluation of exceptional access under the 2008 stand-by arrangement.” imf country report no. 11/145. ———. 2013. “greece: ex post evaluation of exceptional access under the 2010 stand-by arrangement.” imf country report no. 13/156. joyce, joseph. 2013. the imf and global financial crises: phoenix rising? cambridge: cambridge university press. lutz, susanne and matthias kranke. 2014. “the european rescue of the washington consensus? eu and imf lending to central and eastern european countries.” review of international political economy, 21 (2): 310-338. https://www.esm.europa.eu/sites/default/files/20150203_-_esm_treaty_-_en.pdf 15 review of european and russian affairs 12 (1), 2018 mayer, thomas. 2012. europe’s unfinished currency: the political economics of the euro. london: anthem press. moravcsik, andrew. 1993. “preferences and power in the european community: a liberal intergovernmental approach.” journal of common market studies, 31 (4): 473-524. ———. 1998. the choice for europe: social purpose and state power from messina to maastricht. new york: cornell university press. panagiotarea, eleni. 2013. greece in the euro: economic delinquency or system failure? colchester: ecpr press. rato, rodrigo. 2011. “a new role for the imf in the aftermath of the crisis.” european view, 10 (1): 87-94. reuters. 2011. “italy calls for euro bonds, uk backs fiscal union.” august 13. rogers, chris. 2012. the imf and european economies: crisis and conditionality. new york: palgrave macmillan. schimmelfennig, frank. 2015. “liberal intergovernmentalism and the euro area crisis.” journal of european public policy, 22 (2): 177-195. schwarzer, daniela. 2015. “building the euro area’s debt crisis management capacity with the imf.” review of international political economy, 22 (3): 599-625. spiegel, peter, and guy chazan. 2016. “eu, imf attempt to bridge increasingly bitter greece bailout rift.” financial times, march 6. tallberg, jonas. 2003. european governance and supranational institutions: making states comply. new york: routledge. teschner, julia. 2000. “no longer europe’s europhiles? euroscepticism in germany in the 1990s.” journal of european integration, 22 (1): 59-86. vreeland, james. 1999. “the imf: lender of last resort or scapegoat?” international studies association annual meeting. 16 review of european and russian affairs 12 (1), 2018 published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada available online at: journals.carleton.ca/rera/index.php/rera rera is an electronic academic peer-reviewed journal that publishes graduate, post-graduate, and young scholarly works. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is a joint project supported by the canadaeurope transatlantic dialogue—a cross-canada research network supported by the social sciences and humanities research council of canada (sshrc)—along with the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies (carleton university) and its associated research unit, the centre for european studies. rera aims to provide an accessible forum for research, to promote high standards of research and scholarship, and to foster communication among young scholars. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada tel: +01 613 520-2600 ext. 3117; e-mail: rera-journal@carleton.ca creative commons license creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0 this working paper is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial no derivs 3.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 3.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, provided the source is acknowledged. no use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes. issn: 1718-4835 © 20158 the author(s) https://journals.carleton.ca/rera/index.php/rera mailto:rera-journal@carleton.ca http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ review of european and russian affairs 8 (1), 2013 issn 1718-4835 has the sovereign wealth fund of azerbaijan (sofaz) been able to promote economic diversification? vahid yücesoy université de montréal abstract: oil-rich countries have often times been confronted with the challenge of diversifying their economies away from oil dependence given the exhaustible nature of these fossil fuels. investing in sovereign wealth funds has been one of the most ubiquitous ways of preparing for the post-oil period. investing in sovereign wealth funds rather than directly injecting the oil revenues in the economy not only precludes the outbreak of the dutch disease (which is known for giving rise to an exchange rate appreciation, crowding out non-oil industries and keeping the economy reliant on oil), but it also saves for future generations. yet, in the case of azerbaijan, the sovereign wealth fund of azerbaijan (sofaz), founded in 1999, has only increased this reliance on oil. using the rentier states theoretical framework, this paper will argue that the direct control over sofaz exercised by the president and the lack of consultation with the ngos have made corruption easier, making the task of economic diversification more difficult. this has been possible because through corruption the president has often resorted to oil money to buy peace rather than invest it in economic diversification. as a result, since the foundation of sofaz, the country is more reliant, not less, on oil. © 2013 the author(s) www.carleton.ca/rera 2 review of european and russian affairs 8 (1), 2013 introduction oil is an exhaustible fossil fuel. the effective utilisation of this “black gold” before it gives out has been one of the intractable developmental conundrums of developing countries. often times, its role in stimulating economic development has been called into question. authors such as sachs and warner (1995), karl (2004), and ross (2001), have argued that oil-based economies face several challenges such as unsustainable economic performance, corruption, and poor management of revenues. given that at their present-day production levels resources are limited, they have to diversify their economy away from oil in order to better ensure a brighter future. yet, one of the obstacles to economic diversification has been the “dutch disease1.” in order to stave off the adverse economic effects of the dutch disease, many oil-rich countries started collecting their oil proceeds in special funds, often known under the name of “sovereign wealth funds”. the goal was not only to curb the dutch disease, but to also help diversify the economy for future generations so that the economy will be less dependent on oil. sofaz, the state oil fund of azerbaijan is one such fund. founded in 1999 under a presidential decree, the sofaz had pretty much the same goals as many of the existing oil funds in the middle east: reducing azerbaijan’s dependence on oil, keeping oil revenues for future generations, and funding national socio-economic projects (aslanli 2010, 8-11). yet, the level of corruption in azerbaijan and the exclusive control of sofaz by the president of azerbaijan, ilham aliyev, have been hindering effective management of the state oil fund, making it difficult to achieve this foundational objective of the sofaz. more than 13 years since its foundation, the fund’s ability to reduce azerbaijan’s dependence on oil has backfired. azerbaijan’s exports today are more dependent on oil than ever. what is more, although the rate of unemployment and poverty have dropped, this has happened with constant transfers from the oil fund into the state budget (cesd 2012), which indicates that sofaz is not adequately meeting its central objective of preserving oil money for future generations. why did the establishment of the sofaz not reduce azerbaijan’s dependence on oil? this paper will try to respond to this research question by problematizing the institutional structure of the sofaz. as such, our hypothesis is as follows: “the direct control over the sofaz exercised by the president and the lack of consultation with non-governmental organizations (ngos) have made corruption easier, making the task of economic diversification more difficult. this has been possible because through corruption the president has often resorted to oil money to buy peace rather than invest it in economic diversification”. this paper will use the rentier states theoretical framework to explain azerbaijan’s growing dependence on oil. part i will focus on the theoretical framework. in part ii we will highlight the importance of oil for azerbaijan through a historical analysis followed by a synopsis of the sofaz and its foundational objectives. afterwards, by means of the theory of rentier states, we will try to highlight two phenomena: firstly, the oil wealth in azerbaijan has made the state stronger and 1 a commonly occurring phenomenon in countries with high resource revenues, the dutch disease, dubbed after the adverse effects of natural gas discoveries in the netherlands in the 1960s on the manufacturing sector, refers to economic problems arising from the injection of large mineral resources into the economy. this problem usually arises when the real-exchange value of the local currency becomes over-valued, making exports of non-mineral resources less attractive. as a result, the non-mineral manufacturing sector suffers in what is called the “crowding out” effect of the dutch disease (gelb 1988). review of european and russian affairs 8 (1), 2013 3 richer. as a result, the state has managed to buy peace in exchange for an increasingly better quality of life and a lower level of taxation. secondly, as a corollary of the first phenomenon, buying peace through rents has also reduced the accountability of the state to the population, making the state more authoritarian as well as more autonomous from society. part iii will highlight the pervasiveness of corruption in azerbaijan due to the existing rentier institutional structure. part 1: theoretical framework the rentier state theory, introduced by hossein mahdavy (1970) and improved by beblawi and luciani (1990) suggests three characteristics that determine whether a given state is rentier: 1) the economy relies on a substantial amount of external rents and therefore does not require a strong domestic productive sector 2) only a small proportion of the working population is actually involved in the generation of these rents 3) the state is the principal recipient of these rents (8-11). as a result, the state does not necessarily need fiscal revenues to carry out its functions. as mentioned by alan richards and john waterbury, rents allow governments to avoid heavily taxing their citizens, breaking the vital link that unites governments with taxpayers (1996, 17). this gives rise to a lack of accountability on the side of the government towards its citizenry. hence, the famous adage of “no taxation, representation”. according to terry karl, since these states live from oil rents rather than from direct taxation, they are likely to tax their populations lightly or not at all. thus, they are unusually detached from and unaccountable to the general population, and their populations, in turn, are less likely to demand accountability from and representation in government. as a result, the state becomes more authoritarian, and represses dissent with force, harming democracy (2004, 667). such monopoly of the state on the economy enables it to buy peace and stability through rents. in other words, one portion of the wealth is used to better the lives of the population in order to keep the regime stability intact. in such an atmosphere where the material needs of a population are met to a certain extent, corruption2 (rent-seeking) becomes one of the guiding principles of regime stability. according to karl, corruption contributes to the “resource curse”. rulers will support policies that produce personalized rents even if these policies result in lower overall social welfare; because they need to share these rents with supporters and subordinates, the level of distortion can be very great (2004, 667). paul collier highlights the excessive use of resources to finance election campaigns by directly bribing the electorate or smaller political parties, and consequently having to pay for this after a victory. as a result, the need to find money to pay these expenses can lead to corruption in managing the public finances and the government’s investment projects (2007, 43–44). consequently, the state, with the support of its subordinates and supporters, becomes more autonomous from society. as mentioned by theda skocpol, dietrich rueschemeyer, and peter evans, such autonomy refers to the demarcation of state interests from those of society. natural resources provide the state with the capacity to become more autonomous from society (1985, 9). in the case of azerbaijan, we will attempt to apply the rentier state theory of beblawi and luciani in order to find out whether it satisfies the conditions laid out by the authors. has the 2 corruption refers to misuse of public power or resources for private gain (karl 2004, 661). 4 review of european and russian affairs 8 (1), 2013 state become more autonomous from society? afterwards, the research will analyse how the institutional structure of the sofaz —initially founded for a better use of oil revenues in order to accelerate economic diversification— has made corruption inevitable, making economic diversification of azerbaijan increasingly difficult. part 2: oils and rents 2.1 oil in azerbaijan oil drilling in azerbaijan took off during the second half of the 19th century although the presence of oil during a previous era had already been documented. oil production was first launched in the country around the absheron peninsula where the capital city of baku is also located. according to sabit bagirov, in 1940 azerbaijan provided 71.5 per cent of the total oil output of the soviet union. from the beginning of the 1920s until the beginning of the second world war, azerbaijan remained a world centre for oil science and technology. during the period between 1941 and 1945, azerbaijan provided 63.2 per cent of the output in the soviet union. yet as a result, production slowed down since the resources of the constantly exploited onshore oilfields were exhausted and none of the newly discovered fields could prove their profitability. at the same time, extraction from the known fields became increasingly expensive (1996, 4). although the oil production went through a short decline in the immediate aftermath of azerbaijan’s independence in 1991, it was in 1994, with the signature of the contract of the century3, that oil production in azerbaijan regained its long-forfeited momentum. according to oksan bayülgen, the contract of the century was unprecedented because not only did it involve more than 33 oil companies from 15 countries, but also the net value of the contract was around 60 billion dollars (2003, 209). thanks to the positive effects of this agreement, azerbaijan’s oil production reached 1.1 million barrels per day in 2011 (energy information administration 2012), a dramatic increase from its former production level of less than 200,000 barrels per day (rosenberg and saavalaninen 1998). azerbaijan’s oil production more than quadrupled, making the contract of the century a watershed for azerbaijan’s post-independence socio-economic development. according to bayramov, by the end of 2009, azerbaijan, a country with a population less than 10 million people, would make $30 billion annually from oil sales alone (bayramov 2009, 7). however, given such an impressive boost in oil production, oil’s limited lifetime at the current production levels also became quite alarming. according to farid guliyev, considering that the oil production would peak in 2010, azerbaijan’s oil resources would have been completely depleted in 22 years (2009, 4). that is why a few years after the signature of the contract of the century, sofaz, the state oil fund of azerbaijan, was founded under a 3 hailed as a great success for president aliyev, the contract of the century envisaged the development of three offshore fields chirag, azeri and gunesli, the richest of the oilfields on the caspian coast, with us$8 billion foreign investment over the course of 30 years (bayülgen 2010, 219; asadov 2009, 94). review of european and russian affairs 8 (1), 2013 5 presidential decree. to this day, the oil sector remains entirely state-owned. the government owns the resource and the installations (ciarreta and nasirov 2012, 17). 2.2: sofaz: foundation and transparency initiative one of the biggest economic hurdles of oil-producing countries is, as mentioned in the introductory section, the pervasiveness of the dutch disease. as such, one of the principal objectives of the sofaz was to curb the outbreak of the dutch disease. hence, it aimed to keep the windfall oil revenues outside of circulation in order not to heighten the rate of inflation. simultaneously, it was also tasked with saving the oil revenues for future generations by investing them in projects tailored for socio-economic development and for economic diversification of azerbaijan. according to farda assadov, a significant proportion of the receipts from oil companies, with the exception of direct tax payments, accumulate in the sofaz (2009, 98). in fact, according to gubard bayramov and patrick conway, as of january 1, 2010, sofaz had accumulated $15 billion, and the sofaz executive director shahmar movsumov predicts that by 2023 sofaz’s funds may reach more than $200 billion (2010, 2). however, this abundance of revenues has made azerbaijan more dependent on oil. according to ciarreta and nasirov, the non-oil economy is mainly driven by state expenditures through transfers from the sofaz, and its share of gdp is falling as those transfers increase (2012, 284). following the approval of the amendments in the state budget in may, 2011, $12.1 billion was transferred from the oil fund to the state budget in 2011 alone, which is a 41.7 percent increase on the previous forecast and represents 59 percent of total budget revenues (center for economic and social development 2011). these increasing transfers were also diminishing the savings for the future while raising questions about the transparency of their use. it should be highlighted that transferring funds from the sofaz for the purpose of investing it in the non-oil sector is consistent with the foundational objectives of this fund, as this will provide benefits for future generations. however, what is worrisome is the fact that this money was used for expenditures such as salary increases, pensions, and debt payments, which do not result in economic diversification. mindful of such developmental hurdles lurking on the horizon, the azerbaijani government showed goodwill by registering the sofaz with the extractive industries transparency initiative (eiti). launched by the british government, this initiative seeks to enforce the declaration and certification of money received as revenue by national governments from natural resources extraction. this initiative was made possible through the pressure of a slew of civil society organisations including the open society institute (asadov 2007, 96). unlike a number of resource-rich states that showed —and in certain cases continue to show— reluctance to join the eiti, the azerbaijani government announced it was joining the initiative at the first eiti summit in london in 2003 (collier 2007, 143). as a result, according to an international monetary fund (imf) report published by wakeman-linn et al. (2004, 11), the sofaz, although under direct presidential control, has improved the transparency of its reporting since joining the eiti. yet, this optimistic picture is not necessarily shared by everyone. according to guliyev (2009), and bayülgen (2010), direct presidential control has been the biggest obstacle to the 6 review of european and russian affairs 8 (1), 2013 effective use of the windfall oil revenues. the authors also share the pessimistic view that as long as the institutional structure of the sofaz does not change, and civil society is not incorporated into the decision-making body of the oil fund, no meaningful advancement can be attained in the realm of fighting corruption and prioritising economic diversification. according to the crisis group, although sofaz has joined the eiti in a bid to improve its transparency, the eiti does not cover spending from the fund, and large sums are thereby lost through misappropriation and inefficient spending (2010, 3). as brought up by these sources, has azerbaijan’s dependence on oil diminished since the foundation of the sofaz in 1999? if not, is corruption to blame? 2.3: sofaz and the azerbaijani rentier state contrary to its foundational objectives, the sofaz has not made azerbaijan less dependent on oil. since its foundation, the share of oil revenues has, as a percentage of export revenues, risen steadily. for example, according to paul jones luong and erika weinthal, between 2005 and 2010, oil revenues have constituted 90 percent and 97 percent of the revenues, respectively (2010, 219-258). these revenues have accrued to the coffers of the state directly, making azerbaijan much richer than ever before. as mentioned by asadov, since the deep oil is owned by the state, this means a leap in budget credits, of which 60 per cent are already met today by oil revenue. for comparison, in 2002 while the state budget was around $1 billion us, in 2007 it reached the sum of $7 billion us, and in 2011 budget predictions indicated an amount of $15 billion us (2009, 96). in spite of such a huge share of oil generating government revenues, the percentage of the population working in the oil sector was incredibly low. according to carrieta and nassirov, current estimates indicate that the oil and gas industries are only responsible for a little over 1 percent of employment in azerbaijan, while agriculture employs nearly 50 percent of the country (2012, 283). consequently, the increasing share of the oil revenues, the control exercised by the state4 on the management of these revenues, along with the fact that only a very small percentage of the population is directly involved in the oil industry make azerbaijan a typical rentier state. as is the case in many other rentier states, the abundance of oil revenues in azerbaijan has also curtailed the enforcement of the new tax code adopted in 2001. the state has been reluctant to fully implement it, causing the informal economy to flourish in different areas of the country. according to luong & weinthal, azerbaijan is host to a large informal economy. as a result, the state is for the most part devoid of the capacity to properly collect taxes. referred to as a “shadow economy” by the authors, this informal economy accounts for 61 percent of the country’s gdp (2010). while the windfall oil revenues have directly accrued to the state, they have also enabled azerbaijan to make some impressive economic strides. whereas upon independence the poverty rate was situated at 45 percent (wakeman-linn 2004), it fell to 11 percent in 2009 (cia factbook). arguably, the most significant achievement has been made in the realm of tackling 4 in this case, the president, since the oil revenues accrue directly to the sofaz, which is exclusively managed by the president. review of european and russian affairs 8 (1), 2013 7 unemployment, which fell precipitously from 45 percent in 1995 to only 1 percent in 2011 (imf 2004). the bulk of these newly created jobs are attributable to an exponentially growing economy. most of these jobs have been created in the public sector with the help of the oil revenues. for example, according to the international labour office (ilo), since late 2003, some 900,000 new jobs have been created in azerbaijan, of which over 50 percent are permanent. in terms of the sectorial groupings used by azerbaijan’s state statistical committee, the largest employment sectors are education (25.1 percent), maintenance of transport networks (19.5 percent) and health and social work (10.1 percent). this is consistent with the government of azerbaijan’s commitment to ‘full employment’ (2012). while the immediate aftermath of the independence era saw an economic contraction in the country, the development of the oil and gas sectors has propelled an immense economic growth after the crisis. this economic contraction was so severe that during the 1989–94 period, the economy contracted by 63 percent. yet, gdp growth averaged 16 percent a year during 2001– 2009. oil revenues even increased more than predicted due to an upsurge in oil prices on world markets (ciarreta and nasirov 2012, 282). however, at the same time as the seemingly positive economic trends mentioned above, which have been engendered by an upsurge in oil production, there has also been a corresponding deterioration as far as democracy is concerned confirming once again the rentier state hypothesis that posits the adage of ‘no representation without taxation’. as can be seen from figure 1 obtained from freedom house, since 2003, there has been a marked and progressive deterioration of azerbaijan’s democracy score. what is eye-catching is that this deterioration has taken place against the background of increasing oil exports (figure 2), which have accrued exclusively to the government’s coffers, reinforcing its autonomy against civil society. according to freedom house, civil society has borne the brunt of an intensifying authoritarian crackdown. the restrictions imposed on foreign ngo’s have led to the shutting down of the human rights house in march 2011. as a result of a harsh crackdown on civil society, azerbaijan’s civil society rating has declined from 5.75 in 2012 to 6.00 in 2012 (2012, 85). the same report also indicates that the opposition has been muzzled with renewed authoritarianism and a more intense crackdown by the government. consequently, the authorities have serious political rivals. moreover, civic and political apathy is widespread (ibid, 92). this civic and political apathy mentioned by the freedom house seems to be giving greater ammunition to the government to repress dissent. according to aytan gahramanova, not only does the state position itself as the only legitimate supplier of public goods, but most of the population also continues to view the state as the main defender of public interests. state authority is viewed as a force beyond the influence of ordinary citizens (2009, 789). such a level of resignation to state authority has been a factor fuelling social apathy in azerbaijan. 8 review of european and russian affairs 8 (1), 2013 figure 1: nations in transit ratings and averaged scores: azerbaijan (freedom house 2012) reproduced with permission from: "azerbaijan," in freedom house’s nations in transit (2012, 85) figure 2: crude oil and products exports and consumption reproduced with permission from: "azerbaijan," in u.s. energy information administration, international energy statistics database (2013). review of european and russian affairs 8 (1), 2013 9 it can also be argued that the favourable economic situation created by the ruling government has been another factor propelling the political and civic apathy mentioned above by freedom house. according to a survey5 conducted by shannon o’lear, less than 35 percent of the population believes that their well-being has worsened over the past 5 years (2004, 217), while 70 percent of the population believes that azerbaijan has grown more democratic6 (ibid, 219). moreover, the overwhelming majority of those surveyed believe that the incumbent government has improved azerbaijan’s international stature. what is noteworthy from the survey is that the public is more concerned with azerbaijan’s international positioning and the improvement of their material well-being than democracy. as such, the survey also concludes that for the time being, the government enjoys enough legitimacy and support to stay in power. a 2011 survey commissioned by the caspian information centre in azerbaijan and conducted by the british firm, populus limited, found results7 that more or less converge with o’lear’s survey findings. the populus limited survey found that 79 percent of the population believes that the country is heading in the right direction. the survey also indicated that 54 percent of the population noticed an improvement in their quality of life. moreover, 75 percent of the respondents stated that they trusted the government while 82 percent thought that azerbaijan’s international standing was improving (caspian information center 2012). on balance, the government of azerbaijan has capitalized on its oil rents to put a lid on social discontent. as mentioned by jana kobzova and leila alieva, the regime has thus far managed to avoid dangerous levels of instability. oil revenue has enabled it to placate society through social spending (2012). part iii: economic corruption and diversification 3.1 the sofaz and corruption corruption is a major problem in the republic of azerbaijan. according to revenue watch, despite a slight improvement, azerbaijan still remains amongst the top 30 most corrupt countries in the world (2012). transparency international as well highlights the extent of corruption giving azerbaijan a score8 of 2.7 out of 10, registering a slight improvement of 0.7, yet, just like revenue watch, making a caveat about the gravity of corruption in the country (2012). according to the freedom house, however, the corruption in the country has steadily increased between 2003 and 2012, providing a bleaker picture than revenue watch (2012). 5 this survey is a sample of 1200 azerbaijani citizens, 604 males (50.3 percent) and 597 females (49.7 percent). the respondents ranged in age from 18 to 85 and represented 16 different ethnic groups. 6 despite the fact that international organizations, like the freedom house, indicates the contrary. 7 it should be noted that this survey, although more or less confirming the findings of the previous one, should also be taken with a certain grain of salt as it has been commanded by an azerbaijani government agency. yet, its inclusion is pertinent as several aspects of it find results that are akin to the shannon o’lear’s survey. 8 according to the scale of transparency international, a score of 10 out of 10 indicates the least corrupt regime while a 0 out of 10 is the most corrupt. in this regard, the score attributed to azerbaijan, 2.7, is patently a very low one, indicating the pervasiveness of corruption. 10 review of european and russian affairs 8 (1), 2013 the extent of this corruption, notably in the oil sector, is particularly alarming. according to a us state department report, corruption, cronyism, and other crimes remain key problems for azerbaijan’s oil and gas resources (u.s. state department, bureau of economic, energy and business affairs 2011). against the backdrop of such corruption allegations, the government has variously resorted to the oil fund under the pretext of grandiose development projects over the past few years. the sofaz contributes to the state budget to finance investments in such realms as infrastructure, education, poverty reduction and other social projects. despite its positive contributions to the budget, the institutional structure of the fund has rendered it vulnerable to corruption. according to farda assadov, decisions regarding state finances are made in the habitual style of management that has much in common with former soviet practices (2009, 99). the discretionary power exercised by the president as far as the spending of the fund is concerned makes it less accountable to the public. the fund's governance structure is weak. although its regulations hold that "the fund shall be accountable and responsible to the president of the republic of azerbaijan," there are no checks and balances to limit the president's discretion (revenue watch 2012). such a weak governance structure coupled with the exclusive powers accorded to the president, raises the necessity of the involvement of ngos to promote greater transparency. according to assadov, the sofaz investment programme and control over its effectiveness could not be managed without the representative participation of civil society (2009, 99). thus far, civil society has been excluded from the decision-making process of the oil fund’s spending. consequently, according to the business anti-corruption portal, such an absence of civil society has proven very pernicious. in fact, under the presidential bureau, headed by the executive director of sofaz, samir shamirov, top politicians have misappropriated the fund’s money. for example, the government spent a large sum of money from the sofaz to pay pensions and raise civil service salaries in a presidential election year (2011). since independence, no serious privatisation plans were undertaken in azerbaijan. partial economic reform went no further than handing some state-owned enterprises to regime cronies (guliyev 2012, 3-4). in an increasingly authoritarian setting with access to the oil money, a new elite comprised of these cronies close to the president has emerged. their relationship to the president evokes of patron-client relationships. according to the crisis group, the azerbaijani elite represents a symbiosis of family networks and bureaucratic/business interests. they can be divided into three groups: the faction led by the president’s chief of staff, ramiz mehdiyev, which many refer to as the “old guard”; ilham aliyev’s protégés, often called the “oligarchs”, with whom he shares business interests and whom he uses to counterbalance other forces within the elite; and the extended “family”, the president’s untouchable relatives (2010, 8). mehdiyev’s faction is the most consolidated within the ruling elite. according to the economist intelligence unit (eiu), known as the "grey cardinal", mehdiyev, the head of the presidential administration, played a leading role in the transfer of power from the late heydar aliyev to the current president (2006). review of european and russian affairs 8 (1), 2013 11 as for the oligarchs, according to the crisis group, these consist primarily of kemaleddin heydarov, the transport minister, ziya mammadov, and the president of the state oil company, rovnag abdullayev. heydarov has built a large business empire and is widely believed to be the wealthiest person in the country after the president and his family. however, the “oligarchs” biggest disadvantage is that although they earn huge profits from the oil rents allocated by the president, they are still treated as a source for funding his interests and those of his immediate family (2010). finally, the family of president aliyev, with his direct access to the oil fund, is by far, the richest in the country (ibid). according to radio free europe, “aliyev's family has been tied to numerous suspicious business dealings in the past. first lady mehriban aliyeva and her two daughters are believed to control several of the country's largest banks” (2013). although the government appears to have pacified the population through rents and better economic conditions, the level of corruption has been causing widespread public dissatisfaction in society. this dissatisfaction is confirmed by the aforementioned surveys conducted by o’lear. the author confirms that although the government seems to have bought peace through the rents, more than 75 percent of the population is dissatisfied with the way corruption is handled by the government (2007, 219). o’lear also notes that while there has been a marked improvement in the material conditions of the citizenry, perceptions of inequality —due to an asymmetric division of the oil wealth— have also been running high. according to the eiu, in 1999, nominal wages increased at over 9 percent from the previous year, and by 2004 they were increasing at an annual rate of over 25 percent9. this growth in wages, however, is unevenly distributed in favour of employees in the oil industry and related sectors and has not been realised in the agricultural and social sectors (2004). the statistics gathered by the world bank also support the claim that inequality has increased, as the country has grown wealthier. as seen from the following figure (figure 3), between the period of january 200610 and 2008, the level of inequality has risen significantly. in the year 2006, the gini co-efficient11 value for azerbaijan was 16,83 whereas within only two years it rose to 33,71. in other words, while the growth rate has been phenomenal, it also expanded the gap between the rich and the poor. 9 it is also noteworthy to highlight that this increase in nominal wages has taken place while the inflation rate in azerbaijan has been at a very insignificant level. according to unescap, inflation did not exceed 2.3 percent in azerbaijan since 1996 and climbed up to 6.7 percent only in 2004 and was 8.3 percent in 2006 (2007). yet, according to international labour office, wage exponential increases in nominal wages pushed the inflation rate to 16.7 percent in 2007 and to 20.8 per cent in 2008 (2012, 2). this high inflation only started to decline progressively after 2008 (ibid, 3). 10 the year 2006 is an important one for azerbaijan as it was in 2006 that azerbaijan registered a phenomenal economic growth. according to the international monetary fund, azerbaijan registered its highest economic growth in 2006 with a growth rate in excess of 31 percent in one year. the growth is attributable to the oil and gas industry (international monetary fund 2007). 11 the gini co-efficient is the internationally used measure to indicate inequality. whereas a gini co-efficient of 0 indicates perfect equality, a gini co-efficient of 100 indicates perfect inequality. in the case of azerbaijan, since this value shifted from 16.83 in 2006 to 33,71, the level of inequality has aggravated. 12 review of european and russian affairs 8 (1), 2013 figure 3: gini co-efficient in azerbaijan 2006 versus 2008 reproduced with permission from: "azerbaijan," through trading economics (2009). in addition to income inequalities, the concentration of oil in the hands of the president and his cronies has also created regional inequalities. as such, the oil revenues have not been trickling down to all the regions equally. according to david hoffman, regions outside of the absheron peninsula12 had been for the most part neglected. amongst them is the second largest city, gyandja, where even the most basic of government services, such as natural gas supplies or road repair have not been provided in years (1999, 19). 3.2 whither economic diversification? with a population largely placated by rentier politics, an effete civil society that is not included in the decision-making process of the sofaz, a high level of corruption, and the presence of oligarchic figures, is the goal of economic diversification possible? in 2012, economic development minister, shahin mustafayev, asserted in parliament that over 500 industrial facilities would open in 2013 and expand the economy’s non-oil-related sectors by more than 18-percent, plus bring in an additional 500-million manats13 ($637.2 million) in tax revenue. however the long-term feasibility of such a promise remains low (abbasov 2012). moreover, the rentier characteristics of the economy are not easy to shed. 12 this is the peninsula that is not only home to the nation’s political capital, baku, but it is also close to the major oil fields. 13 the currency of azerbaijan. review of european and russian affairs 8 (1), 2013 13 according to the finance monitoring center director, ingilab ahmadov, although the azerbaijan’s construction sector has been booming, tax revenues have not been reflecting this boom as the country is still devoid of the administrative capacity to collect taxes (ibid). this lack of administrative capacity makes resorting to oil revenues all the more attractive, making diversification a difficult goal to attain. however, according to wright, non-oil growth, particularly when government spending funded by oil revenue is excluded, has been anaemic at best. the result is an increasingly unbalanced economy even compared to other petroleum exporters (2011). according to guliyev, given the excessive reliance of the economy on oil in azerbaijan, the private sector tends to shrink over time, while the only survival strategy for private companies is to secure access to government contracts for building physical infrastructure and providing services to the oil industry (some of the very few spillovers from the oil sector) (2012). according to norio usui of asian development bank, exports accounted for more than 60 percent of the total gdp of azerbaijan in 2006, up from 36 percent in 2003. oil constituted more than 90 percent of the export earnings of the country. yet, the share of non-oil exports in the gdp stood at less than 5 percent (2007, 6-10). to make the matters worse, according to an imf report, following the world financial crisis of 2008, azerbaijan adopted a series of revenue measures to mitigate its impact. in particular, the authorities reduced the corporate and personal income tax rates, and exempted banks and insurance companies from taxes on profits used for certain purposes. yet, ever since, these more lenient fiscal policies have been difficult to undo, making it indispensable to resort to the oil fund (international monetary fund 2012, 9) furthermore, the main obstacle to investment, one way of diversifying the economy, is the high level corruption in the country. according to aitor ciarreta and shahriyar nasirov, the existing legacy of corruption dates back to soviet times and currently the huge injections of money from the oil and gas sector are considered as the greatest sources of corruption in azerbaijan. in recent years the government has established a state commission on anti-corruption measures, e.g. legislation has been introduced requiring public officials to disclose their assets on an annual basis. however, this legislation has not been very efficient (2012). the inefficiency of this legislation is also confirmed by the heritage foundation’s study, which blamed the judicial and institutional environment that has impeded foreign investments: the judiciary is burdened by extensive non-transparent regulations and interference from the executive. contract enforcement can be lax. despite some progress, corruption continues to cause concern. the judiciary and police are susceptible to bribery, and businesses abuse their relations with government to gain monopoly control of major industries. the property registration system is awash with bureaucratic requirements… government regulations add to the costs of foreign investment, and monetary instability adds to uncertainty (heritage foundation, 2013). consequently, the government has increasingly resorted to the oil fund in order to propel azerbaijan’s socio-economic development. according to kuralbayeva et al., azerbaijan started 14 review of european and russian affairs 8 (1), 2013 to consume too much of its revenues between 2001 and 2007, although it took steps that led to a large increase in savings in 2008 and 2009 (2010). yet, the growing dependence on oil revenues is not likely to subside soon as it is foremost underpinned by corruption that has not shown tangible signs of improvement since 2003, and has become worse (freedom house 2012). this increased recourse to oil revenues has also created a vicious cycle of real exchange value appreciation, incapacitating non-oil sectors as is often the case with oil-rich countries. in fact, according to montague lord and vugar ahmadov, for macroeconomic factors, azerbaijan’s oil sector boom has created a ‘dutch disease’ that is undermining the competitiveness of the non-oil sector through an appreciation of the real exchange rate and by raising factor input costs. as a result, the rapid expansion of the oil export sector, which now comprises over one-half of the economy, runs the risk of impeding growth in the non-oil sector and promoting the rapid repatriation of profits from the oil sector, as has already occurred in 2007-2008 (2008). conclusion this paper has emphasised the impressive economic rise of azerbaijan thanks to its oil resources and the future challenges created by this new wealth. following its poor economic performance after its independence, azerbaijan’s economy grew rapidly through the signature of the contract of the century with major investors in its oil fields. it was this contract that enabled the country to amass windfall revenues from the oil sector. yet, immediately after its signature, azerbaijan was also confronted with the dilemma that many major oil producers have encountered: how to effectively use its oil revenues in order not only to diversify the economy, but also to improve the socio-economic stature of its population, especially in the light of the fact that the existing resources would only last for a very short stretch of time. that is why, under a presidential decree, sofaz, the state oil fund of azerbaijan was founded in 1999. however, more than a decade into its foundation, while azerbaijan’s economy has more than tripled, not only has it become more dependent on oil, but these windfall oil revenues have ushered in a level of corruption. simultaneously with this increasing dependence on oil, azerbaijan has become more rentier with a corresponding lag in the development of a fiscal system and a growing authoritarianism. as a result, while the material needs of the population were met to a certain degree, giving rise to a temporary peace and stability, the government of haydar aliyev has also created an oligarchy of his supporters. since aliyev has got the final word on the way that the oil fund, sofaz, is expended, corruption has continued to remain a major problem in azerbaijan. as the level of corruption, especially with regards to the management of sofaz, has proceeded apace, azerbaijan has not been able to diversify its economy away from oil and gas. this high level of corruption has had a negative impact on the business climate in the country, making the gdp growth extremely dependent on oil. yet, this increasing dependence on oil and the frequent use of the oil fund have also created this vicious cycle of crushing non-oil industries by causing an exchange rate appreciation, known as the ‘dutch disease’. for the continuity of its economic growth and to better embrace a prosperous future, azerbaijan needs to seriously tackle corruption, starting with the management of sofaz. the review of european and russian affairs 8 (1), 2013 15 involvement of civil society groups and ngos into the decision-making process is one of the essential components of such a success. while the azerbaijani government appears to have silenced civil society at the same time as it has been investing in social development, and while society appears to be adequately controlled through an authoritarian state, the level of dissatisfaction with regards to corruption remains high. in the face of growing inequalities and an increasing level of corruption, the government’s policy of buying peace through rents may run into hurdles in the future. references abbasov, shahin. 2012. 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"azerbaijan," through trading economics. accessed march 3 2013 http://www.tradingeconomics.com/azerbaijan/gini-index-wb-data.html http://www.tradingeconomics.com/azerbaijan/gini-index-wb-data.html review of european and russian affairs 8 (1), 2013 19 correct citation: yücesoy, vahid. 2013. “has the sovereign wealth fund of azerbaijan (sofaz) been able to promote economic diversification?” review of european and russian affairs 8 (1): 1-14. published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada. available online at: www.carleton.ca/rera/ rera is an electronic academic peer-reviewed journal that publishes graduate, post-graduate, and young scholarly works. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is a joint project supported by the canada-europe transatlantic dialogue—a cross-canada research network supported by the social sciences and humanities research council of canada (sshrc)—along with the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies (carleton university) and its associated research unit, the centre for european studies. rera aims to provide an accessible forum for research, to promote high standards of research and scholarship, and to foster communication among young scholars. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada tel: +01 613 520-2600 ext. 1179; e-mail: rera-journal@carleton.ca creative commons license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ this working paper is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial no derivs 3.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 3.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced provided the source is acknowledged. no use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes. issn: 1718-4835 © 2013 the author(s) http://www.carleton.ca/rera/ mailto:rera-journal@carleton.ca has the sovereign wealth fund of azerbaijan (sofaz) been able to promote economic diversification? correct citation: yücesoy, vahid. 2013. “has the sovereign wealth fund of azerbaijan (sofaz) been able to promote economic diversification?” review of european and russian affairs 8 (1): 1-14. why reforms fail: the role of ideas, interests and institutions review of european and russian affairs 9 (1), 2015 issn 1718-4835 ethnic nation no more? making sense of germany’s new stance on dual citizenship by birth elke winter, annkathrin diehl, and anke patzelt university of ottawa abstract while germany does not allow dual citizenship in principle, since 23 november 2014, children born on german territory to non-german parents are no longer forced at the age of 23 to choose between german citizenship or that of their parents. rather, they will be able to hold dual citizenship indefinitely. while this may be a far cry from more liberal dual citizenship policies in other countries, the progressive reform of germany’s citizenship law gains its specific meaning from that country’s tormented history of ethnic nationhood and blood-based citizenship. it is also striking at a time when many countries in the western world are moving towards more restrictive immigration and citizenship policies. in this paper, we argue that the abrogation of the optionspflicht [the duty to choose] constitutes a step in leaving behind the country’s notorious tradition of constituting an “ethnic nation.” our analysis confirms christian joppke’s claim that politics and party ideologies matter for the “de-ethnicization” and “re-ethnicization” of citizenship, simultaneous processes that are neither linear nor necessarily path-dependent. 2 review of european and russian affairs 9 (1), 2015 introduction1 as canada and other western countries are implementing more restrictive immigration and citizenship policies, germany seems to be moving in the opposite direction. does a recent amendment to germany’s citizenship law constitute a step in leaving behind the country’s notorious tradition of constituting an “ethnic nation?” on november 13, 2014, the optionspflicht [the duty to choose] 2 was abolished by law (bundesanzeiger 2014). the optionspflicht was initially introduced in 2000 as part of the new german citizenship act. it granted dual citizenship to children born on german soil of foreign parents. this regulation was a major advancement on germany’s restrictive citizenship law, which traditionally relied on filiation (jus sanguinis). for the first time, the principle of territorybased citizenship (jus soli) was introduced; however, it was linked to two conditions: firstly, one of the parents had to be living in germany under a permanent residency status for at least eight years (staatsbürgerschaftsgesetz 2000, paragraph §4 section 3(1)). secondly, by the age of 23, these children had to decide whether they wanted to keep their german citizenship or take up the citizenship passed down to them by their parents (staatsbürgerschaftsgesetz 2000, paragraph §29). this need to select one nationality only is understood as optionspflicht. with the acceptance of the new bill, entitled “zweites gesetz zur änderung des staatsangehörigkeitsgesetzes” (second law on the modification of the citizenship act), the german bundestag (lower house of the german parliament) abolished the optionspflicht3 for the majority of people currently affected by this regulation, thus allowing them to hold dual citizenship indefinitely (deutscher bundestag 2014). while this may be a far cry from the fairly liberal citizenship legislation in settler societies such as canada, the progressive reform of germany’s citizenship law gains its specific meaning from that country’s tormented history of ethnic nationhood and blood-based citizenship. it is also striking at a time when many countries in the western world are moving towards more restrictive immigration and citizenship policies. in this paper, we will explain germany’s recent citizenship legislation by situating it within the country’s historical and (recent) political context. specifically, we aim to answer the following research questions: to what extent is the country’s new stance on dual citizenship by birth a step away from its notorious legacy as an “ethnic nation?” how can this new stance be explained? the concepts of “ethnic” and “civic” nationhood, reinstated by brubaker in 1992, as well as 1 this research benefitted from financial support provided by the social sciences and humanities research council of canada (standard faculty research grant and canada-europe transatlantic knowledge cluster). the authors thank the anonymous reviewers for very helpful comments and assume full responsibility for all remaining errors. 2 the words optionspflicht [the duty to choose] and optionsregelung [the regulation requiring a choice] refer to the same legal provision; they will be used interchangeably. members of the german opposition also refer to this provision as optionszwang [the obligation to choose]. 3 out of the 569 members of the parliament who participated in the vote on july 3, 2014, 461 voted in favour of the legislation draft, whereas 108 voted against it (deutscher bundestag 2014a). 3 review of european and russian affairs 9 (1), 2015 joppke’s critique of brubaker mobilizing the notions of “de-ethnicization” and “re-ethnicization” will be used as the theoretical framework for this discussion. theoretical framework according to brubaker’s (1992) seminal work, the type of nationhood that has historically informed a given political community, as well as the relative weight that is given to ethnicity within this understanding of nationhood, continues to inform citizenship policy. defined as full membership in a political community, citizenship is based on claims to shared belonging, usually nationhood, as well as on claims to equal rights, duties, and status guaranteed by a sovereign state. brubaker’s argument has famously given rise to two opposing ideal types: that of the “ethnic nation,” based primarily on citizenship through filiation (jus sanguinis) and a communal understanding of nationhood, and that of the “civic nation,” based on shared political will and non-ethnic, associative characteristics, such as unconditional jus soli (citizenship through birth in the territory). within this definitional scheme, germany had come to represent the prototype of the “ethnic nation.” disputing the value of (ethnic versus civic) “national models” for research on citizenship, joppke (2003) argues that ethnic and civic dimensions of citizenship should neither be understood in linear terms nor be viewed as a continuum. rather, they exist simultaneously and in constant tension: “[a] state qua membership unit is a fundamentally ethnic institution because membership is usually ascribed at birth” (435) and continues to exist “irrespective of a member’s contingent location and movements in space” (431). at the same time, the state is also “a territorial unit, whose integrative measures in an age of universal human rights have to become increasingly abstract and procedural” (431). joppke (2003, 436) defines “de-ethnicization” as “the process of facilitating the access to citizenship, either […] in terms of liberalized naturalization procedures, or through adding jus soli elements to […] birth-attributed citizenship.” “a third element of de-ethnicized citizenship is an increasing toleration of dual citizenship” (441). furthermore, “de-ethnicization” requires the “decoupling of the state from [illiberal forms of] nation-building” (437). it is contingent on the governing party’s ideology; it is most likely to occur under left-leaning parties (ibid.). overall, joppke holds that, in western immigrant-receiving states, the trend has been towards the “de-ethnicization” (2003) and liberalization (2007) of citizenship acquisition (through jus soli, naturalization, and toleration of dual citizenship) with very limited forms of “re-ethnicization” in order to avoid citizenship loss (through strengthening jus sanguinis provisions for expatriates and toleration of dual citizenship, which is interpreted as “re-ethnicization” from the point of view of sending states). however, the potential of re-ethnicization remains present. it “is grounded in the fact that states are not just territorial but membership units” (joppke 2003, 443). specifically, “re-ethnicization” of citizenship occurs when criteria of inclusion/exclusion are explicitly or implicitly based on 4 review of european and russian affairs 9 (1), 2015 ascribed ethnic attributes, such as skin colour, religion, place of birth, language, culture, or dress. it is most likely to occur under right-leaning political parties in power (446). against this backdrop, we inquire a) whether the abrogation of the optionspflicht can be interpreted as “de-ethnicization” of citizenship, b) whether this confirms joppke’s claim that politics and party ideologies matter, and c) to what extent the recent legislation means that germany has left its historical roots of being an “ethnic nation.” the history of citizenship in germany from ethnic to civic nation? according to astute observers, at the turn of the 21st century, germany has changed from being an “ethnic nation” to being a country embracing “universalistic immigrant integration” (heckmann 2003, 45). a brief look into germany’s history can clarify this statement. after the second world war, the federal republic maintained a centralized citizenship law, which had been implemented in 1913. this law made the principle of descent (jus sanguinis) the only basis of citizenship, with the territorial principle (jus soli) completely absent. on the one hand, this afforded refugees and displaced persons of german background (auslandsdeutsche) settlement rights. on the other hand, “guest workers” entering the federal republic mainly during the 1960s, coming from southern european countries and, primarily, turkey, were excluded from this right. they were perceived as “foreigners” who were staying in the country only on a temporary basis and were expected to return when recession set in. not being of “german blood,” their children, even if born on german soil, were denied citizenship or even an easy or automatic naturalization. remaining unrevised, after the demise of the german democratic republic in 1989, germany’s citizenship law automatically granted citizenship to all germans from the gdr (übersiedler). additionally, during the 1990s, large numbers of so-called aussiedler – “ethnic germans” from eastern europe and the former soviet union – were granted citizenship rights in germany solely based on their german descent. at the same time however, immigrants of non-german background who had been living in germany for a long time, sometimes several decades, became increasingly ethnicized in public discourse. in january 1991, the admission of non-eu migrants was restricted through a reform of the foreigners’ law (ausländergesetz), and in 1993, anti-immigration rhetoric culminated in a restriction of the constitutionally-guaranteed right of asylum. as mentioned in the theoretical framework, this context inspired rogers brubaker’s work in the 1990s. in the wake of his groundbreaking study, it became common to identify germany as the prototype of an “ethnic nation.” ultimately, national and international criticism of ethnic exclusionism, as well as increasing discomfort with large disenfranchised migrant populations, produced a situation where the status quo with respect to german citizenship legislation was politically no longer defendable. thus, when a new government was elected in 1998, the two parties in power – the social democrats and the green party – finally acknowledged the fact that germany had become a de facto 5 review of european and russian affairs 9 (1), 2015 “country of immigration.” as a result of this change in perspective, the coalition parties proposed to reform germany’s citizenship law. they suggested introducing the principle of jus soli and dual citizenship, thus, on the one hand, granting citizenship to all children born on german soil, and on the other hand, giving non-germans wishing to naturalize in germany the possibility of keeping their previous citizenship, as well. this proposal, however, was not put into action, as it was blocked by the opposition of the christian democrats (cdu/csu), who saw dual citizenship as a danger to the successful integration of immigrants into the country, arguing that it would undermine their loyalty to germany. furthermore, they claimed that such a reform would increase immigration rates to germany, and additionally, would result in a priority treatment of migrants over “germans.” in order to underline their position, the party initiated a signature campaign against dual citizenship. this campaign ran at the same time as the provincial elections in the land hessen took place in february 1999, and it was a success for the christian democrats. not only were they able to win the elections in hessen, but as a result of this, they also won a majority in the bundesrat (upper house of the german parliament). the new german citizenship act that emerged out of subsequent negotiations came into effect on january 1, 2000. even though the new law did not include all the changes originally suggested by the social democrats and the green party, it still represented a major departure from previous policy. first and foremost, it became known for introducing the previously unprecedented territorial principle to the existing german citizenship law based on filiation.4 according to astute observers, the “introduction of jus soli clearly represents a seismic shift in german citizenship law and a firm change of direction away from its previous ethnocultural emphasis” (green 2000, 114). second, the act drastically reduced the mandatory residence requirement for the acquisition of german citizenship from 15 to eight years.5 third, even though the act did not introduce dual citizenship as a general option for everyone, some exceptions to this rule were implemented. for example, recognized refugees, individuals over 60 years old, and certain eu nationals now had access to dual citizenship.6 furthermore, a temporary form of dual citizenship was introduced in §29 of the citizenship act (optionsregelgung; to be discussed below). this allowed children of non-german parents who were born on german soil to obtain dual citizenship upon birth. however, their dual status was only temporary and by the age of twenty-three, these individuals had to decide which of their two citizenships they wanted to maintain. 4 this law stated that children born in germany of non-german parents were to be granted german citizenship from birth, on the condition that one parent: a) had been legally resident for a period of eight years, and b) held either an unlimited resident permit (unbefristete aufenthaltserlaubnis) for at least three years, or a residence entitlement (aufenthaltsberechtigung). however, dual citizenship could only be held until the age of 23 when a decision had to be made. 5 according to paragraph §10 of the citizenship act, a foreigner has a right to naturalization if (s)he has been a legal resident of germany for eight years, commits to the liberal-democratic order of the federal republic of germany, can take care of himself and his dependents, has a sufficient knowledge of german society and language, and gives up his previous citizenship. 6 the act allowed eu citizens to hold dual citizenship on the basis of reciprocity, i.e. on the condition that german citizens were also allowed to naturalize and to hold dual citizenship in the citizenship candidates’ former home countries. 6 review of european and russian affairs 9 (1), 2015 there is widespread consent that the new act introduced major changes to german citizenship legislation. commentators maintain that “germany has clearly moved ‘up’ from having the single most restrictive law before the 1999 reform to a more moderate policy today” (howard 2012, 40). they agree that german citizenship can no longer be deemed “ethnic” in essence (green 2000, 114). on the difficulty of being a “civic nation” simplifying the requirements for naturalization and opening up possibilities for dual citizenship (at least in some cases), the 2000 citizenship act can be seen as a starting point in the movement towards more liberal citizenship policies in germany. despite this fact, many commentators remain critical, and some highlight that the reform “was also tempered by a significant ‘restrictive backlash’” (howard 2012, 39). first, the citizenship act itself contained a number of restrictive dimensions. candidates for naturalization are now asked to swear an oath declaring their loyalty to the “free and democratic character of the constitution,” as well as to demonstrate adequate knowledge of the german language through language tests (ludvig 2004, 507). both requirements were new and remained vaguely defined in both the act itself and subsequent legislation. as a consequence, since the implementation of naturalization requirements falls within the jurisdiction of the bundesländer, there was substantial regional variation with respect to the interpretation of the naturalization criteria (see further below). second, by providing that german citizenship would be lost automatically if another citizenship was acquired, the citizenship act also closed a loophole in german citizenship legislation that had previously enabled migrants to renounce their citizenship, apply for german citizenship, and then reclaim it. for some time, turkish migrants and authorities were either unaware of this change or felt they could safely ignore it. only in 2003 did reapplications for turkish citizenship drop sharply. by then, an estimated 48,000 turkish migrants had taken advantage of the loophole and were in danger of losing their german citizenship (bauböck 2010, 850). finally, while the act allows for multiple citizenship on an exceptional basis, as a rule, citizenship candidates must renounce their previous citizenship. this holds especially true for those who acquire citizenship through being born on german soil. according to the optionsregelung, set out in §29 of the citizenship act, by the age of 23, these individuals have to decide whether they want to keep their german citizenship (acquired through the principle of jus soli) or whether to take up the citizenship passed down to them by their non-german parents (jus sanguinis). furthermore, they automatically lose their german citizenship if they fail to revoke the citizenship passed down to them by their parents, or fail to provide evidence for this revocation. the stipulation that new citizens give up their previous citizenship was clearly the most controversial element of the new law (for details see schönwälder and triadafilopoulos 2012; worbs et al 2012). despite these restrictions, immediately after the implementation of the new act, there was a widespread assumption that the amount of naturalizations would rise. this resulted in renewed 7 review of european and russian affairs 9 (1), 2015 anxiety about safeguarding “german” values and traditions, mainly spurred on by members of the christian democrats. in march 2000, the government’s plans to grant 20,000 work permits for it specialists from non-european countries led to a debate on germany’s declining birthrate and the priority of educating native germans over the immigration of “foreigners” (summarized in the slogan “children, not indians,” kinder statt inder). in october of the same year, the christian democrats’ approach to “integration” kick-started a debate about german “core culture” (leitkultur) to which immigrants must adapt.7 in the wake of these debates, two amendments were implemented that made germany’s new citizenship law even more assimilatory (green 2012, 177). the first amendment refers to the residence act (aufenthaltsgesetz) (bundesministerium der justiz und für verbraucherschutz 2004). this law constitutes article 1 of germany’s first-ever immigration act (zuwanderungsgesetz), which entered into force on january 1, 2005 (bundesministerium des innern 2004).8 under its rules, those wishing to naturalize must complete an integration course, unless they are able to demonstrate their proficiency in the german language and knowledge of german society through other means (winter and john 2010, 4-5). completing an integration course reduces the standard residential requirement from eight years to seven. since 2005, citizenship candidates have also been subject to a nationwide standardized obligatory query about their criminal background at the federal office of the protection of the constitution (bundesverfassungsschutz). this is to determine whether applicants constitute a threat to germany’s constitutional order (hailbronner 2006, 241). in august 2007, eleven eu directives were implemented into german law (gesetz zur umsetzung aufenthaltsund asylrechtlicher richtlinien der europäischen union). this resulted in the second amendment of the german citizenship act. first, the amended citizenship act now permits dual citizenship for all citizens of eu member-states and switzerland. second, it harmonizes targets for language competence (which had previously varied at the federal and the länder level). as an added incentive for citizenship candidates demonstrating high levels of integration (e.g. language skills above level b1 ger), the residential requirement was reduced to six years. in addition, a harmonized federal citizenship test was introduced on september 1, 2008. citizenship candidates are now obliged to demonstrate that they possess sufficient knowledge of the german societal and legal system.9 while the content and questions of the citizenship test have triggered much controversy (michalowski 2011; orgad 2009 – for different positions, see goodman 2010; van oers 2010), the integration courses and german language 7 the debate about the german core culture subsided in 2001, only to return in 2006 and 2007 (cf. palmowski 2008). 8 the content of the zuwanderungsgesetz was significantly watered down from the time of its original conception in august 2001 through to final approval by the parliament in july 2004 (for a discussion, see winter and john 2010). 9 the citizenship test is based on a catalogue of 300 questions developed by the institute for quality assurance in education (iqb) and last updated on june 1, 2013. candidates must correctly answer at least 17 out of 33 multiplechoice questions drawn from a catalogue of 310 questions on german history, culture, and politics (including 10 land-specific questions). the test must be taken at specified adult education centres. it takes 60 minutes and can be taken indefinitely. a 25 euro fee to take the test is included as part of the 255 euro general naturalization fee. according to §10 of germany’s citizenship law, the requirement to attend an integration course may be waived for immigrants who demonstrate a degree of proficiency in the german language and knowledge of german society. however, citizenship candidates must still take a citizenship test as part of the naturalization process (winter and john 2010). 8 review of european and russian affairs 9 (1), 2015 instruction, which are largely paid for by the german government, seem to have been welcomed by immigrants (will 2012). finally, under the amended citizenship act, the written statement of loyalty is to be supplemented by an oral declaration to be made by the candidate at the moment he or she receives the citizenship certificate. debating dual citizenship by birth after more than a decade since its introduction, the reform of germany’s citizenship law has not brought about the expected results. originally, the 2000 citizenship act was to “enable those living permanently in germany and their children born here to acquire full rights of citizenship” (gerhard schröder as quoted in green 2012, 179). there was also a widespread expectation – even anxiety for some – that there was going to be a significant increase in naturalizations. in fact, the opposite has been the case. while there was a surge of 187,000 (2.57%) in naturalizations in 2000, the year the new act came into effect, naturalization rates have been falling, even though the average residence period was on the rise (green 2012). in 2011, germany’s naturalization rate was 1.44%, with 106,896 individuals being naturalized (statistisches bundesamt deutschland 2012). this is higher than annual naturalization rates under the old law in the 1970s and 1980s, when naturalization rates for the most part stayed below 1% (statistisches bundesamt deutschland 2012), but nothing compared to settler societies such as canada, where they are consistently around the 75% mark (oecd 2012). in fact, after having implemented all of these legal changes, the trend has been that “long-term resident non-nationals are increasingly choosing not to naturalize” (green 2012, 180). according to the immigrant citizens survey, the following factors explain this tendency, in decreasing order: the renunciation of previous citizenship; the fact that immigrants see no difference between holding german citizenship and their current status in the country; that they do not plan to settle indefinitely in germany; and that they feel the naturalization procedure is too difficult (huddleston and tjaden 2012; cf. weinman et al 2011). furthermore, as of january 1, 2013, germany was also losing citizens through automatic citizenship revocations. “every three days a german youth turns into a foreigner,” headlined an online migration magazine (migazin 2013). this was a result of the fact that the optionspflicht, which had been in effect since january 1, 2000, had also been retroactively extended to all children who had been born in germany by non-national parents since 1990. therefore, 2013 was the first year in which the first age-group of these until-then dual citizens was faced with the difficult decision of either renouncing the citizenship of their parents or their german citizenship upon their 23rd birthday (3,413 in 2013; bundesministerium des innern 2012). with the aim of counteracting this scenario, a number of motions proposing the abolishment of the optionspflicht (bündnis 90/die grünen), the acceptance of dual citizenship (spd), and the facilitation of naturalization (die linke) were introduced by the opposition parties in the german 9 review of european and russian affairs 9 (1), 2015 bundestag. however, these propositions were struck down by the then-governing coalition of christian democrats (cdu/csu) and liberals (fdp) during a debate in the bundestag on june 5, 2013. the debate then proceeded in the german bundesrat with the introduction of a bill proposing to allow for multiple citizenship and the abrogation of the optionsregelung (deutscher bundesrat 2013). this bill was introduced by seven of the 16 länder represented in the bundesrat. after various discussions in the respective bundesrat committees, the proposition of the bill was accepted in july and consequently forwarded to the bundestag for further discussion (deutscher bundesrat 2013). the fact that the majority of the länder in the bundesrat were governed by the spd alone or in coalition with the green party and/or the left party was a crucial factor in the proposal being accepted. the debates in both houses clearly showed a rift between party lines. while the opposition parties (spd, bündnis90/die grünen, and die linke) argued in favour of dual citizenship and the abrogation of optionsregelung, the governing coalition of liberals (fdp) 10 and christian democrats (cdu/csu) insisted upon the retention of single citizenship. two themes were particularly recurrent among members of the ruling parties. first, they maintained that the toleration of dual citizenship would lower immigrants’ efforts to integrate and “devalue german citizenship” (ole schröder, deutscher bundestag 2013, 30592). 11 specifically, they argued that “only single citizenship promotes integration” (ole schröder, deutscher bundestag 2013, 30593). dual or multiple citizenship, by contrast, was framed as entailing a conflict of loyalty – split between the “home country” and the country of settlement. furthermore, it was viewed as causing political ambiguities. both dimensions are present in the citation below: dr. ole schröder (cdu), parliamentary secretary of state, ministry of the interior: we reject the general acceptance of multiple citizenship, as it can lead to serious problems. in our opinion, it is an expression of successful integration when an individual decides to take up german citizenship, thereby affirming his or her loyalty to this country. this is specifically underlined by giving up one’s former citizenship [...]. we have to face reality: multiple citizenship increases the risk that other states consider themselves a sort of parallel government for individuals who hold more than one citizenship. (deutscher bundestag 2013, 30592) members of the opposition parties, by contrast, argued against the logic of turning german-born citizens into foreigners: “we turn people, of whom the majority are even born here and therefore are born germans, into foreigners in their own country. this is absurd” (renate künast [bündnis 90/die grünen], deutscher bundestag 2013, 30590). according to this logic, dual citizenship does not hinder integration, but rather promotes it. the view taken here is that citizenship acquisition is a starting point for the integration process, and not its end; the integration of newcomers is said to be likely more successful when they are part of the citizenry: 10 the fdp changed its position in the subsequent election campaign, but was not re-elected. 11 all translations are the authors’. 10 review of european and russian affairs 9 (1), 2015 thomas oppermann (spd): within the next 15 years, almost half a million young individuals in germany will have to decide whether they want to remain germans or whether they have to become foreigners. for two-thirds of these people, it is completely obvious that they want to keep both citizenships. what kind of signal are we sending to people who have been germans for 23 years and who now have to renounce the citizenship of their parents and grandparents – in fact, who now have to renounce their heritage, in order to be able to remain german? what kind of citizenship law is this, which turns germans into foreigners? it is an absurd citizenship law. (deutscher bundestag 2013, 30594) bilkay öney (spd), minister of integration, land baden-württemberg: first of all, i would like to state why naturalization is meaningful! besides theoretical considerations regarding democracy, for me, there are major practical reasons related to integration policy. studies have shown that naturalization boosts integration. we know that naturalized individuals achieve higher educational degrees, are less often unemployed, and earn higher incomes. (deutscher bundesrat 2013, 301) furthermore, it was argued that dual or even multiple citizenship is a normal state of affairs in the 21st century. in this sense, the optionsregelung was viewed as being specifically discriminatory against germans of turkish origin. 18.5% of germany’s almost 16 million “persons with a migratory background” (menschen mit migrationshintergrund) are of turkish origin (bundeszentrale für politische bildung 2010). since turkey is not a european union member state, they cannot benefit from the exemption to the requirement to renounce their previous citizenship that is afforded to european citizens. the opposition parties’ insistence that the optionspflicht constitutes a discrimination against immigrants of turkish origin suggests that they tried to win over more immigrant voters. arguments such as the one expressed below were particularly prominent in the debate: sevim dağdelen (die linke): today, we are talking about two subjects that, as far as i am concerned, […] feature many commonalities: on the one hand, we are talking about the staatsangehörigkeitskeitsrecht (citizenship law) – keyword “optionszwang.” on the other hand, we are talking about the german-turkish assoziationsrecht (law in favour of association). at first glance, these are different subjects. however, in my opinion, both subjects are linked in that they both feature discrimination against migrants, especially against turkish citizens in germany. you, dear colleagues, are world champions when it comes to demanding integration, but you fail at providing the basic necessary conditions for the integration of individuals in germany. (deutscher bundestag 2013, 30597) eventually, the political debate was cut short due to the federal election on september 22, 2013, which resulted in a slim victory for the christian democrats (cdu/csu). however, in order to 11 review of european and russian affairs 9 (1), 2015 be able to govern, the christian democrats needed to form a coalition. after long rounds of negotiations, they finally struck a deal with the social democrats. however, the way to forming this grand coalition was marked by intensive negotiations that lasted thirty-six days (landeszentrale für politische bildung baden-württemberg). one of the most debated topics during the coalition negotiations between the christian democrats and the social democrats was the abolition of the optionspflicht (zeit online, november 7, 2013; taz, november 7, 2013; süddeutsche, november 7, 2013; taz, november 24, 2013). whereas the two christian democrat parties continued to oppose the abrogation of the optionspflicht, the social democrats, on their side, insisted on the inclusion of this policy in the coalition treaty. thus, the success of forming a new government was highly dependent on this question. in the end, the christian democrats gave in, the three parties agreed to a compromise, and the new coalition contract, signed by all three parties in november 2013, stipulated the abolition of optionspflicht: “immigrants shall become citizens. those born and raised in germany shall keep their german passport and shall not be forced to choose [between one citizenship and the other]” (bundesregierung deutschland 2013). however, for everyone else, the general intolerance of dual citizenship remains unchanged (bundesregierung deutschland 2013, 74). on july 3, 2014, this stipulation was accepted by the bundestag (deutscher bundestag 2014a) and was brought into force on november 13, 2014 (bundesanzeiger 2014). the introduction of the new law abrogates the optionspflicht for a majority of the people currently affected by this regulation. children who were born on german territory and have obtained german citizenship on the basis of paragraph 4 section 3 (§4 absatz 3) of the staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz (citizenship act)12 are now exempted from the optionspflicht if they grew up in germany. in order to be considered as having grown up in germany, one of the following conditions must be fulfilled: the individual has a) been living in germany for eight years, b) attended a school in germany for six years, or c) graduated from a school in germany or obtained professional training in germany. for everybody else, the optionspflicht – the requirement to choose one nationality only – remains intact.13 discussion in this paper, we have asked 1) whether the abrogation of the optionspflicht can be interpreted as “de-ethnicization” of citizenship, 2) whether this confirms joppke’s claim that politics and party ideologies matter, and 3) to what extent the recent legislation means that germany has left its historical roots of being an “ethnic nation.” 12 §4 absatz 3 of the citizenship act states that children of non-german parents who are born in germany obtain german citizenship if one of their parents has lived in germany for eight years and holds permanent residency, or as a citizen of switzerland or a relative of a swiss citizen, has a residence permit on the basis of the agreement of free movement (from july 21, 1999) between the european community and its member states, on the one hand, and the swiss confederation, on the other (staatsbürgerschaftsgesetz 2000, §4 section 3[1]). 13 there is, however, a hardship provision for individuals who can prove to have a similar connection to germany to those who were born and raised on german soil, but who, for diverse reasons, do not fulfill the criteria mentioned above (deutscher bundestag. 2014. §29 section 1). 12 review of european and russian affairs 9 (1), 2015 first, evaluating the recent changes in germany’s citizenship legislation, one can certainly argue that a process of de-ethnicization as defined by joppke (2003) has taken place over recent years. to reiterate, joppke (2003) highlights three characteristics that determine the de-ethnicization process of citizenship: (a) “liberalized naturalization procedures” (436), (b) “adding jus soli elements to […] birth-attributed citizenship” (436), and (c) “increasing toleration of dual citizenship” (441). with reference to the german case, these characteristics have at least been partly fulfilled: (a) with the introduction of the 2000 citizenship act, the mandatory residence requirement for the acquisition of german citizenship was reduced from 15 to eight years. subsequent changes of the act in 2005 and 2007 further reduced residence requirements from eight to seven and then from seven to six years respectively, if the applicants showed a high level of integration, thus making naturalization procedures more liberal. (b) the 2000 citizenship act also introduced jus soli elements to german citizenship legislation, which until that point had predominantly been based on jus sanguinis, allowing naturalization only by discretion. (c) furthermore, in the last fifteen years, germany has increasingly tolerated dual citizenship. in 2000, the option of dual citizenship was introduced for the first time, and children born on german soil of non-german parents were allowed to obtain both german citizenship and the one passed down to them by their parents. even though this was only on a temporary basis and they had to decide which of the citizenships to keep at the age of twenty-three (optionspflicht), this was a major step in germany’s citizenship history. additionally, since 2007, eu nationals have been allowed to hold dual citizenship. and finally, with the abrogation of the optionspflicht in 2014, children of non-german parents born on german soil now no longer have to choose between one and the other, but can hold dual citizenship indefinitely. to address our second question, in the case of germany, party ideology and politics clearly impacted recent changes to germany’s citizenship law. to reiterate, according to joppke (2003, 437), processes of de-ethnicization are more likely to occur under left-leaning political parties, while processes of re-ethnicization are more likely to occur under right-leaning parties (446). this is reflected in the developments in germany since the 1990s. it was only after the election of a more left-leaning government consisting of the social democrats and the green party in 1998 that germany came to accept being a “de facto country of immigration” and that citizenship legislation became more liberal. the social democrats and the green party pushed for the introduction of jus soli, the acceptance of dual citizenship, and more streamlined naturalization procedures. however, these efforts were then blocked by the more right-leaning christian democrats (cdu/csu). the subsequent changes to german citizenship were thus a fairly watered-down compromise between ideological standpoints and election politics of the parties involved. the same can be said of the abrogation of the optionspflicht in 2014: had the spd not been part of the governing coalition, it is very likely that the optionspflicht would not have been abolished by the cdu/csu. having come to adopt a liberal position towards dual citizenship over time, thereby strengthening its advantage over the cdu with respect to the so-called ethnic vote, the social democrats had made the abrogation of the optionspflicht an election promise, which 13 review of european and russian affairs 9 (1), 2015 needed to be upheld in the coalition contract. with 2013 being the first year that this legal stipulation actually produced a concrete loss of citizenship among young germans, timing and public opinion were on their side. the cdu’s decision to accept the spd’s demand is reflective of the more centrist ideological positions aligned with chancellor angela merkel.14 furthermore, the cdu is also aware that, in the years to come, electoral success will depend, in part, on winning over the votes of germans with a so-called “migration background.” with respect to defending the move vis-à-vis their more conservative-leaning constituency, as well as the more conservative csu, they are able to claim that it had been forced upon them by the spd. this brings us to our third question, namely whether or not the recent legislation implies that germany has left its historical roots of being an “ethnic nation.” the analysis conducted in this paper leads us to share joppke’s scepticism vis-à-vis the adequacy of the terms “ethnic” and “civic” nation. dimensions of ethnic and civic nationhood exist simultaneously and in constant tension with each other. especially in the globalized world of the 21st century, it is becoming more and more difficult to find arguments in favour of a purely ethnic nation. however, compared with citizenship debates in countries such as canada that have never doubted their identity as an “immigration country,” it remains obvious that, while germany is on a progressive route towards liberalizing its citizenship regime, it still has quite a bit of catching up to do (winter 2014). in this sense, the impact of national traditions on contemporary politics of citizenship should not be fully discarded. after all, germany still does not tolerate dual citizenship in cases where it is not acquired through birth. furthermore, the state remains an “ethnic” institution in so far as, for most if its citizens, membership is ascribed at birth and ends only with death. while it is also a territorial unit in which, strictly speaking, ethnic identities are becoming less important, it remains, at least for the vast majority of citizens, a community of destiny, belonging, and (some) interconnectedness based on shared values. as such, joppke’s (2003, 437) additional requirement for de-ethnicization, the “decoupling of the state from nationbuilding,” may be neither realistic nor desirable, as it seems to imply the reformulation of citizenship in purely contractual terms. at least from the debates analyzed in this paper, it is clear that all of the arguments brought forth, whether they were leftor right-leaning, were aiming for the construction of an egalitarian and cohesive national society in times of globalization. conclusion as this paper has shown, germany is on a progressive route towards opening up its citizenship regime. the steps may be incremental, but the direction is forward. in conclusion, we want to underline three lessons to be drawn from the german debates on dual citizenship by birth. first, the abrogation of the optionspflicht underlines once more the importance to grant citizenship rights to all individuals living within the territory of a given state. excluding individuals who have been living in this state as permanent residents for years, sometimes decades, from political rights undermines the democratic system and creates a feeling of alienation and disconnection. 14 we are indebted to one of the anonymous reviewers for drawing our attention to this fact. 14 review of european and russian affairs 9 (1), 2015 second, the abrogation of the optionspflicht highlights that loyalty cannot be legislated; it can only be acquired over time. it builds on trust, identification, and acceptance of individuals in the society in which they are living. by contrast, asking young germans to decide between their german citizenship and the nationality of their parents at the age of 23 resulted in an instrumental interpretation of citizenship, encouraging individuals to base their decision about which citizenship to keep on rational factors, e.g. which country offers them better opportunities or resources, rather than on emotion and long-term experience, which in turn would promote loyalty. third, accepting dual citizenship is not about creating split identities and split loyalties, but rather about building bridges between different countries and cultures and accepting diversity. by abolishing the optionspflicht, german parliamentarians made an 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http://labs.carleton.ca/canadaeurope/2010/policy-brief-a-new-approach-to-citizenship-and-integration-some-facts-about-recent-policy-changes-in-germany-by-elke-winter-and-kristina-john/ http://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2013-11/doppelte-staatsbuergerschaft-koalitionsverhandlungen-union-spd http://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2013-11/doppelte-staatsbuergerschaft-koalitionsverhandlungen-union-spd 19 review of european and russian affairs 9 (1), 2015 published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada available online at: journals.carleton.ca/rera/index.php/rera rera is an electronic academic peer-reviewed journal that publishes graduate, post-graduate, and young scholarly works. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is a joint project supported by the canada-europe transatlantic dialogue—a cross-canada research network supported by the social sciences and 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https://journals.carleton.ca/rera/index.php/rera mailto:rera-journal@carleton.ca http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ theoretical framework the history of citizenship in germany from ethnic to civic nation? on the difficulty of being a “civic nation” debating dual citizenship by birth discussion conclusion review of european and russian affairs 7 (2), 2012 issn 1718-4835 1 © 2012 the author(s) www.carleton.ca/rera 1 mental models and the europe 2020 strategy: neo-schumpetarian ideas in innovation and education conrad king university of british columbia abstract this article asks how ideas have mattered for the establishment of policy goals for the europe 2020 strategy. i argue that despite the specification of new environmental and social targets, the overall policy goals of europe 2020 remain consistent with the 2000 lisbon agenda because the european council and the european commission have had resilient causal beliefs about the challenges of globalization, as well as the appropriate responses to these challenges. using alan jacobs’s theory of mental models and attention heuristics, this article describes the connection between neo-schumpetarian ideas and the policy outcomes of europe 2020, particularly in the domains of innovation and education policy. establishing this connection is an essential first step to explain precisely how ideas can determine and maintain the policy preferences of particular eu actors, a direction for future research. keywords: europe 2020; education policy; innovation policy; ideas review of european and russian affairs 7 (2), 2012 issn 1718-4835 2 © 2012 the author(s) www.carleton.ca/rera 2 introduction on march 3, 2010, european commission president jose manuel barroso announced the launch of the europe 2020 strategy, a ten year economic plan for the european union to balance economic growth, social inclusion, and environmental protection. although the strategy has received criticism for lacking public consultation and for being too ambitious to implement effectively, its central goal of ‘smart, sustainable, inclusive growth’ has received considerable support as an appropriate new direction for the eu. social and environmental civil society groups have perceived europe 2020 as a kind of ‘promissory note’ for an increasingly reflexive view of modernity (beck, 2009; commission, 2010a; platform of european social ngos, 2009). yet the powerful eu actors who set policy goals have emphasized endogenous economic growth through innovation, research, and education. so ideas clearly seem to matter for europe 2020, but which ideas? and how do they matter? this paper addresses the former question in order to form hypotheses about the latter, which will be the subject of future research. europe 2020 offers a case study for understanding how ideas influence political elites when they set high-level policy priorities in conditions of ‘insulated’ decision-making (where effectiveness is more important than accountability). what are the ideas that led to the europe 2020 strategy and where did they come from? why is a theory of ideational causation appropriate for understanding europe 2020? is there a particular ideational theory that offers explanatory leverage for the conditions of high-level policy-making within the executive institutions of the european union? i argue that despite the specification of new environmental and social targets, the overall goals of europe 2020 remain consistent with the 2000 lisbon agenda because the mental models of eu political actors have not significantly changed. these actors’ causal beliefs about the challenges of globalization, as well as the appropriate responses to these challenges (manifest in policy preferences), have remained consistent over time, and are now seen in the policy outcomes of europe 2020. the 2000 lisbon council constructed a neoschumpetarian mental model of reality, influenced by an epistemic community of european economists. the commission then set the eu on an endogenous growth trajectory emphasizing innovation and human capital, a model that now pervades europe 2020, even if some of the individual actors have changed. alan jacobs’s theory of mental models and attention heuristics can explain the causal link between ideas and policy preferences, whereas this paper describes the more general connection between ideas and policy outputs, particularly in the domains of innovation and education policy. establishing this connection is an essential first step to explain precisely how ideas can determine and maintain the policy preferences of particular eu actors (like european commissioners) at the level of individual cognition. thus, this descriptive first step will link ideas to outcomes in a general way, as a preparation for subsequent research that will process-trace the empirics of how ideas determine policy preferences for political elites under conditions of insulated decision-making. the europe 2020 strategy: background and context the europe 2020 strategy is the economic and employment plan for the european union for the next decade. the strategy lays out goals and targets, as well as the means to achieve them, in an overarching mission statement for the future of the european union. the blueprint for this kind of strategy statement was the lisbon agenda, borne out of a meeting of the european council in review of european and russian affairs 7 (2), 2012 issn 1718-4835 3 © 2012 the author(s) www.carleton.ca/rera 3 lisbon in 2000. at the time, european integration had been greatly consolidated through the treaties of maastricht and amsterdam especially vis-à-vis economic and monetary union, yet the eu remained under tremendous pressure to set goals (and justify itself) amidst a prolonged recession in the late 1990s. following the 2000 council meeting in lisbon, the commission could announce an eu economic strategy for the coming decade. with the lisbon agenda expiring in 2010, and in the context of a highly uncertain global financial environment in the late 2000s, the eu wanted to establish new goals and governance for the period 2010 until 2020. the europe 2020 strategy is the expression of that vision. like the lisbon agenda, europe 2020 is fundamentally a strategy for economic growth. while it is constructed on three mutually-reinforcing ‘pillars’—economic, social, and environmental—its primary raison d'être is to ensure the economic viability of the eu. the council and commission envision economic growth that is driven by knowledge and innovation, that decouples growth from the use of carbon-emitting non-renewable resources, and that builds a cohesive society where people are empowered to manage change and actively participate in the new knowledge economies—the eu as “a smart, sustainable and inclusive economy” (commission, 2010b). the strategy has five ‘headline’ targets: to raise the employment rate from the current 69 percent to at least 75 percent; to have 3 percent of member states’ gdp invested in research and development (r&d); to reduce the share of early school leavers from the current 15 percent to 10 percent plus increase the share of the population aged 30–34 having completed tertiary education from 31 percent to at least 40 percent; a 25 percent reduction in those living below national poverty lines; and to implement the ‘europe 20/20/20’ strategy aimed at significantly reducing greenhouse gas emissions.1 these targets seem to signal a departure from the previous lisbon agenda, in that social and environmental targets are better incorporated. yet a social agenda (and eventually a rather nominal environmental agenda) were part of lisbon as well, only to be subordinated to employment and growth when member state economies continued to struggle in the early 2000s. like its predecessor, europe 2020 has positioned economic and employment policy as central, although conceivably the social and environmental goals can be supportive of and integrated into those objectives. in comparison with lisbon, the europe 2020 strategy proposes new means for achieving these objectives. the governance structure of the strategy is based on an architecture of two ‘pillars’: a ‘thematic approach’ and ‘country reporting’. the thematic approach combines the five targets mentioned above with more specific priorities and initiatives, which require action at both the eu and member state level. this is meant to reflect an increased eu dimension in the interdependent member state economies. the country reporting pillar is a feedback mechanism between member states and the eu, which would allow member states to develop countryspecific growth strategies with guidance and coordination from the commission (who would also keep the larger pan-european vision in mind). this pillar is adapted from the primary governance mechanism of the lisbon agenda: the open method of coordination (omc). the omc is an intergovernmental governance tool which relies on voluntary communication between governments along with limited commission guidance (through mechanisms such as stocktaking, benchmarking, peer review, and naming-and-shaming) in order to affect a ‘soft’ coordination of national policy outputs rather than a ‘hard’ regulatory policy framework as legislated through the eu. the country reporting pillar stiffens up elements of the omc by 1. to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by at least 20 percent compared to 1990 levels (or by 30 percent if global conditions are right), to increase to 20 percent the share of renewable energy in overall energy consumption, and to increase energy efficiency by 20 percent. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/greenhouse_gas_emissions http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/energy_consumption http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/efficient_energy_use review of european and russian affairs 7 (2), 2012 issn 1718-4835 4 © 2012 the author(s) www.carleton.ca/rera 4 making communication mandatory (and not just between states) and by giving the commission a stronger coordinating role in terms of issuing policy ‘recommendations’ as well as warnings if member states do not comply (although the penalty for non-compliance has yet to be determined). the basic europe 2020 architecture has then been incorporated into a larger process —the european semester—which coordinates general economic policy with the fiscal surveillance mandate of the stability and growth pact (sgp). all reporting and evaluation for both europe 2020 targets and sgp responsibilities are to be done simultaneously to best coordinate the aims and means of each, while keeping their instruments and procedures legally separate “to maintain the integrity of the sgp” (commission, 2010b, pg. 4).2 the intent of the new governance architecture is to build on the strength of already existing coordination instruments (like the omc) and incorporate new decision-making procedures from the 2009 treaty of lisbon in order to instil greater ownership of the europe 2020 strategy for all actors involved (ibid.). ostensibly, much of the strategy entails ideas about the aims of an eu economy, and ideas about how the eu should go about achieving those aims. within the thematic approach pillar, there is an overlap between aims and means by virtue of seven ‘flagship initiatives.’ although all seven action plans are interrelated, this paper will focus on the first two: ‘innovation union’ and ‘youth on the move.’3 the innovation union aims “to improve framework conditions and access to finance for research and innovation so as to strengthen the innovation chain and boost levels of investment throughout the union” (commission, 2010c). youth on the move aims to “enhance the performance of education systems and to reinforce the international attractiveness of europe's higher education” (ibid.). both are initiatives with core goals categorized within the economic pillar, as they are classified as growth that is ‘smart’ more so than sustainable or inclusive. these initiatives represent likely ‘plausability probes’ (eckstein, 1992, pgs. 147-52) for any theory which posits that actors’ preferences are caused by ideational factors in which economic ideas are the structuring heuristic. this is because actors’ ideas about economics are likely to structure economic policy preferences before they apply to social and environmental policy preferences. in short, if an ideational theory can tell us nothing about the conditions when economic ideas structure economic policy preferences and outcomes, then this theory is even less likely to inform us of the conditions when economic ideas structure other policy domains. therefore, innovation and higher education are two areas where we are likely to see economic ideas being translated into economic policies. ideational theory: mental models and the attention heuristic perhaps it is not surprising that ideas are salient for europe 2020, given the degree to which european political elites can translate their preferences into high-level policy priorities. however, assuming that ideas matter is not the same as assessing the ways that they matter. a 2. arguably, this privileges the sgp. the current priorities seem to be fiscal responsibility and austerity rather than economic growth. 3 the other five are: ‘a digital agenda for europe’; ‘resource efficient europe’; ‘an industrial policy for the globalisation era’; ‘an agenda for new skills and jobs’; and ‘european platform against poverty’ (european commission, 2010c) review of european and russian affairs 7 (2), 2012 issn 1718-4835 5 © 2012 the author(s) www.carleton.ca/rera 5 succinct analysis of rationalist explanations will reveal that ideas do indeed have causal effect on europe 2020, due to the structural and cultural characteristics of the executive institutions of the eu which seem to privilege visionary ideas over material interests or conditions. executive functions for the eu are divided between the council and the commission, with neither body directly accountable to an electorate when they establish european policy priorities. although the intergovernmental council is comprised of elected heads of government, they function as heads of state in council, such that they are not ex ante accountable to domestic constituents or national parliaments for high-level strategy or steering of european integration. specific policy is not discussed in this setting, obviating attempts to ‘upload’ policy from the national to the european level, as occurs in the various councils of ministers. moreover, the critical actor for european policy initiation and implementation is the agenda-setting commission, an appointed body, and one that reaches internal consensus in private. therefore, strategic interests are muted because there are few incentives for political elites to seek votes, office, or specific policies, and because decision-making is occurring out of the public eye. functionalist explanations also assume that actors will respond rationally, although to changes in material conditions. if functional explanations were especially salient, one would expect that the parallels between the lisbon agenda and europe 2020 were a reflection of similar conditions in the late 1990s and the late 2000s. however, much changed over that decade, in terms of internal power dynamics (the lisbon treaty, eu enlargements in 2004 and 2007), and external economic shocks (the 2008 financial crisis). thus, considerable changes in material conditions spurred only modest alterations in the economic plan, primarily vis-à-vis adjustments in governance mechanisms. this is not to suggest that political elites are irrational, or that material interests and conditions do not factor into policy outcomes; ideas are not mono-causal inputs, and policy outcomes are often determined by various factors operating in conjunction. however, rationalist theories about policy-making take preferences as given, whereas ideational theories are concerned with the formation of preferences. there are circumstances when ideas strongly determine policy preferences, and with the right conditions, those preferences can strongly determine policy outputs. europe 2020 offers a set of conditions whereby ideational preferences seem to have particular salience —a small political elite that respond to ideas for appropriate policy responses because they have weak accountability, little deliberative transparency, and are concerned with ‘output legitimacy’, i.e., they are governing for the general welfare, rather than by general consent (scharpf, 1999). if preferences are constructed from mental models, then an ideational theory would help us to understand not only preference formation, but also, under conditions of insulated decision-making, how ideas can become policy outputs. ideas have long been considered a source for public policy, yet ideational theories seldom specify the mechanisms by which ideas can cause particular outcomes. this paper is concerned with ideas as micro-level causal inputs —as cognitive structures in the minds of political elites —which guide both their responses to policy choices as well as the ways that they construct choice scenarios. conceiving of ideas in this way goes beyond ir approaches that posit ideas as general worldviews, values, or causal beliefs, or as discourses diffused from international organizations to national policy-makers (goldstein & keohane, 1993; jakobi, 2009). it also goes beyond public policy theories which restrict ideas to the agenda-setting and policy-formulation stages of the policy cycle; or theories that limit ideas to explaining how governments solve problems or frame issues (bleich, 2002; heclo, 1974; howlett & ramesh, 1995; kingdon, 1984). presenting ideas as broad and somewhat nebulous constructs with little measurable input for policy-making, or else as narrow instrumental tools used at particular stages of policy review of european and russian affairs 7 (2), 2012 issn 1718-4835 6 © 2012 the author(s) www.carleton.ca/rera 6 construction, is saying that ideas matter, but only through loose correlation with policy outcomes or else as a kind of ‘noise’ —mopping up variance not explicable (or measurable) via interests and institutions. what is needed is an ideational theory that causally links ideas to preferences, especially if those preferences are explicit in policy outputs. this paper is a plausibility probe that offers an initial assessment of the latter, but calls on theoretical underpinnings to establish the mechanisms of the former. alan jacobs’ (2009) theory of mental models can both describe the changes in europe 2020 policy (inasmuch as they are a reflection of actors’ preferences) as well as explain how those preferences come about. jacobs argues that actors have pre-existing mental models which narrow the range of possible consequences and preferences before problem analysis even occurs. these mental representations have descriptive and causal content—concepts, their attributes, and the relationships amongst attributes —which steer actors to ignore or attend to particular sets of data or causal explanations. the causal mechanism operates on the level of individual cognition; an ‘attention heuristic’ that goes beyond just issue selection to skew attention towards certain possibilities and ordering the actor’s preferences therein.4 jacobs’ theory has particular leverage because it can explain the relationship between ideas and preferences, and describe the relationship between preferences and policy outcomes. because it is a relatively new theory, europe 2020 is a good empirical case because of its probative value (i.e., hypothesis formation and theory-building). furthermore, ‘ideas as attention’ can explain conditions of change or stability for policy outcomes. if outcomes remain stable, the attention heuristic acts as a confirmation bias towards evidence that is consistent with a pre-existing schema. if outcomes change, it is because the attention heuristic caused actors to widen their search for information (within a finite range of possibilities) to account for an accumulation of disconfirming evidence which diverges from expectations and weakens the existing mental model. therefore, this theory has particular utility for europe 2020 because it accounts for incremental policy change during a period of relative policy stability. it allows one to examine the policy platform and connect it with actors’ ideas, even if the final outcomes remain years away. my method for this paper is to describe the connection between the ideas of the lisbon agenda, and the preliminary policy outcomes of europe 2020. if this relationship can be established, there is good reason to analyze —in future research —the causal mechanisms of how attention heuristics determine policy preferences. if ideas are indeed salient for policy outcomes, i hypothesize that there should be a clear and sequential pathway from ideational origins to policy outcomes that leaves an observable footprint. we would expect to see early interaction between certain economic thinkers and powerful political elites, subsequent adoption of their ideas, and over time, those same ideas would become anchored in the institutional norms and beliefs of a small, socializing organization such as the commission. future research would entail examining public statements, proto-policy documents, private correspondences, and deliberations between political elites and ideas-makers, as well as their temporal sequence. there could well be non-ideational causal variables that are collinear with ideas, but process-tracing should parse out such co-variation. if ideas are salient in a particular way for the conditions present in the development of europe 2020, i hypothesize that they matter most for preference formation at the micro-level. had europe 2020 seen significant policy change, it might have been theorized in a number of other ways: as a response to material interests or conditions; as the 4. this is more than just a theory of ideas. it argues that ideas influence what institutions and material interests will be possible, irrespective of the seemingly complete range of probabilities that a boundedly-rational actor might consider. review of european and russian affairs 7 (2), 2012 issn 1718-4835 7 © 2012 the author(s) www.carleton.ca/rera 7 result of an accumulation of policy anomalies leading to paradigmatic ‘third-order’ change (hall, 1993); or as the result of a critical juncture which caused actors to no longer understand how to structure their interests in light of systemic risk and thus seek new ideas to reduce this ‘knightean’ uncertainty (blyth, 2002). instead, the stability of policy between the lisbon agenda and europe 2020 is a hypothesis consistent with a theory that posits that actors’ ideas serve as attention heuristics. finally, if particular ideas were salient for europe 2020, then i hypothesize that the content of those ideas would be visible in policy outputs. this final hypothesis is what this paper addresses; it is a case study on outcome-continuity over time, linking the ideas that preceded the lisbon agenda to the policy outputs of europe 2020. such a case study functions as a plausibility probe to develop the other hypotheses through future research. attention to goals: ‘smart growth’ and the europe 2020 strategy the european council constructed the europe 2020 strategy on three ideational pillars: the economy, a social dimension, and the environment. however, the five main targets and seven flagship initiatives which specify the goals of the strategy make it clear that the primary aim of europe 2020 is to rejuvenate europe's flagging economy and set it back on a growth trajectory. the other pillars are undoubtedly important, but they are positive externalities and cultivated spillover effects of centrally-guided economic growth. social inclusion is a presumed subsidiary effect from increased labour market integration, and environmental protection/damagemitigation is facilitated by the creation of a sustainable resource-efficient economy.5 the ideas behind these goals are causal beliefs about how to manage economies, not societies or ecological systems. as such, the ‘smart growth’ pillar is the driver of the entire strategy, and the aim is to build up capacity for endogenous supply and demand of the ‘products’ of the new knowledge economies: skilled human capital plugged into technologically-innovative industries. if the commission can succeed in implementing this primary goal, then the other pillars will also be served. because implementation —and not ideas —was deemed the shortcoming of the lisbon agenda, the commission has issued integrated guidelines to member states to achieve the headline targets. these integrated guidelines make clear that member states are obliged to achieve europe 2020 targets because of their commitment to the 2009 lisbon treaty, yet it also reflects a perception at the european level of what innovation and education are really for. the innovation target is under the jurisdiction of article 121 tfeu (economic policy) and the educational target —even though education has never been an eu jurisdiction— is subsumed under article 148 tfeu (eu employment policy) (european commission, 2010c; tfeu, 2008). it appears that the mental model for europe 2020 has endogenous economic growth as the ‘engine’ of the european union — education and innovation are inputs, and social inclusion or environmental protection are desirable outcomes. the innovation union is the first flagship initiative, and it aims to boost r&d funding and re-focus innovation to tackle challenges facing european societies, such as climate change, 5. an example of how the eu can intervene and still be market-making is the eu emissions trading scheme (ets). although the ets clearly has environmental benefits, it is also premised on the porter hypothesis: stringent environmental regulations will spur firms to innovate, and the newly discovered technologies should offset the initial abatement and r&d costs vis-à-vis efficiency gains and first mover advantages (in the global market for green technology). the effect that the ets has on european innovation or creating a global market for that innovation remains to be seen (oberndörfer, 2011; palmer, oates, & portney, 1995; porter & van der linde, 1995) review of european and russian affairs 7 (2), 2012 issn 1718-4835 8 © 2012 the author(s) www.carleton.ca/rera 8 energy and resource efficiency, health, and demographic change. it is a response to causal beliefs about innovation and r&d as drivers of economic-growth, and a result of eu actors’ attention being focused on data which shows europe is falling behind in these domains.6 the eu headline target is to have 3 percent of eu gdp invested in r&d by 2020.7 the commission has a number of strategies to accomplish this central goal: to create a ‘single market’ for the mobility of knowledge by 2014 (the european research area); to protect business innovation (especially smes, via a single eu patent and improved intellectual property protection); to foster innovation at all levels of government (through public procurement and european innovation partnerships); to subsidize innovation in order to better commercialize new technology (through the european investment bank and by strengthening eu funding mechanisms8); and to strengthen the ‘knowledge triangle’ with partnerships between industry and institutions for education and research (through the european institute of technology and the young innovative companies programme).9 the commission must also coordinate member states to ensure a sufficient supply of science, maths and engineering graduates with entrepreneurial skills, prioritize knowledge expenditures through public spending and tax incentives for private r&d investments, and reform national (and regional) r&d and innovation systems by way of ‘smart specialization’ (commission, 2010b, pgs 10-11).10 these strategies and targets reflect an attention heuristic limited to economic ideas for europeanizing innovation and modernizing research and development systems. key concepts are innovation, entrepreneurship, competition, endogenous economic growth, and free markets. while this flagship initiative is not exclusively demand-driven (supply of innovative technology is critical to the eu’s external/international dimension), it does represent the demand-side of a european knowledge economy within the ‘single market’ for labour and capital. thus, the innovation union is the result of powerful eu actors having a pre-existing mental model of the world as a competitive market that rewards innovation. ‘youth on the move’ is the second flagship initiative, and it aims to increase the quality of human capital in europe by enhancing the performance and international attractiveness of 6. “r&d spending in europe is below 2 percent, compared to 2.6 percent in the us and 3.4 percent in japan, mainly as a result of lower levels of private investment. it is not only the absolute amounts spent on r&d that count – europe needs to focus on the impact and composition of research spending and to improve the conditions for private sector r&d in the eu” (european commission, 2010b, pg 10). 7. like the lisbon agenda, indicators for europe 2020 remain quantitative and focused on gdp. for this particular target, the commission intends to construct more nuanced and qualitative indicators. they would like to see a significant portion of the 3 percent gdp being contributed by the private sector. furthermore, they are still developing an indicator to track innovation intensity, i.e., it is not merely amount of r&d investment that is important, but also the quality and destination of that investment (commission, 2010c). 8. a key delivery mechanism is a greater use of structural funds under cohesion policy. however, this might conflict with the common agricultural policy (cap), which still consumes over one third of the eu budget. the european economic and social committee has asked that all eu budget instruments be directed to europe 2020 goals, even if that means a modification of cap objectives (european economic and social committee, 2011, p. 4) 9. the ‘knowledge triangle’ refers to a concerted effort to link research, education and innovation. it is the cornerstone of ‘smart growth’ and the justification for the european institute of technology, a project first presented by the commission in 2005. the eit is modelled after the massachusetts institute of technology, but it also reflects a wider move to emulate the american system of higher education where research activities are concentrated into less than 10 percent of heis (commission, 2006) 10. smart specialization refers to the clustering of research and innovation to achieve a critical mass for a national or regional comparative advantage in particular technologies. ex-ante conditional funding for these ‘ris3 strategies’ is available from the commission’s 7th framework programme for research, technological development and demonstration (rtd) 2007-2013 (european commission, 2005). review of european and russian affairs 7 (2), 2012 issn 1718-4835 9 © 2012 the author(s) www.carleton.ca/rera 9 european higher education institutions, promoting student and instructor mobility, and facilitating youth employment. it is a response to causal beliefs about skilled human capital as an essential component to knowledge economies, and the result of eu actors’ attention being focused on data that shows the comparative deficiency of european education and training systems.11 to overcome these challenges and accomplish its goals, the commission needs to: enhance mobility of students and instructors (via eu programmes like erasmus but also by supporting the european higher education area); modernize the curricula, governance and financing of higher education systems (already underway via the bologna process); promote entrepreneurialism (through competitive funding mechanisms); promote the recognition of nonformal and informal learning (life long learning); and facilitate youth employment (the youth employment framework and the ‘eures job’ scheme). the commission must also motivate the member states to invest in education and training systems at all levels, improve educational outcomes, and enhance the openness and relevance of education systems (via national qualification frameworks that emphasize learning outcomes geared towards labour market needs) (commission, 2010b, pg. 11). the headline target is to reduce the primary/secondary drop-out rate to just 10 percent, while increasing the share of the population aged 30-34 who have completed tertiary or equivalent education to at least 40 percent by 2020. this reflects an attention heuristic relatively constrained by economic ideas about education and training as a functional necessity for participation in the labour market of the new knowledge economies i.e., education as an investment in human capital (commission, 2010c; ecofin, 2010). key concepts are knowledge economies, the knowledge triangle, human capital, ‘flexicurity’, global competitiveness, and mobility across the single market.12 this flagship initiative emphasizes the supply-side of knowledge economies by way of improving human capital formation. thus, ‘youth on the move’ is the result of powerful eu actors having a pre-existing mental model of a world where education and training is an investment in human capital to affect better labour market integration. neo-schumpetarianism from lisbon to europe 2020 the economic idea behind the europe 2020 strategy is ‘neo-schumpetarianism’, a mental representation of reality that emphasizes innovation, entrepreneurship, competition, and free markets.13 in his book capitalism, socialism and democracy, joseph schumpeter envisioned innovation and entrepreneurship as the drivers of constant economic change vis-à-vis a process of ‘creative destruction.’ competition in free markets could facilitate the creative destruction of not only old products and processes, but also the very institutions that buttress obsolete social 11. “less than one person in three aged 25-34 has a university degree compared to 40 percent in the us and over 50 percent in japan. according to the shanghai index, only two european universities are in the world's top 20” (european commission, 2010b, pg.11). 12. a ‘fifth’ freedom in the single market: free movement of knowledge 13. these are not all fundamentally capitalist concepts; innovation and technological change has been a driving force in many human societies. pre-modern china was a great innovator (paper, printing, gunpowder, the compass) and although long-since overtaken, it has recently adapted its economy to be quite adept at ‘process’ innovation in manufacturing. however, in the modern era, innovation seems to have become a core capitalist heuristic: “one way of defining it would be as fresh thinking that creates value people will pay for” (emphasis added) (“from brawn to brain,” 2012, pg. 23). review of european and russian affairs 7 (2), 2012 issn 1718-4835 10 © 2012 the author(s) www.carleton.ca/rera 10 relationships (schumpeter, 1994 [1942], pg. 139).14 neo-schumpetarians emulate the core of this mental model of competition-induced endogenous growth, but believe that a more involved state (or a state-like governance network) can guide and facilitate competition and markets. there is an expectation of ‘value added’ spillovers and positive externalities in all sectors of the economy and even all sectors of society i.e., all policy domains become functions of economic decisionmaking. exogenous factors —like international comparative advantage or external shocks—are not outside the heuristic logic of this mental model. instead, political actors try to shelter comparative advantages while allowing less robust or less competitive parts of the economy to fail. furthermore, actors can facilitate long-term development and modernization of the economy through (seed) investments in human capital, innovation, and knowledge.15 neo-schumpetarian thinkers advocate a competitive innovative economy with a prominent market-making role for a governing body, the core idea behind the europe 2020 strategy. where did this mental model come from? europe 2020 policy outcomes indicate that eu actors’ policy preferences have been heuristically-focussed on the macro-economic theories of a particular group of european economists, amongst them maria joão rodrigues, christopher freeman, luc soete, bengt-åke lundvall, and manuel castells (castells & cardoso, 2005; rodrigues & et. al., 2009; zuleeg & rodrigues, 2011). this same epistemic community was instrumental in the late 1990s for shifting attention away from attempts to manage globalization effects vis-à-vis a stability-oriented, multi-lateral, regulatory framework for global financial markets, towards attempts to manage globalization effects vis-à-vis a growth-oriented lisbon strategy (abdelal & meunier, 2010; haas, 1993). true to jacobs’s theory of resilient mental models, lisbon policies do not suggest a complete departure from the economic ideas that preceded it — the single market, the four freedoms, a common currency, and a strong economic and trade governance role for the eu —these remained central to policy-makers attention heuristic. however, there was some shift away from a stability-oriented plan because the special european council in lisbon perceived the need for “a radical transformation of the european economy” (council, 2000). the policy outcomes of the lisbon strategy demonstrate a somewhat radical (but certainly not total) transformation of ideas about the drivers of globalization and how they might appropriately respond; by transforming the eu into “the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs, and greater social cohesion” (ibid.). economic competitiveness and social cohesion were the main pillars, and the strategy was to modernize innovation and education systems. even if lisbon was crafted as a political compromise between neo-liberals and leftist advocates of a ‘social europe’, the fact remains that such an alliance was based on a coherent idea that might ease implementation, rather than on strategic interests that would produce sub 14. schumpeter’s ideas were explicitly derived from marxist economic theory, and so he perceived reality through a historical materialist lens. his contemporary and co-national, karl polanyi, offered a rival empirical explanation and normative counterpoint to schumpeterian logic and its implications. polanyi argued that a strong state was required to both facilitate and mitigate capitalism's destructive elements, but also that a self-regulating market society is unsustainable because civic society would (and should) spontaneously move to protect itself (evans, 2008; polanyi, 2001 [1944]). arguably, polanyian economic ideas had significant influence on the mental model of powerful political actors in the early years european community (from perhaps the 1950 treaty of rome until the 1987 single european act). 15. the degree to which an innovative economy should be sheltered or facilitated delineates different schools of thought in neo-schumpetarian macro-economic theory. aghion and howitt (1992) caution against too much (or too little) market-shaping investment in innovation, whereas freeman and louça (2001) suggest that state actors must be aware of long-term innovation cycles and capitalize on them with large investments at critical moments. review of european and russian affairs 7 (2), 2012 issn 1718-4835 11 © 2012 the author(s) www.carleton.ca/rera 11 optimal outcomes. neo-schumpetarian economic theory had captured the attention of the council and the commission, and it has since become the mental model on which the europe 2020 strategy was constructed. correlating an ideational connection between the lisbon strategy and europe 2020 does not prove that policy preferences were determined by an attention heuristic, but it does make jacobs’ mental model theory a likely theoretical framework to find out. drilling down to the causal mechanisms is beyond the scope of this paper, and explaining exactly how the ideas of a particular epistemic community caused the policy preferences of powerful eu actors remains an empirical question for further research. however, a strong correlation between the policy outcomes of europe 2020 and the policy ideas that led to the lisbon agenda can inform what methodological tools might have the most leverage. if hall’s descriptive theory was most useful, one would anticipate a change in policy goals to see social learning in action. this would be preceded by changes in policy settings and instruments in response to anomalies and policy failures in the lisbon agenda. significant anomalies and failures did occur: the mid-term kok report (2004) pointed out numerous policy failures, and the aho report (2006) criticized innovation policy and r&d. while settings and instruments were adjusted to refocus the agenda on growth and employment, there was never any third-order change in policy goals—causal beliefs and attention to goals were reinforced by these reports, not undermined by them. therefore, despite the widely perceived failure of the lisbon strategy, a kuhnian paradigm shift did not occur for europe 2020. for blyth’s theory to be useful for understanding europe 2020, one would anticipate a critical juncture of knightian uncertainty opening up actors’ policy preferences to new economic ideas. the global recession and subsequent euro zone crisis would seem to be exactly this sort of critical juncture. however, despite such externally-induced shocks, the council continues to promote free, fair and open trade, and focus on concluding freetrade agreements, either multilaterally through the world trade organization, or bilaterally, like the canada-eu comprehensive economic and trade agreement (ceta). rather than restructuring interests to reflect new economic ideas about market capitalism, perhaps looking for new ideas or returning to a more protectionist ‘managed globalization’ policy platform, the council has emphasized a competitive external dimension to the single market (council, 2011, pgs. 4-5). the crisis has reinforced the neo-schumpetarian mental model, albeit with even greater need for coordination of national and european policy to ensure fiscal discipline. europe 2020 expresses an idea that more effective policy coordination will allow a quick exit strategy from the crisis so that member states can re-focus on the goals of innovation-driven economic growth. fiscal consolidation is expected by 2013, and lessons learned about efficient and strategic budgeting are expected to capture some of the actors’ attention well into the future, but the fundamental goals and priorities – and the neo-schumpetarian mental model —have not changed since lisbon (commission, 2010b, pg. 24). conclusion the europe 2020 strategy suggests that ideas have causal salience. while policy outcomes are often determined by a number of conjunctural factors (i.e., ideas, interests and institutions), social scientists seldom acknowledge that policy-makers are also cognizant of interacting causes. i believe that savvy political elites exhibit what pierre bourdieu has called a ‘feel for the game,’ an awareness of how to achieve material interests within institutional opportunities and constraints. this structuration of interests —manifest in policy preferences—is the result of a review of european and russian affairs 7 (2), 2012 issn 1718-4835 12 © 2012 the author(s) www.carleton.ca/rera 12 constructed mental model of the world. these models, or ideas, are often quite resilient. they offer a heuristic of reality that focuses the attention on particular information or evidence, as well as certain possibilities in terms consequences and preferences. using jacobs’s theory of mental models and attention heuristics, i have described how neo-schumpetarian ideas influential for the lisbon agenda have since become the policy outputs of the europe 2020 strategy. i paid closer attention to innovation and education polices because they are the vital inputs for the primary driver of endogenous economic growth—the ‘smart growth’ pillar. the next step would be to process-trace the causal mechanisms that connect economic ideas to the policy preferences of particular actors, such as the commission dg for research and innovation, or the commission dg for education and culture. yet even at this stage, a connection between neo-schumpetarian ideas and europe 2020 outcomes has practical and normative implications. the normative implications raise questions about the legitimacy of these ideas for the eu, asking: whose ideas matter? one way of answering this question amounts to a general critique of capitalism, yet there are also answers which draw attention to a european democratic deficit.16 the practical implications question the effectiveness of neo-schumpetarian ideas as a model for the european economy, asking how the plan can remain coherent. for example, the european semester seems to privilege the sgp (fiscal constraint) over europe 2020 (macro-economic growth). even if the powerful actors, like the commission, are able to reconcile these two ideas in a single mental model, it does not mean others will share that schema. as commission president barroso has already admitted, “we have to be quite honest with you, there are 27 member states and if they don't want to play ball nothing will happen” (willis, 2010). to return to bourdieu’s ‘feel for the game’ metaphor, political elites in the member states not only need to share the causal beliefs of europe 2020, but they must also have the political will to achieve its goals. references abdelal, rawi, and sophie meunier. 2010. “managed globalization: doctrine, practice and promise.” journal of european public policy 17(3): 350–367. aghion, philippe, and peter howitt. 1992. “a model of growth through creative destruction.” econometrica 60(2): 323–351. aho, esko, and et. al. 2006. creating an innovative europe. luxembourg: office for official publications of the european communities beck, ulrich. 2009. world at risk. cambridge and malden, ma: polity press. bleich, erik. 2002. “integrating ideas into policy-making analysis: frames and race policies in britain and france.” comparative political studies 35(9): 1054–1076. blyth, mark. 2002. great transformations: economic ideas and institutional change in the 20th century. new york: cambridge university press. 16. typically, these critiques over-emphasize a deficit of representative democracy and underestimate the legitimacy of deliberative democracy. however, the danger to deliberative democracy in allowing a small group of unelected political actors to form policy based on the ideas of an epistemic community is that the deficit might be self-reinforcing if powerful actors do not work to prevent it. the governance process of lisbon marginalized the european parliament and the european court of justice, and concentrated power with the commission or the member state governments (either as sovereign states or sitting in the european council). furthermore, experiences with the omc have shown that subordinate aims and indicators can have a considerable influence on discrete policy evaluations, focusing attention on financial inputs and leading to demands for recommodification (hacker & van treeck, 2010). review of european and russian affairs 7 (2), 2012 issn 1718-4835 13 © 2012 the author(s) www.carleton.ca/rera 13 castells, manuel, and gustavo cardoso. 2005. the network society: from knowledge to policy. eds. manuel castells and gustavo cardoso. washington, d.c.: johns hopkins center for transatlantic relations. eckstein, harry. 1992. regarding politics: essays on political theory, stability, and change. berkeley and l.a.: university of california press. european commission. 2005. common actions for growth and employment: the community lisbon programme. brussels, com(2005) 330 final. ———. 2006. frequently asked questions : why does the eu need a european institute of technology ? brussels, memo/06/88. ———. 2010a. “europe 2020.” http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/index_en.htm . ———. 2010b. “europe 2020 public consultation. overview of responses.” europe (march): 1–31. ———. 2010c. europe 2020: a european strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth. brussels, com(2010) 2020. ———. 2010d. europe 2020: integrated guidelines for the economic and employment policies of the member states. brussels, 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freeman, christopher, and francisco louca. 2001. as time goes by: from the industrial revolutions the information revolution. oxford: oxford university press. “from brawn to brain.” 2012. the economist (10-16 march): 23. goldstein, judith, and robert keohane. 1993. “ideas and foreign policy: an analytical framework.” in ideas and foreign policy: beliefs, institutions and political change, eds. judith goldstein and robert keohane. ithaca, n.y.: cornell university press, p. 3– 30. haas, peter. 1993. “introduction: epistemic communities and international policy.” international organization 46: 1–35. hacker, björn, and till van treeck. 2010. “what influence for european governance? the reformed stability and growth pact, the europe 2020 strategy and the european semester”, friedrich-ebert-stiftung, international policy analysis, december 2010. http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id/ipa/07724.pdf hall, peter a. 1993. “policy paradigms, social learning, and the state: the case of economic policymaking in britain.” comparative politics 25(3): 275–296. review of european and russian affairs 7 (2), 2012 issn 1718-4835 14 © 2012 the author(s) www.carleton.ca/rera 14 heclo, hugh. 1974. modern social politics in britain and sweden: from relief to income maintenance. new haven, ct: yale university press. howlett, michael, and m. ramesh. 1995. studying public policy: policy cycles and policy subsystems. toronto: oxford university press. jakobi, anja p. 2009. international organizations and lifelong learning: from global agendas to policy diffusion. new york: palgarve macmillan. kingdon, john w. 1984. agendas, alternatives and public policies. boston: addisonwesley educational publishers. kok, wim, et. al. 2004. facing the challenge: the lisbon strategy for growth and employment. report from the high level group chaired by wim kok, november 2004. luxembourg: office for official publications of the european communities. http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/tl/essentials/reports/kok/index_en.htm. oberndörfer, ulrich. 2011. “lessons for canadian climate policy? insights from the eu ets’ first phase.” in europe, canada and the comprehensive economic and trade agreement, ed. kurt hübner. new york: routledge, p. 245–258. palmer, karen, wallace e. oates, and paul r. portney. 1995. “tightening environmental standards : the benefit-cost or the no-cost paradigm ?” the journal of economic perspectives 9(4): 119–132. platform of european social ngos. 2009. social platform. brussels. http://www.euractiv.com/priorities/eu-new-2020-strategy-comes-fire/article-187582. polanyi, karl. the great transformation: the political and economic origins of our time. boston: beacon press. porter, michael e., and claas van der linde. 1995. “toward a new conception of the environment-competitiveness relationship.” the journal of economic perspectives 9(4): 97–118. rodrigues, maria joao, et. al. 2009. europe, globalization and the lisbon agenda. ed. maria joao rodrigues. northampton, ma: edward elgar publishing inc. scharpf, fritz w. 1999. governing in europe: effective and democratic? oxford: oxford university press. schumpeter, joseph. [1942] 1994. capitalism, socialism and democracy. london: routledge. the treaty on the functioning of the european union. 2008. europe 1–153. willis, andrew. 2010. “lukewarm reaction to europe 2020 plan.” bloomberg businessweek. http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/mar2010/gb2010035_390728.htm. zuleeg, fabian, and maria joao rodrigues. 2011. “implementation of europe 2020: time to act.” brussels: european policy centre. http://www.epc.eu/documents/uploads/pub_1790_tgae2011zuleeg.pdf review of european and russian affairs 7 (2), 2012 issn 1718-4835 15 © 2012 the author(s) www.carleton.ca/rera 15 correct citation: king, conrad. 2012. “mental modes and the europe 2020 strategy: neoschumpetarian ideas in innovation and education”. review of european and russian affairs 7 (2): 1–14. published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada. available online at: www.carleton.ca/rera/ rera is an electronic academic peer-reviewed journal that publishes graduate, post-graduate, and young scholarly works. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is a joint project supported by the canada-europe transatlantic dialogue—a cross-canada research network supported by the social sciences and humanities research council of canada (sshrc)—along with the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies (carleton university) and its associated research unit, the centre for european studies. rera aims to provide an accessible forum for research, to promote high standards of research and scholarship, and to foster communication among young scholars. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada tel: +01 613 520-2600 ext. 1179; e-mail: rera-journal@carleton.ca creative commons license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ this working paper is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial no derivs 3.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 3.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced provided the source is acknowledged. no use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes. issn: 1718-4835 © 2012 the author(s) http://www.carleton.ca/rera/ mailto:rera-journal@carleton.ca why reforms fail: the role of ideas, interests and institutions review of european and russian affairs 12 (2), 2018 issn 1718-4835 the european union’s policy towards its eastern neighbours: the crisis in ukraine1 tatsiana shaban university of victoria abstract the european union’s neighbourhood is complex and still far from being stable. in ukraine, significant progress has occurred in many areas of transition; however, much work remains to be done, especially in the field of regional development and governance, where many legacies of the soviet model remain. at the crossroads between east and west, ukraine presents an interesting case of policy development as an expression of european union (eu) external governance. this paper asks the question: why was the relationship between the eu and ukraine fairly unsuccessful at promoting stability in the region and in ukraine? what was missing in the european neighbourhood policy (enp) in ukraine that rendered the eu unable to prevent a conflict on the ground? by identifying security, territorial, and institutional challenges and opportunities the eu has faced in ukraine, this paper underlines the most important factors accounting for the performance of its external governance and crisis management in ukraine. 1 an earlier version of this paper was presented at the “multiple crises in the eu” cetd conference at university of victoria, feb 23rd, 2017. this conference was made possible by generous financial support from the canadaeurope transatlantic dialogue at carleton university. the author would like to acknowledge amy verdun, zoey verdun, valerie d'erman, derek fraser, and two anonymous reviewers of this journal for their comments on earlier drafts of this work. the author thanks emmanuel brunet-jailly (and the borders in globalization project) for continued support. special thanks to joan debardeleben, the editor–in-chief of this journal for helpful comments and continued encouragement. funding was provided by social sciences and humanities research council of canada, by a grant through dr. amy verdun. 2 review of european and russian affairs 12 (2), 2018 introduction ukraine signed the charter on a distinctive partnership with the north atlantic treaty organisation (nato) in 1997. in doing so, it effectively self-identified as a ‘european’ state, in the sense of pledging allegiance to this important western security alliance. a year later, ukraine established its european foreign policy course when the partnership and cooperation agreement (pca) between the european union (eu) and ukraine came into force. 2 in 2010, the ukrainian parliament adopted the law “on the principles of foreign and domestic policy,” which further prioritised integration into the eu, with the aim of acquiring membership (the law of ukraine №2411-vi of 01.07.2010). however, the crisis in ukraine in february 2014 clearly demonstrated that the eu will have to develop a different strategic approach in its policy toward its eastern neighbours in order to stabilize the situation in the region. people protested against the government of then-president viktor yanukovych, who had concentrated enormous assets within his own family and found himself in a vulnerable position manoeuvring between russia and the eu. on 22 february 2014, the ukrainian parliament (verkhovna rada or just rada) voted yanukovych out of power after he refused to sign the association agreement (aa) with the eu and turned to russia, instead. likewise, the rada announced new presidential elections for 25 may of that same year. in the end, the maidan revolution (also known as the “revolution of dignity”) produced a prolonged political, economic, and security crisis in ukraine, regionally and internationally.3 this paper asks the question of why the relationship between the eu and ukraine was fairly unsuccessful at promoting stability in the region and in ukraine. what was missing in the european neighbourhood policy (enp) policy in ukraine that rendered the eu unable to prevent a conflict on the ground? to answer this, this paper proceeds in four steps. first, it provides a brief literature review of recent academic debates on europeanisation and eu governance, which have paid extensive attention to the development of the enp and the eastern partnership (eap). scholarly debates provide a conceptual framework for the eu as a transformative power and help understand the eu’s external performance in promoting stability in the region. second, the paper examines the relationship of the eu and ukraine by examining the progress of the enp and development of its specific programs and instruments in the area of security and regional integration. third, it analyses territorial and security challenges the eu encountered on the ground, including the role of nato and russia in the ukraine crisis. finally, it explores institutional opportunities for euukraine cooperation. this paper only covers the period of the enp between the implementation of the eap policy, launched by the eu in 2009 on the initiative of sweden and poland, and its second revision in november 2015. 4 that period has been marked by an escalating confrontation between the eu and russia based on disagreement about the eap’s goals and functions. the 2 the pca between ukraine and the eu (1998) was based on the existing agreement between the european economic community and the european atomic energy community and the union of soviet socialist republics on trade and commercial and economic cooperation, signed on 18 december 1989. currently, the association agreement (aa) provides a new legal framework for bilateral eu-ukraine relations, replacing the out-dated pca, after being ratified by all 28 eu member states on september 1, 2017. 3 the ukrainian revolution got its name from the maidan (kyiv’s independence square) where it started in february 2014. 4 the second revision of the enp in 2015 recognized that the attempts to create a “ring of friends” around the eu had failed and many of the neighbouring countries developed in the opposite way. 3 review of european and russian affairs 12 (2), 2018 overall analysis is helpful in articulating a number of factors that can form the basis for future cooperation between ukraine and the eu. literature review the literature on europeanisation (including eu governance) suggests that the eu exerts important transformative power outside its borders. in the post-cold war context, the “wider europe” concept clearly presented the eu as a new kind of international actor (commission of the european communities 2003). the eu concept of wider europe, understood in progressive terms, implied increasing openness and inclusionary politics where neighbourhood relationships could be jointly negotiated between the eu and its regional partners. 5 however, the “arab spring” uprisings that commenced in 2010 clearly demonstrated that policy of the eu toward its neighbours had not lived up to its standards and required change (biscop 2012). in light of regional conflicts and threats to the international order that seem to involve joint efforts by the international community in response, the european commission (henceforth “commission”) called for a comprehensive eu approach to the management of external conflicts and crises.6 however, some scholars argue that the different objectives of the eu regional cooperation agenda have been mutually contradictory and contained both elements of potential regional partnerships and exclusionary and discriminatory aspects (scott 2009; liikanen, scott, and sotkasiira 2016). importantly, after the 2004 enlargement of the eu, and before the 2014 ukraine crisis, russia-eu relations had not reached a high priority on the agenda when brought for political discussion or dialogue. andrey makarychev claims that “the russian version of neighbourhood has been an area predominantly marked by enmity and (geopolitical) competition,” whereas the eu sees its neighbourhood as being a “ring of friends” converging progressively on “european values,” which the eu naturally and hegemonically assumes to be its values (makarychev in emerson 2006, 1541). the eu was regarded as important to secure market access in europe and attract foreign direct investments, but in terms of the eu foreign and security policy, russia considered the united states, nato, and the organisation for security and cooperation in europe as more important players (haukkala 2003, 9). while internally the eu’s institutional development implied a shift towards coordinative network governance, externally it involved different forms of deep association towards neighbouring nonmember states (lavenex 2008). the argument is that traditional rationalist, actor-based foreign policy approaches to the enp that stress its weakness owing to the absence of accession conditionality may miss an essential part of eu external influence, according to which the enp may be conceptualized as a “roof over expanding structures of sectoral, functional co-operation in europe” (lavenex 2008, 951). the eu has also paid considerable attention to regional reform (decentralisation), used in its broad sense to mean producing a change in the nature of relations 5 the eu launched the enp in 2003 with the objective of avoiding the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged eu and its neighbours to the south and east, and of strengthening the prosperity, stability, and security of all countries concerned. the first revision took place in 2011 after the “arab spring” uprisings in many of the neighbouring countries participating in the enp. 6 the eu comprehensive approach towards crises is understood as providing security and building up a security community based on liberal democracy and a market economy, and not just management of the conflict itself. 4 review of european and russian affairs 12 (2), 2018 between national and subnational tiers of government (mrinska 2010). political developments since october 2013, when ukraine decided against signing the eu–ukraine association agreement (aa), once again stressed the need to pay serious attention to the social and institutional context when studying the eu’s ability to function as an effective architect of its security community beyond its borders (börzel and van hüllen 2011; 2013; papadimitriou, baltag, and surubaru 2017a; 2017b). similarly, the capacity of domestic actors to influence or defeat an illiberal government represents an important factor. as langbein (2014) concludes in her research on regulatory convergence, beside strong eu policy conditionality, “multiplex” capacity-building that empowers various nonstate actors and state agencies leads to stronger convergence in ukraine. eu actions target not only governments, but also various societal actors who either observe the eu’s actions or cooperate with it. academic debates emphasise that, in the absence of strong formal institutions, informal networks and decision-making play a crucial role (solonenko 2015). likewise, the mobilising effect of conditionality will be higher if society views eu conditions as legitimate (schimmelfennig and sedelmeier 2005; vachudova 2005; schimmelfennig 2009; börzel and van hüllen 2013). according to burlyuk and shapovalova, “conceptualisation of (eu) conditionality as a tool for societal mobilisation and differential empowerment of domestic actors” potentially explains domestic change as motivated by the eu (burlyuk and shapovalova 2017). in addition to security matters, scholarly research claims that improved governance in the neighbourhood remains crucial to its economic growth (aslund 2015). in ukraine, the eu has provided consistent financial and political support to public administration reform (pa reform), a declared priority for all administrations since independence in 1991, regarded as central to country’s democratic consolidation (youngs 2009). unsurprisingly, the role of the eu as an agent of change in its neighbourhood has been analysed profoundly. in the end, it is through eu assistance that understanding of eu norms and values by the government, civil actors, and society has been introduced and further reinforced in ukraine. however, despite the current ukrainian government being the most pro-reformist in the history of independent ukraine, corruption and old-style bad governance continue to prevent the transformation and development of sustainable democratic institutions (maksak 2015). moreover, critics of eu policies in ukraine argue that linkages between the eu and eap countries (even if increasing) do not necessarily translate into reform (solonenko and shapovalova 2011; maksak 2015). according to kataryna wolczuk (2017) the problem is that many eu officials in brussels and kyiv are reluctant to promote change when engaging at the political level, believing that working with the current, pro-european administration is more desirable than triggering a change of government. yet, wolczuk argues that the most successful reforms so far have been those that created new institutions and systems in ukraine – namely, a national anti-corruption bureau, the electronic public procurement system (prozorro), and the new road police. furthermore, approaching the reforms as a technical process of legal approximation is insufficient for actual democratic transformation of the country (wolczuk 2017). likewise, the question remains whether eu policies and related actions are resulting in sustainable policy change in ukraine. 5 review of european and russian affairs 12 (2), 2018 research methods and design the empirics of this paper rely on qualitative methods. the author conducted interviews in kyiv, lviv, and krakow in 2014 and 2015 with governmental officials, academics, journalists, and nongovernmental organization (ngo) activists directly or indirectly dealing with enp matters. additional data was gathered through official (policy) documents, newspapers, and participation in the events related to the ukraine crisis that took place both in ukraine and at the international level during the same period and later. in order to answer the research question regarding the extent of the eu’s transformative power in ukraine, the paper draws on 1) the institutional arrangements governing ukraine-eu relations, which mainly examine the eu’s governance policy in the framework of the enp and eap; and 2) how these institutional arrangements are perceived and understood by different actors in ukraine and abroad. face-to-face and skype interviews were conducted in english, russian, and ukrainian. all those interviewed were asked to reflect upon eu-related policies and programs in their field of activity and on the role that the ukrainian government is playing in this process. while the interviews also covered other, more regional aspects of policy implementation which are not addressed here, the respondents were asked to assess 1) their relations with the eu, including eu institutions; 2) the role of the ukrainian government; 3) activities of ukrainian ngos; and 4) their own role. the enp: review of eu regional programs and instruments in ukraine the commission’s “communication on wider europe” proposed that the eu should aim to develop a zone of prosperity and a friendly neighbourhood – “a ring of friends” – with whom the eu enjoyed close, peaceful, and cooperative relations (commission of the european communities 2003). drawing on that concept, the eu offered its “ring of friends” to share “everything but institutions.” 7 the development of the enp progressed further when, in 2009, upon the direct initiative of sweden and poland, the eu launched its eastern partnership policy (eap). the eap aimed to support six countries – armenia, azerbaijan, belarus, georgia, moldova, and ukraine – in advancing to a market economy, sustainable development, and good governance.8 it was built on the framework of the enp and designed to “accelerate political association and further economic integration” (joint declaration of the prague eastern partnership summit, 7 may 2009, 6) in several areas, including governance, trade, migration and border management, energy, and the environment between the eu and its partner countries. this policy has been the first comprehensive initiative introduced into the system of the eu’s external relations intended to help neighbouring countries with their approximation to and integration with eu rules and norms based on a differentiated approach, committed to permitting each partner country to progress in its own way and at its own speed. the eap includes an official 7 the quote is taken from a famous speech by romano prodi, former president of the european commission: a wider europe-a proximity policy as the key to stability. “peace, security and stability international dialogue and the role of the eu”. speech/02/619. sixth ecsa-world conference. jean monnet project. brussels, 5-6 december 2002, european commission. press release. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_speech-02-619_en.htm. accessed 10 may 2018. 8 in ukraine, implementation of the measures covered by previous annual action programmes from the period 2007-2009 (european commission 2011) was delayed pending timely confirmation of improved public financial management in the country, notably in the field of public procurement. 6 review of european and russian affairs 12 (2), 2018 package of at least three main elements that, if implemented, would significantly change relations between the eu and partner countries. first, the association agreement;9 second, a deep and comprehensive free trade area (dcfta), which aims to open markets and deal with competitiveness issues and standards set by the eu in the area of trade; and finally, full visa liberalisation. the aa highlights reforms in the spheres of justice, freedom, and security, particularly concerning provisions on mobility. in addition, the eap set up bilateral and multilateral projects and programs in areas of economic, political, and cultural development with all eap participants (except for belarus).10 eap bilateral projects include comprehensive institution building programs (cibp, cib) which aim to help reform, develop, and improve the capabilities of the partner-states’ public institutions. since 2014, the cib has been supported through the european neighbourhood instrument (eni) 11 that replaced the former european neighbourhood policy instrument. specific instruments like the twinning, technical assistance and information exchange instrument (taiex) 12 , and eu advisory missions have been used for the implementation of these programs. the eap multilateral track similarly aims to foster links among partner-countries themselves. the commission identifies four thematic platforms in the multilateral framework: 1) democracy, good governance, and stability; 2) economic integration and convergence with eu sectoral policies; 3) energy security; and 4) contacts among people. in the framework of these thematic platforms, five flagship initiatives have been launched: 1) integrated border management; 2) small and mediumsized enterprises facility; 3) regional electricity markets, energy efficiency, and renewable energy sources; 4) prevention, preparedness, and response to natural and man-made disasters; and 5) environmental governance. the eap’s regional dimension has been covered by pilot regional development programmes inspired by the eu experience of cohesion policy. it supports regional development strategies by aiming at reducing disparities and funding projects, which help in overcoming structural deficiencies. in september 2011, the committee of the regions established a conference of regional and local authorities for the eap as “a political body of multilateral cooperation”(2011). moreover, ukraine, as a member of the eap, has benefited from eu cross-border cooperation, and 9 in may 2012, the eu council adopted three main conditions for the signature of the aa in ukraine: conducting free and fair parliamentary elections, addressing cases of selective justice, and implementing reforms envisaged by the aa. the aa was negotiated between 2007 and 2011 and signed on 21 march and 27 june 2014. substantial parts of its have been applied provisionally since 1 november 2014 and 1 january 2016 for the dcfta. the aa in ukraine fully entered into force only 1 september 2017 after it was ratified by all member states of the eu. in june 2017 the visa liberalisation process was finalised. as of 11 june 2017, the visa obligation for citizens of ukraine who hold a biometric passport and want to travel to the schengen zone for a short stay was abolished (migration and home affairs, european commission, last update 19/04/2018). 10 belarus is excluded from the full participation in the eap due to its violations of human rights and civic freedoms. however, in contrast to russia, belarus participates in the eap, at least formally, for it to take part in its multilateral track. the minsk agreements and the lifting of most sanctions by the eu after the presidential elections in belarus in february 2016 showed a slight warming of belarus-eu official relations and opened perspectives for change in both belarus itself and belarus-eu relations. 11 interestingly, the eni is funding cross-border cooperation programs in which russia takes part under the enp, even if it is not a part of the enp as such. 12 taiex supports public administrations with regard to the approximation, application, and enforcement of eu legislation as well as facilitating the sharing of eu best practices. 7 review of european and russian affairs 12 (2), 2018 various regional and inter-regional cooperation programmes, mainly in education (tempus, erasmus mundus), transport and border assistance, institution building (taiex, sigma13), and investment. in addition, the visegrad (also known as the "visegrad four" or simply "v4") 14 countries have provided many forms of assistance to ukraine and its people. as an example, slovakia launched national conventions for european integration in moldova and ukraine and the centre of transfer of the slovak experience from the accession process at the ministry of foreign affairs in bratislava. in the end, such partnership activities endorse the development of good governing practices at the local and regional levels through the exchange of experience, ideas, and best practices in ukraine. notably, the eap initiative pays much more attention to civil society than previous eu policies towards its eastern neighbourhood. it created the eap civil society forum, which included ngos from both eap countries and the eu. in addition to the forum, the euronest parliamentary assembly (pa) 15 was formed in may 2011 in brussels. the 2011-2013 national indicative program (nip) for ukraine was adopted in march 2010 and had a budget of €470.1 million. the 2011-2013 nip included a specific appropriation to finance new actions under the eap, notably cib with a minimum of €43.4 million and cohesion policy with a minimum of €30.8 million. since the outbreak of the crisis in early 2014, it has mobilised a total of €3.4 billion in macrofinancial assistance (mfa) through three consecutive programmes of low-interest loans to ukraine. that represented the highest amount ever made available by the eu to a non-eu country in such a short time.16 in addition to substantial financial assistance, the eu created the support group for ukraine, which provided expert assistance for reforms. the commission helped to organise the international conference on support for ukraine in april 2015, while the parliament launched a special mission to study the needs of ukraine’s parliament in the reform process. overall, the commission estimated the eu’s financial assistance to ukraine for 2014-2020 at €11 billion. 13 support for improvement in governance and management (sigma) is a joint initiative of the commission and the organization of economic cooperation and development, principally financed by the eu. it focuses on strengthening public management in areas such as administrative reform, public procurement, public sector ethics, anti-corruption, and external and internal financial control. 14 the v4 reflects the efforts of four central european countries (poland, czech republic, slovakia, hungary) to work together in a number of fields of common interest in the broader context of european integration, which prioritize the strengthening of the rule of law, the efficiency of national government and local governments, the transparency of public procurement, the reduction of state regulation, and the fight against corruption. visegrad fund. 15 the euronest pa consists of a european parliament’s delegation and the eap's delegations from armenia, azerbaijan, georgia, moldova, and ukraine (excluding official belarus representation, but including participation of extra-parliamentary representatives of the opposition from belarus). it aims to contribute to the strengthening, development and visibility of the eap, as the institution responsible for “parliamentary consultation, supervision and monitoring.” 16 information provided during the talk by david stulik (press officer of the commission representation in kyiv, ukraine) at the national mohyla academy. key documents relating to mfa i (disbursed in 2014-15): council decision of 12 july 2002 providing supplementary mfa to ukraine (€ 110 million); decision of the european parliament and of the council of 7 july 2010 providing mfa to ukraine (€ 500 million); memorandum of understanding between the european union and ukraine for mfa for ukraine of up to € 610 million. 8 review of european and russian affairs 12 (2), 2018 eu-ukraine territorial and security challenges the problem for ukraine’s sovereignty started with the collapse of the soviet union when ukraine declared itself an independent state in 1991. that act pushed the borders of russia further east and limited its access to the black sea. ukraine signed the charter on a distinctive partnership with nato in 1997 and the charter of the organisation of black sea economic cooperation agreement in 1998, joined pro-european guam (georgia, ukraine, azerbaijan, moldova), and sought further development of its international relationships, aiming at membership in the world trade organisation (wto) and nato.17 since independence, ukraine has regarded cooperation with nato as a priority for its national security. hence, after the orange revolution, as a confirmation of its engagement with the euro-atlantic community, the coalition government of viktor yushchenko and yulia tymoshenko called for consideration of ukraine's entry into nato’s membership action plan (map) during the 2008 bucharest summit. however, due to strong objections from russia, the 26-member alliance was split, and thus confirmed it would not yet offer membership to georgia or ukraine.18 ukraine is in an important geostrategic location between europe and russia. russia perceived the plan of the ukrainian government to join the map as an expression of undesired nato’s expansion to the east into its own sphere of geopolitical and economic influence (ministry of foreign affairs of the russian federation). however, even within ukraine, the application to join nato in 2008 was met with opposition, which revealed the lack of an internal consensus of the political elites, as well as low public support at that time.19 in 2010, the ukraine government dropped plans for membership following the elections in which viktor yanukovych became the ukrainian president. during yanukovych’s government, the ukrainian parliament passed an initial draft of a bill, establishing ukraine's non-aligned status on june 4, 2010. in 2014, prime minister arseniy yatsenyuk’s government submitted to the rada a draft bill that would cancel ukraine’s non-aligned status. during 2014, ukrainian territorial integrity and self-determination, based on general principles of international law and guided by subsequent multilateral and bilateral agreements,20 was challenged and undermined by the military conflict in its eastern territory and the annexation of crimea by 17 ukraine became a member of the wto on 16 may 2008. in the same year, ukraine applied to join the nato’s membership action plan (map). 18 the paper does not provide detailed analysis of russia’s actions in the aftermath of the 2008 bucharest summit due to its space limitations and its major focus on ukraine-eu relations rather than russia-eu relations. however, some facts of particular importance to ukraine are covered in this paper. 19 this evidence is supported by opinion polls conducted in 2007 and 2008 by razumkov centre in ukraine. the results of razumkov centre’s sociological research are also published in the national and security defence magazine. 20 articles 2 and 3 of the treaty on friendship, cooperation, and partnership between russia and ukraine (signed in 1997) promised border recognition, removing all russian territorial claims against ukraine. the stumbling blocks of the treaty were the division of the black sea fleet and the federal status of sevastopol. however, the treaty contained guarantees that the two sides would build their relations on the non-use of force or the threat of force, “including economic means of pressure.” fbis, doc. number fbis-sov-97-124. 9 review of european and russian affairs 12 (2), 2018 russia. 21 on 17 march 2014, following a highly-contested referendum, the republic of crimea declared its independence, started seeking recognition by the united nations, and applied to join the russian federation. on the following day, russia recognized crimea as a sovereign state, an act condemned by the international community. this happened despite a 1994 budapest agreement between the us, russia, and the united kingdom that provided ukraine with security assurances in exchange for the dismantling and destruction of all its nuclear weapons. 22 thus, after the ukraine crisis, the russia-us/nato relationship to some extent reverted to cold war-style antagonism. that change was reflected at the nato summit in september 2014 in wales. likewise, relations between russia and the eu have played a role in the development of instability in the eastern neighbourhood region. the foreign policy concept of the russian federation of 2000 stated that russian foreign policy’s first objective is to preserve and strengthen its sovereignty and territorial integrity, to achieve firm and prestigious positions in the world community, most fully consistent with the interests of the russian federation as a great power. russia did not perceive the eu as a serious geopolitical partner, and the eu did not consider russia to be an equal partner. regrettably, the last eu-russia summit, held in january 2014 in brussels, demonstrated the complete dysfunction of the top-level eu-russia relationship. 23 in 2014, after the ukrainian revolution, the russia-eu relationship was reduced to a technical level, its content consisting of managing conflicts over eu energy policies, gazprom’s operations in eu countries, and russian gas transit across ukraine (trenin 2014). the 2014 ukraine crisis seriously tested the european security order with relation to its eastern neighbourhood. as former swedish prime minister carl bildt (2015) stated, it turned the eu’s “ring of friends” into a “ring of fire.” according to the 2016 munich security report, europe has failed to build a credible common foreign and security policy as envisaged by the treaty of lisbon, with institutional arrangements for decisive crisis management. however, if on the one hand, the ukrainian crisis clearly exposed the vulnerability of the eu’s foreign policy, on the other hand, it prepared ukraine to acknowledge fully its geopolitical choice and foreign policy orientation towards europe. the maidan revolution, the conclusion of the association agreement with the eu, and russian aggression in eastern ukraine dramatically changed not only the ukrainian and european landscapes, but the whole international landscape. in february 2015, the leaders of ukraine, russia, france, and germany agreed to the so-called minsk ii accord concerning the conflict in the ukrainian donbas. this accord called for a ceasefire, withdrawal of heavy weapons from the front, release of hostages and detainees, changes in the ukrainian constitution to give more autonomy to the regions, legislation on special status for parts of the donbas regions of donetsk and luhansk, withdrawal of foreign forces from ukraine, and restored ukrainian government control over the eastern border by the end of 2015 (ivan 2015). however, to date, this accord has achieved none of its goals. additionally, the key diplomatic format to resolve the ukraine crisis – the “normandy group” – does not include the us. hence, 21 the crimean constitution approved by ukrainian parliament in 1998 declared that the autonomous republic was “an inalienable component part of the ukraine.” 22 as a result of this agreement, between 1994 and 1996, belarus, kazakhstan, and ukraine gave up their nuclear weapons. before that, ukraine had the world's third largest nuclear weapons stockpile. 23 remarks by president of the european council herman van rompuy following the 32nd eu-russia summit, european council, brussels, 28 january 2014 euco 27/14 presse 38 pr pce. 10 review of european and russian affairs 12 (2), 2018 for the eu, how to deal with russia in order to secure stability and security on its eastern borders remains an open question. eu-ukraine institutional challenges the 2014 ukrainian crisis pressed the entire international community and powerful foreign actors to play an important role in shaping ukrainian governing structures. recall that ukraine is a postcommunist country with a history of a highly centralised state and a state-owned economy. moreover, the historical legacy of the soviet culture of governance remains evident in various aspects of ukraine’s politics and public administration. the 2004 orange revolution played a crucial role in determining the strategic direction of the ukrainian policy towards its integration into the euro-atlantic community and democratic development (kuzio 2006, kubicek 2007, haran 2013). however, subsequent domestic developments showed how fragile the gains of a democracy could be, if democratic changes are not institutionalized. leaders of ukrainian opposition started to fight with each other for power after 2005, keeping in mind the next presidential election scheduled to take place five years later. the 2005 blue ribbon commission report on ukraine identified five key areas for national reform: political reform; social spending in areas such as health care and education; the tax system and the legal foundations of the financial system; a clear line to be drawn between the state and private enterprise, so that property rights are fully guaranteed; and integration into the world economy, to be facilitated through early accession to the wto and closer integration with the eu.24 the report stated that the fundamental political problem in ukraine, as in other post-communist countries, is that “the state rules its citizens, rather than serving them …the state machinery must become efficient through real control by society and law” (the blue ribbon commission report 2005, 317). thus, the focus of the political debate in ukraine itself gradually shifted from geopolitical orientation to domestic reform. the eap initiative created a critical necessity to put into operation essential management structures to improve the quality of governance in its partners. governance beyond eu borders is conceptualised here as the establishment of “institutions” (in the sense of organisations, but also of rules of the game), which define actors and their responsibilities, both in cooperation towards society’s objectives and in resolution of conflicts that may arise. when talking about governance quality, this paper primarily means establishment of the rule of law, clear division of powers, control of corruption, and design of impartial and professional public administration. with the eu, ukraine faced a very demanding roadmap, particularly in fighting organised crime and corruption (david stulik. naukma talk. kyiv, 5 november 2014). the eu had been pushing ukraine to adopt comprehensive reforms and, most importantly, to effectively implement anti-corruption provisions. those reforms were intended to facilitate eu-ukraine cooperation for the years to come. 24 integration into the eu has always been a priority for ukrainian foreign policy. this goal has been supported by many political and legal instruments, such as the program on the integration of ukraine to the eu (approved september 2000); the law “on state program of adaptation of the legislation of ukraine to the legislation of the european union” (18 march 2004); and the eu-ukraine action plan (2005). 11 review of european and russian affairs 12 (2), 2018 in 2010, after viktor yanukovych’s arrival in power, commissioner for the enp štefan füle presented to the ukrainian government the “füle matrix”25 – a list of 18 political and economic reforms with benchmarks and deadlines. the document was intended to renew mutual commitments, as well as to bring clearer conditions for the finalisation of negotiations and eventual conclusion of the association agreement. on top of that, the eu promised some sectoral rewards, such as €610 million of mfa and €2.5 billion of credit for the modernisation of the ukrainian gas transit system, conditional upon the implementation of the gas market reform. however, the lack of proficient staff26 and of local experience created additional challenges to reforms on the ground. yet, corruption remains the main obstacle to effective governance in ukraine. according to the corruption perception index (cpi), in 2006, ukraine ranked 99 and scored 2.8 for perception of corruption,27 although, after the 2006 parliamentary elections, ukraine was recognised as the only “free country” in the cis in the ratings of freedom house due to the accomplishments of the orange revolution, which were political freedoms, including freedom of the press, and free and fair elections.28 however, in 2010, freedom house had to move ukraine from the category of “free” country into “partially free”.29 president yanukovych (2010-2014), who rejected the eu agreement, had reconstructed the oligarchy, concentrating enormous wealth in his own family and dissatisfying both ukrainian society and business (except, perhaps, his fellow oligarchs). ineffective (bad) governance30 in ukraine happened to be the critical factor that caused the maidan revolution in february 2014, in which people started to protest against the existing government. however, even after the revolution, oligarchs have continued to exercise significant influence through their control of the economy, much of the media, and the financing of political parties (natalie jaresko. the fifteenth annual stasiuk lecture in contemporary ukrainian studies: “ukraine in transition,” 24 february 2017). in march 2015, president petro poroshenko dismissed ihor kolomoyskyi from the governorship of dnipropetrovsk oblast (region) after he attempted to assert control over the country’s main oil company. at the same time, the ukrainian government also sharply reduced energy subsidies, aiming to remove distortions in the market that exhausted state assets and encouraged corruption. however, despite the dismissal, kolomoyskyi continued to influence politics through his support for election financing, his personal television network, armed battalions that are nominally loyal to the state, and other existing means. 25 stefan füle, european commissioner for enp. exchange of views on south caucasus and ukraine. speech/10/189. committee on foreign affairs (afet), european parliament. brussels. 26 in 2015, after the eu conducted its second enp revision in a reorganised eap initiative, the “more for more” principle was further strengthened through a reformed cib, providing more support in the form of expertise, twinning, technical assistance, and financial assistance. 27 the cpi score relates to perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by business people and country analysts. the cpi ranks countries and territories based on how corrupt their public sector is perceived to be. the 2006 index included 163 countries. the score ranged between 10 and 0 (highly corrupt). transparency international. 28 see the ratings of freedom house, available at: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/freedom-press2009?page=251&year=2009. 29 see freedom in the world, 2011: the authoritarian challenge to democracy. washington, dc: freedom house, 2011. www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedomworld/freedom-world-2011. 30 i define “bad governance” as a form of governance involving practices such as abuse of human rights, corruption, lack of transparency, lack of responsiveness, and lack of accountability. in 2014, the cpi ranking in ukraine shot up to 142, and it subsequently scored 24. the 2014 index included 175 countries and territories; the 2014 score ranged between 100 and 0 (highly corrupt). transparency international. 12 review of european and russian affairs 12 (2), 2018 persistent corruption among prosecutors and judges has been another important problem in ukraine. in order to confront this problem, a package of anticorruption legislation adopted in 2014 has been implemented. the government set up a national anticorruption bureau (nabu) to investigate corrupt officials and a national agency for corruption prevention (nacp), and also planned a separate anticorruption section within the prosecutor general’s office. yet, ukrainian nongovernmental organizations focused on combating corruption criticized the government because they were not properly included in the process of choosing the new leaders of the nacp as required by law. in december 2015, president poroshenko signed a law31 creating an additional agency to deal with the assets of corrupt officials (freedom house report on ukraine, 2016). in addition, despite all these reforms, poroshenko did not give up his control of the judicial branch. importantly, due to and during the ukrainian crisis, a strong civic identity developed in ukraine partly owing to institutional cooperation with the eu on various levels. the eu regional partnership has consistently grown through its social engagement in various regions of ukraine (maryan manko. interview. lviv, 4 november 2014). it has been due to civil society pressure, coupled with external pressure from the eu and international donors, that governance reforms have been initiated in ukraine in the first instance. a pro-european orientation, together with the growth of civic identity and patriotic feelings, have helped create a political nation in ukraine (papadimitriou et al. 2017a; 2017b). during 2015 and 2016, however, ukrainian citizens were disappointed with the government’s slow progress in combating corruption. civil society activists wanted the eu to play a stronger political role in bringing about change in ukraine. conclusion this paper examined the extent to which the eu’s enp has managed the crisis that began in ukraine in 2013-2014. it aimed to understand why the eu was unable to prevent a conflict on the ground: why was the relationship between the eu and ukraine fairly unsuccessful at promoting stability in the region, and in ukraine in particular? what had been missing in the eu policy in ukraine that rendered it unable to prevent a conflict on the ground? it provided a summary of the territorial and security challenges, which can be used to identify institutional opportunities for effective cooperation between ukraine and the eu. in the end, this study means to contribute to debates in the literature on eu governance and its foreign policy in the eastern neighbourhood. the eu’s persistent presence in ukraine pushes the country towards its institutional development and the implementation of an important number of reforms, including much-needed anticorruption provisions, while building a security community on its borders. however, the adoption of the enp and eap further intensifies russian concerns in the shared neighbourhood. regrettably, to this date, russia and the eu have not developed a full understanding of each other’s positions and priorities. while uneven development without the promise of eu membership limits the implementation of any “innovative policy framework” in ukraine, the revised enp seems to orient ukraine more toward a form of democratic development, which can be created within its own society by using eu mechanisms and tools. the review of the challenges and opportunities reveals that the eu provides ukraine with exceptional support for its long-term transformation and the establishment of a democratic system and effective governance. academic and policy research 31 however, according to experts, the law potentially exacerbated the problem of overlapping authorities. 13 review of european and russian affairs 12 (2), 2018 also show that eu cooperation with ukraine depends on negating asymmetric relations and applying the eu soft power concept on the ground responsibly and respectfully. 14 review of european and russian affairs 12 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technical aid and international cooperation. regional state administration, lviv. interview. 4 november 2014. stulik, david. press officer. eu delegation to ukraine. talk at the national university of "kyiv-mohyla academy" (naukma). kyiv, ukraine. 5 november 2014. https://www.facebook.com/kjagiellonski/?timeline_context_item_type=intro_card_work&timeline_context_item_source=595019330 https://www.facebook.com/pages/uniwersytet-ekonomiczny-w-krakowie/106058856101391?timeline_context_item_type=intro_card_work&timeline_context_item_source=595019330 17 review of european and russian affairs 12 (2), 2018 published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada available online at: journals.carleton.ca/rera/index.php/rera rera is an open-access electronic academic double-blind peer-reviewed journal. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is a joint project of the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies (carleton university) and its associated research unit, the centre for european studies. rera aims to provide an accessible forum for research, to promote high standards of research and scholarship, and to foster communication among young scholars. rera aims to provide an accessible forum for research, to promote high standards of research and scholarship, and to foster communication among young scholars. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada tel: +01 613 520-2600 ext. 3117; e-mail: rera-journal@carleton.ca creative commons license creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0 this working paper is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial no derivs 3.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 3.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, provided the source is acknowledged. no use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes. issn: 1718-4835 © 2018 the author(s) https://journals.carleton.ca/rera/index.php/rera mailto:rera-journal@carleton.ca http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ why reforms fail: the role of ideas, interests and institutions review of european and russian affairs 12 (1), 2018 issn 1718-4835 crisis, contestation and social order in europe: a sympoietic analysis keith cherry university of victoria abstract europe is facing multiple existential crises at once. i argue that these crises are rooted in larger, older patterns of structural contestation that have always animated the eu. drawing from these patterns, i contend that there are at least two conceptions of social order at work within the eu – an autopoietic model based on bounded hierarchy and a sympoietic model based on decentralization and compromise. i argue that the autopoietic aspects of the union, and neo-liberal representative democracy in particular, continually produce systemic crises. at the same time, sympoietic practices of inter-institutional adjustment allow us to weather such challenges, albeit imperfectly. ultimately, i conclude that escaping the cycle of structural crisis requires moving more definitively towards sympoiesis by radically decentralizing and democratizing political and economic power in europe. 2 review of european and russian affairs 12 (1), 2018 introduction by all accounts, europe is currently facing a dizzying array of crises. from the euro crisis to the refugee crisis, from brexit to the crisis of populism, crisis is quickly becoming a staple of our european vocabulary. in the following paper, i contend that these crises are not aberrant disruptions to an otherwise stable, static, and coherent norm, but rather a systemic feature of a new, polycentric european order. the proper response is not therefore to stabilize the status quo, but rather to embrace the interpenetrating, dynamic, and polycentric features of our order and, indeed, to deepen our aversion to bounded hierarchies and the zero-sum dynamics they perpetuate. my argument proceeds in six steps. first, i suggest that each of our current crises – in particular, brexit, the euro crisis, and the refugee crisis – is to some extent structural. there has always been a certain ambiguity about the nature and final form of the integration process, and this ambiguity creates a number of permanent structural contests. the resulting tensions are an enduring, even defining feature of the integration process. i argue that these tensions have been transforming policy problems into existential crises, as ordinary social challenges activate larger struggles over the nature of the union itself. second, i extend this analysis to argue that there are actually (at least) two different conceptions of social order at work in the eu. the first, what i will call the autopoietic model, understands social order as a form of self-structuring by centralized, organizationally closed units. a second, sympoietic model understands order as a dynamic act of co-structuring by diffuse, interpenetrating processes. the eu contains important elements of both types of social order. third, i show that each type of order suggests a different reaction to our current crises. seen from the perspective of an autopoietic order, crisis appears as a breakdown in hierarchy. as such, the solution comes from centralization and protectionism. seen from a sympoietic perspective, however, crisis appears as the result of hierarchy and exclusion, and thus solutions demand decentralization and democratization. fourth, i begin to assess each of these reactions. ultimately, i argue that autopoietic orders incentivize a winner-takes-all competition that is inherently unstable, producing and reproducing their own cycles of crisis. conversely, sympoiesis centers patterns of mutual adjustment that are inherently dynamic, but not inherently crisis-ridden. fifth, i apply this diagnosis to the current situation in europe, suggesting that reasonably successful patterns of sympoietic adjustment have emerged to manage the tension between nationstate and union institutions, accounting for much of the eu’s longevity in the face of crisis. however, i contend that the entrenchment of neo-liberalism and low-intensity democracy prevents similar patterns from emerging within the nation-state and union, where winner-takes-all competition persists and continually recreates its own internal tensions. while interinstitutional relations have become sympoietic, intra-institutional relations remain deeply autopoietic. the resulting tension lies at the heart of contemporary crises. finally, i conclude by briefly discussing some forms of political and economic organization that give rise to relational patterns better suited to a more thoroughly sympoietic social order. 3 review of european and russian affairs 12 (1), 2018 1. current crises are rooted in structural contests there is a certain degree of ambiguity about the precise nature and ultimate goal of the integration process. the ambiguous, evolutionary nature of the union in turn makes the precise relation between its component parts unclear – more a matter of manoeuvre than settled hierarchy. when policy choices activate these larger, older, more fundamental questions, they can quickly become crises. in greece, for example, what began as an issue of debt quickly became an existential crisis, at least in part because the issue served to activate a litany of more fundamental struggles. through greek crisis, we see the age-old struggle between the nation state and the union, the struggle between public authorities and the discipline of the market, and the struggle between people and their government – all of which have been central themes of the integration project. much the same could be said of brexit, which reflects complex struggles between the union and the british government, the parliament and its citizens, all three of these bodies and the courts, and of course, between finance and the so-called globalization losers. a simple secession becomes a crisis because it activates these larger, older contests. the refugee crisis, too, activates these same struggles between nation and union, between publics and their governments, between all three and their courts, and between vulnerable workers in a global economy and their corporate employers. as all of these struggles coalesce, an influx of refugees becomes a battle for the very soul of europe. each of the current crises therefore activates larger questions about the very nature of the european integration process itself, the relation between its components, and the relative balance of power between them. these questions, triggered by and yet distinct from the policy questions of the particular crisis that spawns them, strike to the heart of the integration process. these questions have the potential to tear the integration process apart. it is by virtue of these tensions that our current challenges are transformed into existential threats. 2. structural contests are an enduring feature of the integration process understanding the structural tensions that underlie current crises begins with understanding that they are far older than the crises themselves. even a brief overview of the political, legal, economic, or civic development of the union suffices to establish clear and enduring patterns of contestation – fundamental questions that occur and reoccur, each time triggering dynamic processes of compromise that adjust the borders between political units to suit current circumstances, yet that never definitively resolve the underlying authority and legitimacy contests. in the political sphere, for example, federalist and nationalist forces have always been engaged in a tug-of-war, pulling back and forth between more centralized and more intergovernmental visions of the european community. it would be difficult to argue that any of the treaties reflect a totally coherent move in one direction or the other. rather, they appear as the result of compromise between conflicting visions over time. these compromises have allowed the union to develop in the face of challenges, but they also leave fundamental questions about the nature of the political community, and in particular where authority and legitimacy lie within it, unresolved. instead, the eu has responded to the ongoing tension by continually compromising, developing and revisiting hybrid institutional structures that reflect both poles imperfectly (liebert 2005). 4 review of european and russian affairs 12 (1), 2018 over time, the legitimacy of these compromises has itself been thrown into question as the permissive consensus has given way and people have begun to assert their own authority, demanding referenda, pushing for civil society consultation, and proposing legislation by popular initiative (saurugger 2010; finke 2007). this challenge revolves around an inherent tension between the sovereignty of a government and the sovereignty of its people. the result is the dynamic development of another compromise structure – a growing european parliament and a technocratic commission busily consulting civil society partners, developing weak-form direct ballot initiatives, and actively cultivating pro-europe ngos, blurring the line between civic and civil. national states, too, have dramatically increased their use of referenda and other quasiparticipatory methods (taggart 2006), while at the same time being challenged by radically democratic movements from the left and frighteningly undemocratic movements on the right (kaldor and selchow 2013; mudde 2004). populist/technocratic, federalist/nationalist, the eu’s political structure has long been marked by enduring tensions that have never been definitively resolved. indeed, many in britain opposed a parliamentary vote on brexit precisely on the grounds that the people had already spoken directly via referendum. implicit in their stance is an ordinal ranking in which the people are supreme over their representatives. conversely, proponents of the remain campaign implore parliament, the courts, the queen – as befits their role as the real decisionmakers of the system – to step in and save the people from themselves. clearly, the issue here is not simply whether or not to brexit. rather, this question has become entangled with the question of who is in charge, and why. the eu treaties of maastricht, nice, and lisbon – as well as the failed 2005 constitution – can all be read as expressions of a long, dynamic struggle over the nature of authority and legitimacy in the european social order (della porta and caiani 2009). in the legal sphere, the court of justice of the eu (cjeu) spent the 1960s boldly proclaiming that eu law is supreme over national law, even over national constitutions. yet, this attempt to establish a clear hierarchy, a clear authority structure, has been resisted by national courts, many of whom are only willing to accept and enforce eu law if it meets certain conditions based within the domestic constitution (maduro 2012; sabel and gerstenberg 2010; maduro 2003). they insist that eu law is not valid unless it respects certain constitutional principles, even as the cjeu insists that the opposite is true. the status of eu law, and indeed of domestic constitutional law, is therefore deeply contested. with the solange decisions, for example, the german constitutional court insisted that eu law could not claim supremacy over the german constitution without adequate human rights protections. the cjeu rejected this stance in principle, but busily developed human rights protections in practice. the germans, satisfied with the changes made, agreed to stop reviewing eu law against the national constitution, while still insisting on their own ability to do so if they see fit. the system functions only through a series of dynamic compromises that allow competing authority claims to coexist without resolution. other spheres have seen just as much contestation, but far fewer compromises. in the economic sphere, we see a historic interplay between public sovereignty, in the form of governmental institutions, and private sovereignty, in the form of private ownership protected by extensive, justiciable economic rights (fritjof and mattei 2015). the role of the market and state are at stake in this contest, and together they work to exclude other forms of political and economic 5 review of european and russian affairs 12 (1), 2018 organization. pro-market forces seem to have run up the score, yet the anti-austerity movements of the periphery make it painfully clear that the fundamental contest over the role of the free market remains unresolved. considering the political, legal, economic, and civic development of the union in concert, a clear pattern begins to emerge. each of these fields would be difficult to characterize through a stable structure or a coherent logic. instead, authority and legitimacy are fundamentally contested. the exact boundaries between various authority systems are blurry, and the entire process is inherently dynamic. in response, european actors have engaged in complex acts of negotiation that allow the integration project to proceed without actually resolving these fundamental questions one way or the other. the system is not animated only by structure, but also by compromise. as a result, authority and legitimacy remain fundamentally contested. indeed, such contestation seems inherent in the structure of the union itself. in this context of deep, dynamic tension, the spate of recent crises is more readily comprehensible – it is not simply that exogenous shocks are causing an otherwise stable union to disintegrate – rather, crises become existential as they activate a variety of long-standing tensions in concert, thus laying bare a fundamental ambiguity at the heart of the integration process. 3. two models of social order and structural contestation so, our current crises are linked to longstanding structural contestation. however, these contests are not just contests between social actors, but rather contests over the very way order is understood in europe. at stake are two very different ways of understanding of what order is, and hence, two very different conceptions of the current crises, and two very different ideas of how best to respond. what i will call the autopoietic model of order stems from a familiar story rooted in the enlightenment: the religious wars of the 16th and 17th century and the peace of westphalia. in essence, europe had been experiencing extremely bloody contests that reflected conflicting authority claims – monarchical, noble, papal, reformist, merchant, peasant – all interacting dynamically in a messy, violent competition with each claiming authority as far as their armies and purses could reach. the solution was to separate these conflicting claimants, insofar as possible, into water-tight compartments, each of whom would determine the nature of its own social order internally and without interference from the others. each sovereign would be omnipotent within their territories but totally impotent beyond them. as a result, authority would be clear. on any given territory, there would be a single authority, and hence, no conflicts (havercroft 2011). this pattern of organization is mirrored in the figure of the private property owner. for any piece of property, there is a single owner. their rights over that property are absolute, and their rights to the property of others are nonexistent. the system is based on hard boundaries between properties and clear authority over them. in this sense, private property and state sovereignty form an integrated system based on the same organizational logic (capra and mattei 2015). there are three conceptual linchpins to this logic: first, the total concentration of authority in a given territory/property; second, the maintenance of water-tight boundaries between territories/properties; and;third, an understanding these of borders and authority structures as stable and static. together, these three mechanisms prevent conflicting authority claims and thereby 6 review of european and russian affairs 12 (1), 2018 secure peace, both domestically and internationally. working with this understanding of social order, any ambiguity about where authority lies, any contest of authority, or any shifting or penetrating of established boundaries appears as crisis (havercroft 2011). where there is no bounded hierarchy, autopoiesis can perceive no order. the influence of this way of understanding of social order is evident in some of the more challenging reactions our current crises have provoked. in a context of fundamentally contested authority and unclear boundaries between components of a system that never seems fixed or stable, we react by hardening borders, centralizing authority and resisting change. the uk takes back its own sovereignty and control of its borders. greece sees authority displaced from the government to the troika as the borders of the eurozone are declared inviolable. refugee flows see countries close their borders as authoritarian right-wing parties gain support. in short, we appear to react to our state of contested authority and shifting responsibility by seeking clear, stable authority structures and clear, permanent boundaries, just as we did in the 17th century. this understanding of social systems has been termed autopoietic – literally, created by the self – because it shares illuminating similarities with autopoietic systems in ecology and information science. in these disciplines, autopoietic systems are systems that continually reproduce themselves according to their own internal logic, free from outside influences on their internal organization. such systems are therefore self-producing, self-referential, self-organizing, and selfcontained. as the natural and human sciences have progressed, however, they have become increasingly sensitive to the blind spots inherent in this heuristic. the very conceptual assumptions that allow us to perceive the individual units of a system also direct our attention away from the complex connections between them. as a result, rival paradigms are emerging and re-emerging, focusing on the connections and relationships between entities and their constitutive role in organizing said entities. these models understand order as sympoietic – co-created. because they understand order as something multilateral and relational, sympoietic models accept fuzzy, dynamic borders and a lack of settled hierarchy as normal. instead of looking for order in bounded hierarchy, they look for order in the practices of mutual adjustment that allow actors to navigate their shifting environments. drawing on cellular biology, ecology, and planning theory, dempster elaborates: in contrast to their autopoietic cousins, sympoietic systems are “conceptually ajar” – neither totally open nor totally closed (2000, 6). their internal structure is in part determined by the system itself and in part by the influence of the surrounding systems with which it interacts. in this sense, its boundaries are ‘fuzzy,’ rather than sharp. for example, a healthy forest like ours in british columbia is ordered according to complex internal relationships in interaction with the prairie, coastal, alpine, and tundra ecosystems that surround it. changes in one produce changes in the others. exact boundaries shift with climatic and other conditions. even when conditions are stable, it can be difficult to say precisely where one ecosystem stops and another starts – trees thin out, meadows increase in frequency, large trees give way to small shrubs and then to grasses and herbs – where in this zone does the forest end and the prairie begin? understanding such systems means focusing on relationships, not bounded units. 7 review of european and russian affairs 12 (1), 2018 sympoietic systems also feature “distributed control,” in that the health of the overall system is determined by many actors rather than being concentrated at a few crucial nodes (dempster 2000). the concept of keystone species is helpful here. keystone species are species whose presence supports a disproportionate amount of the total system, such that the entire system becomes vulnerable when this species is disrupted. when ecosystems are organized around just a few keystone species, they become highly vulnerable to disruption. in these systems, control of the overall ecosystem is concentrated. when there are many keystone species, control over the overall health of the system is distributed. again, understanding ecosystem dynamics means moving beyond component parts to the connections between them. order is seen as a function of relationship, not a function of structure. such systems give rise to emergent properties – properties that are attributes of the system itself, even though they are not attributes of any of its component parts (bedau and humphreys 2008; kauffman 1993). consider, for example, the relationship between courts and governments in a checks-and-balances system of government: the system as a whole produces a rough balance between individual rights and collective goods, despite (or indeed, precisely because of) the fact that each branch of government leans decidedly in one direction or the other. the system has a balancing character that is not reducible to its components; rather, it is defined by its relationships. sympoiesis, therefore, invokes a system where multiple participants co-create social order, which exists as an emergent property of their relations and interactions. such systems depend on distributed control and fuzzy boundaries in order to make room for the wide range of relations they employ to find dynamic balance (bellamy 2013; maduro 2003; de sousa santos 1987). many aspects of the eu can be fruitfully understood through an autopoietic lens. on one level, europe is a system of more or less bounded structures, each of which manoeuvres to occupy the apex of a hierarchical order. yet, important elements of the integration process suggest a more sympoietic form of order. the functionalist development of the eu is in many ways similar to an emergent order, creating novel political structures unpredictably in an environment of disequilibrium and change. its legal, political, economic, and civic structures can be understood not as water-tight compartments ordered neatly according to a single logic, but as the result of multiple intersecting influences, each of which ebbs and flows. the boundaries between systems can be seen to shift over time; the commission’s power waxes and wanes, or policy issues move from the national to the supranational level. similarly, control can be thought of as distributed amoung a number of keystone actors, each of which has the potential to radically destabilize the entire system. as we have seen, the legal and political structures of the european social order can be considered co-created by a variety of actors in dynamic tension. finally, the life of the system has not been characterized by homeostasis; rather, its history is dynamic, evolutionary, and punctuated by surprising changes. all of this suggests that europe’s recent crises and the enduring contests they are rooted in both point to a larger dilemma: europe contains (at least) two fundamentally different understandings of what order is and how to secure it. 8 review of european and russian affairs 12 (1), 2018 4. two heuristics, two understandings of crisis, two reactions because autopoiesis understands order as a function of centralized control within hard boundaries, it attributes crisis to a breakdown in bounded hierarchy. this view suggests that the heart of the refugee crisis is an inability to effectively police borders. the heart of the greek crisis is the inability of the eu to control its members’ spending in a top-down manner. the heart of brexit is the loss of british sovereignty. as a result, autopoiesis suggests a set of reactions based on hardening borders and clarifying hierarchies, all designed to reinstate clear, bounded systems of authority. yet, precisely because these reactions are based on hierarchy and exclusion, the relational dynamic they set in place tends to be inherently adversarial. those who are at the bottom and those who are excluded will always seek to disrupt the established order (rancière 2010). this, in turn, will create incentives for said order to become increasingly rigid, oppressive, and violent in order to maintain the centralization and exclusion that define it as a system. this strategy of oppression and domination sends a clear message, that ‘domination is the currency of this system, and whoever can dominate others most effectively shall rule.’ hearing this message, those who resist accordingly become increasingly aggressive, seeking to impose their preferred solutions on society by capturing the centralized power apparatus. power is understood as being concentrated in one place, and so everyone competes to take it. rather than delivering us from a state of ‘war of all against all,’ autopoiesis ensures it. as a result of this cycle, systems perceived by their participants to be autopoietic are always locked in a risky life-or-death struggle against their own constituent parts. in fact, autopoietic systems generate and regenerate their own crises, self-replicating the very hierarchical, exclusionary dynamics that continually throw the system into question. a long history of revolutions and counter-revolutions, invasions and insurgencies, coups and tyrants attests to this cycle of instability (tully 2014; 2008). so does the nature of capitalist accumulation, which proceeds through endless cycles of boom and bust – regularized crises that are built into the system itself (lazzarato 2012). the tragedy of the commons provides another example, as the exclusive nature of property incentivizes cycles of overuse and ecological crisis (tully et al 2016; polanyi 2001). in all these ways, the system actively undoes the very preconditions of its existence. such autopoietic systems are crisis-ridden by design. conversely, sympoietic conceptions of order portray authority and legitimacy as constantly in flux, always contested, always multilateral, and always something that exists only in relation to and with the others who co-create it. sympoiesis, therefore, presents a very different understanding of our current crises. where autopoiesis perceives a lack of bounded hierarchy, sympoiesis sees a lack of reciprocity. the heart of the refugee crisis is not a lack of police on the border, but rather the unbalanced relationship between the two sides of that border. the heart of the euro crisis is not a lack of centralized budgetary control, but rather the unbalanced fiscal relationship between the european core and its periphery, between finance and government. the heart of brexit is not the invasion of british sovereignty, but rather a deficient relationship between national and eu institutions. instead of reinforcing divisions and establishing hierarchy, sympoiesis asks us to pursue order by being inclusive and seeking balance. 9 review of european and russian affairs 12 (1), 2018 this self-perception sets in motion a very different relational dynamic. a sympoietic heuristic portrays systems as a function of mutual influence. because the flow of influence is recognized as always being multi-directional and reciprocal, winner-take-all contests are an incoherent idea. the winner never takes all. even the most powerful actors remain inherently dependent on and shaped by the influence of others. in fact, their power is a function of their relationships – an actor cannot be powerful without the active participation of others who sustain it. domination, then, becomes a rather short-sighted tactic, one that will inevitably undercut itself in the long run. in this way, understanding systems as sympoietic gives rise to a very different incentive structure and encourages a very different relational dynamic. rather than facing a stark choice between domination and being dominated, actors are faced with a full range of possible relationships that they can explore to meet their particular needs. importantly, meeting the needs of others upon whom one depends becomes an important aspect of one’s own self-interest. each actor is therefore actively attentive to the conditions of its own existence, rather than parasitic upon them. this conception of power, often called power-with, is more dynamic, flexible, and creative than powerover. it is less hierarchical, less violent, and ultimately more robust because it focuses actors’ attention on perpetuating, rather than undermining, the preconditions for its own existence. this changes the nature of social order – in sympoiesis, power comes through the responsiveness of others. because sympoiesis encourages us to conceive of our power as a function of our relationships, it tends not to generate the same competitive dynamics. instead of cycles where violence begets violence, sympoietic systems generate cycles of reciprocity (tully 2018). such cycles, when they function well, do not destabilize the system as such. the system is able to change and reorder the relation of its parts continuously without experiencing such change as crisis. sympoietic systems may encounter crises, certainly, but they do not continually self-produce crisis. sympoiesis and autopoiesis are therefore associated with starkly different understandings of social order, each of which suggests different reactions to crisis. these reactions in turn set in motion different relational dynamics. autopoiesis suggests that order is a function of bounded hierarchy, so it responds to crisis by hardening borders and centralizing power. yet, this sets in motion an adversarial relationship that continually reproduces its own cycles of crisis. in contrast, sympoiesis sees order as a function of balanced, reciprocal relationships. as such, it responds to crisis by pursing equality in the place of hierarchy and inclusion in the place of boundedness. the result is inherently unstable, but for this very reason, it is not inherently crisis-ridden. 5. borders, hierarchies, and crises in contemporary europe as we have seen, the european order contains elements of both models. in fact, i contend that the development of sympoietic relationships has been one of the most significant successes of the european project and that they lie at the heart of its resilience. for example, the current institutional structure of the eu has proven flexible enough for various institutions and ideologies to wax and wane informally, while treaty negotiations have proven capable of continually balancing federalist and nationalist visions of the union. control in this field is distributed – multiple institutional actors are vital to, and have the power to radically destabilize, each of the others. similarly, the boundaries between them are fuzzy; where exactly does the ‘national’ system end and the 10 review of european and russian affairs 12 (1), 2018 ‘european’ system begin? members of the european parliament are elected nationally, but grouped by political association. commissioners and judges are chosen by states, but do not represent them. union services are often delivered by local governments – the boundaries are fuzzy, flexible, and interpenetrating. as a result, power is defined largely through relationships and through the ability to influence others. rather than engaging in conflict, governments typically negotiate and seek compromise. when political challenges arise, they typically play out peacefully through a number of balancing mechanisms that, although permitting substantial change, do not threaten the integrity of the system itself. in the legal sphere, too, the practices of mutual accommodation developed by european courts reflect reasonably sound relational dynamics. here, too, control is distributed. indeed, the ability of each court to radically question the legitimacy of its peers is a crucial motivating factor (maduro 2003). likewise, the compromise reached at any moment is always provisional – courts revisit and revise the exact relationship between european and national law continually, adjusting the boundary zones between them. eu law is supreme and directly effective, yet enforced by national courts in accordance with domestic institutional structures and constitutional traditions. at the same time, the judges of the cjeu understand eu law as explicitly based in those same national constitutional traditions: where exactly does eu law end and national law begin? like a forest, the european legal environment has fuzzy, indeterminate boundary zones rather than sharply policed borders. as in the political sphere, these features have produced cycles of mutual adjustment whereby legal actors continually readjust their relationship without destabilizing conflict – without crisis. on balance, then, europe has developed a rather successful sympoietic system in a number of ways. both governmental and legal structures ebb and flow constantly, but these movements almost never destabilize the system as a whole. however, there are other areas where more autopoietic practices persist. first, political balancing occurs almost exclusively at an interinstitutional level. national and european institutions may have reached a state of distributed control vis-à-vis one another, but they each remain highly concentrated internally. at each level, power is concentrated in a remarkably small group of officials, leaders, and business people, to the exclusion of the vast majority of the population. krasner’s distinction between internal and external sovereignty is useful here – externally, institutions have become more sympoietic in their interactions with one another, yet, internally, they remain highly centralized and bounded (1999). as a result, control is distributed between elites, but not between them and the general public. indeed, this is a general feature of representative, or low-intensity, democracy – elections function as mechanisms for selecting a small group in whom authority will be concentrated. this form of democracy is inherently centralizing. similarly, the boundaries between elites and masses in europe are increasingly sharp. formerly political issues are increasingly the purview of judges or bureaucrats. the fuzzy zone between the powerful and the powerless is shrinking, producing two increasingly polarized groups (mudde 2004). systemic reactions to this tension have been woefully inadequate. the growing power of the european parliament belies its continued weakness, and further has no effect on the fact that referenda and elections are purely schumpeterian in nature – the people get to say yes or no, but they cannot actually shape their environment in an intensive manner (schumpeter 1947). other 11 review of european and russian affairs 12 (1), 2018 reforms that more closely approximate meaningful input are structurally weak. direct ballot initiatives remain largely non-binding, as do civil society consultations and public consultations of all kinds. the so-called participatory turn is merely an attempt to buttress the legitimacy of lowintensity representative democracy without altering its foundations (della porta and caiani 2009). control has not been effectively distributed. borders between rule-makers and rule-followers have not been adequately blurred. the result is the current surge in populism; people understand power to be an all-or-nothing affair, and, perceiving that they have nothing, they strive to take all instead. this manifests as a violent reaction against the current system, a reaction that, of course, both destabilizes that system and encourages it to become more oppressive. in the wake of the brexit referendum many decry the overuse of democracy and profess nostalgia for bygone days of backroom deals and expert influence. the threat of populism is used to resist any move to distribute power or soften boundaries. this reaction only provokes further and more extreme populism, and so the cycle continues, continually recreating its own crises. right-wing, authoritarian populism is not a caution against sympoiesis, but rather a creature of autopoiesis; its exclusionary, hierarchal logic is a natural outgrowth of a perverse systemic dynamic. the economic sphere demonstrates these same deficiencies even more clearly. as income inequality rises, economic control is becoming shockingly concentrated in the wealthiest segments of society. in a context of capital mobility, large corporations are able to dramatically shape their environment, even as the ability of organized labour and elected governments to do the same is curtailed (gill and cutler 2015). this makes the system vulnerable to shocks, as keystone species – those corporations that are ‘too big to fail’ – wield wildly disproportionate influence. at the same time, the judicialization of neo-liberal economic policy through eu treaties and cjeu jurisprudence erects increasingly sharp boundaries between public and private sovereignty, carving out a hard sphere of private activity and shielding it from public intervention. any flexibility in the face of changing circumstances is consequently eroded. once again, this concentration of power and hardening of boundaries produces and reproduces crises, as life for the poor becomes harder and harder, and challenges to the economic system become more and more extreme. the state responds by protecting capital but this only further radicalizes the marginalized. for example, witness the growth of the italian commons movement in direct relation to the italian state’s decisions to protect capital (mattei 2013). when borders are hard and control centralized, adversarial processes ensue, rendering the system permanently unstable and coercive. in fact, these two deficiencies are historically and structurally related. hierarchical states actively expand and protect hierarchical markets, which in turn feed and empower those states (capra and mattei 2015). thus, neo-liberal economics and low-intensity democracy co-constitute each other, each feeding a concentration of power in the other while hardening the border between them. together, they constitute an important bastion of autopoietic order. indeed, the combination of these two factors – economic disillusionment and political disenfranchisement – does much to explain the volatility of the euro, brexit, and refugee crises alike. in all cases, our more robustly sympoietic political and legal processes seemed to function relatively well until stressed by explosive populist or financial pressures. for example, the issue of greek debt became a truly existential crisis when european and international authorities decided to protect and harden the autonomy of the market from social interference (hardening borders) by unilaterally imposing a series of policy conditions upon a democratic government (concentrating control). this reaction triggered the rise of a populist government and movement, which in turn 12 review of european and russian affairs 12 (1), 2018 occasioned a high-stakes referendum and a series of dramatic winner-take-all negotiations. in other words, the crisis developed precisely because european authorities refused to countenance the sort of genuine dialogue and mutual adjustment that flow from a sympoietic analysis. in this way, the concepts of sympoiesis and autopoiesis give us important tools for understanding the integration project, with the simultaneous presence and absence of bounded hierarchy helping to explain what makes integration at once so resilient, and yet, so crisis-prone. while largely sympoietic relations between institutions work to stabilize the system in a dynamic environment, the persistence of hierarchy and exclusion within those institutions sets in motion a relational dynamic that continually reproduces systemic crises. as zielonka notes, relations between institutions have become increasingly interpenetrating, co-constitutive, and polycentric, while at the same time, meaningful democracy within those institutions remains elusive – a condition he has aptly named “empire” (2007). or, as andersen and burns put it, a “democracy of organizations” has displaced the democracy of citizens (1996). this suggests that our current challenges go far beyond fiscal management or refugee processing. rather, addressing europe’s multiple crises requires extending the logic of sympoiesis to radically redistribute political and economic clout on an interpersonal scale. 6. towards a more robust relational dynamic if we choose to embrace a conception of european order as sympoietic, then we must conclude that we need to distribute control and blur boundaries not only at the interinstitutional level, but also at the interpersonal level. we need to resist hierarchies and exclusions, both between institutions, and also within them. since intra-institutional relations lag behind so badly, we need to focus in particular on the mechanisms of low-intensity democracy and neoliberal economics that largely define them. this means that we need to find ways to radically democratize, localize, and redistribute political and economic power between individuals and groups. much as in nature, such mechanisms emerge organically, but their ability to stabilize the system as a whole depends on their ability to spread and grow – to become defining patterns of relation within the system. consider, for example, the italian commons movement (mattei 2013; bailey and mattei 2013). originally organized around resistance to privatization, especially of water and other communal resources, commons activists and scholars enact a new form of property that is neither private nor public (in the sense of stateowned). instead, it is ‘common,’ belonging directly to the people who depend on it, and to the future generations who someday will. mattei (2013) describes this system as an alternative to the private/public dichotomy – a form of resource management that is equidistant from both state and corporate models, with their shared vision of hierarchical control and exclusive use. instead, commons activists seek to put any “goods whose utility is functional to the pursuit of fundamental rights and free development of the person” – everything from water systems, to lodging, to theatres – under the direct participatory control of their users, who are tasked with ensuring said resource is and remains accessible to all who need it in perpetuity (rodotá commission 2007). in this sense, huge swaths of the economy are put under social control, giving regular people and local communities the ability to meaningfully shape their own economic realities, thus distributing control from a few corporate nodes to a much wider array of participants. 13 review of european and russian affairs 12 (1), 2018 such forms of organization are still incipient, but their potential to blur the boundary between public and private ownership is clear. the commons movement, therefore, gestures towards what a more sympoietic economy might look like – one able to provide more stable, equitable, and democratic relational dynamics. de sousa santos (2007) emphasizes a similar model of worker-owned, community-managed cooperatives. like the commons, these cooperative structures put economic production in the hands of their participants, blurring, or perhaps transcending, the line between worker and owner. in the best examples, such co-ops are also community organizations, using any profits to meet the needs and desires of the wider community by developing other participatory community services. gradually, these participatory productive and service delivery units form networks, feeding into and supporting each other’s processes so that control over any single initiative is not only internally distributed amongst its members, but is also distributed amongst its social partners (ibid.). in stark contrast to the hierarchical and bounded relationship between a multinational corporation and its subcontractors, the local economy becomes a negotiated affair, as interlocking participatory units co-determine production and consumption patterns and conditions. spain’s 15m provides another fascinating set of innovations (ouziel 2015). this movement, which arose in opposition to austerity and corporatization, is organized through a series of semiautonomous territorial and functional assemblies. each assembly is literally a public gathering – decisions are not made by delegates or representatives, but by whomever cared enough to show up and speak up. each assembly works autonomously, in that it does not require approval from its peers in order to act. rather, spontaneous federations of assemblies arise on an issue-by-issue basis – one assembly proposes an action, and any others who are interested join in. those who wish to pursue their own way are free to do so. such federations do make use of delegates, but their power is always actively contingent on the continuing support of the assembly and can be withdrawn at any time (ibid.). in this way, the borders of the political organization are inherently dynamic and multi-scale. governance occurs at different scales, and thus involves different actors, for different tasks. similarly, the boundary between representative and represented is inherently blurry – all participate in the assembly on equal footing, and any authority of the former is only temporarily and contingently delegated from the latter. even the boundary between participant and nonparticipant is fluid, in that whoever shows up to a given assembly has a voice within it. no proof of citizenship or past participation is needed, and participants can drop in and out without obstruction (ouziel 2015, 206). control of the system is distributed, both between assemblies and within them. ian shapiro (2003; 2000) provides another, starkly different source of inspiration, exploring how the boundaries of the demos can be made dynamic and fluid, encompassing all affected by a given decision, and none who are not. in this way, democratic decision-making occurs without a stable demos. in contrast to a traditional state, the fluidity of borders allows the community to be explicitly shaped by the interlocking systems that surround and interpenetrate it. innovations like these, paired with more robust forms of democratic participation (e.g., citizens’ assemblies, direct ballot initiatives, participatory budgeting, etc.) can help us begin to soften the hard borders of the demos and flatten the hierarchies within them, moving us towards forms of political association more suited to a sympoietic understanding. 14 review of european and russian affairs 12 (1), 2018 the challenge of our times is therefore to approach current policy problems – the continuing influx of refugees, the persistence of populism, the accumulation of debt – as opportunities for what de sousa santos has called “non-reformist reforms” (de sousa santos 2007, 4). such reforms do not aim at comprehensive revolution, but rather at the cultivation of pre-figurative structures – structures that fundamentally reject the logic of autopoiesis, neoliberalism and low-intensity democracy, and that will therefore help to bring about the sort of transformative relational dynamic that they themselves embody. conclusions in sum, i have argued that contemporary crises are rooted in enduring structural tensions that have long animated the integration process. these enduring tensions reveal two contrasting models of social order, autopoietic and sympoietic, each of which is at work in europe today. naturally, each gives rise to a different diagnosis of our current crises and each suggests different responses. autopoiesis sees order as a function of bounded hierarchy. as a result, it suggests a need to harden boundaries and centralize power. however, this paper argues that this approach incentivizes a winner-takes-all competition, which continually produces and reproduces new crises. in contrast, sympoiesis sees order as a result of reciprocal relationships. this suggests a need to distribute power and blur boundaries. such an approach creates cycles of mutual adjustment, to be sure, but not cycles of crisis. applying this analysis to europe, much of the eu’s resilience can be attributed to the development of sympoietic mechanisms between union and national institutions. at the same time, however, the persistence of bounded authority within those institutions, and in particular the coordinatepairing of low-intensity democracy and neo-liberal economics, is continuing to produce systemic crises. hence, europe appears both remarkably successful and continually precarious. i conclude that overcoming europe’s multiple crises means going beyond the particular policy problems that animate them and seeking structural reforms that radically decentralize political and economic power within institutions, as well as between them. 15 review of european and russian affairs 12 (1), 2018 references andersen, svein and burns, tom. 1996. “the european union and the erosion of parliamentary democracy: a study of post-parliamentary governance.” in the european union: how democratic is it?. edited by svein andersen and kjell a. alliassen. london: sage? bailey, saki and ugo mattei. 2013. “social movements as constituent power: the italian struggle for the commons.” indiana journal of global legal studies 20(2): 965-1013. bedau, mark and 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"editorial, introducing global integral constitutionalism." global constitutionalism 5(1): 1-15. zielonka, jan. 2007. europe as empire. oxford: oxford university press 18 review of european and russian affairs 12 (1), 2018 published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada available online at: journals.carleton.ca/rera/index.php/rera rera is an electronic academic peer-reviewed journal that publishes graduate, post-graduate, and young scholarly works. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is a joint project supported by the canadaeurope transatlantic dialogue—a cross-canada research network supported by the social sciences and humanities research council of canada (sshrc)—along with the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies (carleton university) and its associated research unit, the centre for european studies. rera aims to provide an accessible forum for research, to promote high standards of research and scholarship, and to foster communication among young scholars. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada tel: +01 613 520-2600 ext. 3117; e-mail: rera-journal@carleton.ca creative commons license creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0 this working paper is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial no derivs 3.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 3.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, provided the source is acknowledged. no use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes. issn: 1718-4835 © 2018 the author(s) https://journals.carleton.ca/rera/index.php/rera mailto:rera-journal@carleton.ca http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ microsoft word irinaaervitz_rera_paper.doc review of european and russian affairs vol. 1 no. 1 december 2005 © rera 2005 all rights reserved ………………………………………………………………… elites in transition: case of privatization in veliky novgorod russia irina aervitz abstract this paper is an attempt to develop a critical reflection on the social, political, and economic transformation that russia experienced in the last couple of decades. i argue that the continuity of elites in russia is one of the major features of its transition. this paper attempts to illuminate the continuity of elites as a general trend by using the case study of the privatization process in veliky novgord, russia. this project looks at privatization as an avenue or means of resource allocation by elites during the transition. the data were obtained from 16 structured and unstructured interviews conducted in veliky novgorod in the summer 2004 among the representatives of the business and political elites. this paper deals with one group of the nomenklatura elite – top enterprise managers. review of european and russian affairs vol. 1 no. 1 december 2005 © rera 2005 all rights reserved 2 features of the russian transition there is a recognized trend to call the russian transition from the soviet regime to the post-soviet era a revolution. strobe talbott, referring to the russian transition from the soviet past to the new system, wrote: “the most recent russian revolution…was actually three in one: the russians were trying to transform their country from a totalitarian system to democracy; from a command economy to a market one; and from a multinational empire to a nation-state” (strobe talbott, 2002, 53). mau and staradubrovskaya examine the “russian revolution” in the broad historical context, drawing comparisons between the recent transition in russia, the russian bolshevik revolution of 1917, the english civil war, and the great french revolution (v. mau and i. starodubrovskaya 2001). however, there might be alternative perspectives on the nature of transition in russia. one of these perspectives is the elite theory thesis of elites’ continuity. though the question whether russia experienced a revolution or not is beyond the scope of this paper, i would argue that some aspects of the russian transition from the soviet regime to the post-soviet era can be better perceived through the prisms of the elite continuity rather than a revolutionary change. the nomenklaura1 was a vast network of connections, personal relationships, and clans. after privatization the new elite officially acquired the ownership over means of production. sakwa claims that 75 percent of the new political elite and 61 percent of the new business elite came from the old nomenklatura elite (richard sakwa 2002, 451).2 even the so-called liberal reformers who conducted the economic reforms in the 90s did not believe that they would create 1 the nomenklatura consisted of the party members, komsomol members, and managers of enterprises. 2 sakwa grounds these numbers on the survey conducted by olga kryshanovskaya in 1994, 1995 and 1996. review of european and russian affairs vol. 1 no. 1 december 2005 © rera 2005 all rights reserved 3 a class of genuine entrepreneurs because corporatization or managers’ privatization was a significant part of the privatization reform. kryshtanovskaya and white argue: “formerly the privileges of the nomenklatura had been largely in kind, reflected in the granting of state property for private use, or in money and special services; now they began to acquire an increasingly ‘monetary’ character, with its members allowed to engage in activities that were prohibited for others and to make profits from such activities” (olga kryshtanovskaya and stephen white 1998, 88). privatization of the state by the elite was one of the major avenues of resource allocation by the former soviet elite. state enterprises were turned into commercial enterprises, joint-stock companies, or concerns. the major element of the russian privatization reform included corporatization. the goal of this strategy was to let managers allocate the control rights of enterprises that they had managed during the soviet times. the russian privatization program divided firms into those that could be privatized and those whose privatization was prohibited like, for example, railroad transport, space exploration, health, and education. then firms open to corporatization had to reregister as joint stock companies with 100 percent of equity owned by the government, a corporate charter, and a board of directors. the board consisted of the firm’s general manager (with two votes), the workers, and federal and local government representation. to privatize a company, the management had to assess its value in order to determine its charter capital (maxim boycko, andrei shleifer and robert vishny 1995, 75). the process of evaluation was an unfathomable source of corruption: managers strove to minimize the value of enterprises in the hope to purchase the shares later. the privatization program worked out three packages of benefits for managers and workers of the enterprise under privatization. these packages came to be called options. option 1 was review of european and russian affairs vol. 1 no. 1 december 2005 © rera 2005 all rights reserved 4 the most popular in the parliament. it presupposed that managers and employees would buy out 51 percent of the voting equity at a nominal price of 1.7 times the july 1992 book value of assets. in the end, a workers’ collective guided by its manager had the right under the privatization program to select its benefits option. “taking the workers’ selection into account, the managers then had to submit to their local gki office (state committee on the management of state property) a privatization plan that described how the rest of the shares were to be sold” (maxim boycko, andrei shleifer and robert vishny 1995, 80). the principal forms of sale were voucher auctions and investment tenders. thus, the management of the privatized firms had complete control over the strategy of privatization. privatization in veliky novgorod choice of case veliky novgorod provides an excellent opportunity for the study of regional elites in russia. it is the capital of the novgorod region. it hosts both a municipal and a regional administration. veliky novgorod is a city in the north-west of russia, located between moscow in the south and st. petersburg in the north. veliky novgorod is a city with rich historical heritage. in the middle ages lord novgorod the great was a trade center in the north-west of russia, member of the hanseatic league (a north european alliance of trading cities), and a republic with a popular assembly. today veliky novgorod is the center of novgporod region or oblast, which is the region with conducive investment climate that attracts investors with local tax incentives and authorities’ support. usually scholars of democratization talk about institutional design at the central level. that is why the book of nicolai petro on the study of democratization process in novgorod region review of european and russian affairs vol. 1 no. 1 december 2005 © rera 2005 all rights reserved 5 stands out. one of his contributions is that he shifts analytical attention from the study of the structure and efficiency of government at the national level to the regional level (petro, nicolai 2004, 3). petro claims that the local government used local myths, references to the historical background of political independence and economic development to manage rapid social change in novgorod region. officials of both administrations and local businessmen were the target of this research. they provided their insights on how privatization was implemented in veliky novgorod. the interviews were conducted off the record. thus, the respondents’ names and positions are kept confidential. the way privatization was held in veliky novgorod, though with some specific features characteristic of this city only, reflects the general trend – privatization was often used by the former soviet managers and other nomenklatura members as a means of resource allocation. the specific contextual features are important, however, for the purposes of the future cross-regional comparative studies. the enterprises in veliky novgorod can be divided into two broad categories: profitable industries like food industry, forest-processing industry, etc. and the so-called defense industry. in the first case of more profitable and efficient industries, the top management usually appropriated the enterprises. the defense enterprises became less efficient due to the collapse of the military industry with its network of demand and supply controlled by the state in the soviet times. the directors of the defense enterprises hesitated to become owners. food industry and other profitable industries at the beginning of the 90s, the top management of financially viable enterprises usually announced the first or the second models of privatization and then bought shares from the review of european and russian affairs vol. 1 no. 1 december 2005 © rera 2005 all rights reserved 6 employees. one of the respondents noted that the top management adjusted better than the rest of the employees: they were the managers. they had a better vision and they could foresee the outcome. an employee who had the voucher did not know what to do with it. so, they just sold it. to buy an enterprise one has to buy the control package of shares. this trick has been widely used. you have to buy the control package: 30-40%, then you become the member of the board of directors. the chubais’ model that everyone would manage an enterprise is a lie. look at novobank: it had about 600 shareholders. were they going to influence the management of the enterprise? no. they had to vote for some decision. all 600 voted negatively, but the tableaux showed that 99% voted ‘yes”. how? 600 shareholders represent just 1% of the shares. it is a classic example how these enterprises became to be managed. no one also paid dividends. for example, “alkon”3 has some revenues. the question is whether to pay dividends or invest into the production. the board of directors votes to invest the money into the production development. they bought additional equipment, etc. those who invested into the production survived and continued to work. an example of a successful enterprise and a successful soviet director who turned into a post-soviet owner is the timber-processing factory director slutzker. he has 50 years of experience working in the industry in novgorod oblast. he was a director before and after the economic reforms and he is successful now. there are several heads of enterprises in veliky novgorod that had been working successfully before the reforms and remained in their position after the reforms. among these directors can be named nekrasov,4 ivanov,5 bobrishev.6 a respondent explained how the directors received the control package of shares in most cases: the part of shares was distributed among the personnel. at first people thought that they would be owners, but they had this illusion till the first meeting of the shareholders. he would come to the meeting with his five shares that constitute about 0.0000001 of the whole package, so he was not able to influence any decision. people got disappointed and sold them at a lowest price. the earlier the privatization held the lower was the price of shares. the majority of enterprises were shutdown; people did not receive salaries, so they sold their shares. 3 a local spirit factory. 4 director of the meat-processing factory the director of the meat-processing factory. 5 director general of the chemical plant “akron.” 6 director general of the spirit factory “alkon.” review of european and russian affairs vol. 1 no. 1 december 2005 © rera 2005 all rights reserved 7 another respondent stated that the directors, if the enterprise was appealing, would encourage the employees to sell shares to them, rather than to the outside party. the message was that a person from outside would close an enterprise and lay off people. why would an outside investor close an enterprise? the top management was seeding panic to manipulate the employees. this respondent also noted that practically all former soviet directors of food industry enterprises in veliky novgorod became owners of these enterprises. food industry has obvious advantages: revenues are quick to receive, there is always a local demand, and raw material is local as well. frequently the heads of the enterprises were able to persuade people to sell the shares to them since they managed these enterprises before, so the assumption was that they would be good owners. though the majority of red directors did not know much about the market, most, however, became quickly oriented. some would become owners and sell their enterprise; some would invest into production and expand it. one of the respondents said: a director is not a blue-collar worker. i know one director who was able to accumulate (probably with dummies) about 85% of all shares. the rest belonged to the engineers, etc, whom he needed and had a good relationship with. the director had an important impact on this decision what kind of the joint stock company to chose. they acted differently though. some felt that there was not going to be an outside investor to this enterprise. so, they would create a closed joint stock company, divide the shares between themselves and wait till the potential buyer appears. others felt that enterprise could die out without external investment, so they chose a second model of privatization and turn it into an open joint stock company encouraging external investment. there were objective obstacles to the development of even potentially profitable enterprises: economic uncertainty, inadequate tax burden and other regulations imposed by the state, competition with cheap imported goods, etc. certainly the success of many enterprises can be attributed to the personal traits of some former soviet managers, their entrepreneurial talents. for example, the directors of the local meat and spirit factories opened their own shops to sell review of european and russian affairs vol. 1 no. 1 december 2005 © rera 2005 all rights reserved 8 their products. another factor that influenced an economic success of enterprises is a good relationship with the local authorities. this good relationship could not appear overnight though – it was based on years of cooperation and networking under the soviet system. another successful enterprise is the huge chemical factory that produces fertilizers. this enterprise exports its products abroad. the story behind the privatization of this enterprise is that its owner kanter is considered to be one of the richest people in russia, an oligarch. how an outsider was able to buy the shares in this factory is a commercial secret. the fact that he was a member of the local administration commission that assessed the assets of the enterprise for further privatization definitely casts light on this mystery. these commissions were usually organized at the local administration, which obviously prompted corruption. there is no doubt that personal characteristics of the “red directors” were also influential. naturally some were more successful than others. another respondent noted: the soviet person (homo sovetikus) was rigid in terms of obtaining a new knowledge. no creative thinking. they got used to come to work at 9 am in the morning and leave at 6 at night, to do something almost mechanically, following the certain ritual. the soviet power made them like that. but there were people who were receptive to new knowledge. yeltsin, for example, despite some of his horrid traits was very receptive to new training and new knowledge. a person from a provincial town (sverdlovsk) made it to the supreme soviet as a deputy and was able to learn a lot from the smart people around him. the governor7 was also easy to educated. at the point when he became governor he had practically no education whatsoever, practically no life experience, no political position. he sat close to the interreagional deputy group at the supreme soviet listening to the smart people. he says now that he was a member of this group, but he was not. under the soviet regime there were people who could learn quickly, but they could not turn their knowledge into reality, since they were not free to act. however, they had gone through a very good experience. they are like cognac. they became very good professionals in very narrow fields unlike the new generation of managers who don’t know how to produce anything. the general trends of the privatization process of economically viable enterprises in veliky novgorod included insider privatization, as a result of which the former managers became major shareholders. the extent of success depended, of course, on the personal 7 prusak, governor of the novgorod oblast. review of european and russian affairs vol. 1 no. 1 december 2005 © rera 2005 all rights reserved 9 credentials of the managers. the most successful obtained additional education, attracted investment, and expanded their business. many of the former soviet managers were enthusiastic to acquire new education, broaden their horizons. they traveled abroad to see how capitalism works in practice or earned a business degree. many sent their offspring to western colleges. defense industry in veliky novgorod one of the major features of the novgorod privatization scenario was that in the soviet times the predominant industry in veliky novgorod was an electronic industry, which was part and parcel of the defense industry. novgorod hosted huge state-funded defense enterprises that employed about 50,000 of city inhabitants. the population of veliky novgorod is roughly 280,000, which means that one out of three was employed by this industry. after the collapse of the centrally-planned economy the privatization of these enterprises encountered objective difficulties. due to strategic concerns the state decided when and how to privatize these enterprises. procrastination and uncertainty created a favorable climate for corruption. even if allowed to be privatized, these factories were not appealing to an outside investor. when the defense industry crumbled with its centrally-controlled system of demand and supply, the defense-oriented productions were left without funding. they had outdated equipment on their hands and the products that no one wanted to buy anymore. convention requires investments. who would invest into the production that needs major restructuring in the economy where money due to the collapsed bank system is the scarcest resource? when asked about the result of the privatization of the defense enterprises in veliky novgorod, one of the local officials stated: privatization was going on in accordance with the legal principles worked out by the federal center. we did not invent anything. it is still in progress. there is no way out for them. review of european and russian affairs vol. 1 no. 1 december 2005 © rera 2005 all rights reserved 10 they just can not survive. every year the federal center comes up with the list of enterprises that have to be privatized. we have a list of these enterprises. so, when a potential investor comes, we say that we are ready to sell them. it is impossible to restructure the economy of such a huge country. the conversion was probably not very successful here in the novgorod oblast, because the defense industry dominated here, but now no one wants to invest into it. one has to restructure and reequip these enterprises anew. huge investments are in need. the industry just fell apart, as one of the respondents noted. in contrast to food industry, for example, which had a niche of its own even in the soviet times, the defense industry and electronic industry had about 90% of demand coming from the state. “we are talking about a constant state investment, constant demand, year after year,” the respondent stated. the defenseoriented enterprises were always in the preferable position under the soviet regime; they had a stable customer in the form of the state. after the collapse of the soviet system, all enterprises had to look for the market for their products. one of the respondents noted: the defense enterprises found themselves in the worst position than the rest of the industries: no one needed their products any more. conversion needs money. there was no market for their products. some enterprises though started to look for this market, but you could not sell anything without state’s approval. thus, they are dependent on the center. since the defense ministry demand became smaller, all these defense enterprises have to severely compete for the state as a client. trade liberalization, when russia opened its market for imported goods had a detrimental effect on the industries involved in high tech development in the soviet era. another respondent argued: “there was a period when the market was flooded with imported food products, with colorful wrapping, etc. but very soon people started to buy local food products because they are more organic. in terms of the defense industry and electronic industry, to produce tv screens when the market is filled with sony, panasonic, etc., which are cheap and good in quality, is not profitable. it is impossible to compete. it is like inventing a bicycle all over again. in the electronic industry to convert the production is more difficult than in the food industry.” review of european and russian affairs vol. 1 no. 1 december 2005 © rera 2005 all rights reserved 11 there is a local legend in veliky novgorod about gaidar, who came to visit veliky novgorod at the beginning of the privatization process. gaidar, paying a visit to one of the defense enterprises, declared that he would invest his voucher into the factory “spektr.” no one among the interviewed knew whether gaidar kept his word or not. even if he did, it must have been one of his most failed investments. another respondent, a journalist who might be expected to be impartial, observed: “practically all “red directors” stayed in their positions. if they did not it was only due to the new state of the market. the radio electronics enterprises died a natural death. when enterprises died they turned into an investment polygon – they stopped the production and started to rent out the premises.” the respondent also noted: the meat industry, in contrast to the defense industry, was almost independent from the central authorities. a cow would come from a local village, a local meat factory would turn it into sausage, this sausage would be consumed locally as well. thus, food and food processing industries are industries with considerable revenues. besides, these revenues quick to gain. they could not but succeed because we must eat even under the economic transitional circumstances. radio-electronic industry was created from above. it was the part of the federal defense program. they all, with rare exceptions, worked for the defense ministry. so, when there was no federal program, they could not get restructured. because any restructuring in this industry would demand huge investments. there were almost no investments. the managers of the defense enterprises and other state-dependent industries were less inclined to become owners. one of the most vivid examples of this pattern of behavior is the case of one of the novgorod defense factories that produced equipment for the defense ministry. the director general of this factory has occupied this position for 18 years. at the beginning of the 90s, his factory was privatized. in the course of the decade after the privatization, the number of the factory workers fell from 2,000 to 150 employees, 100 of which are administrative staff (sales department, accounting, etc). some employees left of their own accord; some were fired due to the insurmountable economic hardships. one of the factory’s workers declared that it was a decision of the management to downsize, in contrast to what the director said about his desire review of european and russian affairs vol. 1 no. 1 december 2005 © rera 2005 all rights reserved 12 to make the enterprise profitable and keep the people at all costs through selling the equipment and land. it is hard to say who is right, the worker or the factory director, the facts are, however, that the director enjoys a lucrative salary and is going to retire in a short period of time, the factory is, however, at the brink of bankruptcy. some of the justifications of economic inefficiency brought by the director are valid: under the soviet regime the defense enterprises enjoyed tax cuts. after 1998 all tax cuts (tax on land, premises, etc.) were abolished. the defense enterprises found themselves in a difficult position. on the one hand, they had to survive, but the state-controlled system of guaranteed market for their products collapsed, on the other hand, these factories possessed huge patches of land that they had to pay a tax for. the factory director thinks that the fiscal burden placed on his and other enterprises was unbearable. in general, the position of the factory director is that due to their dependence on the state in the soviet times, these factories were not able to survive on their own, without the state support, when the economic reform took place. furthermore, some technological innovations developed in the soviet times were lost forever due to insufficient funding. the whole military machinery was left unattended. therefore, in his opinion, privatization of the defense industry was a huge mistake. this factory was privatized and turned into a joint-stock company at the beginning of the 90s. now there are about 20 organizations that possess its shares and 250 individuals. the factory chose the first option of privatization the control packet of shares belongs to the employees. the question is, however, since the number of employees at the beginning of the privatization process was about 2,000, how did the number of shareholders become decreased up to 250 individuals? since the shares did not produce dividends, people were getting rid of them, or, as one of the workers noted, some people in senior positions and close to the director were buying the shares from the employees to have some control over the enterprise. the current review of european and russian affairs vol. 1 no. 1 december 2005 © rera 2005 all rights reserved 13 shareholders regularly reappoint the director general at the shareholders’ meetings by the majority of votes and he continues to receive his high salary probably on the basis of his successful dealings with the factory’s land. he argues, however, that it is the state that should be blamed for the meager existence of the enterprises like his. he was looking for markets outside russia, but encountered barriers in the form of competition, certification standards, and the need for investment. thus, he blames external forces in the form of the state abandoning him or market competition for the failure of his enterprise. one of the respondents argued that privatization was a spontaneous endeavor fulfilled without a proper cost-benefit analysis. certain powers were unleashed and defense factories were sinking one after another like titanic. the managers of these enterprises selected a unique strategy of survival – they would not become owners due to obvious non-profitability of the factories, but would stay to extricate as much as possible from the “dying relative.” the continuity of top management, however, was maintained circumstantially, not necessarily as a conscious effort by the elites. conclusions privatization was one of the avenues that the soviet elite took to allocate even more resources after the collapse of the soviet system. the continuity of elites is probably the major characteristic of the transition process in russia. power and resources did not change hands. the circumstances surrounding the transition were beneficial for the so-called “red directors”, the soviet managers who “migrated” into the new russian elite. corportatization, the policy to provide opportunities for soviet managers to become owners, was part of the privatization process. review of european and russian affairs vol. 1 no. 1 december 2005 © rera 2005 all rights reserved 14 therefore, as the case study of the privatization process in veliky novgorod demonstrated, if an enterprise was economically viable the top management tended to allocate the shares and become an owner. when they became owners they could either sell an enterprise or continue to own it. the extent of success as an owner depended, however, on the personal credentials of the managers. the most successful obtained additional education, attracted investment, and expanded their business. in the case of the less viable enterprises the former soviet managers, like in the defense industry in veliky novgorod, drove an enterprise to the brink of bankruptcy or stayed in the management position if the enterprise was privatized. then they usually would manage the property of the enterprise as if it was their property but in a clandestine manner: they would steel, rent out the equipment, premises, and land. the general pattern for the managers was to suck all juices out of an enterprise, drive it to the brink of bankruptcy, and then leave the boat. however, this paper does not emphasize the moral aspect of the elite transition. presumably it was the only way to address a complete economic, political, and social devastation that russia experienced after the collapse of the soviet union. this paper emphasizes the importance of elite continuity as a characteristic feature of the russian economic transition. this paper also stresses the necessity to look at the process of elite transition in a specific context. that is why a case study as a research tool was selected to demonstrate how the former soviet managers used privatization as a tool of resource allotment in veliky novgorod. review of european and russian affairs vol. 1 no. 1 december 2005 © rera 2005 all rights reserved 15 bibliography strobe talbott, the russia hand, new york: random house trade paperbacks. 2002. petro, nicolai crafting democracy. how novgorod has coped with rapid social change. ithaca: cornell university press. 2004. v. mau and i. starodubrovskaya, the challenge of revolution: russia at the end of the 20 century. oxford: oxford university press. 2001. richard sakwa. russian politics and society. new york: routledge. 2002. olga kryshtanovskaya and stephen white, “the nomenklatura in post-communist russia”, in graeme gill (ed), elites and leadership in russian politics. great britain: macmillan press. 1998. maxim boycko, andrei shleifer and robert vishny, privatizing russia. cambridge: massachusetts, the mit press. 1995. review of european and russian affairs vol. 1 no. 1 december 2005 © rera 2005 all rights reserved 16 appendix the 16 interviews that were used for the purposes of this research were conducted between june and august of summer 2004 in veliky novgorod, russia. the interviews were recorded, transcribed and translated from russian into english. the list of respondents’ affiliation institutions includes: 1. novgorod tv and radio broadcast company “slaviia” 2. novgorod region duma (parliament) 3. meat factory “miasnoj dvor” 4. foreign relations department, veliky novgorod city administration. 5. external economic relations department, veliky novgorod city administration. 6. novgorod municipal energy enterprise “novgorodteploenergo” 7. municipal enterprise that organizes children sports, development, educational, and leisure activities “alye parusa” 8. electronic factory “kondensatornyj zavod” 9. a private taxi company 10. center for the entrepreneurship development at the novgorod regional administration 11. center of political analysis “dialogue” 12. new novgorod newspaper 13. novgorod region administration 14. spirit factory “alkon” 15. city administration of veliky novgorod 16. a private firm dealing with alarm systems why reforms fail: the role of ideas, interests and institutions review of european and russian affairs 8 (1), 2013 issn 1718-4835 © 2013 the author(s) www.carleton.ca/rera civil service reform in transition: a case study of russia svetlana inkina university of toronto abstract public administrative and civil service reforms have widely been used as a popular strategy to bring about systemic changes in entrenched bureaucracies. the general tendency that occurred in post-communist states was to adopt comprehensive policy measures dealing with the efficiency and effectiveness of state apparatus. this paper examines the process of an attempted civil service reform in russia starting from the first term of putin’s presidency. based upon interviews with experts and senior public officials, it elaborates on the role of leadership, or the willingness of the national political elite to improve the system of public administration; the impact of path-dependency upon the course of institutional transformation; and finally, the role of reform strategy in the policy implementation process. the article concludes that the case of civil service reform in russia may be explained by a combination of policy-making variables listed above. in addition, it highlights the transformation of the russian policy-making system during the years of political centralization. 2 review of european and russian affairs 8 (1), 2013 introduction at the end of the twentieth century, most post-communist societies had undergone a process of rapid political transformation, bringing about fundamental changes in scholarly approaches toward the state. institutional reforms that swept away former communist countries at a speed unprecedented in recent history resulted in a retreat from centralized government and inspired hopes for the improvement of the quality of governance practices across the post-communist region. paradoxically, the majority of state efforts to rebuild public service in central and eastern europe have failed to achieve their ultimate goals. 1 corruption, nepotism, and other negative consequences of post-communist transformation have flourished in the decade since the collapse of the soviet system. some countries, such as russia, were driven downward on a scale of economic freedom in recent years; others improved slightly, but without any significant change in the nature of public governance. in all stages of institutional restructuring, the implementation process was troubled by problems associated with the role of the post-soviet heritage, as well as the strategy of reform process. questions asked were as follows: what should be the scope and the time frame of reforms; how should it deal with the legacy of the post-communist transformation; how does one combine top-down and bottom-up approaches in administrative change; and why do the national governments postpone public administrative reforms until nearly one decade since the collapse of communism? much of this debate intensified in recent years, when some of the central and east european countries (ceecs), including russia, demonstrated the lack of capacity to achieve any significant breakthrough in the operation of their public administration systems (nunberg 1999). in russia, civil service reform (csr) was implemented in several steps. the first step took place during the 1990s, and it was characterized by institutional inertia in the area of civil service. the majority of the federal laws adopted during this period (the law ‘on the general principles of self-organization’ (1995), the law ‘on the basic principles of the civil service in the russian federation’ (1995), and others) were characterized by the lack of implementation measures, and they were rarely fulfilled in a systematic fashion. however, since 2003, public administrative reform (par), which included csr as an essential component, has become a part of a comprehensive reform package aimed at achieving greater efficiency within the postcommunist state apparatus. in july 2004, the federal council passed a new law, “on civil service in the russian federation” (federal law no. 79), which developed various innovative approaches to the organization of russian civil service. 2 similar to other post-communist countries, a new civil service law in russia has become a key point of reform and its management. however, as beblavy (2002, 58) points out, “it would be a mistake to treat all policy measures as a reform.” scholars observe that civil service reform in russia has never been truly popular among regional and national bureaucrats. in this respect, the lack of improvement in terms of enhancing transformative capacities of post-soviet bureaucracies has yet to be explained. 1. exceptional cases in terms of public administrative and civil service reforms included the baltic states, as well as polish, hungarian and slovak transitions (meyer-sahling, j. 2009). 2. for more information on the content of civil service law (2004) please see konov (2006), kotchegura (2008) and others. review of european and russian affairs 8 (1), 2013 3 this study elaborates on three major hypotheses, inspired by the empirical observation of the cases of post-communist transformation (beblavy 2002, krasnov 2003, barabashev 2005, obolonsky 2006, kotechgura 2008, temmes 2004, oleinik 2009, meyer-sahling, 2009).3 one explanation is that the majority of administrative reform efforts were motivated politically, and therefore they have to be evaluated in a broader context of political transformation. the underlying assumption of this explanation is that at the start of the current wave of reform process, there was no genuine political will to reform, and therefore populist measures produced the discrepancy between the official goals and hidden agendas of national leaders, which resulted in the lack of reform progress. some scholars (krasnov 2003; obolonsky 2006; gaman-golutvina 2008; jakobson 2010) argue that civil servants act as the main participants in the reform process; hence state bureaucracy cannot be trusted in a process that is likely to lessen its own power and privileges. an alternative hypothesis presented in my study suggests that the outcomes of civil service reform depend upon the nature of institutional design developed in russia during the last several years. based on the analysis of scholarly work mentioned above, it can be argued that public bureaucracy is not a uniform entity. it is split into groups with distinct transformative capacities that influence their ability to access policy-making decisions. overall, this hypothesis may be linked to the attempt of public bureaucrats to block the process of policy implementation. at the same time, it highlights the specific organizational characteristics of the post-communist system. finally, there is a third hypothesis, suggesting that reform success is influenced by the content of reform strategy. the scope, timing, and sequencing issues need to be considered because of the fact that it is impossible to conduct comprehensive policy change if the conditions for this moment are not ready. given the fact that each of these hypotheses refers, in one way or the other, to the history of the post-communist transformation, i have chosen the institutional approach to explain the case of civil service reform in russia. the reason for this choice is the mechanism of path dependency that works well in explaining the cases of both policy continuity and the break with the past in public policy making process. historical institutionalism describes institutions as “historically determined rules, norms, values and expectations that, at later historical stages, may independently affect outcomes when actors become wedged between old and new standards of behaviour” (thelen and steinmo 1992; peters 1999; nogaard 2000). the mechanism of pathdependency, in this respect, views the destiny of the transition development as preconditioned by the starting points of change (temmes 2004). 4 the study uses a variety of qualitative methodology instruments to assess the impact of key variables upon civil service reform progress in russia. a large part of my research draws upon semi-structured interviews with senior public officials and civil service experts in russia who were involved in a process of policy formulation and implementation during the last several decades. the sample of interviewees includes 35 experts who were referenced in major public policy reform committees, authors in academic journals, and within the circle of public policy professionals both in canada and russia. this study is complemented by the analysis of the federal legislation, statistical and sociological reports dealing with the process of csr. 3. these hypotheses were developed by author, and they generate knowledge from various streams of scholarly work, rather than test the existing theories of policy-making process. for more information on the empirical foundations of my hypotheses please see the next section ‘the nature of the reform we are dealing with’. 4. for more information, please see paul pierson (2000) and margaret levi (1997). 4 review of european and russian affairs 8 (1), 2013 in what follows, i observe the csr and par in a historical perspective, outlining the basic stages of the reform process and the way in which russian experience relates to the ongoing international trends. i discuss the scholarly literature on policy implementation process, and look into various explanations of reform progress in russia, based on the empirical findings of my study (interviews with experts and public officials). at the end, i return to my hypotheses, trying to understand how useful they are in explaining the russian case of civil service reform. the nature of the reform we are dealing with administrative reform is one of the most dynamic aspects of modern states, as it deals with the core public sector, the administrative side of the government, and public management (khan 2001). since its introduction in 1960, administrative reform has been used as a popular strategy to bring about major changes in entrenched bureaucracies. the wave of public administrative reforms that occurred between 1980 and the 1990s in western european countries was guided by the ideas of the new public management (npm) approach, directed toward a more flexible and efficient societal organization. obviously, very few countries have managed to resolve all governance issues at once, even though comprehensive public policy changes were attempted nearly everywhere. some of the technical areas of public administration reform, such as e-governance, proved to be more successful than others. however, the majority of states faced severe obstacles in tackling the problems of poor performance management, politicization of the civil service, corruption in government, and lack of trust. scholarly literature (pressman and wildawsky 1973; matland 2005; chakerian 2001; shofield 2001; sabatier 2005.) identifies several reasons for the lack of progress in csr implementation process. one of the most obvious explanations originates in the strategic and tactical choices that policy-makers take at the stage of policy formulation (the decision-making process, the choice of policy instruments, and the strategy of reform). another reason relates to the process of reform implementation, such as the lack of policy implementation mechanisms, the imperfections of policy assessment tools, tactical choices on behalf of policy implementers, and the behaviour of public bureaucrats. in more recent literature (matland 2005; chakerian 2001; kingdon 1995) the problems of policy-making process were described as being mutually dependent. however, this idea is not new—for example, hoppe in 1987 (582) asserted that the major problems at the stage of policy implementation emerge due to the disconnected cognitive levels and maps of reform designers, implementers, and target groups. explanations of policy-making progress in post-communist states coincide greatly with some of the findings in western liberal democracies. however, critics observe that in a transitional context, reformers tend to experiment freely with the newly available instruments of public policy, and they are more likely to come up with self-defeating reform projects that end up nowhere in terms of implementation. in this context, public administrative reforms risk impeding the operational capacities of national governments and therefore blocking some other important reform projects. nearly all explanations of policy-making processes in a transitional context include the structural, institutional, and voluntaristic components. for example, the majority of the empirical cases advanced by the leading policy-making institutions, such as the world bank, or the undp program, emphasize the role of the strategy of reform, that is, the scope, the pace, the choice of policy instruments and policy implementers during the course of public policy change. studies in review of european and russian affairs 8 (1), 2013 5 the russian scholarly literature (barabashev 2005; kotchegura 2008; gaman-golutvina 2008; oleinik 2009) suggest that success is defined by the range of factors that vary from the model of public administration state reformers are trying to build to the process of micro-implementation, which includes setting up the goals, strategies, activities, and contacts of the actors involved. overall, the number of explanatory variables is immense, and not all of them are clearly elaborated. finally, there is a growing body of literature (theories of policy diffusion process discussed in barabashev and straussman 2005; zhang and straussman 2003; dimaggio and powell 1991) arguing that reforms are context-bound processes, and therefore, success of reforms depends on the way in which the newly developed institutions adjust to the pre-existent conditions within each particular case.5 in this case, the choice of approach (the strategy of reform) may also need to consider the pre-existing conditions of institutional transformation (such as the heritage of post-communism). the choice of hypotheses of my study, presented in the first half of this paper, centers around the role of political will, institutions and the strategy of reforms, and it is based upon the scholarly analysis and discussed above. the role of reform strategy and political will to reform are more clearly elaborated in western policy-making literature (matland 1995; court and cottrell 2004; sabatier 2005), whereas the study of institutional legacies in policy-making system of russia is practically non-existent. it is important to note that the area of public policy change in a transitional context is continuously challenged by the fact that the field is conceptually underdeveloped. it lacks concepts to grasp the complexity of post-communist transformation, and it does not clearly distinguish among the diverse phenomena that influence the process of policy change. my interest lies in the opportunity to elaborate on those aspects of reforms in russia that will contribute to a better understanding of policy-making process in a transitional context. public administrative reform in post-communist states: the case of russia the start of public administrative reform in russia was marked by the collapse of the soviet union and by the first attempt on behalf of the russian government to redefine the legal basis for the civil service system. this effort coincided with the drafting of the constitution of the russian federation in 1992, which was followed by the adoption of the federal law called ‘on the basic principles of the state civil service in the russian federation’ (1995, no. 119). in 1997–8, a group of reform-minded political advisors (vladimir krasnov, georgii satarov and other experts who had worked closely with the presidential administration), introduced the ‘draft law on public administration reform’ to president yeltsin. this document contained harsh criticisms of the post-communist state apparatus and promoted the idea of an open, meritbased civil service system. the idea of reform was welcomed by the president and served as an important ideological foundation for developing a new reform agenda. however, due to the structure of the government’s priority-setting process at the time, the document has never been officially published. in the year 2001, public administration reform became an issue of top priority on the agenda of the newly elected russian government. federal powers launched a set of comprehensive policy measures aiming to adjust the machinery of the state to the changing political context. 5. these theories originate within the body of developmental research. however, in recent years they found way into the studies of the post-communist transformation (such as barabashev 2005). 6 review of european and russian affairs 8 (1), 2013 most of these reforms went in line with the process of political centralization, the technocratic model of public administration, hierarchy of bureaucratic organization, and centralized control. consistently, reforms attempted to achieve greater efficiency and responsiveness in the state apparatus via the functional and managerial reorganization. one of the crucial challenges for the russian government at the initial stages of reform process was to devise a coherent strategy that would make civil service system more efficient and organized. political turmoil during the 1990s created favourable conditions for the growth of informal practices that helped former nomenclature stay in its old place. thus when reforms started, policy-makers had to deal with the legacies of post-communist transformation, along with the overly powerful body of state bureaucrats. the process of policy formulation involved several important actors: (1) representatives of the presidential administration, (2) ministries and agencies of the russian government, and finally, (3) expert research community based in the leading institutions of higher education (institute of strategic research under the president, the academy of science under the president, higher school of economics). very often, political actors relied on advice from the expert research community, which included scholars and practitioners specializing in the area of public service. these groups were exposed to the ongoing debate on par in foreign countries, and therefore they played an important role in adjusting some of the most innovative, foreign-born ideas to the conditions of post-communist transformation. in the framework of the federal program for reforming the state service (2003–2005), the federal government prepared and adopted several important laws. the first one was federal law no. 55, ‘on public service system in the rf’ (2003), which divided the public service system into three categories: the civil service, the police service, and the military service. the next law, ‘on state civil service of the russian federation’ (no. 79), emerged in 2004 as a follow-up to the newly established institutional framework discussed earlier. the ultimate goal of the law no. 79 was to profoundly modernize the system of goals, rationales, and operational principles of the post-soviet bureaucracy; this included improved systems of remuneration, career promotion, conflict of interest regulations, job descriptions, and other measures dealing with the efficiency of state apparatus. experts interviewed in my study agree that the process of policy formulation has suffered from several important problems. first, there was a lack of clarity about the role that public servants were supposed to play in a transitional context (agreement on the ultimate goals of reform was not achieved). second, the process has suffered from discontinuity between the proposals advanced by expert groups (the “discourse community”) and the ultimate outcomes of the negotiation process. one such example concerns law no. 79, which changed quite radically several times during the time span of policy formulation process. a preliminary draft of the law had passed via several stages of reading in the state legislature. however, when the time came for this law to be approved, experts discovered that the original project they worked on had changed significantly (interviews 2010). experts observe that various groups of public officials interfered into the process of policy formulation, thus undermining the ultimate goals of csr. success in policy implementation process is usually identified with the outcomes that reform yields at the end of implementation stage, as well as with the ability of national governments to achieve policy goals formulated at the initial stage of political transformation. polidano (2001, 1) argues that tactical choices in both the design and implementation of civil service reform can determine the ultimate outcomes of reform process. meanwhile, researchers pay little attention to review of european and russian affairs 8 (1), 2013 7 the interaction between tactical and strategic choices, and therefore explanations of why reforms fail or succeed turn out to be unhelpful. in the case of russia, there is a large area of uncertainty associated with the reform implementation process. first, it is difficult to identify the cases of success and failure, as reforms seem to have been formally implemented in nearly all areas of public service. second, various reform initiatives (anti-corruption, merit-based recruitment, performance-based pay system and others) were launched interdependently as a way to improve the existing institutional framework. these measures did not yet produce any significant changes, and any assessment of outcomes they yield would require a longitudinal study of policy-making process. the experts surveyed in my study adopted an overly pessimistic view of the outcomes of reform process. some of them argued that none of the goals formulated by policy-makers in 2003–4 were practically achieved, whereas other interviewees expressed their concern and dissatisfaction with the quality and content of the law. the study clearly demonstrates that such norms of the law no. 79 (2004) as article no. 11 (‘the system of ranks’), article no. 31 (‘organizational restructuring of civil service institutions’), article no. 33 (‘termination of employment regulations’) and article no. 50 (‘the system of pay and reimbursement’) entailed multiple difficulties during the time of implementation process (tikhomirov and gorokhov 2009). other norms, which covered the standards of conduct and conflict of interest regulations required major systematic improvements, and they were not implemented over the period of five to seven years since the start of the reform. the lack of progress in csr implementation could easily be explained by insufficient funding from the federal powers (the lack of political will to reform). however, it could also be linked to the post-soviet legacy and the mismatch between the strategy of reform and the overwhelming nature of the regulations that were necessary to adopt in order to make it work (the impact of path-dependency upon the nature of policy-making system in russia). overall, the discussion of public administrative and civil service reforms in russia justifies the need to disaggregate the key factors of the policymaking process. how committed was the top-level political elite to the process of csr implementation in recent years? to what extent did the strategy of reform fit with the pre-existing institutional structure of the russian state? finally, what were the legacies of the post-communist transformation and how did they influence reform progress? in what follows, this article will discuss these questions with the goal of testing the initial hypotheses of this study. political will and priorities of the russian government6 since the fall of the soviet union, most post-communist countries have struggled to reinvent their basic political institutions and to keep pace with the developments of the quickly changing world. the first generation of reforms in these societies included rapid systemic changes, such as privatization, macroeconomic stabilization, and liberalization of prices and trade. the second generation of reforms encompassed a variety of administrative measures aiming to reinforce the state’s capacity and ability to govern. scholarly studies (cameron 2007; way and levitsky 2010) suggest that very few postcommunist countries have managed to maintain stable democratic institutions. with the exception of the baltic states, the czech republic, hungary (until recently) and other countries 6. in this study, the will to reform is understood as a combination of leadership required for policy initiation process, and commitment to the reform process, based on policy continuity and legislative support. 8 review of european and russian affairs 8 (1), 2013 that have quickly become part of the european union, the quality of the democratic process deteriorated quickly across the region. in russia, the centralization stage replaced informal decentralization following the yeltsin era. these developments informed the majority of political reforms in putin’s russia, including par and csr. more than anything else, they affected the style of the policy-making process in national and regional governments, leading to the adoption of hectic yet comprehensive reform strategies. in russia, the role of the central state in reforming the public administrative system was crucial. the law no. 55, ‘on public service system’ (2003), and law no. 79, ‘on state civil service in russian federation’ (2004), were both initiated by the presidential administration, and they were both incorporated into a single strategy of comprehensive institutional transformation. the approach taken by the russian government toward reforms could be described as overly dynamic and comprehensive. first, experts observe that at the start of reform process, it seemed to be impossible to initiate reforms in one area of public service without reforming all the others. second, in a country like russia, much work had to be done to overcome the historical legacies reproduced within the context of the post-soviet transformation. the type of change initiated by the russian government required a significant amount of “transformative capacity” on behalf of national and regional bureaucracies; therefore, it may be observed that approach toward reform relied on the contextually inappropriate prerequisites of the reform process. to understand the role of political will in civil service reform in russia, it is important to consider the flow of the government’s priority-setting process during the time span of the reform, as well as the allocation of funds to the reform progress. experts interviewed in my study observe that civil service reform attracted a greater amount of political support in the early 2000s than it did during the 1990s. the national government adopted over 30 normative acts dealing with the process of civil service reform implementation.7 however, in reality, csr has never been placed as high on the agenda of the russian government as other reform projects, such as public administrative, or state budget reforms. starting from 2005, csr initiatives have been toppled by the lack of consistency in the stage of implementation that was marked by the differential implementation progress in such areas as the process of rationalization, the development of job descriptions, standards of conduct and conflict of interest regulations. furthermore, the funds allocated in support of the reform program have not been used efficiently, and as a result, reforms did not go through. another important issue to consider in explaining the role of political will to reform is the existing budget allocation process, and the way it changed during the last several years. starting from 2003-2005, each annual budget in russia has allocated a great portion of economic resources to foster the process of civil service reform implementation. for example, the program of civil service reform in 2003-2005, has funded the process in the amount of 539.1 million roubles ($18 million), whereas the program on reform and development of civil service in 2009-13 received the increased amount of 691 million roubles ($23 million)8. comparatively speaking, this funding appeared to be quite modest; however, in russia, it could make a big difference. at least half of these funds went to a variety of research projects, whereas another half contributed to the actual processes of policy formulation and policy implementation. 7. the list includes: presidential decree «on anti-corruption measures» no. 815 , (2008), presidential decree «on commissions dealing with the standards of conduct and conflict of interest regulations» (2010), the program on civil service reform and development (2009-2013), and others. 8. for more information, please see federalnaya programma reformrovania i razvitia sistemy gosudarstvennoi sluzhby (2009-2013), rossiiskaya gazeta federalny vypusk, no. 4867, 13 march 2009. review of european and russian affairs 8 (1), 2013 9 a great portion of the resources discussed above was used for scholarly research. some experts observe that the money was ‘wasted’—not because research was useless, but rather because it became irrelevant during the subsequent stages of the policy-making process. interviewees assert that scholarly findings and suggestions have disappeared quickly, as soon as they reached the doors of conservative departments in state duma. draft laws have changed multiple times, depending on the group of interested actors who got access to the system of policy-making, which made the life of scholars particularly difficult. summing up, it would be reasonable to observe that the actual political leadership in russia contributed significantly to the process of civil service reform initiation. the presidential administration was the main actor of policy-making process in 2004-5; it has also demonstrated commitment to reform progress by adopting a number of programs and normative acts that were crucial for the success of policy implementation process. however, a variety of factors that were crucial for a comprehensive reform project initiated by the federal government (such as the change in political goals and priorities over the time span of reform and the lack of transformative capacities), have made csr somewhat irrelevant in the eyes of the top ranking officials. formally, policy-makers remained committed toward the goals of the reform process; however, in practice, they were unable to reach multiple goals of csr project in a short period of time, and focused on reforms that were manageable within the existing political constraints (such as public administration rationalization process). the findings of my study confirm the idea of the first hypothesis of my research suggesting that both csr and par have to be evaluated in a broader context of recent political transformations. the process of political centralization that started in the early 2000s imposed constraints upon the csr reforms by dictating the top-level priority-setting process, and the very start of the new wave of reforms became possible with the change of the political environment during the early 2000s. however, several interviewees of my study confirmed that the goals of csr (2004-5) did not fit appropriately within the framework of the ongoing political developments, and the reform was difficult to implement in the existing policy-making context. the goal of president putin during his first term in office was to create an efficient, centralized and responsive administrative machine that would effectively support his initiatives, whereas the goals of the newly adopted civil service law extended further into the area of rational organization of the post-communist state apparatus (ethics, transparency, accountability). consequently, the process of rationalization took place in a more dynamic fashion than the development of ethical standards dealing with issues of behavior, transparency and accountability in public administration. the study does not confirm the idea that csr was a politically motivated reform project, i.e., it may not have been driven by the intention to maintain the status quo, or by the willingness to appease various groups within the russian society (at this moment, there is no evidence in support of this argument). experts observe that in the period of 2000-13, there was genuine political will to modernize the russian bureaucracy, which is evidenced by the surprising degree of policy continuity in the area of csr. what remains unexplained, however, is the hectic nature of the reform funding process, and the dedication of the national government to the comprehensive design of the reforms. some explanations to this conundrum will be offered in the section on the strategy of reform process in russia. 10 review of european and russian affairs 8 (1), 2013 institutional design and the style of policy-making process to understand the relationship between political dynamics and the process of civil service reform implementation, one must take into consideration the type of institutional design developed in russia over the last several decades. it was previously observed that the set of political reforms initiated by president putin during his first years in office were aimed to strengthen the control of the federal authorities over the rest of society. these reforms included efforts at subordinating regional governors to the federal center, the reorganization of the federal council, reforming the principles of operation of political parties, etc. putin’s quest for power produced both intended and unintended consequences for the nature of public choice institutions in russia. one of the effects of these reforms was that the quality of democratic process significantly deteriorated, leading to the adoption of bad governance patterns. another consequence was the lack of coherence in the existing policy-making system.9 experts observe that in recent years, the system of public choice institutions was systemically skewed toward the executive. needless to say, state bureaucrats acquired so much power and influence that they could easily dominate both the process of policy formulation and policy implementation. this process led to the lack of transparency and the narrowness of the circle of people who participated in the decision-making process. the newly emerged institutional framework incorporated elements of both old and new russia. in a nutshell, it was characterized by the following features: (1) the domination of the executive branch of power over the processes of policy formulation and policy implementation; (2) the diminishing accountability of political parties represented in the russian parliament to the public; and finally, (3) the lack of transparency combined with the narrowness of the circle of people who participate in the decision-making process. some experts (krasnov 2003; jackobson 2010) argue that the features of the existing institutional framework predetermined the failure of most political, social, and economic reforms in russia. the domination of the executive narrowed down the circle of people involved in policy-making, whereas the lack of transparency and accountability impeded the process of reform implementation. lev jacobson (2010), the vice rector of the higher school of economics in russia, argues that the russian authorities adopted a “departmental,” or “agencybased,” approach toward administrative reforms. this choice profoundly affected the content of the new laws, as well as the pace of reform in general: given our relatively weak civil society and political parties, the main forum for representation and reconciliation of interests is provided by the executive authorities. accordingly, government agencies and departments are the main actors involved in shaping the political agenda, as well as in its implementation. but the departmental (agency) approach to reforms is limited by definition. a radical agency project is a breakthrough in one relatively narrow area and is out of line with the general state of the public sector and public management. such a breakthrough, first, is rarely successful on its own; second, it tends to produce unexpected effects in related areas; and third, it implies “bridge building” between 9. for more information on how these processes were coupled with the change of center-periphery relations in russia please see debardeleben “fiscal federalism and how russians vote,” europe-asia studies, vol. 55, no. 3 (2003), pp. 339-363 (lead article). review of european and russian affairs 8 (1), 2013 11 the sector under reform and its environment. such “bridges” include the numerous amendments to laws, which make them internally inconsistent. (jakobson 2010, 6) the structure of basic political institutions in russia stipulates the overly powerful role of the executive branch of power. one reason for this is the existing constitutional design (presidential system as opposed to the parliamentary system). however, the majority of the informal policymaking institutions appear to be grounded in the dynamics of political reforms, as well as the changing priorities of the russian government. given the hectic shifts of the policy agenda in recent years, some laws and programs (among them was the law no.79 ‘on civil service reform’) emerged as a result of a rushed consensus among various policy actors with diverse interests and ideas regarding the future of public service in russia. the process has suffered from the narrowness of the circle of people who make decisions; political commitments have changed over time, thus making it hard to fulfill some of the initial reform promises. finally, the style of the policy-making process could be described as inconsistent and non-transparent. in addition to the problems in the balance of power, the russian executive system incorporates several other problematic areas. the government consists of a number of duplicating structures which do not seem to be working coherently on any policy initiative. the apparatus of the government, representing the right arm of president putin, dominates the process of policy-making, and therefore it deprives other ministries with similar functions of any significant influence over reform content. all these processes, when combined, impede the effective coordination among ministries and agencies of the russian government, leading to the overall fragmentation of the policy-making process. summing up, this section of my study contributes to the second hypothesis of my research concerning the role of institutional design in the process of csr implementation. the study suggests that the nature of institutional design developed in russia during the last several years limits the circle of people participating in the process of policy formulation, and it splits the body of state bureaucrats in groups with conflicting interests and ideas (the most obvious split is between the higher-ranking and the lower-ranking bureaucrats, as well as between the groups belonging to different branches of power). an in-depth study of the nature of the body of civil servants in post-communist russia will be elaborated in the next phase of my research. reform strategy it was observed earlier that the approach taken by the russian authorities toward public sector reforms in the early 2000s was comprehensive by design, and it covered such areas as civil service, public administration, budget, taxation, and others. civil service reform aimed at the profound change of the goals, rationales and principles of the existing system. therefore, it relied on a deliberate reform strategy, with a selected choice of policy instruments. experts interviewed in my study observed that the strategy of civil service reform in russia was marked by a radical break from the past of the early 1990s, as it aimed at redesigning the structure of the existing civil service system, with the goal of establishing policy implementation mechanisms for the newly adopted laws. however, in the early 2000s, the strategy of csr has not been designed in a coherent manner, and therefore it incorporated several important problems. first, at the start of reform process, policy-makers approached comprehensive public administrative reform without considering the sequence of steps, as well as some of the existing temporal constraints of public policy change in a transitional context. (the program of reform in 12 review of european and russian affairs 8 (1), 2013 2001 outlined mostly generic policy objectives). second, the policy instruments necessary for reform progress were not clearly elaborated. the law “on civil service reform” (2004) incorporated such legal constructs as “conflict of interest,” “job pool,” “administrative standing order,” and so on. all of them were new to the existing institutional framework, and therefore the creation of policy implementation mechanisms consumed a great amount of policy-makers’ time. another major mistake was that reformers maintained the old patterns of policy-making and did not actively involve civil servants in the process of policy formulation. contrary to the expectations of the research community, by the year 2010 there was a large pool of civil servants in russia who did not understand or share the goals of civil service reform. thus instead of providing support for reformation, civil servants were not receptive to the goals of csr and they more likely to distrust the federal government, acting on the assumptions derived from their previous experience with the nature of decision-making processes in russia. critics describe the view of civil service reform among lower-level bureaucrats as “resistance from within,” which emerged as a result of the dysfunctional reform communication strategy employed by the federal powers. one of the shortcomings of this strategy was that it did not pursue the goal of building alliances with the top-ranking and low-ranking public officials. instead, it presented csr as an ordinary change, one of many others they had to comply with. some of the obstacles to policy implementation process in russia have emerged at the regional level. the enormous workload associated with parallel reform projects, as well as multiple conflicts over ideas, resources, and expertise in other areas of public sector created significant obstacles in csr implementation process at the regional level. thus, except for several outstanding regions such as chuvashia, kalmykia, st. petersburg and murmansk, the majority of territorial units in russia did not take any interest in building comprehensive reform programs, and therefore they made little progress over the last several years (interviews 2010; world bank 2006, 7). overall, the findings of my study confirm the final hypothesis of this paper, suggesting that the content of csr strategy (the scope of reform, the choice of policy instruments, as well as reform communication strategy) has also influenced the outcomes of civil service reform process. the overly comprehensive approach toward csr, along with the choice of policy instruments were not appropriate within the existing policy-making process in russia, and they have both relied on a path-dependent way of thinking about public policy change (viewing policy implementation as a top-down process, disregarding the scope, timing and sequencing issues in policy implementation process; believing that ‘it is not possible to reform one area of public policy without a comprehensive reformation of public sector’10, prioritizing a ‘control’ version of policy implementation over the process of building alliances with public officials and others). on the other hand, it is obvious that policy-makers have tried to maintain some level of policy continuity by advancing a set of policy implementation measures, such as adopting the program on civil service reform and development (2009-13). this tendency represented a notable break with the past of the early 1990s. 10. this phrase is derived from the interview conducted by author with one of the participants of the policymaking process (fall 2010). review of european and russian affairs 8 (1), 2013 13 conclusion the case of russia is interesting for a number of reasons. first, there is a question of leadership, or the willingness of the national political elite to improve the system of public administration. second, there is a question of path-dependency and institutional transformation. thirdly, there is a question of reform strategy, i.e. the scope of reform, the tactical and strategic choices made at the stage of policy formulation, and policy implementation process. results of my study support the main hypotheses of my research, suggesting that reform progress in a transitional context may be explained by a combination of such variables as political will, the strategy of reform and institutional legacies of the post-communist transformation. first, the study suggests that political developments in the decades since the collapse of the soviet union informed the majority of public policy changes in russia. therefore, the success or failure of csr has to be explored in a broader context of political transformation. the role of political will to reform in russia was crucial at the initial stage of policy formulation process (early 2000s). however, the scope of ambition and political support significantly declined in recent years, which is evidenced by the structure of the government’s priority-setting process, resource allocation problems and other indicators of the will to reform. the strategy of the reform process in russia influenced the outcomes of csr in a less obvious way due to the fact that policy-makers did not fully consider the timing, the scope and sequencing issues of policy implementation strategy. the strategy of reform adopted in the early 2000s relied on a path-dependent way of thinking about the process of public policy change, which included the view of policy implementation as a top-down process, the tendency to disregard the prerequisites of comprehensive policy change and others. finally, the findings of my study suggest that the newly emerged institutional system in russia informed the majority of public policy choices in recent years. the russian system of public policy-making incorporated elements of both old and new institutional frameworks, where the traditions of secrecy, the domination of the executive branch, and other legacies of the past appear to be closely intertwined with an intention to create a viable, modern, highly effective civil service system. this model largely affected the flow of information, knowledge, and practices concerning the goals and outcomes of the reform process, therefore it holds answers to the question on where ideas are coming from, as well as why and how they get rejected or transformed into policy projects. overall, both reform design and reform implementation processes in russia involve a standard, path-dependent approach toward the enactment of new legislation. thus to achieve any significant change in post-communist public service, one must start by reconsidering the operating principles of the policy-making system. this process includes the transformation of both formal and informal institutions as well as their intended and unintended outcomes. acknowledgements the author would like 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(lecturer at the national research institute “higher school of economics”); interview by author, russia, moscow, 2010. interviews with experts and public officials (anonymous), conducted by author, octobernovember 2010. proekt kontseprsii administrativnoi reformy. 2003. indem foundation, march. accessed april 10, 2012. http://www.anti-corr.ru/rutxt/2003/admin_reform/index.htm ukaz presidenta rosiiskoi federatsii “o reforme gosudarstvennoi sluzhby v rossiiskoi federatsii” (decree of the president of the russian federation, no.1336, november 19 2002 “on reform of the public service of the russian federation 2003-2005”). rossiiskaia gazeta, 27 june, 2004. accessed april 16, 2013. http://www.rg.ru/2002/11/23/gosslujbadok.html. ukaz presidenta rosiiskoi federatsii ‘reformirovanie i razvitie gosudarstvennoi grazhdanskoi sluzhby’ (decree of the president of the russian federation, no.261 of march 10, 2009 “on federal program “reformation and development of the state civil service of the russian federation 2009-2013”). rossiiskaia gazeta, 11 march, 2009. accessed april 16, 2013. http://www.rg.ru/2009/03/11/ukaz-dok.html. http://www.anti-corr.ru/rutxt/2003/admin_reform/index.htm correct citation: inkina, svetlana. 2013. “civil service reform in transition: a case study of russia.” review of european and russian affairs 8 (1): 1–16. published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada. available online at: www.carleton.ca/rera/ rera is an electronic academic peer-reviewed journal that publishes graduate, post-graduate, and young scholarly works. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is a joint project supported by the canada-europe transatlantic dialogue—a cross-canada research network supported by the social sciences and humanities research council of canada (sshrc)—along with the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies (carleton university) and its associated research unit, the centre for european studies. rera aims to provide an accessible forum for research, to promote high standards of research and scholarship, and to foster communication among young scholars. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada tel: +01 613 520-2600 ext. 1179; e-mail: rera-journal@carleton.ca creative commons license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ this working paper is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial no derivs 3.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 3.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced provided the source is acknowledged. no use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes. issn: 1718-4835 © 2013 the author(s) http://www.carleton.ca/rera/ mailto:rera-journal@carleton.ca accommodation of interests of the state, business and civil society in environmental projects implemented through public private partnership in the russian federation review of european and russian affairs 11(2), 2017 issn 1718-4835 accommodation of interests of the state, business and civil society in environmental projects implemented through public private partnership in the russian federation andrey margolin1 and valentin krasnoshchekov2 russian presidential academy of national economy and public administration abstract environmental projects have a number of distinctive features, among them an increased capital/output ratio, relatively high risks, lengthy payback periods, and outcomes that are hard to evaluate using financial indicators. public private partnership (ppp) appears to be a viable approach for the implementation of such projects; however, existing mechanisms for the accommodation of long-term interest of the state, business and civil society are inadequate to ensure their success. in this context, the author presents an algorithm of multi-criteria analysis to evaluate the social efficiency of ppp-based environmental projects, which takes into account the impact of both financial and non-financial outcomes and includes crowdsourcing public opinion into the final decision-making process. special priority is given to the assessment of multiplicative effects, as their role and impact on the feasibility of investment are often underestimated. the author’s conclusions and recommendations are illustrated using the case study of a construction project for a municipal solid waste processing facility. 1 andrey margolin is vice rector at the russian presidential academy of national economy and public administration, moscow, russia. 2 valentin krasnoshchekov is head of the chair of environmental management of the russian presidential academy of national economy and public administration, moscow, russia. 2 review of european and russian affairs 11 (2), 2017 i believe that we can still save our planet and all of its inhabitants. ―leonardo dicaprio, american actor introduction the indispensable prerequisites for effective solutions to environmental problems are, above all, a high level of environmental awareness by the population and quality legislation regulating the rules of natural resource exploitation and environmental protection. however, these are not sufficient conditions, if for no other reason than because without a sensible state environmental policy and the implementation of a critical mass of investment projects aimed at environmental protection, it is practically impossible to achieve a human living environment less polluted by industrial and post-consumer waste, or a higher quality of potable water and air. such projects usually have a number of distinctive features, the most significant among which are the large volume of initial investment, lengthy payback periods, and increased participation risks both for investors and for investment recipients. this is exactly why, as demonstrated by international experience, there is a wide range of possibilities for their implementation through various types of public-private partnership (ppp), which is an array of forms of both medium and long-term partnership between the state and the private sector aimed at the achievement of socially important objectives on mutually beneficial terms. it is rather telling that the history of ppp began in the mid-16th century with a channel construction project near the town of salon-de-provence in france3, directly relevant to the area of environmental management. it should also be noted that the state, represented by authorized agencies, can content itself with a formalist approach to the assessment of such projects, while lacking awareness and consideration of vital interests of the population of the territory in question. we can recall a lot of cases where public authorities supported and even lobbied projects that would (or actually did) have extremely environmentally damaging consequences. one especially infamous example was the project to divert the flow of northern and siberian rivers in the former soviet union, which was halted due to the efforts of the scientific community and the creative intelligentsia4. this is why active involvement of civil society in the preliminary examination process is an integral element of planning investment projects aimed at integrated use of natural resources and environmental protection using various ppp models. only an approach based on an informal accommodation of interests of the state, the private sector, and civil society can give practical meaning to the leonardo dicaprio quote that serves as the epigraph for this article. one serious obstacle to this is the disparity of planning horizons among the stakeholders of environmental engineering projects. in point of fact, the interests of civil society are usually long term; its competent representatives require a comprehensive account of all possible remote effects of investment decisions represented by environmental quality indicators rather than in monetary terms. 3 marylène soma bonfillon. le canal de craponne un exemple de maîtrise de l’eau en provence occidentale 15541954. accessed july 28, 2017. http://www.asainfo.fr/doc/doc/res-these_mbonfillon.pdf 4 theodore shabad. soviet, after studies, shelves plan to turn siberian rivers. 1983. the new york times, december 16. accessed july 28, 2017. http://www.nytimes.com/1983/12/16/world/soviet-after-studies-shelves-plan-to-turnsiberian-rivers.html 3 review of european and russian affairs 11 (2), 2017 as for potential project participants from the private sector, they are mainly focused on short-term financial gain, often at the expense of future environmental damage. similar short-sighted thinking is also typical of civil servants involved in project discussions, particularly if they are not sure of their career prospects and lack sufficient motivation to assess the implications of the decisions being made beyond their immediate superiors’ terms of office. although according to spinoza’s maxim, “the appeal to authority is not a valid argument,” it is appropriate at this point to refer to the point of view of nobel peace prize laureate muhammad yunus. in an interview for the book 22 ideas to fix the world: conversations with the world’s foremost thinkers (dutkiewicz and sakwa 2014), he stipulates that deterioration of the environment, low quality of healthcare, and insufficient food safety are all consequences of a “cult of money.” it is difficult to disagree with his opinion that earning money cannot be a goal in itself; it should be the means to overcome the challenges faced by humanity. it is important to note that the differences in planning horizons and motivation of project stakeholders are the key reason for the lack of mutual trust between them, and will not disappear on its own. meanwhile, if this issue is not resolved, we cannot count on the development of ppp for the implementation of investment projects aimed at sustainable use of natural resources and environmental protection. the task of reducing the interests of environmental project participants to a “common denominator” is further exacerbated by the fact that it is often challenging or even pointless to represent their outcomes in the form of conventional financial indicators. the strengthening of trust between ppp participants is not a one-way street: the role of the state is undoubtedly important, but by no means absolute. reciprocal effort on the part of the private partner is also extremely important, such as for maintaining a solid positive reputation of its management, complete transparency of financial flows, disclosure of objective information about its owners, existence of a clear environmental strategy, etc. however, since we cannot reasonably expect any ppp participants to forfeit their own interests, the main focus of this article will be on the development of specific recommendations for a methodology to accommodate the interests of the state, business and civil society; to strengthen trust between them; and to ensure the priority of long-term project implementation objectives over short-term financial goals of certain participants. its key elements are as follows: to maintain continuity of assessment of social and commercial outcomes of environmental ppp projects, which would contribute to the accommodation of the participants’ long-term interests.  to develop a methodology for the evaluation of the social return on investment for environmental projects, taking into account the balance of financial and non-financial outcomes;  to involve concerned representatives of civil society in the discussion of environmentoriented projects at preliminary stages using crowdsourcing techniques;  to identify multiplicative effects and provide a quantitative assessment of their impact on investment decision-making concerning the feasibility of environmental ppp projects;  to maintain continuity of assessment of social and commercial outcomes of environmental ppp projects, which would contribute to the accommodation of the participants’ long-term interests. 4 review of european and russian affairs 11 (2), 2017 methodology the opinions of russian economists on the topic of ppp have undergone a certain evolution over the last 20 years. the term “private public partnership,” which was universally accepted in the mid-1990s, has almost gone out of use, replaced by “public private partnership.” the reason behind this switch lies not so much in the literary preferences of specific authors, but rather in the development of certain economic processes. prior to the august crisis of 1998, the state was weak and most resources were concentrated in the hands of large businesses; consequently, it was business that played the senior partner role in the business-state tandem. thus, describing their interaction in terms of “private public partnership” objectively reflected the economic situation at the time. however, the situation has changed dramatically since then, with the state transforming from a passive follower into the dominant partner possessing both adequate financial resources and the opportunities to create necessary institutions for the development of ppp. naturally, in these conditions the transition to the term “public private partnership” was simply an objective reflection of the status quo. besides, this is the term predominantly used in other countries (the world bank 2014; national public-private partnership guidance 2013; oecd 2012). current trends show a pronounced interest towards public private partnership in russia. for example, a unified information system for ppp was launched in 2013 at http://www.pppi.ru/ with the assistance of the ministry of economic development of the russian federation, and more recently, a federal law on ppp was adopted5, which stipulates the following requisite elements of a ppp contract:  the private partner undertakes the construction and/or reconstruction (also referred to as creation) of the object of the contract;  the private partner provides full or partial funding for the creation of the object of the contract;  the private partner is responsible for the operation and/or maintenance of the object of the contract;  the private partner is entitled to the property rights for the object of the contract in case of encumbrance in accordance with the legislation. since this article deals with problems related to the evaluation of environmental ppp project efficiency, we should mention the fact that the ppp law has a special section in the ppp contract object list for facilities that deal with handling, disposal, processing, and storage of municipal solid waste (mpw). in accordance with article 9, paragraph 4 of the federal law on ppp, a key requirement for a methodology of efficiency assessment for ppp projects is to identify their comparative advantages using the following ratios: ratio 1. net present cost value of budget funds of the russian federation in the case of project implementation through ppp / by execution of a public contract (as an alternative to ppp); 5 federal law no. 224-fz dated 13 july 2015 on public private partnership, municipal private partnership in the russian federation and amendments to certain regulatory acts of the russian federation. http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_law_182660/ http://www.pppi.ru/ 5 review of european and russian affairs 11 (2), 2017 ratio 2. extent of liabilities assumed by the public partner in the case of project implementation through ppp / by execution of a public contract. however, we believe that these comparative advantages alone are not sufficient grounds for positive evaluation of ppp projects; in some cases, this approach may lead to unsound investment decisions. some arguments in favour of this statement are presented below. the law in question contains a significant reference rule stating that the methodology used to assess ppp project efficiency and calculate their comparative advantage must be approved by the federal executive agency authorized to carry out state investment policy (article 9, paragraph 7 of the federal law on ppp). although criterial values for ratios 1 and 2 above are not established by law, simple economic logic dictates that each of them must equal <1 for an efficient ppp project. after perfunctory consideration, it seems that when using the ppp model in comparison with alternative methods of state-supported investment, lower volumes of budget expenses and the public partner’s liabilities can be considered as requisite conditions of ppp efficiency. the original roots of this approach can be traced back to the international experience of application of the value-for-money criterion, which is defined in hm treasury (2006) as the ratio of the integrated costs of construction and maintenance of an infrastructural facility to the quality of services provided to its potential customers. the popularity of this method can be partially explained by the basic assumptions made when comparing the alternatives. essentially, it is assumed that the participation of the private partner in a ppp project allows one to lower both capital and operational expenses in comparison with budget financing; for example, up to 15% for school construction (the world bank 2013). however, to prove the accuracy of such assumptions, more compelling evidence is required than the existing anecdotal observations. we believe the following consideration to be more significant. any ppp project not only requires a certain volume of budget expenditure, but also generates tax and non-tax revenues for different levels of the budgetary system, in the form of tax revenue from direct participants of the project as well as multiplicative effects in related sectors of the economy. essentially, these are consolidated budget revenues, comprised of the following:  nontax revenues, including land registry fees; interest on loans allocated to the private partner by the state (directly from the budget or by a relevant development institution); principal payments; dividend on shares; proceeds from private partner shares purchased previously in the open market; guarantee payments; license charges, etc.  direct tax revenues from project participants, including the companies that are recipients of investment in the ppp model and the building contractors involved in project implementation in its investment phase.  indirect tax revenues incidental to project implementation. these include the augmentation of tax payments of all project stakeholders registered in the russian federation: manufacturers of materials and equipment for the construction of objects financed from development institution funds; suppliers of materials and parts for the production of goods or provision of services in the operation phase of the project; and consumers of these goods or services. the inclusion of indirect tax revenues into the evaluation of the efficiency of investment projects allows for the acknowledgement of the tax multiplier arising from their implementation. 6 review of european and russian affairs 11 (2), 2017 in this context it becomes obvious that if the minimization of budget costs is considered the main efficiency criterion, the issue of consolidated revenues is overlooked and has no impact on the conclusion made about the existence or lack of comparative advantages of the ppp approach. it should be particularly emphasized that the importance of multiplicative effects for the assessment of investment efficiency is usually underestimated, not just for ppp projects but for any other projects implemented with any kind of state support. meanwhile, it could possibly bring about a complete overhaul of the logic behind investment decision-making about the feasibility of a project that was previously considered inefficient (or, conversely, its non-feasibility in the case that the multiplicative effect of the project turns out to be negative). this applies to both budgetary and commercial efficiency of the project for the private partner. further on we shall illustrate this point by calculating the efficiency of a municipal solid waste processing project as an example. in light of the above, it is essential to note that various attempts to minimize budget expenses and transfer ppp project risks to the private partner can be explained from the position of common sense, but cannot fully support the required balance between stakeholder interests, often acting as a hurdle to successful project implementation. following the logic established by peter drucker, the guru of modern management, that the focus should always be on maximizing opportunities rather than minimizing risks6, we shall focus on the revenue-based rather than the cost-based approach to the accommodation of stakeholder interests, with obligatory acknowledgement of multiplicative effects of ppp project implementation. results and discussion the goal for the evaluation of ppp projects (especially environmental ones) has inevitably shifted from traditional assessments of commercial efficiency, characteristic of the primacy of business interests over those of the state, towards the justification of the social impact of investment projects that have high significance for society as a whole and are implemented with private sector investment resources through the ppp model. a comprehensive approach to efficiency assessment for such projects involves three interconnected stages: 1. assessing the social efficiency of the project (if the result is negative, the assessment stops and next two stages are not required); 2. assessing the commercial efficiency of the project (if the result is negative, there is no point in selecting any ppp model for the project); 3. selection of a suitable ppp model. a new term, “collaborative governance,” which implies that implementation of such projects involve private companies and the general population as well as the government (bevir 2012), has recently emerged to characterize the specific features of managing projects aimed at solving socially significant problems. in the context of the collaborative governance of ppp projects, a positive assessment of their social efficiency based on the guidelines published by international organizations (european commission 2008), the world bank (belli et al. 2008), or similar russian 6 see, for example, drucker, peter f. innovation and entrepreneurship: practice and principles. new york: harperbusiness, 1993. 7 review of european and russian affairs 11 (2), 2017 documents7 may turn out to be a necessary but not sufficient prerequisite for their successful performance. the fact is that a ppp project can only be implemented when there is a balance between the interests of the public and the private partner when taking into account traditional investment attractiveness indicators for both of them, such as net present value (npv), internal rate of return (irr), payback period (pp) and profitability index (pi)8. this means that, for example, the net present value must be positive not only for society as a whole, but also for the state budget and the private partner. additional mechanisms should be in place to resolve a possible conflict of interest between the private and the public partner; for example, if the budget efficiency of the project is positive but it is commercially inefficient. another valid point is that it is impossible to reduce all kinds of positive and negative implications of socially important projects, particularly environmental ones, solely to financial indicators. the relevant methodology is explained in-depth in guidelines published by the european commission (2008), the world bank (2014) and the international finance corporation (lysy 1999) (see also epec 2011 and new zealand treasury 2016). despite the complexity of its application for the purposes of social efficiency assessment, its practical value is obvious, even though if it does not invalidate the general conclusion about the existence of a whole class of effects that are pointless to convert into traditional financial indicators. it should be noted that in such cases good quality expert appraisal is much more useful than fruitless (and often even harmful) attempts to reduce any kind of external effects to the usual cost indicators in the face of objective reality. such “financial fetishism” only increases entropy and the risk of ill-founded investment decision-making. with regard to environmental projects, it is crucial to present their outcomes as specific target indicators reflecting the prospects of environmental improvement as a result of their implementation. these indicators should be easy to understand for the population of the area where the project is based, which is by definition one of its stakeholders. another cornerstone of success for a project is the organization of preliminary public discussions with the population using state of the art crowdsourcing techniques. we believe that this approach could be included as a formal requirement in the evaluation of environmental projects; positive results of a public discussion should be a necessary condition of its social efficiency. ignoring this rule can have negative consequences, most commonly in the form of public protests against environmental projects, which can lead to a project being delayed or even abandoned entirely. the reason behind these protests is mostly the mistrust of the population (often grounded in bitter experience of similar projects in the past) towards the project’s initiators and the lack of unbiased information about the prospects of environmental improvement. public unrest based on mistrust and misinformation can sometimes stop environmentally unsound projects, but they may also halt the implementation of projects that would contribute to a healthier environment as well as create new jobs. 7 russian federation. ministry of economy, ministry of finance. metodicheskie rekomendatsii po otsenke effektivnosti investitsionnykh proektov [guidelines for performance evaluation of investment projects]. 2nd ed. 1999. 8 the methodologies for the calculation of these indicators are widely covered in economic literature; they are commonly accepted and, as such, are not the topic of this article. 8 review of european and russian affairs 11 (2), 2017 according to the online publication gazeta.ru, ecologically themed protests account for over a quarter of all protest actions in russia9. a number of examples can be cited, including the successful protests against the construction of a silicon plant in abakan, republic of khakassia, and the yenisei ferroalloy plant near krasnoyarsk (the reason in both cases being the threat of air pollution, which was not taken into account in the project development phase10), as well as the halt of a project for the excavation of an iron ore quarry in the village of zyuzelskiy in the sverdlovsk region despite the fact that it was well-thought-out and was granted all necessary permits11, among other things. similar processes can be observed in other countries. mass unrest in china has targeted the construction of a copper plant in the southwestern city of shifang in sichuan province, the dalian fujia dahua petrochemical factory in the province of liaoning, the expansion of a petrochemical complex in the major port city of ningbo, and the construction of a waste water pipeline to dump industrial waste from a paper factory in the city of qidong near shanghai12. of course, the involvement of the population in the social evaluation of environmental ppp projects through crowdsourcing technologies cannot be for free, despite the fact that crowdsourcing itself has its roots in volunteerism which does not presume payment for participation in community service. however, the organization of crowdsourcing requires certain expenses for the creation and maintenance of the project website (in a more advanced version, the development and support of a crowdsourcing platform) and aggregation and analysis of the results of the discussion. the use of crowdsourcing to solve socially important problems is discussed in more detail in margolin and dutkiewicz (2013). nevertheless, as irrevocably proven by the above examples, these expenses are relatively negligible and have a short payback period in contrast to the losses incurred due to delays or abandonment of reasonable and harmless environmental projects. in other cases, when environmental projects are not thoroughly thought out and the risks of their implementation only emerge during public discussion, the expenses related to organizing crowdsourcing are still incommensurably low in comparison to the possible damage to the environment if the project was prematurely funded. the choice of discount rate (defined here as the minimum acceptable value of return per unit of capital invested) for the evaluation of social investment efficiency also has certain peculiarities. it is usually lowered in comparison to the discount rate used for commercial efficiency calculation. the reason for this approach to the evaluation of projects that have significant impact on the environment is the necessity of taking into account the long term possibilities of environmental damage. following this logic, negative net cash flows in the final years of the accounting period, 9 gorod-ad. ekologicheskie protesty sostavlyayut bolee chetverti vsekh protestnykh aktsii v rossii [“hell city. environmental projects account for over a quarter of all protest activities in the russian federation” ] 2010. gazeta.ru, march 26. accessed november 11, 2016. http://www.gazeta.ru/comments/2010/03/26_a_3343366.shtml 10 rossiyu zakhlestnula volna ekologicheskikh protestov [“russia is overwhelmed by a wave of environmental protests”] . 2012. lenta, august 07. accessed november 11, 2016. http://lenta.ru/articles/2012/08/07/protest/ 11 ekologiya protiv deneg: sverdlovskie vlasti ishchut kompromiss mezhdu protestami naseleniya i investproektami. [“ecology against money: sverdlovsk authorities looking for a compromise between civil unrest and investment projects”]. 2014. accessed november 11, 2016. http://urbc.ru/1068027274-ekologiya-protiv-deneg.html 12 ekologicheskaya situatsiya v kitae problema dlya vsego mira [“the environmental situation in china is a problem for the whole world”]. 2013. bellona.ru, march 13. accessed november 11, 2016. http://www.bellona.ru/articles_ru/articles_2013/1363180361.2 9 review of european and russian affairs 11 (2), 2017 for example due to the costs of compensation for ecological damage, when discounted at a low rate, will have more impact on the final net present value than if the market discount rate is used. the current mainstream approach to quantitative assessment of the lowered discount rate (sometimes referred to as the social, public or shadow discount rate) is the social rate of time preferences method (srtp) (national public-private partnership guidance 2013), which reflects the willingness of society to give up consumption in the present in favour of future consumption13. this rate varies from country to country, sometimes quite significantly. for instance, the european commission (2008) demonstrates an almost threefold difference between eu member states (2.8% in the netherlands; 8.1% in hungary). all other conditions being equal, the higher a country’s level of development, the lower its srtp. despite the widespread acceptance of the srtp method, many countries of the world (in particular, the uk, the usa, and south korea) use a discount rate based on the rate of return on state bonds with a long maturity (20-30 years) similar to the project cycle length. this approach seems more preferable on the ground since the social discount rate that it yields is practically identical to the srtp but much easier to calculate given that it is based on standard financial data. in comparison with commercial efficiency assessment, two components of the risk premium are excluded from the calculation, one of which is associated with the risks of the company initiating the project and the other with the risks of the project itself. while the initiator company’s risks can be minimized by establishing rigorous requirements to ppp project participants, project risks are assumed by society. by excluding the risk premium from the requirements of the project’s financial efficiency, it relies on the possibility of additional longterm advantages, both financial and non-financial. it is significant to note that the current rate of return on russian federation bonds denominated in national currency roughly corresponds to the cost of capital that is currently attracted by companies participating in the program to support projects implemented in russia on the basis of project finance14 (further referred to as the program), which amounts to 11.5%. according to the website www.rusbonds.ru, which continuously publishes bond quotes, the effective yield of russian federal loan bonds (ofz-29006-pk series) that were issued on october 19, 2016 and will mature on december 31, 2019 comes up to 11.21%15. in accordance with the relevant legislation, the program is designed to support projects with a total cost of no less than rub 1 billion and not more than rub 20 billion that contribute to one or more strategic development priorities selected by the government of the russian federation. each project goes through a thorough appraisal procedure; the initiator is required to provide their own investment resources amounting to at least 20% of the total cost of the project. a key element of the program is the possibility of concessional lending by commercial banks, which is secured by central bank refinancing and the provision of state guarantees for up to 25% of the loan value. this is the factor that allows us to use an 11.5 % discount rate in further calculations. 13 despite the fact that approaches to the calculation of the social discount rate were developed by frank ramsey back in 1928, there has been a recent boom in research on the topic. for example, sheluntsova (2011) is entirely devoted to the substantiation of the social discount rate. the growth of relevance and popularity of this kind of research reflects the general trend towards increased influence of the social sector on global economic development. 14 http://base.garant.ru/70764842 15 http://www.rusbonds.ru/tooldistrib.asp?tool=109045 http://www.rusbonds.ru/ 10 review of european and russian affairs 11 (2), 2017 without a doubt, this level of interest rate naturally raises some questions from investors from industrially advanced countries, who find even a 5% annual interest rate overwhelmingly high. nevertheless, we should bear in mind that the russian market is significantly different from developed country markets: it is characterized by increased risk (and, consequently, increased interest rates), and, on the other hand, increased investment returns. the selection of procedures for the adjustment of cash flows to determine the social efficiency of investment and the calculation of the social discount rate are followed by an evaluation of project efficiency as a whole, which is based on the assumption that all profits are received and all expenses are borne by the project initiator (society as a whole in the case of social efficiency evaluation, and a specific private company in the case of commercial efficiency evaluation). indisputably, environmental projects have a very high social value, so if the npvtotal indicator 16 is positive, then the project can be assumed to be viable at first approximation. in this case, the existence of additional positive environmental impacts is irrelevant, since they are hard to reflect in monetary form; they simply strengthen the conclusion of the project’s high social efficiency if npvtotal is positive. the only “tight spots” are possible protests by the population caused by mistrust towards project initiators and lack of information about its consequences. as demonstrated above, this risk is alleviated by crowdsourced public discussion. in a more complicated case, the project’s npvtotal can be negative but its implementation can contribute to significant nonfinancial outcomes related to environmental improvement. indeed, if the implementation of a socially significant project is accompanied by impacts and costs that cannot be evaluated in monetary terms, ample opportunities arise for subjective assessment of its feasibility. multi-criteria analysis is a tool that allows one to minimize the risks of non-optimal subjective decision-making while taking into account manifold economic and social outcomes of the project within a single methodological framework (for detailed information on this see [8]). it requires expert evaluation of the significance of impacts that are not reducible to cost based indicators. three possible scenarios are outlined here: a. the non-financial effects are insignificant and have almost no effect on the general assessment of social efficiency (the weighting factor for the importance of the project’s non-financial effects determined on the basis of expert assessment, µ < 0.1). in this case, if npvtotal <0, the project is rejected; b. the non-financial effects weighting factor is 0.1<µ<0.5, that is, financial effects remain dominant, but non-financial effects are strong enough to affect the final decision about project implementation. with regard to scenario (b), we previously (margolin and feldgen 2009) introduced an algorithm based on the principle of multi-criteria analysis of projects with significant non-financial effects common to various types of ppp projects (infrastructural, innovative, environmental). the idea behind that algorithm was to bring together all types of effects (financial and non-financial) into an integrated ranking score and select the optimal scenario for project implementation based on 16 in this case, the use of the total subscript means that the economic sense of the net present value indicator remains unchanged, but it is calculated according to the rules used for social efficiency assessment, which are different from the approaches traditionally used for commercial projects (european commission 2008). 11 review of european and russian affairs 11 (2), 2017 the maximum ranking score. one drawback of this approach is that, while it solves the task of comparing different project implementation scenarios, it includes no way to evaluate the social efficiency of the optimal scenario. essentially, the algorithm leaves open the question of whether the best scenario of project implementation fulfills the requirements of social efficiency. how, then, can this drawback be eliminated? one possible approach is to adjust the social discount rate, factoring in the impact of non-financial effects with the following formula: еa = еs × (1 µ), where: еa = adjusted social discount rate; еs = standard social discount rate. then, the adjusted discount rate is used to recalculate the npvtotal indicator; and if it is positive, the project is deemed to meet the social efficiency requirement (in the case of npvtotal <0, the project is considered socially inefficient). c. the on-financial effects dominate (their weighting factor, µ>0.5). in this case, traditional approaches to social efficiency calculation are pointless and it is advisable to employ the methodologies for state program evaluation (margolin 2013; guide to the program assessment rating tool 2008) to determine the possibility of achieving the environmental improvement objectives. in light of the above, environmental projects implemented through ppp and possessing significant socially-important non-financial effects can be evaluated using a modified multi-criteria analysis method, demonstrated by the flowchart in figure 1. the application of this algorithm allows one to either declare a project socially inefficient (in which case it is pointless to calculate commercial efficiency and select an appropriate ppp model), or to come to the conclusion that it is socially efficient and move on to the next stage – the evaluation of the commercial efficiency of the ppp project (this is the second stage of the comprehensive approach introduced at the beginning of this section). similar to the assessment of social efficiency, the initial assumption here is that the initiator receives all project benefits and bears all expenses (however, in this case it is the private partner rather than society as a whole). a particular feature of this methodology is the necessity to account for cash flows from operating and investing activities, while cash flows from financing activities are not taken into consideration (they are considered at the stage of evaluation of project participation efficiency for each stakeholder). let us consider the results of a commercial efficiency evaluation for an environmentally significant project (assuming that its social efficiency is positive) with the example of a project aimed at the construction of a municipal solid waste (msw) processing facility. the problem of msw processing is becoming more and more urgent. the moscow metropolitan area alone generates 10 million tons of waste annually, and even more if we include unauthorized landfills. the moscow region has no garbage recycling plants at all, while the capacity of existing waste disposal sites is almost exhausted17. a possible ppp project in this sphere would make use 17 situatsiya s utilizatsiei tbo v moskovskom regione [the situation with msw recycling in the moscow region]. 2014. agentstvo gorodskikh novostey, december 30. accessed november 11, 2016. http://www.mskagency.ru/materials/1927613 12 review of european and russian affairs 11 (2), 2017 of the technology of integrated low-waste18 msw processing and disposal: collection of ferrous and non-ferrous scrap metal, production of refuse-derived fuel that can be burned to generate power for the facility, and reducing organic msw to raw materials for the production of construction supplies. the construction would take place in close proximity to the timokhovo solid waste landfill in the noginsky district in moscow oblast (in fact, the corresponding feasibility study was conducted and approved back in 199819). if the project in question was implemented under normal market conditions without resorting to the ppp model, it would be limited to two implementation options: option 1. construction of a facility with a capacity of 240 thousand tons of msw per year for msw sorting and disposal. the total investment necessary for the facility to reach full capacity is rur 5 500 million; option 2. construction of a facility with a capacity of 240 thousand tons of msw per year for msw sorting and disposal, derivation of secondary metals, a power generating unit and a construction materials production unit. this would lead to an increase in the following: (a) capital expenditure for the construction of the power generating unit and the production unit (rur 1 100 million); (b) operating costs of rur 80 million per year (up from rur 400 million in option 1 to rur 480 million) due to special processes used for the extraction of secondary metals in addition to the costs related to the maintenance of the power generating unit and the production unit; (c) revenues from sales of secondary metals, construction materials and electric power (rur 645 million). the corresponding aggregated base values are presented in table 1. characteristically, the second option takes into account the multiplicative effect arising from construction of the facility, which (unlike option 1) allows us to calculate both direct effects from payments for msw reception and additional revenues from sales of electric power and construction materials in the open market. choosing the second option would give substantial reason to consider the project comprehensive rather than local. for the purposes of this analysis, we use the following definition of comprehensive production: the production of more than one product or service within a single production process. it is evident that option 1 involves a single service (msw sorting and processing), and only the second option, which adds the production of secondary metals, electric power and construction materials, makes the whole project comprehensive. 18 here and elsewhere we avoid the “wasteless technology” buzzword, which is a scientific abstraction similar to such terms as “perfectly competitive market,” “ideal gas,” “zero gravity” etc. 19 administration of the moscow region. ob utverzhdenii tekhniko-ekonomicheskogo obosnovaniya na stroitel'stvo kompleksa po pererabotke i utilizatsii tverdykh bytovykh otkhodov v raione pos.timokhovo noginskogo raiona moskovskoi oblasti [on approval of the feasibility study for the construction of a municipal solid waste facility near the village of timokhovo in the noginsky district in moscow oblast]. 1998. accessed november 11, 2016. http://docs.cntd.ru/document/5808662 13 review of european and russian affairs 11 (2), 2017 table 1 base values for comparison of two options for msw processing facility construction project20 indicators option 1, rur million option 2, rur million investment 5 500 6 600 total revenues including: msw reception fees sales of secondary metals, construction materials and electric power 1 205 1 205 1 850 1 205 645 payments 400 480 balance 805 1 370 implementation of the project by a private partner without state support (for instance, in the form of partial assumption of investment risks characteristic of ppp models) assumes the attraction of investment under normal market conditions. the current difficult conditions of the russian financial market mean that the expected annual interest rate would come up to around 20%. the prerequisites for the implementation of the project through ppp are its significant environmental importance, incidental to the reduced load on landfills and creation of opportunities for gradual processing of msw previously accumulated in those landfills. the participation of the state, for example through the program to support projects implemented in russia on the basis of project finance, would lower risks and, consequently, interest rates (to 11.5% as discussed earlier). the required capital investment for the msw processing facility varies from rur 5.5 to 6.6 billion depending on the chosen implementation option, which conforms to the requirements of the program. of crucial importance here is the continuity of assessment of social and commercial outcomes of the project. in relation to the msw processing facility construction project this means that nonfinancial effects have practically no impact on the decision about its launch, and, according to figure 1, the discount rate can be set without adjustment for non-financial effects. 20 table 1 presents a calculation of cash flow values (cf) for the two options under comparison based on initial data from the feasibility study introduced above. specifically, for option 1 cf1= (1205 – 400) = rur 805 million; for option 2 cf2 = (1205 + 645 – 480) = rur 1370 million. further on, when calculating net present values (npv), each of these two options is considered in relation to two project implementation scenarios: with and without state support. the only difference between these scenarios is the discount rate value, which is lower in the case of state-supported implementation due to a reduction in the risk premium. 14 review of european and russian affairs 11 (2), 2017 figure 1 flowchart demonstrating the application of modified multi-criteria analysis 15 review of european and russian affairs 11 (2), 2017 summarizing all possible options for the implementation of the msw facility construction project, figure 2 illustrates the results of an npv calculation for a commercial efficiency assessment for the following four scenarios: 1. multiplicative effects are not considered; the project is implemented by a private partner without state participation (option 1 in table 1; 20% discount rate); 2. multiplicative effects are considered; the project is implemented by a private partner without state participation (option 2 in table 1; 20% discount rate); 3. multiplicative effects are not considered; the project is implemented through ppp (option 1 in table 1; 11.5% discount rate); 4. multiplicative effects are considered; the project is implemented through ppp (option 2 in table 1; 11.5% discount rate). figure 2 presents a quantitative assessment of the dynamics of discounted cash flows using the accrued total method during the 12-year accounting period with the corresponding graphical interpretation. the results show that the project as a whole can only be considered efficient in one scenario: when multiplicative effects are fully taken into consideration and the ppp model is used, so that the participation of the public partner maintains the cost of capital on a level not exceeding the discount rate specified in the program to support projects implemented in russia on the basis of project finance. there are various ways to attract project investment within a ppp model, such as:  the private partner attracts investment on market conditions (at 20%), while the state subsidizes the annual interest rate to the level of 11.5%;  investment is attracted by including the project in the program. from our point of view, these budget expenses should not be considered in terms of losses to the budget system. on the contrary, state participation in ppp projects is tantamount to investment in future tax and non-tax revenues from all private sector participants of the project. possible budget losses due to underestimation of the significance of multiplicative effects should also be mentioned. if, for instance, the third scenario is chosen (using ppp but with no regard to multiplicative effects), then to maintain commercial efficiency the public partner would have to ensure that the annual cost of capital does not exceed 7% (in which case the total project npv will be reduced to zero). in turn, this would increase the volume of budget expenses for interest rate subsidies by approximately half. moreover, the budget system would lose all kinds of tax revenues due to the incomplete exploitation of the project’s potential (essentially by abandoning the production and sale of secondary metals, electric power and construction materials). summarizing the results of calculations presented above and in figure 2, the conclusion we can draw is that msw facility construction project performance can only be efficient in one of the scenarios considered: if the multiplier effects are fully taken into account and the project is implemented jointly by the private and the public partner. within the framework of the comprehensive approach discussed above, the final stage of assessment for this project would be the selection of a specific ppp model. as evidenced by both international and russian experience, concession agreements seem to be the most widespread form of ppp. in russia, a corresponding law came into effect in 2005, a long time before the law 16 review of european and russian affairs 11 (2), 2017 figure 2 results of commercial efficiency assessment for four implementation options of a msw facility construction project 17 review of european and russian affairs 11 (2), 2017 on ppp21, and the latest amendments to it were approved in december 2015. however, despite its unquestionable popularity, the concession model is not the only one currently in use. a detailed discussion of types of ppp is provided in shpakovich and vasilenok (2014) and margolin (2012). other notable approaches include, among others, the lease contract, the management contract, and the very promising life cycle contract. substantiation of the advantages of a particular model for the implementation of a specific project is a separate and rather difficult task that falls beyond the scope of this article. the crucial point is that there is no need to proceed to the selection of a suitable form of ppp for any specific project before a preliminary evaluation is carried out to determine its viability on the whole and the advisability of a ppp approach. in closing, let us note that the implementation of a critical mass of environmental projects using the ppp model can become a crucial factor in the accommodation of long-term interests and the strengthening of trust between the state, business and civil society. all other conditions being equal, the higher the mutual trust of investment process participants, the wider the possibilities for successful investment and the solution of environmental problems faced by society today. conclusions 1) successful implementation of environmental projects is inextricably connected to the accommodation of interests of the state, business and civil society, which contributes to the strengthening of trust between them and ensures the priority of long-term project goals over shortterm financial objectives of separate participants. features of these projects, such as the large volume of initial investment, lengthy payback periods, and increased participation risks create objective prerequisites for their implementation through the ppp model. in order to provide an unbiased assessment of the feasibility of environmental projects for society as a whole as well as the public and private partners, this article substantiates recommendations for the development of a social efficiency evaluation methodology, taking into account the balance between financial and non-financial effects of project implementation and the continuity of assessment of social and commercial outcomes of environmental projects. 2) unlike popular approaches to the evaluation of ppp project efficiency, which employ the valuefor-money criterion focused on a cost-oriented approach (that is, an assessment of the ratio between aggregated expenses for the construction and operation of facilities), this article mostly focuses on a revenue-oriented approach, which presumes taking into account consolidated tax revenues on various levels of the budget system as well as multiplicative effects of environmental ppp projects. as shown by analysis, the significance of taking into account multiplicative effects in investment efficiency evaluation is usually underestimated, both for ppp and other types of projects implemented with state support. meanwhile, it could possibly bring about a complete overhaul of the logic behind investment decision-making regarding the feasibility of a project that was previously considered inefficient (or, conversely, its non-feasibility in the case if the multiplicative effect if the project turns out to be negative). 3) the article introduces an algorithm for the application of modified multi-criteria analysis to assess social efficiency of environmental ppp projects. significant features of this algorithm are: consideration of the impact of the balance of financial and non-financial effects on the results of 21 russian federal law 115-fz of july 21, 2005 “o konzessionnykh soglasheniyakh [on concession agreements]”. accessed november 11, 2016. http://base.garant.ru/12141176/ 18 review of european and russian affairs 11 (2), 2017 social efficiency evaluation of projects, and the inclusion of crowdsourced public discussion into the decision-making process. as a rule, insufficient attention is currently given to the organization of public discussion of environmental projects (above all with local communities living in the project implementation area). in turn, this leads to the fact that over a quarter of all protest actions in the russian federation have to do with environmental issues (and a similar situation exists in many other countries). therefore, the inclusion of public discussions into the procedure of feasibility assessment for environmental projects would minimize social risks and create favourable conditions for investment. the algorithm suggested by the authors and presented in figure 1 allows one to either declare a project socially inefficient (in which case it is pointless to calculate commercial efficiency and select an appropriate ppp model), or to come to the conclusion that it is socially efficient and move on to the next stage – the evaluation of the commercial efficiency of the ppp project. 4) our case study of a project to construct an msw processing facility demonstrates that commercial efficiency for the private partner can only be achieved when its multiplicative effects are fully taken into account and the ppp model is used, which presumes that the participation of the public partner will keep the cost of capital at a level not exceeding the social discount rate. it is worth noting that this mechanism of public partner participation can help maintain the continuity of assessment of social and commercial outcomes of environmental ppp projects. 5) on the whole, the accommodation of interests of the state, business and civil society during the implementation of environmental ppp projects is possible if a comprehensive approach is used, including the development of a methodology for the evaluation of social efficiency of investment projects that takes into account the balance between financial and non-financial effects of its implementation; the involvement of interested representatives of civil society into the discussion of environmentally significant projects during their development stage through crowdsourcing technologies; identification of multiplicative effects and quantitative evaluation of their impact on investment decision-making concerning the feasibility of environmental ppp projects; and maintenance of the continuity of assessment of their social and commercial outcomes. 19 review of european and russian affairs 11 (2), 2017 references belli, pedro, jock anderson, howard barnum, and john dixon. 2008. handbook on economic analysis of investment operations. washington: world bank. bevir, mark. 2012. governance: a very short introduction. oxford: oxford university press. dutkiewicz, piotr and richard sakwa, eds. 2014. 22 ideas to fix the world: conversations with the world’s foremost thinkers. moscow: moscow university press. epec (european ppp expertise centre). 2011. the non-financial benefits of ppps. an overview of concepts and methodology. luxembourg: european ppp expertise centre. european commission. 2008. guide to cost benefit analysis of investment projects. guide to the program assessment rating tool. 2008. washington: office of management and budget. hm treasury. 2006. value for money assessment guidance. accessed november 4, 2016. http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/vfm_assessmentguidance061006opt.pdf. lysy, frank j. 1999. assessing development impact. washington: ifc. margolin, 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"razvitiye form gosudarstvenno-chastnogo partnerstva v rossiyskoy ekonomike [development of forms of public-private partnerships in the russian economy]." natsional'nyi issledovatel'skii universitet informatsionnykh tekhnologii, mekhaniki i optiki. nauchnyi zhurnal, no. 1(16). the world bank. 2013. value for money analysis: practices and challenges. washington: the world bank. ———. 2014. public-private partnership reference guide. version 2.0. washington: the world bank. 21 review of european and russian affairs 11 (2), 2017 published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada available online at: journals.carleton.ca/rera/ rera is an electronic academic peer-reviewed journal. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is a joint project supported by the canada-europe transatlantic dialogue—a cross-canada research network supported by the social sciences and humanities research council of canada (sshrc)—along with the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies (carleton university) and its associated research unit, the centre for european studies. rera aims to provide an accessible forum for research, to promote high standards of research and scholarship, and to foster communication among young scholars. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada tel: +01 613 520-2600 ext. 3117; e-mail: rera-journal@carleton.ca creative commons license this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license (cc by-nc-nd 4.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, provided the source is acknowledged. no use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes. issn: 1718-4835 © 2017 the author(s) https://journals.carleton.ca/rera/ mailto:rera-journal@carleton.ca https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ https://i.creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ review of european and russian affairs 7 (2), 2012 issn 1718-4835 © 2012 the author(s) www.carleton.ca/rera germany’s euro crisis: preferences, management, and contingencies michael olender carleton university abstract this article applies moravscik’s ideational liberalism to outline domestic and international influences on german state preference formation since the introduction of the euro and discusses the trends that distinguish german policy making and why they matter in the development of sustainable solutions to the ongoing euro crisis. the german government’s ideational commitments to the european project and ordoliberal principles are found to be significant determinants in preference formation, but while its commitment to europe has remained stable over time, its commitment to ordoliberalism has wavered. the government prefers to advance european integration in line with ordoliberal principles, though in times of crisis it hardens its ordoliberal stance. this article argues that germany will go to great lengths to keep the eurozone intact because it is part of a grand political project, but the government’s prescription for fiscal austerity, which is underpinned by ordoliberal principles, sometimes exacerbates the euro crisis. policy recommendations that favour flexibility are offered for germany and other eurozone countries. 2 review of european and russian affairs 7 (2), 2012 introduction how much do economic and political ideas matter in germany, the eurozone’s leading economy which is responsible for managing the ongoing euro crisis, and why has the crisis evolved the way that it has? this article investigates which ideational commitments inform the german government’s preference formation on economic and monetary union (emu) and whether its preferences have changed over time. austerity measures demanded by germany and bailouts of indebted greece, ireland, and portugal are evidence of two determinants of state preferences: commitments to ordoliberal principles 1 and the european project. the academic literature on emu does not come to a firm conclusion about which determinant holds more weight in the formation of german preferences (see, for instance, kaltenthaler 2002), which means that the government’s policy making during the crisis can be difficult to understand. following a discussion about the two commitments, this article applies andrew moravcsik’s ideational liberalism 2 in two case studies—germany breaking and revising the stability and growth pact (sgp) between 2002 and 2005 and its management of the 2008–09 global financial crisis—and finds that germany prefers advancing european integration according to ordoliberal principles, but while its commitment to the european project has remained stable over time, its commitment to ordoliberalism has wavered. notably, in times of crisis the german government hardens its ordoliberal stance. reflecting on insights from these studies, this article then argues that germany will go to great lengths to keep the 17-country eurozone intact because it is part of a grand political project, but the government’s prescription for fiscal austerity, which is underpinned by ordoliberal principles, sometimes exacerbates the euro crisis. understanding the coupling of commitments since 1999, when the euro was introduced as an accounting unit, and under which conditions one commitment may be prioritized could help policy makers reconceptualize strategies to address the crisis. 1. ordoliberalism is a multifaceted economic ideology that has evolved over time. see rieter and schmolz (1993, 91–108) for a thorough discussion about how the freiburg school—specifically walter eucken, franz böhm, and hans großmann-doerth—developed the ideology in 1938–45 in opposition to the economic order established by national socialism. see also allen (2005, 205) for the freiburg school’s specific policy prescriptions and the “framework” philosophy of the school. see white (2012) for how ordoliberal policies resulted in the postwar economic miracle in west germany. see kitschelt and streeck (2004) for details about how the german economic system, particularly with regard to the organization of capital and labour and the role of the state, adapted to events and evolved alongside changing conditions from the end of the second world war until the beginning of the 21st century. see allen (2010) for a discussion on germany’s economic performance from reunification through the first decade of the 21st century. for the purpose of this article, what matter are the economic, institutional, and political principles outlined in dyson (2002, 177–78), since they influenced how german policy makers constructed emu and continue to resonate. for the sake of simplicity, these principles will be together referred to as “ordoliberal principles” or “ordoliberalism.” 2. this article recurs to moravcsik’s liberal theory of state preference formation and focuses on ideational liberalism (see moravcsik 1997, 516–21, 525–28). commercial liberalism and republican liberalism help explain foreign policy preferences, but there is much evidence against market incentives of domestic and transnational actors and rent seeking by privileged societal groups in the case of german state preference formation on emu. ideational liberalism is theoretically most interesting because the german government is overtly influenced by ideas when it comes to institution building and crisis management. hence, ideational liberalism will be applied rather than the liberal theory that subsumes all three variants. review of european and russian affairs 7 (2), 2012 3 ordoliberalism and the european project commitments to ordoliberal principles and the european project are linked to germany’s distinctive history, politics, and economics, which matter because the country has a central role in developing policies and designing treaties and institutions in europe. ordoliberalism originated at the university of freiburg in the 1930s and has since evolved and come to be known as the german model of political economy that guides policy makers in their responses to events and change. developed in opposition to the economic order established by national socialism, the ideology has been dominant domestically since the end of the second world war and has had a diverse influence. for example, it underpinned the social market economy that drove west germany’s strong economic performance until the 1990s and influences reunified germany’s policy on emu. on the topic of emu, kenneth dyson (2002, 177–78) explains that ordoliberalism is comprised of three main principles. first, to be sustainable, emu must be a “stability community” based on economic convergence, which means prioritizing open and competitive markets, rules against bailouts, proscription of monetary financing of budget deficits, and strict rules on fiscal discipline. second, specific policy problems are to be clearly assigned to actors or institutions that are responsible for solving them; in particular, the price stability mandate of the european central bank (ecb) is not to be undermined. third, a strong euro depends on the ability of the european union (eu) to project itself as “an autonomous political entity”; emu, then, requires an acceleration of european political union by strengthening eu institutions and increasing the effectiveness of coordination. ordoliberalism prescribes a long-term framework for monetary and fiscal policy as an “essential precondition for sustainable growth and employment” (186). in cases of unsustainable sovereign debt loads, it prescribes austerity measures, which are meant to “break the cycle of debt and the threat of insolvency, reassuring the private sector and thus triggering natural and sustainable growth,” and proscribes expansionary state intervention, such as keynesian stimulus (guérot and dullien 2012). crucially, “[f]ailure to reach fiscal targets is seen as a political failure of will” (guérot and dullien 2012). citing postwar and post-reunification experiences, ulrike guérot and sebastian dullien (2012) argue that “[i]n the german mind, postwar success is firmly linked to ordoliberal policies, even if the reality might be more complex than that. these central tenets that lay out how to run an economy are largely an article of faith across germany.” that ordoliberal principles have become ingrained in german decision making is a testament to the power of ideas and their relation to material outcomes. the german government’s commitment to the european project, here defined as the integration process, is based on germany’s history in the 20th century, and the euro is a focal point because of its role in locking countries into the project. as a country that has played an essential part in two world wars which resulted in its division and a divided europe, germany has a stake in the single currency and, relatedly, the continent’s unity. it is widely understood that the politics which drove european integration since the creation of the european coal and steel community in the 1950s until the creation of the eu was based on attempts by countries, particularly france, to embed germany in a european institutional framework to dissuade it from reverting to its past nationalistic and militaristic ways. but it should be noted that former west german chancellor konrad adenauer intended to regain legitimacy through reconciliation and integration and former chancellor helmut kohl worked to embed west germany and reunited germany in networks of multilateral governance, international alliances, and economic interdependence (chandler 2002, 202–03). karl kaltenthaler (2002, 69–73) finds that the 4 review of european and russian affairs 7 (2), 2012 german chancellery and foreign ministry’s geopolitical concerns drove european monetary integration until german reunification in 1990. after that, he argues, and through the 1990–91 maastricht negotiations that concluded with decisions about moving forward with emu and the institutional structure of the ecb and led to the signing of the maastricht treaty in 1992 and creation of the eu the following year, the german bundesbank (considered ordoliberalism’s “institutional epicentre” [dyson 2002, 177]), finance ministry, and domestic financial and industry sectors together took the lead in shaping policy on monetary integration. complementing kaltenthaler’s analysis, peter katzenstein (1997, 116–18, 123) contends that germans prioritize “political responsibility” because of the “institutionalization of power” since the end of the second world war and have become increasingly aware that their country’s actions are made within a society of states. he says that germany focuses on shaping rules and “tends to mobilize a bias favoring its policy in the long term” (120), which translates into regulative power. katzenstein explains that following reunification, [u]nderneath the “soft” power of institutional politics, newer, “hard” economic interests in the area of regulative politics express serious internal resource scarcities. these interests are beginning to supplant older, “hard” political interests that had aimed at the general stabilization of germany’s external environment . . . . this shift reflects new conditions at home and abroad and increases the weight of short-term interests in german policy. (1997, 121) this perspective suggests that kaltenthaler (2002) may be right in his argument. katzenstein (1997, 122–23), however, goes on to argue that, in contrast to britain and france, germany’s preference has been to advance political integration in europe and strongly support the eu, specifically the european parliament. he concludes that “we need to think not of germany and europe but of germany in europe . . . germany in europe is a political fact that will continue to define the international and national politics of the new europe” (123). it is clear that ordoliberalism informs german preference formation on emu, but katzenstein’s conclusion suggests that germany is deeply committed to the european project regardless of short-term domestic economic interests. moreover, his point about germany supporting the advancement of political integration in europe reflects ordoliberalism’s third principle, indicating that there may be overlap between economic and political ideational commitments. germany’s commitment to the european project evidently deserves more attention in analyses of state preference formation and policy making. time horizons are certainly something to consider. in the short term, domestic economic interests may well be prioritized over political concerns according to national and international circumstances, but this does not mean that they will always be prioritized, especially in the medium and long term. a long-term study that assesses the commitments together could generate new knowledge about the german government’s preferences about emu over time. findings could then be applied to trends during the euro crisis. what follows are two case studies that assess germany’s commitments to ordoliberal principles and the european project since the introduction of the euro. the application of ideational liberalism to analyze state-society relations and international bargaining when germany broke the sgp starting in 2002 and revised it between 2003 and 2005 and during germany’s management of the 2008–09 global financial crisis offers insight into the commitments that inform german preferences about emu in contingency and crisis situations. review of european and russian affairs 7 (2), 2012 5 the studies find that the commitments remain coupled, hence germany’s preference on emu— the german government prefers to advance european integration according to ordoliberal principles—is generally stable over time. germany’s commitment to ordoliberalism became negotiable during the controversy over the sgp, yet its commitment to integration remained strong. during the global financial crisis, germany hardened its ordoliberal stance, but this was ultimately for the benefit of europe, in addition to itself and the global economy. the conclusions that germany prefers to advance european integration according to ordoliberal principles, that these principles are up for negotiation during contingency situations, and that the government reverts to its ordoliberal tradition during times of crisis have implications for policy making on emu in general. the fact that the government’s commitment to ordoliberalism wavers while its commitment to the european project is unwavering is a significant finding because it helps to make sense of german policy making during the euro crisis and highlights areas where the government is able and unable to compromise. breaking the pact kaltenthaler (2002, 81–85) implies that since reunification germany has been committed to european integration in line with ordoliberal principles. this general trend continued through the creation of the euro as an accounting unit in 1999 until the introduction of bills and coins in 2002, but soon after, worsening domestic economic problems caused the country to break from its ordoliberal tradition. believing that there needed to be something in place to ensure the stability of the euro when it launched, then german finance minister theo waigel in 1995 proposed the sgp, which can be considered a means to promote further european integration according to ordoliberal principles. the sgp, a set of legally binding fiscal rules and excessive deficit procedures designed to ensure governments attempt to balance their annual budgets, was concluded in 1996 and afterwards adopted by all eu member states. europe benefited from a cyclical economic boom between 1997 and 2000, which helped improve fiscal balances, but a low-growth trend began at the end of 2000. portugal was the first country to breach the 60 percent limit on public debt in 2001, then germany and france breached it the following year and lobbied to avoid punitive measures. on top of ongoing reunification costs, 3 germany experienced mounting public debt related to a fall in revenues from profit-related taxes, income taxes, social contributions with rising unemployment and wage moderation, and tax cuts, which was only partly offset by expenditure cuts (dyson 2008, 151). germany’s public debt rose from 60.3 percent of gross domestic product (gdp) in 2002 to 67.5 percent in 2006; the country breached the sgp for four consecutive years (151). growth policies became necessary. this was 3. see wiesenthal (2004) for a discussion on the difficulties and costs of reunification. west germany transferred markets and institutions to east germany and expected a smooth transition and economic convergence to bolster germany’s strong international position, but from 1992 to 2002 the country experienced growth rates below its annual increases in productivity, resulting in rising unemployment, a weak economic performance overall, and a political stalemate over economic reform. east german socialist and economic structures were not organized to benefit from west german institutions and currency reform caused the appreciation of the east german mark, leaving east german economic activity uncompetitive. the proper option for improving the macroeconomic situation was lowering wages and taxes while increasing the flexibility of the labour market and state regulation, but the electoral imperatives of parties and state governments resulted in fiscal transfers for wage equalization, perpetuating the stagnation of the overall german economy. germany had the lowest growth rate of all eu countries from 1995 to 2009, growing only 16 percent; its resurgence after 2009 was due to increased exports to china, oilexporting states, and eastern and southern european countries following implementation of the painful agenda 2010 reforms (young and semmler 2011, 7–8, 12–13). 6 review of european and russian affairs 7 (2), 2012 a contingency situation for germany in which realizing legitimate domestic order, socioeconomic regulation, and redistribution led the government to be more flexible internationally on the topic of ordoliberalism and prioritize further integration. the general trend that germany has been committed to european integration in line with ordoliberal principles is nuanced by the fact that its commitment to ordoliberalism wavers. the election of a new government can reflect changes in domestic social identities. 4 the centre-right kohl government, which was strongly committed to both the european project and ordoliberalism, was replaced in 1998 by a centre-left coalition government of the social democratic party of germany (sdp) and the greens. the newly elected government under gerhard schröder prioritized national interests that were tied less to european integration and even less to germany’s ordoliberal tradition. internationally, it emphasized the centrality of the franco–german relationship and favoured “multiple bilateralism” over multilateralism (jeffery and paterson 2004, 71). the government was most concerned, however, about the german economy. it was tasked with improving employment numbers and breaking germany’s cycle of indebtedness and low growth that had been persistent since reunification. over its first term the government increasingly abandoned ordoliberal supply-side policies for fiscal policies that combined supplyand demand-side elements to support growth and employment and adopted a “neo-keynesian” view that budget policy should not be pro-cyclical (dyson 2008, 150–51). the shift away from ordoliberalism was possible because after 1999 the government did not have the same incentives to “bind in” the bundesbank, the opposition and advice of which became less of an issue; the government therefore had more flexibility with domestic fiscal policy and the sgp (150, 152). the shift was also motivated by electoral concerns, internal party opposition to structural reforms and spending cuts, and political problems with agenda 2010, the government’s long-term (ordoliberal) program of deep cuts to social security and labour market reforms aimed to improve economic growth and reduce unemployment (151). notably, neither the government nor the public attributed germany’s economic problems to the euro, a situation that “has its roots in the elite and public consensus on the euro as a fundamentally political project in germany’s vital national interests” (158–59, 163). these developments demonstrate that successive german governments are not bound by the country’s ordoliberal tradition and with emu realized, domestic social identities were characterized by the prioritization of national interests, which included the success of the european project. the german government breached the sgp starting in 2002 because it restricted opportunities for reforms and economic growth, yet the government lobbied to revise the pact, reaffirming its commitment to the european project. comparing international bargaining during negotiations on the sgp in 1996 to germany’s lobbying for reform of the pact in 2003 indicates that one ideational commitment can be prioritized over the other according to national circumstances. in 1996, germany under kohl insisted on near-automatic penalties for countries with excess deficits, a position supported by the netherlands but rejected by france, the united kingdom, italy, and spain as too rigid (chandler 2002, 211). while germany wanted central bankers to 4. ideational liberalism views “the configuration of domestic social identities and values as a basic determinant of state preferences and, therefore, of interstate conflict and cooperation” (moravcsik 1997, 525). social identities are sets of individual preferences about the proper scope and nature of public goods provision that subsequently specify the nature of legitimate domestic order; political decision-making processes—which can be thought of as public goods that are shaped by social identities—are one of the essential elements of domestic public order (moravcsik 1997, 525). in this article, the relevant social identities are the commitment of individuals and groups to particular political institutions and the nature of legitimate socio-economic regulation and redistribution (see moravcsik 1997, 527–28). review of european and russian affairs 7 (2), 2012 7 have maximum discretion in applying sanctions for excess deficits, france wanted ministers to have the last word (a position that was supported by the majority of countries), and there was contention over the definition of “exceptional circumstances” that would allow countries to escape being penalized (211). germany’s rigidity and penchant for penalties often makes bargaining tense, given that almost all other eurozone countries prefer flexibility. an exchange of policy concessions balanced german demands for near-automatic sanctions and majority demands for ministers having the last word, but the sgp ultimately leaned toward german preferences and narrowly defined exceptional circumstances (211). these negotiations, the results of which could be considered a reconfiguration of state preferences, were a crucial diplomatic achievement for germany and their outcome should have improved long-term eurozone prospects—if only countries, including germany, had adhered to the new rules. in 2003, after deterioration in germany’s public finances had caused the european commission to recommend to the eu’s economic and financial affairs council (ecofin) to begin excessive deficit procedures, the schröder government lobbied to ensure that ecofin vetoed the warning proposal and to rewrite the rules of the sgp. other countries were not strongly committed to sgp rules and preferred flexibility, but germany countered the weakening of the pact by assuming political responsibility and revising it. during the 2001–05 period, most countries were not complying with the sgp and ecofin did not penalize them, which further weakened the pact’s credibility (lorca-susino 2010, 159). the german government adopted a position—opposed by the bundesbank, but supported by the french government—that it should be allowed flexibility in hard times to adjust budgetary policy to the economic cycle; that major reforms to labour markets and the welfare state (like agenda 2010 in march 2003) should be taken into account in assessing the state of public finances because of their effects on long-term potential growth and employment; and that, if existing rules did not allow recognition of individual circumstances and germany was being required to engage in ever more pro-cyclical savings, the rules needed to be renegotiated to make them more credible. (dyson 2008, 151) germany and france, because of their greater voting weight in ecofin, were able to reform the pact to be more in line with their interests and more open to political interpretation (chang 2006, 118–19). the sgp was formally revised in march 2005 to meet the schröder government’s demands to adapt the fiscal compliance rules to legitimize germany’s fiscal policy decisions since 2001, which increased the pact’s flexibility for all eurozone countries (dyson 2008, 151– 52). the bundesbank, ecb, and international monetary fund (imf) considered the revised sgp, with an increased time period to implement corrections and a lengthy exceptional circumstances list, to be weak; the pact was unevenly respected after its adoption, despite enforcement efforts by the european commission (lorca-susino 2010, 160). germany’s breaking of the sgp did not result in tensions with other countries, which desired less strictness, but the government’s actions effectively set a new standard in the eurozone—that fiscal rules could be broken without recourse. what is most important in this case, however, is that while germany prefers to adhere to ordoliberal principles and can mobilize bias for its preferences, national circumstances can influence the country to largely abandon those principles, though it will assume political responsibility and advance integration in response. by prioritizing national interests and revising 8 review of european and russian affairs 7 (2), 2012 the sgp, germany improved growth and increased employment while continuing to advance european integration, which demonstrates that its commitment to the european project can be prioritized over its commitment to ordoliberal principles. managing crisis the election of the centre-left “grand coalition” of the centre-right christian democratic union/christian social union (the union) under angela merkel and centre-left sdp in 2005, perhaps explained by a partial reversion in domestic social identities, was followed by an improvement in german economic performance, which improved the eurozone’s overall fortunes and allowed germany to reassert leadership. when the global financial crisis deepened in 2008 with the bankruptcy of american investment bank lehman brothers, the german government was thrust into a leadership role in international crisis management. major drops in stock markets, a near collapse of the us banking system, and a credit squeeze and falling asset prices in europe and the rest of the world resulted in a global recession that necessitated extraordinary action by eurozone governments. like the governments of many other developed and emerging market countries, they responded by providing rescue packages and increasing government spending, which significantly drove up deficits, in attempts to stem the consequences of the crisis (verdun 2009, 233). central banks including the ecb coordinated to lower interest rates and increase liquidity to banks. economic growth in the eurozone ended the year at 0.9 percent, reinforcing uncertainty (234). in 2009, german gdp contracted 5 percent compared to the previous year, reflecting a sharp decline in exports and domestic capital investment in the winter of 2008–09, and the german economy experienced its deepest recession since the second world war (dyson 2010, 400–01). during a time of prolonged uncertainty, germany reverted to its traditional ordoliberal stance and strictly promoted further integration according to ordoliberal priniciples. in this crisis situation, germany prioritized its commitment to ordoliberal principles in order to sustain or restore legitimate domestic order, socio-economic regulation, and redistribution but continued to advance european integration as well. for the german government, ordoliberalism informed preference formation and its strategic response and effectively functioned as an interpretive framework that allowed it to manage and reduce uncertainty and develop proposals to address the crisis. a core executive group with merkel at the helm saw its task as restoring stability first in the country and then europe, with german banks a primary concern. the crisis prompted the rehabilitation of the social market economy after years of experimentation with a liberal market model, the restoration of the bundesbank’s reputation, and financial stability to gain new pre-eminence co-equal with price stability (dyson 2010, 401). the government’s responses were “framed by a mix of classical ordoliberal thinking with centre-left political positioning,” social priorities being education, research, and innovation (407). germany’s bank rescue was the largest in europe and an unprecedented obligation for the government. german banks, which were engaged in international wholesale markets and asset-backed securities, were offered guarantees of €400 billion, and an €80 billion program was created to allow them to borrow from the government to increase equity (400–01; schirm 2011, 55). going against its ordoliberal tradition, the government implemented a short-term domestic stimulus program of around 3 percent of gdp in 2009—a package smaller than in other countries—that included emergency spending, large unemployment benefits, and government subsidies for the pay of workers who work fewer hours (newman 2010, 158). it, however, explained that there would be no lasting reorientation of review of european and russian affairs 7 (2), 2012 9 economic policy, measures taken during the crisis were exceptional, it intended to return to fiscal consolidation as soon as the crisis was over, and the introduction of a constitutional debt brake acted as a long-term guarantee (zohlnhöfer 2011, 236–39). legitimate domestic order became characterized by the priorities of price stability, financial stability, and hence systemic stability, while rescues and stimulus were considered to be aberrant but necessary to sustain or restore legitimate socio-economic regulation, and redistribution. the configuration of state preferences in europe is less of a concern for germany during a crisis situation. a look at international bargaining demonstrates that germany, increasingly pressured by its economic contraction, its threatened financial system, and the world’s economically powerful countries, assumed an assertive role to implement ordoliberal policies to address the crisis, though this was to benefit europe as much as itself (hübner 2012, 161–65). the german government relied on ordoliberal principles to make policy and explicitly attempted to affect european and global dynamics. the government stressed that the crisis was a result of flaws in the anglo-american liberal market model, while maintaining that bailouts involved moral hazard and emphasizing the need for stricter regulation of financial markets and supervision of financial institutions (schirm 2011, 53; dyson 2010, 407). often arguing against stimulus by governments and quantitative easing by key central banks, merkel prioritized international institution building as a crisis response and played a leading role in negotiating the new european and global architecture for financial market regulation and supervision (schirm 2011, 52; dyson 2010, 401, 407). to stabilize the global economy, the government—primarily motivated by officials’ principles—proposed to constrain non-bank activities by expanding regulation of the financial services sector, particularly new rules on hedge funds and credit rating agencies (newman 2010, 159; schirm 2011, 53). germany also opposed unconventional ecb monetary policy operations. in june 2009, after the ecb governing council decided to purchase covered bonds, merkel publicly warned about risks to ecb independence from international pressure (dyson 2010, 408). ordoliberal principles evidently formed the basis of the government’s preferences and strategic response to the crisis. they were promoted for the benefit of germany, europe, and the global economy, despite controversy or contending arguments presented by other countries. it is significant that the german government hardened its ordoliberal stance in a crisis situation because that indicates which policies will be preferred in the context of uncertainty. although ordoliberal principles were prioritized and the configuration of state preferences in europe was not a primary concern, the government believed that new institutions and regulations were necessary for the survival of emu, so its commitment to the european project was apparent. abraham newman (2010, 153, 155) argues that in situations of uncertainty “beliefs play a critical role in interest construction.” he argues that the interwar and reunification experiences “elevated long-held beliefs about policy conservatism that now compete with the postwar multilateral policy frame within the foreign policy elite,” which is indicative of the coupling of commitments, and these experiences put an emphasis on caution, or “the dangers associated with sudden change, loss of control and the benefits of incrementalism,” evincing a commitment to ordoliberalism (152–53, 155). during the crisis, newman finds that “[f]ar from abandoning the european project, germany [was] more critical of potential free riding by other members” (154), which suggests that ordoliberal principles were prioritized to pressure governments to restrain spending and implement reforms, both which boost prospects for the long-term success of the project (152, 154). germany rejected european proposals for solutions, did not prop up its main export market, and, despite a 20 percent fall in exports, “followed a 10 review of european and russian affairs 7 (2), 2012 politics of austerity, emphasizing monetary stability, moral hazard, and institutional constraints” (156–57, 161). the government argued against regional stimulus, stressed the exceptional and temporary nature of the crisis, and reinforced the need to use the sgp to enforce credible exits from stimulus, a position informed by a “broadly shared ideational consensus on fiscal discipline” and a desire to avoid inflation at all costs (dyson 2010, 403; schirm 2011, 55–56; newman 2010, 158). during a crisis situation—like during a contingency situation—germany is first concerned with national circumstances. but in a crisis the government prioritizes its traditional economic ideology, though in its concern for stability, responsibility, and strong institutions, its commitment to the advancement of integration and success of the european project is clear. germany’s euro crisis the german government’s preferences have come under close scrutiny during the euro crisis which has intensified since early 2010. the crisis has fiscal roots in other countries, though germany is primarily responsible for its management and german preferences drive its evolution. the application of ideational liberalism has demonstrated that in response to major events the government prefers to advance european integration according to ordoliberal principles, but while its commitment to the european project has remained stable over time, its commitment to ordoliberalism has wavered. this finding is significant because it helps to make sense of german policy making during the ongoing crisis. the fact that germany’s ordoliberal stance hardens during a crisis has policy implications for eurozone governments. given germany’s commitment to the european project, economic stagnation, rather than disintegration of the eurozone, should be the primary concern for european policy makers. there are areas where the german government, which prescribes austerity over growth policies, is able and unable to compromise. the reasons for the euro crisis in southern europe are many—rescue packages and emergency fiscal policies, which resulted in major increases in public debt, following the global financial crisis certainly played a part—and the crisis is far from over. greece, a peripheral economy that had borrowed beyond its means, attempted to conceal its circumstances by misreporting budget data. the crisis was triggered in january 2010 when the unsustainability of greek debt was exposed. the height of the crisis came in may, when eurozone countries led by germany and the imf approved a €110 billion bailout package coupled with austerity measures for greece, breaking the maastricht treaty’s no-bailout rule. rising borrowing costs since early 2010 caused the public finances of ireland and portugal, which indulged in low interest rates during the previous decade, to deteriorate and both have had to be bailed out as well. greece remains unable to afford to pay its creditors without the help of third parties. in february 2012, a second bailout worth €130 billion, conditional on a new package of austerity measures, was approved amid much doubt and hesitation on the part of germany and other countries (spiegel 2012). some observers believe that greece defaulting on its debts is inevitable. according to jay shambaugh, the eurozone remains in “full-fledged crisis,” which is really three interconnected crises. review of european and russian affairs 7 (2), 2012 11 the euro area is currently involved in a banking crisis, where banks face a capital shortfall, interbank liquidity is restrained, and future losses are uncertain. it faces a sovereign debt crisis, where at least one country (greece) will not pay its debts in full, and bondholders are displaying increasing concern about other sovereigns. it also, though, faces a macroeconomic crisis, where slow growth and relative uncompetitiveness in the periphery add to the burden of some of the indebted nations. (shambaugh 2012, 1) he argues that “a solution to one crisis will prove undone by the others unless all three are resolved” (1). germany has to date focused almost exclusively on addressing the sovereign debt crisis with its austerity paradigm, which is underpinned by ordoliberal principles and applied even to situations in which high deficits are not caused by irresponsible government spending but rather higher borrowing costs since early 2010 and low international competitiveness, as in the cases of italy and spain. paying particular attention to its rigid ordoliberal stance, many observers have criticized the german government for muddling through the crisis instead of exhibiting leadership. unlike in previous contingency and crisis situations, germany’s national circumstances—distinguished by restored growth, low unemployment, and large trade surpluses since 2009—may explain the government’s slow reaction to the crisis. elections in 2009 resulted in a centre-right coalition government, with the centre-right free democratic party replacing the spd as the junior partner to merkel’s union. highlighting that political infighting about adequate crisis management mechanisms is “intense” and the government’s hesitant initial response toward supporting greece created uncertainty, kurt hübner (2012, 161, 166) argues that “[t]he german approach to crisis management so far has added to the overall confusion and the nervousness of financial markets and even risks to prevent any stabilizing outcome of the current crisis.” hans kundnani (2012) suggests that at each stage of the crisis, merkel “has seemed to do the absolute minimum to keep the single currency together — but no more. this minimalist approach to the euro crisis may have ultimately cost germany more in terms of bailouts than it would have if it had acted sooner and more decisively.” he (2012) notes that germany’s ordoliberalism has kept inflation down and the euro weak, both which improve the global competitiveness of german exports but do not help other eurozone countries with competitiveness and growth problems. 5 in 2010, germany experienced a growth rate of 3.6 percent, its highest since reunification (young and semmler 2011, 2). by 2012, it had the highest levels of employment since 1990 (kundnani 2012). but while germany is europe’s largest economy and top exporter, it is also the primary backstopper of other eurozone countries. in return for support, the german government demands the implementation of austerity programs, which include spending cuts, tax increases, pension system overhauls, and labour market reforms. following a record of low growth and almost no increases in living standards throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, germany went through similar hardship to improve its economic prospects. the government’s slow reaction to the crisis, then, may be reflective of social identities that evolved during that time. however, the government breached the original sgp to improve the country’s prospects, so its prescriptions are not beyond criticism. a commitment to ordoliberal principles is explicit, but a commitment to the european project is often only implicit. the german government’s focus has been to use a combination of austerity and the european financial stability facility (efsf), a special purpose vehicle that 5. inflation needs to increase moderately or the euro has to fall further, or both. 12 review of european and russian affairs 7 (2), 2012 provides up to €440 billion to indebted countries, “to deal with the solvency crisis and hope that by proving solvency, liquidity problems will ease” (shambaugh 2012, 31–32). merkel has maintained that germany will neither issue eurobonds, since they reduce incentives for indebted countries to pursue fiscal consolidation and increase the cost of financing german debt, nor permit any role for the ecb beyond its responsibility for monetary policy, but it supports the efsf and a treaty to advance fiscal union (gow 2011). the fiscal compact, which commits states to introduce national debt brakes, was signed in march 2012 by 25 of 27 eu countries and has already been ratified by several. eurobonds, merkel says, may be an option at a later stage of fiscal union (gow 2011), which is sensible since, increased borrowing costs for germany aside, “a system of ex ante control and veto, without which no eurobond could be lastingly stable, requires political integration” (pisani-ferry 2012, 13). the ecb’s independence is not an issue that can be affected, with neither positive nor negative stances tolerated by merkel (gow 2011). finally, she has emphasized that, together with france and italy, germany would “do everything to defend the euro,” though this would require strict actions by other eurozone governments to abide by the rules of the sgp, which was revised again in march 2011 to include automatic sanctions for breaching deficit limits in some cases (gow 2011). many of these policy positions suggest a strong commitment to ordoliberalism; however, contributing significantly to the efsf, advancing fiscal union, and the shift from a no-bailout clause to a bailout guarantee imply a willingness to go to great lengths to keep the eurozone intact. germany’s commitment to europe is particularly evident in its leadership in managing the greek crisis. in march 2012, the biggest sovereign-debt restructuring in history wrote off €100 billion from greece’s debts of around €350 billion, imposing losses on private sector holders (the economist 2012b). in 2011, such a restructuring had seemed very unlikely but merkel pressed for the imposition of those losses. collapse of the euro? germany’s commitments to both ordoliberalism and the european project have been brought to the fore during the euro crisis, suggesting that german and european history warrants careful consideration. scholars and other experts often reference historical events to make inferences about why governments act the way they do, but the direct influence of events is often overstated. the ideational commitments that result from historical events, rather, deserve more attention. some might argue that germany will not allow changes to the ecb’s mandate because of its hyperinflation episode or that it is committed to europe because it does not want to risk war on the continent. this is not entirely the case. the government learned lessons from historical events that prevent economic chaos and war but also instruct how to achieve economic prosperity and high levels of social well-being—these have been institutionalized to some extent in germany. two destructive world wars, hyperinflation, and division resulted in ideational commitments to ordoliberalism and the european project, which have helped germany to become a leading economy and modern liberal democracy. the government has assumed the political responsibility to maintain unity in europe and it believes an appropriate way to do this is by institutionalizing and exporting the economic ideas that have allowed germany to succeed on the continent and globally. case studies that assessed germany’s ideational commitments showed that the government consistently prefers advancing european integration regardless of national and international circumstances, though its ordoliberal stance has been relaxed because of domestic economic hardship and hardened in the context of crisis and uncertainty. review of european and russian affairs 7 (2), 2012 13 the case studies of germany breaking and revising the sgp and its management of the global financial crisis offer insight into the government’s policy making during the euro crisis. the coupling of ideational commitments is apparent, with ordoliberalism prioritized because of uncertainty and a desire to facilitate natural, rather than stimulated, growth. many observers predict that fragmentation or even disintegration of the eurozone is imminent. some argue that germany is tired of funding greece’s debt and is increasing its demands for austerity to hurry greece to default and exit the eurozone (booker 2012). others argue that prescriptions for austerity, which the german government believes will keep the eurozone together in the long term, will likely have the opposite effect (reguly 2012). the case studies indicate that, in accordance with germany’s ideational commitments, the eurozone will not fragment or disintegrate because germany considers it to be part of a grand political project, meaning that the german government will attempt to avoid defaults and exits from the eurozone even at high cost and risk. germany considers the eurozone to be irreversible and will go to great lengths to keep it together. long-term stagnation in greece and throughout the eurozone—related to austerity prescriptions—is more likely. germany’s crisis management style in the context of uncertainty is distinguished by a prioritization of ordoliberal principles. during the euro crisis, this has meant using an austerity paradigm in combination with the efsf and a proscription of ecb intervention. all problems and contingencies during the crisis, even those that do not involve profligacy, are addressed by the same policy paradigm with an overemphasis on deficit cutting (pisani-ferry 2012, 2–4, 13– 15). the government’s entrenched, much-criticized ordoliberal stance is a strategic response to prolonged uncertainty. hübner (2012, 159, 170–75) argues that “germany’s insistence in its own interests and norms hinders the delivery of a comprehensive crisis management of the eurozone crisis.” the implementation of austerity packages in exchange for german support sometimes creates tension and conflict in the eurozone—best illustrated by athens burning and massive protests in spain—because packages include the prioritization of fiscal consolidation and, relatedly, severe cuts to pensions, public services, and education spending. international bargaining, particularly on the issue of making the ecb the lender of last resort, has not led to the sustained cooperation that might motivate germany to relax its ordoliberal stance. uncertainty about the inability or unwillingness of indebted governments to implement reforms remains. according to ideational liberalism, the configuration of state preferences during a crisis is not a significant influence on german preference formation. domestic actors such as merkel, political parties, and the german supreme court have played key roles in state preference formation, while france has had little influence (167–68). a notable break from ordoliberalism is merkel’s criticism of the european commission’s call for eurobonds, which diminishes the ability of the eu to project itself as an autonomous political entity (169–70). germany’s crisis management style at times exacerbates the crisis and subsequently put the viability of the european project into question. age of austerity with the onset of the euro crisis, the eurozone entered an age of austerity characterized by restrained public spending, high unemployment, low growth, and much uncertainty. the facts that germany couples its ideational commitments and its commitment to ordoliberalism wavers can be taken into account in the development of strategies to govern the crisis in a way that can lead to growth, which ultimately underpins sovereign debt sustainability and the strength of 14 review of european and russian affairs 7 (2), 2012 banks. to solve the sovereign debt crisis, eurozone countries have several options: fiscal consolidation, inflating away debt, growth, default, or a mix of these choices. taking a hard ordoliberal stance, germany is only willing to move forward with fiscal consolidation strategies, understanding that these will break cycles of debt, reassure the private sector, and ultimately result in sustainable growth. it is indisputable that sustained fiscal consolidation is necessary to bring sovereign debt under control (pisani-ferry 2012, 9). paul krugman (2012), however, draws attention to the facts that large spending cuts have not resulted in a surge in consumer and business confidence while ireland and portugal, which have implemented austerity programs, still face high borrowing costs because their economies remain depressed, which undermines tax bases to the extent that debt-to-gdp ratios are deteriorating. italy and spain deserve special attention because, unlike greece, they are core economies that can put extreme pressure on the eurozone if long-term stagnation does occur. greece is a different case because it was profligate, hence austerity is non-negotiable, but these other countries need help bringing down interest rates and increasing tax receipts, which means improving growth. a mix of the aforementioned choices is therefore necessary. the german government could unilaterally relax its ordoliberal stance and promote growth on the understanding that without it the sovereign debt crisis will persist. according to shambaugh (2012, 32), focusing on austerity and the efsf is only sensible if the problem is profligacy—if the problem is either due to high interest rates or slow growth, then different solutions are required. one way to promote pan-european growth is to be more flexible on the issues of the ecb’s bond-buying program and inflation. the ecb has already purchased billions worth of covered bonds and lent over €1 trillion to banks to purchase government bonds. to reduce debt and spur growth, shambaugh (2012, 36–37) recommends that the ecb increase its asset purchases, lower long-term interest rates, lift its inflation target, announce that it will keep longterm interest rates within a reasonable range for countries in good fiscal standing or that are following an efsf/imf package, and maximize its bond buying by clarifying its goals for lower long-run bond yields. ending germany’s opposition to the ecb’s program would not only be in line with preserving central bank independence but also improve european growth prospects. it may additionally encourage germans to save less and consume more. germany has one of the highest saving rates of all developed countries, so its citizens would lose some of their savings with even a moderate rise in inflation (hung 2011; kundnani 2012). kundnani (2012) argues that germany’s hawkishness on inflation does not make sense as a strategy in current circumstances because it means there is no solution for indebted countries except for ever greater austerity. higher inflation and slower debt consolidation in germany can boost demand there, which would address the problem of current account imbalances and reinforce growth potential across europe. the german government resists such policies since it wants to set an example of budget discipline, has an aversion to inflation and central bank intervention, and refuses to compromise its competitiveness (the economist 2012a). the configuration of state preferences largely does not matter to germany, but the potential scale of the crisis demands a clear break from ordoliberal orthodoxy and the austerity paradigm in use. since it improves prospects for the success of the european project, growth is ultimately in germany’s best interests. as merkel maintains, other countries must also do their part. reducing the uncertainty that hardens germany’s ordoliberal stance and proposing growth policies that may persuade the german government to be more flexible are two strategies that can increase awareness in germany that austerity is not enough. indebted governments can reduce uncertainty by showing that they too are committed to the european project. for instance, politicians must be willing to review of european and russian affairs 7 (2), 2012 15 make sacrifices to increase wage flexibility and reform product and service markets. guérot and dullien (2012) argue that germany’s commitment to ordoliberalism has “genuine political support and coherent intellectual foundations,” so instead of attacking excessive austerity and suggesting a renegotiation of the fiscal compact, countries could demand pan-european growth and investment programs with more spending and taxation power shifted to the eu level, propose that unused funds should be channelled into the private sectors of peripheral economies, and ask for more time to balance budgets. such strategies could lead to increased flexibility in germany and sustainable growth in europe. in demanding growth, the governments of italy and spain could equate their fiscal and competitiveness problems with germany’s experience with reunification costs, agenda 2010, and revising the sgp to demonstrate that flexibility is important in shortand medium-term plans. countries could also propose their own credible plans for fiscal consolidation that are linked to europe 2020, the ten-year comprehensive growth framework proposed by the european commission and adopted by eu governments in july 2010, 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and contingencies.” review of european and russian affairs 7 (2): 1–17. published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada. available online at: www.carleton.ca/rera/ rera is an electronic academic peer-reviewed journal that publishes graduate, post-graduate, and young scholarly works. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is a joint project supported by the canada-europe transatlantic dialogue—a cross-canada research network supported by the social sciences and humanities research council of canada (sshrc)—along with the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies (carleton university) and its associated research unit, the centre for european studies. rera aims to provide an accessible forum for research, to promote high standards of research and scholarship, and to foster communication among young scholars. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada tel: +01 613 520-2600 ext. 1179; e-mail: rera-journal@carleton.ca creative commons license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ this working paper is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial no derivs 3.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 3.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced provided the source is acknowledged. no use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes. issn: 1718-4835 © 2012 the author(s) http://www.carleton.ca/rera/ mailto:rera-journal@carleton.ca review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 issn 1718-4835 moving from integration to participation? notes on the interrelationship between communal and associative relationships thomas faist1 and christian ulbricht2 bielefeld university abstract there are current trends in public and academic debates which point toward a wish of some analysts and observers to “de-culturalize” debates on international migration. in german debates, it is the term “integration” which has an alleged culturalizing effect and which therefore should be avoided and discarded as a concept of practice and as a concept of theory. in contrast to these positions we argue that there is a fundamental nexus between communal relations (vergemeinschaftung or integration) and sociation (vergesellschaftung). it is only by relating communal relations and sociation that we can understand the logics of important institutions such as citizenship and welfare states. analytical concepts such as vergemeinschaftung and vergesellschaftung are necessary because they help us to account for fundamental changes. we find that in recent decades the meaning of integration connected to nationhood in public debates has changed from an ethno-cultural understanding to a republican one which is simultaneously characterized by increasing demands upon individuals who are conceptualized as autonomous persons (individualization). 1 thomas faist is professor for sociology at the faculty of sociology at bielefeld university. 2 christian ulbricht is a scientific assistant at the faculty of sociology at bielefeld university. 2 review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 introduction in this article we argue that the incorporation of immigrants into nation states depends on a complex interrelationship between communal and associative relationships. using the example of citizenship reform in germany, we demonstrate that incorporation can never be sufficiently understood without referring to the question of belonging. in germany it has become fashionable in recent times to reject the term “integration” in favour of “participation.” the initiative “demokratie statt integration” 3 [democracy not integration], is but one example within the framework of a “post-migration society.” but substituting one term in favour of another is shortsighted as well as detrimental to academic and socio-political discussion. while it may be justified as a discourse strategy of “critical intervention” (laclau 2005), it is important to keep in mind that “integration” highlights certain aspects of social reality that “participation” does not. “integration” refers to communal relationships (vergemeinschaftung), underpinned by characteristic feelings of belongingness and by the setting of boundaries, and includes the binary conceptualization of people as either in-group members or outsiders. “participation” has more to do with associative relationships (vergesellschaftung), for example, in the instrumental consideration of utility by means of contracts in markets; common interests expressed by organisations; or in exercising civil, political, social and cultural rights and responsibilities. 4 in this respect, the participation discourse addresses contractual, legal and interest-based types of involvement that are viewed as particularly desirable in order to be part of society. nowadays, one might be inclined to notice an inversion in the polarity of community and society. after all, the ideal typical construction as envisaged by ferdinand tönnies5 continues to have considerable traction in current academic and public discussion. classical social theorists were wary of the spread of “society” and deeply lamented the loss of “community.” this process was designated by key terms such as alienation (marx), anomie (durkheim), mass society (simmel) and disenchantment (weber). taking a closer look at today’s academic participation debates, the impression arises that few contributors lament the dissolution of community in the form of large political collectives such as nations; however, there is a greater attachment to communities based on family and faith ties. the nation and its implied exclusive belonging is no longer considered current for a large number of observers. yet those observers who nevertheless choose to position themselves within the “iron-cage of belonging” (nassehi 1997), will inevitably be confronted with significant consequences relevant to inequality. empirical studies have confirmed that negative attributions based on ethnicity have a considerable socio-cultural impact, for instance discrimination in access to the labour market (diehl, friedrich and hall 2009; seibert hupkabrunner, and imdorf 2009). it is understandable, therefore, that contributors to the debate attempt to conceptualize the “boundaries of community” (plessner 2002). 3 kritnet network for critical migration and border regime research (2011). democracy not integration. http://www.demokratie-statt-integration.kritnet.org/demokratie-statt-integration_en.pdf 4 max weber conceptualizes a social relationship as associative, “if and insofar as the orientation of social action within it rests on a rationally motivated adjustment of interests or a similarly motivated agreement, whether the basis of rational judgment be absolute values or reasons of expediency” (weber, economy and society 1978, p. 40-41). he defines a social relationship as communal, “if and so far as the orientation of social action – whether in the individual case, on the average, or in the pure type – is based on a subjective feeling of the parties, whether affectual or traditional, that they belong together” (weber, economy and society 1978, p. 40) 5 ferdinand tönnies (1855-1936) was a co-founder of the german society of sociology and established the theoretical distinction between community and society. 3 review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 this context increases the risk that such a dualistic conception of participation and integration, or community and society, will creep into academic debates but with reversed polarity. essential concepts of classical social thought provide the foundation for a framework for capturing new social developments, explaining existing relations and mapping out potential scopes for enquiry. in the following analysis, we approach the current debate with a theoretical lens that accounts for the changing understanding of integration. against this backdrop it becomes obvious why the wish to “‘move from integration to participation” is nowadays so prominent. such a move offers a clear direction for future research in german migration studies that goes beyond creating linkages to established positions in the sociology of citizenship (bloemraad, korteweg and yurdakul 2008). we doubt that it is possible to capture current developments in the context of migration simply by substituting one term for another or creating new terms. to do so would be to neglect the interrelationship between community and society, glossing over one important question in particular: how do processes of forming community relationships affect the conditions and opportunities for participation, (i.e., associative relationships)? it has become clearer than ever that an answer to this question is needed. indeed, empirical phenomena such as the dualism of migration vs. mobility are forcing the issue (faist 2013). the discourse about the demographically desirable migration of highly qualified individuals (eder, rauer and schmidtke 2004) seems to have had no influence on the multitude of reports claiming that migration poses a threat to german cultural and national identity. this begs the question of why qualified people are almost exclusively regarded as highly mobile people contributing to the economy, yet the idea of the migrant worker is framed in the logic of integration into a national society. observations like these raise further questions: which of the boundaries resulting from community formation lead to a distinction between mobile workers vs. migrant workers? what implications does this distinction have for migrants’ access to their rights to citizenship, jobs, and social participation in general? this line of enquiry fundamentally and specifically addresses problems such as the ways in which nation states are currently framing their selection of migrants through legitimated discourse and how belongingness is negotiated in public spaces (brubaker 1995; joppke 2005; tebble 2006; adamson, triadafilopoulos and zolberg 2011). it is not possible to do these developments justice by focusing on either participation or the ethnicizing and culturalizing perspective of the integration paradigm. sociologically informed critical analysis ought to address two fundamental questions throughout. the first, regarding associative relationships, is how participation in society is possible. the second, regarding communal relationships, is what holds specific groups together and what effects does their boundary formation have on participation and, consequently, inequality. both questions address the problem of how social order can be perceived; the possible ascriptions and perceptions of belongingness and participation are mutually interdependent. furthermore, the processes underlying the formation of communal relationships are important for participation. in general, any critical examination of the dominating concept of integration in academia, society and politics must begin with an analytical separation of the dimensions of associative relationships and communal relationships. this separation makes it possible to identify processes of boundary formation as well as general processes of social closure, particularly in the context of migration. only then does it become possible to sufficiently conceptualize and do justice to the fundamentally important interaction between these two dimensions. after all, participation requires a socio-moral basis in order to provide resources through state regulation or 4 review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 redistribution (walzer 2006; kaufmann 2009). furthermore, theories of democracy imply that solidarity amongst citizens has been and continues to be a necessary precondition for a functional political community (offe and preuss 1991). this raises the question of how political community constitutes itself in present circumstances. in this regard, one should not underestimate the importance of norms and values, even in a highly individualized society disintegrating into subsystems. in the first part of our analysis, we discuss the meaning of the concept of integration within the academic sociological debate (concept of analysis). we also examine the critique of the concept in political practice (concept of practice). for both, we look at the post-migration critique and the attempts to involve processes of communal relationship formation. these are discussed with reference to systems theory and contemporary theories of integration. our preliminary conclusion is that none of these approaches does justice to the fundamental issue of how communal relationships and associative relationships mutually influence each other, and particularly how communal relationships act as a precondition for associative relationships. in the second part of our analysis, we argue that it is important to re-establish the relationship between belongingness and participation, that is, associative and communal relationships. using the concept of citizenship, we illustrate how perceptions and interpretations of belongingness (communal relationships) and participation (associative relationships) work to construct membership. belongingness in political practice is especially linked with processes of culturalization which should be analysed against the backdrop of the nexus between heterogeneity and inequality. we conclude by recommending that the analysis of communal and associative relationships be extrapolated beyond the borders of the nation state. a dichotomous conception of “inside” and “outside” will not be able to rise to this challenge. integration and its critics after more than 40 years of migration debates on the legal and social status of immigrants in germany, numerous studies on the representation of immigrants in the public realm conclude that immigrants are frequently portrayed as a burden on society (müller 2015). the representation of immigrants in the mass media is disproportionately negative and symbolically excluding (eder, rauer and schmidtke 2004). today, migration to germany is increasingly discussed in terms of security. islam is often portrayed as a major threat to the liberal democratic order. in public discourse the boundaries between immigrants and the host society are then drawn in debates on issues like islam and gender, such as the headscarf or honour killings (korteweg and yurdakul 2009). as we have indicated above, one way to cope with such negative ethnicization of migration is to “de-culturalize” the integration debates, that is, to get past the perception of immigrants through an ethnic lens. such efforts are put forward by actors who favour a post-migration-society. the aim of post-migration critique is to establish a new ordering of knowledge within german migration research under the heading of “autonomy of migration.” autonomy of migration is conceptualized as a research approach “which examines migration-specific fields and forms of conflict” (karakayali 2008, 258). this critique incorporates, amongst other things, the “liberal paradox” (hollifield 1992), which contrasts the openness of national borders in the economic 5 review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 sense with the closure of national borders in the political sense. furthermore, the conception of an autonomous field of migration, which transverses the logics of the state and the economy, addresses another important core research question. how can a social order be negotiated outside the framework of the nation state and world societal norms (amelina 2013). in this case, the category used to analyse social order is given by an element of post-migration society known as hybrid identity (foroutan 2013). this diffuse concept aims to deconstruct an essentialist understanding of culture. however, post-migration critique neither contributes to the question of the opening and closing of nation states, nor does it revive the flagging discussion of hybridness. to answer the former, there would have to be new insights into the functional logic of boundary formation by nation states; to answer the latter, it must be established to what extent postmigration critique reaches beyond truly innovative concepts such as “translation” as put forth by salman rushdie (rushdie 1995). one promising aspect of post-migration critique is that it seamlessly links with post-colonial perspectives that aim to venture beyond eurocentric knowledge systems. methodologically, both classical migration research and the transnational approach are based on the conception of space as a container. 6 in this respect, these approaches can be characterized by a “methodological nationalism,” which conceptually excludes identities that transcend national boundaries. along similar lines, it has been posited that an “imperative to integrate” dominates german migration research (transit migration forschungsgruppe 2007, 8). these positions reflect an overwhelming focus on identities that, interestingly, overshadow heterogeneities, such as class, and fit neatly into left-wing paradigms of multiculturalism with an anti-racist political stance. it has not yet been made clear how to conceptualize the cultural process whereby migrants themselves make sense of their situation. in this case, stabilizing the contingent character of culture is delegated to the level of the individual, who is in turn shaped by given cultures. through categorization along a continuum of hybridity we can find out where an individual might be embedded into different contexts but not, however, how and when the potential for taking action is mobilized. even with terms such as “new germans” (bota, khuê and özlem 2013), this perspective does not appear sufficiently distanced from methodological nationalism. hence, statements like the following assume the role of unexamined postulates: “we are part of this society. we are different. therefore, our differences are also a part of this german society” (bota, khuê and özlem 2013, 155). such a concept of hybrid identity in post-migration society unequivocally abandons the notion that the whole individual is accepted into the host culture. it thus represents a further development over previous approaches, building on a historical perspective and arguing from a vantage point based on normative values. recalling debates on integration/disintegration as well as on inclusion/exclusion from the mid-1990s (heitmeyer 1997; friedrichs and jagodzinski 1999), it becomes apparent that the concept of post-migration society should not be targeted with the same criticism as wilhelm heitmeyer’s disintegration theory: 6 the extent to which this criticism can be applied to the transnational research perspective remains to be seen. after all, this approach popularized the concept of “methodological nationalism” in the 1990s (summarized in wimmer and glick-schiller 2003) and the construct continues to be investigated predominantly from a transnational perspective (amelina and faist 2012). 6 review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 disintegration, in this sense, is not a pathological deviation from a successful process of forming associative relationships, rather, the result of inclusion relations that themselves are to be viewed as a reaction to the reconfiguration of primary societal differentiation(nassehi 1997, 190). in other words, disintegration is a default condition, and, in the light of contingent opportunities for communication, it is integration that requires explanation. from the communication theory perspective of a functionally differentiated society, exclusion can practically be seen as a precondition for the inclusion of individuals. the functionally differentiated society expels individuals from society, only to partially re-include them in the logic of subsystems. people are included into the social system insofar as they are communicatively addressed by relevant overarching differentiators (for example, paying into/not paying into the economic system); they are excluded when the discrepancy between information and communication renders them invisible. the implication is that individuals are no longer required to subjugate themselves to one single entity, such as a binding and normative set of values as outlined by emile durkheim (1997) and talcott parsons (1991), for example. indeed, from this point of view, morals are a necessary vehicle for integration but only for archaic and pre-modern societies. this “old european” idea becomes obsolete when considering equivalent functional systems whose unity originates exclusively from the differences between them. while proponents of the post-migration perspective do not state this explicitly, their approach can be interpreted as attempting to take seriously the (theoretical) consequences of a functionally differentiated society. it is the demand derived from the postulate underpinning modern society that anyone who participates in a society should be guaranteed access to all of its functions (bohn 2008). the concept of hybrid identity makes reference to a tendency not to address difference and foreignness in an attempt to overcome them. attributes that are not related to function are irrelevant to accessing functional systems, for instance ethnicity, race or gender, and require further explanation. this outlook in particular informs sociological research, and prompts us to investigate the question of “which societal mechanisms lead to the differentiation of populations in modern societies divorced along ethnic-culture lines and why is there room in our society for these supposedly pre-modern types of collective communal relationships, which stand in opposition to structural individualism” (nassehi 1997, 190). in its understanding that the whole individual is not being integrated into society, post-migration critique appears to be very up to date. post-migration critique has come close to the insights gained by system theoretical differentiation theories. the question then arises whether the critique has the capacity to follow the terminology of these system theoretical differentiation theories while based simultaneously on the normative conviction that a sound understanding of social inequality can help in transforming it. this question leads us into contested territory. instead of trying to do away with social inequality, system theoretical differentiation theory aims to describe societal processes of differentiation using the terms inclusion/exclusion. attempts to reconcile theories of social inequality with system theoretical differentiation theories in order to identify and overcome deficits are rare. an exception is luhmann’s questioning of the primacy of functional differentiation and the replacing of it with the overarching categories of inclusion and exclusion (luhmann 1996). the validity of the codes associated with the functional systems is becoming increasingly dependent on location (schroer 2010, 300), with the result that the dimension of space (in a social sense) gains importance as a category. however, 7 review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 the terms inclusion/exclusion are not very helpful in understanding how access to social space is organized; they signify only that one may find oneself inside or outside. it is universally acknowledged that space is foregrounded conceptually when discussing resources that are bound to particular social spaces. the most important socio-geographical space is without doubt the modern nation state. drawing on a variety of theoretical traditions, we know that the nation state is both a symbolic community that encompasses subjective feelings of commonality and a legal-political community based on citizenship (among others: anderson 1983; calhoun 1993; peters 1993; gellner 2008). proponents of systems theory acknowledge these conditions by emphasizing that the communicative perspective is rooted just as deeply in norms and semantics as the use of function-specific binary coding (stichweh 2009). by formulating this point of view, stichweh takes this argument even further than michael bommes, who “merely” emphasizes the role of the political functional system. in order to foster loyalty, the political system includes individuals as a whole and categorizes them unambiguously according to one nation state. when accessing national resources, for instance, the welfare state, belonging to one nation state rather than another can constitute a “threshold of inequality” (bommes 1999, 147). this idea can be expressed more pointedly by asserting that for liberal-democratic nation states a valid passport is the entry ticket to the functionally differentiated society. this claim addresses only one side of the coin, disregarding the idea that associative relationships are fundamentally dependent on communal relationships within nation states, for instance the conception of a national identity. stichweh’s systems theory does not, however, answer the question of how such semantics and norms affect inclusion and exclusion. richard münch, with reference to hondrich and koch-arzberger (hondrich and koch-arzberger 1992), already faulted the systems perspective on integration theory for failing to address ethnicity, nationality and nationalism (münch 1995, 65). thus on the question of inclusion and exclusion in modern societies we are “not further, just later” (“nicht weiter, sondern nur später”) (nietzsche). using the concept of autonomy of migration, “critical migration research” proposes a methodological focus on the possibilities for action available to migration actors and institutions. for this purpose, critical migration research invokes foucault’s concept of governmentality. particular emphasis is placed on the way in which numerous institutions aim to make mobility governable, whereby mobility is foremost understood as mobility of work, and the integration of migrants through categorization, for instance by territorializing the nation state. 7 critical migration scholars argue that migration research which draws on classical integration theory supports an intellectual framework that maintains discriminatory patterns against migrants. however, critical migration research falls short in at least two ways. first, by disjointedly drawing on foucault’s concept of governmentality, critical migration research loses sight of the manifold countervailing power formations on the part of migrants, particularly against state institutions. in this sense, the autonomy of migration is understood as a governmental perspective rather than the independence of migrants. yet this is inadequate, because migrants, even irregular or illegal migrants, can be highly self-sufficient, resistant and autonomous agents 7 see in particular hess and karakayali in “transit migration forschungsgruppe 2007”. 8 review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 vis-à-vis border and integration regimes.8 second, conducting a sort of intellectual exorcism is not really helpful. while the critique of “integration” in the interest of problematizing a dominant knowledge system is understandable, abolishing the term does not solve the issues and questions associated with it. in this context, we assume that the term “integration” primarily refers to processes of communal relationship formation within academic and partially within political debate. surprisingly, integration and its critics are united by the implicit assumption that society can be conceptualized as a unified, if not relatively homogenous body. critics of multiculturalism and post-migration and post-colonial theorists alike share this assumption. prominent political figures such as david cameron, nicolas sarkozy and angela merkel have been some of the most vocal critics of multiculturalism in recent years. at the deutschlandtag (party conference) of the junge union (young conservatives) in 2010, angela merkel succinctly stated: “the multicultural approach has failed, it has failed completely!” the essence of the post-migration critique comes across in the following assertion: we live in an immigrant society. this means that we need to stop talking about integration when we address the social relations that govern how we live together. integration means that people who work, have children, grow old and die in this country have a code of conduct forced upon them before they are even part of society on equal terms. democracy is not a golf club. democracy means that all people have the right to figure out together and for themselves how they wish to live together. the notion of integration is an enemy to democracy”(netzwerk kritische migrationsforschung).9 while these (on the surface) very disparate critiques of the practice of integration implicitly celebrate homogeneity, other voices do not even attempt a differentiated engagement with integration. the expert council on migration, for instance, merges the terms integration and participation by talking about “… integration as an empirical measure of participation in central aspects of social life” (sachverständigenrat migration 2012, 17). at this point, we provisionally establish that the image of homogeneity explicitly formulated in public critiques of multiculturalism and, interestingly, implied in post-migration research is outdated, not least because of the increased diversification of migration and society. post-migration and post-colonial critiques are apparently unaware of the evolution of classical theories of integration over the past decades, in which there has been a movement away from an emphasis on cultural homogeneity. it has been a long journey from the classical assimilation theories as formulated by the chicago school 10 to multiculturalism, to newer assimilation theories and ending with concepts of diversity. all of these theories and perspectives focus attention on the connection between associative and communal relationships. the adaptation of migrants to a culturally homogenous majority society, a process that usually spans several generations, plays an important role in assimilation theories developed within the chicago school framework up until the 1960s (park 1928; gordon 1964). at the crux of these theories is the incorporation or subordination of migrants into or within an existing dominant social 8 see for instance barron et al. 2011. 9 kritnet network for critical migration and border regime research (2011). http://demokratie-stattintegration.kritnet.org/ 10 in part also earlier, see e.g. kivisto 2005. 9 review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 structure or culture, even if, according to park, processes of adaptation can move in the opposite direction. the implicit assumptions of the model are obvious: the integration of migrants is more or less a unilinear process of adaptation to the host society. newer theories of assimilation question the existence of a fixed cultural core of the majority society and shift the focus to processes of boundary formation between migrants and members of majority social groups (alba and nee 2003). assimilation or integration exists when boundaries disintegrate, when minority group members overstep boundaries or when new minorities face exclusion in the sense of sociocultural closure. contemporary theories of assimilation thus reflect a strong turn toward social constructivism. the political theory of multiculturalism remains far removed from these social constructivist contributions. essentially, multiculturalism is a normative strain of theory influenced by the discussions of the rights of national minorities in the 1980s and 1990s and applied as well to immigrant minorities. a central assumption and one of the most significant demands of multiculturalism as a social theory and political practice is that only the recognition of all cultures as equally valid can create a solid foundation for effective social participation (kymlicka 1995). multiculturalism proposes the validation of cultural practices in minority groups as a precondition for participation in all functional systems and social fields. yet critics of multiculturalism frequently assert that validating minority cultures encourages the suppression of dissidence within these groups; with regard to national minorities, québec is often cited as an example (barry 1991). when comparing different conceptions of integration it becomes apparent that communal and associative relationships are usually the focus of analysis. older theories of assimilation, for example, postulate the acculturation of migrants in regard to language and work ethic as a precondition for participation in social fields such as school, work and politics. concepts of diversity also indulge in a kind of methodological holism, even if, unlike in multiculturalism, this breaks down collectives into individuals as carriers of cultural competences. newer theories of assimilation emphasize the social constitution of boundaries between majority and minority groups. in doing so they pay tribute to older social constructivist and social anthropologist traditions (barth 1969), which have recently been revived (wimmer 2008). the social mechanisms behind the transformation of culturally coded differences (heterogeneity) into inequalities have been neglected in past analyses. the climbing team of communal and associative relationships – explored through the example of citizenship the debate on the reform of citizenship laws that has been taking place in germany since the 1990s, shows how important it is to examine the interplay between communal and associative relationships and to clarify which theoretical or socio-political outcomes are present. citizenship as the idea and practice of full membership in a unified political body on the basis of equal legal status is an ideal concept for this purpose. equal democratic participation based on affiliations with imaginary, and in the sense of the thomas theorem also real, communities may be hindered by a variety of inequalities originating from processes associated with civil society, the market and the family. at the same time, the outward social closure associated with citizenship in nation 10 review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 states constitutes a moment in which inequality is generated. for example, the interplay of communal and associative relationships can be illustrated by the functional logic of the welfare state constituted within a nation state. this interaction can also be observed in the political conflicts surrounding citizenship reforms in the federal republic of germany since the late 1990s. hailed by its proponents of as an act of modernization, the german citizenship law reform of 2000 may constitute a success story within the aforementioned narrative. the reform introduced limited jus soli rights, which attribute citizenship and citizenship rights on the basis of the country-of-birth principle (faist 2007). according to the law, children born in germany to foreign nationals who have lived in the country for at least eight years are (also) german citizens.11 the citizenship law reform in 1999 of the social democrats (spd) and the green party (bündnis 90/die grünen) coalition augmented the “right of blood” (jus sanguinis) model of citizenship. this had been the primary means of acquiring german citizenship, with provisions for “right of soil” (jus soli) citizenship, which are in comparison to other european countries very wide-reaching. additionally, the required duration of residence for obtaining citizenship was shortened to eight years. dual nationality was not expected to become the normal case, but provisions were made for a number of exceptions. children between the ages of 18 and 23 born to foreign nationals in germany were required by the reform to choose between german nationality and that of their parents. this had become known as the optionspflicht (duty to decide), which was recently abolished (winter et al. 2015). proponents of jus soli and dual nationality base their central arguments for simplifying the process of citizenship acquisition on different variants of creating political and social equality by means of associative relationships on the basis of legal equality. the social democrats (spd), the green party (bündnis 90/die grünen), the party of democratic socialism (pds) and some in the liberal party (fdp) had two perspectives on political inclusion on the basis of attaining citizenship. on the one hand, they saw it as a precondition for successful integration. on the other hand, they also saw this type of political inclusion as a question of equal rights and the creation of legal as well as social equality. the specific arguments for equality were related to various points of comparison. for instance, it was argued that just like german citizens, immigrants also have a legitimate claim, on the basis of attaining citizenship, to the same scope of civil, social and especially political rights in the host country. making immigrants equal by means of citizenship rights was also said to have the suspected effect of combating racist attitudes by removing the institutional basis for discriminating between foreigners and germans. in sum, citizenship confers rights of access and therefore equal access to equal life chances. furthermore, it was postulated that attaining citizenship fosters feelings of equal belongingness among immigrants as well as identification with german society. the attainment of citizenship was also often viewed as a necessary way of balancing the rights and responsibilities of immigrants, sometimes inviting references to the slogan of the american revolutionary war “no 11 however, this narrative only takes one component of migration and integration into consideration – namely those individuals who settle down as permanent residents. what happens to those who stay for shorter periods of time, be they students, workers on fixed-term contracts, seasonal workers, individuals with mobile lifestyles or expatriates such as managers and diplomats? temporary residence is not a new phenomenon, even though mass media often cultivates the image that we have only recently entered an age of migration. 11 review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 taxation without representation.” this slogan implies that those who have been fulfilling their responsibilities by paying their taxes and their social insurance contributions are legitimately entitled to the full scope of the corresponding rights. with respect to the fundamental entitlement to german citizenship of repatriated ethnic germans who had settled in eastern europe, it was deemed necessary to establish equal treatment for long-time resident migrant workers by tolerating dual nationality. this argument for equal treatment continues to play a role in the relationship between non-citizens from countries within the european union and non-eu citizens. according to the ruling of the german constitutional court (bundesverfassungsgericht) in 1989 on the right to vote for foreigners, non-eu citizens can only exercise the same municipal-level voting rights as non-german eu citizens after becoming german citizens. arguments in favour of the debated reforms which were based on germany’s collective identity drew, to varying degrees, on the belated acknowledgement of germany as an immigration country and on its commonly accepted pro-european stance. the idea was to reform german citizenship legislation so that the liberal developments occurring in other european states could take hold in germany as well. opponents of the controversial elements of german citizenship law reform tended to identify the term “integration” with “loyalty.” whereas proponents believed that the political loyalty of immigrants results from political inclusion on the basis of equal rights, opponents viewed political loyalty as a consequence of comprehensive societal integration. according to the stance of the conservatives (cdu/csu), the attainment of citizenship in itself is not a means of integration; rather, citizenship should be granted once palpably successful integration has taken place. participation in public institutions and membership in civil society groups were framed as associative relationships in this case. according to this view, the regulations governing naturalization must be based on reliable criteria indicative of a move toward successful communal relationships. these measures are intended to prevent the naturalization of individuals who have not developed a true connection with germany and are reluctant to form one due to a desire eventually to return to their country of origin. furthermore, accepting dual nationality, even with respect to migrants who intend to stay in germany in the long term, is still considered by conservatives to be detrimental to integration. they argue that this frees migrants from making the necessary independent efforts to integrate. in this narrative, integration has almost exclusively been framed as a task for the immigrants: as their individual willingness, effort and accomplishment. with respect to democratic legitimacy, the conservatives (cdu/csu) defended a position held since the controversy concerning voting rights for foreigners in the early 1990s. this position predominantly emphasized the civil responsibilities that individuals must fulfil if they wish to enjoy the full scope of democratic participation. following this logic, the acceptance of dual nationality would lead to the privileging of immigrants, who would be able to enjoy corresponding rights conferred by two different citizenships, which would be rejected by the majority of the german population. the conservatives (cdu/csu) position was characterized in two ways by a “communitarian” view rather than the vestiges of unenlightened ethno-cultural ignorance. on one hand, this view is based on the sovereign right of nation states, as recognized by international law, to determine the criteria for entry to and membership in the state. on the other hand, this view emphasizes the conviction that social participation does not emerge as a result of legislation and politics alone. 12 review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 rather, it depends on social resources such as self-organization and solidarity within the framework of what is frequently referred to as civil society. in other words, participation relates closely to aspects of communal relationships. in this sense, people who are in the process of applying for german citizenship are expected to have already developed certain civil competencies that allow them to live as self-sufficiently as possible. it is worth noting that, based on explicit assertions, there is still hardly any evidence of an intention to foster cultural assimilation in the sense of adaptation to specific practices and ways of life. rather, the selfsufficient citizen is expected to have adequate educational as well as professional qualifications or the individual motivation and competencies to acquire them. it is also expected that this citizen will have social networks so that they will require state support only in exceptional circumstances. this understanding of the connection between associative and communal relationships corresponds to recognizable elements of traditionally conservative as well as economically liberal positions. these positions advocate narrowing the scope of state responsibility down to international and domestic security as well as delegating numerous functions of the state to the private sector and initiatives in civil society. finally, the divergent positions of these two political camps showcase two fundamentally different understandings of political legitimacy. for the social democrats (spd), the green party (bündnis 90/die grünen) and the party of democratic socialism (pds), democratic legitimacy was essentially a question of input: the quality of the political process is fundamentally based on the widest possible inclusion and democratic participation of those governed by its laws. the conservatives (cdu/csu) on the other hand obviously favoured an understanding of legitimacy that focused on the efficacy or the output of state regulation. the effectiveness of the state within the framework of its core functions appears here as the central aspect in generating political support from the state and the government. these institutions are, in turn, predominantly accountable to the autochthonous majority society. the illustrative example of dual nationality clarifies the interplay of communal and associative relationships. the social democrats (spd), the green party (bündnis 90/die grünen) and the party of democratic socialism (pds) favoured the argument that equal rights are first necessary to equip individuals to be able to prepare themselves for the demands of a differentiated society and thereby to participate in it. the conservatives (cdu/csu) argued that social participation is linked to certain preconditions. in germany, these socio-moral preconditions of citizenship are discussed using the meta-concept of integration. depending on one’s political orientation, citizenship and the rights associated with it are then conceptualized as either a precondition for integration or as the crowning moment in completing the process of integration. in the latter case, citizenship is a reward for the individual achievement of the migrant. both positions, clearly expressed, for instance, during the bundestag debates on dual nationality in the late 1990s, accept the discourse of equality within nation states: those who see citizenship as a means of enabling membership emphasize equality of opportunity, while those who define citizenship as the crowning moment of the integration process focus on the idea that equality first must be earned. the more diffuse the conception of social integration (the nation) is, the stronger the imperative for migrants to mobilize and integrate and the slimmer the chances of “multicultural” citizenship. interestingly, integration generally relates only to migrant workers and refugees, while the highly qualified are not considered to be migrants at all. the latter group is not referred to through the paradigm of integration, but rather as human capital which enhances economic competition (faist and ulbricht 2015). further research needs to show whether the highly 13 review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 qualified with their status as self-sufficient citizens represent the new legitimate type of communal relationships. in this regard, being individualized in a way that conforms to the market bestows belongingness to the symbolic community of germany. in this view, the supposedly backward traditional forms of communal relationships practiced by migrants are the cause of segregation and exclusion from social participation. this is underpinned by the assumption that less privileged migrants must be shown the basic tenets of liberal-democratic culture12 and need to be liberated from the traditional ties to their culture of origin. again, community appears here as a characteristic of pre-modern society. the idea that aspects of communal relationships via national belonging predominantly serve the selfconfirmation of the majority society, as demonstrated in the public political discussion on the reform of citizenship law in germany, is overlooked. this should not be taken to support the argument that communal relationships are “only” an element of symbolic politics. rather, fundamental concepts such as those underlying socio-political interventions are affected. educational policy constitutes a significant example in this regard. in current debates, the requirements of social participation are being expressed as follows: the preschool and school system should also be the foundation for the children of migrant workers so that they, too, have realistic opportunities in the job market (sachverständigenrat deutscher stiftungen für integration und migration 2013; kuhnhenne et al. 2012). in the past three decades, two to three times as many young people with a “migration background” as those without have been unable to find apprenticeships. often these young people have also not attained a school-leaving qualification (hauptschulabschluss) and are overrepresented in schools for pupils with special educational needs. this raises the question of how young people with a “migration background” can acquire the skills they need to participate in the job market. any measures to further this goal must be underpinned with solid financing and follow the principle of educational foresight rather than compensatory aftercare by means of social welfare programmes. without a clear grounding in a collective “us”—especially on a national level—political coalitions that challenge the alliance of interests benefiting older generations, who currently dominate the discourse, are unthinkable. in this regard, accomplishing the task of integrating the autochthonous population into a multiethnic social reality is vital for any progress toward equality of participation for migrants and their children. however, new types of communal relationships in majority groups will not necessarily lead to conflict-free dealings with migration, even though they are appropriate to a culturally heterogeneous society and function as a socio-moral basis for increased participation. conclusion: inescapable culturalization as we have tried to demonstrate, processes of communal relationship formation are ambivalent, function as a socio-moral basis for wide-ranging social integration on a national level (e.g., resources for the welfare state, just participation for migrants and their children), and also constitute elements of culturalization or boundary formation along cultural lines. these dual consequences, that is communal relationships as a basis for the welfare state and even democracy on the one hand and the inescapable culturalization of resource conflicts on the other, provide a 12 however, a populist version of this relationship says that in contrast with the “german” underclass, “arabs and turks” are not suited for this, as for example in thilo sarrazin’s polemic book (2010). 14 review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 fundamental starting point for substantive analyses, particularly with respect to the question of participation of migrants and non-migrants. consensus and conflict over resources, recognition and power cannot be sufficiently understood without referring to the question of belonging with respect to migrants and non-migrants. this speaks against frivolously discarding the term integration in favour of participation. in this context, the “de-culturalization” of the debate on integration as aspired to by the postmigration perspective would be a dangerous illusion. especially since boundary formation between groups promotes competition for resources, status and power, the struggle for participation opportunities remains ubiquitous. some approaches in inequality research emphasize that the competition for scarce resources leads to the formation of boundaries between groups as a by-product of social closure, opportunity hoarding, exploitation and other mechanisms relating to inequality (tilly 1998). the categorical inequalities produced by this process (massey 2007) often take the form of dichotomies such as black/white, man/woman or migrant/non-migrant. as long as there is competition for valuable material and symbolic goods, processes of boundary formation follow cultural heterogeneities. we need to take into account that (cultural) differences alone do not necessarily imply social inequality or result in exclusionary processes of communal relationship formation. examples abound: religious differences in europe—for instance protestantism and catholicism as different christian denominations—are no longer a basis for exclusion, social closure or exploitation; and in recent times religion has become a characteristic of social segregation. the latter can be observed in the behaviour of dominant population groups in western europe toward “muslim” immigrants (foner and alba 2008). for migrants, what is significant is not only aspects of the distribution of the relevant material resources, that is, differences and similarities between migrants and non-migrants in important life spheres, but also aspects of the perception of and consequently the boundaries between categories, such as groups. two patterns of social segregation are particularly important here: the shifting and the blurring of boundaries. in germany, data from the german general social survey allbus (allgemeine bevölkerungsumfrage der sozialwissenschaften) suggest that there were significant changes in the boundaries between migrant groups and the majority group (“german germans”) between 1996 and 2006. first, a boundary shift becomes apparent: the majority group has clearly acknowledged the belongingness of certain migrant groups (italians, spanish, greeks). these groups are now considered to be part of the majority population. however, attitudes to some other categories have not changed and in some cases there has been an increase in (perceived) differences, for instance with respect to “muslims.” second, the blurring of boundaries with respect to certain categories can also be observed between 1996 and 2006, for instance in the majority population’s increasing support for the demand that people born in germany should have the right to german citizenship. alongside other factors, social class determines how members of various ethnic groups are judged. semi-experimental studies investigating recruitment behaviour in the job market show that discrimination is considerably rarer when the subject’s interaction partner is regarded as an equal in terms of social status. socioeconomic position and command of the majority group’s language are strong predictors in these scenarios (fincke 2009). with regard to citizenship, newer research questions the extent to which communal relationships in western nation states have ceased to run along the boundary between ethnic versus republican 15 review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 understandings of nation (gerdes and faist 2006). the de-legitimization of the ethnicity argument does not necessarily cause the normative basis for citizenship in germany to vanish, though this seems to be what the current participation discussion suggests. rather, it can be interpreted as a sign of a change in which other integration norms come to the fore. but the question is, which ones? in a manner similar to the way in which the spirit of capitalism must adapt to the current demands of the motivational and binding forces of capitalism (boltanski and chiapello 2005), the normative dimension of citizenship is also subject to change. a theory or empirical model reconstructing the change in the normative basis has not yet been developed, however some theoretical work is beginning to move in that direction, for instance work on “identity liberalism” (tebble 2006). this shows how liberal western nation states turn democratically legitimizable integration into citizenship. the legitimate selection of immigrants thereby moves away from public, openly group-based discrimination toward an individual-based understanding of integration (joppke 2005) with special recourse to human capital. the individual bears the full burden of and responsibility for social cohesion. a good society can be achieved through the productivity of the individual and their active willingness to integrate. the blue card initiative (soysal 2012) illustrates that this norm is predominantly represented by highly qualified immigrants. joppke expresses this concisely: “the liberal state is only for liberal people” (2010, 140). our argument is that even within a liberal nation state that guarantees and ensures the rights and responsibilities of its citizens, associative relationships depend on the symbolic imputation of community. this type of communal relationship has indeed fundamentally changed in germany. the debates concerning the reform of citizenship law in the year 2000 illustrate this pertinently. in these debates an ethno-cultural understanding of the nation was relinquished in favour of one that is informed by republicanism but extends the communitarianism found in republicanism with individualization demands. neither the cultural integration debate nor the current discussion on 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electronic academic peer-reviewed journal. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is a joint project supported by the canada-europe transatlantic dialogue—a cross-canada research network supported by the social sciences and humanities research council of canada (sshrc)—along with the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies (carleton university) and its associated research unit, the centre for european studies. rera aims to provide an accessible forum for research, to promote high standards of research and scholarship, and to foster communication among young scholars. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada tel: +01 613 520-2600 ext. 3117; e-mail: rera-journal@carleton.ca creative commons license creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0 this working paper is licensed under a creative commons 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international climate change regime, countries are responsible for greenhouse gas (ghg) emissions that result from economic activities within their national borders, including emissions from producing goods for export. at the same time, imports of carbonintensive goods are not addressed by international agreements, including the paris agreement that was adopted in 2015. this paper examines emissions embodied in russia’s exports and imports based on the results of an input-output analysis. russia is the second largest exporter of emissions embodied in trade and the large portion of these emissions is directed to developed countries. because of the large amount of net exports of carbon-intensive goods, the current approach to emissions accounting does not suit russia’s interests. on the one hand, russia, as well as other large net emissions exporters, is interested in the revision of allocation of responsibility between exporters and importers of carbon-intensive products. on the other hand, both the commodity exports structure and relatively carbon inefficient technologies make russia vulnerable to the policy of “carbon protectionism,” which can be implemented by its trade partners. 1 support from the basic research program of the national research university higher school of economics is gratefully acknowledged. 2 igor a. makarov is associate professor at the department of world economy, head of world economy education programme, national research university higher school of economics, moscow, russia. 3 anna k. sokolova is junior research fellow at the center for comprehensive european and international studies, national research university higher school of economics, moscow, russia. 2 review of european and eurasian affairs 11 (2), 2017 introduction climate change is one of the acute global issues extensively damaging the world economy. according to intergovernmental panel on climate change (ipcc), anthropogenic ghg emissions, primarily co2, are the main cause of climate change (ipcc 2013). international climate cooperation that started in the 1990s made it necessary to account for emissions associated with separate countries. the key issue is how to define which country is responsible for emissions. in order to fulfill obligations under international agreements (the kyoto protocol and paris agreement), countries prepare national inventories containing information about the emissions that take place “within national territory and offshore areas over which the country has jurisdiction” (ipcc 2006). this approach is the most transparent and feasible but has some drawbacks because it does not address international trade flows. meanwhile, around 30% of global co2 emissions are released during the production of internationally traded goods (sato 2014). therefore, an increase in the consumption of carbon-intensive goods in one country may not lead to an increase in its emissions, but will contribute to an increase in emissions in other countries who are suppliers of carbonintensive products. this situation is aggravated by the fact that most of the carbon-intensive trade flows are directed from developing to developed countries. developing countries are not listed in annex i of the united nations framework convention on climate change (unfccc) and therefore have not taken quantitative commitments for emissions reduction under the kyoto protocol. this means that the growth in carbon intensive product consumption in developed countries, which is related to imports from developing countries, is not regulated within the international climate change regime. moreover, it induces “emission (carbon) leakage,” that is, the increase in emissions outside developed countries due to rising imports of carbon-intensive products from developing countries (as a result of the policy to cap emissions). there is an alternative approach to emission accounting based on the consumption, not the production of a particular country. according to this approach, emissions that have occurred abroad due to production of imported goods are accounted along with emissions from domestic final consumption. in this case, preconditions for “emission leakage” disappear and additional incentives for reducing consumption (but not production and exports) of carbon-intensive products arise. according to peters et al. (2011), net embodied emissions exports from developing to developed countries increased from 0.4 gt co2 in 1990 to 1.6 gt co2 in 2008, which exceeds the kyoto protocol emission reductions. aichele and felbermayr (2015) calculated that kyoto commitments had led to growth in embodied carbon imports of committed countries from noncommitted ones by around 8%. global production-based and consumption-based emissions are equal. however, they vary in different countries. according to peters and hertwich (2008), in 2001 total consumption-based emissions of annex i countries were 5% higher than their production-based emissions. in particular, in 2001 the usa’s consumption-based emissions exceeded its production-based emissions by 7.3%. unlike the usa, the production-based emissions of china and russia were 17.8% and 21.6% higher than consumption-based emissions. 3 review of european and eurasian affairs 11 (2), 2017 the difference between production-based and consumption-based emissions is their net emissions exports4. the gaps between national production-based and consumption-based emissions are defined by international trade flows of intermediate and final goods. the generally used assessment method for carbon content of trade (“virtual carbon”5) is input-output analysis (ioa), which allows us to take the whole supply chain into account. emissions embodied in trade constitute a significant part of global emissions and estimating them is necessary to assess the actual carbon footprint of countries (consumption-based, not productionbased). this paper discusses the results of analysis of inter-country input-output tables aimed at calculating emissions embodied in exports and imports of major countries and russia in particular. in this paper, we estimate the volume of emissions embodied in russia’s exports and imports. the main hypothesis is that due to russia’s large ‘virtual carbon’ exports, the international climate change regime based on production-based emissions accounting doesn’t suit russia’s interests. this paper is organized as follows. the second section contains the description of main approaches to the estimation of emissions embodied in international trade along with the related literature review. the third section focuses on the estimates of volumes and the structure of emissions embodied in russia’s exports and imports, as well as a comparison of russia’s numbers with estimates for other countries. this section also explains reasons for the large carbon intensity of russia’s exports. the fourth section addresses a question about the implications of the study’s results for russia’s position in international climate change negotiations. specifically, it is argued that russia has reasons to claim for sharing responsibility for emissions from the production of carbon-intensive goods between their exporters and importers. at the same time, taking virtual carbon into consideration can make russia vulnerable to “carbon protectionism” measures, which can be taken by developed countries. the final section concludes the paper and summarizes its main results. methodology and literature review currently, there are two main approaches to embodied emissions assessment: environmentally extended bilateral trade (eebt) and multi-regional input-output analysis (mrio) (peters 2007). these approaches not only differ in data source (national input-output (io) tables for eebt and mrio tables for mrio), but also in the manner they account for emissions embodied in trade during the different stages of final goods production. the difference between the two approaches can be illustrated with the following example. assume country a imports a car from country b. using the eebt approach, emissions embodied in imports include only emissions related to production of a car itself, whereas emissions from mining of iron ore in country c and smelting of the steel in country d would be imports of country b from countries c and d (the carbon trust 2011). using the mrio approach, co2 emissions associated with the production of the car – mining of iron ore for the steel, smelting of the steel, and the assembly of the car – would be considered 4 𝐸𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑 = 𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠 + 𝐸𝑒𝑥𝑝 − 𝐸𝑖𝑚𝑝, where e_prod – production-based emissions, e_cons – consumption-based emissions, e_exp – emissions embodied in exports, e_imp – emissions embodied in imports. 5 the term originated from “virtual water” (atkinson et al., 2011), the amount of water used for production of a particular good. 4 review of european and eurasian affairs 11 (2), 2017 imports of country a from countries b, c, and d. the mrio approach therefore allows for analyzing the whole life cycle of a good and most completely assesses “virtual carbon” volumes. there are more and more studies using io analysis for accounting emissions embodied in exports of a particular country (primarily for china – the largest emitter and exporter of co2 emissions (peters et al. 2007; xu, allenby, and chen 2009; liu et al. 2010; lin and sun 2010; dietzenbacher, pei, and oosterhaven 2012; su, ang, and low 2013; winchester, karplus, and zhang 2014; liu, peng, and xianqiang 2016) and emissions embodied in global exports6. ahmad and wyckoff (2003) found that total co2 emissions embodied in exports were comparable with (and in many cases exceed) total emissions of particular countries. most developed countries are net importers of emissions, whereas developing countries are primarily net exporters of emissions. in 1995, the net exports of china and russia were almost equal to the net imports of the oecd region (ahmad and wyckoff 2003). nevertheless, some studies reveal some developed countries with energy-intensive exports to be net exporters of emissions: australia (lenzen 1998), norway (peters and hertwich 2006), sweden (kander and lindmark 2006) and canada (the government of canada 2002). peters and hertwich (2008) estimated the trade-related co2 emissions of 87 countries in 2001. global emissions embodied in exports accounted for 5.3 gtсо2. the authors point out that the current international climate change regime is inefficient because it is mainly net importers of emissions who have taken quantitative commitments under the kyoto protocol. they suggest including trade effects in national emission inventories and allocating responsibility in accordance with regional groups, not countries, which could lessen the influence of trade on co2 increases (peters and hertwich 2008). davis and caldeira (2010) calculated co2 emissions embodied in exports for 113 countries and 57 industries. in 2004 they were around 6.2 gtсо2 (later the result was corrected to 6.4 gtсо2 (davis, caldeira and peters 2011)), and most of the emissions embodied in trade occurred as exports from china and other developing countries to oecd countries. in switzerland, sweden, austria, the united kingdom, and france more than 30% of consumption-based emissions were embodied in imports, and in china 22.5% production-based emissions were embodied in exports. the authors conclude that the allocation of responsibility between producers and consumers of emissions is important for developing an effective climate agreement (davis and caldeira 2010). boitier (2012) used the mrio method in order to calculate emissions embodied in trade for 40 countries and 35 industries based on world input-output database (wiod) data from 1995 to 2009. the author distinguished “co2-consumers” (oecd countries, especially eu-15, where consumption-based emissions exceed production-based emissions) and “co2-producers” (developing countries – bric and “rest of the world”). the author suggests implementing not only production-based but also consumption-based co2 accounting, which would allow for the elaboration of more objective targets for climate change mitigation policy. moreover, it is assumed that for most countries that didn’t sign annex i of unfccc, using consumption-based co2 accounting for determining national reduction targets would be preferable and probably stimulated taking quantitative commitments for emission reductions (boitier 2012). 6 for an overview see: wiedmann (2009), sato (2014), lininger (2015). 5 review of european and eurasian affairs 11 (2), 2017 most studies devoted to calculation of emissions embodied in trade include assessment of emissions embedded in exports and imports of russia (boitier 2012; peters and hertwich 2008; davis, caldeira, and peters 2011). however, there are few studies discussing the carbon content of russia’s trade in depth (i.e. apart from indicating total values). emissions embodied in russia’s exports and imports were estimated in 2011 by a russian-indian research group that used the eebt method and the io tables of rosstat (2002), trade statistics, and carbon intensities of industries. emissions embodied in exports in 2002 accounted for 373 mt; emissions embodied in imports were about 203 mt. the authors concluded that the largest importers of emissions from russia are european countries and china, which is related to the high value of exports of mineral resources (mehra et al. 2011). it was assumed that the technology (and hence carbon intensity) of russian exports is equal to the imports technology, which leads to some bias. piskulova, kostyunina and abramova (2013) analyzed exports of russian regions concerning possible changes in russian trade partners’ climate policies. the authors showed that carbon intensity of a large number of russian regions is quite high and the implementation of border carbon adjustment (bca) by russian trade partners could be damaging. this study did not include quantitative assessment of emissions embodied in russian exports. to estimate emissions embodied in exports, we use the world input-output database (wiod, 2015), which contains national and world io tables. world io tables are constructed using national io tables and/or supply-and-use tables, un comtrade trade statistics, oecd, eurostat, imf and wto for services trade data, and others (timmer 2012). the methodology is explained in detail in makarov and sokolova (2014). the analysis conducted in this paper is based on emissions data from 2000-2011 due to the availability of extended input-output data in the wiod database. we may expect that beginning in 2014 the volume of emissions embodied both in exports and imports decreased due to the drop in russia’s foreign trade. however, exact estimates may only be done when all the necessary data for 2014 is published. main findings emissions embodied in russia’s exports and imports currently, russia ranks fourth in the world (after china, the united states and india7) in the production of carbon emissions, and if taking into account land use, land-use change, and forestry (lulucf), it is probably behind brazil and indonesia. the soviet industrialization of the 1930s1980s was accompanied by rapid growth in ghg emissions. for 70 years, the soviet union has increased annual co2 emissions more than 100-fold (from 11.2 mt in 1922 to 1.1 gt in 1988), and before its collapse, the volume of its emissions was very close to that in the united states (marland et al. 2011). after the collapse of the ussr, russia experienced a painful transitional crisis that resulted in a sharp, 42.5%, gdp fall8, and many enterprises were dissolved. one of the external effects of the crisis was the reduction of co2 emissions (see figure 1). by 1998, co2 emissions (not including lulucf) decreased by 42.5% in comparison to 1990. economic recovery since 1999 has not returned russia to its previous level of emissions, as it has been accompanied by 7 according to unfccc. 8 according to world development indicators. 6 review of european and eurasian affairs 11 (2), 2017 industry restructuring; the carbon-intensive industries that dominated in the soviet era have been replaced by the service sector (grigoryev, makarov, and salmina 2013). during the first decade of 21st century, carbon emissions slightly increased, and in 2014 they were 33.3% lower than in 19909. figure 1 со2 emissions (left axis) and gdp (right axis) in russia in 1990-2014 source: based on data obtained from unfccc (2016) and world bank (2016). it could be expected that dynamics of emissions embodied in russia’s exports coincide with dynamics of total emissions. however, it has been revealed that this is not true. in 2011, russia exported 541 mt of со2 (figure 2). this is the highest value since 2007, but it is still 18% lower than in 2000. in 2000, russia exported 45% of total emissions, in 2011 – only 32%. this tendency might seem odd because the export value (us dollar, current prices) rose 5-fold from 2000 to 2011 and production-based emissions (according to unfccc national inventories) increased by 11%10. however, the export volume index11, reflecting real export volumes, reached only 140% by 2011 (base year 2000)12. a 40% increase of commodity exports was compensated, on the one hand, by technological improvement, and on the other hand by simplification of export structure (production of final goods, which requires burning large volumes of domestic fossil fuel, is associated with higher emissions volumes than selling raw mineral fuels). emissions embodied in russia’s imports increased 4.4-fold from 2000 to 2011 (see figure 2). the reasons were rising commodity import volume and substitution of imports of european goods by more carbon-intensive chinese goods. however, emissions embodied in imports in 2011 accounted for only 161 mtco2 – 3.4 times less than emissions embodied in exports. 9 according to unfccc. 10 according to unfccc. 11 the ratio of export value index and national currency value index. 12 according to world development indicators. 0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800 0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 5 2 0 0 6 2 0 0 7 2 0 0 8 2 0 0 9 2 0 1 0 2 0 1 1 2 0 1 2 2 0 1 3 2 0 1 4 со2 emissions (mt) gdp (billion us$, 2010 prices) 7 review of european and eurasian affairs 11 (2), 2017 figure 2 production and consumption-based emissions, со2 exports and imports, mt, 2000-2011 source: authors’ calculations, based on unfccc (2015) and wiod (2015). emissions embodied in exports are represented primarily by the category “electricity, gas and water supply” (42% of emissions embodied in exports). this category includes emissions for generating electricity that is further used for either producing exported manufacturing goods, or for direct exports. emissions from burning exported fuels are not included in emissions embodied in exports, but emissions from their extraction do fall into the category “mining and quarrying” (14% of emissions embodied in exports) that also includes emissions from associated gas flaring. despite significant reductions in recent years, russia is still the world’s leader in gas flaring – the amount of gas flared in russia was 35 bcm in 2012 (world bank 2014). the industrial structure of emissions embodied in imports is more differentiated than that of emissions embodied in exports, which is determined by the more complicated structure of russian imports in comparison to exports. analysis of the geographical structure of emissions embodied in russian exports and imports reveals interesting patterns. a large part of emissions embodied in russia’s exports in 2011 was directed to the usa (see figure 3). this might seem odd because of the low volume of exports from russia to the united states, but the reason lies in methodological features. the mrio method considers emissions embodied in exports from russia to the usa as not only emissions associated with the manufacturing of exported final products, but also emissions associated with mining of resources exported to china, the eu and other countries and then used there for the production of goods exported to the usa. therefore, directions of russian emission exports using the mrio method are defined not by directions of russian commodity exports, but by global trade flows. comparing emissions export data in 2000 and 2011, china’s share significantly increased (from 4% to 10%) and germany’s share declined (from 16% to 6%). the share of the eu countries decreased from 59% to 40%. as for the geographical structure of imports, it changed drastically over 10 years. in 2000, china represented only 10% of emissions embodied in russian imports; in 2011, its share had reached 39%. 0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 exports imports production-based consumption-based 8 review of european and eurasian affairs 11 (2), 2017 figure 3 structure of emissions embodied in russia’s exports in 2000 (top) and 2011 (bottom), by partner13 source: authors’ calculations based on data from unfccc (2015) and wiod (2015). 13 due to lack of data we had to include a range of russia’s large trade partners in the category “rest of the world” (ukraine, belarus, kazakhstan). germany 16% united states of america 10% italy 8% france 6% developed asiapacific (japan, south korea, taiwan) 6% poland 4% china 4% united kingdom 4% turkey 3% developing asiapacific (india, indonesia) 1% brazil 1% canada 1% mexico 1% australia 0% rest of the eu 21% rest of the world 15% united states of america 11% china 10% italy 8% germany 6% france 5% developed asiapacific (japan, south korea, taiwan) 8% united kingdom 3% spain 3% developing asiapacific (india, indonesia) 2% turkey 2% brazil 2% canada 1% australia 1% mexico 1% rest of the eu 15% rest of the world 23% 9 review of european and eurasian affairs 11 (2), 2017 comparison of emissions embodied in trade in russia and other countries the accounting of production-based and consumption-based со2 emissions reveals different results. for example, china’s share of global production-based со2 emissions in 2011 was 30%, whereas its share of global consumption-based со2 emissions was only 25%. the usa demonstrates the opposite tendency: its share of global production-based со2 emissions was 19%, while its share of consumption-based со2 emissions accounted for 21% (see table 1). table 1 emissions embodied in exports and imports of the main со2 emitters in 2000 and 2011 № country p ro d u c ti o n -b a se d e m is si o n s, m t c o n su m p ti o n b a se d e m is si o n s, m t e m is si o n s e m b o d ie d i n e x p o rt s, m t e m is si o n s e m b o d ie d i n im p o rt s, m t n e t e m is si o n e x p o rt s, m t s h a re i n p ro d u c ti o n -b a se d e m is si o n s, % s h a re i n c o n su m p ti o n -b a se d e m is si o n s, % 2000 1 usa 5962.7 6643.2 486.6 1167.1 -680.5 24% 27% 2 china 3607.5 3093.2 696.7 182.3 514.3 15% 13% 3 russia 1471.3 848.6 659.4 36.7 622.8 6% 3% 4 japan 1251.5 1496.1 190.5 435.1 -244.6 5% 6% 5 india 1023.8 922.3 174.9 73.4 101.6 4% 4% 6 germany 891.4 1101.5 212.4 422.5 -210.1 4% 4% 7 canada 564.6 503.5 208.6 147.5 61.1 2% 2% 8 uk 555.2 685.6 126.8 257.2 -130.4 2% 3% 9 south korea 463.3 434.3 147.5 118.6 29 2% 2% 10 italy 462.3 577.5 103.9 219.1 -115.2 2% 2% 2011 1 china 9034.7 7503.4 2116.4 585 1531.4 27% 23% 2 usa 5603.8 6303.6 522.5 1222.3 -699.8 17% 19% 3 india 1860.9 1782.2 319 240.3 78.7 6% 5% 4 russia 1684.4 1304.9 540.7 161.2 379.6 5% 4% 5 japan 1240.7 1475.1 249.9 484.3 -234.4 4% 4% 6 germany 798.1 981.3 243.4 426.7 -183.3 2% 3% 7 south korea 611.7 555.8 236.8 181 55.9 2% 2% 8 canada 555.6 593.2 180.3 217.8 -37.6 2% 2% 9 uk 464.6 604.4 118.5 258.3 -139.8 1% 2% 10 mexico 458.1 505 87.5 134.4 -46.9 1% 2% source: authors’ calculations, based on data from unfccc (2015) and wiod (2015). in russia, production-based and consumption-based со2 emissions also differ significantly. russia is the fourth largest со2 emitter and its share of global production-based emissions is 6%. 10 review of european and eurasian affairs 11 (2), 2017 under the consumption-based approach, russia is responsible for only 4% of global emissions and cedes the fourth place to japan. the gap between production-based and consumption-based со2 emissions is determined by large russian emission exports (even larger than us exports, despite the huge difference in commodity export volumes) and by extremely low emission imports (russia isn’t even listed among top 10 countries). russia was the global leader in net emissions exports as far back as in 2000. however, its net emissions exports have declined by 40%, whereas the numbers for china have increased almost threefold. as a result, currently, russia is the second largest exporter of со2 emissions after china. the gap between russia and china is fourfold. however, russia’s net emissions exports are 4.8 times higher than that of the third largest emitter – india. russia is one of the leaders in export share in production-based emissions. 32.3% of emissions within national borders are exported, which is much higher than in china (23.4%) and the usa (9.3%). on the contrary, russia’s imports share of consumption-based emissions (4.3%) is low in comparison to other large economies – china (7.8%), india (13.5%), and the usa (19.4%). for leading european countries – germany, the united kingdom and italy – this figure exceeds 40% (see table 1). reasons for large volumes of emissions embodied in russia’s exports on the one hand, the large volumes of emissions embodied in russia’s exports are explained by the commodity structure of its exports, which is primarily represented by fuels and energyintensive industries. countries with a high export share in production-based emissions are south korea, canada, russia, and germany. in the case of south korea and germany, this is explained by a high export quota, and in the case of russia and canada, the only explanation is a distortion of the structure of exports towards energy-intensive products. on the other hand, net exporters of emissions are mainly asian and eastern european countries. these countries have a high carbon intensity of exports (and russia is the leader), which is defined as the ratio of emissions embodied in exports to the value of commodity exports (see figure 4). this allows us to presume that large volumes of emissions embodied in exports are determined by relatively low carbon efficiency associated with general technological “backwardness” that is typical for developing countries and economies undergoing a transition from a command-andcontrol to a market economy. in order to assess the influence of technological factors on russia’s emission exports, it is possible to calculate co2 emissions embodied in russia’s exports with the use of input-output tables, making the assumption that for the given volumes and structure of exports it uses “world average” technologies14. calculation results are shown in figure 5. under the assumption that russia uses “world average” technologies, russia’s emissions exports in 2011 would decline 1.65-fold (from 541 to 327 mtco2) (figure 5). therefore, approximately 60% of emissions embodied in russia’s 14 for this purpose, we substitute technological coefficients in input-output tables by gdp-weighted average volume of resources pet unit of output. the data on national output and final consumption of goods and services remains unchanged. we also assume that carbon intensity coefficient of an industry is equal to a corresponding world average coefficient weighted by the countries’ shares in global output of that industry. 11 review of european and eurasian affairs 11 (2), 2017 exports are determined by the volume and the trade structure of its exports, and 40% is determined by its lagging behind global average technology. using the assumption that global weighted average technology is used in all russia’s trade partners, russia’s emission imports would increase 1.09-fold (from 161 to 176 mtco2 in 2011). this means that russia imports production mainly from countries with more carbon efficient technologies in comparison to the world average. figure 4 carbon intensity of exports in 2011, tco2/thousand us$ source: authors’ calculations, based on data from unfccc (2015) and wiod (2015). figure 5 со2 emissions embodied in russia’s exports and imports in 2011: actual values and those under the assumption that weighted average technologies are used all over the world source: authors’ calculations, based on data from unfccc (2015) and wiod (2015). 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 w o rl d a u st ri a l u x e m b o u rg ir e la n d s w e d e n f ra n c e b e lg iu m n e th e rl a n d s g e rm a n y m a lt a it a ly u n it e d k in g d o m h u n g a ry d e n m a rk c y p ru s s p a in f in la n d s lo v e n ia b ra z il p o rt u g a l l a tv ia m e x ic o l it h u a n ia a u st ra li a it a ly u n it e d s ta te s o f… c z e c h r e p u b li c g re e c e s lo v a k ia c a n a d a r o m a n ia s o u th k o re a t u rk e y t a iw a n r e st o f th e w o rl d p o la n d in d o n e si a e st o n ia in d ia b u lg a ri a c h in a r u ss ia n f e d e ra ti o n 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 emission exports under the assumption that average technology is used in all countries emission imports under the assumption that average technology is used in all countries actual emissions embodied in exports actual emissions embodied in imports 12 review of european and eurasian affairs 11 (2), 2017 illustrative here is the comparison of the countries’ net exports under the assumption of weighted world average technology in all countries. this allows us to exclude the effect of technologies and determine how countries vary in exports of emissions due to the volume of their commodity exports and foreign trade specialization. if the whole world switches to weighted world average technology, russia would still take the second place in net emissions exports, following china (figure 6). this is evidenced by the fact that the dominating factor of large net emission exports in russia is not carbon inefficient technologies, but trade surplus and the existing foreign trade structure. figure 6 net со2 emissions exports in 2011 under the assumption that all countries use weighted world average technology source: authors’ calculations, based on data from unfccc (2015) and wiod (2015). discussion the features of methodology and the structure of the data used in this study impose some constraints on the accuracy of the estimates. however, the main point is that analysis conducted in this paper, as well as preceding research (peters and hertwich 2008; peters 2011; davis, caldeira and peters 2011; boitier 2012; aichele and felbermayr 2015) show that flows of emissions embodied in trade are too large to ignore them within the international climate change regime. most of the emissions embodied in trade are directed from emerging economies (including russia) to developed countries. emissions embodied in trade and the new climate agreement the kyoto protocol put on countries the responsibility to reduce production-based, not consumption-based carbon emissions. at the same time, according to the principle of common but -800 -600 -400 -200 0 200 400 600 800 1000 china russian federation south korea netherlands germany denmark taiwan austria spain japan ireland brazil canada indonesia turkey australia mexico france india united kingdom rest of the world united states of america 13 review of european and eurasian affairs 11 (2), 2017 differentiated responsibilities, this responsibility was imposed only on developed countries and those with economies in transition (in other words, unfccc annex i countries). as a result, taking into account that most emissions were exported from developing to developed countries, neither exporters (leading developing countries, non-annex i) nor importers (developed countries, obliged to reduce domestic emissions only within national borders) undertook obligations to reduce these emissions. nowadays, the described regulation failure does not have much importance simply because the kyoto protocol is not the central element of the international climate regime anymore. though it is still in effect (the second commitment period will finish in 2020), the paris agreement that was adopted in 2015 and came into force on november 2016 is much more important for the future of international cooperation for coping with climate change. unlike the kyoto protocol, the paris agreement transforms the principle of common but differentiated responsibility: developing and developed countries participate on equal terms. in order to guarantee compromise between actors who often have opposite interests, the agreement provides a framework for further actions rather than defining them. the word “commitments” in the text of the agreement is replaced by “contributions” (intended nationally determined contributions, indc). these contributions are defined by nations themselves, and contain emission reduction targets that are non-binding. although the paris agreement sets an ambitious goal of “holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°c above pre-industrial levels” (and even pursuing efforts to limit it to 1.5°c) (united nations 2015), the implementation of indcs provided by december 2015 will not be sufficient to limit the temperature increase to less than 3°c by 2100 (unep 2016). the form of indcs is not strictly standardized, and in theory, parties could include into submitted contribution the intended reduction of either production-based or consumption-based emissions. however, the intended national contributions submitted so far refer to the reduction of productionbased emissions only, either in absolute terms or as a ratio to gdp. this means that the new agreement does not change the situation when the national reduction targets (binding or nonbinding) can be completed due to the substitution of domestic production of carbon-intensive products by imports. the allocation of responsibility between exporters and importers under the kyoto protocol, developing countries, concentrating an increasing share of carbonintensive production, did not have any quantitative commitments to reduce emissions, thus no one took responsibility for the emissions embodied in developed countries’ imports. since production in developing countries is on average more carbon intensive than in developed countries, this failure of climate regulation contributed to the increase of global emissions. under the paris agreement, all the major emitters are pledged to reduce or limit their emissions in accordance with their indcs that would mitigate the situation. now the key issue is not the lack of responsibility for emissions embodied in trade, but the fairness of allocation of this responsibility between exporters and importers. placing all the responsibility for emissions embodied in trade on the exporter is not fair: an importer should be responsible because its demand predetermines emissions. at the same time, shifting all the responsibility to the importer is not correct, because an exporter, releasing emissions by producing an exported good, receives a 14 review of european and eurasian affairs 11 (2), 2017 payment from an importer (sato 2014). there can be different forms of joint responsibility. for example, contributions under the new agreement could be recalculated considering emissions embodiment in trade (net exporters could submit smaller contributions and net importers larger contributions compared to those based on production-based emissions only). the main issue is how to allocate the responsibility for emissions reduction between an importer and an exporter of carbon-intensive products. the simplest approach is to divide responsibility proportionally – for instance, to calculate arithmetic mean between reductions under production-based and consumption-based accounting. shared responsibility can also be defined on the basis of the best available technologies. such an approach “allocates the responsibility between the producers and the final consumers based on the real capacity of each agent to reduce emissions” (berzosa et al. 2014). more complex approaches rely on game theory (granot et al. 2014). the paris agreement introduces a new mechanism applied at international level – the sustainable development mechanism (sdm) (united nations 2015). to some extent, it is a re-launch of the kyoto protocol’s clean development mechanism (cdm), which assumed that annex i countries could implement clean projects in developing countries on account of their commitments. however, cdm was not effective enough, primarily because of difficulties in assessing the environmental effects of investment projects under a business-as-usual scenario. it was revealed that many of cdm projects would be accomplished without any climate finance, just in the process of equipment modernization. in these cases, cdm was only a transfer of financial resources from developed to developing countries and did not result in climate change mitigation (wara 2007). under the new circumstances, sdm could be implemented as a mechanism of financing (on account of the net importers’ contributions) of projects aimed at reducing emissions embodied in exports. in order to avoid imperfections of the initial implementation, sdm could be limited by the framework of a value chain. for example, it could be applied only to enterprises oriented to exports to the country that provides sdm investment. one more instrument that can allocate responsibility between an exporter and an importer is border carbon adjustment, which assumes imposing an additional tax on imported carbon intensive products (ismer and neuhoff 2007). in theory, the volume of this tax should be calculated as a difference in volumes of emissions released during the production of one unit of imported product and its domestic analog, multiplied by the carbon price (for example, defined by national emissions trading scheme). in fact, it is often suggested that carbon taxes should be imposed on products imported from countries without an emissions regulation system. a result of imposing border carbon adjustment is that part of the costs associated with its implementation falls on consumers of the importing country, who have to pay higher prices for imported goods, on which a carbon tax is imposed. another part of the costs falls on exporters because of declining competitiveness of their products in importing country. border carbon adjustment is a powerful tool to prevent “carbon leakage” and to stimulate emission reduction in developing countries (branger and quirion 2014), which also can fix distortion in responsibility allocation between importers and exporters of carbon-intensive products. at the same time, border carbon adjustment has obvious drawbacks, including welfare losses in both exporting and importing countries and possible initial conflict of such measures (they are often called “carbon protectionism”). finding a compromise while allocating responsibility for emissions reductions, which implies mutual consideration of interests by net exporters and net importers, and elaboration of cooperative mechanisms to reduce emissions embodied in exports 15 review of european and eurasian affairs 11 (2), 2017 (as technology transfer or as economic flexibility mechanisms) are more appropriate measures for enhancement of the international climate change regime in the future. consumption-based emissions and russia’s interests the current approach to emissions accounting based on calculating emissions from production corresponds to russia’s interests to a lesser extent than to the interests of other countries. a substantial part of russia’s emissions is associated with consumption by developed countries, but according to the climate agreements, russia is solely responsible for these emissions. hence, russia is interested in the re-allocation of responsibility for со2 emissions between exporters and importers of carbon-intensive products. other major net exporters of emissions – china and india – could also support this idea. none of the three countries is interested in the complete substitution of production-based emission accounting by a consumption-based one. the shift to 100% consumption-based accounting would assume regulation of individual consumer behavior instead of industrial emissions. this would only be possible through imposing consumption taxes or implementing border carbon adjustment, which would have a negative impact on imports and therefore national welfare. at present, the key issue is not to substitute but to supplement production-based emissions accounting with accounting that is consumption-based during the un negotiations, with the possible implementation of responsibility allocation schemes. the expert community has long been aware of the importance of accounting for emissions embodied in trade. however, the rules of emissions accounting have been based entirely on production-based emissions for too long and are resistant to such fundamental changes. though in canada and in the eu some elements of consumption-based emissions accounting are used on the national and local levels15, in general, developed countries have little incentive to promote this idea globally as it would undermine their last decade of success in reducing emissions. developing countries, most importantly china and india, hadn’t previously considered the implementation of consumption-based accounting because before paris they didn’t have any commitments under international agreements. but since these two countries are now being involved actively in international climate cooperation, one can expect that the issue will be addressed more carefully. for russia, a change of accounting approach from production-based to consumption-based would lead to the following re-allocations: first, emissions from fossil fuels burned in order to produce non-energy exports would be attributed to their importers; secondly, the same would be true for emissions from the extraction of exported fossil fuels; thirdly, emissions from russian electricity production directed to exports would be also attributed to importing countries. at the same time, some emissions originating from russian imports would be attributed to russia. however, as the volume of emissions imports to russia is much smaller than that of emissions exports, the ideas of consumption-based emissions accounting and sharing responsibility for emissions embodied in trade between exporters and importers of carbon-intensive goods could bring substantial benefits to the country. first, these ideas may represent an important argument in climate negotiations, the argument being that russia releases emissions not only for itself but also for developed countries, providing opportunities to reduce their emissions. at present, russia does 15 for canada see mckewn, bristow and caouette (2016) and for the eu see barrett et al. (2013) and carbon-cap project publications, http://www.carboncap.eu/index.php. 16 review of european and eurasian affairs 11 (2), 2017 not use this argument at all. instead, it prefers to rely on another argument concerning the recordhigh emissions reductions achieved by russia since 1990 (kokorin and korppoo 2013). however, this argument can hardly strengthen russia’s negotiating position as these reductions resulted mainly from the economic slowdown and natural restructuring of the russian economy rather than from climate policy. second, consumption-based emissions accounting may generate some green investment to russia from importers of russian products that would be interested in reducing emissions along the whole value chain. consumption-based emissions accounting would also bring russia some risks. it is important to remember that allocation of responsibility for exported emissions between exporters and importers is justified only in relation to the part of emissions that is determined by large volumes and/or peculiarities of commodity structure of exports, and not by application of carbon inefficient technologies. the conducted analysis shows that this share of russian emissions exports accounts for about 60% if global average technologies ae taken as a benchmark. the other 40% of emissions embodied in russian exports results from technological lagging, and the responsibility for these emissions lies with russia. this part of the emissions makes russia especially vulnerable to border carbon adjustments, which can be introduced by its counterparts. this risk should be interpreted as an incentive to implement green technologies (including renewables), to reduce the carbon intensity of production and to activate a national climate policy in russia. in this realm, russia has not achieved any significant success as of yet (makarov 2016; kokorin and korppoo 2013; boute 2013). conclusion results of the study confirm the main hypotheses of the research: 1) russia is the second largest exporter of emissions embodied in trade, following china. on the other hand, emissions imports by russia are relatively low. therefore, the production-based approach to emissions accounting used within international climate agreements does not suit the interests of russia. 2) the high level of emissions embodied in russia’s exports is partly determined by the large volumes and commodity structure of its exports. russia may claim for partial re-allocation of responsibility for these emissions to the importers of the corresponding production. however, a significant part of the emissions embodied in exports is explained by relatively carbon-inefficient technologies, and this fraction of emissions would remain the responsibility of russia alone. 3) consumption-based accounting and partial sharing responsibility for emissions embodied in trade can provide some benefits to russia. first, large volumes of emissions embodied in exports represent an important argument in climate negotiations, because currently, consuming russian exports allows its trade partners to reduce their production-based emissions. secondly, consumption-based emissions accounting may create some incentives for importers of russian products to make green investments into russia in order to reduce emissions within a value chain. on the other hand, it may also become a strong argument for “carbon protectionism” measures. given the large carbon footprint of russian exports and the country’s carbon-inefficient technologies, russia would be very vulnerable to this policy. 17 review of european and eurasian affairs 11 (2), 2017 references aichele, rahel and gabriel j. felbermayr, 2015. “kyoto and carbon leakage: an empirical analysis of the carbon content of bilateral trade.” review of economics and statistics 97 (1): 104-115. ahmad, nadim and andrew wyckoff. 2003. “carbon dioxide emissions embodied in international trade of goods.” oecd publishing no.2003/15, 2003. atkinson, giles, kirk hamilton, giovanni ruta, and dominique van der mensbrugghe. 2011. “trade in ‘virtual carbon’: empirical results and implications for policy.” global environmental change 21: 563-574. barrett, john, glen peters, thomas wiedmann, kate scott, manfred lenzen, katy roelich, and corinne le quéré. 2013. 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"will economic restructuring in china reduce trade-embodied co2 emissions?" energy economics 42: 204-212. the world bank. 2014. time to end routine gas flaring. available at: http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2014/07/15/gas-flaring-reduction-takescenter-stage-at-global-event the world bank, world development indicators. 2016. gdp constant 2010 us$. retrieved from http://data.worldbank.org xu, ming, braden allenby, and weiqiang chen. 2009. “energy and air emissions embodied in china– us trade: eastbound assessment using adjusted bilateral trade data.” environmental science & technology 43 (9): 3378-3384. http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2014/07/15/gas-flaring-reduction-takes-center-stage-at-global-event http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2014/07/15/gas-flaring-reduction-takes-center-stage-at-global-event http://data.worldbank.org/ 21 review of european and eurasian affairs 11 (2), 2017 published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada available online at: journals.carleton.ca/rera/ rera is an electronic academic peer-reviewed journal. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is a joint project supported by the canada-europe transatlantic dialogue—a cross-canada research network supported by the social sciences and humanities research council of canada (sshrc)—along with the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies (carleton university) and its associated research unit, the centre for european studies. rera aims to provide an accessible forum for research, to promote high standards of research and scholarship, and to foster communication among young scholars. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada tel: +01 613 520-2600 ext. 3117; e-mail: rera-journal@carleton.ca creative commons license this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license (cc by-nc-nd 4.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, provided the source is acknowledged. no use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes. issn: 1718-4835 © 2017 the author(s) https://journals.carleton.ca/rera/ mailto:rera-journal@carleton.ca https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ why reforms fail: the role of ideas, interests and institutions review of european and russian affairs 12 (1), 2018 issn 1718-4835 economic patriotism after the crisis: explaining continuity and change in european securities enforcement chase foster harvard university abstract since the global financial crisis, european governments have sought to intensify the supervision of financial markets. yet, few studies have empirically examined whether regulatory approaches have systematically shifted in the aftermath of the crisis, and how these reforms have been mediated by longstanding national strategies to promote domestic financial interests in the european single market. examining hundreds of enforcement actions in three key european jurisdictions, i find a mixed pattern of continuity and change in the aftermath of the crisis. in the uk, aggregate monetary penalties and criminal sanctions have skyrocketed since 2009, while in france and germany, the enforcement pattern suggests continuity, with both countries assessing penalties and prosecuting insider trading at similar rates before and after the crisis. i conclude that financial regulation is still structured by longstanding industrial strategies (story and walter, 1997), but where pre-existing regulatory approaches were seen as contributing to the crisis, a broader regulatory overhaul has been pursued. thus, in the uk, where the financial crisis served as a direct rebuke to the country’s “light touch” regulation, financial supervision was overhauled, and monetary sanctions dramatically increased, to preserve london’s status as an international financial centre. by contrast, in france and germany, where domestic regulatory systems were implicated by the financial crisis, domestic securities supervision and enforcement was less dramatically altered. while the crisis has led to the further institutionalization of european-level supervisory institutions, these changes have not yet led to convergence in national regulatory approaches. 2 review of european and russian affairs 12(1), 2018 introduction since 2008, european financial market regulation has been transformed. several dozen new directives and regulations have been enacted at the european level that intensify the detail and reduce the flexibility of existing rules while broadening the scope of european regulation to new areas, such as credit rating agencies, hedge funds, and banker bonuses (lannoo 2013; moloney 2016; goldstein and véron 2011). a new paris-based european securities and markets association (esma) has been established to harmonize supervisory and enforcement approaches across jurisdictions, while national market conduct regulators have been provided broader surveillance and enforcement powers. across nearly all european jurisdictions, the number of staff dedicated to supervision and enforcement has increased since 2008. many of the new initiatives and regulatory approaches are qualitatively different from past regulatory efforts. while before the crisis, the focus of regulation was largely on “market making”—removing barriers to entry and enforcing competition rules seen as enhancing market efficiency, while generally trusting the ‘free market’ to ensure financial stability and investor protection—the post-crisis european regulatory landscape is largely oriented toward “market shaping”: initiatives such as consumer protection and financial stability that do not take for granted market rationality (quaglia 2012). additionally, the approach to european financial services integration has shifted from systems of “mutual recognition,” minimal standard setting, and loose coordination through regulatory networks that predominated before the crisis (mügge 2011; coen and thatcher 2008), to more intensive harmonization efforts designed to standardize supervisory questions to the maximum extent possible (moloney 2011). even in the united kingdom (uk), which houses europe’s largest capital markets and was previously the chief advocate of the market-making approach, regulators have shifted from a “principles-based” approach to supervision and “light-touch” application of enforcement, which predominated before the crisis, to a “rules-based” supervisory system that is more interventionist and deterrence-oriented in enforcement (mügge 2013a; tomasic 2010). yet, despite the “epochal” nature of the transformation in regulatory governance (moloney 2011, 43), it remains unclear to what extent patterns of national regulatory enforcement have actually changed in the aftermath of the crisis, and how ongoing reforms have been influenced by national industrial strategies. only a handful of political economy studies have examined post-crisis reform strategies, and few of these closely examine enforcement practices. moreover, many of the extant enforcement studies either focus on single countries or analyze pre-crisis trends. to what extent has the post-crisis promise to intensify supervision and establish more stringent systems of enforcement led to changes in practice? how have these changes varied across jurisdictions? and in what ways have national financial interests continued to limit and shape securities enforcement in practice? drawing from close empirical analysis of enforcement statistics and reports, as well as interviews with regulators, this article undertakes a close examination of the enforcement patterns in financial regulation before and after the crisis in the uk, france, and germany, the largest european member states and home to europe’s most important financial markets. i find wide variation in the extent to which regulatory practices have changed since the crisis. in the uk, aggregate penalties have gone up forty-fold, and criminal prosecutions for insider dealing increased from zero before the crisis to dozens since 2009. by contrast, in france, the regulatory approach in the securities 3 review of european and russian affairs 12 (1), 2018 field has been marked more by continuity, and in germany, the shift toward a more coercive and adversarial regulatory approach is being implemented only gradually. building on story and walter’s (1997) account, and woll and clift’s (2013) work on “economic patriotism” in open markets, i argue that important continuities can be observed in each country’s financial policy goals before and after the crisis, including the uk’s commitment to full liberalization with minimal european rule making, the french focus on building more centralized european supervisory structures, and germany’s approach of incremental liberalization and reregulation combined with continued protections for its cooperative and public savings banks. the differing patterns of regulatory change since 2009 can be explained by different experiences of the crisis. where a country’s pre-crisis regulatory approach was seen by policymakers as contributing to the financial meltdown, supervisory practices have been substantially altered. in the uk, where the financial crisis was a direct rebuke to the uk’s light-touch regulatory approach, and where finance is both highly internationalized and marketized, the political class overhauled financial supervision and instituted more adversarial strategies of enforcement in order to preserve london’s status as an international financial centre. by contrast, in france and germany, where domestic regulatory systems were not as implicated by the financial crisis, enforcement approaches changed less dramatically. both countries instead sought to re-regulate on the international and european levels to address not only the problems of ‘regulatory arbitrage’ that had contributed to the crisis, but also to ensure that the post-crisis regulatory architecture protected domestic interests. in sum, countries continue to promote national financial interests within the single european market, but because the crisis had different implications for domestic regulatory arrangements, we observe different patterns of change. where domestic regulatory systems were delegitimized by the crisis, as in the uk, practices were overhauled as regulators identified failures in past practices and developed new supervisory strategies. but where pre-crisis regulatory practices were generally seen as effective, as in france and germany, supervisory approaches have stayed more or less the same. theoretical perspectives in their classic account of the political economy of european financial integration, story and walter (1997) characterize the development of a single european financial market as a “battle of the systems” between the dominant economies of the uk, france, and germany, with each country vying for regulatory rules and enforcement systems that would best position domestic financial centres and firms to benefit from market integration. in the uk, where capital markets were welldeveloped, financial liberalization and internationalization was an opportunity to further extend its international dominance: policymakers correctly believed that london would attract much of the financial market activity of a newly consolidated european market. in france, where state-owned financial institutions had predominated for much of the postwar period, but where a concerted effort at privatization was ongoing, the new european single market was an opportunity to modernize and expand french finance through a partially protected european financial market. in germany, where an entrenched three-pillar banking system and coordinated model of capitalism was threatened by ‘cosmopolitan’ finance, the posture was more defensive, with governments 4 review of european and russian affairs 12(1), 2018 seeking to protect german cooperative banks and locally-oriented sparkassen within the newly liberalized environment, while simultaneously supporting extensions of european regulatory control over london, promoting frankfurt as a financial centre, and advancing the interests of a small number of large, private banks in foreign markets (story and walter 1997, 275-306; deeg 1999). thus, in negotiations over the rules of the single market, the uk sought full liberalization with minimum re-regulation, france gradual liberalization with strong re-regulation on the european level, and germany partial liberalization and home-control over supervision. since story and walter’s (1997) account twenty years ago, several interrelated developments have challenged these earlier strategies. first, the broad processes of globalization and liberalization have led to the growth of capital markets in bank-dominated countries, rendering national financial systems more difficult to distinguish (hardie et al. 2011; hardie and howarth 2009). liberalization has also loosened state ties with major industries and financial institutions, making the industrial policies of the past more difficult to achieve in practice. for instance, the system of crossshareholding that allowed for public steering has disappeared as the french economy has liberalized (morin 2000), and there is evidence that the much-vaunted german universal bank model has been undermined by eu state aid rules (grossman 2006) and the decline of coordination between german companies and financial institutions (höpner and krempel 2004). second, ongoing europeanization of financial services rules has gradually reduced state control over certain areas of regulatory policy. most consequential has been the adoption of the euro by all of the major european countries except for the uk. this has led not only to a greater level of de facto financial market integration across countries, but also to larger and more powerful financial actors calling for further capital market integration and european re-regulation (mügge 2011). since european-level initiatives generally do not reflect the approach of any national system—promoting instead an external “international” approach to regulation—europeanization may have further undermined possibilities for varieties of capitalism (posner and véron 2012). finally, the financial crisis, by spurring domestic financial reforms in a more punitive direction, and by moving key enforcement questions from national capitals to brussels and paris, may have fundamentally delimited national industrial strategies (moloney 2011). the new centralization of supervisory and enforcement questions has only intensified the scope and reach of european rules. many of these new rules are implemented as regulations, which, unlike directives, cannot be altered by member states, while the delegation of significant rulemaking authority to the european securities and markets association adds to the pressure for more intensive enforcement. yet, while these developments have complicated the traditional strategies of industrial policy, they have not rendered them impossible. undoubtedly, the neat distinctions once made between national financial systems are no longer possible in a financially globalized world, while the steady drumbeat of europeanization has made national regulatory systems more interdependent and superficially similar. but while national financial systems have become more intertwined and financial structures more similar, the level of concentration in national banking systems, the degree of intermediation with industry, the size and breadth of capital markets, and the relative strength of national banks within the european market all remain different across countries in some important ways. the capital markets in the uk are, as a percentage of gdp, roughly three times larger than in germany and around twice as large as in france, while bank credit composes a much larger share of corporate financing in germany than in france or the uk (howarth and quaglia 5 review of european and russian affairs 12 (1), 2018 2013). and while the eu’s financial services action plan did succeed in harmonizing the content of securities regulation (mügge 2011), the lamfalussy process, which aimed to standardize enforcement, largely proved incapable of promoting wholesale changes on the national level (moloney 2011, 18), allowing states significant space to adapt the implementation of european securities rules to their national financial systems (grossman and leblond 2011). finally, while open markets and competition rules have made it more difficult to promote ‘national champions’ (shonfield 1965) or direct capital toward favored projects (zysman 1983), states have still been able to pursue what clift and woll (2013) term “economic patriotism,” defined as “the defense of local prerogatives in integrated markets” (308). over the past few decades, european states have selectively pursued liberalization, showed regulatory forbearance for favored industries, and enacted stringent regulatory rules in sectors where domestic industries were less competitive visà-vis foreign firms, all to promote or protect certain industries. in the aftermath of the crisis, then, we might expect to observe similar instances of economic patriotism under the cover of liberalization or re-regulation. financial enforcement before and after the crisis united kingdom in the uk, financial regulation has been governed historically by a mostly informal, cooperative system of state regulation that provided self-regulatory organizations staffed by industry representatives with ample discretion to apply the law in loose coordination with the bank of england (johal et al., 2012; moran 1986). margaret thatcher’s “big bang” and the establishment of the financial services authority (fsa) in the 1990s was thought to portend a more adversarial and legalistic regulatory process (vogel 1996; kelemen 2006), but in practice, the regulator maintained a comparatively cooperative approach to enforcement as a way to foster the city of london’s attractiveness as a financial centre, seeking to avoid direct intervention into the affairs of financial actors, rarely assessing monetary penalties, and finding alternatives to punitive actions whenever possible (tomasic 2010; ferran 2006; goodhart 2001). conservative and labour governments alike actively promoted the city’s interests, often hailing their light-touch system as a friendlier alternative to the adversarial and legalistic american regulatory state (morgan 2012; kagan 2003), and seeking strong liberalization rules in brussels that removed barriers to financial flows, but largely left re-regulatory questions to domestic authorities (quaglia 2011; mügge 2011). in the short term, willful regulatory forbearance proved to be a successful economic development strategy: on the eve of the crisis, london hosted twice the number of foreign banks as in the us, was the site of 63% of european ipos (international public offerings) in terms of value, and boasted the world’s largest share of international bank lending (talani 2011, 22). meanwhile, the share of domestic gdp stemming from financial services and related accounting, law, and management consultancy industries had risen from 8% in 1997 to 15% in 2007 (morgan 2012, 379). that the uk had a comparatively light-touch regulatory approach is borne out in the regulatory enforcement data. aggregate penalties imposed by uk regulators in the early 2000s were just 1/30th the size of the securities penalties assessed in the us, even after controlling for differences in market size (jackson 2007). while the securities and exchange commission (sec) devoted 40% of its budget to enforcement, the fsa spent just 12%, and whereas american authorities criminally 6 review of european and russian affairs 12(1), 2018 prosecuted scores of securities offenses each year, the uk almost never recommended criminal prosecutions for market abuse, despite internal reports at the fsa finding trading on insider information to be a common practice (coffee 2007, 265-266). throughout the 2000s, even as supervisory problems were revealed, instances of insider trading were made known, and financial institutions collapsed, uk regulators continued to defend light-touch as necessary to preserve london’s status as the world’s leading financial centre (tomasic 2010, 19-20; mügge 2013a). that is, until the financial crisis hit. if the global financial meltdown that reached its climax in october 2008 with the collapse of lehman brothers was difficult for political and economic elites around the world, it was wholly traumatic in the uk, where three of four of the country’s largest banks had to be nationalized, and more than £1.1 trillion spent in bank capital injection and guarantees to shore up its financial system (woll 2014). almost immediately, longstanding scripts about the benefits of light-touch regulation were torn up and, as the extent of the regulatory failure was made increasingly clear by parliamentary inquiries such as the turner report, the fsa engaged in an extensive re-writing of its rulebook (froud et al. 2010). although few questioned whether financial services would remain at the centre of the british economy, a new consensus among politicians, opinion leaders, regulators, and even bankers eventually emerged that, to maintain london’s dominance in global markets, a new regulatory approach was needed (ibid.). as stated in lord turner’s 2009 report, the authority’s approach would now be “underpinned by a different philosophy of regulation” that is both “more intrusive and more systemic” (financial services authority 2009, 88). this new philosophy would do little to undermine the hegemony of finance, but it would entail a significant overhaul of financial supervision and enforcement, including the establishment of a new financial conduct authority (fca) to replace the malesteemed fsa, and an intensification of regulatory sanctions and prosecutions. table 1 reports the fsa and fca’s administrative penalties from 2004-2014. the clear increase in the frequency and size of penalties during the post-crisis period shows that the new philosophy did translate into changes in practice. before lehman brothers collapsed in september 2008, uk regulators assessed on average two penalties per month, with an average value of £555,499 and a median value of £100,000. after lehman brothers went bankrupt, the count more than doubled to 4.46 penalties per month, with an average value of £8.83 million and a median value of £187,829 from 2009-2015. table 1 uk regulatory penalties average (£’000s) median (£’000s) count average count / month before lehman brothers (1/1/02 – 15/9/08) £555 £100,000 164 2 after lehman brothers (15/9/0830/9/15) £8,830 £187,829 372 4.5 before publication of vickers report (1/1/02 – 12/9/11) £747 £101,390 342 3 after publication of vickers report (12/9/11-30/9/15) £16,084 £431,350 194 4 source: author’s, using data from financial conduct authority 7 review of european and russian affairs 12 (1), 2018 in aggregate, this increase is even more striking. from 2004-2006, the three-year average for the fsa’s total penalties was £9.06 million per $1 trillion of gdp. during the 2013-2015 period, after much of the dust from the financial crisis had settled, this figure rises to £358.1 million—nearly a forty-fold increase. we can also assess the transformation in the uk using comparative measures. chart 1, which reports the adjusted penalty increases for the uk and the us, shows that prior to the financial crisis, the two countries were quite far apart in terms of regulatory enforcement, with several single regulatory fines by the sec exceeding the combined monetary sanctions in the uk over an entire year; however, since the crisis, this gap has become much narrower, with total fines in the uk now exceeding those in the us in some years. furthermore, when it comes to pursuing the same instance of misconduct, regulators in the uk and the us are now increasingly on the same page. for instance, the £1.14 billion the fca assessed on five banks for illegal forex trading in november 2014 was roughly similar in size to the $1.4 billion ordered by the us commodity futures trading commission (cftc) the same day (financial conduct authority 2014; commodity futures trading commission 2014). chart 1 us and uk penalties, 2004-015 source: author’s, using annual reports of financial conduct authority (uk), securities and exchange commission (us), commodity futures trading commission (us), office of comptroller of the currency (us), and federal reserve (us), and economic data from organization for economic cooperation and development and international monetary fund finally, the pattern of enforcement intensity can be measured by examining insider trading convictions. as can be seen in table 2, before the financial crisis, the fsa pursued only a handful of major enforcement actions for insider trading, and brought none of these cases to successful criminal prosecution. in 2009, the fsa secured its first insider trading convictions and, over the next year, convicted a total of six defendants for market abuse, imposing aggregate prison sentences of 83 months (esma 2012). in one investigation dubbed “operation tabernula,” the 0 2 0 0 4 0 0 6 0 0 8 0 0 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 uk usa per $1 trillion stock market capitalization per $1 trillion banking assets m il li o n s o f u s d year graphs by country 8 review of european and russian affairs 12(1), 2018 uk regulator pursued simultaneous dawn raids on 16 different properties and searched the files of 140 staff of various financial institutions (the telegraph 2015; see also bloomberg news 2016). and in 2015, the fca cases resulted in a record 14 people being sent to prison for insider trading— an approach that could hardly be described as light-touch (financial times 2015). table 2 uk enforcement statistics, market abuse year criminal convictions for insider trading number of prison sentences avg. length of prison term (months) 2004 0 0 0 2005 0 0 0 2006 0 0 0 2007 0 0 0 2008 0 0 0 2009 4 4 13 2010 4 2 30.5 2011 3 3 25 2012 11 11 22.7 2013 2 2 36 2014 1 0 n/a 2015 15 15 unknown source: author’s, using data from financial conduct authority, esma and news reports in sum, the enforcement approach in the uk has moved from “principles-based” regulation and light-touch enforcement toward more prescriptive modes of state supervision and more stringent approaches to enforcement. while this shift does indicate a modification of regulatory philosophy, it does not mean the financial services industry has become either less influential or less central to uk economic policy. here, the american case is instructive: since the 1930’s, american regulators have strictly enforced reporting and investor protection rules, and since the 1980s, punishment for insider trading has been quite punitive (pitt and shapiro 1990). such enforcement approaches have hardly limited securities market development; indeed, the american system of adversarial legalism is seen by many scholars as facilitating the development of a robust securities market by either providing investors with actionable rights (la porta et al. 2006) or ensuring that public actors protect investors and fair market conduct (jackson and roe 2009). thus, to the extent that british regulatory enforcement focuses on measures such as investor protection or rooting out market misconduct, more intensive enforcement actions may be quite consonant with maintaining london as a financial centre. examining 340 enforcement actions initiated by the fsa or fca from 20092015, we can see that more than half of enforcement actions relate to market misconduct (109) or consumer protection (90), market-shaping measures long seen as enhancing securities market development. so far, at least, the uk appears to be following the us playbook, enforcing in areas that, in theory, should lead to a more robust securities market. we can also examine trends in the size of uk financial services to assess whether increased enforcement has undermined the industry’s predominance in the economy. chart 2 reports the gross value added (gva) of finance and insurance services in the uk economy from 1997-2015. it is clear that financial and insurance services still remain highly central to the british economy. 9 review of european and russian affairs 12 (1), 2018 while declining slightly since their peak in 2009, financial and insurance services still constitute 7% of gdp—and this does not include the value of the real estate, legal, and consulting industries whose fortunes are largely tied to finance. chart 2 gross value added of financial and insurance services, uk, 1997-2015 source: author’s, using data from house of commons finally, we can examine the actions of the british government over the last decade to assess the implications of the shift in supervision and enforcement. politically, the promotion of the city’s interests, while now more muted and containing more caveats, has nevertheless continued. at home, officials have avoided structural reforms that would reduce the concentration of banks, ban certain kinds of financial products, substantially raise taxes on banks or their employees, or promote a less financially-centred economic policy. abroad, the uk has continued to actively promote the city’s interests as well, lobbying for weak versions of european hedge fund regulations (quaglia 2011), and successfully quashing a strong effort by the uk and france to promote a financial transaction tax (schulz 2017). indeed, there are few signs that the crisis has resulted in more democratic or political controls of banks (froud et al. 2010), or that there has been a sustained shift in the broader economic policy paradigm (hodson and mabbett 2009, 1056; mügge 2013a). rather, what we observe is an adjustment of views among regulators about how best to maintain the uk’s status as a global financial centre in the light of the crisis, and the new push for stricter regulatory practices at the european and international levels. while a light-touch regime was developed to promote london as a centre for international finance, it has now been retired to preserve that status. this shift in “regulatory instruments” does not reflect a deeper change in policy paradigm – uk policymakers remain as committed as ever to maintaining finance at the core of their economy (hodson and mabbett 2009; see also hall 1993). 10 review of european and russian affairs 12(1), 2018 however, the transformation from a laissez-faire model to a more adversarial and legalistic approach does evidence a change in beliefs about what regulatory instruments are best able to achieve these economic policy goals. following the crisis, policymakers realized the limitations of the “light-touch” regulatory approach, and came to view the more adversarial and rule-based approach, long used in the u.s., as a better strategy for promoting the city of london’s interests. france french financial regulation in the postwar period was guided by the combination of the étatiste belief that state economic direction was needed to overcome the inherent irrationalities of the market, as well as nationalist views that finance should be structured in the french public interest. consequently, until major financial privatization reforms were undertaken in france from 19841988, most major aspects of finance, both in the french banking system and in the much smaller bourse, were guided directly or indirectly by the treasury (zysman 1983). the french securities regulator, the commission des opérations de bourse (cob), was founded in 1967, but it remained a relatively obscure actor until government financial reforms in the mid-1980s substantially enlarged the french securities market and opened up participation to a wider variety of players (story and walter 1997, 215). unlike in the uk where liberalization and re-regulation took the form of broad steering, but with generally hands-off approaches to the decisions of firms, in france, the state played an active role in the liberalization process (levy 2005). this was no less true for finance, where french authorities privatized the major banks while spending vast sums to modernize the infrastructure of the paris stock market. they also simultaneously pursued strong systems of supervision, borrowing ideas from the adversarial legalistic american regulatory system (story and walter 1997, 298). within a few years, the cob was transformed from a body mostly involved in information gathering to one that possessed “sweeping powers to open inquiries, prevent trading by refusing mandatory authorizations, issue orders to cease trading, take cases to court, and levy fines” (thatcher 2005, 363). during the early 2000s, france developed a “more coercive and judicialized” system (kelemen 2011, 119), establishing the autorité des marchés financiers (amf) with significant new powers to enforce securities rules related to market abuse. a similar shift toward confrontational regulation occurred in banking regulation. by 2006, monetary penalties were included in 85% of the french prudential regulators’ decisions, compared to just 17% in 2001 (see commission bancaire 2007, 152). in many respects, then, the turn toward liberal financial markets underpinned by strong supervision and stringent enforcement was part of france’s pre-crisis economic strategy to foster a larger domestic financial market. furthermore, by the time of the financial crisis, the french already had a market-shaping approach to regulation (quaglia 2011) that was quite interventionist, adversarial, and sometimes punitive. all financial institutions were extensively monitored by state officials, who had usually graduated from either france’s elite école polytechnique or école nationale d’administration, and any potential violations were heard before a quasi-judicial panel in a public proceeding. moreover, unlike in the uk where criminal prosecutions were avoided until after the crisis, the french frequently pursued criminal cases throughout the 2000s. thus, when the financial crisis hit in 2008, with the most salient problems largely emerging from other markets, the french political class did not see their regulatory approach in securities markets as significantly implicated. indeed, initially, the predominant view was that the broader french models of banking and regulation had been vindicated by the crisis, since the size of the french 11 review of european and russian affairs 12 (1), 2018 bailout was much smaller and handled more cooperatively than in other countries (hardie and howarth 2009; woll 2014). if anything, the problem had been the regulatory laxity of foreign (and particularly american and british) jurisdictions. as french president nicolas sarkozy remarked in september 2008, ten days after the collapse of lehman brothers, “self-regulation is finished. laissez-faire is finished. the all-powerful market that is always right is finished” (financial times 2008). the fact that the french had never pursued a laissez-faire approach to liberalization, and indeed had championed a model of liberalization underpinned by strong state regulation, only reinforced french confidence in their domestic regulatory system following the crisis. thus, in contrast to the uk, where the political and economic class came to believe that a new approach to regulation was needed to preserve the country’s comparative advantage in finance, in france, there was little impetus to pursue a wholesale shift in the instruments of domestic supervision and enforcement. the national strategy of fostering more robust capital markets and developing strong european regulation could continue as before. this continuity in french policy is also reflected in the domestic enforcement pattern. chart 3 reports the aggregate penalties of the amf. we can see that the incidence of monetary penalties remains relatively flat at the french securities regulator, with no discernible increase since the crisis. french authorities have continued to pursue high-profile securities cases, including a €14 million fine against an individual for insider trading in 2013 (autorité des marchés financiers 2013) and two €5 million fines for high-frequency trading in 2015. however, there is little evidence that these prosecutions are different from the pre-crisis approach. for instance, in 2002, the cob fined george soros €2.2m for insider trading, which is generally in the same range as fines of today (new york times 2002). and some of the highest-profile charges and convictions, such as the three-year criminal conviction against the rogue trader jérôme kerviel, were initiated well before the crisis and subsequent reforms (the guardian 2010). chart 3 french market conduct penalties, 2004-2014 source: author’s, using data from autorité des marchés financie (amf), annual reports 12 review of european and russian affairs 12(1), 2018 meanwhile, on the european level, the french government has been the leading advocate for addressing international “regulatory arbitrage” by developing more substantial supervisory harmonization on the european and international levels, particularly for areas like private equity, hedge funds, credit rating agencies, and other industries where british and american companies dominated international markets. in 2000, the french treasury minister, laurent fabius, proposed the establishment of a european securities regulator to be based in paris, only to be rebuffed by the uk and germany (quaglia 2007: 282). in 2009, when france made a similar proposal, the political equation had changed because of the financial crisis. two years later, the european securities and markets association (esma) was established in paris. over the following years, the french government supported a variety of other market-shaping initiatives, such as a financial transaction tax, stricter bank remuneration rules, and new hedge fund rules, while seeking to water down new capital requirements that would disproportionately affect some of its largest banks. in sum, france’s post-crisis regulatory approach largely followed its pre-crisis political strategy: domestically, it sought to maintain a strong system of state financial market supervision and enforcement; internationally, french policymakers continued to push for liberalized markets through state-led processes that provided the european union with a strong rulemaking role. but in contrast to the uk, the comparatively positive experience of the crisis led french regulators to not see a shift in regulatory instrumentation as necessary to maintain domestic economic policy goals. what the crisis did alter was the french government’s political capacity to achieve its goal of harmonized european financial supervision. by creating an impetus for european-level reform, the crisis helped french policymakers transform several longstanding proposals into reality. germany in germany, finance has traditionally been bank-dominated, and stock market development quite limited (detzer and herr 2014; zysman 1983). consequently, public securities enforcement was also quite weak: between 1975 and 1990, just one trader was caught for insider dealing in the entire country (story and walter 1997, 182). but just as in france, where the pressures of globalization and regulatory competition in the 1980s resulted in the partial liberalization of a closed system, financial globalization and european integration undermined the traditional mode of west german financial regulation, especially after german reunification inspired additional financing needs. in response to calls by its biggest banks for a centralized and independent stock exchange, the federal government privatized the frankfurt exchange, which housed 70% of german securities trading (story and walter 1997, 181). after 45 stock exchange members were caught in an insider-trading ring in 1991, germany criminalized insider dealing, required public disclosure of most share listings, and established an independent securities regulator. over the next twenty years, the liberalization of german finance proceeded. although important aspects of the three-pillar bank system were preserved (vitols 2005), the reforms paved the way for the internationalization and marketization of germany’s private banks as well as some of its public savings banks (hardie and howarth 2009). it also led to the establishment in 2002 of the consolidated federal financial regulator, bundesanstalt für finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (bafin), which was given significant investigative and sanctioning powers. as an independent regulatory agency, bafin had significant autonomy to apply the rules within a broad regulatory framework. however, the regulator took a less coercive and punitive approach than the amf in france, giving weight to long-term relationships and showing forbearance to firms that cooperated. although 13 review of european and russian affairs 12 (1), 2018 bafin assessed hundreds of fines in the early 2000s, most were small fines assessed for reporting errors, and none were publicly reported. german financial institutions were among the most exposed to the subprime mortgage crisis, and germany had to spend a significant portion of its gdp bailing out the financial sector. but even if some of its largest banks were implicated in the crisis, its system of securities regulation was not. it had not been german under-regulation of the comparatively small frankfurt börse, after all, that had caused the subprime mortgage crisis or the libor scandal. as in france, the german political class saw the crisis as stemming from inadequate enforcement abroad, not at home. as the german president of bafin put it in may 2009: “we were very well aware that in some areas of the international financial system risk volumes had built up that were too high in comparison with the risk buffers that the banks held in the form of capital”; he then later implied that there was little that bafin regulators could have done to regulate foreign markets (bafin 2012). consequently, the impetus to overhaul domestic german securities approaches was limited, even if germany did enact several significant laws increasing regulatory stringency as part of broader efforts to strengthen european enforcement. the pattern of continuity is reflected in the reported regulatory enforcement data. table 3, column 1 reports the number of special audits, one of the primary regulatory tools used by the german federal regulator. columns 2 and 3 indicate the number of insider trading investigations and convictions pursued by public prosecutors. while numbers can fluctuate from year to year, both indicators suggest a more or less stable, and slightly declining, enforcement volume following the crisis. table 3: enforcement sanctions, bafin, 2004-2015 bafin report number of special audits insider trading, new investigations insider trading, convictions 2004 324 57 5 2005 335 54 9 2006 287 51 11 2007 280 42 3 2008 244 44 6 2009 258 30 11 2010 258 34 11 2011 270 31 2 2012 273 51 5 2013 305 27 8 2014 203 46 1 2015 176 41 1 source: author’s, using data from bafin annual reports we can also see from bafin reports that germany has engaged in major legislative reforms that expand the breadth and depth of financial regulation, increasing liability for senior managers (hänßler 2013) and enlarging the statutory maximum for sanctions multiple times over (gibson dunn 2013). however, the regulator has not yet applied more coercive sanctions in practice. in 2013, one of the few years where sanctioning data were published, 119 fines were imposed, totaling €3.3million. the vast majority (97 of 119) of these were for violating information 14 review of european and russian affairs 12(1), 2018 publication requirements (bafin 2014, 85, table 35, administrative fine proceedings). while in the uk, fines are sometimes in the billions, and in france, the tens of millions, as of 2015, the highest fine ever imposed by bafin against a company was €3.5million against blackrock for misrepresenting its ownership stakes in 50 german companies (wall street journal 2015), while the highest fine against an individual remains €215,000 (von buttlar 2016). although the common defense for small fines is that most serious cases are referred to public prosecutors (litsoukov 2015), in actuality, german prosecutions for securities violations rarely result in jail time—there are few cases, and among the cases that are pursued, prison sentences are almost always annulled. for instance, in 2009-2010, there were 67 criminal sanctions in germany for insider trading, but only two involved prison sentences, both of which were annulled (esma 2012). to the extent that we have seen a change in the tone of german enforcement, it appears to be defensive, prompted by the prospect of regulation from other national jurisdictions or the european union. for instance, in the wake of intrusive investigations into the deutsche bank by us, uk, and european authorities, bafin has criticized the bank for stressing profits over ethics, and sought to push the bank to remove its top leaders, singling out five of six for being complicit in the bank’s involvement with libor benchmark rate manipulation (new york times 2015). however, such relatively weak interventions years after the libor investigations by us, uk, and european authorities demonstrate that germany is following, rather than leading, when it comes to the development of more confrontational enforcement approaches. at the same time, there has been a steady, if gradual, shift in enforcement intensity over the last twenty years, as part and parcel of financial liberalization and the europeanization of financial regulation. for instance, the percentage of cases involving fines moved from 12.4% of all proceedings commenced in 1996-1998 to 37% for proceedings from 2013-2015 (von buttlar 2016). and we see evidence that germany is continuing to accept more public, adversarial, and stringent enforcement rules, adopting legislation in recent years that establishes whistleblower protections, substantially increases fines, and provides for the reporting of sanctions, despite strong concerns about the implications of such measures for german privacy protections. however, the use of new sanction powers by bafin has so far been more tentative than in the french and uk cases, where, as we have seen, enforcement practices changed quite dramatically over a short period (in france before the crisis, and in the uk after). consequently, we can expect that any changes that occur in german financial supervision in the years to come will likely remain incremental, as regulators use their discretion to ensure that domestic financial institutions have the time needed to understand, and adjust to, the more rule-based eu regulatory approach. we can also see the continuation of germany’s pre-crisis economic strategy in its negotiations over new european rules. on the one hand, the government has been supportive of extending regulation in areas such as hedge funds, where there are no clear domestic interests (quaglia 2011). but on the other hand, german negotiators have been openly hostile to attempts to establish european-level supervision over banking, out of concern that european central bank (ecb) supervision might undermine the ability of german cooperatives and public savings banks to maintain their distinct business models (schulz 2017). and in some areas of european regulation, germany has been the strongest opponent. for instance, the new european banking union was achieved largely over germany’s objections, and only after the government received an exemption from european supervision for all but a handful of germany’s banks (howarth and quaglia 2016). all in all, we can see that the german government has largely maintained its pre-crisis strategy of 15 review of european and russian affairs 12 (1), 2018 selectively supporting europeanization in financial regulation, while gradually implementing european directives in ways that ensure that domestic financial structures can adjust to the new environment. conclusion industrial policy achieved through state ownership or direct subsidies has been in decline for several decades now. in the 21st century, explicit industrial policy is deemed largely illegitimate, while many categories of industrial support are strictly forbidden under european competition law. yet, the liberalization of finance, development of european law, and institutionalization of neoliberal ideas have not rendered states unable to promote national economic interests. as clift and woll (2013) note, liberalization has forced industrial policy to change, but it nevertheless has continued. “the integration of markets and the concurrent weaving together of regulatory frameworks,” they explain, “put pressure on national economic intervention to eschew old-style industrial policy. governments therefore had to become creative to assure traditional economic policy objectives with new means (309).” in few policy areas has the prominence of “economic patriotism” been clearer than in finance, where european countries have transparently responded to liberalization by promoting domestic financial interests. countries have selectively pursued liberalization where it was thought to advantage domestic financial groups, while supporting more ‘embedded’ markets in areas where domestic firms were less competitive. states have found creative ways to subsidize banks, whether through tax advantages or exemption from antitrust rules. moreover, domestic regulatory systems have also been structured by these strategies, whether we examine the light-touch regulatory system adopted in the uk in the 1990s, the modernized, more coercive securities regulatory system developed in france in the early 2000’s, or the cooperative and closed system of domestic regulation pursued in germany. although the global financial crisis challenged these strategies, in all three countries, the central components of pre-crisis economic strategies were maintained, even if they had to be adjusted in light of the crisis. in the uk, the financial crisis delegitimized the light-touch approach to regulating securities and other financial markets, pushing british elites to overhaul their regulatory instruments and import more adversarial and rule-based enforcement approaches; however, this change was designed to maintain, not abandon, the promotion of uk financial interests in the european single market. in france, the crisis prompted few shifts in regulatory instruments at home, while opening up a window of opportunity to pursue long-standing goals to create more extensive european-level securities regulation that benefited paris’s status as a financial centre. finally, in germany, the crisis challenged key aspects of its three-pillar banking system, but prompted only gradual changes in regulatory instrumentation, and did not disrupt the government’s pursuit of protections for favored domestic banks. in sum, the financial crisis presented a mixture of challenges and opportunities for each country’s national economic strategies, and while it led to some adjustments in policy, it did not force any country to abandon its overall strategy. at the same time, by pursuing this 21st century “battle of the systems,” governments in all three countries have also supported reforms that significantly expanded european authority over supervision and enforcement. just as the european banking union may eventually “de-link banks from their sovereigns” (gros 2013), centralized european 16 review of european and russian affairs 12(1), 2018 securities enforcement may make it more difficult to pursue distinct national regulatory strategies in financial markets. with the new market abuse regulation going into effect in 2016, esma continuing to develop its capacity and expand its orbit, and the ecb now actively supervising systemically important financial institutions (moloney 2016), there will be significant new pressure to further institutionalize arms-length enforcement practices that rely more heavily on transparent sanctions and public punishment. whether real financial supervisory harmonization is eventually achieved remains an open question. what is more certain is that european leaders will continue to face the legacy of 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23 review of european and russian affairs 12 (1), 2018 published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada available online at: journals.carleton.ca/rera/index.php/rera rera is an electronic academic peer-reviewed journal that publishes graduate, post-graduate, and young scholarly works. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is a joint project supported by the canadaeurope transatlantic dialogue—a cross-canada research network supported by the social sciences and humanities research council of canada (sshrc)—along with the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies (carleton university) and its associated research unit, the centre for european studies. rera aims to provide an accessible forum for research, to promote high standards of research and scholarship, and to foster communication among young scholars. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada tel: +01 613 520-2600 ext. 3117; e-mail: rera-journal@carleton.ca creative commons license creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0 this working paper is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial no derivs 3.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 3.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, provided the source is acknowledged. no use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes. issn: 1718-4835 © 2018 the author(s) https://journals.carleton.ca/rera/index.php/rera mailto:rera-journal@carleton.ca http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ microsoft word kurt huebner and bartholomew paudyn_introduction_common markets and common currency eu integration and its out review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 1 ………………………………………………………………… introduction: common markets and common currency: eu integration and its outcomes bartholomew paudyn and kurt hüebner review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 2 in 2007, the process of european integration will celebrate its 50th anniversary. what started as an important but restricted political initiative of overall six european countries has evolved into a mighty and encompassing socio-political structure that defines europe. today, the eu consists of 25 member states, and more may come. the transformation from a political and economic scheme of cooperation of nation-states towards an entity with its own political, legal, social and economic structures, norms, procedures and rules did not happen without deep and sometimes disturbing crises. so far, however, it appears that nothing could really stop the enlarging and deepening of the eu. the evolution of the eu was accompanied by the initiation and growth of the academic field of european studies. the evolution of the eu and the launch of this new scholarly field went hand in hand. whether the insights of the academic preoccupation with the eu have helped and structured the ways of european integration itself may be questionable. yet there is no doubt that political actors were more than willing to use scholarly arguments for justifying their integration policies. even though it seems that until today scholars do not agree whether the launch and then the evolution of the eu has been dominantly driven by (geo)political or by strict economic interests, it is obvious that economically grounded arguments serve best the needs of politicians by lending their actions some credibility. two basic propositions played a particular role in speeding up the processes of integration. there is, first, the argument that the substitution of a number of single national markets by a unified common market delivers a range of welfare benefits. the bigger the market, so the logic goes, the bigger the potential turnover, and the bigger the review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 3 expected economies of scale. consumers as well as producers will benefit from lower prices and the higher productivity of a common market. such a market will have a unified spatial price structures that in turn generate a level playing field for all actors. in real life, all those benefits do not come automatically. markets need frameworks that usually are provided by non-market actors like the state or state-like institutions. diawara discusses the designs of competition policies of the eu and of canada and shows that the eu as a non-state is more successful in launching working competition rules than is the canadian state. in practice, the agricultural sectors of the member states of the eu were transformed into a single common market. the paper by viju/nolan/kerr gives a brief history of the common agricultural policy (cap) of the eu before it analyzes the price integration for selected agricultural products of a sample of member states. the results of the econometric study are somehow surprising as it is shown that only a subset of agricultural products shows significant price integration. more so, price integration between the countries under observation (austria, finland, and sweden) is less pronounced than price integration with the biggest economy of the eu, namely germany. the lack on coherent price integration refers to the still unfinished process of market integration in europe. this insight is supported by the paper of ihor soroka. he discusses the second basic insight that is used to legitimize and push european integration forward. the introduction of a common currency, so the argument runs, will increase price transparency, therefore strengthening price competition and will also drastically reduce transaction costs. due to those benefits the cross-border trade between the members of a currency union will increase significantly. a broadly cited paper by andrew rose and review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 4 subsequent work along those lines have found positive trade effects on the case of a currency union of up to 300 per cent. soroka’s analysis of the effects of the euro on trade between members states (1997-2000) using a standard gravity model, contradicts those results by showing that the positive trade effects of the european monetary union are (i) relatively small and (ii) evaporate in short time. the emu came with an institutional architecture that is mainly made by the stability and growth pact (sgp). much has been written on this pact in the last couple of years, mainly due to the fact that many rules and objectives have been seriously violated by member states. paudyn takes on the asymmetric application of the sgp by introducing the concepts of risk and uncertainty as modes of governance. reflecting the tension between the programmatic and operational dimensions of governing emu, these modes translate into a new institutional capacity for its regulation. the audit quantifies this politics of risk and uncertainty. his contribution shows that the emu introduced a new concept of governance that may have deep effects on the shape of governance of the eu as such. as the eurozone will grow in time the need for an efficient, smooth and also stable mode of governance will increase. whether this may lead to a change in the rules and practices of the sgp will have to be seen. one thing that we can be certain of, however, is that the work load for europeanists will not diminish. review of european and russian affairs 10 (1), 2016 issn 1718-4835 considering the sub-regional cooperation in east-central europe – some conclusions on integrating and disintegrating tendencies in the sub-regional dialogue jacek wieclawski university of warmia and mazury in olsztyn abstract this article discusses the problems of the sub-regional cooperation in east-central europe. it formulates the general conclusions and examines the specific case of the visegrad group as the most advanced example of this cooperation. the article identifies the integrating and disintegrating tendencies that have so far accompanied the sub-regional dialogue in east-central europe. yet it claims that the disintegrating impulses prevail over the integrating impulses. eastcentral europe remains diversified and it has not developed a single platform of the sub-regional dialogue. the common experience of the communist period gives way to the growing difference of the sub-regional interests and the ability of the east-central european members to coordinate their positions in the european union is limited. the visegrad group is no exception in this regard despite its rich agenda of social and cultural contacts. the russian-ukrainian conflict confirms a deep divergence of interests among the visegrad states that seems more important for the future of the visegrad cooperation than the recent attempts to mark the visegrad unity in the european refugee crisis. finally, the ukrainian crisis and the strengthening of the n ato’s “eastern flank” may contribute to some new ideas of the sub-regional cooperation in eastcentral europe, to include the polish-baltic rapprochement or the closer dialogue between poland and romania. 2 review of european and russian affairs 10 (1), 2016 introduction the article discusses the sub-regional cooperation in east-central europe, its theoretical and practical aspects, institutional dimension, and first of all the integrating and disintegrating tendencies that have so far accompanied the sub-regional dialogue in this part of europe. it formulates some general conclusions and examines the case of the visegrad group as the most advanced example of this cooperation. considering the concept of east-central europe, the paper refers to the post-communist members of the european union, although the author is aware of some difficulties in the precise delimitation of this area. similarly, the article follows eva c ihelková and pavel hnát’s definition of sub-regionalism as “the situation, where a regional grouping is entirely (or substantially) included within another integration (...)” (cihelková and hnát 2006, 51). thus, it consequently refers to the cooperation in east-central europe as the sub-regional dialogue within the broader process of the european integration. the main thesis of the article is that the disintegrating tendencies within the sub -regional cooperation in east-central europe prevail over the integrating impulses. the latter played their principal role during the pre-accession period, yet the eastern enlargement of the european union contributed to difficulties with the identification of the new aims in the sub -regional dialogue. it confirmed the incommensurability of the sub-regional cooperation and the dominant process of the european integration as well as growing inability of the east-central european members of the european union to coordinate their positions in the eu. east-central europe remains diversified and the common experience of the communist period is no longer a factor that could integrate the states in the sub-region. their interests differ and so far they have not been able to develop a single platform of the sub-regional consultations. similarly, the eastcentral european members of the european union have successfully defended the economic interests of the sub-region during the eu’s budget debates, but their attitudes towards the main reforms of the european union are far from united. the visegrad group is no exception in this regard. it is the most advanced sub-regional grouping in east-central europe but it suffers similar problems. the visegrad group has contributed to the sense of community and mutual understanding among the visegrad societies, yet the group’s political unity has failed and the russian-ukrainian conflict confirms a deep divergence of the visegrad interests. the visegrad solidarity remains tentative and the difference of opinions among the visegrad states on the european union’s relations with russia seems more important for the future cooperation in the group than its recent unity in the european refugee crisis. in fact, the “russian factor” may contribute to more serious changes in the sub-regional cooperation in east-central europe, including the emergence of the new platforms of the sub-regional dialogue. this article is divided into three parts. the first discusses contemporary regionalism and the role of east-central europe in the sub-regional processes in europe. yet its principal aim is to identify the integrating and disintegrating tendencies that accompany the sub-regional dialogue in east-central europe. the second section discusses the case of the visegrad group as the most advanced forum of this dialogue. it indicates the strengths and weaknesses of the visegrad 3 review of european and russian affairs 10 (1), 2016 cooperation, the divergence in the visegrad att itude towards the russian-ukrainian conflict and its consequences for the future course of this cooperation. finally, the third part of the article outlines new political configurations in the sub-regional cooperation in east-central europe that could emerge after the ukrainian crisis and nato’s recent decisions to strengthen its “eastern flank”, to include the ideas of the slavkov triangle or the polish-baltic rapprochement. the theoretical and practical aspects of the sub-regional cooperation in east-central europe – identifying the disintegrating tendencies the fall of the bipolar order has contributed to a new wave of regionalism in different parts of the world. the “new regionalism” has become a dynamic phenomenon that reflects the processes of globalization, but reaches far beyond the economic and institutional aspects of regional cooperation. as andrew hurrell indicates: “(...) regionalism is an extremely complex and dynamic process founded upon not one but a series of interacting and often competing logics—logics of economic and technological transformation and societal integration; logics of power-political competition; logics of security (both interstate and societal); and logics of identity and community”. (hurrell 2007, 130). in fact, the new wave of regionalism is still about economics. it is about a coordination of economic interests in the specific environment of global interdependence. yet the understanding of contemporary regionalism departs from the state-centric, economic-driven or security-oriented perspectives. the post cold war regionalism reaches beyond the formal and institutional context and emphasises the “soft aspects” of regional processes. they include the role of non-state actors, civic societies, ideas or regional identities (söderbaum 2012, 14-19; yi 2007, 5). east-central europe is a good example in this regard as the post cold-war economic transformation and the new liberal identities there are still accompanied by deeply rooted “illiberal” tendencies and social attitudes inherited from the communist past (wieclawski 2015a, 156-158). furthermore, the new wave of regionalism may serve as a collective response to the risks of globalization. it may help to join the global economic processes in a more coordinated way (hurrel 2007, 130-131; higgott 2005, 17). nevertheless, the “new regionalism” does not eliminate the debate on global inequalities and different abilities to participate in the liberalisation of international markets (hurrell 2007, 144). for less developed states, to inc lude east-central europe, it is still a permanent competition for external investment and “participation in that system” (ethier 1998, 1160; bleiere 1997, 18). finally, the new wave of regionalism departs from euro-centrism and confirms a lack of the single model of this process. europe remains at its forefront yet the states in asia or latin america make their own choices that “(...) best reflect their own needs and the political commitment of the actors involved” (higgott 2005, 17). 4 review of european and russian affairs 10 (1), 2016 in a theoretical context the article shares fredrik söderbaum’s conclusions about the proliferation of theories that accompany the new wave of regionalism. theorising in the regional studies attracts both the broader approaches typical for international relations (neoliberal institutionalism, neorealism) and attitudes focused on regional integration processes (neofunctionalism, federalism). it reaches for the new governance theories but also a catalogue of constructivist and post-structural approaches that depart from the mainstream rationalist (positivist) considerations (söderbaum 2012, 13). the abundance of theories contributes to problems with the “conceptual clarity” and coherence in the analysis of the new regionalism. nevertheless, the regional studies are no exception in this regard and illustrate a broader debate in the social sciences (and especially international relations) after the end of the cold-war about the proliferation of theoretical approaches, fragmentation and hybridity of their disciplines (waever 2010, 298-303, 315-316; smith 2010, 4-13). this article does not aspire to solve these problems yet its author has usually postulated the dialogue between different theoretical attitudes (wieclawski 2015b, 145-148). thus, the chunyao yi study of the synthesis between rationalist and constructivist approaches in the regional studies seem worth mentioning. yi urges that both interests and ideas matter in the study of contemporary regionalism and “(...) international society is both material and ideational, in which material incentives and social construction both play indispensable roles” (yi 2007, 27). therefore, a search for the bridge between the rationalist and constructivist approaches is useful for the multi-casual study of contemporary regional processes, desp ite the ontological and methodological differences between them (yi 2007, 3-4, 8-16, 27-29). the complex interactions between the material and ideational aspects of the liberal and democratic transformation in eastcentral europe seem to confirm this conclusion and illustrate that any serious explanation of the contemporary regionalism cannot be based on a single theory. in europe the fall of the bipolar order contributed to both the new impulses for the regional integration to include the establishment of the european union and the emergence of the new european sub-regionalism (törő et al. 2014, 364). the new wave of the sub-regional cooperation in europe reflected considerable changes in the political, economic and social reality of the continent, to include the transformation of east-central europe and the eu’s dialogue with the countries on its mediterranean border. nevertheless, it has been the democratic and liberal reforms in the post-communist states that serve as a drivingforce of the new sub-regional processes in europe, most of the new sub-regional groupings emerged in east-central europe and their dynamic cooperation remains the key to understanding the new sub-regionalism in europe (ehier 1998, 1149-1150; cihelková and hnát, 2006, 51-52). csaba törő, eamonn butler and károly grúber consider the sub-regional partnership as “(...) one of the key features of contemporary european politics” (törő et al. 2014, 364) and andrew cottey indicates four functions that the new sub-regional cooperation in europe has so far served. the first is the bridging one that helps to overcome the historical and political divisions between the members of the sub-regional groups and mitigates possible divisions between the european 5 review of european and russian affairs 10 (1), 2016 union and its neighbourhood. the second integrative function reflects the sub-regional cooperation of the east-central european states in their accession to nato and the eu. the third function refers to the role of the sub-regional groups as a forum of a common response to transnational challenges, and the fourth illustrates the contribution of the sub-regional dialogue to the east-central european political and economic transformation (cottey 2009, 4-5; 13-15). this article shares the conclusions about the significance of the sub-regional dialo gue in contemporary europe. nevertheless, it notes that for east-central europe the standard media coverage of its effective sub-regional cooperation is more complicated and more nuanced. eastcentral europe remains a dynamic sub-region on the continent. this dynamism, however, has been accompanied by some fundamental problems, some underlying determinants and some clear impediments. in fact, a deeper analysis of the sub-regional dialogue in east-central europe reveals the clash of integrating and disintegrating tendencies and the experience of two decades of this cooperation indicates a growing role of the disintegrating factors. thus, the next part of this section will identify some fundamental problems in the sub-regional cooperation in eastcentral europe and some disintegrating tendencies that accompany this cooperation. first, there are still some difficulties with the identification of the social, cultural, and economic boundaries of east-central europe, and problems with the ability of the states in this sub-region to find a common platform of dialogue. east-central europe is diverse (söderbaum 2012, 15) and the sub-regional cooperation in the area remains fragmented. stefanie dühr’s research on arguments for the european union’s macro-regional strategy for central europe may illustrate this conclusion. it indicates that the (sub) region is diverse in terms of geography, economic development, cultural backgrounds and social challenges. besides, some “sub-spaces” can be identified there that show more coherence and commonality than “the central european space as a whole” (dühr 2014, 2, 48). thus, dühr concludes that: “(...) there are currently no clear and convincing arguments for a comprehensive and integrated strategy for the large area of the central european space. this is because the region is very diverse, and – at the level of central europe as a whole – misses a clear transnational rationale or ‘core issue’ around which cooperation could be structured and which would ensure longer-term political attention” (dühr 2014, 48). to be precise, dühr’s concept of central europe combines the former communist states with the parts of germany, austria or italy and analyses the impact of the previous east-west dividing lines (dühr 2014, 1-2). yet even if reduced to the states of the former eastern bloc alone, these conclusions seem convincing and the differences identified in dühr’s study affect the sub regional cooperation in east-central europe as well. in the context of the institutional fragmentation of the east-central european dialogue there are still different sub-regional groups in the area. some of them, as the visegrad group and the baltic council, are “purely sub-regional” and all their participants are the members of the 6 review of european and russian affairs 10 (1), 2016 european union. others, as the council of the baltic sea states, the central european initiative or the carpathian convention, remain the “peripheral sub-regional groupings” that combine both the members of the eu and the countries on the eu’s borders (c ihelková and hnát 2006, 53 -58; dühr 2014, 3, 39-41). nevertheless, the states in east-central europe permanently lack a single sub-regional platform of dialogue that could gather them together. they even lack a forum for consultations that could help coordinate their positions in the institutions of the european union. they consult in brussels before the eu meetings yet these consultations are usually ad hoc and represent different configurations of regional partners – most often the visegrad four (v4) or the v4 plus formula (with the participation of romania or bulgaria) or, more rarely, the polishbaltic talks. this fragmentation is remarkable and illustrates both the diversity of east-central europe and the limited ability of the sub-regional partners to coordinate their interests. second, the evolution of the sub-regional cooperation in east-central europe illustrates a gradual loss of significance of the arguments that initially contributed to the sub -regional dialogue. thus, among the factors that have so far facilitated the cooperation in east-central europe this article indicates: the common experience of the communist period and similar problems of the transformation after the fall of the bipolar order. the escape of the east-central european states from the post-soviet zone and their fears that re-emerging russia may be interested in re-establishing its political and economic influence in the sub-region. the escape from the “grey zone” of security that emerged in east-central europe at the beginning of the 1990s. the common efforts for democratisation and marked economy transformation combined with the aspirations to join nato and the european union. similarity of the level of economic development in the sub-region, although with the acceptance of some differences between the most developed (czech republic and slovenia) and least developed (romania and bulgaria) states of east-central europe. similarity of the geopolitical position of the states in the sub-region (brazova, matczak and takacs 2013, 10), although with the acceptance of some differences between its northern (baltic) and southern (balkan and the black sea) parts. nevertheless, most of the factors above were crucial at the initial phase of the sub -regional cooperation in east-central europe or during the accession negotiations with the european union. together with the eastern enlargements of nato and the eu their political significance has decreased (lazar 2014, 28-29). third, the eastern enlargement of the european union has shifted the core of the po litical decisions important for east-central europe to brussels. it has contributed to the question of incommensurability of any sub-regional cooperation in europe and the integration processes in 7 review of european and russian affairs 10 (1), 2016 the frames of the eu. eva c ihelková and pavel hnát rightly indicate in this regard that the european union remains the leading scheme of cooperation on the continent, much deeper and certainly more institutionalized than any sub-regional group (c ihelková and hnát, 2006, 51-52). the dominant position of the eu as the motor of the integration in europe is unquestionable (cottey 2009, 5). it does not exclude the space for any sub-regional dialogue, but for the “purely sub-regional groups”, existing entirely in the confines of the european union, “(...) the space for regional cooperation in today’s eu is relatively small since it is given by the ability of such groupings to offer to their member states a platform for creating a common position within the decisionmaking mechanism of the eu” (c ihelková and hnát 2006, 60-61). fourth, the experience of the decade after the eastern enlargement of the european union illustrates a limited ability of the states in east-central europe to present a common sub-regional response to the most fundamental problems of the eu. it revea ls more narrow perspectives (the visegrad, the baltic, the balkan) than a single east-central european position and again confirms the diversity of the sub-region. so far the east-central european members of the european union have had many problems with t heir coordinated response to the institutional reforms of the eu, the debates on the constitutional treaty and the lisbon treaty, as well as the economic challenges that the eu faces, including its energy security (lazar 2014, 30; strážay 2011, 24-25, 29-31). one of a few exceptions has been the east-central european solidarity during the european union’s budget debates and its common position in the defence of the level of the eu’s financial assistance for the new members (dangerfield 2008, 653-654). yet the subregion remains diversified in its attitude to the single european currency since the smaller states in east-central europe joined the euro-zone the others still refrain from this decision. similarly, east-central european members of the european union emphasise the need of the eu’s dialogue with its eastern neighbourhood yet the eastern policy of the states in the subregion reflects some differences and particularities. besides, the russian-georgian and the russian-ukrainian conflicts confirm the growing divergence of east-central european interests regarding both political, economic and security aspects of the regional (eu) and sub -regional relations with russia (kałan 2013, 1; marusiak 2015, 37-44; rácz 2014, 3-8). finally, even the european refugee crisis has so far been consulted more in the frames of the visegrad group, with the ad hoc participation of romania, bulgaria or other partners, than in the context of the single and coordinated east-central european response (groszkowski 2016). thus, the problems discussed above help to identify some more general tendencies that reveal in the east-central european cooperation and that impede this dialogue. among the disintegrating trends that could affect the further course of the east-central european sub-regional cooperation this article emphasises: the different historical heritage of the sub-region that had for a long time been a place of conflicting interests of the most powerful european empires (veselý 2013, 24-25). the communist period muted the historical differences, yet the diverse history of east-central europe 8 review of european and russian affairs 10 (1), 2016 may still determine the shape of the political relations in this part of europe (krno 2013, 118 119). for example, some countries of the sub-region, including poland and the baltic states, share a long and painful experience of the tsarist russia’s domination and their attitude towards contemporary russia may be different from those in south-eastern europe. some cultural differences among the states in the sub-region, despite their similarities. vera-karin brazova, piotr matczak and viktoria takacs refer in this context to the example of the visegrad group and point out that: “the large difference between the v4 countries is represented by the role of traditionalist values. especially in the c zech republic – in contrast with the other three of the v4 countries – the role of secular values is eminent. comparatively, the c zechs adhere to more self-expression values. this can be related to religiosity. it differs among the v4 countries, with poland having a high level of adherence to religion (mostly catholic) and the czech republic being one of the least religious countries. hungary and slovakia are in between the two” (brazova, matczak and takacs 2013, 11). the problem of the leadership in the sub-region. poland is unquestionably the biggest and potentially the most powerful among the post-communist states in east-central europe. it is confirmed by its size, the number of its inhabitants and the nominal gdp of this country that surpasses the gdp of each other partner at least twice. nevertheless, the quality of life (as illustrated by the hdi index) and the gdp per capita (ppp) of some other states in east-central europe (mainly slovenia and the czech republic) exceeds that in poland and makes the picture of the socio-economic relations in the sub-region more nuanced (undp 2013, 143). hence, even in the frames of the visegrad group neither czech republic nor hungary accepts the polish leadership. both states do not consider poland as powerful enough to lead the cooperation in east-central europe (dangerfield 2008, 635, 643; dangerfield 2014, 77-78). the permanent fragmentation of the cooperation in east-central europe. the focus on the visegrad group does not exhaust the potential of t he sub-regional dialogue as it leaves the voices of romania, bulgaria, post-yugoslav and baltic states unheard. nevertheless, the lack of the single platform of political consultations in east-central europe (as identified earlier) may contribute to growing differences in the perception of the sub-regional problems. the perspectives of romania and bulgaria (or croatia and slovenia) may considerably differ from that of latvia and estonia. the domination of the european union’s mechanisms of political consultations and articulation of interests after the accession of the states of east-central europe to the eu (lazar 2014, 28-29). in this pattern of political games, the regional cohesion and solidarity may be valuable in some specific cases. the east-central european pressure on the wealthiest states of the european union to keep the previous level of the eu’s financial support for the new members may be a good example (pastwa 2014, 84-85; jankowski and grzegrzółka 2014, 9-10). in general, however, the sense of belonging to any sub-region is not the main indication of the political cooperation in the european union. 9 review of european and russian affairs 10 (1), 2016 the growing difficulties with the cohesive east-central european responses to the fundamental problems of the european union and limited ability of the countries of the subregion to affect the future course of the eu reforms. the post-communist states in east-central europe do not belong to the group of the most powerful members of the european union. their support may be important in some political projects yet the political initiative in the eu more often belongs to germany or france than poland, romania or czech republic. as a result, a lack of the common proposals of divided and fragmented east-central europe may further reduce the political significance of the sub-region. the sensitivity of east-central europe to the pressure of the external powers, even for the most advanced visegrad group, and the fragility of the sub-regional consensus, even in the eastern policy of the european union. besides, as daina bleiere notes “a lack of resources and a competition for investments, as well as the attention of the major powers of the world, can weaken any sense of solidarity” (bleiere 1997, 18). thus, discussing the effectiveness of the sub-regional groups in europe cottey summarizes that “the impact of european sub-regionalism may not have been dramatic, but a balanced assessment suggests that it has been positive and not entirely insignificant” (cottey 2009, 20). this conclusion is right, especially in the context of the democratic transformation and the mitigation of the post-cold war divisions on the continent yet in the sub-regional cooperation in east-central europe the initial positive tendencies give way to more complex disintegrating impulses. the next part of the article will discuss the case of the visegrad group. it will examine whether the negative trends identified in the east-central european cooperation reveal in its most advanced sub-regional group. the disintegrating tendencies in the sub-regional cooperation in east-central europe – the case of the visegrad group established in 1991 as the informal platform of dialogue of poland, hungary and c zechoslovakia (then the c zech republic and slovakia) the visegrad group has become the most developed forum of cooperation in east-central europe. nevertheless, it is still the more flexible platform for consultations than the international organization, despite some recent attempts to strengthen its organizational capacities (brazova, matczak and takacs 2013, 14-15; dangerfield 2008, 645). rick fawn perfectly indicates in this regard that: “it is not an institution – although some outside observers mistakenly so claim; and although it possesses some attributes of an intergovernmental organization, such as regularized meetings at all levels of government, an annual highlevel summit, a rotating chairmanship with an annual set of goals, and so on, it has never created institutional rules that then force its members to juxtapose cooperation against (supposed) national priority.” (fawn 2010, 504). 10 review of european and russian affairs 10 (1), 2016 the initial aim of the visegrad group was to get experience of the regional dialogue after the fall of the soviet bloc and in the perspective of the accession to nato and the european union (dangerfield 2014, 72). its purpose was to convince the new partners in western europe that the countries of the group were credible candidates to join the integration institutions of the west. the slogans of the “return to europe” were crucial in this regard (strážay 2011 , 15-16) and milada a. vachudova rightly concludes that: “visegrad was first and foremost a triumph of marketing: the term “the visegrad group” became shorthand for the politically and economically most advanced, most “western” post-communist states” (vachudova 2005, 94). besides, the countries in the region suffered similar structural problems after the fall of the bipolar order, to include the heritage of the communist past in their social, political, and economic life. the challenges were common and the exchange of views on how to deal with them was reasonable (brazova, matczak and takacs 2013, 2). one of the crucial aspects in this regard was the withdrawal of the soviet/russian troops (strážay 2011, 16-17). after their 50years’ presence in the region, it was a symbolic confirmation of the end of the soviet domination in east-central europe. the factor of the external threat was fundamental to the effectiveness of the visegrad cooperation at its initial phase. hence, the perspective to join nato and the european union was not only the aim of the transformation, but also the escape from the “grey zone” of security between the falling ussr and the west. it was the case of the common protection against the threats that could emerge from unstable and unpredic table post-soviet area. finally, it was the prevention from potential russian attempts to re-establish its political and economic influence in the sub-region. nevertheless, the visegrad cooperation has from the very beginning faced some disintegrating tendencies that contributed to its declarative character and limited effectiveness. the visegrad dialogue declined together with the division of c zechoslovakia. slovakia met some problems with the liberal reforms while the c zech republic remained reluctant to coordinate its position with other states of the group (dangerfield 2008, 640; wolchik 2011, 207). the c zech foreign policy under the vaclav k laus premiership believed in the country’s advantage and its own capabilities on the path to the european integration (fawn 2010, 503; dangerfield 2008, 641642). thus, the c zech “(...) increase in self-confidence resulted in the conviction that visegrad co-operation could hold the c zech republic back (...)” (strážay 2011, 18-19). the political reality negatively verified the c zech aspirations, yet the returned tendency in the c zech foreign policy to believe in the country’s preponderance over its sub-regional partners became the defining feature of the visegrad cooperation for at least a decade. one of the successes of the visegrad group during the pre-accession period became the activity of the central european free trade area (cefta). established in 1992, it contributed to the liberalization of the visegrad markets (although with some problems in the agricultural goods) and increased the mutual visegrad trade (c ihelková and hnát 2006, 59). from the very beginning, however, c efta was a short or at best “medium-term” project of the candidate states aspiring to join the european union and its single market or as martin dangerfield concludes, “it 11 review of european and russian affairs 10 (1), 2016 was a creature of the eu accession process and always had a pre-determined lifespan and an inbuilt limit to its activities” (dangerfield 2006, 322). hence, it was clear that together with the accession to the european union the visegrad states would leave c efta and join the single european market. in 1998, together with the change of political coalitions in slovakia and the c zech republic, the visegrad group revived its activity. besides, the v4 cooperation has departed from its previous political and economic dimension (cefta) to include the new area of civic affairs (gniazdowski 2005, 82; fawn 2010, 504). the accession negotiations of the visegrad states with the european union were full of declarations of their cooperation. the tendencies to cooperate, however, were accompanied by the regional competition and individualistic approaches (dangerfield 2008, 635, 643; dangerfield 2014, 77-78). here, again, the c zech republic distanced itself from the polish structural problems with the agricultural sector or the obsolete industry. thus, the accession negotiations confirmed both a clash of the integrating and disintegrating impulses in the visegrad cooperation and the problems with the visegrad leadership. poland, as the biggest partner in the group, has not developed a concept of its effective leadership. it has not had an idea as to how the visegrad cooperation should work, or how to reach beyond its routine political consultations. on the other hand, neither c zech republic nor hungary has accepted the polish leadership in the sub-region. both states are too small to aspire to this leadership themselves yet both have not necessarily considered poland as powerful e nough to lead the social, political and economic processes in east-central europe (dangerfield 2008, 635, 643; dangerfield 2014, 77-78). the accession of the states from the visegrad group to the european union meant that their initial political goals were achieved. yet, the group confirmed in the kroměříž declaration of may 2004 its will to continue the visegrad cooperation. the aim of this new phase has been to coordinate the position of the visegrad states in the european union as well as strengthen the civil society dimension of the regional cooperation (strážay 2011, 18; fawn 2010, 505). one of the specific areas emphasised in the kroměříž declaration has been the focus on the relations with the eu’s partners in eastern europe and western balkans (dangerfield 2014, 79-83; lazar 2014, 29). nevertheless, as tomáš strážay indicates “(...) new priorities and goals were formulated very vaguely in the declaration. although a more precise list of priorities appeared soon in the guidelines of visegrad cooperation, the lack of an important goal comparable to that of eu accession was still apparent.” (strážay 2011, 23-24). in practice, the common visegrad attitude towards the european union’s activities has suffered serious problems and the limited effectiveness o f the v4 in the eu’s decision making mechanisms has strengthened the declarative character of the visegrad cooperation. the problems with the common visegrad position were revealed during the eu copenhagen summit in 2002, and during the negotiations on the new eu’s constitutional treaty (i.e., the lack of the czech, slovak and hungarian support for the polish proposals). the v4 attitude towards the us 12 review of european and russian affairs 10 (1), 2016 intervention in iraq was not fully cohesive either (dangerfield 2008, 647-648; wolchik 2011, 207-208; fawn 2010, 504). the visegrad four differed in their opinions on the lisbon treaty, the eu’s energy policy, to include some polish initiatives in this regard, or the interpretations of the russian-georgian conflict (lazar 2014, 30; strážay 2011, 24-25, 29-31, fawn 2013, 345). one of the few exceptions in this regard has been the visegrad cooperation around the v4 accession to the schengen zone and the visegrad unity in the protection of the economic interests of east-central europe during the european union’s budget debates (törő et al. 2014, 366, 371; dangerfield 2008, 653-654). the successful pressure on the wealthiest states of the eu, however, was the merit of all east-central european members of the community and not only the visagrad four. in the same vein, the visegrad group has launched a dialogue with the partners on the european union’s eastern neighbourhood, with a special focus on ukraine and western balkans (lazar 2014, 30; fawn 2010, 506). the visegrad states have considerably contributed to the eastern policy of the eu (to include the activity of the international visegrad fund) yet even this consensus did not eliminate the controversies and the elements of competition in the visegrad cooperation (gawrich and stepanov 2014, 13-14). as dariusz kałan indicates, “(...) each visegrad country also pursues its own eastern policy rooted in a historical and social background, particular economic and geopolitical interests as well as temporary political goals” (kałan 2013, 1). the most spectacular, however, has been the lack of visegrad unity in response to the russianukrainian conflict. the ukrainian crisis has revealed a deep divergence across the visegrad interests and growing difficulties with the common visegrad position on the european union’s policy towards moscow. the attitude of the visegrad four towards the russian federation has never been fully cohesive (dangerfield 2014, 85-86; kałan 2013, 3-6; marusiak 2015, 46). the visegrad states have differed in their opinions on the russian foreign policy and russia has usually remained outside the official visegrad agenda (dangerfield 2012, 966-969). nevertheless, despite its formal absence in the v4 agenda, the “russian factor” has acco mpanied both the visegrad efforts to join the euro-atlantic community and the visegrad cooperation with the post-soviet area. in the case of the russian-ukrainian conflict, however, it has lost its integration potential and joerg forbrig correctly indicates that the visegrad response to the ukrainian crisis has considerably departed from the stereotypical picture of east-central europe as consistent in its policy towards russia (forbrig 2015, 2). the initial visegrad unity and its strong support for ukraine, including the gas “reverse flow” to the ukrainian system (marusiak 2015, 37; forbrig 2015, 4) has given way to the growing difference of interests together with the progress of the russian-ukrainian conflict and the european union’s debates on the sanctions on russia (rácz 2014, 3; marusiak 2015, 38-42). the c zech republic, hungary and slovakia emphasised the need of good economic relations with moscow and feared the negative consequences of the eu sanctions on russia for their own economies (gniazdowski et al. 2014, foy and byrne 2015). all eu members finally supported 13 review of european and russian affairs 10 (1), 2016 the sanctions yet some visegrad states remain reluctant to their further extension (gniazdowski et al. 2014, byrne 2014). dariusz kałan rightly indicates that: “the crisis in eastern ukraine has not changed the czech republic, hungary and slovakia’s perception of their relations with russia, which continues to be defined primarily through economic and energy cooperation, rather than hard security. therefore, due to expected financial and political losses, these countries treat with much caution the eu’s idea to tighten sanctions against moscow” (kałan 2014, 1). indeed, the ukrainian crisis has revealed the scale of the east-central european energy dependence on russia two decades after the fa ll of the ussr (rácz 2014, 5). further, it has illustrated the lack of the visegrad political consistency in relations with russia (if we consider the hungarian bilateral contacts with moscow despite the eu’s sanctions). it has confirmed the growing diffe rences of the visegrad states’ perceptions of their fundamental security threats (gawrich and stepanov 2014, 15; marusiak 2015, 43). finally, andrás rácz indicates the clear domestic aspects of the visegrad response to the russian-ukrainian conflict and especially the debate between the political forces supporting the common eu’s position and those favouring good contacts with moscow (rácz 2014, 6). thus, the ukrainian crisis has further cemented the previous problems within the visegrad unity. even if some differences in the visegrad opinions on russia have been known before, the recent divergence of the visegrad interests has never been so deep. today it practically touches almost all aspects of the visegrad cooperation. besides, considering the significa nce of the eu-russian relations for the security of the continent, it seems that, in the long term, the difference of the visegrad states’ attitudes towards russia becomes more fundamental than the previous visegrad unity during the eu’s budget debates. it becomes more important than the recent visegrad rapprochement in the refugee crisis either. in fact, the more coordinated approach of the visegrad four towards the european refugee crisis (nolan, philipson and freeman, 2015) does not necessarily change the picture of their political disunity. the visegrad voice is important as it reflects the right of the east-central european members of the european union to express their independent view on the problem of refugees yet any claims about the visegrad solidarity in this regard seem premature. the refugee crisis still awaits more decisive solutions that may provoke further tensions in the eu. it may test the visegrad determination under the greater pressure of european leaders and the more assertive game of interests in the european union. the experience of the russian-ukrainian conflict casts doubt on any future visegrad unity. as a result, the visegrad group is the example of the advanced cooperation in east-central europe that, as rick fawn notes, has so far confirmed its “(...) remarkable survivability and transformational capacity” (fawn 2013, 348). positive opinions about the visegrad cooperation emphasise the value of the pre-accession contacts of the visegrad states, to include the experience of their economic cooperation in cefta. they also note the growing sense of community and mutual understanding among the visegrad societies and the successful civic dimension of the visegrad group (lazar 2014, 30; fawn 2013, 342). furthermore, some 14 review of european and russian affairs 10 (1), 2016 analyses indicate the value of the flexible formula of the visegrad cooperation and the absence of the predetermined catalogue of problems discussed within its frames. they point out the “soft” and à la carte character of the visegrad activities (lazar 2014, 40-41; dangerfield 2008, 657, 661; törő et al. 2014, 368). nevertheless, the visegrad group suffers from the same disintegrating tendencies as other sub regional groupings in east-central europe. first of all, it faces the question of the incommensurability of the visegrad cooperation with the european union as the dominant mechanism of the integration on the continent. the visegrad cooperation will not replace the eu. on the contrary, the emergence of the visegrad group was accompanied by the specific “pre accession” logic (c ihelková and hnát 2006, 53) and the eastern enlargement of the european union has illustrated clear difficulties of the visegrad states to identify their new strategic aims after accession. the visegrad group may contribute to some aspects of the sub -regional cooperation in east-central europe yet the previous experience of its cooperation, including the reaction to the russian-ukrainian conflict, confirm its limited ability to address the fundamental problems of the european union. together with the recent economic and institutional crisis of the eu this ability can only decrease and the domination of the disintegrating tendencies over the integrative impulses in the visegrad cooperation will increase. thus, following rick fawn’s suggestions, any ass essment of the visegrad cooperation should reflect “(...) an explicit match between expectations and capacities” (fawn 2013, 340). the visegrad group may still be a valuable platform of the sub-regional dialogue that strengthens the social and cultural ties among the visegrad societies (fawn 2013, 342). it may also try to keep its pressure on the wealthiest members of the european union during the eu’s budget debates (pastwa 2014, 84-85; dangerfield 2008, 632), and it may even achieve some tactical successes in the debate on the european refugee crisis. nevertheless, the scale of the problems facing the european union today may confront the visegrad group with the challenges that exceed its capacity for further unity and effective cooperation. the sub-regional cooperation in east-central europe – towards the new political configurations? the visegrad group has been the most advanced forum of consultations in east-central europe yet the sub-regional cooperation there is not reduced to poland, czech republic, slovakia and hungary. the sub-regional dialogue involves several other groups, including the central european initiative or the council of the baltic sea states (c ihelková and hnát 53 -58; dühr 3, 39-41). most of them, however, lack the “political ambitio ns” of the visegrad four and focus more on the practical aspects of trans-border cooperation. besides, the diversity and fragmentation of east-central europe has so far contributed to limited and occasional contacts among its different sub-regional groupings. 15 review of european and russian affairs 10 (1), 2016 indeed, daina bleiere’s analysis of the cooperation between the baltic states and the visegrad group in the 1990s notes a lack of stimulating forces and sufficient economic interests, but first of all the focus of both groups on their principal foreign policy aims: the integration with nato and the european union. further, the context of the integration brought about some elements of the baltic-visegrad competition, to include the baltic states’ efforts to attract the attention of the western powers (bleiere, 11-13, 17-18, 28-33). thus, bleiere emphasises that “historical experience shows that cooperation in central europe has most often been induced from the outside. all of the countries of the region need to modernize their economies, but they need some "anchor of modernization" that would facilitate this process. such an anchor is located outside the region (...)” (bleiere 27-28). the modernization impulses which are coming more from the process of the european integration than the sub-regional cooperation seem obvious in this regard. the eastern enlargement of the eu has not considerably changed the previous lack of dynamism in the baltic-visegrad cooperation, with some exceptions of the polish-baltic and especially polish-lithuanian bilateral contacts. in fact, the similar perceptions of the security risks, the polish participation in the baltic sea cooperation, and the borders with russia, more strongly encouraged the polish-baltic than the baltic-visegrad cooperation (sliwa and górnikiewicz 2013, 147-152; bleiere. 4-6, 30-31). yet even the potential of the polish-baltic dialogue was not fully exploited and the most spectacular polish-lithuanian projects, including the “energy bridge” (trubalska, 2014: 2-5), were motivated more by the geopolitical and security considerations than the idea of the sub-regional cooperation itself. thus, bleiere’s conclusion that the cooperation between the baltic and the visegrad states could intensify “(...) only if it is backed by simultaneous intensification of the relationship with the eu and nato itself” still provokes some reflections (bleyere, 30). nevertheless, “the russian factor”, the future course of the european union’s relations with moscow, and nato’s recent decisions about the strengthening of the alliance’s “eastern flank” may bring about some new ideas of the sub-regional dialogue. they may strengthen the polish relations with the baltic states and, at least from the polish perspective, co ntribute to the growing significance of romania and bulgaria as the valuable partners in the new sub -regional configurations. simultaneously the clear difference of opinions on russia between poland and other states of the visegrad group may encourage czec h republic, slovakia and hungary to search for new political partners in the sub-region. it may strengthen some previous suggestions of the c zech politicians and intellectuals about the country’s closer ties with austria (and germany) than poland or the ba ltic states (pehe 2004, fawn 2013, 341). it does not mean that the new coalitions of interests in east-central europe would automatically be more effective than the visegrad cooperation, yet it indicates a possibility of some new, alternative platforms of the sub-regional dialogue. in fact, the recent problems with the common visegrad approach towards russia encourage the czech republic, slovakia and austria to engage in a new sub-regional initiative called the 16 review of european and russian affairs 10 (1), 2016 slavkov triangle. the triangle warns against intensifying conflicts with moscow and emphasises the significance of the good economic cooperation with russia. this attitude reflects the interests of the participating states, but it clearly contradicts the political position of poland (kałan 2015, 1-2). the idea of the c zech, slovak and austrian cooperation is not new. jiří pehe claimed in 2004 that the inequality of power in the visegrad group and the growing divergence of interests between poland and its smaller members would contribute to the lack of the “common denominator” in the v4 cooperation. he emphasised that, “after poland’s accession to the eu, other visegrad countries will be more and more frequently confronted with polish stances that may not necessarily be in their interests (...)” (pehe 2004). thus, “it would be much more natural for the czech republic, hungary and slovakia to strive for a closer regional cooperation with austria and slovenia, the contours of which we can already see in some existing regional groupings” (pehe 2004). the visegrad group has discussed its expansion to include austria, slovenia, bulgaria or romania several times during the last two decades. yet the “visegrad four” did not decide on a formal enlargement. instead, they favoured the so-called v4 plus formula of ad hoc consultations with some other partners in the sub-region. there was no consensus in the visegrad group about the potential direction of its extension and, as tomáš strážay explains, the enlargement “(...) would complicate the process of decision-making, simply because there would be more opinions and interests to be taken into account” (strážay 2011, 34). this time, however, the idea of the czech and slovak dialogue with austria is a project of cooperation outside the visegrad frames. the contours of the triangle have not yet been finally defined, but it excludes poland and forms, at least potentially, the alternative to the visegrad group (kałan 2015, 1-2). thus, if the slavkov triangle emerges as a political reality it may reduce the readiness of the c zech republic and slovakia to engage in the visegrad format. it may deepen the declarative character of the visegrad cooperation as well. furthermore, the crisis in the european union’s relations with russia and the strengthening of nato’s “eastern flank” may encourage the new political contacts of poland and the baltic states as well as those of poland and romania. first of all, the anxiety of the neoimperial policy of russia creates a strong incentive for the polish-baltic relations, despite the previous declarative character of their partnership. both partners share similar negative assessment of the russian foreign policy towards east-central europe and postulate further strengthening of nato’s role in the sub-region. both expect nato’s military presenc e in their territory and remain suspicious of the new rapprochement between the western members of the european union and russia (sliwa and górnikiewicz 2013, 161-167). the decisions of the nato summit in warsaw in july 2016 are crucial in this regard (bla ir, 2016). the deployment of nato’s troops in poland and the baltic states, including the planned participation of the polish soldiers in nato’s multinational battle group in latvia (palowski 2016), seems an obvious invitation for both the polish-baltic military cooperation and political consultations. besides, it solves the problem of the lack of the military potential of the baltic 17 review of european and russian affairs 10 (1), 2016 partners that has so far made the polish-baltic military cooperation difficult. operating in the multinational nato’s units polish and baltic soldiers could effectively exercise their interoperability and practical cooperation. finally, nato’s presence in the baltic sea area strengthens the question of the russian kaliningrad oblast that borders both poland and lithuania. it may further shift the polish attention to the baltic cooperation and weaken the sub regional dialogue in the visegrad formula, especially if the previous differences in the visegrad position on russia deepen. yet, the transformation of the similar polish-baltic security concerns into the practical cooperation may face some impediments, despite the clear incentives after the nato warsaw summit. poland has so far not been the main political partner of the baltic republics and the latter favoured their economic and political ties with the nordic states (opitz 2015, 2-4). second, the polish-lithuanian tensions around the polish minority, unresolved for the last two decades, could not contribute to this new partnership as well. finally, the community of t he security interests between poland and the baltic states does not easily translate into the similarity of opinions on the structural problems of european integration and the potential of the polish-baltic cooperation in the european union still lags behind that of the baltic-nordic dialogue (dudzińska 2013, 4-5, sliwa and górnikiewicz 2013, 157-161). in the same vein, nato’s warsaw summit may encourage more dynamic contacts of poland and romania (as well as poland and bulgaria), despite nato’s limited support for the romanian postulates to increase the alliance’s presence on the back sea area (szymański and dąborowski, 2016). herein, the russian factor does not play the same crucial role as it does in the polish-baltic cooperation yet the strengthening of the nato’s eastern flank may contribute to the polish-romanian (and the polish-bulgarian) political and military relations. the planned participation of the polish military aircrafts in nato’s air policing mission to romania and bulgaria, and the possible presence of romanian troops in nato’s battle group deployed in poland, seem important in this context (szymański and dąborowski, 2016). nevertheless, polish-romanian relations are an example of the potential of cooperation that has so far not been converted into practical outcomes. poland and romania are the biggest and the most populous states in east-central europe. both have become the main us political partners in the sub-region and both strive for a stronger nato’s military presence in east-central europe (balcer 2014). their practical cooperation, however, has so far not gone beyond the occasional political consultations. further, the isolation of romania during the communist period and the initial romanian (and bulgarian) problems with the liberal tra nsformation (vachudova 2005, 3739) meant that poland and romania, close allies during the interwar period, do not practically know each other today. 18 review of european and russian affairs 10 (1), 2016 finally, both states do not share the common border and both focus on slightly different areas in the sub-region. for poland, the baltic sea is the political priority while for romania the black sea is the natural area of interest. this may not necessarily be the obstacle for the future polishromanian cooperation yet the more dynamic development of the polish-baltic dialogue seems a bit more likely scenario than the polish-romanian (and the polish-bulgarian) partnership. conclusion east-central europe has actively joined the new wave of regionalism after the fall of the bipolar order. the dynamic transformation in this part of europe has confirmed the multifaceted character of this process and illustrates that any serious analysis of the regional affairs must reach beyond the purely economical and institutional perspective. besides, regional studies cannot be contained in the confines of a single theory and the dialogue between different theoretical approaches better reflects the complex character of contemporary regionalism. furthermore, the cooperation of the former communist states in east-central europe has become the core of the sub-regional processes in europe that enrich european integration. the subregional cooperation is a stable and valuable element of the political, social and economic landscape of contemporary europe. nevertheless, the sub-regional dialogue in east-central europe has from the very beginning been accompanied by the structural problems as well as the clash of the integrating and the disintegrating tendencies. at the initial stage, the aspirations of the states in the sub -region to join nato and the european union, and the progress of their liberal reforms, strengthened the positive impulses. yet the east-central european states have not been able to develop a single platform of cooperation and the sub-regional dialogue remains fragmented. besides, the experience of the previous communist period could no longer serve as the unifying factor and the fall of the bipolar order revealed the difference of interests across the sub-region. the eastern enlargement of nato and the european union marked a fundamental change in the post-cold war history of east-central europe. in many cases, however, the enlargement has confirmed the specific “pre-accession” character of the sub-regional cooperation and strengthened its previous destructing tendencies. it has shifted the core of the decisions important for the sub-region to brussels. the east-central european states declared the will to coordinate their positions in the eu’s decision making mechanisms yet the practical results of this coordination has been limited. they have been able to defend the economic interests of the sub region during the eu’s budget debates yet their attitudes to the most fundamental problems of the eu have differed. besides, the recent institutional and economic crisis in the european union and the problems with the eu-russian relations strengthen the previous difficulties in the subregional dialogue. the visegrad group is no exception in this regard. it has been the most advanced group in the sub-regional cooperation yet it faces the same negative tendencies as other sub-regional 19 review of european and russian affairs 10 (1), 2016 groupings in east-central europe. the visegrad states have not been able to coordinate their attitudes towards the main reforms of the european union and the ukrainian crisis illustrates the deep divergence of the visegrad interests both in the bilateral relations with russia and the eu’s cooperation with moscow. as petr robejšek notes the visegrad group has never recovered from the “excessive romanticism” and “(...) remains an unacceptable balance between vision and illusion” (robejšek 2001, 10). the visegrad cooperation has gradually been losing its dynamics and the recent revival of the visegrad unity in the european refugee crisis does not change this picture. instead, the idea of the slavkov triangle reveals a threat of the marginalization of the visegrad dialogue. milada anna vachudova warns against the split among the states in the sub-region on the “cosmopolitan central europe”, which is more dynamic in international affairs and engaged in european integration, and the “provincial central europe”, that is more sceptical towards the future of the eu and less active within the international forum (vachudova 2001, 13-14). further, the recent russian-ukrainian conflict and nato’s decisions about the strengthening of its “eastern flank” may contribute to some new political configurations in the sub -regional cooperation, mainly the polish-baltic rapprochement in the security affairs and, less likely, the dialogue between poland and romania (or poland and bulgaria). thus, the future course of the sub-regional cooperation in east-central europe still depends on the partners’ determination to participate in this process (marušiak 2013, 12) and there are still some arguments in favour of the sub-regional dialogue, especially to reduce its “ambitions” to the areas of civic society or trans-border cooperation. yet the experience of the last two decades confirms the main thesis of the article that the disintegrating tendencies in the sub-regional cooperation in east-central european outweigh its integrating impulses. references balcer, adam. “the ukrainian policy of poland and romania, ” aspen review , no.3, (2014): 1-3. 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associated research unit, the centre for european studies. rera aims to provide an accessible forum for research, to promote high standards of research and scholarship, and to foster communication among young scholars. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada tel: +01 613 520-2600 ext. 3117; e-mail: rera-journal@carleton.ca creative commons license creativecommons.org/licenses/by-ncnd/3.0 this working paper is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial no derivs 3.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 3.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, provided the source is acknowledged. no use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes. issn: 1718-4835 © 2016 the author(s) https://journals.carleton.ca/rera/index.php/rera mailto:rera-journal@carleton.ca http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ why reforms fail: the role of ideas, interests and institutions review of european and russian affairs 9 (2), 2015 issn 1718-4835 boarding the euro plane: euro adoption in the czech republic and slovakia assem dandashly maastricht university and amy verdun university of victoria abstract what explains euro adoption strategies in the czech republic and slovakia? how have each of these two countries performed under the regime they joined (czech republic: flexible exchange rates; slovakia: in the euro area)? how has that experience affected czech and slovak policies towards euro adoption and their performance during the euro crisis? this paper asks these questions and seeks to give an answer to the question of why slovakia adopted the euro while the czech republic did not. we address these questions by taking an eclectic approach that draws on constructivism, domestic politics, and political economy. the paper examines five explanations based on these theoretical approaches: the inferiority-superiority factor; european identity and the “return” to europe; the symbolic factor of the currency; euroskepticism; and economic structure and trade relations. we find that each of the five explanations enriches our insight into these matters. but if forced to choose, we find that an explanation drawn on a domestic politics approach contributes the most to our overall understanding of euro adoption policies in the two cases. 2 review of european and russian affairs 9 (2), 2015 introduction following the velvet divorce of january 1, 1993, czechoslovakia was separated into two sovereign countries: the czech republic and slovakia. the velvet divorce served as a critical juncture that influenced institutional development in the czech republic and slovakia for the two decades that followed. regardless of the different reform tracks both countries took, they managed to meet the acquis communautaire and be amongst the eight central and east european countries (ceecs) to join the european union (eu) on may 1, 2004. in so doing, they committed to adopting the euro sometime in the future, that is, once they met the convergence criteria. until that time, they would remain member states with a derogation.1 slovakia, the smaller of the two, adopted the euro on january 1, 2009. the czech republic meets many of the convergence criteria, but has not taken serious strides towards adopting the euro. the questions this paper seeks to answer are: why is it that two countries, which used to be one, ended up having very different policies regarding euro adoption? why did slovakia adopt the euro while the czech republic did not? how has each country coped with the financial crisis, given their policy choices? in order to join the euro, countries need to meet the so-called “convergence criteria.”2 however, these criteria can be best met if institutions are adapted to them and if domestic politics are conducive to making major political, institutional, and economic changes. the bulk of this paper seeks to explain euro adoption strategies in the czech republic and slovakia up to 2010. the second part of the paper examines how each country performed under the regime they joined (czech republic: flexible exchange rates; slovakia: in the euro area) and examines how that experience affected czech and slovak policies towards euro adoption and their performance during the euro crisis.3 the paper moves beyond an economic cost-benefit analysis, since it cannot give a full picture regarding the decisions on euro adoption in both countries. moreover, for an open, small, export-based economy with a small domestic market, as is the case with both the czech republic and slovakia, some would argue that it would be in the economic interest of these countries to join the euro area as soon as possible. indeed, the national bank of slovakia and slovak economists believed the advantages of euro adoption would outweigh the costs (personal interview by the authors with an official from the national bank of slovakia, bratislava, november 23, 2009). while the economic explanation might be able to shed some light on the euro adoption strategy in the case of slovakia, it cannot tell us much about the czech case, because in that country, there was not the same push for euro adoption. to answer the main research questions, the paper examines five possible explanations. three of these are loosely based on constructivism and symbolism: (1) the inferiority-superiority factor; (2) european identity and the “return” to europe; and (3) the symbolic factor of the currency. the fourth is derived from a domestic politics approach: (4) the role of national elites and euroskepticism. the fifth explanation builds on the political economy literature: (5) economic structure and trade relations. the paper discusses these explanations: first, in order to understand 1 article 4 of the treaty of accession stipulates that “each of the new member states shall participate in economic and monetary union from the date of accession as a member state with a derogation within the meaning of article 122 of the ec treaty,” official journal of the european union, 2003; see also article 140 of the treaty on the functioning of the european union (tfeu). 2 these criteria refer to inflation and interest rates, budgetary deficit and public debt, and the independence of the central bank; see article 126 tfeu and protocol 13 tfeu (and footnote 4 below for more details). 3 this paper is based on elite face-to-face interviews held during 2009 in the czech republic and slovakia. 3 review of european and russian affairs 9 (2), 2015 the euro adoption outcome in both countries; second, to analyze the performance of both countries during the euro crisis; and third, to highlight which of the five explanations can help us best understand the euro adoption policies in both countries. although we find that we can learn something from each of the five explanations, we find the fourth explanation, the one based on a domestic politics approach, to be the most helpful in understanding euro adoption strategies. the next section lays down the analytical framework of the paper. the paper will then analyze the various possible explanations regarding euro adoption in the czech republic and slovakia and discuss the effects of the euro crisis. we conclude by highlighting the main findings, including a brief discussion of what theoretical perspective best explains the results. framework for the analysis and hypotheses slovakia’s road towards the eu was not easy, given its historically underprivileged situation while part of the former czechoslovakia, and even later, during prime minister vladimír mečiar’s term in office. this disadvantaged position pushed slovakia to be among the last countries (from the group that joined in may 2004) to sign the accession agreement. following that, slovakia managed to move quickly through the reform process, joining the eu and also the euro area soon after. drawing on constructivism, a domestic politics approach, and political economy literature, we seek to obtain a better understanding as to why slovakia joined the euro area while the czech republic did not. european identity and symbolism issues of identity, the role of ideas, and the usage of money as a symbol have often been ignored by political scientists studying euro accession strategies (exceptions are dyson 2007; johnson 2008). constructivists emphasize how ideas and identities are created, how they evolve, and how they shape the way states interpret and react to their situation. since the introduction of the euro and the expansion of the euro area eastwards, ideas and identities have been influencing the attitudes of euro area citizens and the way they identify themselves in european or national terms (walt 1998; risse 2003). since the end of the cold war, the europeanization process has affected decisions and politics of all new member states (nms). various scholars point to a fast trend of institutional development that has been going on due not only to eu incentives, but also to a social learning process (see checkel 2001; schimmelfennig and sedelmeier 2004, 2005). the effect of social learning and incentives can change due to issue area, time, and different circumstances. it became easier to evaluate these factors especially after may 1, 2004, when the nms joined the eu. central banks are among the institutions that underwent changes and institutional developments and were affected by this trend. among the main beliefs transferred to ceecs is the importance of “protecting price stability” and of central bank independence in the transformation process, both of which are considered “key to economic development in democratic states” (johnson 2006, 363). despite the importance of this social learning process that was taking place, involving international players and creating some epistemic communities (haas 1992; verdun 1999), this argument may not be able to explain the whole story. domestic circumstances must be conducive to the changes that will accompany such a development. this situation was not the case all the time, as, in several 4 review of european and russian affairs 9 (2), 2015 instances, these ideas faced confrontation and resistance. let us now turn to the domestic politics approach. domestic politics to understand decision-making strategies, one has to emphasize the importance of the domestic environment, the structure and activities of the state, and its institutions (huelshoff 1994). electoral cycles, domestic institutions and formations, opposition, and the public are just a few environmental factors that affect government decisions and their agendas. a domestic politics approach (inter alia bulmer 1983; huelshoff 1994; ladrech 1994; elster, offe, and preuß 1998; verdun 2000; heipertz and verdun 2010; dandashly 2015; dandashly and verdun 2016) informs us why a government chooses one policy over another and is best able to explain the specific timing of policies. elites’ preferences and choices affect the outcome of the policy. scholars who adopt a domestic politics approach emphasize the importance of various domestic actors, as well as that of institutions at the national level, since they influence the positions of the governments (dandashly 2015). the institutional, political, economic, and public readiness to adopt the euro is highly dependent on the elites’ decisions and the existence of veto points, such as constitutional amendments that require agreement between various parties or presidential veto (dandashly and verdun 2016). furthermore, the government’s ideology and choices affect the central bank’s policies and personnel, e.g., appointing euroskeptic members to the national central bank’s monetary council. thus, policies that favour euro adoption depend on an absence of veto points and the presence of a euro-enthusiastic government that can implement sound economic policies that would allow the country to meet the convergence criteria and adopt the euro. these domestic factors do not operate in isolation from international economic factors. for instance, the eu could impose sanctions on member states if excessive deficits exist.4 the global financial crisis of 2008-2009 showed that international events may have an important influence on the calculation of the costs and benefits associated with being part of the euro area. however, these effects can differ based on the political and economic situation of the country. political economy there is a wealth of studies within the political economy literature that examines macroeconomic choices such as exchange rate regimes. this literature focuses on the degree of development, openness of the economy (share of trade to gross domestic product [gdp]), and whether its business cycle is in sync with its major trading partners. scholars such as bernhard and leblang (1999), clark (2002), hallerberg (2012), and keefer and stasavage (2002) focus on domestic factors to explain the choice of exchange rate regime. for instance, this literature suggests that a choice for any given exchange rate regime may be influenced by either “policy demanders” (interest groups and voters, e.g., frieden 2002) or “policy suppliers” (political parties, legislatures 4 as per the convergence criteria, eu member states are not allowed to breach the 3 percent reference value regarding their deficit except: (a) if the percentage of deficit to the gdp has been corrected and has come close to the reference value; and (b) if the violation of the deficit criteria is only temporary and due to exceptional circumstances. in case the percentage of public debt to gdp exceeds the 60 percent reference, then the debt of this country will be considered excessive (and in violation) unless the debt is improving and coming close to the reference value (consolidated versions of the treaty on european union and the treaty on the functioning of the european union [henceforth ‘consolidated treaties’] article 126: paragraph 2) (ex article 104 of the treaty establishing the european community [tec]; see official journal of the european union c321 2007 and official journal of the european union c 83 2010). 5 review of european and russian affairs 9 (2), 2015 and bureaucracies, e.g., bernhard, broz, and clark 2002). when examining the specific context of the eu, this literature often focuses on whether it is economically feasible for a country to give up the exchange rate instrument as an adjustment tool (buiter 2000; de grauwe and schnable 2005; lipschutz, lane, and mourmouras 2005; schadler 2005; eichengreen 2012). hypotheses and explanatory variables from the aforementioned approaches, we deduce five possible explanations regarding euro adoption outcome and performance during the euro crisis: first, the inferiority-superiority factor: the two parts of czechoslovakia had different levels of development. being less advanced and underdeveloped during communist rule and during the early 1990s created a sense of inferiority within slovakia. joining the euro while the czech republic did not would send a clear message to the czechs and other eu countries that the supposedly last would be among the first newcomers to the euro area. as a partner in an important policy area, it was thought that being part of the euro area would give slovakia a more influential role within the eu, and greater influence over member states that were not part of the euro area. therefore, slovakia sought to adopt the euro to overcome an inferiority complex, while the czech republic did not share this concern. in fact, in the czech case, the predominant feeling among elites was that the country was advanced enough to adopt policies based on national choices independent of what others might think it “ought” to do. h1: the feeling of inferiority pushed the slovaks to adopt the euro faster than the czechs. second, european identity: the sense of european identity might have pushed the newly established countries to join the eu and rush to adopt the euro. following independence, the image of slovakia, as held by non-slovaks, was that it was not europe-oriented. this was especially the case during the mid-1990s, when, under prime minister mečiar, economic and political reforms slowed down while limitations to the freedoms and civil liberties increased. thus, for slovaks, it was important to join not only the eu, but also the euro area, and strengthen the status and influence of slovakia at the eu level. eu membership and participation in the euro area gave slovakia a stronger sense of european identity that was missing when it was still part of czechoslovakia. following the constructivist literature, one could examine whether euro adoption was part of a “return to europe” strategy. in this case, the euro adoption strategy could be seen as creating a stronger sense of belonging to europe. h2: since the euro could be taken as a sense of european identity, the higher the need for a sense of belonging to europe, the more probable that the country will adopt the euro. third, the symbolic factor: the sentimental feeling regarding losing the slovak koruna (in favour of the euro) was not significant, since it was a new currency that existed only briefly after independence. there is some literature that suggests new currencies can be an expression of national identity, and therefore, countries that are in search of identity will not easily give up their currency. this literature further suggests that a young currency is not a fully anchored symbol or token of national identity (gilbert and helleiner 1999; helleiner 2003). following this logic, it was less of a problem to accept the euro in slovakia because the slovak koruna was not seen as a currency important enough to salvage. in contrast, the czech republic retained the koruna that had been circulating during czechoslovakian times (october 1918 january 1993). thus, one could argue that the czechs might be more attached to their national currency because it had a 6 review of european and russian affairs 9 (2), 2015 longer legacy. h3: the lower the attachment to one’s own currency, the higher the probability that a country will join a currency union. fourth, euroskepticism: there are different degrees of euroskepticism and euro-enthusiasm within the czech republic and slovakia. one might be able to trace the underlying reasons to the reform path: the political, economic, and institutional reforms undertaken by both countries might have led to different outcomes. the highly euroskeptic attitude within the czech republic – reflecting the former czech president’s euroskepticism for many years – could have affected the country’s attitude towards the euro and caused the czech republic to stay outside the euro area, while slovakia joined. the degree of euroskepticism in the czech republic and the lack of that same euroskepticism in slovakia (post mečiar) can explain their differing policies towards euro adoption. h4: the higher the degree of euroskepticism, the less likely it is that a country will adopt the euro. fifth, economic structure and trade relations: the economic structure and trade relations in slovakia – especially the automobile industry – with germany, accompanied by the perceived economic benefits, contributed to slovakia’s speedier euro adoption strategy. the czech republic did not have this same push from its euro area trading partners. the diversity of the czech economy in comparison to the slovak one (the latter being more dependent than the czech republic on the automobile industry) affected the clout of the automobile industry lobby in pushing for euro adoption. therefore, slovakia’s trade relations with germany and other partners, compared to that of the czech republic, put slovakia in a position that was more favourable to euro adoption policies. h5: the urgency for euro adoption increases if the economic structure of the country is heavily dependent on one industry that, in turn, is in sync with the euro area. these are the five explanations we are examining in this paper. let us now turn to them one at a time. the inferiority-superiority hypothesis – does it hold? even prior to communism, before the creation of czechoslovakia following the end of the first world war, the czechs were the more dominant group of the two. the slovaks had little influence on the form and functioning of the newly established state at that time (goldman 1999, 3). the situation did not change with communism, with which the economic inequality and gap between the advanced czech and less privileged slovak lands continued. prior to the velvet divorce, the czech part of former czechoslovakia was more technologically and economically advanced and politically dominant. following the separation, slovakia inherited this underprivileged situation, yet managed to develop its economy, meet the convergence criteria, and adopt the euro. can this commitment be explained by feelings of inferiority that pushed the slovaks to outperform the czech republic’s development and progress? the road to the eu, and later to economic and monetary union (emu), was not smooth, and joining the eu was considered an historic moment for slovakia.5 the steps that slovakia took moved it ahead of other nms – including the czech republic – that were considered more 5 for hundreds of years, slovakia had been a subordinate part of hungary – and later czechoslovakia. it did not have its own state except during the second world war under the leadership of jozef tiso, who was a strong ally of nazi germany at the time. 7 review of european and russian affairs 9 (2), 2015 advanced and superior. with european integration, it moved forward and became among the pacesetters – “[it] makes slovaks proud” (personal interview by the authors with an official from the national bank of slovakia, bratislava, november 24, 2009). many politicians and the public considered adopting the euro in slovakia a worthy goal (with 55 percent in 2006 and 2007 in favour of replacing their currency with the euro) (european commission 2008). for many, adopting the euro was the next rational step after accession to further integration. the fear from the past in which slovakia was left behind and did not have its own voice created large public and political support to adopt the euro (personal interview by the authors with a former official from the national bank of slovakia, bratislava, november 23, 2009). furthermore, for centuries, slovakia lived on the periphery of international movements, including the austro-hungarian monarchy (1867-1918), in which the slovaks were a minority, and then in czechoslovakia (1918-1993), where slovakia was the smaller of the two nations. the country is now independent, but it did not start successfully from the point of view of the international community, which did not trust earlier governments that were not considered to be euor western-oriented. now, there is satisfaction in slovakia that they are “among the first class in europe”; have the same privileges as germany, france, etc.; share the same currency as those countries; and were faster than others such as czechs, hungarians, and poles to adopt the euro and thus join an area that contained the major eu countries (personal interview by the authors with an official from the national bank of slovakia, bratislava, november 24, 2009). this view is also supported by that of the vice governor of the national bank of slovakia, martin burto, who on the record states that “it was a big psychological boost for this country that we were in the euro ahead of the czechs and the hungarians” (the new york times july 3, 2009). the psychological factor played an important role in pushing the slovaks towards the euro and integrating further, as it gave them satisfaction that “the last can be first.” they were pleased to be sitting alongside germany, france, and others not only in the various eu meetings, but also in emu meetings and meetings of the european central bank (ecb), having an equal vote in the process. european identity and the return to europe while there is a high level of consensus within the academic literature that joining the eu marked a critical moment that brought nms “back to europe,” from the point of view of the nms, things are perceived differently. perhaps surprisingly, many do not agree with the depiction of eu accession as relevant. in fact, when it comes to euro adoption, it is even less significant. for slovakia, for example, during the interviews conducted by the authors, most interviewees signalled that the slogan “return to europe” does not make much sense, as they have always been a part of europe, so there is “nowhere to return to” (personal interviews by the authors with an official from the national bank of slovakia, bratislava, november 23, 2009 and with officials from the ministry of finance, bratislava, november 26, 2009). one official argued that maybe slovakia was isolated from benefiting from europe, but never left europe. it was mainly a return institutionally back to europe. the slogan “return to europe” is rather a politically empty one, does not hold solid ground, and does not reflect the reality as “we always felt european” (personal interview by the authors with an official at the national bank of slovakia, november 24, 2009). indeed, slovaks are among the five member states that identify most with europe. in 2009, 44 percent and in 2010, 45 percent 8 review of european and russian affairs 9 (2), 2015 of slovaks surveyed reported they felt both slovak and european (european commission 2009, 2010a). in 2013, 76 percent of slovaks indicated that they felt they were eu citizens (european commission 2013a). while czech accession to the eu was a sign of returning to europe, euro adoption did not have that same connotation, although some even added that “we always have been in europe and never left” (personal interviews by the authors with officials from the czech national bank [cnb] and ministry of finance [mof], prague, june 2009). in an interview by die zeit (2003), czech president klaus answered a question regarding eu accession by saying that the czech republic did not have a choice, since the czech republic has been and will always be part of europe. “today, one cannot exist without eu membership in europe. this is a marriage of reason, not of love. for a central european country which is not located on an island or on the edge of europe, it is simply impossible not to join the eu” (die zeit april 17, 2003). in history, czechs have always been within “the german zone of influence,” so interviewees stressed: “why pretend now other than that the eu accession marks a return to europe?” the relevance of euro symbolism and that of the image of a “return to europe” are not that significant (personal interview with an official from the cnb, prague, june 2009). czech interview partners pointed out that the czech republic (and even slovakia) has always belonged to europe, as it was at the crossroads between the east and the west, and czechs disliked being labeled eastern europeans, since it is a central european country (brodský 2003-2004, 10; see also holý 1996). for czechs, the “return to europe” slogan is mainly returning to a europe that they always believed they were a part of and never felt distanced or separated from due to the shared culture and history (brodský 2003-2004, 10). interestingly, the czechs felt that adopting the euro would cause some loss of national identity (70 percent agree; 29 percent disagree [european commission 2014a, 8889], which is higher than in any other member state that had not yet adopted the euro). in both the czech and slovak cases, the notion of a “european identity” and “return to europe” were not that significant to euro adoption or eu accession in that the interviewees supported the argument that the perception among elites and the public at large in both countries is that they have always been a part of europe, even during the cold war. symbolism and attachment to the currency according to various officials that were interviewed in bratislava in the last week of november 2009, slovaks did not really care about what the currency would look like, or what its name would be, since they argued that these matters do not affect their wealth. interview partners argued that slovaks did not connect much with their national currency until late 2009; they claim not to identify with it. rather, in the eyes of various officials, slovaks are perceived to care more about how much money they make and how much they can buy with it, rather than the symbolism around retaining a national slovak currency. however, citizens who travel more would have a stronger feeling of european belonging by having the euro. yet, this group is relatively small in comparison to the number of slovaks who have never left their country or who have only visited neighbouring countries such as the czech republic or hungary. the local currency does not really affect the way slovaks feel about being european (personal interview by the authors with an official from the national bank of slovakia, november 23, 2009). as mentioned above, eurobarometer data 9 review of european and russian affairs 9 (2), 2015 supports this argument. the percentage change of citizens who feel more european because of the euro in slovakia was 26 percent in 2010 and 22 percent in 2014, compared to 73 and 75 percent (in 2010 and 2014 respectively) who felt no change at all (european commission 2010b, 2014b). moreover, with the euro crisis and the economic difficulties faced by slovakia, the nationalist sentiments are increasing at the expense of the european identity. similar to slovaks, most czechs tend to think about euro adoption in economic terms. close to ninety percent of the population thought about the costs and benefits of adopting the euro with respect to their salaries, pensions, and personal accounts as having priority over other issues. in other words, how much individuals can purchase with their salaries takes precedence over other concerns. one important difference with slovakia is that, in the czech republic, around 67 and 61 percent of the population, in 2009 and 2010 respectively, thought that using the euro would make people feel more european (european commission 2009, 2010a). however this percentage decreased in recent years to 30 percent and 34 percent in 2013 and 2014 respectively (european commission 2013b, 2014a). at the same time, czech citizens did not consider euro adoption a significant issue; it was not seen as a priority or cause of stability (personal interviews by the authors with officials from the mof, prague, june 2009). compared to other nms, the czech republic is the most euroskeptic country of all those that joined the eu in the 2000s. eurobarometer data for 2009 shows that 54 percent of the population was dissatisfied with the fact that the euro would replace their currency at some point, while only 37 percent was content with this prospect. with the euro crisis, the percentage of czech citizens against adopting the euro reached 77 percent in 2014 (european commission 2014a). czechs “like their currency,” which has been strong and dates back to the 1920s (personal interview by the authors with an official from the cnb, prague, june 2009). even during communism, czechoslovakia had a stable, strong currency in comparison with other communist countries. czechs are “very pragmatic. they have a preference for a stable currency. but as such, the euro has nothing positive. maybe they use it for travelling, but [it would] not really [be] associated with the issue of being more european or closer to the eu, if they had the euro as their currency” (personal interview by the authors with an official from the cnb, prague, june 2009). thus, the symbolic effect of the euro is absent in the czech case (personal interview by the authors with officials at cnb and mof, prague, june 2009). the czechs are proud of the koruna and czech sovereignty (personal interview by the authors with key informant from euro team, prague, june 2009). the czech republic has had a strong koruna, and given the problems of the euro (weakened after its launch) and subsequently the sovereign debt crisis, the value of the national symbol of the czech koruna has increased. the flipside of the coin is that it lowered local trust in the eu institutions to 37 percent in 2012 and increased fears that the crisis would negatively affect the czech republic’s automobile industry (euobserver january 25, 2013). this situation makes it harder for people to accept another currency and has strengthened the euroskeptic view that was fostered by then-czech president václav klaus. institutional, political, and economic reforms most of the literature dealing with europeanization in the nms focuses on institutional effects. our focus is on the influence of the central bank and some important reforms taken by consecutive 10 review of european and russian affairs 9 (2), 2015 czech governments. the continuous europeanization process and entry of nms countries to the eu affected the existing parties’ ideology, party system, and domestic politics (see baun, dürr, marek, and šaradin 2006). this process also served to create a suitable environment for adopting the german model of independent central banks. many eu and international financial institutions, such as the deutsche bundesbank, bank of england, international monetary fund (imf), world bank, federal reserves, and the bank for international settlements (bis), implemented many programs (such as phare) to help nms countries adopt the necessary political, economic, and institutional reforms to join the eu and later adopt the euro. these western institutions provided the necessary training to a large number of personnel in the central banks, including the cnb and the national bank of slovakia (nbs), leading to a social learning process and transfer of “ideologies, practices, and internal organizational frameworks” (johnson 2003, 3; see also johnson 2006, 2008). while eu support to the central and east european countries (ceecs) was significant prior to the accession period, the european commission did not offer significant political, financial, and economic support for countries seeking to meet the convergence criteria. however, once a member state met the criteria, the commission provided know-how, twinning, and best practices to assist in the transition period (personal interview by the authors with an official of the ministry of finance, czech republic, prague, june 2009). i. the czech case in the case of the czech republic, the eu and other international institutions provided the necessary training and guidance, technical assistance, and development to move the czech institutions and their employees away from the communist era. this support enabled them to play an important role in the country’s economic liberalization process. experts from eu member states were also involved in the training process in order to “familiarize bureaucrats in the czech republic […] with eu policy compliance,” which resulted in the extensive diffusion “of eu practices in the czech financial and banking sector” (vliegenthart and horn 2007, 148). among the reforms implemented was the creation of an independent central bank in 1993. this development was unpopular amongst politicians and led to strained relations between the government and the cnb – particularly between 1997 and 2005, when the cnb board and czech government had different views regarding macroeconomic policies and euro adoption (see dandashly and verdun 2016). the transfer of ideas, technical assistance, and socialization created a culture of privatization, which aimed to transform the economy into a properly functioning market economy. however, privatization processes were not accompanied by “a regulatory framework to keep these development[s] in check” (vliegenthart and horn 2007, 142). the absence of this critical institutional reform is worth noting. consequently, corruption was still present within the banking system, which did not follow suit regarding privatization, and ties between government officials and state-controlled banks were not severed. all these developments led to an unstable currency, economic recession, and market failure in 1997. this situation pushed the organization of economic cooperation and development (oecd) to state that one of the building blocks of good governance and economic performance in the czech republic is the privatization of the stateowned banks (oecd 2000, 79). moreover, there were a variety of eu programs – such as the phare program – that provided institutions and administrations in the czech republic and poland, such as the mof and cnb, with technical assistance. eu programming also sought to help move 11 review of european and russian affairs 9 (2), 2015 the czech republic to a new market economy similar to its fellow western eu countries, and to implement the eu acquis communautaire (ibid., 146-148). another important factor was the democratic system that emerged after the fall of communism in 1989. the czech republic’s new democratic system of governance gave the president significant powers. the two term presidencies of václav klaus (2003-2013) further strengthened the role of the president. in the czech case, the role of euroskeptic president klaus is of particular importance to the extent that “it is not too much of an exaggeration to claim that ideological[ly-]based politics in the czech republic is largely shaped by politicians’ and voters’ reactions to the klausite vision” (haughton 2009, 1383). his euroskepticism is derived from “an ‘anglo-saxon’ neo-liberal economic critique of the eu as an inefficient, over-regulated and ‘socialist’ structure dominated by self-seeking bureaucratic elites with far-reaching political ambitions […] and a ‘national’ critique of the eu as a threat to czech national sovereignty and identity” (hanley 2007, 191; see also haughton 2009). during his presidency, klaus appointed officials to the central bank’s monetary board who shared his euroskeptic views, and thus did not favour a speedy euro adoption process. 6 klaus argued that the main economic benefits of european integration were trade liberalization and the flow of foreign direct investment (fdi). according to klaus, the costs of adopting the euro outweighed the benefits, and “further economic or non-economic unification will be close to zero, if not negative” (klaus 2003). as a trained economist, he also, “saw the problems that a single currency would bring even before the euro was formally launched… [t]he euro would create serious problems for the countries that accepted the single currency in place of their own national currencies” (feldstein 2011). klaus was widely critical of the maastricht treaty, the euro project, and its consequences. to him, the maastricht treaty represented a “turning point at which european integration turned away from its original liberalizing mission and took on an unacceptable federalist course” (hanley 2007, 210). despite the departure of klaus in 2013, euroskepticism may continue within the czech republic for some time to come. within the czech republic, it seems that euroskepticism may have been further fuelled by the euro crisis. it provides support for the position held by some that economic instability within the eu is to blame for economic troubles that the country has recently faced. this perspective has placed further emphasis on national sovereignty – especially in the case of smaller eu member states such as the czech republic (euobserver january 25, 2013). despite the lack of public support for the issue, the current czech president, miloš zeman, is more proeuro adoption. however, given that the czech central bank governor is more cautious, and with elections coming up in october 2017, the current government is not on a path to speedy euro adoption. the decision as to when to adopt the euro has been left to the next government. ii. the slovak case the early and mid-1990s was a difficult period in the history of slovakia. following the velvet divorce, slovakia was in an underprivileged economic situation resulting from previous decades of communist rule that had favoured czech lands. slovakia’s economy was developing at a much slower pace than the other nms. in addition, the troubled political situation in the mid-1990s led to the exclusion of slovakia from the first round of eu accession negotiations. however, economic 6 the current board members are either against the euro project or are euroskeptics (personal interviews by the authors with officials from the cnb, prague, june 2009). 12 review of european and russian affairs 9 (2), 2015 reform started in the early 1990s, and the political situation changed in the second half of the 1990s with the end of vladimír mečiar’s rule.7 since we underlined mečiar’s role in creating a political situation that delayed eu accession negotiations, it is important to highlight slovakia’s governmental and presidential powers, as they played a key role in the county’s eu accession and euro adoption. in comparison to the role of the presidency in the czech republic, the slovak presidency is weaker and more ceremonial. the strong position in the czech republic is not only because of constitutional powers given to the president, but also due to the personality of former president klaus (2003-2013). the weaker presidency in slovakia (compared with the czech republic), along with a strong independent central bank that has been pro euro, greatly influenced the euro adoption strategy. although the slovakian president appoints and dismisses the governor and the vice governor, the appointment and dismissal of the monetary board is the duty of the government. these provisions strengthen the independence of the central bank in slovakia, as opposed to the czech republic, where the president has more say in the appointment process. following the mečiar years (1990-1998), the slovak government had consistently focused on eu accession and euro adoption with 2008-2009 as the target. in 2003, the nbs and the ministry of finance published a report on euro adoption, strategy of adopting the euro in sr. this report was followed by two other joint reports: specification of euro adoption strategy and national euro changeover plan for the slovak republic (nbs and ministry of finance 2003, 2004, 2005). in 2005, the government approved the euro adoption plan, which was implemented by the subsequent government following the 2006 elections that resulted in the direction-social democracy party (smer – sociálna demokracia, smer-sd) winning 29.14 percent of the vote, while the major party in the former ruling coalition slovak democratic and christian union – democratic party (slovenská demokratická a kresťanská únia – demokratická strana, sdkú-ds) got only 18.35 percent (statistical office of the slovak republic 2006). it is remarkable that all elites were in favour of euro adoption. the coalition government, at that time led by smer-sd leader robert fico, did not change the euro adoption target date, and proceeded with the needed reforms to meet the convergence criteria. around the same time, there were important in-depth analyses of the effects of the euro on various sectors in slovakia, such as on the economy, population, and business sector. these studies were conducted by the nbs and confirmed that, for slovakia, the benefits of euro adoption would outweigh the costs (nbs 2006; árendás 2006). the nbs believed that slovakia needed to join the euro area to fully benefit from monetary integration (pechova 2012, 8). consecutive national governments shared the nbs’s view that euro adoption would be important for the development of the slovak economy. slovakia’s position was to implement policies in favour of meeting the convergence criteria, since in the words of the nbs, it was considered “inevitable, irrespective of accession. effective public finance, education and health care systems, 7 mečiar – who was the prime minister for three terms (june 27, 1990 april 22, 1991; june 24, 1992 march 15, 1994; and december 13, 1994 october 30, 1998) and the acting president for two periods (january 1, 1993 march 2, 1993 and march 2, 1998 october 30, 1998) – detached slovakia from its neighbours economically and politically, and delayed reforms (see allam 2006, 191). the eu and the west criticized mečiar for turning slovakia into an autocratic regime. 13 review of european and russian affairs 9 (2), 2015 as well as a flexible labour market are essential for the problem-free operation of any economy” (nbs 2003, 9). both the government and the nbs agreed that all of the required reforms to adopt the euro were crucial for greater economic development and a more stable and advanced economy, and also to attract foreign investors (nbs 2003, 10). economic structure and trade relations according to some officials at the czech national bank, despite the argument that, in the long term, euro adoption has significant macroeconomic benefits, by meeting the convergence criteria, countries would in principle be more disciplined (personal interviews by the authors with officials from cnb, prague, june 2009). 8 according to czech officials, the main benefit of the macroeconomic outcomes would be price stability. some of them argue that, if price stability is the main benefit, and if the czech republic has already achieved this goal while not a euro member, then what is the point of joining the euro area? (hurník, tůma and vávra 2010, 194). prior to its accession to the euro area, slovakia managed to meet the convergence criteria, while the czech republic was very close to meeting them. in 2006, for example, it met the criteria on inflation, deficit, interest rate, and debt (see tables 1 and 2). table 1: slovakia macroeconomic data slovakia 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 inflation 7.2 3.5 8.4 7.5 2.8 4.3 1.9 3.9 0.9 0.7 4.1 3.7 1.5 -0.1 inflation ref. 3.1 2.6 2.7 2.2 2.5 2.9 2.8 4.1 3.9 3.9 5.8 3.1 2.7 1.7 interest 8.04 6.94 4.99 5.03 3.52 4.41 4.49 4.72 4.71 3.87 4.45 4.55 3.19 2.07 interest ref. 6.92 6.85 6.12 6.28 5.37 6.24 6.4 6.6 5.9 5.2 3.1 5.8 5.5 6.2 debt (% of gdp) 48.9 43.4 41.5 40.6 33.8 30.7 29.8 28.2 36.0 40.9 43.4 52.1 54.6 53.6 debt ref. 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60 60 deficit (% of gdp) 6.4 8.1 2.7 2.3 2.9 3.6 1.9 2.4 7.9 7.5 4.1 4.2 2.6 2.9 deficit ref. 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 gdp 3.5 4.6 5.4 5.2 6.5 8.3 10.7 5.4 -5.3 4.8 2.7 1.6 1.4 2.4 source: eurostat 2015 8 some experts and scholars debated this statement, since euro members violated the criteria even before the financial and the euro crises (see heipertz and verdun 2010 on the breach of the rules of the stability and growth pact [sgp]). 14 review of european and russian affairs 9 (2), 2015 table 2: czech republic macroeconomic data czech republic 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 inflation 4.5 1.4 -0.1 2.6 1.6 2.1 3.0 6.3 0.6 1.2 2.1 3.5 1.4 0.4 inflation ref. 3.1 2.6 2.7 2.2 2.5 2.9 2.8 4.1 3.9 3.9 5.8 3.1 2.7 1.7 interest 6.31 4.88 4.12 4.82 3.54 3.80 4.30 4.63 4.84 3.88 3.71 2.78 2.11 1.58 interest ref. 6.92 6.85 6.12 6.28 5.37 6.24 6.4 6.6 5.9 5.2 3.1 5.8 5.5 6.2 debt (% of gdp) 23.9 27.1 28.1 28.5 28.0 27.9 27.8 28.7 34.1 38.2 39.9 44.6 45.0 42.6 debt ref. 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 deficit (% of gdp) 5.3 6.3 6.4 2.7 3.1 2.3 0.7 2.1 5.5 4.4 2.7 3.9 1.2 2.0 deficit ref. 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 gdp 3.1 2.1 3.6 4.9 6.4 6.9 5.5 2.7 -4.8 2.3 2.0 -0.8 -0.7 2.0 source: eurostat 2015 figure 1: gdp growth in percent source: eurostat 2015 15 review of european and russian affairs 9 (2), 2015 since 2004, gdp growth of the slovak economy has been ahead of that of the czech republic, with the exception of 2005 (see figure 1). the automobile industry in slovakia accounts for “41 percent of overall industrial output” (eubusiness april 17, 2013). in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the fdi flow into slovakia increased considerably. this was mainly due to the automobile industry, which was facilitated by an active foreign business lobby. these lobbyists (e.g., german company volkswagen) pushed hard for euro adoption, since their economic benefit would be significant (haughton 2010, 12; personal interviews by the authors with various slovak officials, bratislava, november 2009). the increase in automobile production has helped create thousands of jobs, even after the economic problems of 2009. the economic growth has benefited significantly from the volkswagen (vw) plant in bratislava, peugeot/citroen in trnave, and kia in žiline, and diversified international export destinations, such as south america, china, and brazil (správy april 1, 2013). thus, the market for slovak automobiles is not heavily dependent on the demand from eu countries only. given that it is one of the largest employers in the country, with a significant share in the slovak industry (41 percent in 2012; see figure 2), the automobile industry lobby is one of the most influential in slovakia. figure 2: share of automotive industry in slovak industry source: holeček (2013) the czech republic also relies heavily on the automobile industry; however, its economy is more diversified. the main foundations of czech industry are engineering, mining, chemistry, and foodstuffs, and to a lesser extent, the energy industry (the czech republic, ministry of foreign affairs, 2013). the automobile industry accounts for around 20.1 percent of the total czech industry (see figure 3). this share made the automobile lobby one important player among many, which prevented it from playing a significant role in pushing for fast euro adoption. 16 review of european and russian affairs 9 (2), 2015 figure 3: share of automotive industry in czech industry source: data from the automotive industry association (2014) financial and sovereign debt crises prior to the ecofin council decision on july 8, 2008 to allow slovakia to adopt the euro as of january 1, 2009, the economic development of both countries had similar characteristics. both economies are export-oriented. the gdp share of czech exports was 62.3-77.2 percent from 20052013, and that of slovakia reached 72.1-93.0 percent of gdp in 2005-2013 (world bank data 2015). both economies exhibited a considerable level of nominal convergence before slovakia’s entry into the euro area was confirmed (jevčák 2011, 2). up until the outbreak of the crisis in 2008, despite the differences in inflation rates (1.8 percent in slovakia, compared with 3 percent in the czech republic in 2007, and gdp that reached 5.5 in the czech republic, compared with 10.7 in slovakia in 2007), interest rates in the czech republic and slovakia were very close (around 4.3 and 4.5 percent respectively). the debt in both countries was less than 30 percent of gdp, and the deficit in both countries was within the reference value (see tables 1 and 2). the outbreak of the crisis and the slovak adoption of the euro raises the question of whether the exchange rate regime adopted by both countries influenced their economic performance during the crisis. both the financial crisis and the sovereign debt crisis affected the czech republic negatively, though not as badly as other countries (such as hungary). the czech industry – especially the automobile industry – suffered significantly. most countries that the czech republic trades with were influenced negatively by the crisis and entered into recession. the negative effect of the crisis on the czech republic’s main trading partners9 had its implications on the czech economy (see 9 the countries to which the czech republic exported the most in 2013 were: germany ($44.3billion [b]), slovakia ($11.5b), poland ($7.9b), france ($7.76b), and the united kingdom ($7.46b). the countries from which the czech republic imported the most were: germany ($37.1b), china ($15b), poland ($10.7b), slovakia ($8.68b), and russia ($7.4b). source: http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/cze/ 0.00% 10.00% 20.00% 30.00% 40.00% 50.00% 60.00% 70.00% 80.00% 90.00% 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 ii n d u st ri a l o u tp u t aia other industries 17 review of european and russian affairs 9 (2), 2015 table 2). gdp growth declined and the czech republic performance on the convergence criteria diverged from the levels needed to be ready for euro adoption, thereby giving the euroskeptic group a good argument against a fast euro adoption. slovakia was not immune to effects of the financial and sovereign debt crises. after having one of the highest gdp growth rates in 2006 and 2007 (8.3 and 10.7 percent respectively), the gdp declined significantly in the crisis years (see table 1 and figure 1). however, with respect to gdp, it still performed much better than the czech republic during the crisis, except during 2009 (see figure 1). moreover, the macroeconomic data also suffered from the crisis, with deficit and debt increasing. in comparison to the czech republic, the deficit and inflation were higher in slovakia, and the country’s unemployment rate also increased significantly.10 figure 4: unemployment rate source: eurostat 2015 according to the oecd (2009), the automotive industry was a blessing prior to the crisis, and is now (post-crisis) a curse, greatly contributing to the deteriorating economic situation. the global recession had a negative effect on the automotive industry in slovakia, which employs a large percentage of the population. this situation is strongly related to the economic slow-down with the major trading partners, especially germany, and the decrease in the demand for slovak products. both the czech republic and slovakia suffered from a decline in their exports (as a percentage of gdp), especially in 2009 before recovery started in both countries (figure 5). 10 the unemployment rate in slovakia was much higher, even prior to the crisis (see figure 4). 18 review of european and russian affairs 9 (2), 2015 figure 5: exports of goods and services (% of gdp) source: world bank data 2015 the relatively better performance of the czech economy during the crisis with respect to employment, deficit, and “real exports, as well as manufacturing production,” means that the “overall financial market situation remained more stable” (jevčák 2011, 10). 11 this better performance at the financial level was facilitated by the ecb intervention that “was more aggressive and effective in easing monetary conditions than the cnb” (ibid., 6). thus, it did not really matter much what type of exchange rate those countries had during the crisis, as both economies performed somewhat similarly. being part of the euro, thus lacking the flexible exchange rate, did not really damage the slovak export sector, “while euro-area membership provided an effective shield for its financial markets during the recent crisis period” (ibid., 10). furthermore, in regards to inflation, despite its increase in 2011 to 4.1 percent in slovakia, it managed to go down again (lower in comparison to other countries, including the czech republic) (see tables 1 and 2). politically, the czech government used the financial crisis, and subsequently the sovereign debt crisis, as a tool to support its position of delaying euro adoption. before the crisis, the czech republic was only missing two of the convergence criteria (inflation rate and the exchange rate). in the aftermath of the 2008/2009 financial crisis, the economic situation worsened. the entire effort of all groups (the cnb and both the government and opposition) was to deal with the fallout of the crisis – euro accession was not a priority. another matter has been the reform of the pension system and health care policies. without reform, there would be, in due course, more pressure on the public debt and deficit. the crisis supported the long-standing position of ods and the government that the czech republic would join when it was “in its best interest.” the population generally supports this position. in january 2011, medea research (based in the czech republic) conducted an opinion poll that showed that 77 percent of czech citizens were against euro adoption, compared with 15 percent who were in favour. the poll also showed that 57 percent “strongly disagree with joining the euro zone” (prague daily monitor march 4, 2011). the public is more skeptical regarding the entire european integration process in general, and the euro in 11 http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/economic_briefs/2011/pdf/ecobrief_14_may2011_en.pdf http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/economic_briefs/2011/pdf/ecobrief_14_may2011_en.pdf 19 review of european and russian affairs 9 (2), 2015 particular. these questions were not posed in the most recent eurobarometer on euro adoption in recently-acceded member states (european commission 2014a). in slovakia, despite all of the problems the euro area currently faces, support for the euro remains among the highest. when asked by a eurobarometer team if they are for or against a “european economic and monetary union with one single currency, the euro,” 80 percent of slovaks were in favour (european commission 2012, t69). conclusion we set out to analyze why slovakia sought to adopt the euro while the czech republic did not. let us revisit the arguments that we investigated to find out to what extent different variables can explain the different outcome in both countries. the first explanation focused on the hypothesis that slovakia sought to adopt the euro to overcome an inferiority complex. the czech republic did not have this same issue. this paper showed that, on the whole, prior to euro adoption, slovaks did indeed feel inferior to czechs. some of the interviewees responded that the euro adoption strategy was inspired by seeking to overcome the inferiority complex, the “little brother syndrome.” however, not all interviewees agreed that this factor was present, let alone decisive. the second possible explanation—that the euro adoption strategy was used to create a stronger sense of belonging to europe—was refuted in both countries. the interviewees in both countries did not agree that the adoption of the euro was to signal a return to europe. thus, the “return to europe” argument was not seen to be important in either country. the third explanation focused on the different korunas in both countries. it was hypothesized that it might not be a problem to accept the euro in slovakia because the slovak koruna was not seen as a currency important enough to salvage. indeed, in the case of slovakia, citizens did not seem to have a strong preference for which currency was used. they cared more about economic wealth than about whether the national currency was the euro or the koruna. in the czech republic, the situation could have been a non-issue, as well. however, compared with the slovak case, the czechs were prouder of the koruna and its function of symbolizing czech sovereignty. the czechs also worried more than the slovaks that by adopting the euro, one might give up some of one’s national identity. the fourth argument, that the degree of euroskepticism in the czech republic and the lack of that same euroskepticism in slovakia over the same time period could explain their differing policies towards euro adoption, was supported by the analysis. euroskepticism in the czech republic gained further recognition and strength thanks to the consecutive election of former president václav klaus in 2003 and 2008 respectively. klaus’s euroskepticism has been very important on the czech political scene. as president, not only did he influence public opinion and policies, but he also appointed euroskeptic officials to the central bank’s monetary board. in slovakia, during the early years following the velvet divorce, the figure of vladimír mečiar had a similar dampening effect on european integration. however, once mečiar left office in the late 1990s, slovakia went into “catch-up mode” and managed to join the eu in 2004. since then, there has not been a comparatively strong euroskeptic political persona in power in slovakia. 20 review of european and russian affairs 9 (2), 2015 the fifth explanation concerning economic structure and trade relations showed that slovakia’s relations with germany and other partners, compared to those of the czech republic, put slovakia in a position that was more favourable to euro adoption policies. in interviews, we found support for this hypothesis in the case of slovakia. there were various references to the automobile sector and fdi from germany to slovakia. the same strong connection is absent in the czech republic. although this perception came out of the interviews, it is not certain whether the situation in the czech republic is very much different on this matter, even if a little less determined by the automobile industry. yet, perhaps other factors are more important to determine the czech stance on euro adoption (for instance, euroskepticism of the president). reviewing the five explanations, we find that, to understand the different outcomes in the czech republic and slovakia, we need a combination of these five explanations. yet, based on an assessment of the five explanations, we conclude that the one based on domestic politics was the most influential. for example, the dominance of the euroskeptic president in the czech republic was an important reason for the czech republic’s lack of interest in a fast path to euro adoption. the appointment of euroskeptic members to the cnb monetary board during the two terms of president klaus reinforced the government’s slow euro adoption policies. in the slovak case, it seems that the absence of a euroskeptic leader, in addition to the fact that it had a weaker starting point, was crucially important. with klaus having left his position, euroskepticism seems to prevail in czech society, at least for the time being. the points that stand out are that slovakia wanted to profile itself, did not feel a need to demonstrate national identity, and wanted to adopt the euro before the czech republic as a way to overcome its inferiority complex. the lobby from the automobile industry also played a role, albeit a minor one. however, if a few factors had been different in either 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vliegenthart, arjan and laura horn. 2007. “the role of the eu in the (trans)formation of corporate governance regulation in central eastern europe – the case of the czech republic,” competition and change 11 (2): 137-154. walt, stephen m. 1998. “international relations: one world, many theories,” foreign policy 110, 29-46. world bank data. 2015. http://data.worldbank.org http://spravy.pravda.sk/ekonomika/clanok/276116-slovensko-je-uz-svetova-velmoc-vo-vyrobe-aut/ http://spravy.pravda.sk/ekonomika/clanok/276116-slovensko-je-uz-svetova-velmoc-vo-vyrobe-aut/ http://app.statistics.sk/nrsr_2006/angl/obvod/results/tab3.jsp http://data.worldbank.org/ 26 review of european and russian affairs 9 (2), 2015 published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada available online at: journals.carleton.ca/rera/index.php/rera rera is an electronic academic peer-reviewed journal that publishes graduate, post-graduate, and young scholarly works. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is a joint project supported by the canadaeurope transatlantic dialogue — a cross-canada research network supported by the social sciences and humanities research council of canada (sshrc) — along with the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies (carleton university) and its associated research unit, the centre for european studies. rera aims to provide an accessible forum for research, to promote high standards of research and scholarship, and to foster communication among young scholars. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada tel: +01 613 520-2600 ext. 3117; e-mail: rera-journal@carleton.ca creative commons license creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0 this working paper is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial no derivs 3.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 3.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, provided the source is acknowledged. no use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes. issn: 1718-4835 © 2015 the authors https://journals.carleton.ca/rera/index.php/rera mailto:rera-journal@carleton.ca http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ enhancing eu's research policies: expectations and implications of policy learning review of european and russian affairs 7 (2), 2012 issn 1718-4835 © 2012 the author(s) www.carleton.ca/rera rethinking the open method of coordination: mutual learning initiatives shaping the european research enterprise merli tamtik university of toronto abstract since 2000, the open method of coordination (omc) has become a policy approach increasingly used in the european policy making process. by focusing on research policy, this study examines the ways in which the omc and the mutual learning initiatives have influenced the wider policy discourse in the european union. the paper argues that it is important to think about the contributions of the omc in research policy in more broad and fundamental ways. this theory-guided study takes an empirical approach to the omc, providing significant evidence on mutual learning effects analyzed in terms of developing an authentic dialogue, shaping policy discourse, shaping policy networks and facilitating collaborative learning. the analysis reveals that the omc changes the ways in which the representatives from the member states and the european commission contribute to research policy, leading to a promising foundation for further policy enhancement. 2 review of european and russian affairs 7 (2), 2012 introduction the last couple of decades have witnessed an intense search for new public policy approaches that can effectively address complex social and economic problems (nilsson et al. 2008). governments are increasingly emphasizing the need for evidence-based policy as an essential path to informed policy decisions. scholarly literature has focused on analyzing the importance of research evidence in decision making (hammersley 2005; bogenschneider and corbett 2010), the significance of professional knowledge in policy-making (nutley et al. 2007; culyer and lomas 2006), and the benefits of employing analytical assessment tools to prove effectiveness of policies (radaelli 2004; nilsson et al. 2008). while these outcome-oriented rational policy approaches are useful and anticipated, scholars note that policy change is usually a long term dynamic process that cannot be understood solely in linear terms (kingdon 1984; sabatier 1986). it is the individual ideas, concepts and policy beliefs that shape the policy outcome over extended periods of time (e.g. sabatier 1986; jacobs 2009). the pressure to produce and evaluate policy results has often left the process of policy conversation itself in the shade. to make better use of evidence and foresee potential policy outcomes, it is of crucial importance to understand the nuances of the agency of individuals in cooperation with others, and the dynamics of how policy ideas shape the course of a policy process. research policy in the european union (eu) is a field where a variety of interests, ideas, and policy beliefs meet. in the drive for increased economic competitiveness, eu policy makers are aiming for a better coordinated and more integrated policy approach (van vught 2010). member states, on the other hand, demonstrate considerable resistance towards eu level policy intrusion (gornitzka 2007). in this diffuse policy environment, an array of policy instruments has been developed to deliver policy outcomes. in 2000, the european union introduced a unique policy approach where policy makers and experts from the member states and the european commission (ec) get together, discuss policy ideas, and study from each other in a consciously constructed learning environment. this policy approach is called the open method of coordination (omc). this method is unique as it is a strategic attempt to bring together experts from diverse socio-economic and cultural environments (27 eu member states and associated countries) to discuss specific policy areas, explore solutions, share country-specific examples, and at the end, design policy recommendations applicable for diverse national settings. the omc approach has triggered a significant amount of criticism from scholars who mainly point to the limited nature of any tangible policy change at the national or european level (e.g. kaiser and prange 2004; szyszcak 2006; kröger 2009a). this study proposes that the impact of the open method of coordination should not be understood purely in instrumental terms but should also be analyzed in terms of broader conceptual shifts taking place over longer periods of time. this study is guided by the following research question: how does the omc mutual learning initiative contribute to and shape the european research policy? it analyzes initiatives of the omc working groups where the focus is on the process of policy development rather than specific outcomes that have been translated into policy change. the author hypothesizes that the omc mutual learning exercises impact the dynamics among actors, thus preparing grounds for collaboration and ultimately fostering new approaches to policy making. the author argues that the omc changes the ways in which participants think about policy problems, which in turn lays review of european and russian affairs 7 (2), 2012 3 a solid foundation for enhancing european research policy. the study takes a theory-guided empirical approach to the omc, providing significant empirical evidence to support the hypothesis. open method of coordination in research policy: the existing argument the open method of coordination is a policy making method of the european union and its member states characterized by voluntary policy coordination through mutual learning initiatives (borrás and radaelli 2010). the process is set up as a non-binding, bottom-up initiative where the decision making power lies in the hands of the member states. the process is guided and facilitated by the european commission, which analyzes the progress reports and disseminates recommendations for each of the member states (van vught 2010). ruiter (2010) lists four initiatives that form the infrastructure of the omc: 1) guidelines or objectives, 2) indicators and benchmarks, 3) national action plans (naps) or national reform programmes (nrps), and 4) peer-learning groups. these tools are set up for monitoring and evaluating the progress of policy coordination among the member states with the aim of achieving greater economic development in the region. it has a cyclical nature (typically yearly, sometimes in three year cycles) where member states report to the european commission on its achievements and progress. the omc is very closely linked to research and innovation policies. it was first introduced in 2000 and was seen as the main instrument to reach the ambitious goals of the lisbon strategy for economic competitiveness—to become “the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy”(european parliament, 2000). the diversity of the research systems across the eu member states has been a significant challenge in delivering the goals of the lisbon strategy. as noted by kaiser and prange (2004), the variations in legislative and budgetary powers lead to different research and innovation policies; the range of institutions and national coordination mechanisms along with a remarkable diversification in research performance prevent achieving common european research policy. in addition, there is a considerable resistance among the member states to allow european interference in national research policies (gornitzka 2009). to ensure better integration of national research policies, the political leaders agreed to work towards creating the european research area (era), a concept to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the fragmented european research landscape (van vught 2010). in research policy, the omc was seen as an instrument for intergovernmental policy analysis and was expected to provide the formal setting for initiating policy debates among countries in areas of research and innovation. as a “soft” policy instrument, the method was designed to use peer pressure and “naming and shaming” as opposed to legal interference in order to create stronger member state involvement in the development of european research policy (van vught 2010). one of the crucial dimensions in the dynamics of the omc is policy learning, through a process of incorporating individual agency at the level of policy ideas and beliefs. policy learning is understood as a process of updating one’s beliefs or changing one’s views about key components of policy through social interaction (zito and schout 2011; radaelli 2009). several authors have emphasized the importance of learning capacity, linking it to one potential mechanism for gradual policy change (lundvall et al. 2002; zito and schout 2011; radaelli 2009). nilsson et al. (2008) state that everyday policy making is part of a long term process of learning and strategizing, in which common views and political coalitions are constantly formed and reconstituted over time. while analyzing policy making in the eu, eising (2002), argues that 4 review of european and russian affairs 7 (2), 2012 as a result of policy learning and knowledge exchange, countries’ basic policy preferences can change. zahra and george (2002) note that the capacity to absorb information through learning allows organizations and institutions to better adapt to their changing environments and have an advantage over their competitors. lundvall et al. (2002) argue that interactive policy learning can lead to innovation and increased economic performance. some authors believe that policy change resulting from gradual knowledge accumulation through learning can have long lasting and more stable policy results (lundvall et al. 2002). therefore, policy learning is often seen as a tool for “a soft mode of governance” where change is triggered through voluntary mechanisms without legal interference (borrás and conzelmann 2007; kröger 2009a; van vught 2010). policy learning is used in the omc as a way of motivating member states to participate and engage actively in policy processes. learning from each other and considering best practices of others is expected to enhance policy coordination through the omc. the white paper on european governance articulates the aim of the omc as follows: the open method of co-ordination is used on a case by case basis. it is a way of encouraging co-operation, the exchange of best practice and agreeing on common targets and guidelines for member states, sometimes backed up by national action plans as in the case of employment and social exclusion. it relies on regular monitoring of progress to meet those targets, allowing member states to compare their efforts and learn from the experience of others. (european commission 2001, 20) according to this statement, the primary goal of the omc is not only achieving a set of indicators determined by the national action plans, but mainly facilitating discussions and enhancing cooperation among the member states, in a situation where knowledge exchange and policy learning are set in the centre stage. the omc is regarded as a process, where information and communication are used to shape a shared understanding of common policies (van vught 2010). the main debate in the scholarly community has tended to focus on issues of the effectiveness and measurable outcomes of the omc. the outcomes of the omc have been analyzed in terms of national policy performance and change, effects on eu-level policy paradigms, effects on the transformation in eu law, and effects on governance patterns (e.g. borrás and greve 2004; kröger 2009a; borrás and radaellli 2010). there are both supporters and critics of the omc approach. the supporters mostly argue on the basis of the increased democratic transparency in eu policy making and the impact omc has had for increased europeanization (borrás and conzelmann 2007; radaelli 2008). szyszcak (2006) states that the omc has helped increase the competence of the european union to regulate areas where the traditional community legislative processes had been weak (e.g. environmental policy) or where new areas require coordination of member state policy (e.g. sustainable development strategies). de elera (2006) argues that the european research area, with the help of the omc in research policy, could potentially foster a european identity through the creation of common values. however, so far economic considerations have prevailed and the possibilities of civil society providing inputs for this policy have not been fully used. room (2005) points out that the omc recognizes the role of a wide range of actors, not just national governments, thus helping to alleviate criticisms about the lack of transparency in the eu’s policy making. review of european and russian affairs 7 (2), 2012 5 the absence of tangible results at the level of national policies has triggered most of the criticism in this area. kröger (2009b), analyzing the changes in social policy in france and germany, could not detect any significant effects as a result of the omc. the author notes that the actual changes in social policy in these countries were taking place before the introduction of national action plans. morano-foadi (2008), making reference to the italian research policy, has illustrated how the lack of a powerful enforcement mechanism in relation to the transfer of best practices in italy has served as a challenge in achieving policy change at the national level. mcguinness and o’carroll (2010) see the potential impact of the omc on national research systems in achieving convergence, but not necessarily of a quantitative kind. lacking in this debate is a consideration of less visible and measurable change, which is crucial in terms of longer term policy effects. there is a lack of analysis of the primary goal of the omc—the contribution to the common policy understanding and facilitation of policy learning that in the long run provide a foundation for stable policy results. there is a significant literature about the omc and its relation to mutual learning (nedergaard 2007; radaelli 2008; hartlapp 2009), but again, it is often critical of attempts to measure learning in relation to the outcomes of policy change (e.g. radaelli 2008). there are many scholars who admit that the specific outcomes of policy learning are difficult to identify and practically impossible to quantify (mcguiness and o’carroll 2010; zeitlin 2011). these authors point to methodological reasons. the challenge lies not only in managing the variety of government systems within the eu countries, but determining a causal relationship of policy learning based on collaboration between eu institutions and member state governments without any legally binding sanctions (borrás and greve 2004; gornitzka 2007). kröger (2009a) concludes that the general challenges with the omc include too much information and too many documents along with too little time for discussion, language barriers and an emphasis on governmental reports rather than strategic plans, a lack of political elites in the omc processes, a lack of transfer of what was eventually learned into the ministerial hierarchy, and institutional differences between welfare systems. zeitlin’s (2011) study represents an example of recognizing the broader impact of the omc process. his empirical research into the areas of employment and social inclusion shows that the omc has been successful in many ways. first, it has contributed to the change in focus at the national level by introducing new ideas and concepts to the national policy debates that originate from the eu’s policy discussions (e.g. lifelong learning, social inclusion). second, it has contributed to better horizontal coordination and cross-sectorial integration of interdependent policy areas at the national level and enhanced vertical coordination between levels of governance (eu and country level). third, the impact of mutual learning has led to the identification of common challenges and promising policy approaches at the eu level including statistical harmonization and capacity building (at both eu and national levels); it has also induced member states to rethink established policy approaches and practices. in spite of its criticism, the omc process has not stopped. the most promising indicator seems to be the fact that all of the involved actors want to continue with policy learning as they find it a useful, valuable, and flexible means to harness the benefits of cooperation among the member states (warleigh-lack and drachenberg 2011). the european commission’s (2009) assessment of the omc’s influence (impact) on research policy states the continuous need to focus in the future on facilitating learning and strategic policy coordination rather than only exchanging information. the need to continue with mutual learning exercises through policy monitoring and coordination is continuously expressed and emphasized in various new strategic policy documents (e.g. europe 2020, innovation union communication). 6 review of european and russian affairs 7 (2), 2012 theoretical framework this study is informed by the theory of collaborative governance where policy making is facilitated through dialogue in a consensus-oriented decision making process (e.g. connick and innes 2001; innes and booher 2003; ansell and gash 2008). the theory is useful in taking an alternative approach to the value assessment of the omc. it focuses primarily on the process and the specific conditions needed to secure collaborative policy making. the theory emphasizes the dynamics of cooperation and competition among participants leading to new innovative knowledge through learning practices. connick and innes (2001, 9) understand collaborative governance as a process that includes “representatives of all relevant interests” and “engages various participants as they learn and interact.” ansell and gash (2008, 544) take a more policyoriented approach and define collaborative governance as an arrangement where “one or more public agencies directly engage [non-]state stakeholders in a collective decision-making process that is formal, consensus-oriented, and deliberative and that aims to make or implement public policy or manage public programs or assets.” this definition is useful as it focuses on the process and allows room for looking not only at policy outcomes (implementation) but management of policy initiatives in a broader sense. how does this theory help us in understanding how changes in policy process are occurring? the theory proposes diversity and interdependence as two crucial conditions in establishing an authentic dialogue among participants (see figure 1). diversity is linked to competition as the representation of diverse interests leads to competing policy agendas. interdependence is linked to cooperation as the policy agenda cannot be taken forward without relying on each other’s knowledge, financial resources, or access to information. in this study, diversity is secured by involvement of a variety of actors (e.g. european commission representatives, ministry officials from country governments and area experts), each representing varied interests (e.g. political, professional, and/or personal). mutual interdependence is maintained by a shared realization that only working together and relying on each others’ expertise results in effective learning (e.g. working together helps to take the development of european research policy forward). as different ideas get proposed, discussed, and challenged, a conclusion needs to emerge that would respond to the various interests of the stakeholders. it requires considerable creativity to find actions that would respond to this wide set of competing interests and lead to innovative policy approaches. based on this perspective, i hypothesize that diversity and interdependence matter in creating an authentic dialogue in the omc process. diversity triggers interests, allows collecting information on critical variables, allows policy comparisons, and ultimately contributes to learning (sabatier 1986; kaiser and prange 2004). interdependence of each other’s knowledge and resources helps to develop creativity in proposing policy recommendations or starting new collaborative projects (innes and booher 2003). review of european and russian affairs 7 (2), 2012 7 figure 1. authors’ conceptualization based on the theory of collaborative dialogue (innes and booher 2003). this perspective suggests that changes resulting from the authentic dialogue are gradual and diffuse rather than instrumental and focused. innes and booher (2003) note that policy making in this framework should be analyzed not in terms of specific policy outcomes, but in terms of indicators relevant to the process itself such as the restructuring of policy networks and policy discourse, the emergence of social capital, empathetic relationships among participants, collective learning (what has been learnt), and increased capacity for innovation. as a result of collaboration among diverse groups of stakeholders (member states, associated countries and the european commission), it is the new combinations of policy groupings and emerging patterns of knowledge input that are important to assess, rather than specific policy changes, in order to understand significant nuances around the policy change process. i will first analyze the potential change in policy discourse and hypothesize that the omc influences policy discourse at multiple levels. at the european level, giving the full decision making power to the countries provides the commission with the added incentive to move forward with developing european research policies, referring to the interests of and pressures from the member states. at the national level, the involvement of high level government representatives in the european policy discussions makes possible a higher level of attention to the omc process and its results nationally. in addition, experts involved in the process gain firsthand policy relevant information (best practices, strategic policy approaches) that might serve useful purposes and create increased competitive advantage to a country. collected and disseminated knowledge (ideas and concepts) can enter policy debate gradually and have the potential to influence the policy debates when opportunity arises (kingdon 1995). as the condition 1: cooperation/ inter-dependence condition 2: competition/ diversity of interests process approach authentic dialogue change in: policy discourse policy networks policy learning 8 review of european and russian affairs 7 (2), 2012 participation in the omc process is voluntary, countries choose the topics in which to participate. it could be assumed that by making this choice to participate, there already is a potential opportunity for ideas to enter and shape the debate. then, i will examine the nature of policy networks. as noted by ansell and gash (2008), in collaborative governance new relationships are built among people who would ordinarily not talk to each other. the omc process creates a situation where people from diverse contexts get engaged in a dialogue, developing trust, tolerance, and understanding among one other. i hypothesize that omc discussions create new policy networks at multiple levels. i analyze how these networks among country experts and european commission representatives are established and how these networks contribute to gradual change in policy making. finally, i seek to analyze if and how mutual learning happens. for learning to occur, participants need to be engaged in a task which they are capable of and in which they possess expertise (ansell and gash 2008). the specific institutional design (ground rules for collaboration) contributes to the process. as noted by heritier (2002), usually groups that feel they have had a legitimate opportunity to participate are likely to develop a commitment to the process. the learning component is seen as an interaction where participants not only listen and ask questions of the experts, but also interact actively with one another around an issue. as a result of the collaborative policy dialogue, shared identities, meanings, new heuristics, and innovative policy solutions can emerge (innes and booher 2003). i hypothesize that learning occurs at the individual level through collaborative process when participants can explain their learning experience and describe specific examples on new knowledge gained. overall, the theory is useful in providing an alternative view on how to examine a policy initiative that is aimed at facilitating a dialogue and encouraging ownership of the policies among various stakeholders. as noted by ansell and gash (2008), policy makers might be more favourable to collaborative governance where they expect a difficult implementation process, as is potentially the case with the omc in research policy. the categories stated above provide the analytical framework for examining the contributions of the omc process in the development of the eu’s research policy. methodology this study employs a case study strategy to examine the contributions of the omc to the overall dynamics of policy making in the field of research policy. in this field, the eu competitiveness council has appointed the erac (european research area committee, formerly crest) 1 to oversee the implementation of the omc. the erac is composed of the member state representatives and the european commission representatives that collaboratively make decisions on its activities. as one of its activities, the omc in research policy has been implemented through a formation of theme-based expert groups. during yearly cycles, the member states propose and the commission endorses policy topics that would enhance mutual learning in various areas of research policy. each member state then nominates its area experts (typically mid-level policy makers within the relevant ministries) to participate in the expert groups. the group has a significant freedom to operate. the group first has to select a chair, then decide on its working methodology and agree on its expected outcomes. at the end of each cycle, working groups report back to erac, which draws conclusions and formulates policy recommendations. typically, final policy recommendations are distributed among all member 1. comité de la recherche scientifique et technique, eu’s scientific and technical research committee review of european and russian affairs 7 (2), 2012 9 states (not only the participants of the group) in order to ensure a larger policy impact. over the years, the topics for discussion have included public research spending, coordination of the structural funds and the framework program, internationalization of research and development (r&d), effectiveness of fiscal measures stimulating r&d, and intellectual property rights, among others. selected omc expert groups are set in the centre stage of the study, making possible an assessment of the broader effects of the omc process, rather than simply assessing the guidelines, the level of indicators or the achievements of the national action plans (three other initiatives in the omc process). the “structural funds and the framework program” (group 1) and “internationalization of science and technology (s&t)” (group 2) of the omc have been chosen as case studies for several reasons. first, both topics stimulated debates where complex and diverse national interests emerged, making the dynamics and power hierarchies among participating country experts especially apparent. the “structural funds and the framework program” expert group aimed for efficiency by encouraging the use of two european level financial instruments to support research initiatives. newly joined eu member states were eager to develop their infrastructure, especially in rural areas, and were not ready to integrate these two instruments, which they saw as representing opposite interests in regards to the older european member states. the second group, working to develop eu strategy for international research collaboration, also had varied national interests represented in terms of potential research partners from third countries. second, the time frame between the expert group meetings (group 1 meetings were held in 2006, group 2 meetings were held in 2006-07 and final policy recommendations provided in 2007 and 2009) make it possible to analyze the broader impact of those recommendations. third, both groups were looking to influence policy making not only at the national level, but also at the european level, providing impetus for analyzing developments at both levels in regards to the contribution of the omc. this study has focused on collecting qualitative data on the omc process. such information is crucial in order to better understand and analyze the nuances in this policy approach. two main methods and data sources have been employed. the first step involved content analysis of the omc expert meeting reports and country-specific reports as examples of successful research cooperation initiatives. a content analysis has been carried out, identifying several themes concerning the nature, focus, and targets of these strategic documents (weber 1996). document analysis informed the basic understanding of the nuances in the omc process (which countries/experts participated; the mandate of the working groups; the process and methodology used; the nature of the policy recommendations). built upon the document analysis, the experts were identified and an interview protocol was designed. the second step involved conducting semi-structured telephone interviews with country experts participating in the crest omc working groups. all participants with publicly available email addresses listed in the crest final policy reports were invited to participate. that included experts from the 25 eu member states and associated countries (n=42) and also representatives from the european commission directorate general (dg) research and innovation (n=8), involved in the groups as facilitators. a total of 19 country experts out of 15 member states and associated countries were willing to participate in the study, and three european commission facilitators were available. the telephone interviews were contacted in spring 2011 and spring 2012. the interviewees represented the following countries: austria (1), belgium (2), czech republic (1), estonia (1), germany (2), greece (1), hungary (1), italy (1), lithuania (1), netherlands (2), norway (1), portugal (1), romania (1), spain (2) and sweden (1). 10 review of european and russian affairs 7 (2), 2012 among the country experts there were nine men and ten women, most of them working as government officials (typically in ministries of higher education and research). the interviews were used to clarify how the omc process is viewed to be contributing to policy making and what factors were perceived to be shaping the process. as participation in the group was voluntary for the countries and policy recommendations had a non-binding nature, the threat that participating individuals would tend to overemphasize the importance of their participation, is minimal. several informants were critical, referring to the lack of direct policy outcomes of their work. in addition, in-person interviews with five european commission policy makers (head of units (2) and mid-level administrators (3) from three units: era policy; economic analysis and indicators; and skills) within the dg research and innovation were conducted in brussels during summer of 2012. these interviews with key informants were used to identify the broader policy developments over the past decade taking place in the european commission dg research and innovation as a result of the omc. the interviews, 2 on average of 50-minutes in length, were recorded and transcribed. collected data was organized, coded, and analyzed following usual procedures (miles and huberman, 1994; strauss 1987). categorical themes were determined (open coding), establishing patterns of themes (axial coding, selective coding) and developing generalizations from the information provided through the interviews (creswell 1998). findings the empirical findings are analyzed first with respect to securing authentic dialogue—an environment necessary for the learning to happen. the presence of two important factors— diversity and interdependence—will be explained to demonstrate the complexity of the policy setting. then, the following three main categories, proposed by collaborative governance theory, will be analyzed: restructuring policy networks, restructuring policy discourse, and promoting collective learning. the intention is to explain how the omc has contributed to and indeed changed european research policy. creating an authentic dialogue the omc can be characterized as a dynamic, diffuse and time consuming process, where the outcomes are extremely challenging to predict and influence. policy making in the omc mode is an environment where diversity and interdependence meet. the diversity that is represented in the process is threefold. first, the ec policy makers are trying to direct the process according to the eu’s strategic directions. second, there are country experts, sharing their professional field based expertise, on the one hand, while promoting their country’s political views as national representatives, on the other hand. third, as individuals, the experts bring to the process their own unique personal characteristics, which can also significantly shape the policy outcome. as one ec policy maker reflected: it’s difficult, very many different agendas get mixed up. ultimately, it depends on people. sometimes you can have a dominant personality playing a strong leading role 2. please note that the author preserved the original language of interviewees, thus the quoted excerpts may include some minor grammatical errors. review of european and russian affairs 7 (2), 2012 11 and you end up with a more successful process. then you get some other group where there is a detractor, somebody who is pulling things back. so the success or failure is not dictated just by pure institutional arrangements that are put in place, but people, ultimately things get done by people. country experts noted the influence of political interests in the process: i was representing [country] and of course also the national interests play an important role here. /.../ you need to avoid the fragmentation of national efforts. and our main interest was getting new ideas from other countries to help [country]. a different view from a country representative emphasized the contribution of a professional opinion that might have been different from the country’s official standpoint: i talked from my own professional experience. on my part, i was pretty high up in the hierarchy, so i could say what i thought was right, but i wouldn't bet on that my government would have the same opinion than i had. participating members were aware of their interdependence in taking the policy development forward. experts in the omc group saw a potential for enhancing policy coordination in europe as a result of a mutual contribution based on shared values. several participants were concerned about fragmentation of european level research policy. most governments of the member states are committed to create the european research area and enhance europe as a region through research and innovation initiatives. the idea that european level policy coordination is important serves as one example of a shared policy belief among the country experts. the following comment is representative: [w]e felt that it was time for a more systematic approach [at] the eu level to avoid the duplicity and segmentation. because there were some activities at the member states level and some things done by the european commission, but nobody in fact knew what the other side was doing. as stated above, most of the country experts involved in the omc expert groups really were seeing the value of the omc process helping to enhance the policy coordination. they actively contributed their knowledge and were concerned when the outcomes of their work were not clearly translated into visible policy change. however, not all participants were actively involved in the policy learning process as noted by several informants. according to several ec representatives, the resistance from some of the member states towards contributing to the general vision for eu’s research policy is still very much apparent. however, that did not come up when talking to participating country experts. the following quote is illustrative: then you also have different biases that different member states bring to the table, you have some countries where all the officials maybe are instructed to take part in these types of processes but not necessarily contribute in a proactive manner but to use it more as basically intelligence collecting exercises. so they can then act in the “real” policy circles knowing what’s going on, in order to minimize the eu's agenda. 12 review of european and russian affairs 7 (2), 2012 there are several important factors in creating an authentic dialogue based on diversity and interdependence. as noted by innes and booher (2003), stakeholders are often accustomed to concealing their interests and engaging in positional bargaining, rather than in honest discussion. it is important to create an open environment based on trust where diverse opinions are represented. the role of the group chair is crucial in this process. the chair must manage discussion so that participants feel comfortable and safe in saying what is on their minds even if they think others will not like it. according to the participant, that was mostly the case: i think it was a very well-balanced group. everything worked on equal principles. it was never a case that somebody wanted to talk but was not allowed. no, that wasn’t the case at all. the chair of this group, [name], he is really a dynamic guy with lots of ideas and what was really important, he is working for an executive agency of the [country] government. so he knows all the concrete problems that you have in the field, also when it comes to more practical implementation of the policies. but he is a very dynamic person with lots of ideas, so i think that in the process he was a real driving factor in the whole group. the fact that the dialogue evolved not only around best practices, but sometimes also around policy failures is another indication for an authentic dialogue. it was noted that the debate and the level of honesty in the group depended very much of the individual participants: certain people, they were very…, they talked about how things didn't work. that i liked. that was not of course country dependent, it depends on a people. (country expert) as the recommendations were non-binding and participation voluntary, the participants could speak freely and in most cases represent their own professional knowledge. the following quotes illustrate the nature of the authentic dialogue: i enjoyed the debates and arguments and the way reasoning was done. it was something very exciting. it was rather smooth, the whole procedure of decision-making process in the group. we had not many differences and even if we had some differences, for example on the final report, and the wording, we were trying to find some solution on the wording by eliminating the most sharp differences, so we could live with the final outcome. this complex policy environment, where diverse and sometimes conflicting interests meet, demonstrates why immediate policy results in european research policy have been slower and less visible than expected by some. the process, however, has had distinctive outcomes, characterized by change in policy discourse, rearrangement of policy networks and collective learning. these changes provide the prerequisites that enable broader shifts in policy making to take place. review of european and russian affairs 7 (2), 2012 13 shaping policy discourse the start of the omc process marks a significant change in the broader development of the eu’s research and innovation policy. the omc was introduced and applied to research policy three years after the adoption of the lisbon strategy, in 2003. as noted by van vught (2010) the omc created an additional context for european policy making in the field of research. up until 2003, the european research policy had a very limited scope and was mostly operating in the cycles of the framework programs (fps), providing financial resources to the member states based on their research proposals. the omc process served as a trigger for the start of a gradual shift for the dg research from operating as a funding agency towards becoming a policy developer and leader for shaping the european research area. an ec policy maker reported: research policy at the eu level was largely sort of monolithic affair. about every five years a new fp was adopted and the only policy discussion was what is the next set of thematic priorities going to be to fund research. so basically research policy at the eu level revolved around funding instruments and so the policy was no more than just a tactics or the strategy of the funding agency. with the start of the omc process, the member states were provided with the formal and politically authorized setting to actively participate in the development of eu research policy. an opportunity to work via omc created high expectations among the ec policy makers as well. it was seen as a process leading to results in areas where the commission had no legal power for interfering. as in the field of research the power of the ec to shape national level policies was quite restricted and the hopes for the omc to shape the policy developments in all of the areas were high. as an ec policy maker recalled: “basically the omc when it was first applied to research was seen as the way of doing policies beyond funding a research”. one of the first and significant policy discussions marking the change in policy discourse involved the issue of human capital—the researchers. researchers’ mobility was thoroughly discussed with the country representatives with respect to recruitment challenges, social security issues, visa problems, and training opportunities. this discussion produced several policy documents that were adopted by the commission including the development and endorsement of “the european charter for researchers” and “the code of conduct for the recruitment of researchers” –two policy documents promulgated in 2005. 3 this shift in policy discourse was regarded by the ec expert as follows: you see, this was already something… that there was clearly a development of something a little bit more sophisticated than just a funding program. in addition to developing several new policy documents that helped to guide and govern the implementation of european research policy, the early steps taken through the omc process triggered noteworthy organizational changes at the eu level as well. one example of this is a setting up of a european level discussion forum aiming for developing large-scale research infrastructure projects – esfri (european strategic forum for research infrastructures). as noted in the comment below, the process did not involve representatives from every member 3. for the charter and code of conducts see http://ec.europa.eu/eracareers/pdf/am509774cee_en_e4.pdf 14 review of european and russian affairs 7 (2), 2012 state (probably due to a limited resource capabilities), nevertheless it was a step towards facilitating collaborative policy discussion that eventually led to over thirty different research partnerships with diverse pan-european interests represented. they were putting in place a strategic forum called esfri european strategic forum for research infrastructures. /…/ esfri and the whole process that has kicked off, has led to a gradual development in a project of a eu level that is really improving the efficiency and the effectiveness with which member states set about developing a new scale of research infrastructures. (ec policy maker) some evidence on the shift in policy discourse at national level as a result of the omc is also apparent. for example, a representative from hungary described the lengthy process of getting people to think about possible collaborative synergies along the lines of research innovation when applying for infrastructure funding. this shift happened as a result of organizational change, where a specific administrative body was set up to coordinate the most efficient use of finances. one expert recalled: i think it took about three or four years to have this coordination body set up. but finally it happened./…/ the aim was to coordinate and build synergies between the programs [framework program and the structural funds] and of course coordinate the funding./…/ it is really difficult, it was a totally different mindset to coordinate these effects because the purpose [of these programs] was totally different. after establishing this coordination body, the situation certainly improved. people began to think about the different sources of funding and the different purposes. another expert from sweden recalled how the participation of the omc expert group drew attention and raised the topic of research funding above the other discussion topics related to research. as a result of active participation in the omc group, the variety of ways in which the funds could be used to better facilitate innovation became apparent and triggered intense policy discussions at the national level. the expert recalled: the most important was that people started a long time discussion after many years when we discussed the next fp and the next sf. how could we do this better this time. i am not sure we have been successful but it is a little bit higher up in the agenda compared to the last time when we were working with the fp. several experts noted that participation in the omc process helped partially strengthen or give an incentive for better focus of a policy discourse taken at the national level. for example, the expert from germany noted that knowledge received from the omc survey and subsequent discussions were applied to the further development of their national internationalization strategy in r&d. the same was confirmed by the expert from austria. a representative from norway argued that in this work, they were expecting to strengthen the international cooperation dimension of their national policy directions: review of european and russian affairs 7 (2), 2012 15 there was an expectation and potential for [country] to move from the more sort of initial ways of making international cooperation to a more deep and a more long term cooperation with larger commitments. these examples illustrate the contributions omc has made towards initiating policy discourse or strengthening an existing policy conversation both at the european and national level. organizational change, inserting and maintaining focused policy discussions, initiating collaboration among diverse stakeholders, and taking the leading role in enhancing the european research policy are just some signals of the impact the process has had. clearly, the omc has not been the sole mechanism for enhancing research policy in europe, but it has definitely triggered several significant developments that cannot be ignored. shaping policy networks the findings show that the omc process marks a novel way of establishing networks of experts and policy makers that did not exist before. these networks serve as additional channels for distributing information horizontally (among the area experts but also among the policy departments within the commission) and vertically (between the ec and national ministries). this information includes knowledge of each other’s needs and capabilities, as well as discovering ways for further collaboration. as noted by gornitzka (2010), interaction between sectors that are built on different principles is a fundamental dynamic of change. eventually it can result in radical change if goals, interests, understandings, and actors from one sphere occupy another. the intent to develop research policy that would be responsive to a wide array of policy issues and is based on increased cooperation, could be regarded as an operation on different principles. the start of the omc process created a situation where the commission had to provide leadership for initiating broader policy discussions, a role that dg research had not fulfilled before. this created a situation where cooperation and additional knowledge from other units and departments in the commission was needed. as an informant recalled: you suddenly had an array of policy issues where dg research, in order to try to move ahead with eu research policies, found itself now in building up linkages and dialogues with a lot of the other policy departments in the commission. something that it didn't have up until that point. there was no real sort of discourse with the other because dg research has and still is considered to be a baby, an infant, something that is only beginning to grow, in terms of policy. on one hand the dg research experts had to start building linkages among the relevant policy units, but on the other hand it began to facilitate processes where member states representatives could get together for knowledge-sharing purposes. one of the first settings that were created for that purpose was the era-net scheme– a virtual network of national research councils, working voluntarily to enhance cooperation in areas of research and innovation. an ec expert who was involved in setting up this process emphasized the value of such an initiative: we established era-nets as a way to help public authorities to discuss among themselves, not at the level of diplomats, but at the level of the program managers in 16 review of european and russian affairs 7 (2), 2012 the member states. they actually never met before, these guys! the era-nets were quite successful because they allowed people to share practices, how do you design, how do you implement, how do you evaluate program, how do you launch a proposal, what criteria do you use? and this whole thing at a very working level broke ice and allowed convergence of practices. another example of strengthening policy collaboration between the member states and the eu is the establishment of the strategic forum for international collaboration (sfic) advisory body an instrumental outcome of the policy recommendations made by the omc expert group in “internationalization of r&d with third countries.” the forum is currently composed of highlevel political representatives of the member states and the european commission. it aims at facilitating further development, implementation, and monitoring of the international dimension of european research area for joint research initiatives with partners outside europe. the country experts’ view on the omc initiatives where opportunities were provided for creating a space for policy discussions and learning has been seen as most positive. several experts emphasized the benefit of meeting each other through the working group: one of the good things about this group was that we met. we had this opportunity to meet each other and to discuss common problems, which we had and decide how to go together or how to plan cooperation. the most important thing is that the networking not only between the member states but also with the commission officials, so you have that knowledge how expertise is shared and this is the most important thing in this exercise. the discussions provided them with a chance to share their experiences, get to know each other, and openly discuss relevant issues. many of these discussions apparently resulted in further strategic collaborations. interdependence from each other’s resources and knowledge helped to pave way to productive joint initiatives: with the germans and the dutch we developed very strong ties. we even used one of their programs, so we had a lot of talk on how it worked and what were the conditions and how it was different in [country] and what we could do about it. (country expert) there is an example among romanian-german cooperation in india. some part of this shared contract will be done in romania and some in germany. you don't have to double the effort to gain something. (country expert) clearly, the omc has served as a start for further horizontal collaborations. if the need arises, area experts know who to contact, where to search for additional information or expertise, and how to act collaboratively. experts have created a powerful network that is held together by shared knowledge and contacts created through the omc. collaborative policy making has become the principal policy making model in research policy. the creation and maintenance of a professional network provides a framework for an expert to be involved in the epistemic community that helps building legitimacy to influence and shape policy discourse (haas 1992). review of european and russian affairs 7 (2), 2012 17 the initiative taken by the dg research for broader cooperation has lead to a situation where other units have begun to notice the developments taking place in research policy. the broader eu level policy discussions gradually began to include research and innovation initiatives among their strategic goals to fulfill the general vision for the region. in the europe 2020 strategic policy document, research and innovation is included as one of the flagship areas for securing economic growth. this goal could be fulfilled through vertical collaboration, where individual experts play an important role in disseminating knowledge and gradually shaping mutual understanding for further steps needing to be taken for policy enhancement. collective learning in a collaborative dialogue, stakeholders and the views they represent can learn about one another’s interests and problems, and they can change the way they view their own interests (connick and innes 2001). hartlapp (2009) notes that omc instruments provide distinctive contributions to learning, differentiating among 1) learning from one’s experience, 2) learning from the experience of others, and 3) learning with others in a problem-solving setting. the findings indicate that policy learning in omc working groups takes place in all of these categories. learning involved not only hearing what others were doing, but also becoming more knowledgeable of one’s country’s policy approach in comparative perspective. evidence from learning from one’s own experience was mentioned in regards to the groundwork that needed to be done when preparing for the meetings. the expert discussions involved a significant amount of preparation (collecting and synthesizing data, preparing presentations, and providing data and feedback based on their country-specific knowledge). these preparations provided a means to understand one’s own situation better and then compare it with others. as was noted by one informant, this process involved engaging with the task and then “learning by doing” occurred: we made presentations of national policies and national instruments, and initiatives in the research cooperation area, and that formed the basis for a discussion on similarities and differences regarding the approach to internationalization of research. /.../ i think it was very useful to benchmark of what we are doing in [country]. we provided information on what we do in [country], how we do it and why we do it. we presented the whole policy framework that provides direction to our efforts in the internationalization of research, we also presented some experiences in certain areas./…/ it was a very useful experience. learning from the experiences of others was stated as a crucial motivating factor in participation at the working group. the experts gained knowledge in terms of learning about the policy ideas of others, processes that might have led to a policy result and the specific programs that others have successfully introduced. the following quote sums up the various learning expectations that came together: there was an interest to learn how do they apply international collaboration, international programs for instance. what are the objectives behind the instruments, the tools to implement international cooperation. 18 review of european and russian affairs 7 (2), 2012 the informants provided several concrete examples of the ideas that in their opinion were useful to take on board. the cases, for example, included new ideas on how to enhance research cooperation in future: we took ideas on board for example from france, switzerland and uk. there were ideas in particular on science diplomacy, which influenced our thinking. we took some ideas on board that we experienced from other countries, how they organize it. especially with science councilors, we didn't have or we only had one science councilor, i think, we put more emphasis on having science councilors in other countries as well. learning about the processes involved several examples of know-how on how best to set up new programs or how to conduct productive lobbying in the eu circles to get a policy idea through: in the case of the omc group on fiscal measures where there was a very fruitful exchange, really detailed information on how fiscal incentives measures were set up in the different member states. (ec policy maker) in the expert group i learned, for example, how to promote our research capacities in the best way in brussels because it is no use to promote just your own capacity, but you must join forces with the others, the other countries, so now we work usually together. (country expert) there were a few examples of program learning where, during meetings, the expert was convinced that research cooperation with a particular country was important and needed to be enhanced. based on the experiences of other member states, where a specific cooperation was regarded as beneficial, the idea of initiating a new partnership was expressed “india should be one of the target countries for us, it was one of the target countries of this working group of internationalization.” the omc primarily operates based on learning from the experience of member states using best practices and benchmarking. however, a few references were made regarding learning not only from the best practices, but from the policy failures as well. hearing about the failures was something not often discussed in the group. understanding the factors and mechanisms why a policy approach did not succeed, was regarded as crucial for learning experiences. as a country representative reflected: i was particularly very happy when somebody told about their failures. they talked about how things didn't work and why they didn't work. /…/ because sometimes you can learn more from the failures then from the successes, what didn't work. collaborative learning experiences were apparent not only among the country experts; the participants of the commission also found the experience equally enriching. their learning included testing out policy ideas and being knowledgeable about the specific situations in the member states in order to make suggestions and further policy recommendations. as the review of european and russian affairs 7 (2), 2012 19 capacity to collect current information in a rapidly changing environment is essential, first-hand contacts with member state representatives provide valuable means for doing that. several comments by the commission representatives made this point: for a commission it was also an informal forum, a kind of test its own ideas in front of member states in an informal way, especially as i said as we were preparing commissions communication. so we tested some ideas with the member states. anything that has been generated in the omc is de facto relevant to eu policy. we have to know our member states, we have to know the policies and so on. learning with others is regarded in terms of created mutual understanding among participants, developing reciprocity, and collaborative relationships. the importance of mutual learning was expressed in terms of creating ownership of the policy ideas and recommendations. several informants noted the value of creating shared standpoints: it is important [to facilitate learning]. what we need to do is… we need to get ownership of the agenda into the hands of the people of the member states, that's what ultimately going to make things happen at the local and regional level. and if you don't have that ownership, you can forget it. people share the agenda, they own the thing, and then there is a collective willingness and understanding about what it is that needs to be done. overall, the findings point to the collective acceptance and ownership of policy ideas. therefore, the improved capacity for innovation should be regarded in terms of pooling knowledge, gaining the ownership of policy recommendations, and a better understanding of the diversity of views, all necessary requirements for taking the development of the eu’s research policy forward. that can happen only in mutual collaboration and contribution by the member states. conclusion and discussion this paper focuses on analyzing the contributions of the omc expert groups to the eu’s research policy through mutual learning activities. the main critique of the omc has been that due to its “soft-law,” voluntary and non-binding character, it does not affect the member states’ polices and policy making. as there are no significant sanctions involved, other than peer pressure and naming and shaming, the member states’ governments are not committed to follow the policy recommendations. the argument often made is that there have been no concrete indications of change in national policies. nevertheless, member states and the european commission representatives have expressed an interest to continue with policy learning, as they find it a useful and flexible means to harness the benefits of cooperation (warleigh-lack and drachenberg 2011). this paper argues that the impact of the omc process should be understood in terms of less visible and broader changes in the dynamics of policy making. the paper examines changes in terms of restructuring policy discourse, restructuring policy networks and promoting 20 review of european and russian affairs 7 (2), 2012 collaborative learning. at the beginning of this paper, a tentative hypothesis was presented suggesting that diversity and interdependence enhance an authentic dialogue. the findings indicate that the diversity and interdependence found in the policy environment are significant conditions for policy learning and policy change to happen. the variety of opinions and experiences made the process enjoyable as the experts engage in the debate and a process of learning. the fact that experts discussed not only best practices, but also policy failures indicates that the trust was built among the participants. another factor indicating the presence of an authentic dialogue is the fact that everybody had an equal opportunity to speak and was listened is. clearly, the role of the chair in handling the process is very important. as the group needed to come up with the final policy solutions, interdependence is present when aiming for a solution. this outcome correlates with gornitzka’s (2010) suggestion that differences in stakeholders’ views, interests and goals serve as a fundamental driver for policy change. the second hypothesis suggested that the omc process influences policy discourse at multiple levels. the findings reveal that there has occurred a change in policy discourse both at the european level and at the national level. the most visible change resulting from the omc expert group discussions was apparent in a shift towards initiating broader policy discussions at the commission. the input received through the omc discussions from the member states served as a trigger in becoming more than just a funding agency, but providing strategic policy directions for taking the eu level research policy forward. in the national dialogue there were also perceptions indicating heightened attention towards the topics discussed in the omc working groups as well as strengthening policy discourse that had been recently taken by governments. these developments indicate how ideas distributed through omc policy conversations have the power of fostering policy ideas further. the question remains how the balance of policy interest is maintained so that the view of every participant is equally respected and represented. the third hypothesis that proposed formation of new policy networks through the omc process got confirmed. the omc expert groups serve as one of the mechanisms for establishing unique policy channels for distributing policy relevant information. area experts and policy administrators in the field of research policy did not have the opportunity to meet each other and discuss practices before. these contacts seemed to continue in several cases after the group work had officially ended. these omc expert groups have allowed information to flow horizontally between governments of the member states, between area experts and the commission policy makers from different units. they have also enhanced vertical information flow between the commission and the member states. experts as professionals participate in the process to build up professional knowledge, which allows them to increase their authority locally. for the ec representatives, the involvement of diverse stakeholders helps to project the idea of inclusiveness and transparency in decision making. research and innovation policies have been sensitive discussion topics among the eu member states for decades. scientific cooperation has been traditionally viewed as enhancing the competitiveness of the nation states where member states are not eager to hand decision making capacity over to the european union (gornitzka 2009). the fourth hypothesis stated the presence of learning through the omc. through collaborative learning practices, member states have expressed openness to share ideas and talk about challenges through their participation in the omc initiatives, an activity that was absent before. evidence was presented in terms of learning about policy ideas, programs and processes that have contributed towards policies at national level. overall, the most important contribution of the omc expert groups is that it review of european and russian affairs 7 (2), 2012 21 provides a formal setting where diverse interests can be presented, discussed and learned from. in this process of collaboration, the participants build trust, become aware of the various arguments and gradually build common understanding, necessary for taking a policy dialogue forward. as noted by innes and booher (2003) the processes of collaborative dialogue helps to create a more adaptive and intelligent policy system in general. to conclude, the omc might not have created visible immediate shifts in terms of policy change, but it has definitely built a strong foundation for policy transformations in the future. acknowledgements the author would like to thank professor hubner, professor sá, professor hayhoe, and one anonymous reviewer for their most valuable comments and feedback that helped improve this paper. in addition, the author is truly grateful for the country experts and the ec representatives’ willingness to share knowledge and expertise on the omc process. references ansell, chris, and alison gash. 2008. “collaborative governance in theory and 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dam, 253–73. brussels: p.i.e. zito, anthony r., and adriaan. schout. 2011. “learning theory reconsidered: eu integration theories and learning”. journal of european public policy 16 (8): 1103–23. correct citation: tamtik, merli. 2012. “rethinking the open method of coordination: mutual learning initiatives shaping the european research enterprise.” review of european and russian affairs 7 (2): 1–24. published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada. available online at: www.carleton.ca/rera/ rera is an electronic academic peer-reviewed journal that publishes graduate, post-graduate, and young scholarly works. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is a joint project supported by the canada-europe transatlantic dialogue—a cross-canada research network supported by the social sciences and humanities research council of canada (sshrc)—along with the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies (carleton university) and its associated research unit, the centre for european studies. rera aims to provide an accessible forum for research, to promote high standards of research and scholarship, and to foster communication among young scholars. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada tel: +01 613 520-2600 ext. 1179; e-mail: rera-journal@carleton.ca creative commons license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ this working paper is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial no derivs 3.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 3.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced provided the source is acknowledged. no use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes. issn: 1718-4835 © 2012 the author(s) http://www.carleton.ca/rera/ mailto:rera-journal@carleton.ca microsoft word frédéric mérand and stefan gänzle_introduction.doc review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 2/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 1 ……………………………………… introduction frédéric mérand and stefan gänzle review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 2/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 2 it is our great pleasure to introduce this special issue of the review of european and russian affairs devoted to the external relations of the european union. the three articles selected for this issue deal with some of the most central topics of this particular policy area: the development of a strategic culture in the eu and its member states (as compared to the united states), the eu involvement in stabilizing the south-eastern balkan, and, last but not least, the european neighbourhood policy (enp) and ukraine in matters of migration management. all of them provide in-depth insights into the growing importance of the eu’s actorness in international relations. the contributions were written by promising young scholars, who first presented their work at the young researcher network (yrn) conference in victoria ion may 18, 2006, and then agreed to undergo the painful peer-review process that is the hallmark of rigorous scientific publishing. the first article deals with transatlantic relations. based on a careful and thorough reading of the european union’s security strategy and the united states’ national security strategy, benjamin zyla, royal military college of canada, makes the provocative argument that, beyond the rhetorical fights, eu and us security strategies are in fact quite similar. couched in terms that former president woodrow wilson would have recognized as his own, these official documents “are alike in their messianic approach to create a better world and to enhance global order”. it follows from zyla’s interpretation that it is incorrect to characterize europe as a civilian power and the us as a military one or, to use the now famous bon mot, europe as venus and the us as mars. by and large, the two “share very similar strategic objectives”. although the author admits that there are minor gaps (for instance in terms of long-term visions), zyla states that the differences have been overplayed in academia and the media and may just reflect spin. if zyla is right, the demise of the transatlantic relationship may be further in sight that many believe or would like to believe. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 2/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 3 one may dispute zyla’s conclusions and point out that while europe and the us may agree on the ends – that of a liberal, democratic order – they strongly differ on the means. pierre hassner, for example, argues that the bush administration is promoting a special kind of liberalism, which he calls “wilsonianism in boots”. that is quite different from brussels’ approach of “effective multilateralism”. nevertheless, zyla has written a sophisticated essay, and his argument is well worth reflecting upon. while the fact that the two security documents are similar does not mean that the actual policies are the same, he is right to insist that we should not overplay their differences. zyla’s paper is a sobering reminder that we often read a text in the way we want to read and understand it. with the second article, we move from transatlantic to west-east relations, specifically the eu’s relations with serbia and montenegro. marko papic sets out to analyze the role played by the eu in drafting the serbia and montenegro state union constitution. the eu’s role, papic argues, often bordered on direct intervention in domestic affairs. brussels went “beyond conditionality” in assuming a pro-active – in fact determining – role of “constitutional engineering”. to test this hypothesis, papic unfolds a thickly descriptive account of the brussels’ involvement in the constitutional process. his account highlights the crucial role of javier solana, the eu’s high representative for the common security and foreign policy. the theoretical contribution of papic’s article is superb: his case suggests that the importance of “supportive strategies” in harnessing eastern european countries to the west may have been underestimated in the growing literature on eu-spurred conditionality, which emphasizes reinforcement by reward and (soft) coercion. in addition, papic gives an interesting twist to the constructivist argument of socialization. he shows that, in the process of democratic socialization, brussels may actually have learned more than belgrade did. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 2/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 4 socialization and lesson-drawing, two concepts that have been given special importance by the constructivist school, are not necessarily a one-way street. last but not least, lyubov zhyznomirska’s article takes us firmly onto the constructivist terrain. zhyznomirska uses the example of ukraine to demonstrate how the eu is exporting the burden of international migration management to neighbouring countries. this has the probably unintended effect of destabilizing societal security in these countries which, like in the case of ukraine, lack the administrative or institutional capacity to deal with problems posed by illegal migration. zhyznomirska’s argument relies on the critical constructivist notion of “securitization”, whereby migration issues are increasingly constructed as security threats that require repressive measures. the case of the ukraine suggests that this securitization strategy has a cost, which is borne by the states least capable of supporting it. critical constructivism has often been accused of being high on theory but low on empirics. zhyznomirska avoids this pitfall as she weaves an elegant argument that follows the “securitization” thread to illuminate a rigorous description of the eu’s external policy with regards to migration, ukraine’s adaptation to it, and the complex relations between the two. the three articles include in this special issue demonstrate the richness of canadian scholarship on european affairs. while pluralistic in their theoretical approaches, they share a commitment to rigorous, empirically-based research, with clear policy implications. review of european and russian affairs 8 (1), 2013 issn 1718-4835 © 2012 the author(s) www.carleton.ca/rera europeanization in eu external relations after the eastward enlargement: complications and bypasses to greater engagement with the eastern enp countries ivan f dumka university of victoria abstract: emphasizing poland and its relations with ukraine, this paper applies a europeanization framework to examine the uploading of external relations policies by eu members. it argues that as enlargement has shortened the list of countries to which the eu has made membership commitments, normative entrapment will not be at work in its external relations, nor address the more fractious nature of eu decision-making brought on by a larger and more diverse membership. this results in strategic behaviour by eu members and more laboured decision making, which can be expected, in general, to complicate the eu’s external relations. simply put, the coalition building that is so central to eu policymaking is more difficult following the eastward enlargement. however, because the new members vote, collaborate, and build coalitions in favour of closer ties to these eastern neighbours, complications from enlargement should be far less pronounced in the eu’s eastern policy than with other enp countries. this comes despite striking shortcomings by poland in the administrative capacity and elite socialization that normally characterize those member states who often succeed at projecting their preferences onto eu policy. all of this means that one can expect an eastward shift in the focus of the eu's external relations, and a deepening of its differentiated approach to external relations. review of european and russian affairs 8 (1), 2013 © 2012 the author(s) www.carleton.ca/rera introduction1 it is common to read about enlargement as an instrument of the eu’s external relations, but much less so about the feedback effects that it has upon the union itself (e.g. schimmelfennig and wagner 2004). this is perplexing, given that changes in membership alter the interests and priorities behind the eu’s external relations, and end up changing the dynamics of decisionmaking in the union itself. likewise, there is a growing emphasis in the academic literature upon the eu as an international actor with a distinct legal character and defined interests, and in possession of some substantial inducements for other international actors, such as access to the single market. if this is so, then these changes in the eu’s interests and priorities, as well as how it pursues them are important indeed. considering as well that the eu is often seen as a transformative power (grabbe 2006), these changes in the focus of its external relations may have important implications for countries in its neighbourhood. problematic in this literature, however, has been an inattention to some of the subtleties and asymmetrical effects of these changing dynamics. indeed, much of the recent literature has focused upon how enlargement fatigue and the lack of credible accession prospects for european neighbourhood policy (enp) countries has limited the eu’s influence abroad. certainly, enlargement fatigue has been an important consequence of the eastern enlargement, and the resulting absence of accession prospects limits the tools available to the eu. however, this obsession with enlargement becomes problematic when one considers that the stock of candidate countries is finite, and that the academic literature must now engage with enlargement in more circumscribed terms, i.e. in terms of the few remaining ‘hopefuls’, rather than as a broad field. similarly, while the eastern enlargement has brought a distaste in the eu for further enlargement in general, differences in the mix of interests guiding its behaviour, and changed decision-making dynamics as a result of new membership can be expected to affect any future enlargement and relations with different countries unevenly, a subtlety less prominent in the current literature. conversely, the portion of the academic literature concerned with detailed casework has been insufficiently attentive to how the eastern enlargement has affected the eu’s external relations more broadly. moreover, while scholars of europeanization have turned their attention to the new member states, and more recently to foreign policy, much of this work considers the domestic impact of european policy upon the new member states, rather than the reverse (e.g. sedelmeier 2008, 2011). indeed, while scholars are keenly aware of the ways in which enlargement has redefined the eu’s immediate neighbourhood (e.g. debardeleben 2008), less attention has been given to the new members themselves, and their role in reweighting the union’s interests concerning its near abroad. this is an important shortcoming considering that the eastward enlargement brings with it new members whose interests can potentially have important effects upon decisions made at the european level. this paper takes up the question of the eastward enlargement, applying a europeanization framework to examine the ways in which it has impacted the eu’s external relations, with special emphasis upon the role of poland in the eu’s relations with ukraine. this research was completed prior to november 2013, and while it focuses on events prior to the protests in ukraine, the findings of this paper have important implications in the current context as well. 1 the author would like to thank dr. amy verdun for her feedback on early versions of this paper, and graeme b. crouch for his thoughtful and thorough advice on subsequent versions, as well the two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and constructive critiques. review of european and russian affairs 8 (1), 2013 3 likewise, this paper will touch upon issues with belarus and moldova, but ukraine’s size, economic weight, strategic importance, and, until recently, stable if unsavoury political system have all made for closer scrutiny, with the implication that data on the country’s ties to the eu have been more forthcoming than with belarus and moldova. for the same reasons, closer ties to ukraine would have larger implications for the european union and for other countries in the eu’s neighbourhood, making a study of eu-ukraine relations more pressing than with the other two. on the other hand, while poland is exceptional among the central and eastern european countries (ceecs) for its weight in the eu, its preferences for greater eastern engagement and the ways it pursues them are still, by most accounts, typical of the eu’s new eastern membership. at the same time, poland has been the centrepiece of collaborations with the other eastern members, as well as with older eu members on relations with the eastern enp countries, making it the ideal window into these interactions between eu members on external relations. this paper argues that, while along more established measures of uploading capacity, poland and the ceecs hardly appear as ‘pace-setters’ in börzel’s (2002; 2003) parlance, adjustments by polish policymakers in brussels and administrative changes in warsaw suggest that this may change over the longer term. more interestingly, however, it is in a less-explored area of policy uploading, namely coalition-building, that poland and the ceecs’ accession may be most consequential in the near-term. this is to say that, as enlargement has shortened the list of countries to which the eu has made strong commitments on membership, the normative entrapment and rhetorical mechanisms that so facilitated its dealings with accession countries will not address the complications that arise in the eu’s decision-making with a larger and more diverse membership. indeed, eu commitments on accession are ill-defined or absent with respect to these neighbours, even if select members such as poland are quite supportive of their joining the eu. this results in strategic behaviour by eu members, coupled with more laboured decision-making that has come with the addition of more members, which can be expected, in general, to hinder and complicate the eu’s external relations. in other words, the eastern enlargement complicates the coalition building that is so important to policy uploading. however, poland and these new members tend to be highly active in external relations, bringing pre-existing ties to eastern non-eu members, a strong and shared interest in deeper engagement with them, and well-established fora for collaborating to this end. this means that complications from enlargement should be far less pronounced in the eu’s eastern policy than in its dealings with other enp countries. all of this means that, while their influence over external relations has much potential to grow, so, too, can we expect to observe more dialogue, and proposals for deeper engagement with the eastern enp countries than would otherwise be the case. in short, because of the way poland and the ceecs have affected coalition-building and decision-making in the eu, one can expect an eastward shift in its external relations. the paper is structured as follows: following a brief survey of the literature of europeanization in foreign policy, it argues that while there are discernible effects upon the means by which poland frames and pursues its foreign policy goals, eu member states retain nationally distinct preferences in external relations. much like in other policy areas, members’ success in policy uploading turns on their administrative capacity and coalition-building skills. to that end, the paper then considers each of these factors in turn. in the second section, it examines the role of polish administrative capacity in its attempts to upload policy to the european level, noting that this has traditionally been a hindrance to the uploading of polish preferences, although it is improving. in the third section, it argues that a larger membership review of european and russian affairs 8 (1), 2013 complicates coalition building at the european level, which in turn makes decision making in external relations more laboured in general. in the fourth section, it argues that these complications are less onerous in dealings with the eu’s eastern neighbours, in particular because poland and the ceecs share an interest in greater engagement with these countries, and because they consistently lobby, consult, vote, and build coalitions to that end, with the effect that the focus of eu decisions on external relations can be expected to shift eastward. two sections consider in turn the empirical and theoretical implications of these findings, while a final section concludes. europeanization and external relations while the literature on europeanization is very well-developed, in the area of external relations it has been only lightly applied. after briefly reviewing existing work on europeanization, this section turns to work that focuses on europeanization in external relations. as this section notes, studies of europeanization concerning external relations, as well as those of poland and the ceecs, have tended to be dominated by work on downloading and compliance with eu policy. on closer inspection, this is surprising, in that while uploading, downloading, and socialization mark europeanization studies in external relations, just as in other areas, it is uploading that warrants special attention, but has largely been overlooked. it is with this in mind that this section turns in greater detail to the literature on uploading. as wong has pointed out, europeanization in foreign policy is novel because the policy area is most often considered as one reserved for states (wong 2007: 321). nonetheless, the eu also fits awkwardly into traditional international relations theory, where consequential policy and unique dynamics at the european level coexists with national foreign policies, rather than supplanting them (wong 2007: 321). europeanization scholars have attempted to capture this interplay between distinct national preferences and consequential decisions taken at the european level, and much like in other policy areas, europeanization applied to foreign policy entails three interrelated processes, namely downloading, uploading, and socialization (wong 2005, 2006, 2007; major and pomorska 2005; gross 2009). downloading in foreign policy is a top-down process by which national policy is adapted to suit policy made at the european level (wong 2007: 325; pomorska 2007: 27). some have associated this with policy convergence (harcourt 2003; wong 2007; wong and hill 2011; gross 2009), although other scholars have found that the extent and the effects of this adaptation vary among member states (börzel and risse 2000; wallace 2000; menz 2011). likewise, socialization refers to a process of ‘cultural hybridization’, whereby close and continued contact between national officials operating in brussels imparts changes in their preferences and identities, creating officials who act in both their national and the broader european interest (hill and wallace 1996; smith 2000; wong and hill 2011). with respect to both downloading and socialization, a key point of interest has been whether this affects the procedures by which member states pursue foreign policy, or the actual substance of the policy itself (wong 2007: 322; pomorska 2011: 169). by contrast, uploading in foreign policy, as in other policy areas, entails a bottom-up process of promoting national foreign policy priorities by inserting them into decisions made at the european level. indeed, member states have a number of incentives to project national policy onto european-level decisions, in that converting national policy into european policy increases their influence and may lower costs associated with pursuing controversial policies (wong 2007: review of european and russian affairs 8 (1), 2013 5 328). likewise, uploading policy maximizes an individual member’s benefit by matching european policy more closely to national preferences, while also lowering compliance costs (börzel 2002: 195). some scholars in the europeanization field, such as menz (2011), conceptualize the europeanization process as a bidirectional one, with both uploading and downloading processes interacting. certainly, this is borne out in the casework on poland. for instance, pomorska and wright have observed that, in foreign policy, polish officials in brussels have had better success in pursuing national objectives by adopting more moderate positions than those in warsaw might like (pomorska and wright 2013: 157). this is to say that polish attempts at uploading policy to brussels have had feedback effects upon polish policy, and nor is this limited to poland. indeed, müller notes a similar moderating effect of european foreign policy upon national foreign policy initiatives of germany (müller 2011) and france (müller 2013), for example. pomorska goes still further, finding that in external relations, some downloading by newer members may be a necessary condition for effective uploading. this is to say that some institutional adaptations are necessary to allow national policy-making processes to effectively interface with those at the european level (pomorska 2011: 169). she notes that for poland, this has begun to happen already, and that these adaptations to policy-making processes have made for slow, but important steps forward in its attempts to upload substantive policy to the european level (pomorska 2011: 173). certainly, past work has considered uploading and downloading processes as interrelated, as in börzel (2003). similarly, work by menz (2011) has linked uploading and downloading by conceptualizing the europeanization process as a multi-level game. the examination of the ceecs by pomorska (2011) and the subtle distinction between procedures and substance by wong and hill (2011) instead casts the relationship between the two not just as a ‘reciprocal’ one, but as a symbiotic one when it pertains to procedures being downloaded. likewise, pomorska’s observation that early polish attempts at influencing the european neighbourhood policy had foundered because its policymakers had yet to master ‘playing the brussels game’ (pomorska 2011: 175) suggests a similar role for elite socialization as an important catalyst in the uploading process. with all of this said, however, several scholars, such as wong and hill (2011) and pomorska (2011) have argued that in foreign policy, eu member states do retain distinct national interests, even if they have become more apt to frame them in european terms. likewise, while pomorska (2011: 170) has noted that the process of downloading in foreign policy has helped to produce a convergence in policy-making procedures, for example in restructuring and decentralizing the ministries of foreign affairs in some new members, in substantive policy, convergence among european member states has been ‘patchy and uneven’ (pomorska and wright 2013: 158), while member states’ strategic objectives are not significantly impacted by engagement with other eu member states (pomorska 2011: 173). as such, where the most aggressive policy uploading occurs where there is a misfit between national and eu foreign policies (pomorska and wright 2013: 160), the eu’s combination of diverse national foreign policies with a uniform eu policy leaves ample scope for a misfit between them. as wong notes as well, this uploading process is particularly important in external relations, where decision-making tends to be far more bottomup than in other policy areas (wong 2007: 330). this suggests that it is through member states jockeying to project their preferences onto eulevel decisions that the europeanization process is best captured in external relations. however, it is exactly this uploading process that has been less developed in the recent literature on review of european and russian affairs 8 (1), 2013 europeanization where new member states and external relations are concerned. where the ceecs are considered, the attention of much scholarship in this field has been on the domestic impact of eu policies (e.g. börzel and risse 2012; schimmelfennig and sedelmeier 2004; grabbe 2006), and variations therein (for example, in knill and tosun 2009; bauer, knill and pitschell 2007; zubek 2005). likewise, work on external relations has come to emphasize compliance with eu conditionality in candidate and enp countries (for instance, schimmelfennig and sedelmeier 2004; sedelmeier 2008, 2011; kelley 2004; levitz and pop-eleches 2010; noutcheva and aydin-duzgit 2012). in other words, much of the europeanization literature concerning poland and the ceecs, as well as eu external relations, has been dominated by studies of downloading. to be sure, recalling pomorska (2011) and others, uploading and downloading processes are interrelated, although these studies largely overlook the uploading process, as well as the subtle distinction between substantive policy and policy-making procedures that has allowed some scholars to capture the interdependent relationship between the two. in their approaches to uploading, börzel has divided member states into ‘pace-setters’ who actively attempt to shape eu policy in a given area, ‘foot-draggers’ who seek to block eu policy or extract side-payments as part of its passage, and ambivalent ‘fence-sitters’, who may form coalitions with either ‘pace-setters’ or ‘foot-draggers’ depending upon the issue (börzel 2002: 208). what distinguish the three are their incentives for initiating common policies, and their ability to articulate and promote them at the european level. for börzel, this is primarily determined by member states’ level of economic development (börzel 2002: 194), where economically-developed states are more likely to have complex policies and exacting regulatory standards at home and prefer to see the same at the european level, while those with lessdeveloped economies and regulations will find this overly onerous. likewise, these same economically-advanced member states are more apt to possess the necessary staff power, as well as access to information and experts to promote their interests at the european level than less advanced members (börzel 2002:199). this separates the pacesetters who actively promote common european policies from foot-draggers and fence-sitters. certainly, while an emphasis on economic development as a key feature distinguishing eu member states seems apropos in börzel’s (2002, 2003) rendering of uploading in the field of environmental regulation, this maps awkwardly onto uploading in external relations. indeed, pomorska and wright find that in foreign policy, states are most apt to be aggressive about uploading where there is the largest misfit between eu policy and member preference, and where an issue is considered highly important by a specific member, irrespective of their level of economic development (pomorska and wright: 2013: 160). having said that, comments by pomorska (2011: 170-3), among others, do suggest that in external relations, administrative capacity plays a similar role as in börzel’s (2002) work, although this also suggests, contra börzel (2002), that in external relations there may exist member states who lack the ability to upload, but who nonetheless have clearly-defined national policies in the area and an ambition to upload them. crucially, börzel also points to member states’ coalition-building and interestaccommodation skills as an important determinant of their success in uploading policy (börzel 2002: 199-200; börzel 2003: 7). she notes that dutch policymakers’ knack for formulating ‘complicated, tailor-made compromises’ has made them highly influential in some areas (börzel 2002: 200), although this point has been less fully explored in these writings or subsequent ones. indeed, far less attention has been given to the final steps of the uploading process, i.e. the review of european and russian affairs 8 (1), 2013 7 dynamics surrounding the actual decisions that are made at the european level, although howell (2004) and schimmelfennig (2001, 2009) are exceptions. briefly, europeanization in foreign relations turns on the interaction of socialization, downloading, and uploading. previous work has found evidence of both socialization and downloading in external relations, but has also found that this has most impacted the procedures by which member states pursue their interests, and that in terms of the actual substance of foreign policy, member states do retain distinct interests. what this implies is that europeanization in external relations is much more marked by bottom-up processes, but this is precisely where the literature has explored the least, particularly with respect to coalitionbuilding. the next sections take up this question of uploading, administrative capacity, and coalition-building in external relations with respect to poland and the ceecs. polish administrative capacity and eu external relations firstly, while by most measures, one might expect poland and the ceecs to behave as footdraggers in the eu’s external relations, on closer inspection, their position is rather more nuanced. as this section argues, on well-developed measures of uploading capacity, especially administrative capacity and staff power in brussels, as well as elite socialization, the necessary adaptations and downloading of procedures needed to effectively influence eu policy have happened only slowly. as one might expect from börzel (2002), in some cases, poland has indeed engaged in obstructing and seeking side-payments, especially on the eu’s southern and turkish policy (szymanski 2007: 552). however, poland and the ceecs are hardly opposed to new policy at the european level, as one might expect of a foot-dragger. nor are they pragmatically ambivalent on external relations, as one might expect of a fence-sitter. in fact, poland and the ceecs are active and consistent promoters of greater engagement with the eastern enp countries. put another way, rather than foot-dragging or fence-sitting, poland and the ceecs have clearly been attempting to set the pace in eu external relations, but are only slowly developing the means to do so. this suggests that on these more traditional measures of influence, the impact of the eastward enlargement is limited, although administrative reforms and the slow process of elite socialization also suggest that the eastern members may become much more influential in the future. as börzel has argued, those member states who have the largest role in shaping policy at the european level tend to be those with access to a large bureaucratic staff, information, and policy expertise, and that their aim of projecting their preferences onto european policy is often furthered by offering expertise and seconding experts to brussels (börzel 2002: 200). by contrast, foot-draggers tend to lack staff power, specialized information, and area-specific expertise (börzel 2002: 205), which limits their ability to articulate their preferences and to participate effectively in the negotiation process at the european level. on this measure, poland most closely resembles the latter. dangerfield’s point about extensive exchanges with ukraine on a bilateral basis and under the auspices of the visegrad group, for instance, suggests much expertise in dealing with the country (dangerfield 2009: 1744). however, poland struggles to deploy this to good effect, with shortages of staff and skills, as well as weak cooperation between offices in warsaw and brussels. it also struggles to deploy their staff power effectively in brussels itself, although some scholars have noted that all of this is beginning to change. as pomorska has noted, conducting an independent foreign policy is a relatively recent development for poland, a point readily apparent in the acute staff review of european and russian affairs 8 (1), 2013 and skill shortages characteristic of the ministry of foreign affairs through the 1990s (pomorska 2007: 31). indeed, there has been a recent and significant expansion of the staff dealing with eu issues, although this process really only began in earnest after accession (kaminska 2008b: 12); copsey and pomorska have also emphasized substantial recruitment challenges in the public service (copsey and pomorska 2010: 316-7). while the presence of polish foreign-policy experts in brussels has expanded significantly since accession (kaminska 2008a: 2), peterson stresses the slow absorption of polish administrators into the brussels bureaucracy itself (peterson 2008, 771). furthermore, the irony noted by pomorska that the expansion of poland’s brussels offices has precipitated staff and skill shortages in the ministry of foreign affairs, which is central to developing poland’s position on the eu’s external policy in the first place, is a cruel one (pomorska 2007: 40). all of this has been compounded by a notable generation gap between new staff, who appear much better-suited to dealing with eu policy and policymaking, and remaining pre-1989 hires who tend to be less adept at dealing with eu affairs (copsey and pomorska 2010: 316-7). just as importantly, several scholars have noted that the organization of polish foreign policy staff has limited its ability to upload policy to the european level. this is to say that the process of adapting polish policy-making procedures to suit eu external policymaking has been a slow one. kaminska observes that administrative changes are evident in every government body engaged with eu issues since accession (kaminska 2008a: 2), although jakubek has argued that decision-making procedures surrounding poland’s foreign policy are still too complex to be effective when dealing with the eu (jakubek 2008: 12). likewise, developing and executing a coherent strategy on the eu’s external relations has been undermined, not just by weak coordination between the ministry of foreign affairs and other key participants in the process, like the committee on european integration (copsey and pomorska 2010: 315), but by active competition between these bodies (pomorska 2007: 35; copsey and pomorska 2013: 14). some have pointed to a similar mistrust between polish officials based in brussels and their warsaw-based counterparts (pomorska 2007: 42; copsey and pomorska 2013: 18). all of that being said, kaminska’s point about recent changes in most institutions handling european policy (kaminska 2008a: 2), and others’ about expanding the staff and developing the expertise behind polish proposals on the eu’s external policy, are all well taken, and do suggest a much larger role for them in the future. at present, however, copsey and pomorska conclude that on the basis of administrative capacity, an older member such as france is likely to be far more influential, pointing to its success in promoting the union for the mediterranean (ufm) as an example (copsey and pomorska 2010: 320). similarly, several scholars have pointed to limited elite socialization as a hindrance to polish uploading that has been slow to erode. as kaminska has noted, prior to accession, most of the contact between polish and eu officials occurred at a high level between political staffers, with very little engagement between the polish civil service and permanent staff in brussels (kaminska 2008b: 15). indeed, the process of socialization of polish policy elites only began in earnest following accession (pomorska 2007: 39). consequently, the process of coming to terms with policy-making procedures in brussels, and in engaging with permanent staff from other eu member states has been a difficult one, and one that has limited their ability to influence the eu’s external policy. the experience of polish staffers in brussels has aptly been described as a case of ‘culture shock’ (pomorska 2007: 35), although kaminska’s point that a lack of socialization was because of a lack of contact between polish administrators and eu review of european and russian affairs 8 (1), 2013 9 administration (kaminska 2008b: 15) casts it as a problem unlikely to persist, with poland now a full member of the eu. while poland does not fit the profile of a pace-setter, with its limited administrative capacity and still-developing brussels-savvy, its strong preferences for more advanced policy at the european level do not mark it out as an obstructive foot-dragger, while its consistent and persistent attempts to promote a stronger eastern dimension in eu policy seem at odds with the pragmatic ambivalence of a fence-sitter. in some respects, this is not surprising, recalling pomorska and wright’s point that a member state is most apt to be aggressive about uploading where there is a large mismatch between eu policy and its preferences (pomorska and wright 2013: 160), and dangerfield’s point that quite a bit of the eu’s eastern policy was designed by the eu-15 prior to the 2004 enlargement, rather than by the new members (dangerfield 2009: 1739). as copsey and pomorska have noted, poland has indeed voiced particularly strong preferences on eastern external relations (copsey and pomorska 2010: 311). furthermore, all of the major polish parties favour deepened ties with eastern non-members, making for only small changes in poland’s position between elections (copsey and pomorska 2010: 312-3). likewise, a larger eastern dimension to eu policy is consistently popular among voters (kaminska 2008a: 5; szymanski 2007: 556), which would seem to suggest that there is no electoral advantage for polish political parties in opposing closer engagement with ukraine. interestingly, some of poland’s more ardent positions on ukraine mirror those of the electorate, sometimes to the point of alienating potential allies among the other member states (jakubek 2008: 8). all of this is borne out in poland’s consistent advocacy of greater engagement by the eu with its eastern neighbours. poland began advocating in favour of closer ties between the eu and ukraine even prior to accession (copsey and pomorska 2013: 3; ganzle 2009: 1720). while the eastern partnership is perhaps the most conspicuous attempt by poland and others at deepening the eu’s eastern engagements, poland has in the past been quite assertive on this point, for example on having ukraine declared a market economy, or on visas (pomorska and wright 2013: 160). more interestingly still, in their european policy, polish foreign policymakers are more apt to be criticized for an excess of ambition than the reverse (jakubek 2008: 8; copsey and pomorska 2013: 4). in short, along traditional measures of uploading capacity, specifically administrative capacity and use of expertise, poland’s ability to effectively upload its preferences is very limited, although over time this may change. however, it also does not behave like a foot-dragger or fence-sitter, as it is consistently pursuing initiatives at the european level, sometimes to the consternation of potential allies. what this suggests is that the impact of the eastward enlargement upon what gets uploaded in external relations is relatively small. as the next sections argue, however, the enlargement has had important effects upon coalition-building and decision-making processes that are likely to result in an eastward shift in the focus of the eu’s external relations. heterogeneous membership and laboured decision-making in external relations while on most measures of uploading capacity one might expect that, for the time being at least, the impact of the eu’s new members should be relatively small, it is in the dynamics surrounding coalition building that the eastward enlargement is likely to be the most consequential. certainly, while a number of authors (following schimmelfennig 2001) explain review of european and russian affairs 8 (1), 2013 the eastern expansion of the eu as the result of its prior commitments to admit those countries that subsequently joined, following the accession of the eastern members, the eu has no such commitments outstanding with most enp countries. this section will argue that at the same time as clear norms and rhetorical action (schimmelfennig 2001) will not facilitate integration with enp countries, new membership diversifies the eu’s interests, and in turn complicates the resulting strategic behaviour by members on external relations. this has the effect, in general, of making eu decision-making more laboured, and the process by which member states upload their preferences in foreign policy more difficult. elaborating his concept of rhetorical action into ‘rhetorical entrapment’ (2001), schimmelfennig argues that states still pursue national interests, but channel them through eu norms (schimmelfennig 2009: 502), which can favour closer ties with non-members whose behaviour and past eu commitments resonate with eu norms. this may serve to commit normbound member countries to courses of action that defy a more narrow reading of their interests. however, entrapment requires favourable external conditions, and eu norms that are determinate, i.e. that are clearly stated, providing unambiguous policy prescriptions, and that are ‘relevant’, or salient in the eu’s dealings with a given country (thomas 2009: 346). in his earlier work, schimmelfennig (2001) argued that these norms and the resulting rhetorical entrapment were crucial to explaining the opening of accession talks with what are now the eu’s eastern members, despite the incongruence of expansion with the preferences of several member governments. this is to say that with these countries, eu norms had been ‘determinate’ and ‘relevant’, in that the eu had previously made clear commitments to them around the opening of accession talks, which was actively pursued by some member states and the countries in question. youngs, however, contrasts the eu’s contact with recent members with its relations with other neighbours, as no such norms on accession exist in the eu’s dealings with most enp countries. in these cases, no clear commitments on eu membership were ever made to enp countries, which, as youngs (2009: 371) points out, results in strategic behaviour by member governments towards these countries, rather than the norm-bound cooperative behaviour that resulted in closer ties to several ceecs and their eventual accession. certainly, normative entrapment played a role in eu support for the orange revolution in ukraine, but youngs (2009: 373) insists that this speaks to eu norms on promoting democratization, which does not extend to closer ties, to say nothing of accession. he notes elsewhere that most decision-making by member states on eu policy towards ukraine have been driven by strategic calculation, and not constrained by eu norms (youngs 2011: 45). moreover, the short time since the accession of poland and the other ceecs has not been sufficient to affect eu norms or commitments on external relations (copsey and pomorska 2010: 305). all of this is to say that towards the eu’s eastern neighbours, and most of the enp countries besides, the sorts of norms surrounding membership that helped facilitate closer ties and eventual accession for the ceecs are either absent or ill-defined. this carries the implication that for the foreseeable future, members’ decision-making will continue to be bound by strategic calculation, rather than facilitated by norms. at the same time as the pre-requisites for rhetorical entrapment are not present in the eu’s dealings with most of its neighbourhood, the recent rounds of enlargement have complicated the decision-making processes governing the eu’s external relations. this is what verdun (2005), for instance, has in mind when she notes that enlargement has presented challenges for the governability of the eu. indeed, where new initiatives, such as partnership agreements and the review of european and russian affairs 8 (1), 2013 11 like, require council approval, absent the catalyst of rhetorical entrapment, a larger and more diverse membership makes gaining this approval far more difficult. with this in mind, zimmer, schneider, and dobbins point to more complex voting patterns because of the more heterogeneous interests represented in council votes. they also point to the more ad hoc nature of council coalitions on matters of external relations as a result of a larger membership (zimmer, schneider, and dobbins 2005: 415). also complicating matters are the sheer number of possible coalitions for various initiatives. where member consent is a necessary condition for eu action, one can expect decision making in general to be more fractious, inconsistent, and laboured as a result of the eastward expansion. this is to say that the process of uploading national policy to the eu level will, in general, be slower and far more difficult as a result of the ceecs’ accession because of the challenges that it poses for coalition building. indeed, as members can be expected to behave strategically (youngs 2009: 371), these considerations become especially pertinent in the eu’s dealings with its neighbours. at the same time as decision-making has become more complex for the european union, the new members have also tended to favour greater protectionism in trade, which often manifests itself in a preference for more regulation (zimmer, schneider, and dobbins 2005: 415), a point echoed by elsig (2010). this means that the larger acquis that results makes legal harmonization far more challenging for countries seeking to deepen their ties with the eu. it also means that one of the more enticing incentives available to the eu in its dealings with non-members, i.e. access to the single market, is less appealing to target countries than it might be otherwise, while the protectionist impulses at the root of this development mean that it will be offered less willingly by the eu in any case. in sum, the eastern enlargement greatly reduced the number of external countries with whom the eu has ‘determinate’ and ‘relevant’ norms on accession. this means that the rhetorical entrapment that facilitated dealings with the new members is largely absent, while the additional members themselves have also made the strategic behaviour that has resulted far more complex. indeed, the heterogeneity of new interests introduced into council voting, as well as a preference for more and increasingly elaborate regulation, complicates both the eu’s ability to make decisions about its external relations, and makes the harmonization that is so central to eu conditionality increasingly difficult. in other words, their accession poses new challenges for the coalition-building process that is so crucial to uploading. ceec preferences and bypasses to enhanced eastern ties while the complications and lack of favourable norms governing the eu’s external relations following enlargement may be a hindrance to uploading in eu external relations in general, the new membership brings preferences and a willingness to collaborate that alleviate some of these difficulties in the eu’s dealings with its eastern neighbours, although not necessarily with other enp countries. the fact that poland and the new members are increasingly adept at coalitionbuilding should accentuate this dynamic. this section will argue that while the addition of new members has made eu decision making more cumbersome in general, these difficulties are far less pronounced in its dealings with the eastern enp countries in particular. this is to say that while the ceecs’ accession makes uploading a more fraught process, it also makes the uploading of their preferences in particular much less difficult. review of european and russian affairs 8 (1), 2013 certainly, a number of authors are correct to point out that the eastern expansion has been a key contributor to recent enlargement fatigue (e.g. ganzle 2009: 1717), and still others for pointing out that the lack of credible accession prospects may limit compliance with eu conditionality (kelley 2006). however, not only does the eastern enlargement bring fresh geopolitical considerations for the eu as a whole, but the eu’s new members also bring with them a specific, and crucially, a shared interest in greater engagement with the western newly independent states (nis), specifically ukraine, belarus, and moldova (dangerfield 2009, 1739). this means that to the extent that they pursue these goals consistently, and are willing to collaborate in pursuit of them, the more laboured decision-making that, in general, can be expected to accompany a larger membership, should be less pronounced on issues relating to the eu’s eastern neighbours. under these conditions, the heterogeneity of interests and weak, fractious coalitions that hinder eu decision-making more broadly should be less salient in its eastern policy, and hence, less of an impediment to it. for instance, trade ties to the eu’s eastern neighbours are particularly strong among the baltic countries, as well as poland, slovenia, romania, and hungary (dabrowski 2011: 188). as dabrowski notes, while much of these countries’ trade is with other eu members, the share of these countries’ trade with the nis countries is, unsurprisingly, well above the average for the eu-27 (dabrowski 2011: 188). in addition to having deep trade ties with its non-eu neighbours, particularly ukraine, poland’s poorest regions are in the east, and would be the largest beneficiaries of closer ties with its neighbours (copsey and pomorska 2010: 312). although this dynamic is particularly pronounced with poland, this is also the case with some of the poorer regions of romania and hungary (eurostat 2012: 2). with all of that said, fritz cites in particular limits on cross-border activity under schengen as being especially restrictive to economic growth in these border regions (fritz 2005: 205). with this in mind, where deeper trade ties are one of the objectives of their dealings with their eastern neighbours, one expects the protectionist impulses that the ceecs display in the eu's dealings with other enp countries to be far less acute, as well. similarly, dabrowski, among others, cites common experiences in the 20th century as contributing to poland’s preference for closer ties with the nis. dabrowski highlights the shared, albeit varying experience of communism in the 20th century, but also the common experience of inclusion in the russian empire prior to the first world war. he also points to cultural and linguistic linkages between several eastern eu members, poland chief among them, and some of their neighbours (dabrowski 2011: 186). thinking along these lines, szymanski finds common experience behind polish promotion of bulgarian and romanian accession despite prophetic questions over the extent of their compliance with the convergence criteria (szymanski 2007: 553). furthermore, while she sees them as overblown, fritz cites concerns among the ceecs that their divergence from the nis may constitute a new partition of the region (fritz 2005: 193), while in security and border control in particular, new members bear the worst of ill-considered eastern policy (dangerfield 2009: 1739). this dynamic is particularly acute in migration policy, for instance. indeed, as migration across the eu’s eastern border has grown substantially, contra concerns in mature members states about immigration, many irregular and illegal migrants from the eu’s eastern neighbours, for geographical, cultural, and linguistic reasons settle in its eastern members (dabrowski 2011: 189). this has the implication, firstly, that these countries bear the worst of the eu’s limited success in collaborating with the nis on migration, and, secondly, that review of european and russian affairs 8 (1), 2013 13 these countries have a strong, and crucially, a shared interest in pursuing visa agreements and other avenues for legal migration with these countries (dabrowski 2011: 189). with all of this in mind, polish elites tend to favour ukrainian accession more than older member states (szymanski 2007: 549-50), while many of the new member states share these preferences (dangerfield 2009: 1739). in other words, with their goals of deeper ties and the opening of accession talks with the eu’s eastern neighbours, the ceecs certainly add a new flavour to the interests acting upon eu’s external relations. all of this creates compelling incentives for active involvement in eu foreign policy making, as well as concertation to that end by the new members. crucially, in council voting and coalition building on external relations, polish elites have acted consistently on these incentives. indeed, poland has been extremely active in council in promoting ties with ukraine, even if this has become more challenging after the 2006 ukrainian elections (szymanski 2007: 551), and doubtless more difficult still following the presidential election in 2010. nonetheless, poland has responded to these setbacks by pushing for greater incentives for compliance and the opening of membership talks with ukraine as a means of consolidating the gains of the orange revolution (youngs 2011: 45). youngs notes that while these proposals met with strong opposition from germany, the compromise solution saw ukraine being offered more of the acquis (youngs 2011: 42). similarly, while poland has been far less active in promoting closer ties to turkey and the balkan states (szymanski 2007: 556), it has also attempted to use the turkish accession talks as a precedent for opening similar discussions with ukraine (szymanski 2007: 552). just as importantly, the new member states’ shared interest and willingness to collaborate on deepening engagement with eastern neighbourhood countries defies the fragmentation that would otherwise be expected with a larger membership. indeed, contrary to the fractiousness that might be expected among member governments on relations with other enp countries, the new members have had a degree of success in collaborating among themselves to influence the eu’s external relations. thinking along these lines, dangerfield, for instance, cites the example of the visegrad group, which was originally created by the czech republic, hungary, poland, and slovakia to coordinate their progress towards eu accession, but which has been converted to promote closer ties to other nis countries (dangerfield 2009: 1737-8). this group has been found pushing for closer eastern ties than envisioned under the enp, as well as encouraging the accession aspirations of ukraine in particular (dangerfield 2009: 1741), and pushing for enhanced incentives for these countries, such as greater access to the single market, and fewer travel restrictions. certainly, while its activities towards russia have been limited, in coordinating their positions on its other eastern neighbours, it has only become more active (dangerfield 2012: 964; fawn 2013: 346-7). it has also become a vehicle for engaging with other member states, with meetings between the v4 on the eastern partnership coming to include sweden, romania, bulgaria, and the baltic states, for example (dangerfield 2009: 1743). in any event, this push to allow a large neighbour such as ukraine greater access to the single market is even more striking when one recalls the more protectionist bent of most ceecs. dangerfield points to the visegrad group’s facilitation of the eastern partnership as one of its most important achievements (dangerfield 2009: 1742), notable in particular for its inauguration despite french and german uneasiness. furthermore, at the same time as the group has lobbied for a more comprehensive eastern strategy, it has actively collaborated with nis countries, with information sharing and bilateral review of european and russian affairs 8 (1), 2013 exchanges intended to facilitate compliance with eu conditionality, both bilaterally through twinning projects, and through meetings organized under the auspices of the visegrad group (dangerfield 2009: 1744, 1749). while new member states have been keener to engage with ukraine, belarus, and moldova, and keen to collaborate among themselves, poland in particular has had a degree of success in building coalitions in favour of enhanced eastern engagement with older members, where it had previously struggled (youngs 2009: 362-3). this is to say that, alongside longstanding collaboration with the other ceecs, poland increasingly has the tools to navigate the added complexity that its accession introduces into eu decision-making processes. early polish attempts at influencing the eu’s external policy tended to be overly ambitious and failed to resonate with other members (copsey and pomorska 2013: 4). this stands in contrast with the eastern partnership, which though seemingly less ambitious than the union for the mediterranean, won support for its smaller scope and incremental approach, as well as subtle couching of the issue in terms of ‘regional cooperation’ (copsey and pomorska 2013: 5-6). the eastern partnership was notable as well because it was the product of a newfound willingness to collaborate with sweden. in other words, not only has poland been more willing to present its preferences in the form of more moderate and more broadly appealing policies (pomorska and wright 2013: 157), but it has also become more adept at promoting them by engaging other members. with this in mind, jakubek labels poland as an ‘awkward partner’ through its early years as an eu member because of a confrontational approach to eu policy (jakubek 2008: 8), while copsey and pomorska are hardly alone in pointing out that the adversarial style of the kaczynskis has served to isolate the country at times (copsey and pomorska 2010: 318), taking a high-profile split with germany over a 2006 veto of a partnership and cooperation agreement with russia as a case in point (copsey and pomorska 2010: 313). nonetheless, copsey and pomorska also note that it is in coalition building and ‘persuasive advocacy’ where poland has improved most dramatically (copsey and pomorska 2013: 12). as such, they are also not alone in noting that a more conciliatory approach since the formation of the post-kaczynski government in 2007 has marked a turning point in poland’s relations with other eu members, notably germany (copsey and pomorska 2013: 13). likewise, polish representatives in brussels are increasingly adept at framing issues in terms of community interests, where previously they had struggled to present their preferences persuasively (copsey and pomorska 2010: 317). copesy and pomorska have expressed reservations about poland’s newfound collaborative streak, questioning whether or not the practice will become institutionalized (copsey and pomorska 2013: 20). nonetheless, on policy towards ukraine, poland has had recent success in coordinating with austria and the uk, as well as the scandinavian countries (youngs 2009: 3623). its new relationship with sweden has proved fruitful, not only through mutual support for shared interests, but also because it has offered polish policymakers the opportunity to learn from swedish counterparts more seasoned in navigating the policy-making process in brussels (copsey and pomorska 2013: 20). all of this means that not only has enlargement brought new interests and pre-made coalitions in favour of greater eastward engagement, but that they also resonate with the interests of some existing eu members. indeed, one wonders whether these interests of these older members would have found expression in eu policy absent the support of the eu's eastern membership. in brief, defying the fragmentation and laboured decision making that would be expected to mark relations with other enp countries, the common interest in greater eastern engagement review of european and russian affairs 8 (1), 2013 15 among the ceecs redresses some of the challenges in council voting and coalition building that have accompanied enlargement, at least when addressing relations with the eu’s eastern neighbours. with respect to ukraine, these countries have enjoyed a degree of success in collaborating both with each other, and with older eu members on deepening ties. all of this means that the challenges of an expanded membership should be less pronounced in relations with ukraine, moldova, and belarus than with other neighbourhood countries. this has the implication that as a result of the eastward enlargement, these enp countries in particular can be expected to be the focus of more eu external agreements than with other enp countries. empirical implications thus far, this paper has argued that the changes that the eastern enlargement has brought to decision making in the eu should contribute to an eastward shift in its external relations. this section argues that the eastward enlargement and the resulting attentiveness to the nis are likely to deepen the eu’s differentiated approach to its neighbours, but may also help redress the eu’s problems with ambiguous goals, and the weak incentives it extends to achieve them. this is certainly not a guarantee of success in its dealings with its neighbours, but these changes do help redress some of the self-imposed limitations upon the eu’s policy towards its eastern neighbours. while the ceecs have been most keen to indulge and promote the accession aspirations of eastern neighbours, chiefly ukraine, some of the more substantial advances in european external relations with other neighbourhood countries, particularly the union for the mediterranean, explicitly rule out eventual membership, a point that some authors find has soured relations with these southern neighbours (ozcurumez and bolukbasi 2011), and which does suggest limits on the degree of possible integration between them and the eu. dangerfield’s point that the ceecs’ continued interaction with western nis countries serves to strengthen bilateral ties (dangerfield 2009: 1744), and that the reluctance of the ceecs to explicitly rule out eventual accession by these countries, suggests that closer eastern relations driven by the new members may have feedback effects that would encourage still further engagement with eastern enp countries, but that are not present in relations with southern enp members. the irony is cruel, indeed, when considering how several mediterranean countries’ prospects for making progress on the democratic and human rights indicators stressed by eu conditionality have improved dramatically as a result of the arab spring, in contrast developments in ukraine and belarus occurring at the same time. furthermore, while the eu has deliberately avoided making commitments on accession in its dealings with enp countries, one wonders whether these deepening ties to the east, as well as active support by the ceecs for opening membership talks with the eastern enp countries, might, with the exception of the balkans, make the opening of talks more likely in the east than elsewhere. with this in mind, while the european neighbourhood policy initially took a similar view of future expansion as the ufm, dangerfield also points out that this was because the enp was designed by the eu-15 prior to the eastern enlargement, and doesn’t reflect the influence of the new members (dangerfield 2009: 1739). at the same time, the fact that the visegrad group, for instance, in drawing a distinction between ‘neighbours of europe’, whose integration with the eu it does not promote, and ‘european neighbours’, who it does, suggests that very different assumptions about the ‘neighbourhood’ underlie eu-12-sponsored initiatives (dangerfield 2009: 1741). this is especially striking in light of this paper’s argument that these initiatives stand to be relatively more prominent in the eu’s external relations. review of european and russian affairs 8 (1), 2013 furthermore, the policy implications of these differing assumptions may have crucial and unintended consequences for the eu's response to current events. the eu-15's explicit rulingout of accession for mediterranean neighbours would seem to suggest limits to the depth of its willingness to engage with them, and the credibility of its long-term commitments to them. by contrast, the unwillingness of the eu-12 to rule out accession for the eastern neighbours would seem to suggest that despite the gravity of events in north africa since 2010, these changes seem unlikely to alter this pattern of greater eastern engagement in eu external relations. moreover, while the eu struggles with credibility problems and with limited receptivity by neighbourhood countries because of a lack of clear accession prospects for these countries, dangerfield in particular has pointed out that the bilateral ties between the ceecs and these eastern neighbours have helped redress problems with receptiveness, particularly with respect to ukraine (dangerfield 2009: 1744). interestingly, these exchanges have helped to deepen the sort of bilateral ties between the ceecs and their eastern neighbours (dangerfield 2009: 1744) that help account for their interest in deeper engagement in the first instance. in other words, this interest in deepening ties with the eastern enp countries, and the ways in which the new members pursue them, are mutually reinforcing. this would seem to suggest room for further strengthening of ceec preferences for closer ties with their neighbours at the expense of engagement with other enp countries. none of this is to suggest that holding the continued attention of the eu necessarily alleviates the internal problems, many of them quite substantial, which have hampered the progress of these eastern neighbours on eu conditionality in the past. needless to say, successful deepening of formal ties through the meeting of eu conditionality depends very much upon factors outside of the eu's direct control, and even authors with the most optimistic outlook on ukraine’s compliance, for instance, note the significant internal complications working against compliance with eu conditionality (e.g., fritz 2005: 207). despite the optimism immediately following the orange revolution, halting progress on compliance with eu conditionality and an erratic balancing of relations with the eu and russia are more the rule than the exception for a succession of ukrainian governments (pentland 2007), a point reiterated by the behavior of the former yanukovych government. the same may be said of belarus, whose internal and external politics perpetually leave it closer to sanctions than to greater cooperation with the eu (pentland 2007: 130). this comes despite growing interest in engagement on the part of the european union since 2008-9 (bosse 2009: 216). the lack of receptiveness on the part of belarus is such that bosse goes so far as to suggest that it challenges the hitherto-accepted notion in the academic literature that the eu’s ability to extend its rules and norms is a given (bosse 2009: 217). while increased attention should not be conflated with increased cooperation and successful engagement, the influence of the ceecs does help redress some of the pathologies in the eu’s approach towards its eastern neighbours. for example, pentland notes that weak membership prospects have consistently placed limits on ukraine’s receptiveness towards the eu’s overtures, even before the 2004 enlargement (pentland 2007: 140). similarly, dabrowski summarizes the position held by many in the field that the effectiveness of the enp has long been limited by the combination of weak incentives and exacting expectations placed upon nis countries for reforms and cooperation (dabrowski 2011: 195). bosse also notes that, belarusian intransigence aside, relations with belarus have been hampered by an incoherence in the eu’s goals, with persistent clashes between its strategic-economic goals and its normative-ideational ones (bosse 2009: 219), and nor are relations with belarus unique in this respect. the opening of accession talks review of european and russian affairs 8 (1), 2013 17 with ukraine, or belarus and moldova, for that matter, seems unrealistic in the foreseeable future. however, it is noteworthy that the ceecs have consistently worked in favour of opening talks, and show no signs of relenting on eu membership for these countries. short of opening accession talks, the ceecs have pushed consistently for greater incentives to be offered to their eastern neighbours. offering incentives such as improved market access and concessions on visas likely benefit these members as much as their neighbours. where they succeed in translating this impulse into eu policy towards their eastern neighbours, the ceecs’ influence may help address the problem of weak incentives offered to the eastern enp countries. at the same time, whereas for the rest of the eu, ultimate goals of integration with ukraine have traditionally been ill-defined, the ceecs’ preference for closer ties as an end in itself does lend an element of clarity in the eu’s eastern policy that would otherwise be absent. briefly, the changes in eu decision-making dynamics as a result of the eastward enlargement carries the likely implication of deepening the eu’s differentiated approach to its neighbours, with its eastern neighbours being the beneficiaries of greater eu attention at the expense of its southern ones in particular. moreover, while greater attention by the eu should not be confused with greater success in its eastern policy, greater coherence and a preference for more generous incentives do help address some of the traditional shortcomings of the eu’s eastern policy. theoretical implications while the focus of this article has been empirical, some theoretical implications of its findings are evident. this section argues that coalition building has been under-examined in the europeanization literature, while it is not just the capacity and coalition-building skills that matter, but the presence of other members with complimentary preferences that help define states’ success at uploading. it also argues that a more nuanced understanding of administrative capacity and the relationship between uploading and downloading are evident in a study of the ceecs that might not have been obvious to past researchers. firstly, coalition building in the europeanization literature has been underappreciated as a determinant of successful policy uploading. indeed, while it finds a place in even early formulations by börzel (2002; 2003), it is far less developed in this early literature and subsequent work. to be sure, while foundational work in the area predates the 2004 and 2007 enlargements, subsequent work pointing to the complications that the larger membership has brought make redressing this in future research all the more pressing. likewise, what the ceecs’ shared interest in greater eastern engagement suggests is that not only do the intrinsic features of a given member state matter for their success in uploading policy, but the policies themselves and the extent to which they resonate with other members matter as well. put another way, the literature singles out as successful uploaders member states with access to staff, expertise, and a talent for ‘selling’ their preferences to other members (börzel 2002; 2003), but this suggests that another catalyst might be the presence of other member states with strong and similar preferences on an issue. it also suggests that members’ uploading success may vary systematically by policy area, even if their staff are equally numerous and coalition-building skills just as sharp between issue areas. furthermore, what the influence of the visegrad group also suggests is that not only complimentary preferences, but institutionalized fora for collaboration and well-established networks between eu member states may be consequential, as well. this is further to crouch’s observation that the ‘middle-level’ in the europeanization process, i.e. links between governments through bilateral exchanges or review of european and russian affairs 8 (1), 2013 transnational actors, has been given insufficient attention by europeanization scholars (crouch 2013). moreover, a closer examination of poland’s administrative capacity suggests some additional subtleties not fully articulated in the literature. the fact that some scholars have noted in poland a consistently strong interest in its eastern neighbours, as well as extensive experience in dealing with them, both historically and in the form of recent bilateral exchanges (dangerfield 2009: 1744), would seem to suggest that they possess the sort of area-specific expertise that characterizes a pace-setter. likewise, in numbers at least, the polish civil service and its presence in brussels has expanded dramatically (kaminska 2008a; 2008b). an examination of the polish experience suggests (as in copsey and pomorska 2013; jakubek 2008; kaminska 2008b; pomorska 2007), that the way in which expertise and staff are marshalled matters as well, in two respects: firstly, to the extent that large staffs spread out over multiple offices in the capital and in brussels coordinate their efforts effectively, and secondly, to the extent that staff are organized and behave in a way that is compatible with the unique policy-making processes in brussels. in other words, administratively, there is a distinction to be made between ‘capacity’ and ‘capacity for uploading’. finally, what these struggles with administrative reform also highlight is the importance of the relationship between uploading and downloading. this has been characterized as a reciprocal one, and certainly, past scholarship has hardly been ignorant of the fact that the two interact. nonetheless, these struggles in poland to adapt not just to the finer points of the acquis, but also to refashion their policy-making machinery recalls two subtleties less considered in the current literature. the first is the distinction made by wong and hill (2011) between the downloading of substantive policy and downloading policy-making procedures, and the second, that among new members and concerning procedures, a certain degree of downloading is necessary to be able to upload effectively. this is not a distinction that would be readily apparent in earlier literature that considered first and foremost older eu members with more mature administrative systems and policy-making processes as their window into the europeanization process. nonetheless, it does underscore that the relationship between uploading and downloading is not just reciprocal, but in some cases symbiotic, which is all the more significant given how acute the issue of adapting policy-making procedures, and not just transposing the acquis, has been in both recent and potential eu members. in summary, this article’s findings suggest that coalition building has been underappreciated in the existing literature following enlargement, while the preferences of other members, and not just the characteristics of an erstwhile uploader, are important, as well. furthermore, additional subtlety is needed in treating administrative capacity, while greater sensitivity in subsequent work to the distinction between policy-making procedures and substantive policy would better capture the symbiosis between uploading and downloading. conclusion in conclusion, while one can expect the impact of the eastward enlargement upon the eu’s external policy to be small on measures of administrative capacity and elite socialization, its impact upon coalition building may be far more consequential. the eastward expansion can be expected to complicate the eu’s relations with neighbour countries because of more complex interactions between members. because it has explicitly avoided the sort of commitments that review of european and russian affairs 8 (1), 2013 19 might lead to rhetorical entrapment, this can be expected to be less of a hindrance to the eu in its dealings with ukraine in particular, but also with moldova and belarus, than with other enp countries. indeed, the ceecs bring a strong preference for enhanced ties to these countries, and have had a degree of success in collaborating amongst themselves to this end. this simplifies the strategic behaviour necessary to facilitate ties between the eu and these countries, making the process of uploading an eastern dimension to the enp less laboured. all of this means that the shared preferences and collaboration of the new members bypass a number of difficulties that they introduce into the eu’s external relations, so long as they centre upon its eastern neighbours. hence, the eastward enlargement of the eu encourages an eastward shift in eu foreign relations by introducing complications that hamper decision making in general, but not dealings with the eastern neighbours in particular. this means that one can expect to observe more activity on the eu’s part in the form of dialogues and proposed initiatives focused on the eastern enp countries than would otherwise be the case. in closing, while this paper has argued that attempts at deepening engagement will be more frequent as a result of the eastern enlargement, this does not necessarily suggest that these engagements will be fruitful. the successful 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policies: towards europeanization?, eds. reuben wong and christopher hill (new york: routledge 2011): 1-18 zimmer, christina, gerald schneider, and michael dobbins, “the contested council: conflict dimensions of an intergovernmental eu institution”, political studies 53 (2005): 403-22 zubek, radoslaw, “complying with transposition commitments in poland: collective dilemmas, core executive, and legislative outcomes”, west european politics 28 (2005): 592619 review of european and russian affairs 8 (1), 2013 25 correct citation: dumka, ivan f. 2013. “europeanization in eu external relations after the eastward enlargement: complications and bypasses to greater engagement with the eastern enp countries.” review of european and russian affairs 8 (1): 1–24. published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada. available online at: www.carleton.ca/rera/ rera is an electronic academic peer-reviewed journal that publishes graduate, post-graduate, and young scholarly works. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is a joint project supported by the canada-europe transatlantic dialogue—a cross-canada research network supported by the social sciences and humanities research council of canada (sshrc)—along with the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies (carleton university) and its associated research unit, the centre for european studies. rera aims to provide an accessible forum for research, to promote high standards of research and scholarship, and to foster communication among young scholars. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada tel: +01 613 520-2600 ext. 1179; e-mail: rera-journal@carleton.ca creative commons license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ this working paper is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercialno derivs 3.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 3.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced provided the source is acknowledged. no use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes. issn: 1718-4835 © 2013 the author(s) http://www.carleton.ca/rera/ mailto:rera-journal@carleton.ca http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ the president of the european council as leader: an application of the contingency theory review of european and russian affairs 8 (1), 2013 issn 1718-4835 the president of the european council as a leader: an application of the contingency theory dorian kroqi carleton university abstract the permanent president of the european council represents the most important institutional development in the eu during the last decade. this paper attempts to apply the contingency model of leadership, developed by schout and vanhoonacker (2001) for the study of the sixthmonth nation-state presidencies of the council of ministers, to the operation of the office of the permanent president during the current eurozone crisis. the findings from the application of the model are then related to the broader principal-agent theory. the author argues that with a nonnational and longer-serving president at the helm of the european council, there is an improved balance and relationship between the demand for, and provision (supply) of, leadership on the part of the permanent president. this, in the author’s view, has implications for the principalagent relationship that undergirds the functioning of executive institutions such as the presidency of the council of ministers. © 2012 the author(s) www.carleton.ca/rera 2 review of european and russian affairs 8 (1), 2013 introduction the emergence of a supranational permanent presidency (pp) of the european council with the entry into force of the lisbon treaty represents an important innovation in the institutional framework of the eu. at this level, the pp replaces the rotating six-month member state presidency, thus, contributing primarily to the continuity of the political process. this paper will re-propose, in light of these new developments, a contingency factor analysis that adriaan schout and sophie vanhoonacker applied to the study of the rotating presidency in a 2006 article. what the contingency approach brings to the study of the presidency are the environmental factors (the independent variables) and their influence on the demand for, and supply of, particular roles (the dependent variables). on the demand side, external variables (those related to the eu context) pull the presidency in certain directions. on the supply side, internal contingencies (related to incentives and disincentives within the domestic environment of the presidency incumbent) push the office in others. the purpose of this essay is that of addressing two questions: (1) how has the relationship between the demand for, and supply of, leadership changed with the advent of the permanent president, and (2) what are the implications of a demand/supply matching for the relationship between principal (the european council) and agent (the permanent president)? in fact, the novelty of this paper is that of bringing the concepts of demand and supply into the fold of principal-agent theory (pa theory). in this case study, a principal-agent relationship establishes when the heads of states and governments in the european council in their role as members and ultimate decision-makers appoint the permanent president as the manager of particular tasks that, when completed with competence and diligence, facilitate the political process in the european council. demand and supply determine the position and power of the agent. this, in my view, has implications over the extent to which the principal may control the agent. when dealing with the control of the principal, the primary focus is on ex-post mechanisms to the extent that they follow rather than anticipate a political process that is often uncertain and unpredictable. hence, they represent a more dynamic and complex view of the principal-agent relationship. with respect to the structure of this paper, the first section introduces the permanent presidency, its origins and the institutional context in which it is embedded. the second section deals with the meaning of leadership, the principal-agent framework in the study of the council presidency, and the extent to which such a framework may accommodate the principles of demand and supply as they are found in the contingency model. the third section revisits the theoretical framework to take into account the permanent president as a new factor. the fourth and fifth sections apply the external and internal factors contingency model to the president's activity. the sixth section discusses the relationship between demand and supply from the analysis of the fourth and fifth sections. the conclusion will look at the argument in the sixth section in the light of the principal-agent paradigm. the permanent presidency of the council both the failed constitutional treaty and the subsequent lisbon treaty institutionalized a weak permanent president of the european council as a compromise between the large and small states. according to these texts, the president was to be elected by qualified majority voting in the council for a two year and a half term, once renewable. more importantly, before taking office, he or she had to relinquish any office in his or her home state. the first person appointed, herman van rompuy in 2009, is a citizen of belgium, a small country among those opposed to a review of european and russian affairs 8 (1), 2013 3 european president out of the fear that the new institution would have become a steward for the large member states (wessels 2010). by the logic of the lisbon treaty, the permanent president is, first and foremost, an impartial manager of the procedures, and an organizer whom the heads of states and governments of the council have entrusted with handling major parts of their work in between their meetings (blavoukos et al. 2007). in the agenda-managing dimension, the work of the president of the european council unfolds in three stages. first, in cooperation with the half-year president of the council of ministers and the president of the european commission, the permanent president prepares drafts of the agenda, conclusions, and decisions of a european council meeting. these drafts are, then, debated within the general affairs council, and, in light of these discussions, the president of the european council draws up the provisional agenda, which is, then, submitted for approval at the beginning of the european council summit. the incorporation of the commission as part of the preparatory team, the inclusion of the rotating presidency, and the requirement for deliberation in the general affairs council are procedures that curtail ex-ante the permanent president’s freedom to impose him or herself as the sole leader in agenda-setting (corbett 2011a). another aspect of the permanent president’s set of tasks as a procedure manager has to do with chairing duties, which include the powers of opening (or prescribing) a voting procedure. in this capacity, the permanent presidency shapes the discussions, and, in the most difficult moments, it may act as a mediator and broker among diverging national interests. however, the power to call a vote is quite limited, given the requirement for consensus in decision-making (art. 6(1) of the rules of procedure). finally, the president serves as an internal representative for the european council (notably, through the requirement to report to the ep), and an external representative on foreign policy issues (european council decisions, rules of procedures, article 15(3); corbett 2011a). a contingency model of leadership in the study of the presidency of the council variants of the leadership theory, which originate in the negotiation literature, constitute a point of reference for a group of theory-building and theory-testing scholars who wrote about the presidency of the council of the eu (metcalfe 1998; elstrom and jonson 2000; schout and vanhoonacker 2001; elgström 2003; tallberg 2006). in this paper, i treat the leader primarily as an agent whose services are indispensable for the principals when the latter are experiencing critical collective action problems related to representation, decision-making, and/or third-party negotiation. the agent may exert structural leadership by translating his/her own material resources into bargaining leverage, entrepreneurial leadership by employing his/her negotiating skills to engineer beneficial agreements for the principal(s), and intellectual leadership by generating systems of thought that may shape the perspectives of his/her principals. at the same time, principal(s) control the agent either by defining ex ante the scope, legal instruments, and procedures available to the agent, or ex post oversight provisions (monitoring, rewarding, punishing) (young 1991; nicolaidis 2000; kiewet and mccubbins 1991). we can encapsulate these three dimensions in terms of supply, demand, and control. of concern in this paper are the first two dimensions: demand and supply. these dimensions magnify the agent’s clout, whereas the third dimension (control) magnifies that of the principal. moreover, in the first two dimensions, the agent’s performance is crucial in determining his/her position vis-à-vis the principal, when the latter comes to exert ex-post the 4 review of european and russian affairs 8 (1), 2013 mechanisms of control, most notably, the power of reappointment for a second or subsequent mandate. the principal-agent theory has been applied with particular empirical focus to the commission and the european court of justice (pollack 1995). according to this theory, demand (monitoring compliance, solving problems of incomplete contracting, increasing the credibility and impartiality of regulation, and setting the legislative agenda) creates and shapes the institutions and their functions. in turn, the principal exerts checks on the agent through a repertoire of administrative and oversight measures (the requirement for transparency, greater legislation precision against drift, the comitology system of ‘police patrol,’ judicial review or citizen action, the sanctioning of agency shirking through budget retrenchment or the power to (re)appoint, and the revision of an agent’s mandate through treaty change are all prominent oversight measures). alternatively, the agent can improve on his or her performance and enhance his or her reputation to counteract the principal’s control. the literature on the presidency of the council of ministers and the european council has tackled only the first two dimensions of the principal-agent relationship (demand and supply), and, to some extent, the third (control) with particular focus on ex-ante institutional design (for a theoretical background see fiorina and shepsle 1989; arild 1994). jonas tallberg, for instance, is one of the few scholars who engages in a serious empirical analysis of the presidency’s leadership as an agent. according to tallberg (2006), the member states experienced collective action problems (failures in setting the agenda, negotiating decisions, and representing the body visà-vis third parties). it was this situation that led to a demand for delegation, and, in particular, to the creation of an institution that would deter a breakdown in the decision-making process. on the supply side, the chair performed its assigned functions by drawing on particular power resources, such as privileged information and/or procedural control, with the aim of enhancing efficiency and, ideally, improving the welfare of all parties in the bargaining process. moreover, tallberg (2006) dealt at length with the procedural constraints that affected the functional roles of the president, such as formal agenda-setting rules (with the close cooperation of the commission) and formal decision rules (the infirming role of unanimity for the preferences of the president). the focus on ex-ante constraints that inhibited the power and freedom of the president represented an incursion into the third dimension: control. the starting point of this essay is the schout and vanhoonacker’s (2006) contingency model and the conceptualization of the president of the council in terms of the four roles he or she plays. these roles —that of an organizer, a broker, a political leader, and a national representative— serve as the dependent variables in schout and vanhoonacker’s model. the first three roles owe their genesis to yukl’s (1998) typology of leadership (respectively, task oriented, group-oriented, and transformational leadership). the duties of an organizer include planning meetings, drafting agendas, and chairing meetings. the responsibilities of a broker include sounding out member states, creating understanding, and identifying bargains. these two roles (organizer and broker) have been created primarily to prevent the three collective action failures (agenda-setting, brokerage, and representation). hence, by focusing on them, the presidency seeks to enhance organizational performance, achieve just outcomes for all group members, and pave the way to a coherent and common policy. in most cases, both demand and supply require the president to perform in these two roles. by casting his or herself in the third role (political or transformational leader), the president goes a step further to steer the deliberation and decision-making processes towards common/european long-term goals. on the other hand, as a national representative, the president takes a step back by endeavouring to review of european and russian affairs 8 (1), 2013 5 achieve or protect short-term national gains. both the third and the fourth roles imply some degree of autonomy in the policy-making process. in the group of external contingency factors that demand from the presidency an investment in particular roles, schout and vanhoonacker (2006, table 2, 10581059) include the degree to which a topic has been explored (old versus new), the lack of trust in the chair, the presence of multiple brokerage (i.e. from another member of the council or the commission), the shadow of the future (negative repercussions or failure to act promptly), and the political sensitivity of a topic (both for the council as a body). for instance, new topics may demand from the presidency a greater engagement in all the four roles, while multiple brokerage may relieve the presidency from an obligation to perform as a organizer, broker and/or political leader. the shadow of the future may bring a president to emphasize the first three roles (organizer, broker, and political leader) and forsake national gain. the lack of trust may force the president to contribute additional efforts in organization and brokerage as a demonstration of impartiality, but at the expense of political leadership or the defense of national interest. a sensitive issue leads the presidency to invest in its roles as organizer, broker, as well as potentially in political leadership, while a non-sensitive issue, ironically, reinforces both the political leader's and national representative's roles. in the group of internal contingency factors that compel the president to supply leadership (schout and vanhoonacker 2006, table 3, 1060), the two authors include four variables: the importance of the topic for a chairing country, the commitment of senior management and politicians, the preparatory process, and the sensitivity (on an issue for settlement) among the coalition partners of a member-state government (schout and vanhoonacker 2006). the first three variables induce the president to advance all the four roles. a coalition government, on the other hand, may give rise to a race between partners, hence causing the incumbent to be cautious in the exercise of the first three roles (organizer, broker, transformational leader). from a comparative perspective, the contingency theory represents a superior approach to the study of leadership. the literature outside the contingency approach tends to treat the two classes of variables separately. roles or formal/informal rules, along with environmental factors, are always independent variables and are never brought together into an interdependency interaction. on the other hand, influence as a dependent variable has been narrowly conceptualized as national interest or prestige (tallberg 2006; elgström 2003; bunse 2009). revisiting the contingency model the establishment of the office of the permanent president has reconfigured the power relations in the eu. hence, the contingency model must take stock of the reconfiguration of roles as well as of the new environmental factors ushered in by the provisions of the lisbon treaty. i created two tables based on those originally proposed by schout and vanhoonacker (2006) but considering the emergence of a permanent president. the elements that have been transferred verbatim from the original tables have been highlighted in italics in table 1 and table 2 below. in terms of dependent variable, the most significant modification in the contingency model is the disappearance of the national representative role. in the original tables, there were four roles—organizer, broker, transformational, and national. since the permanent presidency does not represent national interests, in the new tables there are only three. this development brings the schout and vanhoonacker model back to the original typology in yukl’s 1998 study (taskoriented, group-oriented, and transformational). 6 review of european and russian affairs 8 (1), 2013 in terms of independent variables, both the external (table 1) and internal (table 2) contingency factors must either reflect or incorporate the new structure and dynamics of interinstitutional relations. for instance, in the first box of table one, the divide between old and new issues does not lose its salience. this divide must, nevertheless, be redefined to consider the longer tenure of the new president. this, in turn, offers an opportunity to observe the transition of an issue from the realm of the unknown to the familiar, and the impact of this transition on the demand for roles. variables such as the shadow of the future and issue sensitivity (the fourth and fifth boxes of the first column in table 1) still maintain their relevance in the new reality. indeed, the shadow of the future (the failure of agreeing on a particular course of action) still haunts the decision-making process, and issues that affect or are related to national interests and realities hardly disappear. the shadow of the future pressures the chair to be an effective organizer, a proactive mediator and, in extraordinary circumstances, presents him or her with an opportunity to steer the process toward new, unforeseen directions. sensitive issues demand an investment in organisation and brokerage, but an attempt on the part of the chair to act autonomously by departing from the preferences of the actors is risky. the president may only take a lead away from short-term preferences when issues are of no consequence to the actors/principals. multiple brokerage as a variable fails to embrace a multidimensional institutional involvement that goes beyond the restricted membership of the european council. in lieu of multiple brokerage, i introduce two variables: european council leadership and non-european council leadership (third box of the first column in table 1). european council leadership accounts for those situations in which all or some of its members initiate an agenda, propose initiatives, or offer solutions. non-european council leadership refers to a similar attitude by other institutions, most notably, the european parliament. in terms of organization, brokerage and even leadership, an in-council leadership initiative (from one or more members) may simultaneously decrease and increase the demand for action on the part of the permanent president. the permanent president’s task-mastering and negotiating skills are required to create the environment for an agreement, and intellectual leadership is a premise for reshaping the initiatives of the other members. however, since the content of the negotiations has been determined by one or more of the voting members, the president will not engage in drafting from the scratch and may refuse to impose his own ideas. moreover, rather than pointing at the lack of trust in the chair (a phenomenon that usually characterizes a political context in which the president is also one of the voting members in the forum), i will emphasize the presence of trust (second box of the first column in table 1), a phenomenon that consolidates when there is an expectation of impartial leadership, an expectation that the constitutional design of the permanent presidency embodies. trust contributes to a lesser demand on the chair as an organizer, but skill and performance as an organizer enhance trust. trust also requires less investment on the part of the president to demonstrate that he or she is a honest broker since he/she already stands above the parties. instances of heavy distrust among the members of the council may, on the other hand, increase such a demand. trust may also encourage the chair to craft long-term integration-friendly solutions. the new political context also calls for a revision of what is understood as internal contingency factors (see table 2). now that the president is not the representative of a memberstate, the environmental factors underpinning the supply of leadership are not linked anymore to the domestic political scene, but rather to the prerogatives of the brussels' office, the quality of inter-institutional coordination, the perspective of its occupier on the political situation, and review of european and russian affairs 8 (1), 2013 7 his/her perceived position in the policy-making process. two of the four internal contingency factors in the schout and vanhoonacker model (the importance of a topic for a chairing country and preparation, the first and third boxes of the column one in table 2) may still be applicable to the work of the permanent president office. the second variable (commitments of senior managers and politicians, the second box of the column one in table 2) encapsulates a specific situation of the pre-lisbon era, the availability of a national administration and political ministry to the management of the council of ministers. i will rename the variable by emphasizing the role of the permanent president and the general secretariat. when the president contemplates a topic to be important, he/she will invest in organisation and negotiation. however, the president’s predisposition to assert leadership (the transformational role) may be countered by the strength of the national interests. likewise, the seriousness of the commitment of the presidency and its team will improve the supply of leadership on the organizational and negotiation fronts, but it may result in an ambiguous behaviour of the president with respect to the third (transformational) role. the president may prepare and argue policies that have been not envisaged, but may be accepted by the member-states, or otherwise limit himself to conciliating the positions of the participants in the forum). the third variable (preparation) contributes to an improved performance in all the three roles. the fourth variable (sensitivity between coalition partners, the fourth box of the column one in table 2) as a reference to the composition of a national government also becomes irrelevant. in its place, i have traced a new contingency factor, the relationship of the permanent president to the institutions with which it shares agenda-setting duties, the commission and the rotating presidency of the council of ministers (an element that tallberg (2006) listed as a constraint on the president). moreover, i discard sensitivity as a notion to emphasize discord (disagreement) or harmony (agreement) between the permanent president, the rotating presidency, and the president of the commission. disagreements among the presidents affect negatively the supply of leadership in the three roles, while agreement may not only enhance the performance of the president as an organizer and broker, but it may also constitute a premise for transformational leadership. table 1. external contingency factors with the permanent president organizer brokerage transformational national 1. nature of topic (a) old/transparent topic and newcomer + or – issues and positions are already mapped out, but newcomer has to become familiar with them in order to develop his approach – well known positions facilitate formulation of bargains – or + little room for novel solutions, but an impartial newcomer may, through power and expertise, offer creative novel solutions. n/a (b) new topic/ extraordinary circumstances and newcomer + need to study key issues and alternatives and know all national positions + need to identify possible bargains + scope for steering debates away from short-term interests n/a 2. trust + –/ + + n/a 8 review of european and russian affairs 8 (1), 2013 trust and respect in the institution may relieve the chair from having to spend additional energies as an organiser . no additional care is needed to prove that broker is transparent and impartial, but in bargaining contexts characterized by distrust the demand for brokerage increases. trust encourages activism. activism, on the other hand, in favour of a solution in europe’s long–term interest may reinforce trust. 3. alternative supply of leadership (a) european council –/+ european council members and other institutions outside the council may play a role in mapping out issues. good organization may be needed to create the premises for an alternative provision of leadership. –/ + other european council members compensate for the lack of brokerage by the chair. alternatively, superior brokerage skills may be needed to create trust and make acceptable an alternative provision of leadership within the council. –/ + other members of the council may put the debate in a longterm/european perspective or the president may use the ideas and preferences as a starting point to provide leadership n/a (a) non-european council + or – other institutions outside the council may encourage the president or other members of the council to put the issues in a long-term/european perspective 4. shadow of the future + efficient use of valuable time is of the essence. + pressure to reach agreement leads to a high demand for brokerage . + or – political leadership will be needed with respect to important issues and in extraordinary , uncertain historical circumstances. n/a 5. political sensitivity (a) non-sensitive issue – it will be easy to map out various positions. – lack of sensitivity makes it easier to find a compromise. + countries are more willing to move away from their short-term national interests. hence, there is scope for transformational leadership. n/a (b) sensitive issue + bad organization will + creating a good + or – recasting the debate n/a review of european and russian affairs 8 (1), 2013 9 exacerbate the quarreling among member states. atmosphere and compromise-building environment are crucial. towards long-term european interests may be possible but difficult. source: the italicized parts of the table are taken verbatim from schout and vanhoonacker (2006, 1058-1059, table 2), reproduced here with permission from the publisher of the journal of common market studies, john wiley & sons. the text in regular font represents author’s own contribution. note: this table is excluded from the creative commons open access license that guides the use of most content of this paper, unless indicated otherwise. under the terms of the permission from john wiley & sons, this table cannot be photocopied or otherwise reproduced, except for versions made by non-profit organizations for use by the blind, visually impaired and other persons with print disabilities. the sovereign debt crisis and the demand for leadership the economic crisis in the european union was an unprecedented and multifaceted phenomenon. in its early stages, its main feature was a dramatic shortage of capital in the national banking systems of some eu countries. by early 2010, the financial crisis became a currency crisis, when several eurozone countries in the southern periphery (most notably, greece) experienced an escalation of their public debts in proportion to the size and growth of their economies. (for more details, see the euractiv and european voice reports of 2009.) the office of the permanent president became operational in january 2010, when the idea of crisis was being identified with a cross-national public deficit problem threatening the eurozone. a set of new issues emerged (see table 1), both short-term (the greek debt and aid) and longterm (economic governance measures and principles to invigorate the eurozone), which transferred the locus of the decision-making process to the european council. the shadow of the future represented an important pressure factor on the members of the council to deal with these issues effectively. the crisis threatened the institutions and foundations of the european integration. the traditional policy-making and decision-making channels had to adjust to the new situation. a consequence of these developments was the demand on the permanent president to serve as an informed agenda-setter, especially on long-term issues. in march 2010, the european task force on economic governance 1 was set up for this purpose under the european council president’s chairmanship and offered van rompuy an opportunity to assert himself as a leader, neutralize or set apart short-term or isolated concerns, and drive the debate toward long-term goals. even before the second half of 2010, the work of the european task force on economic governance (etfeg) was setting the agenda for the european council (taylor 2010a). again, in the months before the june 2012 summit, president van rompuy, in cooperation with the president of the european commission, josé manuel barroso, the eurogroup chair jean-claude juncker, and the president of the european central bank, dr. mario draghi, prepared an interim report on ways to deepen integration in the eurozone (european council 2012a). the june 2012 summit deliberated on this document entitled “toward a genuine economic and fiscal union,” 1 the european task force on the european governance was created by the european council with the objective of establishing an improved crisis resolution framework and better budgetary discipline, exploring all options to reinforce the legal framework. it was a joint cooperation of van rompuy as a chair with the commission, the finance ministers of the member states, the rotating presidency and the ecb. it was composed of the finance ministers of the 27 member states with van rompuy as a chair. it had to present a final report to the council before the end of 2010. 10 review of european and russian affairs 8 (1), 2013 and instructed the four institutional leaders to continue their work until the december summit (euractiv 2012a; the economist 2012a; european council 2012b). according to richard corbett (2011b), similar formations contribute to the strengthening of the supranational features of the eu by widening the areas of common policy-making and empowering the union’s institutions. the etfeg proposed ground-breaking policies, such as the examination of the national draft budgets by the commission, concrete enforceable sanctions for states running excessive deficits, and measures to reduce the uneven levels of competitiveness across the eu members. the first of these three proposals was submitted to the task force by the commission, and the second was of particular concern to germany. van rompuy himself authored the daring proposal of financing some of the eurozone debt through a joint bond issuance system, a move strongly opposed by the german government. yet, along with rewriting the rulebook (which was a joint effort of all participants), the skills of the permanent president as chairman of both the task force and the european council were demanded in brokerage and coordination within and across the two institutions. for instance, some member states (the uk, france, the netherlands, and denmark) questioned the authority of the commission on national budgetary policy, while germany went so far as to request an exclusive competence of the european central bank in the matter. in this vein, member states also disagreed over the automaticity and severity of the sanctions. mid-size countries like austria, greece, and spain opposed the suspension of the eu funds, while germany had even argued for the suspension of the voting rights in the council. a number of other countries (bulgaria, the czech republic, hungary, latvia, lithuania, poland, romania, slovakia, and sweden) did not want these reforms to affect their pension schemes. the final report of the task force, nevertheless, preserved the authority of the commission without violating the legislating prerogatives of the national parliaments in budgetary politics; and it favored the suspension of funds as a sanction without infringing upon voting rights (brunsden 2010a; taylor 2010b; brunsden 2010b; brand 2010a; brunsden 2010c). much like etfeg, the report “toward a genuine economic and fiscal union” posited the issue of common debt as a non-immediate (medium-term) measure, but it went further to recommend the creation of a single banking supervision and a common deposit insurance scheme coupled with a more integrated budgetary decision-making process. in its present state, the report not only attempts a balance between the french interests opposed to surrendering national sovereignty, and the german interests hostile to any scheme of debt-sharing (cohen-setton and saha 2012), but it also devises a roadmap and vision for the future of european economic integration (european council 2012b). trust was an important institution in the demand for leadership. the final provisions of the lisbon treaty on the president had already allayed the fears of the small member states about a powerful president at the service of the largest and well-resourced members. additionally, the appointment of van rompuy, the citizen of a small member state and an experienced negotiator, conveyed an image of impartial negotiator. this created a demand on him both as an organizer and broker. the trust and reputation that he enjoyed among the members of the european council, the highest decision-making organ of the eu, contributed to his empowerment beyond the lisbon treaty. indeed, as chairman of the taskforce, as well as of the meetings of the seventeen (the leaders of the countries using the euro), he managed to eclipse the official agenda-setter (the commission) and increased his clout vis-à-vis jean-claude juncker, the president of the eurogroup (brunsden 2010d). important leadership rivals to the president among the members of the european council were the german highest officeholders (chancellor angela merkel and the german finance http://topics.europeanvoice.com/topic/person/jean-claude+juncker review of european and russian affairs 8 (1), 2013 11 minister wolfgang schäuble) and, to a lesser extent, the french (nicolas sarkozy and christine largarde). domestic interests, as well as ideology, underpinned the french and german activism. schäuble's nine point plan would propose the suspension of the voting rights for states breaching the rules of fiscal discipline. in early february 2011, merkel and sarkozy proposed a "competitiveness pact" that envisaged the scrapping of wage indexation to prices, the writing of debt limits into the national constitutions, and a common corporate tax. although the pact had apparently evolved from the conclusions of the task force, the disagreement and distrust that it generated among council members contributed to the increase in demand for impartial leadership. the schäuble plan became part of the submissions at the task force, and, as such, it underwent significant modification. in response to the merkel and sarkozy plan, van rompuy and barroso tabled an alternative pact, which called for ‘improved’ indexation rather than scrapping the idea, while leaving the choice of legal instruments for entrenching debt limits to the discretion of each member state (taylor 2010b; brand 2011a; brand 2011b;taylor 2011a; taylor 2011b; euobserver 2011). yet, at other times, the president had to take a step back and allow for single initiatives from the most powerful of the council members. only four member states (the uk, sweden, hungary, the czech republic) opted out of the merkel-initiated europlus pact, in early 2011 (euractiv 2011a). according to bayrich (2010), in late 2010, the german-led camp which emphasized the primacy of strict rules and automatic sanctions was exceptionally strong. it included austria, the netherlands, the non-euro nordic countries, and most of the central and eastern european member states. outside the european council and the task force, the european parliament was an active leadership provider. the lisbon treaty upgraded the european parliament into a powerful institution both as a co-legislator with the council of ministers and as an account-seeker. indeed, the obligation of the commission and european council president to report to the ep created an auspicious circumstance for the latter to exert influence in eu decision-making. the focus of the european parliament was, initially, on europe 2020, a commission-managed program aimed at promoting economic growth and employment. however, when the epicenter of policy-making moved to fora such as the task force and the european council, the european parliament adjusted its priorities to the themes that were being discussed there. the parliament argued in line with the permanent president and the commission for tougher punishments against countries with excessive deficits and a closer economic union, including the establishment of a common financial transaction tax and eurobonds. however, for most of his first term in office, the permanent president paid lip service to the ep, and the only contact with the latter were (and are) those obligatory plenary sessions in which he reported on the outcome of the european council. only the insistence of a number of meps led, by the end of 2011, to the inclusion of the european parliament representatives in the working group in charge of drafting a new fiscal treaty (wishart 2011a; brand 2011c; brand 2011d; brand 2011e; taylor 2011c; brand 2011f; brand2011g; europeanvoice2011a; wishart2011b). the sensitivity of issues was also an important factor in the quest for leadership at the council level. each country or group of countries came to the negotiating table with particular experiences and fears, which the sense of uncertainty engendered by the crisis further accentuatedfor instance, angela merkel’s vehement opposition to german participation in a prospective aid package to greece, along with her insistence on the imf’s involvement, had roots in the frustration with the ineffectiveness of the post-unification financial and monetary assistance to the former länder of east germany. the final negotiated compromise was the 12 review of european and russian affairs 8 (1), 2013 product of van rompuy’s intensive brokerage work at the summitry level (as much as of an initial agreement between merkel and sarkozy) and left germany as the largest contributor but assured the participation of all members and the imf.on the other hand, this package committed greece to austerity measures, a point that the permanent president did not relent from iterating in front of the greek prime ministers (george papandreou and lucas papademos) and to the greek public (brand and taylor 2010a; brunsden 2010e; brunsden 2010f; taylor 2011d). overall, throughout 2010 and 2011, fiscal discipline appeared as a keyword in the permanent president’s engagement as a problem-solver, and this is what germany wanted in exchange. the treaty on stability, coordination and governance in the economic and monetary union (euractiv 2011b) was a combination of an agreed french-german vision of economic governance, as well as of the input and vision of the president. this input was valuable in creating some distance between the final text of the treaty and the french-german agreement in order to protect the interests and preferences of the other 25 members. on the other hand, the vehement opposition of the german government to the eurobonds and the mutualisation of debt compelled the president to a cautious approach that prevented him from boldly prioritizing this item in the decision-making agenda (grant 2012). the austerity versus growth debate, on the other hand, became particularly salient between december 2011 and march 2012 when unemployment in greece, spain, and france soared. the french government, the danish presidency of the council, and the commission raised the issue of growth and jobs, and van rompuy tabled it for the informal meeting of january 30th during which the heads of states and governments agreed on a joint statement about targets and measures on both fronts. moreover, in february 2012, the prime minister of the uk and the heads of state and governments of eleven member-states addressed a joint letter to van rompuy and barroso. the letter advocated a new approach to the crisis-related problems with particular emphasis on strengthening the single market (in the digital, research and energy areas) and promoting well-functioning labour markets capable of creating employment. van rompuy insisted, against resistance from the commission, on having the ideas set out in the letter become part of the march 2012 european council conclusions (ludlow, 2012. uk government document 2011) after francois hollande’s victory in the french presidential elections, growth-oriented leadership received a new impetus. the new french president passionately advocated, during the campaign and after his election, a project of growth to counteract the focus on austerity that characterized the approach of his predecessor. an effect of the leftward change of guard in paris was that of isolating the german chancellor and undercutting her effectiveness as a leader and trend-setter, especially at a time when the anti-austerity rhetoric had permeated the public spheres of some of the northern countries such as the netherlands and finland. this context created a demand on the european council president to continue charting the growth-friendly course that had begun with the january informal meeting. in the months before the june summit, van rompuy sought to forge an agreement on a commission-initiated and france-backed growth pact that included the employment of 120 billion euros, a mixed package of european investment bank capital, structural funds, and project bonds. it was the crown achievement of the june 2012 summit (euractiv 2012b; euractiv 2012c; euractiv 2012d; the economist 2012b; spiegel 2012). according to the expectations of the contingency model, the sensitivity of issues requires the permanent president to invest heavily in organization and brokerage. in this case study, the sensitivity of issues for particular member states interacted with leadership supply (initiatives or http://european-council.europa.eu/eurozone-governance/treaty-on-stability review of european and russian affairs 8 (1), 2013 13 programmatic targets) on the part of the rotating presidency and the commission. the permanent president’s input was the only venue for imbedding these issues into the deliberative process at the european council to determine their position in the decision-making process. in sum, almost all of the contingency factors (except for the in and out of council alternative leadership) on the demand side required the president to act as an outstanding task-master. among these contingency factors, trust, the shadow of the future, issue sensitivity and in-council alternative leadership compelled the president to act as a broker. almost all contingency factors (and issue sensitivity to a lesser extent than the others) encouraged the president to act as a transformative leader. table 2. internal contingency factors with the permanent president organizer brokerage transformational national 1. important topic for the president /importance of the institution + the presidency will invest in the preparations. + the presidency will formulate compromises to move things forward. the presidency will seek to ensure coherence across member states and convey an atmosphere of agreement when addressing third parties. +/ the presidency will be motivated to argue its position in european terms, but, if the issue is important because it is delicate with respect to the preferences of the members, the president may also take a step back and refuse to go beyond the major position of the parties. n/a 2. commitments of the president and its team + commitment will positively affect the development of a strategy to move forward. + commitment will promote brokerage. +/ the presidency will be motivated to argue his position in european terms, but may also be trying to achieve a balance between differing points of view or selling his own view. n/a 3. preparations + if well prepared, the efficiency of meetings will increase. competence is a must. + thorough preparations increase the chances of brokerage being supplied. competence and experience as negotiator is a must. + preparations are a precondition for the supply of transformational leadership. n/a 4. councilcommission cooperation –/+ internal fights create chaos during the preparations. harmony increases efficiency. –/+ disagreements negatively affect the supply of brokerage. harmony facilitates brokerage. –/+ cooperation facilitates the supply of transformative leadership on the part of the president. n/a 14 review of european and russian affairs 8 (1), 2013 source: the italicized parts of the table are taken verbatim from schout and vanhoonacker (2006, 1060, table 3), reproduced here with permission from the publisher of the journal of common market studies, john wiley & sons. the text in regular font represents author’s own contribution. note: this table is excluded from the creative commons open access license that guides the use of most content of this paper, unless indicated otherwise. under the terms of the permission from john wiley & sons, this table cannot be photocopied or otherwise reproduced, except for versions made by non-profit organizations for use by the blind, visually impaired and other persons with print disabilities. the supply of leadership in a speech before the think tank notre europe, van rompuy praised the flexibility of the european council. by flexibility, he meant the availability and use of the institution as a problem-solver in circumstances when treaties could not articulate a clear remedy. in this context, the economic crisis represented an opportunity for the president to highlight the profile and enhance the power of his office within the european union's institutional framework (euractiv 2010a). by the first trimester of 2010, the permanent president had shown incredible skill as an organizer by coordinating the efforts of the technocratic and political institutions of the eu (the euro group, the ecb, and commission presidents) with those of the more resourceful member states (germany and france). it was an innovative approach to problem-solving that went beyond the traditional preparatory work for the council meetings. in brokerage, at the very beginning of his first mandate, van rompuy was particularly active in those negotiations among member states that purported the strengthening of the european council’s role as a central economic policy-maker. his activism in preparing the european council and eurozone meetings on the greek aid, along with his preparation and chairing of the task force on economic governance, were instrumental to effective decision-making. in spite of isolated instances of criticism (taylor 2010c), his success in organization and brokerage at the preparatory stage was significant. the six meetings of the european task force on economic governance in a five month period, the intensity and frequency of the summits of the european council, the creation of the new summit of the eurozone leaders, and the important agreements2 reached in these fora were ambitious and important achievements for a newcomer in the political scene (euractiv 2010b; euractiv 2010c; brunsden 2010g; european voice 2010; taylor 2010d; taylor 2010e; fleming 2010; brunsden 2010b; wishart 2011c; wishart 2011d). more importantly, the president’s commitment to preserve and enhance his reputation as an impartial leader is not the only element that characterizes his relationship to the decision-making process. in the notre europe speech, van rompuy outlined his vision of europe as an integrated polity that competes with the outside world. this pro-integration perspective is predominant in his treatment of crisis-related issues and dilemmas (euractiv 2010a). in terms of expertise and experience, van rompuy is a trained economist. moreover, he served several times as prime 2 the putting together and activation of a financial package for greece (may 2010), the agreement on budget peer reviewing (june 2010), the establishment of the european financial stability facility, the agreement on sanctions for states with high debt and deficit (september 2010), the acceptance of the barroso-van rompuy pact of competitiveness (march 2011), a new fiscal treaty were important achievements for the president (see euractiv in the years 2010 and 2011). review of european and russian affairs 8 (1), 2013 15 minister in a fragile multinational country such as belgium. thus, he is well-suited to chair a body such as the european council, especially, in an institutional life context affected by an economic crisis (barber 2010; howorth 2011; puetter 2012). the rules of procedure require the permanent president to cooperate with the commission and the rotating presidency in the preparation of european council summits. one of the consequences of the post-lisbon era is the overall marginalization of the rotating presidency. in the debate on the economic crisis, only the hungarian presidency came to the spotlight when negotiating with the european parliament as a co-legislator on the debt-and-deficit monitoring legislation. however, the other presidencies were almost invisible as much as the general affairs council was during the major developments (wishart 2011e; euobserver 2010a; euractiv 2010d; euractiv 2010e). the duo permanent presidency–commission has dominated the preparation of the meetings of the european council, but the position of the two institutions is asymmetric. the official agenda-setter in the community method (the commission) is increasingly losing power to the permanent president, and such loss owes both to a combination of historical institutional developments in the past twenty years as well as to the more recent establishment of the european council as the central decision-maker. yet, in spite of instances of competition and conflict, agreement and cooperation prevails. for instance, the economic and monetary affairs commissioner’s proposals on tighter economic surveillance set the stage for one of the most important eurozone leaders meetings (brunsden 2010a; brunsden 2010e; brand 2010b). the van rompuy–barroso economic plan (the alternative to the merkel-sarkozy competitiveness pact) also represented a formidable example of teamwork, redrafted several times through negotiations with all members of the council (desmon 2011; eurobserver 2011a). overall, dialogue and agreement on a number of issues, such as the pre-eminence of debt control, the elements of the european stability mechanism, as well as growth and job creation, contribute to coherence and clarity, while breaking a new path in economic governance (taylor 2010f; rankin 2011; wishart 2011f; vogel, king and taylor 2011). to ensure the persistence of this dialogue, the permanent president schedules regular weekly meetings (every monday) with the commission president (euractiv 2010a). moreover, formal cooperation allows the european council president to draw on the larger resources of the commission’s departments. it is this atmosphere that generates a demand on the permanent president for crisis management leadership (de schoutheete 2012; taylor 2011a; brand 2011h; taylor 2011b). around the nucleus european council president–commission president, a core leadership group has emerged with the additional participation of the president of the eurogroup, the president of the european central bank, the german chancellor, and the french president (european voice 2011b). during the current crisis, they have converged on themes such as policing the finances of the sovereign debtors, while diverging on more enduring reforms (wishart 2011g). the first four members of this nucleus constitute now in a working group that is preparing a report on the future of the economic and monetary union, a premise for interinstitutional convergence. in 2012, the first four members of this nucleus prepared a report on the future of the economic and monetary union, thus setting a new precedent of inter-institutional forum. yet, whether the group of four will become an autonomous cluster of influence (at some distance from the member state leaders) is a probability that cannot be assessed at present. 16 review of european and russian affairs 8 (1), 2013 on the supply side, this case study tells us that all variables contribute equally to the enhancement of all the three roles, given also that topic importance, commitment and preparation are sequences in the policy-making process, and therefore, they have to move in the same direction. matching supply and demand (d=s) the main concern of the contingency model authors (schout and vanhoonacker 2006) is the matching of demand and supply. in schout and vanhoonacker’s study of the french presidency’s handling of the 2000 nice intergovernmental conference, demand met supply only in two of the four issues (flexibility and the qualified majority voting) (see schout and vanhoonacker 2006, tables 2 and 3, 1058-1060). where, on the demand side, topics were old, issues were sensitive, and the quest for brokerage high, and where on the supply side, organisation was outstanding, and the presidency and a number of other brokers were available, the demand met supply. where, on the demand side, an old unresolved topic combined with a lack of trust in the chair and a quest for leadership, while, on the supply side, organisation, brokerage and leadership were poor, demand did not match supply. for instance, this dynamic characterized the leader's deliberations in nice about the post-enlargement size and composition of the commission. national interests conditioned or impeded the fulfillment of the other three roles (schout and vanhoonacker 2006, 1070). this study of the permanent presidency indicates a congruence between supply and demand (see tables 1 and 2 above). on the demand side, the boundary between new and old issues does not seem to be relevant. as long as a phenomenon is persistent and multifaceted, long-term problems arise, which are addressed piecemeal through the effective engagement of all institutional actors and resources. for instance, the task force lasted from march to october 2010 and was only the first spark in a series of proposals and counterproposals that purported to further articulate the ideas of the tfeg. the competitiveness pact, the creation and expansion of the european stability mechanism, a new fiscal treaty, and other proposals were, in part, an outgrowth of the task force conclusions. however, each of them had to be worked out in details and enshrined in a legal instrument of its own. the van rompuy–barroso–juncker–draghi working group, by responding to the evolving economic conditions of the eurozone, took these acts one step further into the future. even more so, a substantial intellectual debate between governments that favoured austerity and those that petitioned for a program of growth increased the demand for guidance on the part of those super partes institutions like the post-lisbon president of the european council. the crisis is a sensitive issue for all actors, and trust seems to increase demand as much as the lack of it in the original schout and vanhoonacker model. when there is an alternative supply of leadership, i speculated that this may either decrease or increase the demand for organization, brokerage and transformation. the empirical evidence showed that the demand for leadership on the permanent president is high, and he or she may choose to respond or not to the institutions and/or states that offer to provide leadership. he/she is likely to respond with his or her own alternative set of ideas when an initiative from a member of the european council is premised on national interests, on a particular ideological perspective or on a restricted agreement that is unlikely to lead to a broader consensus. review of european and russian affairs 8 (1), 2013 17 on the supply side, the permanent president has the maximum interest in, and commitment to, the resolution of the problems and dilemmas that the crisis creates. the prestige of the permanent presidency as an institution is at stake, and this concern is paramount for the incumbent, far more than it was for the national presidents/prime ministers before the entry into force of the lisbon treaty. this is widely reflected in the preparatory process. in addition, the president possesses the expertise and experience to address both the intricacies of governance and the pluralism of the council as a body. the last category in the internal contingency table, cooperation with the commission is also a grey area in terms of supply. supply increases only if there is cooperation and agreement, but the opposite happens, when there is conflict. the empirical evidence, including the stipulations in the rules of procedures, shows a tendency to cooperation, and that the latter considerably improves supply. moreover, the developments during the crisis show a tendency for the permanent president to be a transformational leader, that is to pioneer long-term change in a european pro-integrationist sense. this willingness to lead owes to the extraordinary circumstances rather than to the constitutional position of the office or the personality of the incumbent. concluding remarks this paper found a match between demand and supply in the two-year span covered by the analysis. obviously, this is only one instance in decision-making, an extraordinary moment of crisis. an ordinary moment may suggest other dynamics. it is still early to endorse an argument in favour of a harmonious relationship between supply and demand in a european council chaired by a permanent president. the pathologies that characterized the member state presidency may reappear. if impartiality and trust associated with the supranationalization of the office persist, there will always be demand for leadership, especially in the course of difficult negotiations. a concern with reputation and the predominance of collegiality (in the relations with the commission and the rotating presidency) will improve supply. if, on the other hand, a number of the council members (small members, non-euro or central eastern european governments) will distrust the presidency, any activism on the part of the presidency would be challenged and discredited. in terms of the principal-agent relationship, a congruence between demand and supply is likely to necessitate less effort to invent, write down and employ ex-post measures to control the agent. in part, this is because, ex-ante, the european council has created an office with few resources and well-defined tasks (little discretion and the requirement for inter-institutional cooperation) that somehow obviates the need of preventing the freedom of the agent ex-post through, for instance, budget retrenchment. moreover, the european council can remove or reappoint him or her within a shorter time period. higher demand for leadership and better performance encourages the principal to go the other way and increase, at particular times, the budget and/or the power of the permanent president by specifying new tasks (as it did with the creation of the special task force). the demand, at this particular moment, is determined by a preference on the part of the principals for problem-solving given the exceptionality and unprecedented nature of the phenomena, with the proviso that solutions satisfy all or most of the principals. performance is determined by an effort on the part of the president to make the best of its resources and offer an intellectual/entrepreneurial guidance on the future of the integration process, conscious that he is an agent for all the members of the council. as a result, the 18 review of european and russian affairs 8 (1), 2013 principal (the council as a body) shows little or no concern about the agent becoming autonomous and adopting a transformative approach to policy-making. in addition, a closer fit between demand and supply expressed through the kind of supervision that the principals exert on the president (i.e. a tradition of regular instructions, the definition of the issues he or she must work on between the intergovernmental conferences or alternative proposals by the members of the council) reduces the repertoire of ex-post measures by invalidating, for instance, procedures such council-initiated action to the european court of justice. alternatively, citizens’ action, although a remote probability in the present eu, will likely occur outside the demand/supply relationship between the european council and the president. on the other hand, the mismatch between demand and supply typical of a number of instances during the rotating presidency, further accentuated by the segmentation of the political process in time and it was one of the causes behind the attempts to reform the office, especially in the decade preceding the coming into force of the lisbon treaty. in the hypothetical case of a systematic disruption between demand and supply in the relationship between the permanent president and the european council, the member states may react to alter the rules of procedure. this means that they may revise the agent’s mandate if they perceive that, for instance, the cooperation between the commission and permanent president may drift away from the general direction set out by the heads of states and governments in the european council. this is even more likely if the permanent president and the commission seek to shape the approach of the council (that is, shape demand through supply). in times of ordinary politics, the member states may want the president to perform predominantly task-oriented duties. in instances of difficult negotiations in the course of ordinary decision-making, the member states may request the president to engage in group-oriented 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http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/2010/09/taskforce-agrees-economic-governance-reforms/69003.aspx. ———. 2010 d. “who is in charge of the euro?” european voice, june 17. http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/imported/who-is-in-charge-of-the-euro-/68263.aspx. ———. 2010e. “eurozone holds crisis meeting.” european voice, may 7. http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/2010/05/eurozone-holds-crisis-meeting/67925.aspx. ———. 2010f. “eurozone ministers approve €110bn aid package.” european voice, may 2. http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/2010/05/eurozone-ministers-approve-110bn-aid-package/67853.aspx. ———. 2010g. “taskforce to discuss tough economic rules.” european voice, june 3. http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/imported/taskforce-to-discuss-tough-economic-rules-/68109.aspx. ———.2011b. “on the community method, opinion.” september issue , notre europe. european voice. 2010a. “drive on, herman.” june 06. http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/imported/drive-on-herman/68213.aspx. ———. 2011a. “meps seek greater role in tackling eurozone debt crisis.” november 10. http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/imported/meps-seek-greater-role-in-tackling-eurozone-debt-crisis/72575.aspx. ———. 2011b. “taking charge of the crisis.” november 10. http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/imported/taking-charge-of-the-crisis/72568.aspx. fleming, stewart. 2010. “van rompuy's life-boat may find calmer waters.” july 1. http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/imported/van-rompuy-s-life-boat-may-find-calmer-waters/68403.aspx. grant, charles. 2012. “needed: a franco-german concordat.”centre for european reform june 27. http://centreforeuropeanreform.blogspot.co.uk/2012/06/needed-franco-german-concordat.html. rankin, jennifer. 2011. “summit to focus on energy and innovation.” european voice, january 27. http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/imported/summit-to-focus-on-energy-and-innovation/70039.aspx. ———. 2010b. “germany to push nine financial reforms.” european voice, may 21. 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revised economic pact.” european voice. march 3. http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/imported/support-grows-for-revised-economic-pact/70399.aspx. ———. 2011c. “eurozone leaders agree new bail-out for greece.” european voice. july 21. http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/2011/july/leaders-agree-109-billion-bail-out-for-greece/71726.aspx. uk government document 2011. joint letter to president van rompuy and president barroso available at https://www.gov.uk/government/news/joint-letter-to-president-van-rompuy-and-president-barroso wishart, ian. 2011a. “ministers to discuss fines for member states that break rules. european voice. february 2. http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/imported/ministers-to-discuss-fines-for-member-states-that-break-rules/70137.aspx. ———. 2011b. “"first steps to a new treaty.” european voice. december 21. http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/imported/first-steps-to-a-new-treaty/73025.aspx. ———. 2011c. “van rompuy calls eurozone debt crisis meeting.” european voice, july 11. http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/2011/july/van-rompuy-calls-eurozone-debt-crisis-meeting/71607.aspx. ———. 2011d. “eurozone leaders to hold emergency summit.” european voice. july 1. http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/2011/july/eurozone-leaders-to-hold-summit/71664.aspx. ———. 2011e. “hungary seeks deal on tougher deficit rules.” european voice. march 10. http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/imported/hungary-seeks-deal-on-tougher-deficit-rules/70482.aspx. ———. 2011f. “call for global response to eurozone debt crisis.” european voice. october 10. http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/2011/october/call-for-global-response-to-eurozone-debt-crisis/72251.aspx. ———. 2011 g. “competing demands at european council.” european voice. december 8. http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/imported/competing-demands-at-european-council/72866.aspx microsoft word andrej zaslove and saime ozcurumez_introduction voting no european integration.doc review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 4/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 1 …………………………………………………… introduction: voting ‘no”, european integration and the nation state: disintegration, impasse, or a new beginning? andrej zaslove and saime ozcurumez review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 4/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 2 the french rejection of the european constitution in may, 2005 and the subsequent no vote in holland in june, 2005 represented a significant blow to the legitimacy of the european union and the process of european integration. this is the first time that two founding member states have used a referendum to reject further integration. it is still unclear what the implications of this rejection of the european constitution are for the future of the eu. as alberta sbragia points out, the european union is still going about its daily business “putting forth proposals to keep the doha round alive, continuing to negotiate a major trade agreement with mercosur in south america, keeping peacekeeping troops in bosnia and herzegovina” (2006, 237). to be sure, this is largely due to the degree to which the new constitution represented an amalgamation of previous treaties. however, given that some of the most important features of the new agreement addressed voting procedures for the enlarged european union, it is less clear whether the failure to implement the constitution will become less symbolic and more practical in the near future (sbragia, 238). an important question emerges from this confusion: where does the european union go from here? several scenarios are possible. euro-skeptics proclaim that the failed constitutional process signals the end of the european union. others claim that the eu will simply muddle along. another group anticipates that the european elites (national and those in brussels) have learned their lesson. they will simply proceed forward through intergovernmental treaties or through parliamentary ratification, avoiding the wrath of public opinion (sbragia, 238). still others proclaim that the no vote in france and holland signals the end to elite policy making. proclaiming that the rejection of the constitution was as much a referendum on the democratic deficit, they review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 4/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 3 declare that the eu will need to become more democratic and it will need to more adequately address citizens’ demands in order to regain its legitimacy. the three articles in this special issue of the review of european and russian affairs entitled “european identities and minorities” address this complicated social and political process of european integration through an examination of nationalism, national identities, state formation, and the process of inclusion and exclusion. the first two articles by hernan tesler-mabe and tracey raney argue that in order to revive european integration, to cure the democratic deficit, and to create a true european citizen it will be necessary to include the nation-state into the very process of european integration. tesler-mabe argues that “revisionist” interpretations by prominent political, intellectual, and administrative voices within the european integration process, such as pascal fontaine and klause-dieter borchardt, epitomized the degree to which national narratives have been subsumed by teleological approaches that view european integration as not only inevitable, but as a top down process. comparing and contrasting revisions of earlier texts by fontaine and borchardt on the european union, tesler-mabe argues that more recent publications, such as fontaine’s europe—a fresh start: the schuman declaration 1950-90 and its newer version a new idea for europe: the schuman declaration 1950-2000, epitomize the degree to which advocates of european integration have rewritten history and in the process eliminating national narratives. for example, he argues that fontaine perceives european integration as a common preordained destiny. in the process, post war europe, unfettered by the chains of its bloody past, was put on a new path with the schuman declaration. moreover, europeanists such as jean monet are praised for their ability to act “unfettered by any political mandate.” eliminating, or review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 4/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 4 forgetting history, and unburdening integration from politics, tesler-mabe argues, is directly linked to the democratic deficit since it eliminates the nation-state, and in the process eliminates an important venue for public accountability. if tesler-mabe examines the role that “elites” have played in revising history, tracey raney’s article, “an even further apart union? national and european attachment in the european union,” argues, through an examination of public opinion surveys, that the nation-state is not an impediment to european integration. using social identity theory, raney’s analysis moves from the elite institutional level to a micro analysis. her examination of public opinion within the european union demonstrates, somewhat counter-intuitively, that many europeans with strong feelings of national pride are also some of the most ardent supporters of the european union. raney concludes that feelings of attachment to one’s own country do not necessarily impede the degree to which individuals “feel close to europe.” those who responded to the question “how close do you feel to europe” were also those who felt the most proud of their own national identity. surprisingly, those who proclaimed that religion and ancestry were important features of national identities were also more likely to have a closer attachment to europe. these findings held irrespective of age, gender, education, and employment. however, an important caveat does appear: those who are less fearful of immigration are also more likely to feel closer to europe. raney thus points out that there appears to be two different visions of europe: one based upon a civic nationalism and one based upon an ethnic nationalism. thus, she argues that identity is not a zero sum game. instead, it is possible to possess multiple identities. this implies that a significant portion of eu citizens feel that review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 4/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 5 national belonging is compatible with feeling european. implicit in this argument is the claim that the best way to obtain support for further european integration is to devise institutional structures, such as subsidiarity, that permit the nation-state to function within the confines of the european union. in this manner, a common european identity, and thus support for european integration, are not incompatible with a strong sense of feeling, for example, austrian, german, italian, or spanish. raney’s findings also point to the link between non-civic forms of national belonging and fears of immigration. given the degree to which radical right parties, such as the front national, actively oppose and even campaigned against the european constitution, there is a tangible link between issues of immigration, exclusion, and national identity. similarly, the process of state formation and questions of nationalism, citizenship, and belonging inevitably leads to questions of inclusion, exclusion, and national minorities. this is no more prevalent than in the former eastern europe where countries such as the czech republic, romania, and the former yugoslavia attempt to consolidate their national identities while also attempting to comply with the process of european integration. the discourse of what it means to be european, how to maintain one’s own national identity, and how to recognize the difference of others become particularly important within the difficult process of identity formation. however, as european history has taught us, and as recent debates concerning immigration continue to warn us, it is not clear that being “european” leads to inclusive notions of belonging. thus, eastern european states are confronted with the dual task of national consolidation, while at the same time attempting to forge connections with the european union. jason young reminds us of the potential volatile nature of this process by demonstrating that review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 4/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 6 europe’s other is not only found in its growing immigrant populations. rather, especially in eastern europe, the exclusion of the roma represent both a threat to the nation project, while it also calls the european union claims to inclusion, democracy, and multiculturalism into question. thus, debates about what it means to be european are by no means confined to the west, or the old member states. if the three authors presented here are correct, nation-states not only matter but they can also facilitate european integration. however, the question remains: how should and how will the process of european integration proceed? will further integration become more elite driven? or will it become more inclusive and democratic? teslermabe and raney claim that a more democratic and legitimate form of integration must not exclude the nation-state. nation-states are important sources of identity formation, they act as democratic controls on european elites, and, maybe most importantly, they are not incompatible with european integration. however, as raney and young warn us, this entails fostering civic and inclusive understandings of belonging as opposed to identities that are based on the exclusion of an other. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 4/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 7 works cited alberta sbragia, “introduction-the eu and its “constitution”: public opinion, political elites, and their international context,” political science and politics, april 2006. why reforms fail: the role of ideas, interests and institutions review of european and russian affairs 9 (1), 2015 issn 1718-4835 the pursuit of independence in catalonia and scotland: towards a new form of civic nationalism in europe? alexander gunn and oliver schmidtke university of victoria abstract territorial politics and the prospect of minority nationalist secession have assumed renewed prominence in europe in recent years, centring on the relationships between scotland and the united kingdom and between catalonia and spain. for both cases, 2014 proved a momentous year, with scotland holding a binding referendum on independence in september, and catalonia holding a non-binding (and disputed) consultation vote in november. this paper explores the recent push for independence in these two contexts, employing frame analysis to assess how the pro-independence movements in scotland and catalonia conceptualize and articulate the ideas of nationhood, collective identity, and self-determination. it specifically explores the various political cleavages that these movements draw on in promoting the idea of autonomy or independence, and how these movements have positioned themselves within a changing european political environment. the paper demonstrates that, for both pro-independence movements, territorial politics and the idea of independence serve as vehicle for articulating traditional centre-periphery grievances and for promoting policies that reflect the needs and demands of the scottish and catalan communities. at the same time, both movements put forward a form of civic nationalist discourse that advocates democratic renewal and civic engagement. 2 review of european and russian affairs 9 (1), 2015 introduction the latter half of 2014 saw the resurgence of a form of territorial politics that felt eerily familiar, and yet new in its magnitude and political aspiration. in recent decades, spain and the united kingdom have undergone processes of political devolution designed to accommodate the selfgovernment ambitions of their catalan and scottish minority nations, while also attempting to preserve the territorial integrity of the spanish and british states. in spite of widely-held expectations that devolution and self-government would satisfy the political ambitions of scottish and catalan nationalists, nationalist-led governments in scotland and catalonia have recently held votes on independence from the u.k. and spain respectively. a binding referendum took place in scotland on september 18, 2014, and a non-binding (and disputed) consultation vote took place in catalonia on november 9, 2014. 1 the scottish referendum resulted in a 55.3 per cent “no” victory for the unionist side in the referendum debate, while the catalan vote resulted in a 80.8 per cent “yes-yes” victory for the pro-independence side2. both referendums sparked widespread public engagement, and in the scottish case, encouraged a level of participation that is widely absent in regular electoral politics.3 how are we to understand the renewed vigour with which key actors in party politics and civil society in catalonia and scotland have recently pushed for a referendum on independence? are we witnessing yet another wave of political mobilization on behalf of ‘minority nations’ (keating 2000) whose claims for greater autonomy have historically been deeply ingrained in the political fabric of many european nation-states? can the push for independence in catalonia and scotland simply be interpreted as a momentary revival of long-lasting centre-periphery conflicts, or as a new dimension in how this form of territorial politics plays out in contemporary europe? in order to address these questions, this article investigates how notions of nationhood and collective identity are portrayed in the scottish and catalan contexts by their respective proindependence movements. at the very core of any nationalist aspiration is the notion of a distinct political community defined by a shared sense of identity that is distinct from and in tension with those who are perceived to endanger the self-determination of this community. here, we are confronted with a somewhat paradoxical situation with a view to how the minority nationalist cause is promoted in contemporary western european societies. for decades, scholars in the modernization theory tradition have told us that the traditional political cleavage driven by competing ethnic or cultural loyalties is losing its relevance in terms of how these loyalties shape 1 scots voted “yes” or “no” to the question “should scotland be an independent country?”, while their catalan counterparts voted “yes” or “no” on a two-part question, “do you want catalonia to become a state?” as well as “do you want this state to be independent?” 2 results in the catalan vote were “yes-yes” 80.8 percent; “yes-no” (those of in favour of catalan statehood within spain) 10.1 per cent; “no” (those opposed to catalan statehood and independence) 4.5 per cent; and the remainder consisted of “yes-blank”, “blank” and “other” responses. the high support for independence is partly attributable to the widespread abstention by catalan voters opposed to independence, many of whom regarded the vote as illegal and illegitimate, a view shared by the spanish government and catalan political parties opposed to independence (we address the subjects of legality and voter abstention further below). 3 the 84.5% voter turnout in the scottish referendum set a record for voter turnout in any election held in the united kingdom since 1918. 3 review of european and russian affairs 9 (1), 2015 modes of belonging and political preferences (deutsch 1966). to remain socially and politically relevant, a collective identity is critically dependent on its continuous symbolic affirmation in public discourse in order to remain meaningful in how the assigned community members perceive social and political reality (gellner 1983). this perspective informs our second set of research questions: what kind of political cleavages do these movements respond to in promoting the idea of autonomy or independence? how do present-day minority nationalist movements situate themselves in the changing environment in which notions of nationhood and sovereignty are shaped against the background of the european integration process? the recent referendums in catalonia and scotland provide an analytical focus to assess the aspirations and modes of reproducing a meaningful collective identity for minority nationalism in contemporary europe. the independence campaigns in both regions allow us to shed light on the political cleavages articulated in this form of territorial politics. based on a frame analysis of these campaigns in catalonia and scotland, we intend to contribute to the debate on the changing nature of regionalism and minority nationalism in europe. our working hypothesis is that traditional notions of minority nationalism in (western) europe possibly miss some of the key factors that are driving successful political mobilization on the ground. the article begins with a discussion of territorial politics, its role as a conceptual framework for our analysis of the referendums in catalonia and scotland, and its place within the wider academic literature. our particular interest is directed at the way in which minority nationalists advocate for greater autonomy, if not independence, in light of the changing nature of borders and identities in europe. in a second step, we situate the respective referendums in the wider political and institutional context in which they were organized. in the conclusion, we will come back to a broader assessment of the minority nationalism present in catalonia and scotland. the persistence of territorial politics in the 21st century the resurgence of political movements such as the ones in catalonia and scotland represents a challenge when it comes to explaining the driving forces behind such regionalist or nationalist aspirations in contemporary europe. this form of territorial politics advocating independence for a small nation seems to be at odds with the very way in which the european continent has developed over past decades. the process of european integration has enhanced cross-border mobility and allowed for a transfer of policy responsibilities to the trans-national level in a way that has undermined the notion of the nation-state as the sole territorial container for political authority and societal integration. national borders are decreasingly the only legitimate demarcations for political community and governance structures. in such a world, proponents of minority nationalism appear to reproduce the obsolete logic of the nation-state and its reliance on the congruence between (national) culture, territory, and political representation (berezin and schain 2003). in their political struggles, national minorities depend on the sovereigntist discourse and the related plea for self-governance. in this respect, the claims of national minorities replicate forms of political legitimacy and institutional practices that were historically established by traditional nation-states from whose dominance these same minorities claim to 4 review of european and russian affairs 9 (1), 2015 have suffered. somewhat paradoxically then, the solutions promoted by national minorities are strongly committed to and conceptually molded by the logic of the westphalian state system. another puzzle of regionalist or nationalist politics, as noted by anderson (1991), is that their claims portray the community in question as eternally given and equipped with incontestable rights. the quest for self-determination is justified by referring to this supposedly unchangeable ‘essence’ of a people or ethno-cultural group. the reference to the ethno-cultural core (connor 1994, muller 2008) still constitutes much of the attraction of nationalist movements. it is against this background that regionalist claims have traditionally been dismissed from a modernist perspective. most prominently, karl deutsch (1966) predicted that national states would invariably extend their control over their peripheries and gradually deprive regions of the socioeconomic and political-cultural foundation of sovereigntist claims. this statist teleology has instilled a considerable degree of – normatively driven – skepticism regarding the prospects and legitimacy of minority nationalism. seymour martin lipset’s dictum that such sub-state forms of territorial politics are indicative of vain ‘revolts against modernity’ still reverberates in scholarly and public discourse. yet, minority nationalism has not withered away in the wake of ‘modernization’ (rokkan and urwin 1983). indeed, the manifest persistence of territorial politics has produced competing scholarly approaches: instead of portraying such political movements as anomalies of modern society, the resurgence of regionalist and minority nationalist aspirations are interpreted as an integral part of the territorial reconfiguration of europe. traditional notions of spatial-territorial scale are changing in profound ways (brenner 2004), allowing the regions to play a more prominent role in generating meaning and loyalty at the sub-state level (jessop, brenner, and jones 2008). in the 1990s, scholars may have gone too far in predicting the end of the nationstate or the dawn of a post-westphalian and post-national era (appadurai 1996, ohmae 1995, strange 1996). still, these daring interpretations accurately indicated a shift in europe’s governance system that has had a profound effect on the context within which the concerns of regions are articulated. the literature on the ‘new regionalism’ (keating 1998; for a good overview, see keating 2008) emerged in the 1990s, linking this form of territorial politics to the structural changes of the state and the changing nature of borders and modes of governance in europe. in a nutshell, the emerging system of multi-level governance in europe has created institutional spaces for regions both as administrative units and as entities that can sustain viable forms of collective identities (kahler and walter 2006). one critical dimension in this respect has been to explore the link between the political aspirations of regions and the process of european integration (hooghe 1995; jones and keating 1995; keating 2004). although some of the far-reaching expectations associated with the establishment of the committee of the regions in 1994 have not materialized, european integration has opened opportunities for regions in terms of pursuing their territoriallydefined interests and cultivating their collective identities (hepburn 2008). however, given the fact that the centre-periphery conflict has produced remarkably different outcomes across europe, such broad structural explanations need to be complemented with a more specific sense of the political dynamics involved in political mobilization on behalf of the region (hepburn 2009). what are the particular circumstances under which this type of territorial politics is able to command such mobilizing force? who are the actors that assign meaning to the region and its identity as a primary reference point for defining loyalties and interests? our 5 review of european and russian affairs 9 (1), 2015 article focuses on the political dimension of the conflicts under investigation. we seek to shed light on the specific political opportunities 4 that the nationalist movements in catalonia and scotland have been able to exploit. analytically, we focus on the framing strategies of the main proponents of the independence campaign, identifying the key arguments that have been put forward in support of the nationalist cause.5 in the first step, we briefly describe the politicalinstitutional context for the referendums and the main proponents involved before we come to the analysis of the dominant frames in their respective campaigns. the political-institutional context for the referendums in catalonia and scotland the decision of certain political and civil society actors in catalonia and scotland in recent years to employ a referendum to secure independence is significant both in terms of the stability of the wider spanish and british states and their success (or inability) at accommodating the ambitions of scottish and catalan nationalism, and in terms of the political strategies of the scottish and catalan pro-independence movements. the first issue speaks to broader questions regarding strategies for maintaining the stability of multinational polities. is it more effective to accede to the demands of minority nationalists for greater autonomy and political recognition in the interests of preserving the unity of the larger multinational polity (to the point of accepting asymmetrical federal or confederal political arrangements), or is it better to refuse minority nationalist demands on the grounds that greater decentralization will only encourage aspirations for secession? this question has provoked considerable academic debate in recent years among scholars of multinational polities. will kymlicka (2005, 138) describes this conundrum as the “paradox of multinational federalism,” in that the political autonomy available to national minorities under a federal system can have an unpredictable effect on their desire for secession.6 he notes that on the one hand, federalism “provides national minorities with a workable alternative to secession” by granting them a degree of self-government over their own affairs, but on the other hand, the autonomy it bestows has the potential “to reinforce the belief that the group is able and rightfully entitled to secede and exercise full sovereignty” (ibid.). wayne norman (2001) articulates a similar point when he explains the unforeseen challenges of officially recognizing a minority nation within a larger multinational state (including the minority nation’s right to self-determination). he argues that recognizing a minority nation “might make the members of the group feel more at home in a state that no longer pretends that they do not exist,” but that it also “might strengthen the national identity of the members of that group, and thereby weaken their attachment to the larger state,” thus encouraging secession (norman 2001, 93). michael keating (2001b) agrees that accommodating minority nationalist demands can have unforeseen consequences, but cautions 4 we operate with the concept of political opportunity structures which, according to tarrow (1998), can be understood as “consistent – but not necessarily formal or permanent – dimensions of the political struggle that encourage people to engage in contentious politics”. 5 methodologically the analysis draws on discourse analysis in the tradition developed in social movement research: gamson and wolfsfeld (1993); koopmans and statham (1999). 6 while kymlicka referred to multinational federal states, his argument could also apply to multinational devolved unitary states such as the united kingdom and spain, in which opponents of political devolution have characterized greater autonomy for scotland and catalonia as merely a stepping-stone on the path to their eventual independence. 6 review of european and russian affairs 9 (1), 2015 that the prospect of it leading to secession is not as likely. rather, he contends that recognizing a minority nation’s right to self-determination will not necessarily lead to that nation seceding from its larger multinational polity, as “the costs of secession militate strongly against this,” and argues “that secession is more likely in conditions in which the right to self-determination is denied, thus forcing nationalists into more extreme postures” (keating 2001b, 61). this choice between accommodating or resisting the self-government and recognition demands of minority nationalists has underlined the british and spanish debates surrounding political devolution in recent decades, and reappeared in discussions over granting the scottish and catalan governments the necessary powers to hold referendums on independence. the british strategy of agreeing to negotiate with the scottish national party through the edinburgh agreement over granting scotland the authority to hold an independence referendum, agreeing to abide by the result of the vote, and promising the scottish people greater devolution in return for voting “no” and remaining within the united kingdom, appears to reflect a more open strategy to minority nationalist accommodation. the british government appears to recognize and affirm scotland’s national status and right of self-determination, and has attempted to prevent scotland from declaring independence by granting it greater political autonomy within the british state. indeed, it is a fascinating question (yet one beyond the scope of this article) to inquire whether, since the initiation of devolution in the uk under the government of tony blair, there has been a gradual build-up of scottish government competence and institutional capacity that has allowed for a push for a referendum.7 keating, cairney, and hepburn (2009) have portrayed scotland as the most developed ‘territorial policy community’ in the united kingdom, with an expanding set of legislative powers addressed at the subnational level. this has created opportunities for interest formation and articulation that, as we will show in a moment, have contributed to the push for independence by the nationalists. like the u.k., spain has undergone a process of regional devolution over the past three decades designed in part to respond to the self-government aspirations of minority nationalist regions such as catalonia. unlike the u.k., however, the position of the spanish government on granting catalonia the authority to hold a referendum on independence has been decidedly negative. the different positions of the british and spanish governments relate in part to the different constitutional contexts in the united kingdom and spain. the scottish referendum process benefitted from the flexibility of the u.k.’s unwritten constitution in which a simple parliamentary majority in westminster is able to alter the devolved powers that scotland exercises, including granting scotland the authority to hold a referendum on independence. the catalan referendum process, by comparison, has proven more complicated, due to the language of spain’s written constitution, which has served as the foundation for the spanish government’s opposition to a catalan referendum. in particular, the spanish government contends that, under constitutional law, a constituent unit of spain such as catalonia does not have the sovereign authority to vote on seceding from spain, as the sovereignty to make such a decision resides with 7 cairney (2014) describes the gradual territorialisation of interest representation in scotland and how devolution has allowed distinct policy preferences to be nurtured. 7 review of european and russian affairs 9 (1), 2015 the people of spain as a whole.8 as the spanish prime minister, mariano rajoy, argued on september 29, 2014: sovereignty lies with the spanish people as a whole, and one part of the people may not take decisions on what affects all of them. the spanish constitution is based on the indissoluble unity of the spanish nation, and thus any attempt to dissolve it is radically contrary to the constitution. (la moncloa 2014a) the spanish government’s interpretation of the constitution (one that has been endorsed at different times by the spanish parliament and the spanish constitutional court), is rejected by the catalan government and the main supporters of catalan independence. in their view, the debate over the right to vote on independence is “more a political than a legal one,” and argues that catalonia has attempted various legal measures to gain the authority to hold a referendum that were subsequently blocked or “excluded” by madrid (catalonia votes 2014f).9 the first initiative came on january 16, 2014, when the catalan parliament made a formal petition to the spanish parliament – one modeled after the edinburgh agreement – in which they requested that madrid transfer to catalonia the legal authority to hold a referendum on independence. the spanish parliament subsequently voted against this request on april 8.10 the second initiative came on september 19, 2014, when the catalan parliament passed the law on non-binding popular consultations to serve as the legal foundation for the referendum vote, followed by president mas signing a decree on september 27, calling for a referendum vote for november 9. in response, on september 29, the spanish government issued an appeal against both measures in the spanish constitutional court, arguing that they were unconstitutional. the constitutional court agreed to hear the appeal, leading to the temporary suspension of both measures. president mas attempted to circumvent this legal hurdle on october 14 by calling for a non-binding consultation vote through a “public participatory process” (catalonia votes 2014g). due to the constitutional court’s legal injunction, however, the catalan voting process on november 9 had to be carried out by volunteers. voter turnout consisted of 2.3 million voters out of over 5 million potential voters, in which it was assumed there was large-scale abstention from catalan voters opposed to independence (the process was also publically boycotted by catalan parties that opposed independence) (bbc news 2014). the catalan president, artur mas, described the vote as a significant achievement and justification to hold a formal binding referendum on independence in the future, while the spanish government refused to recognize 8 the spanish government invokes article 1.2 of the 1978 constitution in this argument, which states that “[n]ational sovereignty is vested in the spanish people, from whom emanate the powers of the state.” they also justify their opposition to the catalan referendum by invoking article 2, which states (in part) that “the constitution is based on the indissoluble unity of the spanish nation, the common and indivisible country of all spaniards,” and article 149.1(xxxii), which grants the spanish state “exclusive competence” in terms of providing “authorisation for popular consultations through the holding of referendums” (kingdom of spain 1978). 9 catalonia votes (2014f) contends that “[f]rom the joint application of the principles of rule of law and democracy – enshrined in the spanish constitution and international and european union law –, there are up to five different legal ways for the referendum to be held,” but are unclear on their website as to what exactly constitutes these “five different legal ways.” 10 during the parliamentary debate, prime minister rajoy argued the catalan request was unconstitutional in that the powers over holding referendums are under the “exclusive” authority of the spanish state and cannot be transferred to other levels of government, and that the purpose of the referendum conflicted with the constitution’s commitment to the sovereignty of the spanish people (la moncloa, 2014b). 8 review of european and russian affairs 9 (1), 2015 the outcome, as well as questioned the vote’s constitutional legality and credibility (ibid.). on november 21, spain’s state prosecutor began to seek criminal charges against president mas, along with the catalan vice-president and the minister of education, on the grounds of “disobedience, perverting the course of justice, misuse of public funds and abuse of power” due to their leading roles in the referendum vote (catalonia votes 2014g). in spite of madrid’s legal efforts, the mas government announced its intention on january 14, 2015 to hold early parliamentary elections in catalonia (set for september 27, 2015) that will act as a “de facto independence referendum,” arguing that “[t]he spanish government has blocked all other alternatives of holding a specific vote so far” (catalonia votes 2014g). the second significant issue arising from the decision of the catalan and scottish proindependence movements to employ a referendum to secure independence relates to questions of political strategy. both movements are drawing on an older democratic/dialogical secessionist tradition (best exemplified by quebec), in which a polity attempts to secure independence through popular referendum and intergovernmental negotiation, as opposed to a unilateral declaration of independence and/or armed conflict. similarly, both movements have articulated a “qualified” form of independence rather than absolute sovereignty, in which the scottish and catalan governments are promising that an “independent” scotland and catalonia would potentially maintain significant political and economic ties to their former states, as well as immediately become members of the european union. there are similarities between these visions of scottish and catalan independence “within europe” and quebec’s past attempts at securing political “sovereignty” while maintaining an economic and monetary union with the rest of canada, as well as membership within the north american free trade agreement. many minority nationalists regard this form of “qualified independence” as a more palatable political solution among larger sections of the electorate, in particular among those who otherwise may be uncomfortable with voting for independence. finally, complicating the strategies of both the wider british and spanish states at preserving their territorial integrity as well as the strategies of the scottish and catalan pro-independence movements has been the changing economic and fiscal circumstances in the uk and spain since the 2008 economic crisis. the austerity measures and public spending cuts introduced by prime minister david cameron’s conservative-liberal democrat coalition government since their election in 2010 proved widely unpopular in scotland (as well as other parts of the united kingdom). one key issue at the centre of the debate leading up to the referendum was whether scotland would be able to afford the expansive welfare state provisions promised by the yes campaign. more broadly, the economic viability of an independent scotland proved to be a matter of fierce contestation. in this context, scottish nationalists referred to the revenues from north sea oil as a critical tool to create a more prosperous independent country (depicted in stark contrast to the social costs of the socio-economic crisis that has affected the uk in recent years). similarly, in spain, the austerity measures introduced by the partido popular government of prime minister mariano rajoy provoked widespread protests across the country, including in catalonia. tensions were also exacerbated by the efforts of the catalan government of artur mas at securing a new fiscal agreement (pacte fiscal) for the region from madrid, one that would grant catalan institutions the authority “to levy all taxes in catalonia and also to reduce the indirect money transfers from catalan tax-payers to other spanish regions” (martí 2013, 508). the pacte fiscal built on the long-held assertion among catalan nationalists that a fiscal 9 review of european and russian affairs 9 (1), 2015 imbalance exists between catalonia and the rest of spain, in which they argue that, as one of the wealthiest regions in spain, catalonia gives more money to the rest of spain through tax revenue than it receives in return through central government funding and services. it also reflected the view of the catalan government (with the support of several major opposition parties) that catalonia required greater fiscal autonomy if the region was to respond effectively to the rising unemployment and deficit levels it had experienced since the beginning of the economic downturn. in september 2012, a major meeting took place between mas and rajoy in which rajoy rejected the catalan demands articulated in the pacte fiscal and mas in turn rejected madrid’s counter-offer of reforming spain’s existing system of fiscal re-distribution (martí 2013, 509). the following sections will discuss how these failed negotiations (along with other recent intergovernmental disputes between catalonia and madrid) have served as a reference point for the mobilization of pro-independence sentiment in catalonia in recent years. supporters of independence in the catalan and scottish context supporters of independence consist of a broad coalition of political and civil society actors. the main political parties backing independence in the catalan parliament are the centre-right nationalist governing party, convergència i unió (ciu), and two left-wing nationalist opposition parties, esquerra republicana de catalunya (erc) and candidatures d’unitat popular (cup). until recently, the ciu as a whole had been circumspect in its ultimate political ambitions for catalonia relative to the rest of spain. the party traditionally avoided explicit statements about independence, and for much of its history was seen as an “autonomist” party, committed to securing national recognition for catalonia and maximizing its political autonomy within the spanish state rather than outside of it (see keating 2001a, martí 2013). esquerra republicana de catalunya, in contrast, has promoted catalan independence since the early 1990s, and while the party was a marginal force in the years immediately following the restoration of catalan selfgovernment, it has grown in prominence over the past decade, and is now the second-largest party in the catalan parliament. in contrast, the cup is a newcomer to the catalan parliament, having won three seats in the 2012 election, and is committed to the goals of “independence and democratic regeneration” for catalonia (martí 2013, 513). on the periphery of the proindependence side11 is the iniciativa per catalunya verds – esquerra unida i alternativa (icveuia), a left-wing and ecologist coalition that supports catalonia’s “right to decide” on its national future, but whose leaders have refused to commit publically on whether they support independence. the main impetus for the growth in secessionist sentiment in catalonia, however, has not come from catalan political parties, but from catalan civil society organizations. the assemblea nacional catalana in particular has been a major leader in mobilizing the catalan public in favour of independence. born out of broader catalan nationalist frustration with the spanish state in the wake of the 2010 constitutional tribunal ruling on catalonia’s 2006 statute of autonomy, the assemblea nacional catalana has been instrumental in organizing large-scale annual demonstrations in favour of independence on september 11th, catalonia’s “diada nacional.” the work of the assemblea has been supported by older catalan nationalist civil society 11 elements of the centre-left partit dels socialistes de catalunya (psc) have also endorsed catalonia’s “right to decide,” but the party has remained internally divided on the issue. 10 review of european and russian affairs 9 (1), 2015 organizations like òmnium cultural, which was a prominent actor in the development of catalonia’s language normalization laws. finally, an important advocate for catalonia’s “right to decide” on independence at the international level has been the public diplomacy council of catalonia, which developed a multi-lingual website entitled “catalonia votes,” designed to educate the wider world on the issues at stake in the catalan independence debate, as well as to provide a forum for the various political and civil society advocates of independence to make their case to an international audience. the drive for scottish independence also relies on a similarly broad coalition of actors from both civil society and the political elite. yet, stronger than in catalonia, the leadership and organizational drive for the referendum came from the scottish national party (snp) under the leadership of alex salmond. in the 2011 scottish parliamentary election, the snp gained a majority, which it interpreted as a mandate to hold an independence referendum. with alex salmond as the first minister, the snp launched a broad mobilizing campaign designed to engage civil society. in its efforts, the snp found allies in other parties and non-party proponents of independence (most notably the scottish independence convention, a broad-based centre-left umbrella organization promoting the referendum) and high-profile artists, actors, and intellectuals. the organization that had run the campaign since 2012, “yes scotland,” was, at its core, an alliance of the governing snp, the scottish green party, and the scottish socialist party. blair jenkins, former director of broadcasting at scottish television (stv), ran “yes scotland” and served as its chief executive. regardless of this broad coalition, the snp was clearly the driving force behind the referendum; its organizational (and ideological) commitment to independence put it into a widely-accepted leadership role. framing the vision of an independent nation independence and the referendum process for achieving independence have been framed and justified by catalan and scottish actors in a multitude of ways, drawing on: 1) historic grievances, national identity, and the plea for independence; 2) democratic renewal and the right to national self-determination; 3) pursuing distinct policy priorities and preserving ‘national traits’ and ‘values;’ 4) national unity and the internal diversity of the minority nation; and, 5) the relationship between the quest for independence and european integration. these diverse frames are not exclusive, but rather repeatedly intersect and inform one another, creating an overall complex pro-independence/self-determination discourse that is grounded in catalan and scottish history and national distinctiveness, but also coupled with a sense of the region’s growing diversity and its interconnected future within europe and the wider world. 1) historic grievances, national identity, and the plea for independence much of the official and popular discourse in catalonia surrounding independence frames the region’s relationship with spain in negative terms, in which spain is conceptualized as an obstacle to catalonia’s nationalist and self-government ambitions in recent years, as well as a fiscal/financial drain on catalonia’s wealth. the first criticism relates to the perception of growing opposition and resistance by spanish institutions and political actors in recent years to catalan efforts at securing greater national recognition and political autonomy within the spanish state. the second criticism relates to the perception cited above that catalonia suffers a fiscal imbalance within the spanish state, and leads to the conclusion among some pro-independence 11 review of european and russian affairs 9 (1), 2015 advocates that catalonia would be better off fiscally and economically if it were to secede from the rest of spain.12 the spanish political order is frequently conceptualized in catalan discourse as having initially offered the potential for catalonia to pursue greater self-government and national recognition. indeed, catalonia has been at the forefront of the devolution process that has taken place in spain since the passage of the 1978 constitution and the creation of the present spanish system of regional government, known as the state of autonomies. over the decades, the region successfully secured greater political authority in a range of policy areas and, like the scots, gradually developed its institutional capacity for self-government, which in turn encouraged its leaders to push for even greater autonomy and national recognition within spain. the most recent effort at securing greater devolution came in 2006 when the region successfully negotiated a revised version of its statute of autonomy13 with the spanish government. the new statute increased the region’s jurisdictional powers in a range of policy areas, and at one point recognized catalonia as a “nation” within spain (though this language surrounding catalan nationhood was later amended at the insistence of spanish legislators). the revised statute of autonomy was approved by the spanish parliament and, subsequently, by the catalan electorate in a referendum in 2006, but its passage prompted a backlash from the political right in spain, who condemned the statute as divisive and secessionist, eventually leading to a constitutional court challenge and a controversial ruling in 2010 that further limited the scope and meaning of the statute. the ciu articulates a narrative regarding the earlier openness of the spanish political system to catalonia’s self-government aspirations in their platform for the 2012 catalan parliamentary election, in which they describe catalonia’s past efforts at securing greater autonomy since spain’s transition to democracy in the 1970s: [f]or more than three decades, convergència i unió and a good part of political catalanism has worked to get the most self-government possible for catalonia and at the same time to search for a viable place within the spanish state. a place that allows catalonia to feel comfortable, that permits it to remain feeling what it was and is: a nation with a strong history behind it, in the context of a state that recognizes plurality. (ciu 2012, 9) nonetheless, according to this narrative, the potential of the spanish state has remained unrealized in terms of fulfilling the aspirations of the catalans and other national minorities in spain. catalonia votes (2014g), for instance, notes that spain has undergone extensive economic and social modernization since the restoration of democracy, but that the country “has not fully accommodated its internal diversity into its political setup,” to the detriment of catalonia. furthermore, the present-day spanish state is conceptualized as resistant or hostile to the self 12 this argument has parallels with the flemish and northern italian contexts, in which nationalist/regionalist parties justify secession on the grounds that the rest of the country is a drain on their resources. 13 under the spanish state of autonomies system of regional government, each of the 17 autonomous communities were required to negotiate a “statute of autonomy” with the spanish government, outlining the new regional government’s institutions and the powers and policy responsibilities that these institutions exercised. catalonia negotiated its original statute of autonomy in 1979, and its re-negotiated 2006 statute in turn prompted several other autonomous communities to revise their statutes as well, in part, to match the jurisdictional gains the catalans had made. 12 review of european and russian affairs 9 (1), 2015 determination aspirations of its catalan citizens, a hostility that has grown more pronounced in recent years.14 as the ciu (n.d.) argue, in spite of recent catalan efforts to reform the spanish political framework to make it more amenable to their needs, “[t]he attitude of the spanish state has been systematically to reject all the proposals made by catalonia for dialogue and to reach agreements.” the party further contends that spain’s system of regional government, the state of autonomies, has gradually transformed into a “symmetric, homogeneous” framework that is inimical to catalonia’s national aspirations (ciu 2012, 10). pro-independence advocates cite several recent events as being indicative of spain’s increasing resistance or hostility towards catalonia’s self-government aspirations. these include the spanish constitutional court’s 2010 ruling on catalonia’s reformed statute of autonomy, the spanish government’s refusal in 2012 to endorse catalonia’s proposed pacte fiscal, recent spanish political challenges to catalonia’s education system and language laws, and the spanish government’s refusal to negotiate with catalonia over the necessary powers to hold a referendum on independence (see catalonia votes 2014g, ciu 2012, erc 2012, icv-euia 2012). of these events, the 2010 constitutional court ruling is often cited as the most egregious, and the starting point for catalonia’s pro-independence turn in recent years. catalonia votes (2014g), for instance, contends that catalonia’s reformed statute of autonomy was approved democratically by catalan citizens in a referendum, as well as by the spanish parliament, only for it to be “drastically altered by a controversial court ruling.” the ciu (2012, 10) similarly characterize the constitutional court ruling as a politicized act that “ignored the majority will of the catalan people for more self-government expressed in the referendum,” as well as “showed that there was no desire to deepen the constitutional pact and to evolve the spanish state towards a plurinational state.” instead, the ruling indicated that “spain wants to remain a state with a single nation,” and that, for catalans, “[t]his was a point of no return” in their relationship with the rest of spain (ibid.). the icv-euia (2012, 130) also characterize the constitutional court ruling as a significant turning point, arguing that it “demonstrated that catalonia’s aspirations for more political power, for more capacity in its economic resources and for more national recognition, have no place in the current constitutional framework.” the pro-independence advocates contend that, in response to this growing resistance on the part of the spanish state, the catalan people have no choice but to pursue independence, as, in their view, spain has become unresponsive and unsympathetic to catalan concerns.15 the erc (2012, 6) argue that the “process of national emancipation has accelerated” in the wake of the constitutional court ruling on the catalan statute of autonomy and in response to popular demonstrations on the streets of catalonia. the leader of the erc, oriol junqueras, further attributes growing catalan demand for a referendum on the grounds that “we don’t feel 14 the recent opposition of the spanish state to catalan demands is regarded by some as being symptomatic of a larger historical pattern of spanish domination and disrespect towards catalonia. the ciu (2012, 10) contend that the actions of the spanish state are “not new” and that “sadly, this is the response that political catalanism has always found when it has tried to get a place in spain that respects the right of catalonia to arrange its own identity,” adding that “this response is independent of the eras, of the political systems and the governments that have been at the forefront of the state.” 15 the ciu are perhaps the clearest example of this attitude, justifying their recent turn from supporting catalan autonomy within spain to independence from spain on what they regard as the obstinacy of the spanish state towards catalonia’s political ambitions and demands in recent years. 13 review of european and russian affairs 9 (1), 2015 represented by the spanish government” (catalonia votes 2014d). the ciu (n.d.) similarly note how catalans have “[f]or years [...] sought to fit our identity within the spanish state,” only to realize “that with the present tools we cannot serve the hopes of the people in this country” and that, therefore, “[t]he logical evolution of catalanism is to raise the objective of our own state.” according to the ciu (2012, 10), the recent actions of the spanish government towards catalonia have given catalans a clear choice to “either renounce our commitment for greater recognition and greater levels of self-government [...] or initiate a new stage.” a profound sense of alienation from the country’s key political decision-making is also driving the centre-periphery conflict in scotland. when the snp launched the campaign for a referendum on independence in 2011, it started with a drive to collect over one million signatures for the “yes declaration.” the text of this ‘declaration’ provides a good sense of the grievances mobilized and nurtured during the campaign: i believe it is fundamentally better for us all, if decisions about scotland's future are taken by the people who care most about scotland, that is, by the people of scotland. being independent means scotland's future will be in scotland's hands. there is no doubt that scotland has great potential. we are blessed with talent, resources and creativity. we have the opportunity to make our nation a better place to live, for this and future generations. we can build a greener, fairer and more prosperous society that is stronger and more successful than it is today. (bbc news 2012) at the very core of the plea for independence is the notion that scotland’s integration into the united kingdom does not allow for a proper pursuit of what is deemed to be the prospective “great potential” of scotland as an independent country. this point speaks to an historicallyrooted sense of inferiority of scots towards great britain. even in the speeches and declarations of pro-independence proponents, there is a recognition of the historic achievements of great britain, some of which they promise to protect and nurture within an independent scotland (indeed, the “better together” campaign mocked scottish nationalists’ idea of combining the ‘best of two worlds’ and that relatively little would change in terms of some of the british traditions, including allegiance to the monarchy).16 throughout the 1990s, scotland benefited considerably from devolution that the labour party under tony blair initiated in order to address the sense of an inadequate representation of scottish interests in the westminster system. the rationale of transferring competence in key policy areas to the then-newly-established scottish parliament at holyrood was to allow for a greater sense of political ownership over political decisions affecting the region. yet, arguably, one can contend that, as some critics feared, devolution has fueled the appetite and provided resources to pursue an even greater degree of home-rule. in his speeches, alex salmond repeatedly characterizes independence as “not just as an end in itself.” in the political framing strategy of the “yes campaign,” the goal of independence is intimately tied to the ‘aspirations’ of the scottish people and the ‘unfulfilled potential’ of a truly self-ruling scotland. the snp 2011 election manifesto that put the plea for independence at its 16 salmond spoke about six unions forming the uk, of which an independent scotland would keep five: the currency, monarchy, society, europe and defence. 14 review of european and russian affairs 9 (1), 2015 core provides a good sense of how the resulting campaign leading up to the 2014 vote is justified. the manifesto speaks of a: culture of independence, a culture of responsibility and confidence across our nation. in our approach to government this will see more power devolved to local communities and greater involvement for people in the decisions that most affect the place they live. this theme of empowerment for our communities runs like a thread through our policy platform. (snp 2011, 5) the framing focuses on issues of ‘empowerment’ and ‘involvement of the people’ – thus, on issues genuinely related to the current democratic decision-making process – rather than an explicitly-declared scottish collective identity and associated historic grievances. commentators such as charles king (2012) contrast the “kilt-and-bagpipes version of scottishness” with one that is essentially grounded in social and political values (see more on this point in the next section). the focus of the nationalist campaign is hardly on any ethno-cultural differences or even historic grievances 17 ; even the collective memory of a supposedly glorious past as promoted by scottish nationalists well into the 1970s has largely ended. in its place, the framing of the pro-independence cause is driven by the demand for proper political institutions and claims of self-governance. scottish nationalists are extremely careful when it comes to exploiting the simple ‘us’ versus ‘them’ binary employed in traditional nationalist reasoning. moreover, the rationale for doing so can be found in a peculiar social reality when it comes to defining modes of collective belonging and identity. according to a study conducted by carman, johns, and mitchell (2014), most voters in scotland would describe their identity as a mix of scottish and british elements. while there is a strong recognition of an independent sense of being scottish, it is not primarily defined as non-british. indeed, the 2006 british and scottish social attitudes survey found that symbols of british culture are similarly endorsed in england and in scotland (most prominently those of democracy, the monarchy, and a sense of fair play). 2) democratic renewal and the right to national self-determination often, the question of independence is downplayed in catalan political discourse in favour of the question of catalonia’s “dret de decidir” (“right to decide”), in which catalonia is characterized as a nation with legitimate political concerns and where “it is for the catalan people to decide its preferred form of government, either within or outside spain” (martí 2013, 510). past examples of democratic self-determination referendums from around the world are cited as justification and precedent for catalonia’s “right to decide.” the erc leader, oriol junqueras, argues that catalans “want to vote and decide on the future of our country as every democratic society does” (catalonia votes 2014d). supporters of independence frequently invoke the example of scotland’s referendum (and the willingness of the british government to devolve the necessary authority to hold the vote and to abide by the result) and cite it as a model for spain and catalonia to follow.18 17 in terms of references to history, it is remarkable that historic grievances since the vote for a merger between england and scotland in 1707 do not figure prominently in the framing of the yes campaign. virtually no reference is made to the historic predecessors of the fight for independence, such as the highland clans, the scottish free church movement, or the glasgow dockworkers in the post-war period. 18 catalonia votes (2014e) provides a section on their webpage entitled “they also did it,” in which they compare catalonia’s situation with 20th and 21st century examples of self-determination referendums, including those of scotland, quebec, iceland, and norway. 15 review of european and russian affairs 9 (1), 2015 the argument that catalonia has the “right to decide” draws broader support than the subject of independence itself, whereby a large majority of catalans endorse the idea that catalonia should at least be able to decide on the subject of independence through democratic consultation (martí 2013, 510). consequently, during the 2012 catalan parliamentary election, the “right to decide” was endorsed by a mixture of “sovereigntist” (ciu; erc; cup) and “federalist” parties (icveuia; elements of the psc), while the subject of independence was downplayed by many of these same parties (ibid.). catalonia’s right to decide and its possible independence from spain are justified as an expression of democracy and self-determination, as articulated in the opening section of catalonia’s declaration of sovereignty passed by the catalan parliament in 2013: catalonia, throughout its history, has democratically expressed its commitment to selfgovernment, in order to strive for more progress, welfare and the equal opportunities for all its citizens, and to reinforce its own culture and its own collective identity. (generalitat de catalunya 2013b) democratic freedom and national self-determination therefore serve as the two guiding normative frames behind this discourse. regarding the first point, proponents frequently frame the subjects of “independence” or of “national transition” as a healthy and necessary exercise in democratic renewal. catalonia votes argues that the freedom to vote on independence is the only logical and truly democratic response to what has taken place between catalonia and spain in recent years: a referendum on self-determination is necessary to reset the relationship between catalonia and spain. it is the popular demand of more than 80% of catalans in opinion polls, and of a clear majority of members of the catalan parliament. (catalonia votes 2014g) this argument that it is the “will” of the catalan people to vote appears repeatedly in the political discourse, along with the idea that the right to decide is a fundamentally democratic exercise. carme forcadell, the president of the assemblea nacional catalana, argues that a referendum on self-determination is justified “[b]ecause the majority of the catalan people want to vote to decide our future,” that “[t]here are a lot of reasons, but this is the most important” (catalonia votes 2014c). muriel casals, president of òmnium cultural, similarly attests that “[w]e want to decide our political future” and that “[v]oting is the democratic way to solve conflicts” (ibid.). the catalan president, artur mas, notes that “there is a larger majority of the catalan people who want to vote,” as demonstrated by the large pro-independence demonstrations in barcelona since 2010, and argues, “[n]ow it’s time to let these people vote” (catalonia votes 2014b). his party, the ciu, similarly contend in their 2012 platform that: the people of catalonia, diverse and plural, are no longer a spectator of reality but a protagonist of change. catalonia has the right to decide its future and it is time to exercise this right. after thirty years, it is the moment to choose. (ciu 2012, 12) the erc (2012, 6) similarly characterize the push for a referendum on independence as “[a] radically democratic proposal based on the right to decide, a proposal that places popular sovereignty at the centre of social and national construction.” finally, david companyon, an euia parliamentarian, argues that catalan efforts to bring about a referendum “is based above all on the power of the people” (catalonia votes 2014d). he cites the example of the recent 16 review of european and russian affairs 9 (1), 2015 large-scale demonstrations as evidence that a referendum is the democratic will of the catalans, and argues that "[m]ore than two million people" have marched in the streets in recent years and "demand[ed] that their voice be the one to define [catalonia's] relationship with the other parts of spain and europe via the ballot box" (ibid.). building on this argument, catalan political discourse frequently frames the push for a referendum and independence as a by-product of grassroots/popular mobilization in which civil society organizations have taken the leading role (as opposed to being initiated by catalan nationalist parties or government elites). catalonia votes (2014a) argues that “[t]he catalan social movement working to achieve the fulfilment of the right to self-determination is a broad and inclusive, peaceful movement,” one that is “[i]ndependent of political parties” and instead “is led by civil society through organized groups and individual actions.” pro-independence groups like the assemblea nacional catalana (n.d.) similarly describe themselves as broad-based and inclusive, composed of thousands of devoted volunteers bound together by a shared commitment to “the independence of the catalan nation by democratic and peaceful means”. the principle of national self-determination serves as the other major normative justification for catalonia’s right to decide on independence from spain. catalonia votes (2014g) contends that a referendum vote is necessary in part by stressing catalonia’s national particularity, noting that “catalonia has always had a distinct culture and language and a strong desire for selfgovernment.” the ciu emphasize the longevity of the catalan nation in their justifications for both the right to decide and independence. their leader and catalan president, artur mas, relates catalonia’s desire for a referendum to its lengthy national history and distinct political and legal traditions, stating that: we want to vote because catalonia is a nation. as a matter of fact, catalonia is one of the oldest nations of europe. catalonia has one of the oldest parliaments in the world, with its own culture, its own language, its own identity, its own civil law. (catalonia votes 2014b) the ciu (n.d.) similarly contend, “catalonia is a thousand-year-old nation” and not simply a recent political invention or a by-product of the present system of regional self-government in spain.19 its 2012 election platform emphasizes that catalonia is “[a] nation that has not ever renounced its inherent rights as a people, or the right to self-determination, and has always desired the highest levels of self-government” (ciu 2012, 9). in terms of other parties, an icv spokesperson, dolors camats, similarly justifies the desire of the catalans to hold a referendum by stressing their desire to preserve their national distinctiveness, stating that catalans want to vote “[b]ecause we are a people, we are a community, and we are a nation”, and that “[w]e were and we want to be [a nation] in the future” (catalonia votes 2014d) the ‘right to choose’ also plays a key role in the arguments mobilized by the yes campaign in scotland. the claim that scotland is unable to articulate its interests and values is couched in two framing strategies. the first strategy links the issue of scottish independence with a general feeling of disengagement from mainstream politics. the yes campaign portrays people in scotland as marginalized and voiceless, and it accuses the uk westminster system of being the 19 in spite of this reference to the age and history of the catalan nation, the ciu (2012, 9) does not treat it as some sort of backward-looking and reactionary entity, instead equating the evolution of the catalan nation within spain over the past 150 years with “modernity, progress, and democracy.” 17 review of european and russian affairs 9 (1), 2015 root cause of this marginalization. with this strategy, the yes campaign seeks to relate to a broader sense of alienation from mainstream politics and political institutions. in this narrative, scottish independence is depicted as a fundamental decision on the rules under which citizens engage politically and ‘have a say’ in the collective fate of the community. the second framing strategy is more narrowly focused on the british political system. for scottish nationalists, british politics suffers from a structural underrepresentation of scottish interests in london. repeatedly, the yes campaign has pointed to the fact that, in post-war britain, scotland has regularly lived under uk governments for which it has not voted, and the snp could claim that it is highly unlikely that it will be able to represent scottish interests in any future uk government. the current political configuration in westminster, in which only one of the 304 conservative mps comes from scotland, also serves as an example of scottish underrepresentation and disconnect from the u.k government. again, the yes campaign depicts london rule as a form of suffocating conservatism. the central reference point in the yes campaign is scotland’s alienation from tory-governed england and the claim that only farreaching self-government can put an end to ‘foreign rule’ resulting from scotland’s peripheral role in the westminster system. 3) pursuing distinct policy priorities and preserving ‘national values and traits’ pro-independence discourse in catalonia frequently frames the vision of independence in a forward-looking manner, focusing on the potential of what independence could mean for catalonia and the freedom it could provide catalans in shaping their own future. the assemblea nacional de catalunya (n.d.) stresses that they “want independence for dignity, for democratic regeneration and for social justice,” adding that, for catalonia, “[i]ndependence is a real opportunity for collective and individual improvement.” the erc leader, oriol junqueras, articulated a similar sentiment when he argued that catalans want a self-determination referendum in order to have the freedom and power to shape their future, stating “we are working in order to solve our political, economic, and social problems with more and more democracy, and to do it we need the best tools – the tools of a state” (catalonia votes 2014 d). the erc (2012, 6) similarly emphasize the creative possibilities of independence, stating that “catalonia has the opportunity to constitute the first state of the twenty-first century: a state based on social, environmental and economic sustainability.” the party portrays the present push towards a referendum as a unique opportunity for catalonia: the opportunity to construct a new country; the opportunity of the catalan people to be the protagonists of our own history; the opportunity to place politics at the centre of public debate; the opportunity to construct a society based on social justice and equality; the opportunity to reaffirm our commitment with democracy, with peace, and with europe. (ibid.) the icv spokesperson, dolors camats, also stresses that the referendum means more than having the freedom to vote on independence, and is instead about having the freedom to shape the future of catalonia in accordance with its own policy priorities and values, stating that: [t]his referendum is also about deciding everything, on everything, not only on being a state, on being a country, on being a nation, but also to decide about the society that we want to be, about the social state, the welfare state, and the kind of society that we want to be. (catalonia votes 2014d) 18 review of european and russian affairs 9 (1), 2015 the icv-euia 2012 platform similarly groups the right to decide within a broader vision of promoting social equality and environmental stewardship. it is presented as part of three “dilemmas” facing catalonia regarding major decisions on whether “to redistribute or to cut” in terms of wealth and social services, “to transform or to conserve” in terms of the existing political structures, and the “freedom to decide or recentralization” in terms of catalonia’s future status within spain (icv-euia 2012, 5). regarding the last decision, the party strongly affirms that “[t]he next catalan legislature should be able to decide with freedom and without limits” on catalonia’s future relationship with spain, adding that “[w]e, from our sovereignty as a people, decide the future” (ibid.). independence is also presented as a way of preserving particular traits of catalan society that are regarded by nationalists as historic, valued, and potentially threatened within the context of the spanish state, of which the catalan language is the most prominent. muriel casals of òmnium cultural argued that a referendum is justified in terms of both protecting catalan distinctiveness and serving broader european cultural purposes, stating, “[w]e want to assure our culture and our language because this is the way to contribute to european diversity” (catalonia votes 2014c). the ciu appeals both to the idea of preserving what is distinct about catalonia and to having the freedom to shape a new future for the region within their 2012 platform, stating that: catalonia has the right to decide its future and it is time to exercise this right. after thirty years, it is the moment to choose. it is time that catalonia takes its own path [...] that will allow us to make our own decisions, which should allow us to live according to our own possibilities [...] it is the freedom to develop our nation-building project, which has as its pillars economic progress and social cohesion, with the preservation of our welfare state. a path that should allow us to show us as we are and to project our identity, our culture and our language. (ciu 2012, 12) the narrative that the snp and the yes campaign have embarked on focuses on the dynamic of electoral and party politics in great britain. according to their reading of recent british history, the legacy of margaret thatcher has pushed the uk’s major parties so far to the right that the more progressive scottish society and political elite feel alienated from the rest of britain. the thatcher years are vividly depicted as an onslaught against the progressive values of scotland and the achievements of the post-war british welfare state (pensions, medical care, public housing, higher education, etc.). the former prime minister has become the epitome of “nonscottishness.” again, thatcher is not depicted as the ethno-cultural other, but as the representative of a way of organizing the political community that is deemed alien to values widely held in scotland. these sentiments are primarily directed at the british conservatives, but include the labour party. during the referendum campaign, labour was depicted as a party firmly rooted in the westminster system that translated british priorities into the scottish context without proper sensitivities to regional needs. the fact that all three mainstream british parties joined in the better together campaign helped to paint a picture of british parties as being hostile to scottish home-rule, regardless of their ideological perspectives. in addition, the rise of ukip (the uk independence party, a populist anti-immigration, anti-eu party) during the campaign gave additional arguments to the pro-independence advocates to depict the goal of a ‘fair and harmonious society’ as being increasingly incompatible with the direction of british politics. 19 review of european and russian affairs 9 (1), 2015 scottish nationalists have made the protection of welfare state provisions the cornerstone of their campaigns. these frames resonated strongly with the scottish electorate: they could vividly paint a contrast between scotland and the rest of the uk (and in particular, england). however, in its campaign, the pro-independence camp faced the challenge of having to reconcile its commitment to expansive welfare state provisions with its separate commitment to keeping an independent scotland economically competitive in a globalizing world. clearly, the reliance on revenues from natural resource extraction (most notably north sea oil) was a critical element in this regard. the yes scotland campaign claimed that an independent scotland would be ‘one of the wealthiest nations in europe’ due in part to oil revenue. 4) national unity and the internal diversity of the minority nation the idea of independence is frequently juxtaposed with the internal diversity of catalan society, both in relation to the varied political attitudes surrounding the question of self-determination, and in terms of the growing social/cultural/linguistic diversity within catalan society. several actors present the right to decide and securing independence as an opportunity to foster social cohesion within catalonia. the assemblea nacional catalana (2014), for instance, articulates a vision of an independent catalonia that will be “a country for everyone,” arguing that “the independence of catalonia is an inclusive project, that permits us to build, together, a new country.” the assemblea’s commitment to inclusiveness and to a common project of nationbuilding also recognizes the existence of segments of the population who are opposed to or undecided on the issue of independence. they accordingly pledge “to consolidate and expand the social majority in favour of the independence of catalonia” as a way to “guarantee us social cohesion in the future” (ibid.). they also commit to reaching catalan voters who remain “undecided” or “unconvinced” about catalan independence, and emphasize the need to expand their work in “metropolitan areas of catalonia and the neighbourhoods of large and mid-sized cities, where there are now more undecided people” (ibid.). this final statement appears to be an implicit recognition of the greater social and linguistic diversity within urban parts of catalonia, particularly in barcelona, where larger numbers of spanish speakers live and where affinity with spain is stronger. the assemblea nacional catalana are not alone in this sentiment regarding the need for social unity and cohesion, in that the ciu, erc, and icv-euia all emphasize the need to build a broad “social majority” in favour of either the “right to decide” or in favour of independence (see ciu 2012, erc 2014, icv-euia 2012). catalan president artur mas similarly framed the referendum on independence as the foundation for a broader national project that will encompass all catalans, stating that “we want to vote because we have the strong will to build a collective future for 7.5 million catalans” (catalonia votes 2014b). mas contended that the desire for a referendum transcends differences within catalan society, in which he explained that “catalonia is a sort of melting pot, 70% of our people have a non-catalan origin, and all these people, all this country, all this nation, for all these reasons, want to vote” (ibid.). in scotland, the yes campaign embarked on an approach to immigration and governing diversity that is explicitly open and multicultural in spirit, again setting it apart from the current government at westminster. the british nationalist course of the cameron government (driven by the rise of ukip) and its increasingly exclusionary stance toward immigration has opened a political opportunity for scottish nationalists to give substance to their claim to represent a more 20 review of european and russian affairs 9 (1), 2015 open, compassionate, and fairer approach to social inclusion. this openness not only extended to eu and “third country” nationals, but also to those who moved to scotland from other parts of the united kingdom, all of whom were encouraged to join the scottish independence movement. the pro-independence campaign depicted itself as socially diverse, emphasizing shared values that bound its diverse supporters together and de-emphasizing exclusionary sentiments regarding scottish national identity. on many of the pamphlets used in the campaign, immigrants and minorities of a non-european background are prominently featured. similarly, regulated immigration was described as a key element of the economic policy for an independent scotland. 5) the relationship between the quest for independence and european integration as shown in several of the above statements, europe frequently features prominently in catalan pro-independence discourse and in the vision of an independent catalonia. catalonia is often presented as an historic nation within europe that desires its national distinctiveness to be recognized and represented at the european level. the ciu (2012, 12) explicitly situate their vision of catalan independence within the context of the eu, stressing that “[w]e want to construct a large social majority so that catalonia can have its own state within the european framework, as catalonia has the aspiration to be a normal people among the countries and nations of the world”. the erc (2012, 6) similarly articulate a vision of a catalan “state federated with the european union.” catalan nationalists have also challenged suggestions that the region would be expelled from the european union if it voted to secede from spain. the spanish government and certain eu officials have contended that if a constituent unit secedes from an eu member state, the terms of the eu treaties no longer apply to the seceding unit, which would then have to apply for official membership along the same lines as other eu applicant states. in response, the ciu-led government has described the threat of catalonia’s expulsion from the union as a scare tactic on the part of the spanish government, designed to deter catalans from voting for independence (generalitat de catalunya 2013a). furthermore, the erc (2013) has stated that there are no formal rules regarding secession from an eu member state, and contend that it would be in the economic and political interests of the both the eu and spain to keep catalonia in the european union. similarly, the yes campaign in scotland portrays scottish independence as fully compatible with and in harmony with the spirit of european integration. as in catalonia, one of the major controversial issues of the british debate was whether scotland would be allowed to stay in the eu or whether, after independence, it would need to reapply and exist in an extended period of uncertainty regarding its status with the eu. the pro-independence movement countered this argument with a staunchly pro-european stand which, given the euroscepticism of the british conservative party and the rise of ukip, was meant to give further substance to the need for greater self-rule. somewhat ironically, the pro-eu course of the snp and most of the supporters of the pro-independence campaign was able to fuel the plea for national independence, with “yes” campaigners arguing that independence offered the only way for scotland to remain in the european union in light of the british government’s recent commitment to hold a referendum on the uk’s membership. conclusions: towards a new form of territorial politics in europe? 21 review of european and russian affairs 9 (1), 2015 the 2014 referendum campaigns for independence in catalonia and scotland show distinct features that reflect their particular national contexts and the grievances with their respective national centres. yet at the same time, there are comparable elements in the framing strategies that allow for some rather tentative reflections on the kind of minority nationalism and visions of nationhood present in both contexts. the catalan political discourse surrounding independence is multi-faceted, complex and occasionally contradictory as it tries to bridge a plurality of actors seeking independence, as well as a plurality of motivations. on one level, it is more accurate to refer to this discourse as being motivated by the “right to decide,” or the right to hold a referendum on independence, rather than by independence itself. nonetheless, questions and concerns regarding independence underline the entire public discussion surrounding the “right to decide,” in particular, questions regarding the political and economic implications of catalan independence. the scottish proindependence campaign was driven by very similar concerns: the plea for self-governance itself, in which the quest for proper political institutions to reflect the interest of the scottish people took precedence over detailed accounts of what independence would entail and how an independent scotland would be different from the rest of the uk. the subject of historical grievance appears more prominently in the catalan case than in that of scotland, whereby arguments regarding the failure of the post-transition spanish political order to live up to its initial promise regarding catalan self-government, or its increasing resistance to catalan political aspirations, are cited as justifications for pursuing independence (or, at the very least, voting on independence). the ideas of “betrayal” or “hostility” appear frequently in this discourse, in which spain is conceptualized as having broken past commitments to the catalan people or having become increasingly intolerant to the political aspirations of the catalans. the catalans, according to this argument, have no choice but to “take their own path” or to “construct a new home” for themselves, as they can no longer consider spain to be their home without sacrificing their long-held nationalist aspirations. nonetheless, it is incorrect to characterize catalan independence discourse as entirely negative or focused on what they perceive as the failings of the spanish state. much of the language surrounding both the right to decide and independence is grounded in normative justifications and positive visions of what the future could bring for catalonia. proponents of the right to decide and of independence frame these issues as exercises in democratic freedom and national self-determination that the rest of the world should respect, and which have the potential to include the entire catalan population within a broader “regenerative” public debate. similarly, for left-wing proponents (in particular, the erc and icv-euia), the debate surrounding the right to decide and independence is conceptualized as an opportunity for a much broader discussion on the future direction of catalan society, one where the subjects of socio-economic equality and ecological stewardship are of equal importance with the subject of national selfdetermination. further, pro-independence advocates emphasize that their goal is not to create an insular and isolated catalonia. rather, the idea of national self-determination within the context of a broader interconnected world underlies the arguments of several of the major actors, in particular the goal of catalan independence within the european union framework. 22 review of european and russian affairs 9 (1), 2015 in a comparable way, the snp and yes scotland campaign embarked on a strategy of differentiating scotland from the rest of the uk that downplayed a distinct culturallyor ethnically-coded identity and instead focused on civic and political values. the political cleavages that the scottish pro-independence campaign addressed were those related to the perceived lack of democratic self-governance and a vision of the scottish national community that, with its focus on a fairer, ecologically-responsible society, were depicted in stark contrast to the current priorities of the british government. clearly, the overall political environment proved to be extremely receptive to such a framing strategy. british mainstream parties have moved to the (neo-liberal) right over the past decades (including new labour), and the austerity measures implemented in the wake of the financial-economic crisis threatened to compromise an agenda directed at social justice and equality (on the role of the recent economic crisis in this respect, see: gómez fortes and cabeza pérez 2013). along these lines, king (2012) describes the snp and pro-independence ideology as “a postmodern species of nationalism” that is “multicultural, social-democratic, and pro-european.” the attribution ‘post-modern’ refers to the fact that the party has dropped many of those ideological tools that in the past have been the bread and butter of nationalist movements, namely the strong reliance on a culturally-based collective identity and a resulting us-versus-them binary as its crucial mobilizing tool. while, in both cases, we clearly witnessed forms of traditional nationalist rhetoric based on an exclusionary, identity-based approach, ultimately, these voices were marginal in the public discourse leading up to the referendums in catalonia and scotland. the analysis of the framing strategies in the catalan and scottish referendum campaigns suggests that much of the political attraction and popularity of the yes-vote can be attributed to a civic vision of national community and a call for democratic governance. territorial politics in these cases appear to be vehicles for articulating political grievances that are only partly caused by the traditional centre-periphery conflict. at the very core of both campaigns for national independence was the notion of territorial politics as an instrument for fostering democratic renewal and promoting policies that reflect more accurately the needs of the affected community. in this respect, the two nationalist movements under investigation have been effective in bringing the regionalist plea for independence into close alignment with broader issues of contemporary politics, most notably alienation from mainstream party politics, as well as concerns about democratic governance, civic engagement, and social inequality (in this respect, we concur with cairney (2014) who speaks of a “territorialisation of interest representation”). keating and harvey (2014) make a compelling argument that “globalization and european integration have encouraged the re-emergence of a new ‘civic’ nationalism within established nation-states.” what both campaigns surely have achieved is reinvigorating political debate and participation. in many respects, both referendum campaigns were examples of a fundamental debate about the nature of political community, its key values, and its visions for the future. 23 review of european and russian affairs 9 (1), 2015 references anderson, benedict. 1991. imagined communities: reflections on the origins and spread of nationalism. revised edition. new york: verso. appadurai, arjun. 1996. “sovereignty without territoriality: notes 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http://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/lang/en/presidente/news/paginas/2014/20140920-statement.aspx/ http://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/lang/en/presidente/news/paginas/2014/20140920-statement.aspx/ http://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/lang/en/presidente/intervenciones/paginas/2014/20140408_plenary_session.aspx/ http://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/lang/en/presidente/intervenciones/paginas/2014/20140408_plenary_session.aspx/ 27 review of european and russian affairs 9 (1), 2015 published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada available online at: journals.carleton.ca/rera/index.php/rera rera is an electronic academic peer-reviewed journal that publishes graduate, post-graduate, and young scholarly works. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is a joint project supported by the canada-europe transatlantic dialogue—a cross-canada research network supported by the social sciences and humanities research council of canada (sshrc)—along with the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies (carleton university) and its associated research unit, the centre for european studies. rera aims to provide an accessible forum for research, to promote high standards of research and scholarship, and to foster communication among young scholars. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada tel: +01 613 520-2600 ext. 3117; e-mail: rera-journal@carleton.ca creative commons license creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0 this working paper is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial no derivs 3.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 3.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, provided the source is acknowledged. no use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes. issn: 1718-4835 © 2015 the author(s) https://journals.carleton.ca/rera/index.php/rera mailto:rera-journal@carleton.ca http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ microsoft word oliver schmidtke and constantin chira-pascanut_what kind of europe multiculturalism migration and political co review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 1 ………………………………………………………………… what kind of europe: multiculturalism, migration and political community – lessons from canada (?) oliver schmidtke and constantin chira-pascanut review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 2 immigration has emerged as one of the most important and controversial issues in contemporary european politics. european societies have struggled to come to terms with two major challenges: the task to develop an immigration and citizenship policy in countries that, often until very recently, have been countries of emigration themselves. and second, european countries have struggled to find an appropriate response to the socio-cultural implications of an increased ethnic-cultural diversity and the political reactions it has sparked. in the current issue of the review of european and russian affairs the authors shed light on these two challenges discussing the european experience of dealing with migration issues in light of the legacy that shapes canada in this respect. the question mark in the title of this issue indicates that one could have doubts whether the canadian tradition as an immigrant society and its decades of experiences with one of the most advanced migration regimes in the world is indeed a good reference point in trying to understand developments in europe. the authors of this issue are as divided over this issue as is the wider scholarly and public debate: while some base their arguments on the assumption of incomparable experiences other contributors work at least implicitly with the idea that canada and european societies have to face very similar challenges in terms of the transformation of national immigration and citizenship regimes. however what the articles do share is, from different perspectives, the question as to how migration challenges traditional forms of (nationally defined) political community, citizenship and sovereignty. it is one of the most remarkable developments in this respect that the provisions established by the nation-state tend to be increasingly dysfunctional or, may be better, overly narrow to cope with transborder mobility and practices of migrants. yet at the same there do not seem to be any politically or socially feasible options available to replace the nation-state as the review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 3 exclusive reference point in determining inclusion and exclusion, granting rights and in providing a sense of political community. the growing incongruence between social and political space raises some fundamental questions about how to redefine the notion of political community. the very idea of politics as the collective selfdetermination of citizens in a spatially defined community and the alleged universalism of the nation state is in question. the nation-state as it emerged in europe in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries seems to have become too narrow to serve as the exclusive spatial and social container of modern democratic politics. the ambitions of the european union to move migration and asylum policies to the community level can be seen as one promising approach to deal with this reality. yet, the very idea of depriving nation-states of sovereignty in this field and relegating power to european authorities generates a host of important questions: is the envisioned european citizenship regime a feasible alternative to the seemingly inadequately prepared nationally defined notion of community? what form of a collective identity does this supra-national political community invoke to generate trust, loyalty and solidarity among its citizens? how deeply entrenched are patterns of an emerging european identity into national contexts? migration thus can be seen to be at the root of the current transformation of political community and citizenship in europe. this issue brings together articles that focus on three major issues of this transformation: the changing images of national identity and community, the politicization of migration in political discourse, and the political response in terms of redesigning citizenship provisions at the european level. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 4 the transformation of collective identity and national community although modern societies are increasingly less able to portray themselves as closed, ethnically or culturally defined communities, a clear sense of “us” and “them” still forms the indispensable cultural basis for community membership. regardless of whether they are built on consensual, territorial, or primordial notions of nationhood, societies have always had a cultural, particularistic understanding of what makes their own community distinct from neighboring ones. in europe, however, such standards of societal inclusion and exclusion can no longer claim the status of an unquestioned fact. the boundaries between what legitimately divides "insiders" and "outsiders" have become increasingly blurred in these times of an unprecedented degree of transactions and socioeconomic practices beyond national borders. thus it is not surprising that questions concerning nationhood and citizenship have been the focus of political and scientific discussions throughout the 1990s and up to the present. the renewal of post-communist societies in central and eastern europe, the formation of an ever-closer european union, and the increasing ethnic pluralization of modern society have fueled debate over how to re-conceptualize the boundaries of the political community and the viability of established forms of collective identity. anna vorobyova’s article integrating immigrants through the policy of multiculturalism as a state’s response to the sovereignty challenge looks at how canada and its legacy of multiculturalism have faced this challenge. from a theoretical perspective she argues that pursuing a sense of national homogeneity is an integral – and so far indispensable – part of state sovereignty. in stark contrast to popular perceptions of canada as a (post-) national community characterized primarily by diversity vorobyova argues that multiculturalism, although being a rather benevolent form of dealing with internal cultural plurality, essentially can be review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 5 seen as a policy protecting and further cementing the idea of a culturally homogeneous, sovereign nation. vorobyova claims that even the canadian version of multiculturalism is still fundamentally committed to the idea of nation-building. based on her theoretically driven argument she sees multiculturalism as not having made any serious inroads into developing a truly “post-national” sense of community and sovereignty. historically european societies seem even less well prepared to deal with the challenge of internal diversity and its implications for notions of national community. the headscarf debate or the recent riots in france in which mainly young immigrants were involved have indicated the conundrum that even the – seemingly – most tolerant and open immigration regime in europe has to face. the french republican approach to integrating immigrants and assimilate them into citoyens has repeatedly been portrayed as the more benign way of including newcomers (e.g. as compared to germany that traditionally employed a more ethnically based mode of selecting and integrating immigrants). yet the public was surprised to find a great degree of frustration and alienation among young immigrants in france as well. their sense of being discriminated against and not having equal access to the life opportunity in french society is an indication of how deficient the whole process of social integration has been. one aspect of this puzzle how to deal with religious, ethnic or cultural difference and thus to promote integration in pluri-ethnic societies is the issue of political extremism. how far can and should liberal democracies go in tolerating political claims that threaten to undermine their constitutive principles? in the netherlands the murder of van gogh has let to a backlash against multiculturalism and the alleged excessive acceptance of extremists activities. in his article on the review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 6 danish cartoon affair per anders rudling describes islamic extremism as a test for western universal values such as freedom of speech or freedom of religion. he interprets the reaction to the moral indignation over the publication of these cartoons as misleading tolerance of extremism in the name of accepting cultural-religious diversity. in his view the strategy of trying to appease radical islam has undesirable political consequences (such as self-imposed censorship). rudling develops the provocative hypothesis that multiculturalism interpreted along those lines is prone to weaken and undermine the foundations of liberal democracy. politicizing migration in political discourse another way of looking at the political consequences of migration and multiculturalism is to investigate its role in mainstream public and political discourse. here we are faced with a telling paradox of how this issue is being dealt with in public debates n european societies: on the one hand, issues of immigration are closely linked to the rational debate about europe’s future labour market and its aging society. here the overwhelming majority of parties show a surprisingly similar pragmatic approach to the issue of immigration: it is perceived to be an inevitable component for how european countries need to prepare for the future. on the other hand, however, this issue has been employed in a populist fashion designed to evoke emotional attachment to those allegedly defending national interests and identity. in times of an ever closer resemblance of two major catch-all parties, the issue of immigration has repeatedly been used as an effective political device to polarize the electorate and to re-instate strong party allegiances. in particular against the background of the process of european integration and globalization the issue of immigration and citizenship is one prominent field in which fears, concerns and review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 7 frustration with the current political realities can be articulated. invoking strong symbolic patterns of national community and identity is promising stability in a world in radical transformation. andrej zaslove’s article the politics of immigration: a new electoral dilemma for the right and the left? focuses on the opportunity structures for political parties, on both the left and right, to politicize immigration. in his observation issues related to immigration, integration, exclusion, and multiculturalism have developed into a divisive element in electoral competitions in most western european democracies. in particular appeals to law and order and security scares have provided an environment in which the populist use of the topic has flourished. at the same time, however, zaslove shows that the left and the right have major difficulties in developing a coherent approach to issues related to migration mainly due to entrenched interests of their respective constituencies and the overall coherence of their ideological stand. the european response to migration and citizenship europe and the european union can be seen as the promising path towards overcoming some of the contradictions and challenges involved in conceiving of political community primarily if not exclusively in terms of a national one. and indeed, the eu has developed ambitions to generate a truly european approach to immigration and citizenship. in her contribution citoyenneté européen, transnationale ou globale: penser la citoyennete au-dela de l'etat elise auvachez addresses the question of the likelihood and desirability of citizenship beyond the nation-state. from a theoretical perspective she develops an interpretation that primarily looks at what constitutes citizenship, or in her conceptual framework “citoyennisation” in terms of the political actors involved. with this perspective her focus rests on citizenship not as review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 8 a set of legal provisions but rather as a political project that involves constant negotiation between state authority and various social actors in civil society. she goes back to the essential meaning of citizenship as a constitutive part of the political community and a constant struggle over its meaning. in this respect she interprets the emerging pattern of a european citizenship status in terms of a struggle over what kind of political community the european union will and should represent. in her paper le désalignement des politiques d’immigration et d’intégration au sein de l’ue : hardlaw versus softlaw? aude-claire fourot evaluates the current eu immigration policy noting a different approach at the eu level when it comes to issues related to immigration policies (the regulation of admission of a third-country national to the territory of a member state), one the one hand, and integration of migrants, on the other hand. by examining the evolution of eu immigration and integration policies (from the treaty of rome to the hague program), she identifies a progressive communitarization (europeanization) of immigration policy. conversely, the process of integration methods of migrants is left by the eu to the individual member states. as there is not a uniform eu model of integration of migrants, fourot concludes that in practice the results of this process can be fairly different. what kind of europe: multiculturalism, migration and political community – lessons from canada (?) the papers included in this special issue of the review of european and russian affairs address timely questions on both canada’s and the eu’s immigration and citizenship policies. as the eu embarked on the road of defining and ‘inventing’ review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 9 its first common immigration policy1, looking elsewhere for successful models of inspiration might be an appropriate approach. at this moment, europe faces the challenges of a rapidly ageing population as well as of integrating millions of migrants already working in the eu. in this context canada’s immigration and integration policies (‘immigration by invitation’) might represent an attractive model for europe. however, finding an agreement at the eu level on a common immigration policy is not an easy attempt. while some eu member states have decided to open their borders to migrant workers (see the recent decision of italy) others have chosen to postpone the application of the principle of free movement of labour (the british decision for placing restrictions of free entry into the uk on romanians and bulgarians when their countries join). yet, even if a european immigration policy is still in its infant stage europe and canada will face similar challenges in terms of reconsidering their underlying sense of community in light of the increasing ethniccultural diversity of their population. it is with respect to both issues immigration policies and the challenge of dealing with ethnic-cultural diversity that this issue of review of european and russian affairs seeks to encourage a trans-atlantic dialogue. 1 at the tampere european council (october 1999) the european leaders recognized the necessity to define an eu common immigration policy. the ‘draft treaty establishing a constitution for europe’ states in art iii-267 that “the union shall develop a common immigration policy aimed at ensuring […] the efficient management of migration flows […]” microsoft word kdiawara rera.doc review of european and russian affairs vol. 1 no. 1 december 2005 © rera 2005 all rights reserved ………………………………………………………………………..… l’apport du règlement 1/2003 : décentralisation et homogénéisation du droit européen de la concurrence karounga diawara doctorant en droit, université laval dea en droit européen (ulg, belgique) maîtrise en droit de l’entreprise (ugb, sénégal) 2 plan introduction -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------3 1. l’apport principal, l’article 81§3 : de l’autorisation préalable à l’exception légale.----6 1.1. la suppression de l’autorisation préalable ----------------------------------------------7 1.1.1. survol du système de notification sous le règlement 17/62 ---------------------7 1.1.2. les raisons de la suppression de l’autorisation préalable ------------------------8 1.2. l’instauration d’un système d’exception légale de validité des accords ----------10 2. l’apport subsidiaire : le réajustement des rapports entre le droit communautaire et les droits nationaux -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------12 2.1. le renforcement de la primauté du droit communautaire ---------------------------13 2.2. la soumission du droit national : l’article 3§ 2 --------------------------------------15 conclusion-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------17 3 introduction le droit de la concurrence a joué un rôle central dans la construction européenne. dès l’origine de la fondation de la communauté européenne, les articles 81 et 82 du traité de rome (ancien 85 et 86) portant respectivement sur l’interdiction des ententes anticoncurrentielles et les abus de position dominante, complétés en 1989 par une législation portant sur le contrôle des opérations de concentration (conseil ce 1989;1997;2004), ont permis d’instaurer un régime assurant que la concurrence n’est pas faussée conformément à l’objectif fondamental de création d’un marché intérieur ouvert et concurrentiel (commission ce 2004a)1. le traité ce est fondé sur le principe d’une économie de marché ouverte où la concurrence est libre. dans ce schéma, les règles de concurrence ont constitué très vite la constitution économique de l’u.e. par une interprétation téléologique des règles en matière de concurrence, la cour de justice (ci-après cjce) a posé les fondements de la politique européenne en matière de concurrence : la politique de la concurrence constitue un moyen, parmi d’autres, visant à l’érection d’un marché intérieur, objectif premier du traité de rome (cjce, metro s.b 1977, p. 1875). anticipant l’élargissement de l’union, et manifestant le désir de mettre en conformité la politique de la concurrence avec la stratégie de lisbonne qui vise à faire de l’u.e «l’économie de la connaissance la plus compétitive et la plus dynamique du monde », la commission européenne (ci-après commission) a entrepris un vaste champ de réforme du droit communautaire de la concurrence (commission ce 2000a, p.2). 1selon la commission, « un marché intérieur concurrentiel et ouvert offre la meilleure garantie de voir les entreprises européennes renforcer leur efficacité et leur potentiel d’innovation ». 4 ce vent de réforme, initié par le commissaire karel van miert, continué et approfondi par le commissaire monti, est aujourd’hui entrain d’être achevé par l’actuelle commissaire européenne n. kroes. la réforme a d’abord touché, vers la fin des années 90’, les accords verticaux qui ont bénéficié d’un règlement d’exemption par catégorie (conseil ce 1999). elle s’est poursuivie et a connu son paroxysme le 1er mai 2004 avec l’entrée en vigueur d’un ensemble de dispositions ayant trait à la mise en œuvre des articles 81 et 82 ce d’une part (commission ce 2004c) 2, et d’autre part, au contrôle communautaire des opérations de concentration (conseil ce 2004; commission ce 2004b). la réforme est entrain de suivre son cours avec l’adoption prochaine d’un ensemble de dispositions relatives aux aides d’états. c’est la réforme concernant l’application des articles 81 et 82 ce qui retiendra notre attention. cette réforme vise la modernisation du droit européen de la concurrence. elle entraîne un changement profond dans l’application des articles 81 et 82 en opérant une décentralisation du droit européen de la concurrence. la modernisation supprime le célèbre règlement 17/62 (conseil ce 1962) remplacé depuis le 1er mai 2004 par le règlement 1/2003 relatif à la mise en œuvre des articles 81 et 82 c.e (conseil ce 2003) (ci-après le « règlement 1/2003 »). cette réforme constitue le plus grand changement connu par le droit européen de la concurrence depuis quarante ans. selon l’expression consacrée, l’avènement du règlement 1/2003 marque une véritable « révolution juridique et culturelle» (ehlermann 2000, 537; idot 2001,1370; 2004;waelbroeck 2005, 2). 2 il s’agit du « paquet modernisation » qui outre le règlement contient deux autres règlements, cinq communications et un projet de communication; le tout est disponible en ligne sur le site de la commission : www.europa.eu.int/comm/competition 5 l’objet de cet article est d’analyser le changement fondamental qui concerne l’application de l’article 81§3. pour rappel, l’article 81§3 institue un régime d’exemption individuelle des ententes, décisions et pratiques concertées qui, tout en portant atteinte à l’article 81§1, produisent néanmoins des gains d’efficience économique (commission ce 2004d). l’article 81§3 pose quatre conditions cumulatives qui permettent à l’accord anticoncurrentiel d’être exemptés : d’abord, l’accord doit contribuer à améliorer la production, la distribution ou le progrès technique; ensuite, ces avantages économiques doivent profiter aux consommateurs; troisièmement, les restrictions de concurrence causées par l’accord doivent être indispensables; et enfin, l’accord ne doit pas éliminer totalement la concurrence sur le marché du produit en cause. sous l’empire du règlement 17/62, la commission s’est vue attribuer la compétence exclusive d’appliquer l’article 81§3. dès lors, elle était le seul organe habilité à délivrer des exemptions individuelles ou des attestations négatives constatant l’inapplicabilité de l’article 81§1. le changement majeur opéré par le nouveau règlement 1/2003 est la suppression de la compétence exclusive de la commission et l’abrogation de la procédure de notification obligatoire. dorénavant, les autorités et les juridictions nationales des états membres pourront appliquer cette disposition. c’est en ce sens que le règlement opère une décentralisation du droit européen de la concurrence. ainsi nous montrerons dans la première partie l’étendue de cette révolution qui instaure le passage d’un système d’autorisation préalable à celui d’un système d’exception légale (1). dans la seconde partie, nous montrerons comment le nouveau règlement vient réajuster les rapports entre d’une part, le droit communautaire et d’autre part, les droits nationaux de la concurrence. en effet, nous verrons que le règlement vient réaffirmer la 6 primauté du droit communautaire sur le droit national, en conférant au premier une envergure et une portée appréciable (2). 1. l’apport principal, l’article 81§3 : de l’autorisation préalable à l’exception légale. la révolution apportée par le règlement 1/2003 concerne sans nul doute l’application de l’article 81§3. cette disposition, qui permet de rendre inapplicable l’interdiction prévue par l’article 81§1 aux accords, décisions et pratiques concertées produisant des gains d’efficience économiques susceptibles de neutraliser leurs effets anticoncurrentiels, était placée sous la compétence exclusive de la commission qui fut le seul organe habilité à délivrer des exemptions individuelles sous l’empire du règlement 17. depuis le 1er mai 2004, cette prérogative exclusive de la commission est supprimée par le règlement 1/2003 qui institue à son article 1er§2 un régime d’exception légale en vertu duquel « les accords, décisions et pratiques concertées visés à l'article 81, paragraphe 1, du traité qui remplissent les conditions de l'article 81, paragraphe 3, du traité ne sont pas interdits, sans qu'une décision préalable soit nécessaire à cet effet ». le règlement abroge le système d’autorisation préalable fondé sur la notification obligatoire des ententes (1.1.) pour instituer un système d’exception légale basé sur la validité de l’accord ab initio (1.2.) 7 1.1. la suppression de l’autorisation préalable 1.1.1. survol du système de notification sous le règlement 17/62 au début de la construction européenne où peu d’états membres disposaient encore de législation sur la concurrence3, il avait paru opportun pour une application homogène et harmonisée du droit de la concurrence de confier à la seule commission la prérogative d’appliquer l’article 81§3 et ainsi de pouvoir, seule, contrôler les accords anticoncurrentiels au sens de l’article 81§1, mais produisant des gains d’efficience susceptibles de les exempter de la prohibition. c’est cette philosophie qui a inspiré le règlement 17, premier règlement d’application des articles 81 et 82. ainsi fût institué le système d’autorisation préalable qui obligeait aux entreprises voulant se prévaloir de l’exemption prévue à l’article 81§3 de notifier le dit accord à la commission. ainsi, tous les accords susceptibles d’affecter le commerce interétatique étaient transmis à la commission par notification. en vertu de cette procédure, les entreprises demandaient soit une décision d’inapplicabilité de l’article 81§1, auquel cas la commission délivrait une attestation négative; soit la commission constatait que l’accord notifié tombe sur le coup de l’article 81§1 mais remplit les conditions d’efficience de l’article 81§3; dans ce cas, une décision d’exemption individuelle constatant l’inapplicabilité de l’article 81§1 était délivrée. la notification offrait un certain nombre de garanties aux entreprises. d’abord, elle permettait à l’entreprise de bénéficier d’une immunité en matière d’amandes pour les agissements postérieurs à la notification, tant que la commission n’a pas pris une 3 en 1957, date de la signature du traité de rome, seule l’allemagne (rfa à l’époque) disposait d’une véritable législation sur la concurrence. les autres cinq membres n’en disposaient pas. 8 décision finale ou provisoire sur l’applicabilité de l’article 81§1 (attestation négative) ou §3 (exemption individuelle). en revanche, le défaut de notification de l’accord exposait l’entreprise à l’inapplicabilité de l’article 81§3 dans la mesure où seule cette la notification permettait à l’entreprise de pouvoir se prévaloir de l’exemption individuelle prévue par l’article 81§3. ainsi, même si l’accord ne contrevenait pas à l’article 81§1 ou s’il remplissait les conditions de gains d’efficience prévues par l’article 81§3, l’entreprise ne pouvait avoir aucune garantie d’inapplicabilité de l’interdiction de l’article 81§1. c’est pourquoi, la commission fut très vite envahie par une multitude de notifications. pour rendre son action plus diligente, la commission n’eut pas le choix de développer une pratique administrative informelle qui consistait à délivrer des lettres de confort. ces lettres, qui ne liaient pas pour autant la commission, ont permis un traitement plus rapide des dossiers, mais montraient déjà les limites d’une telle centralisation qui allait nécessairement être abandonnée dans une union élargie à vingt-cinq états membres. 1.1.2. les raisons de la suppression de l’autorisation préalable à cause de la rigidité du système de notification, la commission fût vite envahie par de nombreuses demandes d’exemption individuelle, les entreprises voulant s’assurer d’un minimum de sécurité juridique, sachant qu’en notifiant leur accord, elles sont protégées contre d’éventuelles sanctions encourues en cas de non notification. au surplus, même avec une lettre de confort de la commission, les accords ainsi notifiés jouissaient d’une certaine « garantie » de non contestation. ainsi étouffée et engorgée par des demandes multiples, la commission concentrait ses énergies dans un travail purement bureaucratique d’analyse d’accords qui, pour la plupart, ne présentaient aucun problème majeur pour la concurrence au détriment des 9 pratiques les plus nocives, mais jamais notifiées comme les cartels secrets (commission c.e 2000b). là se trouvent une des raisons qui ont amené la commission à proposer la suppression du système d’autorisation préalable. l’autre raison qui militait en faveur de l’élimination d’un tel système est liée à l’élargissement qu’allait connaître l’union passant de quinze à vingt-cinq membres au 1er mai 2004; un tel système aurait été insupportable et lourd pour la commission dans son rôle de gardien du traité et autorité principale de contrôle de la concurrence dans une union élargie. enfin, une autre raison non moins déterminante reste la promotion d’une application harmonisée et efficace du droit de la concurrence obéissant au principe de subsidiarité qui promeut une intervention communautaire seulement là où elle se révèle plus efficace et plus déterminante que celle des états membres4. or, il fallait corriger une incohérence interne dans l’application des articles 81 et 82 ce. en effet, alors que les autorités de la concurrence et les juridictions de droit commun des états membres pouvaient appliquer directement les articles 81§1 et 2 de même que l’article 82 c.e, il ne leur était pas permis d’appliquer l’article 81§35. cette limitation de la compétence de ces autorités et juridictions nationales n’allait pas dans le sens d’un développement harmonisé du droit européen de la concurrence (de smijter 2003,4; idot et van de walle de ghelcke 2001, durand-barthez 2004). toutes ces raisons ont été à la base de l’abandon de l’ancien 4 le principe de subsidiarité est posé par l’article 5 al. 2 du traité ce 5 les juridictions et autorités nationales de la concurrence ne pouvaient au titre de l’exemption par catégorie que vérifier si l’accord entre le champ d’application d’un règlement d’exemption sans jamais pouvoir accorder une quelconque exemption individuelle, compétence réservée exclusivement à la commission. 10 système pour un système censé être plus efficace et basé sur le principe de la validité ab initio des accords. 1.2. l’instauration d’un système d’exception légale de validité des accords c’est l’article 2 du règlement 1/2003 qui pose le principe du nouveau système en constatant la validité des « accords, décisions et pratiques concertées visés à l'article 81, paragraphe 1, du traité qui remplissent les conditions de l'article 81, paragraphe 3, du traité (…), sans qu'une décision préalable soit nécessaire à cet effet » (nous soulignons). selon ce nouveau système, tout accord est réputé valide dès sa conclusion sans qu’il soit nécessaire de le notifier. ainsi passe-t-on d’un contrôle a priori (ex ante) à un contrôle a posteriori (ex post). ce système de validité automatique des accords en vertu de l’article 81§3 emporte plusieurs conséquences. la première est que le paragraphe 3, à l’image des paragraphes 1 et 2 de l’article 81, devient d’applicabilité directe. ce qui a pour conséquence de rendre ainsi compétentes les juridictions et autorités de concurrence des états membres pour appliquer cette disposition. la commission perd ainsi son exclusivité au profit d’une compétence concurrente partagée entre elle et les juridictions et autorités nationales de la concurrence. c’est en ce sens que le règlement opère en quelque sorte à une décentralisation du droit européen de la concurrence permettant ainsi aux juridictions et aux autorités nationales de la concurrence d’appliquer en entier toutes les dispositions relatives aux pratiques anticoncurrentielles regroupant les articles 81 et 82 dans leur ensemble. ainsi, l’article 81 dans ses 3 § retrouve son unité et sa cohérence 11 juridique du point de vue de l’applicabilité directe c’est ce que kovar a appelé « une réunification matérielle et une réunification procédurale » (kovar 2003, 478). le principe d’exception légale rétablit le droit commun dans la mesure où il « correspond au principe général selon lequel chacun doit évaluer le caractère licite ou non des comportements qu’il s’apprête à adopter » (rincazaux 2003,5). dès lors, le principe d’exception légale attribue aux entreprises la responsabilité première d’évaluer leurs accords au regard de l’article 81§3. c’est d’ailleurs pour faciliter cette tâche aux entreprises que la commission a accompagné le règlement d’un ensemble d’actes soft law en mesure d’aider à une meilleure compréhension de l’article 81§3. il en est ainsi notamment de diverses communications et lignes directrices contenues dans le « paquet modernisation » (commission ce 2004c). néanmoins le problème reste de savoir si les entreprises seront aptes elles-mêmes à faire le travail que faisait la commission ? si cela est de nature à ouvrir une brèche d’insécurité juridique ? la sécurité juridique impliquant un minimum de prévisibilité et de prédictibilité des normes, la commission a avancé comme argument pour repousser cette crainte des entreprises le fait que le règlement 17/62 a permis de bâtir un ensemble cohérent et homogène de corpus juridique ayant trait aux interdictions des articles 81 et 82 du traité (conseil ce 2003, considérant 1). mais si l’on sait que la jurisprudence européenne a plus porté sur l’article 81§1 que sur le §3, il y a de quoi comprendre la crainte formulée par les milieux d’affaires. cependant, la pratique semble démontrer que cette crainte est quelque peu démesurée puisque, malgré la pauvreté de la jurisprudence en cette matière, la doctrine 12 européenne a apporté une contribution notable à l’interprétation et à l’appréciation analytique que nécessite la prise en compte des gains en efficience organisée par l’article 81§3. de plus, sous le système de la notification, même s’il revenait à la commission d’évaluer la compatibilité de l’accord avec l’article 81§3, les entreprises appréciaient dans une large mesure leurs accords avant de les notifier. enfin, la décentralisation de l’application de l’article 81§3 a entraîné l’établissement de règles relatives à la charge probatoire ; les règles déjà dégagées par la jurisprudence européenne ont été codifiées par l’article 2. suite à l’inquiétude de la doctrine sur l’absence d’une disposition relative à la charge de la preuve dans le projet de règlement (paulis et gauer 2003; ehlermann 2000), la commission s’est rattrapée en insérant une disposition ayant trait à la charge de la preuve dans le but de dissiper toute crainte. l’article 2 codifie la jurisprudence consten et grundig en édictant qu’ « il incombe à l'entreprise ou à l'association d'entreprises qui invoque le bénéfice des dispositions de l'article 81, paragraphe 3, du traité d'apporter la preuve que les conditions de ce paragraphe sont remplies » (cjce 1966, p.430). ce procédé, consistant à codifier la jurisprudence existante mais tout en la renforçant, est aussi visible en ce qui a trait à la primauté du droit communautaire sur le droit national. 2. l’apport subsidiaire : le réajustement des rapports entre le droit communautaire et les droits nationaux outre le passage d’un système préalable à un système « ex post », l’autre apport né de l’application du règlement 1/2003 est la réorganisation des rapports entre le droit européen de la concurrence et les droits nationaux des états membre. l’u.e est une organisation de « 3ème type » inclassable, car ne relevant ni à proprement parler d’un 13 système fédéral, ni à fortiori d’un état unifié. le règlement 1/2003 vient renforcer la primauté du droit supranational de la concurrence tout en prenant en compte l’autonomie des droits nationaux de la concurrence (2.1) auxquels il dicte une certaine soumission au droit communautaire (2.2). c’est l’article 3 du règlement qui pose ce principe. 2.1. le renforcement de la primauté du droit communautaire c’est dans ce domaine que le règlement est resté théoriquement plus timide. puisque la solution qui a été envisagée dans le projet de règlement a été abandonnée du fait de la réticence des grands états membres comme la france et l’allemagne à l’instauration d’un principe de guichet unique à l’image de la répartition des compétences organisée en matière de contrôle des opérations de concentration. comme le constate wathelet : « cette proposition [d’une application exclusive du droit communautaire en cas d’affectation du commerce interétatique] s’est heurtée à l’opposition de plusieurs états qui voulaient encore appliquer leur droit national dans certains cas ou qui craignaient la difficulté de devoir décider dès l’ouverture d’un dossier du point de savoir si le commerce interétatique était ou non affecté » (wathelet 2004, 25). le principe d’une application exclusive du droit communautaire écartée, il ne restait plus que la solution d’une application cumulative des droits communautaire et nationaux de la concurrence. ce « compromis belge » obtenu, in extremis, est aujourd’hui consacré par l’article 3 du règlement qui organise pour l’essentiel les rapports entre les articles 81 et 82, d’une part, et les droits nationaux de la concurrence, d’autre part. 14 l’article 3§1 pose le principe d’une application cumulative des droits communautaire et nationaux de la concurrence en cas d’affectation du commerce interétatique en ces termes : lorsque les autorités de concurrence des états membres ou les juridictions nationales appliquent le droit national de la concurrence à des accords, des décisions d'associations d'entreprises ou des pratiques concertées au sens de l'article 81, paragraphe 1, du traité susceptibles d'affecter le commerce entre états membres au sens de cette disposition, elles appliquent également l'article 81 du traité à ces accords, décisions ou pratiques concertées. lorsque les autorités de concurrence des états membres ou les juridictions nationales appliquent le droit national de la concurrence à une pratique abusive interdite par l'article 82 du traité, elles appliquent également l'article 82 du traité. cette solution n’est pas nouvelle, elle constitue une codification de la jurisprudence walt wilhelm selon laquelle les droits communautaire et nationaux peuvent être appliqués cumulativement à une pratique affectant le commerce interétatique, sans pour autant qu’il soit possible pour le droit national de remettre en cause le droit communautaire et ainsi porter préjudice à une application uniforme et cohérente du droit communautaire de la concurrence (cjce 1969, p.1). l’article 3§1 vient consolider cette jurisprudence en la généralisant6. selon l’expression métaphorique d’un auteur « le règlement n°1/2003 consacre une grande marée communautaire dans le sens où le droit communautaire de la concurrence a désormais clairement vocation à irriguer profondément et de manière récurrente, les droits nationaux » (viennois 2004, 35). même si une telle interprétation est quelque peu hyperbolique puisque l’article 3.1 n’amène pas une nouveauté au plan de la primauté mais vient juste éclaircir la portée et 6 on sait que la jurisprudence walt wilhelm tranchait spécifiquement la question de savoir si le droit national pouvait autoriser une pratique interdite par le droit communautaire. 15 l’envergure de la jurisprudence walt wilhelm qui, il faut le reconnaître, a été quelque peu assombrie par l’arrêt isolé de la cour dans l’affaire dite des parfums guerlain rochas(cjce 1980, p. 2327)7. l’apport fondamental de l’article 3.1 est qu’il vient mettre fin à toute controverse. cette controverse n’est aussi plus envisageable quant à la soumission des droits nationaux de la concurrence au droit communautaire. 2.2. la soumission du droit national : l’article 3§ 2 à notre sens, c’est plutôt l’article 3§2 qui apporte une contribution fondamentale dans le sens de la réaffirmation de la primauté du droit communautaire sur les droits nationaux. en effet, cet article vient lever une équivoque qui a toujours perduré dans les rapports entre le droit communautaire et les droits nationaux ; la question posée et réglée définitivement par le §2 est de savoir si le droit national peut interdire une pratique autorisée par le droit communautaire ? la réponse à cette question dépend de la nature de la pratique en cause, le règlement opérant pour la première fois une distinction fondamentale entre l’entente et l’abus de position dominante ou pratique unilatérale. c’est en présence d’une entente que le §2 opère à une autre révolution du droit de la concurrence. si l’entente est licite au sens de l’article 81 §1 ou §3, elle jouit d’une immunité à l’égard du droit national qui ne saurait la remettre en cause ; l’article 3§2 est formel sur ce point : l'application du droit national de la concurrence ne peut pas entraîner l'interdiction d'accords, de décisions d'associations d'entreprises ou de pratiques concertées qui sont susceptibles d'affecter le commerce entre états membres, mais qui n'ont pas pour effet de restreindre la concurrence au sens de l'article 81, paragraphe 1, du traité, ou qui satisfont aux conditions énoncées à l'article 81, paragraphe 3, du traité 7 dans cet arrêt controversé, la cour a décidé que l’existence d’une lettre de confort ne faisait pas obstacle pour le juge national d’appliquer le droit national. 16 ou qui sont couverts par un règlement ayant pour objet l'application de l'article 81, paragraphe 3, du traité (nous soulignons). dès lors, la doctrine s’accorde pour affirmer qu’il s’agit d’une condamnation éclatante de la théorie de la double barrière 8( idot 2003, 286; 2004a 120; ehlermann 2000). si la théorie de la double barrière est condamnée en matière d’entente, il semble qu’elle subsiste toujours en ce qui concerne les pratiques unilatérales dont principalement l’abus de position dominante. pour cette dernière pratique anticoncurrentielle, l’article 3§2 laisse la possibilité au droit national des états membres de pouvoir sanctionner plus sévèrement l’abus de position dominante que ne le ferait le droit communautaire. au surplus, il permet au droit national de prévoir ou de laisser subsister des incriminations unilatérales hors du champ substantiel du droit communautaire. en effet, des incriminations unilatérales telles que l’abus de dépendance économique, la pratique de prix abusivement bas pourraient s’appliquer à une pratique unilatérale affectant le commerce interétatique mais non constitutive d’abus de position dominante au sens de l’article 82 ce. ici, la théorie de la double barrière semble renaître de ses cendres. enfin, terminons par noter que le critère de l’affectation du commerce interétatique demeure l’élément fondamental de répartition des compétences entre la commission et les états membres (commission 2004e; viennois 2004, 9). l’absence de cet élément confine en principe la pratique en cause sous le joug exclusif du droit national. mais, semble-t-il que cette exclusivité du droit national demeure un mythe du fait de 8 théorie selon laquelle non seulement une entente doit se conformer au droit communautaire (première barrière) mais même dans les cas où elle bénéficie d’une exemption au titre du droit communautaire, il n’est pas exclue qu’elle puise tomber sous l’interdiction des dispositions d’un droit national plus strict (seconde barrière). 17 l’interprétation large au niveau communautaire de la notion d’affectation du commerce interétatique (viennois 2002, 1) l’application concurrente des droits nationaux et communautaire n’est possible qu’en cas d’affectation du commerce interétatique. dans ces cas précis, une collaboration s’impose entre les organes de contrôle communautaires et les organes de contrôle nationaux dont seulement le réseau européen des autorités de la concurrence (ci-après r.e.c) retiendra notre attention pour terminer. conclusion le passage d’un système d’autorisation préalable à un système de validité automatique permet aux autorités nationales de la concurrence d’appliquer directement les articles 81 et 82. l’article 3 §1 leur impose d’appliquer le droit communautaire lorsque le commerce interétatique est affecté. toute cette panoplie de mesures, contribuant à la décentralisation du droit communautaire de la concurrence et au renforcement de sa primauté sur le droit national, entraîne le risque de fragmentation dans l’interprétation et l’application des articles 81 et 82 du traité ce (.schnichels 2004; weitbrecht 2004; idot 2004a; 2004b). alors, fondamentalement la réforme devait réajuster la collaboration entre la commission et les autorités nationales de la concurrence dans le but d’éviter toute perturbation majeure dans la cohérence de la mise en œuvre des règles de la concurrence. c’est pourquoi les articles 11 à 14 du règlement, complétés par la communication sur la 18 coopération entre la commission et les autorités nationales de la concurrence, ont institué le r.e.c (commission ce 2004f)9. l’appellation de réseau rappelle un mécanisme volontaire de coopération qui existe au niveau international en matière de concurrence10. d’ailleurs si les règles européennes organisant le r.e.c s’inspirent de ces mécanismes de coopération internationale, elles s’en distinguent fondamentalement (idot 2003 ; 2004b). le réseau est fondé sur des principes de coopération horizontale (entre les autres nationales elles-mêmes) verticale (entre la commission et les autorités nationales) ascendante (demande d’information des autorités nationales à la commission) et descendante (vice-versa).après plus d’une année d’existence, le réseau marche normalement malgré les difficultés inhérentes à tout début (lasserre 2005). en définitive, nous aurons souligné la décentralisation et l’homogénéisation qui résultent du règlement 1/2003 sur le droit européen de la concurrence. en principe, cette décentralisation-homogéneisation rendra l’application du droit de la concurrence plus souple et plus efficace. pour cela, le r.e.c jouera un rôle important dans la répartition et la coordination des litiges relevant des articles 81 et 82 c.e (brammer 2005). 9 depuis le 1er mai 2004, le rec a ouvert 529 enquêtes antitrust dans des affaires où les échanges entre états membres étaient affectés; la commission vient de lancer le site internet du réseau : http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/ecn/ecn_home.html 10 il s’agit du réseau international de la concurrence (r.i.c) : www.reseauinternationaldelaconcurence.org 19 bibliographie cjce, consten et grundig c. commission, c-56/64, rec. 1966 i. p. 430 cjce, metro s.b c. commission, c-26/76, rec. 1977, p. 1875, cjce, walt wilhelm et autres c. bundeskartellamt, c-14/68, rec. 1969, p.1 cjce,procureur de la république et autres c. bruno giry et guerlain sa et autres, c253/78 et 1 à 3/79, rec. 1980 p. 2327 commission ce, conclusions de la présidence du conseil européen de lisbonne, doc/ 00/8 du 24-03-2000 (2000a) commission ce, proposition de règlement relatif à la mise en œuvre des règles de concurrence prévues aux articles 81 et 82 du traité, j.o c 365 e du 19-12-2000 (2000b) commission ce, une politique proactive pour une europe compétitive, com (2004) 293 final, 20.04. 2004 (2004a) commission c.e, lignes directrices sur l’appréciation des concentrations horizontales, j.o c 31/5 du 5-02-2004 (2004b) commission c.e, modernisation des règles d’application des articles 81 et 82 traité ce : règlement 1/2003 et « paquet modernisation », bruxelles-luxembourg, 2004 (2004c) commission ce, lignes directrices portant sur l’application de l’article 81§3 du traité, j.o. c 101/97 du 24-04-2004 (2004d) commission ce, lignes directrices relatives à la notion d’affectation du commerce figurant aux articles 81 et 82 du traité, jo c 101/07 (2004 e) commission ce, communication relative à la coopération au sein du réseau des autorités de concurrence, j.o. c 101/43 du 27-04-2004 (2004 f) conseil ce règlement 17/62 jo l3 du 21.2.1962, p. 204/62 (1962) conseil ce, règlement n°4069/89 sur le contrôle des opérations de concentration, jo l 395, 30.12.1989 (1989) conseil ce, règlement 1310 du 30 juin 1997, jo l 180, p.1, 09.07.1997 (1997) conseil (c.e), règlement n°2790/1999 concernant l’application de l’article 81§3à des catégories d’accords verticaux et de pratiques concertées, j.o l 336 du 29-12-1999 (1999) 20 conseil (ce), règlement n°1/2003 relatif à la mise en œuvre des règles de concurrence prévues aux articles 81 et 82 du traité, j.o l 001/1, 04 -01-2003 (2003) conseil (c.e), règlement n° 139/2004 relatif au contrôle des concentrations entre entreprises, j.o l. 24/1 du 29.1. 2004 (2004) durand-barthez pascal, « décentralisation et sécurité juridique » dans alexis mourre, le nouveau droit communautaire de la concurrence : les droits de la défense face aux nouveaux pouvoirs de la commission européenne, (bruylant, bruxelles, 211-226 2004) ehlermann claus-dieter, « the modernization of ec antitrust policy: a legal and cultural revolution », (37 common market law review, 537-590, 2000), idot laurence, « le futur règlement d’application des articles 81 et 82 ce : chronique d’une révolution annoncée »,( dalloz, 1370, 2001) idot laurence, van de walle de ghelcke b., « le besoin de sécurité juridique : notifications et exemptions», (cahier droit européen, n°1/2, 2001) idot laurence « le nouveau système communautaire de mise en œuvre des articles 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communautarisation du droit de la concurrence et une nationalisation de sa mise en œuvre? », (lamy droit économique, n°162, 1-5, mai 2003) 21 schnichels dominik , “the network of competition authorities: how will it work in practice?” dans geradin damien (ed), modernisation and enlargement: two major challenges for ec competition law, (intersentia, antwerp-oxford, , p. 99-121, 2004 ) silke brammer, « concurrent jurisdiction under regulation 1/2003 and the issue of case allocation », ( 42 common market law review, 1383-1424, 2005) smijter e. de, « regulation 1/2003 : a modernised application of ec competition rules, (competion policy newsletter, n°1, p.3, spring 2003) viennois jean-pierre, « la portée du droit communautaire de la concurrence et le mythe du champ d’application exclusif du droit national, (revue trimestrielle de droit commercial, p.1, 2002) viennois jean-pierre , « les rapports entre droit communautaire de la concurrence et droits nationaux sous l’empire du règlement (c.e) n°1/2003 du 16 décembre 2002 », dans cyril nourissat, wtterwulghe robert (dir.), le nouveau règlement d’application du droit communautaire de la concurrence : un défi pour les juridictions françaises, (paris, dalloz, 33-47, 2004) wathelet melchior « le nouveau règlement « concurrence » : révolution copernicienne? », dans cyril nourissat, wtterwulghe robert (dir.), le nouveau règlement d’application du droit communautaire de la concurrence : un défi pour les juridictions françaises, (paris, dalloz, 21-31, 2004) weitbrecht andreas,” the network of competition authorities: how will it work in practice: remarks from a practitioner”, geradin damien (ed), modernisation and enlargement: two major challenges for ec competition law, (intersentia, antwerpoxford, p 123-128 2004) wils wouter p.j , “regulation 1/2003: a reminder of the main issues”, dans geradin damien (ed), modernisation and enlargement: two major challenges for ec competition law,( intersentia, antwerp-oxford, p 9-81, 2004) frederic merand and antoine vandemoortele_introduction_volume3_issue2 review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 2/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 1 ……………………………………… introduction frédéric mérand1 and antoine vandemoortele2 1 frédéric mérand is assistant professor of political science at the université of montréal. 2 antoine vandemoortele is a phd researcher at the european university institute. review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 2/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 2 this special issue on european union canada relations and the new foreign policy challenges seeks to provide grounds for discussions on key aspects of the transatlantic link and of new elements of the foreign policies of both the eu and canada. all articles in this issue present original and well-thought analysis on a specific aspect of this question; the governance of security within the eu, the use of sanctions by the eu, the eu strategy toward the middle east, the development of hybrid peace operations and, finally, the promotion of security sector reform in post-conflict situation. these five articles were first presented and discussed by promising young scholars during the young researchers network (yrn) transatlantic conference held at the european university institute in april 2007. the authors then agreed to revise their papers and submit themselves to the process of peer-review to present in the end what we hope, and what we definitely think, are texts of excellent quality that reflect the efforts of the authors and are deem worthy of what in our discipline we call scientific publications. the five articles in this special issue address important issues related to the transformation of both the nature of canadian and european efforts to deal with new security threats and the evolution of the transatlantic security community. more precisely, one of the broader concerns of the authors is the question of how canada and the eu deal with the different set of transatlantic security institutions and the way they design and develop their own capabilities to achieve better security governance. another important element that several authors focused on was the new approaches used by canada and the eu in addressing new threats such as terrorism and failed states and in developing new approaches toward sanctions, peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction. these debates, related to the new foreign policy challenges faced by canada and the eu, also reflect the broader issue on the international agenda on finding ways to construct a better, more peaceful world. with the increasing role of the eu as an international actor and the canadian tradition of honest broker on the international scene, the questions asked by these scholars and the analysis made of key security issues leads us to a reflection on the changing role of international security relations which is bound to remain both intellectually challenging and policy-relevant. the first article by chantal lavallée attempts, with great success, to provide a map of the field of security governance within the eu. by clearly setting the development of the esdp outside the traditional framework of security, the author seeks to understand the logic that shapes the interactions between the many public and private actors involved in the esdp process. her objective is to explain both how this european security governance is constructed, not in term of a hierarchical dimension but alongside several spheres of interactions, and how this impact the way canada sees the eu as a partner in security related issues. she draws a detailed picture of who are these actors and how they interact. this attention to detail and the use of several interviews is particularly strong in her discussion of private actors, most notably think tanks. although she positions her analysis in the theoretical domain of critical security studies, the author does not solely argue on the theoretical level and provides us with many examples that reflect the strong empirical value of her work. the second part of this article deals with a more policy-relevant aspect and should be of interest to policymakers from both sides of the atlantic, but especially for canadian decision review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 2/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 3 makers. by pointing out the possibilities for canada to get involved in the renewal of the transatlantic link, chantal lavallée sets the tone for a discussion on the ways canada could be more dynamic in its security relation with the eu. moving from the internal dimension of the eu foreign policy-making, the next two articles analyse key elements of the eu as an international actor in different contexts. the article by ruth hanau-santini frames the debates and actions of the eu toward the middle east since the european security strategy in 2003. her main hypothesis is that while the eu has shifted its security discourse to address new security threats, the actions of the eu remain largely inconsistent due to the balance of influence between the eu and the member states. in order to substantiate this claim, the author first uses the discourses of the eu council presidency conclusions and the european security strategy (ess) document to discuss the way the eu understands security. concerning the ess, the author presents a compelling argument of the way the ess is leaning towards a human security understanding of threats and security issues. once the nature of eu discourses on threats in the middle east is done, ruth hanau santini proceeds to demonstrate the lack of coherence between words and deeds in terms of its institutional, horizontal and vertical dimensions. she raises an important point in discussing the horizontal dimension of the eu coherence, highlighting the domains of failed states, terrorism, non-proliferation and regional conflicts by showing that there remains important limits in linking these different security aspects in a comprehensive strategy. this section is also representative of the article in which the author uses a vast amount of empirical information to add to her argument. in her conclusion, she returns to the difficult balancing between the eu institutions and the individual member states. “the inconsistencies are more between european institutions and single member states foreign policy interests and legacies, than between the security discourse and the policies on the ground.” (hanau santini, this issue, p. 17) echoing some of the issues highlighted by hanau-santini, clara portela addresses in the third article the development of eu sanctions policies toward the acp countries. the objective of this article is to analyze the effectiveness of eu sanctions as policy tools. this is done by focusing on the use of the article 96 that allows the suspension of development aid toward a number of african caribbean and pacific countries when violations of human rights and democratic principles have occurred. the first part of portela’s article focuses on linking the issue of development aid cut-offs to the general sanctions theory and then setting the framework for analyzing the effectiveness of these policy tools. by clarifying the difference, in eu terminology, between sanctions and aid suspensions, the author addresses an important conceptual element that sheds light on the process of the use of article 96. however, the central aspect of this article is a detailed, empirically focused and impressive analysis of all seven cases where the article 96 was invoked by the eu. this compelling evidence leads the author to conclude that the use of aid suspensions was largely successful, in five cases out of seven. she then proceeds to discuss the merits and limits of these policy tools by arguing that this tool has only been used in cases where success was, in large part, foreseeable. this means that these measures can be effective, but only if the context is right. these policy advices that are visible throughout the text also add another important dimension to this article. review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 2/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 4 the final two articles move away from a european centred debate to an understanding of different elements related to peacekeeping and peacebuilding. they both share the idea that the debates related to these issues cannot be framed solely in terms of eu or canadian foreign policy challenges and need to be embedded in discussions of the roles of international organizations such as the un, nato or the osce. the fourth article by kristine st-pierre then rightfully frames the notion of hybrid peace operations as a triangle between the un, regional organizations and contributing countries. four types are hybrid missions are covered in this paper, depending on the relationship between the un and the regional organizations involved. the objective of this paper is to clarify the roles of hybrid missions in un peace operations and to elaborate on the implications this has on the un, regional organizations and peacekeeping more generally. by discussing the role and contributions of the eu and canada in hybrid missions, the author provides ample empirical evidence to support her findings. after a thorough and well executed analysis of the history and objectives of hybrid missions, kristine st-pierre proceeds to discuss the contributions of the eu and canada and highlights key elements and differences in their approaches. on the one hand, the eu is a recent actor in peace missions and still mainly focuses its attention to civilian or civilian-based crisis management. with this in mind, the eu needs to address its capabilities issues, especially the military part, and the notion of policy relevance and operations control in order to increase its cooperation and effectiveness with the un. on the other hand, the canada has a longstanding tradition of peacekeeping and has been involved in almost every mission in the last 50 years. however, unlike the eu, canada has started to decrease its participation in un-led operations since the mid-90s and has moved toward closer cooperation with nato. while canada has maintained ties in un peacekeeping, its participation in the nato-led mission in afghanistan clearly shows the kind of commitments canada prefers. in the end, the author concludes by discussing how the eu and canada contributions, as well as canada-eu relations in crisis management, will likely shape hybrid missions and improve the effectiveness of peace missions by providing the un with more capabilities. finally, the article by antoine vandemoortele moves the timeline of peace operations further by analysing the issue of post-conflict reconstruction and the importance of security sector reform. the paper seeks to explore the relationship between national and regional contributions toward security sector reform (canada and the eu) and the role of international organizations involved in this process (the osce and nato). more specifically, this article analyzes the role of the eu and canada in the promotion of security sector reform (ssr) within the osce and nato. the first part of this article then traces the development of the concept of security sector reform since the mid-90s and its use both at the international level and on the ground, in peace operations. the main focus of this article is then to explain the absence of an overall framework for ssr within the osce and nato despite the role of the eu and canada and to explain the differences between these two organizations. the main finding of the author is that nato has focused its role on defence reform and has developed a robust, but specific agenda and conceptual framework toward ssr while the osce rules, including the consensus element, has forced the organization to be active on the ground through its long term missions, but has limited the debates on the adoption of a conceptual tool similar to the old review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 2/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 5 osce code of conduct on politico-military aspects of security of 1994. in the end, the author proposes some policy recommendations to provide both organizations with more effective ways to deal with ssr and post-conflict reconstruction, but also to help canada and the eu to remain at the front of the development of ssr policies. with this summary of the articles in this special issue in mind, it is easier to gain a broader picture of some important aspects of the eu-canada relationship and some of the key foreign policy challenges that they both face. we strongly believe that taken collectively, these articles provide us with compelling analysis and answers on these issues and that the authors’ advices fully merit our attention. bonne lecture! review of european and russian affairs 9 (2), 2015 issn 1718-4835 the politics of face coverings and masks in russia, france, and québec andrea chandler carleton university abstract since 2004, governments in a number of countries have initiated tense political debates over the question of whether religious symbols should be permitted in public places. frequently, such debates have focused on the head and face coverings worn by many observant muslim women, as has been explored by a rich scholarly literature. however, relatively little has been written about the specific reasons why these laws have been adopted, and few cross-national comparisons have been made. this paper will examine the following cases: first, the law against wearing face coverings in france, adopted during nicolas sarkozy’s presidency in 2010; and second, the extensive debates about access to government services for people wearing religious clothing in québec (canada). finally, the paper will examine the distinct case of russia, where high court decisions have revealed a reversal in the authorities’ former tolerance of the wearing of head coverings in public places. three variables help to explain why these laws came upon the political agenda in these admittedly very different countries. first, all three adopted previous measures to limit citizens’ ability to don face coverings during political protests; second, these countries’ choices influenced each other, showing the importance that global influences can play in policy formation; and finally, political leaders attempted to use laws on face and head coverings as a strategy to reinforce their power. 2 review of european and russian affairs 9 (2), 2015 author’s note: this article is based on a paper presented to the 2014 annual conference of the canadian political science association, may 29, 2014, brock university, st catherines, on. i am grateful to those who attended for comments. i thank the office of the dean of the faculty of public affairs at carleton university for funding to attend the conference. i also received valuable comments, especially from melanie adrian, at a presentation of the preliminary draft of this paper at a research seminar at the centre for european studies, carleton university, february 12, 2014. finally, i would like to thank two anonymous referees, whose suggestions helped me to improve the final version. ________________________________________________________________________ introduction governments have suddenly become very interested in what people wear on their heads and faces. in the last ten years, countries as diverse as france, bulgaria, and russia have advanced new restrictions on the wearing of head coverings in public (ghodsee 2007). this paper will examine government and legislative action on head coverings and masks in the following cases: first, the law against wearing the niqab or other face covering in france, adopted by the french parliament during the tenure of former president nicolas sarkozy in 2010; second, the province of québec in canada, which had lengthy legislative debates about the extent to which people displaying visible religious symbols – among them the hijab or niqab – should be able to receive government services. québec’s liberal government retreated from relatively moderate proposed legislation in 2011, only to see its successor government, led by parti québécois leader pauline marois, advance the more controversial charter of québec values (which ultimately failed to pass). finally, the paper will examine the case of russia, where judicial decisions by the country’s supreme court have demonstrated a shift away from tolerance towards the wearing of head coverings in public places. why are governments seeking to adopt policies restricting the wearing of head and/or face coverings in public? as this paper will explain, it is puzzling that such different governments have considered these kinds of laws, even in the face of evidence that such policies have considerable negative consequences. furthermore, it is surprising that these policies were initiated in very different kinds of societies by contrasting political regimes. québec is a province within a liberal democratic federal system, france is a liberal democracy within a unitary state, and russia is a country which has moved away from democracy under the presidency of vladimir putin. all of the cases chosen are secular states with multiethnic societies, including muslim minorities. the countries however have different political traditions – canada has a parliamentary system, france a semipresidential system, and russia a legacy of strong state control. furthermore, laws on head and face coverings were initiated by leaders of different political stripes. france’s ump and russia’s vladimir putin shared a right-wing political orientation, but operate in very different contexts. however, the parti québécois is situated squarely on the left of the canadian political spectrum. soft nationalism is the only common denominator among these three leaderships. so then why would leaderships in these countries that are so different be pursuing policies that are so similar? 3 review of european and russian affairs 9 (2), 2015 a second puzzling feature of these policies is there is no particular dramatic event or social change that seems to be inspiring them. as jennifer fredette argues with the case of france, certain powerful politicians and prominent intellectuals participated in a discourse that posited that headscarves were an indicator of a problem in the muslim population, to be addressed with state action. however, more nuanced views of headscarves did not gain as much publicity in the media (fredette 2014). despite the tone of urgency with which policies on head and face coverings were introduced, there was no immediate pretext for them, and the rationales for government action were vaguely defined. the third puzzle is that legislative efforts to limit the wearing of head and face coverings led to unexpected negative consequences, as much of the literature suggests. indeed, france’s law could be credibly considered a policy failure. and yet the parti québécois attempted to put forth a law with strong similarities to the french model, even as that model was being challenged at the european court of human rights. why pursue a policy that has been heavily criticized elsewhere? this paper offers two arguments, and an additional observation, which emerged from an analysis of the three countries’ efforts. the first argument posits that there was a global “demonstration effect:” debate in these countries drew upon references to the models of other states. politicians invoked ideas and arguments from other contexts in order to justify their own political plans. once a law was adopted in one country, it became a model for others, even if that other country had a completely different social context. oddly, however, the spread of these discourses did not seem to take into account whether a policy had been effective or beneficial when put into practice. the second argument is that these policies can be considered examples of “wedge politics.” wedge politics is a term used to describe situations where a political party or leader, in a competitive political system, adopts policies aimed at gaining the support of one part of the population, even if it alienates other groups. wedge politics may drive leaders to pursue questionable policies in an effort to achieve a short-term political objective, such as to win an election. finally, the research led to an observation: in all three countries, laws previously passed limiting the wearing of face coverings during protests were passed shortly before politicians staked strong positions against the wearing of head and/or face coverings. it is thereby hypothesized that laws against wearing masks during protests created a form of path dependency, facilitating the process of framing the wearing of face coverings as an act of defiance. literature on the politics of head and face coverings much of the existing literature on the politics of head and face coverings examines them in the context of governments’ attempts to separate church and state. state campaigns aimed at ending veiling practices within muslim communities are not a new phenomenon: such campaigns took place in turkey under kemal ataturk, and in soviet central asia, in the 1920s (massell 1974, 218-20, 241-6). such policies often were presented as efforts to free women from the social constraints of religion. john bowen (2007) argued that france’s fairly restrictive policies towards muslim headscarves are a result of the way in which secularism (“laïcité”) had become perceived as an accomplishment of the 1789 french revolution. while secularism may provide 4 review of european and russian affairs 9 (2), 2015 protection against state encroachment upon religion, there are differing views on the extent to which secularism should affect individuals’ behaviour in public spaces. for example, in some countries, individual women, girls or their families, have appealed to judicial institutions for the right to wear their headscarves within institutions, especially in schools (ghodsee 2007, shadid and van koningsveld 2005). as some scholars argue, political culture can play a strong role in determining whether differences of opinion over religion in the public sphere can be amicably resolved. a history of multicultural policies, a degree of consensus over the boundaries of religious expression, and strong judicial protections for minority rights, can prevent issues from becoming politicized. in a 1997 article, sarah v. wayland contrasted the cases of canada and france in responding to appeals by individual students to wear religious symbols (respectively the sikh kirpan and the muslim hijab) to public school. in wayland’s analysis, canada’s history of religious pluralism and strong history of immigration contributed to an outcome that was more accommodating of students in hijab than france (wayland 1997). in short, this first literature tends to see headscarf politics as disputes over balancing civil rights, which can be negotiated as part of a robust democratic process. however, as this paper will demonstrate, political leaders sometimes pursue politicized policies that vary considerably from judicial decisions on minority rights. why do headscarves and face coverings attract so much attention from parliamentarians in north america and europe? some authors argue that contentious assumptions about muslims sometimes colour debates about social policy issues. fredette (2014) argued that in france, elites often perceive muslims as being a relatively similar group of people, rather than as diverse as any other group of french citizens. furthermore, politicians may view a particular religion in ways that do not necessarily coincide with the perceptions of members of that religious community. as abdolmohammad kazempur argues (2014, 30), policy debates that advocate firm actions towards muslims are often linked to what he calls the ‘muslim question’: common, stereotypical beliefs, such as the idea that muslim minorities are reluctant to embrace democratic practices. such beliefs are not necessarily evidence-based; for example, a recent survey suggested that many people in western countries think that the number of muslims in the total population is much higher than it actually is (ipsos-mori 2014, 10). in the minds of authorities in some western countries, headscarves have been considered a symptom of the social problems facing muslim minority communities; some leaders assume that headscarves pose a barrier to women’s full participation to public life (adrian 2011, 411-22). emma tarlo (2010, 132-4) argues that suspicion towards the face veil controversy reflects western mentalities, insofar as the use of the face for communication is important in european culture, and because masks have historically been seen as either playful or ominous. another literature points to the importance of the global context, in which the tragic events of september 11, 2001 contributed to a fear of muslim fundamentalism in the western world. in the context of 9/11, some saw this fundamentalism as a threat to liberal democracy (kaya 2012, 399-401). this discourse at times was simplistic, as islam was not always well understood by western political leaders (afshar 2013, 10-12). in this context, a hijab or niqab became perceived by some as an indicator of a rejection of the west. as mel chen argues, burqas became seen as a symbol of women’s oppression, 5 review of european and russian affairs 9 (2), 2015 while unease about face coverings drew on a theme in western popular culture where “bad guys” are often depicted wearing masks (chen 2012, 79-86). in some studies, muslim women reported that after september 11, women wearing hijab faced greater discrimination than previously (reeves, mckinney and azam 2013, 59; ahmed 2011, 207, 221). at the same time, globalization also influenced the decision to wear the hijab; kristen ghodsee argued that increased contact with the middle east since the collapse of communism influenced the increased prevalence of austere muslim dress in bulgaria (ghodsee 2010, 161-3). in this context, the headscarf and face covering became symbols of the uneasy relationship between islam and the western, or european, state. scholars have tried to reclaim the agency of muslim women who wear head coverings, in order to contribute to more accurate knowledge of those who share this identity. although not all observant muslim women cover their heads, those who do are particularly affected by requirements that religious affiliation not be made visible (leane 2011, 1033-4, 1060). a number of studies on muslim women in western countries have shown that those who cover their heads or faces do so out of personal choice, for a variety of reasons. even the wearing of a veil, such as a niqab, does not necessarily indicate either a strict interpretation of islam. rather, it may be an expression of identity, or a rejection of the excesses of western fashions (borghée 2012, 43, 136, 166-9; ahmed 2011, 120-23). these literatures regard the headscarf issue as a political controversy. two principles collide: the state’s obligation to protect the individual’s freedom of religion clashes with the idea that the state must be a secular space in order to ensure neutrality towards diverse social groups. but controversies over headscarves cannot be seen only as philosophical debates. in a competitive political arena, legislators’ incentives to gain or keep power may outweigh the desire to represent minority citizens. one must consider, then, whether laws on face and head coverings serve a political purpose. to date, relatively little has been written about the political reasons why these policies are adopted. a useful concept is the term “wedge politics,” which came into use to describe certain strategies attributed to republicans in the united states and conservatives in australia, among others. shaun wilson and nick turnbull define wedge politics as an overt planned effort to win political support by calling attention to sensitive, polarizing political issues, which often isolate one particular group of people. (wilson and turnbull 2001, 386, 390). another term for the same basic phenomenon, “issue politics,” is when politicians take strong stands on hot-button issues such as abortion and immigration (nicholson 2005, 134-6). wedge politics strategies have become more prevalent as politicians have used social media and electronic polling to try to precisely pinpoint pockets of receptive voters (hillygus and shields 2008, 184). although politicians who use wedge politics tend to believe strongly in its advantages, it is not clear whether politicians win because of those strategies, or in spite of them (ibid, 189-90). indeed, the analysis of nicholson (2005, 134-39) showed that wedge politics often fail, because they underestimate the sophistication of voters and miscalculate the potential for backlash. wedge politics may backfire if a party’s harsh rhetoric actually mobilizes opposition to defeat the wedge party (jeong, miller, schofield and sened, 6 review of european and russian affairs 9 (2), 2015 2011, 524). a similar argument was made by maddison (2006, 433-4), who argued that wedge politics are particularly ineffective in countries with multiparty (rather than twoparty) systems. however, the literature suggests that wedge politics can change political discourse and beliefs over time, even if they do not necessarily lead to short-term political victories (jeong, miller, schofield and sened, 2011, 524; wilson and turnbull, 2001, 401). this paper will argue that the logic of “wedge politics” helps to explain why france and russia adopted policies on head and face coverings, while quebec’s attempt to establish these policies failed. in france, nicolas sarkozy won the presidency in 2007, a victory that was credited in part to a use of strident rhetoric on issues such as immigration and reducing the welfare state. this rhetoric, arguably, helped draw voters who might have otherwise been tempted by the extreme right front nationale (nadeau and lewis-beck 2007, 55). however, once in power, sarkozy continued to use wedge policies, which included policies perceived as tough on migrants and rhetoric unsympathetic to muslim minorities (gougou and labouret 2013, 281). the ban on face coverings, insofar as it was couched in the effort to preserve french values, could be seen as a wedge politics strategy, as it seemed to cast the issue so that the opposition socialists would have to take a stand either for or against veils. public opinion can provide incentives for particular parties to pursue policies on issues related to islam. a comparative study, surveying people from a variety of countries, found that left-leaning voters think much more highly of muslims than those who identify with the right (pew research center 2014, 30-2). by looking at the politics of face and head coverings across these three cases, we can potentially learn about the limitations of wedge politics. while some politicians seem convinced that wedge politics work, more needs to be known about the instances in which wedge politics fail. for example, sarkozy’s defeat at the polls in 2012 suggests that wedge politics may be less effective for incumbents than it is for those seeking power. the case of russia is also instructive, as this former budding democracy has again reverted to authoritarianism under the presidency of vladimir putin. while we typically associate wedge politics with competitive liberal democracies, the russian case suggests that authoritarian regimes make use of this technique as well, although they may use it in a different way. france in france, political controversies over whether it was appropriate to wear muslim head and face coverings in secular spaces date back to the 1990s. in 2004, a law was passed that prohibited the wearing of religious symbols in schools, which included the wearing of hijabs and other head coverings associated with religion. as john bowen argued, muslim headscarves became seen at that time, especially by right-wing politicians as a vague, but growing threat to the separation of church and state. at the same time, some muslims were becoming more assertive in advocating for their rights to practice their religion (bowen 2007, 83-4, 91, 197-8). two young muslim women appealed (unsuccessfully) to the european court of human rights, claiming that the prohibition on wearing a headscarf at school violated their right to religious freedom.1 the 2004 law led 7 review of european and russian affairs 9 (2), 2015 some girls to stop attending public schools (borghée 2012, 147). however, one researcher who interviewed muslim women in a paris suburb said that many did not object to that particular law, which confined restrictions on the headscarf primarily to schools and government offices (selby 2012, 90). under the presidency of nicolas sarkozy, the debate on coverings advanced again, this time raising the issue of the wearing of face coverings (such as the niqab). at issue was not just whether faces should be uncovered in order to receive government services, but whether faces should be uncovered in all public places, such as streets, stores or markets. subsequently, the french parliament (in which at that time sarkozy’s party, the ump, had a majority), established a mission of inquiry into the wearing of face coverings (voile intégrale) in france. presided over by andré gerin, the report was released in january 2010. the lengthy report was based on hearings, written submissions, and feedback solicited by the parliament. on the one hand, it declared that french muslims should be supported. on the other hand, the report came down quite firmly against the niqab, considering face coverings to be inconsistent with gender equality and a potential threat to society, insofar as they were presumed to constitute reluctance on the part of the wearer to interact with other citizens (gerin 2010, 19, 23). it was written that the veil was not compulsory in islam and that it was new to france (ibid, 31). the report expressed the concern that males were pressuring their female family members to wear veils (ibid 53-5). interestingly, the report made reference to the province of québec, which was at the same time preparing to debate a law defining the parameters of “reasonable accommodation” on the basis of religion. however, the report rejected that “très libérale” canadian approach, saying that accommodation could lead to ever-increasing demands (gerin, 2010, 64-7). finally, the report voiced the idea of banning the wearing of the veil in all public places, although in fairness, it noted that there were valid concerns about whether such a ban could encroach upon individual freedoms (gerin 2010, 92). although the report claimed to be aggregating many different views, it was critical of the veil from the beginning. indeed, the gerin report was criticized for insufficient consultation with french muslims (adrian 2011, 419). the gerin report served to frame the subsequent discussion of veils in the french legislature. in april 2010, the legislature passed a resolution criticizing the wearing of a veil as a “radical practice” which was inconsistent with the values of the french republic, but also stating that the state would actively address discrimination and inequality.2 a few weeks later, draft law 2520, to prevent the wearing of the veil in public, was introduced in the parliament by minister of state michèle alliot-marie.3 the impact study presented to the parliament in may began by stating that citizenship requires face-to-face contact with other people within “public space” (l’espace public), and referred to wearing of face coverings as “dissimulation” (concealment). the niqab was said to be inconsistent with gender equality. the study went so far as to call the wearing of the veil a “symbolic act of violence,” (“porteuse d’une violence symbolique qui déstabilise le contrat social”), creating a security problem because it made the wearer difficult to identify. while alternatives to a ban were discussed, the study claimed that a 8 review of european and russian affairs 9 (2), 2015 ban on covering the face would be consistent with other european countries and with rulings of the european court of human rights.4 thus, we can see that from the outset law 2520 was framed in strong terms. those who proposed the ban saw veils as a challenge to the french values affirmed in the 1789 revolution. it was assumed that those who wore the veil rejected french society. however, studies have shown that very few women resident in france wear the veil. furthermore, those who wear it generally see it as their personal choice, do not necessarily wear it every time they go outdoors, and are overwhelmingly frenchspeaking french citizens (borghée 2012 43, 38-9, 71; bowen 2007, 70-2.) as elaine r. thomas argues, the headscarf laws in france juxtapose two different ideas of citizenship: one in which citizens are obliged to present themselves openly in public, and one in which citizenship means being included in society (thomas 2012, 49). the law was adopted in the national assembly of the french parliament in july of 2010, after passing through three readings in less than two weeks. in the first reading, michèle aliot-marie, the minister of state who introduced the law, stressed the importance of the law for maintaining “the will to live together” (“la volonté de vivre-ensemble”). another defender of the law, jean-paul garraud, argued that it would be inconsistent to oppose the taliban while condoning the wearing of the veil in france. arguments were also voiced that the ban would promote gender equality. however, jean glavany, from the socialist opposition, criticized the idea of banning the veil as too heavy-handed, and expressed the fear that it could promote social tensions and “fear of the other”. other opposition politicians expressed similar concerns, seeing the law as a manifestation of “sarkozyism,” and raising questions about whether the law infringed upon individual freedoms.5 as debate on the law continued, critics (primarily socialists) argued that what was needed was greater social inclusion, not banning the veil. but andré gerin (of the gerin report) argued that the law was a stand against increasing radicalism. an attempt to amend the law to confine its application to places where the government offered public services failed.6 by the third reading, debate followed similar lines, and the law was passed, with the ump providing most of the support.7 in the senate, defenders of the law noted that the law would especially penalize those who tried to compel others to wear the veil, and noted that a six-month period before implementation period would allow public education to take place. but again, critics argued that it was contradictory to claim to be passing a law that was in the interests of women’s equality, and yet which would impose penalties primarily on women. a socialist deputy raised the delicate question of how women would be compelled to remove garments which, in some cases, might cover the entire body. nonetheless, the law passed the senate.8 the law survived a challenge addressed to the constitutional council, and took effect in 2011.9 once implemented, the law proved to be unpopular and difficult to enforce (chrisafis 2011). police were reportedly often unwilling to apprehend alleged violators of the law, and the law’s purpose was called into question by the fact that some women were being fined repeatedly under the law while no men ever had (camus 2014). in 2013, the european court of human rights announced that its grand chamber would hear a complaint about the law lodged by a muslim woman who claimed that her right to privacy and religious freedom were violated (european court of human rights 2013). in 9 review of european and russian affairs 9 (2), 2015 the end, the court did not uphold the woman’s complaint, noting that the proper balance of religious freedoms with other democratic principles depends upon a country’s historical and social context, and observing that the law did not explicitly discriminate against muslims. however, the court’s ruling was complicated, insofar as it demonstrated skepticism towards the government’s claims that the law served gender equality, and expressed concerns that the law primarily affected one particular group (muslim women).10 in july 2013, riots were reported in trappes, outside of paris, allegedly after police asked a woman wearing a niqab to show identification (chrisafis 2013). in france, the parliamentary debate on the headscarf law showed a hardening of positions. proponents of the law depicted it as an attempt to cope with a growing problem, but did not define what the problem was. nor was there much evident consideration of how encounters between police and veiled women might take place. if the ban on face coverings was an attempt by gaullists to use “wedge politics,” in order to court the support of far-right sympathizers and to embarrass the socialists, it was unsuccessful. in 2012, sarkozy was defeated as president, as was his political party (the ump) in parliamentary elections. the face covering ban itself was not a prominent issue in the election campaign. among the factors that experts considered responsible for his defeat, was the idea that sarkozy’s wedge politics had actually provoked some centreright voters to vote socialist, while failing to win over front national sympathizers (gougou and labouret 2013, 295-6; nadeau and lewis-beck 2013, 64) one scholar argued that the french experience showed that while “cultural” issues such as immigration were important to french voters, in 2012 they were more important to leftleaning voters, while right-leaning voters were more concerned about the economy (tiberj 2013, 83-4) furthermore, sarkozy failed to galvanize new potential supporters into voting, as voter turnout was lower in 2012 than in the previous electoral cycle (muxel 2013, 209). thus, with a sound defeat at the ballot box, and a return to power for the socialists, sarkozy’s use of wedge politics was a questionable choice. it is paradoxical, then, that québec’s parti québécois would subsequently try to adopt a similar wedge policy a year later, shortly before calling an election which the party would ultimately lose. québec after france’s uncomfortable experience, québec politicians could reasonably draw the conclusion that an extreme policy on face coverings was inadvisable. indeed, québec’s provincial government initially adopted a relatively moderate approach. in 2010, the liberal government initiated a draft law, bill-94, on “reasonable accommodation.” the law was not directed explicitly at headscarves or face coverings. instead, its intent was to provide a clearer definition of the extent to which government offices would be expected to accommodate requests, made on the basis of religion, for accommodation in the delivery of government services. the draft law stated that government employees, including those working in educational institutions, health care, and public child care institutions, had to show their faces while working.11 thus, the emphasis in the discussion, from the beginning, was not about how to regulate social behaviour in the public at large, but how to define when exceptions could be made in general government 10 review of european and russian affairs 9 (2), 2015 regulations. therefore, with the focus on the government’s limits and capacities, rather than on muslims per se, the draft law was framed in a way that was less politicized than that of france. the debate on the law, however, took place in a social context of controversy over religious accommodation. as daiva stasiulis argued, there has recently been social tension in québec over immigration, as well as concern about islam. while this disquiet is not necessarily distinct from that found in the rest of canada, what makes québec different is the strong will among the francophone population to maintain the frenchlanguage identity (stasiulis 2013, 191-5). in previous years, a number of disputes in québec had inspired media attention and public debate. for example, a case where muslim girls were allegedly sent home from school because they were wearing hijab led to a complaint to the québec human rights commission, which ruled against the school (wayland 1997, 545-61). in another controversy, a town, hérouxville, apparently adopted a “code of conduct,” which among other things prohibited the wearing of face veils, and the stoning of women (cbc news 2008). these and other controversies were perceived as demonstrating misconceptions about immigrants and muslims (stasiulis 2013, 202-3). in 2007, québec’s premier jean charest tasked two prominent academics, gerard bouchard and charles taylor, with forming a commission to hold public hearings on the question of reasonable accommodation. the hearings were tense at times: however, in contrast to the gerin mission in france, bouchard and taylor did not assume in advance that there was a serious problem with respect to ethnic relations and religious accommodations. in their report, bouchard and taylor argued that the evidence showed that most disputes were resolved amicably, without resort to the courts (bouchard and taylor 2008, 18). bouchard and taylor argued that although most disputes were resolved, there was a problem of perceptions, insofar as some francophones feared that immigration might put gender equality and the separation of religion and state at risk. these perceptions were sometimes based on incomplete information: people heard about controversies that erupted over religious accommodation, but did not always learn when these controversies ended in a mutually agreeable outcome (ibid 18, 71-4). the authors’ main recommendations included the following: an insistence that any accommodations should observe the principle of equality; a commitment to educating males and females together, while permitting head coverings of a religious nature to be worn in schools; an affirmation that accommodations should be considered to require dialogue and compromise from all sides; allowing empty rooms in public buildings to be used for prayers, upon request; and accommodations should be considered in the spirit of making people feel part of a community rather than as outsiders (ibid, 20-1). the two academics also called for more assistance to immigrants in finding employment and learning french, and for government and school staff to have a better understanding of diverse cultures (ibid, 23). so like the gerin commission in france, the bouchard-taylor commission recommended that education was very important in reducing social tensions, and they also explicitly raised france as an example not to be emulated: in their view, banning headscarves in schools contradicted the principles of learning and inclusion which were essential to the school’s enterprise (ibid, 20). 11 review of european and russian affairs 9 (2), 2015 in 2010, québec’s minister of justice, kathleen weil, introduced bill-94, positing that its goal was to provide clearer guidelines for government bodies to determine when to grant accommodations.12 evoking the same phrase as had been used in the france debate, weil argued that bill 94 would be helpful “pour mieux vivre ensemble” (to live together better). weil, and her fellow minister of communications denise beaudoin, emphasized the large amount of public consultation that had preceded the law.13 some deputies, however, expressed the view that the law did not provide a concrete guide for resolving disputes, and that it was directed primarily at one group.14 the bill was adopted in first reading on february 15, but narrowly 56 for, 46 against.15 those opposed were members of the parti québécois and the coalition avenir québec.16 subsequently, there was a process of consultation in which experts and social groups were able to present comments on the law. for example, the québec council on the status of women’s submission expressed concern about whether it was appropriate to pass a general law on issues that could be decided on a case-by-case basis on the basis of rulings by human rights tribunals. the council also posited that there was a need for a broader debate on secularism, and was concerned about the possibility that government employees might be permitted to wear religious symbols.17 in contrast, the federation of canadian muslims was opposed to the law because they thought it was overly directed towards muslims and towards the niqab. the federation argued that what muslims needed were policies to help muslim women find employment, to gain equal opportunities and to improve their social position.18 these views were echoed in the legislature’s commission on institutions, which examined the draft law in 2011. from the beginning, committee members expressed concerns about whether such a simple law could serve such a complex intended purpose definitively. one deputy asked whether the main purpose of the law was to require women to remove their face coverings when in public, implying that a law primarily directed at women could be perceived as unfair.19 in subsequent meetings, deputies expressed concern about how to define various terms, even how to define religion.20 as one deputy put it, the bill was “anemic” (anémique) and was concerned that if passed, it could oblige individual institutions to provide accommodations that might overextend their capacities. the council on the status of women’s reservations were referred to repeatedly by the commission.21 in defence, minister weil said that bill 94 would be “un geste d’interculturalisme” (a gesture of interculturalism) that would provide helpful guidelines for frontline government staff.22 as commission meetings continued, the same deputies tended to speak to the same points as before, and increasingly argued in favour of reinforcing the values of gender equality and secularism as declared in the draft law.23 one deputy expressed concerns about whether abortion rights could be affected if religion gained more influence; later, another deputy asked what the impact might be on gay and lesbian rights.24 on may 18, the commission of institutions considered, but did not vote on, an amendment to read: “un accomodement pour motif religieux doit respecter le principle de laïcite de l’etat” (“a religious accommodation must respect the principle of the secularism of the state”).25 the commission held its last meeting on the bill on september 28, and that ended the discussion of the bill, which was not further pursued in the legislature in that form. with no firm consensus on the merits of the law, and doubts about its effectiveness, the liberals did not pursue it further. although the 12 review of european and russian affairs 9 (2), 2015 debate in québec had some similarities to the debate in france, at that time no deputies called for the sort of law passed in 2010 in france. the québec debate eventually became, to a considerable extent, a matter of jurisdiction. was it appropriate for the provincial legislature to be passing a law on this issue? or was it a matter for particular institutions, the judiciary, or simply human dialogue to resolve? in 2012, the liberals lost a provincial election, bringing to power the parti québécois (pq), which revisited the issue of head and face coverings in mid-2013 with the proposed charter of values. the draft charter was approved for the legislature’s agenda on november 7, 2013, although the liberal opposition had already expressed concerns about the charter as early as october 23.26 members of the pq presented the charter as an affirmation of secularism as a fundamental québécois principle. however, the liberal opposition claimed that the introduction of the bill was aggravating discord between quebecers, and was attempting to reinvent state-society relations in a way that would adversely affect religious freedoms.27 members of the other opposition party, the coalition avenir québec (caq) also criticized the pq’s draft charter, as they had their own alternative charter to offer.28 given the small size of the caq, however, the bill had little chance of passing. the charter declared a broad range of public employees that were expected to refrain from wearing obvious religious symbols, and to show their faces, in the course of their work. these groups included civil servants, at the provincial and municipal levels; but also those who worked in provincially-funded institutions, such as health care practitioners, teachers, university employees and child care providers. members of the public who were clients of these services were generally expected to have their faces uncovered as well. the charter stated that members of the public could request religious accommodations, but institutions could grant such accommodations only if they met specified criteria.29 the charter thus covered a very broad scope, and limited public institutions’ discretion to provide accommodations. the charter did not specify the consequences of violating the charter, or who would determine whether a violation had occurred. therefore, there was potentially a great deal at stake for those who regularly wore religious symbols. the opposition liberals noted that the charter therefore directly affect over 600,000 people whose employment was covered by the charter, and called attention to the many public figures and groups who had expressed concerns about the charter even before it had been introduced.30 the national assembly held hearings on the bill, where a variety of individuals and groups expressed their views to the commission on institutions. however, the bill was never passed, as it was abandoned when the liberals defeated the pq in the spring 2014 provincial election. the pq’s charter seemed at odds with a recent canadian judicial precedent. in 2012, canada’s supreme court issued a ruling on a dispute involving a woman, who had been denied in her request to wear a niqab in court to give testimony about an alleged assault upon her. the court accepted that it could adversely affect the rights of the defendant if he and his lawyers were not able to see her face in the courtroom; however, the court called upon the judge to make efforts to see if an alternative resolution of the issue was possible before requiring the witness to remove her niqab.31 the court’s decision seemed 13 review of european and russian affairs 9 (2), 2015 to suggest that appropriate grounds for religious accommodation were highly contextual, depending on the particular circumstances. the charter seemed to be a wedge issue for the pq, as premier and marois’s government continued to pursue the charter despite its evocation of considerable opposition. indeed, marois called a provincial election not long after introducing the charter, even though hearings on the bill had been well underway. the introduction of the charter in the legislature had given the opposition liberals an opportunity to deliver long speeches in favour of human rights and social inclusion, which gained considerable media attention. in april 2014, the parti québécois lost the election to the liberals, a defeat that analysts attributed in part to opposition to the charter (hébert 2014, wells 2014). wedge politics, arguably, had failed again, as they had in france. russia as an authoritarian regime, russia’s situation is quite different from the previous two cases; in states where elections do not meet the liberal democratic standard of fair competition, wedge politics do not serve the same purpose as in québec or france. however, we should not assume that authoritarian polities do not use wedge politics; they may instead use them to try to court populist support and to weaken a fledgling opposition. the russian case is interesting in its abrupt reversal of a previous position. a controversy in 2013 led the supreme court to deviate from its previous position, and the russian position limiting headscarves in schools invoked the french precedent even while the country’s leadership were otherwise arguing that “western” democratic practices were not applicable to russia. islam has been a prominent faith on russian state territory for centuries, but under the soviet regime (1917-91), the state officially embraced atheism. officially religions were still allowed to exist, but they were under the tight control of the state. after the collapse of communism, religion began to be practiced more openly, and there was a growing interest in islam among muslim communities in the north caucasus and the volga regions. a separatist government took power in the republic of chechnya, and two civil wars broke out in the russian government’s effort to restore the republic to federal control. in the late 1990s and early 2000s, several bombings in russia were attributed to chechen terrorists. in the hostage-taking at the nord-ost theatre in moscow, the media showed attention of veiled chechen women among the hostage takers, developing a media stereotype of a female fundamentalist (stack 2011, 83-95). concerns over security at the 2014 sochi winter olympics drew renewed media attention to the fear of possible muslim female suicide bombers, or “black widows” (for example associated press 2014). chechens were often negatively depicted in the media as “bandits,” who sometimes covered their faces (eichler 2006, 489-90, 498). in chechnya, under the presidency of ramzan kadyrov, there has been a campaign to encourage women to wear headscarves as a sign of adherence to muslim traditions; a human rights watch publication (2011, 11-4) criticized the policy for pressuring women and girls to cover their heads. 14 review of european and russian affairs 9 (2), 2015 however, officially, the russian federal government did not take steps against head or face coverings. in 2003, several women complained to the supreme court about regulations that required individuals requesting passports to submit photos with uncovered heads, claiming that this rule violated their right to practice their muslim faith. initially, the supreme court turned down the complaint, noting that russia was a secular (“svetskii”) state and the rules were not specifically directed towards islam; procedures, in the court’s view, must apply equally to all individuals.32 two months later, though, the women won their case upon appeal. one of the supreme court’s collegial bodies ruled that the women should be allowed to be photographed with covered heads, in order to respect their right to choose their religion; said the judges, constitutional rights could be limited only through federal laws, and not by a government regulation.33 hence, the court took a stance of religious tolerance. perhaps this is because russian women, especially of the older generation, have long worn colourful headscarves. with the revival of orthodox christianity in recent years, some russian orthodox women have adopted a modest style of dress which includes a scarf covering the hair (kizenko 2013, 607). so in russia, wearing a scarf on the head is not necessarily seen as a sign of muslim identity. in 2013, two events occurred that put the issue of women’s face coverings at the centre of political controversy in russia. the first was the trial of three activists of the feminist punk-rock art collective, “pussy riot.” the three young women were arrested for alleged criminal hooliganism after an incident at moscow’s cathedral of christ the saviour, where they had performed a brief dance, which later appeared as a rock video with lyrics critical of vladimir putin and the orthodox church. a major issue in the trial revolved around the brightly coloured clothes and balaclavas that the girls were wearing. the masks were an issue for two reasons: first, they were a key part of the case, because the judge was persuaded that masks were inappropriate to wear in church. the girls were said to have entered the cathedral with their heads (but not faces) covered in the manner of orthodox tradition, which the judge interpreted to mean that they knew what the standards were. second, the judge ruled that the masks were worn in order to conceal identity.34 the women’s defence posited that the masks served an artistic purpose, saying that they had performed on shrove tuesday (maslenitsa), when it is customary to wear costumes (alekhina 2012). in the trial, a key issue was that women were expected to cover their heads in church, but it was unacceptable to cover both head and face. shortly after the pussy riot verdict, seven women in balaclavas were reported to have been arrested in france under france’s 2010 law on face coverings. the women were apparently protesting the pussy riot verdict at the russian consulate in marseille (chrisafis 2012). the second controversy was a court case in the region of stavropol’ in southern russia, where a local schoolteacher was reported to have refused to allow girls in hijab to attend class, and where the school subsequently imposed a uniform which excluded the hijab (barry 2013). parents appealed the ban in court, but the appeal was dismissed (rapsi, 2013). a regional court ruled that schools had the right to impose dress codes to maintain order, and as appropriate to a secular institution (fedosenko 2013). the stavropol case gathered nationwide attention. a new education law passed in the russian parliament in december 2012 stated that schools had the right to establish their own dress codes.35 president putin himself weighed in on the issue, saying in december 2012 that there was 15 review of european and russian affairs 9 (2), 2015 no tradition of hijabs “in our culture,” and “why should we introduce traditions that are foreign to us?”36 a few months later, putin opined that hijabs had already been banned in some muslim countries and in france, and that he favoured the idea of a school uniform.37 in july of 2013, russia’s supreme court rejected an appeal on the stavropol’ school decision, arguing that by law russia’s schools were secular and school uniforms ensured the neutrality of schools towards religion. the court opined that the rights of one group could not be privileged over other groups, implying (but not elaborating) that religious forms of dress had an adverse effect on those who were not members of that group. the decision also cited decisions of the european court of human rights on complaints in france and turkey, thereby revealing an attention to international decisions. finally, the court ruled that home schooling and religious schools were options for children who wore headscarves.38 the court also cited a russian government document that claimed that wearing head coverings in school could spread diseases. that document, coincidentally, was dated november 2012, just as the headscarf issue was heating up in stavropol’ krai. the headscarf issue subsequently entered the arena of federal politics: on december 18, 2013, the duma passed in its first reading an amendment to the law on education which stopped short of mandating a single school uniform for all of russia, but which would require russian regional, republic and krai governments to establish a school uniform within their respective jurisdictions.39 school uniforms were presented as a way to establish an orderly learning environment; however, the desire to limit the wearing of religious symbols in schools was presented as the second major rationale for the draft law. the deputy from the “united russia” party who presented the law in the duma discussed the stavropol’ case as “a scandal.” she argued that those, orthodox or muslim, who wanted to cover their heads could do so on evenings and sundays.40 legislation, she argued, would enable regions to establish uniforms appropriate to their conditions. a deputy from the liberal democratic party of russia (ldpr, a nationalist party) argued that the stavropol’ contretemps was about “the expansion of a particular radical direction of islam.”41 after passing in the first reading, the bill was passed in the duma with little discussion in may 2014, and was signed into law in time to take effect for the 2014-2015 school year.42 arguably, one reason for russia’s apparent about-face on headscarves was the previous passage of a law which included measures on the wearing of face coverings during demonstrations, as part of a series of new restrictions on opposition political activity. in 2012, vladimir putin had returned to the russian presidency, but only following large protests in response to parliamentary elections in 2011 and the presidential elections of march 2012. an opposition movement formed, voicing allegations of electoral irregularities (wood 2012, wolchik 2012). subsequently, a series of laws were passed that indicated that the regime intended to tighten its power. among the laws passed was a law increasing penalties for unauthorized protest activity, including the wearing of masks during demonstrations. in the debate on the law, masked protesters were discussed as “lowlifes” (“mertsavtsy”).43 another law, passed in the spring of 2013, included in the criminal code more explicit definitions on the criminal offence of insulting religious feelings, which was introduced in parliament as being inspired in part by pussy riot.44 the idea was that masks could be used by vandals and “hooligans” in order to conceal 16 review of european and russian affairs 9 (2), 2015 their crimes. it is interesting, though, that in the debate on masks, those who wore them were perceived as acting on their own volition, whereas those girls who wore hijabs to school were assumed to be obeying their parents. in donning balaclavas, pussy riot were perceived by the prosecutor and judge in their trial as acting deliberately, to reject the orthodox head scarf that was considered appropriate to wear in a cathedral. the russian case showed that in some contexts it was considered necessary to wear an item of clothing that was forbidden in another context, and women seemed to be the object of these confusing, shifting prohibitions. analysis of findings the russian case raises the question of path dependency: to what extent were laws on face coverings made possible by previous legislation? once covering the face during a protest was framed in law as a punishable act of civil disobedience, it created a discourse in which face covering itself could be more readily seen as an act of political defiance. turning to the cases of france and québec, we can see that in those countries, acts were passed to limit the covering of the face during political protests, and that these acts occurred prior to france’s 2010 niqab ban and the pq’s introduction of the charter. part of the context for debate over face coverings is the occurrence of new forms of protest movements, in which clothing can make a statement about one’s political views (tarrow 2011, 151-3). radical political movements, such as the occupy movement, have gained more attention in recent years (kaldor and slechow 2013, 78-99). in 2009, the french government issued a decree that banned the “illicit” covering of the face during demonstrations that threaten public order. the decree said that it did not apply to faces covered for a “good reason” (“motif légitime”).45 although the decree was directed at masked protesters rather than the niqab, the decree set an expectation that people be expected to show their faces in public. in canada’s federal political arena, face coverings became a political issue in a different context. in response to intense and prolonged student protests in montreal in the spring of 2012, the local city council had passed a bylaw making it an offence to cover one’s face during a public demonstration “without a reasonable motive.”46 in june of 2013, canada’s house of commons, dominated by the conservative party and its prime minister stephen harper, passed a law, bill c-309, which banned the wearing of masks during riots and “illegal demonstrations.” wearing a mask during a raucous protest henceforth could be a criminal offence leading to five years in prison. the law was introduced as a private member’s bill, and was presented by its conservative proponents as being necessary to protect public order from masked rioters, who might try to conceal their identity.47 it was argued that the law responded to the disorders associated with the protest at the g20 meeting in toronto in 2010, and the stanley cup riots in vancouver in 2011. in parliamentary debates, opposition members from the new democratic party (ndp) and liberal party raised objections about the potential impact on civil liberties, where masks might be worn for reasons other than inciting violence. although the draft law stated that there might be a “lawful excuse” for covering one’s face, it was not clear what constituted a “lawful excuse.”48 in the senate debate, the senator who introduced the bill claimed that it would not apply to the niqab.49 another senator wondered how 17 review of european and russian affairs 9 (2), 2015 viable it would really be for a person to be prosecuted simply for covering his or her face,50 echoing the debate in france about whether the niqab ban could realistically be enforced. yet as senator serge joyal pointed out in the debate in canada’s senate, the montreal by-law was in the process of being challenged in court.51 since montreal (quebec’s largest city) and canada as a whole had passed controversial decisions on the wearing of face coverings during protests, this created a political discourse politicizing face coverings and identifying them with resistance. indeed, the pq began floating the idea of the charter not long after bill c -309 was passed. the fact that france had adopted legislation was used as one of the arguments in favour of bill c-309, thereby showing the existence of a global debate on face coverings. hence, the idea of limiting face coverings gained influence across transnational boundaries, in which once adopted in one context, laws were serving as role models for other countries’ governments. as the above discussion showed, legislative debates in france and québec referenced each other’s decisions, while russia’s discussion also referred to the case of france. in defence of the proposed charter of values in québec, a member of the parti québécois (and cabinet minister) argued in the legislature that similar laws had been adopted in france as well as other european countries.52 considering the differences between the three countries, debates showed some striking similarities in discourse. notwithstanding the objections, a parliamentary majority passed a sweeping law in france. in 2014, a more fragile government in québec attempted to follow a path that resembled that of france, even when it was clear that such a law would bring difficult consequences. in québec and in france, soft-nationalist parties pursued these laws in a determined manner, typical of “wedge politics.” the fact that both sarkozy and the pq suffered electoral defeats suggests the limits of this type of politics. in québec, the fact that the liberal government had previously initiated a more nuanced effort to build consensus on the issue may help to explain why the pq had more difficulty than france’s ump did in putting its vision into law. however, the similarities between the discourses of france and russia on headscarves ought to give western politicians pause, as it suggests that there is some policy convergence between authoritarian states and democracies. the evidence in this paper suggests that minority rights continue to be fragile in a number of states. as a numerically small population in russia, france, and québec, it is difficult for muslim women to challenge such policies on their own. one of the most compelling arguments against restrictions on head and face coverings is the notion that such policies do not help women to achieve equality. a study of muslim women in the united states (a slight majority of which did not wear the hijab) found that a substantial number said they had experienced discrimination. some participants told interviewers that wearing a hijab could make one vulnerable to discrimination or unwelcome comments (reeves, mckinney and azam 2013, 56-60). another study, carried out in a french suburb, found that many muslim women who wore hijab participated actively in the civic life of their communities, and that restrictions on head coverings were more likely to impede women’s participation than to facilitate it (selby 2012). one wonders why politicians are so interested in what women wear. it was after all only in 2013 that it became legal for french women to wear trousers in public: they had been banned since 1800 (bbc news 18 review of european and russian affairs 9 (2), 2015 europe 2014). apparently, liberal democracies have not reached a consensus about when it is appropriate for the state to legislate on dress codes, especially those that apply to women. endnotes: note: for space reasons, references in some endnotes have been abbreviated. see list of references (following endnotes) for fuller reference, including web addresses where indicated. the list of references provides a single web address for each of the bills 94 and 60 (quebec national assembly), loi 2010-1192 (french national assembly), and c309 (canadian parliament), a link from which the web address can be found for any endnotes that refer to those particular bills in the respective legislatures. those endnotes conclude simply with “web,” and the reader can refer to the list of references for the link. in endnotes that reference those parliaments on other matters, the full web address is provided within the text of the endnote. 1 european court of human rights. case of dogru vs. france, application no. 27058/05; affaire kervanci vs. france, requête no. 31645/04; 4 december 2008. web. 2 république française, assemblée nationale. “proposition de résolution sur l’attachement au respect des valeurs républicaine face au développement de pratiques radicales qui y portent atteinte.” 27 april 2010. web. 3 république française, assemblée nationale. projet de loi 2520. “projet de loi interdisant la dissimulation du visage dans l’espace public.” 19 may 2010. dossier legislatif, loi no. 2010-1192. web. 4 assemblée nationale, “projet de loi interdisant la dissimulation du visage dans l’espace public.” étude d’impact, may 2010, http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/13/projets/pl2520-ei.asp accessed 18 june 2012. 5 assemblée nationale. république française. compte-rendu intégral (hereafter c-ri). 6 july 2010. unless otherwise specified, complete web references for the compte-rendu intégral of the french national assembly can be found below under references : i – primary source documents, dossier legislatif, loi no. 2010-1192. 6 assemblée nationale. république française. c-ri. 7 july 2010. web. 7 assemblée nationale. république française. c-ri. 13 july 2010. web. 8 république française. sénat. compte-rendu analytique officiel, 14 september 2010. web. 9 république française. décision no 2010-613 of the conseil constitutionnel (constitutional council). 7 october 2010. web. 10 european court of human rights, grand chamber decision (strasbourg) case of s.a.s. vs france, application no. 43835/11. 1 july 2014. 11 assemblée nationale du québec, 39th legislature, 1st session, projet de loi no. 94, “loi établissant les balises encadrant les demands d’accomodement dans l’administration gouvernmentale et dans certains établissements.” (text of the draft law). web. 12 assemblée nationale du québec, journal des débats de l’assemblée nationale (hereafter jdan) 41 (98), 24 march 2010. web. 13 assemblée nationale du québec, jdan, 41, (170), 9 february 2011. web. 14 assemblée nationale du québec, jdan, 41 (170), 9 february 2011. web. 15 assemblée nationale du québec, jdan, 41 (172), 15 february 2011. web. 16assemblée nationale du québec, jdan 41 (172), 15 february 2011, p. 9013. web. http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/13/projets/pl2520-ei.asp 19 review of european and russian affairs 9 (2), 2015 17 conseil du statut de la femme, québec. “memoire sur le projet de loi no. 94, loi établissant les balises encadrant les demands d’accomodement dans l’administration gouvernmentale et dans certains établissements,” may 2010. www.assnat.qc.ca/fr/travaux-parlementaires/commissions/ci/mandats/mandat12329/memoires-deposes.html accessed 24 june 2013. 18 federation des canadiens musulmans. “pour un québec inclusif et rassembleur: le projet de loi 94 est préjudiciable envers les québécois(es) de confession musulmane.” mémoire presenté a l’assemblée nationale du québec, may 2010, www.assnat.qc.ca/fr/travauxparlementaires/commissions/ci/mandats/madat-12329/memoires-deposes.html accessed 24 june 2013. 19 assemblée nationale du québec, commission des institutions, journal des débats de la commission des institutions (hereafter jdci), 42 (2), 16 march 2011. web. 20assemblée nationale du québec, commission des institutions, jdci, 42 (4), 29 march 2011. web. 21 assemblée nationale du québec, commission des institutions, jdci 42 (5), 30 march 2011. web. 22 assemblée nationale du québec, commission des institutions, jdci, 42 (5), 30 march 2011. web. 23 assemblée nationale du québec, commission des institutions, jdci 42 (6), 31 march 2011, (7) 6 april 2011, and (8), 3 may 2011. 24 assemblée nationale du québec, commission des institutions, jdci 42, 18, 3 may 2011; and (34), 28 september 2011. web. 25 assemblée nationale du québec, commission des institutions, jdci 42 (21), 18 may 2011. web. 26 assemblée nationale du québéc, 40th parlement, 1st session, jdan, 43 (82), 23 october 2013, http://www.assnat.qc.ca/fr/travaux-parlementaires/assemblee-nationale/40-1/journaldebats/20131023/98991.html accessed 18 march 2015 and 43 (89) 8 november 2013. http://www.assnat.qc.ca/fr/travauxparlementaires/assemblee-nationale/40-1/journal-debats/20131107/100389.html accessed 18 march 2015. web. 27 remarks of jean-marc fournier, in assemblée nationale du québéc, 40th parlement, 1st session, jdan 43 (89), 7 november 2013. web. 28 assemblée nationale du québéc, 40th parlement, 1-re session, procès-verbal no. 82, 23 october 2013, pp. 5107-5110, 5114-15, http://www.assnat.qc.ca/fr/travaux-parlementaires/assemblee-nationale/401/journal-debats/20131023/98991.html accessed 26 november 2014. 29 assemblée nationale du québéc, 40th parlement, 1st session, projet de loi 60, “charte affirmant les valeurs de laïcité et de la neutralité réligieuse de l’état ainsi que d’égalité entre les femmes et less hommes et encadrant les demandes d’accomodement,” (text of bill). web. 30 remarks of marc tanguay, assemblée nationale du québéc, 40th parlement, 1st session, journal des débats de la commission des institutions, vol. 43, no. 110, 23 january 2014, http://www.assnat.qc.ca/fr/travaux-parlementaires/commissions/ci-40-1/journal-debats/ci-140114.html accessed 18 march 2015. 31 supreme court of canada, r. vs. n.s., 2012 scc 72, 20 december 2012. 32 verkhovnyi sud rossiiskoi federatsii (supreme court of the russian federation), hereafter vsrf, “reshenie ot 5 marta 2003 n. гкпи03-76.” web. 33 vsrf, “opredelenie ot 15 maia 2003 g. n. kac03-166. web. 34 “tekst prigovora uchasnitsam gruppy ‘pussy riot.’” (“text of the verdict to the participants in the ‘pussy riot’ group”) http://slon.ru/russia/prigovor_pussy_riot-821705.xhtml accessed 8 july 2013. 35 russian federation federal law 273-fz “ob obrazovanii v rossiiskoi federatsii,” 29 december 2012. 36 “vy znaete, ved’ v nashei kul’ture (kogda ia govoriu – nashei, ia imeiu v vidu traditsionnyi islam) nikakikh hidzhabov net…. a 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july 2012, pp. 63-70. wood, tony. “collapse as crucible: the reforging of russian society,” new left review, no. 74, march-april 2012, pp. 5-38. 29 review of european and russian affairs 9 (2), 2015 published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada available online at: journals.carleton.ca/rera/index.php/rera rera is an electronic academic peer-reviewed journal that publishes graduate, postgraduate, and young scholarly works. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is a joint project supported by the canada-europe transatlantic dialogue — a cross-canada research network supported by the social sciences and humanities research council of canada (sshrc) — along with the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies (carleton university) and its associated research unit, the centre for european studies. rera aims to provide an accessible forum for research, to promote high standards of research and scholarship, and to foster communication among young scholars. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada tel: +01 613 520-2600 ext. 3117; e-mail: rera-journal@carleton.ca creative commons license creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0 this working paper is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial no derivs 3.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 3.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, provided the source is acknowledged. no use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes. issn: 1718-4835 © 2015 the author https://journals.carleton.ca/rera/index.php/rera mailto:rera-journal@carleton.ca http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ gabriela e. chira and constantin chira-pascanut_volume 3_issue 3 review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 3/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 1 ………………………………………………………………… introduction: ‘the post-1989 world: a crisis of western identity’ gabriela elena chira and constantin chira-pascanut review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 3/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 2 the concept of a politically unified europe has been consistently advocated over the last two centuries; from victor hugo’s états unis d’europe to coudenhove-kalergi’s pan-europe and briand’s fédération européenne. it was not, however, until the economic plan to pool french and german coal and steel production of post second world war europe, that a european community was born. vain attempts have since been made to politically integrate the european communities member states. europeans experienced greater difficulty in agreeing on a political and security community, such as the european defense community. in the end, the north atlantic treaty organization (nato) primacy in guaranteeing european security was almost unanimously accepted. one of the reasons for this consensus was the presumed identity of interests of the ‘western world’ (often defined as including western europe, the united states, and canada) in the cold war context. however, with the end of the cold war the ‘western identity’ came into question. this ‘western identity’ was based on a set of shared interests and a common cultural heritage that traveled from europe, the old world, to north america, the new world. the common enemy, which fueled this identity, had succumbed peacefully. yet, ‘cold war triumphalism’, present in many representative scholarly works on the cold war and the fall of communism in eastern europe, did not anticipate the effects of these historical events on what had become the ‘western identity’. the authours of the articles included in this special issue examine this unexpected identity crisis. while their approach and analysis take various forms, daria kazarinova, juan-camilo castillo and rouba al-fattal all assert that the growing divide between the review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 3/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 3 european union and the american models of security and foreign affairs has contributed to this crisis. the events of 1989 came during the european scramble for a common identity. in a way, the end of the cold war also brought to an end one of the key characteristics of the european identity that the eu had cultivated over the previous fifty years: partnership in defending democracy and spreading the western idea of the free world. in anti-americanism and the spirit of european unity, daria kazarinova posits that over the past decade, a significant reawakening of ‘anti-americanism’ in the european consciousness has taken place.1 this explains why ‘anti-americanism’ is increasingly becoming part of the current european identity. further, in post-war: a history of europe since 1945, tony judt emphasizes that during the cold war period, ‘the presumptively ‘un-american’ qualities of europe were fast becoming the highest common factor in european self-identification. european values were contrasted with american values. europe was – or should strive to be – everything that america wasn’t…’2 juan-camilo castillo argues in the european security and defense policy: defining the european union as a rational actor in international security, that the european security and defense policy (esdp) envisaged a strengthening of the eu’s defence identity, which would challenge the hegemony of the united states and the 1 volker r. berghahn argues that ‘when american cultural products arrived in europe for the first time during the 1920s, in quantities that could no longer be ignored, many europeans rejected them as trashy, vulgar, cheap, mechanical and primitive. by comparison european culture was supposedly sophisticated, time-honoured, refined, profound, mature and – in contrast to the technological optimism of the americans – conscious of the dark sides of the modernity.” in this context, american intellectuals traveling to europe after 1945 ‘wished to project an imagine of the united states as a nation whose cultural achievements were at least equal to those of europe.” (volker r. berghahn, america and the intellectual cold wars in europe, princeton: princeton university press, 2001, pp. 287-8). 2 tony judt, post-war: a history of europe since 1945, new york : penguin press, 2005, p. 790. review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 3/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 4 traditional identity of the western world alike. such a concept, of a separate security entity outside the nato umbrella, is not well received in washington. only with the establishment of the esdp was the ‘supremacy’ of nato challenged. moreover, castillo remarks that especially after 1992 (with the signing of the treaty of the european union), security mechanisms have been established that would further distinguish europe from the united states and nato. therefore, the eu-nato joint declaration of 2002 came in response to an increasingly independent european security policy. in sum, castillo concludes that europe’s military independence is causing the relationships between nato members to ‘disintegrate.’ in her article, the role of political culture in shaping canadian, eu and us disarmament initiatives, rouba al-fattal evaluates western political culture and the way in which it explains foreign policy choices. she argues that although there are scholars who group western political culture under one umbrella, such as samuel huntington, contemporary western political culture has important variations. while both castillo and al-fattal highlight the eu’s preference for the use of ‘soft-power’ diplomacy, al-fattal further asserts that the united states prefers unilateralism and militarism to solve international disputes. with reference to her case studies (the anti-personnel landmines and the iranian nuclear issue), al-fattal outlines the contrasting approaches of the eu, the united states and canada, concluding that the presumed common political culture of the western world is not in itself a sufficient explanation for foreign policy choice. this trans-atlantic rift is common to all three papers under review. there is a consensus between the authours that in the post-cold war era, the eu and u.s. interests have diverged. if the ‘anti-americanism’ of the interwar and cold war periods divided review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 3/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 5 the west based on presumed cultural differences, cold war ideology of anti-communism united both sides of the atlantic. however, when this community of interests ceased to exist, cultural differences took precedence once again in western europe, polarizing the identities of the two sides of the atlantic. microsoft word tuna baskoy_rera_paper.doc review of european and russian affairs vol. 1 no. 1 december 2005 © rera 2005 all rights reserved ………………………………………………………………… effective competition and eu competition law1 tuna baskoy abstract the notion of workable or effective competition is at the centre of eu competition law and policy, as it strives to achieve and maintain it. some scholars do not mention it at all. those who refer to it either do not explain it in any way or explicate it very shortly. in fact, the concept is too important to be ignored totally or elucidated briefly. the objective of this article is to provide a comprehensive analysis of the concept by focusing on the theory of workable or effective competition. it is argued that effective competition is the key for an in-depth study of the political economy (i.e. real policy goals, economic rationale behind individual competition rules, institutional requirements, and implications for distribution of wealth) of eu competition law and policy. 1 a longer version of this paper was presented at ecsa-c conference, canadian perspectives on contemporary issues of european integration, university of victoria, victoria, b.c., november 7-8, 2003. i would like to thank you very much for constructive criticisms as well as useful comments of conference participants and anonymous referees of this journal. all remaining errors and shortcomings are solely mine. review of european and russian affairs vol. 1 no. 1 december 2005 © jeurus 2005 all rights reserved 2 the european commission often perceives competition policy as the european union’s (eu) central public policy (cec: 1997, p. 17). the eu does not see free market competition or a laissez-faire model premising on capitalist markets as a panacea to all problems due to self-destructive nature of market competition (cec: 1958, p. 59). that is why competition rules were included in the european economic community (eec) treaty. as early as 1965, hans von der groeben, the first head of the european commission’s directorate for competition, maintained that one of the fundamental objectives of competition policy is “to establish an effective and workable competitive system” (cec: 1966, p. 59). in accomplishing this objective of introducing as well as maintaining effective competition, eu competition policy inhibits restrictive practices that fail to qualify for exemption (article 81); proscribes abusive market conducts by dominant firms (article 82); and prevents emergence of a dominant position that alters market structure significantly through mergers, acquisitions and merger-like joint ventures (the merger control regulation or mcr). moreover, it makes sure that public or private firms granted special rights by member states do not harm market competition (article 86) and that state aids do not distort market competition (article 87) (korah: 2000). with respect to administrating eu competition policy, article 83 states that the council of ministers lays down the appropriate regulations and directives for implementing the principles in articles 81 and 82 based on a proposal from the european commission. moreover, the council of ministers has extensive powers for implementing article 87, as stated in articles 88 and 89. similarly, the european commission has the power to implement articles 81, 82, 86, and 87 as stipulated in articles 85, 86 and 88. review of european and russian affairs vol. 1 no. 1 december 2005 © jeurus 2005 all rights reserved 3 moreover, the european commission has the right to apply the mcr. national competition authorities and courts can implement articles 81 and 82 only by following previous interpretation of them by the european commission, the court of first instance (cfi) and the ecj. in moschel’s words, “ultimately, the organs of the member states mutate into auxiliaries of the commission” (moschel: 2000, p. 497). this brief account illustrates the fact that powers to implement eu competition law are centralized in the hands of eu institutions. being the central concept, workable or effective competition is ubiquitous in literature on eu competition law and policy as well as in official documents. yet, surprisingly, it has not attracted the attention it deserves from students of eu competition law and policy. the objective of this article is to provide a comprehensive analysis of the concept of workable or effective competition. it is argued that an in-depth analysis of workable or effective competition unravels the economic and political rationale behind eu competition law and policy. the first section provides a brief literature review, which is followed by the significance of effective competition in eu competition law in the second part. the third segment explains the theory of effective competition which was originally developed by john maurice clark in 1940, while the fourth and fifth subdivisions elaborate on how effective competition is helpful in understanding the inclusion of articles 81, 82, 86 and 87 in the eec treaty and the exclusion of the mcr. the last section elucidates the reverberations of effective competition for institutional structure of the state and role of law in eu economic policy making and implementation. review of european and russian affairs vol. 1 no. 1 december 2005 © jeurus 2005 all rights reserved 4 literature review it is widely acknowledged among the students of eu competition law and policy that effective or workable competition underlies the economic model behind eu competition policy (mclachlan and swan: 1963; cini and mcgowan: 1998). in essence, three consistent patterns may be discerned in the literature regarding the treatment of effective competition. first, some scholars, for instance, do not mention the concept in their analysis at all (petrella: 1998; kemp: 1994; fishwick: 1993; swann: 1983). rather, they discuss perfect and imperfect competition to elucidate the economic reason that justifies eu competition law. second, others maintain that eu competition law promotes and maintains workable or effective competition (korah: 2000; van gerven: 1974). instead of elaborating the concept, they prefer to either silent or make broader generalizations without clarifying it in the first place. finally, still others make a concrete attempt to explain the terms “effective” or “workable” competition, but their analysis is far from dispelling the mystery around the concept, as they use secondary resources on the concept (lasok and lasok: 2001; carchedi: 2001; goyder: 1998; jacquemin and de jong: 1977). not surprisingly, even eu institutions are not clear about what effective competition means to them. the ecj defined workable competition in the metro-sbgrossmarkte case as “the degree of competition necessary to ensure the observance of the basic requirements and the attainment of the objectives of the treaty, in particular the creation of a single market achieving conditions similar to those of a domestic market” (ecj: 1978, p. 2). nonetheless, this definition is far from being clear. veljanovski review of european and russian affairs vol. 1 no. 1 december 2005 © jeurus 2005 all rights reserved 5 correctly states the problem as follows: “it is rare to find in ec antitrust texts, or in statements by the commission, a clear expression of the nature of effective competition”(veljanovski: 2004, p. 179). therefore, there still remains a void both in the literature and the acquis regarding the meaning of effective competition. as a core concept in eu competition law and policy, it deserves to be explained in detail to dispel the confusion and ambiguity that surround it. effective competition and eu competition law market competition plays a central role in the economic constitution of the eu (sauter: 1998). lindahl and van roermund stress that “the core of ec [european community] law consists in arranging, adapting, applying, and enforcing the default setting of competition, and which the ecj [european court of justice] has elaborated by reference to what it terms ‘workable competition’” (lindahl and van roermund: 2000, p. 15). the ecj stated in the hoffman-la roche case that article 3(f) of the eec treaty envisages the establishment as well as the maintenance of an effective competitive market structure (ecj: 1979, p. 299). not surprisingly, wilks and mcgowan (1986) keenly observed that: “it is not too fanciful to suggest that european competition policy is one element determining the evolution of european capitalism, an element with a potential to take pre-eminence over other areas of community law” (wilks and mcgowan: 1996, p. 226).in a nutshell, a comprehensive study of eu capitalism entails understanding its competition policy adequately which is not possible without elaborating on ‘effective’ or ‘workable’ competition. astonishingly, neither the literature nor the acquis provides a coherent and review of european and russian affairs vol. 1 no. 1 december 2005 © jeurus 2005 all rights reserved 6 consistent explanation for the rationale behind individual competition rules and their wording. it also has also a difficulty of explaining the motivation for the centralized enforcement of eu competition law. the best place to turn for satisfactory answers to these questions are is the theory of workable or effective competition. the theory of workable or effective competition john maurice clark was the first economist to develop the theory of workable or effective competition in 1940 (clark: 1940). however, in revising his work, he decided to replace the concept ‘workable’ with ‘effective’ in 1961, after realizing that the former had connotations that it is static (clark: 1961). in the continental europe, clark’s theory found adherents amongst german ordoliberals or the members of the freiburg school who, in turn, played a crucial role in the preparation of the eec treaty (bonefeld: 2002; siems: 2002; gerber: 1998). there are three factors behind the development of the theory of effective competition. first, a capitalist market economy was producing instability, cartels and monopolies in the 1920s and 1930s. second, it was not possible to reconcile the principal assumptions of perfect competition with the reality of economies of scale internal to the firm in the aftermath of theoretical developments in the field of economics (clark: 1969, p. 488). scale economies required large firms with significant market power that could be abused easily for realizing individual interests at the expense of social needs (clark: 1960, p. 22).2 finally, the capitalist market economy was in grave danger because of the economic depression of 1929 as well as the rising ‘communist threat’ (clark: 1955b). 2 clark summarized the situation as follow: “to sum up, in a modern economy it has become impossible to trust an ‘invisible hand’ to turn crude self-interest into an efficient engine for meeting every social need” (clark: 1955a, p. 14). review of european and russian affairs vol. 1 no. 1 december 2005 © jeurus 2005 all rights reserved 7 it was clear by the 1930s that perfect competition was no longer a political ideal to be achieved under modern industrial conditions (clark: 1969, p. 31). in response to theoretical developments in economic theory and historical evolution of capitalism, the theory of effective competition was put forward as a middle ground between perfect competition and monopolies (keppler: 1994, p. 168). in particular, the theory was a pragmatic attempt to answer the negative public policy reverberations of the theories of imperfect and monopolistic competition such as excess capacity due to economies of scale, inefficient advertisement by monopolistic firms and market instability (clark: 1961, p. ix). as an attempt to incorporate dynamic analysis into the static neoclassical economic theory rather than totally overthrowing it, effective competition is a synthesis of the theories of monopolistic and imperfect competition with the vision of competition put forward by the classical and austrian schools of economics respectively (markham: 1950). not unlike the classical and austrian theories of competition, effective competition is defined as “rivalry in selling goods” (clark: 1940, p. 243). indeed, it is pictured as a dynamic process, consisting of a series of ‘gentle’ competitive moves and responses (clark: 1955b, p. 457). these moves and responses appear in the form of independent activity in pursuit of higher profits or preventing a decline in profit (clark: 1954). in aggressive and defensive forms, competition creates, reduces, eliminates and recreates profits in different sectors of the economy (clark: 1955b, p. 454). in this regard, competition is a kind of ‘neutralization process’ in which the initial market power of the first mover is eradicated review of european and russian affairs vol. 1 no. 1 december 2005 © jeurus 2005 all rights reserved 8 by the responding second firm, restoring the status quo ante in the market and eventually maintaining an equilibrium position. in figuring out the real intent behind effective competition, the distinction between short-term and long-term analysis of competition within an industry is the key starting point. the underlying assumption in the theory of effective competition is that industry does not operate at full capacity or at a point where a marginal cost is equal to marginal revenue in the short run. indeed, demand fluctuations cause the industry to operate below full capacity in the short-term in actual competition. if marginal cost is equal to average cost under such circumstances, there will be many bankruptcies. the solution to this problem in the short run is as follows: …, the requirement is an individual demand curve with sufficient slope to bring price, on the average, far enough above marginal cost so that average cost may be covered, over the run of good times and bad. along with this should go, presumably, enough price flexibility to afford a stimulus to demand in dull times, and the reverse in boom times (clark: 1940, p. 250). the theory of effective competition simply pronounces that the financial health of firms in the short term is the most important concern. firms should have enough market power to make adjustments in prices according to changing market circumstances to assure their survival. compared to short-term curves, the theory assumes that long-run cost and price curves are much flatter as “long-run forces serve to mitigate the seriousness of the effects of imperfect competition” (clark: 1940, p. 246). to be more precise, there is no immediate danger of bankruptcies. potential competition and product substitution in the long-run are the principal factors that mitigate the slope of the curves and hence lessen effects of market power. moreover, the long-run cost and price curves of commodities are much flatter than those of the short-run for two reasons. in the case of price curve, review of european and russian affairs vol. 1 no. 1 december 2005 © jeurus 2005 all rights reserved 9 firms, instead of making profits in the short-run by increasing prices, maintain and improve their sales volume by sacrificing their immediate profits. concerning the cost curve, changes in capacity, not changes in output, within the physical capacity of an existing plant dominate firms’ long-run cost curves. such costs do not vary significantly, if one considers the average optimum size of the firm. certainly cost curves are much flatter (clark: 1940, pp. 248-9). the theory of effective competition, therefore, is an attempt to reduce the discrepancy between immediate shortrun pressures and conditions of long-run equilibrium (clark: 1940, p. 249). after this explanation, it is not fancy to conclude that the theory of effective competition engenders a particular market environment where effective or ‘gentle’ competition can exist without ruining profit margins and causing market instabilities on the supply side. this particular market environment requires certain market structure and conduct. put together, the required market structure and behaviour advocated by the theory of effective competition provides clues about the logic for the inclusion and wording of the competition rules in the eec treaty. it also explicates the exclusion of a competition rule dealing with mergers and acquisition in the treaty. effective competition, firms, and articles 81, 82 and the mcr to survive short-term fluctuations in profitability, firms are presumed to have some degree of market power to affect price changes in effectively competitive markets. effective competition requires high profit margins between prices and costs to stimulate demand in times of recession and do the reverse when the economy is booming. thus, not every market structure is suitable for workable or effective competition review of european and russian affairs vol. 1 no. 1 december 2005 © jeurus 2005 all rights reserved 10 (sosnick: 1958). effective competition requires a particular market structure where there are ‘enough’ number of players, depending on the dynamics of a particular industry (shepherd: 1990, p. 16). in other words, effective competition engenders a moderate market concentration and loosely oligopolistic market structure (sosnick: 1958, p. 419). this kind of market structure is perceived essential to prevent industry bankruptcies, besides providing firms a suitable environment for stimulating and curbing demand in accordance with changing market conditions. it is not surprising that the treaty of rome did not have any competition rule that would prevent industrial concentration through mergers and acquisitions at the beginning, given there were so many firms in the newly opened eec-wide markets. nonetheless, increasing pace of market concentration in the late 1960s and 1970s and because of the limited juridical powers of article 82 to deal with mergers and acquisitions, the european commission submitted a proposal to the council of ministers in 1973 to regulate mergers and acquisitions with a community dimension (cec: 1974, p. 31). it took the council 16 years to accept the proposal in 1989. given that effective competition requires loosely oligopolistic markets, there are usually firms, having a dominant market position. to have effective competition in place, it is necessary to assure that such firms do not abuse their dominant position by using any kind of unfair, exclusionary, predatory or coercive tactics against their competitors, suppliers or customers. that is the reason for the inclusion of article 82 in the eec treaty that proscribes dominant firms abusing their market power. as it is clear from the language of article 82, having a dominant position is legal, but abusing market power that accrues from such a position is illegal in eu competition law. review of european and russian affairs vol. 1 no. 1 december 2005 © jeurus 2005 all rights reserved 11 other market conditions for effective competition to flourish are price-sensitive quality differentials, free entry to the market, free access to information and some uncertainty about meeting price reductions are preconditions for effective competition, since a transparent and stable market environment causes an open or tacit collusion between firms (asch: 1970, pp. 120-1). free market entry is a key condition for effective competition, as it would put market pressure on firms thereby providing an incentive on the part of the firms to offer innovative, new and good-quality products (sosnick: 1958, p. 418). corporate conducts such as shielding of inefficient rivals or producers, and using tactics such as unfair, coercive, exclusionary and/or predatory and misleading sales promotion are harmful to effective competition (asch: 1970). as the extreme case, outright collusion is the most harmful market behaviour for effective competition (clark: 1955b, p. 461). however, there are always exceptions against economic discrimination or restrictive practices. cooperation and collaboration in every form such as interlocks, joint ventures and technological pools are legitimate, provided that they do not harm competition significantly and that they encourage efficiency and technological development which are thought to be beneficial to consumers in general (sosnick: 1958, pp. 419-20). this explains the inclusion of article 81 in the eec treaty as well as the rationale behind the wording of article 81 which does not prohibit restrictive practices and cartels per se. rather, it considers their benefits and costs on the basis of individual cases. on the whole, articles 81 and 82 deal with firms competing in the market. review of european and russian affairs vol. 1 no. 1 december 2005 © jeurus 2005 all rights reserved 12 effective competition, economic role of the state, and articles 86 and 87 as it is clear from this brief account, there is little trust laid in market competition alone in allocating resources efficiently. competition is not ‘a simple and self-acting regulator that maintain[s] itself’ without any outside help (clark: 1961, p. 1). effective competition can work only in certain markets and does not have power to correct significant market failures as “[t]he economist’s chief mechanism – the market – cultivates certain kinds of needs and neglects others” (clark: 1960, p. 10). in other words, the market is not trusted by itself because of the deleterious effects of effective competition and therefore is not seen as “a simple and self-acting regulator that can maintain itself” without any state intervention (clark: 1960, p. 23). the theory of effective competition attributes three major tasks to the state vis-àvis the market. the first function is to safeguard effective competition by regulating not only firm conduct, but also economic activities of states (clark: 1961, p. 1). the second duty of the state is to correct market failures as well as to eliminate inefficiencies of effective competition by providing basic public goods, regulating the economy as well as pursuing stabilization, growth, and industrial policies. the final responsibility of the state is to pursue social goals through moderate fiscal redistribution (clark: 1969, p. 168).3 this brief account of effective competition and the role of the state have two reverberations. first, despite its possible failures and negative consequences, theory of effective competition still defends market competition and puts it over everything else. similarly, article 86 subjects a revenue-producing monopoly to the rules contained in the eec treaty, especially to the rules of competition, as long as such rules do not prevent 3 underlying this theory, however, rests a fear that the welfare state may fuel high inflation that the keynesian macroeconomic model carries within itself. review of european and russian affairs vol. 1 no. 1 december 2005 © jeurus 2005 all rights reserved 13 the performance of the particular tasks assigned to public undertakings and privative firms to which the member states grant special or exclusive rights. article 86 asserts the prevalence of market competition over anything else. second, state intervention indirectly and directly is justified in the theory of effective competition to correct market failures, provided that it does not distort market competition. as a form of indirect intervention, the insertion of the competition rules in the eec treaty serves this purpose. additionally, article 87 deals with direct state intervention, as it invalidates any aid granted by a member state or through state resources in any form that distorts or threatens competition by favoring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods, if it influences trade between the member states negatively. under article 87, state aid permissible under three conditions. while, the first is whenever market forces obstruct progress towards the treaty’s objectives, the second is in situations where market forces prolong the period of attaining an objective of bringing cheaper and good quality goods and services or of bringing them at unacceptable social costs. finally, whenever market forces intensify competition to such an extent that it can destroy itself, state aid is justified (cec: 1965, p. 60).in brief, article 86, along with article 87, disciplines the state by controlling its activities in the market (cec: 1973, p. 12). this is in line with what the theory of effective competition implies. effective competition, institutional structure of the state and role of law a system of effective competition entails “a framework of institutions as well as essential rules.” (lenel: 1989, p. 29) a specific solution advocated by franz böhm, a review of european and russian affairs vol. 1 no. 1 december 2005 © jeurus 2005 all rights reserved 14 prominent adherent of ordoliberalism, was the conception of an economic constitution (moshel: 1989, p. 151). walter eucken , the founding father of ordoliberalism, defines the two underlying principles of the economic constitution, as constitutive and regulative (eucken, 1950). with respect to the constitutive principle, institutional requirements necessary for the constitution to work comprise of the constitutional principles such as private property, a stable monetary system, freedom of contract, ‘open’ markets, and personal liability for action. the regulative principles safeguard and maintain the system by preventing it from developing spontaneously in undesirable directions (barry: 1989, pp. 114-5). state intervention should be in the form of a few well-defined stabilizing measures. since the economy consists of interrelated parts, frequent and arbitrary interventions in some spheres may have deleterious repercussions for other areas. this is essential for isolating economic logic from political pressures (oliver, jr.: 1960, pp. 1256). the only means to achieve this is law whose function is explained by clark as follows: “in short, law is seen as an instrument of social control because it assures stability against frequent political interventions” (clark: 1969, p. 123). this shows a strong tendency in the theory of effective competition that law is the main policy making instrument and few technocrats are the principal actors. in short, the state is given the obligation to prevent the market system from destroying itself through stabilization, anti-monopoly and social welfare policies (clark: 1969, p. 168). naturally, the theory of effective competition entails a strong and isolated state: “the formula of ‘strong state’ was meant by them as shorthand for a state that is constrained by a political constitution that prevents government from becoming the target review of european and russian affairs vol. 1 no. 1 december 2005 © jeurus 2005 all rights reserved 15 of special interest rent-seeking” (vanberg: 1998, p. 178). taken as a whole, the state has autonomy in making laws, as well as in daily administration. a regulatory state established on the basis of rule of law and market competition as a coordinator of activities in the market makes up the theoretical core of the theory of effective competition (berhnholz: 1989, p. 190). as such, the theory of effective competition has four major implications for political decision-making and organizational structure of the state. first, effective competition inevitably necessitates centralization of political power, augmenting decision-making power of the central authority at the expense of the lower levels of bureaucracy and citizens. second, it requires technocratic decision-making by ‘competent’ top bureaucrats. third, these bureaucrats should be free from political interventions and should be able to realize ‘public’ goals. finally, objectives of the general public, rather than parochial political concerns, should be the guiding factor behind the actions of these bureaucrats (clark: 1969, pp. 490-1). as a result, effective competition requires specific institutional structure and organizational form which has negative implications for democracy, as political power is gathered in the hands of few, while citizens are excluded from participating in political decision making. nonetheless, such negative results of the strong state for democracy in return for gains in efficiency in the economic and political spheres are accepted: if the state is strengthened against such pressures, something of what we are accustomed to think of as democracy may be lost. bureaucracies and centralized executive power and responsibility grow. but there is no reason to think we must go all the way to dictatorship in order to make control reasonably effective; in fact, we may lose little that we now have of the substance of popular control over government and its activities (clark: 1969, p. 494). review of european and russian affairs vol. 1 no. 1 december 2005 © jeurus 2005 all rights reserved 16 in other words, effective competition requires a trade-off between economic and political efficiency and democracy. economic and political efficiency, rather than democratic participation, is the source of legitimacy for the polity in the theory of effective competition. this brief account of the institutional requirements of effective competition and the role of law in policy making process substantiate an observation by majone, an eminent student of european integration that the main function of law in the eu is to keep economics as separate as possible from politics by isolating the former from the latter as well as disciplining the latter (majone: 1998). in this sense, the legal debate has become a fully autonomous factor in the political process in the process of european integration (dehousse: 2000, p. 17). in particular, the primary function of law is to work as a mask for politics, creating a functional sphere for circumventing the direct clash of political interests. dehousse succinctly describes the role of law in policy-making as follows: “partisan conflict is transformed into allegedly non-partisan questions about the proper interpretation of the treaty.” (dehousse, 1998, p. 115) debating and deciding important political outcomes in the language and logic of law conceals as well as alters political conflicts to a certain extent, resulting depoliticization of political decision-making and juridification of politics (burley and mattli, 1993, p. 44). as such, law replaces ‘conflicts of interests’ with ‘matters of principles’ and depoliticizes the political process. this also explains why the european parliament is still not the main legislative institution. review of european and russian affairs vol. 1 no. 1 december 2005 © jeurus 2005 all rights reserved 17 concluding remarks it has been demonstrated that the theory of effective competition provides a set of relevant criteria with the aim of providing guidance on the competitive nature of markets, thereby serving as a guide to the formulation and implementation of competition policy.7 as such, the theory of workable or effective competition has six major implications for the design of the eu competition rules and their administration. first of all, assuring profitability of firms is the main goal of eu competition law and policy. second, loosely oligopolistic markets which are free from restrictions and abusive practices are the ideal market environment for effective competition to exist as well as flourish. third, effective competition is not against restrictive practices or cartels per se, in that if they are beneficial to consumers and do not restrict competition significantly, they can be tolerated. fourth, market competition has priority over everything else in the market, including firms granted special rights to provide general public services. fifth, the state is attributed significant responsibilities to correct market failures through both direct intervention and indirect regulation. finally, the theory of effective competition requires centralized political power and technocratic decision-making, and law is attributed a significant role to play in economic policy making and implementation. because of space limitation, this essay did not deal with major flaws of effective competition. the next task to be accomplished is to identify the major flaws regarding the vision of effective competition and analyze eu competition law cases to figure out how they become manifest in eu competition law decisions. this will provide concrete clues for improving eu competition law and policy. review of european and russian affairs vol. 1 no. 1 december 2005 © jeurus 2005 all rights reserved 18 bibliography asch, p. economic theory and the antitrust dilemma, (new york: john wiley & sons, inc. 1970). barry, n. p. “political and economic thought of german neo-liberals,” in peacock, a. and willgerodt, h. eds., german neo-liberals and the social market economy, (new york: st. martin’s press, 1989). bernholz, p. “ordoliberals and the 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‘ordoliberalism’,” european business law review, vol. 13, no. 3 (2002), pp. 139-51. sosnick, s. h. “a critique of workable competition,” quarterly journal of economics, vol. 72, no. 3 (1958), pp. 380-423. swann, d. competition & industrial policy in the european community, (methuen, 1983). vanberg, v. j. “freiburg school of law and economics,” in p. newman, ed., the new palgrave dictionary of economics and the law, vol. 2, (london: macmillan, 1998). van gerven, w. “twelve years ec competition law (1962-1973) revisited,” common market law review, vol. 11, no. 1 (1974), pp. 38-61. veljanovski, c. “ec merger policy after ge/honeywell and airtours,” antitrust bulletin, vol. 49, no. 1/2 (2004), pp. 153-93. wilks, s. and mcgowan, l. “competition policy in the european union: creating a federal agency?,” in doern, g. b. and wilks, s. eds., comparative competition policy: national institutions in a global market, (oxford: clarendon press, 1996). microsoft word karounga diawara_politique de la concurrence et intégration des marchés intérieurs analyse comparative entre review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved ………………………………………………………………… politique de la concurrence et intégration des marchés intérieurs : analyse comparative entre les perspectives canadienne et européenne (u.e) karounga diawara résumé l’objet de cet article est d’analyser les objectifs de la politique de la concurrence au canada et en europe relativement à l’objectif d’intégration des marchés intérieur. l’auteur montre que les politiques canadienne et européenne en matière de concurrence n’ont pas les mêmes orientations quant à l’objectif d’intégration des marchés intérieurs. tandis qu’en europe, la législation antitrust constitue un moyen pour parvenir à l’objectif essentiel d’édification d’un marché intérieur; au canada, les règles de la concurrence visent d’abord et avant tout à promouvoir l’efficience économique et à lutter contre le gaspillage des ressources économiques rares. dans la première partie, l’auteur met en exergue cette différence d’orientation en insistant sur les contextes constitutionnels et historiques qui expliquent cette différence. dans la seconde partie, l’auteur analyse la nature juridique différente des deux regroupements d’états qui constitue le fondement principal de cette différence. l’auteur démontre que la nature économique du traité ce a facilité, dès le début, une politique européenne de la concurrence tournée vers l’érection d’un marché intérieur ouvert et concurrentiel. alors qu’au canada, la nature politique de la fédération n’a pas permis d’orienter la politique de concurrence vers l’intégration des marchés provinciaux. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 58 introduction en édictant des règles en matière de concurrence, chaque état leur assigne des objectifs donnés. ces objectifs peuvent être divers et variés allant de la recherche de l’efficience économique à la protection du consommateur en passant par la lutte contre le pouvoir de monopole. les politiques canadienne et européenne de la concurrence obéissent à cette réalité. elles ont des fonctions différentes liées au contexte historique et économique ayant présidé à leur apparition et à leur développement. alors qu’au canada la législation antitrust date de la fin du 19ème siècle (1889); en europe, les règles de la concurrence ne sont apparues qu’un demi siècle plus tard à savoir au milieu du 20ème s avec l’avènement de la construction européenne. apparues dans des contextes différents, les règles européenne et canadienne de la concurrence, même si elles partagent quelques similitudes, poursuivent des objectifs différents. il en est ainsi de l’objectif d’intégration des marchés intérieurs. l’objet de cette étude est de mettre en exergue la différence fondamentale qui a prévalu à l’origine et qui demeure encore aujourd’hui entre les perspectives européenne et canadienne dans la mise en relation entre la politique de la concurrence d’une part et l’objectif de décloisonnement des marchés intérieurs d’autre part. l’analyse des objectifs de la politique de la concurrence de part et d’autre de l’atlantique montre que relativement à l’objectif d’intégration des marchés intérieurs, la politique canadienne en matière de concurrence, à la différence de celle européenne, ne vise pas à encourager l’interpénétration des marchés et à censurer toute pratique favorisant le cloisonnement des marchés. en effet, les politiques canadienne et review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 59 européenne en matière de concurrence n’ont pas les mêmes orientations relativement à l’objectif d’intégration des marchés intérieurs. tandis qu’en europe, la législation antitrust constitue un moyen pour parvenir à l’objectif essentiel d’édification d’un marché intérieur; au canada, les règles de la concurrence visent d’abord et avant tout à promouvoir l’efficience économique et à lutter contre le gaspillage des ressources économiques rares. ainsi nous montrerons dans la première partie cette différence d’orientation des politiques de la concurrence européenne et canadienne quant à l’objectif de décloisonnement des marchés. dans cette partie, nous insisterons sur les contextes constitutionnels et historiques qui expliquent cette différence. dans la seconde partie, nous analyserons les fondements de cette différence d’orientation qui sont attribuables à la nature juridique différente des deux regroupements d’états. il sera démontré que la nature économique du traité ce a facilité, dès le début, une politique européenne de la concurrence tournée vers l’érection d’un marché intérieur ouvert et concurrentiel. alors qu’au canada, la nature politique de la fédération n’a pas permis d’orienter la politique de concurrence vers l’intégration des marchés provinciaux. 1. la différence d’orientation de la politique de la concurrence quant à l’objectif d’intégration des marchés intérieurs : concurrence-moyen v. concurrencecondition cette différence d’orientation des politiques européenne et canadienne de la concurrence est révélée notamment par deux facteurs importants. le premier est historique et contextuel. il est relatif à la différence qui a caractérisé l’apparition des politiques de la concurrence en europe et au canada (1.1). ce contexte historique review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 60 différent va rejaillir sur la priorité assignée à la politique de la concurrence. c’est l’opposition entre deux conceptions de la politique de la concurrence : la conception canadienne, à l’image de celle américaine, fait de la concurrence une condition d’organisation du marché; alors que la conception européenne fait de la politique de la concurrence un moyen de parvenir à l’érection d’un marché intérieur sans frontières (1.2.). 1.1. différence du contexte d’apparition de la politique de la concurrence au canada et en europe le contexte historique qui a vu apparaître les politiques canadienne et européenne en matière de concurrence est très différent et explique la différence d’orientation qui existe quant à l’objectif de création d’un marché d’un marché commun ouvert, concurrentiel et interpénétré. au canada, c’est pour lutter contre les coalitions entre les producteurs visant à fixer les prix et ainsi, exploiter le consommateur qu’une première législation contre les ententes et complots a été élaboré en 1889. il s’agit de l’ l’acte à l’effet de prévenir et supprimer les coalitions formées pour gêner le commerce1. comme aux u.s.a, cette loi visait à combattre la fixation de prix de la part de certains manufacturiers profitant des barrières tarifaires qui isolaient le marché canadien pour se livrer à des complots (trebilcock, winter, collins et iacobucci 2002, 8-9; bliss 1973, 180). cette loi, d’abord 1 s.c 52 vict. (1889), c. 41 review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 61 insérée dans le code criminel2, allait connaître plusieurs modifications avant d’être remplacée par la loi relative aux enquêtes et les coalitions3. ces deux premières principales législations sur la concurrence avaient pour objectif de protéger le public contre les ententes de fixation de prix (dispositions sur les complots) et contre l’exploitation par les monopoles de la vulnérabilité du consommateur canadien. comme le constate rioux : « dans le contexte économique de l’époque, caractérisé par l’accroissement de la taille des entreprises et par la progression de la concentration économique, les deux principales sources d’inquiétude tenaient aux inégalités de pouvoir économique et aux pratiques collusoires des entreprises » (rioux 2000, 8). cependant ces objectifs ainsi assignés aux premières législations canadiennes sur la concurrence n’allaient pas être atteints du fait principalement du niveau de preuve élevée exigé par les tribunaux canadiens pour constater les infractions criminelles à la concurrence. en effet, c’est dans l’affaire irwing que le sort de ces premières lois allait être scellé : la cour suprême a exigé une preuve d’atteinte à l’intérêt public qui supposait de démontrer non seulement que la pratique en cause porte atteinte à la concurrence mais aussi qu’elle transgresse l’intérêt public (cour suprême (c.s) 1978, 408). c’est dans ce contexte que le canada changea sa politique de la concurrence pour la rendre plus flexible en dépénalisant les dispositions en matière de fusion et d’abus de position dominante. 2 article 411 3 s.r.c 1952, c. 314 review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 62 cette réforme importante aboutit à l’adoption en 1986 de la loi sur la concurrence4 qui allait donner une nouvelle impulsion à la politique canadienne en matière de concurrence lui permettant de mieux répondre à ses objectifs de protection du public orientée vers la recherche essentielle de l’efficience économique. cette apparition de la politique de la concurrence au canada contraste avec l’apparition d’un droit de la concurrence en europe caractérisée par son application dans le cadre de l’érection d’un marché commun européen. en europe, l’apparition de la politique de la concurrence a coïncidé avec la construction européenne. déjà présentes dans le feu traité de paris5, les règles de la concurrence allaient être établies, dès l’origine de la fondation de la communauté économique européenne, par le traité de rome. pour les pères fondateurs européens, il était important de prévoir une politique de concurrence dans une europe d’après guerre marquée par le corporatisme. et surtout il fallait démanteler les concentrations d’acier et de charbon existant dans le ruhr allemand (monnet 1976, 411). c’est ce qui explique que l’allemagne a été le premier état membre originaire à disposer d’une politique de concurrence imposée par les alliés. mais fondamentalement, l’adoption d’une politique de la concurrence dès l’origine avait pour objectif premier d’encourager la construction d’un marché commun européen sans entrave, ouvert et concurrentiel (gerber 1998, 347). comme l’a noté jean 4 l.r.c (1985), c. c-34 5 il s’agit du traité ceca (communauté européenne du charbon et de l’acier) qui a expiré le 23 juillet 2002 review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 63 monnet dans ses mémoires : “...c’était une innovation fondamentale en europe, et l’importante législation antitrust qui règne sur le marché commun trouve son origine dans ces quelques lignes pour lesquelles je ne regrette pas de m’être battu quatre mois durant” (monnet 1976, 413). ainsi, il était évident dès le départ que la politique de la concurrence devait accompagner l’érection d’un marché intérieur. ainsi des règles s’appliquant autant aux entreprises privées (article 81 et 82, ex 85 et 86) aux entreprises publiques et aux états membres (art. 86 à 88) allaient être imposées afin d’assurer un régime assurant que la concurrence n’est pas faussée dans le marché commun. ces règles primaires allaient être complétées en 1989 par une législation portant sur le contrôle des concentrations. ce tableau historique d’apparition des politiques européenne et canadienne en matière de concurrence montre clairement la différence de base qui les séparera quant à l’objectif d’interpénétration des marchés. alors que le droit européen a posé dès le début les jalons d’un tel objectif dans le cadre normal de la construction d’un marché commun; au canada, l’échec connu par les premières lois antitrust allait entraîner une refondation visant à retrouver l’efficience économique recherchée dès le départ. dès lors, il s’en suit que les priorités assignées à la politique de la concurrence de part et d’autre de l’atlantique ne sont pas les mêmes. 1.2. différence dans les priorités : efficience v. intégration des marchés l’analyse des priorités établit la différence fondamentale qui sépare les politiques européenne et canadienne de la concurrence relativement à l’objectif d’intégration des marchés. alors que le canada profite de la réforme en profondeur de sa politique de la review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 64 concurrence survenue d’abord en 1976 puis en 1986 pour affirmer de manière nette son orientation vers l’efficience économique; dans le même temps, les tribunaux européens dans une interprétation téléologique des règles de la concurrence vont consacrer l’objectif fondamental de création d’un marché commun. au canada, la réforme de 1986 qui a abouti à l’adoption de la présente l.c allait préciser de façon claire la priorité de la politique de la concurrence. l’article 1.1 de la l.c mentionne que l’objet de la politique en matière de concurrence vise en premier la recherche, la préservation et le développement de l’efficience économique : « la présente loi a pour objet de préserver et de favoriser la concurrence au canada dans le but de stimuler l’adaptabilité et l’efficience de l’économie canadienne ». cet objectif d’efficience économique découle de la recommandation du conseil économique du canada (ci-après cec) qui, dans le rapport provisoire sur la politique de concurrence, a préconisé « pour la politique de concurrence l’adoption d’un seul objectif qui consisterait à améliorer le rendement de l’économie et à éviter le gaspillage des ressources, de façon à accroitre le bien-être » (cec 1969, 23). en conséquence, il semble que les règles canadiennes en matière de concurrence, à l’image des u.s.a, ont consacré la théorie de la concurrence-condition. selon cette théorie, le but des règles en matière de concurrence est de garantir un rendement économique maximum. le droit antitrust protège la concurrence en elle-même, élément indispensable pour le bon fonctionnement du marché. d’où l’appellation de concurrencecondition, car la concurrence est une condition d’existence d’une bonne économie : « dans un tel modèle (…), on recherchera la concurrence la plus large possible, et la review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 65 réglementation des comportements anticoncurrentiels visera à l’élimination systématique de toute entente, de tout comportement entrainant une diminution de la concurrence, dès que significative » (bonassies 51). dès lors, plus il y a la concurrence, meilleurs seront les rendements. il ne s’agit donc pas de protéger les concurrents mais la concurrence. parallèlement en europe, les règles de la concurrence sont posées pour éviter qu’aucune nouvelle barrière ne vienne prendre la place de celle que la création du marché unique ferait tomber. l’objectif de décloisonnement des marchés poursuivi par le droit européen de la concurrence est consubstantiel au traité c.e. en effet, la cour de justice (ci-après cjce) dans une interprétation combinée des articles 2, 3g et 81 ce a ainsi posé l’objectif de création d’un marché intérieur poursuivi par la politique de la concurrence : …la concurrence non faussée visée aux articles 3.g et 85 [actuellement 81] du traité c.e.e implique l’existence, sur le marché d’une concurrence efficace, c’est à dire de la dose de concurrence nécessaire pour que soient respectées les exigences fondamentales et atteints les objectifs du traité et, en particulier, la formation d’un marché unique réalisant des conditions analogues à celle d’un marché intérieur » (nous soulignons) (cjce, 1977, cons. 20). dès lors, la politique de la concurrence vient se joindre et compléter les quatre libertés de circulation (personnesétablissement-, marchandise, services, capitaux) pour l’érection d’un marché intérieur européen sans frontières. et la politique de la concurrence a largement contribué à cet objectif comme l’illustre la sévérité dont font montre les autorités européennes à l’égard des pratiques qui ont pour effet de cloisonner le marché review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 66 européen6 (ehlermann 1992). ainsi, avec l’élargissement que vient de connaître l’union, cet objectif de la politique de la concurrence va contribuer à insuffler cette dynamique constante d’interdiction des pratiques de cloisonnement des marchés. en définitive, la politique européenne de la concurrence constitue un moyen, parmi d’autres, visant à l’érection d’un marché intérieur. à la différence du canada, l’u.e a opté pour la théorie de la concurrence-moyen. selon cette conception, la sauvegarde de la concurrence n’est qu’un moyen pour atteindre des objectifs particuliers. les effets concurrentiels, mais aussi économiques et sociaux d’un comportement restrictif de la concurrence sont pris en compte (bonassies 1983, 55). il pourrait, donc, être concevable de restreindre la concurrence pour parvenir à l’un ou l’autre de ces objectifs. la concurrence n’est pas alors érigée comme un principe sacré et inviolable. elle peut être restreinte si elle tend à remettre en cause l’intégration européenne. mais surtout, elle doit être protégée chaque fois que les intérêts du marché intérieur le commandent. 2. les fondements de la différence d’orientation : union politique v. union économique la différence d’orientation des politiques canadienne et européenne en matière de concurrence quant à l’objectif d’intégration des marchés intérieurs trouve son fondement principalement dans la nature juridique différente de ces deux unions étatiques. alors que 6 infra point 2.1 review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 67 l’u.e constitue toujours une union de nature économique, le canada est d’abord une union politique. si paradoxal que cela puisse paraître, alors que l’europe s’est servi des règles de la concurrence pour en faire un moteur d’intégration économique (2.1) ; au canada, du fait de la nature politique de la fédération, la politique de la concurrence n’a pas été orientée vers une intégration des marchés provinciaux (2.2.). 2.1. la politique de la concurrence, moteur de l’intégration européenne l’u.e est une organisation supranationale à caractère économique. le traité de rome de 1957 a posé, dès l’origine, les bases de cette union économique. il a institué, dès le début, un régime assurant que la concurrence n’est pas faussée (article 3g ce). les célèbres articles 81 et 82 (ancien article 85 et 86 du traité c.e) ont interdit toute entente ou tout abus de position dominante tendant à créer des obstacles à l’unification des marchés européens. de la même façon le contrôle des aides d’état, l’obligation imposée aux états à ne pas prendre de mesures susceptibles de restreindre la concurrence ainsi que la politique de libéralisation des industries en réseau (télécommunications, gaz, poste, chemin de fer etc.) ont encouragé une interpénétration des marchés européens en un marché intérieur ouvert et concurrentiel. dès lors, les pratiques anticoncurrentielles favorisant le cloisonnement de marché à savoir les ententes de fixation des prix et les ententes de répartition de marché7 ont été 7 se répartir les marchés est directement contraire à l’objectif de réalisation d’un marché unique puisque cela aboutit à reconstituer des frontières privées, là où les frontières politiques ont été abolies. c’est l’infraction la plus grave avec les infractions portant sur les prix auxquelles elle est souvent liée, puisque les différences de prix peuvent être maintenues grâce à la répartition des marchés qui empêchent les review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 68 systématiquement et rigoureusement condamnées par les autorités antitrust européennes. en effet, la cour de justice a rapidement interprété de façon téléologique la législation sur la concurrence dans le sens de renforcer le marché commun conformément à l’objectif du traité ce. c’est ainsi que la cour a montré son aversion envers les ententes de répartition de marché avec protection territoriale absolue. en effet, selon une jurisprudence constante, la protection territoriale absolue stipulée en faveur du distributeur dans un accord de distribution exclusive et destinée à permettre le contrôle et l'entrave des importations parallèles, aboutit au maintien artificiel de marchés nationaux distincts, contraire au traité, de sorte qu'elle constitue une infraction à l'article 81, paragraphe 1(cjce 1971, 487;1985, 3933;1990, 261; 1998, 1983; 2004, point 85). de la même manière, la commission a développé une politique vigoureuse envers les pratiques anticoncurrentielles de cloisonnement du marché qu’elle qualifie de « cancer à l’économie européenne » (commission 2002, p. 19). comme le résume bien ehlermann, ancien responsable de la politique de la concurrence : the commission has from the start pursued a hardline policy under article 85 against market sharing agreements, cartels related to prices, quotas and investments and collective mutual exclusive dealing arrangement between manufacturers and traders. selling syndicates have also been viewed unfavourably. such agreements and arrangements are in direct contradiction to the principle of a single market based on effective competition; logically, it was necessary to eliminate them. the commission’s pratice vis a vis abuses of dominant positions by undertakings has developed along the same lines (ehlermann 1992, 261). consommateurs d’acheter les produits les plus intéressants là où ils sont et, par voie de conséquence, de déplacer les parts de marché. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 69 et jusqu’à présent, la commission garde cette même antipathie envers ces infractions graves. en 20018 et 20029, elle a mené une action d’envergure contre les cartels de prix et de répartition de marché ; lutte matérialisée par la création au sein de la commission depuis 1998 d’une première unité anticartel et en 2002 d’une seconde unité anticartel. ces deux unités sont chargées de la détection, la poursuite et la sanction des cartels secrets. ainsi, l’expérience européenne montre que les règles de la concurrence sont indispensables pour la création d’un marché commun. en effet, les quatre libertés fondamentales10 du marché commun ne sont viables et ne trouvent leur éclosion que dans le cadre d’un marché ouvert et concurrentiel. les entreprises ou l’état, en adoptant des pratiques restrictives de la concurrence, créent de nouvelles barrières dans l’union et ainsi ralentissent la création d’un espace intérieur sans frontière. c’est pourquoi, la politique de la concurrence constitue l’un des moteurs les plus puissants de l’intégration des marchés européens. comme le souligne slot: « the primary objective was market integration. this explains inter alia the emphasis of ec competition policy on the elimination of vertical restraints and export bans. the role of competition law as an instrument of market integration was not limited to the initial stages of the integration process. competition 8 en 2001, la commission a adopté dix décisions formelles négatives contre 56 entreprises pour un montant global d’amendes de plus 1,800 milliards d’euros. 9 en 2002, la commission a adopté 9 décisions formelles négatives contre 56 entreprises pour un montant global d’amendes de plus 1 milliards d’euros. 10 il s’agit de la libre circulation des personnes (1) des biens et des marchandises (2) des capitaux (3) et de la libre prestation de service (4). review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 70 policy continued to play an important role for completion of the internal market and beyond » (slot 2004, 445). ce qui n’est pas le cas du canada qui, du fait de sa nature fédérale, n’a pas connu les mêmes options. 2.2. la nature politique de la fédération canadienne, obstacle à une politique de la concurrence tournée vers l’intégration des marchés provinciaux? la nature politique de la fédération canadienne va avoir l’effet inverse de négliger l’importance de la politique de la concurrence dans la constitution d’un marché intérieur canadien intégré. puisqu’un état fédéral « repose sur l’acceptation d’objectifs communs qui englobent et dépassent les données de l’économie » (safarian 1974, 13). l’état fédéral canadien est organisé suivant une répartition des compétences entre le niveau fédéral et le niveau provincial (art. 91 à 95 de la loi constitutionnelle de 1867). l’une des raisons, qui a fait que la politique canadienne en matière de la concurrence n’a pas favorisé dès le début de l’union une intégration du commerce interprovincial, est liée au fait que la compétence fédérale en matière de concurrence a d’abord été reconnue seulement au titre du droit criminel. c’est pourquoi, les premières législations canadiennes en matière de concurrence étaient des lois exclusivement criminelles. et aujourd’hui encore les dispositions interdisant les complots sont encore de nature pénale. cette situation qui impose un fardeau élevé de la preuve n’a pas permis de lutter efficacement contre les complots anticoncurrentiels entrainant un cloisonnement des marchés interprovinciaux, à savoir les accords de fixation des prix et de répartition des marchés. la reconnaissance de la compétence fédérale en matière de concurrence au titre de ses pouvoirs de réglementation du commerce et des échanges (article 91(2)) n’a pas review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 71 non plus permis de tourner la politique de la concurrence vers l’intégration des marchés provinciaux. en effet, cette reconnaissance est intervenue à un moment où l’intégration des marchés canadiens était déjà accomplie en partie. dès lors, le législateur canadien a alors posé comme priorité à la politique de la concurrence la recherche de l’efficience économique. la deuxième raison non moins déterminante est constituée par le fait que la loi constitutionnelle de 1867 avait déjà posé le fondement l’union économique canadienne. l’article 12111 constitue l’expression constitutionnelle du marché commun canadien (safarian 1972, 19 ; treblicock 2001, 550). l’article 121 assure la libre circulation des marchandises du crû dans toute la grandeur du canada sans droits de douanes. cette disposition, telle qu’elle a été interprétée par les tribunaux canadiens, ne crée guère une union économique intégrée mais seulement une union douanière. en effet, la cour suprême a décidé dans l’affaire gold seal limited c. dominion express company que ce texte a pour « l’objet réel …d’interdire l’établissement de droits de douane affectant le commerce interprovincial pour les produits de toutes provinces de l’union » (c.s 1921, 424). ainsi, cette disposition n’a pas permis de créer un marché commun intégré; elle n’a permis d’assurer que le libre mouvement des marchandises, occultant la libre circulation des personnes et des capitaux (safarian 1972, 21). c’est pourquoi, l’article 6 11 l’article 121 dispose que : « tous articles du crû, de la provenance ou fabrication de l’une quelconque des provinces seront, à dater de l’union, admis en franchise dans chacune des autres provinces ». review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 72 de la charte canadienne des droits et libertés allait venir compléter la réalisation d’un marché commun canadien en consacrant la liberté de circulation et d’établissement de tout citoyen canadien à la grandeur de la fédération12 (de mestral et winter 2001). néanmoins, il aura fallu attendre 1994, suite à l’échec d’établir une disposition constitutionnelle garantissant un marché commun canadien complet, pour que l’accord sur le commerce intérieur (ci-après aci) soit signé entre le fédéral et chaque province pour assurer l’érection d’un marché intérieur sans frontière. l’aci vise à « réduire et éliminer, dans la mesure du possible, les obstacles à la libre circulation des personnes, des produits, des services et des investissements à l'intérieur du canada, et établir un marché intérieur ouvert, performant et stable ». l’aci n’a pas une force contraignante et ne peut pas être appliqué par les tribunaux. il s’agit d’un accord politique tenant compte des particularités du fédéralisme canadien (trebilcock 2001, 586). en somme, le canada n’a pas eu besoin d’utiliser sa politique de la concurrence pour développer un marché interprovincial intégré. la nature politique de l’union, la criminalisation des règles de la concurrence et l’existence d’autres instruments juridiques lui ont permis de réaliser un marché intérieur intégré sans pour autant recourir à sa politique de la concurrence. 12 l’article 6 (1) et (2) de la charte dispose que « 1. tout citoyen canadien a le droit de demeurer au canada, d'y entrer ou d'en sortir. 2. tout citoyen canadien et toute personne ayant le statut de résident permanent au canada ont le droit :a) de se déplacer dans tout le pays et d'établir leur résidence dans toute province; b) de gagner leur vie dans toute province » review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 73 pourtant ce constat peut être déplorable si l’on sait, à l’instar de l’exemple européen, que la politique de la concurrence aurait pu aider à encourager une interpénétration des marchés interprovinciaux canadiens. et comme l’avait recommandé déjà en 1972 safarian, la politique de la concurrence peut être utilement utilisée pour l’érection d’un marché intégré : on comprendra la relation qui existe entre la politique de concurrence et le marché commun en se reportant aux propos sur les avantages qui découlent des échanges. en l’absence de barrières à la mobilité interprovinciale des biens, et dans la mesure où le permettent les coûts de transfert, on a supposé que les producteurs se déplaceraient au-delà de leurs marchés locaux et que les consommateurs pourraient s’approvisionner ailleurs que de leurs sources locales. celles-ci, en retour, retireraient les avantages indiqués. si des restrictions particulières sur la production et la répartition empêchent cette mobilité, les avantages provenant des échanges s’évaporeront. (…)une politique efficace de concurrence est nécessaire à la réalisation des avantages à retirer du marché commun (safarian 1972, 263-264). conclusion en définitive, s’il est vrai que l’objectif de décloisonnement des marchés n’est pas une priorité de la politique de la concurrence au canada du fait de plusieurs facteurs relatés ci-dessus dont le premier tient à la particularité de la nature politique de la fédération canadienne. nous avons vu par contre que la politique européenne en matière de concurrence a largement contribué à créer un marché intérieur européen intégré. malgré cette opposition de taille due à des facteurs historico-politiques et économiques, les règles canadiennes en matière de concurrence, à l’instar des règles européennes, contiennent des dispositions susceptibles de combattre certaines pratiques favorisant le cloisonnement des marchés. mais, il est vrai, que c’est dans l’abnégation du traitement de ces interdictions que se trouve toute la différence. nous avons vu que les review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 74 autorités antitrust européennes ne tolèrent aucunement les pratiques tendant à empêcher l’interpénétration des marchés. au canada, les dispositions de principe existent mais les autorités de concurrence ne font pas de la lutte contre de telles pratiques une priorité. c’est là où réside toute la différence. pourtant, le cadre juridique de l’interdiction des comportements encourageant le cloisonnement des marchés canadiens existe bien dans la l.c. il en est ainsi, aussi bien, des pratiques anticoncurrentielles13 que des pratiques restrictives de concurrence14. ainsi donc, le droit canadien de la concurrence réprime en principe les pratiques tendant à cloisonner les marchés, à savoir les pratiques de fixation des prix et les pratiques de répartition des marchés. 13 il s’agit principalement des complots restrictifs de concurrence interdits par article 45 de la l.c, de l’abus de position dominante interdite par l’article 79 et des fusions régies par les articles 91 et s. de la l.c 14 il s’agit notamment des articles 51 interdisant la discrimination par les prix; 61 (1) a) prohibant le maintien de prix; et surtout l’article 77 qui censure dans certaines conditions l’exclusivité, la vente liée et la limitation de marché. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 75 bibliographie anderson r.d. et khosla s. d., la politique de concurrence en tant que dimension de la politique économique : une analyse comparative, industrie canada, document hors série n°7, ottawa, 1995 bliss m, « another antitrust tradition: canadian anti-combines policy, 1889-1910”, 47 business history review (1973), 177-88 bonassies pierre, « les fondements du droit communautaire de la concurrence : la théorie de la concurrence-moyen », dans études dédiées à alex weill, paris, dalloz-litec, 1983, 51-68 cjce, deutsche grammophon c. metro sb, c-78/70, rec. 1971, p.487 cjce, eta c. dk investment, c-31/85, rec. 1985, p.3933 cjce, javico c. yves saint laurent parfums, c-306/96, rec. 1998, p.i-1983 cjce, tipp-ex c. commission, c-279/87, rec. 1990, p.i-261 cour suprême, gold seal limited v. dominion express company, (1921), 62 s.c.r. 424 cour suprême, r. c. irwing 1978 r.c.s, 408 ehlermann claus-dieter, « the contribution of ec competition policy to the single market », 29 common market law review (1992), 257-282 gerber david j., law and competition in twentieth century europe: protecting prometheus, clarendon press, oxford (1998) goldman calvin s. et kissack joel t., “the role of competition policy in canada’s industrial policy”, 19 can.-u.s. law journal (1993), 105-130 gorecki paul k. et w.t. stanbury, the objectives of canadian competition policy 1888 1983, montréal, institut de recherche politique, 1984 green c, “canadian competition policy: past and present”, dans miren a. letemendia (dir) les politiques de concurrence de la communauté économique européenne et du canada, montréal, centre de droit privé et comparé, 1983, 39-66 khemani r.s. and w.t. stanbury (dir), canadian competition law and policy at the centenary, halifax, institute for research on public policy, 1991 khemani r.s. and w.t. stanbury (dir), historical perspectives on canadian competition review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 76 policy, halifax, institute for research on public policy, 1991 de mestral a. and winter j.,”mobility rights in the union european and canada”, 46 mcgill l. j. (2001), 979-1009 monnet jean, mémoires (fayard, paris, 1976) rioux michèle, « le rôle stratégique de la politique de la concurrence du canada », cahier de recherche gric uqam 2000-09, juillet 2000 (en ligne : http://www.unites.uqam.ca/gric/pdf/09-2000-rioux.pdf consulté le 20-04-2006) safarian a.e, le fédéralisme canadien et l’intégration économique, ottawa, information canada, 1974 slot piet jan, “a view from the mountain: 40 years of developments in e.c competition law” (41 common law market review, 443–473, 2004) t.p.i, jcb service c. commission, t-67/01, rec. 2004, p. ii 49 trebilcock michael et al., the law and economics of canadian competition policy, toronto, university of toronto press, 2002. trebilcock michael j.,” the supreme court and strengthening the conditions for effective competition in the canadian economy”, 80 la revue du barreau canadien (2001), 543 microsoft word wisneiwski_rera_paper.doc review of european and russian affairs vol. 1 no. 1 december 2005 © rera 2005 all rights reserved 1 ………………………………………………………………… convergence toward the european social model? impact of eu accession on polish social policy jakub wiśniewski abstract in order to join the european union (eu) poland had to meet a wide range of conditions including adoption of acquis communautaire, significant administrative reforms and economic restructuring. this article deals with all these eu-membership commitments which directly influenced the polish social policy, spanning such areas as free movement of persons (mainly workers), labour law, social dialogue, labour market and social inclusion policies and pensions. these changes even if incremental and evolutionary made the polish welfare state more compatible with the european social model. judging from the experience of poland, the european social model (esm) is far from vague and meaningless ideology. the esm has had a significant impact on national social policies which is discernible at four general levels: values and general rules, which engender a welfare state philosophy shared by all member states; community-enforced social minimum standards; european-level institutional co-operative procedures; and monetary transfers in the framework of cohesion policy. the impact of the eu is visible to a varying degree – ranging from substantial in the peripheral areas such as gender equality or health and safety at work to purely theoretical in fiscal and monetary matters. the polish welfare state has been heavily influenced by practical day-to-day administrative and institutional co-operation of poland with the ue. review of european and russian affairs vol. 1 no. 1 december 2005 © rera 2005 all rights reserved 2 introduction the “big bang” enlargement of the european union (eu) of 2004 was unprecedented in the number of acceding countries and the socio-economic disparities between member states resulting from it. the accession of poland was perceived as part of an historic process, in which countries of central eastern europe overcame the half-century-long division of the continent in order to join the peace, stability and prosperity guaranteed by the union. the euphoria of may 1 was preceded by a lengthy and painstaking preparation on the part of candidate countries adoption of acquis communautaire, significant administrative reforms, as well as necessary restructuring of their economies. the eu25 has been a reality for over a year now and some socio-economic ramifications of the accession are starting to be visible in central eastern europe. has the european social model (hereinafter “esm”) left its mark on the polish welfare state? if yes, to what extent has the social policy been affected? the answer carries weight not only in the eyes of “new” europeans, but also for the whole of europe in general, because it leads to another question: is esm an important aspect of the european integration in its own right or a mere marginal supplement to the single market? in this article we assume that challenges that the polish state must meet for full eu membership include elements of the european social model. therefore, by studying the accession-influenced reforms in the polish welfare state one can shed some light on the elusive notion of “social europe”. in the second half of 2004, poland experienced the post-accession boom. it occurred despite the appreciation of the zloty (the polish currency) and was reflected in the increase of foreign direct investments and a surge in exports. the results could be felt in the social sphere almost immediately. socio-economic tensions in the polish countryside have eased thanks to financial transfers through direct payments to farmers (in the framework of the common agriculture policy). preliminary assessments of the recent enlargement have tended to focus on the economic aspects of the process because these were relatively easy to measure thanks to readily available economic indicators such as the consumer prices index or the unemployment rate. accession-related changes to the polish social policy have not previously been analysed in a more systematic manner.1 in order to fill this gap, this article examines the 1 by comparison, in the 1980s and 1990s copious research was carried out as regards the influence of the european community (eu since 1993) on social policy at the national level. see simon bulmer et al.: 1992, robert geyer et al.: 2000, jonas malmberg: 2004), donald sassoon: 1999, lars trägårdh: 2002, antoni zabalza and zafiris tzannatos: 1985. review of european and russian affairs vol. 1 no. 1 december 2005 © rera 2005 all rights reserved 3 evidence about how and to what extent the welfare state in poland has recently evolved under the influence of the european social model. european social model although the debate over european social policy has been going on for a very long time, there is no consensus about the concrete definition of esm. many experts claim that the historical development of welfare states in europe pushed them in divergent directions; so that it would be a gross misconception to define esm as something more than just a very broad set of values which is shared by all member states. gøsta esping-andersen, known for his typology of “welfare regimes”, distinguished at least three different models of social policy in europe (gøsta esping-andersen: 1990 and pekka kosonen: 1995). the six original members of the european economic community belong to the conservative-corporatist group (france, germany, italy, belgium, luxembourg and, to certain extent, the netherlands). great britain is classified as a case apart, with its social policy having much more in common with the liberal regime represented by the united states than with any other european regime. the third group consists of social-democratic regimes, such as sweden or denmark. to these three clusters some experts add a separate southern european or mediterranean model of welfare (mark kleinman: 2002, p. 33). along with the enlargement of 2004, the question whether the post-communist countries of europe represent another distinctive social policy model has come to the fore. the existing typologies notwithstanding, the notions of the “european social policy” or the “european social area” (l’espace social as jacques delors, the president of the european commission, put it in 1985) are widely used in the political jargon of the european union institutions. these expressions suggest there exists a pan-european model of social policy, which can be compared with other models such as that of the united states. some politicians go even further in referring to esm as the “european welfare state” in statu nascendi a preparatory stage in the long process of evolution toward common social policy of the european union. european social policy has developed in response to political and economic integration, which in turn was partly triggered by such socio-economic factors as globalisation and demographic changes, followed by modifications in the employment structure. it is generally believed that there is a necessity for a holistic, co-ordinated at the european level approach to common challenges such as unemployment, social exclusion or population ageing. in this article, we assume that esm can be analysed at four distinctive levels. first review of european and russian affairs vol. 1 no. 1 december 2005 © rera 2005 all rights reserved 4 and foremost, esm is about values and general rules, which engender a philosophy shared by all member states. second, there is the hard law, i.e. the community-enforced social minimum standards. third, there are the european-level institutional co-operative procedures. last but not least, monetary transfers in the framework of cohesion policy of the eu play an important role in shaping the common european identity in social policy. values and aims embodied by esm are ex definitione of a general and imprecise nature. they are either mentioned explicitly in the treaty establishing the european community or in numerous strategic programmes such as conclusions of the european council summits.2 the social objectives, as laid down in articles 2 and 136 of the treaty establishing the european community, are “improvement of employment, improvement of living and employment conditions, high level of social protection, social dialogue, development of human capital and combating social exclusion” (didier fouarge: 2003, p. 7). according to the european council, which debated this question in barcelona in 2002, esm “is based on good economic performance, a high level of social protection and education and social dialogue” (european commission: 2004, p. 5). esm is also associated with notions of democracy, justice, participation and social cohesion, individual rights, free collective bargaining, market economy, equality of opportunity for all, and solidarity. common ambitions and objectives “not only reflect shared aspirations, but perhaps more precipitously, a common concern with the new risks of social polarization which beset the advanced welfare states in the european union” (anton hemericjk: 2002, p. 19). the european commission perceives social policy as a productive factor, where activities at the european level focus not only on promoting growth, but also promoting quality of life. although the “quality of life” principle does not seem to be properly defined, it points to alternative set of indicators (other than gdp growth rate) to reflect such phenomena as human development or high social efficiency (fouarge didier: 2003, p. 10). 2 in march 2000 the european council adopted the lisbon strategy, an action plan for enhancement of the competitiveness of the european economy. the european council stated explicitly that if the lisbon strategy is implemented, the eu will “become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustained economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion” (european council 2000). in 2002 in barcelona the strategy, hitherto seen as an economic project, was widened to embrace a bigger number of social goals such as inclusion or high level of social protection. a few years earlier, in 1989, eleven european economic community member countries signed the community charter of the fundamental rights of workers (great britain decided for an opt-out), which is another example of the community strategic approach. it is also worth noting that policies of the european union have been heavily influenced by initiatives of the council of europe and other international organisations dealing with social affairs. for example in 1961 member countries of the council of europe signed the european social charter paving the way for various eu activities. review of european and russian affairs vol. 1 no. 1 december 2005 © rera 2005 all rights reserved 5 in areas where the community is given real competence, esm can be considered in more practical terms. the social integration, propelled by the establishment of the european economic community in 1957, was initially a very limited process (due to the lack of power to legislate on the part of the european institutions). the powers of the european community were extended substantially through subsequent revisions of the original treaty – mainly the single european act signed in 1986, the maastricht treaty signed in 1992 and the amsterdam treaty signed in 1997. the amendments changed the voting system in the council from the unanimous agreement to the qualified majority vote in certain areas of social policy (health and safety at work, working conditions, information and consultation of workers, gender equality, integration of persons excluded from the labour market). given the subsidiarity principle, the community does not, however, have extensive powers concerning employment policy, social inclusion or social integration. it does not deal much with healthcare, social care, family policy, education or housing. as far as institutional processes are concerned, european integration started with economics, but it gradually “spilled over” to social policy, politics and public administration. the european union has been described as a “state of courts and technocrats.” at present, given the extent of the economic integration, social affairs are on the agenda of all the major european institutions and bodies. they are assisted by various interest groups, social partners and non-governmental organisations. these actors play an important role as a bridge between national and supra-national social policies. the last aspect of esm is connected to financial transfers in the framework of structural policy, which is the second biggest component of the eu budget. the main policy instrument in the social field is the european social fund (esf). although it was established as early as in 1960, its role only started to become significant by the end of the 1980s. esf provides funding on a major scale via programmes implemented through partnerships of national, regional and local authorities, educational and training institutions, voluntary organisations as well as social partners. the role of esf is to invest in people – to contribute to the development of a skilled, adaptable and mobile workforce. esf “focuses on providing citizens with appropriate work skills as well as developing their social interaction skills, thereby improving their self-confidence and adaptability in the job marketplace” (european commission: 2005). the analysis of the community-influenced changes in the polish social policy must take into account the model of the welfare state in this country before the transition process review of european and russian affairs vol. 1 no. 1 december 2005 © rera 2005 all rights reserved 6 began. it is therefore necessary to present a brief outline of the communist social model that was put into practice in poland between 1945 1989. legacy of the communist social policy model many typologies of the welfare state do not take into account the countries of central eastern europe, as though an active social policy was never pursued in this region of the world. this is clearly wrong. the postcommunist countries deserve special attention because they – contrary to some of their western counterparts – have been subject to ambitious social security and labour market reforms lately. the communist social policy model has been categorised as the “state-collectivist”, “bureaucratic-collectivist” welfare state or “an antiliberal, etatistic, hierarchic socialist policy mix with conservative elements” (mirosław księżopolski: 1999, p. 117). in communism the state played the role of “a stabiliser of societal production and consumption” (kosonen, pekka: 1995, p. 82). the state-collectivist model shared many characteristics with the conservative-corporatist and the social democratic models. communist welfare states resembled social-democratic regimes to the extent that the state was bestowed with a role of a sole provider of all the social benefits and services. moreover, social security provision was built upon the universalistic principle. the “social citizenship” idea was embodied in the universal rights to work and education. the state took up the role of employer of last resort, providing citizens with a guarantee of work. communist countries just like nordic welfare states were “work societies” in the sense that there was a right and an obligation of both men and women to work (kosonen, pekka: 1995, p. 85). the communist model was conservative-corporatist to the extent that social rights were closely linked to employment status as the social insurance system was built upon principles of the bismarckian model. the main difference between market economy-based models and welfare states under soviet tutelage was the means by which the state intervened in the market. in western europe, the state influenced consumption of goods and services considerably, whereas the communist state intervened in the allocation of resources at the stage of production of goods (production of many goods such as dairy products or meat was subsidised by the state). public sector institutions and companies employed surpluses of labour and thus salaries and wages played a role similar to social benefits. there were no unemployment benefits and the social assistance review of european and russian affairs vol. 1 no. 1 december 2005 © rera 2005 all rights reserved 7 system was – as a rule residual. although citizens were provided with a safety net against all major social risks (through entitlements to various benefits) communist welfare states did not try to redistribute incomes on a massive scale. the downfall of communism in 1989 led to a gradual reversal of these polices, deemed as incompatible with a free market economy. as a result, during the 1990s subsequent governments experimented with social policy instruments that had been used in western europe after world war ii. in the context of ongoing economic restructuring, it was extremely difficult for the authorities to keep up high social security standards.3 on december 16, 1991 poland signed the “european agreement”. the treaty establishing association with the european economic community provided for approximation of legislation with community law and co-operation on – among others improving standards of health and safety at work and labour market policy as well as modernisation of the social security system. additionally, it stipulated that community workers legally employed in poland and poles working in the eu should be treated without discrimination on grounds of nationality as regards their working conditions. poland submitted an application for eu membership on april 5, 1994. on march 31, 1999 the accession negotiations started. to assess the influence of the eu in the following paragraphs, we now turn to an overview of specific areas of the polish welfare state. free movement of persons free movement of citizens and labour is closely linked to social policy, because travel and migration goes hand in hand with transfer of social security rights. during the negotiations, poland raised no problems that would necessitate requests for a transitional period or derogations in the negotiation chapter of “free movement of persons” (apart from minor aspects of co-ordination of social security systems). on the day of accession, poland joined the european employment services system (eures). to a certain extent, it has given a much needed development boost to polish labour market policy. organisational activities included development of the national internet portal, hardware and software investments in 3 during the early 1990s poland and other postcommunist countries were not so unique in experiencing structural problems leading to reorganisation of the welfare state. developed countries went through a painful process of transformation to the “postfordist” model of capitalism. with mass production companies in crisis and markets for mass-consumer durables saturated, social security systems came under financial strain. in response to the welfare crisis, social policies underwent significant reforms embracing the arguments of the new public management proponents. mots de jour were “market-type mechanisms” in social policy (quasi-markets, review of european and russian affairs vol. 1 no. 1 december 2005 © rera 2005 all rights reserved 8 job centres as well as information campaigns for employers and job-seekers. since the accession, services provided by voivodship and poviat4 labour offices have been supplemented by eures services. counsellors and assistants who started to be part of the eures network were suddenly confronted with more the customer-friendly and responsive attitudes of their western counterparts. more frequently, set against the more business-like approach in the labour offices in the “old” member states, polish labour institutions took to active and innovative ways by taking part in local job fairs and regularly sending promotional materials to social partners. there are several european directives concerning right of residence of different groups workers, employees, entrepreneurs, persons who have ceased their occupational activity, and students in the eu territory. they stipulate conditions for the issuance of permanent residence permits by member states to intra-community migrants and their family members. prior to the accession, poland acknowledged the rights of the above mentioned categories of persons to enter and stay in poland under conditions stipulated in the directives. by 2004, eu nationals as well as their family members were granted the right to take up and pursue an occupation without the obligation to obtain a work permit.5 additionally, they were given the possibility of receiving, under certain conditions, unemployment benefits. all in all, minor modifications apart, the polish social security system was not affected through legislative and administrative changes in this respect. during the negotiations, the european commission put much pressure on poland to introduce measures to ensure that all its professionals would after the accession meet all the requirements laid down in the directives. the commission’s view reflected the anxieties of the national governments that underqualified professionals from “new” member states would come in floods to settle down in the “old” member states and lower the professional vouchers, user fees, etc.). another facet of the ideological shift was a shift from “nanny state” toward “workfare state”. 4 polish administrative structure is based on three levels of government: voivodships (“województwa” -16 regions), poviats (“powiaty”) and counties (“gminy”). 5 this right applied only to citizens of these member states, which opened their labour markets to polish citizens. this article deals only with implications of the eu enlargement on the polish welfare state, without getting into the subject of “new” member states’ influence on eu15. it is important to note however that negotiations in the chapter of “free movement of persons” were concluded in 2001 only after a hot and fiery debate. with the unemployment rate on the rise, some “old” member states were extremely reluctant to open their labour markets to poorer and more cost-competitive newcomers. in the framework of the transitional arrangement agreed by the two parties, restrictions on the movement of workers from poland to the eu apply for a minimum two-year period as of the date of accession and may remain in place for a maximum of seven years. additionally, some eu15 countries were afraid of the inflow of migrants whose social security entitlements would put the national budgets under strain. there were even some tendencies to replace transfers with direct services and to replace the beveridge insurance models with the bismarck-type ones. review of european and russian affairs vol. 1 no. 1 december 2005 © rera 2005 all rights reserved 9 standards in the single market. the requirement of polish citizenship was abolished, wherever it was a precondition for the performance of a profession. the general system for the recognition of qualifications was implemented through amendments of all laws regulating the conditions for the exercise of professions to which the ‘general directives’ apply.6 the list of regulated professions was prepared by the polish authorities and handed over to the european commission. special measures were taken in regard to certain professions – lawyers, nurses, midwives, doctors, dentists, veterinary surgeons, architects and pharmacists. in the case of dentists, a polish system of professional qualifications had to be reconstructed, because the official titles in poland and other member states did not correspond to each other. as the european commission put it in 2002, “shortcomings have been identified in the curricula and training of nurses and midwives” (european commission: 2002, p. 53). not until the copenhagen summit in december 2002 was the problem of the qualifications of polish nurses and midwives resolved. shortly before the accession, polish authorities expressed anxiety that intercommunity migrations would have a negative impact on the financial stability of the social security system. there were fears that the newly reformed healthcare and social security systems might not reach adequate financial stability to be able to fully participate in the community co-ordination of social security systems. there was debate among experts in the government over whether to apply for a transitional period concerning financial transfers as regards the co-ordination of healthcare systems. in order to reduce the size of future financial transfers, polish authorities undertook bilateral negotiations to complete waiver agreements with other member states. particularly important is the fact that poland successfully improved its administrative capacity to apply detailed co-ordination rules in co-operation with other countries, although a lot of preparation, staffing and training was needed before the accession. belatedly, in 2002, a computer system was set up in the social insurance institution (zakład ubezpieczeń społecznych – zus). some issues connected with free movement of persons are of secondary importance to social policy. for example, european citizenship, which is derivative from nationality in a eu member state, has more symbolic than real significance. european citizens are entitled to vote and stand as candidates in elections to the european parliament in any member state in which they reside. the right to vote and stand as a candidate applies also to municipal elections. voting rights were conferred to eu citizens in poland through amendment of the election law. 6 council directive 89/48/eec and council directive 92/51/eec. review of european and russian affairs vol. 1 no. 1 december 2005 © rera 2005 all rights reserved 10 labour law the community labour law consists of a complex set of regulations dealing with various aspects of employment such as non-discrimination, industrial relations or health and safety at work. it often deals with very specific and narrow issues such as safety and health requirements at temporary or mobile construction sites or surface and underground mineralextracting industries. protection of workers is mainly about technicalities, e.g. protective measures in the workplace (work equipment, manual handling of heavy loads, exposure to noise or different chemical and biological substances, work with display screen monitors etc.). these standards include the rights and duties of workers and employers as well as the obligations of the state. the purpose of social directives is to ensure sufficient minimum standards in all the member states. the transposition of the acquis communautaire to the polish legal environment proceeded rather smoothly thanks to extensive subsequent revisions of the labour code of june 26, 1974 and other laws (e.g. anti-discrimination regulations) or issuing new regulations (health and safety). as early as july 1997, the european commission stated that “the measures introduced by poland in the area of labour law nearly bring their legislative situation in line with the eu” (european commission: 1997, p. 87). this is when social standards concerning the working time, safety and hygiene, protection of juveniles at work, part-time, temporary and posted workers were introduced. before the accession process began, the polish labour code did not contain any specific measures to fight discrimination in employment. the term of “equality at work” started to be interpreted broadly, so that social insurance, salaries and wages, access to employment, and burden of proof in sex discrimination cases are included. in 2001, rules of equal pay, equal access to employment, professional training, promotion, working conditions were established (european commission: 1997, p. 87). the rights of self-employed women were also recognised. occupational health and safety of female workers who are pregnant or recently gave birth or are breast-feeding was enhanced. the right to parental leave was extended to fathers. despite all these amendments the non-discrimination principle was not in the eyes of the commission fully respected in poland (european commission: 1997, p. 87). the commission pointed to the disparities in pay based on gender. in october 2001 poland, urged by the european commission, established the government plenipotentiary for equal status of women and men. review of european and russian affairs vol. 1 no. 1 december 2005 © rera 2005 all rights reserved 11 sometimes difficulties in the process of approximation of laws do not refer to high costs but technical issues changing definitions, measures, indicators etc. for example, assuring compliance with high hygienic safety standards in medical facilities turned out to be expensive. purchase of new equipment was a big one-time cost, especially for the healthcare providers, given that before the accession medical equipment (used to protect workers from exposure to biological agents) was in poor condition. poland obtained only one transition period in the chapter of “employment and social affairs”, i.e. in regard to machinery in operation in businesses.7 the polish authorities did not question the usefulness of the directive as such, appreciating its importance in ensuring safety of workers and creating the best possible protection of their health. there was a widely shared view, however, that rapid implementation of the directive might bring about cumulative increase of expenses, especially as far as small and medium sized enterprises were concerned. this would in turn have led to a decrease in their competitiveness and could have undermined their ability to operate in the single market. according to the agreement with the european commission, new equipment installed in all businesses after december 31, 2002 would have to meet the requirements of the directive. in regard to equipment already operative in businesses by december 31, 2002 a three-year transition period started to be applied until december 31, 2005. during this period such equipment was allowed to operate in businesses. as regards the legal issues, there is another aspect that needs to be mentioned here. in the beginning of the accession process, polish authorities were tempted to retain provisions restricting the social security entitlements so that only polish citizens would be eligible, or stating that benefits could only be consumed within their own territory. the fact that the european court of justice proved to be insistent in the matter of interpretation of the community regulations was a decisive factor in reshaping the polish social security system into compliance with acquis communautaire. the polish authorities had to accept the fact that they were not allowed to offer minimum unemployment or pension benefits to their own citizens without extending these rights to other eu nationals who also worked in the country. social dialogue and the institutional framework another important area of the european social policy is social dialogue. the treaty establishing the european community vested the commission with powers to undertake 7 council directive 89/655/eec. review of european and russian affairs vol. 1 no. 1 december 2005 © rera 2005 all rights reserved 12 measures to develop a dialogue between employers and employees at the european level. the amsterdam treaty sanctioned a legislative path whereby social partners are allowed to conclude legally binding agreements. during the accession negotiations this issue was uncontroversial – the polish government expressed support for the idea of social dialogue and declared readiness to engage polish representatives in all forums of discussion between employers and employees. following the provisions of the european agreement, poland further developed institutions of social dialogue. in the early 1990s employer and employee organisations struggled to forge a consensus-based approach through engagement in tripartite negotiations (with the participation of the government). in 1997 the european commission criticised poland for the lack of a division of labour between social partners and the government. it pointed to the fact that employers were often represented by public companies so that differences between respective parties (employers and the government) got blurred. the community requirements concerning protection of employees in cases of collective redundancies, transfer of enterprises, employers’ insolvency and functioning of european work councils in poland were introduced without difficulty. duty to inform employees on the conditions of the labour contract or labour relationship was imposed on employers. in 2001 the lower chamber of the polish parliament (sejm) enacted the law on the tripartite commission for social and economic issues. at the regional level the voivodship commissions for social dialogue started to operate in june 2002. special task-groups were set up involving representatives of central and local government, sejm, social partners and ngos. since the accession, social partners have been having their say in the distribution of the community financial support in poland. thus the new political framework was created. at the european level, representatives of the polish government and the public administration joined various co-operative bodies such as the committee for occupational exposure limits to chemical agents, the committee of senior labour inspectors and the mines safety commission. one of the major policy exchange forums that poland joined was the european foundation for the improvement of living and working conditions (the so called foundation of dublin). the foundation offers the possibility for the exchange of information, experience and documentation concerning such areas as health and safety at work and organisation of work. moreover, poland acquired member status in different forums of social dialogue sensu stricto at the community level: the standing committee on employment, sectoral joint committees concerning such areas as fisheries, agriculture, inland navigation, railways, road review of european and russian affairs vol. 1 no. 1 december 2005 © rera 2005 all rights reserved 13 transport, maritime transport, civil aviation, telecommunications services, as well as postal services. the process of integration in the field of social dialogue proved to be difficult for social partners in poland. it soon became evident that social policy issues, just like any other matters, are discussed at the community level through procedures and habits that had evolved over the years. “policy-making in the eu is complex, involving co-operation between different levels. policy networks involving private interest groups and scientific and technical expertise are important. informal processes and informal agreements often precede formal (council of the eu) policy-making, with a network of the eu and national agencies administering the outcome” (mark kleinman: 2002, p. 107). the european commission expressed a view on several occasions that, given the numbers of communicable diseases, poland needs to significantly improve its healthcare (european commission: 1997, p. 86). in general, in the 1990s health condition of the polish population were significantly lower than the eu average. polish participation in numerous community action programs (prevention of aids and other communicable diseases, drug addiction, combating cancer etc.) did not raise any fundamental issues for the polish social policy. council directives concerning labelling of tobacco products and tar yield in cigarettes were quickly transposed to the polish legal environment. poland developed a health monitoring system, so that many detailed health indicators, as of accession, started to be comparable with the rest of member states. as the eu15 would be easily affected by the potential failures of poland to introduce the community standards, the european commission put much pressure on outbreak management, systematic vigilance, greater data analysis, laboratory capability strengthening, data confidentiality, rapid response capability and implementation of community case definitions (european commission: 1997, p. 86). economic integration and the common currency in the contemporary world social issues get increasingly interwoven with economic ones. this tight connection is particularly visible as far as the european monetary union (emu) is concerned. once monetary policies are integrated at the european level, the financial basis of national welfare state cannot possibly remain unaffected.8 the ongoing 8 several authors point out that emu reduces incentives to reform the labour market, because at this level of economic integration, burden of reforms in one member state can be shifted onto other member states. some countries spill over their inefficiencies to others (free-riding) (luisa corrado et al.: 2003, p. 43). review of european and russian affairs vol. 1 no. 1 december 2005 © rera 2005 all rights reserved 14 liberalisation, which is triggered by the common currency, leads to a tax competition which, under certain circumstances, may result in the “race to the bottom”. (anton hemericjk: 2002, p. 11). current debate about the “delocalisation” reflects the social and economic consequences of the establishment of the single market in 1992. high-tax countries with overregulated labour markets seem to be most affected by this phenomenon. according to estimates of the polish national bank, poland will join emu in 2011. poland has however been bound by tight fiscal rules even before joining the eurozone (constraint of three percent of gdp for the budget deficit and sixty percent for the public debt). on several occasions the european commission urged poland to trim its fiscal deficit. if poland is to meet maastricht convergence criteria soon, its social security system must be put on a more sound financial footing. it entails less ambitious social programmes in the short term and a totally different philosophy of the welfare state in the longer term. this kind of thinking resembles the rhetoric of “third way” politicians in great britain who advocate merits of the “social investment state”, which merges fiscal responsibility and ambitious social aims into a distinctive policy-mix, characterised by lower but better-targeted social expenditure. the keynesian welfare state with public deficit-financed social investments has been ruled out through the stability and growth pact regulations. furthermore, emu might stimulate a radical shift in collective bargaining from the national to the community level (mark kleinman: 2002, p. 147-148). effective social dialogue can only be carried out in countries with either very decentralised wage bargaining structures (usa), or very centralised ones (sweden). once the european monetary union is in force “centralised bargaining at the national level becomes equivalent to decentralised bargaining at the continental level, and hence less beneficial to employment performance” (mark kleinman: 2002, p. 148). thus the monetary integration will lead either to europeanlevel bargaining (unlikely given the differences in productivity across european countries) or more decentralised systems of wage determination. when poland joins emu it is improbable that national-level bargaining procedures will remain unaffected. employment and social inclusion policies in recent years the european union has been busy taking up initiatives in employment policy that proceeded in parallel to the labour law harmonisation. the chief instrument for promotion of cohesive employment policies was given a name of the “luxembourg process”. review of european and russian affairs vol. 1 no. 1 december 2005 © rera 2005 all rights reserved 15 four pillars of the european employment strategy were established: increased employability; development of business adaptability to new market requirements; development of entrepreneurship; and ensuring equal opportunities for women and men in the labour market. given the macroeconomic context, the polish labour market policy is doomed to have different priorities from other member states for years to come. in the 1990s and 2000s it was heavily influenced by an alarmingly high unemployment rate (reaching 18 percent in 2005), structural inefficiencies in agriculture and industry, deeply entrenched gender inequalities, and low productivity. at the same time there was a rapid increase in the size of the productive-age population. restructuring of several industries and somewhat different demographic challenges called for a different approach to labour market policy. under these circumstances, it is understandable that some priorities were valued differently. notwithstanding its difficult socio-economic situation, poland did genuinely try to adapt its labour market policy to the recommendations voiced by the european commission. on january 29, 2001, poland and the european commission signed an agreement to accelerate reform of employment systems in preparation for enlargement. the agreement committed the polish authorities to a set of common labour market objectives and established channels of cooperation for both parties to assess progress on a regular basis.9 the commission pointed to three priority areas for action by poland: first, education and professional training (life-long learning, reform of the general education system); second, strengthening of public employment services; and third, tax and social security reform. throughout the 1990s, the european commission continued to push the polish government to develop a regionalised employment service structure to handle active labour market policy (european commission: 1997, p. 86). as far as macroeconomic policies are concerned, the polish authorities were urged to reduce the tax burden on low incomes and reform the system of pre-retirement payments. in 2004, prior to the accession, poland adopted the national action plan for employment (nap), the main programmatic document in the framework of the european employment strategy presenting a “roadmap” for the polish labour market policy over the next couple of years. nap was the chief means by which 9 anna diamontopolou, eu commissioner for employment and social affairs said on the occasion of signing the agreement: “(...) lisbon [agenda] set the goal of full employment in the eu as the key aim of economic and social policy. the commission is already pushing ahead to make this vision a reality. we invite poland and the other candidate countries to share this vision and to help transform it into reality in an enlarged eu. we are all in the same boat: the process of economic and social transition is not limited to the candidate countries. central to the transition is a sound response to the challenge confronting employment policy and labour markets. european commission, poland and commission sign agreement to accelerate reform of employment systems in preparation for enlargement; press release (brussels, january 21 2001). review of european and russian affairs vol. 1 no. 1 december 2005 © rera 2005 all rights reserved 16 poland sought to implement the european employment guidelines formulated in the decision of the council.10 according to nap, polish employment priorities were the following: (ministry of economy and labour: 2004, p. 4): 1. curbing the institutional barriers for creation of employment opportunities through increased access to quality services of labour market institutions, support for adaptability of enterprises (especially those of small and medium enterprises), as well as promotion of activities enhancing the attractiveness of employment. 2. development of active labour market policies at the regional and local level, supported by effective implementation of sectoral and regional operational programmes. 3. occupational activation of disadvantaged unemployed persons, in particular by means of training as well as vocational and general development. 4. strengthening institutional co-ordination and enhancing the transparency of decisionmaking. as for the first priority, it has already been mentioned that, throughout the first year of membership, there has been a steady improvement in the quality of services of labour market institutions in poland. it is estimated that quantitative and qualitative support for the labour offices staff will grow further in the following years ((ministry of economy and labour: 2004, p. 12). public investments were coupled with the promotion of non-public labour market institutions (mainly job agencies). the polish government tried to eliminate rigidities and institutional barriers to business such as tax wedges, an inflexible labour code, or unemployment trap. the authorities developed a more coherent system of business services and financial support for small and medium enterprises (covering expenditures for upgrading machinery and equipment, cost of research and development as well as implementation of innovative technologies). access to external sources of financing investments for business was fostered through changes in the loan and guarantee fund system. thanks to the eu cofinanced integrated operational programme for regional development a network of training centres for business start-ups was established. even if all these initiatives bear fruit in the long term, they do reflect an important shift of the polish welfare state towards a business-oriented approach in public activities. as regards the second priority, in recent years, polish labour market policy has been overhauled to respond to the commission’s recommendations. instruments such as 10 council decision of july 22, 2003 (2003/578/ec). review of european and russian affairs vol. 1 no. 1 december 2005 © rera 2005 all rights reserved 17 apprenticeships, internships, active job placements, self-employment, and voluntary work have become used more widely. polish labour market institutions started to pay attention to the unemployed having appropriate professional qualifications, including job-seeking skills. the youth was given priority, especially in the vocational training policy. the voluntary labour corps (a governmental youth activation unit) was reformed so that young people could become better prepared for the exigencies of the market. the labour market policy and the education system started to be more closely interlinked, to reflect common goals of human capital development and lifelong learning. in 2005 the government (in co-operation with social partners, sectoral organisations and education authorities) began systematic research in order to set standards for specific vocational qualifications. important preparatory steps were taken to create an electronic network of regional educational institutions and distance-learning centres. as far as the third priority is concerned, concrete measures were adopted to target sources of social exclusion more efficiently by reaching out to people with low levels of education, disabled, women and ethnic minorities. social assistance system was reformed in march 2004 when “social contracts” were introduced, i.e. agreements between social officers and recipients of assistance laying down the obligations of both parties. the “welfare-towork” governmental approach became visible as the unemployed recipients of social assistance were offered professional training programmes and were given responsibility for actively seeking work. at present, people on assistance benefits who have refused to take up employment on offer become ineligible for social assistance. moreover, the pre-retirement benefits system was retrenched in order to reduce professional de-activation of elderly workers. the new approach of the polish welfare state to the socially-disadvantaged groups is fully reflected in the gender equality policy. projects co-financed by esf helped to disseminate information concerning flexible forms of employment (to promote reconciliation of professional and family life) among women workers. non-governmental organisations and employers were given resources to fight discrimination at work. the public authorities promoted knowledge and legal awareness concerning anti-discrimination law provisions protecting women. people with disabilities were given special attention through instruments aiming to raise their employability.11 a lot of effort was made to minimise the effects of 11 for example, according to the national action plan for employment for 2005, activities carried out until 2006 will have covered 21 thousand people with a considerable and moderate degree of disability. it is assumed that review of european and russian affairs vol. 1 no. 1 december 2005 © rera 2005 all rights reserved 18 stereotypes and prejudice towards disabled persons. the law on social employment passed in june of 2003 provided for the creation of social integration centres, assisting people returning to (or entering) the open labour market. poland, urged by the european commission, paid special attention to members of the roma community, who were considered to be particularly at risk of social exclusion. the roma-targeted measures included training, vocational workshops, subsidised employment and accompanying activities such as childcare. as for the fourth priority, one needs to once more emphasise the fact that the national action plan for employment is a product of co-operation between ministries and central government offices and various social, economic and self-governmental partners. the importance of the tripartite commission for social and economic issues or the joint commission of the government and territorial self-government grew considerably. given the cyclical character of the peer pressure mechanism, the consultation procedures became a permanent feature of the administrative procedures. the polish government, having developed nap, made a significant leap forward as far as the programming of polish employment policy is concerned. new instruments such as the labour demand forecasting system (ldfs) were introduced. nap provided a tool to monitor occupational fluctuations in the national and regional labour markets. thanks to financial resources from the eu cofinanced sectoral operational programme, “human resources development” research was launched to develop an analytical methodology for labour market planning and forecasting. the open method of co-ordination is not limited to employment policies. the member states use this mechanism of peer pressure in the field of pensions (covered in the next section) as well as social inclusion and the fight against poverty. as for the latter, poland, even as a candidate country, had gradually been invited to participate in the process since 2001 by means of a joint co-operation exercise. the polish statistics concerning poverty and social exclusion have been adjusted to eurostat methodology. the polish government was put under pressure to develop a national, integrated strategy on promoting social inclusion, taking into account eu objectives.12 15-20 percent of the disabled will continue education or find employment after completion of activation programmes offered by labour offices (ministry of economy and labour: 2004, p. 38). 12 “as poverty and social exclusion are multi-dimensional by nature, it is important to promote an integrated approach mobilising various governmental bodies and all relevant stakeholders in the process” (european commission: 2002, p. 88). review of european and russian affairs vol. 1 no. 1 december 2005 © rera 2005 all rights reserved 19 employment and social inclusion policies have been given additional resources from the budget of the european union. the influence of financial transfers from the eu (preaccession funds, structural funds) has already been substantial and according to estimates it will grow in the coming years. in the years 2004-2006 poland will have received 13,549 billion eur in total. 3,894 billion eur will come from the structural funds. the community support from the european social fund will amount to 1,749 billion eur (ministerstwo gospodarki: 2004). in order to absorb these resources a lot of preparatory work has been involved for the polish administration. the polish government had to set the criteria for selection of projects to be financed under the sectoral operational programme “human resources development” and allot particular tasks to various intermediate bodies such as the ministry of education and sport and the voivodship labour offices. some degree of rationalisation of public social expenditure had to take place in order to meet the criteria for community support.13 pensions the accession to the european union brought few direct changes to the polish pension system. the only novelty was to include poland in the community co-ordination of social security systems. since may 1, 2004 poland has been obliged to transfer pension benefits to other member states if a person who had worked in poland moves to live in another eu country. the co-ordination is a big challenge as far as the administrative costs and preparatory procedures are concerned. more importantly, in recent years the european union has exerted a growing influence over strategic choices for the future of the polish pension system. in 2001, common objectives for pension system reform were adopted at the european level. the objectives were grouped around three key priorities: adequacy, sustainability and modernisation. adequacy is mainly about prevention of social exclusion in old age, maintenance of living standards for pensioners and solidarity between generations. sustainability has to do with co-ordination of pensions with labour market policy, active ageing strategies and sound public finances. modernisation has to do with making pension systems more responsive to social and economic change through more efficient institutional 13 a radical improvement of the effectiveness of public employment services was a prerequisite for absorption of the european social fund resources. the new law concerning employment promotion and labour market institutions of april 20, 2004 imposed on the minister of labour an obligation to formulate standards of labour market services and introduced the requirement of receiving licenses by public employment service employees – job placement officers and vocational counsellors. review of european and russian affairs vol. 1 no. 1 december 2005 © rera 2005 all rights reserved 20 arrangements. in 2002 member states provided the european commission with reports on national pension strategies (poland was not included as a candidate country). in 2003 the european commission and the european council prepared jointly the analysis of developments in the member states. in 2005 the member states (poland included) submitted updated national strategy reports (nsr). given the intergovernmental character of the european initiatives, the peer pressure mechanism did not pose an immediate obligation to adopt policies prescribed by the european commission. moreover, specific measures of meeting common objectives were not determined at the european level. there are, however, some implications for the polish pension system. firstly, the european union provided poland with the methodological basis for efficient monitoring of pension reforms and policies, through a set of indicators comparable with other member states. secondly, certain policy prescriptions seem to have spilled over to the national agenda (social protection committee: 2005, p. 2). since the accession there have been efforts in poland to eliminate these forms of unequal treatment between men and women that are entrenched in the pension system (retirement age, survivors’ benefits, special advantages for raising children, mortality tables used for calculation of benefits). thirdly, poland made a significant leap forward as far as the programming of pension reform agenda is concerned. for example the nsr commitments put the polish authorities under obligation to discuss the likely evolution of incomes for the elderly, taking into account the employment histories of future pensioners, demographic developments and envisaged ongoing reforms in the pension system (social protection committee: 2005, p. 6). national policy-makers were able to acquire a better understanding of the strengths (better demographic situation) and weaknesses (high level of profession deactivation) of poland in a european perspective. european social model – conclusions a broad overview of eu-influenced changes to the polish social policy gives credence to the experts’ broad interpretation of the term “european social model”. there is more to the european social model than white papers, slogans and declarations. it seems justified, when referring to esm, to include not only general values and objectives, but also legally sanctioned social standards, administrative procedures and financial transfers via the european social fund. some of the effects on the social policy in poland are hardly measurable. for example, practical day-to-day administrative and institutional co-operation of review of european and russian affairs vol. 1 no. 1 december 2005 © rera 2005 all rights reserved 21 poland with the eu and other member states helped to foster a new political framework with a bigger involvement of social partners. all in all, it seems that the polish social policy has been affected most by esf operating principles (programming procedures, necessary institutional arrangements) at the operational level. the esf co-financed investments in poland would not be possible but for national integrated strategies in the fields of social inclusion, employment and public health. these strategies take into account the eu objectives. fiscal and monetary aspects of the european integration have had a visible impact on national welfare states, although poland does not seem to have been affected very much during the first year of membership. the principle of fiscal restraint does not necessarily push “new” member states into the welcoming arms of neoliberals advocating retrenchment of the welfare state towards american-style residual social policy. when joining the eu, the central-eastern countries were integrated into many community initiatives in the field of social integration and combating poverty. the case of poland shows clearly that the eupromoted idea of social justice appeals more fully to the central-eastern europeans than toward american-style liberal welfare states. this is especially visible in the context of popular attitudes and political decision-making procedures where bargaining, coalitionbuilding and consensus are the standard rules. the tangible substance of esm is visible in peripheral areas such as gender equality or health and safety at work. the eu initiatives contribute to building a network of organisations that are important players at the national level, affecting the context of national social policy. the traditional welfare state is hollowed out in two respects: on the one hand, european institutions pursue their autonomously formulated agenda; on the other, the subsidiarity principle is an effective tool for empowerment of various non-governmental bodies and interest groups. in conclusion, it is necessary to bring up another aspect of poland’s social integration with the european union. recently, there have been numerous discussions at the european level about fundamental goals and practical means for an effective modern social policy. given the economic problems of countries representing the continental model of the welfare state, some experts suggest that a new l’europe à l’anglo-saxonne is being born. set against the drastic polarisation of visions of social europe between “neoliberals” and “etatists”, the political stance of “new” member states on welfare reform becomes of crucial importance. to what extent has the polish accession changed the balance of power between the existing review of european and russian affairs vol. 1 no. 1 december 2005 © rera 2005 all rights reserved 22 visions of reform in europe? it is too early to answer this question in a decisive manner. given the volatile political situation in europe, the question as to whether there will be a shift toward a “european welfare state” in the future remains open. the case of poland, however, has shown beyond doubt that the notion of “social europe” cannot be simply dismissed as an empty, meaningless ideology. bibliography aiginger, karl. “the new european model of the reformed welfare state (new-rms)”. european working paper, stanford university. 2/2002, http://www.wifo.ac.at/karl.aiginger/publications/2002/nem-rws.pdf. (accessed 12 january 2006). bulmer, simon and stephen george and andrew scott (eds). the united kingdom and ec membership evaluated. (new york: st. martin's press, 1992). corrado, luisa and david londoño and francesco mennini and giovanni trovato, "the welfare states in a united europe". european political economy review 1(1): 040-055 (2003). database on-line, http://aei.pitt.edu/archive/00000630/, (accessed 12 january 2006). drop, agnieszka and tomasz czyszek, (eds). poland’s position papers for the accession negotiations with the european union. government plenipotentiary for poland’s accession negotiations to the european union. (warsaw: chancellery of the prime minister of the republic of poland, 2000). esping-andersen, gøsta. the three worlds of welfare capitalism. (cambridge: polity press, 1990). european commission. european social policy: a way forward for the union. brussels, 1994. the white paper, http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/cha/c10112.htm. (accessed 12 january 2006). european commission, ministry of labour and social policy of poland. joint assessment of employment priorities in poland. warsaw 2001. http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/employment_analysis/japs/poland_en.pdf. (accessed 16 january 2006). review of european and russian affairs vol. 1 no. 1 december 2005 © rera 2005 all rights reserved 23 european commission. introducing european social fund. www://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_soc.../introduction-en.htm. (accessed 16 august 2005). european commission. opinion on poland’s application for membership of the european union. brussels 1997. http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/dwn/opinions/poland/po-open.pdf. (accessed 16 january 2006). european commission. poland and commission sign agreement to accelerate reform of employment systems in preparation for enlargement. press release. brussels, january 21 2001. http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressreleasesaction.do?reference=ip/01/127&format=html&age d=1&language=en&guilanguage=en. (accessed 16 january 2006). european commission. regular report on poland’s progress towards accession. brussels 2002. http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report2002/pl_en.pdf. (accessed 16 january 2006). european commission. report of the high level group on the future of social policy in an enlarged european union. brussels 2004. http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/publications/2005/ke6104202_en.html. (accessed 16 january 2006). european commission. study on the social protection systems in the 13 applicant countries. poland – country study. brussels 2003. http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/social_protection/docs/poland_final.pdf. (accessed 16 january 2006). european council. presidency conclusions. lisbon european council, 23-24 march 2002. http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/00100-r1.en0.htm. (accessed 16 january 2006). ferrera, mauricio and anton hemerijck and martin rhodes. “the future of the european “social model” in the global economy”. journal of comparative policy analysis: research and practice. 3/2001. fouarge didier. costs of non-social policy: towards an economic framework of quality social policies – and the costs of not having them. brussels 2003. http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/news/2003/jan/costofnonsoc_final_en.pdf. (accessed 16 january 2006). review of european and russian affairs vol. 1 no. 1 december 2005 © rera 2005 all rights reserved 24 geyer, robert and christine ingebritsen and jonathon moses (eds). globalization, europeanization and the end of scandinavian social democracy?. (hampshire: macmillan, 2000). hemericjk, anton. the self-transformation of the european social model(s). in gøsta esping-andersen, ed. why we need a new welfare state. (london: oxford university press, 2002). hykawy, rafał, ed. polska w unii europejskiej – doświadczenia pierwszego roku członkostwa. (warsaw: urząd komitetu integracji europejskiej, 2004). kleinman, mark. a european welfare state? european union social policy in context. (london: macmillan, 2002). kosonen, pekka. “european welfare state models: converging trends”. international journal of sociology, no. 25:1/1995. księżopolski, mirosław. polityka społeczna – wybrane problemy porównań międzynarodowych. (katowice: wydawnictwo naukowe śląsk, 1999). leibfried, stephan. towards an european welfare state? on integrating poverty regimes in the european community. university of bremen, zes-arbeitspapier no. 2/1991. malmberg, jonas. „effective enforcement of ec labour law – a comparative analysis of community law requirements for national laws on procedures and sanctions”. european journal of industrial relations, no. 10/2004. ministerstwo gospodarki, pracy i polityki społecznej. narodowy plan rozwoju – podstawowe informacje. warszawa 2004. http://www.npr.gov.pl/nr/rdonlyres/a789fe725d77-49b9-9964-b1bb7cfe7f79/0/nprpodstawoweinformacje.pdf, (accessed 20 january 2006). ministry of economy and labour. national action plan for employment for 2005. warsaw 2004. http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/employment_strategy/nap_2004/nap2004 pl_en.pdf. (accessed 16 january 2006). office of the committee for european integration. poland’s position on mid-term review of the lisbon strategy. (paper presented at the spring european council, brussels, 22-23 march 2005). review of european and russian affairs vol. 1 no. 1 december 2005 © rera 2005 all rights reserved 25 pierson, paul and stephen leibfried, eds. fragmented social policy: the european union's social dimension in comparative perspective, (washington: brookings institution, 1995). sassoon, donald. european social democracy and new labour: unity or diversity?. in andrew gamble and tony wright, eds. the new social democracy. (london: blackwell, 1999). social protection committee, economic policy committee. preparation of the 2005 national strategy reports on adequate and sustainable pensions. guidance note prepared by the commission and endorsed by the social protection and economic policy committees, brussels, 2005. europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/ social_protection/docs/outline_en.pdf. (accessed 16 january 2006). trägårdh, lars. sweden and the eu. welfare state nationalism and the spectre of ‘europe’. in lene hansen and ole waever, eds. european integration and national identity. the challenge of the nordic states. (london: taylor & francis, 2002). zabalza, antoni and zafiris tzannatos. women and equal pay. the effects of legislation on female employment and wages in britain. (london: cambridge university press, 1985). joan debardeleben and lyubov zhyznomirska_volume 4_issue 1 review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved ………………………………………………………………… external influences on domestic reforms in post-communist european countries joan debardeleben and lyubov zhyznomirska review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 2 three articles in this special issue of the review of european and russian affairs address the complex interaction of domestic politics and international influence as a source of the reform processes in eastern european countries. patricia young and nikolas rajkovic critically assess the literature on conditionality and compliance politics based on the case studies of romania and serbia respectively. in turn, frederick peters interrogates how ideological shifts in the modes of capitalist accumulation at the global level change the balance between the private and public at the local level of supply of social needs in post-communist countries of estonia and russia. what the authors convincingly show is that political and economic processes at the domestic and international levels do not exist in isolation from each other but are closely interlinked and interdependent. as international organizations, be it the european union or international financial institutions (ifis), and the conditionality they impose affect the reform processes in a particular country or region, the analysis of the effectiveness of their conditionalities and what reforms and processes they evoke at the national/local levels needs to be sensitive to the domestic context of compliance politics. it should also reveal the interests served and ideologies supported in promoting a particular type of political/economic/social change at the local level. while the european union may be effective in evoking political and economic reforms by imposing conditionality clauses during the accession negotiations, the analysis of the effectiveness of this conditionality requires more than just the analysis of whether the eu has succeeded in extracting compliance. in democratic and market governance in romania: between domestic politics and eu accession, patricia young evaluates the quality of institutions created as the result of the political and economic reforms in romania (required by the eu accession negotiations in 2000-2004 and pre-accession monitoring in 2004-2006) in order to assess the effectiveness of eu conditionality to institutionalize and deepen new review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 3 democratic governance rules in eastern europe. young argues that real reforms in political and economic governance cannot be undertaken only by adopting the ‘right’ laws based on european values and principles. she suggests differentiating between the passage of legislation and its consequent implementation, and giving more attention to the effects of the lack of political will to implement the adopted reforms. young also compares eu conditionality in the realms of political and market governance reforms and concludes that economic reforms required by the european commission as part of accession conditionality “do not appear to have suffered from the same political interference as the political governance reforms.” nevertheless, young notes the existing disconnect between economic laws on the books and in practice and observes that market governance efficiency continues to be impaired by corruption and a politically dependent judiciary. as a result, despite the successes of the eu in promoting economic and political reforms in romania during accession negotiations, young convincingly argues that the effectiveness of the legislated reforms is yet to be proven. in the limits of consequentialism: icty conditionality and (non)compliance in postmilosevic serbia, nikolas milan rajkovic challenges the capacity of a rational-consequentialist approach, dominant in the literature on compliance politics, to account for the changing pattern of compliance and non-compliance with the international criminal tribunal on the former yugoslavia (icty) conditionality by serbian governments since the year 2000. rajkovic suggests that the explanatory power of a rational-consequentialist model is limited because it gives priority to material incentives but downplays the importance of normative and temporal aspects of conditionality and compliance process. he suggests that the quality of prescribed norms and rules that “attempt far-reaching institutional and social change” can trigger review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 4 multidimensional and politically complex historical processes, and these processes cannot be accounted for by the rationalist model. instead, rajkovic calls for “a more contextual way of studying compliance politics” that would allow to uncover “the unique material, normative and temporal dimensions of compliance politics and practice.” to demonstrate the limits of the rationalist model and sketch some alternatives, rajkovic utilizes inductive process-tracing to study icty compliance during the kostunica government in serbia in 2004-2007. he focuses on such dimensions as (1) strategic calculation; (2) identity and cultural tolerance; and (3) temporality; rajkovic emphasizes the importance of studying and theorizing context “as a field of practice with variable realizations and meanings across time.” by investigating the kostunica government’s (non)compliance with the icty conditionality, the author attempts to show how multi-dimensional and diachronical the practice of compliance politics is, and how certain incentives, identity frames or events get their significance under a particular historical sequence of events. rajkovic concludes that ‘thick descriptions’, sensitive to both material and normative and temporal aspects, reveal the complexity of compliance politics experience and are more representative of political ‘reality’ than a rationalist and model-driven outlook can suggest. finally, in accumulation by any means: neoliberalisation and environment in postcommunist europe, peters traces the interconnections between macro level changes in the global economy and shifts in the local practices of supplying human basic needs in an urban context. he explores water services restructuring in post-communist europe by utilizing the case studies of two cities, st petersburg in russia and tallinn in estonia. while major attention in the literature has been given to the role and involvement of the world bank (wb) and the international monetary fund (imf) in promoting restructuring and transition to market in the review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 5 post-communist countries, the role of the european bank of reconstruction and development (ebrd), the european union’s institution established to rebuild environment and infrastructure in the post-communist world, has not received equal attention. hence peters analyzes the ebrd’s involvement in specific local projects of water supply restructuring and strategic partnerships formed in the baltic region in order to shed some light on the development of its capacity and strategy as an investor in the infrastructure in the region since the early 1990s. peters argues that an analysis of ownership restructuring and the conditions of investments in the urban centres of the baltic region challenges the notion that market reforms lead to democratic institution-building; rather, his study reveals a deficit of democratic control over restructuring and privatization processes. on the basis of his case studies, peters concludes that privatization of water supply infrastructure in the region shows “ideological shifts in the balance of public versus private management and opportunism using public money to support capitalist intensification at the expense of public benefit.” he suggests that in order to understand transformation in governance practices and relationship of the state to market in the management of environment and infrastructure, markets and political institutions should be treated as interrelated and constitutive of each other, with state institutions being implicated in the constitution of both national and international economic structures. in addition, peters suggests that political scientists should pay more attention to how management paradigms from the corporate sector have transformed governance thinking, both at the national and international levels. while all of these articles examine post-communist transformation, they relate to countries at varying ‘distances’ from the eu-europe. conventional wisdom would suggest that the further ones moves outward through the concentric circles of prospective eu membership, review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 6 the lesser would be an impact of european values, europeanization or conditionality based on western values and practices. the three articles in this volume provide a perspective from which to view this proposition. while young’s article deals with a very new eu member (romania), rajkovic’s study deals with an ambivalent eu-aspirant (serbia), which has been explicitly identified by the eu as a prospective future member. frederick peters’ two cases include one relatively new eu member state (estonia) and one eu ‘non-aspirant’ (russia). in each case, the authors show both the capacity and weaknesses of international institutions, including but not limited to the eu, to motivate or fail to motivate domestic political action. what becomes strikingly clear from the three articles is that the strength of international influence is variable and is not necessarily correlated with a country’s eu aspirations. equally evident is the difficulty of translating specific policies demands into the normative outcomes that the eu and other western actors promote (such as democratic governance, principles of justice, or fair market competition). in each case there are intended as well as unintended consequences of attempted international influence on domestic politics, which are strongly influenced by the specific historical trajectories of the particular nations involved. daria kazarinova_volume 3_issue 3 review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 3/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 56 ………………………………………………………………… the anti-americanism and the spirit of european unity daria kazarinova abstract the european integration process was initiated based on the model of the united states. the idea was to create a unit similar in some ways to the united states, while at the same time a unique, european entity. anti-americanism can be defined as the ideological tendency to resist the reproduction of american economic, social and cultural patterns. at the heart of this article is the question of whether antiamericanism is an effective contributor to the european integration process. review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 3/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 57 the european integration process was initiated based on the model of the united states. the idea was to create a unit similar in some ways to the united states, while at the same time a unique, european entity. history reveals that the origins of european integration were inspired by the united states. in the context of post world war ii, european leaders responded to the strengthening of u.s. influence in a globalizing world. today in europe (the old world), the united states (the new world) is seen differently. according to russian political scientist vladislav inozemtsev, “the european non-acceptance of the usa is becoming more and more ideological.”1 most europeans prefer to stress the political, economic, social and cultural distinctions between europe and america. such a frame of mind can be defined as antiamericanism: the ideological tendency to resist the reproduction of american economic, social and cultural patterns. in this sense, anti-americanism is not active hatred towards the united states, but rather the promotion of a distinctly european socio-cultural identity. in “the anti-american century” ivan krastev introduces two basic types of anti-americanism: murderous anti-americanism (such as terrorism), and “soft” anti-americanism (such as popular belief and the media). the approach of this article is to consider anti-americanism as defined as the resistance to the american economic, social and cultural models. anti-americanism is rooted in the perception of the united states as a superpower. we must, therefore, determine if the united states is in fact a superpower. the majority of scholars agree and global public opinion considers the u.s. a unique superpower of present time. its economic power and aggressive foreign policy, which seek to spread american cultural standards, (also known as “americanization”), lead us 1 inozemtsev, v., is europe really possessed by anti-americanism?, moscow: 2005, p. 286. review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 3/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 58 to consider the united states as a superpower. however, such widespread public opinion is not shared by russian academic evgeny primakov, who contends that, “a superpower is determined not by consensual description… it is a conglomeration of states, which ensures its own security and dictates the rules of the game.”2 according to primakov, the united states does not satisfy these requirements and therefore does not qualify as a superpower. the opposite opinion, that the united states is a superpower, is much more common. this is true especially in the united states.3 in reality, the u.s. dictates the rules of the game: from 1890 to 2001, the u.s. used armed intervention 134 times and imposed sanctions to 75 countries, or 52 percent of humanity.4 in “the opportunity: america’s moment to alter history’s course” r. haass asserts that the world today can be characterized by the blatant misbalance of american superiority over the rest of the world.5 consequently, this opinion is shared not only by intellectual circles but by the public at large. in ivan krastev’s words, it has become a “master framework.” the european version of anti-americanism is based on ideological, cultural and political reasons unique to european countries. as j.f. revel stresses, “the hatred of the liberal civilization… is based on the anti-american idée fixée and we should look to the remote past for its sources.”6 thus, european anti-americanism appeared long before the u.s. became a global superpower, and perhaps before it even came into being. in any case, we cannot attribute this phenomenon to only the last decade when the united states became subject to unprecedented european criticism. some analysts give their opinion that there is nothing new in european anti-americanism and anti-european 2 primakov, e. the world after september, 11th and the invasion of iraq. ekaterinbourg: 2003, pp.138-139. 3 see hardt, m. and negri, a., empire, cambridge (ma) and london: harvard univ. press, 2000, p.180; boot, m., “america’s destiny is to police the world” in: financial times, february 18, 2002, p. 15. 4 sardar, z. and davis, m. w., why do people hate america? cambridge: icon books, 2002, pp. 68-79. 5 haass, r., the opportunity: america’s moment to alter history’s course, new york: public affairs, 2005, p. 8. 6 revel, j.-f., l’obsession anti-américaine. son fonctionnement, ses causes, ses inconséquences. paris : 2002, p. 98. review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 3/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 59 moods in america. as far back as 1953, french philosopher j.p. sartre asserted to european left circles that the united states suffers from “rabies”.7 anti-americanism is notable concerning several different spheres: social, economic, domestic and foreign policy. concerning the social and economic component, the american economic model has little in common with the socially oriented economics of europe; there is a significant divide between american and european values. as samir amin writes in the liberal virus: permanent war and the americanization of the world, “european political culture since the french revolution has given a central place to values of equality, the american state has developed to serve the interests of capital alone.”8 in other words, the american dream is based on individualism and economic efficiency while the european dream is based on values such as universalism, the dominant idea of common good and welfare state, the economics of participation, secularity, quality of life, sustainable development, multiculturalism, interdependency and compromise. research carried out in european countries after 2004 (the year of president george bush’s reelection), indicated that europeans have begun to question such values of community.9 there are no appropriate correlates in europe for the american interpretations of economic success, liberty, and democracy. concerning the u.s.’ domestic policy, anti-americanism manifests itself in three ways. firstly, europeans are skeptical of liberal democracy's ability to function. secondly, this skepticism is enhanced by what is considered an archaic bi-partisan electoral system, which is foreign to the european multi-party model. thirdly, there is a 7 cited by: franquel, g., the anti-americanism: the political mainstream in europe, www.inopressa.ru (accessed on 17.03.2006). 8 samir amin s., the liberal virus: permanent war and the americanization of the world, moscow: europe publishing house, 2006 (abstract of the russian edition available at: http://www.europublish.ru/eng/allbooks/144377368, accessed on 12.08.2005). 9 wilkinson, r., the european anti-americanism. brussels, www.voanews.com, (accessed on 12.08.2005). review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 3/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 60 lack of transparency in american political life which further generates skepticism. as we know, the european electorate demands political transparency. regarding external affairs, anti-americanism is generated in reaction to the u.s.’ aggressive unilateral foreign policy. much of the united states’ foreign policy has completely disregarded the concerns of many european leaders, which has not only aided in undermining the legitimacy of the decision-making mechanisms of the united nations, but has in turn provoked outright european irritation, to the bewilderment of americans. from the european perspective that a global superpower is responsible to actively respond to global poverty, selfish intergovernmental agreements, and environmental degradation, the united states is not fulfilling its duties. instead, it is cutting its aid to developing countries, is indifferent to international organisations, and refuses to subscribe to international environmental conventions, etc. in his article “the usa is surprised by european anti-americanism”, nikolay zlobin notes that, “american foreign-policy elites are not morally ready for the european anti-americanism. americans reject the idea that they need to earn europeans’ confidence and bring their behaviour and thinking into correlation with the old world. obviously, the traditional differences in culture and history have more influence upon the relations between the two sides than during the cold war. the main issues that divide europe and america are a divergence of views on military force and the international problem solving.”10 in contrast to the european approach, the united states increasingly gains confidence in its belief in using force to establish the so-called common liberal values of individual liberty, economic prosperity and democracy in the whole world. europeans do not see military force as a means to achieving their foreign policy objectives. 10 zlobin, n., the usa is surprised by the european anti-americanism, www.ng.ru, (accessed on 27.01.2003). review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 3/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 61 international relations expert, jerome sheridan, considers that the cause of antiamericanism is “a problem of overwhelming military superiority of the usa, their readiness for action and for using the military force. the europeans think the iraq war made the world less secure as long as it led to the appearance of a new generation of terrorists. by their opinion, america rash uses the military power without a moment's hesitation to the consequences for the other people and for the whole world”.11 not only does unprecedented use of military force antagonize other global actors, but the establishment of military bases outside of the u.s. spreads american cultural and social norms. anti-americanism is thus manifested on a cultural level, in reaction to stereotypes of the american lifestyle, which are popularized by mass media. according to public opinion polls conducted by the pew research centre, despite a penchant to consume products of american mass culture, the majority of europeans are displeased with the growth of american views and behaviours. 12 in sum, scepticism of liberal democracy and the bipartisan american political system; hegemonic foreign policy and a preference for military force; and a dislike of the spread of the influence of american mass culture, all form the basis of antiamerican expansion. according to j.f. revel, anti-americanism “is present in the whole world… including europe, its birthplace, and in some capitals is an idée fixée or represents certain principles of foreign policy”.13 furthermore, anti-americanism is divided everywhere in europe. in general, northern european countries are considered more sympathetic to the united states (britain's attitude towards the united states is a topic for individual research) than southern countries such as italy and france. vladislav 11 cited by wilkinson, r., the european anti-americanism. brussels, www.voanews.com, (accessed on 12.08.2005). 12 franquel, g., the anti-americanism: the political mainstream in europe, www.inopressa.ru (accessed on 17.03.2006). 13 revel, j.-f., l’obsession anti-americaine. son fonctionnement, ses causes, ses inconsequences. paris : 2002, p. 114. review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 3/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 62 inozemtsev posits that france’s treatment of the united states is “nearly indecent.”14 however, it is inaccurate to stereotype a stringent “north-south” divide. in hatred against america, based on a norwegian case study, bower claims that antiamericanism in europe is rooted in the biased european media. “there is no doubt that the main obstacle for the improvement of our relations and mutual understanding is the european media establishment.”15 if bower was right, mass media has been incredibly successful in accordance with the findings of the pew research centre, which assert that the majority of europeans want their governments to be more independent from washington concerning diplomatic and external policy.16 in sum, “from its traditional roots in left intellectual circles, academics and café habitués, european antiamericanism has spread into mainstream political culture.”17 the role of, and the relationship between the eu and the u.s. in an age of globalization, are actively discussed by european thinkers, politicians and economists. some of them are unapologetically anti-american. will hutton, in the world we live in, supports a re-orientation of great britain's foreign policy towards continental europe.18 benjamin barber, authour of fear’s empire and jihad vs. mcworld, presents the idea of pax americana, the strategy of preventative war, which has contributed to anti-american attitudes around the globe.19 thinkers in opposition to this idea, such as bruce bower and j.f. revel, seek to deflate the stereotypes upon which “vulgar anti-americanism” is based. the majority of american social scientists does not take issue with the ideological divide between europe and the u.s., and seek to share world hegemony. according to fred bergsten in 14 inozemtsev, v., is europe really possessed by anti-americanism?, moscow: 2005, p. 294. 15 bower, b., the hatred against america, atlantic diary, www.svoboda.org, (accessed on 13.07.2004). 16 wilkinson, r., the european anti-americanism. brussels, www.voanews.com, (accessed on 12.08.2005). 17 franquel, g., the anti-americanism: the political mainstream in europe, www.inopressa.ru (accessed on 17.03.2006). 18 hutton, w., the world we live in. moscow : 2004. 19 barber, b., fear’s empire. war, terrorism, and democracy, new york and london: 2003. review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 3/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 63 g2: the best way to go, the eu is an international economic and political leader, which together with the united states, should form an informal advisory body (bergsten’s g2), as a basis for all intergovernmental organisations (such as the g8, imf and wto) concerning global decision-making. in advocating that all intergovernmental organisations form such a basis, bergsten essentially suggests that the eu and the united states need only manage global economics.20 at the heart of this article is the question of whether anti-americanism is an effective contributor to the european integration process. in its institutional form, the european union is much less anti-american than europe as a community of nationstates that draw some of their identity from negative american rhetoric. critics assert that anti-americanism is a convenient excuse for policy and ideological shortcomings. a united europe can be identified as an association equal to the u.s. in the international arena. so much so, that during the negotiations of the eu treaties, the representatives of the member states had difficulty defining this new suprastate body. the negation and opposition of american values represents an important step in the attempt to define the nature of the eu, an original organisation in itself. antiamericanism identifies common characteristics unique to european countries alone. without doubt, europe needs to find this common denominator. therefore, when europe defines its unique identity, it must replace vulgar antiamericanism with a respectful anti-americanism that recognizes the u.s.’ political culture. the european identity is certainly in crisis. however, as russian political scientist gleb pavlovsky writes, “the european idea of an integrated europe will 20 bergsten, c. f., g2: the best way to go: the partnership principle, ew forms of governance in the 21st century. alfred herrhausen society for international dialogue. archetype publications : london, 2004, pp. 323-324. review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 3/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 64 survive crisis and likely come out victorious, established, and even more expansionist.”21 it is likely that if the ideology of ‘europeism’, some kind of utopia or myth about the european integration process, came true, it would be positive and constructive. this concept of utopia, as the forerunner of a project, creates strong societal bonds. according to vaclav klaus, for some, the concept of ‘europeism’ “became a new alternative, a modern liberalism or a post-liberal ideology”.22 world war ii triggered “a modification of political thought and a political mind shift towards internationalism and universalism” 23 and, thus, a shift towards ‘europeism’. in has history restarted since september 11, francis fukuyama writes that the surrender of individual states’ national sovereignty to the supranational organisation of the eu demonstrates their faith in the end of history.24 ‘europeism’ is essentially a collective ideology, which advocates a break with individualism and calls upon a democratic suprastate. the basic question is whether such a state could be a real and efficient democracy. 21 pavlovsky, gleb. preface, in europe without russia. european constitutional treaty of 20 october 2004. moscow: 2005, p. 5. 22 klaus, v. why i am not an “europeist”, in europe without russia. european constitutional treaty of 20 october 2004. moscow: 2005, p. 9. 23 klaus, v. why i am not an “europeist”, in europe without russia. european constitutional treaty of 20 october 2004. moscow: 2005, p. 12. 24 fukuyama f., has history restarted since september 11, cis, sydney: 2002. review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 3/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 65 bibliography barber, b., fear’s empire. war, terrorism, and democracy, new york and london: 2003. bergsten, c. f., g2: the best way to go: the partnership principle, ew forms of governance in the 21st century. alfred herrhausen society for international dialogue. archetype publications : london, 2004. franquel, g., the anti-americanism: the political mainstream in europe, www.inopressa.ru (accessed on 17.03.2006). fukuyama f., has history restarted since september 11, cis, sydney: 2002. haass, r., the opportunity: america’s moment to alter history’s course, new york: public affairs, 2005. hardt, m. and negri, a., empire, cambridge (ma) and london: harvard univ. press, 2000, p.180; boot, m., “america’s destiny is to police the world” in: financial times, february 18, 2002. hutton, w., the world we live in. moscow : 2004. inozemtsev, v., is europe really possessed by anti-americanism?, moscow: 2005. klaus, v. why i am not an “europeist”, in europe without russia. european constitutional treaty of 20 october 2004. moscow: 2005. pavlovsky, gleb. preface, in europe without russia. european constitutional treaty of 20 october 2004. moscow: 2005. primakov, e. the world after september, 11th and the invasion of iraq. ekaterinbourg: 2003. revel, j.-f., l’obsession anti-américaine. son fonctionnement, ses causes, ses inconséquences. paris: 2002. samir amin s., the liberal virus: permanent war and the americanization of the world, moscow: europe publishing house, 2006. sardar, z. and davis, m. w., why do people hate america? cambridge: icon books, 2002. wilkinson, r., the european anti-americanism. brussels, www.voanews.com, (accessed on 12.08.2005). zlobin, n., the usa is surprised by the european anti-americanism, www.ng.ru, (accessed on 27.01.2003). microsoft word crina viju_james nolan and william kerr_common markets measuring price integration in european agricultural ma review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 33 ………………………………………………………………… common markets measuring price integration in european agricultural markets crina viju1, james nolan2, william a. kerr2 abstract the accession of austria, finland and sweden to the european union (eu) is assessed from the perspective of market integration in key agricultural sectors. an empirical investigation is conducted using monthly data for two periods: from 1975:01-1994:12 (the pre-eu period) and 1995:01-2004:12 (post-eu period). the existence of market integration both within the countries and within the eu is tested using time-series methods. a long-run equilibrium between prices for the same good in different markets does not exclude the possibility of short-run deviations in the individual data, so part of this analysis consists of estimating an econometric model (error correction) to uncover long-run effects of price deviations. only a subset of agricultural prices moves together after eu integration. 1 corresponding author. department of agricultural economics, university of saskatchewan, 51 campus drive, saskatoon, sk, s7n 5a8. e-mail address: crv058@mail.usask.ca 2 department of agricultural economics, university of saskatchewan, saskatoon, sk, canada review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 34 introduction one of the central economic ideas behind the creation of the eu was that common policies would lead to the integration of various spatially separated product markets. specifically, the principles of the common agriculture policy (cap) were designed to ensure that agricultural and food markets in europe would become integrated. cap principles support free trade within the eu, and specify common external tariffs and financing. even after accession to the eu when formal barriers to trade in agricultural goods are removed, in many countries barriers to market integration remained. among factors that might further impede market integration in eu agriculture markets are the absence of arbitrage mechanisms between markets in the member states, along with residual barriers to efficient arbitrage and imperfect competition in these markets (zanias, 1993). the effectiveness of regional trade agreements such as the eu is difficult to assess. market integration, however, is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for the gains from trade expected from regional trade agreements. if markets are not integrated then prices cannot provide the appropriate signals for resources to be redeployed to provide gains from trade. hence, examinations of market integration are important for the assessment of the trade agreements. stylized facts about trade tell us that one of the measurable outcomes resulting from a regional trade agreement is increased market and price integration among member states. market integration then becomes a necessary, but not sufficient condition describing the movement of resources from inefficient into efficient industries among those countries engaged in trade liberalization. if market integration does not arise, trade-liberalizing initiatives would not function as predicted (moodley et al. 2000). review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 35 market integration can be measured in different ways, including the movement of goods or tracking investment flows (moodley et al, 2000). in this work, our definition of market integration is founded on the economic law of one price (lop). markets are considered spatially integrated for a specific good if a causal relationship between prices in different spatial markets can be measured. a stronger version of lop argues that market prices will eventually equalize between separate regions, when accounting for transport costs, trade restrictions and other transaction costs. we will only try to measure the weaker condition the stronger conditions for lop will not be tested here. a key concept in understanding market integration is spatial price arbitrage: as price increases in one region, this product will eventually be imported into that region from a region with lower prices. this, in turn, leads to a shortage in the exporting region, and, as a result, the good’s price increases in the exporting region as well. the possibility of spatial arbitrage explains why prices of homogenous goods can track together in spatially separated markets so long as those markets are integrated in some manner. market integration means that a measurable long-run relationship exists between spatially separated prices for the same good. thus, even when prices might temporarily deviate from each other in the short-run, overall, prices should still be consistent with other integrated markets. figure 1 is based on barley prices for germany and finland for the period jan 1995 – dec 2004 and is an illustration of integrated market prices. throughout the time period shown, prices in each market follow the same pattern. in the case where lop is responsible for the price behavior in these markets, the two lines in figure 1 should overlap. conversely, figure 2 is based on rye prices in germany and finland for the review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 36 period jan 1975 – dec 1994, and is an example of non-integrated market prices. it is easy to see that the two price series in figure 2 possess distinct patterns over the chosen time interval. figure 1 figure 2 source: author’s calculations to date, most applied econometric trade studies have concentrated on testing market integration rather than adherence to the lop. considering lop, we offer that prices of similar goods actually moving together across spatially distinct markets is a better indication of market integration than examining whether or not prices equalize across regions. since this issue is important for measuring the success of trade policy, the aim of this paper is to examine price movements in several agricultural markets for countries that recently joined the european union (eu) in the same year. with respect to these countries, this represents the first study drawing upon lop to document how key agricultural markets were affected by joining the eu. in this light, the empirical investigation will consist of two parts. in the first part, we address the following issues: 1) are agricultural markets in these three new acceding countries integrated with those in the eu?; and 2) is there evidence of market integration in the example of integrated markets 2 2 .1 2 .2 2 .3 2 .4 2 .5 2 .6 2 .7 ja n95 ja n96 ja n97 ja n98 ja n99 ja n00 ja n01 ja n02 ja n03 ja n04 example of non-integrated markets 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 ja n75 ja n77 ja n79 ja n81 ja n83 ja n85 ja n87 ja n89 ja n91 ja n93 review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 37 pre-eu and/or post-eu period? the second part of this study will concentrate on the analysis of the acceding countries individually to determine if their agricultural markets were integrated with the other acceding countries in the pre-eu and/or post-eu period. the paper is organized as follows. section ii highlights the most important characteristics of the agri-food sector in the three european countries (austria, finland and sweden). section iii reviews contributions to this literature. section iv presents the empirical methodology, while section v describes the data used in the analysis. in section vi the empirical results are described and the paper ends with a series of concluding remarks. the eu agricultural sector the primary objective for creating a common agricultural market within the eu was to facilitate movement of goods and factors of production between eu member states. it was this idea of a common market that influenced the initial design of cap. cap was established in 1957 and it was focused on the development of a set of common policy instruments along with setting common prices (i.e. target, threshold and intervention prices). common prices were set with respect to a common currency and this situation influenced each member country in different ways, with specific effects depending on market exchange rates. monetary compensatory amounts (mca’s) were introduced in the eu and became a means to tax or subsidize exports, compensating for currency fluctuations and facilitating agricultural trade among the eu countries (zanias, 1993). mca’s were used for more than twenty years and preserved protection levels in member states at previous review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 38 exchange rates, thus impeding free trade and market integration. even though they were supposed to be temporary measures, mca’s became a source of conflict among the member countries. this situation was solved only when the member states converged to become a monetary union. through the mcsharry reforms of 1992, guaranteed agricultural prices were replaced with a new system of direct compensating payments for farmers, activated if prices fell below a certain level. cap was further reformed under agenda 2000. these reforms came into effect in march 2003 and production subsidies were replaced with a set of direct payments, linked with standards on food safety, animal rights and environmental concerns. the newest element of this latest reform is the introduction of the “single farm payment”, which replaces a vast array of extant direct payment schemes. to date, there have been some problems with the accession process in the eu agricultural sector. these stem from differential levels of farm support along with particular regional circumstances, including extreme climate and geophysical conditions which characterize agriculture in some acceding countries. for this study, we note that austria, finland and sweden became full members of eu in 1995. austria is one of the wealthiest european countries, with an economy of a highly developed nation possessing an important service sector (65% in 2002). just 17% of austria is arable land, a fact that motivates highly intensive forms of crop production. in fact agriculture does not play a very important role in the economy of the country, accounting only for 2% of gdp. as shown in annex a, table a1, for the agricultural products considered in this analysis, rye accounts for the highest production in austria as review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 39 a percentage of production in eu-15. traditionally, austria is an agri-food importer, but in recent years its agri-food exports increased faster than its imports. the main trading partners for austrian agri-food products are its eu neighbors. germany is at the top of this list, accounting for 42% of austrian imports and 35.9% of exports in 2003 (agriculture and agri-food canada, 2004). finland is the northernmost agricultural producer in the eu, and only 6% of the total land area is considered to be arable. the main crops produced in finland are barley and oats (annex a, table a2). due to its climate, agriculture does not occupy an important role in the finnish economy, contributing to about 3% of the gdp (agriculture and agri-food canada, 2004). the main trading partner for finnish agri-food products is also germany. finally, sweden is the third largest country in western europe, but is has only 6% total arable land. crop production is dominant in central sweden, with the main crops produced being cereals and fodder crops. as can be seen in annex a, table a3, barley, wheat and oats represent the main crops produced in sweden. agriculture accounts for just 2% of gdp (agriculture and agri-food canada, 2004). the most important trading partners are eu countries such as denmark, the netherlands, norway and germany. the accession to eu affected the agricultural sector of these three countries in different ways. firstly, under the accession agreement, new members had to adjust their prices to eu levels. this adjustment caused a price drop of about 40 to 45 percent in the cereal, livestock and dairy sectors in austria and finland. the situation was different in sweden, where agricultural support declined significantly after 1991 and the gap between review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 40 domestic and international prices was smaller.3 after accession, in sweden cereal prices increased, dairy prices remained stable, while in the livestock sector prices decreased sharply. secondly, as a result of lowered prices for agricultural products, farmers in the three new eu member countries faced increased competition from more efficient eu producers. note that the eu is by far the largest single exporter of rye, with the vast majority of production coming from germany. for this reason, rye production has become an important issue for eu policymakers, with intervention price support for rye being €101.31/t in 2001-2002 – the same as the intervention price for wheat and barley. the major exporters of barley are the eu, russia and the ukraine. among eu producers of barley, most production comes from france, germany and spain. unlike the situation for wheat, barley and rye, the eu does not offer an intervention price nor maintain intervention stocks for oats. however, in recognition of the importance of the oats trade to sweden and finland, special provisions were made when they joined the eu for subsidies on their oats exports (as of 1997). oats are still a very thinly traded commodity, being used mostly on farm for animal feed in country of origin. however, human consumption is an important part of distribution in the uk, germany and the us. within the eu, trade of oats is mostly limited to intra-eu trade and exports from finland and sweden to the us (agriculture and agri-food canada, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004). 3 sweden reduced its agricultural support primarily due to currency devaluation in this time period. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 41 price transmission and market integration some of the international trade literature evaluates market integration across countries by testing the law of one price (lop) or absolute purchasing power parity (ppp) at an aggregate level (casel, 1918). lop is based on international commodity arbitrage in efficient markets, implying that every good has a single price that can be expressed in a common currency throughout the world (isard, 1977). ppp also implies that by aggregating all goods, an overall price index computed between two countries should be the same after conversion to a common currency. however, many studies have shown that the strict price behavior implied by lop is not often observed in reality. ardeni (1989) showed that one of the shortcomings of earlier empirical studies in finding evidence that supports perfect arbitrage for commodity prices is the failure to consider the time-series properties of the variables (i.e. identical joint distributions throughout the data) and by the improper use of transformations on these variables. the failure of lop in this study is explained by institutional factors, including the cost of arbitrage, errors in data and in the definition of prices. subsequently, engel (1993) measured the variation in the price of identical goods across countries and the variation of different goods within a country. he showed that the first type of variation, which represents the failure in the lop is usually larger than the second variation. engel and rogers (1996) found some explanation for deviations from lop observed in the data. they found that the distance between markets explains most of the variation in prices of similar goods in different areas. when considering two cities located in different countries, the variation of the prices is much higher than for two review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 42 equidistant cities in the same country. they suggest this could be due to sticky nominal prices. another large body of research has applied various quantitative techniques to more accurately measure market and price integration. gordon et al. (1993) examined the nature of integration for the british and french lamb market during the period 1983-1986. to test for price integration, they employed a time series causality test. they reached the conclusion that the markets are integrated for the specified period, but the response of one price to the change in the other price was surprisingly slow. slow adjustments in prices were explained by non-tariff barriers, differences in product quality, as well as uncertainty surrounding the final price received. zanias (1993) tested lop using time series data on four agricultural products produced within the european community. the products chosen (soft wheat, dairy milk, potatoes and pig carcasses) are very different in terms of product characteristics and associated policy framework. zanias found that a single price existed in soft wheat markets, but suggested this was the result of minimum intervention prices and efficient arbitrage. with milk, the markets were found to be nonintegrated. this result was explained by the importance of non-tariff barriers in milk markets and by imperfect competition in this industry. for potatoes and pig carcasses, the lack of consistent data series did not allow the inclusion of much data, so these results differed from case to case. diakosavvas (1995) examined agricultural market integration by looking at australian and u.s. beef prices at the farmgate level. he tested for price cointegration using a time-varying parameter estimation procedure. his analysis found that the two markets are cointegrated (although not fully), whereas the time-varying procedure review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 43 indicated that the convergence between prices did not increase substantially over time. he concluded that australian beef prices could not be used as a proxy for a world price for empirical analysis. with respect to north american market integration, moodley et al. (2000) evaluated the canada-us trade agreement (custa). previous work indicated that markets in the us and canada were not integrated before custa, so this empirical work addressed two basic questions were these markets integrated, and was there evidence of market convergence after custa? the latter could be interpreted as evidence that the trade agreement had critical effects on the product markets. their analysis found that a cointegrated price system existed after the introduction of custa. additionally, their approach showed that price convergence occurred before the introduction of custa, leading them to conclude that it was likely easier to ratify custa given that many of the expected trade adjustments in these markets had already taken place. with respect to agriculture, mohanty and langley (2003) examined grain (wheat and barley) price integration between the us and canada. they tested whether policy changes, such as the north american free trade agreement (nafta) and the western grain transportation act (wgta) affected the degree of integration between these grain markets. they found that these markets are in fact integrated, and that the post-nafta and post-wgta periods were characterized by improved market integration. finally, a number of studies on market integration and price transmission (both spatially and vertically) have highlighted several factors that impede price transmission. for example, border and domestic policies, in the form of price support mechanisms, weaken any link between international and domestic markets. different agricultural review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 44 policy instruments as well as exchange rate policies hinder the full transmission of international price signals (knetter, 1993). other policies among the border measures are non-tariff barriers, which may have strong effects on price transmission through space (zanias, 1993; thompson et. al., 2002). apart from policies, domestic markets can also be partly insulated by large marketing margins that arise due to high transport and transaction costs. this factor can have strong effects, especially in developing countries where poor infrastructure and transport services give rise to large marketing margins due to high costs of delivering traded commodities. high transfer costs hinder the transmission of price signals, and they may prevent or discourage goods arbitrage (sexton, kling and carman, 1991; badiane and shively, 1998). market power can also hinder market integration, in the sense that the price differences between international and domestic prices may be higher than those determined by transfer costs alone (dhar and cotteril, 1998). this literature also concentrates on the extent to which changes in exchange rates facilitate price discrimination (i.e. charging different customers different prices) among destinations (froot and klemperer, 1989; knetter, 1993). testing for integrated or common markets empirical methodology cointegration tests and error correction models are modern statistical tools that help analyze price movements beyond the simple case of market integration or complete price transmission across markets. these specifications allow us to test notions such as completeness, speed, and asymmetry of the relationship between agricultural prices in various countries. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 45 listing producer prices ptaus, ptfin, ptsw and pteu for each agricultural product in the three countries under study and in the eu, and with eaus, efin, and esw listed as the corresponding exchange rates, the following price series are tested for statistical cointegration: )pln(p),peln(p )peln(p ),peln(p :where )p,p(fp and )p(fp),p(fp),p(fp teueutswswsw tfinfinfintausausaus swausfineusweufineuaus == == ==== given that the data employed in the analysis need to be expressed in logarithms, the estimated parameters can be directly interpreted as “transmission elasticities” for one price with respect to another. cointegration or co-movement of these commodity prices across countries can be tested using econometric time-series techniques. statistical cointegration analysis consists of two steps. first, the cointegrating relationship is investigated to see if prices are related by a long-run relationship. second, in order to determine if two countries belong to the same market, an adjustment process to short-run shocks must also be investigated. as a specialized technique with specific structural assumptions about data, cointegration analysis (engle and granger, 1987) is preceeded by tests for nonstationary variables. specifically, if a linear combination of integrated variables is stationary, the variables are said to be co-integrated. in turn, the cointegrated vector defines the long-run relationship among the nonstationary variables. cointegration does not mean that review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 46 variables cannot deviate from a long-run equilibrium, but deviations will usually be temporary and market forces will bring the variables to their cointegrated equilibrium. there are two commonly used methods to test for cointegration. there is the wellknown engle and granger (1987) methodology, which determines whether the residuals of the equilibrium relationship are stationary, while the johansen (1988) and stockwatson (1988) methodologies determine the number of the cointegrated vectors. for this analysis, the johansen procedure will be used to determine if a long-run relationship between the prices under consideration exists. it is also well known that such results are quite sensitive to the data lag structure in the model. most commonly, one estimates a vector autoregression using undifferenced data, and then a set of statistical tests (akaike, schwartz or hannan-quinn information criteria)4 facilitate the choice of the right lag length in the time series equation. the last two tests are preferred because they are more accurate when more variables bet introduced in to a model. finding a cointegrated system does not exclude the possibility of observing shortrun deviation of the individual series. the short-run dynamics of prices are often modeled using an error-correction statistical model (ecm). in turn, vector autoregression (var)5 is commonly used for forecasting systems of interrelated time series. a vector error correction (vec) model is a restricted var that has cointegration restrictions built into the specification. finally, the vec specification used here restricts the long-run behavior of the endogenous variables to converge to their cointegrating relationships while allowing a certain amount of short-run dynamics. 4 see akaike (1974,1976), schwartz (1978) and hannan-quinn (1979) 5 see greene (2003) review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 47 data description empirical analysis is conducted for a few key agricultural commodities from austria, sweden and finland. we study price movements in rye, soft wheat, barley, oats and potatoes. the first four products listed are heavily supported by cap, while the fifth product (potatoes) is not. the absolute producer price series comprise monthly data, collected for a period of thirty years, from 1975:1 – 2004:12. the data for 1975:1 – 1994:12 were obtained from the boards of agriculture in each country and were expressed in their respective national currencies. for the period 1995:1 – 2004:12, the data were extracted from eurostat and were expressed in euros. the data were all converted to ecus using the market exchange rates from eurostat. one additional characteristic of the data is that from 1999:1, austria and finland joined the monetary union, while sweden kept its own currency. so starting with 1999:1, the prices in austria and finland are expressed in euros at the fixed exchange rate, while the prices in sweden are expressed using a flexible market exchange rate. since the first question to be addressed is whether the three acceding countries’ markets and the eu market are integrated, a reference eu producer price should be used. as there is no dominant eu price, we chose german producer prices because germany is clearly the most important trading partner for the three countries. the producer price series for germany were loaded from eurostat and are expressed in ecu until 1995, and in euros after 1995. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 48 empirical results to be able to conduct a cointegration test on prices, the individual price series need to be tested for stationarity – the techniques described above only work with nonstationary data. tests revealed that four out of the five products under consideration are non-stationary: rye, soft wheat, barley and oats. some additional data transformations are necessary to estimate equations to describe price movements for these products. with respect to cointegration between each new acceding country’s product price and prices in germany, a johansen test did not reject the null hypothesis of zero cointegrating vectors for the pre-eu sample period. the only exception was found with the price pair (pger, paus) in the case of rye, soft wheat and barley. in these cases, the null was rejected, providing evidence that these product prices were cointegrated even before austria joined the eu. for the post-eu period, a null hypothesis of zero cointegrating vectors was rejected in many of the cases. the only cases for which cointegration was not observed were for the pair (pger, pfin) for soft wheat, along with price pairs (pger, pfin) and (pger, psw) for oats. such results are evidence of strong agricultural price cointegration after the three countries joined eu. with the exception of oats, where price cointegration appears only for austria, for the rest of the chosen products, producer prices in the three countries share a long-run relationship with the eu price (pger). convergence in prices might also be influenced by minimum intervention prices (zanias, 1993), even price supports were reduced as a result of the macsharry (hubbard and ritson, 1997) and agenda 2000 (van meijl, 2002) reforms. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 49 an interesting situation concerns the cointegration results among the three acceding countries. the producer prices in these countries do not share a long-run equilibrium in the two periods evidence of almost no market integration (except for soft wheat in the post-eu period). this could be explained by the fact that producer prices in the three acceding countries were highly supported by governments in the pre-eu period, so these prices were not the result of market forces. as small agricultural markets, when joining the eu these countries suddenly had access to wider markets and the price discipline that followed. as well, consider that each of these countries increased agricultural trade with former eastern european countries around the time of their eu integration (breuss, 2005). there still exists the possibility that producer prices in each country’s market can temporarily deviate from long-run equilibrium. such short-run dynamics can be examined by estimating a vector error correction (vec) model on the data. rye prices in the eu and the three acceding countries are in fact cointegrated, meaning that these markets have a strong long run relationship. this supports our supposition about the structure of an integrated european market for certain agricultural products. examining the short run response to the long run equilibrium we found that, in general, price adjustments are very quick. in the case of soft wheat, there is evidence of market integration except for finland. examining short-run dynamics, speed of price adjustment increased in the posteu period compared with the pre-eu period. for the pair of (germany, austria) there was evidence of market integration before austria joined the eu. this implies that prices were in the process of converging prior to joining the eu (moodley et.al., 2000). finally, review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 50 results from the error correction model show that price adjustment was faster in the posteu period, while the level of market integration has decreased. prices of barley are cointegrated in the post-eu period, and we interpret this as evidence of long-run equilibrium. with respect to the short-run dynamics, in general, there is no evidence of adjustment (the parameter estimates are statistically insignificant), while the european market for oats did not actually become integrated with the inclusion of these countries into the eu. summary and conclusions the study of market integration is important with respect to evaluating the success of particular trade agreements. the process of price transmission from one market to another is central in understanding the extent of the integration of economic agents into the market process. conversely, the absence of market integration has important implications for economic welfare. incomplete price transmission arises from either trade barriers or other protectionist policies, or can be due simply to transaction costs such as poor transport and communication infrastructure. this results in a reduction in the price information available to economic agents and consequently can lead to decisions that contribute to economically inefficient outcomes. in theory, spatial price determination models suggest that if two markets are linked by trade in a free market regime, excess demand or supply shocks in one market will have an equal impact on price in both markets. in general, the existence of import tariffs allows price changes to be fully transmitted to other markets in relative terms. however, with a prohibitively high tariff, changes in one price would be only partly (if at review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 51 all) transmitted to the other market. furthermore, this price will likely be close to the autarky (no trade) price level and will prohibit all opportunities for spatial arbitrage. regarding price support policies such as intervention mechanisms and floor prices, changes in one price will have no effect on the other market only when the price falls below that level at which the floor price has been set. however, any changes in the price above the floor price level will be transmitted to the other market. apart from such policies, there are other factors that can impede market integration, as high transfer costs and non-competitive behavior. the primary objective for the formation of cap was the integration of agricultural markets in this spatial sense. the treaty of rome from 1958 established that “the common market shall extend to agriculture and trade in agricultural products” (article 38) and eventually, all the barriers to trade between member states will be eliminated (ritson, 1997). in turn, the two guiding principles of the single european market (sem) are non-discrimination and mutual recognition. as mutual recognition proved to be insufficient, common harmonization directives were adopted. these were focused on health, safety, and environmental protection. finally, an important obstacle for the existence of increased market integration is the insistence of some member states (especially the uk) on having national sovereignty over important macroeconomic matters (e.g. monetary policy, fiscal measures). cap contributes to a more ideal market environment for arbitrage activities. operation at a minimum price might influence convergence in prices, even thought this situation would not likely be observed without markets being linked through arbitrage review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 52 (colman, 1985). therefore, as long as prices are above the intervention price level, finding cointegrated prices in a statistical sense is strong evidence of market integration. in this paper, the accession of austria, finland and sweden to the european union (eu) is assessed from the perspective of market integration in several agricultural sectors. to our knowledge, the agricultural sectors of these countries have never been studied before in this respect. the analysis addresses two important questions in this regard 1) are markets in these three acceding countries integrated with those in the eu; and 2) are these markets integrated with each other? note that if we found market integration emerging in the post-eu period, this is evidence that the accession to the single market had an important effect on these agricultural goods markets. our empirical investigation examined a set of important agricultural products (rye, soft wheat, barley, oats and potatoes) for two periods. the sub-samples include the time from 1975:01-1994:12 (pre-eu period) and 1995:01-2004:12 (post-eu period). the existence of market (price) integration both within the countries and within the eu is tested using time-series econometrics. in the pre-eu period, cointegration among prices was discovered for rye, soft wheat and barley between austria and germany, while in the post-eu period, rye and barley markets proved to be most tightly integrated with the german (eu) market. the oats market was the least integrated in the sample. and regarding market integration among the three acceding countries, we found no evidence that prices among these commodities share a common long-run equilibrium. even though the countries under study were part of the european free trade agreement (efta) before joining eu, there was certainly no evidence of market review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 53 integration for agricultural products in the pre-eu period. based on our findings, we expect that the situation would be the same in case of the central and eastern european countries (ceec), which joined eu in 2004 (plus romania and bulgaria in 2007). however, the situation in these latter countries is different compared to our sample in three ways. firstly, agriculture makes up a large share of employment the two largest ceec countries alone (poland and romania) contain almost half the agricultural area as the eu-15. secondly, cap would clearly be applied in stages to the new members over a ten-year period, rendering the transition as smooth as possible. lastly, cap itself will be reformed further as a result of world trade organization’s (wto) liberalizing measures pertaining to agriculture. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 54 bibliography agriculture and agri-food canada. “agri-food trade synopsis – austria.” (september, 2004). http://ats-sea.agr.gc.ca/europe/3936_e.htm. agriculture and agri-food canada. “finland and sweden: oats.” bi-weekly bulletin 17/7(2004). http://www.agr.gc.ca/mad-dam/e/bulletine/v17e/v17n07_e.htm. agriculture and agri-food canada. “feed barley: 2003-2004 outlook.” bi-weekly bulletin16/19(2003).http://www.agr.gc.ca/maddam/e/bulletine/v16e/v16n19_e.htm agriculture and agri-food canada. “rye: situation and outlook.” bi-weekly bulletin 15/12(2002). http://www.agr.gc.ca/mad-dam/e/bulletine/v15e/v15n12e.htm. agriculture and agri-food canada. “barley.” bi-weekly bulletin 14/10(2001). http://www.agr.gc.ca/mad-dam/e/bulletine/v14e/v14n10e.htm agriculture and agri-food canada. “wheat: situation and outlook.” bi-weekly bulletin13/17(2000).http://www.agr.gc.ca/maddam/e/bulletine/v13e/v13n17e.htm akaike, h. “a new look at the statistical model identification.” i.e.e.e. transactions on automatic control, ac 19(1974):716-723. 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r., kling, c. and carman, h. “market integration, efficiency of arbitrage and imperfect competition: methodology and application to us celery.” american journal of agricultural economics 73(1991):568-580. stock, j. and m. watson. “testing for common trends.” journal of the american statistical association 83(dec. 1988): 1097-1107. thompson r.s, sul, d. and bohl, m. t.. “spatial market efficiency and policy regime change: seemingly unrelated error correction model estimation.” american journal of agricultural economics 84(2002): 1042-1053. van meijl, h. and van tongeren, f. “the agenda 2000 cap reform, world prices and gatt-wto export constraints.” european review of agricultural economics 29(4)(2002): 445-470. zanias, g.p. “testing for integration in european community agricultural product markets.” journal of agricultural economics. 44(1993): 418-427. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved i annex a table a.1: production of agricultural commodities in austria (1990-2005) as percentage of production in eu-15 source: eurostat table a.2: production of agricultural commodities in finland (1990-2005) as percentage of production in eu-15 finland 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 cereals 2.18% 1.74% 1.43% 1.85% 1.93% 1.85% 2.06% 1.82% 1.30% 1.41% 1.89% 1.81% 1.84% 1.99% 1.58% 1.79% soft wheat and spelt 0.77% 0.52% 0.27% 0.47% 0.44% 0.47% 0.55% 0.53% 0.42% 0.28% 0.56% 0.59% 0.60% 0.83% 0.78% 0.85% rye and meslin 4.14% 0.56% 0.68% 1.33% 0.44% 0.93% 1.50% 0.78% 0.77% 0.43% 1.96% 1.01% 1.52% 2.23% 1.27% 0.96% barley 3.09% 3.15% 2.82% 3.55% 4.26% 4.06% 3.53% 3.83% 2.55% 3.22% 3.86% 3.71% 3.62% 3.64% 3.32% 4.71% oats and summer cereal mixture 18.69% 14.70% 16.50% 16.18% 16.16% 17.63% 16.94% 17.30% 14.49% 15.47% 19.84% 19.68% 20.13% 18.07% 14.57% 19.84% potatoes 1.79% 1.48% 1.32% 1.61% 1.73% 1.83% 1.52% 1.58% 1.37% 1.64% 1.62% 1.64% 1.69% 1.51% 1.30% 1.54% source: eurostat austria 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 cereals 2.68% 2.56% 2.39% 2.34% 2.52% 2.48% 2.62% 2.40% 2.24% 2.36% 2.08% 2.39% 2.22% 2.25% 2.32% 2.14% soft wheat and spelt 1.64% 1.60% 1.62% 1.28% 1.57% 1.57% 1.44% 1.49% 1.35% 1.48% 1.33% 1.76% 1.47% 1.38% 1.62% 1.49% rye and meslin 7.16% 7.44% 7.73% 6.83% 7.03% 5.28% 2.81% 3.48% 3.76% 4.05% 3.41% 3.47% 3.71% 4.33% 4.56% 4.67% barley 2.73% 2.52% 2.85% 2.32% 2.72% 2.45% 2.06% 2.40% 2.35% 2.37% 1.66% 2.11% 1.79% 1.89% 1.94% 2.02% oats and summer cereal mixture 3.54% 3.68% 3.79% 3.17% 3.02% 3.09% 2.58% 3.24% 2.94% 2.93% 2.02% 2.37% 1.85% 2.10% 2.30% 2.48% potatoes 1.61% 1.75% 1.45% 1.83% 1.42% 1.66% 1.53% 1.42% 1.50% 1.47% 1.43% 1.55% 1.48% 1.37% 1.45% 1.59% review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved ii table a.3: production of agricultural commodities in sweden (1990-2005) as percentage of production in eu-15 source: eurostat sweden 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 cereals 3.29% 2.64% 2.05% 2.80% 2.42% 2.67% 3.32% 2.87% 2.64% 2.42% 2.62% 2.66% 2.55% 2.82% 2.41% 2.22% soft wheat and spelt 2.76% 1.79% 1.79% 2.27% 1.74% 1.93% 2.45% 2.35% 2.38% 1.86% 2.51% 2.82% 2.24% 2.78% 2.40% 2.42% rye and meslin 5.67% 3.27% 3.49% 4.87% 3.42% 3.33% 2.87% 2.28% 2.50% 2.12% 3.39% 2.85% 2.67% 3.62% 2.72% 3.02% barley 3.81% 3.42% 2.67% 3.53% 3.81% 4.13% 4.01% 3.98% 3.27% 3.80% 3.18% 3.42% 3.70% 3.32% 3.26% 3.68% oats and summer cereal mixture 19.62% 20.22% 14.57% 18.32% 15.02% 15.87% 17.47% 18.72% 17.62% 17.41% 17.26% 15.64% 16.47% 16.30% 13.92% 13.49% potatoes 2.77% 2.27% 2.47% 2.64% 2.53% 2.46% 2.38% 2.54% 2.77% 2.05% 2.02% 2.07% 1.98% 2.09% 2.05% 1.96% microsoft word bartholomew paudyn_risking the stability of emu the asymmetric application of the stability and growth pact.do review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved ………………………………………………………………… risking the stability of emu: the asymmetric application of the stability and growth pact bartholomew paudyn abstract fiscal profligacy poses a high risk to the credibility of europe’s common monetary policy and its ultimate objective of price stability. unfortunately, the aim of preventing fiscally responsible states from being penalized by those with lax budgetary policies via inflationary pressures and interest rates is jeopardized as members breach the stability and growth pact (sgp). moreover, there are major institutional inconsistencies in how states are treated under the current framework as is exemplified by the november 2003 econfin crisis. what is witnessed is an antagonistic relationship between the programmatic and operational dimensions of monetary governance. does the fact that half the members who have adopted the euro have also breached its rules signal that surveillance as regulation is being displaced as a mode of governance? it calls for a reimaged spatial-temporal explanation of governance to adequately capture the political economy of emu. at the core of emu management are risk and uncertainty based modes of governing. employing a governmentality approach, i argue that the audit is one prominent style of processing and institutionalizing risk as an aggregate future of monetary activity. by altering the administration and objects of risk governance the audit is perceived as reducing the susceptibility to failure. hence, it has a performative function that extends beyond simply measuring deficit or debt to gdp performance and acts as a social and institutional process structuring a homogenous set of fiscal practices. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 6 introduction inexorably equated to the broader project of european integration, on january 1, 1999 europe witnessed the irrevocable locking the conversion rates of eleven national currencies as they became denominations of the euro. this transition to stage three of the european monetary union (emu) embodied the vision of europe as an emerging, major player in international economic and monetary affairs (dyson 2000; verdun 2002). by january 2002, greece had satisfied the convergence criteria and the last remnants of national legal tender disappeared. having no equivalent in history, this is arguably the construction of a novel monetary space outside the parameters of the traditional nation-state with its own set of articulations and practices of governance and valuation (de goede 2005). the euro involves a new “monetization of time-space, rendering the future calculable…and presupposes a particular rationalization of money and risk” (pryke & allen 2000: 265). it is the management of the currency through the deployment of particular risk discourses and techniques, such as audits, which changes the perception of how money is governed in this evolving spatial-temporal order. what is witnessed is an antagonistic relationship between the programmatic and operational dimensions of monetary governance. on the one hand, risk management presupposes the “functional and political need to maintain myths of control…because it is what various constituencies and shareholders demand” (power 2004: 10). conversely, we are haunted by a consistent stream of failures that challenge our organizational capacity to control risk. this contradictory dynamic is one focus of this paper. it is reflected in the emu as members transgress the very conditions established to prevent the destabilization of this monetary union, namely the stability and growth pact (sgp). the sgp was devised as the anchor review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 7 for the euro but it has come to symbolize its weakness (gros et al. 2004). as a new style of governance, which shifts away from rule primarily based on the redistribution of resources or the mediation of social struggles, i posit that risk management reflects this tension between the programmatic and operational dimensions of governing emu. offering potential insights into the trajectory of emu in its institutional capacity to manage and enforce this regulatory bloc by introducing new forms of governance and analytical instrumentality, the governmentality approach best captures this relationship. arguably, the underlying model for policy in emu remains opaque as the different mandates assigned to the ecb (price stability) and member states (output stabilization) create a de facto policy conflict. what results is a high-risk strategy that is neither linear nor guaranteed in the successful development of a european monetary space. in effect, the sgp resembles a “contract” amongst countries that retain sovereignty over fiscal policies. unlike a conventional contract, however, its politicized nature thwarts its enforcement by legal means. thus, the “essence of the pact is not a mechanism of ‘quasiautomatic sanctions’ but the institutionalization of a political pledge to aim for low deficits” (heipertz & verdun 2004: 770). fiscal indiscipline is a political failure. thus, the primary research interest that i pursue in this paper considers how monetary governance is influenced by the politics of risk and uncertainty associated with fiscal profligacy. does the fact that half the members who have adopted the euro have also breached its rules signal that surveillance as regulation is being displaced as a mode of governance? how does this differentiated assessment of sgp statutes problematize the changing governmental perceptions of the problem of european monetary management? more appropriately, how can the “audit”, as a quantification of risk and institutionalization review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 8 of value, be used to regulate this asymmetric application of the sgp? it calls for a reimaged spatial-temporal explanation of governance to adequately capture the political economy of emu. risk and uncertainty, as particular modes of governing, are instrumental in examining this problematic and helping understand (1) changing nature of the governance function, (2) the emergence of new authoritative institutions and mechanisms, (3) shifting power relations, wealth production and economic growth. drawing attention to and historicizing the mechanisms of governance and the discourses embedded within these practices will reveal the audit to be a program for indirect control or “government at a distance”. in deciphering the trajectory of the euro and analyzing how this space is governed, this argument is developed in five stages. the first section will detail the problematic. next, i will introduce the reader to the conceptual territory of risk and uncertainty as modes of governance, which underpin the development of a european monetary space. the following section will demonstrate how mainstream integration theories are lackluster in explaining the sgp crisis. this literature privileges a mainly materialistic conception of power and neglects certain institutional mechanisms of monetary control, such as the audit, and associated relational forms of power. having catalogued competing yet inadequate explanations of how the euro is governed and why clear regulations associated with its management are being so blatantly breached, i will proceed to introduce the governmentality approach as a better account of the phenomena in question. here practices and technologies of risk management will be analyzed as these migrate into the emu domain. from this discussion the various power systems at play in emu will be revealed. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 9 continuing, attention will be devoted to an investigation into how the audit acts as a force in the production of monetary objects of knowledge. i will operationalize how the audit functions as a technology of risk in the internalization of self-regulation, which may be deployed in promoting sustainable public finances and fiscal convergence. the problematic beset with problems right from its introduction in 1999, the euro quickly depreciated against the dollar and the entire regime looked vulnerable as italy seemed unable to meet its budgetary obligations (jones 2002). fiscal profligacy continues to pose a high risk to the common monetary policy and its ultimate objective of price stability. unsound budgetary policies threaten to increase inflationary pressures through fiscal expansion (issing 2004: 9; stiglitz and greenwald 2003). as such, deficit financing undermines confidence in the price stability oriented monetary policy of the european central bank (ecb) as it is expected that government borrowing will be monetarily financed. yet, little did the architects of emu realize that this problem was only going to be exacerbated by the very champion of fiscal prudence, namely germany, as well as a handful of other states. the stability and growth pact (sgp), designed to ensure fiscal sustainability and prevent negative spill-over effects on interest rates across member states, has progressively come under attack as the rules prescribing government deficit (3% of gdp) and debt (60% of gdp) levels are breached. this asymmetric application of the sgp by governments undermines the stability of the euro and the common monetary policy, and exposes institutional inconsistencies apparent in governing the emu. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 10 built upon an asymmetric architecture with a common monetary policy but decentralized budgetary and wage setting arrangements, the emu is hardly an optimal currency area (oca) (mundell 1961). underlying its fiscal framework is the mentality that privileges rules over discretion in the attempt to preserve the credibility of economic policy (jespersen in ljungberg 2004: 54). although imposing a pro-cyclical policy acts as a constraint, states cannot be trusted from seeking the short-term political gains that result from a relaxed fiscal stance and free-ride as more responsible members adhere to the rules and shoulder a greater adjustment burden. already the implication for potential abuse is apparent. the paradox, however, is that “the declared intention is to keep political discretion at a minimum in order to prevent opportunism by governments that are both subject to, and the executors of, the pact” (schelkle 2005: 375). here lies the dilemma in reconciling the programmatic aspect of emu with its operational component. such a conflict of interest has stirred a contentious debate, which culminated in november 25, 2003 when the council of ministers in the economic and financial affairs (ecofin) decided to suspend the excessive deficit procedure (edp) against the primary authors of the sgp, germany and france. acknowledging that they were in violation, ecofin rejected commission recommendations to sanction the two members “sounding the death knell for the unloved stability and growth pact (sgp) and also challenging recommendations to member states under the broad economic policy guidelines (bepgs)” (begg & schelkle 2004: 86). in response, the commission launched an action in the european court of justice (ecj) questioning the legal basis for ecofin’s decision. the ecj sided with the commission and annulled the november ruling. nonetheless, the annulment did not indicate whether penalties should be imposed nor did review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 11 it resolve the outstanding question of what to do next? on the one hand, what remains is a deficit bias of fiscal policies that is ultimately unsustainable and a behaviour that the sgp has apparently failed to eradicate. on the other hand, what is clear is: that if the problem is primarily one of adherence to the rules, the priority should be to ensure rigorous implementation of the existing rules rather than to change them. at the same time, it is widely recognized that simply attempting to apply the existing rules after the watershed of november 2003 is not a viable option. reestablishing a sense of ownership of the fiscal rules by all parties would be the precondition for their effective enforcement (buti 2006: 9). all this culminates in the need for a revamped approach to governing the fiscal operations of emu. an assemblage of risk, uncertainty and calculations problematizing and deconstructing the euro is instrumental in helping understand how governance is affected by the movement to a strong regulatory approach with an emphasis on quantitative targets, intervention and sanctions. this managerial approach posits that the future of the emu should be governed through risk and uncertainty. as opposed to defining uncertainty as the incalculable risk, which is favoured by ulrich beck and most “risk society” theorists, i prefer to adopt the distinction that pat o’malley makes (beck 1999; ericson & doyle 2003). whereas risk is a quantifiable frequency of an undesirable event, uncertainty may be understood as a subjective estimation, as the “fluid art of the possible” (o’malley 2004: 5). however, this variation should not be interpreted as a rigid binary as they overlap in certain areas. understood nominalistically rather than as a totalizing theory, governance is always spatialized and temporal since it defines the area, both geographical and discursive, and review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 12 time that authority may be exercised to achieve particular objectives. accordingly, “power now has a new form: the knowledge and command of space” (mitchell 2002: 90). it is this transmission and circulation of statistical information that emerges as a method of governing the euro (eu presidency conclusions – 22 and 23 march 2005). by scrutinizing vast amounts of economic code via the sgp, a reality is constituted embodying the values of organizational discipline and accountability. the “feedback loop is the locus of the critique of information” (lash 2002: 112). one of the most visible feedback technologies in emu regime of financial control is the audit. even though it forms only a part of the broader regulatory framework, it works to institutionalize the emu as a field of knowledge by framing problems in a largely quantitative manner while organizing relationships according to reference values. audits grant power and authority to figures and abstract modeling (strathern 2000). they “promise to compensate for the lack of government regulatory oversight and to provide accountability for organizational behaviour” (courville et al 2003: 180). moreover, audits increase transparency, which should be a key objective of any central bank. the origins of this mode of governance are unique neither to emu nor politics for that matter. they have migrated into the emu domain from the private sector where risk analysis has been a powerful tool, dating from the beginning of the century to the current neoliberal push to minimize costs and maximize profits (knight 1921). michael power has identified three primary elements that have been adopted by political authorities. all three are visible in emu. the first concerns the emergence of risk-based “internal control” in redefining organizational governance. early warning systems, such as those employed by ecofin, externalize institutional control arrangements. next is “operational risk”, defined review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 13 by the basel committee as “the risk of direct or indirect loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems or from external events” (basel 2001, http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs_wp8.pdf ). finally, the category of “reputational risk” connects the question of legitimacy and power with organizational identity (power 2004). the second understanding that we arrive at by problematizing the sgp is how new authoritative institutions and actors function within this monetary space. the ecb has replaced a plurality of decision-making centres. by moving to a monetary union, europe has resolved the four elements of what tommaso padoa-schioppa labels as the “inconsistent quartet” (padoa-schioppa 1998, http://www.ecb.int/press/key/date/ 1998/html/sp981203_1.en.html). the argument posits that fixed exchange rates, complete capital mobility, free trade, and autonomous national monetary policy cannot coexist simultaneously. with pegged rates and highly integrated financial markets “any attempt to pursue independent monetary objectives is almost certain…to result in a significant balance-of-payments disequilibrium, and hence provoke potentially destabilizing flows of speculative capital” (cohen 1993: 147). aside from the ecb, the european court of auditors (court) reports on the accounts of the eu as a whole. the push to increase the surveillance authority and reach of the court along with eurostat, allowing for the direct assessment of the quality of financial operations of member states, only reinforces the notion that quantitative measures are necessary for the constitution of a healthy monetary space. most revealing, however, is the recognition of subtle, institutional mechanisms of monetary control, such as the audit. mainstream theories fail to analyze how these accounting systems constitute the real emu space thereby rendering it governable in economic terms. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 14 thirdly, not only is the territorial basis of power problematized but how power is exercised also changes with the construction of emu. transnational audits qualify and quantify economic activity according to new european benchmarks, thereby disrupting traditional forms of power rooted in the nation-state. here power “works in part through its ability to name, to define and to describe certain people and places as being different from others” (larner & le heron 2004: 219). being identified as a fiscally prudent state (e.g. germany prior to 2002) is thought to translate into superior economic performance thereby bestowing a considerable amount of authority to shape the emu agenda whereas fiscal profligacy does the opposite (e.g. greece). granted that money is the ultimate expression of political power relations, problematizing european monetary governance allows us to better understand how power functions. determining where and how conduct is governed privileges particular regimes of power over others. national ownership of the fiscal framework is essential to enhancing economic performance and preventing sovereign states from ceding too much power to unaccountable supranational bodies, such as the ecb or the commission. critics contend that the sgp is overtly rigid, “forcing countries to restrain fiscal policies in difficult times and exacerbate cyclical volatility” while “inhibiting growth by limiting useful public expenditures (e.g. on investment)” (issing 2004: 9). however, the flouting of the sgp by member states and its asymmetric application by ecofin undermine the management of the common currency as serious harm that is inflicted on the credibility of a common monetary policy. a rules-based fiscal framework that fosters transparency, consistency and equal treatment is essential for establishing effective economic and monetary governance. part of this involves establishing eu-wide standards for the compilation and review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 15 reporting of fiscal statistics (com (2004) 581). next, strengthening eu governance of fiscal statistics necessitates enhancing eurostat’s operational capacity by granting it right to check government accounts directly. to achieve sound budgetary policies across diverse states requires a regulatory approach that adequately quantifies levels of assurance and institutionalizes the value of fiscal conduct. direct audits executed by eurostat may be capable of just that and may increasingly serve to discipline national authorities to adhere to the fiscal statutes. here discipline is a positive force as it fosters the internalization of self-regulation. embedded within regulatory practices are discourses of risk and uncertainty, which are institutionalized through the deployment of the audit as a calculative form of control. minimizing exposure to risk and uncertainty, emu “governance is not about policing or surveillance in the normal sense of external observation” but “has more to do with attempts to re-order the collective and individual selves that make up organizational life” (power 1997: 123). this entails accepting the superiority of knowledge derived from mathematical methods and technical expertise as a mode of governance. european integration theories transposed on a larger scale, fiscal control does not reside in a central european authority but is premised on the notion of self-regulation by member states. undoubtedly, this is one of the reasons why the sgp is so blatantly flouted. with the absence of any credible, overarching supervision or enforcement, members are more prone to violating its conditions if it suits their interests. nevertheless, the idea of transferring economic command to the supranational level is not being seriously entertained as fiscal review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 16 sovereignty is a sacred cow of the state (puetter 2004). the governmentality literature adequately accounts for this phenomenon as it captures the various layers of economic and monetary regulation and the risk management practices and discourses inherent in them. such an understanding of emu lends itself well to the network metaphor of connecting different spaces at the cores and peripheries. political power is defined by the proximity to european monetary centres (i.e. frankfurt) in a hierarchy of nodes and areas that are connected by flows of individuals, capital and information. however, given its nonlinear and discontinuous character, this network is prone to multiple failures. making these risks and uncertainties auditable and governable is how the emu operates. yet, before forging ahead with the merits of this approach in relation to the problem of monitoring and auditing failure, namely risk regulation, it is wise to develop a better understanding of one of the more compelling theoretical explanations. at a time when the nation-state is reasserting itself in the process of european integration, intergovernmentalists emphasize the national interests of germany, france and portugal, to name but a few, as the key factors behind the turmoil (hodson 2004: 231). building on earlier analyses of thinkers such as andrew moravcsik (1998) and geoffrey garrett (1995), the relevant decision-making mechanism is an institutionalized form of inter-state bargaining. within the european council but particularly within ecofin, member governments are dominant in determining the course of emu (scharpf 1999; zangl & rittberger 2006). here the influence of supranational actors is considered as limited. they are important insofar as they inform the preferences of national governments. intergovernmentalism serves to clarify this interaction and predicts outcomes based on the relative power of member states. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 17 it is intergovernmentalist preoccupations with materialism and individualistic explanations of behaviour that allows them to draw a causal conclusion between the relative power of france and germany and their escape from sanctions in 2003 (chang 2006). during the first years of stage three, larger countries failed to consolidate their public finances sufficiently to attain the position of “close to balance or in surplus” that constitutes the medium-term rule at the heart of the sgp (council resolution no 1466/97). given the prolonged economic slowdown, the french and german deficits breached the 3 percent limit in 2003 (4.1% and 3.9% respectively) and subsequent years. together they dominated ecofin and therefore managed to orchestrate a blocking coalition against the commission’s proposal to begin the edp (de haan et al 2004: 236). again, national interests superseded those of the broader community and supranational institutions, such as the ecb. in the end, sgp dictates are enforced by ecofin, which “manifestly does not have the collective capacity to commit itself to an impartial, consistent enforcement of the rules” (buiter 2003: 15). arguably, most versions of intergovernmentalism are prone to the charge of reductionism with their preoccupation with a unitary state. they “offer refined decisionmaking and interest aggregation theories against the background of game theoretic concepts, while still lacking a genuine interest theory” as “interests and preferences as exogenous to the model” (wolf in verdun 2002: 30). moreover, these accounts fail to capture how monetary integration is shaped by societal actors. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 18 analytics of government as mentioned above, an analytics of government is more conducive to conceptualizing emu as a network/assemblage of a diverse set of practices in which discourses of risk and uncertainty are embedded. according to mitchell dean, an assemblage “is a way of thinking about entities as multiplicities rather than unities, as complex ensembles of discontinuous elements and forces bound by heteromorphic relations” (dean 1996: 55). irreducible to a basic essence, the assemblage does not privilege some fixed state of affairs but is malleable, reflecting the changing problem of government with the asymmetric application of the sgp. no longer is the primary focus of emu defined as the direct “control over specifically capitalist processes, the redistribution of resources, or the mediation of social struggles, but in terms of meta-processes of knowledge production and problem solving” (barry & walters 2003: 319). increasingly, it relies on performative technologies to project a particular vision of what is considered appropriate behaviour in order to enforce a homogenous set of fiscal practices across different contexts. government seeks to address the problem of controlling the economy, which has itself become an object of rule. making sense of how a space labeled “emu” is organized and rendered thinkable for the purposes of government will allow for an assessment of its relative merits as a field of intervention. furthermore, this shift privileges membership constituted in economic terms making the evaluation of “good standing” all the more dependent on expertise and technologies of risk management. governmentality studies concentrate on how the emu is constructed as an object of knowledge and how its “space, movement, sequence and position” are manipulated by technologies such as the audit (mitchell in steinmetz 1999: 86). review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 19 monetary relations are exemplary of “socio-technical” links where actuarial/ expertise knowledge shapes the cultural and intersubjective aspects of life (mauer 2002: 16). it is a blend of statistical information and societal expectations, which produces a notion of how we should organize and interact within the economy. not only is currency a material medium of exchange but it is a discursively constituted practice of representation (de goede 2005). intergovernmentalist explanations fail to recognize this social construction of the euro. instead we are presented with either ex ante bargaining scenarios. being contestable and historically contingent a governmentality approach is instructive to deciphering how the euro emerges as a problem of government. with the shift to emu, no longer are currency challenges restricted to the exclusive authoritative domain of state sovereignty, even though the ecofin crisis demonstrates that this cannot be readily discounted. monetary authority is increasingly dislodged from this traditional locus and centred in the ecb, necessitating a revamped approach to governing monetary relations in the emerging spatial order. problematizing the asymmetric application of the sgp reveals how power is exercised in the construction of emu conceived of as a struggle between national and european versions of risk-centred governance. given the substantive ambiguity associated with the practice of auditing, an array of power systems is identifiable that is relevant for conceptualizing the audit as a territory of government. by remanagerializing risk audits help uphold the myths of control as calculations encourage conformity to a set standard. with the emergence of risk and uncertainty as dominant modes of rule, “sovereignty” and “discipline” have not been completely displaced by the art of “government” (foucault in burchell et al. 1991: 101). rather the idea of a government of economy introduces a self-regulating element to the review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 20 organization of emu. the sgp envisioned members as enterprising subjects entrusted with the responsibility of prudently managing their fiscal books. audits function as a subtle mechanism reinforcing this sovereignty. the chance that members will deviate from their expected roles ushers in a politics of uncertainty and the need for self-regulation. accordingly, the audit is valuable in addressing not only questions of discipline but government as well. recognized as the continuous exercise of power through surveillance, individualization and normalization it works by constituting the subject as an object of knowledge (barry et al 1996: 8). in accordance, michael power notes that “governance is not to do with policing or surveillance in the normal sense of external observations” but “has more to do with attempts to re-order the collective and individual selves that make up organizational life” (power 1997: 146). the governmentality literature concentrates on discipline, sovereignty and government in the contested production of modern subjects and rationalities underlying the spatial-temporal organization of emu. aside from discipline and government, “control” is another power system that is relevant when discussing the sgp. acknowledging that failure is possible across multiple sites of this assemblage labeled emu, the “modulation” of conduct programmed into daily practice may reveal how governance is transforming with the shift to modes of risk and uncertainty (deleuze 1995). whereas discipline entailed both individualization and normalization, regimes of control are concerned with the “administrative management of populations at risk, anticipating ‘possible loci of dangerous irruptions through the identification of sites statistically locatable in relation to norms and means’” (castel in rose 1999: 235). therefore, the objective is to regulate deviance rather than to reform the review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 21 actor. this capacity and propensity of member states to violate the rules and norms of monetary union is established through codes, accounts and feedback loops. a caveat is in order when discussing the variety of power systems at play in the emu. in the first instance, november 2003 called attention to the potential deterioration of the normalizing force implicit in the sgp and its related arsenal of technologies. member states readily breached the deficit and debt ceilings, questioning the disciplinary power of accounting measures. portugal joined the ranks of germany and france in 2003 as being subject to the edp. shortly after, in june 2004, the netherlands was added to the list of delinquents and advised in a formal ‘early warning’ from ecofin. since then greece and italy have come under scrutiny for lax fiscal positions leading to violations of the sgp (http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l25019.htm). therefore, half the members who have adopted the euro have breached its rules. is surveillance as regulation being displaced as a mode of governance? could “actuarial” power prove to be more dominant in risk-centred governance? assigning actors to risk pools recasts them as calculative and prudent liberal subjects capable of controlling their susceptibility to fiscal profligacy (simon 1988; ewald in burchell et al 1991). if so, would an alternative form of fiscal coordination as a form of collective insurance be more effective in achieving stabilization with “actuarial” power as its most prominent articulation? rather than continuing with the “disciplinarian device” rationality of the present sgp, a “stabilization as insurance” approach to fiscal policy coordination pools the uncertainty of national economies experiencing asynchronous business cycles at a higher level of aggregation (schelkle 2005: 378). compensation as opposed to punishment would be favoured in the event of a review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 22 negative shock. however, this should not be construed as a perfect solution as certain inconsistencies surface that detract from its value; its tolerance for variation being one. marieke de goede notes that “governing through statistics is both an individualizing and a totalizing power” (de goede 2005: 92). managing risk and uncertainty through the audit also involves identifying and classifying the potential deviance of a collective without necessarily reforming the individual subject. this regulatory approach is associated with an “actuarial” form of power in that it seeks to “alter the physical and social structures within which individuals behave” without directly changing the actor (simon 1988: 773). incapacitation of the aggregate group at risk is the objective. aside from this feature, actuarial techniques possess two further characteristics. risk classification often produces unique categories that are removed from daily experience. similar to the practice of designating an object as “auditable”, resistance is more difficult given it is not readily recognizable. finally, actuarial technologies “act in situ rather than by separation or exclusion of deviant cases, and as a by-product have less need to be coercive” (o’malley in barry et al 1996: 191). by signaling who is more prone to fiscal profligacy the audit constrains some degree of autonomy as all member states are part of a common monetary pool. this distributive characteristic is visible when emu risk management practices differentiate between the prudent “scandinavian” states and the more fiscally lax “mediterranean” economies (jones 2002). acknowledging that: uncertainty is a characteristic modality of liberal governance that relies both on a creative constitution of the future with respect to positive and enterprising dispositions of risk taking and on a corresponding stance of reasonable foresight or everyday prudence (distinct from both statistical and expert-based calculation) with respect to potential harms, review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 23 actuarial techniques may provide an alternate method for dealing with the asymmetric application of the sgp (o’malley 2000: 461). spreading and minimizing the dangers of fiscal uncertainty through an insurance-like scheme may help reinforce stability in emu. auditable objects of governance having established the emu as a space of monetary activity with identifiable parameters, power systems and mentalities of rule predicated on risk and uncertainty, i now proceed to investigate how the audit acts as a force in the production of monetary objects of knowledge. understood as mechanisms through which risk is portrayed for managerial purposes, audits: can be described in as an instrument of definitional risk management, effectively subsuming those risks which are open to social definition and construction within a new managerialism with its own esoteric risk knowledges (power in hopwood & miller 1994: 312). by transforming the administration and objects of risk governance, the audit is perceived as reducing the susceptibility of the sgp to failure. hence, it has a performative function that extends beyond simply measuring performance, according to benchmarks, to being a social and institutional practice. embodying the principles of accountability, organizational discipline and transparency the audit attempts to classify an unknown future. “auditability” renders subjects and risks manageable as it “travels well across space and time, is capable of being propagated in a multitude of locales, channeling and organizing activities and linking centres of calculation to sites of implementation according to new vectors” (rose in barry et al 1996: 55). being both temporal and spatial, governing through statistics reveals certain regularities about the political economy of emu. risk sharing in the sgp is renegotiated by making the time frame for correcting excessive deficits more conditional on economic growth. although “accepted for the close to balance provision as it supports review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 24 stabilization”, it is inappropriate for the “edp where the risks to macroeconomic stability were considered more important than the desire for risk sharing” (schuknecht 1994: 23). recognizing the differences in degree in which these behaviours and events are susceptible to failure offers the opportunity of stability through regulation. in this manner, the audit “creates specific patterns of visibility and performativity” as it institutionalizes a risk management system geared to securing a homogenous set of fiscal practices across different european contexts (power in hopwood & miller 1994: 308). communicating economic irregularities is essential for the successful functioning of a reformed sgp, especially in a system of national accounts that is hampered by delays and the manipulation of data. one only has to look to portugal in 2001 or the more dire case of greece, which as it turns out had swollen deficits in excess of 3% of gdp since 1997 (http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l25071.htm). hence, the availability of accurate information is vital and: the new pact acknowledges the importance of high-quality, timely and reliable fiscal statistics and pledges to ensure the independence, integrity and accountability of both national statistical offices and eurostat. the availability of better statistics should be complemented by a more comprehensive surveillance of fiscal variables (buti 2006: 15). problematizing european monetary affairs in terms of deficit and debt to gdp ratios, among a variety of statistical variables, privileges the audit as one particular style of processing risk as this space called emu is understood as a series of numerical propensities, which may be verified against a standard. as such, solutions to guarding against adverse outcomes are conceptualized in terms of expertise and technologies of risk. good governance, however, relies on multiple principles of accounting ranging from surveillance to verification to supervision (deuchars 2004: 164). the audit is one part of review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 25 this configuration but it is also arguably one of the most visible and powerful institutions of risk processing (power 2004). given the vast spatial and informational geography of emu it is inefficient and extremely costly to directly monitor the monetary practices of each member state in an overarching fashion. the audit performs such a “governance-at-adistance” function as a “responsibilizing technology” (miller 1992). it categorizes objects of emu and makes them intelligible according to a rationality that emphasizes discipline and accountability with respect to economic conduct. modes of financial calculation become the dominant form of rule, transforming how objects of knowledge are conceived as a problem of monetary governance. timetables, balance sheets and other disciplinary institutions regulate emu conduct. audits exemplify one such technology as they assign a risk value to the fiscal conduct of member states, indicating how far from the prescribed sgp policy objectives they are operating, thereby rendering them auditable. since the suggestion to establish independent monitoring bodies at the national level was rejected, enforcement must take on a more discrete form in addition to the direct monitoring by eurostat. member states are accorded freedom in the management of their economic affairs while simultaneously being transformed into visible, calculable objects of government. such a spatial configuration allows emu “to be represented as a series of financial flows, enables the evaluation of these spaces according to a financial rationale and allows particular forms of action upon component parts of the organization” (miller 1992: 76). we come to recognize and understand euro-zone by the monthly or quarterly balance of payments statistics disseminated by the ecb or that indicator-based forecasts for eurozone gdp growth show a range of 0.4% to 0.8% for the first quarter of 2006 (http://epp. eurostat.cec.eu.int/cache/ity_offpub/ks-bj-06-002/en/ks-bj-06-002-en.pdf.) review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 26 liberty also reveals the “uncertainty” inherent in governing the emu as estimating if and when a member will breach the sgp remains subjective guesswork. uncertainty challenges a fundamental assumption underpinning risk; that the future reproduces the past. unfortunately, it is seldom analyzed as a distinctive modality of governance. harmonization is central to this programmatic and stipulates that all member states implement the accounting directives (fourth european company law directive & seventh consolidated accounts directive). instead of devising its own set of rules, the eu decided to import international accounting standards (ias) (van hulle in leuz et al 2004: 349). the intent was to subject national regulatory schemes to international pressures for harmonization. yet, harmonization is not equivalent to uniformity. the differences between the financial statements of enterprises need only to be reduced so that they do not impede the efficiency of the european capital market. in practice, however, the push towards harmonization through the directives has seen limited success. national accounting systems still exist and globalization has curtailed the competitiveness of eu firms (flower 2002: 211). nevertheless, accounting measures designed to regulate the neoliberal private sector are increasingly being transposed onto the supranational level in order to govern the accounts of states themselves. with the “admixture of administrative and political themes…public sector auditing implicates questions about the distribution of authority and control in a way that financial auditing does not” (power 1997: 45). recently, imperfect links with national accounting agencies coupled with what harden identifies as “a spending culture in conflict with constraint values”, have impeded the precise and efficient monitoring of eu accounts (harden in power 1997: 48). acknowledging the deficiencies in the compilation and reporting of fiscal data (i.e. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 27 greece 2004), the commission has issued a “european governance strategy for fiscal statistics” with the aim of enhancing the integrity and accountability of budgetary management and by extension the sgp (com (2004) 832). to strengthen the governance of fiscal statistics the commission proposed the following three measures: – first, the relevant provisions on the quality of statistical data used in the context of the excessive deficit procedure should be clarified. a proposal will be presented, aiming at supplementing the existing rules by strengthening data monitoring mechanisms. under existing law, the commission (eurostat) lacks the power to monitor government accounts directly. the existing set of rules needs to be extended to ensure that eurostat, as the statistical authority, can carry out effective checks on the data notified by member states – second, the operational capacities of the commission, most notably eurostat and of the directorate-general for economic and financial affairs need to be improved. systematic planning of existing missions, plus longer and more in-depth verification missions, are required. – third, there is a need to establish europe-wide standards as regards the independence, integrity and accountability of the national statistical institutes. (http://epp.eurostat.cec.eu.int/cache/ity_public/fiscal_statistics/en/ fiscal_statistics-en.pdf). these proposed reforms that would allow eurostat to directly audit the books of member states enhance surveillance thereby heightening the potential disciplining force exerted on national governments to respect fiscal regulations. few would dispute the claim that the current enforcement structure is weak. for real reform to occur, however, some degree of national fiscal sovereignty must be relinquished. audits strike a necessary balance between maintaining fiscal sovereignty and accountability. however, rather than governing through risk, as is evident with regards to the ecb, within regulatory policy audits it is discourses of “uncertainty” which are embedded. given this lack of knowledge about an unwanted outcome, generating quantitative guidelines for monitoring contingency is difficult. as is currently the case with the sgp, states may violate whatever regulations review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 28 are tabled and in the process jeopardize the monetary union. no statistical method exists for predicting which state will breach the pact, when and how it will happen. hence, these subjective probabilities must be governed through uncertainty as the unanticipated contingency is ever present making discipline all the more significant. conclusion the focus of this paper is to analyze how monetary management is affected by the divergent application of sgp statutes. there is a visible tension between the commission and ecofin, which the ecj ruling did not reconcile. essentially, the court annulled the november decision clarifying the procedural dimension but it did not direct ecofin to impose any sanctions. now the commission must prepare a fresh recommendation, which ecofin may reject (de haan et al 2004). arguably, this renders the sgp virtually impotent as national governments will avoid imposing penalties onto themselves. both scenarios pose a high risk to the existence of the fiscal framework even in its revamped configuration, effectively jeopardizing the credibility and stability of the common monetary policy. therefore, new forms of governance are necessary in order to prevent another potentially more damaging crisis. what the governmentality approach offers is a new analytical instrumentality with which to understood and even manage the political economy of emu. in the process, we come to terms with how the audit achieves its authority and how it is being redefined within the broader emu regulatory context. mainstream theories fail to recognize how the audit functions as a normalizing mechanism for monetary control. what this omits is an understanding of emu as a unique space, imbued with its own set of discourses and their practices of governance. two of the most dominant are those of risk and uncertainty. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 29 bibliography barry, andrew, thomas osborne and nikolas rose, eds. 1996. foucault and political reason. chicago: university of chicago press. barry, andrew and william walters. 2003. “from euratom to ‘complex systems’: technology and european government”. alternatives. 28: 305-329. basel committee on banking supervision. 2001. sound practices for the management and supervision of operational risk (basel: bank for international settlements, december). beck, ulrich. 1999. the world risk society. malden: blackwell publishers. begg, iain and waltraud schelkle. 2004. “the pact is dead: long live the pact”. national institute economic review. 189: 86-98. buiter, w. h.. 2003. “how to reform the stability and growth pact?”, ebrd mimeo. burchell, graham, colin gordon and peter miller. 1991. the foucault effect. chicago: chicago university press. buti, macro. 2006. “will the new stability and growth pact succeed? an economic and political perspective”. http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications /economic_ papers/2006/ecp241en.pdf). chang, michelle. 2006. “reforming the stability and growth pact: size and influence in emu policymaking”, journal of european integration, 28 (1): 107-120. cohen, benjamin. ed. 1993. the international political economy of monetary relations. london: edward elgar publishing. dean, mitchell. 1996. “putting the technological into government”. history of the human science. 9(3): 47-68. de goede, marieke. 2005. virtue, fortune, and faith. minneapolis: university of minnesota press. de hann, j, h. berger and d.-j. hansen. “why the stability and growth pact failed?” international finance. 7.2 (2004): 235–260. deleuze, gilles. 1995. negotiations. translated by m. joughin, new york: columbia university press. deuchars, robert. 2004. the international political economy of risk. burlington: ashgate review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 30 publishing company. dyson, kenneth. 2000. the politics of the euro-zone. new york, oxford university press. ericson, richard v., aaron. doyle and dean. barry. 2003. insurance as governance. toronto: u of t press. european central bank: http://www.ecb.int/home/html/index.en.html. european parliament: http://www.europarl.eu.int european union: http://europa.eu.int flower, j. 1994. the regulation of financial reporting in the nordic countries. stockholm: fritzes. garrett, geoffrey. 1995. “the politics of legal integration in the european union”. international organization. 49 (1): 171-181. gros, daniel, thomas mayer and angel ubide. 2004. “the dog that lost its bark: the commission and the stability pact”, ceps policy brief, 18. heipertz, martin and amy verdun. 2004. “the dog that would never bite? what we can learn from the origins of the stability and growth pact”. journal of european public policy. 11(5): 765-80. hodson, dermont. 2004. “macroeconomic co-ordination in the euro area: the scope and limits of the open method”, journal of european public policy, 11(4): 231-248. hopwood, anthony and peter miller, eds. 1994. accounting as social and institutional practice. cambridge: cambridge up. issing, otmar. 2004. “the stability and growth pact: the appropriate fiscal framework for emu”, international economics and economic policy. 1: 9-13. jones, erik. 2002. the politics of economic and monetary union. new york: rowman & littlefield publishers. knight, frank. 1921 (1964). risk, uncertainty and profit. new york: a.m. kelley. larner, wendy and r. le heron. 2004. “global benchmarking.” in global governmentality: governing international spaces, edited by wendy larner and william walters. london: routledge. lash, scott. 2002. critique of information. london: sage publications. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 31 leuz, christian, dieter pfaff and anthony hopwood. 2004. the economics and politics of accounting. new york: oxford university press. ljungberg, jonas, ed. 2004. the price of the euro. new york: palgrave macmillan. mauer, bill. 2002. “repressed futures: financial derivatives’ theological unconscious”. economy and society. 31(1): 13-36. miller, peter. 1992. “accounting and objectivity: the invention of calculating selves and calculable spaces”. annals of scholarship. 9: 61-86. mitchell, tim. 2002. rule of experts. berkeley: university of california press. moravcsik, andrew. 1998. the choice for europe. new york: cornell university press. mundell, robert. 1961. “a theory of optimum currency areas”, american economic review. 51 (4). o’malley, pat. 2000. “introduction: configurations of risk”. economy and society. 29 (4): 460-84. o’malley, pat. 2004. risk, uncertainty and government. london: glasshouse press. power, michael. 1997. the audit society : rituals of verification. new york: oxford university press. power, michael. 2003. “evaluating the audit explosion”, law & policy. 25 (3): 115-202. power, michael. 2004. the risk management of everything: rethinking the politics of uncertainty. london: demos. pryke, michael and john allen. 2000. “monetized time-space: derivative-money’s ‘new imaginary’”, economy and society. 29 (2): 264-284. puetter, uwe. 2004. “governing informally: the role of the eurogroup in emu and the stability and growth pact”, journal of european public policy. 11 (5): 854-870. rose, nikolas. 1999. powers of freedom. cambridge: cambridge university press. scharpf, fritz. 1999. governing in europe: effective and democratic? oxford: oup, 1999. schelkle, waltraud. 2005. “the political economy of fiscal policy co-ordination in emu: from disciplinarian device to insurance arrangement”, journal of common market studies. 43 (2): 371-91. simon, jonathan. 1998. “the ideological effects of actuarial practices”. law and society review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 32 review. 22. steinmetz, g, ed. 1999. state/culture: state formation after the cultural turn. ithaca: cornell up. stiglitz, joseph and bruce greenwald. 2003. towards a new paradigm in monetary economics. cambridge: cambridge university press. strathern, marilyn, ed. 2000. audit cultures. anthropological studies in accountability, ethics and the academy, (easa series) london: routledge. verdun, amy, ed. 2002 the euro: european integration theory and economic and monetary union. lanham, md.: rowman & littlefield publishers. zangl, bernhard and volker rittberger. 2006. international organisations. polity, policy, and politics houndsmills: palgrave. microsoft word hernan tesler-mabe_the union of laughter and forgetting the european union and the construction of its own his review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 4/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 8 ……………………………………………………… the union of laughter and forgetting? the european union and the construction of its own history hernan tesler-mabe abstract as recently as one year ago, the european union was seemingly on a direct path toward its avowed goal of "ever closer union." in numerous publications, eu authorities asserted that they had the confidence of european peoples desirous only of further integration. in the wake of the failed referenda for a european constitution, however, enthusiasts of european union can no longer be certain that their enterprise will succeed. the european union, once strong and united, seems now an entity teetering on the edge of collapse. the reasons for such a dramatic shift are, of course, wide-ranging. yet i would suggest that a great part of the general european disillusionment with european union has come about as a result of the actions of the europeanists themselves. over the last decades, european officials have exhibited a frightfully high incidence of revisionism in their literature. this practice, i argue, has caused many europeans to question the integrity of the project of european union. for my presentation, i intend to undertake a close study of a selection of documents published by the european communities. in this endeavour, i will compare and contrast the messages imparted in different editions of these works and consider the semiotic significance of the textual and non-textual language appearing therein. in this manner, i hope to achieve two aims. first, i mean to add a corrective element to a literature that, guided by a teleological interpretation of integration, endows integration with”logic" to be found only in hindsight. second, i intend to examine the many meanings that the eu has had over its history and assess how closely policy has adhered to the ideological goals of prominent europeanists. in sum, i hope to shed light on the fundamental disconnect between advocates of europe and the "man on the street" and help establish a dialogue which may contribute to resolving the current impasse within the european union. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 4/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 9 introduction ‘non.’ ‘nee.’ two little words, one great furor. in late spring 2005, the initiative for a european constitution was derailed after a majority of french and dutch voters voted ‘no’ in referenda that had been envisioned by the european communities as “an important step in the construction of europe.”1 until this setback, the construction of a new europe, strong, united and rapidly evolving towards its own vision of a progressive society had seemed to be on course. in numerous publications, the eu authorities asserted that they had the support of a european peoples desirous of a united europe.2 yet how was the task of convincing europe’s citizenry being accomplished? institutions of the european union, buoyed by a profound confidence in their goal of “ever closer union,” persistently produced a literature (propaganda to some, information to others) that explained the campaigns and competences of the european union and revealed the trajectory of european integration. this literature, however, exhibited a frightfully high incidence of revisionism, being substantively revised from edition to edition to present an ever more “correct” vision of recent european history. the cost of such a course was altogether too high -the recent failed initiative for a european constitution has soundly shaken the self-assurance of european integrationists and led to questioning the means by which the support of the european populace had been obtained. in light of this recent setback, the time has come to revisit 1 “a constitution for europe” (luxembourg: office for official publications of the european communities, 2004), 5. 2 european opinion polls show that europe’s citizenry has been largely in support of integration -the percentage of europeans desiring a unified europe remained well above the 80% mark between the years 1952 and 1985. the question posed to assess this feeling has traditionally been, “in general, are you for or against efforts made to unify western europe?” more recent sources have replaced “western europe” with “europe” but the results have remained largely unchanged. jean-claude deheneffe, europe as seen by europeans: european polling 1973-1986 (second edition) (luxembourg: office for official publications of the european communities, 1986), 28. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 4/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 10 the integrationist literature and explore the manner in which this body of work has sought to advance european integration. in this article, i undertake a close study of a set of documents published by the european communities between 1986 and 2000.3 written by authors closely connected to the project of european integration in a format and style suitable for general consumption, bearing the eu imprimatur and dealing extensively with the history of european integration and european history as a whole, these documents serve as a window into an integrationist literature that has aimed at helping to create a unified europe and to construct a shared european history. by comparing and contrasting the messages imparted in varying editions of these documents, i intend to add a corrective element to an eu literature that, guided by a teleological interpretation of integration, endows many aspects of the integrationist process with a “logic” to be found only in hindsight and reconstitutes european history to accord with present-day objectives. i hope to thus assist in providing a solution to the current integrationist impasse while in the process contributing to a vast academic literature that explores the process of european integration.4 3 the works examined are: pascal fontaine, europe -a fresh start: the schuman declaration 1950-90 (luxembourg: office for official publications of the european communities, 1990); pascal fontaine, a new idea for europe: the schuman declaration -1950-2000 (luxembourg: office for official publications of the european communities, 2000); klaus-dieter borchardt, european unification: the origins and growth of the european community (luxembourg: office for official publications of the european communities, 1986); klaus-dieter borchardt, european integration: the origins and growth of the european union (fourth edition) (luxembourg: office for official publications of the european communities, 1995); pascal fontaine, europe in ten lessons (second edition) (luxembourg: office for official publications of the european communities, 1995); pascal fontaine, europe in 10 points (third edition) (luxembourg: office for official publications of the european communities, 1998). 4 scholars across disciplines have engaged in an intensive study of european integration. cultural theorists such as peter van ham, anthropologists and sociologists such as maryon mcdonald and cris shore, and political scientists like mark pollack have all contributed interesting studies that ruminate on the meanings of the construction of europe, show the manner in which the european commission and other organs of the eu contribute to the construction of europe and shed considerable light on the policy processes and interinstitutional relations involved in the progression of european integration. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 4/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 11 i. pascal fontaine’s histories of the schuman declaration (1990 & 2000) pascal fontaine (b.1948) is a man whose european credentials run strong and deep. serving as the last assistant to jean monnet between 1973 and 1977, by the late 1980s fontaine had risen to principal administrator of the european parliament. in recent years, fontaine has been affiliated with the epp-ed group (the group of the european people's party (christian democrats) and european democrats) in the european parliament, acting as both deputy secretary general to the party as well as head of the party’s documentation, publication and research service. in essence, fontaine is a person possessing a close affiliation and sense of identification with the european project. meant to commemorate the 40th and 50th anniversaries of the schuman declaration, pascal fontaine’s europe -a fresh start: the schuman declaration 195090 (1990) and a new idea for europe: the schuman declaration -1950-2000 (2000) are substantially different in terms of how the events of the post-war period in european history have been interpreted by the author. despite the difference in the works’ titles and the different conclusions drawn in the two texts, however, it is clear from the most cursory of glances at the structure and contents of the publications that the latter work is a revision of the earlier text. in sum, the similarities establish the fact that these are merely different editions of the same text while the differences, the examination of which we shall now turn to, in aggregate serve to reconstitute history. since the early years of post-war integration, europeanists have often cast the history of europe as a continuous sweep in an effort to portray european integration as review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 4/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 12 the culmination of a common historical destiny.5 it is therefore surprising to find pascal fontaine attempting to disassociate the post-war european project from its historical antecedents by altering the passage which relates how “in extending a hand to recent enemies…[robert schuman] wiped away the bitterness of war and the weight of the past” (1990, p.5) to “he extended a hand to yesterday’s enemies and erased the bitterness of war and the burden of the past” (2000, p.5). with this change, fontaine effectively demarcates the end of the second world war as a phenomenon from a distinct historical period which has concluded and calls attention to the schuman declaration as the beginning of a new era in european history. fontaine’s depiction of the second world war as an event from a different historical period is consistent with a europeanist discourse that, according to antiintegrationist affiliations such as the bruges group, is a blatant offensive aimed at eroding the traditional nation-state building project of the 19th and early 20th centuries.6 such charges are supported by pascal fontaine’s description of jean monnet’s career. while fontaine initially described jean monnet’s political career in an apologetic manner, admitting that “although [monnet] never held political office,” (1990, p.10) by the time of the second version of his text, the author attempts to recast it as a positive, saying that monnet had remained “unfettered by any political mandate” (2000, p.11). by portraying the possession of a “political mandate” as a burden, fontaine’s subtle change 5 many examples of this type of literature exist, ranging from textbooks stressing the unity of european history (les memoires de l’europe), to works for children suggesting that today’s europe is far superior to past incarnations (der krieg ums himbeereis) and on to more discursive works such as those written by denis de rougement (the idea of europe). see bibliography for full citations. 6 this discourse, the most obvious examples of which are the initiatives undertaken as a consequence of the 1985 adonnino report (such as the creation of an official eu flag and the naming of the choral finale to beethoven’s 9th symphony as the eu’s “national” anthem) has resulted in anti-integrationists condemning these actions as attempts at having “the visible emblems of national identity [be] replaced by those of the supranational.” martin ball, et al, “federalist thought control: the brussels propaganda machine” http://www.brugesgroup.com/news.live?article=79&keyword=8#through [accessed 21 december 2004]. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 4/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 13 strips the nation-state of its role as a traditional source of political authority pascal fontaine’s work bears further evidence of an attempt to erode the import of the nation-state by undermining its agency in the construction of europe. in 1990, pascal fontaine proclaimed that “france is taking the first decisive step to rebuild europe and is inviting germany to play its part” (1990, p.13) while in the revised text the sentence is altered to read “france is now taking the first decisive step towards the construction of europe and is associating germany in this venture” (2000, p.13). in the new text, therefore, two fundamental changes are found. first, the original text used the verb “rebuild” to imply that european integration was to restore europe to its pre-war state and solely to fix what had gone wrong. by replacing “rebuild” with “construction,” the author implies that the project of european integration is no longer about correcting european problems but has become an attempt to create a new europe. second, “invite”, a word suggestive of directorship of a project or activity, is replaced by “associate”, a word used to convey the impression that both parties are part of a larger grouping or project and that neither has control of the enterprise. europe thus becomes an actor independent of its constituent states. the discussion of the directorship of the european project dovetails closely with the subject of the democratic deficit and how the eu is often seen as an entity that has assumed control over a wide-ranging set of competences despite having far too few channels through which european citizens can exercise democratic control. with this concern in mind, it comes as a surprise to find pascal fontaine revealing in his 1990 text “that the schuman plan was the result of a conspiracy” (1990, p.12). ten years on, numerous institutional changes later and doubtless mindful of the difficulties encountered review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 4/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 14 in ratifying the treaty of maastricht, this controversial and ill-chosen statement is removed. the historical record is thereby purged of a reference to an act of intrigue that only undermines the eu’s credibility in an era during which criticisms of the european union’s democratic deficit have been bandied about far too regularly to be ignored.7 pascal fontaine has also used his texts as a forum for laying out how the european union’s raison d’etre has changed. in 1990, for instance, the european union was envisioned by the author as an area in which “the merging of economic interests would help to raise the standard of living and pave the way for the establishment of an economic community” (1990, p.13) while ten years on this phrase is changed to read “the fusion of these economic interests will help to raise the standard of living and establish a european community” (2000, p.15). via this alteration, the author clearly shows that the economic role of the european union has been subsumed within the larger goal of creating a community whose form transcends the purely economic sphere. the moral and religious foundations of modern europe are also opaquely addressed by the author in his description of one of the founding fathers of european integration. in 1990, fontaine described robert schuman as a “native of lorraine” (1990, p.10). by 2000, however, robert schuman has become both “a native of lorraine and a christian” (2000, p.12). one may of course consider fontaine’s new appellation as merely the personal choice of an author who is, as evidenced by his affiliation with the epp-ed, fundamentally christian in outlook.8 that possibility, however, should not 7 the democratic deficit is a problem that has over the years increasingly plagued the eu in its quest for legitimacy. stefan elbe, for instance, points out that the democratic deficit is a problem that threatens to undermine the european integrationist project. see: stefan elbe, europe: a nietzschean perspective (london: routledge, 2003), 2-3. 8 the epp-ed is a european parliamentarian party which brings together the christian democratic and conservative parties of europe. for the religious/political nexus of the epp-ed, see the tenets professed by the party as well as the numerous ecumenical initiatives they have undertaken. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 4/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 15 obscure the fact that for many the construction of europe also means the construction of a christian edifice.9 moreover, the possibility that his views are synchronous with those of a majority of europeans corresponds with the worst fears of those who hold other values or adhere to other religions such as islam.10 meanwhile, europeans of the jewish faith are confronted with the fear of being both excised from the historical record as well as viewing the european union as a hostile entity that, if not encouraging anti-semitism, at least allows a space for it.11 in sum, the differences between pascal fontaine’s 1990 and 2000 texts underline the fact that fundamental changes had taken place in the european union throughout the 1990s and that by the end of the decade such changes were contributing to a sense of an impending completion to the project of european integration. in 1990, fontaine felt confident enough to only anticipate the completion of european integration, entitling the final section of his pamphlet “questions and answers for tomorrow’s europe” (1990, p.25). by 2000, the same section of the author’s pamphlet has been renamed “questions for the europe of the 21st century,” (2000, p.23) suggesting that europe has been http://www.epp-ed.org/home/en/aboutus.asp [accessed december 18, 2004]. 9 at a european study congress exploring the creation of a european constitution in june 2002, pope john paul ii presented a speech in which he stated “europe will need to draw inspiration with creative fidelity from the christian roots that have defined european history.” “message of john paul ii to the european study congress on the theme: ‘towards a european constitution?’” http://europa.eu.int/futurum/documents/speech/sp200602_2_en.pdf [accessed 20 december 2004] intriguingly, information has also come to light that, with the backing of jacques chirac, the diocese of metz has been working for the last 14 years on a campaign to have robert schuman sainted. ambrose evans-pritchard, “statesman unlikely to become saint” http://washingtontimes.com/world/20040818094347-6213r.htm [accessed 22 december 2004]. 10 talal asad, for instance, has arrived at the conclusion that “muslims are present in europe and yet absent from it.” talal asad, “muslims and european identity: can europe represent islam?” in the idea of europe: from antiquity to the european union, ed. anthony pagden, (cambridge: cambridge university press, 2002), 209-227. 11 in january 2004, romano prodi found himself having to respond to allegations made by mr. cobi benatoff (chairman, european jewish congress) and mr. edgar bronfman (world jewish congress) that some of the positions taken by the european commission over which he was presiding were anti-semitic. see: “eu commission president sets record straight on anti-semitism” http://www.eurunion.org/news/press/2004/2004001.htm [accessed 18 december 2004]. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 4/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 16 achieved as well as portending that europe will be in existence for the course of the 21st century. and while one may choose to view this change as being one that is merely reflective of the arrival of a new millennium, one cannot help but wonder whether such an alteration also reveals a profound confidence in the completion of european integration and a prediction of its permanence. ii. klaus-dieter borchardt’s histories of european integration (1986 & 1995) klaus-dieter borchardt’s career, like pascal fontaine’s, has been closely tied to the european union.12 borchardt’s literature on european integration (european unification: the origins and growth of the european community (1986) and european integration: the origins and growth of the european union (1995)) has meanwhile undergone extensive revision despite seeming sizably unchanged. and while these alterations were, according to the author, meant only to reflect the different times in which the texts were written, i suggest that they reflect not only changes in the course of recent european integration but amount to a sizeable reformulation of european history.13 like pascal fontaine, klaus-dieter borchardt must surely be aware that the successful completion of the european project could only be aided by limiting the effect of divisive events in european history. unlike fontaine, however, borchardt chooses not to distance present europe from the cataclysms of the first half of the european century but, rather, to emphasize these historical events as part of a common history. for instance, the author uses the opportunity to recast the two world wars as having begun as 12 borchardt (born in 1955) was educated in law at hamburg and berlin, worked with the european court of justice between 1990 and 1994, and has served in numerous posts in the commission from 1987 on. http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/fischer-boel/cabinet/borchardt_en.pdf [accessed june 30, 2006] 13 “[t]he differences between the first and the second edition [sic] are due to the developments of the european integration between 1986 and 1995.” klaus-dieter borchardt, email to the author, 23 december 2004. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 4/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 17 european civil wars. between the two texts, however, there is a subtle yet fundamental difference; in the 1986 text, “civil wars” (1986, p.6) is presented in quotes, thereby demarcating this as an unofficial version of history, while the 1995 text sees the quotations removed.14 in this manner, a heightened level of resonance is added to an interpretation of european history that stresses pan-european connections. over the years, the european union has assumed an ever greater number of competences that have brought into question whether the european union’s (and its predecessors’) activities in the economic sphere were meant solely as a first step in a political and cultural unification.15 such suspicions are borne out by borchardt’s discussion of the role of economics in the european union. in the 1986 text, borchardt described the eec as being “concerned with general economic integration” (1986, p.20) while in the 1995 text the author chooses to emphasize how the task of “the european economic community -renamed the ‘european community’ under the treaty of maastricht…is to mould the member states into a single community embracing every sector of the economy” (1995, p.25). in this manner, the author correctly draws attention to the fact that the european union is no longer to be thought of as an entity in existence primarily for its economic logic but, rather, is to be a single community whose final shape informs its economy. the textual change, however, collapses the goals of the pre and post-maastricht eras into one, failing to note how the creation of “a single community” is a goal that transcends the original compass of the pre-maastricht era 14 the first text reads: “emerging from the terrible experience of two world wars -both of which had begun as european ‘civil wars’”. the second work reads: “after the terrible experience of two world wars, both of which had begun as european civil wars.” 15 bernard connolly, once head of the ems (economic monetary system), national and community policies unit in the commission, has posited that economic integration was only “part of a programme to subvert the independence -political as well as economic -of europe’s countries.” bernard connolly, the rotten heart of europe: the dirty war for europe’s money (london: faber and faber, 1995), xii. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 4/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 18 treaties. klaus-dieter borchardt’s belief that the european union is more than the sum of its economic parts is corroborated by his conflation of the accomplishments of europe’s past with a contemporaneous vision of europe linked geographically, politically and culturally: cultural assets such as the city of venice, the paintings of rembrandt, the music of beethoven or the plays of shakespeare are an integral part of a common cultural heritage and are regarded as common property by the citizens of europe. (1995, p.73) in this manner, borchardt appropriates the cultural assets heretofore considered fundamental aspects of national cultures and contentiously claims them as an element of a common european heritage while simultaneously stressing the political dimension of european integration. the social dimension, too, is an area in which borchardt pursues a line of argumentation that is an imprecise depiction of european history, re-ordering the timeline of integration and thus obscuring the belated entry of social policy into the project of integration. in discussing the social aims of european union, the author merely declares that “the treaties did not map out any coherent scheme for a future common social policy” (1995, p.26) when in fact the social dimension of integration only became a topic of serious discussion in the late 1980s. furthermore, the reason for the exclusion of social policy from the original treaties is directly attributed to indecision over whether the establishment of the common market required the broad alignment of social security costs or whether in practice it would inevitably bring the member states’ social security arrangements into line with one another. (1995, p.26) borchardt thus ascribes the lack of a coherent social policy to indecision over how best to review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 4/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 19 achieve advances in the social sphere when in fact several member states were reluctant if not downright hostile to the idea of giving up their right to budget and control social security within their borders, this competence having been integral to the consolidation of the nation-state in the early to mid 20th century.16 borchardt’s vision of the social dimension of europe connects with the manner in which the author envisions the european project and its aims. in this discussion, borchardt explicitly describes what he feels to be the aims of european unification, albeit differently from edition to edition. in the original text, borchardt declared that the aim of european unification is: to preserve and strengthen peace, to achieve economic integration for the benefit of all the peoples of europe through the creation of a large economic area, and to work towards political union. (1986, p.19) in the second text, however, this same passage is altered to read: to preserve and strengthen peace, to achieve economic integration for the benefits of all citizens of the union through the creation of a single internal market, to work towards political union and, last but not least, to strengthen and promote social cohesion within the union. (1995, p.23) in the transition from one passage to the next, we find numerous points of substantial interest. first, social cohesion, while being only a goal of recent vintage, is appended to the other aims (the preservation and strengthening of peace as well as economic integration) that long predate it with only the slightest hint that this is a new policy area. second, while the first passage makes note of only the geographical connectivity between europeans -europeans being merely those people that inhabit the geographical area that 16 carl strikwerda argues that the cataclysm of the first world war led to the creation of a “social citizenship” in which the national governments became the providers of social welfare for their citizens. see: carl strikwerda, “reinterpreting the history of european integration: business, labor, and social citizenship in twentieth-century europe,” in european integration in social and historical perspective: 1850 to the present, ed. jytte klausen and louise a. tilly (oxford: rowman and littlefield, 1997), 65. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 4/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 20 is europe -the more recent text adds a layer of political affiliation, europeans no longer being described just as “the peoples of europe” but having become “citizens of the union.” third, and perhaps most importantly, borchardt fails to note that the goals of european integration have undergone any change over time. thus, while the author’s statements are in the strictest sense true, the omission of any mention of change to the goals of european integration obscures the fact that integration is not based upon a set of unchanging goals but an evolutionary process through which new goals have been constantly articulated. iii. pascal fontaine’s europe in ten points -the images speak for themselves up to this point, this study has focused on textual explorations of how europeanists are revising the historical record. yet it is not only by way of words that meaning is constructed; images, too, provide us with a means of understanding how changes are being implemented and what these changes mean in aggregate. no text is more illustrative of an evolution in imagery than pascal fontaine’s europe in ten lessons. this booklet, having undergone four editions thus far, has expanded from its original edition in which not a single illustration was present to its more recent incarnations in which pictures are utilized to introduce each chapter as well as illustrate key points. for the purposes of this study, i will examine the versions of this text printed in 1995 and 1998 to compare and contrast the meanings of the messages to be found therein. for ideas to resonate most profoundly in non-textual form, a common motif is often employed as a point of reference. in the 1995 version of fontaine’s pamphlet, the common motif utilized was that of homo europeanus, a stick figure character whose review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 4/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 21 european identity is represented by his head being in the form of europe’s twelve stars.17 for each of the chapters, homo europeanus is depicted performing an action or holding an object that symbolically or metaphorically corresponds with each of the areas under discussion. to take but one example, in the first chapter entitled “a brief history of european integration,” our homunculan guide is shown ascending a set of stairs that he himself is drawing (1995, p.5). common to all the images of homo europeanus is a progressivist philosophy, a belief in which historical events are cited as steps leading towards a better future. this philosophy of progress, while tempered somewhat in the last chapter entitled “europe in the 21st century: the shape of things to come” (1995, p.40) and shown by way of homo europeanus holding a divining mechanism and able to only guess at the final shape of europe, pervades the illustrative motif employed throughout the pamphlet.18 the 1998 incarnation of the pamphlet shows a remarkable reformulation of the unifying motif employed to underline the text’s key messages. entitled “europe in ten points,” the new edition witnessed the extinction of homo europeanus and his replacement by more fleshed-out, less abstract characters. the european union, more aware of the dominant position that it was attaining in the world and seemingly freed from the need to prove itself, is portrayed metaphorically as a series of approachable comic characters that reveled in their good-natured demeanor. for instance, whereas the 1995 version of “the union and the world” portrayed homo europeanus standing triumphantly atop a smiling planet earth, the 1998 version of this chapter has a smiling 17 the application of the term homo europeanus for the figure represented in the text is my own, although the term, coined by oswald spengler (1880-1936), has been bandied about extensively in discussions of european identity. 18 this uncertain vision of the future is confirmed in the text: “this vision of europe at the beginning of the 21st century is of necessity speculative and incomplete.” p.41. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 4/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 22 man carrying a european flag in his backpack attempting to find his way to the top of the earth (1998, p.47). so too had the display of european strength been tempered; in 1995 “political union and defence” was portrayed as homo europeanus flexing his bicep in an explicit show of strength while by 1998 the correspondent chapter proudly displays the eu flag with a dove sitting atop it and holding an olive branch in its mouth (1998, p.33). what is more, instances that continued to have progressivist overtones, such as the man climbing to the top of the world, are deprived of much of their grandiose and selfadulatory projections by way of the softer and more innocent tenor of the illustrative trope employed. perhaps the change between the pamphlets, that feeling of confidence so succinctly conveyed in the images, is best encapsulated in the final section of both texts entitled “key dates in the history of european integration.” to accompany this section of text, the 1995 version of the pamphlet portrayed homo europeanus pointing to a clock he held in his hands (1995, p.43). by 1998, however, that unimaginative image of the passage of time was replaced by the far more evocative image of a bearded old man pointing to a blue wall with a sole yellow star upon it (1998, p.57). next to him stands a young girl upon whose head the old man’s other hand rests. here, seemingly, we have the older generation of european, now aware of his european heritage and proud of the european edifice that has been built, explaining to the young girl what it means to be european and recounting the achievements of the european integrationist project. like the nation-states that had come before it, the european union had matured to a point at which it possessed its own distinct history that would be passed on from generation to generation. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 4/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 23 conclusion in the course of this paper, we have surveyed a sampling of the textual and nontextual historical revisions in the works of two leading europeanists, pascal fontaine and klaus-dieter borchardt. we have seen how these two authors have attempted to both come to terms with the constantly evolving compass of european union as well as assist in creating a historical record and logic for its existence. in this bifurcated yet singleminded pursuit, whether discussing the founders of european integration, their aims and ambitions, the steps that have led to the present condition of european integration, or reflecting upon the achievements of european union, these authors have shown a marked inconsistency and a cavalier approach to european history. yet this does not mean, as members of the explicitly anti-european bruges group have argued, that this attempt to craft a “new” european history is an exercise in malevolence.19 rather, i would suggest that the authors’ revisions are a result of two reasons devoid of any express malevolence but that come as a consequence of a particular world-view. first, i believe that the work of both authors is informed by a progressivist philosophy that underpins their weltanschauung and clearly translates into a sliding perception of reality in which the re-interpretation of history to conform to present-day objectives is not an aberration but an entirely natural phenomenon. second, i think that pascal fontaine, klaus-dieter borchardt and other like-minded europeanists see their goal of disseminating the message of european union as sufficiently important and benevolent an enterprise as to demand that they make changes that might facilitate 19 ball, et al, “federalist thought control.” review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 4/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 24 european integration. i believe that these people genuinely hold the european union and the values it is to represent in such high regard that they cannot but help write in a manner that is inherently revisionist. such europeanists, so involved in their enthusiasm for their project, therefore fail to see the sacrifices they are making to accomplish their goals. i take exception to the authors’ revisionist practices for two reasons. one is the historian’s fundamental suspicion of the revision of history when no new findings have been unearthed to corroborate new verdicts. and while it would be foolhardy to posit that history is a “truth” that can ever be lain bare, the authors discussed in this paper have displayed a blatant disregard for established narratives (and even their own earlier conclusions) when little if any evidence exists to substantiate what seem to be little more than present-day agendas and goals. although i have much sympathy for a united europe, i feel that any attempts to recast european history in a manner consistent with expressions of continent-wide unity must be grounded in thorough research and circulated with great care. to do otherwise means to mire the debate in a plethora of half-truths and opinions which the european populace would surely not accept. this connects with my second point. it is my earnest belief that displaying an aggressive form of supra-nationalism that attempts to gloss over or cast aside “traditional” nation-state nationalisms is a tactic that reflects badly upon european integration and is bound to fail. disregarding the national narratives that have become inexorably intertwined with many a european’s sense of identity only serves to drive a wedge between those most devoted to european integration and a sizeable segment of a european populace that, though not opposed to integration per se, finds the attempt to review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 4/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 25 weaken national narratives an affront to their identities. so what is the answer? luisa passerini (2003) has recently written that people are in possession of what she calls a “dirty identity,” a sense of being and selfcomprehension in which the lines between different forms of affiliation blur and a person’s identity becomes a composite of the many forms of identification that they simultaneously bear. i think such an ingenious construction serves as a guide to how we may solve the problem of blending an enthusiasm for europe with an allegiance to the nation-states of europe. the height of european nation-building occurred in the latter parts of the 19th century and the beginnings of the 20th century. and while that historical period has long since passed, its repercussions continue to manifest themselves in a deeply felt and often elusive patriotism and a strong allegiance to national narratives. thus, we must seek to integrate the national narratives upon which these patriotisms are built and include them as part of a european narrative that does not suppress nationalism but expresses how the project of nation building, and even nationalism itself, is a key component of european history. by way of this approach, i believe it possible to accommodate national narratives into a pan-european narrative, a synthesis that would result in the strengthening of europe by building upon the feelings of community that bind the citizens of europe’s nation-states. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 4/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 26 bibliography i. primary sources official eu publications: borchardt, klaus-dieter. european unification: the origins and growth of the european community. luxembourg: office for official publications of the european communities, 1986. ---. european integration: the origins and growth of the european union (fourth edition). luxembourg: office for official publications of the european communities, 1995. a constitution for europe. luxembourg: office for official publications of the european communities, 2004. deheneffe, jean-claude. europe as seen by europeans: european polling 1973-1986 (second edition). luxembourg: office for official publications of the european communities, 1986. fontaine, pascal. europe -a fresh start: the schuman declaration 1950-90. luxembourg: office for official publications of the european communities, 1990. ---. europe in ten lessons. luxembourg: office for official publications of the european communities, 1992. ---. europe in ten lessons (second edition). luxembourg: office for official publications of the european communities, 1995. ---. europe in 10 points (third edition). luxembourg: office for official publications of the european communities, 1998. --. a new idea for europe: the schuman declaration -1950-2000. luxembourg: office for official publications of the european communities, 2000. a frontier-free europe. luxembourg: office for official publications of the european communities, 1988. der krieg ums himbeereis: eine comic fur junge leute uber ein friedliches europe ohne grenzen. luxembourg: amt fur amtliche veroffentlichungen der europaischen gemeinschaften, 1998. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 4/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 27 other primary sources: de rougemont, denis. the idea of europe. new york: the macmillan company, 1966. ---. lettre ouverte aux europeens. paris: editions albin michel, 1970. “eu commission president sets record straight on anti-semitism” http://www.eurunion.org/news/press/2004/2004001.htm [accessed 18 december 2004]. evans-pritchard, ambrose. “statesman unlikely to become saint.” http://washingtontimes.com/world/20040818-094347-6213r.htm [accessed 22 december 2004]. vivet, jean-pierre, ed. les memoires de l’europe. paris: robert laffont, 1970. voyenne, bernard. histoire de l’idee europeenne. paris: petite bibliotheque payot, 1964. ii. secondary sources asad, talal. “muslims and european identity: can europe represent islam?” in the idea of europe: from antiquity to the european union, ed. anthony pagden, (cambridge: cambridge university press, 2002), pp.209-227. ball, martin et al. “federalist thought control: the brussels propaganda machine” http://www.brugesgroup.com/news.live?article=79&keyword=8#through [accessed 21 december 2004]. borries, bodo von. “european history written by various european historians.” in european history: challenges for a common future, ed. attila pok, et al. hamburg: korber-stiftung, 2002, pp.22-44. connolly, bernard. the rotten heart of europe: the dirty war for europe’s money. london: faber and faber, 1995. dunkerley, david, et al. changing europe: identities, nations and citizens. london: routledge, 2002. elbe, stefan. europe: a nietzschean perspective. london: routledge, 2003. gowan, perry & anderson, perry, eds. the question of europe. london: verso, 1997. ludlow, n. piers. “frustrated ambitions: the european commission and the formation review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 4/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 28 of a european identity, 1958-1967.” in institutions europeennes et identities europeennes. brussels: burylant, 1998, pp.307-325. macdonald, sharon. approaches to european historical consciousness: reflections and provocations. hamburg: korber-stiftung, 2000. mcdonald, maryon. “’unity in diversity’. some tensions in the construction of europe.” in social anthropology 4, no.1 (1996): 47-60. mommsen, wolfgang j., ed. the long way to europe: historical observations from a contemporary view. chicago: edition q, inc., 1994. north, richard & szamuely, helen. “the mythology of the eu -countered” http://www.brugesgroup.com/news.live?article=242&keyword=8 [accessed 21 december 2004]. pagden, anthony. “europe: conceptualizing a continent.” in the idea of europe: from antiquity to the european union, ed. anthony pagden. cambridge: cambridge university press, 2002, pp.33-54. pagden, anthony, ed. the idea of europe: from antiquity to the european union. cambridge: cambridge university press, 2002. passerini, luisa, ed. figures d'europe: images and myths of europe. bruxelles: p.lang, 2003. pollack, mark a. “international relations theory and european integration,” journal of common market studies 39, no. 2 (june 2001): 221-44. pok, attila, et al. european history: challenges for a common future. hamburg: korber-stiftung, 2002. shore, cris. building europe: the cultural politics of european integration. london: routledge, 2000. ---. “european union and the politics of culture” (paper no.43 -the bruges group) http://www.brugesgroup.com/mediacentre/index.live?article=13#culture [accessed 19 december 2004] strikwerda, carl. “reinterpreting the history of european integration: business, labor, and social citizenship in twentieth-century europe.” in european integration in social and historical perspective: 1850 to the present, eds. jytte klausen and louise a. tilly. oxford: rowman and littlefield, 1997, pp.51-70. van ham, peter. european integration and the postmodern condition: governance, democracy, identity. london: routledge, 2001. microsoft word tracey raney_an ever further apart union national and european attachments in the eu.doc review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 4/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 29 …………………………………………………… an ever further apart union? national and european attachments in the european union tracey raney abstract this paper is about the ways that citizens perceive their place in the political world around them, through their political identities. using a combination of comparative and quantitative methodologies, the study traces the pattern of citizens’ political identifications in the european union and canada between 1981 and 2003 and explains the mechanisms that shape these political identifications. the results of the paper show that in the eu and canada identity formation is a process that involves the participation of both individuals and political institutions yet between the two, individuals play a greater role in identity construction than do political institutions. the paper argues that the main agents of political identification in the eu and canada are citizens themselves: individuals choose their own political identifications, rather than acquiring identities that are pre-determined by historical or cultural precedence. the paper makes the case that this phenomenon is characteristic of a rise of ‘civic’ identities in the eu and canada. in the european union, this overarching ‘civic’ identity is in its infancy compared to canada, yet, both reveal a new form of political identification when compared to the historical and enduring forms of cultural identities firmly entrenched in europe. the rise of civic identities in both the eu and canada is attributed to the active role that citizens play in their own identity constructions as they base their identifications on rational assessments of how well political institutions function, and whether their memberships in the community will benefit them, rather than on emotional factors rooted in religion or race. in the absence of strongly held emotional identifications, in the eu and canada political institutions play a passive role in identity construction by making the community appear more entitative to its citizens. these findings offer new theoretical scope to the concept of civic communities and the political identities that underpin them. the most important finding presented in the paper is that although civic communities and identities are manufactured by institutions and political elites (politicians and bureaucrats), they require thinking citizens, not feeling ones, to be sustained. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 4/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 30 introduction to claim there are serious roadblocks ahead in the construction of a european community and identity is fairly obvious; what is less clear is whether and how these roadblocks can be overcome. one question that animates the study of identity in the european union is whether strongly held national identities stand in the way of constructing an ‘ever closer union’.1 one line of argumentation holds that deeply rooted, historically based national identities pose significant obstacles to the development of a european union community and identity (carey 2002; mclaren 2002). should the trenches of deeply held national attachments prove too deep or expansive to overcome, the project of the european union will prove to be even more daunting. faced with the task of disentangling the primordial ties of ethnicity, ancestry, and/or religion and squared directly against national sovereignty, it is logical to assume that the constitution-making processes and the capacity of the european union to broaden and deepen its scope would be seriously limited into the foreseeable future. whether national identities stand in the way of an ‘imagined europe’ bound by a common and publicly shared identity is therefore an important question for the future of the eu. this article explores the degree of consonance between national and european attachments within the eu. the central argument forwarded is that national attachments do not appear to be in systemic tension with the creation of a european identity. instead, the reverse appears to hold true: those who hold national attachments are more likely to also have an attachment to europe. these findings are consistent with social psychology studies that suggest that identity is not zero-sum but multiple, and that individuals are social beings who need group attachments and loyalties to make sense of the world around them. to follow, the article examines the 1 as stated in the treaty of rome, 1957. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 4/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 31 importance of identity studies for the future of the european union. i then outline the main theories within the field. i subsequently establish the methodology and highlight my central findings. finally, in the conclusion i point out how these findings substantiate the claims put forward by social identity theory regarding multiple and overlapping identities and the possibility of individuals to support both a national and a european identity. why study identity? political identities are important building blocks in political communities since they help sustain democratic spaces, contribute to the legitimization of political institutions, and help sustain communities. a shared eu identity is a prerequisite for a vibrant civil society within the european union since it helps to create an engaged citizenry bound by common public goals, a shared sense of obligation, and encourages participation within the european political community. a shared identity can help nurture these goals and it can help to facilitate the spread of political values such as democracy. the generation of a european-wide public sphere depends upon a shared political culture by all (habermas 2001: 19). a public ‘eu’ identity can also act as a ‘bridging’ mechanism that connects individuals from different ethnicities, religions, regions and national states and that transcends more parochial or national reference points, producing greater information flow, norms of reciprocity and solidarity within the european union public (putnam 1995). as such, the study of identity formation is central to any understanding of the future success of a shared european union polity. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 4/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 32 theories of identity formation in the eu yet what are the processes of identity construction at the micro-level: does the average, ordinary, non-eu bureaucrat identify with europe and if so, what factors explain this phenomenon? studies often focus on the role of political institutions in the construction of a european identity (panebianco 1996; habermas 2001; risse 2002; laffan 2002). panebianco (1996) explores how the maastricht treaty sought to create a new eu identity that would simultaneously accommodate— yet also transcend —national identities. other authors such as habermas argue that a future european constitution is essential for the development of a european community and for the creation of a european identity, while risse (2003) focuses on the euro, and laffan (2002) examines the role of the european commission in the construction of a european identity. institutional perspectives offer important insights, but they also tend to gloss over the important role that individuals play in the processes of identity formation. if a group identity is to exist, it requires individuals to imagine and believe themselves to be members of the group. in short, identity construction is a process that must be understood at both the macro and microlevels — institutions and groups. in combination with research at the institutional level, a more complete understanding of identity formation is possible only when micro-level data are factored into the equation. survey research helps to fill this gap by examining how and why individuals may or may not identify with europe, their country, both, or none at all. in their work citrin and sides find a “nation first, but europe too” attitude toward identity in the eu (2004). what remains less clear is specifically how national and european identities ‘fit’ together at the individual level. for example, are identities ‘marble caked’ such that one’s self-understanding as a german review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 4/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 33 inherently contains aspects of europeanness, as risse suggests?” (2003: 6). there is also disagreement over the extent to which the process of ‘disembedding’ national identities in favour of a european identity will be successful (laffan 1999). some suggest that rather than weakening national states and identities, european integration is rescuing nations from near demise (milward 2000). bruter finds it useful to differentiate between a cultural and civic eu identity; the latter referring to the political/institutional ‘frame’ of the eu, and the former to an historically shared identity bound by a certain culture, social similarities, ethics, or even ethnicity (2004: 189-190). this distinction is similar to theories of nationalism that differentiate between civic and ethnic nationalisms (smith 1976). somewhat surprisingly, one area that has yet to be fully explored is the extent to which certain types of nationalist beliefs, such as cultural and civic, might be more or less consonant with european identity. one of the tasks of this article is to fill this gap in the research. identities can also be ‘thick’ or ‘diffuse’. for example, while national identities may have an emotive component to them (or a ‘thickness’), european identities may be more diffuse, carrying less emotional baggage and more utilitarian weight. research conducted by gable (1998) and castano (2000) suggest that support for european integration is linked to a perception of positive economic benefits with eu membership. according to castano, “[i]f people realize economic advantages of the new supranational level [in the eu] and if the new level can provide wealth and welfare it is likely that identities and loyalties will develop towards it” (2000: 8). given that support for integration is driven by utilitarian concerns, it is imaginable that european attachments and identities may also carry a diffuse, utilitarian dimension. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 4/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 34 national identities are not always fixed or stable (hall 1992). rather than provide a holistic view of identity over time, this article provides a ‘snapshot’ of how citizens think and feel about their nation and europe within a particular moment. this ‘snap shot’ is important, however, since it addresses whether an inherent ‘tension’ exists between national and european identities. if this tension does exist it would render the project of constructing a european community and identity even more problematic than it already is. social identity theory while institutional theories of identity tell us how institutions shape identities, theories of identity in social psychology explore the ‘individual’ side of the identity equation. while the more general field of identity theory is concerned with the self and the internal psychological processes of identity formation, social identity theory (sit) sets out to explain group processes and inter-group relations (hogg et al. 1995: 255). tajfel defines social identity as “the individual’s knowledge that he/she belongs to certain social groups together with some emotional and value significance to him/her of the group membership” (1971: 31). the sit approach suggests that while people sometimes think, feel and act as unique individuals, most of the time they think, feel, and act as members of collective groups, institutions and cultures (operario and fiske in abrams and hogg 1999: 41). in this manner, not national identities, but a group identity of some sort is a primordial precondition of humanity (stern 1995). now widely accepted, sit also emphasizes that identity is not zero-sum, but multiple (tajfel 1971; turner et al. 1985; abrams and hogg 1999; brewer 2001; risse 2003). this implies an ‘interplay’ between identities, wherein some may reinforce, conflict with, or be independent of one another (stryker and burke 2000: 291). sit also assumes that identity is a review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 4/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 35 by-product of ‘in-group’ and ‘out-group’ delineation such that the differences within the ‘ingroup’ are minimized while the differences in the ‘out-group’ are maximized. here, the ‘ingroup’ is the group to which one hopes to acquire membership, and the ‘out-group’ the group from which one aspires to differentiate oneself. i posit that the ‘in-group/out-group’ distinction has implications for identity in the eu. if it is the case that most citizens of the eu view their nation as the ‘in-group’ and europe as the ‘out-group’, then the prospects of creating a singular, european union identity and community become even more difficult. revisiting bruter’s cultural and civic identity distinction, it is plausible to assume that those who hold cultural understandings of the nation would be less likely to identify with a clearly defined out-group (europe) than those who define the nation in more civic terms. methodological considerations this article seeks to contribute to the unresolved discussion concerning the influence of national identities on european identity by closely examining the degree to which national identities impede attachments to europe. i draw on individual-level data measuring attachment to country and to europe from the international social science program 2003 national identities ii survey data. while most quantitative studies of identity in europe rely on eurobarometer data, the issp data include more nuanced questions concerning national identities. since the survey was conducted prior to the 2004 expansion of the european union, the hypotheses are tested using data from ten member states: germany, great britain, ireland, austria, sweden, spain, france, portugal, denmark and finland drawn from the international social science program review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 4/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 36 2003 national identities ii survey data.2 the pooled data are weighted by population to ensure eu-comparisons can be drawn across the ten countries included in the study. the purpose of my analysis is to test three hypotheses. the first draws from the sit literature and maintains that national attachments do not impede attachments to europe. respondents were asked: “how close do you feel to your country: very close, somewhat close, not very close, or not at all close?” responses of “very close” were given a value of 1 and all other responses a zero. in light of academic research that suggests that in-group identifications will reduce out-group identities?, this might mean that citizens with a stronger sense of national identity (the in-group) would be less likely to also identify with the european union (the outgroup). although distinct from nationalism, national pride is another way to gauge an individual’s subjective assessment of their nation. respondents were also asked how much pride they had in a variety of potential sources. based on the results of a factor analysis that showed two underlying ‘dimensions’ of pride, the independent variables were recoded into pride of ‘nonpolitical’ symbols (such as sports and arts) and pride in ‘political symbols (such as social security and the economy). each index was rescaled such that 1 is equal to high levels of pride and zero to low or non-existent levels.3 if pride of one’s country is an impediment to a european identity, we should expect to see a negative relationship between high levels of pride for both political and non-political pride and european identity. 2 germany was split into ‘west’ and ‘east germany’. the data set from the netherlands was delivered at the archive after the integrated file had already been prepared. for this reason, it was not included in the data presented here which draws from the integrated file. unfortunately, data from both belgium and italy were not collected in the issp national identities ii survey and are missing from this analysis. 3 see appendix for a detailed discussion of the factor analysis and recoding of the variables. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 4/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 37 the second hypothesis tests the distinction between a cultural and a civic identity, positing that those who hold cultural nationalist attitudes will be less likely to feel attached to europe. using a regression analysis, respondents were asked the importance of a series of factors for membership in the national community. they were asked the importance of ancestry, religion, birth, residence, the degree to which they feel for example “french,” and the importance of national institutions, laws, language, and citizenship. if respondents claimed that any of the above were ‘very important’ their responses were coded as 1, while all other responses were coded as 0. those who were not able to choose and missing cases were removed from the analysis. ‘cultural’ nationalist attitudes include ancestry, religion, birth, language, and ‘feeling’ nationalistic, while ‘civic’ nationalist attitudes include respecting institutions, and citizenship. length of time lived in a particular country was coded as neither. as a rapidly emerging political and social space comprised of a large population of myriad ancestries, races, religions and political beliefs, it is reasonable to suspect that those who hold cultural attitudes toward their ‘in-group’— their nation will be less inclined to identify with the eu, the ‘out-group’. conversely, respondents who have a more open or flexible attitude toward nationalism, immigrations and citizenship will be more likely to feel attached to europe. respondents were asked their opinions on a range of questions related to immigrants4 and citizenship. positive attitudes were coded as ‘1’ and negative as ‘0’. the third test examines the utilitarian hypothesis. i maintain that if a respondent believes they will benefit from the eu they will be more likely to harbour european attachments. respondents were asked whether their country has benefited from its membership in the 4 see appendix for question wording and recoding. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 4/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 38 european union. responses of ‘greatly benefits’ were coded as 1 and all other responses were as zero. five socio-demographic variables were also included in the model. i included whether both parents of the respondent are citizens of the country in which they live, their gender, their employment, level of education, and their age.5 the variables were recoded into binary categories where 1 is equal to: both parents are citizens, male, full-time workers, and those who are university educated and zero to all other responses. ‘age’ was kept as interval level data. a stepwise forward binary logistic regression is used in the analysis. this procedure was followed in order to test whether relationships between variables change when new variables are introduced into the model, thus allowing for multiple tests using a single model. using a single model also allows us to assess the relative robustness of each hypothesis stacked against the others. attachment to europe is the dependant variable. the respondents were asked: “how close do you feel to europe: very close, somewhat close, not very close, or not at all close?” responses of ‘very close’ were given a value of 1 and all other responses a zero. although ‘attachment’ is distinct from ‘identity’, it is our best available proxy in the dataset and is close enough to it conceptually that it can be used to make claims about a european identity. 5 see appendix for a detailed discussion of how each independent variable was constructed. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 4/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 39 findings the odds ratios (exp(b)) for the logistic regression are provided for each of the independent variables in each of the steps. the pseudo r-square (nagelkerke) is reported for each regression equation.6 table 1.1 shows the results for those who felt ‘very close’ to europe.7 “insert table 1 about here”. it is important to note that the nagelkerke r-square value rises from explaining 21% to 29% of the overall variance as successive clusters are integrated into the model. the shaded cells signify statistically significant relationships. the first major finding concerns the hypothesis that national attachments impede european attachments is not sustained. in fact, the most powerful predictor of attachments to europe is the presence of national attachments: those who feel very attached to their nations were nine times more likely than those who do not feel very close to their nation to also feel ‘very close’ to europe (9.23). respondents who felt proud of political symbols were 1.31 times more likely to feel ‘very close’ to europe. this finding supports the notion that group identities are multiple. certain nationalist beliefs are also related to european attachments. those who believe that ancestry is ‘very important’ to nationality were 1.7 times more likely than those who do not to feel ‘very close’ to europe. similarly, those who believe that religion is ‘very important’ to their nationality were 1.8 times more likely than those who do not to feel ‘very close’ to europe. there is also no statistically significant relationship between any of the ‘open’ attitudes toward nationalism and feeling close to europe. however, when examining attitudes toward immigration and citizenship, we can see a positive relationship between more open attitudes 6 these must be interpreted with caution and do not correspond to the r-squares of linear regression assumptions, as in ols. 7 all stages were statistically significant at p.<.10 and the full model at p<.001. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 4/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 40 toward immigration and feeling ‘very close’ to europe. in the full model, those with the most open attitude toward immigrants were 1.6 times more likely than those with less open attitudes to feel ‘very close’ to europe, while those with the most open attitudes toward citizenship were 1.7 times more likely than those with closed attitudes to feel ‘very close’ to europe. therefore, our second hypothesis produces a mixed finding: while respondents who hold “cultural” attitudes toward nationalism are more inclined to feel attached to europe, those with more open attitudes toward immigration and citizenship are also more likely to feel close to europe. this finding is consistent with bruter’s belief that two europe’s exist within the minds of european citizens: one that is delineated by cultural aspects, and another that is more civic. the model also demonstrates that citizens are more likely to feel close to europe if they believe their country benefits from the eu: those who believe their country benefits from the eu are 2.3 times more likely to feel ‘very close’ to europe than those who do not believe that their country benefits from european integration. we can conclude that many citizens have an instrumental view of the eu; those who feel close to the eu also believe that eu membership benefits their country. examining the socio-demographic variables demonstrates that there is no statistically significant relationship between gender, age, education or employment status and attachment to europe. in the full model, with all of the variables introduced (block 6), however, there is a negative relationship among those whose parents are both citizens of their country and european attachments; that is, offspring of parents who are both citizens of their nation are less likely than those whose parents are not both citizens to feel attached to europe (.47). in sum, the results demonstrate that there is a positive relationship between national and european attachments and citizens who hold nationalist attitudes. this is especially the case review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 4/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 41 when ancestry, religion and more open attitudes toward immigration and citizenship are emphasized. discussion and implications the results suggest that firmly entrenched nationalist identities are not a significant barrier to the creation of a european union identity. in fact, quite the opposite holds true: feeling close to one’s nation is positively correlated with feeling close to europe. although sit scholars may be correct to conclude that individuals develop in-group/out-group categorizations that inform their conceptions of social groups, there is little evidence to suggest that eu citizens view their nation as the ‘in-group’ and europe as the ‘out-group’. this could be a positive sign for euroenthusiasts, especially if citizens are willing to identify with two or more overlapping, yet discrete in-groups: their nation, europe, or perhaps even their region or locality. in addition, the results demonstrate that respondents who believe in both ancestry and religion – two narrow definitions of the nation – are also more likely to possess strong european attachments. this particular finding is somewhat confusing since it implies that those who define their nation in narrow, cultural terms are more likely to also feel attached to europe, a community that is clearly more broadly defined across ancestral and religious cleavages. although more research needs to be conducted in this area, it is possible that this result underscores the degree to which a growing european identity is reinforcing national identities. the end result is that citizens of the member states feel a weaker, more diffuse attachment to a borderless, unfixed, heterogeneous europe and a more narrowly defined ‘nation’ at the same time. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 4/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 42 the consonance of national and european attachments is also consistent with the institutional structures of the european union, many of which safeguard the role of nations within the eu. for example, the principle of subsidiarity means that only those powers should be exercised at the eu level that cannot be exercised as effectively at the national or subnational level (wood and yesliada 2002: 91). even as the integrationist efforts were pushed further in the maastricht treaty (and in the european constitution, if it would have passed), the preservation of national sovereignty has always been explicitly defined. while clearly some nations are more pro-europe than others (germany compared to britain and the netherlands, for example), the overlap of national and european attachments at the aggregate level implies there is still an important role for individual member states in the construction of a shared, european identity. it is likely that the discourses of national political elites and national media in the social constructions of both national and european identities will remain important for the success or failure of the european union community. the findings also demonstrate that attachments to europe are diffuse, depending upon citizens’ utilitarian understandings of eu membership. although this may be problematic for euro-enthusiasts interested in creating an emotional bond between the institutions of the eu and its citizenry, it would be far easier for the european union to change the public’s perceptions of its economic benefits for member states than it would to create an shared identity that is perceived to be in fundamental conflict with historically-based, long-enduring national identities held by its potential members. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 4/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 43 concluding remarks political communities and identities need institutions to sustain themselves, and citizenries to legitimize their existence. in the european union there is an ongoing debate concerning the extent to which national identities pose as obstacles to the development of a european identity. this article has explored some of the main hypotheses in the field concerning identity construction within the eu. i have examined whether attachments to the nation prevent a european sense of belonging, whether certain types of nationalist beliefs pose barriers to european attachments, and whether utilitarian concerns concerning the eu further shape attachment to europe. the results support the position that at the micro-level national attachments are not inherently incompatible with support for the european union. however, as we know national identities are not necessarily stable. one limitation to the research presented here is that it cannot speak to the degree that national and european attachments will remain more or less constant. it is plausible that as the european union expands, to include for example turkey, that nationalist sentiments will exert a negative influence over support for the european union in the future. nevertheless, the results are sufficient to demonstrate that many citizens’ national attachments do not appear to be a priori in tension with an evolving european identity. another limitation of the research presented here is that it does not include member states that joined the eu after 2004. future research needs to be conducted to determine whether citizens of the more recent member states have different perceptions of the european union and whether these beliefs conflict with their attachment to the national state there is no question that formidable roadblocks lie ahead in the processes of european unification and the development of a european identity. however, i argue that studies of public review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 4/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 44 opinion on national and european attachments are important for the future of the eu. given that citizens today have higher levels of educated and are more demanding of their political institutions and politicians, a more responsive european union requires us to examine how individuals perceive their own identities. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 4/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 45 appendix issp national identities ii survey question wording and coding for independent variables parental citizenship: “at the time of your birth, were both, one or neither of your parents citizens of country?” 1= both were citizens of country 2=only father was citizen of country 3= only mother was citizen of country 4=neither parent was a citizen of country responses of ‘both were citizens of country were coded as 1 and responses of ‘only father was citizen of country’, ‘only mother was citizen of country’ and ‘neither parent was a citizen of country’ were coded as 0. “don’t knows” and refusals were coded as missing. male: 1=male 0=female employment: “what is your current employment status?” 1=employed full-time (35 hours or over) 2=employed part-time (15-35 hours or over) 3=employed less than part time 4=helping a family member 5=unemployed 6=student or vocational training 7=retired 8=housewife/home duties 9=permanently disabled 10=others (not in labour force) responses of “employed full-time” were coded as 1 and all other responses were coded as zero. “don’t knows” and refusals were coded as missing. highly educated: “what is the highest level of education you have achieved?” 1=lowest form of qualification 2=above lowest qualification 3=higher secondary achieved 4=above higher secondary 5=university degree completed responses of “university degree completed” were coded as 1 and all other responses as zero. “don’t knows” and refusals were coded as missing. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 4/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 46 age: “how old are you?”. “don’t knows” and refusals were coded as missing. nationalism attitude indicators question wording: “some people say that the following things are important for being truly [nationality]. others say they are not important. how important do you think each of the following is: very important, fairly important, not very important, not important at all: to have been born in [country], to have [country] ancestry, to have lived in [country] for most of one’s life, to respect [country’s] political institutions and laws, to have [country] citizenship, to feel [country], to be able to speak [country]” for regression responses of ‘very important’ were coded as 1 and all other values as 0. missing cases were excluded from the analysis. pride indices question wording: “how proud are you of [your country] in each of the following: very proud somewhat proud, not very proud, not proud at all: its scientific and technological achievements, its achievements in sports, its achievements in the arts and literature, its armed forces, its history the way democracy works, its political influence in the, world, its economic achievements, its social security system, and its fair and equal treatment of group.” for each pride item, responses of ‘very proud’ were given a score of 4, ‘somewhat proud’ a score of 3, ‘not very proud’ a score of 2, and ‘not at all proud’ a score of 1. in order to test for underlying relationships amongst the variables, an exploratory factor analysis was conducted, revealing two underlying factors with eigenvalues of over 1. the first factor explains 37% overall variance and the second, 14% . for detailed results of the exploratory factor analysis of pride, please contact the author. pride in non-political symbols index (cronbach’s alpha = .67) the first factor corresponds roughly to ‘non-political’ sources of pride; meaning, symbols of pride that do not have overt political meaning: sports, arts and literature, armed forces, and the history of the country. to obtain a score of pride in non-political symbols, the responses to four variables were combined and the total divided by 4. a score of 4 meant all questions were answered ‘very proud’ while a score of 1 meant all questions were answered ‘not at all proud’. the variable was recoded where those with a score of 3-4 were given a value of 1 and the rest a value of zero. pride in political symbols index (cronbach’s alpha = .78) the second factor loaded items that were decidedly more political in nature; meaning the government or state are in some way associated with them. these include pride in: democracy, the country’s economic achievements, pride in the country’s political influence in the world, social security, the fair treatment of groups, and scientific achievements. to obtain a score of pride in political symbols, the responses to these six variables were combined and the total divided by 6. a score of 4 meant all six questions were answered ‘very proud’ while a score of 1 meant all questions were answered ‘not at all proud’. the variable was recoded where those with a score of 3-4 were given a value of 1 and the rest a value of zero. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 4/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 47 benefits of eu membership question wording: generally speaking, would you say your country benefits or does not benefit from being a member of the european union? greatly benefits, largely benefits, somewhat benefits, only a little, not at all. attitudes toward immigrants index (cronbach’s alpha = .81) an index comprised of answers to nine questions pertaining to beliefs about immigration: there are different opinions about immigrants from other countries living in country (by immigrants we mean people who come to settle in [country]. how much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements: agree strongly, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree strongly, can’t choose. “immigrants increase crime rates.” “immigrants are generally good for [country] economy.” “immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in [your country].” “immigrants improve [country] society by bringing in new ideas and cultures.” “government spends too much money assisting immigrants.” “it is impossible for people who do not share [country’s] customs and traditions to become fully [country]. “do you think the number of immigrants to [your country] nowadays should be increased a lot, increase a little, remain the same as it is, reduced a little, or reduced a lot?” “government spends too much money assisting immigrants” the questions were recoded where the most positive responses to immigrants were equal to 5 and the most negative were recoded to 1, with a range of other responses falling between. responses were combined in an index and divided by 8. here, those who were very supportive of immigrants received a score of 5 and those who were the least supportive a score of 1. the variable was then rescaled where the more supportive (those who scored between 3 and 5) were equal to 1 and those who were the least supportive (0-2.99) were equal to 0. citizenship index (cronbach’s alpha = .62) an index comprised of answers to six questions pertaining to beliefs about citizenship: “how much do you agree or disagree with the following statements: agree strongly, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, disagree strongly, can’t choose.” 1. “children born in [your country] of parents who are not citizens should have the right to become canadian” 2. “children born abroad should have the right to become [country].” 3. “legal immigrants to [country] who are not citizens should have the same rights as [country’s] citizens.” 4. [country] should take stronger measures to exclude illegal immigrants.” all the questions coded where the most positive/open attitudes toward citizenship were given a score of 5 and the least positive a score of 1, with the other responses ranging between. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 4/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 48 responses were added together and divided by 4. a score of 5 means responses were the most open toward citizenship, and zero means the responses were the least open toward citizenship. the variable was rescaled where the top half that were most open to citizenship (2.51 to 5) were given a score of 1 and the bottom half of least open (1 to 2.50) a score of zero. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 4/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 49 bibliography abrams, dominic and michael a. hogg, eds. 1999. social identity and social cognition. oxford: blackwell publishers. bruter, michael. 2004. “civic and cultural components of a european identity: a pilot model of measurement of citizens’ levels of european identity”. in transnational identities – becoming european in the eu. ed. richard k. herrmann, thomas risse, and marilynn b. brewer. oxford: rowman and littlefield publishers: 186-213. carey, sean. 2002. “undivided loyalties: is national identity an obstacle to european integration?”. european union politics. 3(4): 387-413. citrin, jack and john sides. 2004. “more than nationals” how identity choice matters in the new europe”. in herrmann, richard k., thomas risse and marilynn b. brewer. transnational identities – becoming european in the eu. oxford: oxford university press: 161185. gable, matthew. 1998. 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nationalist movements. oxford: oxford university press. stern, paul c. 1995. “why do people sacrifice for their nations?”. political psychology. vol. 16, no.2: 217-235. stryker, sheldon and peter j. burke. 2000. “the past, present, and future of an identity theory”. social psychology quarterly. 63(4): 284-297. tajfel, h., ed. 1971. the social dimension: european developments in social psychology. vols.2. cambridge: cambridge university press. turner, j.c., ed. 1985. social identity and intergroup relations. cambridge: cambridge university press. wood, david m. and birol a. yesilada. 2001. the emerging european union. 2nd edition. u.s.a.: addison-wesley educational publishers inc. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 4/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 51 table 1: ‘very close’ feelings toward europe: block 1 exp (b) block 2 exp(b) block 3 exp(b) block 4 exp (b) block 5 exp (b) block 6 exp (b) both parents citizens .78 .49 b .50 b .44 a .45 a .47 a male 1.08 1.01 1.00 1.01 1.02 .98 full-time workers 1.06 1.05 1.06 1.11 1.11 1.08 highly educated 1.09 1.20 1.19 1.30 1.16 1.12 d em og ra ph ic v ar ia bl es age 1.01 a 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 feel “very close” to nation 10.42 a 9.73 a 9.10 a 9.40 a 9.23 a non-political pride 1.09 1.02 1.03 1.03 n at io na lis t fe el in gs political pride 1.44 a 1.41 a 1.44 a 1.31 a birth in country .89 .98 .96 ancestry 1.59 a 1.72 a 1.73 a length lived in country .95 .90 .90 religion 2.05 a 1.85 a 1.80 a respect for institutions .89 .84 .87 citizenship .85 .93 .95 “feeling” country 1.14 1.12 1.11 w ha t’ s im po rt an t t o yo ur n at io na lit y? language 1.09 1.22 1.14 immigrants 1.68 a 1.62 a ‘o pe n’ im m ig ra tio n a tti tu de s citizenship 1.82 a 1.70 a country benefits eu 2.30 a % correct 80 80 80 80 82 82 r2* .01 .21 .22 .25 .27 .29 note: *nagelkerke pseudo-r square. a p<.01, b p<.05, c p< .10; all other values not statistically significant source: issp national identity ii 2003, n=3173 antoine vandemoortele_volume3_issue2 review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 2/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 66 ………………………………………………………………… the promotion of security sector reform strategies: comparing the roles of the european union and canada antoine vandemoortele 1 abstract this article analyzes the role of the european union (eu) and canada in the promotion of security sector reforms (ssr) activities in two regional organizations, the organization for security and cooperation in europe (osce) and the north atlantic treaty organization (nato). the concept of ssr seeks to address the effective governance of security in post-conflict environment by transforming the security institutions within a country in order for them to have more efficient, legitimate and democratic role in implementing security. recent debates within the eu have led to the adoption of an ssr concept from the council and a new strategy from the european commission on the ssr activities. within the framework of the esdp, the eu has positioned itself as a leading actor, in this domain, including in its crisis management operations. on the other hand, canada, through its whole-of government and human security programs has also been an important actor in the promotion of ssr activities. yet, even though several international organizations (including the united nations, the osce and nato) are effectively doing ssr activities on the ground, there does not exist a common framework within any of these organizations despite the role of the eu and canada. as such, it is surprising to found no global common policy for ssr while this approach is precisely holistic in its foundations. taking these elements into consideration, this paper analyzes two specific aspects : a) the absence of a common policy framework within international organizations and b) the major differences between the approaches of the osce and nato in the domain of ssr and the implications for the eu and canada’ roles. keywords: post-conflict reconstruction; security sector reform; multi-level governance; osce, nato 1 antoine vandemoortele is a phd researcher at the european university institute. the author wishes to thank frédéric mérand, stéphane roussel and the participants at both yrn workshop in montreal (march 2007) and florence (april 2007). the author also wishes to acknowledge the administrative and financial support of the research group in international security (regis),university of montreal and mcgill university. review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 2/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 67 1. introduction after the demise of the soviet union and the end of the cold war, one of the main challenges for the international community was to deal with a new security environment where regional conflicts and civil wars were multiplying around the globe. while on the theoretical level, this challenged the view of the ‘end of history’, it also had clear practical implications for the international community: how to develop tools, strategies and policies to cope with these new threats and to transform these zones of conflicts into zones of peace. these new practices of the international community towards these zones of conflicts include the development of new alliances, the transformation of peacekeeping into a more robust and strong proposal, the international administration of entire zones of conflicts, military invasion, sanctions and, in the case of the european union and nato, enlargement and membership prospects. addressing the issue of conflicts, wars and violence, however, is only one aspect of the entire security-development nexus (stewart 2004). transforming zones of conflict into zones of peace is the first step, but this needs to be reinforced by the transition from zones of peace toward zones of lasting and sustainable peace. this means that, in the domain of security, a double challenge emerged in the 1990s: conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction. this study aims to understand the latter and more specifically the development of new tools and strategies aimed at creating the conditions for a durable and peaceful security environment. the other objective of this study is to understand the evolution of the role of the international community in the practices of post-conflict reconstruction and to assess the different ways the international community dealt with this issue. in order to do so, this paper focuses on the development, both on the field in post-conflict situations and at the international level, of security sector reforms strategies (ssr). while the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration process (ddr) (knight 2004) seeks the return of ex-combatants in the civil sphere following a conflict period, the process of security sector reform (ssr) is a more comprehensive framework. the concept of ssr seeks to address the effective governance of security in post-conflict environment by transforming the security institutions within a country in order for them to have more efficient, legitimate and democratic role in implementing security. this includes the democratic control of the military complex, the redesign of civil-military relations and the professionalization of security services and the judiciary system (clingendael 2002, schnabel and erhart 2005). in short, this approach seeks nothing less than the reinstitutionalization of the military, police, political and judiciary sectors to foster both internal (citizens) and external (state) security (toft 2007). this concept was developed after the end of the cold war as a possible way to be more efficient in addressing post-conflict reconstruction and the development of good governance. it has been experimented in panama, el salvador, somalia, haiti, east timor and, on a larger scale, kosovo and afghanistan (brzoska 2006). . however, while ssr has developed as a tool that helps in dealing with post-conflict reconstruction, a gap emerged between practices on the ground and debates at the international level, between the many international organizations and the donor community in general. in short, this means that will security sector reforms strategies have effectively been implemented in post-conflict situations, with mixed but often positive results (law 2006a), the debate at the international level on how to ‘do’ ssr and how to develop a substantial reform agenda and have a positive impact has not been systematically addressed. first, even though (and at the same time, because of this) ssr strategies are meant to be holistic in nature, definitions within the donor community (european countries, canada, united states of america, oecd, un, nato, osce) vary to large degree. secondly, the approach towards ssr also varies, ranging from a security perspective to a more development-centred framework. finally, the actors at the international community share different interests in doing ssr. review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 2/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 68 for some, it is used as an instrument of power and influence, as a tool to enhance its own foreign policy structure, as an ideological aspect or simply (in a more pragmatic way) as another available policy in the toolbox to deal with post-conflict development and reconstruction (law 2006). in order to explain this puzzle, this gap between the local and international level, this paper focuses on two main actors in the development of security sector reforms practices and two regional security organizations. thus, the main research problem is to analyze the promotion of security sector reforms at the international level using the case of two transatlantic security institutions, the north atlantic treaty organization (nato) and the organization for security and cooperation in europe (osce), and to understand these elements: 1) why have these organizations failed to develop overarching framework in the field of security sector reform practices? 2) how can we explain the differences between the ways both organizations do ssr? this study proposes that the main explanatory variable is the way member and participating states of these organizations have promoted the debate on ssr internally. more precisely, this study focuses on the role of two leading actors in the field, canada and the european union. by focusing on a set of actors and organizations that have a long history of interactions and where the same countries are often member and participating states of both organizations, this study follows a most-likely case scenario. this approach follows closely the one adopted by checkel et al (2003) in their discussion of the socialization influence of international organizations. this means that if the findings of this study are not entirely conclusive, it would be difficult to apply this framework to other inter-institutional cases related to ssr (see also george and bennett 2005). hypothesis a the failure to develop an overall framework designed to spearhead security sector reforms practices in nato and the osce is explained by the different mechanisms employed by the member and participating states (cooperation, competition and-or coordination) and the resulting division of labour where these members (mainly the european union, canada and the united states) attempt to take the lead on this issue. hypothesis b the differences in the field of security sector reform policies between nato and the osce can be explained by this same behaviour and the differences in the use of mechanisms of competition (in the case of nato) or cooperation and norm-driven (in the case of the osce). by highlighting the way actors behave and interact within these security institutions, this paper develops a multi-level governance framework that bridges over both rationalist (cost-benefits analysis) and sociological (understood at the micro-level analysis of individual actor interactions) perspective. this paper then presents the different mechanisms and explains the relative importance and the development of ssr practices using these mechanisms. the paper then shows that the differences in the practices of security sector reform for nato and the osce are explained by the different pattern of behaviour (simply put, competitive or cooperative) of the main promoters of ssr (the eu, canada and the united states). by approaching this research puzzle on the evolution of security sector reforms at the local and international level using a narrower perspective (two actors and two organizations) enables us to gain a more precise and detailed understanding of a key aspect, namely the relationship and interactions review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 2/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 69 between the principal actors involved, within the international community, in the promotion of ssr practices. this paper also attempts to contribute to the debates on the role of international organizations and the development of the eu as an international actor. on the theoretical level, this paper develops a multi-level governance approach that uses both institutionalist and constructivist input. on the empirical level, the objective is to understand the internal mechanisms of the debates and practices of security sector reforms and to highlight, in an exploratory way, the way these mechanisms are used and how they influence the outcomes of security sector reforms on the field. on the policy side, this project aims to provide some elements (best practices, lessons learned, positive interactions amongst actors) that may lead to policy recommendation as to better address and deal with the development of a common practice (or complementary practices) of security sector reforms. the paper is divided as follows. the next section discusses the origins and evolution of security sector reform practices during the 1990s in order to frame the paper. this is done at three different levels: the field, where ssr has been experimented, the international and, more specifically, the development of ssr within the policies of canada and the eu. the third section is used to present the theoretical and analytical framework, based on an institutionalist perspective, and to explain the main hypothesis and explanatory variables. the following two sections consist of the empirical focus of the paper and looks first at the different mechanisms that defined the debates on ssr practices at the international level and the role of canada and the eu in these debates before moving towards an analysis of the impacts this has on both nato and the osce. the final paper reviews these main findings and presents the way forward within this research agenda. 2. the evolution of security sector reform practices two dimensions of security sector reforms practices are taken into account in this section: the promotion at the international level and the implementation at the local and field levels. 2.1 on the ground in order to understand the development of security sector reform in post-conflict environment, it us important to frame the initial debates on the development of strategies towards post-conflict reconstruction. in the early to mid 1990s, these debates have focused mainly on the transformation of the military and the changing dynamic of civil-military relations. this approach was also supplemented by ddr (disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programs). the security sector was, mostly, defined, as the external military dimension and aspects of political and judiciary institutions, democratization programmes were present, but not at the forefront. these elements of post-conflict reconstruction were, in short, increasing in terms of quantity and quality, but could not be described as a comprehensive and holistic view of security sector reform. following, the creation in the development donor community of the term security sector reform in 1998; several attempts have been made to tie together these individual aspects of security sector reform. this shift on the international level to a more general and broad security sector reform created the opportunity to integrate the different reform projects of the security sector into one roof. the impacts of the new debate on security sector reform were thus, in a large degree, reflected on the ground with mixed, but positive reviews (brzoska 2006). in short, “while the concept itself was new in 1998, practically all of its components, such as reform of the defence forces, improvement in democratic oversight of armed forces, police reform, etc, were not” (brzozka 2003) . 2.2 the international level review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 2/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 70 this however was not the case at the global or international level. “in surveying the global response to ssr, it is clear that there is a great deal underway that could fall under the rubric of ssr but is not in any way comprehensive” (smith 2005). to understand this gap, it is important to understand the origins of this debate at the international level. in europe, the united kingdom has been the main pioneer of security sector reforms as a way to link security and development issues together in post-conflict settings. in 1998, clare short, at that time uk secretary of state for international development, framed the concept of security sector reform, and its holistic approach, in public. while in europe, the netherlands and the uk remain the two main actors, the european union has started to integrate the concept of ssr into its rhetoric and practices (albeit with some inconsistency on the implementation part, sedra 2006) following the european security strategy in december 2003, the council of the european union adopted an eu concept for esdp support to security sector reform in october 2005. this document highlights the aim of ssr activities under the esdp, the internal division of labour expected between the council and the commission and the modalities and plan of action concerning the implementation of ssr. this was followed by a similar exercise by the commission in its documents “a concept for european community support for security sector reform” in may 2006. finally, the council adopted recently, in june 2006, a policy framework that is aimed at combining both approaches to ssr into an operational code of conduct. as such, in the framework of the european union’s external relations, the eu has positioned itself as the main actor involved in the promotion of the debate on security sector reform, most notably throughout its crisis management operations (rule of law mission in iraq and georgia, police mission in bosnia-herzegovina, palestine, macedonia and condo and security sector reform assistance in rdc) on the other hand, canada has also been a core actor alongside the uk, netherlands and the eu. security sector reform debates were originally designed and promoted as new way of thinking the security-development nexus, reconceptualising notions of state security and recasting this approach in terms of human security. since the mid-1990s, canada has been a strong advocate of a human security agenda. this approach, developed largely with then minister of foreign affairs lloyd axworthy, effectively seeks to address similar aspects than security sector reforms (individual security, democratic control of the military complex, new civil-military relations, good governance and lasting peace development) (owens et arneil 1999). more recently, in its international policy statement (2005), canada has developed a plan of action at the international level that reflects this issue of security sector reform: the 3-d approach. this policy seeks to improve the existing practices of the role of canada on the international scene and also in post-conflict setting by uniting the efforts of diplomacy, defence and development. finally, with its strong engagement in afghanistan, canada has put into practice this notion of security sector reform in the context of provincial reconstruction teams (boivin 2006). at the level of international organizations, some ios, and especially regional organizations have started to deal with the notion of ssr, including nato and the osce in europe, ecowas or sagd in africa. the un has, at the global level, engaged in discussions concerning the use of security sector reform. in february 2007, the security council held high-level discussions and an open debate on this issue, although the results have yet to be released (most probably a presidential statement is forthcoming). the un is also active in coordinating ssr activities in afghanistan (toft 2006). however, none of these organizations has developed an overall framework or a set of guidelines for the implementation of security sector reforms, despite the fact that in its conceptual origins, ssr precisely calls for a coordinated and holistic perspective. in fact, despite the rhetoric on ssr and the review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 2/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 71 few but limited actions aimed at fostering better coordination, this lack of global framework is quite surprising. this is reinforced by the fact that the main actors involved in ssr are also members of these organizations (nato, un and osce and canada, uk, eu and netherlands). this gap between rhetoric and practice is best explained by the absence of coordination amongst actors at the internal level (within national governments and between departments) and the external level (between different countries, institutions and organizations). the latter is what this project focuses on. 3. external security governance and the making of security sector reform policies on the theoretical level, this project seeks to integrate elements of both institutionalism and constructivism. the main building blocks of this project are as follows. first, this project draws from the literature on multi-level governance (hooghe and marks 2004) attempting to understand the way that the debates on ssr within nato and the osce are structured among these decision-making sites this can explain how institutionally the debate is developing. yet it cannot account for what are the content and the process of these institutions related. the second aspect thus attempts to characterize the decision-making process within institutions using a security governance inspired framework (krahmann 2003) in short, this multi-level governance approach to understanding the debates on security sector reform attempts to frame and highlight the mechanisms that support the interactions between these two institutions and the two actors under study, canada and the european union. finally, the third central element of this research design is to move the analysis from the domain of “high politics” to the sphere of “low politics”. this means that the focus is on small level functional cooperation and not on the high-level rhetoric. the objective of this is to analyze the different mechanisms of the debate between a focus on high politics on which the main actors could not agree. by shifting the weight of the decision-making process to a much smaller scale, the main actors could provide a way forward. in short, this move from high politics to low politics is the central argument of this thesis and will be analyzed through the two elements mentioned above: a governance-inspired perspective on the dynamic of power relations and identity construction and an institutional perspective that builds on a multi-level governance view. three mechanisms can best explain the interactions amongst the donor community and, more precisely, the dynamic between eu, canada, nato and the osce. these mechanisms are used as explanatory variables: competition, coordination and division of labour. the notion of inter institutional competition is the first mechanism described. it refers first to a non cooperation relation. this notion however can also be viewed as a strategic competition between different organizations over resources, policy choices, domains of actions and sphere of influence. competition over resources reflects the fact that many international organizations share the same member countries and that they have to fight to gain the largest share of resources (financial, human, administrative, etc.) available. different policy choices can also be the source of competition where the organizations attempt to gain control over a specific strategy. taken together, these two elements are considered the internal competition, i.e. competition over the internal direction that these organizations adopt. on the other hand, competition over domains of actions (fight against terrorism, human security, defence reform, justice and legal reform for examples) and sphere of influence or territory of intervention (examples include nato’s partnership for peace programme, the eu’s neighbourhood policy and the osce’s claim of being the largest security organization, ranging from vancouver to vladivostok) are the external modes of competition between international review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 2/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 72 organizations. another explanatory variable is the cooperation dimension. this is taken here in a very narrow sense. this mechanism refers to specific and limited scheme of cooperation between two organizations, for example the transfer of the mission in bosnia and herzegovina from the nato-led sfor to the euled althea operation in 2004 stands as a clear example. finally, this article proposes to revisit the notion of division of a labour and the so-called european security architecture debate that was prominent in the beginning of the 1990s. the notion of division of labour was a recurrent them in the early 1990s where several ideas where launched to integrate the different security organizations (nato, eu, the osce). the idea of a hierarchical division of labour, usually with the osce as the organization with the broadest security agenda, has not however taken place. this is especially true due to the increasing role played by the eu and the development of the esdp. however, while the conceptualization of an overall division of labour between these security organizations has failed to materialize, it is clear that some specific form of cooperation has been institutionalized. in this sense, the third mechanism seeks to present the way that these organizations cooperate not only on an ad hoc level, but also on broader terms. for example, until recently, the osce has remained the leader in security relations with the former soviet union republics in central asia. defence reform has also been the domain of nato while the eu focused on civilian crisis management. 4. framing the debate within nato and the osce: anarchy, hierarchy or division of labour? it is possible to understand this debate on the role of regional organizations by looking first at the different programmes implemented by both the osce and nato. the objective of this section is to provide an overview of the roles and contributions of the osce and nato in ssr policies on which it will be possible to compare and analyze the modes of interactions. 4.1 nato and defence sector reform nato activities in the field of security sector reform are centred on capacity-building and defence sector reform more precisely. its sphere of activities lies both with the euro-atlantic developed countries and in post-conflict reconstruction. it is most active in the field of defence reform in the balkans and afghanistan and is also promoting security sector reform through the partnership for peace programme and its membership plan. this operational understanding of ssr, as opposed to a concept or framework, is seen in the lens of the decalogue of norms for the pfp defence institution building. regarding the partnership for peace programme, nato has developed the individual partnership action plans (ipap) in which nato and one pfp country agree to work together to achieve domestic reform impacts. the first country to sign an ipap, georgia in 2004, has since moved on to an intensified dialogue (id) with nato in 2006 which is the next step after the initial reform is set and may lead to a membership action plan. the georgia-nato ipap has led to a drafting of national security concept and the elaboration of a strategic defence review which sets the goal for the reform of the military and has paved the way for the transfer of the minister of defence to a civilian administration. 4.2 the osce, norm-building and ssr the osce activities in the domain of ssr (law 2006c) revolve around the norm-building dimension review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 2/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 73 and are centred around the osce code of conduct on politico-military aspects of security (1994). this politically binding instrument while not effectively a ssr concept does provide a normative policy-oriented perspective for the development of ssr activities in the osce long term missions (ltms). the guiding lines of this code, linking security and stability to the democratic control of the security system (military, political and police-related complex) are reflected in the technicalassistance and norm-building approach to ssr from the osce. however, this code of conduct does not address all aspects of security sector reform and should be understood more as a normative tool rather than an overall framework. the osce is particularly active in its long-term missions in the domains of police reform, border management and civil-military relations and the role of the civil society in the security sector. as such, the osce is not directly involved in defence reform per se; rather its comparative strength lies in its use of both development and security tools, geared in part by a human security agenda. 4.3 comparing and contrasting nato and the osce the different approaches used by nato and the osce are quite different. for example, nato relies on high level cooperation with individual countries and assists only indirectly in the local process of reform. the osce is however more present at the local level where its field missions have a large autonomy to conduct reforms and to help local ownership of the ssr process. in short, nato has developed an operational understanding based on defence reform while the osce has used the code of conduct as a guideline for implementing norm-building ssr activities in its long term missions. once this overview done, one can argue that the mechanisms (competition, coordination and division of labour) have in fact an important influence on the absence of an overall framework guiding ssr activities and this can in turn explain the differences between nato and the osce. on the question of mechanisms, three elements are important to highlight. first, the competition mechanisms seem to be the main element that governs the relationship between nato and the european union. this is best explained by the absence of division of labour mechanisms and the intention of the eu of becoming an increasingly important international actor and the need to become the de facto crisis manager in the european security field. this is also explained by the general lack of coordination amongst the different actors, canada, eu and both nato and the osce. on the ground, this coordination is not very, as is highlighted for example in afghanistan and the provincial reconstruction teams. the third mechanism, division of labour, also seems to be a secondary factor. first, division of labour is not clearly defined between canada, eu and nato. this means that all actors attempt to ‘do’ ssr in the same geographic space, especially in afghanistan and in the balkans. however, there seems to be a better definition of roles between canada, the eu and nato where both canada (with its human security program) and the eu leaving a substantial, but secondary role for the osce to play in the norm-building process of ssr activities. this means for example, that the osce is the primary actor in central asia. this in turn better explains the differences between nato and the osce. while nato has developed an operational understanding and has put ssr rhetoric and elements in many important aspects of its program (pfp, membership plan, afghanistan), it has had to deal with a lack of coordination and competition from other actors on the ground which has limited its capacity to develop an overall framework. by not being able to have a defined role on the ground and to implement specific (i.e. defence reform) aspects of ssr, nato could not use a consistent set of ssr practices to shape a conceptual debate. the debates have also been limited at the international level review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 2/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 74 because of this competition between the eu and nato. on the other hand, the osce has been able to find a niche in the field of ssr activities and has developed, using the code of conduct, limited, but substantial field activities. however, the division of labour between the osce, the eu and canada has limited the capacity of the osce to go beyond this practical norm-building program and to update its code of conduct to reflect conceptual development back from the field. this means that the eu and canada wanted to keep the osce as a secondary actor by keeping it practical. this is also explained by the internal mechanisms of osce decision-making and the rule of consensus and actual crisis (vandemoortele, 2006). in short, one can argue that what best explains the differences between these organizations and the absence of an overall ssr framework is the interplay between the competition and cooperation (both ad hoc and institutionalized) mechanisms present in the eu-osce-nato triangle. nato has not adopted an overall framework in large part because it has to deal with the competition at the internal level (policy choices and resources) and the external level (especially the domain of action where nato has created a niche for defence reform). it has also driven its ssr strategy on high level cooperation with individual countries because it has found a way to institutionalize its cooperation with the eu and the osce by targeting the element of defence reform within the ssr strategies. the osce has to deal less with competition than the fact that its high-level of specialization (normbuilding and long term missions) has led to a division of labour where the osce’s domain of intervention is shrinking while nato and the eu are growing in the domain of ssr policies. the osce still remains an important ssr actor on the ground, but it is rapidly losing its distinctiveness and the internal competition over resources and policy choices has led to the failure of developing a new ssr strategy or at least an update of the 1994 code of conduct. 5. conclusion the preliminary results of this study highlights several key aspects surrounding the debates on security sector reform within the international community. the objective of this study was to understand why the osce and nato have not developed overall ssr framework and what were the roles of the european union and canada in the promotion of these debates. by exploring the way that these institutions and actors have shaped the relationship and interactions using three mechanisms (competition, coordination and division of labour), this paper provided a better understanding of this debate. on the policy side, this project also tried to put forward several elements of reflection and discussion that should be highlighted here and put together. first, the idea of understanding inter institutional dynamics in terms of competition and cooperation should put in perspective the debates on closer cooperation between the osce, nato and the eu. this paper proposes to revisit the notions of competition and cooperation and proposes a roadmap to new forms of interaction in which specializations, sharing and pooling resources and a new non-hierarchical division of labour should be put to test. secondly, this paper also puts forward the main positive elements of both the osce and nato’s attempts at security reform sector. mainly, it is argued that nato should continue its focus on defence reform while the osce should pursue its field operations. to improve nato’s defence reform activities, it would be important to share information with other organizations involved and to be more active in the process of local ownership of ssr policies. to improve the osce’s long term missions, a better focus should be put on the objectives and key issues to be addressed in each mission depending on the context and the role played by ssr policies. the focus on local ownership of ssr policies should be maintained at all costs. review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 2/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 75 the next logical step for this project will be to investigate, at the external level, why competition is the main lens through which the interactions between actors is conducted. at the internal level, a more detailed study of the decision-making processes in the eu and canada would probably provide some elements to the way the promotion of ssr practices is done at the international level. finally, a third important way forward would be to compare the impacts of ssr programs between these different actors and to look at the impacts for the local actors involved directly in post-conflict reconstruction. review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 2/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 76 bibliography boanas, edward. 2005. “crossing the fault line – coordinating multilateral security sector reform engagements in post-conflict countries”. journal of 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(november). vandemoortele, antoine. 2006. outsourcing its future: the osce and the panel of eminent persons. chroniques du gersi 2 (1). agu uudelepp_rera_volme3_issue1 review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 1/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 1 ………………………………………………………………… propaganda instruments in contemporary campaigns: comparison of estonian political television advertisements and modern television commercials agu uudelepp abstract the author argues in the present article that although propaganda is considered mostly a tool of ideological communication suitable for use during wars or in totalitarian states, it is still used in contemporary democratic societies at peacetime and there are no major differences between employing instruments of propaganda in the public or the private sectors. the present analysis is based on the similarities and differences between estonian political television advertisements and modern television commercials with an emphasis on the application of propaganda instruments. the author employed content analysis when studying the sample in which were 100 non-political and 84 political advertisements. this research shows that estonian political television advertisements and international non-political television advertisements share some significant similarities: cognitive propaganda instruments are more widely employed than social or technological ones. the role of technological propaganda instruments is diminishing and such instruments are replaced by structural ones. a major difference is that, on average, there are more propaganda instruments per advertisement in political television advertisements than in non-political television advertisements, and technological propaganda instruments are not employed in non-political television advertisements. review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 1/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 2 1. introduction attempts to influence the minds of others are as old as human communication (taylor 2003:6). many artefacts from prehistory and from earliest civilizations provide us with evidence that attempts were made to use the equivalent of modern-day propaganda techniques to communicate to the people the purported majesty and supernatural powers of rulers and priests (jowett and o´donnell 1999:48). early texts written in hieroglyphs also bear symbols which describe history in the way useful for leaders (pratkanis and aronson 2001:11). the term “propaganda” has distinctly religious origins. on 22 june 1622, pope gregory xv issued the papal bull inscrutabili diviniae establishing the sacre congregation de propaganda fide.1 the new congregation was colloquially called propaganda. (jackall 1995:1) so propaganda as a process is of ancient origin but as a term, it is of medieval origin. still, no theoretical analysis of propaganda was made until after the world war i. prior to the world war i, it was believed that developing a conditioned reflex was sufficient to influence people i.e. if a message is repeated frequently enough people will start believing it (uudelepp 2005). the world wars necessitated broadening of practical knowledge of propaganda because of the need to conduct wide scale propaganda campaigns. that gave the term “propaganda” negative connotation which it still has in democratic states. negative connotation means that it is politically incorrect to admit application of propagandistic tools in order to achieve the aims of an institution or organization. this in turn causes a controversial situation where the importance of a desired influence on target audiences is rising and, at the same time, the explicit application or demonstration of proven principles is not acceptable. there are several possible solutions to the contradiction: first, to abandon propaganda in modern societies; second, to develop other ways of influencing public opinion such as public relations; third, to rename the techniques formerly known as propagandistic and continue applying them. the author argues in the present article that although propaganda is considered mostly a tool of ideological communication suitable for use during wars or in totalitarian states, it is still used in contemporary democratic societies at peacetime and there are no major differences between employing instruments of propaganda in the public or the private sectors. several problems arise from this hypothesis. considering the limited space of one article, it is impossible to analyze all the aspects of propaganda. therefore, the research question is formulated as follows: what are the main similarities and differences between the application of propaganda instruments in political and non-political tv advertisements? the question can be divided into groups of more specific questions: 1. are any propaganda instruments used? 2. if yes, are they applied only in politics or in other spheres, too? 3. if they are applied both in politics and other spheres, what are the specific aspects of the use of such instruments in various spheres? the present analysis is based on the similarities and differences between estonian political television advertisements and modern television commercials with an emphasis on the application of propaganda instruments. this constitutes a new approach to research into 1 the sacred congregation of disseminating faith review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 1/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 3 propagandistic messages in eastern europe. it is common to study the messages contained in advertisements or their influence (kaid and holtz-bacha 1995:207). context analysis of propaganda instruments in television advertisements is new in the eastern european context. propaganda instruments are deliberate and functional instructions and ways of interaction to influence people. it is customary in the literature about propaganda to refer to the seven propaganda devices defined by the institute for propaganda analysis in 19372: name calling, glittering generalities, transfer, testimonials, band wagon, card stacking and plain folks. such a classification is not academic and the wording is also more suitable for popular sciences. the author aims at presenting in his article a more academic and theoretically sound abstraction of propaganda instruments. 2. methodology and sampling the current research is focused on the study of political and non-political television advertisements. there are two reasons for choosing television advertisements as the basis of the analysis. first, advertisements are the only form of mass communication over which political or business communicators have total control, i.e. each message is formulated and presented exactly as wanted (mcnair 1995:95). second, in most countries, television is the major channel of advertisements and most people consider it the major communicative link between politicians and their electorate (mcquail 2003:24). it is also easier to create suitable emotional conditioning via television because the mutual effect of sound and images can be applied. the same is possible in films but television is a much more immediate means. the sample of the study consists of all television advertisements of estonian major political parties from 2003-2005, 84 advertisements in total. the above timeframe was chosen because it included all direct elections at various levels held in estonia at the time: in 2003, there was a general election; in 2004, there was a european parliament election; in 2005, there was a municipal election. the political parties covered in the study include the centre party (cp), the reform party (r), pro patria (pp), the people’s union (pu), the social democrats (sd, they participated in the 2003 election as moderates) and res publica (rp). all the parties won seats in the parliament in 2003 and all of them conducted wide-scale television campaigns. the electoral/public support to other estonian parties is marginal. the non-political advertisements, a total of 100, were chosen from among the award-winning advertisements of the 2002 cannes international advertising festival. these advertisements were selected understanding that the information on the most modern ways of making television advertisements was available for the estonian political campaign managers in 2003. in addition to propaganda instruments, the application of humour and story-telling in advertisements is also analyzed since humour is considered one of the tools to make someone likeable (kidron 2004:211). therefore, it is possible, by using humour, to enhance the pleasantness of a communicator and also increase his/her credibility (o´keefe 2002:190). thus, it can be concluded that humour has a desired side-effect: if it is possible to make people smile, it is also possible to create approval for the presented cause (taylor 2004:51). the presence of story-telling is analyzed because stories enable to attract and hold people’s attention while the message is presented. 2 institute for propaganda analysis. how to detect propaganda // propaganda. edited by robert jackall. new york university press 1995. pp 217-223. reprinted from propaganda analysis, vol. 1, no. 2, 1937 review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 1/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 4 the author employed content analysis when studying the sample. the method is considered to be suitable for establishing differences and similarities (kleinstauber 2004:68). according to the classical definition, content analysis is a research technique for the objective, systematic and quantitative description of the manifest content of communicative messages (berelson 1952:18, cited in bryman 2001:178). it is common to use the research technique for analyzing the content of messages intended for broad audiences (neuendorf 2002:22) and specifically for propagandistic messages (krippendorff 2004:8). during the world war ii, it was believed that it was possible to manipulate masses with messages disseminated via mass communication channels, and quantitative content analysis was partly developed for scientists and politicians to be aware of symbolic aspects of mass culture and to identify propagandistic messages and their influence (deacon et al 1999:115-116). it is characteristic of content analysis that the researcher presents the research question, not the hypothesis (krippendorff 2004:32). content analysis has also its limitations. the technique enables the researcher to gather and compare data but it is not possible to explain the findings and the causal relations between the different aspects of messages (bignell 2004:211). another limitation is that content analysis is not suitable for analyzing the effects of the message (sumser 2001:199). also, it is difficult to answer the question why and inevitably the codebooks leave some space for interpretation (bryman 2001:191). however, these restrictions are not important in the context of this article as the research question is formulated to find possible propaganda instruments in television advertisements and to identify the similarities and differences between political and nonpolitical advertisements, not to explain them. 3. concept of propaganda: core and variations conceptual understanding of propaganda varies. one of the first definitions of propaganda was offered by walter lippmann in his book “public opinion” in 1922: “propaganda is an effort to alter the picture to which men respond, to substitute one social pattern for another (lippmann 1997:16). in 1928, edward bernays defined propaganda as a consistent, enduring effort to create or shape events to influence the relations of the public to an enterprise, idea or group (bernays 2004:52). in 1934, harold d. lasswell defined propaganda in its broadest sense as the technique of influencing human action by the manipulation of representations (lasswell 1995:1). these were the three most important propaganda definitions before the world war ii. thus, in the first half of the 20th century, it was not yet agreed whether propaganda was an action or a formation of techniques. it was clear, however, that the aim of propaganda was to influence people. such a dual view of the concept of propaganda continued after the world war ii. one of the most influential writers about propaganda in the post-war period, jacques ellul, defined propaganda as a set of methods employed by an organized group that wants to bring about the active or passive participation in its actions of a mass of individuals, psychologically unified through psychological manipulations and incorporated in an organization (ellul 1973:61). however, the understanding that propaganda is a set of methods did not prevail. garth s. jowett and victoria o´donnell, two frequently quoted propaganda theorists of the late 20th century, define propaganda as the deliberate, systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behavior to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist (jowett and o´donnell 1999:6). the above definitions allow drawing conclusions about certain characteristics of propaganda (table 1): the aim of the propagandist is to influence the attitudes and behaviour of the target review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 1/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 5 group formed of individuals who are an integrated part of the society; the propagandist tries to manipulate both the way people perceive the reality and also the way their emotions are created from these perceptions of reality. based on the above definitions, propaganda is understood in this article as shaping of the attitudes and behaviour of a person in a way desired by the propagandist. the person is considered to be an integrated part of the public and the propagandist’s arguments are derived from the socio-cultural context, based on symbols and stereotypes and targeted at emotions. table 1 the characteristics of propaganda author altering attitudes/ behaviour manipulating reality target group activity/set of methods walter lipmann altering attitudes forming social patterns people activity edward bernays altering attitudes altering relations public activity harold lasswell altering both manipulation of representations people technique jacques ellul altering both psychological manipulations organized group set of methods garth jowett & victoria o´donnell altering both manipulate cognitions people activity for better understanding of propaganda, the author has constructed a propaganda model (figure 1). the socio-cultural context is considered to be the basis of propaganda. the sociocultural context, and propagandist and mass media influence each another. everything done during a propaganda campaign influences the socio-cultural context and this has to be taken into account when planning future actions. influencing the context is defined as a social propaganda or pre-propaganda. its aim is not to induce immediate change in action but to prepare the ground for that, and to insist on the attitudes favourable for the propagandist while reducing the impact of the unfavourable attitudes. in modern societies the information flow (i) is open. this means that an essential characteristic of totalitarian propaganda, censorship (bartlett 1940:13-14) is no longer valid because massive censoring of information is almost impossible. in modern societies censorship is superseded by manipulating the interpretations of facts. in other words, the propagandist interprets events, objects and arguments in the way most suitable for him. also, he tries to enhance the credibility of favourable sources and disregard possible opposition with a myth. the facts, the data, the reasoning – all are forgotten and only the impression remains (ellul 1973:86). therefore, the task of the propagandist is to create an irrational reaction based on rational and factual arguments so that the target group would act in the way desired by the propagandist (uudelepp 2005). propaganda must cover all intellectual and emotional aspects of everyday life; there must be no way of escaping the propagandistic message. the most effective means for reaching the review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 1/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 6 public is mass media. personal contacts are also considered to be valuable, especially while communicating with opinion leaders (o). figure 1. model of a contemporary propaganda source: uudelepp, 2005 according to the definition, the aim of propaganda is to shape attitudes and behaviour. both components are equally important. social propaganda is used to shape attitudes in the way favourable to the propagandist and, by that, the atmosphere for calls to action is created. then it is easier for the propagandist to manipulate people’s behaviour in the desired way. every person is considered to be an active part of the society interacting with other people both within his/her social group and outside of it. by doing that, he/she filters new messages. the propagandist needs to create the circumstances where the group is ready to support his/her messages and diminish the importance of competing messages. institution propagandist mass media small group o symbols myths arguments public i i socio-cultural context f e e d b a c k stereotypes interpretation of facts review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 1/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 7 4. developing conceptual basis for propaganda instruments according to the above propaganda model, there are three different sets of instruments for possible manipulation. the first set is derived from the socio-cultural context. it is cognitive and based on simplification complex issues are simplified and made easily comprehensible. this level is based on symbols and stereotypes upon which propagandistic arguments are built. it allows the propagandist to manipulate the way we perceive those symbols and adapt stereotypes. the importance of symbols in propaganda is based on the understanding that ideological signs are connected more to symbols and less to issues (conover and feldman 2004:213). this connection between propaganda and ideology is important because propaganda is commonly understood as discourse serving ideology (burnett 1989:127). the meaning of symbols is essentially social and the meanings are altering with persons (millar and millar 1976:4). thus, no symbol has an essential connection with the meaning ascribed to it. this is an opportunity for propagandists to establish connections that suit their aims. stereotypes are closely connected with symbols. stereotypes are generalizations, particularly the attribution to an individual of characteristics ascribed as universal to a group from which that individual is drawn (o´shaughnessy 2004:57). the importance of stereotypes in propaganda has been known for a long time; stereotypes were the cornerstone of lippmann´s writings about public opinion and propaganda. he wrote that in the world overflowing with information people are searching for the first familiar sign and after that stereotypes fitting to that sign are applied (lippmann 1997:59). the second set is social and based on people’s need to identify oneself and become part of the society. it is possible to guide people’s behaviour by directing them to act according to the role model set by the élite and opinion leaders or by the fellow members of their social group. explicit ideological self-knowledge is not common, usually it is limited to rulers, opinion leaders and other members of the élite (van dijk 2005:121). classic propaganda is vertical its source is the leader, the political or religious head who acts from the superior position of his authority and seeks to influence the crowd below (ellul 1973:80). the assumption that the ruling elite can indoctrinate and manipulate people the way suitable for the élite is based on that (lukes 1988:77) and when experts alter their ideological understanding the public will follow after some period of time (zaller 1992:328). if there is no example from trusted leaders, people tend to base their decisions on how to behave and what to think on the values presented by the other members of the same social group. this means that people tend to decide on the right and wrong relying on others (cialdini 2005:121). in totalitarian propaganda, it was one of the core statements. the third set is based on the different ways of selecting suitable information and is, therefore, technological. it is based on either censorship or on manipulating with facts and their interpretation. in the interwar period, it was agreed that successful propaganda is impossible without effective censorship (lippmann 1997:28, bartlett 1940:13). censorship is still present in modern societies but its forms have changed. media chooses “facts” that are in accordance with the interests of the élite or attract public attention thus influencing mental models of the broader public while the possibilities for minorities to present their cause in the mass media is limited (van dijk 2005:218). as applying censorship is not possible for every propagandistic body and direct lying is difficult, censorship is, in most part, replaced by manipulation of interpretations of facts. for example, ellul claimed (ellul 1973:52) that direct lying must be avoided but the propagandist is free to manipulate with context and presentation of facts. review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 1/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 8 5. typology of propaganda instruments hence, it is possible to develop a certain typology of propaganda instruments. table 2 presents the instruments, their connection with classic propaganda devices, propaganda techniques3 and possible indicators for every technique. the table is a summary of the research instrument for the content analysis of the present study. table 2 propaganda instruments, their bases and indicators bases of instruments propaganda instruments classic propaganda devices propaganda techniques possible indicators name calling 1. ad hominem arguments greedy, unintelligent etc 2. ridiculing comparison with animal etc 3. selection of emotionally appealing words best, new, future etc symbols and stereotypes cognitive propaganda instruments glittering generalities 4. selection of emotionally appealing images children, animals, sun etc (cpi) 5. calls for altruism claiming that person is good etc transfer 6. referring to accepted symbols university, church, flag etc 7. referring to accepted professions doctors, judges, teachers etc testimonial 1. emphasizing on authority scientist, cabinet minister etc 2. emphasizing on celebrity sports star, singer etc 3. image based on target audience clothing, haircut etc influence of élite or social group social propaganda instruments plain folks 4. behaviour based on target audience visiting same market etc (spi) 5. creation of confident image lots of followers on image etc band wagon 6. utilization of absolutes always, everybody etc 1. false inductivity sample too small etc distortion of reality technological propaganda instruments card stacking 2. false causality switching cause and effect (tpi) 3. oversimplification creating false dichotomy 4. manipulating with numbers mixing percentages etc 3 the propaganda techniques are based on henry t. conserva´s book „propaganda techniques“. review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 1/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 9 we can conclude from the table that there are two contradictory categories: élite vs. social group and benefiting from patterns of cognitive process vs. distortion of input to cognitive process. based on these two pairs, the author has constructed the axis of propaganda (figure 2). figure 2. the axis of propaganda there are four possible types of propagandistic messages according to the axis: 1. the message is based mostly on the socio-cultural context and the example of a strong leader; 2. the message is based mostly on the socio-cultural context and the example of a social group; 3. the message is based mostly on the manipulation of facts and the example of a strong leader; 4. the message is based mostly on the manipulation of facts and the example of a social group. 6. results and discussion comparison of estonian political parties’ television advertisements the frequency per advertisement with which estonian parties apply propaganda instruments is presented in figure 3. it is obvious that the centre party, pro patria and res publica apply more propaganda instruments per advertisement than the remaining three parties that use propaganda in relatively similar proportions. the centre party and the reform party are the only two employing technological propaganda instruments. benefiting from patterns of cognitive process influence of élite influence of social group distortion of input to cognitive process 1. 2. 3. 4. review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 1/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 10 0 0,5 1 1,5 2 2,5 3 3,5 4 4,5 cp r pu pp sd rp cpi spi tpi total figure 3 the average representation of propaganda instruments in political television advertisements all parties use cognitive propaganda instruments more frequently than other types of instruments. the reform party and res publica employ cognitive instruments the most frequently (figure 4); the usage of cognitive instruments by pro patria is also above the average. the centre party and social democrats employ cognitive and social propaganda instruments in relatively similar proportions. thus, the author draws a conclusion that the estonian right-wing parties focus in their propagandistic television advertisements mostly on the usage of symbols accepted by the society while the centre and left-wing parties’ advertisements use a more balanced proportion of cognitive and social instruments. the usage of technological propaganda instruments is limited; only in the case of the centre party the percentage of technological instruments employed is above 10. 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% cp r pu pp sd rp total cpi spi tpi figure 4. division of propaganda instruments in political television advertisements figure 5 presents the usage of humour and story-telling. humour is employed by the reform party and people’s union; story-telling is used by the centre party, the reform party and the people’s union. other three parties have used neither. however, only the application of humour in the reform party’s advertisements can be considered deliberate; story-telling in the review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 1/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 11 centre party’s advertisements and both humour and story-telling in the people’s union’s advertisements are casual. 0,00% 5,00% 10,00% 15,00% 20,00% 25,00% 30,00% cp r pu pp sd rp humor story-telling figure 5. humour and story-telling in political television advertisements. comparison of political and non-political television advertisements all categories of propaganda instruments were used in political television advertisements but in non-political television advertisements, technological propaganda instruments were not applied. so the further comparison of technological propaganda instruments is not possible. figure 6 presents the frequency of propaganda instruments per advertisement in political and non-political television advertisements. the following two major similarities become obvious: • cognitive propaganda instruments are more often used than social propaganda instruments; • the application of cognitive and social propaganda instruments is similar in proportion. two major differences are also obvious: • technological propaganda instruments are not employed in non-political television advertisements; • on average, more propaganda instruments per advertisement are applied in political television advertisements. 0 0,5 1 1,5 2 2,5 3 3,5 political tv advertisements non-political tv advertisements cpi spi tpi total review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 1/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 12 figure 6. average representation of propaganda instruments in political and non-political television advertisements figure 7 indicates that the proportion of cognitive propaganda instruments applied in political and non-political television advertisements is not only similar but practically identical. the difference in the proportional application of social propaganda instruments is marginal and caused by the fact that 4% of instruments used in political television advertisements are technological. 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% political tv advertisements non-political tv advertisements cpi spi tpi figure 7. proportion of propaganda instruments in political and non-political television advertisements at the same time, there are major differences in the application of humour and story-telling (figure 8). while in political television advertisements, the usage of humour and story-telling is rare, these instruments are in constant use in non-political television advertisements. if we consider it together with the fact that technological propaganda instruments are used only by 1/3 of the sample political parties and not at all in non-political tv advertisements, would it be possible to assume that there has been a change in the set of propaganda instruments? as pointed about above, censorship was considered a vital part of propaganda in the early 20th century and manipulation with facts in the middle of the previous century. but perhaps technological propaganda instruments are loosing their importance in contemporary propaganda and are being replaced by instruments based on the structural aspects of propagandistic messages? these are then structural instruments which can be used to create messages suitable for commercializing media and society. in that case it is not that important in contemporary propaganda to concentrate on hiding or distorting information because the political process itself does it4. it is more important to create the message in a form that attracts attention, holds it for a time long enough to distribute symbols and information, and evokes a positive emotional memory. this is in accordance with the understanding contained in propaganda theory that propagandistic arguments and messages have to be rational but their effect has to be emotional. 4 see taylor 2003, p 86-103 review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 1/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 13 0,00% 10,00% 20,00% 30,00% 40,00% 50,00% 60,00% 70,00% 80,00% political tv advertisements non-political tv advertisements humor story-telling figure 8. humour and story-telling in political and non-political television advertisements based on the formulated questions and the gathered data, it is possible to place the sample political parties on the propaganda axis, and make a comparative analysis between them and the propagandistic placement of non-political advertisements. the coordinates for the placements are calculated based on the average representation of propaganda techniques in different sets of advertisements. in order to establish coordinates for the vertical axis, the average representation of technological propaganda instruments in political advertisements are subtracted from the average representation of cognitive propaganda instruments in such advertisements. to establish coordinates for the horizontal axis, the sum of the average representations of techniques based on the influence on a social group, i.e. an image based on the target audience, a behaviour based on the target audience, projecting a confident image and utilization of absolutes, is subtracted from the sum of the average representations of techniques based on the influence of the élite, i.e. emphasizing authority and recognition. table 5 coordinates for placing advertisements on propaganda axis vertical axis horizontal axis centre party (cp) 1.7 -0.8 reform party (r) 2.3 -0.3 people’s union (pu) 1.9 0.7 pro patria (pp) 2.8 0.5 social democrats (sd) 1.7 0.8 res publica (rp) 3.4 0.6 political tv advertisements (p) 2.4 0.1 non-political tv advertisements (np) 1.5 -0.6 the propaganda axis shows that political parties can be divided into three groups (see figure 9). the first group comprises the centre party and the reform party, the second group consists of pro patria and res publica, and the third of the people’s union and social democrats. the former two parties are placed in the quarter of the axle which shows that the propagandistic message is based mostly on the socio-cultural context and on the example of the social group. the latter four are placed in the quarter that is based mostly on the sociocultural context and on the example of the strong leader. non-political advertisements are in the same quarter with the centre party and the reform party, and political advertisements with pro patria, res publica, the people’s union and social democrats. it has to be pointed review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 1/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 14 out that the previous statement is not very informative because different parties function as each other’s counterbalance; generally, political advertisements are in the centre. centre party reform party people´s union pro patria social democrats res publica political non-political 0 1 2 3 4 -2 -1 0 1 2 centre party reform party people´s union pro patria social democrats res publica political nonpolitical figure 9. placing of political parties on the propaganda axle the placement of non-political advertisements and advertisements promoting the centre party and the reform party is interesting. it shows that two estonian parties which have been constantly successful at elections5 form the propagandistic construction of their advertisements in a similar way to the award-winning non-political advertisements competing at the cannes international advertising festival. this raises a question about possible casual relations between specific patterns of the usage of propaganda instruments and the success of persuasive communication in contemporary society. as a result of this study, it is possible to conclude that cognitive propaganda instruments are more widely employed than social propaganda instruments. at the same time, there is no clear application pattern of cognitive instruments which might determine success in persuasive communication. the application of social instruments makes a clear difference: parties concentrating on the influence of social groups are more successful than those emphasizing the role of the élite. in the case of the centre party, it brings out an interesting contradiction. according to the propaganda axis, the centre party is the closest to the example set by the modern award 5 the centre party won the 2003 and 2005 elections and came second in 2004; the reform party was the second in 2005, and the third in 2003 and 2004. review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 1/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 15 winning television advertisements. but if we speak about a possible shift in propaganda instruments, the centre party is the most stagnant estonian political party employing technological propaganda instruments more widely than all the other parties combined. this means that they still apply instruments considered no longer vital and, like all other estonian political parties, neglect modern additions to propaganda instruments. the second group consisting of pro patria and res publica is also interesting. these two parties merged after the 2005 election. it might indicate that parties with similar ideological background may apply propaganda instruments in a similar way. the third group consists of two parties the closest to each other on the axis the people’s union and social democrats. these parties had a joint campaign in tallinn at the 2005 election meaning that some of their television advertisements were done by the same people. that might be the reason why these two parties are placed so close. in conclusion this research shows that estonian political television advertisements and international nonpolitical television advertisements share some significant similarities. cognitive propaganda instruments are more widely employed than social or technological ones. parties that emphasise in their advertisements the role of the influence of social groups rather than that of the élite are more successful. the role of technological propaganda instruments is diminishing and such instruments are replaced by structural ones. a major difference is that, on average, there are more propaganda instruments per advertisement in political television advertisements than in non-political television advertisements, and technological propaganda instruments are not employed in non-political television advertisements. the author would also like to draw attention to the following questions raised as a result of his present research. first, presumably there is a connection between successful persuasive communication and ways of implementing propaganda instruments as the placement of the successful international non-political advertisements and the estonian political propagandistic messages in the same quarter on the propaganda axle indicates. second, the analysis showed that estonian political parties differ in their usage of propaganda instruments and are, thus, differently placed on the propaganda axis. there are several possible reasons: • different ideology, for example maybe liberal and conservative parties differ in their implementation of fact manipulations or techniques aimed at using the impact of the élite or social group6. • the preferences, requests and know-how of party leaders or campaign managers. • the background, professionalism, experience and know-how of the agency hired to make the advertisements. probably there is a major shift in the sets of propaganda instruments. this raises the third question: why are humour and story-telling not applied in estonian political advertisements although they have been proved necessary at the international non-political level? there are also several possible reasons: 6 then the reform party and pro patria ,or the centre party and the people’s union should be intuitively similar, not the centre party and the reform party, and the people’s union and social democrats as the results of this research indicate. review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 1/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 16 • elections are considered to be too serious a process and, because of that, presenting the party platform in a humorous way is regarded as inappropriate. • agencies are not capable of writing copies for such advertisements7. • this option has not been considered important and useful. the fourth question concerns possibilities for further generalization. for example, are estonian non-political television advertisements more similar to contemporary non-political or estonian political advertisements? and whether the absence of humour and story-telling is characteristic of estonian political advertising only or is it also commonplace in the states with a long tradition of free elections? if it is not commonplace elsewhere, maybe it is a further proof of evolution in the field of propaganda instruments? answering these questions requires further research and, regarding the former three questions, application of qualitative methods. 7 this cause might not have a very high probability rate as the reform party and the people’s union have used humour in their advertisements. review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 1/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 17 bibliography bartlett, f. c. (1940). political propaganda. cambridge university press. bernays, e. (2004). propaganda. new york: ig publishing. originally published: new york, 1928 bignell, j. (2004). an introduction to television studies. london: routledge. bryman, a. (2001). social research methods. oxford university press. burnett, n. f. s. (1989). ideology and propaganda: toward an integrative approach. – t. j. smith iii (ed). propaganda. a pluralistic perspective. new york: praeger publishers, 127138. cialdini, r. b. (2005). mõjustamise psühholoogia. teooria ja praktika. tallinn: pegasus. original title: cialdini, r. b. 2001. influence: science and practice, 4th edition. allyn&bacon. conover, p., j. and feldman, s. (2004). origins and meaning of liberal/conservative self-identifications. – j. t. jost, j. sidanius (ed.). political psychology. new york: psychology press. deacon, d., pickering, m., golding, p., murdock, g. (1999). researching communications. a practical guide to methods in media and cultural analysis. oxford university press dijk, t. a. van. (2005). ideoloogia. tartu: tartu ülikooli kirjastus. ellul, j. (1973). propaganda. new york: random house, inc. originaali tiitel: propagandes. librairie armand colin, 1962 jackall, r. (1995). propaganda. new york: university press jowett, g. s., o´donnell, v. (1999). propaganda and persuasion. sage publications inc. kaid, l., l., holtz-bacha, c. (1995). political advertising across cultures. comparing content, styles, and effects. – l. l. kaid & c. holtz-bacha (ed.). political advertising in western democracies. parties & candidates on television. london: sage publications, 206227. kidron, a. (2004). suhtlemine. mondo review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 1/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 18 kleinsteuber, h. j. (2004). comparing mass communication systems, media fomrats, media contents, and media processes. – e. f. esser, b. pfetsch (ed). comparing political communication theories, cases and challenges. cambridge university press. krippendorff, k. (2004). content analysis. an introduction to its methodology. thousand oaks: sage publications. lasswell, h. d. (1995). propaganda – r. jackall (ed). propaganda. new york university press, 13-25. originally published in encyclopedia of the social sciences, 1st edition, vol. xii. london: macmillan, 1934 lippmann, w. (1997). public opinion. free press paperbacks. originally published new york: macmillan, 1922 lukes, i. (1988). radio moscow’s north american service: a study in radio propaganda. – l. bittman (ed). soviet propaganda & disinformation today. pergamont-brassey´s international defence publishers, inc, 77-112. mcnair, b. (1995). an introduction to political communication. london: routledge. mcquail, d. 2003. mcquaili massikommunikatsiooni teooria. tartu: tartu ülikooli kirjastus. original title: mcquail. d. 2000. mcquail´s mass communication theory. 4th edition. sage publications. millar, d., p., millar, f., e. (1976). messages and myths. understanding interpersonal communication. new york: alfred publishing co., inc. neuendorf, k. a. 2002. the content analysis guidebook. thousand oaks: sage publications. o´keefe, d., j. (2002). persuasion. theory & research. london: sage publications. o´shaughnessy, n., j. (2004). politics and propaganda. weapons of mass seduction. michigan: the university of michigan press. pratkanis, a., aronson, e. (2001). age of propaganda. the everyday use and abuse of persuasion. new york: w. h. freeman and company. sumser, j. (2001). a guide to empirical research in communication. rules for looking. thousand oaks: sage publications. taylor, m. (2003). public policy in the community. new york: palgrave macmillan taylor, k. (2004). brainwashing. the science of thought control. oxford: oxford university press. uudelepp, a. (2005). propaganda aristotelesest tänapäevani. – riigikogu toimetised, 11, 170-176 zaller, j., r. (1992). the nature and origins of mass opinion. cambridge: the cambridge university press. oliver schmidtke and jason r. young_volume 4_issue 1 review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 1 ………………………………………………………………… redefining europe – islam, secularism and diversity: “the search for europe’s future: nations, religions, and politics” oliver schmidtke and jason r. young review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 2 introduction few ideas have endured as long and have proven to be as powerful as that of the nation and the ideology of nationalism save perhaps for religion. the complex and intricately interwoven web of ethnic, religious, linguistic, cultural and territorial markers that make up nationalisms and ideas of the nation are statements about distinction that identify ‘self’ in opposition to ‘other’. in attempting to disentangle the connection between religion and the nation, one is immediately struck by the frequency of which conceptions of the ‘nation’ as possessing a divine origin or a social destiny, such american manifest destiny or the french colonial mission civilisatrice arise. the psycho-physical connections between the idea of the nation as elect, the nation as victim, and the nation as a territorial bound entity lies closely at the heart of nationalism, providing the basis for pogroms against enemies within and wars against threats external. the dark side of nationalism – its aggressive attitude toward the external other and its uncompromising homogenizing claim toward internal minorities – has been the historic price for providing the socio-political space for modern politics. as a political ideology, one of nationalisms central features is its keen interest in defining and perpetuating the political community as well as its incumbent restrictions of rights to and within territory that come about with defining the ‘outsider’. the cultural, linguistic and social organization of the political state has preoccupied much of european intellectual and political history. the binding role of religion as the basis for the political state was increasingly displaced by an imagined common history, culture and language in the shape of the nation. nationalism as ideology is however wrought with pitfalls; review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 3 discursive and xenophobic tendencies to see other nations and minorities as physical and biological threats to the life of the nation were quickly developed into enmities by nationalist elites and political projects that aimed at reconstituting or maintaining the nation’s political territory in terms of homogeneity. in many senses the past 60 years of european economic and political integration has been a response to the belligerent legacy of nationalism, and ‘europe’ as a governance space has come to be a symbolic representation of diversity, accommodation and civic nationalism. yet, despite these movements, a familiar spectre has returned to haunt europe: the ideal of ethnic and religious homogeneity as the basis for political community. europe has seemingly now entered in a period of intense self-reflection as nationalism (“nation as state”), religion and territory reemerge as subjects of political discourse. national borders as exclusive demarcations for political communities can no longer simply be taken for granted and essentializing ethnic identities have largely been discredited. this has sparked a debate on legitimate and politically desirable forms of defining the borders and nature of political community in europe. at the height of this introspection is a debate centering on the attractiveness of further increasing the political integration of european nation-states into something potentially resembling a federal europe. this debate is wrought by internal tensions around institutional, political and cultural change. the rejection of the constitution treaty by the french and dutch electorates, enlargement fatigue, and the reality of turkey’s candidacy for accession have polarized an already frayed sense of a shared european cultural identity. the debate over inserting a reference to europe as possessing a specific christian tradition in the draft constitution marked an effort to draw upon a specific religious heritage as a common review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 4 thread to re-launch european integration; it also signified the renewed salience of religion as cultural and political markers. europe’s uneasy peace with religion, specifically those practicing islam, has gradually grown more tenuous as europe’s muslim population have continued to grow both demographically as well as a political voice. the 2005 riots in the periphery of paris provided a dramatic account of how insufficiently certain immigrants are integrated in european societies and how the religious divide corresponds strongly with forms of social exclusion. the so-called ‘cartoon crisis’ that recently rocked europe is but the most recent embodiment of a perceived fundamental clash between cultures. the ‘cartoon crisis’ suggests how deeply linked integration, assimilation, and culture are with europe’s self-identity. religious and cultural minorities, turkey’s potential accession to the european union and the very public debate over the presence and visibility of islam in the public sphere all push europe’s identity crisis to the forefront of both public debate as well as academic investigation, especially in light of the present geo-political climate. this issue of the review of russian and european affairs brings together young scholars to explore the interaction between minorities, majorities, islam and religion in a broader sense of europe. the contributors to this volume engage with these two fundamental and interconnected themes: first constructing europe and second defining europe. in his article on “christianity and tolerance” daniel augenstein gets to the core of this debate by reminding us that despite multicultural narratives, the nation-state continues to be constituted by the idea of homogeneity even though the reality reflects something entirely different. through an engagement with john locke’s writing on toleration, augenstein suggest that rather than attempting to create a ‘christian culture’ review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 5 for europe, europe should instead embrace co-existence and tolerance for alternative world-views as the way forward beyond cultural essentialism. augenstein suggests that a european identity based on inclusiveness and respect for difference rather than on an unrealistic pursuit of homogeneity is essential if europe as a polity is to step beyond the politics of cultural difference. ian morrison’s essay, likewise, comes at an important juncture as recent scholarship has begun to critically re-examine the secularization thesis (for example, norris and inglehart, 2007). morrison steps outside the debate over the accuracy of the secularization thesis and conflict over the place of religion in the public sphere by focusing on the social goals of secularization: the attainment of universal rights and freedoms through limiting the influence of the church (religion) over the social and political affairs of society. morrison notes that the public sphere is the key site for the commemoration of the civic nation and the presence of overt religious symbols in the public sphere – such as the hijab and burqa– contest the legacy of secularism. morrison argues the secularization thesis has gone beyond limiting the influence of religious institutions in social and political agenda setting, and instead has become a sacred doctrine itself, which manifests in the construction of the public sphere and the ideal citizen. the debate over assimilation versus multiculturalism therefore has emerged as the issue politic. this construction of the political subject and the public sphere is directly connected to the idea of the state and the nation as political life; it is here that dagmar soennecken draws our attention to the courts and refugee ngo’s increasing importance in the migration regime and thus the constitution of the national. soennecken’s article explores the judicialization of the immigration regime in review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 6 germany, revealing that contrary to the north american experience – and other european civil law domains such as the netherlands–, while german ngos have become increasingly judicialized, they have not directly entered the courts as interveners and petitioners as north american groups have. instead, soennecken’s study of the strategies of german refugee ngo’s directs our attention to the roles of policy actors, refugee organizations, social discourse and institutional design in expanding the space for court challenges and mediation of the refugee regime. soennecken’s study suggests that further research into the institutional structure of civil society, the state, and the operation of the courts beyond the literature dominated by north american case studies will add new depth to the study of european immigration regimes and political integration. the perception of an immigration problem identified by soennecken further casts light upon conceptions of ‘europe’ as a spatial and cultural narrative. it is this point that jason young and naozad hodiwala take up in their respective essays. young looks at europe’s seemingly new found identity crisis by suggesting that ‘europe’ is constructed by a series of ‘othering’ processes. young argues that muslims and islam in europe, beyond representing alternative cultural and social organizations, have been constructed by narratives of ethical, linguistic, and cultural difference to comprise europe’s antithesis; dual bindings of islam as a religious and a cultural boundary and turkey as a geographic boundary serve to define the limits of europe and provide fuel for developing a core and a periphery of europe. the debate over, including a reference to christianity in the constitution treaty illustrates a europe that is still grappling with the pressures of integrating the former socialist states of east and central europe into the core of europe. for western european review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 7 states with sizable muslim populations – namely france, germany, and the netherlands – religious and cultural traditions have come to the forefront of the public debate over the national space as the resident muslim population continues to grow both in numerical size as well as in political assertiveness. the immigration question is constructed as a threat to social homogeneity and cultural traditions, traditions already under strain by european integration and particularly by the eastward enlargement. the discourse of europe and european-ness is constructed in terms of cultural binaries, of which muslims and turkey represent the ‘other’ against which to measure europe’s similarities. like young, naozad hodiwala picks up on the securitization of the immigration regime by conservative and populist politicians and public intellectuals. hodiwala perhaps accurately sums up the sentiments of the far right, of which jean-marie le pen is the most symbolic in his characterization of the threat posed by islam. striking to the core of their arguments, hodiwala, as young, suggests that the renewed strength of the antiimmigrant lobby comes as a result of a sense the ‘meaning’ of the nation has or is being changed by islamic migrants. hodiwala is highly critical of western european media and politicians fear mongering, cultural misrepresentation and hyperbolic characterizations of muslims as dangers to social security, as sources of unemployment, and as terrorists bent on destroying european national, cultural and religious traditions. hodiwala focuses on the securitization of migration and culture and the role of elites in perpetuating a ‘clash of cultures’. the debate over turkey’s potential accession has roused academics, politicians and media alike into discourses spanning everything from a ‘clash of civilizations’ to fundamental questions about the nation as the state and essentialist discourses of ethnic review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 8 nationalism. the major contributions the papers in this volume make are to engage with these two concepts and to explore europe as a set of cultural, economic and religious discourses (pagden, 2002). europe’s identity crisis seemingly hinges on this question. europe’s self-identity is now confronted by fundamental questions about europe as a political and social set of meta-narratives. changing demographics, the eastward expansion, and the potential accession of turkey raises important questions about the social, and political design of a future europe: will europe be troubled by a clash of civilizations and exclusionary forms of nationalisms or will europe represent a new, cosmopolitan or post-national form of political and social polity? review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 9 works cited anderson, benedict. imagined communities: reflections of the origins and spread of nationalism rev. ed (london: verso, 1993) norris, pippa and englehart. sacred and secular (cambridge: cambridge university press, 2005) anthony pagden, ed. the idea of europe: from antiquity to the european union (cambridge: cambridge university press, 2002) microsoft word ihor soroka_the effect of membership in the european monetary union on trade between member countries_an empir review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved ………………………………………………………………… the effect of membership in the european monetary union on trade between member countries (an empirical study) ihor soroka∗° abstract the question of whether or not to adopt the euro is a very important one, not only for the 13 european union members that do not share the same currency, but also for future eu candidates. current literature on the effect of the euro on trade is scarce since the european monetary union (emu) was officially created in 1999, and up until recently there has not been enough data to analyze this issue. this paper aims to estimate the effect of the euro on trade between member countries using the standard gravity model of trade. using data from current 25 eu members over the period from 1997 to 2004, i show that higher trade volumes between emu members cannot be attributed to the adoption of the euro. i find evidence that the euro adoption has had a short-run effect on bilateral trade and that this effect is eliminated over a short period of time. my findings suggest that members of the emu trade on average from 8.8% to 47% more compared to non-members depending on the type of regression used, while members of the free trade agreement trade 61.3% more. the effect of the euro on trade is eliminated as soon as i control for country-pair specific effects that include the fta effect as well as history of trade relations between two countries. i conclude that the adoption of the euro should be seen as a final step in the european economic and monetary integration for countries that already benefit from relatively high volumes of bilateral trade. ∗ e-mail: ihor_soroka@yahoo.ca ° i am very grateful to my supervisor prof. eckhard siggel for brilliant ideas, constant help and support throughout the work on this paper. i would also like to thank prof. a. darku for valuable comments and suggestions, prof. j. hansen and prof. s. imai for econometric-related help as well as my colleague, erik franko m.a., for making stylistic corrections. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 78 “the critics questioned whether the research had allowed sufficiently for other factors likely to be associated with currency unions that would also generate higher trade volumes. these might simply reflect historical ties between countries. leaving them out would exaggerate the estimates of the effect on trade of currency-union membership.” the economist. the euro, trade and growth, july 10th, 2003. introduction in recent years there has been growing interest in estimating the effect of membership in a currency union (cu) on trade among its members. rose (2000) estimated this effect using trade data for 186 countries over the period from 1970 till 1990. his estimated coefficient on membership in cu came up to be statistically significant, suggesting that countries sharing the same currency trade three times more compared to the ones that are not (rose, 2000). micco et al. (2003) estimated that the effect of the european monetary union (emu) on trade ranges between 4 and 16 percent depending on the sample. if sharing the euro does have a significant positive effect on trade leading to gains in the social welfare, this will encourage new members of the european union to the early adoption of the euro in order to benefit from its trade effect. the adoption of the euro can also be seen as a culmination in the history of economic and monetary integration in europe, the final step for countries that already trade significantly with each other. the question as to whether the euro boosts trade between the members of the emu is, therefore, of great interest from the policy perspective. this paper aims to estimate the effect of emu on trade using bilateral trade data from 25 current eu members over the period from 1997 till 2004. i conduct both crosssection and panel data analyses using the standard gravity model of trade. i show that review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 79 although members of the european monetary union trade more with each other compared to non-members, the effect of using the common currency is eliminated as soon as i control for country-pair specific effects such as the history of the bilateral trade between countries. this evidence supports the economist’s point of view on the effect of membership in the emu on trade, and contradicts the findings of rose that sharing the same currency itself has large effect on trade. in the next section of this paper the literature review on the effect of membership in a currency union on trade is presented. in the third section i show how european economic and monetary integration affected trade between member countries. in the following two sections i introduce the methodology and describe the data for my empirical study. the empirical results are presented in the sixth section. in the final section of the paper i derive my conclusions. literature review the idea that a common currency may increase trade came from mccallum (1995) and helliwell (1998) who found a large home market bias when studying trade between canadian provinces and the united states1. rose (2000) for the first time attempted to directly estimate the common currency effect using the un trade data for 186 countries over the period from 1970 till 1990. his estimated coefficient on membership in cu came up to be statistically significant suggesting that countries that have the same currency trade three times more compared to the ones that do not (rose, 2000). numerous scholars (persson (2001), nitsch (2002), tenreyro(2001) among the 1 the authors argued that, ceteris paribus, trade between two canadian provinces was 10-20 times greater than trade between a canadian province and a us state. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 80 others) criticized the rose’s original work on methodological grounds and showed that the effect of cu on trade can be reduced by using different econometric techniques as well as data sets. these critiques didn’t prevent but rather encouraged rose to further investigate the issue. rose (2001) estimated the effect of a currency union on trade using imf data set which is larger than the un data set used in the original work. the author experimented with three different econometric techniques: usual cross-sectional ols, matching technique proposed by persson (2001) as well as panel data fixed effect estimation, which “exploits variation over time and answers an interesting policy question, namely ‘what is the trade effect of a country joining (or leaving) a currency union?’ (as opposed to the cross-sectional question of ‘how much more do countries within currency unions trade than non-members?’)” (rose, 2001, p.455). he found the effect of a cu on trade to vary from 21% to over 200% depending on the exact estimation technique and concluded that in general it is still very large and statistically significant. glick and rose (2002) exploited the panel nature of the data by estimating both fixed and random effects on the extended data set that covers over 200 countries over the period from 1948 to 1997. by controlling for a set of variables that affect trade, the authors concluded that joining a currency union nearly doubles bilateral trade. this result is statistically significant and insensitive to the exact econometric specification (glick and rose, 2002). other studies that focused on the discussed issue are frankel and rose (2001), rose (2002b), rose and engel (2002). review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 81 in order to summarize findings of twenty-four studies on the effect of common currencies on trade at the time, rose and stanley (2005) conducted a meta-analysis2 of the effect of common currencies on trade. the authors concluded that a currency union increases bilateral trade by between 30% and 90%. thus far i have not discussed the literature that directly addresses the question about the effect of the european monetary union (emu) on trade, which i will do in the following part of this section. the important point mentioned by rose (2000), among others is that most of the countries that share the same currency in rose’s sample are either very small or poor and, therefore the results might not be applicable to richer european monetary union countries. micco et al. (2003) made the first attempt to estimate the effect of emu on trade using bilateral trade data from two different data sets (the first one– on 22 developed countries including 15 eu countries with belgiumluxembourg considered as one ‘country’ observation along with australia, canada, japan, iceland, new zealand, norway, switzerland and the usa, and the second one – exclusively on the eu-15 countries) over the period from 1992 to 2002. the authors employed a modified version of the gravity model using panel data and country-pair fixed effects. they concluded that the effect of emu on intra-union trade is positive and statistically significant. it also ranges between 4 and 16 percent (it is much smaller than the one estimated by rose (2000) and glick & rose (2001)). barr et al. (2003) addressed the endogeneity issue by estimating the standard gravity model using the instrumental variable method. the results turned out to be very similar to the ones obtained using standard ols, indicating that the endogeneity effect is 2 meta analysis is a set of quantitative techniques for evaluating and combining empirical results from different studies (rose and stanley, 2005, p.4) review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 82 minor in case of the emu. the authors estimated the effect of the emu on trade using the data on 17 european countries over the period from 1978 to 2002. they found an effect of 29% using ols and 27% using a fixed effect approach. as opposed to micco et al. (2003) and barr et al. (2003), berger and nitsch (2005) analyzed the trade between european countries over the last fifty years. they examined a data set for the same 22 countries as in micco’s et al. (2003) for the period from as early as 1948 until 2003. the authors put creation of the emu in a historical perspective and argued that increase in trade between the members of the emu was a result of gradual trade integration between european countries: “… once we control for the historical trend in trade integration, the effect of the euro weakens considerably or even disappears completely” (berger and nitsch, 2005, p.3). to sum up, different authors came up with different estimates of the currency union effect on trade. the multitude of the results is shown in the attachment 1. although most authors found this effect to be positive and statistically significant, some (tenreyro (2001) for instance) found it positive but statistically not different from zero or even negative (pakko and wall (2001)). the literature on the effect of membership in the european monetary union on trade is still very limited since up until now there has not been enough data to study this issue. in this paper i will analyze the most updated trade data for all current 25 european union members, which, to my knowledge, has not been done by scholars. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 83 trade and economic integration in europe the important question i would like to address is how the economic and monetary integration in europe affected the trade between emu members. berger and nitsch (2005) used the data for 22 industrial countries including the 15 eu members over the period from 1948 till 2003 to show that trade between countries that will later form emu was gradually increasing long time before the creation of the emu. the authors also showed that once controlling for this trend in trade integration, the effect of the emu on trade is eliminated. these findings are consistent with the idea that historical integration in europe from the formation of the customs union, european monetary system to the economic and monetary union led to higher trade volumes between member countries and contradict the so-called rose effect (i.e., the effect of a common currency on trade). in other words, the euro itself didn’t lead to the high trade volumes between emu members; the adoption of the euro must be seen as a culmination of a long history of economic and monetary integration in europe. let us now look at the trade data for members and non-members of the emu used in our analysis (see figure1). review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 84 figure1. the pattern of trade for members and non-members of the emu -10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 years % emu-emu nemu-nemu emu-nemu note: • aggregate bilateral trade volume is deflated by the us cpi (base year – 1997) • emu stands for 12 european monetary union members (11 countries because of the belgiumluxembourg customs union) for the entire period (even before the existence of the emu since we are interested in tracing changes in the trade volumes for those countries) • nemu represents the rest of the european union countries that are not members of the emu (13 countries) • each line represents percentage change of bilateral trade volume (1997 being 0) between emu members (emu-emu), non-members of the emu (nemu-nemu) and between members and nonmembers (emu-nemu). source: author’s calculations from the imf trade statistics and the imf international financial statistics as one can see from figure1, members of the european monetary union did see a relatively high increase in the aggregate bilateral trade volume in 1999 when the emu was officially created. however, over the following two years these countries experienced a decrease in the trade volume in real terms by around 5%, which may be partially attributed to the global economic slowdown. the next three years are characterized by the rapid increase in the aggregate trade volumes for both members and non-members of the emu. interestingly, non-members experienced even higher increase in the aggregate trade volume than members. overall, the aggregate trade volume review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 85 between emu members increased by 63.5% in real terms from 1997 till 2004 while nonmembers increased its trade by 65.2%. this may lead to the conclusion that countries that share the euro experienced relatively lower percentage increase in the trade volume compared to the ones that do not. in what follows, i will explain why this conclusion can be misleading. figure1 clearly displays that up until 2004 emu members traded relatively more than non-members (keeping in mind that the base year is 1997). it seems like in 2004 non-members experienced some kind of boost that led to a drastic increase in the trade volume (so drastic that while in 2003 the difference in relative trade volumes between members and non-members was +7.9%, in 2004 it was –1.7%). the question is: what could possibly lead to such a boost in trade for non-members in 2004? my answer is: it was the effect of the european union enlargement. in 2004 10 countries joined the european union. these countries form the majority of my non-members sub-sample (13 countries in this sub-sample include 10 new members plus countries that have not adopted the euro such as the u.k., denmark and sweden). becoming a part of the single market such as the european union can lead to greater increases in trade volume between the eu members. therefore, i may conclude that the euro did affect trade between members in 1999 leading to a gap in relative trade volumes. however, this gap had been diminishing and finally disappeared in 2004, which could be partially attributed to the fact that 10 non-members joined the european union. the above-presented arguments suggest that the effect of the membership in the european monetary union on trade may be of a short-run nature and can be eliminated over time. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 86 methodology in order to analyze the effect of membership in the european monetary union on trade i will use the standard gravity model approach. both the cross-section and the panel data analyses will be performed. the gravity model approach introduced by tinbergen (1962), the gravity model has been extensively used by empirical trade economists ((rose (2000), glick and rose (2001), micco et al. (2003) and others) as it performs quite well empirically. the idea behind the gravity model, taken from the newtonian physics, is that trade flows between two countries depend positively on the product of the gdps of both countries and negatively on the distance between them. distance between corresponding capitals is used as a proxy for the distance between two countries. other independent variables often included in the gravity model are product of the gdps per capita, product of surface areas, the number of landlocked countries in a pair (0,1 or 2), a dummy variable that indicates whether two countries share a common border, a common language, as well as common membership in a free trade area (fta). following rose (2000), in addition to the independent variables described above, a dummy variable that indicates a common membership in the european monetary union will be included. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 87 cross-section data analysis the cross-section data analysis of the effect of a single currency on trade answers the following question: do countries that share the same currency trade more than the ones that do not? the following specification of the gravity model is used for the cross-sectional analysis: lntij = β0 + β1lnyiyj +β2lnyiyj + β3borderij + β4langij + β5lndij + β6lnsurfij + +β7landlockij + β8ftaij + β9euij + β10emuij + εij, (1) where lntij represents log of the bilateral trade volume between countries i and j (the simple average of the bilateral imports and exports declared by both countries3), lnyiyj is the log of the product of nominal gdps (in constant us$), lnyiyj is the log of the product of nominal gdps per capita, borderij is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if two countries share the same border and 0 otherwise, langij is a dummy which takes the value of 1 if two countries share the same language and 0 otherwise, lndij is the log of the distance between two capitals of corresponding countries, lnsurfij is the log of the surface product (surface area of country i times surface area of country j), landlockij is the number of landlocked countries in the pair (0,1 or 2), ftaij is a dummy variable for common membership in a free trade area4 (“1” if both countries belong to the same free trade area and “0” otherwise), euij is the same for membership in the eu, and, finally, the variable of interest, emuij, represents membership in emu. 3 imports from country i to country j declared by country i do not necessarily equal exports from country j to country i declared by country j. this is why i use the average of these values. 4 my sample comprises of countries that belong to 3 free trade agreements: european union, central european free trade agreement (cefta) and baltic free trade area (bafta) (see attachment 2 for the list of members). in order to avoid double counting the fta dummy comprises of 2 free trade agreements: cefta and bafta. also note that although some countries ceased their memberships in either cefta or bafta in 2004 because of entering the eu, i will still treat them as non-eu members in 2004 as that year was a transitional one and cannot be treated as a full year of membership in the eu. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 88 panel data analysis glick and rose (2001) argued that the cross-section analysis might not be the most efficient way to analyze the effect of a monetary union on trade. the authors argued that fixed effect estimation answers the more important policy perspective question of whether joining a currency union has an impact on trade for new members. it estimates the coefficient on the membership in a currency union by comparing trade for a pair of countries before cu creation to trade for the same pair of countries after cu creation as opposed to the cross-section ols estimation where trade between cu members is compared to trade between cu non-members (glick and rose, 2001). the only weaknesses of the fixed effect (“within”) estimator are the impossibility of measuring time-invariant variables as well as lack of efficiency. the latter can be ignored, as my data set is fairly large. i begin my panel data analysis by estimating the following model: lntij = β0 + β1lnyiyj +β2lnyiyj + β3borderij + β4langij + β5lndij + β6lnsurfij + +β7landlockij + β8ftaij + β9euij + β10i98 + β11i99 + β12i00εij + β13i01 + β14i02 + β15i03 + β16i04 + εij, (1*) where all the variables are as described in the section 4.2 plus year-specific dummies (i98 – i04). inclusion of the year-specific dummies allows me to control for the yearspecific effect on trade (for instance, global change in the oil price that affected all countries in the sample). note that equation (1*) does not include the emu variable, which is added in the next model specification. as will be shown later, exclusion of the emu variable, an important variable that belongs to the model, leads to biased estimates. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 89 some changes in the model specification will be made in order to better estimate the effects of the emu as well as the ftas. in total five separate regressions with different model specifications will be run: 1) i run pooled ols using the equation (1*); 2) i add emu variable to the equation (1*); 3) i combine the fta dummy with the eu dummy into the single fta2 dummy since the fta dummy only represents the combined effect of cefta and bafta. i believe that fta2 dummy is more appropriate in order to show the effect of the free trade agreements in europe on trade between members. 4) i split the fta2 dummy into three dummies: eu, cefta and bafta. this will enable to show the trade effect of each free trade agreement. 5) i will include country-pair specific dummies and exclude all time-invariant variables (least squares dummy variable estimation). a country-pair specific dummy, which takes value of one whenever the specific countrypair is observed in the panel data, captures all observable and unobservable characteristics of the country-pair that are invariant over time and impact bilateral trade. therefore, the last model specification excludes all time-invariant variables since they are captured by the country-pair fixed effects. this model specification allows us to estimate the effect of membership in the emu while controlling not only for observed timeinvariant explanatory variables such as distance or common border, but also for omitted time-invariant unobserved explanatory variables that can affect bilateral trade. for instance, if poland historically traded more with germany than what is due to the explanatory variables, then the germany-poland country-pair dummy will capture this review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 90 openness to trade. therefore, if poland were to adopt the euro in 2004, the country-pair dummy would capture historically high trade volume between poland and germany and the emu dummy would supposedly capture only the effect of the euro adoption (micco et al., 2003). the estimator that includes country-pair specific dummies, called the least squares dummy variable (lsdv) estimator, is equivalent to the fixed effect (“within”) estimator (wooldridge, 2002, p.273). as argued by glick and rose (2001), the last model specification is the most appropriate for the estimation of the effect of entering the monetary union on trade between members. data the data for this study has been obtained from different sources such as the imf, the world bank, the cia, and the university of michigan geographic name server. trade data (exports and imports) for 25 european union members for the period from 1997 until 2004 inclusive has been taken from the imf direction of trade statistics (dots). the year 1997 was chosen as a starting point for the analysis because prior to this year we observed many missing values in the data. the data for the years 1997 to 2004 have no missing values, allowing me to work with the balanced panel data. there are in total 276 country-pair observations for each year5. in the panel data estimation, the trade data has been deflated by the us cpi, taken from the imf international financial statistics. the data on gdp and per capita gdp have been obtained from the world development indicators (wdi) of the world bank. in the cross-section data analysis i 5 belgium and luxembourg are considered as one “country” because of the belgium-luxembourg customs union. therefore, the number of country-pair observations can be computed as (24x23)/2=276. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 91 use the nominal gdps while in the panel data regressions, real gdps with the base year of 1997 have been used. data on common borders, common language, surface area and landlocked condition were obtained from the cia world factbook. the data on distances between capitals were obtained from the university of michigan geographic name server. data on free trade agreements were taken from frankel (1997). empirical results cross-section data analysis i run ols regressions using equation (1) for each year starting with 1997 until 20046 inclusive. table 1 displays estimated coefficients for the emu, eu and fta dummy variables. the complete results for all the variables in the regressions are presented in the attachment 3. i define the emu dummy as the one that takes a value of one for all emu country-pairs even before the creation of the european monetary union. the purpose of this exercise is to see whether there is a jump in the coefficient at the time when the monetary union was created. in other words, i want to trace the changes in trade volumes between emu members throughout the whole period (1997 – 2004). scholars such as micco et al. (2002), berger and nitsch (2005) also use this technique to analyze the effect of a monetary union on trade using the cross-section data. the model fits the data quite well: r-squared in all eight regressions is quite high (approximately 0.94), which tells us that around 94% of variation in the bilateral trade is 6 i chose this sample period (1997-2004) because it allowed me to work with the balanced panel data. other authors such as micco et al. (2003) use the short sample period (1992-2002) and the longer one (19802002) in the similar regression analysis. the results they obtained from both samples do not significantly differ from each other. therefore, i believe that extending my sample period will not drastically change the general conclusion. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 92 explained by the variation in our explanatory variables. the emu coefficient becomes statistically significant in 1998 and following years. it is consistent with the findings of micco et al. (2003) who argued that although the monetary union was officially created in 1999, “the year 1998 was a pivotal year in the process of monetary unification” (micco et al., 2003, p.331). the value of the emu coefficient varies from 0.334 in 2002 to 0.385 in 2000, which implies that countries that share the euro trade 39.7% to 47%7 more compared to the ones that do not. the value of the coefficient is comparable but slightly lower than the one estimated by micco et al. (2002) (0.462 to 0.467), who used the similar regression but different than mine data set. the authors analyzed the data for 22 developed countries (including 15 eu members) over the period from 1992 till 2001. table1. ols gravity estimates year emu eu fta 1997 0.229 (1.634) 0.061 (0.374) 1.316 (6.173)*** 1998 0.252 (1.79)* 0.006 (0.030) 1.254 (5.87)*** 1999 0.369 (2.722)*** -0.064 (-0.402) 1.361 (6.603)*** 2000 0.385 (2.721)*** -0.135 (-0.813) 1.335 (6.198)*** 2001 0.344 (2.616)*** 0.011 (0.070) 1.084 (5.419)*** 2002 0.334 (2.566)** -0.061 (-0.398) 1.099 (5.560)*** 2003 0.358 (2.771)*** -0.056 (-0.373) 1.108 (5.637)*** 2004 0.371 (2.801)*** -0.105 (-0.674) 1.237 (6.138)*** note: t-statistics in parentheses. *** significance at 1%; ** 5%; * 10%. number of observations in each regression: 276 according to my estimates of the eu dummy, the effect of membership in the european union has no statistically significant effect on bilateral trade. however, one 7 since the value of the emu coefficient represents the effect of membership in the emu on the logarithm of trade, the following formula is used to calculate the effect of the euro on trade: eβ -1, where β is the emu coefficient review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 93 should not conclude that membership in the european union has no effect on trade. the data suggests that relatively to the gdp level, members of the european union trade more than non-members. it is possible that higher trade volumes between eu members are well explained by their high gdps, proximity to each other as well as other gravity equation variables. if this is the case then the marginal effect of the eu may be insignificant even though the eu members do trade more with each other than non-eu members. the most interesting finding so far is a relatively high and statistically significant value of the coefficient for free trade agreement dummy. in fact, the value of the coefficient implies that membership in either cefta or bafta has, on average, much stronger effects on bilateral trade (195.6% to 290%) compared to the membership in the monetary union (recall, 39.7% to 47%). membership in the free trade agreement such as cefta or bafta nearly doubles or even triples the trade between members. in the panel data analysis i introduce fta2 dummy that would capture the effect of all 3 ftas that are present in my data: eu, cefta and bafta. it will allow me to better estimate the effect of the free trade agreement on trade. other explanatory variables in my ols regressions have the expected signs and magnitudes. both distance and landlocked condition have negative and statistically significant effects on trade. product of gdps has positive and statistically significant effect on trade as predicted by the standard gravity model. product of gdps per capita has positive but, with the exception of years 1999 and 2000, not statistically significant effects on trade. the rest of explanatory variables such as the product of surface areas, review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 94 common border and common language have positive but not statistically significant effects on trade. to sum up, the results on cross-section data showed that countries that share the same currency trade on average 39.7% to 47% more compared to the ones that do not. furthermore, countries that belong to either cefta or bafta trade even more. it is evident that there was a jump in the emu coefficient from 0.252 in 1998 to 0.369 in 1999. it is consistent with the figure1 that clearly displays a sharp increase in trade volumes between emu members in 1999. panel data analysis first, i redefine the emu dummy variable. in the cross-section data analysis the emu dummy takes the value of one for all 12 members for the entire period (1997 till 2004), as i was interested in tracing the changes in the trade volumes for the same countries before and after emu membership. now, as i run regressions on the pooled data that consists of 2208 observations (276 observations per year times 8 years), i want my emu dummy to display the membership in the emu only in the years in which countries were emu members. therefore, emu dummy takes a value of one if both countries in the country-pair belong to the emu as of 1999 (with the exception of greece that joined the emu in 2001). as was described in the section 4.3, i run five separate regressions using different model specifications. each column in the table2 corresponds to the appropriate model specification described in section 4.3. as i described earlier, model (1) excludes the emu variable. the coefficients from model (1) have the expected signs and magnitudes. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 95 however, inclusion of the emu dummy in model (2) drastically changes the magnitude as well as significance of the eu variable. while emu coefficient is large (0.237) and significant at 1% level of significance, eu coefficient drops to 0.087 and is only significant at 10% level. it is evident that model (1) suffers from the omitted variable bias. the positive bias in the eu coefficient is removed as soon as i add the emu variable, a significant variable that belongs to the model. models (2) – (4) are similar in the sense that they tell us whether countries belonging to a free trade area or monetary union trade more compared to the ones that do not. therefore, i can conclude that emu members trade on average from 8.8% to 26.7% more compared to non-members (emu coefficient ranges from 0.084 to 0.237 depending on the model specification). members of the cefta or bafta trade on average 232% more than non-members. fta coefficient from model (2), which show the combined effect of cefta and bafta, equal 1.20. the only reasonable explanation for these enormous trade effects is the fact that cefta and bafta were established with the intention of joining the european union. hence, members of the cefta and bafta were getting ready to join the european union by removing existing trade barriers, which led to higher trade volumes between members. the combined effect of all 3 ftas as captured by the fta2 dummy is 61.28% (the value of the fta2 coefficient from model (3) is 0.478). this means that countries belonging to a free trade area trade on average 61.28% more with each other than the ones that do not. it is important to note that the fact that emu members trade more compared to non-members may not imply that this is because they all share the same currency. it is review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 96 possible that models (2) – (4) do not include some important variables, which could lead to biased estimates. recall the germany-poland example, in which the high trade volume between these countries is partially attributed to their close historical ties. if this is the case then this ‘history of trade’ effect could be picked up by the emu variable, which makes the emu coefficient biased. this problem is addressed by estimating the emu coefficient using model (5), which is designed to estimate the effect of time-variant variables such as the emu controlling for all observed and unobserved time-invariant variables, which, in my case, include eu, cefta and bafta. the country-pair dummies included in model (5) capture all time-invariant variables that affect trade focusing on estimating the effect of time-variant variables such as the emu membership. if countries that joined the emu really experienced a persistent increase in trade after joining the monetary union, the emu dummy from model (5) must come up large and statistically significant. otherwise, i will conclude that higher trade volumes of the emu members cannot be attributed to the adoption of the euro. scholars, such as glick and rose (2001), micco et al. (2003) among the others also argue that the inclusion of the country-pair dummies is the best way to estimate the effect of entry into a monetary union. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 97 table2. pooled panel ols gravity estimates variable: model (1) model (2) model (3) model (4) model (5) constant -27.843 (-55.35)*** -27.847 (-55.64)*** -24.372 (-59.53)*** -29.166 (-58.32)*** -44.327 (-7.81)*** log of distance -1.132 (-43.98)*** -1.145 (-44.46)*** -1.198 (-45.94)*** -1.115 (-44.33)*** log of product of surface areas 0.009 (0.85) 0.012 (1.17) 0.002 (0.16) -0.0005 (-0.05) log of product of gdps 0.814 (65.97)*** 0.811 (65.92)*** 0.798 (63.32)*** 0.835 (68.76)*** 0.98 (9.42)*** log of product of gdps per capita 0.007 (0.28) 0.017 (0.67) -0.104 (-4.51)*** 0.023 (0.95) common border 0.218 (3.88)*** 0.179 (3.17)*** 0.262 (4.54)*** 0.142 (2.58)*** common language 0.183 (3.25)*** 0.207 (3.68)*** 0.164 (2.85)*** 0.213 (3.90)*** landlock condition -0.233 (-8.28)*** -0.240 (-8.54)*** -0.199 (-6.94)*** -0.160 (-5.67)*** fta= (cefta + bafta) 1.184 (15.98)*** 1.20 (16.27)*** fta2= (cefta+bafta +eu) 0.478 (12.16)*** cefta 0.871 (11.26)*** bafta 2.539 (18.40)*** eu 0.199 (4.35)*** 0.087 (1.69)* 0.038 (0.75) emu 0.237 (4.84)*** 0.084 (1.73)* 0.233 (4.89)*** -0.047 (-1.57) r-squared 0.939 0.939 0.936 0.943 0.991 number of observations 2208 2208 2208 2208 2208 year dummies yes yes yes yes yes country-pair dummies no no no no yes note: t-statistics in parentheses; *** significance at 1%; ** 5%; * 10%; the log of product of gdps per capita is excluded from the last model specification because of its high correlation with the country-pair dummies as one can see from the empirical results using the fifth model specification, the inclusion of the country-pair dummies drastically changed the previous findings. the emu coefficient suddenly became negative and no longer statistically different from zero. this causes serious concerns regarding the effect of membership in the european review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 98 monetary union on trade. micco et al. (2003) observed that “the currency union effect is systematically smaller when pair dummies (country-pair dummies – author) are included” (micco et al., 2003, p.329). the authors stated that one possible explanation for this relates to the possibility of reverse causality or, in other words, the ‘endogeneity bias’. the idea behind the reverse causality is that countries may be joining the currency union because they already trade a lot and not vice versa. the inclusion of country-pair dummies reduces the endogeneity bias and allows us to better estimate the time-variant effects such as the effect of entry into the emu (micco et al., 2003, pp.329-330). so, does it mean that when we control for the country-pair specific effects such as the intensity of trade between two countries, the effect of joining the monetary union is eliminated? according to my estimates – yes. in other words, it’s not the euro that boosts the trade between the emu members, it’s the high volume of trade that leads to sharing the same currency (reverse causality issue). it is important to note that the country-pair dummies in our case capture the effect of a free trade agreement. as i described in section3, european countries had over 50 years of history of economic integration that gradually led to the removal of trade barriers and thus increased bilateral trade between countries. no wonder then that the effect of the euro is eliminated as soon as we control for country-pair specific effects that include the fta effect as well as history of trade between two countries. conclusions monetary integration in europe has raised many questions. the most important one is: do countries benefit from sharing the common currency? politicians see the review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 99 adoption of the euro as a necessary step in the european economic and political integration while economists have different perspective on this issue. some argue that joining the euroland has potentially large trade benefits while others see it as an unnecessary step that makes a country give up its important macroeconomic tool such as the ability to conduct its own monetary policy. in this paper i analyzed the effect of membership in the european monetary union on trade. using the data for 25 european countries over the period from 1997 till 2004, i showed that although members of the european monetary union do trade more with each other (the effect ranges from 39.7% to 47% in the cross-section data analysis and from 8.8% to 26.7% in the panel data analysis), the effect of entering the monetary union is eliminated as soon as we control for country-pair specific effects that capture all observed and unobserved effects that are specific to each country-pair including the fta effect as well as historically intense trade relations between two countries. it leads to the conclusion that the fact that countries that joined emu trade more with each other cannot be attributed to the adoption of the euro. joining the monetary union seems to be a culmination point for well-integrated countries with long history of trade relations. nevertheless, the data suggest that joining the euroland did boost trade between member countries in 1999. however, it didn’t lead to the gradual and consistent increase in trade, but rather to a sharp jump in 1999 that was quickly exhausted over the next five years. another important finding of this paper is that members of the free trade agreement in europe traded on average 61.28% more compared to non-members, the effect much higher than the one of the emu members. moreover, members of free trade agreements such as cefta and bafta, designed to prepare countries to the integration review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 100 to the eu, experienced significantly high trade intensities. it has important policy implications as it suggests that it is the free trade agreements that lead to high trade volumes and not the euro. countries that joined cefta and bafta with the intention of joining the european union in the future already achieved high trade volumes by removing trade barriers and thus preparing themselves for the european single market. while they still should expect increase in their bilateral trade after joining the eu, the effect of sharing the euro would be negligible. my results suggest that countries that are eager to join the european union and eventually the european monetary union such as the ukraine should put the question of joining the free trade area such as cefta as a number one on their foreign policy agenda. it will allow them to benefit from the increase in trade while waiting for the full eu membership. the findings of this paper are in certain aspects contradictory to the ones of rose(2000), micco et al.(2003), among others, and support the position of berger and nitsch (2005) and others. further research and time will allow to re-evaluate whether there is actually a trade effect of membership in the european monetary union. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 101 bibliography anderson j. and van wincoop e. 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(2002) “honey, i shrunk the currency union effect on trade” the world economy 25(4), 457-474. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 102 pakko, m. r. and wall h. j. (2001) “reconsidering the trade-creating effects of a currency union” frb st. louis review 83(5), 37-45. persson, t. (2001) “currency union and trade: how large is the treatment effect” economic policy 33, 433-448. rose, a. (2000) “one money, one market: estimating the effect of common currencies on trade” economic policy 30. 7-45. rose, a. (2001) “currency unions and trade: the effect is large” economic policy 33, 449-461. rose, a. (2002a) “honey, the currency union effect on trade hasn’t blown up” the world economy 25(4), 475-479. rose, a. (2002b) “the effect of common currencies on international trade: where do we stand?” mas occasional paper no. 22, august. rose, a. and van wincoop, e. 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(2002) econometric analysis of cross section and panel data, the mit press: cambridge, ma; london, england. world bank (2005) world development indicators. washington, dc, united states: world bank. cd rom. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 103 attachment1 34 estimates of effect of currency union on trade note: *** significance at 1%, ** 5%, * 10%; γ monetary union effect; s.e. of γ standard error of γ. source: rose, a. recent developments in optimum currency areas (powerpoint presentation). uc berkeley, cepr and nber. http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/arose/ocaboj.pdf author year γ s.e. of γ author year γ s.e. of γ rose 2000 1.21 0.14*** klein 2002 0.50 0.27* engel-rose 2002 1.21 0.37*** estevadeoral, et al 2003 0.293 0.145** frankel-rose 2002 1.36 0.18*** alesina, barro, tenreyro 2003 1.56 0.44*** rose-van wincoop 2001 0.91 0.18*** smith 2002 0.38 0.1*** glick-rose 2002 0.65 0.05*** bomberger 2002 0.08 0.05 persson 2001 0.506 0.257** melitz 2002 1.38 0.16*** rose 2001 0.74 0.05*** saiki 2002 0.56 0.16*** honohan 2001 0.921 0.4** micco, stein, ordonez 2003 0.089 0.025*** nitsch 2002b 0.82 0.27*** kenen 2002 1.222 0.305*** pakko and wall 2001 -0.38 0.529 bun and klaassen 2002 0.33 0.1*** walsh and thom 2002 0.098 0.2 de souza 2002 0.17 0.24 melitz 2001 0.7 0.23*** de souza and lochard 2003 1.21 0.12*** lopezcordova, meissner 2003 0.716 0.186*** flam and nordstrom 2003 0.139 0.02*** tenreyro 2001 0.471 0.316 barr, breedon and miles 2003 0.25 0.033*** levy yeyati 2003 0.5 0.25** de nardis and vicarelli 2003 0.061 0.027** nitsch 2002a 0.62 0.17*** rose 2004 1.12 0.12*** flandreau and maurel 2001 1.16 0.07*** subramanianwei 2003 0.732 0.08*** review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 104 attachment 2 free trade agreements in europe the european free trade association (efta) was established in 1960 as an alternative for european countries that were not allowed or did not wish to join the european community (former eu). the united kingdom, denmark, norway, sweden, austria, switzerland and portugal were the original members of the efta. iceland joined the efta in 1970, finland in 1986 and liechtenstein in 1991. in 1973 the united kingdom and denmark joined the european community and thus ceased to be efta members. portugal left efta for the european community in 1986 and austria, finland and sweden in 1995. norway, switzerland, iceland and liechtenstein are current members of the efta. the european union (eu) was established in 1992 by the maastricht treaty and originally included 12 members (belgium, france, germany, italy, luxembourg, netherlands, denmark, ireland, united kingdom, greece, portugal and spain). austria, finland and sweden joined the eu in 1995. ten new members (poland, hungary, czech republic, slovakia, slovenia, estonia, latvia, lithuania, cyprus and malta) joined the eu in 2004. the european economic area (eea) was established in 1994 to allow efta members to participate in the european common market without having to join the eu. switzerland decided not to become a member of the eea. current members of the eea are 25 eu members plus three out of four efta members (norway, iceland and liechtenstein). the central european free trade agreement (cefta) was established in 1992 by poland, hungary and former czechoslovakia. slovenia joined cefta in 1996, romania in 1997, bulgaria in 1998, croatia in 2002 and the republic of macedonia in 2006. cefta served as a preparation for full eu membership and therefore upon accession to the eu countries are expected to leave cefta. therefore, poland, hungary, czech republic, slovakia and slovenia left cefta in 2004 when they entered the eu. in analogy to the cefta, the baltic free trade agreement (bafta) was established in 1994 by three baltic states (estonia, latvia and lithuania) interested in the eu membership. it ceased to exist when its members joined the european union in 2004. sources: 1. frankel, j. (1997). regional trading blocs in the world economic system, institute for international economics. washington, dc, october. 2. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/european_union review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 105 attachment3 ols results for cross-section analysis note: t-statistics in parenthesis; *** means significance at 1%, ** 5%, * 10%; attachment 4 list of countries used in regressions belgium-luxembourg** france** germany** italy** netherlands** denmark* ireland** united kingdom* greece** portugal** spain** austria** variable: 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 constant -28.671 (-20.7)*** -28.976 (-20.5)*** -30.676 (-22.3)*** -30.908 (-20.8)*** -28.144 (-19.9)*** -28.762 (-20.2)*** -28.705 (-19.7)*** -28.882 (-18.8)*** log of distance -1.190 (-15.9)*** -1.142 (-15.2)*** -1.177 (-16.3)*** -1.155 (-15.3)*** -1.155 (-16.4)*** -1.137 (-16.3)*** -1.166 (-16.9)*** -1.187 (-16.8)*** product of surface areas 0.039 (1.27) 0.050 (1.64) 0.027 (0.93) 0.041 (1.33) -0.036 (-1.26) 0.015 (0.53) 0.032 (1.15) 0.016 (0.58) log of product of gdps 0.786 (21.86)*** 0.769 (21.41)*** 0.802 (23.23)*** 0.800 (22.29)*** 0.831 (24.82)*** 0.806 (24.43)*** 0.815 (25.00)*** 0.822 (24.65)*** log of product of gdps per capita 0.098 (1.36) 0.130 (1.77)* 0.174 (2.48)** 0.175 (2.31)** 0.038 (0.52) 0.068 (0.93) 0.023 (0.33) 0.035 (0.48) common border 0.126 (0.77) 0.162 (0.98) 0.121 (0.76) 0.144 (0.87) 0.170 (1.10) 0.198 (1.30) 0.181 (1.20) 0.198 (1.27) common language 0.265 (1.63) 0.161 (0.99) 0.238 (1.51) 0.248 (1.51) 0.176 (1.15) 0.172 (1.14) 0.204 (1.36) 0.177 (1.15) landlock condition -0.297 (-3.67)*** -0.259 (-3.18)** -0.243 (-3.09)*** -0.210 (-2.55)** -0.190 (-2.48)** -0.238 (-3.15)*** -0.250 (-3.35)*** -0.251 (-3.28)*** fta 1.316 (6.17)*** 1.254 (5.87)*** 1.361 (6.60)*** 1.335 (6.20)*** 1.084 (5.42)*** 1.099 (5.56)*** 1.108 (5.64)*** 1.237 (6.14)*** eu 0.061 (0.37) 0.006 (0.03) -0.064 (-0.40) -0.135 (-0.81) 0.011 (0.07) -0.061 (-0.40) -0.056 (-0.37) -0.105 (-0.67) emu 0.229 (1.63) 0.252 (1.79)* 0.369 (2.72)*** 0.385 (2.72)*** 0.344 (2.62)*** 0.334 (2.57)** 0.358 (2.77)*** 0.371 (2.80)*** r-squared 0.942 0.939 0.947 0.940 0.943 0.944 0.945 0.942 observations 276 276 276 276 276 276 276 276 review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 1/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 106 finland** sweden* poland*** hungary*** czech republic*** slovakia*** slovenia*** estonia**** latvia **** lithuania**** malta cyprus note: * denotes members of the eu (excluding 10 new members that joined in 2004) that are not members of the emu; ** emu members; *** former members of cefta; **** former bafta members. microsoft word marko papic.doc review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 2/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved ………………………………………………………………… “rolling up the sleeves”1 how eu policy towards serbia and montenegro acts as the glue that holds the state union together? marko papic abstract the most powerful tool of eu foreign policy in dealing with potential candidate countries (and beyond) is that of political conditionality. the successes of this policy, as well as its spectacular failures, have been largely well documented by the political science research community. far less research, however, goes into explaining the scenarios where the eu goes “beyond conditionality” (teokarevic 2003) in its dealings with potential candidates for membership in the eu. the goal of this paper is to explain the extremely intensive and pro-active eu involvement in the drafting of the constitution of serbia and montenegro and the subsequent attempts by brussels to determine the future nature of the union between these neighboring republics. in answering this question the paper looks at the history of eu’s involvement in the region and attempts to provide a theoretical framework that can best provide the explanation for the motivation of eu’s policy makers to utilize such a direct strategy of involvement that goes far “beyond conditionality”. the conclusions of this paper are that eu went “beyond conditionality” in dealing with serbia and montenegro on two levels: functional and theoretical. on the functional level, eu did not employ the principle of conditionality per se. instead of placing conditions on serbia and montenegro and then cajoling the two to settle their differences (both pre-state union agreement and post-action plan), eu actually went in and was actively involved, “beyond conditionality”, 1 a longer version of this paper was presented at yrn conference in university of victoria, victoria, b.c., on may 18, 2006. the author would like to thank dr. stefan gänzle, dr. ljiljana biukovic, dr. lenard cohen and dr. frédéric merand for their comments and constructive criticisms as well as their encouragement. the author would also like to thank conference participants and anonymous referees of this journal. any errors in this paper are solely my own. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 2/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 57 in resolving problems that arose from the weak state union (harmonizing the financial systems, parliamentary referendum crisis, independence referendum rules clarification and public declarations supporting the state union). on a more theoretical level of foreign policy preference formation, conditionality had been replaced by ‘high politics’ (similar to the cases of romania, bulgaria and macedonia). this can be explained both by a bureaucratic/institutional approach that draws upon neo-functionalism and the constructivist approach, in particular in terms of how the eu constructs its foreign policy preferences. the case of serbia and montenegro, which because of its volatility is probably the most important accession case, shows us that high politics indeed rule out in the end of the day and that the eu is read and willing to “look the other way” on a number of its own conditions, for the sake of realpolitik. introduction in a 2000 economist article, the european union’s main external relations focus and task for the near future were understood as “the avoidance of another war in the balkans, which remains all too real a possibility.” as main evidence of the possibility of another such war, the economist article proposed that “several signs suggest that his [milosevic’s] next war could be fought over montenegro.”2 the article goes on to suggest that the best way to prevent such a war would be to support the independently minded montenegro. in defense of the economist, that article was written well before the october 2000 democratic revolution that toppled the milosevic regime. however, what the economist article and many observers since have missed is that one of european union’s main foreign policy objectives had always been the prevention of war. the very impetus for the creation of the european union was the fear of another war, not in the balkans though, but rather one between france and germany. in general terms, this paper expands on the ability/willingness of the eu to project such a reconciliatory goal in serbia and montenegro and subsequently in the wider region of western 2 “the next balkan war.” economist 4/1/2000 vol. 355 issue 8164 review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 2/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 58 balkans. in particular, the goal of this paper is rather modest: to explain the extremely intensive and pro-active eu involvement in the drafting of the state union constitution and eventual “running” of serbia and montenegro. it is argued here that the former and the latter are closely related, as the western balkan “peace project” requires exactly that form of intensive interaction that often requires the eu to willingly undermine its own conditions and sometimes even look beyond them. in elaborating such a pro-active approach we will have to dwell into the history of the eu’s involvement in the region and also try to assess the eu policy makers’ motives in utilizing such a direct strategy of involvement that goes “beyond conditionality”3 dynamics evident in the central eastern european countries’ (ceec) accession process. this paper is an attempt to introduce the logic behind the dynamic of eu interaction that goes “beyond conditionality” into the lexicon of the eu enlargement studies. the constitutional charter of the state union of serbia and montenegro would have been an impossibility had it not been for the “very prominent role played by the eu” whose “proactive role in the constitutional engineering of serbia and montenegro far surpasses the policy model known as conditionality,” as argued by teokarevic.4 to try to explain such eu involvement in serbia and montenegro and how it may have gone “beyond conditionality” we try to explain a theoretical framework that explains such a policy preference (part i). to empirically test this theoretical model we will analyze how the eu has enacted its conditions in serbia and montenegro (part ii) and then attempt to offer some reasons for why it has gone “beyond conditionality” (part iii). however, it should be noted that the question of “why” eu 3 “beyond conditionality” is a concept first introduced by jovan teokarevic who uses it in his article on this same subject matter, “eu accession and the serbian-montenegrin constitutional charter” that appeared in the winter 2003 edition of the romanian journal of political science. 4 jovan teokarevic, “eu accession and the serbian-montenegrin constitutional charter,” romanian journal of political science (3 2 winter 2003): 45-46. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 2/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 59 went beyond conditionality in serbia and not in some other countries is difficult to answer completely. i. dynamics “beyond conditionality” – theoretical framework it is necessary to situate the use of conditionality, or in this case the idea of going “beyond” it, in terms of theory. schimmelfennig and sedelmeier (2005) identify three models of how countries adopt the rules of the eu and in essence get “europeanized”: external incentives, social learning and lesson-drawing. they note that the success of democratic conditionality depends in large part on the initial conditions in the candidate countries concluding that eu’s influence is the strongest in the fragile and unstable democracies, noting serbia explicitly as an example of such a case. in this paper, however, we are primarily trying to assess the eu motivations for proactively involving itself in the elaborate tasks of constructing a state constitution and even forgoing its own conditions in order to advance the eventual contractual relationship based on those very conditions. which theory then best explains such a pro-active eu dynamic? this question needs to be explained from both the perspective of the eu and the specific country in question. a unique dynamic exists in special cases where conditionality alone is insufficient or domestic variables call upon for a different mechanism of europeanization. schimmelfennig and sedelmeier argue that democratic conditionality is “likely to be ineffective in the case of failed states, primarily those affected by severe ethno-political conflict, such as many successor states of yugoslavia. in the latter cases, the eu would need to go beyond reinforcement by reward and review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 2/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 60 use both coercive and supportive strategies to have positive impact.”5 this paper thus looks at one example where conditionality alone does not suffice. the case of eu involvement in resolving the serbia and montenegro constitutional impasse is an explicit example of the eu using such “supportive strategies…beyond reinforcement by reward… to have a positive impact” and is an empirical contribution to the theoretical dynamics uncovered by schimmelfennig and sedelmeier’s seminal contribution to the study of european integration. while serbia and montenegro is largely (entirely?) an example of the eu using “supportive strategies” one would not need to look much farther/further east to find “coercive strategies” as well, the main example being lukashenko’s government in belarus. schimmelfennig and sedelmeier argue that the export of rules and democratic conditionality do not lend to being explained through social learning and lesson-drawing. our analysis largely agrees with that assessment, although from the eu perspective we will prove that “lesson-drawing” does explain interacting with serbia and montenegro “beyond reinforcement by reward”, especially when seen from the historical examples of “learning” from the previous balkan conflicts. the eu therefore has considerable interests to act so pro-actively in serbia and montenegro and has also “learned” to do so.] ii. how the eu acts “beyond conditionality” the country created by the 2003 constitution was dubbed by commentators as “solania”6 and in many ways had been plagued by constitutional problems from the very start7 (including 5 schimmelfennig and sedelmeier 214, emphasis added. 6 julie kim, serbia and montenegro union: prospects and policy implications, crs report for congress, february 2, 2005. accessed on april 26, 2005 http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/rs21568.pdf page 1. 7 problems also range from the “… division of ambassadorial posts between serbia and montenegro, especially those postings which are seen as most important or attractive destinations…” to “the supreme court of serbia and montenegro, for example, still has neither its own premises nor a clearly-defined set of powers.” delevic-djilas review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 2/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 61 the bizarre case of the national anthem8). for example, the president of the state union was also the vice-president of the democratic socialist party (dps), the pro-independence party of the montenegrin prime minister milo djukanovic.9 the eu went “beyond conditionality” by actively involving itself in the day to day running of the state and in actively trying to preserve the state union. to illustrate how the eu acted in such a pro-active manner that relied on more than just mere conditionalities we will look at five empirical examples: the negotiations of the serbia and montenegro constitutional charter, the federal parliament election crisis, the “twintrack” approach to economy, the montenegro referendum and the icty conditionality. these examples will provide empirical support for professor teokarevic’s assertion that the “eu will have to be engaged to an extraordinary degree in its [serbia and montenegro’s] day-to-day workings for years to come, to give the nascent union state even a chance of survival.”10 1. negotiations of the serbia and montenegro charter at the meeting of the eu-fry consultation task force held in belgrade in july 2002, it was made clear to the two republics that coming up with a constitution was a “requirement to the completion of the feasibility study.”11 therefore, from the onset of eu’s policy towards pro “external debt is 11.6billion usd, or about 140% of gdp.” woehrel, steven woehrel, serbia and montenegro: current situation and us policy, january 18, 2005 accessed on april 26, 2005 http://www.usembassy.it/pdf/other/rl30371.pdf page 10. 8 under article 4, the state union is assured having an anthem. a proposal to unite the two anthems of the republics in one amalgamation (much alike the current italian anthem) did not go over well, despite the need to come up with a solution before the 2004 summer olympics in anthem. in the end, the serbian orthodox patriarch opposed the montenegrin part of the anthem, “oj, svijetla majska zoro” because it was composed by sekula drljevic, a supposed “neo-nazi and a pagan”, according to the patriarch pavle. slobodan kostic, “boze zore,” vreme, august 12, 2004. that at the olympics, serbia and montenegro was represented by the “hey slavs”, the old anthem of tito’s yugoslavia, illustrates the difficulty of getting compromise between the two republics on even the most mundane of constitutional arrangements. 9 he has recently identified serbia and its government, as the republic that is standing in the way of eu progress. vera didanovic, “tuzibaba i oponenti,” vreme, december 2, 2004. 10 teokarevic 39. 11 teokarevic 44. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 2/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 62 democracy belgrade government, the onus was placed on having a unified constitution and one state. the charter was officially adopted on january 2003, following the signing of the belgrade agreement on march 14, 2002. it is largely acknowledged that “the fact that the long negotiations between belgrade and podgorica were positively concluded at all was due, to a large extent, to the promise and prospect of membership in the eu and to the direct participation of the eu in the negotiating process.”12 nathalie tocci argues that the eu negotiated belgrade agreement and the eventual constitutional charter both “explicitly stated that eu integration was the very raison d’etre of the state union… [suggesting that the] state union was a prerequisite (or at least a catalyst) for integration in to the eu, and that the eu integration would represent the essential glue keeping the common state together.”13 tocci argues that while the eu was simply a framework in cyprus, in serbia and montenegro “the union was instrumental both as an actor and as a framework.” “in 2002, the union stepped up its involvement, mandating high representative javier solana to mediate an agreement. solana’s direct intervention was considered by some in the region as excessively intrusive. but few dispute the fact that without it the agreement may not have been reached. in brussels, the belgrade agreement was generally considered one of the first concrete successes of the common foreign and security policy.”14 the involvement of the eu went well “beyond conditionality” and it subscribes to the dynamic of “supportive strategies…beyond reinforcement by reward… to have a positive impact. the eu first sought pro-actively to identify the state with which it was to have contractual relationships, seeing as montenegro at the time operated as an independent entity. 12 teokarevic 40. 13 tocci 563. 14 tocci 562. – teokarevic argues a similar point when he states that ““the agreement required considerable effort on the part of the eu – both in public and behind the scenes, including active shuttle diplomacy by javier solana.” teokarevic 42. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 2/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 63 the involvement of solana and his signing of the constitution points to the unprecedented level of eu involvement. once serbia and montenegro was identified, the conditionalities to be followed by it in its relationship with the eu were laid by the council.15 2. the federal parliamentary election crisis to further illustrate the problems of reaching consensus one has to only look at the federal parliament crisis caused by the republic of montenegro not wanting to spend money on the parliamentary elections (which according to the constitution were supposed to be held in february 2005 article 20) since it intended to hold a referendum on independence in may 2006. the crisis was finally averted on april 7th, 2005 through negotiations between the officials of montenegro, serbia and javier solana. the decision was made to hold the federal parliamentary elections alongside the republican parliamentary elections. the federal mps would have their mandates extended until those republican election dates, although with montenegro independence the federal parliament ceases to exist.16 this again points to the extent to which the eu was involved in the very day-to-day constitutional problems. 15 “the main priorities identified for serbia and montenegro including kosovo relate to its capacity to meet the criteria set by the copenhagen european council of 1993 and the conditions set for the stabilization and association process, notably the conditions defined by the council in its conclusions of 29 april 1997 and 21 and 22 june 1999, the content of the final declaration of the zagreb summit of 2 november 2000 and the thessaloniki agenda” council decision 2004/520/ec 14 june 2004 on the principles, priorities and conditions contained in the european partnership with serbia and montenegro including kosovo as defined by the united nations security resolution 1244 of 10 june 1999. official journal of he european union 26.6.2004. l 227/21 – similarly the council regulation that replaced phare and obnova aid programs with cards noted in the article 2 that “the main purpose of the community assistance is to support participation by the recipient countries in the stabilization and association process.” council regulation (ec) no 2666/2000 of 5 december 2000 official journal of the european union 7.12.2000. l 306/3 16 milan milosevic, “pisak briselskog voza,” vreme, april 14, 2005. – to further elucidate this crisis and its implications one should consider that the “serbian legal expert momcilo grubac told the belgrade daily politika that representatives to the serbia and montenegro parliament ‘no longer have legitimacy because their term in office has expired. they can keep meeting, but their decisions will not be legitimate… but the president of the serbia and montenegro constitutional court, montenegrin lawyer blagota mitric, argues that the representatives’ mandates last until the next elections. he added that for legitimacy’s sake serbia and montenegro should regulate the postponement of elections with a special law or by amending the constitutional charter.” jovanovic. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 2/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 64 3. the “twin-track” approach to economic integration according to delevic-djilas, “the eu remains attached to the concept of the state union of serbia and montenegro and wants the saa to be concluded with this overarching entity.”17 to prove the extent of eu’s commitment to the now defunct state union, we need only to examine eu’s decision to incorporate a “twin-track” economic approach to serbia and montenegro, without which the state union would have not been able to receive the positive feasibility study. the council outlined the “principles, priorities and conditions” on which the eu-serbia and montenegro partnership was to be conducted made explicit references to the need to “dismantle existing and avoid new obstacles to the state’s internal market”18 this was then one of the main, if not the main conditionality of the eu towards serbia and montenegro. however, at the september 4th 2004 eu foreign ministers’ meeting in maastricht, the ministers hinted at the need to utilize the “twin-track” approach to financial integration with the eu.19 the problem with the two economic systems lay in the fact that since 1998 montenegro had pursued its own financial policy and the question of synchronizing the agricultural tariffs with those of serbia became especially difficult.20 however, legally both the council decision 2004/520/ec and the article 3 of the constitutional charter referred to the “harmonization of the economic systems of the member states in line with the principles and standards of the european 17 delevic-djilas, milica. “comment: on the twin-track highway to europe.” institute for war and peace reporting december 24, 2003. http://www.iwpr.net/index.pl?archive/bcr3/bcr3_200412_534_3_eng.txt similar point was made by javier solana in his meeting with montenegrin prime minister milo djukanovic when he “reiterated that the eu’s framework for a european perspective for serbia and montenegro remains the belgrade agreement and the constitutional charter. he stated that the road towards europe will be better and faster together rather than separate.” gallach, cristina. “javier solana, eu high representative for the cfsp, met with milo djukanovic, prime minister of montenegro.” eu commission’s delegation to scg website march 3, 2005. accessed on april 25, 2005 http://www.eudelyug.org/en/news/news/final20050303/final20050303.htm 18 council decision 2004/520/ec june 14 2004 19 igor tintor, “a two-track state,” transitions online september 13, 2004. 20 vladimir medjak, “twin-track approach towards serbia-montenegro,” institute for war and peace reporting http://www.iwpr.net/index.pl?archive/bcr3_200412_534_3_eng.txt review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 2/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 65 union.”21 finally and officially, at the council of ministers’ meeting in luxembourg on 11-12 october 2004, the “twin-track” approach was officially adopted.22 this approach illustrated the near impossibility of synchronizing agricultural tariffs23 between the two republics and the commitment of the eu to somehow and at some point conclude the saa with serbia and montenegro as a whole, even if it meant negotiating the two economic annexes separately. market synchronization was clearly a condition imposed by the eu, but it shoved it aside in the face of common sense and realpolitik, especially since economic harmonization will have to be achieved before the eventual accession to the eu. the actual negotiations for the saa opened officially in belgrade on october 10th, 2005, right as the eu commissioner for expansion, olli rehn promised with the conclusion of the positive feasibility study in april of 2005.24 it is evident that the eu pushed through all the obstacles, most imposed by its very own conditionalities, in order to start negotiations in the fall of 2005. 4. the montenegro independence referendum montenegrin government had not received much moral support from the eu for its drive towards independence, at least not since the fall of the milosevic government. on 25th february 21 article 3 constitutional charter of the state union of serbia and montenegro. ministry of foreign affairs website accessed on april 26, 2005 http://www.mfa.gov.yu/facts/const_scg.pdf 22 communication strategy of the republic of serbia about the stabilization and association process of the state union serbia-montenegro, government of the republic of serbia european integration office december 16, 2004 accessed on april 25, 2005, http://www.seio.sr.gov.yu/code/navigate.asp?id=74 page 4. 23 a clarification on the agricultural tariffs may be of use here. “tariffs are on average several times higher in serbia than in montenegro… in montenegro, the most frequently applied tariff rate is 1 per cent (41 per cent of all products) as well as 3 per cent and 5 per cent (15 per cent of products each) and 0 per cent (12 per cent of products). in serbia, the tariffs that are most frequently applied are 1 per cent (33 per cent of products), 10 per cent (23 per cent of products) and 5 per cent (17 per cent of products). the two highest tariff rates (20 and 30 per cent) are applied to over 20 per cent of products and the lowest tariff rate – 0 per centis quite insignificant (applied to 0.1 per cent of products)… this disparity is especially pronounced for agricultural products. the average nominal tariff for food amounts to 16.7 per cent in serbia, 3.1 per cent in montenegro and 5.2 per cent in the eu.” daniel gross et al, “on the cost of re-establishing yugoslavia: first estimates of the economic impact on montenegro of establishing a customs union with serbia,” southeast european and black sea studies 4(1) (january 2004): 123-124. 24 “eu otvorila vrata za scg.” b-92 online april 26, 2005 accessed on april 26, 2005 http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2005&mm=04&dd=26&nav_id=167222 review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 2/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 66 2005 javier solana publicly opposed the 22nd february proposal by the montenegrin government which would have created a union of two independent, internationally recognized republics. solana indicated that such a change would “push away” serbia and montenegro from eu accession.25 in a meeting with pm of montenegro djukanovic, solana reiterated that “the road towards europe will be better and faster together rather than separate.”26 solana had also indicated that separating one country from another would not be a “simple matter” and that it would not be sufficient to have a “majority of one person”27, a clear reference to the very tight independence polls.28 meanwhile, the eu negotiated article 60 of the state union constitution affirms that the republic that decides to leave the union would not inherit the international personality of the state union of serbia and montenegro. essentially, this means that montenegro will have to apply for membership in all international organizations now that it has chosen the path to independence (save for in wto where serbia and montenegro have applied separately). furthermore, the constitutional changes made on april 7th, 2005 also referred to the referendum rules outlined in article 60. the changed article called for a greater role of the eu as well as maintaining a “european standard” in conducting the referendum. this “european standard” was then formulated by the solana appointed envoy miroslav lajcak of slovakia and involved a very stringent demand of having a 55% majority of a 50% voter turnout vote for independence. the montenegrin parliament finally adopted this formula on 27th february 2006 25igor jovanovic, “ex-ex-yugoslavia: a virtual country,” transitions online march 2, 2005. 26 gallach. 27 drashko djuranovic, “plan protiv referenduma,” monitor accessed on april 25, 2005 http://www.monitor.cg.yu/arhiva/a_756_01.html 28 “the most recent polls [october 2004] show 41% supporting independence, 39% against and 20% undecided.” “semi-independent.” economist 4/10/2004 vol. 371 issue 8370 in march of 2005 the public “opinion poll conducted by the independent center for democracy and human rights (cedem) in podgorica, around 44 percent of polled montenegrins advocate an independent montenegro, 40 percent want the state union to survive, and the rest plan to abstain from the referendum.” jovanovic transitions online review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 2/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 67 and organized a referendum, which passed with the very slight 0.5% margin, under its rules on may 21st.29 the eu has thus been very pro-active in trying to maintain the state union of serbia and montenegro. the lajcak formula favored the anti-independence camp significantly, to the point where it was not clear whether it was even a democratic proposition. of great concern was a situation where a majority between 50-54.9% would have voted for independence and yet the eu imposed rules would have forced montenegro to preserve the state union. 5. the icty conditionality the eu had published a positive feasibility study and rushed the negotiations of the saa despite the fact that the us30 and the human rights watch ngo31 had in january of 2005 condemned serbia’s lack of cooperation with the icty. serbia’s responsibility to the icty is clearly one of the conditions underlined by the feasibility report and will need to be fulfilled before membership talks begin. on february 27th 2006 the eu gave serbia until the start of the second round of saa negotiations (april 5th, 2006) to hand over the bosnian serb general ratko mladic. however, on march 31st 2006, the eu again relented and eased pressure on serbia with a decision not to suspend the saa negotiations.32 finally, after delaying punitive action for almost two full years, the eu finally suspended the saa negotiations in may of 2006. however, almost instantly javier solana made it clear that the arrest of mladic was not a condition, but 29 nedjeljko rudovic, “montenegrins accept eu referendum rules”, institute for war and peace reporting accessed on april 6, 2006 http://www.iwpr.net/?p=brn&s=f&o=260118&apc_state=henpbrn 30 “for fiscal year 2004, administration did not issue the certification and therefore a portion of fy2004 aid to serbia (estimated at $16 million) was suspended. as recent as january 2005, the administration announced that because there had been “no improvement” in belgrade’s cooperation with the tribunal, the us would withhold an additional $10 million.” woehrel 14. 31 “the government is unwilling to cooperate fully with the international criminal tribuneral for the former yugoslavia and efforts to prosecute war criminals before domestic courts are inadequate.” country summary serbia and montenegro, human rights watch january 2005 accessed on april 25, 2005 http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/01/13/serbia9859.htm 32 matic, tanja, “eu grants serbia more time over mladic”, institute for war and peace reporting accessed on april 6, 2006 http://www.iwpr.net/?p=brn&s=f&o=260114&apc_state=henfbrn260118 review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 2/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 68 rather that cooperation with the hague tribuneral was. therefore, as soon as icty determined that serbia was cooperating, and not when or if mladic was arrested, would the talks restart. this case points to an obvious conflict between the “grand-strategy" supportive strategies favored by javier solana and the commitment to the fulfillment of conditionalities practiced by the dg enlargement. while saa negotiations were finally suspended in may 2006, it took the eu considerable time to do so and even then only after significant pressure from the icty main prosecutor. even once the suspension took place, javier solana made sure to make a public qualification that the mladic arrest was not the main conditionality, thus further offering a supportive strategy that seeks to make the conditionality less coercive. it is very likely that under pressure from mr. solana and the council of ministers, the icty will eventually give serbia a positive assessment, whether mladic is finally captured or not. there is simply too much at stake for the eu and furthermore the above empirical examples point to a pattern of eu pro-active supportive strategy that is unlikely to stop. iii. why the eu acts “beyond conditionality” to understand the motives for the kind of foreign policy decisions that the european union has made in relation to serbia and montenegro, we must first assess the history of eu’s involvement in the region (and its lesson-drawing dynamic) and then finally assess the actions and the motives of the eu. in his main work in international relations (ir) theory, perception and misperception in international politics, robert jervis, using case studies from clinical psychology, tries to explain how decision makers “learn” from their past experiences. jervis concludes that “firsthand experiences”, “generational effects”, “the last war” and “failures” all contribute to how decisionreview of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 2/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 69 makers make policy decisions.33 it is interesting how jervis’s approach can explain eu’s involvement in the western balkans exactly because there was the “last war” eu had to directly involve itself with, with a “generation” of policymakers that went through it in the “formative years” of the common foreign and security policy (cfsp) and an involvement that was generally perceived as a gross “failure”. this paper is making an argument that the form of interaction eu is undertaking in the western balkans goes “beyond conditionality”, especially in comparison with the central eastern european countries, and to understand to reasons why eu is taking such an approach it is necessary to survey the history of eu involvement in the region, as it is exactly the balkan wars of the 90s that are, for better of for worse, conditioning the current eu response. interestingly, lesson-drawing from the balkan conflicts could also be seen as a social constructivist dynamic, especially since it essentially operates under the “logic of appropriateness” identified by march and olsen and is at the forefront of current constructivist eu integration research as presented by alexandra gheciu, jeffrey checkel, michael zürn and frank schimmelfennig in the october 2005 edition of international organization. while these authors concentrate on how states become socialized by european institutions, whether the eu or nato, and thus how we should bring the “domestic” back into the forefront, our analysis posits that in many ways we should also concentrate on the socialization and social-learning processes of the institutions themselves. 33 robert jervis, perception and misperception in international policies, (princeton: princeton up, 1976): 217-282. a note here on jervis’s work may be necessary. it was his intention to clarify how decision makers were in fact often drawing the incorrect conclusions from their past experiences and thus ir theory should not put too much credence in, or at least be highly cautious in using, rational choice. this paper is not making a normative conclusion as to whether the eu is making the “right or wrong decisions” and therefore whether they are learning the “right or wrong” lessons. it is the intent here to use jervis’s research to support the concept of historical events influencing decision makers and fashioning their response for future involvement in similar situation or in the same region. the point here is that eu “learned” something from past balkan wars and that “something” is fashioning its response today. whether the eu learned the right things or whether the current policy is right, is not the scope of this paper, but may be assessed in the policy prescription part of the conclusion. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 2/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 70 the difficult lessons of the cfsp formulation throughout the 1990s have essentially “taught” the eu to be pro-active in the region and not wait to act as a peace maker while the conflict is raging, but rather a peace guarantor. so while social constructivism is not used to explain the dynamic of eu involvement in the constitution formulation analyzed here, it might very well explain the underpinning rationale behind such an idea in the first place. it is also important to note that the line separating jervis influenced theory of lesson-drawing and that of social constructivist “logic of appropriateness” is very blurred. all that a “generational effect” may in the end mean, for example, is a common adoption of a norm of behavior by a particular group of decision-makers, states and/or institutions. the failure of the european powers to prevent and assuage the balkan war by agreeing on a common policy towards the newly formed independent countries is largely responsible for the carnage that ensued across the balkan peninsula. despite the warnings of the arbitration commission set up by the general affairs council of 16 december 1991 that raised serious doubts as to croatia’s respect for minority rights, the german government placed “immense pressure” on the ec, which eventually recognized slovenia and croatia on 15th january, 1992.34 not only did the eu not follow its own political conditionality relating to minority rights, democracy and rule of law, but the newly formulated european union was proven to be incapable of operating a common foreign policy with any success. eu scholar desmond dinan summarizes the effect of the yugoslav conflict in his ever closer union: “far from reflecting well on the eu, the yugoslav war emphasized deep foreign policy differences among member states and showed the limits of eu international action. more than any other event or development since the end of the cold war, yugoslavia demonstrated the extent to which ‘the dominant foreign policy reflex in western europe [continued to be] 34 dimitris papadimitriou, “the eu’s strategy in the post-communist balkans” southeast european and black sea studies 1(3) (september 2001): 80. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 2/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 71 national, not communitarian.’ the eu’s ineffectual involvement also sapped popular support for european integration and for the fledgling cfsp.”35 although when robert jervis speaks of “generational effects” he refers to particular generations of people (such as the may 1968 generation or the 1930s generation), we are taking the liberty here of referring to a “generational effect” on a policy, in this case the cfsp and perhaps in extension subsequently on enlargement. the cfsp was really in its formative stages, even if only as an idea, in the early 90s and the failure to prevent the balkan wars has created a kind of a “generational effect” on european decision makers. the shift in policy, from one of ‘sticks and carrots’ in terms of aid to one of direct involvement and potential membership, followed the kosovo crisis and the nato bombing of serbia in the spring of 1999, but was also motivated by the complete failure of cfsp to alleviate the armed tensions in the region. part of the ‘sticks and carrots’ strategy was the july 1996 community regulation on assistance that created the obnova aid program. while political conditionality36 was applied to this program, the eventual prize was aid, not membership, and thus the states intended to benefit under it did not take it too seriously. another attempt was the creation of the stability pact for south eastern europe on may 17, 1999. however, the stability pact was not even a eu instrument, but rather had “its further development and implementation… vested in the osce.”37 the kosovo crisis, seen as the culmination of utter and complete failure of cfsp (and of the eu’s foreign relations capabilities as a whole throughout the entire 90s), spurred eu into 35 desmond dinan, ever closer union (boulder: lynne rienner publishers, 1999): 521. 36“respect for democratic principles, the rule of law and human rights and fundamental freedoms as an essential element of the application of the entire program.” council regulation (ec) no. 1628/96, oj l 204, 14 august 1996, i (art. 2) quoted in christian pippan, “the rocky road to europe: the eu’s stabilization and association process for the western balkans and the principle of conditionality,” european foreign affairs review (9 2004): 223. 37 pippan 227. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 2/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 72 action.38 in particular, this led to the creation of the stabilization and association process (sap) and the actual promise of eu accession to the nations of the western balkans. while the sap itself is not evidence of eu involvement “beyond conditionality” it is a step towards it, as it draws it roots from passive conditionality of pre sap aid agreements which eventually led to the pro-active involvement of the eu in the region with the potential of eu membership as the “carrot”. the history of the eu involvement, and the lesson-drawing dynamic, therefore offers two explanations for its policy making in relation to serbia and montenegro. first, it has conditioned the kind of policy eu undertakes (ever increasing in involvement and proactiveness) and second, it has taught the eu a lesson on preserving nations in their constitutive form and shying from solutions that seek to create more independent states, of particular importance to our specific example under analysis.39 explanations for leniency of conditions and pro-activeness of interaction are not only found in eu’s preference formation dynamics but also in the domestic politics situation in serbia. specifically, the threat of the radical victory is ever present. the serbian radical party (srs) led by vojislav seselj, now in the hague facing war crimes charges, won the majority of parliamentary seats in the march 3rd, 2004 serbian parliament. however, a minority government of democratic parties, dependant on milosevic’s socialist party of serbia (sps) for votes, managed to stave off the radical challenge. later on that year, dusan tadic, the leader of the late-djindjic’s democratic party (ds), barely managed to stave off the surge by the srs’s nikolic in the second round of the presidential elections 38 papadimitriou 76. 39 whether this second lesson is the “right” lesson can not be assessed fully at the moment. serbia and montenegro is still in existence, but as it will be proven later, it is a very feeble union. the ultimate decision can not be made until (and if) serbia and montenegro becomes member of the eu as one or two countries. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 2/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 73 another important element in the equation is the concern over the resolution of the kosovo question. polling results (from end of 2004) indicate that majority of serbs do not favor cooperation with kosovo albanians (38%), do not favor “any” solution proposed by the un, including independence (64%), believe that new kosovo borders along ethnic lines are the “only means by which to guarantee long-lasting security” (34%). even voters of extremely liberal and pro-democratic parties (such as the g-17) overwhelmingly seem to believe that some territorial gains can still be made by dividing kosovo along ethnic lines. this illustrates the volatility of the kosovo issue, something that the eu surely understands. it is absolutely necessary to provide pro-democracy parties with international “successes” in terms of their association process as it will soon become apparent that kosovo will not be divided along ethnic lines and will in fact soon become independent, something that the srs will surely use to its advantage in future political campaigns especially following the independence of montenegro. loss of both montenegro and kosovo will constitute a large loss of territory and thus, in the eyes of many serbs, of prestige. the kosovo issue is also part of the reason why the eu had been so reluctant to support montenegrin independence, as losing both the territories of kosovo and montenegro in such a short period of time would be quite a shock for the public opinion in serbia. the international commission on the balkans in fact suggested that perhaps independence of kosovo might be easier to swallow if serbia is offered eu membership. “the necessary precondition for both the serbian government and the serbian public is a fast track accession of serbia to the eu together with international guarantees for the protection of the interests of kosovo serbs…. the eu accession process is the only framework that gives serbia real incentives if not to endorse then at review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 2/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 74 least to consent to such a fundamental change in the statues of kosovo as independence represents”40 what spurs eu to so vehemently and tirelessly work on the preservation of the state union of serbia and montenegro, to go so far “beyond conditionality”? lessons from history are part of the explanation here. the collapse of the old socialist yugoslavia led to incredible carnage and so perhaps the eu policy makers are weary of further destabilization. the 2001 macedonia example41, where macedonia was rushed into the sap in order to prevent an ethnic conflict was also probably providing the policy makers with an incentive to maintain the state union until enough momentum had gathered behind its accession to the eu that conflict becomes unthinkable. similarly, eu is probably considering wider regional strategy in the balkans, in particular the domino-effect the independence of montenegro would have on the constitutional arrangements in bosnia or the kosovo situation. already republika srpska in bosnia is considering a referendum of its own for independence, which could be much more dangerous than the montenegrin independence. another potential motivation could be the fact that the eu does not want to deal with two separate applications, especially after absorbing 10 new members in 2004 and having the issue of “enlargement fatigue” seriously affect the constitutional referendums in the netherlands and france in the summer of 2005. important to conclude here is that ‘high politics’ take precedent over conditionality, much in the way that dimitris papadimitriou argued happened with the romanian and bulgarian accession talks post nato bombing of serbia in 1999 in his seminal article on the issue “the 40 the balkans in europe’s future. international commission on the balkans. accessed on april 26, 2005 http://www.kbs-frb.be/files/db/en/pub_1497_int_commission_balkans.pdf page 23. 41 the balkans in europe’s future. international commission on the balkans. accessed on april 26, 2005 http://www.kbs-frb.be/files/db/en/pub_1497_int_commission_balkans.pdf page 28. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 2/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 75 eu’s strategy in the post-communist balkans”. papadimitriou’s analysis of the change in commission’s assessment of romania and bulgaria in october 1999 “had little to do with the process of internal reform… [but rather was the effect of] the geopolitical situation in the balkans.”42 in terms of serbia and montenegro, the eu’s (mis)perception is that the preservation of serbia and montenegro is vital for geopolitical/realpolitik reasons and it will seek to preserve the union through similarly realpolitik/’high politics’ means, going above, over, through and beyond traditional concepts of conditionality. thus we can summarize the eu relationship with serbia and montenegro as a “learned/acquired” strategy expressed in policy that goes “beyond conditionality”. however, it should be made clear that explaining the “why” is very difficult and this paper only offers an attempt to answer the difficult and seminal question of what makes serbia and montenegro such a high priority target for the eu. iv. conclusion schimmelfennig and sedelmeier identify states fraught with ethnic divisions, such as serbia and montenegro, as being prime targets for “supportive strategies…beyond reinforcement by reward… to have a positive impact”. from our empirical analysis we have one primary example of eu pro-active involvement on the state union constitutional level, number of examples of eu helping in the day-to 42 papadimitriou 85. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 2/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 76 day running of that state union and even cases of the eu trumping its own conditionalities in order to advance the saa negotiations. to argue that political/democratic/acquis conditionality explains the eu foreign policy in serbia and montenegro is to ignore plethora of evidence to the contrary. spurred by lesson-drawing from previous balkan conflicts and realizing the geo-political importance of the western balkans to its own security, the eu has taken into consideration the precarious and unstable domestic politics situation in serbia and sought to involve itself pro-actively and vigorously through a policy that goes “beyond conditionality” as first posited and recognized by teokarevic. a very important dimension to this topic is the failed constitutional referendum in france and how it may affect future enlargement. the eu simply must not forego its aggressive, pro-active involvement in serbia and montenegro. with the independence of montenegro and eventual independence of kosovo the serbian pro-democracy government will come under incredible stress and the successful association process may be the only bright spot to campaign under. reforms, which clearly will induce economic hardships on the balkan nations, cannot be “sold” to the populace through promises of aid alone as the failures of obnova to spur political change clearly illustrate; they must be backed by a firm commitment to an eventual accession. so far the eu has proven to be up to the challenge of offering “supportive strategies” that go “beyond conditionality”. motivated by carefully formulated and “learned” preferences that lean heavily towards the geopolitical variety, the eu has shed its purely conditional approach and “rolled up its sleeves” in what may just be the greatest, most important and (so far) most successful peace building / democratization project since the end of the second world war. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 2/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 77 bibliography anastasakis, othon and dimitar bechev. “eu conditionality in south east europe: bringing commitment to the process.” st anthony’s college university of oxford. april 2003, accessed on april 25, 2005 http://www.cespi.it/stocchiero/dossierbalcani/conditionality.pdf 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eu. the hague: kluwer law international, 1998. kostic, slobodan. “boze zore.” vreme. august 12, 2004. matic, tanja. “eu grants serbia more time over mladic.” institute for war and peace reporting. http://www.iwpr.net/?p=brn&s=f&o=260114&apc_state=henfbrn260118 medjak, vladimir. “twin-track approach towards serbia-montenegro.” institute for war and peace reporting. http://www.iwpr.net/index.pl?archive/bcr3_200412_534_3_eng.txt milosevic, milan. “pisak briselskog voza.” vreme. april 14, 2005. mitic, aleksandar. “serbia: running for the eu train.” transitions online january 31, 2005. papadimitriou, dimitris. “the eu’s strategy in the post-communist balkans.” southeast european and black sea studies 1(3) (september 2001): 69-94. papic, maja. conditionality super glue. political cartoon. april 20, 2005. pippan, christian. “the rocky road to europe: the eu’s stabilization and association process for the western balkans and the principle of conditionality.” european foreign affairs review 9 (2004): 218-254. rudovic, nedjeljko. “montenegrins accept eu referendum rules.” institute for war and peace reporting accessed on april 6, 2006 http://www.iwpr.net/?p=brn&s=f&o=260118&apc_state=henpbrn schimmelfennig, frank and ulrich sedelmeier (eds.). the europeanization of central and eastern europe. ithaca: cornell university press, 2005. “semi-independent.” economist 4/10/2004 vol. 371 issue 8370 smith, karen e. european union foreign policy in a changing world. cambridge: policy, 2003. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 2/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 80 “stavovi gradjana o medjunarodnoj zajednici i odnosima srbije i crne gore krajem 2004 godine.” centar za politikoloshka istrazivanja i javno mnjenje institut drushtvenih nauka accessed on april 6, 2006 http://www.cpijm.org.yu/scharts/izvestaj1.pdf teokarevic, jovan. “eu accession and the serbian-montenegrin constitutional charter.” romanian journal of political science 3(2) (winter 2003): 39-49. the balkans in europe’s future. international commission on the balkans. accessed on april 26, 2005 http://www.kbs-frb.be/files/db/en/pub_1497_int_commission_balkans.pdf “the eu’s actions in support to the stabilization and association process.” eu’s external relations website accessed on april 26, 2005 http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/see/actions/sap.htm “the next balkan war.” economist 4/1/2000 vol. 355 issue 8164 tintor, igor. “a two-track state.” transitions online september 13, 2004. tocci, nathalie. “eu intervention in ethno-political conflicts: the cases of cyprus and serbiamontenegro.” european foreign affairs review 9 (2004): 551-573. woehrel, steven. serbia and montenegro: current situation and us policy. january 18, 2005. accessed on april 26, 2005 http://www.usembassy.it/pdf/other/rl30371.pdf “zagreb summit 24 november 2000.” eu commission’s delegation to scg website accessed on april 26, 2005 http://www.eudelyug.org/en/documents/24-11-2000-zagrebdeclaratione.htm microsoft word benjamin zyla_how the eu supports the bush doctrine.doc review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 2 august-september 2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 5 ………………………………………………………………… how the eu supports the bush doctrine benjamin zyla abstract soon after the terrorist attacks on september 11th, the bush administration announced a new national security strategy. soon thereafter, this strategic document was denounced in european capitals as ‘cowboyesk’ and isolationist. particular dislike was announced about the strategy of pre-emption in domestic affairs of other states. under this plan washington reserved the right to send u.s. soldiers abroad to intervene in countries before they can pose a threat to the united states. in addition, many officials in europe rejected washington’s assertion of withdrawing from its membership in the international criminal court, the comprehensive test ban treaty, and the kyoto protocol; it was perceived as a unilateralist foreign policy that rejects america’s responsibility in the world. however, what some analysts and commentators neglect to see is that the bush doctrine also shows elements of wilsonianism, a policy named after former u.s. president woodrow wilson who stood for promoting democracy, human rights, freedom and effective in international affairs. the european union published their first security strategy a year after the u.s. published theirs. interestingly, brussels advocated similar strategies and concepts to the us strategy. similarities can be see in both strategies in their messianic approach to create a better world and promote more international oder. this paper argues that despite the unilateralist tone of the current u.s. national security policy, the european strategy and its american counterpart share the same values of how to conduct and what to achieve in international affairs. consequently, the two strategies can be seen as complementary to each other, not contradictory. the paper will first address the nature of the u.s. national security strategy before analyzing the european security strategy while making reference, in both cases, to the wilsonian tradition of international affairs. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 2 august-september 2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 6 introduction soon after the terrorist attacks on september 11th, the george w. bush administration announced a new national security strategy.1 shortly thereafter, the document was denounced in european capitals as ‘cowboyesk’ and isolationist. particular dislike amongst some european governments was publicized about the strategy of pre-emption in domestic affairs of other states and the notion that washington reserved the right to send u.s. soldiers abroad to intervene in sovereign countries. in addition, many government officials in europe rejected washington’s assertion of withdrawing its membership of the international criminal court, the comprehensive test ban treaty, and the kyoto protocol it was perceived by them as a unilateralist foreign policy that rejects america’s responsibility in the world. as a result, some analysts on both sides of the atlantic have suggested that the united states and its european allies are drifting apart due to diverting strategic cultures.2 robert kagan, for example, argues that the united states acts like an international policeman that unilaterally enforces international order and stability. the u.s. is willing to use its military powers to achieve political objectives whereas the europeans are portrayed as a civilian power and less inclined to use military forces.3 1 in accordance with goldwaternichols department of defence reorganization act of 1986, every president of the united states has to send a detailed report to congress outlining the administration’s security strategy. see european council, "a secure europe in a better world: european security strategy," (brussels: european council, 2003). 2 for a comparison of the european vs. american security strategy see felix s. berenskoetter, "mapping the mind gap: a comparison of us and european strategies," security dialogue 36, no. 1 (2005), simon duke, "the european security strategy in a comparative framework: does it make for secure alliances in a better world?," european foreign affairs review 9 (2004), robert kagan, paradise and power: america and europe in the new world order (london, new york: atlantic books; alfred a. knopf, 2003), robert kagan, "power and weakness," policy review 113 (2002). 3 for the concept of ‘civilian power’ see for example sebastian harnisch and hanns maull, germany as a civilian power?: the foreign policy of the berlin republic, issues in german politics (manchester; new york: manchester university press, 2001), horst mendershausen, civilian power europe (santa monica, calif.: rand corp., 1975), mario telò, europe, a civilian power? : european union, global governance, world order (houndmills, basingstoke, hampshire ; new york: palgrave macmillan, 2006), henning tewes, germany, civilian power, and the new europe: enlarging nato and the european union, new perspectives in german studies (houndmills, basingstoke, hampshire ; new york: palgrave, 2002), richard whitman, from civilian power to superpower? : the international identity of the european union (houndmills, basingstoke, hampshire, new york: macmillan press; st. martin's press, 1998). review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 2 august-september 2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 7 however, what analysts and commentators neglect to see is that the bush doctrine also shows elements of wilsonianism, a policy named after former u.s. president woodrow wilson. wilson is associated with the idea of promoting democracy, human rights, freedom and the rule of law in international affairs.4 the former president believed in the “the principles of liberty”5 and the responsibility to protect these liberties. the same elements of wilsonianism can also be found in europe’s first security strategy. about a year after the u.s. published a new national security strategy (nss), the european union released its own strategic document partly in response to the nss and the changing security environment after 9/11. this document constitutes the first official e.u. strategy that is dedicated to formulating a common security strategy for the member states. interestingly, however, is that europe’s first security strategy is similar to its u.s. counterpart in its wilsonian ambition of spreading democracy and the rule of law around the world. both strategies are alike in their messianic approach to create a better world and to enhance global order. the comparison of the two strategies is an important mental exercise that allows to examine the “transatlantic rhetoric” that took place on both sides of the atlantic during the debate of the war in iraq.6 this exercise also provides a new perspective to the debate of a ‘transatlantic drift’ and makes the case that in fact the two continents share very similar strategic objectives. the comparison can also be seen as a basis for a renewed strategic dialogue between the u.s. and the e.u.7 the central argument of the article is that the two strategies can be seen as 4 for a greater discussion of traditions of american foreign policy see walter a. mcdougall, promised land, crusader state: the american encounter with the world since 1776 (boston: houghton mifflin, 1997), walter russell mead, special providence: american foreign policy and how it changed the world, 1st ed. (new york: knopf, 2001). 5 white house, "the national security strategy of the united states of america," (washington, d.c.: white house, 2002), 3. 6 elisabeth pond succinctly describes in detail the incidents that led to the transatlantic drift. see elizabeth pond, friendly fire: the near-death of the transatlantic alliance, eusa's-u.s.-eu relations project series (pittsburgh, pa: european union studies association, 2004). 7 this, however, seems to be the hope of the german government. see auswärtiges amt: eu-sicherheits-strategie (ess), stand: dezember 2003, abrufbar unter: http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/de/eupolitik/ review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 2 august-september 2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 8 complementary to each other and not contradictory. furthermore, it will be argued that despite the unilateralist tone of current u.s. national security policy, the european security strategy and its american counterpart share similar wilsonian values of how to achieve greater global order. hence, the theoretical lines of conflict between the transatlantic alliance partners should be minimal. in order to support the central argument, the paper will be structured into the following sections: it will first address the nature of the u.s. national security strategy and the factors that led to its publication. then, in a second step, the european security strategy will be examined while making reference, in both cases, to the wilsonian tradition of international affairs. the road to the bush doctrine in 1999, condoleezza rice published an article in foreign affairs outlining bush‘s vision of a new foreign policy.8 at that time she was special advisor to the then presidential candidate george w. bush and asserted that if he was elected president, his foreign policy would be “more realist” american foreign policy would be based more on the u.s. national interests. the new bush administration, rice argued, would ensure that the american military is capable of deterring war, projecting power as well as renewing america’s alliances.9 she accused the previous clinton administration of deploying american troops and risking the lives of u.s. soldiers in countries such as somalia or rwanda where the united states had no national interest to be involved in. then presidential candidate, george w. bush, specified this new foreign policy vision and advocated a “distinctly american internationalism.”10 gasp/ess_html [12. märz 2004]. 8 condoleezza rice, "promoting the national interest," foreign affairs 79 (january/february 2000): 57. 9 ibid.: 47. 10 george w. bush, “a distinctly american internationalism,” delivered at the ronal reagan presidential library, nov. 19th, 1999, available at http://www.georgewbush.com/speeches/foreignpolicy/foreignpolicy.asp, accessed jan. 1st, 2006. see also philip h. gordon and jeremy shapiro, allies at war: america, europe, and the crisis over iraq (new york: mcgraw-hill, 2004), 48. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 2 august-september 2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 9 at the beginning of his presidency bush’s ‘distinct foreign policy’, one can argue, was deeply rooted in the neorealist tradition of international relations, which assumes that states are the principal actors in foreign policy. domestic politics of sovereign states are not relevant in the international power play. secondly, neorealists assume that the power of the state is essential in the conduct of foreign policy. national interests of states are pursued by resources of power politics.11 inherent in this assumption is the logic that once states gain power it is their desire to expand territorially.12 thirdly, neorealists focus on great power politics and argue that no great power should ever be able to dominate international relations. the balance of power is the key mechanism for the conduct of international affairs. finally, governments should oppose involvements in internal affairs of sovereign states, humanitarian interventions, and the involvement with international institutions.13 yet, after being sworn into office, the bush administration continued to have a ‘unipolar’ world view14 in which no other great power would be able to challenge the global hegemon – and primacy was the pre-eminent strategy.15 the nss acknowledges that the “united states possesses unprecedented – and unequalled – strength and influence in the world.”16 as a result of this new unilateralist foreign policy, the administration rejected the kyoto protocol to control global 11 fareed zakaria, from wealth to power: the unusual origins of america's world role, princeton studies in international history and politics (princeton, n.j.: princeton university press, 1998), 8-9. 12 james m. mccormick, american foreign policy and process, 4th ed. (belmont, ca: thomson/wadsworth, 2005), 210. 13 ibid, p. 212. 14 charles krauthammer called it the ‘unipolar moment’. see charles krauthammer, "the unipolar moment," foreign affairs 70 (1990/1991). 15 the focus of the grand strategy of primacy lies on great power relations in an anarchic world. it is a classical realist theory. the primary objective of this grand strategy is that a state wants to keep its supremacy over other competitive states that intend to reach a great power status. secondly, a strategy of primacy is motivated by both power and peace. it tries to ensure peace in the world, and it is its view that only a preponderance of u.s. power ensures peace and stability in the world. “peace is the result of an imbalance of power in which u.s. capabilities are sufficient, operating on their own, to cow all potential challengers and to comfort all coalition partners”. this strategic view clearly demands a unipolar environment; multipolarity is not permitted and not desired. see barry r. posen and andrew ross, "competing visions of u.s. grand strategy," international security 21, no. 3 (winter 1996/97): 32. 16 see the 2002 and 2006 national security strategy: white house, the national security strategy of the united states of america (washington, d.c.: white house, 2002), white house, "the national security strategy of the united states of america," (washington, d.c.: white house, 2006). review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 2 august-september 2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 10 warming, disagreed with the comprehensive test ban treaty (ctbt) that limits the spread of nuclear weapons, and withdrew from the 1972 anti ballistic missile treaty (abm). it also rejected its membership of the international criminal court. what was apparent was that the united states was deemed to reduce the amount of ‘entangling alliances’17 that would impede on american sovereignty. however, the terrorist attacks on september 11th transformed the nature of u.s. foreign policy and shifted into a more defensive realist mode mixed with elements of idealism. defensive realism basically shares the same assumptions as do classical realists. however, the major difference between the two is that defensive realism highlights the importance of a state’s insecurity, which is the driving motivation for a state to act militarily for its own defence.18 since states can never be certain of other states’ present or future intentions they are seeking policies vis-à-vis potential adversaries. the president’s foreign policy shifted from a narrow definition of american national interests to include a broader set of values and principles.19 lastly, idealist views and attitudes were embodied into u.s. foreign policy advocating for regime change and the promotion of democracy and freedom around the world.20 in short, the previous “distinct american internationalism” was modified to a “comprehensive american globalism”. 17 the notion of ‘entangling alliances’ stated that america should remain independent from its european heritage, britain and france in particular. it was first used by george washington in his farewell address. this address was written primarily to eliminate himself as a candidate for a third term. it was never read by the president in public, but it was printed in claypoole's american daily advertiser, philadelphia, september 19, 1796. the doctrine stated that the united states should stay out of european conflicts to avoid an engagement into alliances with european powers that would impede on u.s. room of manoeuvre. see mcdougall, promised land, crusader state: the american encounter with the world since 1776. 18 zakaria, from wealth to power: the unusual origins of america's world role, 8-10. 19 mccormick, american foreign policy and process, 219. 20 idealists believe strongly in the affective power of ideas, in that it is possible to base a political system primarily on morality. the idealist school of thought is the oldest school of international relations. the theory of idealism has its origins in the first world war when the widespread view was the military force cannot achieve the objective of keeping the peace. see martin hollis and steve smith, explaining and understanding international relations (oxford, new york: clarendon press; oxford university press, 1990), 16-20. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 2 august-september 2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 11 the bush doctrine the national security strategy (nss) of september 20, 2002 outlined strategies and tactics on how to best meet the threats facing the united states in the 21st century. the president himself conveyed his visions of a new u.s. defence strategy in the state of the union address on january 29, 2002, saying that “we must prevent the terrorists and regimes who seek chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons from threatening the united states and the world”.21 in the following months, iran, iraq, and north korea were labelled as the “axes of evil”, a list of countries that pose a threat to america. president bush explained his strategic vision, which became better known as the bush doctrine, in a speech at west point on june 1, 2002 in greater detail: for much of the last century, america's defence relied on the cold war doctrines of deterrence and containment. in some cases, those strategies still apply. but new threats also require new thinking. deterrence -the promise of massive retaliation against nations -means nothing against shadowy terrorist networks with no nation or citizens to defend. containment is not possible when unbalanced dictators with weapons of mass destruction can deliver those weapons on missiles or secretly provide them to terrorist allies. we cannot defend america and our friends by hoping for the best. we cannot put our faith in the word of tyrants, who solemnly sign non-proliferation treaties, and then systemically break them. if we wait for threats to fully materialize, we will have waited too long.22 the bush doctrine has four main characteristics. first, the administration in washington recognizes that domestic regimes of certain states constitute a vital threat to the united states. this assertion is consistent with waltz’s second image of the causes of war.23 it describes the internal character of the state public beliefs and practices, opinions and expectations, political systems and institutions of government that can affect the interaction between states. consequently, the only strategic option is to pursue regime change in those countries that pose a threat to the u.s. the second characteristic of the bush doctrine is the notion of pre-emptive and 21 http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030128-19.html, accessed jan. 19th, 2005. 22 http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html, accessed jan. 21st, 2005. 23 see kenneth neal waltz, man, the state, and war; a theoretical analysis (new york,: columbia university press, 1959). review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 2 august-september 2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 12 preventative use of military force. the president reserves the right of anticipatory military actions against any state that poses a threat to america’s national security. international law and alliances are no longer the guiding principles of international diplomacy and are being replaced by ‘coalitions of the willing’, which offer washington more strategic and tactical flexibility. these new coalitions also highlight an instrumentalist view of international organizations: they are only consulted if they favour u.s. policies and agendas. thirdly, the doctrine asserts that peace and stability in the world require u.s. primacy. the ‘unipolar moment’24, as charles krauthammer coined it, should be extended. the united states seeks to dominate international affairs for some time to come. lastly, the new national security strategy speaks highly in favour of the spread of democracy and free markets around the globe. this is a classical wilsonian element of u.s. foreign policy and highlights the belief that enhancing globalized trade and freedom will raise living standards for everybody. wilsonianism and the bush doctrine woodrow wilson was the first u.s. president that was confronted with the new revolutions of the twentieth century. ‘wilsonian’ became a label for a style of u.s. foreign policy that is committed to internationalism and moralism in world politics that were dedicated to extending democracies. however, critics and proponents of ‘wilsoniansm’ are united in the view that the former president indeed had the largest long term vision of the nation’s future.25 for president woodrow wilson the justification for u.s. global engagements was messianic and a long-term oriented vision for u.s. foreign policy. he was not only a politician but also a scholar and former president of princeton university who formed policies out of “an understanding of the nation’s 24 krauthammer, "the unipolar moment." 25 walter lafeber, the american age: united states foreign policy at home and abroad since 1750, 2nd ed., 2 vols. (new york: norton, 1994), 269. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 2 august-september 2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 13 history.”26 the united states, wilson thought, has an obligation to spread the principles and values of the united states around the world. however, these unique wilsonian characteristics were shaping american foreign policy long before he became president. they are, as walter r. mead argues, “deeply rooted in the national character” of the united states and have been a consistency in american foreign policy for a long time.27 wilson himself outlined the principles in his fourteen point speech in an address to a joint session of congress on january 8, 1918.28 the united states, he argued, is an exceptional nation that rejects great power politics and is proud of its democratic institutions. international order, in wilsonian terms, is based on universal law, national trust and freedom. he saw the united states as a model the world should follow. the belief of a global civil society is rooted in the american missionary movement in which american religious groups alleged that the western world has a duty to support the development of what is today called the third world.29 “the missionary movement indeed deserves far more credit for promoting the idea of a global human community than it often receives.”30 yet, wilson insisted that the u.s. has the right and moral duty to “change the rest of the world’s behaviour.”31 a country should not be guided exclusively by its national interest but by its commitment to spread democracy and freedom around the world to ensure a more stable international system.32 wilson himself said: “we are participants, whether we would or not, in 26 ibid., 270. 27 mead, special providence: american foreign policy and how it changed the world, 134 and 39. 28 in the theoretical literature about u.s. foreign policy this event is also seen as the turning point from isolationism towards internationalism and more international engagement. lafeber argues that wilson had little choice and that the united states “could no longer withdraw from world affairs.” see lafeber, the american age: united states foreign policy at home and abroad since 1750, 303. wilson himself stated in his fourteen point speech that “neutrality is no longer feasible or desirable” for the united states. a the first step towards greater international engagement was “to make the world safe for democracy”. 29 see mead, special providence: american foreign policy and how it changed the world, chapter 5 for a greater discussion of these historical roots. 30 ibid., 139-51. 31 ibid., 138. 32 this became known as the ‘democratic peace theory’. for a greater discussion see michael mandelbaum, the ideas that conquered the world: peace, democracy, and free markets in the twenty-first century, 1st ed. (new york: public affairs, 2002). review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 2 august-september 2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 14 the life of the world. the interests of all nations are our own also. we are partners with the rest.”33 elements of the wilsonian tradition can be found in president bush’s foreign policy.34 afghanistan and later iraq are the most recent examples where the united states engaged in nation-building, and is trying to promote democratic institutions and the rule of law.35 after the terrorist attacks on september 11th, bush’s foreign policy shifted towards regime change in the middle east. the purpose of the war in afghanistan and later on in iraq was to transform dictatorial regimes that suppress their people and transform it into prosperous democracies where the state is governed by the rule of law, democracy, and freedom. it is the wilsonian belief that democracies are better reliable partners than totalitarian regimes. “democracy guards against one of the most dangerous forms of misrepresentation and misgovernance: the domination of the state by the military elite.”36 a short empirical survey reveals america’s commitment to wilsonian ideals: the word ‘democracy’ appears fourteen times in the 2002 document and fifty-two times in the 2006 edition. further, promoting the rule of law and institutions is mentioned ten times in the 2002 strategy and sixteen times in 2006. the word ‘freedom’ the 2002 is used forty-six times in 2002 and eighty-one times in the 2006 document. in addition, economic liberalization and free markets would lead the way to an integration into the global economy and prosperity. the nss links free trade and development with each other and asserts that “the lessons of history are clear: market economies … are the best way to promote prosperity and reduce poverty.”37 it is the notion of ‘extending freedom’ and ‘spreading democracy’ around the world that is a fundamental, global security imperative for the u.s. 33 quoted in mcdougall, promised land, crusader state: the american encounter with the world since 1776, 122. 34 michael j. mazzarr, "george w. bush, idealist," international affairs 79, no. 3 (2003). 35 francis fukuyama, nation-building: beyond afghanistan and iraq (baltimore: johns hopkins university press, 2006), francis fukuyama, state-building: governance and world order in the 21st century (ithaca, n.y.: cornell university press, 2004). 36 mead, special providence: american foreign policy and how it changed the world, 163. 37 white house, "the national security strategy of the united states of america," 17. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 2 august-september 2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 15 administration. this, again, appears to be consistent with the wilsonian tradition of international affairs. yet, president bush’s world view is not as messianic and long term oriented as wilson’s’. this might have to do with wilson’s fear of a revolution that would change the united states as it did in europe. he wanted world order and thus required a long term policy to achieve such order. “the president…wanted that world to be a safe and an orderly place in which americans could compete equally – perhaps even a place in which all people…would become much like americans.”38 nonetheless, it is american neoconservatives who are prepared to use military power to promote liberal values. a french analyst has called the strategic objective of regime change in combination with promoting liberal values such as democracy, liberty and the rule of law as ‘wilsonianism in boots’.39 moreover, the united states sought to establish market economies that would open highly regulated markets in the middle east and foster local entrepreneurship. the president’s vision was that a healthy economy would be the best source of global stability. this is consistent with the assumptions of the democratic peace theory, which says that liberal democratic states have been able to maintain peaceful relations amongst themselves, but are prone to wage war against non-liberal/democratic regimes.40 other scholars have outlined that three major ideas have characterized the modern world: peace, democracy, and free markets are seen as the optimal ways to organize political life.41 “if others make something that you value, you should be able to 38 lafeber, the american age: united states foreign policy at home and abroad since 1750, 272-73. 39 pierre hassner, the united states: the empire of force or the force of empire?, chaillot papers no. 54 (paris: institute for security studies, european union, 2002), 43. 40 for further reference to the democratic peace theory see for example michael doyle, "kant, liberal legacies and foreign affairs," philosophy and public affairs 12, no. 4 (1985), michael doyle, "kant, liberal legacies and foreign affairs part 1," philosophy and public affairs 12, no. 3 (1985), michael doyle, "kant, liberal legacies, and foreign affairs," in debating the democratic peace, ed. sean lynn-jones and michael brown (cambridge: mit, 1996), mandelbaum, the ideas that conquered the world: peace, democracy, and free markets in the twenty-first century. see also mazzarr, "george w. bush, idealist." 41 mandelbaum, the ideas that conquered the world: peace, democracy, and free markets in the twenty-first century, 62. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 2 august-september 2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 16 buy it. this is real freedom, the freedom for a person – or nationto make a living.”42 president bush believes that free trade in the middle east as well as free markets around the globe will create more employment opportunities and higher income for the region. this economic growth would also raise educational standards and employment for their citizens. expected tax revenue from higher employment rates, for example, could be used to invest into infrastructure, institutions, law enforcement institutions, and a better health care system. afghanistan was a perfect example of a poor country that was devastated by civil wars and foreign interventions throughout its history. the gross domestic product of the economy per capita was about $150 in 2004. it drove many afghans to leave their country to live and work across the border in pakistan where the living conditions were much friendlier. overall, several million afghan people were dependent on food shipments from abroad. to help the afghan people, the u.s. committed $4.5 billion dollars over five years for rebuilding the country. this wilsonian element of the bush doctrine was sought to be applied as a universal formula in every part of the world. it had strategic as well as moral origins. strategically, poverty, crime and corruption could pose a threat to american national security. poor nations might fall into the hands of terrorists. morally, poverty in the world affected american values: “a world where some live in comfort and plenty, while half of the human race lives on less than $2 a day, is neither just nor stable.”43 the core objective of the u.s. administration was to give afghans the opportunity to make the same choices as americans made two hundred years ago they chose democracy, freedom, and free enterprise. “the united states will use its moment of opportunity to extend the benefits of freedom across the globe. we will actively work to bring the hope of 42 the national security strategy of the united states, 18. 43 idid, p. 21. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 2 august-september 2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 17 democracy, development, free markets, and free trade to every corner of the world.”44 however, contrary to wilson, it was short term oriented. yet, it is not only the promotion of democracy and free trade that makes the current bush doctrine inherently wilsonian, but also its commitment to multilateralism. “this is a missionary, idealist administration in the best … traditions of wilsonianism.”45 current wars in iraq and afghanistan require a high degree of international collaboration and cooperation. the international community, including the european union, supported the united states in the war against terrorism by sharing vital intelligence information and providing logistical support in order to prevent a further destabilization of the region. germany, for example, as one of the countries that opposed the war in iraq, allowed the united states over flight rights, and shared crucial intelligence information of two of their officers in bagdad with the cia.46 it also trains iraqi police forces outside of iraq and provides other logistical support. intelligence agencies on both continents tracked international terrorists and money laundering regimes, and froze suspicious bank accounts of terrorists and their organizations. in short, this is the multilateral element of the bush doctrine.47 yet, it is an instrumentalist foreign policy that makes use of its alliances and international organizations when they are congruent with american national interests. europe and the question of power and security the european union published its security strategy (ess) in december 2003 in which it outlines how to cope with external threats such as terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. “it 44 ibid. 45 mazzarr, "george w. bush, idealist," 509. 46 see dominik cziesche and holger stark, "aktion glasnost: ein bericht des kanzleramts legt details der operationen deutscher sicherheitsbehörden offen die regierungskoalition sieht die dienste entlastet," der spiegel 9/2006, michael r. gordon, "german intelligence gave u.s. iraqi defense plan," the new york times, february 27 2006. 47 stephen m. walt, taming american power: the global response to u.s. primacy, 1st ed. (new york: norton, 2005). review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 2 august-september 2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 18 sets out an analysis of and response to the most salient security threats the union is facing.”48 it is guided by the decisions made by the european council’s meeting in cologne in 1999 that laid the foundations for early, rapid, and if necessary robust european civilian and military crisis management capabilities. these ‘new’ capabilities were designed to allow brussels the deployment of its military forces around the world for conflict prevention missions. they were based on the “petersberg tasks”49 – evacuation, humanitarian and rescue missions including humanitarian aid, separation of warring factions, and conflict prevention. it also strengthens the picture of the union as a global actor in international affairs and highlights the importance its civilian crisis management capabilities such as police, the rule of law, strengthening civilian administrations, negotiation and consultation to engage in these areas.50 yet, under the helsinki headline goal in 1999 a european rapid reaction force (errf) of 60.000 troops was created with the mandate to carry out the petersberg tasks.51 yet, due to capability shortfalls and lack of commitments in european capitals the headline goals did not fully materialize. instead, a smaller version of the rrf, the european battle group concept was developed that consists of max. 1.500 troops and is on stand by for short notice deployments. however, the e.u. security strategy is explicit in saying that european forces will only be deployed in multilateral operations and with the consent of other nations or international organizations.52 this shows that the e.u. subscribes to the doctrine of multilateralism in 48 christoph o. meyer, "convergence towards a european strategic culture? a constructivist framework for explaining changing norms," european journal of international relations 11, no. 4 (2005): 524. see also sven biscop, the european security strategy: a global agenda for a positive power (hants, england: ashgate, 2005), alexander skiba, "die nationale sicherheitsstrategie der usa und die europäische sicherheitsstrategie in vergleich," in wissenschaft & sicherheit: beiträge zur sicherheitspolitik sonderband (bsrarbeitskreise sicherheitspolitik an hochschulen, sonderband 4/2004). 49 the negotiations were held on a hotel on the petersberg near bonn/germany. the petersberg tasks were literally taken from the western european union’s toolbox 50 see 2385th european council meeting, general affairs, 19-20.xi.2001, brussels, 19-20 november 2001. further, the eu defines its global power status by referring to the size of its populations and the percentage of its gross national product (gnp). 51 the european council in feira decided to recruit 5000 policemen that are deployable within two months and sustainable for at least one year. 52 european european council, "a secure europe in a better world: european security strategy," 9. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 2 august-september 2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 19 international affairs that is based on international cooperation. this commitment is consistent with wilsonian ideas of conducting international relations. consequently, it can be argued, the european security strategy is consistent with the nss in its ambition of making the world not only a safer but also a better place. both strategies highlight the significance of international terrorism and state failures as threats to international order. “state failure and organized crime spread if they are neglected – as it was seen in west africa. this implies that we should be ready to act before a crisis occurs.”53 however, the historical experience of the member states dissuades the union’s willingness to engage in military conflict. the strategy makes explicit reference to the ‘european experience’ and the lessons learned from two devastating world wars. it bases all e.u. strategic and tactical engagements and commitments on these experiences. these lessons learned and the positive experiences of the process of european integration made europe democratic, wealthy and peaceful. “europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free. the violence of the first half of the 20th century has given way to a period of peace and stability unprecedented in european history.”54 it underlines the unwillingness in european capitals to see the world in terms of power relations and is the source of europe’s commitments to conflict prevention and the promotion of the rule of law.55 stability through cooperation became the leitmotiv of european diplomacy. “europe seems, therefore, to be a model of non-military power, influential but disinclined to use force.”56 however, the e.u. does not shy away from the possibility of deploying military forces at all. the strategic document states that brussels is willing to send forces abroad as a last resort for 53 ibid., 7. 54 ibid. 55 see robert cooper, the breaking of nations: order and chaos in the twenty-first century (new york: atlantic monthly press, 2003). 56 ibid., 161. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 2 august-september 2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 20 solving international conflicts.57 ambassadors of the european union’s political and security committee drafted the first version of the strategy and sold it to the national foreign ministers. it shows that key actors in the esdp institutional framework were engaged in developing a more pro-active role of the union in international affairs. what took place in the european union is what christoph meyer called a “normative convergence”58 of national strategic cultures. contrary to the accepted wisdom of europe’s “capability-expectations gap”59, e.u. member states transformed gradually from defensive oriented countries towards more proactive states working towards a more unified european policies. the result is a de-prioritisation of territorial defence, the acceptance of intervention in sovereign states for humanitarian reasons, and an institutionalized set of norms.60 meyer showed that the new ess represents a departure of nato’s strategic thinking of more autonomous european military capabilities.61 again, the foundation of europe’s increased military engagement is its experience in the balkans and its impotence of preventing massacres such as the one in srebrenica. the blame and shame of the international community to the union’s inability to act started a process of re-thinking traditional security paradigms towards “more reactive and territorial defence-oriented national security cultures and initiated a process of societal learning in a number of member states.”62 the new engagement constitutes a “shift away from the ‘civil power’ leitbild towards a union that aims to develop autonomy in defence matters and considers the use of military force a legitimate option to tackle security threats.”63 nonetheless, there also appears to be a difference between the european and the american security strategy. the european security strategy is ‘passively 57 meyer, "convergence towards a european strategic culture? a constructivist framework for explaining changing norms," 544. 58 ibid.: 545. 59 see for example christopher hill, "the capability-expectations gap, or conceptualizing europe's international role," journal of common market studies 31, no. 3 (1993). 60 meyer, "convergence towards a european strategic culture? a constructivist framework for explaining changing norms." 61 ibid.: 539. 62 ibid.: 540. 63 ibid.: 539. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 2 august-september 2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 21 aggressive’ in the sense that european policy makers do not subscribe to the u.s. ambition of transforming other countries around the world into prosperous democracies. instead, other countries approach brussels and ask for their assistance in the democratization and/or domestic transition processes. other countries are used as the ‘vehicles’ for europe’s wilsonian ambitions. for example, the e.u. implicitly offered the peoples of eastern europe a prosperous and democratic future should they overcome communism. within two years between 1994-96 ten central and eastern european states applied for membership in the european union. brussels signed a so called association agreements with applicant states and imposed conditions of reform on them. the acquis communautaire laid out the treaties and regulations of the european union and a roadmap for the applicant countries for transforming their economies, reforming their judicial systems, and preparing their political systems for accountability and democracy. however, up until today, the e.u. has deployed military forces in various missions in support of its wilsonian objectives. under the heading of the european security and defence policy (esdp), the e.u. has been running ten formal crisis management operations (3 military and 7 civilian). seven of them are still ongoing (1 military, 5 civil, 1 mixed) in theatres all over the world.64 a european capability action plan was launched at the e.u. council’s meeting in laeken in 2003 to boost the development of european crisis management capabilities particularly in the field of police. one thousand police officers should be ready to for deployment within less than thirty days, two hundred experts in the rule of law, and specialists for civilian administration should be ready to be posted on short notice. the ministerial crisis management capability conference, held on 19 november 2002, confirmed the commitments of the member states. in addition, in 1999 the european council in helsinki authorized a european rapid 64 operation “concordia” (fyr macedonia), operation “artemis” (congo), operation “althea” (bosnia herzegowina), operation “amis” (darfur), operation “proxima” (fyr macedonia), operation “eu pm” (bosnia), operation “eu pol kinshasa” (congo), operation “eu just lex” (middle east), operation “eu sec” (congo), and operation “eu just themis” (georgia). review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 2 august-september 2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 22 reaction force composed of 50-60,000 troops that will perform humanitarian and rescue missions, traditional peacekeeping missions, and peacemaking tasks.65 these commitments were developed to underline europe’s commitments and efforts in nation-building. however, it is no secret in european capitals that the e.u. is new to the business of peace support operations.66 the e.u. security strategy provided the strategic objective of these missions and specified the goals of europe’s global engagements. altogether, the e.u. developed four areas of civilian crisis management: the rule of law, civil administration, civil protection, and police. in the area of the rule of law, the aim of the council is to provide 200 agents ready for deployment to assist in establishing law and order in failed or failing societies. judges, prosecutors, and correctional officers are deployed in support of developing democratic institutions and to ensure rule based democratic transitions.67 this could be to reform the public administration of a country, the judicial system, the police, and reform the electoral process. thirdly, civil protection forces involve european internal protection mechanisms for crisis management. finally, the area of civil administration is the least developed areas of europe’s four pillars in civilian crisis management. wilsonianism and the e.u. security strategy by analyzing the union’s strategic document and subsequent decisions of the e.u. council, it becomes clear that the e.u. is driven by a wilsonian vision of international relations. first, the e.u. makes clear that international conflicts can only be solved multilaterally. “we need to pursue our objectives both through multilateral cooperation in international organisations and through partnerships with key actors.”68 second, the e.u., like the united states, intends to 65 raimo väyrynen, "the european union’s new crisis management capability," (policy briefing of the joan b. kroc institute for peace studies, february 2000). 66 antonio missiroli, "the european union: just a regional peacekeeper," european foreign affairs review 8, no. 4 (2003): 493. 67 european security review, no. 10, january 2000, p. 1. 68 european council, "a secure europe in a better world: european security strategy," 13. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 2 august-september 2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 23 export europe’s values to other countries. it recognizes that regional conflicts and failed states are the primary threats to the union.69 failed states in afghanistan, for example, may pose a risk to european security in the years to come, especially countries that are close to the european heartland. issues such as organized crime, human smuggling, democracy, freedom and human rights are already pressing concerns of the union. in order to better manage these risks, the e.u. strategy advocates an active engagement and investment into nation-building capabilities and the spread of democracy. the european union and its member states have intervened to help deal with regional conflicts and to put failed states back on their feet, including in the balkans, afghanistan, and in the democratic republic of congo (drc). “restoring good government to the balkans, fostering democracy and enabling the authorities there to tackle organised crime is one of the most effective ways of dealing with organised crime within the e.u.”70 furthermore, the strategy clearly espouses the promotion of economic and political interdependence with less fortunate countries. “we need to extend the benefits of economic and political cooperation to our neighbours in the east while tackling political problems there.”71 this commitment is consistent with the objectives of the american nss as well as the ‘democratic peace theory’. “we need to extend the benefits of economic and political cooperation to our neighbours in the east while tackling political problems there.”72 part of europe’s commitment to stabilizing failed states is its european development fund that distributes money to countries of less fortune. it could be accompanied by assistance programs or targeted trade measures. however, to ensure liberalized markets and the respect for human rights and freedoms, it is recognized that the rule of international law, another wilsonian element in the security strategy, should be respected and extended. only when the international community respects international 69 ibid. 70 ibid., 6. 71 ibid., 8. 72 ibid, p.8. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 2 august-september 2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 24 law and arbitration, conflicts can be contained and resolved. the e.u. recognizes that the fundamental framework for international relations is the united nations charter. the united nations security council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. in order to strengthen these responsibilities the e.u. is committed to reform the united nations and its sub-organizations. “we are committed to upholding and developing international law… strengthening the united nations, equipping it to fulfil its responsibilities and to act effectively, is a european priority.”73 this rule based international order includes the reformation of the world trade organization as well as the international criminal court. conclusion this article argued that both the u.s. national security strategy and its european counterpart share similar strategic objectives and are committed to a world order based on wilsonian values and visions. thus, it was shown that both documents can be seen as complementary to each other and that both are rooted in the wilsonian vision of international affair that is the promotion of democracy, the rule of law, freedom of people, free markets and open access to markets. further, the conduct of international relations should be based on the rule of international law. it was shown that despite the unilateralist tone in the current u.s. national security strategy and its notion of pre-emption and prevention, its nature is multilateralist. yet, there are also dissimilarities. even though president bush’s ‘distinct internationalism’ appears to be consistent with the wilsonian tradition of u.s. foreign policy, it lacks wilson’s long term visions. instead, the president instrumentalizes american consultation and cooperation with international institutions as long as they favour u.s. policies. for example, in the most recent war on terrorism, the united states shared crucial intelligence information with its allies, particularly those from europe, but only to the end of gaining vital intelligence 73 european council. a secure europe in a better world, p.9. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 2 august-september 2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 25 information in return. the german government, for example, had two agents posted to baghdad on the eve of the u.s. bombing campaign and cabled a list of possible targets and other tactical intelligence information to the administration in washington.74 similar multilateral pledges can be found in the current european security strategy. it outlines clear guidelines how to prevent international crisis. amongst the advocated policies is the commitment to promote free markets and democracy in failed or failing states, the promotion of the rule of law as well and civilian police commitments. in sum, it should be said that the two security strategies share rather similar visions of a post 9/11 world order. thus, the transatlantic alliance can be seen as strategically more coherent as robert kagan forecasted. 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"the national security strategy of the united states of america." washington, d.c.: white house, 2006. whitman, richard. from civilian power to superpower? : the international identity of the european union. houndmills, basingstoke, hampshire, new york: macmillan press; st. martin's press, 1998. zakaria, fareed. from wealth to power: the unusual origins of america's world role, princeton studies in international history and politics. princeton, n.j.: princeton university press, 1998. microsoft word andrej zaslove_the politics of immigration a new electoral dilemma for the right and the left.doc review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 10 ……………………………………………… the politics of immigration: a new electoral dilemma for the right and the left? andrej zaslove abstract the success of radical right, anti-immigrant political parties and the recent riots in france are only two of the more publicized examples of how volatile the issue of immigration has become across western europe. it is often believed that the dichotomy between racism and anti-racism is quite clear. right-wing and center-right parties and their electoral constituencies are less accepting of immigrants, while center-left and left-wing political parties and their supporters are more accommodating. in this paper, however, i argue that this distinction is not as clear as it is often perceived. using italy as my case study, i outline the various ideological positions on the left and the right, and within the left and right, vis-à-vis immigration legislation and important related issues such as integration and multiculturalism. in the second section, i then examine how these ideological positions respond to the realities of immigration and to new pressures from voters within civil society. the question is whether immigration has created a new electoral dilemma for both sides of the political spectrum. i examine whether: 1) left-wing parties are experiencing pressures from their traditional working class constituencies to be tougher on immigration and issues of law-and-order. how does this mesh with more liberal attitudes regarding policies that permit immigrants to enter, find work, and integrate into society? 2) the question is whether right-wing political forces are also experiencing an electoral dilemma between center-right voters who support less liberal immigrant legislation and their traditional business constituency who support center-right economic policy but also realize that they require immigrant labour. in the conclusion, i, briefly, examine whether this new electoral dilemma experienced by the italian left and right is consistent with other west european countries such as germany, austria, demark, the united kingdom, and france. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 11 introduction immigration, and related issues such as integration, exclusion, and multiculturalism, dominates much of the current academic and journalistic discussions concerning european politics. the subject matter is often contentious and controversial: from violent attacks on ethnic minorities, to the arrival of illegal immigrants off the shores of italy and spain, to the electoral success of anti-immigrant radical right populist parties in austria, denmark, france, italy, and holland. immigration to europe and migration within europe has a long history. the post 1945 economic boom was, in part, driven by internal migration and by the arrival of non-european labour. in the 1970s, when northern european countries such as germany, switzerland, and france stopped their active recruitment of foreign labour, discussions turned to issues of residency rights, citizenship, asylum, and family reunification. despite the long and often controversial nature of immigration, it was not until the 1980s, with the possible exception of great britain, that immigration has been politicized. several economic and political developments opened up this contentious issue to public debate and controversy. first, in the 1970s stagnation, inflation, and declining growth and productivity restructured the post second world war fordist economies. the transformation of european economies into post-fordist production systems altered the nature of labour-demand and migration patterns. secondly, the dealignment of party systems, and the rise of green and radical right populist parties, diminished the ability of christian democratic and social democratic catch-all parties to control the political agenda. scholars writing about post war immigration have noted both the degree to which the issue of immigration cut across the left-right divide and the review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 12 degree to which political elites demonstrated little desire to politicize the issue. this began to change as new left forces, especially green parties, demanded more social and even political rights for immigrants, and as radical right forces demanded more restrictive immigration policies. these economic transformations and the politicization of immigration set the agenda for an important research question: does immigration pose an electoral dilemma for center-left and center-right parties? in order to address this question, i first outline a model for explaining the current politicization of immigration. i argue that the transition from fordism to post-fordism and the process of electoral de-alignment have created opportunity structures for new political forces, on both the left and right, to politicized immigration. subsequently, i examine the potential tensions within the left and right visà-vis immigration. i question whether the politicization of immigration implies that the left is vulnerable to conflicts between supporters of policies that grant immigrants social and political rights and working class voters who fear that immigration precipitates crime and insecurity, creates unfair competition for employment, and overburdens the welfare state. i also point out that the right is not immune to its own electoral dilemma. it must deal with tensions among supporters of right-wing populist parties that want to limit immigration, public fears concerning immigration and crime, business leaders who recognize the need for immigrant labour, and center-right christian democratic voters who supported more humanitarian treatment of new arrivals. i then turn my attention to the evolution of italian immigration policy in order to investigate whether the empirical evidence demonstrates that such an electoral dilemma exists. since italy’s transition to an immigrant receiving country in the 1980s, it has review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 13 passed a series of immigration laws. i examine italy’s first immigration law in 1986 (law 943), the martelli law (1990), the turco-napolitano law (1998), and finally the controversial bossi-fini law (2002) in order to scrutinize the degree to which the left and the right have faced internal divisions and contradictory pressures from within civil society while attempting to contend with the momentous social, political, and policy changes involved in the transition to an immigrant receiving society. the politics and the political economy of immigration gary freeman argued in 1995 that immigration policy in industrialized countries is expansionist (1995). despite surges of anti-immigrant sentiments, immigrant receiving states have avoided anti-immigrant populist sentiments since immigration policy is drafted behind closed doors. he claims that immigration policy is driven by “organized interest groups, usually, ‘employers, ethnic advocacy groups, and civil and human rights organization.’ (perlmutter, 375).” according to this argument, immigration policy has been immune from “irrational” populist forces within civil society intent on limiting immigration. freeman refers to this as a theory of client politics (perlmutter, 375, freeman, 888). while freeman’s “client” model of immigration policy accurately accounts for the immediate post war (1945-1973) era of immigration, this model is less valuable for the post 1973 era of immigration. criticizing freeman, perlmutter, correctly, points out that this model is “most accurate for cases where the national leadership of mass parties control the political agenda. it is less accurate for party systems where this leadership has been challenged by other actors (1996, 376).” it is my argument that this is precisely review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 14 what has occurred in europe since the 1980s. the “client” nature of immigration policy formation has been challenged, on both the left and the right, by political parties that have politicized immigration. this is not to imply that immigration policy is necessarily becoming more exclusionary, rather, the point is that the policy process is increasingly exposed to competing political forces, debate, and conflict. several political and economic developments have facilitated these changes. there has been a gradual de-alignment of the dominant post war christian democratic and social democratic catch-all parties. smaller green parties, on the left, and radical right parties, on the right, have challenged the ability of catch-all parties to control the political agenda (kriesi, kitschelt). center-right parties are forced to respond to fears of radical right parties and their supporters concerning immigration and claims that new arrivals increase crime, unemployment, and threaten national identity. green parties have also challenged the hegemony of social democratic parties on the left, by pushing for more inclusive immigration and citizenship policy. the political economy of the post-fordist era must also be taken into consideration. as enrico pugliese emphasizes, during the heyday of post war migration the fordist model of production prevailed. fordism accounted for the integration of the workers into the work force and into the working class: “as far as these migrations are concerned, industrial development in the core countries has been the motor of the labour demand and the migratory inflows. the labour demand in the manufacturing sector (besides mining and the construction industry) was the factor activating population movements. this does not mean of course that all immigrants everywhere entered industrial employment.” however, it does hold true that “for the majority of the intrareview of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 15 european migrants, industrial employment was certainly the main destination (1993, 317).” the crisis of the post war fordist model has important implications for current migration patterns, labour demand, and for occupational and social structure. the demise of post war levels of demand, productivity, and growth are countered with the often precarious nature of employment, the heterogeneous origin of international migrants, and the predominance of employment in the secondary economy (pugliese, 61). the demise of post war levels of demand, productivity, and growth are countered with the often precarious nature of employment, the heterogeneous origin of international migrants, and the predominance of employment in the secondary economy. the volatility of this post-fordist economic context is exacerbated by the declining hegemony of the catchall party, the emergence of radical right and green political parties, and competing understandings of citizenship and belonging. it is within this post-fordist socio-political climate that immigration policy has moved from the dark corridors of parliament committees to the often populist and emotionally charged public sphere. does an electoral dilemma exist? although the potential for internal divisions within the left and the right existed vis-à-vis immigration under the post war model of immigration (veugelers, 38), it was assumed that, christian democratic and social democratic catch-all political parties did their best not to politicize the issue. the rise of new social and political forces on both the left and the right marked the end of the post war immigration model, signaling the review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 16 potential for conflict to ensue within the left and with the right vis-à-vis immigration policy. in an important analysis of inclusion and exclusion in europe, sniderman et al. conclude that “the fundamental cleavage over the value of order and authority is thus not between the left and the right, but within the left itself. (2000, 119).” the authors question whether the politicization of immigration has created an important rift within the left between those that favour policy that grants immigrants more social and political rights and those who fear that immigration is linked to crime, unemployment, and a risk to national identity. sniderman et al. predict that “as the issue of immigration moves to the center of public argument, public debate . . . it will be framed in terms that advantage the political right, with considerations of order, tradition, and national integrity coming to the fore (2000, 119).” what about the right? does a potential electoral dilemma also exist for the right? according to perlmutter, an important tension exists within the center-right between cultural conservatives who call for stricter immigration controls and employers who demand more immigrants (1996, 377). it is necessary to include, especially in countries with strong christian democratic traditions, that center-right parties possess humanitarian wings that favour a more solidaristic position towards immigrants. the question becomes: to what degree is the center-right vulnerable to radical right populist forces, and to what degree does this affect the more humanitarian or the business interests within the coalition? review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 17 policy and politics: towards an immigration electoral dilemma. lingering fordism and cross-party consensus as a consequence of the above analysis, i now turn to the evolution of italian immigration policy. the actions of political parties and social movements, at both the state and civil society level, highlight the tensions between the left and the right, and within the left and the right. before 1986, italy did not possess an immigration law; immigration was treated as a law and order issue. however, in the 1980s it became strikingly apparent that italy could no longer ignore that it had become an immigrant receiving country.1 italy’s first immigration law was passed during the era of christian democratic (dc) hegemony, albeit a declining hegemony. this is significant in explaining why and how immigration was de-politicized at this early stage. since the end of the second world war, the christian democratic party governed italy. although, italy is infamous for its numerous governments, it was also one of the most stable political systems in western europe. the christian democratic party was able to maintain political power from 1945, working in coalitions with other political parties, until its demise in 1992. giovanni sartori has characterized the italian political system as polarized pluralism. this refers to both the dominance of the christian democratic party and to political reality that the strongest opposition party was the italian communist party (pci) (sartori). due to the cold war and to the fear of communism, the pci was not perceived as a legitimate party of government even though it obtained between 18 and 34 percent of the national vote and it was the party of 1 space does not allow me to elaborate on italy’s transition to an immigrant receiving society. for an excellent discussion see: russell king, “the troubled passage: migration and cultural encounters in southern europe,” in russell king (ed.) mediterranean passage: migration and new cultural encounters in southern europe (liverpool: liverpool university press, 2001). review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 18 government at the municipal and the regional level, especially in its strongholds in the socalled red zones in emilia-romagna and in tuscany. in the 1980s the dc, in part, due to its declining electoral support, was forced to form a coalition with four other parties: the socialist party, the liberal party, the republican party, and the social democratic party. this period is referred to as the pentapartito. it was within this political context in the mid-1980s that it became apparent that immigration policy needed to recognize the economic and social reality of immigration to the peninsula. the absence of an immigration law meant that there was no policy regarding the entry and residency of aliens, while social and civil rights were also insufficient. since immigration was treated as a law and order issue, policy did not address immigrant flows, employment, housing, education, training, health, and family reunification (veugelers, 35). several elements characterize the drafting of law 943 (1986). the dominant italian political parties still possessed a firm hold on the political process. thus, the drafting and the passing of law 943 fits freeman’s early claims concerning the depoliticization and the “client” nature of post war immigration policy. the lack of any well organized opposition is consistent with a low level of opposition to immigration in italy in the 1980s (veugelers 36, perlmutter, 234). finally, cross-party consensus was aided by general agreement between unions and catholic associations concerning the need for progressive and comprehensive immigration policy. in the italian case, the left, and its union organizations, have not attempted to exploit immigration for the purpose of creating a nativist, exclusionary politics of selfdefense, as occurred in several other european countries (rydgren, schain). instead, review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 19 unions and left wing activists within civil society were instrumental in assisting immigrants with housing, employment, and education. this position stems from both ideology and from a general pragmatism. the italian labour unions have always held a progressive position vis-à-vis the so-called third world, while they also recognized that, due to a decline in industrial employment and an aging population, the future of unions will depend upon immigrant labour. the growing presence of immigrants in italy is reflected in higher levels of unionization. the highest number of unionized immigrants can be found in the cgil (italian general confederation of labour) with over 100.000 members. the unions have responded with internal measures to coordinate immigrant labour at the regional and the provincial levels (macioti and pugliese, 84). catholic organizations such as caritas were also essential in providing social services and shelter to immigrants. these organizations were especially important in the early stages of immigration to italy. they provided help to immigrants before there was adequate legislation and they lobbied the government to increase the legal status and to grant social and civil rights to immigrants. improvement to law 943: towards the martelli law the murder of jerry esslan masslo in august 1988, a political refugee from south africa and an agricultural worker in a small southern italian town, served as a catalyst for a more up to date immigration law. although, the motive was ostensibly robbery, the tragic event galvanized support within society for the need to improve social and civil rights for immigrants. contrary to other european countries, in italy in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the general attitude towards immigrants was rather positive. a march in review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 20 response to masslo’s killing was organized in rome by unions, voluntary, and religious organizations, drawing 200, 000 people (perlmutter, 234). realizing that it was necessary to improve italy’s first immigration law, the prominent socialist minister within the pentapartito government, claudio martelli, exploited this public outrage over masslo’s murder to garner support for further legislation. initially, there was general support for martelli’s initiatives, especially among the christian democratic and the socialist representatives in government, and among the oppositional communists members of parliament. in general, it was not feared that immigrants would take jobs from locals. it was acknowledged that italy’s wide-open borders meant that immigration was inevitable. moreover, the italian government did not seem particularly concerned with external demands made by the european union regarding schengen and the need to further regulate and control immigration (perlmutter, 234). and finally, both catholic and left-wing civil society associations continued to push for improvements to italy’s immigrant legislation. thus, at this stage public opinion favoured martelli’s initiatives; initially, no political party or social movement successfully mobilized opposition to the new law. passing of martelli: early signs of politicization if, initially, early attempts at drafting the martelli law received cross-party support, opposition among political parties and within civil society did begin to take shape before the proposed legislation became law. the republican party, a small party and member of the governing pentapartito coalition, objected to the early drafts of the martelli law. it claimed that, especially in relation to the planned amnesty, that the review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 21 proposed legislation was too lenient. it was argued that the leniency of the law would encourage further third world immigration to italy, and in the process, italy would be excluded from the schengen accord. in fact, in the municipal elections of may 1990, the republican party attempted to exploit immigration (perlmutter, 235-6). it is important to note that political opposition to the proposed immigration law coincided with the rise of the lega nord. the lega nord, under the leadership of umberto bossi, was an amalgamation of the smaller regional protest leagues that had become increasingly powerful in the late 1980s and the early 1990s in northern italy. although the early political message of the lega emphasized regional devolution, criticizing rome, the italian state, and the southernization of the italian state, early signs of anti-immigrant sentiments were already visible in the late 1980s and the early 1990s. in other words, political space for exclusionary, anti-immigrant politics was opening up. however, despite these efforts by the republican party, the mainstream political parties, the communist and the catholic parties, avoided the issue. this was even the case for the neo-fascist movimento sociale italiano. at this point in time, the republican party’s attempt to politicize immigration failed. eventually, with minor revisions, the martelli law was passed in 1990. in short, although these represented only initial steps, the law succeeded in granting asylum seekers legal rights. it broadened residence categories and permitted non-eu migrants to enter for reasons of tourism, education, health, and work. it established employment quotas in consultation with unions and employers. it clarified expulsion procedures. and it announced a second amnesty in order to attempt to legalize illegal workers (calavita, 386, veugelers, 42). review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 22 the second republic and the politicization of immigration as our discussion to this point has emphasized, the first phase of immigration policy (law 943 and the martelli law) can be characterized as largely consensual. as italy evolved into an immigrant receiving country, it passed legislation that began to address issues of entry, residence, work, asylum, immigrant rights, and border controls. although there were early signs of potential anti-immigrant mobilization, in general mainstream political parties sought a cross-party consensus. however, unlike in the 1980s, in the 1990s social and political forces intent upon politicizing immigration increased. this was due to several domestic and international developments. 1) the italian political crisis in 1992, and the demise of the party system that dominated the post war period, meant that smaller parties were, subsequently, able to politicize issues that were previously avoided by the christian democratic and the communist parties. 2) during the 1990s, the number of immigrants arriving in italy was on a steady increase. macioti and pugliese point out that the number of immigrants from the so-called third world tripled between 1992 and 2000: expanding from 474.000 to over 1.200.000 (2003, 35). it is important to note that these figures only take into account legal residents and not the large numbers of illegal arrivals (reyneri).2 3) this dramatic increase in new arrivals was highlighted by several refugee crises. in 1991 and in 1997, large numbers of albanian refugees arrived on the italian shores. if initially, italian public opinion was empathetic to the plight of the albanians, public opinion soon turned to fear and apprehension (woods, sciortino). 4) the post-fordist nature of immigration, i.e. its often illegal, precarious, and highly visible nature, coupled with the albanian 2 for an excellent discussion concerning illegal immigration and employment see: 2 emilio reyneri, “immigrants in a segmented and often undeclared labour market,” journal of modern italian studies, 9(1) 2004. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 23 refugee crises and the dramatic arrival of illegal migrants off the italian coastline is accompanied with the media’s dramatization of these events. in the 1990s the media increasingly associated immigration with crime, insecurity, international organized crime (referring to the smuggling and trafficking of migrants), and to the “flood” of economic and political refugees from the third world (sciortino and colombo, 2004). the political actors: parties and civil society the post war party system that dominated italian politics since 1945 crumbled as, especially, the christian democratic party and the socialist party were implicated in complex webs of corruption. of equal importance, the fall of the berlin wall in 1989, facilitated the transition of the italian communist party into a social democratic party (they are currently referred to as the left democrats, ds).. the birth of the so-called second italian republic in 1992 dramatically altered the italian party system. the left eventually evolved into a coalition that included the ds (ex-communists), the margherita (ex-center left christian democrats), partito della rifondazione comunista (communist refoundation party), and greens. these political parties joined forces to become the olive tree coalition (it currently uses the name: the union). in 1994 the center-right galvanized under the leadership of silvio berlusconi and his newly created forza italia. forza italia became the dominant center-right party under the strong tutelage of its founder and charismatic populist leader, the billionaire silvio berlusconi. despite berlusconi’s strong hold on the party and “his penchant for populist appeal” the party consists of three wings: a liberal conservative steam, a catholictraditionalist wing, and a group of ex-christian democrats (ignazi, 335). of equal review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 24 importance was the transformation of movimento sociale into the post-fascist alleanza nazionale, the birth of the regional populist anti-immigrant lega nord, and the small coalition of ex-center right christian democrats under the union of christian and center democrats (udc). in order understand the evolution of italian immigration policy, it is important to clarify how these new party dynamics influence party politics. in the 1980s the msi did not exploit the immigration issue. it did not follow the path of other right-wing parties in western europe. msi did link immigration to law and order by expressing its reluctance in supporting both the 1986 immigration law and the 1990 martelli law. this trend continued in the 1990s. for example, in 2000 a proposed law by alleanza, the landi-fini bill, sought to criminalize illegal immigration with immediate incarceration (zincone 2002, 62). despite these initiatives, msi, and its successor party alleanza nazionale, took a more moderate line vis-à-vis immigration than other european radical right parties. this was rather surprising given its fascist heritage and given that research has consistently demonstrated that its membership expresses deep concerns over immigration (ignazi, 343). to be sure, the msi, and later on an, did not completely ignore immigration. during the 1990s there was a consistent attempt to link immigration with crime and with illegal immigration. an officials and members have also participated in anti-immigrant protests at the local level. however, there is a general consensus among scholars that an left considerable space for other political forces to exploit and politicize immigration. there is little question that most successful attempts to politicize immigration came from the lega nord. throughout the 1990s, but especially after 1996, the lega review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 25 nord’s objections to immigration and the radicalization of its anti-immigrant discourse took advantage of the reluctance of alleanza nazionale to politicize immigration.3 employing la nouvelle droits’ “right to difference,” the lega defends what it perceives to be the right of cultures to protect themselves from external invasion. the party defends cultural identity, security, and the right of locals to prioritize their own needs such as work, housing, and access to social services over the needs of foreigners. the martelli and the turco-napolitano immigration laws were target by the lega for being too liberal and too lenient. what about political forces within civil society? how have they reacted, and how did they assist in politicizing immigration? as mentioned earlier, in the 1980s most italians were either indifferent or they demonstrated minimal fear of immigration. proimmigrant forces, such as the left-wing immigrant advocacy associations and catholic organizations exerted their hegemony over immigration within civil society. however, beginning in the 1990s, fear and apprehension of immigrants began to increase. della porta points out that “particularly after 1992, the public discourse on immigration came to be dominated by the links between immigration and crime.” she emphasizes that, “in many large cities, above all in the center-north, committees of citizens mobilized around the theme of crime, connecting it to that of illegal immigration.” highlighting the potential for immigration to develop into a non-partisan and a cross class and cross party 3 piero ignazi, correctly, emphasizes that “alleanza nazionale is no longer the italian exponent of rightwing extremism. in the last decade it has been moving with increasing speed over the last few years, towards moderate-conservative territory.” he continues: “the void left by an has been occupied by the lega nord. the lega’s more and more aggressive statements and demonstrations against foreigners and especially muslim immigrants contrast with the soft attitude adopted by alleanza nazionale. even if the two leaders have co-signed a new and quite restrictive law on immigration— but one not so different from other regulations recently enforced in europe— alleanza nazionale did not play the race card.” piero ignazi, “the extreme right: legitimation and evolution on the italian right wing: social and ideological repositioning of alleanza nazionale and the lega nord, south european society and politics, vol. 10, no. 2 july 2005, 348. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 26 issue, della porta emphasizes that these social protests were supported not only by the poor and the disenfranchised but by a wide-cross section of society (della porta, 121-4). i have emphasized how the rise of the lega nord and the emergence of antiimmigrant protests within civil society contributed to the politicization of immigration. immigration became a particularly volatile issue given the nature of employment and migration within the era of post fordism. these developments are important for several reasons. immigration became linked with crime and issues of law and order. immigration emerged as a cross party issue. and finally, the successful politicization of immigration highlights the failure of legislation to regularize and legalize immigration. these developments become particularly poignant given the precarious, seasonal, and often illegal nature of current immigration flows. a new immigration law for italy: immigration, exclusion, and integration there is no doubt that these growing concerns over immigration would prove vital for subsequent immigrant legislation. however, until 1998 these developments did not substantively influence governing attitudes towards immigration policy. rather, it could be argued that immigration policy was becoming increasingly comprehensive and progressive. this appeared to be the case especially after the olive tree won the 1996 national elections. although, the martelli law (1990) was a step forward from law 943 (1986), it still did not adequately address work quotas and civil and social rights for immigrants. it became immediately apparent to the new government that it needed to update the martelli law. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 27 in the initial process of drafting the immigration legislation, the unions, left-wing immigrant advocacy groups, and catholic organizations were influential in pushing for measure that would encourage legalization and integration of immigrants. however, as the drafting of the legislation progressed other forces began to exert and influence the policy process, demanding a more legalistic approach in order to control illegal immigration. external pressure from the european union demanded more control of illegal immigration in order for italy to comply with the schengen accord. domestically, local mayors— influenced by a growing fear of immigration and perceived links to crime— pushed for stronger law and order provisions. the center-left was caught in a dilemma: it needed to respond to coalition forces on the left of the olive tree, and left wing social movements, which can be characterized by a position of solidarity with immigrants. and it was also pressured by local and international pressures that focused on law and order (zincone 2002 and di gregorio, 22-7). the defeat of the left in the 1999 bologna mayor elections demonstrated that the left’s fear that more and more center-left voters were open to a center-right discourse of law and order were not completely unfounded. the city of bologna, within the “red” region of emilia-romagna, was an infamous communist stronghold. although immigration and crime were not the only election issue, the historic defeat of the left in the bologna municipal elections can be attributed to public perceptions that the right was better at addressing issues such as immigration, crime, and law and order.4 4 gianfranco baldini and guido legnante, “the municipal elections of 1999 and the ‘defeat’ of the left in bologna,” in mark gilbert and gianfranco (eds.) pasquino italian politics: the faltering transition, (new york: berghahn books, 2000), 76 recent studies of attitudes towards immigrants by center-left voters, further demonstrate, that these fears were not completely unfounded. for example, zanier, in a study of pds and msi voters in bologna, argues that the left is potentially vulnerable to the discourse of the right, especially as it relates to immigration. making an important distinction between explicit and implicit review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 28 the turco-napolitano immigration law was finally passed in 1998. the turconapolitano law targeted better planning of entry flows. it increased measures against illegal immigrants and criminal exploitation of immigrants by human traffickers. and finally, it increased integration measures. the law also has “a range of social measures, with better administrative coordination and more financial resources, covering health, education, assistance to minors, and to women (hine, 187-8).” although it is necessary not to overestimate the influence that law and order issues and growing fear of immigration exerted on the new immigration law, there is no question that external pressure and the politicization of immigration played an important role in increasing penalties for trafficking and provisions that made it easier to expel illegal immigrants. the most important changes to the martelli law highlight the governments attempt to facilitate integration while not wanting to appear weak vis-à-vis illegal immigrants and law and order. for the first time in the evolution of italian immigration policy the decision process was influenced by deepening concerns over immigration, by the politicization of immigration by new social actors within civil society, and by radical right populist forces such as the lega nord. the 1998 immigration law must be viewed as an attempt to strike a compromise between the powerful lobby that supported the weak within society and the business associations that recognized the need for foreign workers and the demands of citizens, expressed in public opinion and local official, who called for more controls of illegal immigration (zincone 2002 and di gregorio, 27). two leading experts on italian racism, she points out that interviews with pds and msi voters confirms that right-wing voters, not surprisingly, were more fearful of immigrants, claiming that they threatened security, employment, and national identity. however, the author also, importantly, concludes that latent racism, especially among less educated and among non-party militants, was equally as prevalent on both the right and the left.4 this highlights the potential for an electoral dilemma for the left. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 29 immigration proclaim that the new law was better able to address issues of integration, the rights of immigrants in italy, while it also sets up more realistic quotas for granting work permits. however, not unlike recent trends in the rest of western europe, it also has strengthened provisions to control illegal immigration, simplifying the ability of the government to expel illegal residence (colombo and sciortino, 2003, 165). the center-right takes power: a dilemma for the right in 2001, the center-right coalition consisting of forza italia, alleanza nazionale, the lega nord, and the union of christian and center democrats (udc) won the national elections. they formed a coalition government (the coalition is referred to as the house of liberties). central to the center-right’s electoral victory, and to its subsequent immigration policy, was berlusconi’s inclusion of the lega nord into the coalition government. even though in the 2001 elections the lega secured just under 4% of the vote, it proved to be an important and influential force within the coalition, due, in part, to its special relationship with berlusconi. previous to the inclusion of the lega in the center-right coalition, leading up to the 2000 regional elections, immigration was not a central concern for either forza italia or its coalition partners zincone, 2002, 57). once the house of liberties formed the government, one of its first priorities was to change italy’s immigration law. however, this would not prove to be an easy task. on the right, the lega called for zero immigration, linking immigration with a radical islam and an unwanted multicultural society, which we have seen was not typical of all right of center parties. alleanza nazionale, positioned itself somewhere in the middle, linking immigration to crime, but also more aware that it was not possible to stop immigration. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 30 its position can be characterized as reluctant acceptance with an emphasis on integration (albertazzi and mcdonnell, 963). the other central actor was the coalition of center-right christian democratic forces. the christian democrats demanded an amnesty for domestic workers at a bare minimum, even though their ultimate goal was a general amnesty. this christian democratic position was, in part, due to pressures from catholic organizations, while it was also part and parcel of its humanitarian philosophy vis-à-vis immigration.5 the other important political forces that the government had to take into consideration were the national and the regional employer associations. entrepreneurial and employers associations were, of course, natural allies of the center-right. however, these associations often sharply disagreed with policy that would limit the ability to recruit and employ immigrant labour. for example, the influential venetian entrepreneurs publicly voiced their objections to the lega’s proposed attempts to limit immigration, claiming that cuts to immigration would severely hamper their ability to conduct business. rossi luciani, the leader of the venetian wing of confindustria (the national employers association) proclaimed that “the lack of a serious open immigration policy that is not based on demagogy puts at risk the very survival of the north-eastern economic system.” in particular, he was critical of the rigidity of the law, especially provisions that required workers to leave the country after losing their jobs. instead, he demanded an immigration policy that was more flexible and more suited for the current economic reality (guolo, 891). 5 for good a discussion on alleanza nazionale and immigration see: john w.p. veugelers and roberto chiarini, “the far right in france and italy: nativist politics and anti-fascism,” in shadows over europe : the development and impact of the extreme right in western europe, martin schain, aristide zolberg, and patrick hossay,( new york : palgrave macmillan, 2002) and jessika ter wal, “the discourse of the extreme right and its ideological implications: the case of the alleanza nazionale on immigration,” patterns of prejudice, vol. 34, no. 4, 2000. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 31 in february 2002, the new bossi-fini law was passed by the senate. the law was then presented to the parliament for discussion, finally becoming law on july 30, 2002. the bossi-fini law amended the turco-napolitano law in several important ways. it is now possible to receive a work permit only if the applicant first secures a job and a place of residence, and if the employer can guarantee return passage if the new arrival does not have work. non-eu citizens are no longer able to qualify for entrance visas in order to come to italy to seek employment. sponsoring a person without a preimmigration job in italy is also no longer possible. instead, entry into italy is only possible if an employer, through one of the newly created local immigration centers, puts in a specific request for a specific quantity of workers and/or a type of worker, or for a specific individual. as soon as the work permit runs out, the person, if he or she does not find a new job, must return home (colombo and sciortino, 204-10). much to the public disappointment of the lega, a general amnesty was achieved. here the christian democrats achieved their goal. however, in exchange it was also declared that immigrants would be fingerprinted and that the navy would be used to patrol the coast for illegal immigrants. exchanging the latter two amendments to the bossi-fini law for the general amnesty was as much about appearing tough on immigration as it was about tangible control of migration (colombo and sciortino, 211). in the final analysis, the center-right coalition also needed to address a series of contradictory pressures exerted by political parties within the coalition and by political and social forces within civil society. the bossi-fini law was a compromise between two political parties on opposite sides of the immigration issue: on the one side, the lega pushed for stricter immigration controls, while, on the other, there were the christian review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 32 democratic voices that demanded the legalization of illegal immigrants with permanent employment. to be sure, these political parties were not immune to pressures from civil society. pressure was put on the house of liberties by demonstrations demanding zero tolerance towards immigrants (often organized by the lega nord), by catholic associations who supported the rights of immigrants, and by business associations that needed immigrant labour. immigration and exclusion: towards an electoral dilemma? discussions concerning immigration, integration, exclusion, and multiculturalism have developed into a divisive election issue for political parties across western europe on both the left and the right. political and economic transformations have precipitated changes from the previous “client” based model that dominated the post war fordist era to a politicized post-fordist model. as i have argued in this paper, in the case of italy’s attempt to develop public policy to confront the challenges involved in becoming an immigrant receiving society, conflicting tensions exist within the left and right concerning immigration as it relates to law and order, integration, employment, and national identity. the 1998 turco-napolitano law and the 2002 bossi-fini law highlight the internal divisions and competing forces that have influenced immigration policy. however, to date, the center-left and the center-right coalitions have been able to hold together despite these internal tensions. moreover, to date, it is also important to emphasize that left wing legislation remains more progressive towards issues of integration and cultural recognition, despite law and order pressures. right-wing laws have emphasized law and order issues, despite demands and pressures by business and review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 33 catholic associations to accept more immigrants. although competing forces within the left and the right have influenced immigration policy, these forces have not destroyed the unity of either side. the larger question for european politics is whether similar tensions exist in other countries. although further research is required to answer this question, a cursory examination does point to the potential for a similar electoral dilemma vis-à-vis immigration among parties of the left and the right across western europe. to be sure, currently in france the left is vulnerable to issues of immigration and law and order. the french communist party in the early 1980s anticipated these developments with the now infamous attempts by local communist mayors to tear down housing meant for immigrant workers (rydgren,163-172). these early attempts by the french communists to exploit immigration have been superseded by the large numbers of working class voters that currently support jean-marie le pen and the national front. similar dilemmas exist in austria where immigration has mobilized large working class constituencies to support the austrian freedom party through out the late 1990s, leading up to the controversial 1999 elections when jörg haider’s party was included in the governing coalition. more comparative analysis is needed. however, it does appear that similar tensions exist within the left and the right in other european countries. the question is whether these tensions will be exploited. western europe is currently a prime landing destination for migrants. issues of integration, exclusion, and multiculturalism challenge the very identity of europe. the degree to which the left and the right will be able to review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 34 overcome its own internal contradictions on this issue will affect how the continent as a whole is able to confront these profound changes. bibliography albertazzi, daniele and mcdonnell, duncan. (2005) “the lega nord in the second berlusconi government: in a league of its own,” west european politics. volume 28, issue 5, november. baldini, gianfranco and legnante, guido. (2000) “the municipal elections of 1999 and the ‘defeat’ of the left in bologna,” in mark gilbert and gianfranco (eds.) pasquino italian politics: the faltering transition, new york: berghahn books. calavita, kitty. (2004) “italy: economic realities, political fictions, and policy failures,” in wayne a. cornelius, tsuda takeyuki, philip l. martin, and james hollified, (eds.) controlling immigration: a global perspective, stanford: stanford university press. colombo, asher and sciortino, giuseppe. (2003) “the bossi-fini law: explicit fanaticism, implicit moderation, and poisoned fruits,” in j. blondel, p. segatti, (eds.) italian politics, new york: berghahn books. della porta, donatella. (1996) “immigration and protest: new challenges for italian democracy,” south european society & politics volume 5, issue 3, winter. freeman, gary p. (1995) “modes of immigration politics in liberal democratic state,” international migration review, winter (29). guolo, renzo. (2002). “immigrazione, etnicismo, crescita zero. la lega e il nord est,” il mulino, (403). hine, david. (2002). “drafting the 1998 legislation on immigration: a test of government cohesion,” in david hine and salvatore vassallo (eds.) italian politics: the return of politics, new york: berghahn books. ignazi, piero. (2005) “the extreme right: legitimation and evolution on the italian right wing: social and ideological repositioning of alleanza nazionale and the lega nord, south european society and politics, vol. 10, no. 2 july. king, russell. (2001) “the troubled passage: migration and cultural encounters in southern europe,” in russell king (ed.) mediterranean passage: migration and new cultural encounters in southern europe, liverpool: liverpool university press. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 35 kriesi, hanspeter. (1999) “movements of the left, movements of the right: putting the mobilization of two new types of social movements into political context,” in herbert kitschelt, peter lange, gary marks, john d. stephens (eds.) continuity and change in contemporary capitalism, new york: cambridge university press. kitschelt, herbert. (1997) “party systems: continuity and change,” in martin rhodes, paul heywood, and vincent wright (eds.) developments in west european politics, houndmills, basingstoke, uk: macmillan. macioti, maria immacolata and pugliese, enrico. (2003) l’esperienza migratoria: immigrati e rifugiati in italia, roma: editori laterza. perlmutter, ted. (1996) “brining parties back in: comments on ‘modes of immigration politics in liberal democratic societies,” international migration review. volume 30, issue 1, spring. pugliese, enrico. (1995)“new international migrations and the “european fortress,” in costis hadmimchalis and david sadler (eds.) europe at the margins: new mosaics of inequality, john wiley & sons: new york. pugliese, enrico. (1993) “restructuring of the labour market and the role of third world migrations in europe,” society and space, 11 (4). reyneri, emilio. (2004) “immigrants in a segmented and often undeclared labour market,” journal of modern italian studies, 9(1). sartori, giovanni. (1976) parties and party systems: a framework for analysis, cambridge, uk: cambridge university press. rydgren, jens. (2005) the populist challenge: political protest and ethno-nationalist mobilization in france, new york: bergham books. schain, martin. (1989) "immigration and changes in the french party system," european journal of political research, vol. 16, january. sciortino, giuseppe and colombo, asher (2004) “the flows and the flood: the public discourse on immigration in italy, 1969-2001,” journal of modern italian studies 9(1). sciortino, giuseppe. (1998) “the albanian crisis: social panic and italian foreign policy”, in l. bardi, m. rhodes, (eds.) italian politics. mapping the future, westview: boulder. sniderman, paul m., peri, pierangelo, de figueiredo, j.p. rui and piazza, thomas. (2000) the outsider: prejudice and politics in italy princeton, nj: princeton university press. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 36 veugelers, john w.p. (1994) “recent immigration policy in italy: a short story,” west european politics 17/2. veugelers, john w.p. and chiarini, roberto. (2002) “the far right in france and italy: nativist politics and anti-fascism,” in martin schain, aristide zolberg, and patrick hossay (eds.) shadows over europe : the development and impact of the extreme right in western europe, new york: palgrave macmillan. woods, dwayne. (1993) “the immigration question in italy," in stephen hellman and g. pasquino, (eds.) italian and politics: a review, new york: st. martin's press. zanier, maria letizia. (2002) “destra e sinistra di fronte agli immigrati: identità politica o conflitto di interessi?” in asher colombo and giuseppe sciortino (eds.) stranieri in italia: assimilati ed esclusi, bologna: il mulino. zincone, giovanna and di gregorio, luigi. (2002) “the immigration policy process in italy: an integrated scheme of interpretation,” paper presented at the international and european forum of migration research, workshop: immigration policies: between center and peripheries, nation states and the eu, turin, 22-27 march. zincone, giovanna. (2002) “immigrazione,” in francesco tuccari (ed.) il governo berlusconi: le parole, i fatti, i rischi roma: editori laterza, 2002. microsoft word lyubov zhyznomirska_ externalities of the eu immigration and asylum policy the case of ukraine.doc review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 2/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved …………………………………………………………… externalities of the eu immigration and asylum policy: the case of ukraine lyubov zhyznomirska abstract since the 1990s, the eu has been gradually transferring to neighbouring countries parts of the burden of securing its internal order from illegal migrants, terrorists, criminal groups and other “threats.” it has done so using policy transfers and foreign relations mechanisms. the european union, seeking to create an “area of freedom, security, and justice” in the region, exports the burden of migration management to its neighbouring countries and thus creates security threats – if not real then perceived – for these countries. the case of ukraine demonstrates that eu policies of shifting the burden of international migration management to its neighbours can destabilize the societal security of countries that lack the experience and instruments to effectively deal with migration. rather than shifting the burden of responsibility to the neighbouring states, the eu should prioritize co-operation and assistance to expand the area of freedom, justice and security on the european continent. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 2/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 29 introduction the securitization of migration in the european union (eu) since the 1980s has received a great deal of attention from scholars (see huysmans, 2000; mitsilegas et al., 2003; tsoukala, 2005; wœver et al., 1993; wœver, 1996). from nationalists to welfare chauvinists, immigrants are blamed for undermining national unity, ethnic purity, and social cohesiveness, and for abusing social security programs. the securitization of migration (understood as the discursive construction of migration as a security issue in political discourse) and a depiction of immigration as a threat to the eu societies have provoked confusions between immigrants and asylum-seekers, as well as between legal and illegal immigrants.1 more recently, the figure of “the foreigner” has been associated, through security discourse, with islamic fundamentalism and the threat of terrorism. such discursive linkages have caused a highly defensive and exclusive approach to european migration management in which an emphasis is placed on control (both internal and external), policing, surveillance, and containment.2 faced with difficult decisions in managing migration, european governments have sought international cooperation on the issue. the eu migration regime, created through harmonization of immigration and asylum policies among member-states, can be understood as an “entirety of formal and informal directives, regulations, practices, and conventions adopted at the level of eu institutions that regulate the movement of persons across borders and the entry and stay of non-eu nationals in 1 in this paper, i use the concept ‘migration’ in its general meaning as the movement of people from one country or locality to another. consequently, the concept ‘migrant’ generally denotes the categories of “people on the move” – immigrants, asylum-seekers, and refugees. in particular cases, the terms ‘immigrant’ and ‘asylum-seeker’ are used. 2 immigrants are portrayed as “security threats” whose control necessitates harmonized and strict identity controls at eu borders and beyond. bort calls this strategy a “spatial approach to security and control” (2005: 64). review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 2/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 30 the common territory” (lavenex and uçarer, 2003: 3). such a regime, it has been argued, affects policy-making in the union’s member-states, candidate states, and non-candidate states. since the 1990s, the european union has gradually been transferring the burden of securing its internal order from illegal immigrants, terrorists, criminal groups, and other “threats” to its neighbouring countries using policy transfers and foreign relations mechanisms. as a result, the eu’s neighbours have been under pressure to adopt policies and institutions that would secure eu borders and control its unwanted immigration (lavenex and uçarer 2003, 2004).3 hence, the union’s internal security measures have been transferred to the external relations framework. this paper focuses on how the eu policies on immigration and asylum, as well as intensified co-operation among member-states in the area of justice and home affairs (jha), have been producing external policy effects on non-member states. my argument is that the eu, seeking to create an “area of freedom, security, and justice,” exports the burden of migration management to its neighbouring countries and thus creates security risks – if not real then perceived – for the countries to the east of the european union. the eu migration regime is extended to bordering countries which are turned into gate-keepers to protect ‘fortress europe’ from illegal immigrants. these states must also share the burden of asylum-seekers with the eu. through an examination of the case study of ukraine, i will show that european policies of shifting the responsibility of international migration management to other countries can 3 european neighbourhood policy, presented by the european commission in its communications “wider europe – neighbourhood: a new framework for relations with our eastern and southern neighbours” (march 2003) and “european neighbourhood policy: strategy paper” (may 2004), explicitly emphasize the importance of reaching the union’s goals in the area of justice and home affairs through cooperation with and assistance to the eu neighbouring countries. in the enp strategy paper, the commission says: “the enp can also help the union’s objectives in the area of justice and home affairs, in particular in the fight against organized crime and corruption, money laundering and all forms of trafficking, as well as with regard to issues related to migration. it is important for the eu and its partners to aim for the highest degree of complementarity and synergy in the different areas of cooperation” (commission, 2004: 6). review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 2/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 31 destabilize the societal security of those countries that lack experience and the institutional capacity to effectively deal with international migration. transit countries frequently do not have the infrastructure, resources, or the juridical norms and institutions necessary to guarantee the protection and security of immigrants and asylum-seekers. this results in the securitization of immigration as a way to attract resources to deal with the problem. co-operation and assistance, rather than the off-loading of responsibility onto the neighbouring states, should be a priority for the eu if the area of freedom, security and justice is to be shared on the european continent. after the may 2004 enlargement, ukraine became a new eastern neighbour of the eu. as it is both a sending and a transit country for migrants, its case is interesting to explore. moreover, as much attention in the literature on europeanization and the effects of eu enlargement has been devoted to the study of member-states or candidate countries, it is worth exploring what effects eu governance has produced in the neighbouring non-accession countries. in this paper, the term ‘europeanization’ is used as in grabbe (2006) to denote the eu’s impact on states, not bilateral pressures between them. i maintain that ‘europeanization’ encompasses “securitization” because among the “externalities” of eu integration and enlargement is the generalization of the eu’s security concerns – at least as these are perceived by the dominant groups in policy-making of the european union. in the next section, i briefly sketch the changing nature of member-states’ cooperation on immigration and asylum issues. in section three, i review the existing literature on the externalities of the eu migration regime. my analysis supports lavenex and uçarer’s (2004) argument that the eu common policies develop external dimensions. these may take the form of changes in policy or institutional practices within non-member states ranging from fully review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 2/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 32 voluntary to constrained adaptation. this review is followed by the case study of ukraine, presented in section four. european union cooperation on immigration and asylum with the end of the cold war, symbolic openings of borders – through the dismantling of the berlin wall and the lifting of the iron curtain – created the potential for greater mobility of peoples from ex-soviet countries across now international borders. at the same time, there was a shift in the attitudes of the western public and governments to the issue of international migration (i.e. from the politics of protection to the politics of containment), accompanied by the discourse of asylum abuse and the impossibility of differentiating between political and economic migrants. growing anti-immigrant sentiments were galvanized and brought into the political arena by extreme right parties in a majority of the european countries (e.g., austria, belgium, france, denmark, italy). the end of the cold war also brought about new dimensions in security discourse. state security, usually described in military terms, was challenged, and complemented by collectiveor individual-based approaches, placing greater emphasis on human security. the growing perception of population displacement as an economic and social security threat to the international order amounted to a new security paradigm in the management of international migration. the discourse on migration has been highly securitized placing immigrants – both refugees and economic migrants – into the category of ‘security threats’. the beginning of cooperation among eu member-states on the issue of immigration-assecurity can be traced back to the mid-1980s.4 the single european act (1986) aimed to achieve 4 lavenex and uçarer (2003) and geddes (2003) mention that since the 1970s, member-states have cooperated on review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 2/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 33 freedom of movement for goods, capital and labour within the european community (ec), and it reaffirmed the member-states’ commitment to establish a single european market, that necessitated the creation of a common security regime. the schengen agreement, signed in 1985 by five ec countries (france, west germany, belgium, luxembourg, and the netherlands), was drafted to eliminate internal border checks between the signatory states. order and security were to be reconciled with freedom of movement for eu nationals and third-country nationals legally residing in the territory of a member-state by means of increased and improved coordination among the police, customs and the judiciary of the signatory eu states and third countries. the eu external borders were to be strengthened through the sharing of best practices of border checks and surveillance, the provision of common training and education for border personnel, and the introduction of measures necessary to combat terrorism and organized crime, illegal migration, and trafficking in goods and human beings. the schengen information system (sis) was introduced to share information on asylum claims, illegal migrants, and any other required information. the fortification and increased policing of external borders was justified on the grounds that threats were emanating from organized crime, terrorists, illegal migrants, and traffickers of drugs, goods, and humans. similarly, immigration was criminalized by linking the entry of illegal immigrants into the eu with the cross-border activities of organized crime networks. european governments sought to cooperate on border control and illegal entry measures, framing them as collaboration on internal security (see mitsilegas et al., 2003; bowsell, 2003). internal security measures. the trevi group was formed to discuss state responses to terrorism, but through the 1980s, it provided a forum for additional discussion between the member-states on issues of eu integration. geddes points out that the trevi group “provided a ‘security’ frame into which migration issues were inserted” after they appeared on the political agenda in the late 1980s (2003: 130). review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 2/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 34 accordingly, immigration policy was a national prerogative from 1957 to 1986 (geddes, 2003). the next period (1986-1993) was characterised by informal inter-governmental cooperation with confidential negotiations held behind closed doors, outside of the institutional framework of the eu. in 1990, the dublin convention was drafted and negotiated, introducing new asylum processing measures and the ‘safe third country’ status, allowing the negotiation of readmission agreements with third countries. in geddes’ view, the dublin convention facilitated the “off-loading” of responsibility for managing migration to “a central and eastern european ‘buffer zone’” (2003: 136). approved measures on asylum processing had a significant effect on central and eastern european countries that had to adapt these measures as one of the requirements for eu membership, without being able to partake in the negotiation process and with no option to opt out. thus, the dublin convention turned these countries into “buffer zones” that were created to control migration and absorb immigrants from the eu; asylumseekers entering the eu from these ‘safe countries’ could be returned back in accordance with readmission agreements. security-centred measures to combat immigration were prevalent during this period, resulting in highly restricted access to the european space for those who were unwanted. since 1993, the member-states have started formal intergovernmental cooperation on asylum and immigration policies. the maastricht treaty (1992) established an intergovernmental pillar dealing with justice and home affairs (jha), as well as the common foreign and security policy (cfsp). the maastricht treaty recognized the issues of common concern for the eu member-states, such as: asylum policy; external frontiers; immigration policy and policy regarding third-country nationals (tcns); conditions of tcns’ entry and movement within the review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 2/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 35 eu; and combat against unauthorized immigration, residence, and work by tcns (geddes, 2003: 135). the 1997 treaty of amsterdam declared the eu “an area of freedom, security and justice” and created a directorate-general for justice and home affairs (ceu 1999b, art. 2, referred to in lindstrøm, 2005: 591). the treaty incorporated the schengen acquis as part of the eu legal framework under a separate title iv. the amsterdam treaty also stipulated that applicant countries must accept schengen acquis in full and conferred the authority for negotiating readmission agreements to the european commission. an essential step forward in the development of a common approach was the first european council meeting on justice and home affairs in tampere in 1999. the summit meeting of heads of government called for a common approach to asylum and migration issues with an emphasis on partnership with countries of origin and transit of migrants, improved and effective asylum measures, and fair treatment for third country nationals who legally reside in the member-states. it was agreed to incorporate standard readmission clauses as a part of all association and cooperation agreements concluded with third countries. since then, in its international cooperation, the eu has focused, on the one hand, on the development and implementation of common policies and approaches to deal with justice and home affairs (jha), and, on the other hand, on “cooperation with migrant-sending or transit countries to control, contain or prevent migration and refugee flows” (boswell, 2003: 99). the hague programme (2004) has further developed the common management of migration, the setting up of a common asylum regime, the equitable treatement of the third-country nationals, and the partnership with third countries in managing migration. the european commission and member-states have focused on the development of eu review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 2/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 36 policies to halt immigration (internal security) and to eliminate the root causes of immigration through external policies of assistance and humanitarian aid (external security). the european commission (2004) emphasized prevention as a viable option for addressing the causes of immigration and forced displacement through development assistance and humanitarian relief efforts and through bilateral agreements with immigrant-sending, refugee-producing, and transit countries. lindstrøm’s interpretation is that “current policy methods and instruments work to establish legitimacy for the denial of protection and the conclusion of readmission agreements, with a view to shifting responsibility away from the european territorial core” (2005: 588). bowsell (2003), in turn, distinguishes three types of policy goals which european national governments are pursuing through international cooperation in the realm of international migration: 1) control of illegal entry and human trafficking; 2) “burden-sharing”, and; 3) migration prevention. while european governments have been working to harmonize their immigration and asylum policies in order to distribute responsibilties for illegal migrants and asylum-seekers between member-states, in their relations with third countries the eu and member-states have been mainly focused on border control and law enforcement issues. lindstrøm has characterized these practices this way: “migration control and law enforcement may be described as having been outsourced to third countries in exchange for intensified trade and development cooperation” (2005: 592). this characterization is accurate in light of the new european neighbourhood policy and the development of bilateral agreements and action plans with each of the neighbourhood countries because conditionality and assistance have become the main tools in bilateral relations. the external dimension of maintaining the eu’s “area of review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 2/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 37 freedom, security and justice” has become increasingly important in eu governance.5 the externalities of the eu immigration and asylum policy european integration is strongly founded on the idea of common security – political, economic, and cultural. viewing immigrants as a threat to the existing european social order has resulted in a highly defensive and exclusive approach to european security in which emphasis is placed on control (both internal and external) and policing. as well, governments fear having border controls less stringent than their neighbours, lest their countries become attractive destinations for refugees and illegal immigrants (lindstrøm, 2005). van selm (2005) observes that the movement of people across geo-political frontiers can be viewed either as strengthening or weakening regional security. in the case of the eu, we see that the movement by eu nationals within the european union is not subjected to the same degree of critical scrutiny or suspicion as the entry into the eu space by non-nationals.6 nationalist-populist discourse has associated “non-european” immigrants, in particular, with a host of societal risks, from increasing unemployment to terrorism. member-states press neighbouring countries to increase surveillance 5 as an example, a strategy on the external dimension of the area of freedom, security and justice was developed by the european commission in october 2005 at the request of the european council of 16-17 june 2005, as a part of the hague programme aimed at strengthening freedom, security and justice in the european union. according to this strategy, cooperation with third countries on migration, asylum and border management is among the top political priorities of the eu (commission, 2005a). further, the commission has developed the thematic programme for the cooperation with third countries in the areas of migration and asylum (january 2006) “to provide support for third countries so that they can better manage migratory flows” (commission, 2006). funding of this programme will be allocated to eligible countries taking into account respect for democratic principles and the rule of law and records on human and minority rights. 6 one can argue that even intra-regional migration in the eu can be considered negative when people see “the migration of the european citizens as a threat, when they perceive job ‘stealing’ taking place, or migration for primarily tax and social security purposes” (van selm, 2005: 13). the recent rhetoric of the eu members regarding the freedom of movement of nationals from newly admitted cee countries is worth mentioning, as well. although these people became new eu citizens, they, evidently, cannot fully enjoy the rights and freedoms of movement of other eu citizens without being ‘tested’ and ‘constrained’ for a while – at least two years. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 2/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 38 and control of borders in order to guard the european “area of freedom, security, and justice.” such a situation might cause the transit and buffer zones to receive larger amounts of labour migrants and asylum-seekers wishing to enter the eu. a convincing account of the externalities of the eu migration regime has been suggested by lavenex and uçarer (2004). drawing on the literature on europeanization and policy transfer, these authors argue that eu immigration policies produce external effects on non-eu states that deal with the union. although europeanization has been narrowly defined as “the impact of european integration at the national level of the member-states (knill and lehmkul, 2002: 255), its dynamics can also be extended to states other than eu member states in so far as they refer to ‘a process of change in national institutional and policy practices that can be attributed to european integration’” (hix and goetz, 2000: 27; cited in lavenex and uçarer, 2004: 419). as the european union has significantly increased its image and influence in the international arena, it is now involved in institutional cooperation with many other states. as a result, eu immigration policies have implications for destination countries of asylum-seekers and immigrants, as well as for the countries of their origin and transit. the question then is: how can we determine that changes happening in the policies of non-member states can be attributed to european integration and/or pressures from the eu? as lavenex and uçarer (2004) suggest, eu policies can be designed intentionally to have external effects on third countries (i.e. to purposefully export common policies through bilateral or multilateral agreements). they may also reflect “unintended consequences of other intentional activities” and cause the extension of eu policies to the countries with which the union review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 2/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 39 co-operates (2004: 420). in turn, another important dimension is whether the effects in third countries occur because of states’ voluntary action or a coerced adaptation and change.7 lavenex and uçarer suggest, from an institutionalist perspective, that non-member states’ established institutional linkages with the european union “indicate the content and scope of [policy] transfer intended on the part of the eu” (2004: 423). these linkages correspond to the geographic proximity of a country to the eu, and determine the scope of externalities felt by each country.8 eu policies directed at the management of migration flows will necessarily affect both the countries of destination and the countries of origin of the migrants: changes in the immigration policy of one country have implications for the immigration policy of other countries: a more permissive policy may lead to a reduction of immigration flows in neighbouring countries, while a more restrictive policy may increase the number of migrants seeking entry in other countries. ... both the territorial scope of the eu and its importance as a major destination for voluntary and forced migrants imply that common policies aiming at the extension or reduction of immigrant inflows will necessarily have implications for other countries, both countries of destination and of origin (lavenex and uçarer, 2004: 425). as has been suggested in the europeanization literature (see grabbe, 2003; grabbe, 2006; schimmelfennig and sedelmeier, 2005), a country’s aspiration to eu membership provides the european union with significant leverage for the transfer of european rules, norms, and policies, as well as for the shaping of that country’s administrative and institutional structures. as the negotiations on the membership of the newly admitted ten central and eastern european countries (ceecs) showed, the european commission was able to use membership status as the 7 lavenex and uçarer “distinguish between four forms of policy adaptation and transfer: adaptation through unilateral emulation, adaptation through externalities, and two forms of policy transfer through conditionality, one where the changes fit the domestic interests, and one when the latter occur under pressure” (2004: 420 21). 8 according to lavenex and uçarer (2004), there are five types of institutional affiliation with non-eu countries based on the types of associational agreements: 1) close association (norway and switzerland); 2) accession association (central and eastern europe); 3) pre-accession association (turkey and balkan countries); 4) neighbourhood association (ukraine, russia, moldova, maghreb countries); and 5) loose association (the african, caribbean and pacific countries). review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 2/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 40 “carrot” in protecting its interests. the eu frequently used conditionality as a strategy of reinforcement by reward to induce compliance (schimmelfennig and sedelmeier, 2005). grabbe (2006), however, suggests that in cases where the european institutions and governments were undecided and ambivalent on how to proceed in negotiations, the ceecs were able to use these inconsistencies to lessen the effect of the eu’s accession conditionality and proceed with their interests.9 while conditionality played a great role in the european commission’s negotiation with the acceding ceecs, its effects were less significant in the case of ex-soviet countries, or the commonwealth of independent states (cis). as both grabbe (2006) and kelley (2006) observe, the eu’s conditionality has not been successful and worked only partially in the cis where domestic politics determined a major cause of whether eu values and norms have been adopted. in the case of the current neighbouring states (moldova, belarus, russia, and ukraine), where association agreements cannot yet be put on the table for discussion, the eu does not have the same leverage to impose its internal policy agenda. the european neighbourhood policy (enp), however, was designed to “take the opportunity offered by enlargement to enhance relations with its neighbours on the basis of shared values” and “to avoid drawing new dividing lines in europe and to promote stability and prosperity within and beyond the new borders of the union” (commission, 2003). as kelley (2006) suggests, the european commission, viewing enlargement as the most succesful eu foreign policy, drafted the enp using the model – and 9 although the schengen acquis have to be fully implemented before a new member can enjoy all four freedoms of movement, some of the ceecs were able to negotiate the gradual adoption of these acquis. while visa regulations and border control mechanisms were adopted by the candidate countries by the accession date, all the rest of the schengen acquis should be implemented by the date at which a country becomes a member of the schengen visa regime. newly admitted countries do not belong to the schengen visa regime yet. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 2/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 41 sometimes the content – of the previous accession agreements.10 yet, the fact that there is no promise of institutional association can be viewed as an attempt “to find a substitute for the leverage provided by the promise of membership” (lavenex, 2005: 105). the reality, nevertheless, is that following the last enlargement to the east, the eu now borders countries that are viewed as ‘soft’ security threats – as countries of both the origin and transit of illegal or irregular migrants, asylum-seekers, criminals, and drug and human traffickers. as these issues are at the core of the eu jha policy, cooperation with the neighbouring countries in this realm is important. the rest of this essay explores eu-ukraine cooperation on justice and home affairs, with particular attention to immigration and asylum issues. the externalization of international migration management: a case study of ukraine as was mentioned above, the case of ukraine is interesting and important to examine because ukraine is a country of transit for illegal immigrants and asylum-seekers and also a source of both legal and illegal immigrants. its close geographic location to the european union and the opening of borders since ukraine’s 1991 independence has turned the country into a transit area for illegal immigrants and asylum-seekers from africa, asia, and the middle east. on the other hand, socio-political transformations in this post-soviet country have liberalized its borders for the legal movement of people, and economic crises have pushed some ukrainians to 10 as kelley’s (2006) analysis of primary documents and interviews with commission officials, officials of enp countries, and human rights experts shows, “the commission’s conceptualization and development of the enp has drawn on multiple elements from the past enlargement experiences” (2006: 30). review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 2/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 42 seek jobs and earnings abroad. ukraine’s long and poorly guarded frontiers11 (with corrupt officials engaged in the illegal transportation of migrants) and the absence of readmission agreements with neighbouring countries make it a widely-used transit country (uehling, 2004; polyakov, 2004; icmpd, 2005). after the may 2004 enlargement ukraine’s western border has become the eastern frontier of the strictly guarded european schengen area. this, in turn, causes additional pressures created by the european union on ukraine to guard the european territory, as well as to keep the ukrainian territory in check.12 official statistics and estimates of the numbers of ukrainian migrants and transit nonukrainian migrants vary greatly. polyakov (2004: 18-19) points out that the number of illegal migrants transiting through ukraine and detained by ukrainian border guards has increased from 148 persons in 1991 to approximately 14,646 in 1999. polyakov mentions afghans, indians, and chinese among the most frequently detained groups. according to the 2004 migration report of the state committee on nationalities and migration, the number of people trying to cross ukrainian borders illegally in 2004 for migration purposes was 2,918 persons (of these: 610 chinese, 532 russians, and 319 georgians). the largest number (1548 persons) of illegal migrants was detained crossing the ukrainian-slovak border. elsewhere, 769 were arrested on the ukrainian-polish border and 391 on the ukrainian-russian border (dcnm, 2005). the report also mentions that, according to the ministry of internal affairs, 12,271 persons were 11 ukraine has a 103 km border with hungary, a 526 km border with poland, a 97 km border with slovakia, and a 169 km border to the south and a 362 km border to the west with romania. 12 according to malynovska (2006), during the soviet times, immigration into ukraine was prevalent over emigration and was predominantly composed of ex-soviet nationalities. in the early 1990s, the repatriation of nationalities that lived in the ex-soviet republics, as well as the inflow of refugees fleeing armed conflicts and civil wars in some post-soviet states, dominated the migration patterns. since the mid-1990s, the ethnic constitution of people immigrating to ukraine has changed in favour of those groups that had not historically resided there (i.e. ethnically and culturally different immigrants from asia, africa, and the middle east). review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 2/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 43 deported from ukraine in 2004. however, polyakov (2004) and pidluska (2001) refer to government estimates of illegal entrants as high as 35,000 to 50,000 per year. malynovska (2006), in turn, points out that between 1991 and 2003, ukrainian border-guards detained about 100,000 illegal migrants trying to cross ukraine’s western border.13 while it is hard to argue about the intention of people on the move, some studies (see uehling 2004) show that many illegal immigrants, detained crossing ukraine’s borders, had no intention to stay in ukraine. hence, this country is turned into a ‘buffer zone,’ through which routes for illegal migrants into the european union are laid. also, it becomes a space for stopping the illegal migrants and asylum-seekers unwanted in the eu.14 the european union-ukraine co-operation has been based on the following major agreements: the partnership and cooperation agreement (pca) of 14 june 1994; a common strategy on ukraine of december 1999; the eu-ukraine action plan on justice and home affairs (december 2001); and the eu-ukraine action plan (february 2005) adopted in the framework of the enp. both the pca (1994) and the common strategy on ukraine (1999) emphasize support for democratic and economic transition in ukraine, cooperation to ensure stability and security on the european continent, and increased political, economic, and cultural cooperation. the priorities of cooperation in the framework of the eu-ukraine action plan on justice and home affairs (2001) were determined at the ministerial level in 2002, with its progress 13 it is hard to predict the total number of illegal migrants when many of them enter the ukrainian territory legally but then violate their status and become illegal (i.e. without a proper documentation and allowance to stay). further, ukraine has no single government body responsible for all migration-related issues. rather, migration-related responsibilities are divided among eight executive agencies (polyakov, 2004). 14 vachudová (2000) suggests that the eu builds relationships with its southern and eastern neighbours on a basis of “proximity policy” that accounts for their political and strategic importance as trading partners and as european ‘buffer zones.’ review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 2/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 44 reflected in the scoreboard. as mentioned on the official web-site of the european commission: “this action plan [2001] seeks to impart on ukraine the principles inherent in the eu area of freedom, security and justice.” the co-operation between ukraine and the union on jha has focused on negotiating an eu-ukraine readmission agreement and better migration management, improving border management, judicial reform, implementing the rule of law, and eliminating organized crime and terrorism (commission, 2001). the 2001 action plan was incorporated as a part of the eu/ukraine action plan agreed upon in the framework of the enp in february 2005 (commission, 2005b). in the eu-ukraine co-operation, significant efforts are directed at the harmonization of legislation, maximization of government capacity, and promotion of cross-border cooperation. measures to “combat” illegal/irregular immigration have also received a great deal of attention. in the framework of the eu-ukraine action plan on jha (2001), ‘migration and asylum’ and ‘trans-border cooperation and visa policies’ were listed as two first areas of co-operation (see commission 2001). the eu and ukraine have closely cooperated on such issues as visa regulation, border management, irregular migration, asylum regulation, human trafficking, and return and readmission policies. ukraine, faced with the problem of migration management, adopted its first laws to control migration from ex-soviet countries and to regulate the status of citizens, foreigners, and persons without statehood in the early 1990s. in 1993, the ukrainian parliament, reacting to increasing number of asylum-seekers from the ex-soviet republics, passed the “law on refugees”. it was later replaced by a new law on refugees, which allowed ukraine to accede in january 2002 to the 1951 un convention on refugees and its 1967 protocol. in addition to that, review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 2/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 45 other major laws in the realm of migration management were adopted (e.g., “on immigration,” a new law “on citizenship”, the amendments to the law “on the legal status of foreigners”, “on the state borders of ukraine”). all these laws were adopted in full compliance with eu standards. according to chumak (2003), such convergence of the ukrainian law with the related european law on the management of legal migration was voluntary, but also necessitated by the communitarisation of the schengen acquis in 1999. in addition, some requirements (e.g. to improve the law on refuge and asylum issues; to establish a single governmental body responsible for migration-related issues; to improve border management) were stipulated as a part of the eu-ukraine action plan on jha. therefore, such policy transfer can be viewed as a mix of voluntary and involuntary adaptation by conditionality and as a response to the externalities of the eu migration policies.15 using the principle of conditionality, the european union has made a readmission agreement a prerequisite for ukraine to be granted a simplified visa regime for its citizens. as a country of the origin and transit of migrants, ukraine, evidently, will not benefit from signing such an agreement. nevertheless, it is forced to comply in order to get its reward – a simplified visa regime for its citizens. to lessen this conditionality, ukrainian government seeks the support of the european commission and governments to negotiate readmission agreements with its neighbours (policy emulation).16 and similarly to the newly accessed ceecs, because of its future prospect for european integration and its national interests and security, ukraine is willing 15 the european neighbourhood and partnership instrument (enpi) will replace such geographical assistance programmes as tacis and meda in 2007. it will be specifically “designed to target sustainable development and approximation to eu policies and standards” and will assist in implementing the european neighbourhood policy. 16 although ukraine has successfully signed such agreements with georgia and moldova, it has not been successful in completing such agreements with its biggest suppliers of illegal migrants – belarus, russia, china, and review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 2/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 46 to trade freedom of movement of its citizens for restrictive measure for citizens of those countries, which are on the eu’s “black” visa list. willing to join the eu, ukraine’s new pro-european leadership seeks to repair a relationship of mistrust that had developed as a result of ukraine’s inconsistency in democratizing and transforming the country since the 1990s. ukrainian authorities are focused on improving legislative base, strengthening border cooperation with neighboring countries, and improving the organizational and institutional framework for dealing with illegal immigration. more attention has been paid to increasing the state’s capacity in assisting individuals detained while transiting through ukraine. restrictive immigration measures, however, are on the rise, and detention and deportation are used by ukrainian authorities as the main policy instrument used to halt immigration (human rights watch, 2005). it is important to note that the securitization of immigration in europe has created a narrow understanding of immigration as a law enforcement issue (uehling, 2004; guiraudon, 2006). as a result, immigrants are perceived by the european public as posing societal risks. although the situation with immigrants in ukraine has not yet been thoroughly studied, the issue of immigration is also interpreted by some officials and bureaucrats as a “security concern.” polyakov (2004), for example, emphasizes the criminal nature of transit illegal immigrants and describes them as a significant challenge for ukraine: in general, growing illegal migration to ukraine contributes to the growth of criminality and corruption, and to overloaded social support systems and infrastructures. it threatens cultural identity and can bring social and ethnic tensions. it is not a fantasy any more to conclude that illegal migrants could well have terrorist backgrounds and intentions. in the end, the settling of illegal migrants in ukraine does uzbekistan. it aims to work out the agreement with russia before signing an agreement with the eu, as russian undemarcated borders with ukraine pose the largest concerns regarding illegal transit migration (icmpd, 2005). review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 2/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 47 not support economic development of the country (unlike the case of the european union, where cheap labor is in demand), and it generally threatens ukraine’s relationship with the eu in future (polyakov, 2004: 28).17 this very negative portrayal of a generalized “illegal” is not unique to ukraine. mass media frequently report stories on immigrants from asia and africa bringing unknown diseases and “exotic” religions and customs, or being involved in drugs or contraband business (pidluska, 2001; uehling, 2004). in its report, the state committee on nationalities and migration reports on crimes committed by illegal immigrants, threats to public health, and the number of detentions and administrative fines (dcnm, 2005). these claims have not been substantiated by actual research on the situations and activities of immigrants. uehling (2004) points out that xenophobic and discriminatory statements about asylum-seekers and refugees were made during her interviews in ukraine, even by state officials who deal with these groups. combined with its policies, the eu exports its social construction of immigrants as inherent “threats” who must be combatted, stopped at the borders, and deported. because immigration is dealt with on the level of justice and internal affairs officials, border guards, and policemen, the ukrainian public receives its information about immigrants from these law-andorder authorities. ukrainian officials, who co-operate with eu authorities in the area of migration and asylum management, learn and adopt both positive and negative practices for dealing with migration. they partake in the discursive construction and perception of an immigrant as a “threat” to ukrainian society, while no empirical evidence exists to prove or disprove the existence of such threats. concurrently, whereas the ukrainian state seeks the support of the european union in combating illegal migration throughout its territory, it portrays 17 interestingly enough, ukrainian immigrants, who are also frequently illegally present and employed in eu countries, are described by polyakov as workers who should be socially and legally protected. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 2/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 48 ukrainian labour migrants (either legal or illegal) as hard-working persons undergoing hardships abroad in order to provide for their families. such ‘doubled’ construction of ‘immigrants’ merits further study. evidently, it is not appropriate to consider ukraine a ‘blank page’ on which the eu discourse on immigration (hardly homogeneous but, nevertheless, heavily influenced by populist anti-immigrant rhetoric) is easily written. nonetheless, i would argue that eu practices and policies set models for other countries to follow. as for indigenous influences on the ukrainian national discourse on immigration, it should be remembered that ukraine is an immigrantsending country and it does not yet have a need for low-paid immigrant labour. unlike in western europe, immigration has not yet become “the” issue in electoral campaigns, and it is hardly debated by the ukrainian public.18 nevertheless, the ukrainian press has a tendency to mainly focus on negative aspects of immigration, connecting it to crime, drug use, and public health issues. this tendency would be rather interesting to account for by comparing mass media discourse with public attitudes towards immigrants and foreigners.19 in addition, political elites’ willingness to show ukraine’s ability to fight illegal migration leads politicians to focus on the association between immigration and “security threats”; little distinction is being made between asylum-seekers and economic immigrants. refugees and asylum-seekers pose a problem to the state because of the state’s lack of resources and institutional capacities to provide these people with the level of support to which ukraine has committed. 18 it should be mentioned, however, that in the 2006 parliamentary campaign in ukraine, some marginal extreme right parties, such as “freedom” and una-unso, did campaign using anti-immigrant slogans and attracting the public’s attention to the presence of “foreigners” and “occupants” in ukraine. it will be interesting to follow if and how these issues will develop into “the” topic on which electoral campaigns will be built in ukraine. 19 braichevs’ka et al. (2003) did interviews with local citizens and experts in kyiv, the capital of ukraine. their research showed that the majority of the kyivan population was not concerned about the arrival of immigrants from africa, asia, and the middle east. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 2/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 49 as human rights watch (2005) reports, ukraine – which accepts returnees from eu member-states and is now working on an eu-wide readmission agreement – violates the human rights of returned immigrants and asylum-seekers. there are no satisfactory institutional, legal, and material resources to guarantee the security of either illegal immigrants or genuine refugees and asylum-seekers, nor is the assistance from the eu adequate. because of ukraine’s aspiration to join the eu, it continues to accept returnees from the eu member-states. as the hrw research shows, there is hostility towards foreigners in ukraine, especially toward chechens and afghans who face discrimination and deportation, even when they have circumstances to become unhcr-recognized refugees. as mentioned above, a country’s aspiration to membership in the european union provides the latter with significant leverage for transferring rules, norms, and policies, as well as in shaping administrative and institutional structures (grabbe, 2003). although the local elites’ willingness to adapt domestic policy to eu requirements and priorities might be viewed as an effective strategy for accelerating association status, this strategy may also be viewed negatively because it displaces a more autonomous policy process, as well as alternative policy approaches. while the eu neighbourhood policy can be regarded as a process of bringing ukraine closer to the eu in terms of political and economic cooperation, the policy does not satisfy the ukrainian goals of association. the eu-ukraine action plan in the framework of the enp is not considered to be an adequate foundation for the development of eu-ukraine cooperation, as it does not acknowledge ukraine as an integral part of a united europe. rather, the enp is viewed as one of the strategies that will prepare ukraine for european integration and will allow it to enter into a qualitatively new legal framework of relationships with the eu. according to the minister of review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 2/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 50 foreign affairs of ukraine, borys tarasyuk, the enp should be replaced by the association agreement that will set clear perspectives for ukraine’s membership in the union.20 there is a clear divergence of interests between the eu and ukraine; while the eu wants ukraine to put resources into the policing of its western borders, ukraine is interested in demarcating and maintaining control of its eastern borders, which are the main access points for illegal migrants and criminal groups. at the same time, ukrainian authorities do not want to allow for new “curtains” or “walls” to be built on its western frontiers. for ukraine, the schengen acquis must mean not only border security, but also the opening of doors to europe for its citizens and businesses (i.e. special visa rules for ukrainian business persons, diplomats, politicians, academics, and students). the european union, especially the member-states from central and eastern europe, have similar interests. they want to avoid new dividing lines being erected across the borderland ethnic communities along the european external border, which, consequently, might challenge cross-border economic, cultural, and scientific exchanges. therefore, the cross-border co-operation programmes (introduced by the union to strengthen the eastern borders of the eu candidate countries and to establish regional partnership between accession countries and their neighbours) are beneficial both for the eu and ukraine. although “the neighbourhood association illustrates the limits of a strong unilateral approach favoring one-sided eu interests” (lavenex and uçarer, 2004: 434), the “joint ownership” of the action plans and individual approaches to each of the neighbours create a virtual space for dialogue and cooperation. nevertheless, the european neighbourhood and partnership instrument (enpi), that will replace such geographical assistance programmes as 20 such a position was vocalized by borys tarasyuk at the international conference “ukraine and european integration: challenges and opportunities” (kyiv, ukraine, 6 july 2006). review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 2/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 51 tacis and meda in 2007, will be specifically “designed to target sustainable development and approximation to eu policies and standards” and will assist in implementing the european neighbourhood policy (the enp web-site). its application will be tied to conditionality of democracy and human rights development. in this light, eu policy-transfer to neighbouring states that have or not legal framework for dealing with the flows of irregular migrants and organized crime groups seem inevitable if neighbours want to receive development assistance and grant funding. thus, the commission will receive additional leverage over the countries whose integration perspectives are questionable. further developments into how non-member and non-accession countries adapt to european integration will be interesting to follow, especially in light of the new environment of international security concerns and the debates about the future of the eu project. conclusions the management of eu external borders is greatly dependent on its integration and enlargement processes. the conceptualization of european identity, which accompanies the process of integration, and the conceptualization of threats that endanger security, either societal or state, determine the relationship of the eu and its member-states with their neighbouring countries. perceived “security threats” from immigrants create more anxiety and fear among the public as european frontiers come closer to the countries of origin of these “threats.” the securitization of immigrant flows and the discursive construction of immigrants as “criminals”, “bogus refugees”, or “intruders”, deprived of human faces and problems, takes away these people’s protection. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 2/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 52 the politics of containment practiced and promoted by the eu has both positive and negative effects. on the one hand, it allows countries in need to receive more substantial development assistance but, on the other hand, it takes away the right of people residing in those countries to seek asylum and a safer life in the european space. at the same time, the pressure that the eu puts on its neighbours to implement similar practices for securing frontiers impels the expansion of an immigration regime that is discriminatory and exclusionary towards new territories. new transit and buffer zone countries, which lack efficient institutional and infrastructural frameworks for dealing with illegal migration and crime groups, may face further societal disturbances if the problem of international migration is not adequately addressed by the international community. the enp framework and differential approach to every neighbouring country proposed by this policy has become an important platform for the eu’s co-operation with its neighbours. it will produce positive outcomes if the principles of mutual co-operation and material, technical, legal, and educational assistance to transit countries and the countries of origin of migrants are followed. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 2/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 53 bibliography bort, eberhard. 2005. “european borders in transition: the internal and external frontiers of the european union.” in holding the line: borders in a global world, eds. heather n. nicol and ian 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security strategy ruth hanau santini 1 abstract this paper looks at the qualitative change in the foreign policy discourse by the european union towards the middle east, as well as the eu’s overall degree of consistency between words and deeds. by looking at european council conclusions as well as general affairs council conclusions, it will be argued that on a discursive level the union has taken stock of the emergence of new threats to its security, and has started shifting its attention from state failure and regional conflicts to the threats posed by terrorism and non-conventional proliferation. secondly, by differentiating among three kinds of coherence, it will be shown that the main source of incoherence in the union external action in the middle east is not to be found in its institutional or horizontal dimensions, but in its vertical level, that is between the union and member states. examples will be provided in order to substantiate an overall claim: the eu security discourse might have changed; its policies however remain driven by the difficult balancing exercise between brussels and national capitals. keywords: eu foreign policy, esdp, european security strategy, eu-middle east relations 1 ruth hanau santini is currently completing a phd at the university of naples federico ii on the evolution of threat perception among european policymakers since 9/11. review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 2/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 7 1. introduction the european union is actively involved in middle eastern politics, suffice it to look at its role within the quartet, the eu3 vis-à-vis iran, two esdp missions in palestine, one police mission in iraq and a european military support to the southern lebanon unifil mission. this goes without considering humanitarian aid, cooperation and trade agreements. only for humanitarian aid, in 2006 echo’s humanitarian assistance to the middle east represented 1/5 of the total eu world assistance, summing up to eur 134 million. while in geo-strategic terms, europe depends for 45% of its oil supplies from the middle east, 40% of which from opec countries. these brief remarks show the multilayered nature of european interest in the region. the european involvement and engagement in the region responds to different sets of criteria, from reputation to political and geo-economic interests. focusing on this region, this analysis will examine how security concerns are framed by the eu. the foreign and security policy discourses will by extrapolated by looking at general affairs council conclusions (gaerc) and at the european council presidency conclusions. while since 9/11 the tone of the discourse towards the challenges posed by this region has shifted, paying greater attention to proliferation and terrorism, pragmatically the union has failed to devise coherent strategies in these policy areas, due to the difficulty of reaching a sufficient degree of understanding with member states over the long-term strategies to deploy in the area. secondly, the eu’s foreign policy consistency will be assessed by cross-checking its operational activity in different contexts: in its intra-institutional coordination (institutional coherence), among different policy areas (horizontal coherence) and vis-à-vis member states (vertical coherence). thirdly, considering the way in which the union perceives threats to its security and the way it addresses them, a preliminary definition of the kind of actor the eu is in this regional context will be provided in the final section. 2. how does the eu understand and frame security? 2.1. how does europe speak about the middle east? the middle east has historically been and still is one of the key areas of european interest. the european union has stressed several times “the global strategic importance of peace, stability and prosperity in the mediterranean and the european commitment to the resolution of the middle east conflict” (european council, 16-17 june 2005). its salience is clearly spelled out in the 2003 european security strategy, which has been defined as the “most ambitious security and defence initiative since the collapse of the european defence community in 1954” (haine, 2004). the threats associated to this geo-strategic area are mainly linked to the regional dimension and the risks of de-stabilization of the regional order. the nature of the threats the region poses is diversified and its underdeveloped regional institutionalization has further increased eu risks’ perceptions vis-àvis threatening strategic scenarios. in the post-9/11 context, the focus of european foreign policy toward the middle east has shifted, mainly on the discursive level, where the security discourse has tended to identify terrorism as both an internal european and external threat linked to radical forms of islam. the mediterranean, as volpi notes, from being held as an environment of diffused threats pre9/11 has acquired a sense of new urgency (2007). international terrorism has become the catchword defining the nature of the threat posed by mediterranean and middle eastern radical islamist groupings. in december 2003, for instance, after the terrorist attacks in turkey, the european council presidency stated that: “the union reaffirms its determination to defeat terrorism together with others in the review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 2/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 8 international community and to provide common response to this global threat” (council doc, 5381/04, 12-13 december 2003: 15). even more clearly, this was referred to by the june 2004 european council conclusion related to the establishment of the “strategic partnership with the mediterranean and the middle east”, aimed at promoting political reform, stimulating trade and economic cooperation and thirdly combating terrorism, non-proliferation and illegal migration (council doc, 10679/2/04 rev 2, 17-18 june 2004: 15). the formulation got more explicit in november 2004, when the council affirmed sharing responsibility with the us “in addressing key threats and challenges, such as regional conflicts, in particular the middle east; terrorism, proliferation of wmd; aids; the fight against poverty /(council doc, 14292/1/04 rev 1, 4-5 november 2004: 7). the lenses through which the eu has looked at this region might have changed, identifying new issues threatening its security, on the ground, however, the union has addressed mainly “old kinds of concerns”, namely state building, the reverse of the coin, state failure and regional conflicts. 2.2. what is the prevailing security understanding in europe? in the realist view of security, states are the main referent objects of security, which is to be gained through power politics and military means (hydeprice, 2001:30). given the anarchic structure of the international realm, the security dilemma constitutes the inescapable determining factor of international life. from the 1970s, however, this view became increasingly challenged from neoliberal institutionalists who, sharing many of the ontological and epistemological realists’ assumptions, focused on the chances for cooperation among states, stressed the increasing relevance of non military aspects of power, especially economic, political and societal forms of power (soft), recognised the increasing role of non-state actors in the international system. as a consequence, in the field of security studies, a growing literature started focusing on the non-military dimension of security. this contributed to the shift from strategic to security studies. in the 1980s, a third stream of thought has emerged, critical theory, which has criticized the former two for having merged into a “neo-neo” synthesis (ruggie, 1986). the assumption for the emergence of this new analytical approach was the demise of the prevailing conception of states as sole repository of the duty and means to grant the inviolability of national borders and the safety within them from outside menaces. the state has come to be seen as, at least to some extent, a passive actor facing an increasingly complex and unpredictable domestic and international environment. traditional state security instruments (based on deterrence and defence) have become peripheral given that the post-territorial nature of threats has made them not susceptible to military responses. this is so because new threats mostly target societal rather than state actors. both agents (state or non-state) and targets (state or non-state) of threats have namely undergone a process of change and their unpredictability has henceforth increased. within this context, critical theory has emphasized the constructed nature of security relations and of threats to security. secondly, the referent objects have become individuals rather than the state. the concept of security has also changed, stressing its non-military components. within this strand, the copenhagen school has underlined the aspect of “threat-construction” by public authorities who present it as “an existential threat” requiring emergency measures (buzan et al., 1998: 24). the european union understanding of the ways in which its external action can best address and respond to security threats in the middle east does not fall neatly into just one of these categories, but can be thought of comprising a varying combination of elements from the second ( “soft power”) and third ( “human security”) approach. in a restrictive reading of the second approach, the union can be review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 2/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 9 seen as pursuing “milieu goals” rather than “possession goals” (wolfers, 1962). in wolfers’ words, milieu goals “aim at shaping conditions beyond their national boundaries”, best exemplified by those efforts aimed at promoting international law or establishing international organizations. the eu, in other words, tries to portray itself as a threefold “normative” agent in world affairs: as a ‘moderator of international conflicts’ through its support of multilateralism, as a promoter of development in the poorest countries and as an advocate of human rights (barros-garcia, 2007: 7). a second aspect of this normative dimension of foreign policy is the way in which instruments are deployed, within a continuum between persuasion, promising rewards, menacing retaliation and threatening the use of force (holsti 1995). further distinguishing, one could devise concrete manifestations of “soft” methods joint ownership, engagement, persuasion and cooperationand of “coercive” ones conditionality, sanctions and military action (tocci, forthcoming 2007). an approach based on human security would consider the well being of individuals as an overriding concern compared to state security traditional concerns. within this conception, the dimension of values rather than that of even indirectly eu-security related needs (like stability in the near abroad) would play a central role. this dimension occasionally resurfaces: the focus is on european global “responsibilities”, in terms of transforming the international system into a more democratic order. 2.3 the european security strategy: a pendulum swinging closer to soft than to human security the european security strategy (ess) is currently taken as reference point by eu institutions as far as the definition of the european security environment and the nature of threats are concerned. through this document and a series of linked cfsp strategies (the coetaneous wmd strategy, the counterterrorism strategy), the eu gave voice to its ambition to develop its security role from a passive –as provider of economic integrationto a pro-active one. while it is widely acknowledged that a common outlook on threats and security questions at the eu level is still a far-off perspective (ekengren, 2006), the ess marked a qualitative step in this direction. until 2002, namely, the eu was in short supply of a clear typology of threats, as there was no conceptual consensus on either the content, forms or agents of the threats posed (kirchner and sperling, 2002). this depended partially from eu internal dynamics and the slow path of institutionalization in the common foreign and security policy, but it was also a reflection of a global trend. prior to the end of the cold war and to a large extent until 11 september, security threats have been mainly looked at through the prisms of interstate violence. security was scarcely a contested concept, and its prevailing understanding (with the exception of the understanding espoused by the un) reflected the predominance of realist and neorealist ir security approaches. the ess then, taking stock of the state of the art of the debates within the security academic community, refers to human security challenges on a world scale, such as poverty and pandemics (ess, 2003: 5-6) alongside the strategically qualitatively different “key threats” (terrorism, non-conventional weapons proliferation). the ess has securitized all threats included in its analysis, from the old ones regional crises, organized crime, failed states to the new ones international terrorism and wmd proliferation -. the old threats have been “securitized” as they have been attributed a direct impact upon the international order and thought to be facilitating conditions for new threats to emerge, mutually reinforcing one another. on the other hand, human security challenges failed to receive a strategic priority in the ess, although they were mentioned in subsequent declarations and speeches by the high representative: examples review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 2/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 10 were either framed in general terms mentioning local grievances and poverty (interview, euronews, 1 july 2003) or in more specific contexts, such as related to darfur, which was depicted as “the first war we are aware of being caused by climate change” (solana, march 2007). the ess remains however far from representing a clear and comprehensive strategic outlook for the eu, and this for several reasons. firstly, it cannot be considered a fully-fledged strategic document, as it does not provide a defined hierarchy among the different threats, something on which neither the policy unit nor member states were able to agree. secondly, it fails to sketch out a geo-strategic european conception distinguishing challenges from threats as they manifest themselves in different geographical areas. thirdly, while subsequent documents were meant to complement the strategy, it was never explicitly mentioned that the document itself would undergo the necessary updates and revisions. this implies that the document was at best seen as a snapshot capturing the state of the art of a political outside-the-union reality as well as inside-the-union toolbox to efficiently interact with that reality, but without setting out a longer time horizon for eu action. 3. assessing the coherence of european foreign policy in the middle east given the novel nature of one group of dangers and their ranking in the ess, it could be easy to overstate their relevance in relative terms vis-à-vis traditional threats. caution, however, pushes us to look for the implementation side in order to check whether, as jean-yves haine notes, despite 11 september and the terrorist attacks on european soil, so-called “old” threats have remained more prominent than new ones (in s. biscop, forthcoming 2007). namely, while the eu discourse toward the middle east has been consistent with that assessment, on the policy level the eu has shown a considerable degree of inconsistencies in its approach toward the middle east. this could be best thought of on three levels, in terms if institutional, horizontal and vertical consistency (nuttall in hill and smith, 2005). reaching vertical consistency, i.e. between the eu foreign policy and those of member states, possibly remains the most visible challenge for the eu in the conduct of its external affairs. horizontal coherence is reached when different eu policy areas are conducted according to the same logic. lastly, the coherence between the community integrationist logic and the second pillar intergovernmental one represents institutional coherence. 3.1 institutional coherence the treaty of the european union introduced a ‘single institutional framework’ purportedly designed to safeguard consistency in the eu’s external action (art. 3 and art. 11). a coordination reflex between institutions, through the harmonization of cfsp common positions, strategies and joint actions with the commission’s external action policies should have developed. the appointment of a high representative for the cfsp, agreed at amsterdam, complicated this process, as a previously obscure institutional discrepancy became a personal duel between the hr and the external relations commissioner. considering the israeli-palestinian conflict, the two institutional logics at play have failed to go hand in hand. on the one hand, the high representative –representing the eu within the quartet, uniting the us, the un and russia as a sort of intensified ‘contact group’ dealing with this regional crisiswas an initiator and promoter of the roadmap since 2002, on the other, the 2004 commission’s enp action review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 2/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 11 plans with israel and the palestinian authority did not envisage any clear institutional link between the progress and respect of the conditions set by the roadmap and the fulfilment of the political/economic agreements. for the first time, in june 2002, president bush called for an independent palestinian state, living peacefully side by side with israel. in 2003, in exchange for statehood and the end to settlement activity in the gaza strip and the west bank, the roadmap required the palestinian authority to undertake democratic reforms and fight terrorist attacks against israel. however, the lack of monitoring and enforcing mechanisms with regard to israeli settlements’ dismantling meant that the only party expected to deliver was the palestinian authority. something similar had already happened: at the berlin eu council 24-25 march 1999, the union had endorsed the two-state solution, without however taking strong stances against israel’s human rights violations and land annexation. while this fallacy was not attributable uniquely to the eu, but to the quartet, by having associated itself with its proceedings brussels partly lost some of its appeal in arab capitals as well as among palestinians. the two action plans’ overall stated objective was reaching a comprehensive settlement of the middle east conflict. however, their leverage vis-à-vis the implementation of the roadmap was strikingly weak, as no explicit linkage or conditionality clauses were enclosed in the deals. the plans’ shortcomings have become manifest: in the action plan with israel, critical stances taken by the commission in its previous report were watered down and references to human rights abuses or international law were barely mentioned. in the action plan with the pa, the eu focus was kept more on financial accountability matters than human rights issues or the need for an effective separation between executive and legislative powers (del sarto 2007: 34-37). both cases hence point to a structural eu deficit insofar as economic, political and diplomatic means have been deployed within a short-term perspective and without making use of the synergies their inter-linkages could provide. 3.2 horizontal coherence in june 2000, the council adopted a common strategy on the mediterranean region, which was renewed until january 2006. this strategy involved all the barcelona process countries plus libya and was aimed at strengthening the political and economic relations of the eu with this bloc. in june 2004, the council endorsed “the strategic partnership with the mediterranean and the middle east”, aimed at promoting the development of a common zone of peace, prosperity and progress in the mediterranean and middle east. politically this was intended to foster good governance, democracy and human rights. economically, the long-term purpose was to stimulate liberalization reforms and finally, on the security level, measures against terrorism, proliferation and illegal immigration were equally endorsed (council doc, 10679/2/04 rev 2, 17-18 june 2004: 15). with its adoption, part of the targets spelled out in the 2000 strategy was upgraded and became more specific: conflict prevention and non-proliferation, aiming at creating a wmd-free middle east. this followed a december 2003 request by the council to the presidency –jointly with the commissionto come up with concrete proposals embodying the principles endorsed by the european security strategy in relation to the middle east. the framework was to be reviewed every six months and the areas it included were broadened. terrorism entered as the top priority, together with wmd proliferation. the biggest obstacles in implementing the eu strategies were and remain twofold: strategic interests of individual member states (i.e. french obstructive stance on syria) and scarce co-ordination between single member states and eu bodies, as is the case regarding the listing of terrorist organizations and managing states failures in the region. review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 2/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 12 a) failing states the eu has so far deployed three cfsp missions in the region without providing an overall strategy for state failures’ prevention or management: the eu border assistance mission at rafah (eu bam rafah), the eu police mission in the palestinian territories (eupol copps) and the eu mission for iraq (eujust lex). after the quartet-brokered israeli-palestinian “agreement on movement and access”, the first cfsp mission was established in rafah, at the gaza-egypt border in november 2005. the mission aimed at facilitating the opening of the passage while training palestinian personnel working at the border. politically, it was meant as a confidence building measure between israel and the palestinian authority. the mission, notwithstanding its limited scope in terms of financial resources and forces on the ground, was considered symbolically important for two reasons: firstly, the palestinians were granted the only safe passage to get out of the territories, at the same time acquiring a typical feature of state sovereignty, and israel could partly de-escalate the pressure on the gaza-egypt border. secondly, the eu presence was accepted by both parties, representing a common ground for further co-operation. leaving the symbolic dimension aside, the eu failed, in concrete terms, to be able to grant the continuing opening of the passage, which was allowed to operate for only 40% of the time. both european and palestinian observers had namely to adapt to israeli security concerns whose definition has often been arbitrary. the eu is also present in the palestinian territories with a police mission undertaken at the beginning of 2006, following a request from the palestinian authority, for a three-year period. this operation was conceived as a tool supporting the roadmap’s institution building purpose, by consolidating the existing palestinian security framework. in addition to strengthening the palestinian civilian police, its task is coordinating eu donors contributing to the upgrading of the existing police force. it is a small mission, consisting of only thirty people on the ground, and since may 2006, in order to avoid being seen as supporting the re-shaping of the security services under a hamas-led government, it has almost ceased to work. beyond individual member states´ engagement in the broader middle east, since july 2005, the eu arranged a rule of law mission in iraq. the eu’s commitment is to train almost 800 iraqi officials in the criminal justice system. this was agreed by the troika, composed under the luxembourg presidency in cooperation with the external relation commissioner and the former british foreign minister, jack straw, as representative of the upcoming british presidency in 2005. finally, in the run-up to the escalation of the war between israel and the hizbollah in summer 2006, some european countries france, italy and spain whom enjoy strong economic and historical ties to the region quickly agreed to upgrade the already on the ground but small un mission. these countries responded to the un general secretary’s request of 15000 international troops to reinforce unifil. after the approval of unsc resolution 1701, europe pledged a total of 6000 troops, mainly italian and french. the deployment of an esdp mission, however, remains politically and organisationally highly problematic as it would be directly linked to the israeli-palestinian conflict and the fight against terrorism in the region. in lebanon, as elsewhere (afghanistan) the eu still lacks an overall strategy for state failure’ prevention and management. in december 2003, iraq was depicted as a state at risk of failing, and it was re-affirmed that its stability was in the enlightened interest of all parties involved. review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 2/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 13 “the european council reaffirms that the stability of iraq is a shared interest and reiterates the union’s commitment to supporting the political as well as economic reconstruction of the country, within the framework of the relevant unsc resolution”. (council doc 5381/04, 12/13 december 2003: 14). the eu stressed both the regional and the global aspects of the risks posed by the lack of stability and of substantial progress in the country’s economic reconstruction. in june 2004, in view of the restoration of iraqi sovereignty at the end of the month, europe was hoping for an increase of the regional stability, and in the establishment of a full cooperation between the iraqi authorities, the regional powers and the international community. “the eu affirms its objective of a secure, stable, unified, prosperous and democratic iraq that will make a positive contribution to the stability of the region; an iraq that will work constructively with its neighbours and with the international community to meet shared challenges” (council doc, 10679/02/04 rev 2, 17/18 june 2004: 22). in the commission communication “the eu and iraq”, five areas of engagement are identified where the involvement of the eu could benefit the country. the plan encompasses technical and economic assistance, favouring multilateral cooperation (between iraqi authorities and the un), enhancing the eu representation in the country, beginning a process of dialogue on the political level and finally engaging in a diplomatic regional effort to win iraq’s neighbouring countries over in their support for the stabilization of the country. no reference is made either to wmd or to terrorist cells within the country, let alone to neighbouring countries who might exploit the ongoing instability to enhance their relative power position vis-à-vis other middle eastern states. iraq, despite the desire to define a “comprehensive approach” is looked at in isolation from the power struggles going on in the region. also, any reference to the inter-connectedness nature of old and new threats is absent. failing states or regional crises are considered by the ess as dangerous as newer threats as they can be used for further de-stabilizing the political context, by providing a safe heaven for terrorist planning activist or proliferation efforts. in november 2004, with the internal security situation in iraq steadily deteriorating, the eu verbally condemns terrorist attacks but does not analyse their origin, raison d’être or effective ways to address them. it does, however, start planning a police and rule of law mission in iraq, other than providing a comprehensive package of assistance. b) fight against terrorism in december 2003, the fight against terrorism was seen in optimistic terms, as a bet to be won but one which, given its global inter-connectedness, required a global approach. this optimism seems to draw on member states’ national experiences in fighting terrorist groupings in the 1970s-1980s and their mixed successes (success in germany and the uk, less in spain and uncertain current developments in italy). in this depiction, terrorism failed to be analysed and scrutinized in its different geographical expressions, and the stress was more on the eu side to strengthen its international partnerships in this endeavour. in december 2004, after the madrid bombings, the internal dimension of the fight against terrorism was substantiated by a series of extensive provisions concerning border security, intelligence, the financial aspect of terrorist networks, civil protection, and by creating counter-terrorism clauses in agreements with third countries. in this presidency conclusion, all other threats are considered “key concerns” as the terrorist one is the strategic priority for the eu (council doc, 16238/1/04 rev 1, 16/17 december 2004: 8-11). review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 2/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 14 in response to the coordination needs emerged after the london and madrid bombings, in december 2005 the eu launched its strategy on counter-terrorism, a cross-cutting task between cfsp and cooperation in justice and home affairs. despite the strategy, however, no consistent eu policy towards terrorist organizations has developed yet. in mid-december 2006, the european court of first instance ruled against previous eu decisions to enlist the people’s mujahidin of iran, considered a terrorist-supporting organisation. this ruling could have a domino effect, for example, in supporting the case for the suspension of the current sanctions against hamas. were this to happen, it would point to inconsistent policies conducted by eu institutions. different national evaluations have brought to paradoxical results: while the palestinian hamas movement was listed as a terrorist organization in 2003, the eu – despite us pressureshas avoided attributing the same label to the lebanese hezbollah. the decision not to list the group signalled a divergence in views between member states and the high representative of cfsp, who lined up with the us in calling for having the hezbollah defined as a terrorist organization. had the eu listed the hezbollah, an overall economic embargo would have been imposed, implying a complete freeze in any trade transaction or even humanitarian programs. this is what happened to the palestinian government after the electoral victory of hamas. following the formation of a hamas-led government in may 2006, the european commission suspended political contacts and cooperation with the palestinian authority, pending their renewal on hamas’ acceptance of the quartet’s principles. taking into account the catastrophic humanitarian situation in the palestinian territories, however, a temporary aid mechanism (tim) was set in place under the supervision of the world bank. this mechanism bypasses the institutions-level and directly supports civilian infrastructures. the damage the eu has self-inflicted is threefold. firstly, differentiating between the hamas and the hezbollah without the council giving an explanation for listing one and not the other has diminished the credibility of the european threat assessment’s consistency. secondly, expressing two views on the same matter, one from the presidency and one from the high representative, the eu has increased the aura of ambiguity surrounding its decisions. thirdly, and most gravely, by having boycotted a democratically elected government, the eu has emptied some of its legitimacy reservoir in the arab streets. c) non-proliferation policy the eu strategy against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (wmd) was endorsed by the european council in december 2003. however, european efforts’ still limited impact in the region’s wmd policies was recently exemplified in the case of iran. despite having tried to impose itself as an indispensable international facilitator in the iranian nuclear crisis through the eu3 (france, germany, great britain, and since summer 2006, the high representative for cfsp), the union has failed to live up to the expectations arisen by the strategy. this is also linked to the use of directoires as the eu3, which enjoy more flexibility during negotiations, but are of limited value when final decisions concerning sanctions or the freeze of aid have to be taken at unanimity. on top of that, some countries, such as italy, spain, and the czech republic question the whole principle of the directoires – partly from self-interest and partly for ‘communautaire’ reasons. this implies that certain groups of smaller countries may drift apart from discussions on non-proliferation in the cfsp. there is also a clear split between big and small countries; the latter suffering from under-representation during these politically highly delicate negotiations. in june 2004, the union expressed its desire to cooperate more fully with iran, making clear its “concerns”: the nuclear programme, the existence of a terrorist threat, the lack of respect for human review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 2/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 15 rights and the opposition of iran to any step in the direction of solving the israeli-palestinian conflict. few months later, in the november presidency conclusions, all of these issues are dropped (but they are re-affirmed in june 2005), with the notable exception of the nuclear dossier. in mid-june 2006, the eu-3 plus 3 (france, uk and germany with the unsc members of china, russia and us) formulated a proposal in vienna offering teheran cooperation in the civilian development of nuclear energy in exchange of ceasing the enrichment process of uranium. at that point in time, the eu was confident that chances were good to strike a deal with the iranian negotiating team headed by larijani. at the end of the year, the tone in the eu changed and iran is called to behave responsibly within the region. “the european council expresses its concern about the negative impact of iranian policies on stability and security in the middle east. the european council underlines that iran needs to play a responsible role in the region” (council doc, 15914/1/05, 14-15 december 2006: 25). the leadership had rejected the vienna proposal and the eu was left with no other tangible option in sight. for the first time, the eu clearly chose a threatening stance suggesting the possibility of adopting sanctions within the un framework. “in the absence of action by iran to meet its obligations, the european council supports work in the security council towards the adoption of measures under article 41 of chapter vii of the un charter” (ibid). on the commission’s side, as there have never been cooperation agreements with iran, action plans or other forms of economic partnership, one can only look at what the commission has done with the only nuclear power of the region it has a contractual relation with, namely israel. in the eu-israel action plan both sides agreed to ‘further develop co-operation and co-ordination in the prevention of and fight against the illicit trafficking of wmd-related materials’ and to co-operate on the development of ‘effective systems of national export control, controlling export and transit of wmd-related goods, including wmd end-use control of dual use technologies and effective sanctions for breaches of export control’. while the aim of controlling the trafficking and transit of wmd and related goods should not be a major point of controversy, it is certainly surprising that the enp-action plan explicitly refers to wmd non-proliferation – considering israel’s traditional ambiguity with regards to its nonconventional capabilities and its long-standing reluctance to discuss the matter with other parties. the devil, however, is in the detail. in fact, the action plan at no point defines which wmd both sides intend to talk about. more importantly, the action-plan states that the wmd dialogue shall be based on two documents, which, however, were not enclosed in the plan. while the eu wmd strategy of december 2003 is available, ‘israel’s vision on the long-term goals of regional security and arms control process in the middle east’ of 1992 is not easily retrievable. d)-regional conflicts: mepp in december 2003, the middle east conflict was framed as an old kind of threat, endangering regional and global stability, whose solution would rely on the creation of a viable palestinian state and assuring the borders’ security of israel, two typically westphalian attributes of national sovereignty. the situation on the ground however differed from european expectations and proved to be a difficult case for testing a skilful use of the horizontal toolbox the eu had at its disposal. the two esdp missions in the palestinian occupied territories were formally meant to support institution building, but they became useless instruments when the unborn palestinian state risked failing before having seen the review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 2/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 16 light. by “urging” the palestinian prime minister to re-organise the security services and to eliminate the terrorist menace operating in its territory acting against jerusalem, the eu was formulating the expectation that the pa could act as a state. towards israel, the council expressed its disapproval of the continuing building of settlements as well as later of the security fence. what lacked in this respect, however, were either carrots or sticks attached to it. in march 2004, the tone of the eu vis-à-vis israel was embittered and critical of the use of extrajudicial killings (the recent murder of hamas leader yassin being the last of a series). with regard to israeli disengagement plans from the gaza strip, brussels “noted” them, reminding however of the roadmap framework as the only legitimate one. a few months later, in june, the eu softly changes tone with israel, “welcoming” its disengagement from gaza as a first step of a “complete withdrawal”. while israel was called to comply with international law, accepting its membership within a legalistic international community; the pa was expected to crack down on terrorist activities, with no reference to legal tools or to potential side effects to civil liberties and the rule of law, overarching features of the commission’s external activity. then, despite “welcoming” regional peace initiatives, the eu remained cool at the idea of setting up joint peace efforts with middle eastern countries. this case could point to the structural limit for the ess’ call for efficient multilateralism. moreover, the fact that the eu still tends to portray the israeli-palestinian issue in isolation from the ongoing frozen and less frozen tensions (israel-syria; lebanon-syria) shows the lack of clear understanding of the inter-linkages not just between old and new threats (let alone between old challenges and threats) but even more dangerously of those among the several middle eastern dossiers (see council doc, 10679/2/04 rev 2, 17-18 june 2004: 25). 3.3 vertical coherence for obvious reasons, discrepancies in this domain get an ample media coverage, thereby overdrawing positions which often do not differ in the substance, but for domestic reasons are articulated differently from official eu stances. the june 2006 communication from the commission, “europe in the world”, underlined the necessity for the eu to establish closer relations among all the actors involved in external policies, especially the union and national capitals. in the first place, the existence and role of the quartet or the eu3 would gain visibility and legitimacy if all member states were to actively support it. the panoply of recent european initiatives towards the middle east has impaired their overall efficiency: to make one example, in december 2006, chancellor merkel announced her will to revitalize the quartet during the german eu and g-8 presidency in 2007. this intention had found only verbally the support of the us administration, whose secretary of state condoleeza rice dealt with the crisis in a trilateral way, meeting with israeli pm olmert and palestinian pm abbas in february 2007 without engaging the european counter-party. previously, in november 2006, spain, italy and france had declared their intention to promote a regional conference to promote a new peace effort on the israeli-palestinian front, which has remained an idea that continues to be floating around. despite spain’s prime minister, josé luis zapatero, wish to have england and germany on board, the two countries have so far been sitting on the fence, review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 2/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 17 abstaining from a clear commitment, fearing to create discontent in jerusalem. according to another proposal put forward by spain and france –with italy retreating to a more cautious “wait and see” position-, any attempt to renew the political process should start with five steps: an immediate ceasefire from both sides (which until present was never formally reached); the formation of an internationally acknowledged palestinian national unity government (which was eventually agreed on in mid-march 2007) ; an exchange of prisoners (pm abbas promised setting free caporal shalit but could not deliver); talks between israel’s prime minister and his palestinian counterpart (currently underway despite the lack of recognition by israel of the new coalition government) and an international mission in gaza monitoring the cease-fire. regularly, some national capitals advance a proposal to foster stabilization in the region, be it a regional peace conference, a multi-national force to be sent to the gaza strip (an idea floated by italian foreign minister d’alema in 2006) or formulating various and un-coordinated attempts to get syria involved in resolving its golan and sheba dispute with israel so as to weaken iran’s relative weight. 4. conclusion when one looks at official discourses and actual policy implementation, it is often the case that discrepancies emerge. in the case of european foreign policy toward the middle east, however, the inconsistencies are more between european institutions and single member states foreign policy interests and legacies, than between the security discourse and the policies on the ground conducted by the eu3, the quartet. both in words and deeds, namely, the eu espouses an approach towards the middle east based on multilateralism, that is strong coordination with the un, which tries to be effective by adopting a multilayered approach, tackling different dossiers with different instruments by its institutions and which has the ambition of putting its efforts into context. it remains to be said, however, that while the discourse has, at least to some extent, evolved including more and more counter-terrorism elements in declarations and agreements with those countries, the eu still tends to intervene when old conflicts and old kinds of threat risk to damage the overall regional balance of power. then, how it intervenes depends on some internal variables, which have here been looked at – horizontal and institutional coordinationfor which the room for improvement remains significant, as well as external variables –the regional context in which it operates, other global playerswhich the eu has so far failed to influence to a relevant degree. the lack of effectiveness of the overall strategy is hence due to its scarce support by member states when brave and creative initiatives should be undertaken, and by the timidity of eu actions vis-à-vis other global players. review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 2/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 18 bibliography x. barros-garcia, “effective multilateralism and the eu as military power: the worldview of javier solana”, eui working paper, rscas 2007/2008. f. bicchi; m. martin, “talking tough or talking together? european security discourses towards the mediterranean”, mediterranean politics, vol. 11, no. 2, july 2006. s. biscop, the european security strategy, implementing a distinctive approach to security, ashgate, 2005. centro internacionale toledo, “eu civil missions in the palestinian territories: frustrated reform and suspended security”, citpax middle east special report, n. 1, summer 2006. a. de soto, “end of mission report”, the guardian documents, 12 june 2007. r. del sarto, ‘benchmarking human rights and democratic development in the euro-mediterranean context: conceptualising ends, means, and strategies’, euromesco report, lisbon: instituto de estudos estratégicos e internacionais (ieei), 2007 (forthcoming). m. ekengren, “new security challenges and the need for new forms of eu cooperation: the solidarity declaration against terrorism and the open method of coordination”, european security, vol. 15, no. 1, 2006. h. gärtner, a. hyde-price, e. reiter, europe’s new security challenges, lynne rienner publishers, n.y., 2001.j-y. haine, “idealism and power: the new eu security strategy”, current history, march 2004. j-y. haine, “the european security strategy and threats: is europe secure”, in s. biscop and j. andersson, forthcoming 2007. s. nuttall, “coherence and consistency”, in c. hill and m. smith, international relations and the review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 2/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 19 european union, oxford university press, 2005. e. j. kirchner, “the challenge of european union security governance”, journal of common market studies, vol. 44, no. 5, 2006. e. j. kirchner, j. sperling, “the new security threats in europe: theory and evidence”, european foreign affairs review, 7, 2002. f. volpi, “introduction: strategies for regional cooperation in the mediterranean: rethinking the parameters of the debate”, mediterranean politics, vol. 11, no. 2, july 2006. m. webber, s. croft, j. howorth, t. terriff and e. krahmann, “the governance of european security”, review of international studies, 30, 2004. european union council presidency conclusions: council doc, 5381/04, 12-13 december 2003 council doc, 10679/2/04 rev 2, 17-18 june 2004 council doc, 14292/1/04 rev 1, 4-5 november 2004 council doc, 16238/1/04 rev 1, 16-17 december 2004 council doc, 15914/1/05 rev 1, 15-16 december 2005 microsoft word aude-claire fourot.doc review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 147 ………………………………………………………… le désalignement des politiques d’immigration et d’intégration au sein de l’ue : hardlaw versus softlaw? aude-claire fourot review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 148 deux types de politiques traitent généralement des questions migratoires. les politiques d’immigration concernent la gestion des flux de personnes non-nationales sur un territoire donné et en régissent les modalités d’entrée et de sortie. mais une politique de gestion de flux ne concerne qu’un aspect du parcours migratoire. les politiques d’intégration traitent de l’installation et des conditions de séjour des immigrants. ces deux politiques apparaissent alors étroitement liées dans le sens où une simple gestion des flux ne peut se suffire à elle-même. une fois les immigrants entrés dans un territoire, reste à s’installer… et c’est à partir de ce moment que les politiques d’intégration prennent toute leur importance. or souvent, un certain désalignement des politiques d’immigration et des politiques d’intégration est constaté. l’union européenne en est un bon exemple. en effet, alors que l’on assiste à un processus d’européanisation progressif et continu des politiques d’immigration en europe, la question de l’intégration des immigrants ne suit pas cette logique avant tout légale et contraignante. les politiques d’intégration sont quant à elles pensées avant tout à travers le prisme de la gouvernance. aux hard laws des politiques d’immigration, les soft laws sont privilégiées dès qu’il s’agit des politiques d’intégration des immigrants. alors que les hard laws exigent de la part des etats membres une mise en conformité communautaire, les soft laws sont par définition incitatives et basées sur l’apprentissage social, laissant aux acteurs une plus grande marge de manœuvre pour mettre des programmes incitatifs particuliers et divers, dont le bilan est plus difficile à appréhender. ainsi, dans le contexte du désalignement des politiques d’immigration et d’intégration, comment se mettent-en place de tels programmes ? quels sont les impacts concrets de cet apprentissage social ? review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 149 nous procéderons dans un premier temps à un survol historique de l’évolution et des politiques d’immigration et d’intégration de l’union. cet historique nous montre que l’intégration des immigrants n’est pas envisagée de la même manière qu’en ce qui concerne la politique d’immigration, l’union peinant à imposer des règles communes pour tous les etats membres en matière d’intégration. dans un second temps, nous verrons que, en ce concerne l’intégration des immigrants, la solution proposée par l’ue relève beaucoup plus de la « gouvernance », qui mise sur une participation accrue des acteurs locaux dans la mise en place de programmes favorisant l’intégration des immigrants. l’étude de cas d’un projet equal mené par la mission intégration de la ville de paris, « chinois d’europe et intégration », nous laisse envisager que l’impact de l’union est mitigé à la fois dans la mise en place de nouvelles pratiques mais aussi sur les contenus des actions menées. l’évolution des politiques d’immigration et d’intégration de l’union européenne l’évolution des politiques d’immigration et les dispositions sur les politiques d’intégration de l’union européenne sont longues et complexes. a travers la présentation des principales étapes historiques de ce processus, nous montrerons le désalignement de ces deux politiques, c’est-à-dire la réalisation progressive de la communautarisation des politiques d’immigration alors que les tentatives récentes d’une approche commune en matière d’intégration tardent à se concrétiser, si ce n’est pas des programmes incitatifs. du traité de rome au troisième pilier en 1957, même si le traité de rome promeut la libre circulation des biens et des travailleurs, celui-ci ne traite pas directement des problématiques d’immigration et encore review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 150 moins d’intégration. celles-ci, très liées à la conception de souveraineté statonationale, restent de compétence étatique. la signature de l’accord de schengen en 1985 consacre une étape plus importante en matière d’immigration. l’accord consacre trois articles à l’immigration (visas, asile et immigration illégale) et se dote d’instruments prévoyant la suppression graduelle des contrôles aux frontières communes, l’adoption d’un visa unique de moins de trois mois pour les non communautaires, l’adoption d’un système informatisé, le système d’information schengen (sis) 1. cet accord s’applique dès le départ à la france, à l’allemagne et au benelux et s’étend progressivement à d’autres pays. l’adoption de l’acte unique européen en 1986, élargit quant à la lui la logique de libre circulation des travailleurs dans le traité de rome à la libre circulation des personnes. en 1993, l’entrée en vigueur du traité de maastricht (signé en 1992) conduit à la création d’un troisième pilier, le jai (justice et affaires intérieures) qui relève du domaine de l’intergouvernementalité. il institutionnalise la coopération en matière d’asile et d’immigration dans le cadre de l’union européenne. de plus, le traité de maastricht consacre la citoyenneté européenne (article 8), notamment en garantissant des droits qui ne sont plus uniquement liés à la nationalité d’origine mais au pays dans lequel une personne réside. le traité de maastricht garantit alors plusieurs droits liés à la mobilité comme la liberté de circulation, d’installation et de travail, ou encore des droits politiques2. cependant, l’introduction de la citoyenneté européenne conduit à distinguer deux types d’étrangers, qui deviennent alors deux objets 1 le sis consiste en « la mise en ligne de données nationales sur les « indésirables » (clandestins, déboutés du droit d’asile, obligeant tous les états européens à leur refuser le droit au séjour et à les expulser » (de wenden, 2004, 15). 2 comme le droit de vote et d’éligibilité aux élections européennes et aux élections municipales dans l’état de résidence, membre de l’union. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 151 juridiques différents : les étrangers communautaires et les étrangers non-communautaires. plusieurs ont noté que cette distinction est potentiellement discriminatoire quant aux droits des étrangers non communautaires (soysal, 1994). pour plusieurs, cette différence entre communautaires et non communautaires « génère (…) une citoyenneté à plusieurs vitesses, avec de nouvelles frontières symboliques autour des allégeances, de la crainte des intrusions étrangères et de l’exclusion » (de wenden, 1997, 15). en effet, les ressortissants non communautaires restent soumis à des règles nationales. par exemple, dans le cas de la france, les étrangers non communautaires ne peuvent voter aux élections locales3, ce qui a d’importantes conséquences sur leur exclusion politique, des points de vue de la participation et de la représentation. vers la communautarisation des politiques d’immigration avec l’entrée en vigueur de la convention de schengen4 en 1995, des avancées grandissantes dans le processus d’européanisation des politiques d’immigration sont réalisées. avec la levée du contrôle aux frontières intérieures, l’union européenne renforce ses frontières extérieures sur la base d’une confiance mutuelle entre les états quant à la protection de ces frontières. il s’en suit notamment une politique commune des visas et le sis se met en place5. en 1997, le traité d’amsterdam est une étape importante dans le processus de communautarisation de la politique d’immigration au sein de l’union européenne. en effet, il « a permis d’enclencher la dynamique du passage progressif de politiques d’immigration 3 en revanche, certains pays comme par exemple l’irlande, la suède, le danemark, les pays-bas et la finlande octroient un droit de vote et d’éligibilité aux étrangers non communautaires, selon des conditions diverses. 4 la convention a été signée par treize des quinze états membres. ne sont pas signataires le royaume-uni et l’irlande. le danemark pourtant membre de schengen n’est pas tenu légalement de se conformer qu’aux règles en matière de visas. quant à la norvège et à l’islande, états non membres de l’ue, elles peuvent participer à la coopération en matière migratoire. 5 le sis s’est concrétisé par l’échange de données dans le but d’assurer la coordination des services de police, des douanes et de la justice, ainsi que la lutte contre le terrorisme et la criminalité organisée. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 152 nationales vers une politique commune » (de bruycker, 2003, 11) en prévoyant de transférer les questions d’immigration, d’asile, d’admission et de résidence des étrangers non communautaires du troisième pilier au premier, processus illustrant un passage de l’intergouvernementalité vers la communautarisation6 des politiques (de wenden, 2004, 17). de même, le traité d’amsterdam donne des compétences aux institutions européennes pour combattre la discrimination, le principe de non discrimination ayant été affirmé au départ dans le traité de rome7. la recherche d’un « équilibre » entre approche commune en matière d’intégration et approche sécuritaire de l’immigration clandestine le conseil européen de tampere en 1999 constitue une étape très importante dans le processus d’européanisation des politiques d’immigration et d’intégration, car c’est la première fois que se tient un conseil européen sur le thème exclusif d’une politique commune en matière d’asile et de migrations. tampere pose les bases d’une politique commune concernant l’immigration et l’asile avec des principes d’une coopération judiciaire et policière entre les états membres. les conclusions du conseil de tampere apparaissent ambitieuses à la fois en ce qui concerne l’asile et l’immigration, et autre nouveauté, en ce qui concerne l’intégration en mentionnant la nécessité d’une approche commune pour assurer l’intégration des ressortissants non communautaires résidant légalement dans l’union. les principaux objectifs et dispositifs de tampere concernent les partenariats et le codéveloppement avec les pays d’origine8, un régime d’asile européen qui respecte intégralement les termes de la convention de genève, le 6 la méthode communautaire relève du monopole d’initiative pour la commission, de la procédure de codécision entre le parlement et le conseil et du vote à la majorité qualifiée au conseil. voir l’article 251 du traité ce. 7 notamment concernant la protection sociale des travailleurs migrants et les discriminations basées sur le genre (art. 119). 8 ce qui implique, dans la limite des traités, une intervention de l'union européenne dans les domaines politiques, économiques et sociaux dans les pays et régions d'origine et de transit. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 153 traitement équitable pour les ressortissants des pays tiers9 ainsi que la lutte contre l’immigration clandestine. plus précisément, le traitement équitable des ressortissants des pays tiers est envisagé par l’intermédiaire d’un rapprochement des statuts juridiques des ressortissants des pays tiers de celui des ressortissants des états membres. il s’agit alors de favoriser un ensemble de droits aussi proches que possible de ceux dont jouissent les citoyens de l’ue (résidence, travail, études), de lutter contre la discrimination dans la vie économique, sociale et culturelle et la mise en place des mesures de lutte contre le racisme et la xénophobie et d’offrir aux ressortissants des pays tiers résidant légalement et depuis longtemps dans l’union, la possibilité d’acquérir la nationalité de l’état membre dans lequel ils résident. les dispositifs spécifiques de lutte contre le racisme et la discrimination prennent alors une place très importante au sein de l’ue. en effet, l’adoption de la directive relative à la mise en œuvre du principe d’égalité de traitement entre les personnes sans distinction de race ou d’origine ethnique en juin 2000 constitue un tournant important dans l’évolution des considérations de l’ue par rapport aux questions migratoires. en établissant un vaste système de protection contre les discriminations directes et indirectes, en permettant les discriminations positives et en s’appliquant à des domaines où il n’y avait pas de compétences communautaires (par exemple le logement) la directive exige de nombreuses adaptations de la part des etats membres où le système de lutte contre les discriminations était insuffisant (geddes et guiraudon, 2005). c’est le cas de la france, où la lutte contre les discriminations occupe désormais le haut du pavé quant aux discours sur l’intégration et qui correspond à cette mise en conformité avec le droit communautaire (fassin, 2002, 409). 9 i.e. des états qui ne sont pas membres de l’ue. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 154 en 2001 et en 2001, la commission a présenté deux communications sur une politique communautaire en matière d’immigration. ces communications vont dans le sens des conclusions de tampere. celle de 2000 marque une rupture en affirmant que la poursuite d’une immigration zéro est révolue, compte tenu du développement économique et démographique de l’union. la commission reconnaît alors que les immigrants ont un impact positif sur la croissance économique et convoitent les immigrants qualifiés : si l’europe forteresse semble ici vouloir ouvrir ses portes, il faut aussi reconnaître que cette ouverture se fait seulement sur invitation (caviedes, 2004, 299). de plus, la commission recommande la nécessité de développer des politiques d'intégration spécifiques (basées sur le traitement équitable des ressortissants de pays tiers qui résident légalement sur le territoire de l'union, sur la prévention de l'exclusion sociale, du racisme et de la xénophobie, et sur le respect de la diversité)10. la concordance entre les conclusions du sommet de tampere en 1999 et les conclusions du sommet de lisbonne en 2000 (qui visent à faire de l’europe l’économie de la connaissance la plus dynamique au monde en 2010 dans le souci d’une plus grande cohésion sociale et de d’une plus grande convergence des politiques des états membres) se retrouve dans la communication de la commission en 2001 sur une méthode ouverte de coordination (moc) pour l’immigration. cette communication propose l'adoption de la moc en matière d'immigration afin d'encourager l'échange d'informations entre les etats membres concernant la mise en œuvre de la politique commune. 10 mais la diversité des attitudes nationale concernant l’admission et l’intégration des résidents non communautaires a convaincu la commission d’ouvrir d’abord un débat afin d’obtenir un consensus sur les objectifs à atteindre. la décision de disposer de données fiables sur les flux migratoires a été identifiée comme une condition préalable au dressement d’objectifs qualitatifs (caviedes, 2004, 298). review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 155 la stratégie d’appliquer la moc au domaine de l’immigration a été analysée comme un calcul conscient de la commission devant l’affirmation de la souveraineté étatique des pays membres. pour la commission, il s’agissait d’ouvrir le débat sur l’immigration par le biais de soft laws tout en laissant l’initiative aux etats membres, ce qui en retour lui permet de ne pas assumer des coûts politiques trop importants (caviedes, 2004, 290). cependant, si ces mesures ont suivi les conclusions de tampere et que la volonté d’une stratégie globale à l’échelle de l’union est affichée, ces objectifs ont connu des réalisations prudentes et hésitantes dans la suite du calendrier européen. la lutte contre l’immigration clandestine domine l’agenda des conseils européens de laeken en 2001 et de séville11 en 2002. le conseil européen de thessalonique en 2003 continue de traiter de la question de l’immigration clandestine mais met également l’accent sur la coopération en matière d’intégration des étrangers en situation régulière dans les états membres. les directives de 2003 relative au statut des ressortissants de pays tiers résidents de longue durée qui ont résidé légalement pendant cinq ans12 sur le territoire d'un etat membre de même que la directive sur le droit à la réunification familiale ont été envisagées comme des tentatives pour garantir des droits aux ressortissants de pays tiers, même s’ils restent exclus de la citoyenneté européenne (rodier, 2003). par la suite, on note toujours la volonté de rechercher un équilibre entre lutte contre l’immigration illégale, le terrorisme et la lutte contre la criminalité et le respect des droits humains et l’intégration des immigrants. c’est ce qu’illustre très bien le programme de la 11 « les événements se sont précipités avec l’approche du sommet de séville de juin 2002 sous une présidence espagnole fort préoccupée par la lutte contre l’immigration illégale et à l’instigation pressante du royaume uni exerçant sur ses partenaires européens une pression en faveur de la prise de mesures en ce domaine (63) ». (63) « ce qui constitue un paradoxe au regard de la position britannique de ne pas participer en principe à la politique d’immigration et d’asile lancée par amsterdam » (de bruycker, 2003, 28). 12 elle est entrée en vigueur le 23 janvier 2004. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 156 haye adopté en 2004, qui définit les priorités de l’union pour les cinq années à venir en matière d’immigration. cependant, ce sont les mesures qui relèvent du contrôle des frontières extérieures et à la lutte contre l’immigration illégale plutôt que des mesures concernant l’immigration légale qui relèvent de la méthode communautaire et sont donc votées à la majorité qualifiée. en ce qui concerne l’intégration des étrangers en situation légale, la commission souhaite définir un cadre européen d'intégration et veut promouvoir l'échange structurel d'expériences et d'information sur l'intégration, avec la publication d’un manuel européen d’intégration en 2004, visant à diffuser les meilleures pratiques en ce domaine. quel bilan ? le processus de communautarisation des politiques d’immigration, s’il ne se fait pas sans réticences de la part des états-nations et qu’il connaît dans ses applications de grandes disparités nationales (de wenden, 2004) est progressif. cependant, il n’atteint pas le même degré dans tous les domaines. « dans les domaines relatifs au contrôle des migrations et à l’asile, où la convergence existait avant le traité d’amsterdam (…) la convergence s’autorenforce, directive après directive » (weil, 2006, 2). de plus, la communautarisation des politiques d’immigration selon un biais sécuritaire progresse (entre autres bigo, 1998 ; huymans, 2000) notamment dans un contexte post 11 septembre, reflétant la continuité d’un cadrage politique qui met l’emphase sur le contrôle et sur l’aspect sécuritaire des migrations (lavenex, 2006, 330). cependant, « il n’en est pas de même dans le domaine de l’admission d’immigrants légaux pour motifs familiaux, ni surtout dans celui des demandes du marché du travail » (weil, 2006, 2). dans des domaines ayant un impact important sur l’intégration des immigrants, la communautarisation des politiques apparaît beaucoup plus lente. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 157 le désalignement entre politique d’immigration et d’intégration est ici explicite. dans le domaine de l’intégration des immigrants, malgré les volontés affichées de l’union européenne de mieux intégrer les ressortissants des états-tiers, peu d’avancées sont réalisées. aux hard laws des politiques d’immigration, l’intégration des immigrants relèvent beaucoup plus des soft laws, par l’intermédiaire d’actions incitatives et de soutien. c’est en ce sens que la méthode ouverte de coordination est apparue comme une réponse aux volontés d’européaniser les politiques d’intégration. ainsi, dès lors qu’il s’agit de l’intégration à caractère économique et social, la commission, en manque de compétences explicites et par crainte de la réticence des etats membres, envisage la convergence européenne par le biais des soft laws. dans cette quête d’européanisation des politiques d’immigration et d’intégration, la mise en place des mesures incitatives prises par la commission, revêt une importance particulière. alors que les hard laws exigent une mise en conformité communautaire, les soft laws dépendent de configurations particulières que l’on ne peut examiner qu’à travers des études de cas. nous avons choisi de présenter un cas particulier eu égard des politiques européennes, puisqu’il concerne l’intégration des immigrants chinois à paris. nous verrons comment, dans ce cas, est envisagée l’intégration de ressortissants de ce pays tiers, ressortissants plus souvent envisagés à travers le prisme de la lutte contre l’immigration clandestine et des demandes d’asile. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 158 la mise en place des soft laws : l’exemple d’un pic-equal pour les ressortissants chinois à paris la mise en place du premier programme européen mené par la ville de paris « chinois d’europe et intégration » (2002-2005) se fait en plein contexte de privilégier les soft laws dans le domaine de l’intégration des immigrants, ce qui renvoie plus généralement à la question de la gouvernance européenne13 promue la commission. le programme européen que nous étudions ici est un programme d’initiative communautaire de type equal (pic-equal). les pic constituent une très bonne illustration de la prévalence de la « gouvernance européenne » dans le souci de convergence des politiques des etats membres et sont un exemple typique des instruments concrets privilégiés par la commission. pour plusieurs auteurs, en dépit de leur caractère incitatifs, les soft laws pourraient se révéler d’une influence considérable (calvès, 2002 ; caviedes, 2004). cependant, dans l’absence d’un recul historique, seules des études de cas peuvent pour le moment illustrer la capacité d’influence de ces outils de la gouvernance sur les politiques nationales. les programmes equal visent la lutte contre les discriminations sur le marché du travail. ils sont financés à 50% par le fonds social européen, doivent avoir un caractère pluriannuel, une conduite locale de type partenariale, un volet transnational de coopération avec au moins un état membre de l’union et une approche intégrée et évolutive. ils reprennent les instruments de la moc comme outils de la nouvelle gouvernance européenne tels que le partenariat et de l’empowerment, la coopération transnationale, l’intégration de la dimension de genre, l’approche thématique, l’innovation et le mainstreaming, soit l'intégration et 13 à cet égard, voir scott et trubek, 2002, 5-6. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 159 l'incorporation des idées et des approches nouvelles dans les politiques et les pratiques. les pic-equal illustrent particulièrement bien le répertoire européen des soft laws. de plus, les pic-equal illustrent bien le lien entre gouvernance européenne et gouvernance urbaine, puisqu’ils invitent14 particulièrement les collectivités locales et urbaines à y participer. dans le cas présenté ici, la mise en place de tels programmes était loin d’être évidente. en effet, les collectivités territoriales françaises n’ont pas d’attributions formelles en matière d’intégration des immigrants (berthet, 1999, 306). dans le cas de la ville de paris, son statut particulier (ce n’est qu’en 1977 qu’un maire a été élu dans la capitale pour remplacer le préfet de paris chargé d’administrer le département), a fait que la ville a longtemps été contrôlée par l’etat central. ce n’est qu’à partir des années 1980 que l’immigration est devenue un enjeu politique pour la municipalité en tant que telle et non plus un enjeu relégué aux municipalités avoisinantes (mahning, 2004, 23). cependant, même après les années 1980, aucune politique municipale parisienne ne visait particulièrement les immigrants. il faut attendre un changement de majorité politique suite aux élections municipales de 2001 pour que des structures politiques et administratives consacrées à l’intégration soient mises en place : un poste d’adjoint au maire en charge de l’intégration et des étrangers non communautaires a été créé, avec une unité administrative la « mission intégration » pour supporter son action. la candidature au projet equal pouvait ainsi être supportée par ces nouveaux acteurs sur la scène municipale. 14 le livre blanc sur la gouvernance européenne indique que les institutions européennes doivent « établir un dialogue plus systématique » avec les collectivités régionales et locales, et ce, « à un stade précoce de l'élaboration des politiques » (livre blanc sur la gouvernance européenne, 2001, 4) pour mettre en place « des partenariats allant au-delà des normes minimales dans certains domaines ». review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 160 l’opportunité donnée aux collectivités locales de s’engager dans le domaine de l’intégration des immigrants est toutefois conditionnée au respect des formes institutionnelles partenariales prévues dans le programme d’initiative communautaire. ce faisant, l’union européenne diffuse l’idée selon laquelle les politiques publiques gagnent à être développées en réseau. ainsi, l’incidence de l’ue agit sur les relations verticales en liant plus directement les villes à l’ue en permettant de « contribuer au contournement du niveau national » (arnaud et pinson, 2005, 214) mais a aussi un impact sur les relations horizontales en encourageant les partenariats avec les différents acteurs locaux comme les ong ou encore les entreprises. outre la ville de paris, les autres acteurs impliqués proviennent à la fois d’autres pays européens (en italie, la province de prato et en allemagne, la chambre des métiers de münster), mais aussi des associations (dont deux spécifiquement en lien avec la communauté chinoise), un centre de formation d’apprentis et une mission locale. il est bien question de nouvelles formes de coordination verticale et horizontale, liant partenaires européens et partenaires locaux diversifiés : collectivité locale, secteur associatif et organismes parapublics15. ces acteurs gagnent une nouvelle légitimité et une plus grande visibilité dans le domaine de l’intégration des immigrants en étant associés à ce type de projet. de plus, conformément au principe des soft laws, les idées et les pratiques novatrices encouragées par la commission sont censées essaimer parmi les acteurs qui y participent. au cœur de la gouvernance se situe la notion de partenariat. le partenariat repose sur l’idée d’une plus grande efficacité des politiques lorsque les acteurs s’accordent sur les problèmes et les solutions à mettre en œuvre (peters, 2000, 41). selon la logique de la « bonne » gouvernance, les 15 les centres de formation d’apprentis dépendent des chambres des métiers, établissements publics administratifs, tandis que les missions locales, ont depuis 1982 un statut associatif loi 1901, sont rattachées à l’état et ont une possibilité de contractualisation avec les régions. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 161 partenariats sont envisagés comme participant à une amélioration de la qualité des services rendus à la population, en suivant les principes selon lesquels les organisations partenaires ont une meilleure connaissance de leurs clients que les différents ordres de gouvernement et qu’elles ont suffisamment de flexibilité pour répondre à leurs besoins (jenson et phillips, 1996, 127). le partenariat est généralement bien apprécié par les acteurs, compte tenu de la « tendance à considérer l’inclusion des associations dans le travail des autorités en général comme positive, à cause d’un climat favorable à la délégation ou à la coopération avec des groupes issus de la société civile entretenu par les institutions européennes, la privatisation des services publics, et généralement l’importance croissante du discours sur le bien fondé du partenariat et de la délégation en politique » (garbaye, 2005, 179). mais qu’en est-il pour notre cas d’étude ? le fait de changer la forme et les instruments des politiques publiques a t-il un effet sur leur contenu ? pour répondre à cette question, nous nous attacherons à analyser trois aspects du picequal. le premier s’interroge sur la forme prise par les partenariats transnationaux et locaux et leur évaluation par les acteurs locaux. le deuxième concerne le public visé par le projet. finalement, le dernier s’attache au contenu des politiques et des actions prises dans le cadre du programme d’initiative communautaire. l’évaluation par les acteurs des formes partenariales la perception par les acteurs des formes partenariales proposées par le pic-equal est généralement positive et ce, qu’ils soient du secteur associatif ou de la municipalité. cependant, lorsque les participants évoquent en détail les partenariats, plusieurs questions sont soulevées. des conceptions divergentes des actions à prendre et de la place occupée par chaque partenaire viennent nous rappeler que, si la forme partenariale est surtout présentée comme une review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 162 collaboration et un partage, elle n’est pas non plus exempte de rapports de force et de pouvoir entre les acteurs. la forme partenariale n’est donc pas en soi une condition suffisante d’égalité entre les acteurs impliqués. ces désaccords peuvent perdurer, avec des tensions plus ou moins fortes pendant toute la durée du projet et peuvent de fait limiter la perception d’efficience des politiques menées. pour la mission intégration de la ville de paris, le programme equal apparaissait unique du point de vue des relations qu’elle entretenait avec les associations partenaires. la mission ne se considérait pas comme simple financeur de l’activité mais se voyait plus impliquée dans la mise en place des programmes. cela peut s’expliquer par le fait que la mairie avait un rôle de pilote dans le programme. il n’en demeure pas moins que ce rôle pilote consistait surtout à des activités de coordination et de suivi du projet sur les plans administratifs et financiers. la municipalité a plutôt entretenu une approche top down des politiques, agissant à titre de contractant de services, même si les étapes du projet ont été discutées entre tous les partenaires. en suivant des normes administratives complexes et lourdes, un certain décalage entre les pratiques de la municipalité et les réalités des associations a été constaté, les associations agissant à une petite échelle, avec un petit nombre d’acteurs et selon des modes de fonctionnement beaucoup moins bureaucratiques. de plus, la concurrence entre les associations spécialisées n’est pas à négliger dans le fonctionnement du projet. les associations ne partagent pas nécessairement les « mêmes visions », et s’accordent pour dire qu’« il y avait des désaccords » sur les mesures à mettre en place et « beaucoup de difficultés entre partenaires ». si, au cours du projet les tensions ont diminué, les conflits ont placé la mairie dans un rôle d’arbitre, « au dessus-de la mêlée » plus que comme un acteur comme un autre dans le processus décisionnel. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 163 les relations avec les autres partenaires transnationaux sont aussi intéressantes à examiner. elles relèvent de dynamiques différentes, plus lointaines aux yeux des partenaires français, moins tendues aussi, et sont au cœur du principe de circulation d’idées et d’une éventuelle européanisation des pratiques. les partenariats transnationaux sont justifiés à l’intérieur des pic-equal comme une importation et une exportation d’idées bénéfiques entre les différents pays. cette affirmation est confirmée par les acteurs qui soulignent l’apport d’un partage d’expérience et un enrichissement personnel à connaître les pratiques européennes dans le domaine de la lutte contre les discriminations. mais encore une fois, si l’on va plus en détails dans les discours des acteurs, ces derniers apportent des nuances importantes quant à l’effectivité du partage d’expérience. si par exemple des ateliers communs sur l’intégration des ressortissants chinois entre prato et paris ont donné lieu à des bilans comparatifs entre les deux villes, les problématiques abordées dans les autres partenariats avaient peu de choses en commun. les partenaires allemands sont d’ailleurs très peu évoqués par les acteurs français, étant venus se « rajouter » au tandem franco-italien. de plus, au sein de l’atelier « migrants », les acteurs ont souvent changé, limitant les possibilités de suivi sur le long terme. de l’avis de certains partenaires associatifs, ce partenariat manquait de cohérence : « hasards de la cuisine communautaire » pour les uns, « urgence et copinage » pour les autres, ce manque de cohérence pourrait aussi pointer certaines limites du partage d’expériences sur la base du traitement des discriminations dans leur ensemble. les acteurs locaux ont souvent mis en exergue la multiplicité des projets, qui traitent à la fois des personnes handicapées, des femmes et des migrants (pas seulement d’origine chinoise) limitant les centres d’intérêts partagés. le traitement des discriminations dans leur ensemble, en mettant l’accent sur la transversalité des discriminations, sous-estime cependant review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 164 le fait que chaque type de discrimination a ses propres ressorts (fassin, 2002, 415) et que ces singularités peuvent ralentir la circulation des idées au sein des pic-equal. si les pratiques discriminatoires, à leur source, relèvent de mécanismes comparables, elles ne revêtent pas les mêmes formes et n’ont les mêmes effets sur les différents publics. partager des expériences et en tirer des leçons dans les programmes à mener localement est apparu parfois limité pour les acteurs en présence qui ne ressentaient pas nécessairement de proximité entre les différentes situations abordées. le public visé : l’origine ethnique légitimée comme cible d’action publique concernant le public cible, l’influence des pic apparaît en revanche très manifeste et va dans le sens de la logique de la lutte contre les discriminations au cœur des directives de l’union européenne. en effet, la lutte contre les discriminations se base sur le principe transversal précédemment évoqué, soit la reconnaissance de publics cibles pouvant être plus directement touchés par des pratiques discriminatoires, que ce soit en fonction de la race ou de l’origine ethnique, du genre, de l’handicap ou de l’orientation sexuelle. en france, les politiques à destination des immigrants traditionnellement menées, le sont sur la base de critères aveugles à l’origine ethnique16. or dans le cas de ce pic-equal, et pour la première fois à paris, ce projet se tourne vers les difficultés particulières d’intégration d’un groupe ethnique plutôt que de traiter de problématiques communes aux immigrants. de ce point de vue, le projet equal a une influence très importante sur la manière d’envisager les politiques à destination des immigrants en considérant directement des groupes ethniques 16 officiellement seulement, puisque implicitement ces populations sont touchées par des mécanismes de discrimination positive territoriale et qui, de fait, se rapproche de critères ethniques. cela est notamment le cas de la politique de la ville. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 165 comme des cibles légitimes d’action publique, une logique monoethnique se rajoutant à une logique territoriale. comment expliquer ce choix ? pourquoi les jeunes et les femmes d’origine chinoise, et notamment du zhejiang (de la ville de wenzhou et de sa région avoisinante) ont-ils été désignés comme public cible ? une des explications réside dans le rôle moteur joué par la province italienne qui se sentait concernée par la présence des immigrants chinois. mais le public cible a aussi été déterminé en fonction de caractéristiques locales particulières, qui relèvent de mécanismes migratoires liés au pays d’origine17 et des spécificités de l’intégration de ces immigrants au sein de la société d’accueil parisienne. a paris, il a été relevé que ces immigrants s’organisent autour d’un fort relais communautaire (béja et chunguang, 1999) et concentrent leur activité dans des secteurs d’activités fermés, la maroquinerie, la restauration et la confection, que l’on appelle « le secteur des trois couteaux ». mis à part le 13ème arrondissement, d’installation plus ancienne et habité par les immigrants d’origines ethniques diverses, arrivés dans les années 1970 (béja et chunguang, 1999, 61), les immigrants chinois récents s’installent dans le nord-est de la capitale, majoritairement dans le 3ème arrondissement, regroupant plus du tiers des ressortissants chinois à paris (poisson, 2005, 71), mais aussi dans le 11ème (appelé aussi le sentier chinois), le 10ème et le 20ème arrondissement. 17 on recense plusieurs vagues de migrations chinoises en france, très différentes les unes des autres, mais paris constitue à chaque fois une destination privilégiée. les premières migrations chinoises datent de la participation à l’effort de guerre en 1914-1918. de la seconde guerre mondiale aux années 1970, l’immigration est assez limitée. s’en suit une autre période mieux connue, qui concerne l’immigration de personnes d’ascendance chinoise, originaires du sud-est asiatique. ce sont les « boat people », des ex-colonies et protectorats français comme le vietnam, le laos, et le cambodge. a partir de 1986, l’immigration chinoise reprend du fait de l’ouverture officielle de la chine à l’étranger. il s’agit avant tout d’une population originaire du zhejiang, population plutôt rurale, et qui est aujourd’hui majoritaire à paris (poisson, 2004). l’immigration chinoise s’est accélérée à partir des années 1990. actuellement cette population est estimée à 600 000 (chabrun et thiolay, 2004). review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 166 alors que les immigrants de la « chinatown » du 13ème ont longtemps servi d’exemple d’une communauté jugée « bien intégrée » au sein de la capitale française, les nouveaux immigrants wenzhou, cristallisent au contraire les peurs des pouvoirs publics. dans la lignée de la sécurisation des politiques d’immigration en europe, les ressortissants chinois ont souvent fait l’objet d’enquêtes sur les flux migratoires clandestins18 ou les demandes d’asile. ainsi, les mineurs étrangers isolés, le travail forcé19, les rackets ou encore les formes d’esclavage moderne apparaissent aussi comme des phénomènes qui inquiètent la scène politique nationale française. de plus, des conflits ont éclatés suite à la monoactivité de certains quartiers. ces derniers sont loin des représentations des quartiers chinois dans les villes occidentales, seuls les pas de portes montrant la présence des immigrants chinois par le biais de leurs commerces20. mais c’est précisément cette activité commerciale qui a créé des tensions, allant même jusqu’à susciter des vagues de manifestation organisées par la mairie d’arrondissement en 2003 sous le slogan « mairie en colère, mairie fermée ». l’arrondissement, sous la houlette de son, soulignait les risques qu’il associait à la monoactivité, comme la perte d’identité du quartier, le départ des résidents, en se plaçant du côté des registres de la « menace », de l’« inondation », et des « nuisances » (site internet mairie 11ème ). des locaux commerciaux ont alors été rachetés 18 si l’entrée sur le territoire se fait principalement de manière légale grâce à un visa touriste (migrations études, 2002, 5), ces migrants restent et deviennent clandestins à l’expiration de celui-ci. les immigrants sont alors contraints de payer une dette de passage très élevée. pour ce faire, nombreux sont ceux qui, par le biais des relais communautaires, travaillent dans des ateliers clandestins, dans la restauration ou dans la prostitution afin de payer la « tête de serpent », chef d’un réseau de migrations clandestines. il est estimé que, en travaillant dans la confection, pour les années 2000 à 2002, cinq à huit ans de travail sont nécessaires pour rembourser la dette (migrations études, 2002, 6). 19 les conditions de travail de ces immigrants ont été inscrites dans les formes d’esclavage moderne. 20 dans « le sentier chinois » (11ème arrondissement), leur présence est même exclusivement professionnelle, leur implantation résidentielle étant plus en seine-saint-denis (pribetich, 2005, 86). review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 167 par la mairie de paris21 pour lutter contre la monoactivité tandis que dans la même période, une vingtaine de magasins ou ateliers ont été fermés par le préfet de police de paris (chabrun et thiolay, 2004). cette attention portée à la clandestinité, à la monoactivité de certains quartiers ou à la problématique des contacts plutôt rares avec la société parisienne montre le contexte dans lequel le programme « chinois d’europe et intégration » a pris place. ce contexte est important car il situe la manière dont les acteurs locaux ont envisagé la problématique d’intégration des nouveaux immigrants chinois, et par conséquent, le contenu des actions menées dans le programme « chinois d’europe et intégration ». des pratiques d’insertions professionnelles pour lutter contre le communautarisme la logique des actions menées est le troisième aspect du programme que nous souhaitons examiner. la brèche ouverte dans la conception républicaine de l’intégration à la française par un ciblage ethnique ne signifie pas pour autant sa remise en question fondamentale. dans leur manière de poser le problème, les acteurs locaux et certains acteurs associatifs ont proposé leur propre interprétation de la lutte contre les discriminations. compte tenu du contexte attaché au choix des chinois originaires du wenzhou, le « problème » a été posé à paris comme une question d’intégration sociale, de diversification des activités professionnelles des immigrants et de lutte contre le communautarisme, plus que comme un projet qui vise spécifiquement à lutter contre les pratiques discriminatoires de la société d’accueil. 21 par la société d’économie mixte de l’est parisien (semaest). review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 168 le partenariat transnational, notamment avec l’italie, soulignait des visions différentes de l’intégration des immigrants chinois. la province italienne valorisait beaucoup le levier économique que représentent à ses yeux les entrepreneurs chinois, revitalisant les ateliers de confection désertés par les italiens. les acteurs locaux, en participant au projet « chinois d’europe et intégration » ne se situait -et ne s’est pas situéedans la même perspective. en france, il s’agissait plutôt d’éviter que les jeunes ne se retrouvent dans la confection (poisson, 2005, 70). les mesures prises dans le cadre du projet equal ne s’attaquaient pas directement aux commerces et aux embauches de clandestins (ce qui relèverait davantage d’une logique policière) mais ont prévu de diversifier les activités professionnelles des immigrants chinois, concrétisée notamment par des actions dans les domaines de la formation et de la médiation avec par exemple la création d’une plateforme d’accueil mutualisée (pfam)22. un volet du projet visait à accueillir, informer et suivre les jeunes et les femmes sur la formation et l’insertion professionnelle, par le biais de séances d’informations collectives avec un interprétariat en mandarin notamment et de la dispense d’un accompagnement individualisé. pour les femmes et les enfants, une première crèche franco-chinoise a été créée à paris, dans le but d’accueillir au moins 50% d’enfants d’origine chinoise et de former des femmes (et dans certains cas embaucher) aux métiers de la petite enfance. outre le fait que ces deux actions visent à une plus grande diversification professionnelle et à une meilleure information sur les services disponibles pour les immigrants, ces programmes ont aussi comme objectif de sortir les immigrants d’un mode de vie jugé trop communautaire. 22 pour le détail, voir poisson, 2005 et moreno, 2005. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 169 le cas de la crèche est emblématique de cette volonté. les « crèches sauvages » désignent un système de garde hors des structures jugées plus « traditionnelles ». elles avaient déjà été « pointées du doigt » dans un état des lieux de l’intégration des immigrants à paris23. pour les acteurs impliqués, il est considéré que l’enfant doit être socialisé dans des structures comparables à celles qui sont mises en place en france. de même, la crèche vise à sortir les femmes d’une relative autarcie, en cherchant des contacts plus directs avec la société d’accueil et les amenant à se former dans des métiers jugés plus « standard ». d’autres actions ont été menées tout au long du projet, notamment la poursuite de cours de formation professionnelle au sein d’un centre pour apprentis. elles se sont souvent heurtées au problème du statut juridique des jeunes de plus de 16 ans et en situation irrégulière. en effet, au début du projet « chinois d’europe et intégration », une des raisons pour lesquelles la cible jeune avait été choisie, tenait au fait que les mineurs entre 16 et 18 ans ne pouvaient être scolarisés. depuis l’ordonnance du 20 mars 2003 relative aux modalités d’inscription et de scolarisation des élèves de nationalité étrangère des premier et second degrés, ceux-ci peuvent être acceptés dans des parcours pré-professionnels24. cependant, sur le terrain, il appert que cela soit plus difficile et que les jeunes restent toujours en difficulté de ce point de vue. suivant la même logique que pour les femmes, ses programmes visent aussi à protéger25 les jeunes de l’emprise de la communauté d’origine, notamment concernant ses 23 dans le « diagnostic intégration » commandé par la ville de paris. 24 « les nouveaux arrivants âgés de plus de 16 ans, ne relevant donc pas de l'obligation scolaire, peuvent néanmoins être accueillis dans le cadre de la mission générale d'insertion de l'éducation nationale (mgien) qui travaille à la qualification et la préparation à l'insertion professionnelle et sociale des élèves de plus de 16 ans. ainsi des cycles d'insertion pré-professionnels spécialisés en français langue étrangère et en alphabétisation (cippa fle-alpha) peuvent être mis en place pour les jeunes peu ou pas scolarisés dans leur pays d'origine ». 25 ce souci de protection peut être alors rapproché des raisons qui ont poussé les experts de la commission stasi en france à interdire le port de signes religieux à l’école. un des principaux arguments était de protéger les jeunes femmes, notamment de confession musulmane, d’une emprise de la communauté d’origine qui pourrait les obliger à porter le voile. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 170 choix professionnels. ainsi, le registre de lutte contre les discriminations a plus été interprété comme une aide à l’insertion professionnelle que comme une volonté de contrer les pratiques et les politiques discriminatoires de la part de la société d’accueil à l’endroit des immigrants. le contenu de ces programmes s’explique alors par la forte prégnance des principes d’intégration républicains en france (favell, 2001; geddes et guiraudon, 2005). malgré les débats très actuels sur l’échec du modèle d’intégration à la française26, les programmes locaux menées sous la houlette de l’ue tendent plutôt à montrer la permanence d’une manière de penser l’intégration des immigrants selon une approche sociale, traditionnellement au centre des politiques d’intégration (berthet, 1999, 303-304). de même le fait de penser des programmes en terme de protection contre le communautarisme plus qu’en terme d’antidiscrimination, rejoint un des principaux éléments du discours républicain, considérant d’un mauvais œil le renfermement communautaire. a cet égard, le fait que la notion de discrimination soit « suffisamment polysémique et ambiguë » (geddes et guiraudon, 2005, 85) peut expliquer cette appropriation des acteurs locaux, à prendre ce type d’actions, jugées conformes au contexte et aux principes au sein duquel ils oeuvraient. conclusion en analysant l’historique des politiques d’immigration et d’intégration au niveau de l’union européenne, nous avons illustré le désalignement de ces politiques au sein de l’ue. alors que la communautarisation des politiques d’immigration suit son cours suivant la logiques de directives, les etats membres devant se conformer à ces hard laws, les politiques 26 cf. les débats sur la discrimination positive ou sur les causes des émeutes dans les banlieues françaises à l’automne 2005. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 171 d’intégration suivent quant à elle une logique de soft laws, dont les résultats dépendent de la mise en place de projets particuliers. la mise en place des soft laws concernant l’intégration des immigrants trouve sa place dans une europe marquée par la moc et la volonté d’insuffler de nouvelles pratiques de gouvernance dans un domaine où les souverainetés nationales restent très affirmées. la présentation de notre étude de cas nous a permis de montrer que l’influence de l’union européenne est différente selon différents aspects du programme, et que l’adhésion aux principes de la bonne gouvernance européenne ne signifie pas nécessairement la réalisation termes à termes des objectifs prônés par la commission. au niveau du changement du contenu des politiques, les pic ont contribué à une légitimation de l’origine ethnique comme cible d’action publique. de plus, le pic-equal « chinois d’europe et intégration » rompt avec un focus avant tout sécuritaire sur les ressortissants chinois. cependant, il n’est pas clair que l’ue accompagne, au-delà d’un changement de discours, une réelle modification du contenu des politiques destinés aux immigrants. dans notre cas, celles-ci sont restées fortement associés aux politiques généralement menées au niveau national, limitant les résultats anticipés de l’apprentissage social au niveau européen. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 172 bibliographie arnaud, lionel et gilles pinson. 2005. « villes européennes et citoyenneté de projet : vers de nouvelles formes d’implication locale pour les minorités ethniques ? », dans arnaud lionel (dir) les minorités ethniques dans l’union européenne, paris : la découverte, pp. 209-228. béja, jean-philippe et wang chunguang. 1999. « un village du zhejiang à paris ? », hommes et migrations, (1220) juillet-août, pp. 60-72. bigo, didier. 1998. « europe passoire et europe forteresse : la sécurisation/humanitarisation de l'immigration », dans réa andréa (dir) immigration et racisme en europe, bruxelles : editions complexes. berthet, thierry. 1999. « doit-on parler de politiques locales de l’ethnicité? », dans balme richard, faure alain et mabileau albert (dirs) les nouvelles politiques locales, paris : presses de science po, pp. 299-319. bruycker (de), philippe et daphné bouteillet-paquet (dirs). 2003. the emergence of a european immigration policy/ l'émergence d'une politique européenne d'immigration. bruxelles : bruylant. calvès, gwenaëlle. 2002. « il n’y a pas de race ici. le modèle français à l’épreuve de l’intégration européenne », critique internationale, (17) octobre, pp. 173-186. caviedes, alexander. 2004. « the open method of co-ordination in immigration policy : a tool for prying open fortress europe? », journal of european public policy, vol. 11 (2), pp. 289-310. chabrun, laurent et boris thiolay. 2004. « la vague chinoise », l’express, 06 décembre. commission européenne. 2001. gouvernance européenne. un livre blanc. bruxelles, com (2001) 428. fassin, didier. 2002. « l’invention française de la discrimination », revue française de science politique, vol. 52 (4), pp. 403-423. favell, adrian. 2001. philosophies of integration. immigration and the idea of citizenship in france and britain, londres: macmillan. garbaye, romain. 2005. « gouvernance urbaine, minorités ethniques et identités locales à birmingham, lille et roubaix », dans arnaud lionel (dir) les minorités ethniques dans l’union européenne, paris : la découverte, pp. 165-184. geddes, andrew et virginie guiraudon. 2005. « la construction d’un paradigme européen de lutte contre les discriminations ethniques à partir des modèles nationaux contrastés : une comparaison franco-britannique », dans arnaud lionel (dir) les minorités ethniques dans l’union européenne, paris : la découverte, pp. 67-86. huysmans, jef. 2000. « the european union and the securitization of migration », journal of common market studies, vol.38 (5), pp.751-777. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 173 jenson, jane et susan d. phillips. 1996. « regime shift: new citizenship practices in canada », international journal of canadian studies, (14) automne, pp. 111-135. lavenex, sandra. 2006. « shifting up and out: the foreig policy of european immigration control », west european politics, vol. 29 (2), pp. 329-350. mahning, hans. 2004. « the politics of minority-majority relations : how immigrants policies developed in paris, berlin and zurich », dans rinux penninx et al. (dirs) citizenship in european cities, hans: ashgate, pp. 17-37. migrations études. 2002. les modalités d’entrée des ressortissants chinois en france, (108) juilletaoût. moreno, sabine. 2005. « le projet chinois d’europe et intégration », hommes et migrations, (1254) mars-avril, pp. 58-73. peters guy b. 2000. « governance and comparative politics », dans pierre jon (dir) debating governance, oxford: oxford university press, pp. 36-53. poisson, véronique (2004), « chinois d’europe et intégration », actes du colloque l.e.i. living european integration, paris, 28 avril. poisson, véronique. 2005. « les actions de médiations. chinois d’europe et intégration », profession banlieue, avril, pp. 69-78. pribetich, justine. 2005. « la construction identitaire d’un quartier : l’exemple de sedainepopincourt », hommes et migrations, (1254), pp. 82-90. rodier, claire. 2003. « l’intégration mise aux oubliettes », plein droit, (57) juin. scott, joanne et david m trubek. 2002. « mind the gap: law and new approaches to governance in the european union », european law journal, vol. 8 (1), p. 1-18. soysal, yasemin. 1994. limits of citizenship, migrants and postnational membership in europe, chicago: the university of chicago press. weil, patrick. 2006. « immigration : un cadre flexible pour une europe plurielle », fondation robert schuman : les policy papers de la fondation, 3 avril. wihtol de wenden, catherine. 1997. la citoyenneté européenne, paris : presses de science po. wihtol de wenden, catherine. 2004 ( ?). l’union européenne face aux migrations. en ligne www.ceri-sciencespo.com/ themes/europe/ceri/uemigrawenden.pdf frederick peters_volume 4_issue 1 review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 7 ………………………………………………………………… accumulation by any means: neoliberalisation and environment in post-communist europe1 frederick peters abstract this paper explores water services restructuring in the post-communist europe. the cases of the cities of st petersburg, russia and tallinn, estonia serve to trace changes in tone and timbre over the course of the post-communist transition to a market based economy. this paper is divided into two sections: we begin by placing the european bank of reconstruction and development (ebrd) in the context of the world bank and international monetary fund–the international financial institutions significantly involved with infrastructure rebuilding. section two presents a brief look at specific cases of municipal water restructuring in the baltic region in postcommunist transition period, 1991 – 2006, brokered and funded in part by ebrd money. tracing investments and the strategic partnerships formed in the region by the ebrd sheds light onto the development of ifi capacity and strategy since the early 1990s. the politics behind the notion described in shorthand with harvey’s reworking of the marxian ‘primitive accumulation’ is crucial to understanding the dynamics and trends often apparent in water infrastructure restructuring. keywords: european bank of reconstruction and development (ebrd), international monetary fund (imf), world bank (wb), international financial institutions ,st petersburg, russia, tallinn, estonia, baltic, international financial institutions, water, privatization, ownership, post-communist transition, environment. 1 special thanks go out to the organizers of the young researchers network transatlantic conference in florence, april 27th, 2007, joan debardeleben, kurt hübner, beate schmidtke, oliver schmidtke, bartholomew paudyn, and the participants for the opportunities to begin, present, and refine this paper as well as the anonymous reviewer(s) for their invaluable critique to help improve it. further thanks go out to julia lajus of the european university in st petersburg and the participants of a special seminar held there september 24, 2007 for their help in understanding contemporary st petersburg and russia. all errors and omissions are of course my own. review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 8 introduction this paper explores water services restructuring in post-communist europe. the cases of the cities of st petersburg, russia and tallinn, estonia, serve to trace changes in tone and timbre over the course of the post-communist transition to a market based economy. in the initial years of the transition, 1989 to the mid 1990s, between the world bank, the imf and economists such as jeffrey sachs, a rapid liberalization of all aspects of the economy, shock therapy, was the dominant approach to post-communist ownership reforms led by the world bank (wb) and international monetary fund (imf). but the practice as it has been carried out by recently significant players (since the mid to late 1990s) such as the european bank of reconstruction and development (ebrd) show the stakes to have been a question of public and private responsibility and risk. very recently (so from 2005 where oil sold for over us$60 per barrel with trends upwards since2) soaring oil and gas prices have once more completely altered the relationship between international financial institutions (ifis) and the russian federation. while the two cases share common characteristics up until the early 21st century, in the last few years, the terms have changed. tracing investments and the strategic partnerships formed in the region by the ebrd sheds light onto the development of ifi capacity and strategy since the early 1990s. as the region develops and changes, with uneven environmental improvements and uneven increases in social welfare and equity, questions of institutional change and arrangements in both the region and among the investors’ strategy are evident, but have they been effective and in what way? this paper is divided into two sections: i begin by placing the ebrd in the context of the world bank and international monetary fund – the international financial institutions review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 9 significantly involved with infrastructure rebuilding. while it has been less the focus of scholarly interest than the other ifis, my emphasis on the ebrd comes from its status, and its own claims to be the largest single investor in the region’s infrastructure. while the wb and imf can be said to have set the tone for reform and restructuring the region in a mode of ‘triumphant capitalism’ after the fall of communism, the ebrd has devoted considerable resources, management and monitoring capacity to trying to make out of restructuring, functional water supply systems. in these as in other specific projects, the ebrd has been specifically and operationally involved. it is this more intimate involvement with specific projects that makes a study of the ebrd’s work revealing of the dynamics of changes in ownership and control of key municipal or local level services. section two presents a brief look at specific cases of municipal water restructuring in the baltic region in post-communist transition period (1991-2006) brokered and funded in part by ebrd money. i seek to show changes in approaches to the transition by local and international actors and bring up questions of the social and ecological implications of water valorization in the context of urban water services. some of the implications for the study of institutions and neoliberal reform as it pertains to environmental change are presented in the conclusion to this paper, where i set out a research agenda for the analysis of the interconnections between macro level changes in the global economy and micro level shifts in the approaches to supplying human basic needs such as water in an urban context. neoliberalism, a critic’s word, not a banker’s, is not a stable set of precepts or a coherent ideology. looking at what has been done in the trajectory of reform in the region allows for some brass tacks conclusions about what has been at stake for the cities, citizens and environment in the region. 2 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/7048600.stm (accessed november 14, 2007). review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 10 this paper’s title recalls david harvey’s thesis of ‘accumulation by dispossession,’3 but the argument i am constructing is wary of a common anti-privatization presumption that a vague sort of happy collective ownership structure is being replaced by a clearly corporate privatization scheme. privatization of a common or shared resource amounts to the imposition of a liberal creed of private property rights over a non-liberal logic of collectivity with water infrastructure. in fact and deed, the issue of ownership in the region’s water infrastructure is quite complex with preand post-communist examples of public and private holdings, better situated along a continuum, and a series of contractual relationships between state and construction, engineering and management firms, either state owned, separate, or in between. ownership issues and the actual dynamics of post-socialist reorganization of rights of property are simply more complicated than praise for, or criticism of, ‘privatization’ can address: “’privatization = divestment of government ownership’ is not a sound conceptual formulation of the process; privatization is not the same thing as destatification.”4 post-communist legal reform in estonia and russia transferred water infrastructure responsibility to other local levels of government from the central state, with insufficient support to handle necessary improvements without outside investment. this investment from the ebrd among others was coupled with conditions, including private sector involvement. this remains the case in tallinn, but is no longer quite so clear in st petersburg. oil and gas revenue makes moscow the financial centre for st. petersburg, as it were, with the central state in russia brokering st. petersburg’s infrastructure investment. the local water company has gone corporate but ‘public’ – i.e., belonging to the region of st petersburg, which, however is not ‘democratically legitimated’ as it has a moscow 3 david harvey, the new imperialism (oxford university press, 2003). review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 11 appointed governor – now after years of ebrd reliance, in what some are calling “outright renationalization.”5 the politics behind the notion described in shorthand with harvey’s reworking of the marxian ‘primitive accumulation’ is crucial to understanding the dynamics and trends often apparent in water infrastructure restructuring. what is important to pursue further is the notion of choice and outcomes: what choices were available to whom (municipalities, regions, corporations, “the people”?) regarding infrastructure investment needs? what have been the ensuing actual environmental and social outcomes? who has profited, and by whom? the ebrd, the other ifis and baltic region water infrastructure several central european, as well as the baltic countries, were affected after wwii by the highly centralised soviet tradition of state water management. it will be interesting to see to what extent they will “go back” to the municipal tradition, or whether they will choose the private company tradition for the short or long term (juuti and katko, 2005: 11). there has been significant mobilization of financial resources and environmental experts for a ‘clean-up’ of the baltic since the early 1990s. to a significant extent, scholarly focus has been less on the european commission, its own financial tools including the european investment bank (eib) or even the european bank for reconstruction and development despite this latter organization being set up precisely for the purpose of environment and infrastructure rebuilding in the post-communist world. the world bank, and the international monetary fund 4 peter marcuse, “privatization and its discontents: property rights in land and housing in the transitions in eastern europe,” in in andrusz, g, michael harloe and ivan szelenyi (eds) cities after socialism: urban and regional changes in post-socialist societies, (oxford: blackwell publishers, 1996), 119.. 5 anders aslund, “focus on gazprom, not sovereign wealth funds,” st petersburg times, nov 13, 2007, http://www.sptimes.ru/index.php?action_id=2&story_id=23621 (accessed november 14, 2007). review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 12 have instead been the focus of much analysis that tends towards a top down understanding of these organizations, their influence, and the outcomes of their initial responses to the postcommunist transition. certainly the wb and imf have all been significantly involved in the early transition years and influential in setting a certain tone in western response to those developments.6 critiques come internally as well, as gianni zanini, reporting for the world bank on the outcomes of its loan commitments in his 2002 country assistance evaluation for the world bank operations evaluation department, has pointed out. the pressure placed upon russia for rapid privatization by these institutions did not lead to the expected outcomes of efficiency and stability, despite the large figures reported (us$ 4.6 billion in loan commitments between 1992 and 1995). more than half of the projects were said to have suffered "serious implementation problems," which required "intensified supervision" and restructuring.7 woods go so far as to suggest that mid 1990s wb and imf assistance to the new russia was politically rather than financially motivated: “major shareholder governments decided that political exigencies overrode technical qualifications” in support of yeltsin’s government against both communist and nationalist opposition.8 these analyses are general and cross many sectors. as relates to the water sector, allouche and finger, elsewhere, explain the conflict between world bank water resources 6 jeremy allouche and matthias finger, water privatisation: trans-national corporations and the re-regulation of the water industry (london: spon press, 2002); ngaire woods, the globalizers: the imf, the world bank and their borrowers (ithaca: cornell university press, 2006). 7 quoted in a summary of an event sponsored by the carnegie foundation where zanini presented his finding for the world bank, thursday, september 12, 2002, “what the world bank has done for russia: an evaluation” still available at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/events/index.cfm?fa=eventdetail&id=516&&prog=zru (accessed september 6, 2007). the original report was not found on line by the author. 8 woods, ngaire. the globalizers: the imf, the world bank and their borrowers. ithaca: cornell university press, 2006, p. 134. review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 13 management policy guidelines and financial restructuring guidelines overall. they suggest that within the wb a “serious simplification” of its own policy guidelines occurred where decentralization of control of water resources came to mean straightforward privatization.9 the principles set out at the 1992 un conference on environment and development at rio de janeiro, also known as the earth summit, and in the 1992 international conference on water and the environment, known as the dublin conference, include integrating environment, user participation, and policy integration at all government and planning levels. further principles agreed upon at these conferences to guide international planning and world bank policy state that while water is to be seen as an economic good in all its competing uses (from agriculture and industry to domestic supply), clean water and sanitation are to be guarded as a basic right for all human beings to access at an affordable price. the simplification that seemed to guide the bank’s own guidelines became the equation of these concepts of decentralization and user participation with privatization. privatization was seen as the answer to the new focus on environmental concerns. the guidelines developed at rio and dublin have an international focus and were formulated with the developing world in mind as much as anywhere. while initial sums of money were committed by the wb and imf to russia and post-communist europe, under conflicting mandates and with controversial results, the european investment bank and especially the ebrd have been significantly involved from the early 1990s specifically in this region in this sector. established in 1991 with initial investments made by the eib, the us, france, germany, as well as other nations in europe, and including canada, the ebrd is a compromise and a 9 jeremy allouche and matthias finger, “two ways of reasoning, one outcome: the world bank's evolving philosophy in establishing a “sustainable water resources management” policy,” global environmental politics 1, no. 2 (may 2001): 42-47. review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 14 reflection of a complex of state and market interplay among the leading capitalist nations. it is not an institution of the european union. as an investment institution it is typical in that it uses this initial capital (public money) to borrow on the market with its top market credit ratings. capitalized at € 20 billion (€ 5 billion paid-in and € 15 billion callable) and with investments in september 2006 of approximately €2.568 billion, the ebrd has in 2005 managed to achieve a profit on its investment totalling € 1.5 billion, up from € 157 million in 2001.10 ebrd.com makes claims of the bank being the biggest single investor in infrastructure improvement in central and eastern europe. essentially the ebrd was set up with the specific mandate to invest in post-communist europe and asia, expressly to foster a nascent private sector and address environmental issues. there are important parallels in its constitution to the bretton woods institutions of the wb and imf established to rebuild europe at the end of the second world war, but also differences, specifically regarding its purported agenda. its mandate around environmental issues and the promotion of democracy are of course worthy ambitions. investigation reveals ambivalent outcomes. the ebrd shares with the eib and others an environmental mandate, but each has come to focus on environment for different reasons. the eib was established as an institution of the union with the treaty of rome, 1957, as the (then) european economic community’s financing institution. currently it bills itself as “the bank promoting european objectives”11. these objectives include european integration through energy, water and transport infrastructure, and balanced economic development for social cohesion of member states, making it not an investment bank per se, but a strategic arm of european commission policy both inside and 10 see www.ebrd.com and specifically http://www.ebrd.com/pubs/general/6710.pdf (accessed march 21, 2007). review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 15 outside the union. the eib has similar profit results from its investments as the ebrd (€ 1, 389 million in 2005).12 the environmental mandate in its objectives is to promote “the environmental policy of the european union, in particular the eu’s sixth environment action programme.13 this programme dovetails with the water framework directive (wfd). the wfd, an overarching piece of ec legislation that summarizes the myriad of previous water related law in the eu with some important new guidelines around pollution toleration levels and implementation timelines for new member states of the eu, has come to frame and drive infrastructure improvement in the sorts of investments made by the ebrd since it came into force on 22 december 2000.14 one cannot say that the wfd, or the previous pieces of legislation it contains, are driving privatization per se, as that pressure is better linked to the financial institutions themselves. what the wfd does do is add to the pressure to seek further financing for infrastructure rebuilding through corporate involvement in order for water supply and treatment facilities to adhere to eu standards, required by all member states. it does remain in part the polluting substances that have spawned the pressure to restructure and reform water services.15 11 http://www.eib.org/ (accessed november 14, 2007). 12 http://www.eib.org/about/index.asp?designation=keydata (accessed march 21, 2007). 13 http://www.eib.org/site/index.asp?designation=environmen,t (accessed march 21, 2007). for the eu’s 6th environmental action programme see http://ec.europa.eu/environment/newprg/ . the 6th environmental action programme is more of a list of priorities developed since the first eap developed after 1972 un conference on the environment in stockholm by the then european community. eib financing of “environment and urban infrastructure” includes city water supplies and treatment such as € 15 million (of a total project of € 70 million) proposed in 2002 for kaliningrad and baltic clean up in cooperation with the nordic investment bank and ebrd.13 this scale of investment is fairly typical of the size of projects each of these organizations has been pursuing. 14 the uk government’s department of agricultural and rural affairs provides an outstanding on-line summary and series of pdfs around the wfd, at http://www.defra.gov.uk/environment/water/wfd/index.htm (accessed november 14, 2007). 15 maria kaika and ben page, “the eu water framework directive: part 1. european policy: making and the changing topography of lobbying,” european environment 13 (2003): 314-327. european and then national rules (required to ‘harmonize’ with ec directives) are specific about organic and inorganic compounds in water systems through such legislation, a document that both summarizes earlier directives and is itself codification of the review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 16 the distinctions between these organizations are clear, but how they effectively function remains murky. their cooperation and the penetration of the ebrd by the eib as well as member nations from europe and the us and canada require more study and analysis as part of a systematic research agenda. how and by whom are decisions about cooperation and investment partnerships made when both public and supposedly democratically controlled funds are mixed with private sector holdings such as the market support called upon by the ebrd when it makes its loans? what is more, as the ebrd financing has at its source a series of national commitments underwriting its investments, how are we to understand the balance of public and private? what these organizations are doing is offering the sums they do to then foster private investment amongst other things from corporate water giants developing their holdings in the region. as the public services international research unit (psiru) reports, one of the top four water companies [veolia environnement (until 2003 called vivendi), suez (ondeo), rwe (themes water) and bouygues (saur)] is involved in nearly every urban water privatization scheme in the world.16 veolia environnement (ve), part owners with rwe and the land of berlin of berlinwasser ag and istanbul’s water services, as well as prague’s water company in partnership with anglican water group, has recently announced a contract signed with st petersburg’s vodokanal to help build a sludge treatment plant for the north st. petersburg wastewater treatment plant. revenue for ve for the contract is € 52 million out of a total of € 70 million for the entire project.17 the ebrd retains a strong interest in investment in the north negotiations carried out at the european commission and european parliament, under lobby pressure from forces from both environmentalists and water treatment chemical industries 16 cited in erik swyngedouw, “water, money and power,” in socialist register 2007, eds. l. panitch and c. leys (london: merlin, 2007), 204. 17 http://www.veoliawater.com/access/press/?news=704 (accessed november 14, 2007). review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 17 west of russia, including vodokanal, as recent comments in the st petersburg times by bruno balvanera, head of the north west federal district office of the ebrd show.18 european based capital (with unclear us financial and us national involvement) has organized an interesting interaction between public and private sector holdings and control of key resources in this mix of money and water that is the water services restructuring process of the post-communist transition. but, as the russian federation becomes increasingly liquid with oil revenue and with the ambitious felix karmazinov, winner of the 2005 swedish baltic sea award19 and the title of commander of the order of the finnish lion, “in recognition of his long-standing work for the protection of the gulf of finland, in cooperation with finnish enterprises”20 as general director of the state unitary enterprise vodokanal of st petersburg, there is increasingly less reason for russia or st petersburg to behave as if it is in need of this international investment. neither is it necessary for russia to put up with the ‘conditionality’ of ifi loans, or feel it requires the cooperation of international (non-russian) corporate involvement. two cities and their water services details of ownership restructuring and the conditions of investment in the urban centres of the baltic open up questions about the way the post-communist transition has been handled and how certain actors have benefited over others. looking at cases in greater detail problematizes the notion that market reform leads to democratic institution building. but even 18 http://www.sptimes.ru/index.php?action_id=2&story_id=22198 (accessed november 14, 2007). 19 cf: http://www.siwi.org/sbswa/sbswalaureate2005.html (accessed november 14, 2007). 20 vladimir kovalev “city plans to stop polluting baltic” st petersburg times, 9/6/2004, available at http://cache.zoominfo.com/cachedpage/?archive_id=0&page_id=814566496&page_url=%2f%2fwww.times.spb.ru %2farchive%2ftimes%2f1001%2fnews%2fn_13462.htm&page_last_updated=9%2f6%2f2004+10%3a15%3a30+p m&firstname=felix&lastname=karmazinov (accessed november 14, 2007). review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 18 ‘good governance’ notions supported later in the transition process21 are coupled with a deficit in democratic local control. in st petersburg, ve’s recent contract with vodokanal follows a decade of multi-partner deals: 1990s restructuring made a hybrid of public and public /private arrangement. in the ebrd financing of st. petersburg’s vodokanal, dm 35 million was loaned initially (€17.5 million approximately). a 1997 ebrd press release statement about st petersburg’s vodokanal emphatically supported an ownership structure in municipal control: “vodokanal's operational performance, the quality of its management and the strong support it has from the city of st. petersburg allow the ebrd to rely solely on vodokanal's financial strength to repay the loan.”22 restructuring occurred after 1997. the ebrd reported in 2002: “to complete the south west waste water treatment plant (swwwtp) in st. petersburg to reduce the discharge of untreated waste water in the gulf of finland”, […] up to [€] 42 million […] will be provided to nordvod with co-financing provided by public and private parties. nordvod is a limited liability special purpose company registered under russian law and owned by the nordic environment finance corporation, vodokanal of st. petersburg and a group of nordic construction companies comprising skanska ab, ncc ab and yit corporations”.23 completion of the project in 2005 was announced as the first successful public-private partnership (ppp) in russia.24 tallinn, estonia, has lower tiered water companies such as united utilities in with bechtel involved in its water services. january 2001, united utilities was awarded a 15 year 21 cf european bank for reconstruction and development transition reports. (1995-2006) london: ebrd publications office. 22 ebrd press release, “st petersburg improves water supply and waste-water services with ebrd financing”, 17 july 1997. 23 http://www.ebrd.com/projects/psd/psd2002/677stp.htm (accessed nov. 17, 2003). see also http://ebrd.com/country/sector/muninfra/signed/main.html (accessed oct. 13, 2003). 24 http://www.yitgroup.com/content.aspx?path=16407;16412;30910;31128 (accessed november 14, 2007). review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 19 contract to manage water and wastewater services for the estonian capital, serving over 400,000 people. a “baltic state report” by radio free europe online from 2003 notes about the bank’s loans: “the european bank for reconstruction and development will give tallinna vesi a €22.5 million ($22 million) loan, of which €15.5 million would be used to refinance a 1994 loan. […the] ebrd will also invest €10 million in the equity capital of tallinna vesi, once the city has sold a 50.4 percent stake to a strategic investor” (emphasis added).25 in june 2005, tallinna vesi was successfully listed on the estonia stock exchange through an initial public offering (ipo). united utilities participated in this process by placing part of its total shareholding in the business, reducing their joint stake held with the ebrd to 35.3 per cent.26 the city of tallinn owns 34.7% and the nordea bank (finland) handles 11% of the utility. from its initial ipo of €9.25, the stock is increased to € 13.48 in dec 2005. 27 it is worth €16.25 by march, 2007. in both st petersburg and tallinn, what appeared to be efficiently run utilities owned by the municipalities28 (and surplus revenue was circulated back to them) became examples of significant international corporate interest, pushed to be so by various factors, including the conditions of ebrd financing. critics of privatization posit that these factors do not include simple definitions of efficiency or supposed municipal incompetence but are examples of ideological shifts in the balance of public versus private management and opportunism using public monies to support capitalist intensification at the expense of public benefit. this seems to apply to ‘state capitalist’ interests equally. 25 http://www.rferl.org/balticreport/2000/08/27-070800.html (accessed nov. 17, 2003). 26 see http://www.uucontractsolutions.co.uk/?obh=3515; http://www.watertime.net/docs/wp3/wtec.pdf (accessed november 14, 2007). 27 http://www.baltic.omxgroup.com/upload/reports/tve/2005_q4_en_eek.pdf (accessed november 14, 2007). 28 http://www.watertime.net/docs/wp3/wtec.pdf, p. 58, (accessed november 14, 2007). review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 20 these illustrations of the way the transition to market based economies goes brings up questions of social equity and makes problematic the relationship of neoliberal restructuring and democratic institutional ambitions. debates about the nature of the transition are interesting in so far as the dominant view which comes from the investment institutions themselves in certain cases blithely takes for granted that its approach will result in the realization of its environmental and democratic mandates. even when the transition literature admits to governance issues, it still assumes that the capitalist logic of shareholder value increase will somehow result in an increase in liberal democracy and social welfare. meanwhile, commentators on the russian situation, with one story running in both the moscow and st petersburg times, quote financial times chief economist martin wolf, that we are “living in the brave new world of state capitalism.”29 citing state reserves in the form of sovereign funds for monetary stabilization in russia exceeding $148 billion making this the fifth-largest sovereign fund, the newspapers continue: “the countries that were hit by this crisis [of 1998] realized that they could not rely upon the international monetary fund as a fire brigade and that they needed to create their own sufficient reserves. it is commendable that the east asian and former soviet states have adopted such conservative fiscal policies.” what implications this has for the imf is expressed between the lines with a certain sang froid, although recent comments by ngaire woods,30 fresh from ministerial-level meetings of the international monetary and financial committee (imfc), the imf's policy-guiding body, and the development committee, a joint imf-world bank forum, 29 anders aslund, “focus on gazprom, not sovereign wealth funds,” st petersburg times, nov 13, 2007, http://www.sptimes.ru/index.php?action_id=2&story_id=23621. in the moscow times, the same story was published thursday, november 8, 2007. available at http://pda.moscowtimes.ru/article.php?aid=180899 . the financial times podcasts, available at http://podcast.ft.com/?section=martinwolf and http://www.podplanet.com/episode_detail.asp?eid=1516903 (accessed november 14, 2007). 30 ngaire woods, “current revolutions in the world of development finance,” friday, october 19, 2007, 4:00 pm 6:00 pm, political science department, university of toronto. see also world bank group international monetary fund web site http://www.imf.org/external/am/2007/index.htm, accessed november 14, 2007. review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 21 suggest russia, china and a few other middle sized states have turned their back on the imf leaving that institutions concerned about its future. conclusions corporatization of water utilities in post-communist urban europe is largely a fait accompli. ownership has been spread out. risk has become the issue as risk in these investments rests heavily on the local government side rather than the corporate side. the ifis had hopes that water privatization would solve problems with water in developing nations, something that has clearly failed.31 central and eastern european operations are a different sort of story. eu, ebrd, eic and other influences are certainly part of the explanation. these include cohesion funds, taxation systems, tariff increases, choice urban centres without obligation to service outlying non-urban regions. when you cherry pick concessions,32 you are more likely to do well. in the case of tallinn, profits seem to match increases in tariffs awfully well. current ownership structuring is leaving the water company of the city of tallinn reaping 35 per cent of the resident water users own money paid out. on the up side, investment is being realized in increased environmental measures being carried out. in st petersburg, the jury is still out, but with renationalization and corporatization, very little democratization is occurring. tallinn is an example of a utility being groomed for increased attractiveness to the private sector, who buys up partial ownership and proceeds to increase tariffs and profits, siphoning money away form municipalities who, had they been able to secure investment themselves could conceivably share the profit around within the city. st petersburg is turning its back on european capitalism, the 31 david hall, “eu faith in private water finance shows ignorance,” eu observer, 27.03.2007, http://euobserver.com/875/23785, accessed march 27, 2007 review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 22 ifis as well. but this movement is not socially minded. state capitalism run in the name of people it does not represent formally, lacking in democratic institutions to legitimate it, yet running towards profit for the corporation, in an alarmingly successful hybrid of models. the implications of this surpass the notion of simply dispossessing a group of people from their own life support systems, as they are effectively and sometimes de facto dispossessed. implications are of the order of the commodification of these life support systems and the rendering democratic decision making around water infrastructure tricky. this stands in contradiction with the mandates of the investment institutions to foster democracy in the ‘transition’ countries. does it matter who owns what now under a corporate logic? the trajectory we have seen is from a privatization drive to a state and institutional capacity building drive. extra democratic governance and support for capital accumulation accompanies this in the water sector. other options have become inconceivable, as the only way loans seem to function is by ‘fostering’ a private sector involvement within these structures of utility ownership. even where loans come from the state as in russia, and the vodokanal is a state unitary enterprise, public ownership is sidestepped. the trend in the global south has been for big water companies to divest and pull out of contractual obligations33 while in the post-communist region we are indeed seeing an intensification of corporate and financial interest, be it french, eu, ebrd or indeed russian. the baltic region is one where states, hamstrung by historical circumstances as the transition process develops, are subject to radical transformations from within and without. the upside now, 15 years later, is that eu environmental regulations are closer to being met. the st. 32 erik swyngedouw, "dispossessing h20: the contested terrain of water privatization," capitalism nature socialism 16 (1) (march 2005). review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 23 petersburg vodokanal general manager has made statements that st petersburg water will be clean by 2010 as it flows into the baltic.34 yet currently, although the water is ‘clean’ by some standards, a boil advisory remains.35 33 david hall, “eu faith in private water finance shows ignorance,” eu observer, 27.03.2007, http://euobserver.com/875/23785 (accessed march 27, 2007). 34 city plans to stop polluting baltic” st petersburg times, 9/6/2004, available at http://cache.zoominfo.com/cachedpage/?archive_id=0&page_id=814566496&page_url=%2f%2fwww.times.spb.ru %2farchive%2ftimes%2f1001%2fnews%2fn_13462.htm&page_last_updated=9%2f6%2f2004+10%3a15%3a30+p m&firstname=felix&lastname=karmazinov (accessed november 14, 2007). 35 city tap water ‘clean enough to drink’ st petersburg times, issue #1082 (48), tuesday, june 28, 2005, http://www.sptimes.ru/index.php?action_id=2&story_id=69&highlight=water. review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 24 bibliography allouche, jeremy, and matthias finger. “two ways of reasoning, one outcome: the world bank's evolving philosophy in establishing a “sustainable water resources management” policy.” global environmental politics 1, no. 2 (may 2001): 42-47. allouche, jeremy, and matthias finger. water privatisation: trans-national corporations and the re-regulation of the water industry. london: spon press, 2002. anders aslund, “focus on gazprom, not sovereign wealth funds,” st petersburg times, nov 13, 2007 http://www.sptimes.ru/index.php?action_id=2&story_id=23621 (accessed november 14, 2007). bakker, karen. an uncooperative commodity: privatizing water in england and wales. london: oxford university press, 2006. barnett, c. “the consolation of ‘neoliberalism.” geoforum 36 (2005): 7-12. blanchard, olivier. the economics of post-communist transition. london: oxford university press, 1999. bronstone, adam. the european bank for reconstruction and development: the building of a bank for east central europe. manchester: manchester university press, 1999. buiter, willem h. 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"commodifying what nature?" progress in human geography 27, no. 3 (2003): 273-297. dejak, bojan. the cold war was won in the nineties: or a short history of the european bank for reconstruction and development. victoria: trafford publishing, 2006. desfor, g and keil, r. nature and the city: making environmental policy in toronto and los angeles. tucson: university of arizona press, 2004. european bank for reconstruction and development. transition report 2004: infrastructure. london: ebrd publications office, 2004. european environment agency. “europe’s water: an indicator-based assessment.” eea, copenhagen, 2003, http://www.eea.eu.int. david hall, “eu faith in private water finance shows ignorance,” eu observer, 27 march 2007, http://euobserver.com/875/23785, accessed march 27, 2007 harvey, david. the limits to capital. new and fully updated version. london: verso, 2006. harvey, david. the new imperialism. oxford university press, 2003. juuti, petri, and tapio katko. “city in time.” report from watertime, a research project funded by the european commission, coordinated by the psiru, university of greenwich, 2005. available at http://www.watertime.net/wt_reports.asp. review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 25 kaika, maria, and ben page. “the eu water framework directive: part 1. european policy: making and the changing topography of lobbying.” european environment 13 (2003): 314-327. kaika, maria, and ben page. “the eu water framework directive: part 2. policy innovation and the shifting choreography of governance.” european environment 13 (2003): 328-343. kaika, maria. city of flows: modernity, nature and the city. new york: routledge, 2005. keil, roger, david v.j. bell, peter penz and leesa fawcet. political ecology, global and local. london: routledge, 1998. kovalev, vladimir “city plans to stop polluting baltic.” st petersburg times, 9 june 2004, online at http://cache.zoominfo.com/cachedpage/?archive_id=0&page_id =814566496&page_url=%2f%2fwww.times.spb.ru%2farchive%2ftimes%2f1001%2fnew s%2fn_13462.htm&page_last_updated=9%2f6%2f2004+10%3a15%3a30+pm&firstnam e=felix&lastname=karmazinov (accessed november 14, 2007). leys, colin. market driven politics: neoliberal democracy and the public interest. london: verso, 2001. lobina, emanuele. “water privatisation and restructuring in central and eastern europe, 2001.” public services international research unit (psiru), university of greenwich. presented at public services international (psi) seminars in slovakia and romania, 2001. available at http://www.psiru.org (accessed october 10, 2003). marcuse, peter. “privatization and its discontents: property rights in land and housing in the transitions in eastern europe.” in cities after socialism: urban and regional changes in post-socialist societies, eds. g. andrusz, michael harloe, and ivan szelenyi, 119-91. oxford: blackwell publishers, 1996. menkveld, paul a. origin and role of the european bank for reconstruction and development. london; boston: graham & trotman, 1991. mohajeri, shahrooz. “trinkwasserversorgung und nutzung im berlin des 19.jahrhunderts.” in blickwechsel: beiträge zur geschichte der wasserversorgung und abwasserentsorgung in berlin und istanbul, eds. noyani dinckal and shahrooz mohajeri, 39-58. berlin: tu verlag, 2001. moharjari, s., knothe, b., lamothe, d., faby, j., (eds). aqualibrium: european water management between regulation and competition. european commission community research, luxembourg, office for official publication of the european communities, 2003. nonaka, i. and takeuchi, h.. the knowledge-creating company: how japanese companies create the dynamics of innovation. new york; oxford: oxford university press, 1995. panitch, l. and s. gindin. “finance and american empire.” in socialist register 2005, eds. leo panitch and colin leys. london: merlin, 2004. saad-filho, alfredo, and deborah johnston, eds. neoliberalism: a critical reader. london: pluto press, 2005. review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 26 sachs, jeffrey. “what is to be done?” the economist, 13 january, 1990. spender, j.-c. “organizational knowledge, learning and memory: three concepts in search of a theory.” journal of organizational change management 9, is. 1 (1996): 63-72. swyngedouw, erik. "dispossessing h20: the contested terrain of water privatization." capitalism nature socialism 16 (1) (march 2005): 81-98. swyngedouw, erik. “water, money and power.” in socialist register 2007, eds. leo panitch and colin leys, 195-212. london: merlin press, 2007. swyngedouw, erik. social power and the urbanization of water flows of power. oxford: oxford university press, 2004. woods, ngaire. the globalizers: the imf, the world bank and their borrowers. ithaca: cornell university press, 2006. zanini, g, “what the world bank has done for russia: an evaluation”, prepared for the world bank operations evaluation department (oed).thursday, september 12, 2002 still available at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/events/index.cfm?fa=eventdetail&id =516&&prog=zru (accessed september 6, 2007). kristine st-pierre_volume3_issue2 review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 2/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved ………………………………………………………………… hybridizing un peace operations: the role of the european union and canada kristine st-pierre 1 abstract the prevalence of hybrid peacekeeping missions on the international stage underscores the increasing flexibility with which the un can meet the peacekeeping demand. this flexibility results from the growing number of actors that the un can rely on, allowing in turn for more diverse responses to conflict. however, current confusion surrounding hybrid missions points to the need to further clarify the role of regional actors in hybrid missions and elaborate on the implication of these missions for un peacekeeping. this paper thus discusses the importance of hybrid missions in peace operations by examining the current nature of european union (eu) and canadian contributions to peace operations, and by analysing the implications of these contributions for hybrid missions and un peacekeeping in general. keywords: un peacekeeping, hybrid peace operations, regional actors, eu and canada contributions to un peacekeeping 1 kristine st-pierre is presently interning at the henry l. stimson center in washington, d.c., where she is conducting research with the future of peace operations programme. ms st-pierre holds an m.a. (conflict analysis and resolution) from the norman paterson school of international affairs (npsia), carleton university. 21 1. introduction hybrid peacekeeping missions—or missions in which united nations(un) and non-un forces share, under various frameworks, peacekeeping responsibilities—are not new. according to bruce jones and feryal cherif (2004), most contemporary or post-1990 un missions have been hybrid in nature. hybrid operations are particularly important when considering the un’s deepening responsibilities in peace and security, as manifested through the increasing strain in recent years on its capacity to deploy and sustain peacekeeping missions. the prevalence of these missions on the international stage also reveals the significant growth in the number and involvement of regional actors in peace operations. this trend in turn translates into greater flexibility in the field, by offering the un different avenues for meeting the peacekeeping demand. however, as hybrid missions offer greater possibilities, there is still confusion regarding the operational and organizational nature of hybrid missions and their implications for conflict management (jones & cherif 2004). this confusion points to the need to further clarify the role of regional actors in hybrid missions (i.e., how do regional actors contribute to hybrid missions?) and to elaborate on the implication of these missions for un peacekeeping (i.e., how do hybrid missions affect un peacekeeping?). to achieve this task, this paper first discusses the importance of regional actors in conflict management, following which it considers the role of hybrid missions in peace operations. the paper then examines the current nature of european union (eu) and canadian contributions to peace operations, and analyses the implications of these contributions for hybrid missions and un peacekeeping in general.2 the paper’s focus on the eu and canada specifically stems from their shared support for a multilateral approach and for strengthening un and regional capacity in responding to conflicts. in addition, crisis management is often described as a particular area where cooperation between the eu and canada is exceptionally good, and where future joint efforts are more than likely. as a result, it seems appropriate to look at the different ways both can contribute to peace operations, and to the un. 2. regional actors in peace operations: the role of hybrid missions following a downturn in un peacekeeping missions in the mid-to-late 1990s, the un has since witnessed a deepening of its responsibilities in peace and security (see durch & berckman 2006b). this can be seen from the increase in the number, size and complexity of un peacekeeping missions since the beginning of the 21st century. there are presently over 100,000 military, police and civilian personnel (of which more than 80,000 are uniformed personnel) deployed as part of 15 un peacekeeping missions (dpko 2007b).3 with the new mission to darfur currently underway, this number can only increase.4 2 it should be mentioned that the eu does not consider itself a typical regional organisation as foreseen by chapter 8 of the un charter; it is nevertheless a regional actor (or as some argue global actor) in the field of crisis management. 3 in fact, the center for international cooperation’s 2007 annual review of global peace operations mentions that un deployments have seen a five-fold increase between 2000 and 2005. the number of uniformed personnel also saw an increase of 10,000 since last year (cic 2007). 4 in a press release in october 2006, jean-marie guehenno, the undersecretary-general for peacekeeping warned that this number could reach 140,000 with a year (leopold 2006). 22 while this surge in un peacekeeping missions clearly reveals the evolving and crucial role of un peacekeeping in conflict management, it is also contributing to the dramatic strain on the un’s capacity to undertake and sustain substantial missions. this strain is compounded by the organisation’s increasing financial burden, which has for the first time in un history surpassed the $5 billion mark (unog 2006). given these constraints, strategic partnerships between regional actors and the un are increasingly looked upon as the preferred option for meeting the peacekeeping demand (cic 2006). the potential role of regional actors and organizations in conflict management was underscored by the 2004 report of the secretary general’s high level panel on threats, challenges and change and the secretary general’s 2005 report in larger freedom. the high level panel called for a greater reliance on chapter 8 of the un charter and a more integrated approach to peacekeeping between the un and regional organisations (un 2004).5 in larger freedom went further in suggesting the establishment of formal agreements between the un and regional peacekeeping capacities that would allow for greater exchanges in early warning information and help in the areas of training and logistics (un 2005). the report called on the establishment of “an interlocking system of peacekeeping capacities that will enable the united nations to work with relevant regional organisations in predictable and reliable partnerships” (ibid., 31). the report further acknowledged that the need for rapid action could not be achieved solely through the mechanisms of the un, and urged un members to improve the un’s deployment options through the creation of strategic reserves that could deploy rapidly within the framework of the united nations arrangements. in this regard, the report welcomed, for example, the decision by the european union and the african union to create highreadiness standby brigades that could be used to reinforce un missions, and invited other nations to develop similar capacities and place these at the disposal of the un. the high level panel also highlighted nato’s increasing role in peacekeeping, though it cautioned that such capacity to undertake stand-alone operations should not be used outside a un framework. in sum, the emergence of regional actors on the international scene, namely the eu, nato, the au, and ecowas, and their potential deployment capacity is beneficial for the un as they provide the un with the opportunity to utilize complementary capabilities through hybrid missions. the nature of these missions and their role in peace operations are explored next. 2.1 hybridizing un peacekeeping missions jones and cherif (2004) identify four types of hybrid missions, which differ in the level of integration between the un and non-un entities. these are described in table 1. each type of hybrid mission can be further differentiated with respect to the nature of the nonun component, whether a regional organization (ro), a multinational force or a bilateral operation.6 5 chapter 8 refers to operations authorized by the security council, but led by other actors, such as regional organizations and coalitions of willing states. 6 one example of a hybrid mission includes afghanistan, where a un political mission, the united nations assistance mission in afghanistan (unama), is working alongside the nato-led isaf mission. a hybrid un-au peacekeeping force is also underway in darfur. this hybrid force, however, would be much more integrated than the operation in 23 table 1: hybrid missions and their characteristics types of hybrid missions characteristics integrated un and ros operate with single or joined chain of command coordinated un and ros are coordinated but operate under different chains of command parallel un deploys alongside other org.; no formal coordination sequential un precedes or follows other forces source: jones and cherif 2004. the potential complementary capability offered by regional actors is important considering the ongoing challenges facing the deployments of un peacekeeping operations. in general, un deployments are marked by limited rapidity, a lack of flexibility and delays in the approval of mandates. the un also faces a growing reluctance on the part of western countries to deploy troops—especially larger contingents—under un command (liégois 2006).7 this has led since the mid-1990s to a dramatic decline in the level of troop contribution by western states to un-led operations and to an increasing reliance on developing countries to offer troops.8 while these contributions are much needed, the large provision of military personnel by developing countries has caused serious operational consequences in peace operations, as troops are often poorly and inadequately trained, and they suffer from a limited pool of specialized units and from delays in deployment. it is also fair to say that regional actors and ad hoc coalitions rarely enjoy the same level of legitimacy than the un (cic 2006).9 in fact, as argued in the center for international cooperation’s (cic) 2006 annual review of global peace operations, hybrid missions may prove to be the best option for the future, owing to their combination of un legitimacy and regional or local capacity. while there are significant differences in the capacity level of regional actors, in general, hybrid missions are said to be advantageous for several reasons. hybrid missions can alleviate the un’s burden by dividing peacekeeping responsibilities between the un and the regional actor, or by assigning the latter with the entire mandate. regional actors in hybrid missions can also deploy in advance of a un force, thereby providing the un with more time to build-up and deploy a mission, and can help reinforce un missions at short notice. finally, hybrid missions are believed to be more robust and capable than un afghanistan, the latter of which can be qualified as coordinated rather than integrated. see jones and cherif 2004; and durch and berkman 2006a,b. 7 it should be noted that the concentration of western countries on providing logistics, planning and command & control also involves significantly lower political and human risks than that of deploying a battalion (liégois 2006). 8 as of 31 october 2006, the top 10 contributors of uniformed personnel to un peacekeeping were pakistan, bangladesh, india, jordan, nepal, ghana, uruguay, ethiopia, nigeria and south africa. together, these countries accounted for 60 per cent of all un military and police personnel. since december 31st, 2006, italy and france are now 8th and 10th respectively (replacing ethiopia and south africa). this is due to their contribution to unifil, the un interim force in lebanon. see dpi 2007. 9 the african union (au) force in darfur is a specific example of an organisation who has enjoyed greater legitimacy than a un mission. indeed, the blockage, until recently, of the un (as part of a un-au hybrid force) in darfur demonstrates that even un legitimacy is not always recognized as such. 24 missions on their own.10 this is especially the case as regional organisations and ad hoc forces have proven more willing to undertake deployments under chapter 7 of the un charter.11 (see durch & berckman 2006a; jones & cherif 2004; cic 2006) in this context, bruce and cherif (2004) project that un-commanded peacekeeping operations will continue in the future especially in africa, and see the overall response as being met through hybrid operations. as mentioned earlier, the prevalence of hybrid missions underscores the increasing flexibility with which the un can meet the peacekeeping demand. this flexibility results from the growing number of actors that the un can rely on, allowing in turn for more diverse responses to conflict. the presence of numerous actors, however, does not guarantee that an intervention will occur, as other factors enter into play. most often, deployments occur where national and/or security interests can best be served, though the availability of funding and equipment are also important factors in the decision to send troop and can significantly restrict the scope and duration of interventions (durch & berckman 2006b). still, it is argued that the probability of regional actors to get involved in a hybrid mission will depend on the extent to which such deployment can, first and foremost, serve their interests. in addition, jones and cherif (2004) maintain that there is still confusion, both within policy circles and within the un itself, as to the exact nature of hybrid missions and their implications within the broader field of conflict management. in particular, they note the un’s (including the department of peacekeeping operations and secretariat) limited capacity to manage the hybrid nature of operations and their increasingly large civilian component (especially with respect to planning of the civilian dimension). as a result, they specify that un operations will often be preceded by force multiplier components, though they predict that the availability of such mission will remain ad hoc and inconsistent. in this regard, it is fair to say that hybrid missions need “a comprehensive approach, coordinated and planned not in isolation, but in close cooperation between the parties involved” (eide 2006, 51-52). however, the development of partnerships between the un and regional actors raises questions regarding the strategic nature of these partnerships and whether they should be formed through established collaborations between the un and other entities or on a case-by-case basis (guicherd 2006). moreover, while the un welcomes the desire of regional actors to conduct operations (either under chapter 8 of the un charter or by request), it is important that efforts geared towards strengthening regional and local peacekeeping capacities complement un efforts and works towards strengthening the organisation rather than undermining it. in trying to understand how regional actors can contribute to and support the deployment of hybrid missions, i now turn to an examination of european union and canadian contributions to peace operations, and analyze the implications of these contributions for hybrid missions and un peacekeeping in general. 10 nevertheless, regional actors, especially in africa, may not always be adequate and sufficiently credible for a mission to succeed and are often no more efficient than the un. according to cilliers (69), for example, most missions in africa are “significantly beyond african resources.” 11 operations with chapter 7 mandates provide peacekeepers with greater flexibility to use force. 25 3. european union contributions to crisis management the eu is a relatively new comer on the peacekeeping front, its first mission dating back to 2003 in macedonia. the eu has since conducted 16 missions, some of which were in close cooperation with the un, and has extended beyond its immediate geographic reach deploying military, police, and civilians to the balkans, africa, southeast asia, and the middle east (see table 2). these missions were conducted under the european security and defence policy (esdp), which according to jim choos, director at the council secretariat, is in many ways geared towards helping the un “fulfill its increasing burden” (2007, 15). table 2: eu-led civilian and military crisis management missions type of crisis management corresponding missions civilian crisis management current operations: � eupm in bosnia-herzegovina (2003-present) � eusec dr congo (2005-present) � eu bam rafah in palestinian territories (2005-present) � eujust lex in iraq (2005-present) � eu support to amis ii in darfur (2005-present; civ-mil component) � eupm in palestinian territories (eupol copps; 2006present) � eupt in kosovo (2006-present) � eupol afghanistan (deployed in june 2007) � eupol rd congo (deployed in july 2007) � esdp mission to kosovo (expected deployment in 2007) completed operations: � eupm in the former yugoslav republic of macedonia (eupol proxima; 2003-05 � eujust themis in georgia (2004-05) � aceh monitoring mission (amm; 2005-06) � eupat in the former yugoslav republic of macedonia (200506) � eupm in drc (eupol kinshasa; 2005-2007) military crisis management current operations: � eufor in bosnia-herzegovina (operation althea; 2004-present) � interim eu force to chad (under discussion) completed operations: � eufor in the former yugoslav republic of macedonia (operation concordia; 2003) � eufor bunia, drc (operation artemis; 2003) � eufor rd congo (2006) source: european council 2007 (data as of july 2007). in september 2003, the eu and un signed a “joint declaration on eu-un cooperation in crisis management” calling for the practical cooperation in the field of crisis management, planning, training, communication and best practices, greater exchange of information, and coordination of activities and priorities. the importance of such developments were reaffirmed in the european security strategy (ess), adopted in december 2003, which emphasizes multilateral responses to security questions and the 26 need to reinforce international organisations. since then, joint efforts between the eu and un have substantially intensified, and eu developments in crisis management and deployments under an eu flag have been welcomed by the un. the possibility of “relying on a more active, capable and coherent eu as an operational partner committed to ‘effective multilateralism’” constitutes a significant attraction to the un (graham 2004, 10). however, it is important to ensure that eu capacities serve to enhance rather than weaken the un. the next section thus examines eu developments in both military and civilian crisis management and identifies the opportunities and challenges to greater eu-un cooperation. 3.1 military crisis management in 2004, the eu and un adopted an “agreement on cooperation in military crisis management” (2004), establishing two frameworks for engaging the eu in un operations, at the request of the un or under a un mandate (liégois 2006). they are the ‘bridging model’ and ‘standby model.’ the ‘bridging model’ envisages the rapid deployment of an eu force immediately following a cease-fire or in response to an emerging crisis. the force would provide an immediate presence and show of force on the ground, and would give the un time to deploy a larger follow-on operation. examples of bridging forces include the take over of the un task force by the european police mission in bosnia and herzegovina in 2003, and the deployment, that same year, of an eu military force to bunia, drc, allowing the un to strengthen its peacekeeping mission (monuc) and expand its mandate. the ‘standby model’, for its part, foresees a number of eu forces kept on standby to deploy at the un’s request as a stand-alone operation or in the initial phase of a larger un operation. forces could also intervene to assist peacekeepers or get people out. on the basis of these models, the eu has developed two capacities that could help boost its contributions to un peacekeeping (choos 2007). the first is the development of battlegroups (bgs) aimed at reinforcing the esdp’s military capabilities. declared operational in january 2007, bgs are forces composed of 1,500 troops deployable within a timeframe of 5 to 10 days and sustainable in the field for up to 120 days. each bg also has a force headquarter and pre-identified logistics and transport components. there are presently two bgs on standby that are able to deploy simultaneously on different missions. the second capacity is the setting up of a civilian-military cell to improve planning capacity in integrated missions. 3.2 civilian crisis management in june 2000, the eu identified four priorities for civilian crisis management: police, rule of law, civilian administration and civil protection.12 the eu also set up quantitative targets for meeting these priorities, including the provision of an available force for international service of up to 5,000 civilian police (1,400 of which are part of a rapid response force which can deploy on a 30-day notice), as well as 200 judges, lawyers, and corrections officers (60 of which can deploy on a 30-day notice) (ec 2007). while these 12 the establishment of monitoring capacities is identified as a possible fifth priority area. 27 quantitative targets have been largely surpassed (based on voluntary member state commitments), the eu is now concentrating on developing the qualitative aspects of its civilian approach, concentrating on the development of capabilities using a needs-based approach (goulay 2005). in line with this new focus, in 2005, new goals were set for improving the civilian dimension of esdp.13 these goals are based on the development of capacities that will enable the eu to deploy integrated civilian crisis management packages, conduct simultaneous civilian missions that are sustainable over a longer period of time, deploy at short notice, work in close-cooperation with the military, and respond to requests by international organisations, with particular attention given to the un (goulay 2005). 3.3 opportunities and challenges to greater eu-un cooperation while the eu has conducted both military and civilian missions, the vast majority of esdp missions to date (as identified in table 2) have been civilian or civilian-oriented. in fact, the eu has made fastest operational progress with respect to civilian capabilities for crisis management and more success has been achieved in police missions than in military ones. this has led many scholars and policy makers to view the eu’s comparative advantage to be in the civilian field (liégois 2006). many also believe that much can be learned from the eu’s integrated concept of civilian-military crisis response (see earle 2004; gcsp 2003). as liégois argues, “the eu appears as a particularly promising actor owing to its capacity to effectively combine the military and civilian components required in contemporary multidimensional peacekeeping operations” (2006, 160; own translation). this capacity, combined with the eu’s “new focus on creating modular and potentially multifunctional packages, capable of being tailored to the specific needs of a crisis at short notice” serve as distinct advantages for conflict prevention and crisis management (goulay 2005, 4). battlegroups (bgs), for example, could prove to be effective as an initial entry force to secure vital assets, or as an emergency force to establish a deterring presence on the ground while awaiting the deployment of a larger and more robust peace-enforcement mission or follow-on peacekeeping force. in fact, bgs were envisaged for missions comparable in size, capabilities and requirements to that of operation artemis in the drc—the eu’s first autonomous mission without reliance on nato assets, with france as the framework nation—and as a result, bgs could prove credible and effective in similar kinds of missions. despite these developments, the eu still demonstrates serious flaws with respect to peacekeeping, affecting its credibility and its effectiveness with respect to the actions it undertakes (liégois 2006). for example, earle (2004) argues that the eu faces a deficit in military and police capacity that can be deployed as part of post-conflict peace operations. she identifies two types of military gaps: the first between forces committed and their ability to deploy, and the second between the declared capacity and the actual trained, deployable and interoperable capacity, referring specifically to the “triple-hated” nature of eu troops as counted as part of available eu, nato and un contributions. 13 these goals were set out in the civilian headline goal 2008. 28 earle also identifies a police gap between the number of police officers committed to operations and the actual number available to deploy. another concern is the question of whether bgs will be able to deploy in larger and more demanding types of operations. as the usual deployment time for a un peacekeeping force takes up to six months, bgs would need to be capable and willing to remain in theatre for longer periods of time. moreover, as force generation and deployment are the sole responsibility of the member states, bgs are required to find their own transport to a mission area. this issue will remain a major challenge for the eu, for as long as airlift capacity remains limited. it is also well-known that the eu faces a lack of adequate investment in defence. in this regard, while the operational capacity demonstrated in recent eu operations could foresee the deployment of bgs to other continents, the limited size and capabilities of bgs will inevitably limit their reach to that of responding and solving local and/or limited size crises. as a result, it is reasonable to think that future out of area missions will not be feasible without the appropriate military capabilities and force structure, as well as the adequate financial means. apart from questions of capabilities, policy questions also present obstacles to the deployment of bgs. one potential challenge will be meeting the short timeframe between the approval of a bg and its deployment. this will depend on rapid political decisionmaking at both the member state and council levels. in addition, the success of the bg concept will emanate from the ability of member states to come to a consensus, or the ability of some members to pressure others in deploying the force. consequently, powerful nations within the eu will likely keep their leverage and dictate when and where bgs are used. more specifically, this means that eu deployments will likely concentrate in regions that are of strategic interest to its members. the eu’s main engagement under the esdp is in the balkans, a situation, which according to liégois (2006) is not likely to change for several years to come. yet, the eu has also clearly demonstrated its capacity and intent of conducting both military and police operations in africa.14 as a matter of fact, while europe’s primary interest lies in the security of its borders, africa is also extremely important strategically, especially in terms of the fear and political drawbacks generated by an increase in refugees and asylum seekers (belliard 2007). europe thus has an interest in seeing that african conflicts are contained (ibid.). other outstanding issues have to do with the chain of command in military operations, i.e., the control over the chain of command in joint operations, the eu’s involvement in planning of un operations, and the arrangements for the transfer of authority from eu to un mission (isis 2004). the latter component is particularly important as the eu’s exit strategy, in most situations, remains a un operation. on these issues, the deployment of the un mission to lebanon (unifil) following the july 2006 crisis, is an interesting case. although it was difficult to get member states to commit troops and uphold their 14 while some (see moens 2006) argue that esdp missions should concentrate on stabilizing european borders as nato devotes itself to areas outside of europe, the reality is that nato will not, at least in the foreseeable future, deploy troops to africa. 29 commitments (in addition to delays involved in requiring parliament approval), a force of over 13,024 was eventually deployed with italy contributing 2,488 soldiers, france, 1,610, spain, 1,082, and germany, 782 (dpko 2007a). while this major involvement in unifil by eu members is proof of the continued reliance on the un in situations where the deployment of regional actors or ad hoc forces would be controversial, it also points to the ability of eu members to retain command and control over their contingents, even when deployed under a un flag. finally, the eu’s lack of commonality and cohesiveness in both decision-making and capability structure is possibly the eu’s greatest challenge in crisis management (see liégois 2006). as eide (2006, 46) argues, the eu “has precisely the multifaceted nature that is needed to take an integrated approach to [peace operations]” but it needs “to get its act together to reap this potential synergy.” in other words, a coherent strategy and “collective will to deploy” will be crucial for the deployment of police and military crisis management missions (earle 2004). 4. canadian contributions to peace operations canada, in comparison to the eu, has participated in almost every mission since the inception of peacekeeping and canadian soldiers and civilian police officers are recognized worldwide as being among the finest peacekeepers. canada has also always been a strong supporter of un peacekeeping, although its role in un peace operations in the last 15 years has been decreasing. canada’s troop contribution has suffered a stark decline since the mid-1990s, counting a total of 139 military observers, police and troops to un peacekeeping missions as of march 2007 (see table 3) (dpko 2007a). out of 114 troop contributing countries, canada ranks 59th. canada’s financial contribution to the un peacekeeping budget is minimal, contributing 3% of the 2006 assessed contributions to un peacekeeping budget of about $4.75 billion (unac 2007). although canada clearly acknowledges that peacekeeping is beneficial to the international community, these figures reflect an increasing gap between canada’s long history and exemplary record in un peacekeeping and its present contribution in terms of un peacekeeping personnel and percentage of cost of peacekeeping missions. table 3: current canadian contributions to un peacekeeping operations un peacekeeping operations contributions un stabilization mission in haiti (minustah) 66 (62 police; 4 troop) un organisation mission in the drc (monuc) 8 (military observer mo) un assistance mission for iraq (unami) 1 (mo) un disengagement observer force in the golan heights (undof) 2 (troop) un forces in cyprus (unficyp) 1 (troop) un mission in sudan (unmis) 35 (8 troop; 3 police; 24 mo) un integrated mission in timor-leste (unmit) 6 (police) un operations in côte d’ivoire (unoci) 5 (police) 30 un truce supervision organisation in the middle east (untso) 7 (police) source: dpko 2007a (data as of 30 june 2007). the trend in canadian commitments to peace operations can be described as a clear move away from un-led peacekeeping and a move towards nato or un-mandated stabilization missions. canada has taken greater interest in missions run by nato partly because of un failures in the 1990s and the increasing fear of placing canadian soldiers in situations where they are vulnerable. in addition, the “military structure [in nato-led operations] is better defined, the number of troops deployed is larger, the level of support is greater, and partner nations are generally better equipped and trained than in typical un-commanded missions” (dorn 2006, 16). canada’s interest in nato also reflects a rapprochement vis-à-vis the us and the emergence of ‘new’ security issues such as terrorism. this can be seen from canada’s present contribution of 2,500 troops to the nato-led international security assistance force (isaf) in afghanistan. despite the trend identified above, canada, just like the eu, remains committed to the un and to a multilateral approach, as highlighted by its focus on the role of international organisations as the basis for stability and peace within the international system (ips 2005). these commitments have resulted in the development in recent years of a number of initiatives. as these initiatives were created to support canada’s desire for a larger role in conflict management, in doing so, they also demonstrate direct implications for un peacekeeping. these initiatives are briefly described below. 1) creation of the stabilization and reconstruction task force (start) start was created in 2005 to assess the extent of crises around the world, and, drawing on expertise from across government and in collaboration with task forces from partner countries, to promote faster and more coordinated responses by the government in support of stabilization and reconstruction efforts. the task force also aims to be effective in providing support to the un when responding to crises (government of canada 2007; hamilton 2007). 2) increasing role of canadian civilian police in peacekeeping missions canadian police officers, coordinated by the royal canadian mounted police, are increasingly taking part in peacekeeping missions. their activities include training local police, reforming and professionalizing police organisations, strengthening security and reinforcing local authority, and promoting civil-military relations. canada, for example, contributes 12 police experts in darfur, the largest police contribution to the area. canadian police personnel (up to 100 civilian police and 25 experts on police services) also provide training and expertise to the haitian national police (rcmp 2007). 3) creation of the standing contingency force canada recently developed a standing contingency force to enhance its ability to respond quickly to international crises. the force consists of approximately 1000 soldiers deployable within 7 to 10 days notice, with the aim of providing an initial stabilizing 31 presence on the ground to facilitate, if needed, the deployment of a larger, follow-on force (unac 2007).15 4) development of civilian rosters the creation of rosters or catalogues, such as the roster developed by canadem for example, can help to circumvent a lack of political will by individual states and can also enable a more timely deployment of peacekeeping forces. rosters keep an updated database of civilian experts that can deploy on short-notice to peace missions. 5) deployment of the multinational stand-by high readiness brigade (shirbrig) an initiative of the danish and canadian governments, shirbrig is a rapidly deployable peacekeeping force at the un’s disposal. the brigade’s estimated response time is of 15 to 30 days and it is comprised of 4000 to 5000 troops when fully deployed. its purpose is to buy time to generate forces; it can remain in the field for up to six months. since becoming operational in january 2000, shirbrig was deployed to four missions (unmee, unmil, unamis, and unmis). it also provided planning assistance to ecowas in côte d’ivoire and the dpko in darfur. according to a former commander of the brigade, shirbrig has become an important element of peacekeeping operations and has proven an effective and efficient contributor to un operations. while canada’s involvement in shirbrig has diminished in recent years, the brigade remains operational and should be viewed as an additional tool for effectively responding to crises (mitchell 2006; unac 2007). 4.1 canadian contributions to eu deployments apart from these developments, canada is also increasingly engaged with the eu in peace operations. the eu has become a global peace and security partner for canada, with whom canada enjoys much credibility. it is also in canada’s interest to have a secure europe. since 2003, canada has contributed to four eu missions. at the 2007 canada-eu summit held in berlin at the beginning of june, canada agreed to participate in the new eu police mission to afghanistan by deploying at least 22 police officers (canada-eu summit 2007). canada could also possibly participate in the new police mission to the drc (see table 4). table 4: canadian contributions to eu crisis management missions16 type of crisis management corresponding missions contributions � eufor bunia, drc (operation artemis) strategic lift support. military crisis management � eufor in bih (operation althea) 8 (troop); ended march 2007 � eupm in drc (eupol kinshasa) 1 (rcmp civilian); (ended june 2007) civilian crisis management � eupm in bih 8 (police) 15 at present, however, it is unclear when the force will become operational and how sustainable it will be in the field. 16 the numbers identified in table 4 correspond to current canadian commitments to eu missions (or commitment at time of mission closure). they are not an accurate representation of the total canadian contribution to each eu mission. 32 � eupol afghanistan 22 (police) � eupol rd congo possible contribution. source: canadian forces operations 2007; rcmp international peacekeeping 2007. as part of its 2005 international policy statement (ips), the government of canada pledged to continue working closely with the eu, and contribute to its missions. in following up on this commitment, canada and the eu signed an “agreement establishing a framework for the participation of canada in eu-led crisis management operations” in november 2005, which provides a blueprint for canadian participation in eu military and civilian operations. the ips also identified the capacity to respond to the challenge posed by state failure as a key component of canada’s defence strategy (government of canada 2005). this commitment to address weak or failing states is crucial in that it reasserts the goals of the european security strategy, and further justifies canadian involvement in missions undertaken by the eu. according to some scholars, however, canadian participation in eu-led military operations does not serve canadian interests. for moens (2006), canada’s participation in operation althea, the largest canadian contribution to an eu-led mission can be explained by the operation’s reliance on a nato-eu cooperation agreement (i.e., the berlin plus agreement) and the fact that canada did not have to choose sides. in his view, canadian participation in a decision-making process that determines eu missions and objectives could never be meaningful simply because it is not an eu member. in his words, “canadian military return from participating in eu-led operations is marginal at best,” and he does not believe that “placing canadian forces under the european union in military operations [produces] an effective political or force multiplier for canada” (ibid.). by contrast, he acknowledges that combining canadian and eu efforts in the areas of humanitarian, development and police coordination functions can be effective in getting results. if this is the case, it is not surprising then that canada’s military strategic interests are believed to be better served with nato, as canada is said to have more voice within nato than within the eu (see moens 2006). however, practice points to a different picture. when looking at the list of canadian contributions to eu missions (including potential future contributions), canada appears more inclined to contribute to civilian missions than to military ones. while this may reflect a desire to retain command and control over its forces—as opposed to placing canadian soldiers under the command of an organisation they are not a part of—the reality is that there has been much more opportunities to participate in civilian missions. canada’s close relationship with the eu is reflected in constant dialogue between canadian and council officials, at the political and technical levels. canada is also recognized as an essential partner in crisis management, based on the expertise, professionalism and bilingualism of its personnel. canada’s contribution is always highly appreciated, especially in terms of what it doesn’t bring to the table: a history of colonialism, a geographic proximity to belligerents, and a 33 history of animosity of confrontation with parties to the conflict (hamilton 2007). as a result, canada’s voice within the eu may not be as limited as some want us to believe.17 notwithstanding the deepening level of cooperation between the eu and canada, this relationship remains largely ad hoc and contributions modest in scale. considering the strengths and added value that canada can bring to eu missions, it is likely that canada’s participation in eu-led missions will continue in the future, particularly in civilian missions. these contributions are likely to remain modest in size, but will nevertheless serve to enhance eu missions positively. 5. conclusions: implications for hybrid peacekeeping missions in the future at a time when the un is more and more recognized as an ‘indispensable’ global actor in international peace and security, the surge in peacekeeping missions and financial demands has put an enormous strain on the organisation’s ability to carry out ongoing missions and to undertake new ones (brahimi 2006). given the constraints placed on the un, the development of hybrid missions has become the preferred option for responding to emerging crises and increasingly complex post-conflict situations. this paper thus examined european union and canadian contributions to peace operations in an attempt to clarify the implication of their contributions for hybrid missions and for un peacekeeping in general. the above analysis demonstrates that hybrid missions involving the deployment of eu military and civilian capacities can help the un in assuming its increasing role in conflict prevention and crisis management. while military deployments will be beneficial in providing for rapid and robust responses to crises and for supporting the un in the event of growing instability, civilian capacities will prove beneficial in providing the un with an integrated civilian package. apart from this progress, including improvements to formalize the eu-un relationship, there is still confusion as to the exact nature of hybrid missions involving eu and un components and their implications for conflict management. for example, future eu deployments in support of un missions are not clear and predictable; some even argue that such contributions will remain “episodic and fragmented” (liégois 2006, 160; own translation). this is especially the case for military deployments, as they do not yet provide for a full range of capabilities, leaving gaps to be filled by other actors. in addition, deployments must still be approved by individual eu member states, underlining the need for early exchanges of information and early engagement of states in the process. as goulay (2005, 4) observes, “the challenge of institutionalising integrated and flexible responses in an eu context remains great, and will require creative practical solutions and continued support from member states for strengthening the eu’s role and 17 it is worth mentioning that the eu and canada have recently agreed to establish cooperation on crisis response through start, and to continue to cooperate closely on eu election observation missions in order to allow participation by canadian observers (canada-eu summit 2007). it is also important to note that both the eu and canada are providing significant support to the african union (au), and particularly to the african union mission in sudan (amis). this support—in the form of military and police advisers, logistical support, equipment, training, strategic lift, as well as financial resources—is crucial in that it supports au peacekeeping missions in africa, which in turn provides the un with greater burden-sharing opportunities in responding to conflict. 34 resources for civilian crisis management.” the same can be said of military crisis management. thus, while challenges remain, the growing number of esdp missions gives a good idea of the willingness of the eu and its member states to get involved in peace operations and to support a multilateral approach with the un at its center. the above analysis also shows that canada is in a unique position to cooperate with the eu to advance common interests. as a result, canada should aim for a greater contribution to eu deployments where canadian interests are best served. in doing so, both the eu and canada should further develop the modalities for engaging canada in eu missions. greater canadian engagement, combined with canada’s expertise and credibility, would enhance cooperation and coordination between the two entities, and could raise canada’s profile and voice within the eu and its institutions. where the eu is not involved, but canadian interests are at stake, canada could pressure individual eu members and other un members to use established frameworks such as shirbrig. the analysis also points to the need to strengthen un capacity to undertake hybrid missions. in supporting hybrid missions, regional actors must ensure that the creation and build-up of regional capacities strengthen the un organisation as a whole, rather than undermine it. this implies close cooperation and coordination between the un and regional organisations, but also with single troop contributing countries such as canada. moreover, while it is clear that hybrid missions can help to alleviate the un’s burden in peace and security, the ‘hybridization’ of un peacekeeping operations should not constitute a reason for western states to continue to avoid greater engagement in un peace operations, both financially and in terms of military and civilian personnel. as cottey and forster (2004, 67) argue, “more equitable sharing of the burden of maintaining international peace and security [should be] a desirable goal in itself.” such equitable sharing will not only strengthen the legitimacy of peacekeeping in general, but may in the longer term, also help to develop “a wider consensus on sensitive questions of peace enforcement and intervention” (ibid.). to conclude, hybrid peacekeeping missions will likely prove advantageous in addressing the surge in the number, size and complexity of peace operations and in relieving the strain faced by the un and the international community as a whole. as more actors acquire deployment capacity, more options are made available to the international community and the un in conflict prevention and crisis management. more choices, in turn, can translate in a greater flexibility to choose the most suitable mechanism for a particular situation. in this regard, the flexibility of a hybrid model may in fact allow for more originality and context-specific solutions, and could help circumvent institutional rigidity when crafting responses (unac 2007). thus, the best approach to the development of partnerships may be through the combination of established modalities for engaging with the un and case-by-case analysis. on a final note, it is worth mentioning that the strengthening of un peacekeeping will only be possible through the active and sustained engagement of western states to multilateralism and to the un as a core actor in peace and security. 35 bibliography belliard, jean-christophe. 2007. presentation given by mr. belliard, task force afrique, european council, march 1st. brahimi, lakhdar. 2006. “un peace operations in the 21st century: a few personal thoughts.” in peacekeeping – peacebuilding. preparing for the future, ed. hanna ojanen, 13-19. helsinki: the finnish institute of international affairs. available at: www.upi-fiia.fi/doc/fiia_report_14.pdf. canada-eu summit statement 2007, berlin, 4 june 2007. available at: www.eu2007.de/en/news/download_docs/juni/0604-raa1/010erklaerung.pdf. center on international cooperation (cic). 2006. annual review of global peace operations 2006. boulder, co: lynne rienner publishers. choos, jim. january 2007. “eu-un co-operation on crisis management.” european security and defence policy newsletter, no. 3. brussels: european council. cottey, andrew and anthony forster. 2004. “enhancing regional peacekeeping capabilities.” in reshaping defence diplomacy: new roles for military cooperation and assistance (adelphi papers), 51-68. london: international institute for strategic studies. dorn, walter. december 2006. “canada: the once and future peacekeeper?” peace magazine 30. available at: http://peacejournalism.com/readarticle.asp?articleid=12227. durch, william and tobias c. berckman. 2006. “définition et délimitation des opérations de paix.” in guide du maintien de la paix 2007, ed. jocelyn coulon, 1747. québec: cepes. _____. 2006. who should keep the peace? washington, d.c.: the henri l. stimson center. earle, caroline r.. march 2004. european capacities for peace operations: taking stock. washington, d.c.: the henri l. stimson center. eide, espen barth. 2006. “from peacekeeping to peacebuilding.” in peacekeeping – peacebuilding. preparing for the future, 43-52. european council. 2007. “security and defence policy.” available at: www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showpage.asp?lang=en. geneva center for security policy (gcsp). 2003. eu and peace operations, conference proceedings, 22-23 september. 36 goulay, catriona. march 2005. “eu civilian crisis management: preparing for flexible and rapid response.” european security review, no. 25. brussels: institute for security and international studies. available at: www.isiseurope.org/ftp/download/esr25-ccm%20final.pdf. government of canada. 2005. canada’s international policy statement: a role of pride and influence in the world—defence. ottawa: government of canada. graham, kennedy. 2004. “towards effective multilateralism – the eu and un: partners in crisis management.” issue no. 13. brussels: european policy center (epc). available at: www.isn.ethz.ch/pubs/ph/details.cfm?lng=en&id=10822. guicherd, catherine. april 2006. “reviving chapter viii: the united nations and regional organisations – partners for peace.” international peace academy meeting note, 1-12. hamilton, kevin. 2007. remarks by kevin hamilton, deputy director, conflict prevention and peacebuilding group, department of foreign affairs and international trade at the “3rd workshop on enhancing cooperation with major players in conflict prevention,” hosted by the madriaga european foundation, brussels, 19 april. international security information service (isis). july 2004. “follow up to the european security strategy: effective multilateralism.” european security review, no. 23. jones, bruce and feryal cherif. 2004. evolving models of peackeeping, policy implications and responses, report prepared for the united nations department of peacekeeping operations’ peacekeeping best practices unit. new york, n.y.: new york university center on international cooperation. leopold, evelyn. 2006. “u.n. peacekeeping nearing 100,000 troops, civilians.” reuters, 5 october. available at: http://thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2006/10/5/worldupdates/2006-1005t072950z_01_nootr_rtrjonc_0_-270789-1&sec=worldupdates. liégois, michel. 2006. “l’union européenne et les operations de paix: l’arrivée à maturité d’un nouvel acteur?” in guide du maintien de la paix 2007, ed. jocelyn coulon, 144-160. québec: cepes. mitchell, gregory b. 2006. “briefing to the danish institute of international studies.” available at: www.diis.dk/graphics/events/2006/shirbrig/mitchell_briefing_diis.pdf. moens, alexander. 2006. "canadian participation in eu-led military operations does not serve canadian interest.” the dispatch 4, no. 2. calgary: canadian defence 37 and foreign affairs institute. avalailble at: www.cdfai.org/newsletters/newslettersummer2006.htm. royal canadian mounted police (rcmp). 2007. “international peace operations branch.” available at: www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/peace_operations/index_e.htm. united nations. march 2005. in larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all, report of the secretary general, a/59/2005. available at: www.un.org/largerfreedom/. _____. december 2004. a more secured world: our shared responsibility, report of the secretary general’s high-level panel on threats, challenges and change, a/59/565. available at: www.un.org/secureworld/report2.pdf. united nations association of canada (unac). 2007. peacekeeping to peacebuilding: lessons from the past, building for the future. the report on the una-canada 50th anniversary of un peacekeeping international panel series 2006-2007. ottawa: unac. united nations department of peacekeeping operations (dpko). 2007a. “monthly summary of contributors of military and civilian police personnel.” available at: www.un.org/depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/. _____. 2007b. “united nations peacekeeping operations.” available at: www.un.org/depts/dpko/dpko/bnote.htm. united nations department of public information (dpi). 2006. “united nations military, police deployment reaches all-time high in october.” pko/152. available at: www.un.org/news/press/docs/2006/pko152.doc.htm. _____. 2007. united nations peace operations year in review 2006. available at: www.un.org/depts/dpko/dpko/pub/year_review06/. united nations office at geneva (unog). 2006. speech by secretary general kofi annan at a panel discussion on the occasion of the international day of united nations peacekeepers, geneva, june 1st. available at: www.unog.ch/unog/website/dg.nsf/(httpspeechesbyyear_en)/971583c641a6b776 c12571810039de38?opendocument&year=2006. microsoft word jason r. young_roma in europe human rights or humans out of sight.doc review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 4/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 52 …………………………………………………… roma in europe: human rights or humans out of sight? jason r. young abstract europe is confronted by a painful paradox; while the idea of ‘europe’ conceptualizes the european union as a champion of liberal democracy, human rights and equality, the position of the roma clashes with this vision. this paper looks at human rights and exclusion in europe with specific emphasis on the roma ethnic minority and argues that prevalent anti-roma discrimination in both western and centraleastern europe holds larger ramifications than merely the roma’s constant position of alien, or “despised outsider”. the power of discrimination, popular culture and opinion in marginalizing the roma effectively limits their equal exercise of civil, political, and human rights. the roma therefore represent tangible limits to the ideas intertwined with european integration. it is argued that the unwillingness to address the issue of roma exclusion on the local level within specific countries possesses the effect of creating a two-tier citizenship regime that possess the capacity for unraveling the social and intellectual aims of the european project. social, legal, and actual exclusion of the roma therefore holds significant ramifications for social policy within an enlarging eu. the paper presents popular depictions of the roma and illustrates the pervasive power of exclusion by examining events such as the 1993 czech citizenship law; the 1999 construction (and subsequent debate over the dismantling) of a wall around roma apartments in the czech town of ústi nad labem, widespread use of physical violence and intimidation to discourage roma settlement and racism in central and eastern europe. these events suggest that the pan-european “identity” is far from constructed and that systematic and fundamental change in attitudes towards among elites and society at large and representations of the roma is essential if the eu’s enlargement is to expand the protection of human rights on an equal footing throughout europe for the roma. combating historical representations constructed by social and political elites of the groups such as the roma as an other is of paramount importance if the roma, and other ethnic minorities, are to be included as equal stakeholders in an enlarged europe. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 4/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 53 introduction daniel livermore writes, “the ideas of good citizenship and loyalty to the state have gradually become identified with the cultures and traditions of the majorities [within the nation-state]” (1994:10). livermore raises important questions about the present political and social construction of europe. they are particularly relevant for postsocialist central and eastern europe (cee) as this region has revealed that cultural nationalism based upon an ethnic concept of the nation-state remains a driving force (gheorghe and acton, 2001: 54). the collapse of communist rule released powerful sentiments of historical injustices and drives to reconstitute cultural identities as sovereign nation-states. this was strikingly apparent within cee where east and west germany reunified, while czechoslovakia voted itself out of existence, creating separate czech and slovak states and yugoslavia fractured violently along ethnic lines. this period reflects in a sense, competing narratives of national emancipation/liberation and of the ‘return to europe’. in the present era of european integration this raises not only questions about the processes of political transformation in cee, but also about the construction of “european” as an identity. ian hancock writes, “european isn’t a nationality or an ethnicity; europeans are composed of a multitude of these” (2002:77), and yet, within europe there is both a multitude of nationalities and ethnicities, in light of ethnic nationalism whose “european-ness” is questioned and even whose presence in europe, broadly defined, is contested. the reorganization of space in europe, as it moves closer to political harmonization, and perhaps even foreshadowing the decline of the nation-state, has placed increased emphasis on answering the question what is european-ness and review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 4/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 54 uneuropean-ness? this is especially relevant for eastern europe, where nationalism has redrawn the lines of who does and does not belong in the national polity. despite official pronouncements and discourses of european liberalism, tolerance and multiculturalism, in practice, europe still excludes outsiders. these outsiders are not however confined to new immigrants originating from outside of “europe,”; an ethnic and cultural group who have long inhabited europe, the romani people (or the gypsies) have experienced centuries of systematic exclusion and define the threshold between inclusion and exclusion in europe. in 2000, a preparatory conference in cee for the world conference on racism in 2000 noted, “the roma remained the least integrated and most persecuted people in europe” (council of europe, 2004: 169). in this article i use the roma in order to highlight the degree to which europe continues to exclude outsider groups. inclusion and exclusion continues to rest firmly within the framework of nationality and the nation-state. likewise, the sanctions contained within european union and community law for exclusion based on xenophobia, racism, or intolerance fall under the jurisdiction of member-states, which as the article will show, are in fact the offenders, to enforce (spencer, 1995: 128-135). while european citizenship, in the eu sense provides for a symbolic citizenship that complements rather than replaces citizenship in the member-states, it does not impose an overriding citizenship. being roma and being european: mutually exclusive identities? assertions of roma identity and rights have often faced a violent response in postsocialist europe where the re-assertion of national identities increasingly demand review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 4/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 55 minorities assimilate into the host society or submit to the cultural and linguistic supremacy of the ethnic majority. michael ignatieff asserts “as a political doctrine, nationalism is the belief that the world’s peoples are divided into nations, and that each of these nations has the right to self-determination, either as self-governing within existing nation-states or as nation-states of their own” (1994: 5). the expression of roma identity captured fears among some sectors that the “national” identity and the national polity renewed or reemerging in the post-socialist period is imperiled by the expansion of minority rights and cultures (tevzadze, 1994: 438). more important, with respect to the roma, were fears voiced by some czech and slovak leaders that international recognition of the new ethnically defined republics was imperiled by the potential for association of their national identities with roma culture, which were viewed as backward; this acerbated efforts to exclude the roma from czech and slovak societies in the sense of formal as well as practically citizenship. this comes in light of discourses that emphasized the backwardness of central and eastern europe as a result of the communist experience, and fears of being viewed as second–class europeans in light of bids to ‘return to europe’. this is perhaps one of the most acute examples of ethnicity and cultural based identity politics in the ‘new europe’. dov ronen provides a bleak interpretation of the re-emergence of the politics of national cultures in cee, arguing, “[n]ationalism has not only come to rival democracy [in cee]; nationalist manifestations have come to threaten democracy” (1994: 479). europe is confronted by a painful paradox; while many like to see the european union as a champion of liberal democracy, human rights and equality, the continued marginalization of the roma –gypsies– as well as other ethnic communities, both review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 4/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 56 diasporas and regional, clash with this vision. the nation-state as the unit of primary identification is far more important than many would like to acknowledge, and rather then entering a period of decline, in cee, the nation-state is enjoying a renaissance. in essence, the ideals of european citizenship take a back seat to the formation of the nationstate in so far as citizenship regimes reflect core issues of sovereignty (see for instance oommen, 1997). while european citizenship complements national citizenship it does not trump the right of the national polity – through national legislation – to decide the criteria for determining citizenship and political participation as well as the extension of its rights (spencer, 1995: 129). more importantly, minorities, such as the roma, provide convenient outlets for domestic frustrations within the impact of political and economic instability within ceecs (evans & need, 2002: 656, 675). the space of other in europe: the roma on the eve of the dramatic changes which swept throughout central and eastern europe after the collapse of communism in 1989, a young roma woman paused to allow her photograph to be taken in front of the dilapidated shack, cobbled together from pieces of corrugated tin, wood and fabric in which she and her family lived on the margins of a bosnian town. her remark, “let the whole world see from your book how we gypsies live. like we weren't people at all. there’s no work and no home for us, like there is for others,” speaks as forcibly about the isolation of europe’s approximately 10 million roma on the margins of city and societies in 1989 as it does in 2006 (tomasevic, 1988: 133). the roma have been confined physically, politically and socially to the margins of review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 4/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 57 many european societies by the status of undesirable or “despised outsider”(barany 2002: 2). ghettos, lack of adequate education, healthcare, housing, high unemployment, racism, ethnic violence, state indifference or active discrimination are all features of roma life in many countries (cahn, 2002: 48). the europe spoken of in the helsinki final act, the convention on human rights, in the framework on minority rights and in the rhetoric of european integration to a large degree is not the europe experienced by most roma. former czech president václav havel remarked that the treatment of the roma is a “litmus test of civil society”; it is a test europe is thus far struggling to pass (fawn, 2001:1195). the roma face a deep cycle of systemic racism, poverty, and even statelessness. their case is not merely that of an ethnic minority struggling to define its place in a rapidly changing europe; the case of the roma speaks about the forces of integration, identity and citizenship, social exclusion and equality; it suggests that minorities exercise very little power in the process of shaping european integration, beyond acting as a moral signpost; that is unless they seek and obtain separate nationstates. indeed, it was not until the influx of large numbers of roma seeking asylum in ec/eu countries that western europe took serious notice of the condition of the roma in cee. the roma as a subject confront the territorial, cultural and legal boundaries of the nation-state as an institution and the intellectual and social ideals of an enlarged common european home. the problem posed by europe’s ‘gypsies’, is not, how will the european union find a home for the gypsies, but rather, can the european union protect the rights of other cultures and ethnic minorities, especially small groups within specific nations as well as throughout an increasingly larger ‘europe’. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 4/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 58 while article 8 of the treaty on european union (teu) confers equal european citizenship on member-states’ nationals, alvaro gil-robles, the european commissioner for human rights in his report for 2003 asks a timely, but uncomfortable question: whether it is possible to be a non-citizen of the union? (council of europe, 2004: 28). the roma are effectively non-citizens, their rights in practice are not equal to those of other national and european citizens. racism and prejudice relegate them to the status of second or third class citizen, often below that of ethnic and culturally distinct im/migrants such as the turkish gastarbeiter. they are rejected by mainstream societies that seek to either remove their culture through assimilation, or push it far enough to the margins that it is excluded (european roma rights center, nov, 2005: 31). ethnic groups such as the roma, that is a group recognized as a distinct group on the basis of shared national/ linguistic/ cultural, religious, ancestral traditions or origins face negative pressures in identifying themselves as a ethnic minority or promoting that identity. this is especially the case in cee as a result of the degree to which nationality and ethnicity are politically charged and the emphasis on either assimilation or on simply not permitting competing identities. david mayall writes, “[t]he struggle for the recognition of ethnic status [by the gypsies] has largely been achieved within the specialist academic community engaged in gypsy studies, but only small headway has been made outside this limited field” (mayall, 2004:243). what is clear in much of the literature is that the transnational similarities between public perceptions and representations of the roma are striking. the article has two deeply interconnected themes, the first is the link between social and physical marginalization and isolation of the roma (the boundaries between cultures), and the second, is discourses of power which employ narratives of biological, review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 4/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 59 social, or ethnic otherness as legitimating mechanisms to enforce the limits of the first (narratives defining the impermeability of those boundaries). modernity, both through connections of physical space and as discourses of social order highlight some of the processes of roma exclusion. peter vermeersch notes, “[t]he identification betweens social behavior and ethnic identity can easily be maximized in public discourse and can lead to support a ‘discourse of otherness’. for example, when speaking of romani policy, certain politicians have attributed problems of social disadvantage to a reified notion of the ‘romani way of life’” (2003: 898). few reject the isolation of criminals from society for societies protection, but what of an ethnic identity that is criminalized? the “stigmatization” of gypsy as an identity through hostile discourses drives much of the difficulty between gypsy and non-gypsy communities. there are plenty of grey areas between these two themes, but nonetheless, they define the mechanisms and the methodology of exclusion. the perceptual basis for discrimination joseph agassi and norbert elias have observed that modernity, or the process of promoting and maintaining the new social order —broadly defined as civilizing society and changing social and power relations with space– has placed unprecedented power in the hands of the nation-state to regulate and remove the “chaotic” from society (elias, 1978; agassi, 1996: 385-401; bancroft, 2005:51). modernity links these interconnected themes into a series of processes which modernize, categorize and constitute subjects as fields or objects of knowledge (foucault, 1983). if civil society and inclusion is thought of as a series of processes through which one becomes accepted as belonging within a review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 4/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 60 society then this status of other, or outsider is likewise a series of processes meant to exclude (penninx et al, 2004:141). the manufacture of this discourse has its roots in the enlightenment quest for unity, coherence and community that constructed and regularized the divisions of labour and race as well as the emergence of the nation-state as an ethnically and culturally homogenous homeland of a particular group (livermore, 1994:10; mayall, 2004:101, 104-105). the race for empire among the european powers and the emerging ‘science’ of race provided the intellectual and moral mandate for the european mission civilisatrice. more importantly, it provided the tools to categorize the newly acquired colonial possessions as lesser subjects along the basis of skin colour and race; modernity provided the methodology to construct the racial and social ‘other’. ann stoler observes social and political power narratives of those from a group with subordinate social status not only manifest in discourses of order but also in ideas of racial and national purity and co-committal ideas of racial and class inferiority (stoler,1995; sokolova, 2002: especially chapters 4 and 10). evidence illustrating this type of thought is readily available, for example in the history of france’s colonial empire in southeast asia. french administrators, traders and church officials alike viewed and treated the vietnamese as “an inferior, child like race, ideally suited for a life of hard work for low wages”; work that was deemed beneath educated, literate, christian europeans (moss, 1998:14). this separation of labour (class), also equated a separation of power based on assumptions about the vietnamese’s nature, (order) but also their inferiority and inequality to exercise the same rights as white europeans (race). similar attitudes towards ethnic or cultural others can be tracked in other civilizing missions; for example american ‘manifest destiny’ and the political debate on philippine selfreview of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 4/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 61 governance and filipino acquisition of american citizenship following the annexation of the philippine islands from spain. senator henry cabot lodge summed up the difference between ‘dark skinned savages’ and cultured whites on the floor of the united states senate, commenting, “whither they are fit to govern themselves, they are not fit to govern us” (lasch, 1958: 327). the construction of minorities as the ‘others’, and as groups with lesser social value or rights plays out in discourses that reinforce those distinctions through narratives of difference. these are distinct features of cultural domination at work, which label and categorize the weaknesses or failings of other cultures. the defining of opposing or coexistent cultures and their reduction of status to other legitimates the exercise of policies that exclude them from the body politic. the roma, seen as incapable of belonging, and therefore displaying loyalty to the state, are reduced to the status of other, or alien culture. this not only positions them beneath the lowest rung on the social-economic ladder; it utilizes a discursive strategy that presents the roma as either unwilling or incapable of participating in society; at the extreme it situates them as threatening to national and cultural survival (stoler, 1996:9). this social construction of the roma as dangerous to national unity or cultural coherence provides ontological justification for repression and exclusion of the roma in the name of cultural and national survival. two key observations about the processes of modernity become clear; that it is spatially oriented, and that is hierarchically organized along lines of productivity or perceived social value. territory, or spatial relationships therefore are key aspects in relationship between the state and political and legal rights. geography, social space, and the use of space as power are therefore essential aspects of modernity. space, however, is review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 4/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 62 more than geography in terms of belonging and power; modernity also fixes the boundaries of social space, establishing and reinforcing the divisions between class and political power and between ideas of national space and ethnic space (foucault, 1980:6869). the power dynamic establishes and reinforces social and political hierarchies of power by reducing the status of other groups and therefore their right to geographic and social inclusion (mayall, 2004:12). the roma as a subject: some attitudes why is discrimination and marginalization accepted and even justified by a large majority of national population? how is it that governments and the state, thought of by modern human rights regimes as having a responsibility to protect its citizens, have allowed or even designed the structures of systematic exclusion and been so hesitant or unwilling to dismantle them? the roots of discrimination targeting the roma are closely connected with discourses of what the roma have been made to represent; it also shares a great deal in common with the treatment of minorities in general; the social status of other and the contest for dominance and space (ringold, 2004: vii). the roma have been described as europe’s other unwanted population, and the discourse of otherness surrounding the roma portrays them as anti-modern, rootless, criminal and often as dangerous to the progress and cohesiveness of society. one hungarian poll, conducted in the 1970’s revealed that approximately a quarter of the hungarian population viewed the gypsies as “lazy, immoral and prone to criminal behavior”, while another showed that most viewed the roma as “work-shy” and “welfare parasites who receive too many social benefits” (helsinki watch, 1993:40). a series of recent inquiries into czech attitudes revealed that many feel the roma’s isolation is of review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 4/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 63 their own making, having squandered government and societal support (fawn, 2001: 1196). surveys in post-socialist hungary reveal not much has changed, with attitudes towards the roma ranging from indifference to outright hostility; in a letter to the editor of a local paper, one hungarian opined: i cannot comprehend, even if you’re a liberal how could you always and in every case take the gypsies’ side? …that everyone harms the poor gypsy, from the government to the local council,that i’ve heard often from you, but not the reason everyone hates them! they cannot live like normal european people, though they had twenty-five years to thirty years to become humanized under the communists. nobody forbade them from working and learning. but they steal and beg instead from childhood on. they teach their children to cheat…. and don’t tell me its poverty that made them do it because they are not poor. they have money for everything from food to taxis…. (human rights watch, 1993: 47-48) a 1999 undp public opinion poll in bulgaria reveal that 78% of the population indicated they did not want roma as neighbours, ranking the roma lower then former prisoners in terms of preference of neighbours (ringold, 2000: 8). a 1991 survey in three cee countries revealed 78% percent of respondents held definitively negative attitudes towards the roma (barany, 1994: 329). a report by the human rights group helsinki watch, notes that roughly 60% of the male prison population in hungary are gypsies, making the rate of gypsy imprisonment 12 times the national average (quoted in the economist may 12-18, 2001: 30). similarly, exclusionary social thought can be found in western, liberal europe as well; in britain, a member of the township of sheffield’s council, in the uk remarked after a debate about regulating camping sites, “ i wish you would stop calling them gypsies…they’re cannibals, they’re parasites on society” (mayall, 2004: 261). such sentiments are telling important, as law has historically been one the key tools used to both legitimate and exercise control over the assimilation and exclusion of the roma. recent czech government positions have defined romani review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 4/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 64 interaction as a one-way process: “integration, then, is understood to mean the romani community’s full-scale incorporation into [czech] society while preserving most of the cultural specificities…and which it wishes to adhere to so long as theses distinctive features are not at variance with the laws of the czech republic.”(vermeersch, 2003: 893). rather then ensuring human rights or group protection, government and social efforts have focused at keeping the gypsies out of sight. denied inclusion in the social and educational fabric of czechoslovak society in the post-war reconstituted czechoslovak state, popular perceptions of the roma as uncontrollable, distinct and unreliable, and incompatible with czech and slovak culture and identity ensured that the roma were excluded from the start. the 1958 czechoslovak law outlawing nomads represented similar perceptions of the gypsies as social parasites or undesirable nomads, “who wander from place to place, even if they are permanently registered is some village, and avoid honest work or support themselves through dishonest activities” (solkova, 2002:8). dr. h. arnold, writing around the same time period in the gypsy lore society’s magazine in britain in 1961 opined, “the essential gypsy nature is due to a hereditary characteristic which determines whether a person is in behavior a gypsy.”(quoted in mayall, 2004:133). this suggested that illegal or immoral behavior is a distinctive feature of gypsy identity. similar sentiments such as those voiced by jozef pacai, the mayor of medzev in eastern slovakia, can be found in posttransition eastern europe who remarked, “i am no racist…but some gypsies you would have to shoot” because of their nature (vermeersch, 2003: 893). what is presented here is a depiction of the roma as an outsider within their own societies by genetic, social, or cultural practices; the implications however, are far review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 4/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 65 reaching. among many czechs, surveys have revealed there is a sense that the roma reject the values of czech society, or that as a group, they are incompatible with czech, or european society. indeed, many continue to view the isolation of the roma as necessary. one czech government report observed, “ [the government] is aware that the majority of the czech citizens is able and willing to accept romanies only when they adapt to the majority and assimilate into it” (vermeersch, 2003: 894). similar sentiments are discernable in western europe, for instance the mayor of gisors, france remarked that the stopping areas required by the french besson law (security law) should be constructed in a guarded and controlled area outside the town limits in order to keep the “security threat” posed by the gypsies as far away as possible (european roma rights center, nov, 2005:95). this 1956 czechoslovak depiction of the roma as dark-skinned, unproductive nomads with multiple children and dogs living in caravans devoid of order continues to find remarkable traction throughout present day europe. fig a: czech depiction of traditional roma life. note the prominence of the caravans, dark skin and the inevitable dogs. zdeêka jamnická-smerglová, dêjiny nas^ich cikánú (prague: orbis, 1955. 59) this discourse of the gypsy as physical representations of social disorder perpetuates the conditions that magnify their exclusion as a source of disorder. discriminated against as unwilling to participate in meaningful employment and joining sedentary life, prevented review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 4/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 66 by racism from obtaining meaningful employment, or prevented by lack of educational opportunities from integrating or participating on a equal basis, they are confined to a vicious circle of poverty and exclusion. racism and discrimination has created in effect a second-tier of citizenship. indeed, a december 1950 czechoslovak document reveals that communist authorities realized that integration of the roma into communist society was entirely dependent on the willingness of the czechoslovak population to accept them as belonging (solkova: 2002: 101). in spite of czechoslovakia’s communist governments efforts to force the settlement of the roma and assimilate it into communist society, popular perceptions – ironically those produced by the regime itself – effectively created roma ghettos in cities and towns that served to reinforce gypsy as an identity and cut off the roma population from the services and opportunities necessary to shed the traits viewed by the regime and society as anti-modern and socially disruptive. in other countries, such as france, laws have been passed which require ‘travelers’ (almost exclusively gypsies) to possess circulation documents, and the permission of the police to move about or set up camp. the absence of either can result in criminal sanction (european roma rights center, nov, 2005: 61). one of the core features of discrimination is therefore the criminalization and depiction of the roma as not belonging, nor capable of belonging, making them whoever the writer or speaker wants them to be, whether that be an ethnic minority, a criminal group, social vagrants, or a race (mayall, 2004:3). review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 4/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 67 modernity, the city, and exclusion if it is accepted that one of the key aspects of modernity is the intertwining of power with physical geography through the social and physical transformation of space from rural, unproductive and uncivilized to urban, orderly and modern; then the rise of the city as a feature of modernity provides and key example between the rights, space and power linkages connected with modernity. in a social capacity, the city provides a framework to examine the relationship between space, power, inclusion and exclusion. in order to exercise equal participation, the roma must assimilate and become czech, hungarian, french etc, and no aspect of roma culture is seen as compatible with modern living. for the roma, the struggle for space, and thus inclusion, plays out on the edges of the city; the degree of spatial separation between the roma and non-roma community has a direct connection with levels of roma prosperity or poverty, access to equal services and therefore inclusion and exclusion (ringold, 2004: 62). as a social institution based on cohesiveness and continuity, the city, as a territorial and social project, allowed urban communities to survive war, religious and political upheavals (friedrichs, 1995). modernity’s isolating and removal of the ‘chaotic’ from society makes the urban city a dividing line between ‘modern’ society and uncivilized elements which threaten social cohesion; or keeping out the other. thinking about exclusion through the framework of the city works as effectively for 18th century europe as it does for the twentieth, to evaluate the prominence of roma settlements on the outsides – or marginsof towns, and ghettos within the urban environment in cee and western europe. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 4/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 68 if we return briefly to ann stoler, who argued that socially engineered and constructed values play an important role in providing the benchmarks against which claims of citizenship, property rights and public value are measured, then within the urban city the ability of the roma to access, remain within, and exercise property ownership and access to public services reveals the depths of roma marginalization (stoler, 1995:7-8). residential segregation is not a new experience for the roma, even those who have settled into sedentary life styles. in central and eastern europe, the roots of segregation predate the socialist era; despite one of the main social projects of the cee communist regimes being the denial of ethnicity and the effort to forge new socialist societies, segregation was deepened by the efforts of the communist regimes to control the gypsy population therefore had distinct spatial aspects. the czechoslovak communist party identified the nomadic nature of the gypsy population – to many extents a direct result of social ostracism – as the major barrier to successfully forging a new society. the czechoslovak communist government attempted to resolve the ‘gypsy question’, by removing, legally, the status of gypsy through the passage of the “law about permanent settlement of nomadic persons”. modernity is deeply connected with this effort, in that it was the first law not to use the term gypsy, or any other ethnic distinguishers, instead adopted the language of modernity, and the goal of settling unproductive citizens into productive citizens. this law was part of a discursive strategy aimed at removing the ‘gypsy’ as an identity and as a legitimate subject. enforcing state authority required extending its spatial control to citizens outside of its normal power base. spatial control was a key aspect, and state agencies were ordered to “liquidate gypsy camps and ghettos in order to get rid of all sources of gypsy isolation” review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 4/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 69 and bring the anti-modern life style of the gypsy into the modern environment of the city (solkova, 2002:106). a series of raids by local police and security services were efforts to end the “backwardness and the incorrect way of life of citizens of gypsy origin in [czechoslovakia], to increase their standard of living and to reeducate them into being dignified citizens of our socialist society” (solkova, 2002:112). bringing a ‘dignified’ existence to the gypsies meant the taking of a census, but discrimination was readily perceptible with local police units cutting off the wheels of caravans, and confiscating gypsy groups horses in order to force their conversion to sedentary life: they came in the middle of the night. it was cold. they woke everybody up. adults and children. and started to count everybody. they took horses, our biggest friends and helpers. and cut wheels off the wagon – calling us black gobs…(solkova, 2002: 118) by virtue of being where they were the night of the raid, roma groups where made members of whichever town they were closest to; those towns, in turn, inherited the responsibility to clothe, feed, and educate them in order to transform their lifestyle and identity (solkova:2002:120). the biases against gypsy culture are accessible in directives from the national party authority to local levels to teach the roma how to live in apartments and modern society (solkova, 2002:104). local resistance, and difficulty assimilating the gypsies into local communities was two fold; local communities refused or resisted their integration, and gypsies themselves, refused to accept their reduction to the non-status ascribed by the state. vera solkova advanced an interesting argument, which explains in some ways the post-1989 experiences of the roma in central europe; their reduction as a subject or group with an ethnic right to inclusion and participation in civil society and reduction to ‘social deviant’ under communism built upon existing prejudices. this depiction, and the review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 4/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 70 all to frequent criminalization of their lifestyle and culture removed their entitlement to recognition and protection as participants in civil society by conferred upon them the status of criminal (solkova, 2002:114). the sudden changes in europe only served to reinforce those perceptions. more so, the often physical difference between the gypsies and their czech and slovak neighbours ensured that the gypsy community was in effect pushed by popular opinion and local particularity into a ghetto either within the city, or that the boundaries of the city proper shifted in ways which pushed the gypsy population to the city’s margins. the lack of opportunities within cities were reinforced by educational differences; where gypsy children were placed into special remedial classes in schools, which in effect closed off higher education, dooming successive generations of roma to menial labour jobs and increased social isolation (solkova, 2002: 222). regime efforts to assimilate the roma into czechoslovak were the victim of a double-edged sword, the first being the artificial nature of the communities the communist regimes attempted to create through forcible integrating of the roma into towns. the second, was the all to successful campaign to describe the roma as ‘asocial’, or social parasites and the failure of the regime to enforce a true lack of distinction, which created ghettos, second class educational and employment options, and essential reinforced the difference czechoslovak society intimately felt between themselves and the gypsies. istván pogány observes, “[i]t is widely recognized that gypsies, or roma, have been routinely denied basic rights and that they have been treated less favourably than non-roma by bureaucracies, courts and police in much of central and eastern europe”(pogany, 2004:13). review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 4/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 71 communist europe was not alone in its treatment of the roma as social deviants or a disruptive force to social cohesion. in both britain, and france, the gypsy community has not fared well. take for example, the use of city bylaws to force roma who own the property they live on to move. in the town of merignac in france, the local mayor used article 9 of the security law. which relates to public order, to evict gypsy families. it is notable that only gypsy families were forced out and subjected to having their homes destroyed (european roma rights center, nov, 2005:128). the courts, when asked to review or intervene have frequently ruled in favour of the municipalities, or declined to hear the cases on ‘procedural grounds’. the tone of anti-gypsy sentiments is readily accessible through the comments of elites. take for instance, the following from the prefect of vaucluse: you can ask my former colleagues… i have no particular tenderness for those people. they live at our expense, from pillage too, everyone knows it. when they invade a piece of land, believe me, i am always ready to use all means to expel them. but there is a law that imposes a halting area in each commune of more then 500 residents, and it is necessary to respect it…. don’t worry, i know how to behave with respect to this subject (european roma rights center, nov 2005: 32-33). institutional expressions of anti-gypsy public sentiment become institutionalized harassment that chases gypsy groups from one community to the next, often with the stated goal of driving the gypsy out of the country. in the czech republic, following the ‘velvet divorce’, anti-gypsy sentiment took on a far more invasive form, the outright denial of citizenship. following the break up of the country, a new citizenship law was drafted which conferred “czech” citizenship on those who where considered czech under the 1969 citizenship law, and deemed all others as aliens. ethno-politics and ethnonationalism were key elements of the mix that drafted the law in order to deny czech citizenship to “slovaks” in advance of an anticipated wave of economic migration from review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 4/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 72 the poorer slovak republic (csce, 1994:22). a further aspect of the czech law was its prohibition on eligibility for citizenship to those with criminal records within the previous five years. on the eve of its passage, numerous local police forces raided gypsy ghettos to ensure that as many roma as possible possessed criminal records and thus would be ineligible for citizenship. czech officials have admitted that nearly all those excluded under the czech citizenship law, were in reality, roma; wanted by neither the slovak nor czech republics effectively found themselves stateless and thus citizenship less (csce, 1994: 26-27). slovak premier vladimir meciar, argued in a september, 1993 speech that he considered it, “necessary to curtail the ‘extended reproduction of the socially inadaptable and mentally backward population”, he was referring to the roma, an “official translation” of his speech was released shortly after in efforts to assuage western european outrage to his remarks; that translation asserts, they [the gypsies] should be perceived as a problem as a problem group that is growing in size… this means if we do not deal with them now, they will deal with us later…. another thing we have to consider is extended reproduction of socially inadequate population. [sic] (crowe, 1991: 66). meciar’s comments were foreshadowing of deepening exclusion of the roma from slovak society. within the immediate period of the collapse of communism and the ‘velvet divorce’, roma settlements in slovakia increased from 278 in 1988, to 591 in 1998 (ringold, 2004: 61). in the czech republic, local elites and town governments sought central government assistance to “repatriate “undesirables” to slovakia” (barany, 1994: 337). fears of association between the national identity and gypsy identity manifested in as efforts to remove the roma: “[a] gypsy will not work, he wants to wander, steal and live his own life. gypsies are a terrible advertisement for us. foreign review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 4/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 73 tourists take pictures of the gypsy gangs, their camps and wagons –soon we will be known abroad as the nation (národ) of gypsies. (solkova, 2002: 91). europe’s roma find themselves economical, socially, and financially inhibited from asserting rights on par with ethnic majorities. the city, as a space for observing and evaluating roma inclusion and exclusion, as the slovak, czech, and french examples reveal is an ideal site. perhaps, the most telling example of the roma’s place in european society comes from the czech town of ústi nad labem, and the construction by local residents of a sixty meter long, two meter high reinforced concrete wall with three gates locked nightly (creating in effect a detention camp) and patrolled by uniformed police around the apartment block housing mostly gypsies in october of 1999 (council of europe, 2004 :169). the construction of gypsy identity as criminal and dangerous found physical expression in the efforts of local residents, unable to physically remove the residents, to isolate them, in effect building a physical ghetto where a cultural economic and social ghetto already existed (solkova, 2002: 3-5). even within the core of the city, where communist authorities had previously forced the roma’s physically inclusion, in reality, social exclusion in the form of a ghetto exists. similar circumstances can be found in the slovak republic, where a substantial portion of the roma have been forced to live on the outskirts of towns or continue to face discrimination such as curfews either directly sanctioned or tacitly ignored by government officials (barany, 1994: 338-339). forced inclusion by law and legislation by the eu or national governments will only have the effect of continuing to perpetuate roma exclusion and xenophobia as ústi nad labem illustrates at the worst, and at best, will only maintain the status quo. there are signs that positive change is being made, but review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 4/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 74 it all too frequently comes as a result of incidents such as ústi nad labem (which was extremely embarrassing for the czech national government) or the drowning death of a young roma chased by skinheads into a river in 2003. paul polansky captured the attitudes that led to that death succinctly in his poem, “the river killed my brother”: they weren’t skinheads who threw my brother into the river. they were boys he went to school with… i ran for help. . i didn’t have to go very far. two policemen were sitting in a car watching, laughing. (2001:6) this status of ‘other’ perhaps speaks most for the plight of the roma than any of the many terms commonly used to describe them, tsigani, roma, gypsy, gypsy-traveller or any permutation thereof. the roma have been traditionally viewed as a problem, as barriers to progress and modernization and thereby subjected to wide reaching efforts by state authorities at assimilation and elimination (solkova, 2002:10). in the aftermath of the demolition of the gypsy wall in ústi nad labem came two separate comments that reveal the depth of animosity towards the gypsies, as well as the strength of prejudice. the first, is closely linked with the earlier illustrated processes of modernity, and connects the economic dislocation experienced by many czechs during the transition to market economies with a physical target, “everything, whether it is criminality, drugs, whatever comes to your mind was first started by the roma”. the ‘wall’ itself illustrates the second aspect, which is the impermeability of borders between social spaces. one czech woman asked, “why can’t the roma behave as decently as we do?” (solkova, 2002 :5-6). race, class and social characteristics are intrinsically linked in the production of a divide, which positions the racialized ‘other’ in opposition to the mainstream (stoler, 1995:22). the politics of exclusion in cee can be thought of as a two-tier process with respect to the roma: the first finds its basis within an agenda located in the processes of review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 4/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 75 modernity, understood through economic and social aesthetics, in that ‘white’ society ascribes to itself the social values and ideal its holds at the highest level, whereas ‘dark’, or ‘black’ society are represented as exhibiting criminality, backwardness and social practices rejected or held in contempt by the majority population. concurrently, a western european modernity project is taking place, shaping eastern europe as an object, in the context of which ceecs attempt to emphasize their modern-ness, or european-ness. (dunn, 1995; kuus, 2004:482). geopolitically, the implosion of communist regimes shifted the borders, real and imagined for europe, creating new spatial orientations and a new ‘east’ (dingsdale, 2001:5, 11). at the same time that this process unfolded, western european states began enacting a series of legislative acts, and acts by effect, which aimed to limit the real or perceived influx of eastern europeans, particularly roma to western europe, to take advantage of the social security net. in effect, the continued existence of these laws, and laws that affect roma exclusion (or other ethnic minorities) reveals the tension between ‘old europe’ and a ‘new’ europe. the full rights of eu citizenship cannot be denied to a substantial number of citizens, based on their ethnicity and yet be still thought of as citizenship, in its full sense (council of europe, 2004:29). in an article titled, “the coming hordes” the january 15th, 2005 edition of the economist magazine captured the position of outsider that the roma hold. (the economist, january 15, 2005:) the roma exist on the margins described in the opening to this paper and as vaclav havel noted, they are indeed a litmus test for the human rights regime. the roma are the quintessential outsiders; they are often seen as a social problem to be solved not through inclusion, but rather regulated exclusion (pogany, 2004:51). massive economic and social dislocation, combined with historical review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 4/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 76 prejudice have created an environment where even in geographies where the roma population possess formal citizenshipwith all the formal entitlements and protectionsin practice they are subjected to a ‘different’ type of citizenship which denies them the basic rights accorded to other citizens (bancroft, 2005:32). for cee, the construction of internal narratives of ethnic state and national identity place ethnic minorities, despite legislation or official government positions at a disadvantage. for cee, treated as a “subject” by europe proper, in need of western european expertise, institutions and structures in order to become fully european, the effort to retain national identities finds a direct tension with integration. ironically, perhaps, is that integration itself, is in tension between national identities and supranationalism. the position of ethnic minorities in cee, and in europe at large continues to remain tenuous as integration increasingly reframes discourses of europeanness and ethnic and territorial claims of what is european and not european back to the center of the debate on political integration especially in light of the debate on turkish accession. what separates a czech or pole from a romanian, a russian, or a latvian and what defines a “european” from a “noneuropean”? for central europe, and the roma, discourses that define the geographic and geopolitical space, as well as the nations and the peoples who inhabit it as an “other” places the continued exclusion and marginalization of the roma in a position of constant relevance for evaluating european citizenship and integration. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 4/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 77 bibliography agassi, joseph. “the contemporary role of historians of science and technology” protosoziologie 8 (1996): 385-401. bancroft, angus. roma and gypsy-travellers in europe: modernity, race, space and exclusion. burlington, vt: ashgate, 2005. barany, zoltan. the east european gypsies: regime change, marginality and ethnopolitics. cambridge: cambridge university press, 2002. _______, “living on the edge: the east european roma in postcommunist politics and societies” slavic review 53:2 (summer, 1994):321-344. cahn, claude. roma rights: rights, justice, and strategies for equality. new york: international debate education association, 2002. commission on security and cooperation in europe, implementation of the helsinki accords: human rights and democratization in the czech republic. (september, 1994) washington dc: commission on cooperation and security in europe, 1994. council of europe, commissioner for human rights; “4th annual report; january to december 2003 to the committee of ministers and the parliamentary assemble” 15 december 2004. strausbourg: council of europe, 2004. dingsdale, alan. mapping modernities: geographies of central and eastern europe, 1920-2000. new york: routledge, 2001. dunn, elizabeth c. “standards and person-making in east-central europe” in global assemblages: technology, politics and ethics as anthropological problems, oxford: blackwell publishing, 2005. pp.173-193. elias, norbert. the civilizing process: the development of manners. new york: urizen books, 1978. european roma rights center, “always somewhere else: anti-gypsyism in france”. country reports series, no 15. (nov, 2005) budapest: european roma rights center, 2005. evan, geoffrey and ariana need. “explaining ethnic polarization over attitudes towards minority rights eastern europe: a multilevel analysis” social science research 31(2002): 653-680. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 4/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 78 foucault, michel.“the culture of the self “ university of california-berkeley regents lecture. april 12 and 19, 1983. _______, power/knowledge: elected interviews and other writings, 1972-1977. brighton: harvester press, 1980. fawn, rick. “czech attitudes towards the roma: ‘expecting more from havel’s country’?” europe-asia studies 53:8 (dec, 2001). 1193-1219. friedrichs’ christopher r. the early modern city, 1450-1750.a history of urban society in europe, vol.1. london: longman, 1995. nicolae gheorghe & thomas acton, “ citizens of the world and nowhere: minority, ethnic and human rights for roma during the last hurrah of the nation-state.” in between past and future: the roma of central and eastern europe, ed, will guy. hertfordshire: university of hertfordshire press, 2001. hancock, ian. we are the romani people (ame sam e rromane dzene). université rené descartes. centre de recherches tsiganes. hatfield: university of hertfordshire press, 2002. helsinki watch. “struggling for ethnic identity: the gypsies of hungary”. new york: human rights watch, 1993. kuus, merje. “europe’s eastern expansion and the reinscription of otherness in eastcentral europe” progress in human geography 28:4 (2004): 472-489. lasch. christopher. “the anti-imperialists, the philippines, and the inequality of man.” the journal of southern history. 24:3(1958): 319-331. livermore, daniel. ethnic conflict in the new europe, queens centre for international relations, martello papers #10, kingston: queens university press, 1994. mayall, david. gypsy identities: from egipcyans and moon-men to the ethnic romany. london: routledge, 2004. moss, george d. vietnam: an american ordeal. upper saddle river, n.j.: prenticehall, 1998, 14. penninx, rinus; et al, eds, citizenship in european cities: immigrants, local politics and integration policies. burlington vy: ashgate, 2004 pogány. istván. the roma café. london: pluto press, 2004 polansky, paul. the river killed my brother. poems of the czech and slovak roma since 1989. san francisco: norton coker/ jejune publications, 2001 review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 4/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 79 ringold, dena. roma and the transition in central and eastern europe: trends and challenges. washington, dc: the world bank, 2002. ______. roma in an expanding europe: breaking the poverty cycle. washington, d.c.: the world bank, 2004. ronen, dov “on the incompatibility of “nationalism” and “democracy”–lessons from east central europe” history of european ideas 19:1-3 (1994). 479-484. sokolova, vera. “a matter of speaking: racism, gender and social deviance in the politics of the “gypsy question” in communist czechoslovakia, 1945-1989” phd. diss. university of washington, 2002 stoler, ann laura. race and the education of desire: foucault’s history of sexuality and the colonial order of things. durham: duke university press, 1995. vermeersch, peter. “ethnic minority identity and movements politics: the case of the roma in the czech republic and slovakia” ethnic and racial studies 26:5 (sept, 2003): 879-901. tevzadze, natia. “national identity and national conciosuness” history of european ideas 19-1-3(1994): 437-440. juan-camilocastillo_volume 3_issue 3 review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 3/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 30 ………………………………………………………………… the european security and defence policy: defining the european union as a rational actor in international security juan-camilo castillo abstract the main objective of this article is to analyze how the european union, through its security and defence policy, has become a rational actor in international security matters since the end of the cold war. it will analyze the close relation that exists between european integration and the notion of continental collective security. also the new post-cold war concerns that present a potential risk to the eu are going to be examined, and consequently how they affect the rationality of this institution as an actor. finally the last section will explore the divergence between europe and america in matters of security and the way this political drift may create a situation in which nato can become irrelevant in regards of european defence. review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 3/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 31 introduction when the collapse of the soviet union in 1991 marked the waning of the cold war, the role that europe would play in the new world order was brought into academic inquiry. the fact that fifteen european states were accomplishing their long term goal of integration with the signature of the maastricht treaty clearly established that europe sought to transform itself from the mere stage where the cold war superpowers went head to head into a significant actor in world politics. certainly, the european union has not failed in fulfilling this goal. with 27 member states, a gdp of 13.62 trillion dollars and a population of 486,642,177, the eu has become the world’s biggest economy. 1 moreover, at a political level, the eu has been actively engaged within various international organizations, is one of the major foreign aid donors, and holds diplomatic relations with a variety of states. however, the eu’s strategic role at a global level still presents itself as a source for debate. as the european union is easily associated with its economic and organizational achievements, it is often overlooked not only the eu’s long standing goal to position as a security actor itself, but also its capacity to perform complex missions around its periphery. indeed, the paramount normative motive behind the venture of european integration was the objective to bring “stability, peace and prosperity” to the region. yet, in order to achieve this goal, the concept of defence and force projection cannot be taken out of the equation. 2 therefore, it is not surprising to find that the amalgamation of defence capabilities among european states has gained significance over the years. subsequently, the opportunity to 1 updated data obtained from the cia factbook (available online at: https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/). 2 holm, erik. the european anarchy: europe's hard road into high politics. copenhagen business school press, 2001, p. 268 review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 3/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 32 build up a collective security arrangement has presented itself as an additional benefited for european integration that has attracted possible candidate states. 3 the notion of having a united yet self-sufficient europe in respect to its defence capabilities has been something that various countries in western europe were aiming for since process of integration began. evidently this shows the existent desire to pursue a more autonomous approach to security that would be better established to address specific yet common european interests and concerns. today, the focus on security has shifted from the former cold war state-centric approach to a broader perspective that looks at a great variety of security threats such as terrorism, low intensity conflicts and transnational organized crime. hence, it has become a time for the eu to prove itself as a reliable actor by addressing these emergent threats. the main purpose of this article is to demonstrate how the eu, through the european security and defence policy (esdp), addresses its security concerns and defence interests by performing as a rational actor in the global scenario, and consequently, it has become a force to reckon with in world politics. hence, by examining the connection between integration and collective security, it will demonstrate how the eu has made one of its priorities to acquire its own defence identity. moreover, through the use of both theoretical approaches and empirical analyses it will be attested the extent to which the eu has achieved this. finally, this piece will put into perspective how a military autonomous europe is weakening the cohesion between the eu and the usa, and subsequently, how the espd may create a situation of political competition within the west. 3 cahen, alfred. the western european union and nato: building a european defence identity within the context of atlantic solidarity. 1989 p. 14 review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 3/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 33 integration and security: the birth of the esdp in order to better understand the role of the esdp, it is critical to realize the link that exists between european collective security and continental integration, and how this relationship transforms the eu into a key actor in international politics. after more than two centuries of continuous political tension and constant warfare in europe, the idea of cultural, economic and political interdependence among european states became a widely accepted philosophical principle that offered a tangible solution for the establishment of peace and stability in the region. after the catastrophic outcome of wwii, the ideas of political thinkers such as david mitrany and ernst haas gained legitimacy among leaders and civil society alike, making the concept of trans-national integration into a relevant ideological driving force behind the political developments within the continent.4 after a period of forty years with no significant inter-european armed conflicts and tighter multilateral relations (which were a product of various economic and political agreements), the european union was born in 1992 with the ratification of the maastricht treaty, hence materializing the ideal of interdependence into political reality. however, even before the process of economic and political integration began, many western european states sought military and strategic cooperation among themselves in order to be able to re-gain their capacity of independent self-defence; which would ultimately protect the delicate political environment that was created in the post-wwii. consequently, in 1948 the treaty of brussels was signed, giving birth to the western european union (weu) which became the first modern multilateral security arrangement among european nations. in reality, the weu only came across as a formal treaty with not enough conventional and strategic capabilities to deter a soviet attack. however, events such as the 4 jackson, robert & sørensen georg. introduction to international relations, 1999. p. 115 review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 3/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 34 remilitarization of germany and the end of the dispute over the saarland through weu negotiations generated a sense of trust among former antagonist states. 5 this later opened the door for further cooperation in the economic and political realms among france, germany and the benelux. other earlier attempts for inter-european military alliances were thought of, but never progressed from the preparation stages such as the european defence community (edc) and the european security and defence identity (esdi), which due to a series of conflicts of interest between the partner states they were never conceived.6 it was not after the birth of the european union in the early nineties that the esdp was able to take the weu and other security accords under its wing. clearly, the desire for common defence and military cooperation was an ideal that almost every leader in western europe had in mind during the cold war. initially, the most successful arrangements came in the economic realm; yet, as time progressed, various european states became more willing to surrender autonomy in a variety of fields which facilitated the process for political integration. however, as mentioned above, the possibility of developing a well-established european security arrangement started out with some difficulties and would get momentum only after the european union proved itself in the 1990s to be a successful experiment. not surprisingly, like the eu, the esdp was born from an incorporation of a series of accords instituted to coordinate further collaboration among the signatory states. what is considered to be the first step in this process was the signature of the saint petersberg tasks in 1992; which consisted of giving the weu the mandate to perform “humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in 5 these were two key events that gave hope to most european states for the possibility of integration, specially taking into consideration that the rivalry between germany and france for the saarland region and the strong militarization of germany were the two main factors associated with the causes of the world wars and some armed conflicts of the 19th century such as the franco-prussian war. cahen. pp. 4-5 6 gordon, philip. h. “europe’s uncommon foreign policy.” international security. 1997. p. 83 review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 3/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 35 crisis management, including peacekeeping”. 7 later in 1997 the signature of amsterdam treaty ensured that the saint petersberg tasks would be transferred from the weu to the european union as the attempts to integrate both institutions became quite difficult. 8 conversely, this legal transfer created the perfect political opportunity for the eu to launch its own approach to defence as part of its existent foreign policy. subsequently, in 1998, after being hunted by the poor performance of nato’s european forces in the former yugoslavia, both the british prime minister and the president of france gave a common declaration in saint malo stating that it was time for the eu to develop “the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises.”9 the saint malo declaration defined the purpose of the esdp and the role it would play in european politics. even though britain and france had a historically conflicting perspectives regarding regional security, it became clear that the desire for further autonomy from the united states and nato was at hand.10 furthermore, this feeling was shared by others of their european counterparts and at the 1999 cologne european council the heads of state declared that: the european union shall play its full role on the international stage. to that end, we intend to give the european union the necessary means and capabilities to assume its responsibilities regarding a common european policy on security and defence . . . the union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide 7 keane, rory. “european security and defence policy: from cologne to sarajevo.” global society, vol. 19, no. 1, january, 2005, p. 91 8 missorili, antonio. background of esdp (1954-1999). institute for security studies – european union. 2004, p. 2 9 joint declaration given by prime minister tony blair and president jacques chirac in saint malo, from missorili. p.2 10 keane, 2005. p. 90 review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 3/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 36 to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by nato.11 the cologne summit marked the birth of the esdp and, since then, this new institution has notoriously shaped the eu’s ability to use military force. indeed, the eu expects to have a rapid reaction force of 60.000 troops under its direct command by the end of this decade. 12 moreover, in the last seven years, the eu has launched numerous deployments all over the world showing its compromise to the saint petersberg tasks. currently it is possible to see european forces in peacekeeping/peacemaking operations in the balkans, west africa, the levant and south asia. bastian gieregich and william wallace argue that it is nothing new for european nations to be involved in overseas deployments; however, what is a novelty after the cologne declaration are “the involvement of so many states acting together, and the toughness of the tasks and rules under which they are operating.” 13 in fact, according to the research done by gieregich and wallace, the number of troops sent by europe in missions overseas has doubled in the last ten years. 14 therefore, these developments demonstrate how the esdp has triggered a ‘paradigm shift’ in the strategic culture within the eu, which has been distancing itself from the standbydefensive regime imposed by nato during the cold war and embracing instead an active role in military operations. finally, it is worth mentioning the success that the esdp had in bringing together member states that were somewhat marginal in matters of regional security. for instance, even though ireland has traditionally had a neutral stand regarding foreign policy (which 11 statement of the european council held in cologne, from haine, jean-yves. esdp: an overview. institute for security studies – european union. 2004, p. 3 12 mccormick, john. understanding the european union: a concise introduction. 2005. pp. 218-19 13 gieregich, bastian. & wallace, william. “not such a soft power: the external deployment of european forces.” survival. vol. 46. no. 2. summer 2004. p. 169 14 gieregich, bastian & wallace, william. p. 178 review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 3/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 37 involves not being part of nato nor weu), it has actively participated in esdp operations and un operations where there are large contingents of european forces.15 by the same token, other countries with a longstanding history of neutrality such as austria, finland and sweden, have partaken in multiple esdp operations.16 furthermore, these countries were the main lobbyists behind the transfer of the petersberg tasks from the weu to the eu in 1997 clearly showing their desire for an eu-sponsored security arrangement.17 the esdp has proven to be a very efficient framework that has politically synchronized states with different approaches to defence and security. initially, it became a surprise to see britain—a traditionally ‘atlanticist’ state—agree with france—a prime ‘europeanist’ state—in the need of making the eu more strategically significant. however, what has been even more interesting is the manner in which eu neutral countries decided to integrate within the esdp. a brief theoretical analysis of the eu’s role in international security for students of international relations, the success of the european union and the role it plays globally has proven to be a constant challenge to the established paradigms in the field. in fact, this defiance gains more complexity as the esdp gives further autonomy to this organization by providing the eu with the ability to use coercive force. customarily, when speaking about matters of international security in the ir discipline, the most influential paradigms adopt a position in which the state is the sole actor responsible for the “causes of war and conditions for peace.”18 however, since the esdp presents the eu as an 15 strategy statement 2005-2007. department of defence, ireland. publication available online at: http://www.defence.ie/website.nsf/publication+id/c3700595684613a1802570c80055b722?editdocume nt 16 gieregich & wallace. p. 173 17 missorili p. 2 18 holsti, k. j. the dividing discipline: hegemony and diversity in international theory. 1985. pp. 15-19 review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 3/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 38 actor that has acquired the capacity to administer force, just like a state, the traditionalist hypotheses become ineffective in understanding this institution. this phenomenon, as the scholar adam bronstone points out, confronts traditional ir theories (especially the realist and liberal traditions), which fail to explain the intricate functionality of integration and the capacity to apply common security policies for all member states.19 nonetheless, this opens the opportunity to use alternative theoretical models that could assist in the comprehension of the nature of the eu’s role and behaviour as a significant security actor. in their article the politics, power and pathologies of international organizations, m. n. barnett and m. finnemore proposed a hypothetical model that treats international organizations as rational actors, based on the sociological assertion that they are behavioural bureaucratic entities capable of acting in an autonomous manner. we can trace the origins of this paradigm to earlier ir theories that sought a pseudo-ontological role for international institutions. functionalism, which has been commonly used to approach the eu, comes across as one of these first theories which suggested that over time states would give leeway to a specific international organizations (oi) due to the benefits brought by membership. consequently, the organization would find itself in a position where it could acquire “jurisdiction over preceding states.”20 however, in barnett’s and finnemore’s argument, the international organizations’ power and autonomy comes from two very specific sources: the legality of the values they represent and the control they have over “technical expertise and information.” 21 this, unlike the more optimistic views of the functionalist and neo 19 bronstone, adam. “ir theory and the epc/cfsp: the case for a different approach.” european security into the twenty-first century. 2000 p. 181 20 ernst haas being quoted in martin, l. & simmons, b. “theories and empirical studies of international institutions.” international organization. 54:2. 1998. p. 735 21 barnett, m. n. & finnemore, m. “the politics, power and pathologies of international organizations.” international organization. 53:4. 1999. p. 707 review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 3/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 39 functionalist approaches, leaves space to judge the performance of international institutions. barnett and finnemore acknowledge the existence of international organizations that fail to fulfill their intended purpose.22 nevertheless, they argue that due to the normative the ios represent and their bureaucratic structure it is very unlikely to see their autonomic pursuit of interests in jeopardy. if barnett’s and finnemore theorem is applied to the eu’s ability to work as a strategic actor, the result is staggering. in comparison to nomal ios, the european union has already an extensive level of autonomy and a great competence to persuade or influence its member states. furthermore, the existence of supranational bodies and the pervasive cooperation that exists among member states gives the european union a high degree of authority to preside over them.23 hence, through the esdp, the eu should have the ability to command military strength from its member states in order to accomplish specific goals or interests, which are beneficial for both the organization itself and its members. this ability is expected to increase in the years to come as the compatibility between national forces and the command organization becomes more effective (i.e. european rapid reaction force.) however, what makes the eu a rational actor and not merely and autonomous one is its capacity to act according not only to its interests and concerns, but also according to its limitations. indeed, while the eu is known for often using soft power as an integral part of its foreign policy, when it comes to the use of coercive force, the eu is more likely to act under certain parameters in order to maximize its utility. the raison d’être behind the european union is to maintain peace and stability within its borders, and for that reason, we 22 ibid. 23 mccormick, j. pp. 126-27 review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 3/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 40 can see how military action presents itself as a viable mean against significant threats that may directly or indirectly affect this stability. now, if we consider the assumption that the eu works in a fully autonomous manner, and we apply it in a rational action model, it is possible to see how there are certain variables which facilitate or limit the implementation of force. by no means are these variables the sole conditions which influence the use of coercive force; however they are present in most empirical and are useful for the purpose of this article. the first variable to consider is the extent to which the threat can disrupt the status quo of peace and stability within the eu. the second variable is the length to which the elimination of a potential or external threat will provide a better outcome or position for the organization. the third variable is the normative value the action would have; and finally, the last variable is the cost of the endeavour. in order to better understand these variables we can represent different contemporary conflicts (which are not necessarily armed) in the form of possible actions: ( i.e. a = {a1,...,ai,...,aj} ). 24 thus, we can obtain a model that looks like this: a = {internal conflict w. africa/levant, iran’s nuclear program, internal conflict colombia} in this case, the result in the form of strict preference would be: a = {internal conflict africa/levant} the main reason behind this result is the presence of the four variables mentioned before in this strict preference. undeniably, the levant and western africa are regions of interest for the eu where there is extensive economic and political investment. apart from that, a 24 the mathematical representation for rational action model (ram) was obtained from: arrow, kenneth j.. “economic theory and the hypothesis of rationality," the new palgrave: a dictionary of economics, 1987. pp. 69-75. review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 3/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 41 conflict in these regions could have repercussions in europe in the shape of illegal immigration, transnational crime and disruption in economic production. 25 also, as humanitarian violations occur as consequence of the domestic armed conflict, it becomes necessary for the eu to act as part of the saint petersberg tasks mandate. finally these two regions are within the range of the capabilities that most european militaries have for force projection (i.e. c-130 or a400 cargo airplanes). consequently, to be engaged militarily in these regions is in europe’s best interest. in the case of iran, some of the variables are met, but not the majority. therefore, we can see how the eu would rather use soft power in order to disengage this possible threat (i.e. the eu3-tehran agreement). 26 indeed, starting an armed conflict with iran over their obscure nuclear program would bring more costs than benefits at a devastating level. for that reason, only in the occasion that iran would undertake a hostile action against europe the majority of the variables would be met, and thus, it would be in the eu’s best interest to protect itself from an eminent threat. also, if we look at the last option proposed in the model, there are almost none of the variables met, clearly indicating that the eu will use exclusively soft power in order to address this issue.27 as a result we can conclude that the eu has the capacity to act as a rational actor in matters of security as it uses coercive force in selective occasions where its stability is at stake or certain interests can be satisfied. in the next section a variety of threats and security interests will be examined. 25 chancellor merkel of germany highlighted the fact that what happens in africa may have repercussions in europe in a speech held in the g8 summit 2007 in heiligendamm. transcript of her speech “ africa: a continent with huge potential” is available online at: http://www.g-8.de/content/en/artikel/2007/05/200705-22-afrika-kontinent-mit-potenzial__en.html 26 an electronic copy of the eu-tehran agreement document is available in the iaea website at: http://www.iaea.org/publications/documents/infcircs/2004/infcirc637.pdf 27 more information the the eu’s role as a broker in negotiations between the colombian government and the farc is available at: http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/colombia/intro/index.htm review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 3/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 42 european security concerns in the 21st century with the fall of the soviet union in 1991, the dissolution of the warsaw treaty organization, and the slow integration of central-eastern europe into the continental sphere, the eu has experienced a rapid shift of focus in security matters. with the end of the cold war, new potential threats have surfaced, ones that challenge the conventional defence approaches undertaken post-wwii. in many respects, most of the security concerns do not affect all member states equally due to different factors such as geographical location, historical background and economic interests at a regional or global level. however, as the neo-functionalist school of thought argues, the economic and political interdependence that exists under the european union has put most states in a position where their approach to common issues or a specific problem that could disrupt the normal functioning of a member have become evenly relevant security concerns.28 also, as the european union itself has become an autonomous and rational actor, it is in its best interests to protect the regional stability. for the purposes of this paper, i will classify the main security concerns that europe faces today into three general categories that are able to put into perspective the ways in which these feasible dangers may affect the continental stability. the first category groups the domestic concerns which relates to potential threats that exist within the boundaries of the european union or other associated states in the continent. the second category will encompass the regional concerns, which are the threats that exist outside the borders of the eu, yet due to their close proximity at a geographical level, they present an existent danger to one or more member states. finally, the last category is related to global concerns which 28 the functionalist theory argues that countries with strong economic or political ties cooperate in order to satisfy common goals. caporaso, j. "regional integration theory: understanding our past and anticipating our future." journal of european public policy, 5(1). 1998. pp.1-16. review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 3/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 43 its primary focus is on potential security risks that threaten economic or political interests that the european union may have in any part of the world. with the integration of various states within the eu, certain domestic security issues, which may exist in a particular or various states, are able to cross borders hence transforming into trans-national issues. in regard to this, we are able to identify two main concerns that have been present in the continent since the early 20th century: domestic terrorism and organized crime. the former is a problem that, in most cases, is related to pre-second world war political or cultural predicaments. for instance, we can trace the origins of the ira in northern ireland or the basque separatist eta in spain back to the regionalist movements of the late 19th century.29 therefore, it is important to understand that various european states have an extensive level of experience dealing with this issue. in addition, it is worth noticing how in the last 20 years different national security services and law enforcement agencies have worked closely in order to combat these illegal armed groups. in the case of eta for example, the mutual cooperation and joint operations between neighbouring states (spain and france), have become invaluable tools that helped to put pressure on the terrorist band and capture many of its key affiliates.30 moreover, as terrorism has become a global issue with domestic implications, it is possible to see how domestic agencies of the eu such as europol work hand in hand with the esdp. 31 organized crime is another trend with a long history of being a significant concern in europe. it is believed that it emerged as a side effect from the socio-economic disparity that 29 dorman, andrew. & treacher adam. european security: an introduction to security issues in post-cold war europe. 1995, pp. 144-145 30 in the last ten years, various members of eta have been captured thanks to successful franco-spanish joint actions in towns along the basque border. bbc news. 03 october 2005. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4305062.stm 31 den boer, monica. & monar, jörg. ”keynote article: 11 september and the challenge of global terrorism to the eu as a security actor,” jcms: journal of common market studies 40 (s1), 2002. pp. 18-19 review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 3/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 44 surfaced in urban centres as a consequence of the industrial revolution; however, it became into serious international problem once globalization started to facilitate the movement of goods, information and people in the 1960s/70s.32 certainly, the opening of borders within europe has left the region vulnerable to these criminal groups. subsequently, the illicit traffic of drugs, humans, weapons and the violence that comes with it represents a real hazard against european citizens, communities, and the states themselves.33 thereby, as markus ekergren argues, it is possible to see how in the european context the term of security threats broadens to include domestic criminal activities within one or more states, and consequently the esdp will have to work in conjunction with the judicial branch of the eu in order to fight against illegal activities which may affect the wellbeing of any member state or the continent as a whole.34 the second category of european concerns in continental security include what can be classified as regional concerns, which are basically any potential dangers that are located in the proximity of the european union’s boundaries. sven biscop argues that there are four main politico-military threats which exist towards europe on the mediterranean boundary, these are; weapons proliferation, radical islamism, terrorism and military threats (which is meant for the use of conventional force by one or various states).35 in fact, in the last twenty years europe has actually come face to face with most of these threats. some examples of there are the use of scud missiles by libya towards us naval bases in italy, islamic terrorism in rome, madrid and london, the invasion of the perejil islands by moroccan seamen, the 32 williams , phil, “transnational criminal organisations and international security,” survival, vol. 36, no. 1, spring 1994, p. 97 33 ibid. p. 110 34 ekengren, magnus. “from a european security community to a secure european community.” cfsp forum. 2005, pp. 5-7. 35 biscop, sven. euro-mediterranean security: in search for a partnership. 2003 pp. 12-16 review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 3/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 45 acquisition of ballistic missiles by north african and levant countries, and their capability to obtain chemical, biological and nuclear technologies.36 the mediterranean has become an important geo-political arena for the esdp due to its economic and political importance. it is imperative not to forget that the mediterranean still is one of the main highways for resources such as oil and minerals that come from the middle east and sub-saharan africa to europe. nevertheless, the same concerns can be applied to all the peripheral regions that surround the continent. biscop’s politico-military threats can be found in other regions in close proximity such as the caucasus and central asia, which not only contain similar security risks for the region, but also have an important economic value in natural resources such as oil and natural gas among others. finally, the third category of security issues refers to the global concerns that the european union or its member states may have at any location in the world. many of these are in countries that were under the sphere of influence of imperial powers such as the former colonies of britain, france, belgium, the netherlands, spain and portugal. consequently, various european states have acted as stabilizers in places where violence and humanitarian disasters have taken place, which in most cases are the legacy of the harsh imperialistic policies that these nations imposed in the first place.37 however, it is hard to ignore that many of these volatile locations possess valuable resources as well, those necessary for the manufacture of goods in europe, implicating that in some cases the intervention of the european union or one of its member states in these regions may also take place in order to protect specific economic interests overseas. for instance, the esdp operation artemis had as its main priority to stabilize the north-eastern province of ituri in the democratic republic 36 ibid. pp. 18-21 37 dorman & treacher. pp. 154-155 review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 3/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 46 of congo, and there is evidence that the french government was planning to launch a deployment if the esdp mission was not approved.38 the significance of this is that the ituri province has one of the biggest precious metals deposits in africa where many european companies (mainly french and belgian) had extraction operations. however, it is important to note that this region has experienced one of the bloodiest internal conflicts in modern history where 2.5 million were estimated to be killed by different warring factions fighting for the total control of the natural resources of the province.39 in sum, the european union focuses on specific security issues that have the potential of disrupting its economic and political functionality as well as the stability of its member states. many of these threats can be traced as consequences of the geo-political location in which the continent encounters itself, and also to the products of the political, social and military history of the region. however, it is important to point out how, under the esdp, these issues are seen in a regional context and not only a national one. in this sense, a security threat is not only assessed by the level of damage it can cause to an specific state, but also by how it can affect europe as whole. it also gives the different governments a chance to cooperate in order to address common security issues in concert, therefore they are able to deal with any threat in a more effective way, which has a major political, economic and military weight in comparison to what a single state would normally have. the eroding cohesion in transatlantic security approaches the dismantling of the soviet union and the eastern bloc in the early 1990s created a situation in which both the western european nations and the united states lost their 38 keanne, p. 94 39 number obtained from neack, laura. “peacekeeping, bloody peacekeeping,” bulleting of the atomic scientists. volume 60, number 4 / july/august 2004. p. 47 review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 3/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 47 common ideological enemy. with this, the focus on defence shifted from a potential full scale war with the east to the new dangers that are associated with less developed countries where deteriorating socio-economic conditions have become harvest fields for new potential dangers such as international terrorism. in this context, europe started to define its own approach towards security issues. the emergence of political ideologies such as gaullism, demonstrated the willingness of governments to manage international affairs independently from the american clout. however, due to the economic aid that western europe depended of in order to rebuild itself after wwii and the military umbrella that the americans offer to balance out the soviet union and the warsaw pact, it became extremely difficult to manage things without washington’s consent. yet, thanks to the economic revival in the second half of the 20th century and the positive results in the experiment of continental integration, the european union has been able to approach questions of foreign policy according to its own needs, interests and limitations, which consequently has led to a disparity between european and american foreign policy making. the gap between the european and american approaches to global security issues has become more evident in the last seven years, making it clear that there is an inconsistency between the methodologies that the two parties may have. in his article, power and weakness, american neo-conservative scholar robert kagan argues that the reason behind this separation between european and american interests and approaches in the field of defence and security rests on the fact that the us has maintained its position as a military superpower while the european union has failed to reach similar standards, dismissing the neo-realist theory of a post-cold war era in which europe, china and japan would obtain the status of military superpowers and subsequently review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 3/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 48 creating a new multi-polar order in the global system.40 in kagan’s view, the approaches that the us and eu pursuit are dictated by their military capabilities and by the percentage of their gdp which they spend in defence.41 kagan’s argument clarifies the reason why the us is more susceptible to take a confrontational approach towards an issue, while europe would rather use soft power as its first option. furthermore, the constraint in military expenditure by the eu can also elucidate the reasoning behind the esdp’s prioritization of threats that are positioned close to home, instead focusing its attention towards other issues that exist in a global level. indeed, catherine gegout and marie c. fellow, two scholars from the london school of economics, argue that policies taken by the esdp such as the european security strategy aim “mainly to protect european security, rather than focusing on global security” and consequently illustrate “that the eu is a strategic actor focused on short-term [european] security.”42 the reasoning behind this argument is the fact that the existing limitation in the military capability of the eu in comparison to the us has forced brussels to prioritize the threats it can only cope with based the level or risk they pose and their geographical proximity. thus, in the event that the eu finds itself in a position where it requires the use force, it would rather use it in a peripheral region rather than in remote areas such as the far east. other factors are also important to take into consideration in order to understand the gap between the american and european defence approaches and capabilities. the director general in the directorate general external relations of the european union, robert cooper, 40 kagan, robert. power and weakness. policy review. 2002. available online at: http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/3460246.html 41 while the us spends $500 billion per year in military expenditures, europe only spends $160 billion per year (although this figure has changed since 2006, now the defence budget of europe is around $250 million). ibid. 42 gegout ,catherine and fellow, marie c. “europe has a strategy, but is the eu a strategic actor?” cfsp forum. vol. 3 2005 pp. 8-9 review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 3/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 49 responds to kagan’s arguments by pointing out a number of aspects that are ignored in kagan’s analysis.43 the first one would be the fact that the eu forces have to go through an evolutionary process in which the military elements of each member state have to become compatible with one another at a technical level in order to be able to respond to any threat globally.44 this point has been widely overlooked in the academic community especially if we take into consideration that several western european states support their own armed forces through national military industries that supply specific combat material, while at the same time there are others that rely on foreign weaponry (which comes from various sources such as america, other european countries and even surviving equipment from the former warsaw pact). the second point in cooper’s argument is the fact that the european low-politics approaches to certain issues are indeed a product of a non-violent post-modern european mentality rather than just a consequence of the lack of military power as kagan states.45 although this view it is somewhat eurocentric, many europeans believe that the economic interdependence formula that worked in europe can work in other parts of the world. in fact, various approaches taken by the eu towards certain issues are based on the historical experience that one or various member states may have in respect to the same or similar issues. for instance, in the case of terrorism, europe has a long history of dealing with groups such as the ira, eta, the red army faction and the red brigades, which performed terrorist acts such as the use of improvised explosive devises, extortions and kidnaps against 43 cooper robert. “the european answer to robert kagan.” transatlantic internationale politik. 2003. p. 19-20 44 ibid. pp 19-25 45 this refers to the notion that the main reason for europe’s choice of low politics instead of high politics goes to the idea that most european states try to avoid continuity of the continent’s violent history of the last 200 years. ibid. review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 3/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 50 both the civilian population and specific political targets. hence, it is possible to see why “terrorism is still seen as a crime problem [in europe], and not an occasion to go to war.”46 this makes it clear how there is a diverging perception between the responses in international security that europe and united states are likely to have. this section established how the european union has developed its own policies and approaches towards security issues on a different path from the ones of the united states. factors such as constraints in military capabilities, immediate concerns and historical background, play a role in shaping the way in which the eu acts in the global scenario. the divergence in approaches that exists nowadays in the west has become a clear indicator of how the european union has been able to develop into a rational actor in matters of security and defence. the esdp and nato: a transition in collective security? with the cohesion between the eu and us growing weaker in issues of security, defence and military interests, the former western bloc is experiencing disintegration as the two main parties pursuit their own paths. thus, nato is at risk of becoming obsolete due to the fact that the divergent interests in foreign policy possessed by both the european and north american components are at risk of becoming incompatible. nevertheless, there are still many ‘atlanticists’ such as robert e. hunter, whose arguments are in favour of the necessity which the esdp and nato have of working together in order to protect existing common interests and “maintain the security of the transatlantic region.”47 in other words, according to the atlanticist view nato is still an invaluable political tool that is as functional for both europeans and north americans alike and therefore it is able satisfy the necessities of both sides, even though these have been diverging since the last stages of the cold war. 46 leiken, robert s. “europe’s angry muslims.” foreign affairs. vol. 84. 2005 pp. 129-130 47 hunter, robert e. the european security and defense policy: nato’s companion or competitor. 2002. review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 3/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 51 in other words, according to the atlanticist view nato is still an invaluable political tool that is as functional for both europeans and north americans alike and therefore it is able satisfy the necessities of both sides, even though these have been diverging since the last stages of the cold war. however, for many the atlanticist view has become as obsolete as the institution they are trying to defend. according to owen harris, the concept of “the west” ceased to exist with the end of the cold war, and therefore the principle behind nato is gone.48 also, most european states, as it has been stated throughout this piece, always had a desire for a more autonomous approach to current threats, rather than a general western one that would be predisposed by the united states. therefore, the esdp as an institution allows the european union to satisfy its necessities in respect to security and defence matters in a more specific way which works towards the common interests of its member states and the organization itself, while, on the other hand, nato‘s more broad approach to security may become incompatible in respect to european concerns. the criticisms towards a crumbling nato go further than just an empirical observation of the division between north america and europe. many critics believe that there is a division existent among the european states as well. the conflicting stands that were taken by the leaders of various countries towards the question of afghanistan and especially iraq made many experts believe that the west was breaking into smaller fragments. however, many scholars saw this situation as a learning experience in which the esdp would be able to explore its strengths and flaws. for example, anand menon believes that the iraq crisis in europe helped the different governments of the eu (and especially the ones from britain, france and germany) to understand and solve possible complications that may exist within the esdp, therefore presenting the crisis as a situation from which the institution has 48 harries, owen. “the collapse of the west.” foreign affairs. vol. 72. 1993. pp. 41-42. carpenter, gallen. beyond nato: staying out of europe’s wars. 1994 p. 145 review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 3/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 52 benefited itself.49 it is important to take into consideration the fact that the esdp is a young institution that it is evolving at a fast rate, and for that reason controversial events such as the war in iraq can help to prepare the european union in becoming a more effective strategic actor. also, it is essential to remember that the esdp has been able to surpass the divisions created by the iraqi situation and consequently has been working at full strength in more relevant scenarios for europe such as sub-saharan africa and afghanistan. by the end of the cold war, many analysts predicted a significant structural change in regard to the international security system. the prominent realist scholar kenneth waltz believes that “nato is a disappearing thing. it’s a question of how long it’s going to remain a significant institution even though its name might linger on.”50 as a result, it is not surprising that in coming years the relevance of nato will decrease, particularly at a time where most international security threats are located in the global south. this may also at some point create a situation in which the role of the esdp in respect to regional security will become more relevant for most european nations; which subsequently would create a situation in which nato could be become politically insignificant. conclusion in conclusion, we can consider the european union an autonomous and rational actor in the realm of international security. indeed, this is a challenge for traditional approaches to ir where the state has been seen as the core actor of the international system. however, by examining two different hypothetical tenets it is possible to visualize the extent to which the eu acts according to its own interests, concerns and limitations. the esdp has provided the european union with this capacity after a long and somewhat difficult process of defence integration. for that reason, when we look at this specialized agency of the eu it is important to understand that it goes further from just being a novel security arrangement; it 49 baldwin, david a. (ed.). “institutionalist theory and the realist challenge after the cold war.” neorealism and neoliberalism: the contemporary debate, 1993, pp. 286 50 menon, anand, from crisis to catharsis: the esdp after iraq. international affairs. 80:4, 2004. pp. 641-642 review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 3/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 53 actually represents the authority that the eu has as a rational actor to use coercive force, soft politics and diplomacy in order to accomplish specific goals. furthermore, the esdp framework has worked effectively in creating compatibility between the interests of the organization and its member states. therefore, it is evident that the european union has an autonomous, effective and active engagement with the international system. nonetheless, there are also implications regarding a self-directed eu which has become in a significant strategic actor. the most prominent one is the way in which a militarily impendent europe is eroding the transatlantic relationship. from a positivistic point of view it could be argued that europe, by acting as a rational actor, has different interests and concerns in contrast to the united states. this has created a vivid discourse among scholars, as many of them try to predict the outcome of this conflict, especially in regards to what will happen to nato. in fact, in order for the north atlantic alliance to survive it will have to unearth way in which it will have to modify its mandate in two ways. first, it will have to be able to satisfy the interests of the two divorcees; and secondly it has to become more active in order to be relevant to both europe and the united states. despite of what happens with nato in the years to come, thanks to the esdp the european union has entered the international arena as one of the most significant international security actors of the 21st century. review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 3/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 54 bibliography arrow, kenneth j. “economic theory and the hypothesis of rationality," the new palgrave: a dictionary of economics, new york: stockton press, 1987 baldwin, david a. (ed.). “institutionalist theory and the realist challenge after the cold war.” neorealism and neoliberalism: the contemporary debate, new york: columbia university press, 1993 barnett, m. n. & finnemore, m. “the politics, power and pathologies of international organizations.” international organization. 53:4. mit press, 1999 biscop, sven. euro-mediterranean security: a search for partnership. asgathe publishing ltd. england. 2003 bronstone, adam. european security into the twenty-first century: beyond tradional theories of international relations. asgathe publishing ltd. england, 2000 cahen, alfred. the western european union and nato: building a european defence identity within the context of atlantic solidarity. brassey’s ltd. london, 1989 caporaso, j. "regional integration theory: understanding our past and anticipating our future." journal of european public policy, 5:1, routledge, 1998 cooper, robert. “the european answer to robert kagan.” transatlantic internationale politik. 2. 2003 carpenter, gallen. beyond nato: staying out of europe’s wars. cato institute. washington. 1994 den boer, monica. & monar, jörg. ”keynote article: 11 september and the challenge of global terrorism to the eu as a security actor,” jcms: journal of common market studies 40 (s1), blackwell publishing – uaces, 2002 dorman, andrew. m & treacher, adam. european security: an introduction to security issues in post-cold war europe. darmouth publishing company. cambridge. 1995 ekengren, magnus. “from a european security community to a secure european community.” cfsp forum. vol. 3. january 2005 gegout ,catherine & fellow, marie c. “europe has a strategy, but is the eu a strategic actor?” cfsp forum vol. 3. january 2005 gieregich, bastian. & wallace, william. “not such a soft power: the external deployment of european forces,” survival, vol. 46. no. 2, summer 2004 gordon, philip. h. “europe’s uncommon foreign policy.” international security. vol. 22. no. 3. mit press. 1997 review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 3/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 55 harries, owen. “the collapse of the west,” foreign affairs. vol. 72. council on foreign relations, 1993. holm, erik. the european anarchy: europe's hard road into high politics, copenhagen business school press, 2001 holsti, k. j. the dividing discipline: hegemony and diversity in international theory. winchester, massachusetts, allen and unwin, 1985 hunter, robert e. the european security and defense policy: nato’s companion or competitor. rand. santa monica. 2002 jackson, robert & sørensen georg. introduction to international relations. oxford university press. new york. 1999 keane, rory. “european security and defence policy: from cologne to sarajevo.” global society, vol. 19, no. 1, january 2005 kagan, robert. “power and weakness.” policy review. no. 113. june 2002 leiken, robert s. “europe’s angry muslims.” foreign affairs. vol. 84. july/august, council on foreign relations, 2005 martin, l. & simmons, b. “theories and empirical studies of international institutions.” international organization. 54:2. mit press, 1998 mccormick, john. understanding the european union: a concise introduction. palgrave macmillan, 2005 missorili, antonio. background of esdp (1954-1999). institute for security studies – european union. 2004 menon, anand, “from crisis to catharsis: the esdp after iraq.” international affairs, vol. 80. no. 4, the royal institute of international affairs, 2004 neack, laura. “peacekeeping, bloody peacekeeping,” bulleting of the atomic scientists. volume 60, number 4. july/august, bulleting of the atomic scientists, 2004 williams, phil .“transnational criminal organisations and international security,” survival, vol. 36, no. 1, spring, oxford university, 1994 microsoft word anna vorobyova_integrating immigrants through the policy of multiculturalism as a state’s new response to the review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 113 ……………………………………………… integrating immigrants through the policy of multiculturalism as a state’s new response to the sovereignty challenge anna vorobyova inclusion may be of more relevance to the stability of the system than to the interests of the included. philip cerny abstract today the eu and canada experience a significant international migration inflow that requires a delicate treatment on the government side which would not contradict with these countries’ adherence to a liberal nation-state idea. the non-ratification of the eu constitution precluded the creation of a common immigration policy that could facilitate and level the social integration of immigrants within the eu member states that currently have different historically shaped strategies towards the newcomers. even though the legal and economic barriers for immigration and naturalization have been reasonably decreased over the past decades across the eu, the legacies of nationalizing citizenship laws are still persistent and immigrants are expected to integrate into the host cultures. these path dependent repercussions contradict the idea of a liberal nation-state and erect the second level barriers (besides legal and economic ones) for integration of immigrants into the host societies. these cultural barriers are more persistent in the social consciousness than the institutionalized ones, which is a reason for why liberalizing laws are not the most effective means for facilitating the immigrants’ integration into the host societies. this situation of intensive immigration combined with the low opportunities for social integration gives grounds to instability and dissatisfaction within certain social groups in the eu. this paper investigates how multiculturalism policy in canada contributes to a higher level of immigrants’ integration into canadian society as compared to the eu memberstates. moreover, the novel information from the centre of excellence for the study of immigration at simon fraser university suggests that maintenance of immigrant ethnicities contributes to the overall economic success of a country, which is another reason for the introducing multiculturalism and a common eu immigration policy. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 114 introduction the idea introduced with the essay title seems quite counterintuitive to the predominant scholarly view on the canadian policy of multiculturalism which is often suggested as a solution to the “ethnic dilemmas” in the eu countries (carens, et al. 1994, inglis, 2003, kymlicka, 1998, castles, 1992, et al. 1994). the paper aims at reassessing this accepted idea since the suggestions of adapting multiculturalism across european countries become more salient in the light of the enlarged nature of the eu, new immigration law in france, ethno-cultural tensions in denmark, estonia and latvia. literature debate and research question background the debate about nation-state sovereignty is an ongoing one and is shaped around opposing views on whether cultural, trade, value, business, and political globalizations irreversibly encroach on or mildly transformed nation-state sovereignty. the academic areas that deal with this issue are numerous, ranging from art history to international political economy, from identity politics and development studies to the international law regimes. one of the obvious results of globalization is an increased legal and illegal migration of people across state borders that challenge a recognized phrase coined by john torpey that “modern states expropriated from individuals and private entities the legitimate means of movement”.1 1 torpey john, coming and going: on the state monopolization of the legitimate “means of movement”, sociological theory, vol. 16, no. 3. (november, 1998), p. 239. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 115 in the field of migration control there are two opposite strands of thought concerning the changing nature of state sovereignty.2 some scholars (jacobson, 1996, sassen, 1996, 1998, soysal, 1998) argue that the state’s capacity to control migration has been significantly diminished by neo-liberal international economy coupled with international human rights regime. engbersen (2001) suggests that the state’s capacity to control the entering flow of migration has not significantly changed; however, the state’s efficiency in preventing illegal residency internally is dramatically challenged by ethnic communities and various strategies that immigrants employ quite successfully finding the loopholes in the law. other scholars (freeman, 1995, joppke, 1998, lahav and guiraudon, 2000) disagree with the conclusion that state sovereignty is decreasing. freeman (1995), money (1997) and joppke (1998) suggest that states are internally, rather than externally, limited in their ability to control immigration because of the institutional constraints of interest groups politics and political parties electoral pragmatism. guiraudon and lahav (2000) highlighted how states have managed to delegate migration policies to various international and domestic non-state actors, but that does not necessarily mean states are losing sovereignty or regressing in their ability to control migration. thinking in terms of infrastructural state capacities defined by michael mann (1984) as an ability to hold the exclusive control over the territory at the expense of any other entity of non-territorial nature (such as church, business corporations, university) it might appear problematic to resolve the debate about migration control and state sovereignty. even though delegating its authority to control migration over to the non-state entities might mean an extraterritoriality which is beyond the modern 2 from now on, discussion of state sovereignty is limited to the western developed nations that experience significant migration inflow. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 116 conventional understanding of a state, in my opinion, the very fact of delegating some authority initiated by the state itself signifies still the ultimate sovereignty of a state over its new partners in migration control. assuming that the question of a state retaining major control of migration inflow might not be the only decisive indicator of its preserved sovereignty, i look at another vital aspect of state operation, namely, a state’s historical pursuit of homogenizing a nation (brubaker, 1992, schulze, 1994). considering that the literature on migration control cannot resolve the debate about possible transformations in state sovereignty when exposed to significant movements of people, i shift attention from the policies controlling migration to the policies treating migration that has already occurred. as it is questionable if a state has ever held a complete control over its territory (joppke, 1998), the increased level of migration nevertheless poses a problem for a state in terms of how to extend and maintain its sovereignty over the newcomers with the backgrounds more diverse than ever in all respects: geography, ethnicity, education, gender, income and others. the overwhelming diversity of newcomers poses a challenge to the state’s sovereignty as the necessity of controlling the population under the state rule was often connected with the homogeneity and loyalty of the people (brubaker, 1992, schulze, 1994), which becomes quite complicated to ensure given the scope of the migrants’ diversities. thus the research question i intend to answer is what influences policies towards immigrants in a liberal democratic state today given both the increased diversity of the newcomers and the state’s pursuit of internal stability through homogenizing its inhabitants? apparently, today it is impossible to speak about “a state” as a unitary actor due to the democratization of the state apparatus and of its interaction with the society. policies review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 117 concerned with the immigrants are in particular influenced by various state actors with opposite interests. bureaucracy is supposed to be persistently stricter about migration control both internally and at the state borders (ellermann, 2005), whereas political parties and governments tend to change their positions according to election cycles and public attitudes (freeman, 1995, joppke, 1998, money, 1997). however, considering a significant part of literature which argues that state policies concerned with immigrants proceed almost exclusively at the elite level (freeman, 1995, giuraudon, 2000, favell, 2001) for the narrow purpose of this research certain generalizations in the phenomenon of state seem to be justified. i suggest thinking of a state as a self-perpetuating open system with an interest in preserving its internal stability. the understanding of a state for this paper is framed in the conventional weberian terms, but at a higher level of abstraction that is omitting various institutions and actors engaged in the process of immigrants’ integration policy-making. a state will be considered as a territorial political organization that is endowed with exclusive sovereignty from the inhabitants of its territory and supported by its possession of the legitimate means of violence. state sovereignty is manifested in its authority to make collectively binding decisions and to be the last resort of responding to the citizens’ claims. a state will be viewed as a coercive system interested and engaged in maintaining its internal stability through mitigating differences and cleavages within the population under its rule. in addition to the challenge of increased diversity, the exercise of state sovereignty through homogenizing the inhabitants and ensuring their loyalty is furthermore contentious today given the liberal democratic discourse of protecting human review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 118 rights, privacy, and ethnic minorities in addition to minimal emphasis on community. indeed, as freeman (1995) and joppke (1998) suggest, principles of liberal democratic state functioning (pluralism, openness) is one of the major factors that forces the developed industrialized states to accept immigrants regardless of the unfavorable public opinion and despite the need to keep control over who resides on the state’s territory. i extend this idea and would argue that: despite the increased diversity of the immigrants and the liberal democratic discourse a state still succeeds in maintaining its sovereignty through the same means of homogenizing the new residents and as a result a state still exists as a stable political-territorial organization with a population which is conformed into a nation according to some underlying shared values. even though the process of policy-making in the area of the immigrants’ treatment is not designed and executed unilaterally, its general direction and results seem to reveal the grand rationale behind it. i argue that the latter can be defined as the state’s continuous pursuit of maintaining control over the population under its rule that historically took various forms and employed many strategies and which today can be defined as the politics of integrating immigrants. state pursuit of controlling its people as far as this research is concerned, the idea of authority in the early modern europe faced three major changes that drastically diverged from the authority in the previous period conventionally called feudalism. these innovations were territorial demarcation, centralization and extra-personal nature of the office. therefore, the review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 119 ascension of a modern state required from the rulers to find new sources of legitimacy for this impersonal and remote apparatus claiming its right for coercion and exemption of resources (tilly, 1990, schulze, 1994). search for a new linkage between a state and the inhabitants of the land claimed to be under the state’s rule led to the various strategies such as: registering people and their property, standardization of measurements (scott, 1998), coercive religious conversion (schulze, 1994), nationwide printed media, unified symbols and holidays (anderson, 1991), national education, official language and historiography (gellner, 1983) and even mass conscription and warfare (tilly, 1990). all these enterprises were initiated by the rulers at first to advance integration of the land inhabitants to a higher level such as shared membership in a political community; and afterwards to create a special and almost affectionate bond between a state and its population that can be named patriotism, nationalism, national identity, or the civic code of loyalty to the state. these affiliations were finally established in the concept of citizenship that encompasses not only mutually recognized rights and responsibilities between a state and an individual but more importantly points to the belonging of a citizen to a particular nation (brubaker, 1992, faist et al. 2004), to the political community with a distinct collective identity. this was possible since the idea of citizenship was originated as national citizenship, meaning that individuals related to the state in a very close and symbolic way, what some scholars even called “a genuine link” (rittstieg, 1990: 1402, qtd in faist, et. al. 2004). for this reason there is a debate about dual citizenship and an emerging post-national or even global citizenship since it is problematic to maintain “a genuine link” with two polities least to say with the humanity at large. the problem disappears if there is no place for this special genuine connection in review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 120 the idea of citizenship but it is not how it emerged. interestingly enough, the soviet tradition of citizenship is quite different from the western one exactly in the criteria of belonging. soviet citizenship used to describe only formal legal relations between a state and an individual and it was clearly differentiated from the idea of patriotic adherence to the soviet ideals of communism that were supported by the ideology of class solidarity and not by the ties of nationality. the latter was fundamentally neglected in the ussr and reduced to the nominal label in the passport (nahorna, 2002). being a soviet citizen meant adherence to the “higher” ideals of working class solidarity that crossed any national borders and denied any national differences. it is obvious from the collapse of the ussr, one of the reasons for which was nationalism, that citizenship without national belonging looses its power of integrating and affectionately affiliating individuals with a state. decreasing any kind of cleavages within the society was another vital interest of the state as they are sources of instability, anti-state protest claims and even separatism of some groups. therefore, besides the initiatives noted above there was another set of state activities tailored at embracing and demarcating its inhabitants, which comprises modern citizenship (brubaker, 1992). this legal connection of an individual with a polity was developed through balancing rights and duties of the citizens in relation to the state. the evolution of the modern citizenship regimes depicted by t.h. marshall can be also understood as various contracts between the state and its citizens influenced by the circumstances which at times endangered state-society relations of loyalty and stability. under this logic, welfare state was created to mitigate class divisions, which were dangerous to the extent of splitting one nation into two as disraeli famously expressed it. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 121 state enfranchising responses to the labor and feminist movements, satisfying responses to the civil rights, handicapped, and sex minorities’ movements all can be viewed as state pursuit of internal stability and self-preservation. if the inclusion of women and labor into political and social welfare community did not change but simply expanded the same universal citizenship to the new segments of population, the inclusion of various other minority groups qualitatively changed nature of citizenship. the innovation in the citizens’ rights was in a differentiated treatment of the people by a state based on their belonging to a particular group within a larger society led to the idea of multicultural citizenship (castles, 1994) that is widely considered as just, humanistic and democratic in political philosophy (young, 1989, 1990, taylor, 1994, castles, 1992, 1994). a totally different story may be told about state treatment of those distinct groups of population whose differences were along the lines of ethnicity, culture, religion or language. this inclusion was coercive and assimilatory in nature, especially in the first modern territorial states to emerge, such as france and spain. ethnic subgroups were either wiped out or fought against or negotiated to conform to the central source of authority and uniform language, religion and various other cultural practices. later in the history those ethnic groups (the basques, the bretons, the irish, the scottish, the walloons, the flemish) who managed to preserve their identity different from the national one reiterated their claims on rights for a cultural distinctiveness to the central state. these claims were addressed through federalization, special public programs of preserving ethnic cultures, languages and through other forms of cultural autonomy. again, these state policies seem liberal and humanistic in a way, however, state’s concern with ethnic unrest, terrorism and separatism is driving those policies. therefore, it is review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 122 possible to argue that after initial coercive assimilation of the ethnicities into the mainstream nationwide culture, the state now chose a more sophisticated way of maintaining national homogeneity, namely, through preemption for the ethnic sentiments to take over the loyalty to a nation-state but at the same time allowing for certain freedom of expression of ethnic identity. again, all these inclusive activities of a state were largely motivated by its pursuit of internal stability and of a more homogeneous nation. it is worth emphasizing that the ethnic groups noted above were originally a population of a particular state and their demand of inclusion was based on their citizenship rights as of inhabitants’ of this state. conversely, immigrants face a different challenge in their interaction with a host state, on one hand, they want to preserve their identity but on the other, they have to accept the rules of the society they chose to enter. from the state perspective, immigrants are both dangerous as they bring new diversity, inequality and thus instability but on the other hand, their economies need immigrants and even human rights issues request accepting immigrants sometimes. this state-immigrant dilemma is well-described by adrian favell as immigrants being the last challenge of inclusion for the liberal democracies (favell, 2001). as he demonstrated in his book and as this research supported his idea, liberal democracies found their escape in certain policies of integrating immigrants, namely, fair socioeconomic treatment to reduce social cleavages under condition of immigrants’ conforming to the national culture. various states succeeded differently in these policies accordingly to the extent of assimilation claims they pose on immigrants. the canadian policy of multiculturalism in this respect appears to be one of the most successful as it faces the least amount of social cleavages between immigrants and nationals. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 123 analytical framework what are the means that a state employs today in order to mitigate the differences and to keep control over the newcomers? what are the state policies towards its new residents that can shed light on the research question? there are several classifications of these policies possible, for instance, according to the legal status of migrants or to the rights and duties extended to them (denizens, naturalized citizens, first-, secondgeneration immigrants, illegal immigrants, migrant workers). however, my argument requires the policies that are concerned more with values and identity issues than with socioeconomic relations between a state and its new residents. in order to investigate whether a state still pursues nation homogeneity it seems more logical to explore the policies that reveal how a particular nation is imagined and whether or not the immigrants are expected to conform to this image. this policy would be an extrapolation of the particular citizenship regime onto the newcomers either through the process of naturalization and of the consequential integration of the immigrants into the traditionally imagined community of citizens. in this i follow roger brubaker’s argument that cultural idioms historically shaped the citizenship regime of a particular nation around the core values that members of this nation adhere to. i find also that adrian favell (1998, 2001) logically extends this argument onto how particular citizenship regimes shape the state policies of integrating immigrants according to these cultural idioms, so to say in order to become a member of a particular nation immigrants are expected to comply with the conventions and values embodied in the cultural idioms. germany, great britain, france and the us are widely discussed in the literature as classical examples of the nations with particularly vivid cultural idioms review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 124 of their citizenship and consequently shaped policies of integrating immigrants. even though other european nations are not as discussed in the literature regarding their particular citizenship idioms, brubaker’s and favell’s arguments seem quite applicable to any other nation-state, especially to the so called “old” historical nations. the challenges that arise in the european states due to their expectation of immigrants to integrate into the established cultural idiom are manifold: first, contradiction to the idea of liberal democracy professed by the eu members; second, aggravation of inconsistencies in the policies towards immigrants across the eu3 and lastly, creating serious internal tensions between the indigenous and immigrated citizens in many eu countries. one of the most widely proposed cures for these cleavages in europe is a policy of multiculturalism as practiced in canada (carens, et al. 1994, inglis, 2003) or australia (castles, 1992, et al. 1994). canadian application of multiculturalism is renowned for the metaphor of “mosaic” as juxtaposed to the us “melting pot” and is discussed particularly positively by will kymlicka and charles taylor, which importantly means the acceptance of multiculturalism by both liberal and communitarian perspectives on citizenship and ethnic identities. it is suggested that multiculturalism values diversity, allows for preserving and expressing one’s identity without major restrictions as long as it does not contradict with the liberal freedoms of others. before conducting this research i stood on the same position of assigning a high value to the idea of multiculturalism as the policy which aims at preserving and 3 it is interesting to note that the non-ratification of the eu constitution, which proposed a creation of a common immigration policy for the eu members, reinforces the assumption that states aim at preserving their sovereignty through homogenizing their populations and, therefore, try to retain their historically shaped cultural idioms of citizenship and of integrating the newcomers. there is also some evidence that common immigration policy was one of the reasons for the french and the dutch to vote against the constitution. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 125 developing particular ethnic and cultural identities. after completing the inquiry, i have some evidence to argue conversely that the policy of multiculturalism can be viewed as the newest accommodation necessitated by the liberal democratic discourse which essentially remains the same policy of conforming immigrants to the mainstream host culture. in this way, liberal democratic state still is able to exercise its sovereignty over the population through homogenizing ethnic and cultural differences within the policy of multiculturalism. therefore, retrospectively my hypothesis was: it is likely to observe that a liberal democratic state has preserved its pursuit of nation homogeneity in order to ensure internal stability and loyalty of its citizens through the investigation of the policy of multiculturalism in canada. as a theoretical method to uncover this veiled state interest i chose discourse analysis of the language used in the official public documents discussing the principles and functioning of the multiculturalism policy in canada. the prominent work that first introduced this method in studying the policies of integrating immigrants was adrian favell’s book philosophies of integration: immigration and the idea of citizenship in france and britain (1998, 2001). he argued that an insightful research of immigration and integration policies, especially in france and britain, can only be interpretative and consequently, studying merely formal laws and institutions is not adequate. favell insisted that “politics takes place within language: within rhetoric and argument, which divide up, categorize and bound the social and cultural context of the policies” (favell, 2001:9). i agree with his idea that policy language is not just a reflection or a separate element of the debate on immigrants’ integration but rather is a cognitive justification further constructing the policy in the path-dependent mode. another significant example review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 126 of employing discourse analysis in studying treatment of the migrants is a working paper by peter s. li deconstructing canada’s discourse of immigrant integration further developed as one of the approaches in his recent book destination canada: immigration debates and issues (2003). peter s. li looked at how immigration critics, policymakers and political theorists view the concept of immigrants’ integration from different perspectives of diversity in mind but at the same time converging on the idea that integration implies immigrants’ conforming to the mainstream culture. he looked at the context in which those three discourses used concepts of integration and diversity and concluded two things of major relevance for this research: 1) rather than questioning the relationships between diversity and integration, advocates of multiculturalism accept the already existing canadian culture as a standard of normalcy; 2) evaluation of immigrants’ integration into canadian society is based on how well their various ethnic, religious, and cultural practices are conformed to the mainstream canadian culture. i will rely on his findings in the process of my deconstruction of the language used in the public policy reports on multiculturalism in canada. another study on the canadian multiculturalism policy only episodically employed discourse analysis in a book selling diversity by yasmeen abu-laban and christina gabriel (2002). their main focus was historical and institutional changes in this policy as influenced by internal political (government ideology) and external (globalization of business) factors, however, they also noted how the language of the politicians and business corporations reveals and supports the conclusions based on their observations of the empirical developments in the multiculturalism policy. in short, there was a significant shift in the official discourse about multiculturalism from the era of neoreview of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 127 conservative mulroney government (up to 1993) that discussed multiculturalism as a profitable neo-liberal business card. canadian corporations “sell” diversity around the globe, which basically means that successful sales depend largely on personal attachments of “hyphenated” canadians with their home countries or with the business people of similar ethnic origin. this position on multiculturalism obviously did not require any public spending. under a liberal pm jean chrétien the discourse on multiculturalism has changed to focusing on ethnic identities per se and their contribution to the canadian national unity and cohesion. the major lens of the liberal multiculturalism policy became equality of opportunity, consistent with the reform liberal ideology, however, not necessarily with the amount of public spending on ensuring this equality. the liberal discourse of multiculturalism policy became a part of an overarching theme of protecting various minorities (gender, racial, sexual, ethnic) from discrimination. overall, the book selling diversity again supports my choice of discourse analysis as an insightful method of inquiry in the field of state policies on integrating immigrants. besides the fact that there are some studies which successfully employed discourse analysis to my research focus earlier, another reason for me to choose this particular method of studying the policy of multiculturalism, is that phenomena involved here, namely, identity and ethnicity, are symbolic and require an interpretative rather than an institutional or policy approach. for instance, k. fierlbeck (1996) pointed out that cultural identity is ambivalent in terms of public-private dichotomy as it is not clear whether state institutions or individuals should be ultimately responsible for the expression and preservation of the cultural identities. another ambivalence is in how to review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 128 balance liberal and communitarian values in the matters of identity, whether it should be regarded as a group phenomenon and a collective right or conversely as a right of an individual. ethnicity and identity are one of the most irrational and symbolic phenomena that social sciences aspire to deal with because there is a strong sense of personal belonging and attachment hidden in those which does not require a logical or rational substantiation (castoriadis, 1975, smith, 1991). almost always identity cannot or should not even be explained or justified for it expresses the necessity of a human being to belong to some group among which an ethnic group provides one of the most emotionally strong and irrational collective identities (smith, 1991, taylor, 1996). deconstructing the language of the official documents on the canadian policy of multiculturalism, i am interested in the words that are relevant to my hypothesis such as: “integration”, “inclusive”, “diversity”, “stability” and “cohesion”. in particular, i will look at the contexts in which these words are used, their connotations, and frequency of their use. focusing on these particular words and their meanings, i draw from the previous discourse analysis study dome by peter s. li (2000). research findings as my major source, i chose official reports of the multiculturalism division of the canadian heritage department. those are policy summaries of the annual (1997/1998 to 2003/2004) operation of the canadian multiculturalism act, available on the web4. there were several reasons for focusing on these particular documents only: first, consistency in the provider of the discourse, second, possibility to track changes in the 4 can be found at http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/multi/reports/index_e.cfm review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 129 discourse over time, and most importantly, the substance of the reports reflecting the official understanding of the values and goals of multiculturalism together with the means of their implementation. i chose to avoid other texts that discuss multiculturalism in canada, especially media sources because of the distortions in their discourse by its internal information cycles and business interests (chomsky, 1994, 2002, patterson, 1998). structurally, every report consists of an introduction or a foreword by a prominent politician (prime minister, head of the commission on multiculturalism, minister or secretary of the relevant to multiculturalism department within the government) and an overview or summary of the best practices, reforms, achievements together with highlighting the problems and challenges. the first part is the most representative and a concentrated data for the discourse analysis of the values and interests of the state in the policy of multiculturalism. the parts of the reports that summarize the successes and failures of implementing the policy of multiculturalism are larger in size and more informative but less valuable for the discourse analysis. however, they convey an important message that the government focuses more on the institutional side of the multiculturalism act rather than on symbolic one even though identity is primarily a symbolic phenomenon (smith, 1991, taylor, 1996). i have analyzed the reports for the years of 1997/1998, 1999/2000, 2001/2002, and 2003/2004. as for the discourse changes over time, there were no significant and no irreversible shifts even after the paramount event of 9/11 attack that supposedly could have diminished the appreciation of multiculturalism. i find two possible reasons for such discourse consistency: first, no change in government ideology as liberal party was in review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 130 power since 1993 up to 2005 and secondly, that the liberals campaigned against conservatives and the reform party, in particular, appealing to diversity and multiculturalism as fundamental values and core of canadian identity (lupul, 2005). however, the consistency of the government ideology cannot be the only reason for a no drawback to occur. relying on my findings, and with support from the previous studies (elliott, 1992, abu-laban, 1994, li, 2003, abu-laban and gabriel, 2002, lupul, 2005), i argue that the major reason for the 9/11 to not interrupt the consistently appreciative discourse on multiculturalism is the active government construction of canadian national identity around the idea of diverse and inclusive canada. as the multiculturalism act was passed in 1971 and enacted only in 1988, it is highly unlikely that multiculturalism could have been firmly enrooted as a core of the canadian national identity. two decades of enactment is not a sufficient period of time for any value to become engraved in any collective identity, least to say the identity of a large and heterogeneous group such as a canadian nation. even though diversity has been a century-long reality for canada, by itself it cannot be a sound justification for such frequent official statements as: “multiculturalism is even more than a policy. it is a way of life. it is a value at the heart of our collective identity, “…diverse and multicultural is who canadians are” or “multiculturalism is a core of the canadian national identity”5 if it were indeed so, racism and discrimination based on religion and ethnicity would not be 5 it is important to note though that there is evidence of a stronger connection between multiculturalism and canadians’ sense of identity. when canadians were asked in 1999 about what contributes to their sense of identity and makes them different from americans, multiculturalism came in second after the health care system. (2000/2001 annual report on the operation of the canadian multiculturalism act). however, i strongly argue that it is only indicative of the general public in canada accepting the official discourse of constructing the national identity based on multiculturalism because racism and discrimination are still persistent in the canadian society which directly contradicts with multiculturalism as an essential part of the canadian national identity. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 131 still discussed as one of the major challenges for the successful functioning of the multiculturalism act in all the reports that i have examined. it is a paradox that even the latest report (2003/2004) acknowledges the fact that racism still is a part of the canadian society which presumably practices and appreciates diversity and multiculturalism. as recent as 2004 there was a conference titled hate and racism in canada: seeking solutions held by the indigenous bar association and the national anti-racism council of canada still has a work to do in fighting racism and racial discrimination. the question arises about the commensurability of such statements as “diversity is a canadian value” and a still pertinent need to fight racism. also it is been not so long ago (1960s, beginning of the 1970s) that the canadian government pursued an assimilatory policy towards immigrants whose children were forced to live in the residential schools in order to become “more canadian” linguistically, religiously and culturally. one of the advocates of the multiculturalism act in the 1970s, a ukrainian-canadian, manoly lupul shockingly compared the canadian policies towards immigrants with the soviet policies of russification of all the nationalities within the ussr. (lupul, 2005: 67-102) whereas it is possible for the government to repeatedly invoke the idea of multiculturalism being a national value and an identity for the canadians, the change in the policy direction is not able to be reproduced so quickly in the self-perception of the society. therefore, having analyzed the official discourse on multiculturalism i found that the first overarching theme of the reports is government persistent reinforcement of multiculturalism as a national identity component in the consciousness of the canadians. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 132 i found that the official multiculturalism discourse concentrates less on positive activities and even words such as “celebrating”, “promotion”, “understanding”, “contribution” and more often emphasizes successes of the anti-racism endeavors that use negatively changed words “elimination” or “combating” of racism, “victimization” or “under-representation” of the minorities. the exception to this negative discourse is found in the introduction to the report of 1999/2000 by the honorable hedy fry says: we know that legislation alone isn’t enough particularly when, as with the canadian multiculturalism act, the aim is to encourage and promote change rather than taking a regulatory or coercive approach. (emphasis added). another macro observation is that with the exception of the 1999/2000 report the major discourse employed in discussing multiculturalism is institutional or functional. by this i mean that the reports are concerned with “making federal and provincial institutions more reflective of the diverse canadian society” (2003/2004), “diversity lens should be implemented in how government agencies deliver their policies”, “being proud of the activities undertaken by federal departments and agencies to support multiculturalism and build a stronger, more united canada” (2001/2002). the majority of the discussion in the reports is devoted to public spending, of how various state institutions implement the multiculturalism act, and cooperate with ethnic communities. for instance, in the 2003/2004 report: the increasing diversity of the canadian population requires government institutions to examine their policies, programs and services to ensure that they are accessible to all canadians and meet the changing needs of a multicultural population. ...role of the public servants in promoting the values of diversity and respect in their programs, policies and service delivery. (emphasis added). review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 133 the first question to ask is who defines the needs of various ethnic groups, second, what if their identity does not require any special service but merely recognition and lastly, i can hardly picture a bureaucrat widely promoting values of diversity in his delivery of the public services. issues of diversity, identity and symbolic pluralism are more influentially promoted by the public figures such as intellectuals or top politicians whose discourse is known for a wider public than just the particular groups or individuals who receive the particular services. it is not that i argue about diminishing the importance of the institutional aspect of the multiculturalism policy or the significance of the government funding for the successful maintenance of diversity, however, i am concerned with the symbolic discourse nearly absent in these official documents. the only report where i found such words as “belonging”, “sense of pride”, “partnership”, and such phrase as there are many different views about which outcomes matter most. measures themselves influence the way policies are implemented and programming is designed and delivered. for example, is it more important to help 100 people get started on a journey or to help 10 people who are most in need to complete it? certainly, it matters that we reach as many people as possible. but the effectiveness of what we do in reaching them matters more. in the case of multiculturalism, this means attitudes and expectations and a sense of pride and belonging. these are difficult outcomes to measure and even harder to attribute to one government initiative or program. (emphasis added). this is from an introduction by the honorable hedy fry, secretary of state on multiculturalism and status of women, for the report of the year 1999/2000. i can contribute this only case of rhetoric which at least minimally employed symbolic attributes of identity issue to the fact that it was written by a woman. this idea is also supported with her overall use of narrative rather than explanatory or informative style in her introduction, which is considered a distinction of a feminine expression. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 134 the next major theme to discuss is a concern of the canadian government about social cohesion. in the majority of times discussion of diversity and “various racial, ethnic, and religious groups” goes together with the issue of social cohesion. whenever social cohesion or stability is mentioned, the word “inclusive” or “inclusion” appears as well. there are no cases that i noted where “diversity” would be mentioned just by itself as a sign of celebrating its very presence. it is always used in the context of “integrating” or “inclusive” government actions “to build a cohesive and diverse canadian society”. conversely, “not recognizing diversity is dangerous and neglects opportunities for prosperous and just canada”. deconstructing this discourse, it appears that diversity by itself is not celebrated within the policy of multiculturalism rather it is acknowledged as an inevitable fact and is being dealt with through “inclusion” and “integration” of the various cultural groups with the major goal of maintaining stability and cohesiveness of the canadian nation. as i already mentioned, the word “partnership” was used just once, other than that it is always “canadian society” which “includes ethnic, racial, cultural minorities”. the question arises naturally about how it corresponds with “multiculturalism being a value at the heart of our [canadian] collective identity” if the diversity should be incorporated into the mainstream canadian culture. obviously, the policy of “inclusiveness” is meant to combat the social injustices and racism but the discourse reveals that the government is interested in multiculturalism as long as it does not contradict with social cohesion and internal stability of a country. in a large society to maintain those it is inevitable to acknowledge diversity and to give it a limited freedom with the condition of this diversity being integrated over time into conventional culture. how much then this kind of review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 135 “inclusiveness” allows for maintaining “diversity”? if canadian society aims at including all the diverse ethnic groups, how is it possible for the latter to maintain their distinctive differences? going back to the canadian state preoccupation with the “social cohesiveness”, the most vivid and representative example of this discourse is the phrase from 2001/2002 report: the explicit recognition that diversity within a common citizenship is good, which is what multiculturalism is all about, encourages canadians to feel committed to canada, fostering a sense of belonging and attachment to the country and to one another, a collective state of being otherwise known as “social cohesion.” as canada becomes increasingly diverse, efforts to strengthen social cohesion between and among all the many ethnic, racial and religious groups in canadian society will be central to our continued progress as a modern, united and democratic society. (emphasis added). in every report that i have examined the most frequent use of the word “equality” was in the meaning of economic, social and political equality of the “various minorities” and “canadian society”. i have traced none phrases mentioning “equality” with cultural or symbolic connotation. no doubt, the political and socioeconomic aspects of equality are vital for an individual success in a modern society such as canada; however, this type of equality implies that all ethnic groups aspire to perform in the canadian economy and politics. moreover, socioeconomic and political equality undermines the fact that some ethnic groups strive just for the recognition of their difference which requires only cultural and symbolic equality without any social endowments. if the main value of multiculturalism is “celebrating diversity”, then initially equality should be recognized in cultural terms, meaning that values and life attitudes of various ethnic groups are equal in their difference rather than different from the mainstream. the phrase representative of review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 136 this idea is from the foreword by jean chretien, a prime minister back then, in the 1997/1998 report: all canadians regardless of their background will continue to work together ensuring participation of all citizens in all the aspects of society. (emphasis added). i suggest that if multiculturalism is meant to celebrate diversity, the phrase “regardless of their background” quite undermines this endeavor. another prevailing theme of the official multiculturalism discourse is “participation” or “active citizenship”. the government aims at “ensuring canadians of diverse backgrounds to fully participate in the political, economic and cultural life of our country.” the value of taking part in the social institutions is clearly emphasized for being a “true canadian citizen”. this is again the intertwined discourse of “inclusion” “integration” and “cohesion” that does not allow for diversity and ethnic differences per se to be the main focus of multicultural citizenship. diversity is allowed for the ethnic groups to the extent of their adherence to the image of canada as it existed before this particular group appeared on its territory. “participation in all aspects of canadian life” means that immigrants or individuals of the ethnic backgrounds that are very different from what canada was before the official announcement of multiculturalism should accept the already existing institutions and to participate in those despite possible incommensurability with their ethnic values. next, it almost seems that the official discourse on multiculturalism bears resemblance to political correctness in such goals as: “inclusion of visible minority actors cast in leading and recurring roles; and initiatives implemented to ensure that scripts not portray minorities in a stereotypical manner” or that “visible minorities should review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 137 be represented in all levels of government agencies”. however, i argue for the converse acknowledgement that multiculturalism is much more that political correctness if it aspires to reach its goals of “cross-cultural understanding.” the final point that stands out from the official discourse on multiculturalism is the underlying assumption that there is a “modern”, “normal” and “civilized” (not quoted from the reports) canadian general culture that is juxtaposed to “visible minorities”, “ethnic, religious, cultural, racial minorities”. here is a couple of the most representative phrases of this discourse: “women torn between western and muslim traditions.” (1997/1998 report) and from the latest (2003/2004) report: multiculturalism is a policy of inclusion that aims to help people overcome barriers related to race, ethnicity and cultural or religious background. (emphasis added). and: multiculturalism is a social model that is an example for the world and is founded on the belief that diversity is synonymous with success, prosperity and the future. (emphasis added). this kind of treating ethnic values as barriers means not respecting them as differences worthy of cherishing and, moreover, rejecting the fact that some cultures define diversity in the opposite way, namely, without reference to success and prosperity as for some cultures those are not values at all. also this discourse is premised on the assumption that members of ethnic communities have it as a goal to become a part of the “wider” canadian society and therefore, they should forsake their adherence to ethnic values which endanger mainstream canadian culture. such premises cannot be a part of the kind of multiculturalism which embraces and promotes ethnic and cultural diversity. finally, even the very use of the term “visible minorities” undermines the idea of diversity and multiculturalism in at least two ways: it implies existence of non-visible review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 138 majority and it undermines differences within both visible minorities and non-visible majority. overall, the idea of “integration” is expressed in the official discourse on multiculturalism as a result of immigrants or members of ethnicities to conform to the “canadian values”, which are claimed to be “tolerance, equality, justice and diversity” (2003/2004 report). “integration” occurs not as a result of a deeper cross-cultural partnership and understanding but rather through the “inclusion” or “active participation” of the members of various diverse groups into a standard north american culture. this idea is reinforced in the discourse which juxtaposes “canadian society” to “ethnic, racial, cultural, religious minorities” that reoccurs as a major theme in all the reports on the operation of the multiculturalism act in canada. significance of the research findings and conclusions overall, my research question was supported with the discourse analysis data, specifically; it appears that the policy of multiculturalism in canada might serve the persistent goal of the state to homogenize its population in order to ensure internal stability. the official discourse of the canadian policy of multiculturalism seems to reveal that the underpinning motivation of this policy is not simply to integrate immigrants or to facilitate an understanding between various ethnic groups but rather is to conform the immigrants and ethncities into the mainstream canadian way of socioeconomic, political life and, most important, of attitudes and values with only superficial cultural expressions of ethnic identities (food, festivities, garments). review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 139 the research findings support the idea by roger brubaker about how cultural idioms shape citizenship regimes with an example of a new country. in the case of canadian multiculturalism there was initially a distinct feature of canada that makes it different from other cases of immigrant nations and allowed for an easier transition to a multicultural citizenship. it is “an extraordinarily disperse pattern of geographic settlement”, as cole harris (2001: 194) put it, that allowed for ethnic groups to maintain their patterns of economic and cultural reproduction for a longer time than in other immigrant nations. the prairies in canada, unlike any land in the us or australia, were from the beginning of settlement inhabited mainly by the german-scandinavian or the polish and the ukrainian communities. this “postmodern patriotism” (ibid. 193, 197) is what makes canada a unique nation, what allows for a political institutional solidarity with ethnic and cultural diversity as contrary to the “melting pot”. therefore, policy of multiculturalism in canada did not emerge at once and is not a proof of exceptional benevolence to the immigrants since canadian “mosaic” was not the planned positive government policy but rather a pattern of residing of the various ethnicities that allowed for them to stay for a long time not intermingled with other ethnic groups and to the mainstream anglo-celtic or french cultures. the deconstruction of the multiculturalism discourse is also in line with the findings of adrian favell and his seminal work on the philosophies of immigrants’ integration. introducing a new case to his comparative framework, first supports his argument about ethnic dilemmas of the liberal democratic states and also contributes to a deeper understanding of how state policies towards immigrants are shaped within broader philosophies of nations. the case of canada appears to support favell’s idea. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 140 the research findings support also the historical institutionalism study by jane jenson (1997) about the changing nature of the canadian citizenship regime due to the transformations in the dynamics of internal political institutions and neo-liberal international trade regimes. thus, change in government ideologies from the “quiet revolution” and trudeau in 1960s then to the neoconservatives in the 1980s and finally to the reform liberals in 1993 contributed to the changes in the understanding of the canadian citizenship with the consequent reforms such as policy of multiculturalism coupled with the instabilities and changes in the social welfare. also, the findings provide an episodic support for the importance of “participatory” or “active” citizenship in the republican understanding of nation (sicakkan, 2004). in this, canada appears similar to the us and france in their concern with the civic political culture of its citizens. the research findings are also significant for the studies on multicultural citizenship. it is a good empirical observation for the political theorists who advocate this kind of citizenship such as isis m young, will kymlicka and charles taylor. my thinking suggest that it is rather a disproof than support for their arguments about benevolence of multiculturalism as it appears to be less liberal than they suggest. the deconstruction of the official canadian discourse on multiculturalism suggests that it can be simply a more sophisticated and a better veiled strategy of assimilating immigrants than the us “melting pot” or the republican france. in this my findings support another study by reitz and breton (1994) which showed that canada and the us incorporate ethnic groups into host society similarly, despite the popular belief that canadian “mosaic” allows for preserving one’s ethnicity. essentially, north american culture assimilates ethnic and cultural minorities into its way of life. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 141 overall, it is questionable if the policy of multiculturalism as practiced in canada should be a model for the european nations in order to reduce the social cleavages persistent in the host societies with regards to immigrants and ethnic minorities. first of all, multiculturalism appears to be quite specific for canada, or to use terms of brubaker and favell, a canadian cultural idiom and philosophy of immigrants’ integration. therefore, it is not easily transferable into other nations with established cultural idioms of their own. most importantly, the canadian government in its policy of multiculturalism is not selflessly liberal and pursues the same goal of homogenizing its population as the “old” european nations. in this respect, my findings fundamentally contradict the popular proposals of employing canadian multiculturalism for the european nations (castles et al. 1994, carnes et al., 1994, inglis, 2003), which were the start point for my inquiry. the majority of the studies on multiculturalism policy in canada follow the frameworks of the economics of migration, institutional, public administration, or public policy studies, with discourse analysis being utilized only in the mentioned before peter s. li’s book and episodically in the book by y. abu-laban and c. gabriel. however, as this research provided a number of significant insights, it is a good contribution to the studies on the canadian policy of multiculturalism. it is important also that some of the conclusions drawn from deconstructing the official discourse on multiculturalism support some of the major ideas discussed within other frameworks. for instance, my findings review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 142 hold true for the argument of canada “selling diversity” expressed in the book under the same name by y. abu-laban and c. gabriel.6 as the discourse deconstruction showed, there is a misbalance in structural versus symbolic language in the policy of multiculturalism represented in such statements as “institutional change is a fundamental step in eliminating systemic inequality.” (2003/2004 report) in this my findings support elliott’s argument that the success of the policy of multiculturalism should come from “restructuring of the symbolic order to incorporate all identities on an equal basis” (1992: 73), or what brotz and roberts and clifton describe as “token or symbolic pluralism” (li, 2003: 135). the research appeared to be quite dispersed in its focus and touched on many issues connected to the state sovereignty with respect to the state pursuit of internal stability through homogenizing its population. this lack of clear focus is the main weakness of my study. however, it would be impossible to report the findings and their significance without all the extensive background information provided. overall, the discourse analysis of the official documents on the policy of multiculturalism in canada substantiated my assumptions about continuous state pursuit of homogenizing its inhabitants. as the contemporary stage of state development is marked with liberal democratic discourse, canada seems to have chosen a very sophisticated way of 6 the discourse that represents this idea is: “canada can capitalize on its diversity.” (2003/2004 report). also, as prime minister jean chrétien noted in 1998: “canadians have learned that their two international languages and their diversity are a comparative advantage and a source of continuing creativity and innovation.” or, as recent (2001) public opinion polling shows that more than two-thirds of canadians believe that canada’s culturally diverse population is a competitive advantage in the global economy. (from the 2001/2002 report). review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 143 assimilating immigrants and ethnicities in general. on a surface its multiculturalism policy appears very benevolent to the individuals from diverse ethnic backgrounds but deconstruction of the official discourse revealed the presence of the veiled interest of the canadian state to preserve its internal stability. as ethnic values of the immigrants can endanger the conventional canadian political culture, policy of multiculturalism still requires diversity to conform to the mainstream. there is a necessity of a standard canadian who can be diverse culturally or ethnically but who is still a canadian. multiculturalism requires a balancing on the edge of ethnic separatism or claims of being one of the constitutive nation groups. multiculturalism as a philosophical ideal is liberally and democratically benevolent and ambitious but claims far more than it can achieve without endangering sovereignty and oneness of canada. in turn, the real policy of multiculturalism is far more pragmatic and stems from the state necessity of maintaining internal cohesiveness, which is easier to achieve if the population is homogeneous. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 144 bibliography castoriadis, cornelius. 1997. the imaginary institution of society. 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(2nd ed.) houndmills, basingstoke: macmillan press. inglis, christine. 2003. multiculturalism: new policy responses to diversity. policy paper no. 4 for the unesco project “management of social transformations”. subramanian, narendra. 1996. “ethnicity and pluralism: an exploration with reference to indian cases.” canadian journal of political science. vol. xxxii:4. pp.715-745. smith, anthony d. 1991. national identity, reno: university of nevada press. harris, cole. 2001. “postmodern patriotism: canadian reflection.” canadian geographer. 45(1). pp. 193-207. schulze, hagen. 1994. states, nations, and nationalism. cambridge, ma: blackwell. scott, james c. 1998. seeing like a state: how certain schemes to improve the human condition have failed. new haven, ct: yale university press. mann, michael. 1984. “the autonomous power of the state: its origins, mechanisms, and results.” european journal of sociology 25(2): pp. 185-213. tilly, charles. 1990. coercion, capital and european states, ad 990-1990. cambridge, ma: basil blackwell. riesenberg, peter. 1992. citizenship in the western tradition: plato to rousseau. the university of north carolina press. guiraudon, virginie. 1998. “citizenship rights for non-citizens: france, germany, and the netherlands.” in: christian joppke (ed.). challenge to the nation-state: immigration in western europe and the united states. new york: oxford university press. pp. 273318. soysal, yasemin nuhoglu. 1998. “toward a postnational model of membership.” in gershon shafir (ed.). the citizenship debates: a reader. minneapolis: u-ty of minneapolis press. pp. 189-217. torpey, john. 1998. “coming and going: on the state monopolization of the legitimate “means of movement”, sociological theory, vol. 16, no. 3. pp. 239-259. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 146 engbersen, godfried. 2001. “the unanticipated consequences of panopticon europe: residence strategies of illegal immigrants.” in virginie guiraudon and christian joppke (eds.). controlling a new migration world. new york: routledge. pp. 222-246. sikaccan, hakan g. 2004. envisioning togetherness. edwin mellen press. lahav, gallya and virginie guiraudon. 2000. “comparative perspectives on border control: away from the border and outside the state.” in peter andreas and timothy snyder. the wall around the west: state borders and immigration controls in north america and europe. new york: rowman & littlefield. pp.55-77. money, jeanette. 1997. “no vacancy: the political geography of immigration control in advanced industrial countries.” international organization 51(4). pp. 685-720. ellermann, antje. 2005. “coercive capacity and the politics of implementation: deportation in germany and the united states.” comparative political studies 38(10). pp.1219-1244. freeman, garry. 1995. “modes of immigration politics in liberal democratic states.” international migration review. no. 4. pp. 881-902. joppke, christian. 1998. “why liberal states accept unwanted immigration.” world politics 50. pp. 266-293. sassen, saskia. 1998. “the de facto transnationalizing of immigration policy.” in: christian joppke (ed.). challenge to the nation-state: immigration in western europe and the united states. new york: oxford u-ty press. pp. 49-85. guiraudon, virginie. 2000. “european integration and migration policy: vertical policymaking as venue shopping.” journal of common market studies 38(2). pp.251-271. jenson, jane. 1994. “understanding politics: contested concepts of identity in political science.” in: j. bickerton & a.-g. gagnon (eds.). canadian politics (2nd ed.). ontario broadview press. pp.54-75. microsoft word elise auvachez_citoyennete europeenne transnationale ou globale penser la citoyennete au-dela de l etat. anal review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved ……………………………………………… citoyenneté européenne, transnationale ou globale : penser la citoyenneté au-delà de l’état. analyse critique d’un débat élise auvachez résumé objet politique pas toujours identifié, mais souvent controversé, la citoyenneté européenne, près de 15 ans après son introduction dans le traité de maastricht, continue de susciter le débat : quelle citoyenneté pour quelle europe ? quelle autonomie pour une citoyenneté européenne dont l’acquisition reste soumise à des règles nationales ? finalement, la citoyenneté européenne est-elle possible ? la présente communication propose de lire la problématique de la citoyenneté européenne à la lumière d’un prisme élargissant l’intégrant dans un questionnement dépassant le débat spécifiquement européen, celui de la gouvernance supranationale. les dynamiques de globalisation et de fragmentation qui caractérisent le contexte contemporain se traduisent dans la sphère politique par la multiplication des paliers de régulation. la sphère nationale n’est plus dans cette perspective le seul locus de la vie politique ; les enjeux et les rapports de force politiques se jouent à des échelles multiples. ce constat a donné naissance à une prolifération d’analyses concernant la dimension de plus en plus européenne, post/trans/supra-nationale, voire globale, de la citoyenneté. celles-ci constituent néanmoins un corpus théorique un corpus théorique marqué par une compréhension à la fois fractionnée et diluée de la notion de citoyenneté supranationale et caractérisé par une perspective statique conférant au débat entre les partisans d’une citoyenneté au-delà de l’état et les avocats d’une citoyenneté par essence nationale une circularité stérile. la démarche théorique proposée consiste alors moins à tenter de caractériser les changements contemporains à la lumière des critères de la citoyenneté dans une perspective dichotomique pour savoir si « la » citoyenneté est nationale ou postnationale mais plutôt à comprendre la « citoyennisation », la construction et la définition d’une citoyenneté au-delà de l’état-nation, en relation avec la constitution et la consolidation d’entités politiques supranationales. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 38 objet politique pas toujours identifié, mais souvent controversé, la citoyenneté européenne, près de 15 ans après son introduction dans le traité de maastricht, continue de susciter le débat : quelle citoyenneté pour quelle europe ? quelle autonomie pour une citoyenneté européenne dont l’acquisition reste soumise à des règles nationales ? finalement, la citoyenneté européenne est-elle possible 1? le présent article propose de lire la problématique de la citoyenneté européenne à la lumière d’un prisme élargissant l’intégrant dans un questionnement dépassant le débat spécifiquement européen. car la dernière interrogation formulée ci-dessus en termes européens renvoie à une réflexion plus large sur la possibilité d’une citoyenneté au-delà de l’état. si l’union européenne représente indubitablement le cadre de gouvernance supraétatique le plus abouti, son développement mérite d’être placé dans le cadre plus général des transformations contemporaines de la sphère politique. les dynamiques de globalisation et de fragmentation qui caractérisent le contexte contemporain se traduisent dans la sphère politique par la multiplication des paliers de régulation. la superposition, ou plutôt l’enchevêtrement, des institutions nationales, des entités infra-étatiques (problématique de la décentralisation) et des organisations supranationales (à caractère régional et international) caractérise cette nouvelle structure de gouvernance, une gouvernance « multi-niveaux », au sein de laquelle l’état, tout en conservant un rôle privilégié, ne détient plus le monopole de la gestion des affaires publiques. la sphère nationale n’est plus dans cette perspective le seul locus de la vie politique ; les enjeux et les rapports de force politiques se jouent à des échelles multiples. ce constat a donné naissance à une prolifération d’analyses concernant la dimension de plus en plus 1 d’après le titre de l’article de étienne balibar (1992). review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 39 européenne, post/trans/supra-nationale, voire globale, de la citoyenneté2 ; selon ces travaux, le locus de la citoyenneté est de moins en moins national et de plus en plus supranational. cet argument commun s’accompagne toutefois d’une multiplicité de définitions associées au concept de citoyenneté; mais en dépit de ces multiples angles d’analyse, les travaux contemporains sur la citoyenneté au-delà de l’état partagent une conception exclusive et une approche réifiante de la citoyenneté. il en résulte un corpus théorique marqué par une compréhension à la fois fractionnée et diluée de la notion de citoyenneté supranationale et caractérisé par une perspective statique conférant au débat entre les partisans d’une citoyenneté au-delà de l’état et les avocats d’une citoyenneté par essence nationale une circularité stérile. la démarche théorique proposée consiste alors moins à tenter de caractériser les changements contemporains à la lumière des critères de la citoyenneté dans une perspective dichotomique pour savoir si « la » citoyenneté est nationale ou post-nationale mais plutôt à comprendre la « citoyennisation », la construction et la définition d’une citoyenneté au-delà de l’état-nation, en relation avec la constitution et la consolidation d’entités politiques supranationales. une multiplicité de définitions partielles plusieurs conceptualisations différentes de la citoyenneté au-delà de l’état la littérature sur la citoyenneté post/trans/supra-nationale n’échappe pas à la critique formulée par plusieurs auteurs à l’égard des analyses sur la citoyenneté dans le cadre national : l’absence d’une théorie intégrée (tilly 1995a, turner 1993). comme les 2 un champ important de la science politique est également consacré à la citoyenneté urbaine, mais cette perspective infra-étatique n’est pas l’objet de la recherche menée ici. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 40 études autour de la citoyenneté nationale, les analyses sur la citoyenneté post/trans/supranationale sont marquées par une multiplicité de définitions du concept. l’émergence et le développement exponentiel de systèmes de droits internationaux et régionaux constituent tout d’abord pour plusieurs auteurs la pierre angulaire d’une citoyenneté au-delà de l’état-nation. la base juridique sur laquelle s’est construite l’union européenne et le système de reconnaissance des droits qui la caractérisent offrent pour plusieurs auteurs l’exemple le plus abouti du développement d’une citoyenneté au-delà de l’état. l’ordre légal distinct sur lequel est fondée l’union européenne constitue alors le support de l’analyse d’une citoyenneté européenne en gestation (notamment shaw, 1998 ; meehan, 1993 et 2000 ; preuss et al., 2003 ). elizabeth meehan montre ainsi comment les droits sociaux développés au sein de l’union européenne contribuent à la création d’une citoyenneté proprement européenne, même si elle reconnaît que celle-ci présente encore un certain nombre de défauts (1993). jo shaw souligne alors la dimension légale historiquement conférée au concept de citoyenneté dans le contexte de l’union européenne (1998). tout en reconnaissant que le concept de citoyenneté n’est pas un concept purement légal et qu'il est ancré dans une culture politique, la définition de la citoyenneté en termes récemment privilégiée par ulrich preuss et ses collègues dans le numéro spécial de citizenship studies consacré à la citoyenneté européenne s’inscrit également dans cette approche juridique : « citizenship is the status that encompasses the rights, duties, benefits and burdens that follow from a person's nationality» (2003 : 7). « thus, citizenship is defined as the set of (predominantly, but not necessarily legal) rules that constitute a person as a competent member of the polity» (2003: 8). dans une perspective plus internationale, à partir d’une review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 41 analyse de l'incorporation des travailleurs immigrés dans l'ordre social et institutionnel des différents états européens, yasemin soysal (1994, 1997) constate l’émergence depuis la seconde guerre mondiale d’une nouvelle conception de la citoyenneté : une citoyenneté « post-nationale » universelle, fondée sur la personnalité et non sur l’appartenance nationale, et dont les principes normatifs sont définis au sein des discours et structures transnationaux. dans la même perspective, rainer bauböck (1994) voit dans les droits promus par les organisations transnationales en faveur des migrants et l’acceptation de ces droits par les états le développement d’une conception « transnationale » de la citoyenneté. enfin, l’acquisition de plus en plus fréquente d’un double, voire triple, passeport par un nombre croissant d’individus constitue pour certains analystes le signe d’une « dé-nationalisation » (bosniak 1994) croissante de la citoyenneté (soysal 1997 ; spiro 1997). selon yasemin soysal, l’existence de doubles citoyennetés, qui remettent en question la notion de loyauté envers un seul état associée à la conception traditionnelle de la citoyenneté, illustre bien l’émergence de formes « postnationales » de la citoyenneté (1997 : 512). l’ensemble de ces analyses procède d’une conception libérale de la citoyenneté ; celle-ci est associée à un statut légal dont le bénéfice donne accès à un certain nombre de droits. cette approche en termes de droits renvoie clairement à celle formulée par le sociologue britannique t.h marshall : « citizenship is a status bestowed on those who are full members of the community. all who possess the status are equal with respect to the rights and duties with which the status is endowed » (1963: 87). a la lumière de l’histoire de la grande-bretagne, t.h marshall conçoit la citoyenneté à travers un modèle tripartite de droits civils, politiques puis sociaux. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 42 envisagée dans une perspective supranationale, l’approche légale de la citoyenneté permet de mettre explicitement en lumière comment une partie importante des droits individuels sont désormais définis et garantis au-delà du cadre étatique par des institutions régionales ou internationales. considérant la citoyenneté dans une perspective juridique, elle occulte toutefois la dimension politique du concept : celuirenvoie non seulement à un statut légal mais également à une activité politique. les travaux de yasemin soysal montrent ainsi bien comment les principes juridiques de la citoyenneté sont de plus en plus définis au niveau international ; son tableau comparatif des citoyennetés nationale et postnational indique cependant que l’organisation de la citoyenneté comme pratique exprimant une appartenance relève toujours de l’etat (soysal, 1994 : 140). un tel argument constitue une limite importante à la définition d’une théorie générale de la citoyenneté post-nationale. l’analyse de la transnationalisation des pratiques politiques est alors au cœur d’un pan important de la littérature sur la citoyenneté supranationale. un certain nombre d’auteurs voient en effet dans la multiplication des mouvements sociaux transnationaux et l’émergence d’une société civile globale le signe le plus évident de la dénationalisation de la citoyenneté. richard falk décrit ainsi l’activisme transnational comme un mode de « citoyenneté globale » ; le « réformiste global », avocat du gouvernement mondial et partisan d’une onu plus forte pour un monde meilleur, est le premier portrait qu’il dresse de ce que signifie être un « citoyen global » (1994 : 132-133). selon warren magnusson : «[t]ransnational social movements involve people in active citizenship and thus lay claim to a political space that may or may not conform to the spaces allowed by review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 43 the existing system of government » (1996 : 9-10). james tully voit dans la prolifération de réseaux « contre-hégémoniques » reliant organisations et acteurs locaux au sein de réseaux globaux le développement d’une « citoyenneté diverse glocale » (2005 : 13). la société civile globale en émergence résultant de l’agrégation de ces mouvements sociaux transnationaux de plus en plus nombreux constitue pour plusieurs auteurs le principal support de la citoyenneté supranationale (notamment walzer, 1995 ; wapner, 1995 ; lipschutz, 1996 ; spiro, 1999 : 625-630 ; anheier et al., 2001 ; tehranian, 2002 ; sahle, 2005) : « it is through international civil society that people can best act as global citizens » (lister, 1997 : 63). fondée sur une conception républicaine de la citoyenneté, exprimée notamment dans les écrits de rousseau et considérant la condition citoyenne moins en termes de statut qu’en termes de véritable « office » (van gunsteren, 1994), d’activité politique d’engagement, l’ensemble de cette littérature met clairement en exergue le développement de pratiques de citoyenneté au-delà du cadre stato-national. la société civile globale dont beaucoup des auteurs cités décrivent l’émergence constitue un argument de poids en faveur de l’hypothèse du développement d’une citoyenneté postnationale ; elle ne saurait cependant constituer à elle seule le locus d’une citoyenneté supranationale, et encore moins le point d’ancrage d’une théorie générale de la citoyenneté supranationale. les travaux associant société civile internationale et citoyenneté post-nationale font de façon générale souvent abstraction des arènes politiques, du cadre institutionnel au sein desquelles s’exerce cette citoyenneté : l’entité politique au sein de laquelle la citoyenneté supranationale émerge est rarement clairement définie, ni même souvent mentionnée. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 44 la problématique de l’entité politique sur laquelle serait fondée toute forme de citoyenneté postnationale, et par conséquent de l’identité ou de l’appartenance dont celleci serait l’expression, mobilise une partie importante de la littérature. la construction de communautés politiques « post-westphaliennes » fondées sur le dialogue (« dialogic communities ») et la promotion d’une citoyenneté transnationale constituent ainsi le cœur du « projet critique » proposé par andrew linklater (1998 et 2001). celui-ci s’inspire explicitement dans son ouvrage transformation of political community (1998) des travaux de philosophie politique de habermas, dont la notion d’ « action communicative » (1989 et 1990) rend possible l’existence de communautés politiques supra-étatiques fondées sur le dialogue et la communication. habermas démontre ainsi le potentiel d’une citoyenneté européenne fondée sur un « patriotisme constitutionnel » (1992). dans la lignée des écrits habermasiens, la question de l’identité et de l’appartenance européennes figure au centre des préoccupations de nombreux auteurs : etienne balibar (1996), j.h.h weiler (1997), richard bellamy et alex warleigh (1998 et 2001), jo shaw (2000), andreas føllesdal (2001), percy lehning (2001) et philippe c. schmitter (2001) analysent le potentiel d’une citoyenneté européenne à travers le prisme de l’identité européenne. l’ensemble de ces travaux envisagent la possibilité d’une citoyenneté supranationale fondée sur une conception civique ou « éthico-politique » (mouffe, 1993) de l’appartenance plutôt qu’une conception ethnique/nationale : « thus, while nominal citizenship by definition implies identity (…), this would not appear to necessitate ethnic or national identity » (tambini, 2001 : 210).un certain nombre d’auteurs se fondent néanmoins sur une définition culturelle ou ethnique de l’identité pour concevoir l’émergence d’une citoyenneté supranationale à travers une définition review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 45 culturelle de l’identité. richard falk dresse ainsi le portrait d’un citoyen global homme/femmes d’affaires opérant à l’échelle transnationale et immergé dans une culture globale d’élite ; il décrit ainsi l’émergence d’une communauté de citoyens globaux businessmen fréquentant les mêmes hôtels à tokyo, londres ou new-york, parlant l’anglais couramment, partageant les mêmes expériences, symboles et infrastructures, etc. (1994 : 134). la croissance des migrations internationales a également vu l’émergence d’une littérature prolifique sur les identités et communautés transnationales générées par ce phénomène et constituant une base fertile pour le développement d’une forme dénationalisée de citoyenneté (basch et al., 1994, smith, 1998 ; portes, 1996 ; ma mung, 1999; fitzgerald, 2000). cette lecture de la problématique de la citoyenneté supranationale à travers le prisme de l’appartenance et de l’identité collective s’inscrit directement dans la perspective de plusieurs analyses majeures de la citoyenneté dans le cadre national. dans les écrits de t.h marshall, la citoyenneté, en tant que statut composé de droits et de responsabilités, est l’expression légale de l’appartenance pleine et entière à une communauté (1949 : 8). dans son analyse historique, rogers brubaker montre dans la même perspective comment la citoyenneté, à la fois objet et instrument d’inclusion et d’exclusion (1992: 23, 34), est historiquement liée à la formation des états-nations français et allemand : « the citizenry of every modern state is internally inclusive (…). in this respect the modern state is not simply a territorial organization but a membership organization, an association of citizens » (1992: 21). ces travaux soulignent l’importance de la dimension collective de la citoyenneté. une analyse complète de la notion de citoyenneté supranationale ne saurait review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 46 donc en faire abstraction. l’idée de communautés post-westphaliennes dépassant l’étatnation ainsi que les travaux sur l’identité européenne mentionnés précédemment offrent dans cette perspective un éclairage fructueux sur les bases collectives d’une éventuelle citoyenneté supranationale. les travaux contemporains sur la définition de l’appartenance au-delà de l’état s’inscrivent cependant généralement dans une perspective, implicite ou explicite, d’évaluation et de prescription. andrew linklater présente ainsi explicitement son ouvrage comme un « projet » pour la construction de « communautés postwestphaliennes » (1998). dans la sphère européenne, un grand nombre d’analyses européanistes visent à évaluer le potentiel de l’ue pour l’instauration d’une citoyenneté européenne (notamment preuss et al., 2003 : 12) et proposent dans cette perspective un certain nombre de scénarios ou de principes d’appartenance qui pourraient constituer les bases de cette citoyenneté: dans la lignée du “patriotisme constitutionnel” proposé par jürgen habermas (1992), percy b. lehning propose une théorie de philosophie politique fondée sur le contrat comme base d’une “citoyenneté européenne démocratique libérale” (2001) et andreas føllesdal conçoit la citoyenneté européenne à travers la notion de “confiance mutuelle” entre les individus (2001); richard bellamy et alex warleigh proposent une “éthique de la participation” fondée sur un “communautarisme cosmopolite” (1998) et philippe c. schmitter évalue le potentiel de la citoyenneté européenne à la lumière des six “membership norms” définissant la conception idéaltypique de la citoyenneté selon rogers brubaker pour présenter un ensemble de réformes visant à renforcer le sentiment citoyen en europe par une nouvelle conception de la citoyenneté sociale (schmitter 2001). ces analyses présentent ainsi souvent un caractère exclusivement philosophique et prescriptif qui laisse peu de place à une analyse review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 47 sociologique3 de ce que sont (et non ce que pourraient être) les liens d’appartenance à la base d’une citoyenneté supranationale dans le contexte contemporain. la notion de « citoyenneté globale » ou « citoyenneté cosmopolite » figure enfin au centre d’un nombre conséquent de travaux cherchant à imaginer la citoyenneté au-delà de l’état-nation. dans un plaidoyer contre le patriotisme, martha nussbaum affirme ainsi que seul le développement d’un citoyen cosmopolite, « the person whose primary allegiance is to the community of human beings in the entire world », par l’éducation permettra la réalisation des idéaux moraux de justice et d’égalité dans le monde contemporain (1994 : 2). le projet critique défendu notamment par linklater revêt également une orientation cosmopolite : « critical international theory defends the political transformation of political community by advocating dialogic communities which are cosmopolitan in orientation, respectful of cultural differences and committed to reducing social and economic inequalities, nationally and internationally » (1998 : 109). dans l’ensemble de ces travaux, c’est l’impératif moral de solidarité qui justifie le développement d’une citoyenneté supranationale ; la citoyenneté est ainsi moins envisagée en termes de droits que de responsabilités à l’égard de l’ensemble de l’humanité (heater 1990 et 2002 ; wingenbach 1998). la notion de responsabilité comme fondement à une citoyenneté globale est considérée dans une perspective à la fois morale mais aussi « pragmatique » dans les travaux sur la responsabilité à l’égard de l’humanité en matière d’environnement (hunter 1992 ; van steenbergen 1994 ; urry 2000) ou de solidarité nord-sud (arneil, 2005). 3 bien qu’andrew linklater décrive sa démarche comme une entreprise à la fois « normative, sociologique et praxéologique » (1998 : 10), son argument est avant tout fondé sur la présentation d’un « projet » de communautés post-westphaliennes et de citoyenneté transnationale. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 48 dans la lignée de la philosophie cosmopolite de kant (1970), l’invocation des notions de solidarité/responsabilité comme fondement de la citoyenneté offre une perspective intéressante pour la sphère supranationale ; elle permet de dépasser la conception traditionnelle d’une citoyenneté nécessairement fondée sur une identité partagée. les travaux s’inscrivant dans cette perspective ne résistent pourtant pas à deux critiques importantes. en premier lieu, l’idée de solidarité ne suffit pas à la construction d’une citoyenneté supranationale effective ; l’exercice de celle-ci suppose en effet des responsabilités et des droits concrets garantis par des cadres d’action institutionnels effectifs (ignatieff 1991, 34 ; archibugi 1995). or, à l’exception de quelques travaux4, ceux-ci sont rarement analysés par les avocats d’une citoyenneté globale/cosmopolite. ensuite, les travaux autour de la citoyenneté globale ou cosmopolite présentent une perspective explicitement normative. « avocats de la citoyenneté globale » (sahle, 2005 : 2), ils insistent sur la nécessité, l’impératif de développer la citoyenneté au-delà de l’état dans le contexte contemporain de fragmentation et globalisation: « (…) it is increasingly unlikely, in the context of rising instances of, and opportunities for, transnational harm, that the civic ideal will be preserved if citizens rely exclusively on national institutions. under these conditions, the ideals of citizenship clash with the sovereign nation-state in which they were first developed» (linklater, 1998: 182). dans une analyse récente, nigel dower définit en ces termes la notion de «citoyenneté globale»: «a normative claim about how humans should act, an existential claim about what is the case in the world and an aspirational claim about the future » (2003: 6). dans une perspective similaire, richard falk considère que si l’état actuel de la société 4 on pense ici à l’analyse de david b. hunter liant citoyenneté globale et droit international de l’environnement. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 49 internationale rend tout argument en faveur de l’existence d’une citoyenneté globale irréaliste et idéaliste, le développement de celle-ci comme projet politique ne saurait être abandonné ; dans cette perspective, il suggère le dépassement d’une conception de la politique comme « art du possible » (« axe de faisabilité » en faveur d’une conception de la politique comme « art de l’impossible » (« axe d’aspiration »)(1994 et 2000) : « global citizenship of a positive variety implies a utopian confidence in the capacity to exceed realistic horizons, but it is also rooted in the highly pragmatic conviction that what is currently taken to be realistic is not sustainable » (1994 : 140). dans l’ensemble de ces travaux, la citoyenneté est présentée comme un idéal à atteindre ; or l’atteinte de cet idéal dans le contexte contemporain suppose la création d’une citoyenneté transnationale. la réalité présente doit donc être transformée afin d’atteindre cette idéal. vers une définition intégrée ainsi, si elle offre dans son ensemble un corpus théorique et analytique fructueux qui permet de mettre en lumière les mutations actuelles de la citoyenneté, la littérature contemporaine sur l’émergence d’une citoyenneté européenne, post/trans/supra-nationale ou globale se caractérise en premier lieu par l’absence de consensus concernant la définition même de l’objet analysé. statut légal composé de droits et de responsabilités, activité politique, expression d’une identité ou de l’appartenance à une communauté, ou encore expression d’un sentiment de solidarité, la citoyenneté est envisagée à travers des perspectives diverses. il en résulte une conception sous-spécifiée de la citoyenneté ; la notion subit une sorte « d’étirement conceptuel » (sartori, 1970) et se voit conférer une élasticité apparemment indéfinie, qui semble progressivement lui ôter toute substance. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 50 bosniak souligne ainsi « the risk of producing a concept of citizenship that begins to mean very little since it can so readily mean so much » (2000: 487). les analyses d’une citoyenneté globale fondée sur une solidarité mondiale se prêtent souvent à cette critique (cf. supra). limiter le risque d’ « étirement conceptuel » implique alors de s’interroger sur la définition de l’objet « citoyenneté ». les travaux présentés ci-dessus proposent différentes définitions du concept. celles-ci renvoient cependant plus à des dimensions complémentaires de la citoyenneté qu’à des conceptions contradictoires. il convient d’ailleurs de souligner que plusieurs des auteurs mentionnés ne conçoivent pas la citoyenneté à travers une seule de ses dimensions. c’est souvent dans les termes d’une articulation bi-dimensionnelle que s’articule la réflexion de plusieurs européanistes: l’approche de la citoyenneté européenne privilégiée par jo shaw (1998 et 2000), ou encore j.h.h weiler (1997 et 1999) combine à la fois la question des droits et celle de l’ appartenance. la perspective en grande partie légale de elizabeth meehan (2000) conduit également l’auteure à penser la problématique de la participation des citoyens européens. dans une même perspective bi-dimensionnelle, les travaux de yasemin soysal (1994) et rainer bauböck (1993), centrés sur l’internationalisation des régimes de droits, analysent l’implication de la transnationalisation de la citoyenneté comme statut légal pour la définition de l’appartenance à la communauté nationale. c’est également en termes d’articulation droits/appartenance au sein de l’union européenne que s’articule la réflexion de plusieurs européanistes tels que jo shaw (1998 et 2000) ou weiler (1997 et 1999). andrew linklater (1998), avocat déterminé de la citoyenneté cosmopolite, tente lui de combiner les définitions de la citoyenneté comme élément d’appartenance à une review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 51 communauté politique et comme expression de solidarité dans son projet critique de communautés post-westphaliennes. enfin, les arguments en faveur d’une citoyenneté globale environnementale combinent souvent une approche juridique de la citoyenneté et une analyse en termes de responsabilité (notamment hunter, 1992). en dépit de ces tentatives, la plupart des études sur l’émergence d’une citoyenneté supranationale sont marquées par une vision partielle du concept, la plupart des auteurs concentrant leurs analyses sur une, tout au plus deux, dimensions de la citoyenneté. face à cette compréhension fractionnée du phénomène, l’élargissement de la définition de la citoyenneté, le développement d’un cadre théorique qui permettrait de la prendre en compte dans toutes ses dimensions semblent nécessaires (jenson et phillips, 1996 ; wiener, 1997 et 1998 ). cherchant à dépasser les conceptions uniquement juridiques ou politiques qui caractérisent une grande partie des analyses de la citoyenneté, la définition proposée par bryan s. turner s’inscrit clairement dans cette perspective: « [a] set of practices (juridical, political, economic and cultural) which define a person as a competent member of society, and which as a consequence shape the flow of ressources to persons and social groups » (1993 : 2). jenson et phillips (1996) et wiener (1997 et 1998) proposent une conception visant non seulement à élargir la définition de la citoyenneté mais également à l’appréhender dans une perspective permettant de rendre compte de ses transformations : à travers la notion de “citizenship practice“, la citoyenneté est conçue comme une relation dynamique entre le citoyen et l’entité politique. les auteures se sont alors appuyées sur cette conception pour caractériser la citoyenneté et ses transformations dans le cadre de l’état canadien (jenson et phillips 1996), mais également dans le cadre supra-étatique de l’union européenne (wiener 1997 review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 52 et 1998 ; jenson 2005). cette conception de la citoyenneté comme relation entre individus et entité politique favorise une approche large et dynamique qui permet de dépasser la compréhension fractionnée du phénomène caractérisant actuellement la littérature sur l’émergence d’une citoyenneté supranationale. si ces auteures proposent une conception plus large de la définition de la citoyenneté que celles traditionnellement utilisées dans la littérature, elles n’évacuent pas cependant la nécessité de spécifier cette relation à la lumière de ses fondements historiques. ainsi, plusieurs auteurs soulignent le lien qui relie citoyenneté et démocratie (arneil 2005 ; tully 2005 ; falk 1994). dans cette perspective, la citoyenneté comporte au moins deux principes constitutifs : la présence de droits et l’idée de participation (van gunsteren 1994 ; falk 1994 ; arneil 2005). selon van gunsteren, le citoyen est à la fois « gouverneur et gouverné » (1994 : 37). la citoyenneté étant une relation dynamique entre des individus et une entité politique, wiener (1997 et 1998), jenson et phillips (1996), et bellamy (2005) ajoutent à ces deux principes caractéristiques de la citoyenneté un troisième élément : l’expression d’une appartenance à une communauté. « historical studies reveal that debates often turn on three elements of citizenship. the first elements is rights which establish how the individual is legally related to the polity (...). the second element is access which provides information about the conditions for practicing the relationship between citizen and polity (...). the third element is about belonging to a community» (wiener, 1998: 24-26). la définition de la citoyenneté comme relation dynamique entre individus et entité politique caractérisée par des droits, des canaux institutionnels de participation et la définition d’une appartenance permet ainsi d’appréhender la citoyenneté dans une perspective à la fois globale et dynamique. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 53 un débat polarisé : la question du locus de la citoyenneté une problématique unique en dépit de leurs divergences de forme (analytique, normative ou prescriptive) et de contenu (définition de la citoyenneté), l’ensemble des travaux contemporains sur la citoyenneté au-delà de l’état sont orientés vers le même argument : la citoyenneté est de moins en nationale et de plus en plus supranationale. dans cette perspective, ils s’adressent directement aux partisans d’une conception essentiellement nationale de la citoyenneté pour mettre en évidence sa « dénationalisation » (bosniak, 2000) progressive. une problématique unique semble donc monopoliser les travaux mentionnés ci-dessus, celle du locus de la citoyenneté : la citoyenneté est-elle (ou doit-elle être) nationale ou dénationalisée ? les débats se cristallisent ainsi autour d’une perspective dichotomique opposant le « national » au « post-national » (roche, 1995 : 727) : « increasingly therefore normative debate is polarized between liberal nationalists and cosmopolitans. cosmopolitans seek to understand the scope for rights, participation and belonging beyond the nation-state, whereas liberal nationalists defend the national model » (tambini, 2001: 202). près de 15 ans après l’émergence des travaux sur la citoyenneté supranationale, cette polarisation binaire enferme les débats dans un cercle stérile. le dépassement de cette perspective dichotomique nécessite de repenser ses fondements ontologiques. a cette fin, il convient de remarquer que bien qu’ils défendent des arguments radicalement opposés, la grande majorité des travaux contemporains concernant le locus de la review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 54 citoyenneté sont fondés sur une même conception exclusive de la citoyenneté et une même démarche appréhendant la citoyenneté comme un « donné » objectif. dépasser la polarisation la citoyenneté : conception exclusive vs. approche multiple qu’ils défendent une conception strictement nationale de la citoyenneté ou au contraire celle d’une citoyenneté au-delà de l’état, une grande partie des travaux récents concernant le locus de la citoyenneté véhiculent l’idée d’une citoyenneté conçue comme une relation exclusive entre le citoyen et l’entité politique privilégiée (état, union européenne, communauté internationale). martin kohli dénonce en ces termes la faiblesse des discours contemporains autour de l’identité européenne : « european identity has (…) taken its inspiration from the political science concept of identity as a sense of belonging to some larger political unit, especially as developped in the analysis of nationalism and national identity. the latter leans essentially towards an essentialist or even primordialist understanding of identity belonging without reservations » (2000: 117). dominique schnapper analyse ainsi dans quelle mesure la citoyenneté européenne pourra ultimement remplacer la citoyenneté nationale des états-membres: « intellectual belief in abstract principles, such as the respect for human rights, legally constituted states, and european citizenship – can these principles really replace, at least in the forseeable future, political and emotional mobilisation which results from the interiorisation of a certain political tradition and national culture? » (2000 : 11). les avocats de la citoyenneté supranationale insistent quant à eux sur la nécessité d’envisager « la » citoyenneté au-delà de l’état-nation : yasemin soysal affirme ainsi que « la » citoyenneté est de plus en plus post-nationale (1994 et 1997) ; linda bosniak s’interroge review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 55 moins sur l’émergence d’une citoyenneté supranationale que sur la dé-nationalisation de « la » citoyenneté (2000). s’érigeant contre ces arguments, les partisans d’une conception strictement nationale affirment ainsi que « la » citoyenneté ne peut prendre sens que dans un cadre étatique (miller, 1995 et 1999 ; himmelfarb, 1996). s’ils proposent des arguments radicalement opposés, ces travaux partagent paradoxalement une conception conventionnelle de la citoyenneté fondée sur le postulat que tous les citoyens doivent reconnaître l’autorité suprême d’un seul pouvoir souverain ; le lien individu/entité politique (état ou communauté internationale) est présenté comme un lien exclusif. cette conception conventionnelle exclusive, dont découle en grande partie la polarisation stérile caractérisant les débats contemporains sur le locus de la citoyenneté, peut être dépassée par une approche autorisant une conception multiple de la citoyenneté. certains travaux européanistes offrent en ce sens une piste de réflexion fructueuse. l’idée d’une citoyenneté multiple est notamment présente dans les travaux d’elizabeth meehan : considérant le lien entre nationalité et citoyenneté comme une relation historiquement contingente plutôt qu’analytiquement nécessaire (2000 : 4), celle-ci affirme qu’à travers la citoyenneté européenne, c’est une nouvelle forme de citoyenneté qui est en train de voir le jour : cette citoyenneté n’est « ni nationale ni cosmopolite » ; c’est une forme « multiple », institutionnalisée à travers une configuration de plus en plus complexe liant institutions de la communauté européenne, états, associations nationales et transnationales, régions et alliances de régions, etc. (1993 : 1). soulignant le caractère primordialiste de la conception de l’identité traditionnellement adoptée dans les travaux sur l’identité européenne, martin kohli propose une nouvelle conceptualisation fondée sur la notion d’ « hybridation » : « accordingly, european identity is not empirically review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 56 opposed to national identity. it can and should be conceived as multi-level or multilayered, comprising global and national (and possibly regional and local attachments as well » (2000: 126). «european identity may be part of an identity mix linking it with national (and possibly other territorial) identities; or it may be part of a specifically hybrid pattern where contradictions remain virulent and situational switches occur» (2000: 131). dans le champ des relations internationales, andrew linklater revendique également une conception multiple de la citoyenneté : s’inspirant notamment du scénario de société internationale « néo-médiévale » de hedley bull (1977 : 245-246), linklater développe l’idée d’une citoyenneté multiple fondée sur des entités politiques multiples : «there would be no requirement that the members of [the] community should share one national identity or recognise the supremacy of a single political authority. breaking with the classical nation-state, post-westphalian communities would promote a transnational citizenry with multiple political allegiances and without the need for submission to a central sovereign power» (1998:181). penser la problématique de la citoyenneté supranationale à la lumière d’une conception multiple de la citoyenneté peut également s’appuyer sur un certain nombre de travaux de la littérature, notamment canadienne, entourant la problématique de la citoyenneté dans un cadre national multiculturel (notamment kymlicka, 1995; papillon et turgeon 2003). « to what extent can the citizenship regime associated with a sovereign state be fragmented or redefined ‘from within’ by small nations? » s’interrogent ainsi martin papillon et luc turgeon (2003:315). afin de répondre à cette question, les auteurs comparent l’émergence et la consolidation de régimes de citoyennetés spécifiques au québec et en écosse dans le cadre des états canadien et britannique. montrant alors comment en écosse, un régime de review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 57 citoyenneté multi-niveaux où les attributs de la citoyenneté sont partagés entre les deux ordres de gouvernement écossais et britannique a progressivement pris forme et au québec un régime de citoyenneté québécois distinct s’est progressivement constitué en opposition au régime de citoyenneté fédéral, ils proposent une conception non-exclusive de la citoyenneté. ces analyses offrent un point d’ancrage fructueux pour dépasser l’orthodoxie conventionnelle d’une citoyenneté unique en montrant comment certains contextes sont mieux caractérisés par la superposition, ou l’enchevêtrement, de plusieurs formes de citoyennetés que par une perspective dichotomique cherchant à déterminer « le » locus de la citoyenneté. objectivation vs. construction si la polarisation qui caractérise les débats autour du locus de la citoyenneté repose sur une conception essentiellement exclusive de la citoyenneté qui peut être dépassée à la lumière de la littérature sur les citoyennetés multiples, elle procède également d’une approche ontologique marquée par l’objectivation. qualifier ou évaluer la réalité contemporaine à la lumière de ce qu’est la citoyenneté : telle est la démarche qui sous-tend la majeure partie des travaux contemporains cherchant à déterminer le locus de la citoyenneté, que leur argument soit en faveur d’une citoyenneté nationale ou d’une citoyenneté post-nationale. la citoyenneté est ici appréhendée comme un « donné », quelque chose de « naturel » (hindess 2000) aux caractéristiques fixées antérieurement à l’analyse à partir de l’histoire occidentale ou de normes morales. les caractéristiques de la citoyenneté telle qu’elle s’est développée à un certain moment historique dans le cadre d’un espace géographique donné l’état-nation occidental – sont réifiés pour en devenir review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 58 les caractéristiques objectives et essentielles. « very often the idea of supranational citizenship has no meaning other than the displacement to a ‘higher’ echelon of the very characteristics of national citizenship », note ainsi etienne balibar (1996: 356). bien qu’elles cherchent à démontrer une transformation de la citoyenneté, les analyses autour de la citoyenneté supranationale ou européenne offrent au concept un statut essentiellement statique: la citoyenneté est conçue comme un état dont il convient de déterminer le locus. dans cette perspective, la citoyenneté est souvent pensée en termes de conditions, de pré-requis. la problématique du lien citoyenneté/démocratie permet clairement d’illustrer ce point : si plusieurs auteurs mettent à juste titre en lumière la relation historique entre citoyenneté et démocratie (cf. supra), une grande partie d’entre eux envisagent cette relation en termes conditionnels : la démocratie apparaît comme un pré-requis à l’établissement de la citoyenneté. certains affirment ainsi qu’il semble encore difficile de parler pleinement de citoyenneté à l’échelle supranationale dans la mesure où les institutions de la sphère internationale ne présentent pas un caractère démocratique (falk, 2000 :6). d’autres considèrent au contraire le caractère de plus en plus transnational de la société civile et de plus en plus global de l’espace public comme l’émergence de conditions menant au développement d’une citoyenneté supranationale (notamment walzer, 1995). dans une même perspective conditionnelle, dominique schnapper, répondant aux travaux de habermas sur la possibilité de créer une citoyenneté européenne fondée sur une appartenance civique, insiste sur la nécessité d’une identité, d’une culture communes, définis en termes de « sentiments », pour la création d’une citoyenneté européenne (2002 : 11). la question du lien entre l’état et la citoyenneté, problématique centrale des débats contemporains auteur du locus de la citoyenneté, est review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 59 souvent appréhendée en ces termes. dans la lignée de philosophes tels que hegel ou arendt, une branche importante de la théorie politique défend l’idée qu’il est absurde de concevoir la citoyenneté au-delà de l’état-nation car celui-ci reste le seul mode d’organisation politique capable de concrétiser idéal civique (miller, 1995 et 1999 ; himmelfarb, 1996 : 72 et 74). la citoyenneté ne peut être envisagée qu’en fusion avec les concepts de souveraineté, nationalité et territorialité ; elle perd toute signification quand elle est détachée de l’état-nation. l’état est présenté comme une condition objective à l’existence de la citoyenneté ; l’utilisation du concept de citoyenneté est conditionnelle à l’existence d’un état. au nom de la dimension historique du concept, la citoyenneté est donc, dans les arguments contemporains concernant son locus, appréhendée comme un élément donné nécessitant la présence d’un certain nombre de conditions, de critères de nature structurelle (état, démocratie, identité commune). or il semble que l’histoire de la citoyenneté offre une tout autre lecture de la relation entre ces variables; celle-ci s’inscrit moins dans une perspective unilatérale et statique de conditionnalité que dans une dynamique bilatérale de construction. le rapport entre la citoyenneté et l’état est tout d’abord dans cette perspective moins un rapport conditionnel (l’état comme pré-requis à la citoyenneté) mais une relation de constitution mutuelle. de nombreux auteurs en effet souligné le rôle de la citoyenneté dans la construction et la consolidation des institutions étatiques aux 19ème et 20ème siècles (bendix, 1964; tilly, 1990; rokkan, 1975; brubaker, 1992). « the emergence of the institution of citizenship cannot be understood apart from the formation of the modern state and state system. but the converse is equally true: the formation if the modern state and state system cannot be understood apart from the review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 60 emergence and institutionalization of citizenship. (…) the state constitutes itself, and delimits the field of its personal jurisdiction, by constituting its citizenry » (brubaker, 1992: 72). la citoyenneté ne saurait donc être appréhendée comme une conséquence de l’état ; elle est un construit qui participe du processus même de sa formation. cette conception de la citoyenneté est présente dans des travaux plus récents sur la construction nationale. a la lumière des cas irlandais et basques, charles tilly souligne le lien entre citoyenneté et souveraineté : « on both sides of the state-led/state-seeking gap, political leaders sought to attach citizenship to sovereignty » (1995b: 233). dans la même perspective, analysant la définition d’un régime de citoyenneté distinct comme une « troisième voie » des nationalismes québécois et écossais, martin papillon et luc turgeon écrivent: « for the state, it [citizenship] is an important political tool for regulating the nature of the relationship between the state, markets and communities. for political actors, it is also a powerful tool for making claims against established norms and institutions and for greater recognition, inclusion and political rights, in other words, citizenship is a central aspect of modern political struggles and its definition may well vary considerably (…)» (2003 : 317). la problématique d’une citoyenneté au-delà de l’état-nation devrait donc moins se poser en termes statique chercher à déterminer l’état de la réalité au regard des critères donnés de la citoyenneté qu’en termes dynamiques : il s’agit alors d’analyser la construction d’une citoyenneté au-delà de l’état-nation en relation avec les processus d’émergence et de constitution d’entités politiques supranationales (ue, onu notamment). review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 61 comprendre la citoyennisation citoyennisation et art de gouverner plusieurs auteurs ont ainsi pensé la citoyenneté comme un dispositif de gouvernementalité, i.e comme instrument du gouvernement dans une perspective de gestion de la population (rose, 2000; hindess, 2000 et 2002). barry hindess (2000, 2002) ancre cette approche dans une perspective supranationale: « in this respect, citizenship functions as one component of a broader regime of population management: a regime which operates first by dividing humanity into discrete sub-populations, each consisting of the citizens of some particular state, and secondly, by assigning to each state not only the right but also the obligation to manage its own internal affairs » (2002: 130). il montre ainsi comment la citoyenneté est un instrument de gestion au sein d’un régime supranational de gouvernement et en tant que tel est constitutive du système interétatique et de l’état. nikolas rose explique comment les dispositifs de gouvernementalité contemporains consistent à renforcer les capacités des individus, dans le sens d’une plus grande civilité notamment : « contemporary strategies for the government of conduct, far from seeking to crush hand eliminate the capacities for action of those persons and forces they act upon, on the contrary seek to foster and shape such capacities so that they are enacted in ways that are broadly consistent with particular objectives such as order, civility, health or enterprise » (2000: 323). ces analyses s’inspirent explicitement de l’analyse foucaldienne de la construction de l’état. selon michel foucault, l’élément central du processus de la formation de l’entité étatique renvoie moins à la problématique de sa souveraineté qu’à review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 62 celle de sa « gouvernementalisation » : « et il est vraisemblable que si l’état existe tel qu'il existe maintenant, c’est grâce, précisément, à cette gouvernementalité qui est à la fois extérieure et intérieure à l’état, puisque ce sont les tactiques de gouvernement qui, à chaque instant, permettent de définir ce qui doit relever de l’état et ce qui ne doit pas en relever, ce qui est public et ce qui est privé, ce qui est étatique et ce qui est non-étatique, donc, si vous voulez, l’état dans sa survie et l’état dans ses limites ne doivent se comprendre qu’à partir des tactiques générales de la gouvernementalité » (foucault, 2004 :112-113). (2004 :109). selon foucault, c’est non pas dans le rapport à un « territoire » mais à une « population » que s’exerce le gouvernement et par conséquent se crée une entité politique (2004 :100). il montre alors clairement que le gouvernement, et par conséquent le processus de formation de l’entité étatique, s’accompagne du développement d’un « art de gouverner », « de tactiques et de techniques » spécifiques pour agir sur la population : « naissance d’un art ou, en tout cas, de tactiques et de techniques absolument nouvelles » (2004 : 109). adoptant une approche différente, d’autres auteurs ont également mis en évidence l’importance de la définition d’un art de gouverner rationnel dans la construction de l’état et le rôle de la citoyenneté dans ce processus. c’est à travers la création d’une structure organisationnelle répondant aux normes de rationalisation institutionnalisées au niveau mondial que george m. thomas, john w. meyer, franciso o. ramirez et john boli, s’inspirant dans leur analyse historique structurelle des travaux de max weber, expliquent la constitution de l’état ; john boli met alors explicitement en évidence le rôle de la citoyenneté dans la mise en place de cet art de gouverner rationnel : « citizen rights are ‘incorporative’, serving not so much to strengthen the possibility of individual review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 63 choice as to expand state jurisdiction over the lives of citizens bringing individuals fully into the arena of state action and control » ( 1987 : 134). la citoyennisation, un processus politique : le rôle des acteurs si les travaux mentionnés ci-dessus permettent de mettre en évidence le rôle des structures dans la construction d’une entité politique et la constitution de la citoyenneté, comprendre la citoyennisation comme processus de construction implique de considérer aussi le rôle des acteurs. il s’agit de prendre en compte la dimension politique de la citoyenneté, son caractère contesté, et par conséquent ne mettre en exergue le rôle des acteurs dans sa construction. instrument de gouvernance, la citoyenneté est un enjeu de pouvoir et de ressources, et par conséquent un objet de lutte mobilisé et façonné par des acteurs particuliers dans un contexte particulier. sa construction est alors le fruit de négociations, d’un échange entre différents acteurs politiques et sociaux. définissant la subordination de l’intérêt privé à l’intérêt public et de la décision privée à la décision publique comme la condition sine qua non de toute communauté politique, reinhard bendix affirme ainsi : «(…) the members of a political community consent to that subordination in an exchange for certain public rights, while governments vary greatly with regard to the subordination they demand and the rights they acknowledge, the term ‘ political community’ may be applied wherever the relations between rulers and ruled involve shared understandings concerning this exchange and hence are based in some measure on agreement » (1964 : 19). l’idée d’échange et de négociations au coeur de la citoyenneté est encore plus explicite dans l’analyse de charles tilly. l’auteur montre ainsi comment, dans le cadre du processus de formation de l’état, la citoyenneté a review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 64 émergé comme produit de négociations entre les différents groupes de la société et les autorités en quête ressources pour la conduite de la guerre. il conclut ainsi: «the core of what we now call ‘citizenship’, indeed, consists of multiple bargains hammered out by rulers and ruled in the course of their struggles over the means of state action, especially the making of war» (1990: 102). la conception d’une citoyenneté à la fois instrument de gouvernance et objet de contestation est également présente dans des travaux plus récents sur la construction nationale. s’appuyant sur les cas irlandais et basques, charles tilly montre combien la citoyenneté est à la fois un outil politique et un objet de lutte (1995b: 233). dans la même perspective, analysant la définition d’un régime de citoyenneté distinct comme une « troisième voie » des nationalismes québécois et écossais, martin papillon et luc turgeon écrivent: « for the state, it [citizenship] is an important political tool for regulating the nature of the relationship between the state, markets and communities. for political actors, it is also a powerful tool for making claims against established norms and institutions and for greater recognition, inclusion and political rights, in other words, citizenship is a central aspect of modern political struggles and its definition may well vary considerably (…)» (2003 : 317). à la fois instrument de gouvernance et objet de contestation, la citoyenneté doit être appréhendée non pas comme un « donné » universel et atemporel mais comme un « construit » dont la signification est « le produit d’un processus relationnel, culturel, historique et contingent » (wiener, 1998 : 11). c’est dans ces termes que la question de review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 65 la citoyenneté au-delà de l’état-nation, dans une perspective européenne comme dans une perspective internationale, mérite d’être posée : l’approche devient alors moins « substantialiste » (tambini 2001 : 207) et plus constructiviste. la problématique de l’émergence d’une citoyenneté au-delà de l’état-nation est alors non plus envisagée à travers la caractérisation de l’état de la citoyenneté (nationale vs. supranationale) mais l’analyse de la citoyennisation comme politique au sein du processus de constitution d’entités politiques de gouvernance à l’échelle supranationale. dans cette perspective, il convient moins de s’interroger sur l’existence des structures conditionnelles de l’établissement de la citoyenneté au-delà de l’état que sur les acteurs, les entrepreneurs politiques 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'european citizenship practice'. building institutions of a nonstate. boulder, oxford: westview press. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 72 wingenbach, ed. 1998. «justice after liberalism: democracy and global citizenship”, dans citizenship after liberalism, dir. karen slawner et mark e. denham. newyork: peter lang. rouba al-fattal_volume 3_issue 3 review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 3/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 6 ………………………………………………………………… the role of political culture in shaping canadian, eu and us disarmament initiatives rouba al-fattal abstract canada and the european union (eu) share, to a certain extent, a similar political culture, one based on multilateralism and the use of soft power. nevertheless, over the past fifteen years canada has been sometimes adopting disarmament policies that are similar to those of the eu and different from those of the us, while in other times it has been adopting policies that are similar to those of the us and different from those of the eu. this indicates that similarity in political culture alone is not sufficient enough to create convergence on foreign policies and that certain conditions must first be met for political culture to take precedence over neorealist explanations when dealing with security issues. using canadian, eu and us decisions on the issues of anti-personnel landmines and iranian nuclear proliferation dilemma as case studies, this article analyses the conditions under which political culture plays a role in forming similar security policies. key words: political culture; european union; canada, united states; nuclear proliferation; landmines review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 3/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 7 introduction during the past decade there has been a growing dissatisfaction with using only neorealist approach in explaining foreign policies, and a growing interest in using also cultural arguments to explain international relations and security policies. “in the post-cold war world,” argues huntington, “for the first time in history, global politics has become multipolar and multicivilizational.”1 accordingly, in the post-cold war era “the most important distinctions among people are not ideological, political or economic. they are cultural…people define themselves in terms of ancestry, religion, language, history, values and customs.”2 culture as a foreign policy indicator appeared promising in explaining some phenomena that neorealism alone can not explain. however, there are a number of interrelated cultural explanations which explore themes such as military, strategic, organizational, global and political culture from a different perspective than neorealism. this paper focuses on political culture variable (which will be defined in the next section) since, as john duffield puts it, “political culture promises to explain phenomena that are puzzling from the perspective of leading non-cultural theories, such as neorealism. yet it is likely to apply to a broader range of cases than do the alternative cultural concepts that have been employed.”3 also “political culture subsumes most alternative societal-level cultural constructs, such as strategic culture and military culture, while remaining focused on political phenomena in contrast to national character.”4 this work treats the european union (eu) as a whole, instead of providing analysis on particular european union members. in doing so, (and for the sake of theoretical parsimony), the assumption that there is a common political culture at the eu level, at least with regards to the policies at hand, is maintained. this assumption stems from apparent increases in eu reliance on the role of the 1 samuel huntington. the clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order. new york: simon & schuster, 1997. p. 21 2 ibid., p. 21 3 john duffield. “political culture and state behavior: why germany confounds neorealism.” international organization. 53, no.4 (autumn1999). p. 766 4 ibid., p. 777 review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 3/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 8 common foreign and security policy (cfsp) role in forming policy priorities for the two disarmament issues this work is based on: landmines and nuclear non-proliferation. in fact, not automatically but through intergovernmental cooperation and negotiations, the eu has reached a common response to those international issues at hand. almost all eu members have adopted a similar position in the landmine case (finland serves as an exception). and all eu members adopted a common position or a joint action in the case of iran’s nuclear policy. additionally, there appears to be an emergence of talks about a unified eu political culture (at least among the older western european member states, when these issues were peaking) which did not exist a decade ago.5 notwithstanding the rising strength of political culture as a variable, helping to explain states behaviour in the post-cold war period, the political cultural argument has also been criticized for its inability to explain some forms of state behavior, such as those that states adopt despite their obvious contradiction with their prevailing political culture. thus, a deeper analysis may help reveal that in order for the political cultural variable to be a highly determining measure in explaining state behaviors, especially in international security domains, certain conditions need first to be met. therefore, the question that this paper asks is: under which condition(s) does political culture play a leading role in shaping foreign and security policies of states or international bodies (such as the eu)? through inductive reasoning and interpretive case analysis, it appears that all three conditions need first to be simultaneously satisfied for political culture to count as the leading explanatory factor for states implementing certain security policies. first, the security issue which the state is dealing with needs to be perceived of as a low threat or risk issue. thus, it must be perceived of (objectively or subjectively) as a threat solely to human and not a threat (whether directly or indirectly) to national security. second, the public needs to be aware of the issue and be involved in the decision making process. public opinion can be either manifested through strongly expressed views in the street or organized through non-governmental organizations (ngos) and civil society movements. third, the 5 interview, canadian mission to the eu, brussels, 2005 review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 3/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 9 political elite or policy makers, be it a group or an individual, which is involved in the decision making process must be an idealist, legacy seeker, charismatic actor or a firm believer in the issue as well as the political culture that is being represented. in other words the policy maker or political entrepreneur must represent and act on behalf of the political culture of the collective; and he must be able to influence public opinion on the matter. the author, hence, chooses to analyze these particular case studies (landmines and iran’s nuclear programme) and the corresponding policies that were adopted for them in canada, the eu and the us to help illustrate the argument put forward. the case studies prove to correspond to the circumstances set up by the author. in fact, the two cases line up on all three aforementioned conditions but in a contradictory fashion. while in the landmines case all three conditions were present, in the case of iran’s nuclear programme they are all absent. this allows the author to demonstrate the necessity of all three conditions to be present in order for political culture to play a determinant role in foreign policy. in order to illustrate the importance of these three conditions which allow political culture to matter in forming foreign policies, this article first turns to demonstrate that western political culture has some important variations. so, contrary to huntington who groups the west – europe, canada and the united states (us) – under one big cultural umbrella, 6 the contemporary west in wendt’s opinion is composed of at least two forms of political cultures that correspond to two different levels of “cultural internalization.”7 accordingly, the us has a different political culture from that of canada and the eu due largely to historical reasons.8 thus, the us has a political culture of what wendt would call a second degree level of internalization,9 focused on self interest, unilateralism and militarism. canada and the eu, on the other hand, have a similar political culture, one of the third degree which emphasizes legitimization of actions, multilateralism and the use of soft-power (persuasion and 6 samuel huntington. p. 46 7 alexander wendt. social theory of international politics. cambridge: cambridge university press, 1999. p. 250, 254 8 philip resnick. the european roots of canadian identity. peterborough: broadview press, 2005. p. 8 9 alexander wendt. p. 246-312 review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 3/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 10 diplomacy).10 next, this article compares the actions (including ends and means) of canada to that of the eu and the us regarding two different disarmament policies: banning personnel land mines and halting iran’s uranium enrichment. the results of this research demonstrate that canada converged with the eu but not the us when it came to the land mine issue and converged with the us but not the eu on the iranian nuclear program. the differences between canada and the eu on the question of iran’s nuclear programme may be attributed to the fact that the three conditions, that were mentioned earlier, were all satisfied during the land mine situation but were not all met during the iranian case. the fact that canada and the eu acted similarly when it came to policies on banning landmines than on prohibiting iran’s nuclear ambitions–in spite of the political culture similarities between canada and the eu and despite the political culture differences between canada and the us–demonstrates that political culture on its own is not sufficient to explain foreign policies and that it needs to be looked at within a framework of the surrounding circumstances. political culture: definition, debate and criticism thomas risse defines political culture as those “worldviews and principled ideas—values and norms—that are stable over long periods of time and are taken for granted by the vast majority of the population. thus, the political culture as part of the domestic structure contains only those ideas that do not change often and about which there is societal consensus.”11 and according to duffield, political culture has been used as a term to emphasize the inter-subjective orientation of assumptions about the political world. these assumptions and perceptions of members of a particular society guide and inform their political actions.12 generally speaking, political culture can be defined as “the sets of symbols and meanings or styles of actions that organize political claims-making and opinion-forming, 10joseph nye. soft power: the means to success in world politics. new york: public affairs, 2005. p. 31, 78-79 11 thomas risse-kappen. “ideas do not float freely: transnational coalitions, domestic structures, and the end of the cold war.” international organization. 48, no. 2 (spring 1994). p. 209 12 john duffield. p.774 review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 3/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 11 by individuals or collectives.”13 thus, by political culture this author means political patterns of publicly shared symbols, meanings or style of actions which enables and constrains what elites and politicians can say or do or the actions that they may take. there are three identifiable ways in which political culture can directly influence behavior of a collective; as such, political culture may help define the political goals of the group. firstly, it can define the way a state or an institution perceives its interests and, in turn, the way they pursue policies that will insure these interests. secondly, political culture can shape the group’s perception of the external environment. as a result, the group pays particular attention to certain events and actions that challenge their political culture, while neglecting other which do not directly affect their identity. finally, political culture may eliminate (or emphasizes) on certain actions. therefore, some behaviors or policies become an impossible solution while others become viable options depending on the limits that political culture draws for the group.14 applying political culture as an independent variable to account for security and foreign policies has been criticized for various reasons. one of these criticisms considers the study of the effect of political culture on states behavior as “ethnocentric,” one that is not based on empirical evidence but on feeling or intuition. however, “these early criticisms were addressed through an increased use of more systemic techniques such as sample survey, quantitative content analysis, and structured interviews.” another common criticism is that cultural explanations are methods that scholars resort to whenever they are short of other explanations which are based on more concrete factors. this criticism does not flow from the inherit limitations of cultural variables but from the way they are deployed. thus, scholars should not wait for other explanations to be exhausted before they resort to culture. on the contrary, they should consider it from the start, and define immediately the unit and the cultural form that they are going to use—be it institutional, global, military or political—and remove behavior 13 robert goodin and charles tilly. contextual political analysis. oxford: oxford university press, 2006. p. 392 14 ibid., p. 772 review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 3/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 12 from their definition of culture to avoid tautology. finally, the most frequent and serious criticism “concerns the difficulty of defining, operationalizing, and measuring cultural variables.” political culture has been criticized by many scholars—such as desch—for lacking a clear definition; however, one could object to this claim since risse and duffield seem to give a relatively clear definition of political culture. although, it is not obvious what risse believes to be a “long periods of time”; this author, for the purpose of this paper, will consider values that are stable for at least a decade to constitute a political culture. also, desch’s criticism may apply to many other concepts, such as power which is used by neorealist and lacks a clear definition as well. add to that, desch who himself criticizes cultural approach concedes that “the definitional problem, however, is largely one of application rather than principle, because it is possible to clearly define and operationalize culture.”15 the article now proceeds to compare the political culture and two disarmament policies concerning apms and iran proliferation of nuclear weapons in canada, the eu and the us. in order to try and understand the factors that shaped decisions among these political communities, this author analyzes the conditions under which the policies were taken. by doing so, it will become evident whether political culture plays the role this author predicts it does, when all three conditions are present. anti-personnel land mines (apms) treaty the ottawa convention or mine ban treaty is a formal “convention on the prohibition of the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of apms and on their destruction.”16 in september 1997, the treaty was open for signature in oslo-norway, and in march 1999 it entered into force.17 the international campaign to ban land mines (icbl) 2006 report indicates that 154 countries signed the 15 ibid., p. 773 16 david long. “the european union and the ottawa process to ban on landmines.” journal of european public policy. 9, no. 3 (june 2002). p. 429 17 canada treaty information. ottawa convention, 2006. available online from http://www.treaty-accord.gc.ca/details.asp?treaty_id=102758 review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 3/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 13 treaty and 151 of them already ratified it,18 while 40 states have not yet signed it including the us.19 the report shows that canada and almost all of the eu member states signed and ratified the treaty.20 in october 1996, canada hosted the “ottawa international strategy conference towards a global ban on apms.”21 ngo and representatives of 71 states attended the conference,22 the highlight of the conference occurred during the closing ceremonies when canada’s (then) foreign minister, lloyd axworthy, surprised and challenged states delegates in his closing speech, by asking them to meet within a year to sign a mine ban treaty. fortunately, the continuous negotiations and meetings between mr. axworthy and foreign ministers of various countries over the whole year after the conference were not in vain, because by december 1997 122 out of the 150 states who had attended the ottawa convention have signed the treaty during the event.23 according to the 2005 landmine monitor report, 84 states and 8 territories had been identified as affected “to some degree by landmines and/or unexploded ordinance (uxo), of which 54 are state parties to the mine ban treaty;”24 since 2003 the bosnia and herzegovina mine action center (bhmac) has recorded in bosnia and herzegovina (bih) alone the existence of still 18,600 landmines, despite all the constant de-mining efforts.25 most of these mines lie along the deserted front lines where opposing ethnic enemies fought the bosnian-serbian war (1992-1995), “covering approximately 4.4% of the total landmass of bih.”26 they were dropped by north atlantic treaty organization (nato) air-fighters when its troops intervened to stop the serbian aggression in 18 international campaign to ban landmines. states parties, 2006. available online from http://www.icbl.org/treaty/members 19 international campaign to ban landmines. states not parties, 2006. available online from http://www.icbl.org/treaty/snp 20 ibid. 21 david lenarcic. knight-errant? canada and the crusade to ban anti-personnel land mines. toronto: irwin publishing, 1998. p. 11 22 ibid. 23 canada’s department of foreign affairs. canada’s guide to the global ban on landmines: the international movement to ban landmines-ottawa convention signing conference and mine action forum, 1997. available online from http://www.mines.gc.ca/ii/ii_d-en.asp 24 international campaign to ban landmines. landmine monitor report: major findings, 2005. available online from http://www.icbl.org/lm/2005/ 25 international campaign to ban landmines. landmine monitor report: bosnia-landmine and uxo problem, 2005. available online from http://www.icbl.org/lm/2005/bosnia.html#heading59 26 ibid. review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 3/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 14 december 1995.27 according to an interview conducted with an expert on the issue, the number of landmines could be higher than reported; no one knows precisely how many mines were buried but went unrecorded. 28 realizing the urgency and gravity of the situation, canada and the eu with the help of various ngos mobilized quickly to deal with this dreadful human security condition.29 they pursued policies, which were in accordance with their political culture and their aspiration to promote human security globally through multilateral cooperation, despite the huge economic cost that they knew they would incur for this mission. actually, at the time the united nations (un) estimated that the cost of removing all the active landmines will accumulate to us $33 billion and will take many years to accomplish.30 canada and the eu still joined in this international campaign that would not only prohibit them from the use, transfer and production of apms, but that would also require them to destroy their stockpile of it and provide humanitarian assistance and rehabilitation programs to landmines victims.31 canada’s prime minister in 1998—jean chrétien—in order to help “universalize the land mines convention and allow it to achieve its humanitarian objectives,” allocated can $100 million for this cause over a period of five years, which was renewed for can $72 million for another five years (2003-2008).32 at the same time the eu allocated €60 million of its budget, which would be renewable over a period of two years. nonetheless, the estimate of total eu assistance for mine action during 2005-2007 surmounts to €140 million.33 it is worth noting here that the us response to the ban landmines treaty was different from that of its western allies. it was not because there was a lack of public support for the treaty; in fact, 27 rae mcgrath. landmines and unexploded ordnance: a resource book. london: pluto press, 2000. p. 42, 195, 135-136 28 interview, center for defence information (cdi), brussels, 2005 29cameron maxwell, et al. to walk without fear: the global movement to ban landmines. new york: oxford university press, 1998. p. 32, 34, 40-41 30 david lenarcic. p. 3 31 canada’s department of foreign affairs. canada’s guide to the global ban on landmines: canada’s support for mine action, 2006. available online from http://www.mines.gc.ca/menu-en.asp 32 ibid. 33 european commission external relations. european union and anti-personnel landmines challenge: eu mine action strategy 2005-2007, 2004. available online from http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/mine/intro/strat05_07.htm review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 3/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 15 several american ngos pushed for it.34 they did not sign it because the us owns the biggest stockpile of these weapons. indeed, it is also the main producer and user of landmines. most importantly, why it did not want to sign, because it does not want to clear its stockpile from north korea or not be able to use them if necessary in that region.35 in fact, the us wanted to take part in the treaty, especially when it sensed that it was being left out of the initiative,36 but the international community could not convince it to bend on the north korea exception. consequently, canada and the eu signed a comprehensive treaty, while us national security and realist considerations took precedence over humanitarian security. in the end, the us acted according to its political culture, which is generally self regarding, and did not sign the treaty.37 analysis of the landmine case in light of political culture conditions the canadian, eu and us responses to the landmine issue demonstrates how political culture can play a significant role and shaped these entities’ foreign policies. clearly, canadian and eu’s general preference for multilateralism and their concern about human security distinguishes them from the us and makes them sign humanitarian agreements, like the ottawa convention, when the us does not. however, political culture on its own does not account for the eu and the canadian response. so, now in order to prove this point the article will go on to discuss in detail the three conditions which made political culture matter. the first condition stresses that the security issue affecting the state needs to be perceived of as a low threat one. clearly, apms are considered a low risk issue for canada and the eu because it poses a threat to human security but not to a national one. and yet, it is important enough from a humanitarian perspective. the speech of jean chrétien, canada’s prime minister, at the treaty signing 34 cameron maxwell. p. 22, 100 35 david lenarcic. p. 25-26 36 ibid. 37 rae mcgrath. p. 8 review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 3/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 16 conference in 1997, emphasized that land mines are a human security concern more than anything else.38 still, landmines in less developed countries are not considered a direct menace to canada’s or eu’s survival and peace. and, there are no landmines in canada or in eu member states to worry about; so, political culture and moral considerations can have the upper hand in this situation.39 also, there was no ambiguity or uncertainty in the objectives behind this policy; negotiations on land mines had a relatively transparent character.40 the second condition emphasizes that public opinion has to be involved in the decision making process. certainly, public attention to this grim issue was grasped not only by the statistics but also by the testimonies of landmine victims, who survived to tell their stories.41 these victims got involved with important organizations, such as landmines survivors network, and their stories were picked up by the media and received words of sympathy from the pope john paul ii and celebrities like princes diana.42 public pressure to get something done on landmines was, and still is, very prominent; icrc, icbl, mine action canada (mac), are among few of the organizations that are working diligently to eliminate this perfidious weapon and the suffering that is associated with it.43 generally, on the government side there is some hostility towards ngos.44 many politicians are irritated by ngos taking their position on decision making, when politician consider themselves to be elected representatives of the people and thus better at judging what the people want.45 hence, there seems to be “a mutual agreement between ngos and the government to keep a distance, operate in different spheres and intersect only on specific issues.”46 luckily, on the landmines issue canadian foreign affairs officials 38 canadian government library and archives. jean chrétien speech at the treaty signing conference, 1997. available online from http://www.collectionscanada.ca/primeministers/h4-4081-e.html 39 united nations mine action service (unmas). video: if there were landmines here, would you stand for them anywhere?, 2006. available online from http://www.stoplandmines.org/slm/index.html 40 david long. p. 442 41 lloyd axworthy. navigating a new world: canada's global future. toronto: vintage canada, 2004. p. 130 42 ibid. 43 cameron maxwell. p. 163, 168, 173, 176, 180 44 lloyd axworthy. p. 139 45 ibid. 46 ibid. review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 3/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 17 “rewrote the script” in cooperating with ngos and accepting their advice.47 for instance, in his speeches minister axworthy quoted red cross doctors—who deal with treating landmines civilian victims, especially children—saying that the “worst results are not physical. the most serious consequence was psychological trauma, the aftermath of being suddenly mutilated, of having their lives drastically changed for no reason. this required careful and often prolonged counseling.”48 indeed, there is a huge number of ngos that got involved and pushed the us, canada and eu member states to sign the ban-land mines treaty.49 however, ngos did not succeed in the us because landmines for the us are a national security matter since it involves north korea, and generally the us follows its interests more than international norms. however, even without the us’s support the treaty was signed after a year of negotiations only, which makes it one of the fastest treaties to be signed and ratified due to ngos and public intense involvement.50 the third condition focuses on the role of the leader in setting the agenda and pushing for the policy. the political entrepreneur who took the leading role on the apms treaty was definitely the canadian minister of foreign affairs in 1996 under the liberal party, axworthy.51 he is a known idealist who is also a firm believer in canada’s multilateralism and soft power traditions.52 in his book he says that his own resolve was certainly strengthened when he could not find an acceptable answer to his young son’s question, who asked him, while they were touring a landmine exhibition, “why would any one use such weapons to kill children?”53 no doubt that axworthy’s leadership ability granted the success of the ottawa convention and his nomination in 1997 to receive the nobel peace prize for his 47 ibid. 48 ibid., p. 131 49 richard matthew, bryan mcdonald, and kenneth rutherford. landmines and human security: international politics and war's hidden legacy. new york: state university press, 2004. p. 6 50 canada’s department of foreign affairs. canada’s guide to the global ban on landmines: the international movement to ban landmines-ottawa convention signing conference and mine action forum, 1997. available online from http://www.mines.gc.ca/ii/ii_d-en.asp 51 canada’s department of foreign affairs. canada’s guide to the global ban on landmines: documents and research materials-judy williams speech, 1997. available online from http://www.mines.gc.ca/vii/vii_a_xi_c_2-en.asp 52 lloyd axworthy. p. 1-2 53 ibid., p. 136 review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 3/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 18 work on banning landmines, which he did not get but was thanked by the recipient—icbl—speaks for his outstanding role in banning landmines.54 axworthy worked very hard to convince canadian defence ministry to get rid of canada’s landmines stockpile.55 on the day of the ottawa international strategy conference towards a global ban on apms, in 1996, and just before the conference started, axworthy met with officials from his cabinet and with some important ngos representatives. he confesses (later in his book) that no one new if the conference and his initiative to call on countries to sign the treaty within a year will succeed but they were all willing to give it a go. at that moment he “realized that the decision was in his hands alone and he said it’s the right thing. let’s do it.”56 axworthy’s decision to take the lead, and his incredible political will was fruitful. the canadian initiative shifted the movement on land mines from geneva to ottawa and made the ottawa convention a canadian as well as a humanitarian legacy.57 iran’s nuclear proliferation program in 1968 iran signed the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (npt), which entered into force in 1970.58 this legally binding treaty obligates five nuclear-weapon states (britain, china, france, russia, and the us) to disarm and prohibits the ratifying states from pursuing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (wmd).59 nevertheless, article 4 of the npt allows parties to engage in peaceful nuclear programs, such as the production of nuclear energy for domestic use, as long as they are under the international atomic energy agency (iaea) safeguard.60 for years, iran concealed the fact that it 54 david lenarcic. p. 64 55 lloyd axworthy. p. 133 56 ibid., p. 137 57 ibid., p. 134-135 58 canada treaty information. treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, 2006. available online from http://www.treaty-accord.gc.ca/details.asp?treaty_id=103576 59 canada’s department of foreign affairs and international trade. introduction to the treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons (npt), 2006. available online from http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/arms/intro-nuclear-treaty-en.asp 60 international atomic energy agency (iaea). in focus iaea and iran: iran safeguards agreement, 1974. available online from http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iaeairan/index.shtml review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 3/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 19 was building uranium enrichment facilities. suddenly in august 2002, an iranian opposition activist, alireza jafarzadeh, revealed the existence of two unknown nuclear sites in natanz and arak.61 this discovery created tension between iran and the west and iran’s nuclear activities became scrutinized and feared by the us, europe and canada.62 despite the repetitive verbal assurances by iranian officials, western governments remain greatly concerned that iran is using its civilian nuclear programme to mask an undeclared military nuclear agenda for several reasons. firstly, iran’s radical islamic views and its overt (moral or material) support to anti-western “terrorist” organization such as hezbollah raise many red flags in the west.63 in fact, david harris, a former agent with canadian security and intelligence service (csis) remind us that “ahmadinejad has also called israel a disgraceful stain on the islamic world and has vowed to have israel wiped off the map.”64 so, although iran now is stressing its commitment to the npt, the fear is that once it develops nuclear weapons it will act like north korea and abandon the treaty and sell its knowledge to rogue states and terrorist organization.65 these intentions were presented in khamenei’s statement that iran is “prepared to transfer the experience, knowledge and technology of its nuclear scientists.”66 hence, the west views the verbal assurances by iranian officials and supreme religious leaders as time buying mechanisms that will change once iran acquires nuclear defence capabilities. second, iran’s lack of transparency, its failure to report to the iaea the construction of nuclear facilities and its pursuit of nuclear technology covertly for 18 years have fuelled suspicion in the west 61 strategic policy consulting (spc). biography: alireza jafarzadeh, 2005. available online from http://www.spcwashington.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=32&itemid=43 62 european union institute for security studies (eu-iss). newsletters no. 19: dialogue with iran-the eu way out of the impasse, 2006. available online from http://www.iss-eu.org/newslttr/n19.pdf 63 center for strategic and international studies (csis). publications—iran: iran’s support of the hezbollah in lebanon, 2006. available online from http://www.csis.org/component/option,com_csis_pubs/task,view/id,3360/ 64 ibid. 65 new threat initiative (nit). issue and analysis: iran, 2004. available online from http://www.nti.org/e_research/e3_59a.html 66 institute for science and international security (isis). publication—iran: better carrots not centrifuges, 2006. available online from http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iran/iranissuebrief.pdf review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 3/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 20 that iran's nuclear programme has a “military dimension” to it.67 indeed, in february 2006, elbaradei reported that the agency has not seen clear indications of deviation of nuclear material to nuclear weapons; however, he also noted that there was a lack of cooperation and transparency from the iranian side over the past three years of dealings with the iaea,68 which created, according to may western analysts, a “confidence deficit” regarding iran’s intentions.69 third, many governments, including the us, the eu and canada, do not understand iran’s insistence on acquiring the ‘know how’ of nuclear technology, and enriching uranium on its soil if it was only for civilian use. actually, one of the alternatives or “carrots” that was proposed by the e3/eu and refused by iran in 2004 was for the eu to provide all necessary civilian nuclear energy to iran, as long as the latter agreed to suspend all its nuclear activities. 70 in addition, the west claims that iran does not need nuclear power due to the fact that it has the third largest oil reserve in the world, and that nuclear power is more expensive for the iranians to generate than oil-fired power.71 however, iran’s oil ministry deputy for international affairs, hadi nejad-hosseinian, argues otherwise, insisting that at the current rate of oil production (which is 1.5 billion barrel a year), iran’s reserve (of 133.3 billion barrels) will deplete within 90 years,72 and iran does not want to be dependent on others for its domestic energy in the future.73 lastly, an assessment made by the international institute for strategic studies (iiss) in 2005 concluded that "if iran threw caution to the wind, and sought a nuclear weapon capability as quickly as possible without regard for international reaction, it might be able to produce enough highly enriched uranium (heu) 67 international atomic energy agency (iaea). in focus iaea and iran: documents and reports—february resolution, 2006. available online from http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iaeairan/index.shtml 68 ibid. 69 european policy center (epc). iran’s nuclear programme-a transatlantic assessment, 2006. available online from http://www.theepc.be/en/er.asp?typ=er&lv=293&see=y&t=2&pg=er/en/detail&l=&ai=582 70 new threat initiative (nit). nuclear chronology: iran, 2004. available online from http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/iran/1825_4398.html 71 central intelligence agency (cia). the world factbook: iran, 2006. available online from https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ir.html 72 alexander’s gas and oil connections. news: iran may run out of oil in 90 years, 2005. available online from http://www.gasandoil.com/goc/news/ntm54300.htm 73 bbc news. analysis: iran’s nuclear fuel debate, 2006. available online from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/5235732.stm review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 3/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 21 for a single nuclear weapon by the end of this decade."74 furthermore, in june 2nd 2006 us director of national intelligence, john negroponte, estimated that iran, if left unchecked, could build a nuclear bomb between 2010 and 2015.75 the possibility of iran developing a nuclear weapons, or even knowing how to, causes a great concern in the west since it poses a “threat to the stability in the middle east,” which is strategically very important for the west to maintain.76 so, canada, the eu and the us appear to view these ambitions as an imminent threat to their national security and deem it a fatal situation. for that reason they all agree that they cannot allow iran to continue with its uranium enrichment program.77 however, when it comes to iran, despite the fact that the west shares the same views/goals its entities do not seem to agree on the means to achieve these ends. the us has been pressuring the un security council and the eu to enforce stronger sanctions against iran while the eu keeps pushing for diplomacy, negotiations and mitigated sanctions.78 when iran’s nuclear activity was discovered in 2002, canada appeared to err on the side of caution by not stating openly its unconditional support for the us regarding iran’s nuclear problem. in fact, at first it was hard to infer clearly from officials’ statements whether canada was on the eu’s side (diplomacy) or on the us’s side (sanctions). however, since 2003 as time went by under the liberal party—and continuing with the appointment of a canadian prime minister (stephen harper) who represents the conservative party and seems to be pro-american—it looks like, on the iranian issue, canada has succumbed completely to the will of the us and is now swimming with their current and echoing their voice. this continuity in the reaction against iran’s nuclear program, under both liberal 74 international institution for strategic studies (iiss). iran’s strategic weapons programmes—a net assessment, 2005. available online from http://www.iiss.org/index.asp?pgid=5498 75 bbc news. middle east news: iran bomb within 10 years, 2006. available online from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/5039956.stm 76 european policy center (epc). iran’s nuclear programme-a transatlantic assessment, 2006. available online from http://www.theepc.be/en/er.asp?typ=er&lv=293&see=y&t=2&pg=er/en/detail&l=&ai=582 77 public conference: european policy center (epc), q/a period, iran’s nuclear programme-a transatlantic assessment, brussels, 2006 78 united nations department of disarmament (undd). disarmament digest: peace and security through disarmament, 2006. available online from http://disarmament.un.org review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 3/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 22 and conservative parties, indicates that partisan politics is not what is affecting canada’s response. instead, canada’s behavior is affected by the non-satisfaction of the three conditions which are needed for political culture to play a role in foreign policy. one only has to read the official statement of mackay, the current canadian foreign minister, after the un security council 1696 resolution on 31 july, 2006 on iran’s nuclear program, to realize how canada is bandwagoning completely with the us: canada fully supports the resolution issued today by the unsc, reiterating the international community’s serious concerns about iran’s past and ongoing nuclear activities... it also notes iran’s failure to comply with the measures demanded of it in the unsc presidential statement of march 29, 2006, as well as in various international iaea board of governors resolutions…through this resolution, the unsc has made the suspension of iran’s enrichment and reprocessing activities mandatory. canada urges iran to implement this suspension immediately and to enter into negotiations toward a long-term comprehensive settlement, on the basis of the proposal offered on june 6 by the eu high representative on behalf of china, france, germany, russia, the united kingdom and the united states…canada also supports the unsc’s determination to reinforce the authority of the iaea in order to resolve all outstanding issues pertaining to the nature and scope of iran's nuclear program. canada urges iran to cooperate fully with the iaea, including through resumed application of the additional protocol to its comprehensive safeguards agreement, as a necessary step toward a long-term comprehensive settlement.79 analysis of the iran issue in light of political culture conditions by using the iranian nuclear proliferation issue as a case study, the author tries to demonstrate how canadian material interests were given precedence over canada’s political culture regarding this problem. canada, the eu and the us in this case all have similar fears and goal, which is to stop iran’s uranium enrichment program, nevertheless they use different means to achieve this goal. in dealing with iran the eu follows to a certain degree its norms and political culture, and hence it prefers the use of diplomacy and persuasion. the us follows its interests and political culture, and so it favors sanctions and use of force (or threatening language). while canada in this case does not follow its political culture but considers its strategic interests and thus it bandwagons with the us, abandoning its soft power tradition in the adopting of the us’s hard power rhetoric. the reason behind this canadian 79 canada’s department of foreign affairs and international trade. news releases: statement by ministermackay on unsc resolution on iran’s nuclear program, 2006. available online from http://w01.international.gc.ca/minpub/publication.asp?publication_id=384286&language=e review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 3/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 23 behavior, is that the three conditions—which are essential to be all satisfied in order for political culture to play the main role in shaping foreign policies—are absent in the iranian situation. in order to demonstrate this point, the article will go on to discuss those three conditions and their effects in detail. the first condition stresses that the security issue which the state is dealing with needs to be perceived of as a low threat one. this is obviously not the situation here since the iranian problem poses a threat to national security and to the survival of the state (although not in the direct sense). iran’s nuclear ambitions are of great concern to the west; not only because iran’s purposes for insisting on enriching uranium on their soil is ambiguous to the west, but also because iran’s previous policies and statements have had aggressive tendencies and tones towards the west. canada, the eu and the us seem to be uncertain that the iranian government would act responsibly and refrain from the use of nuclear weapons in order to advance some of their islamic fundamentalist goals.80 the fear of iran’s advanced nuclear program and its intentions to develop nuclear weapons in the future is not new. in a joint declaration released on june 3 2003, the g-8 nations—canada, france, germany, italy, japan, russia, the united kingdom and the us — harshly criticized iran’s lack of transparency and its failure to abide by its iaea safeguards agreement. according to the g8 “such actions undermine the nonproliferation regime and are a clear breach.” the g8 also said “we recognize that the proliferation of wmd and their means of delivery pose a growing danger to us all. together with the spread of international terrorism, it is the pre-eminent threat to international security.”81 canada in particular expressed its great concern about iran’s nuclear program in its statement to the 47th general conference of the iaea on 16-17 september 2003.82 80 public conference: european policy center (epc), q/a period, iran’s nuclear programme-a transatlantic assessment, brussels, 2006 81 new threat initiative (nit). nuclear weapons: g8 declaration on iran nuclear program, 2003. available online from http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/newswires/2003_6_3.html 82conference of radiation control program directors (crcpd). 47th general conference of the iaea: canadian statement, 2003. p. 2. available online from http://www.crcpd.org/international_issuestopics/iaea2003/canada.pdf#search=%22canada%2c%20iran%2c%20nuclear %2c%20proliferation%2c%20security%2c%20threat%22 review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 3/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 24 the second condition emphasizes that public opinion has to be involved in the decision making process. on the iranian nuclear proliferation topic, public pressure—whether organized through open demonstrations or through ngos—is absent in canada the eu and the us. the subject has been discussed for more than three years solely through high level officials. civil society appears to agree with their respective governments on the problem and the solutions. however, the absence of civic participation might also be due to the lack of government’s transparency on the topic—which usually tends to alienate citizens and creates apathetic feeling towards the issue—or it may be due to the fact that the horrific effects of using nuclear weapons are not as tangible on a daily basis, as the consequences of using other conventional weapons. the third condition focuses on the role of the leader in acting on behalf of his collective identity and pushing for the policies that would advance his countries political culture. for the eu, solana seems to be the main political figure dealing with iran’s nuclear file and he has been trying hard to calm down the rising conflict between the us and iran. for instance, on wednesday august 30, 2006, the financial times published an article which stated that solana is “ready to continue discussions with iran over its nuclear programme even though a un deadline for tehran to restrict its nuclear activities expires on thursday.”83 as far as the us is concerned, it is president bush who has been lobbying very strongly against enrichment. for example, in an article which was published on august 31 2006, also by the financial times, us president george w. bush announced that iran had to face the outcomes for its “failure to meet a un deadline to halt its nuclear activities. “we must not allow iran to develop a nuclear weapon. there must be consequences for iran’s defiance” mr. bush said, in a statement “seemingly intended to build international support for sanctions on tehran.” however, his incendiary towards such measures “has been undermined by russia and china’s continued resistance to 83 financial times. eu will continue nuclear talks with tehran, 2006 available online from http://www.ft.com/cms/s/90a61514-3853-11db-ae2c-0000779e2340.html review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 3/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 25 sanctions.”84 conversely, in canada there is obviously a canadian leadership deficiency when it comes to iran. certainly, it looks like there is a growing rift between canada’s foreign policies on iran (among other issues) and canada’s political culture, especially since harper came to office in 2006. moreover, canadian liberal and conservative party officials—like martin, harper, pettigrew and mackay—seem to lack charisma, experience or popularity. for instance, looking at the national poles suggests that the public mistrusts these leaders’ actions or motives, at one point or another during their term in office. unlike axworthy who possessed all three qualities before getting involved in the landmine issue, these leaders are either young and new to foreign affairs at the time when they had to deal with the iranian issue (like mackay). or they lack charisma and popularity, as can be observed from the results of the angus reid global monitor poll, in 2007, on harper. apparently, “fewer canadians are satisfied with their prime minister…and 28 per cent say their opinion of the head of government worsened over the past months.”85 however, as stated earlier, trust in a leader and his popularity are necessary leadership qualities, without which it becomes hard for a leader to consolidate his countries political culture into concrete policies that he can convince his people, his government and other governments to adopt. conclusion despite the attractiveness and popularity of neorealism as an explanation of state decisions in international politics, in the post-cold war period it faces some severe challenges in providing an adequate accounting for many aspects of state security considerations. at times, states seem to be adopting policies that are not in their best interests (from a neorealist account) but more in accordance with their political culture, while at other time the opposite is true. therefore, one must think that 84 financial times. us says iran must face consequences, 2006 available online from http://www.ft.com/cms/s/95b60d46-3909-11db-a21d-0000779e2340.html 85 angus reid global monitor: polls & research. harper falls to 29% in canada, 2007 available online from http://www.angus-reid.com/polls/index.cfm/fuseaction/viewitem/itemid/16582 review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 3/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 26 certain circumstances must be ripe for one approach to be more employable than the other, in order to account for this policy alteration. this article addressed the conditions under which the political culture approach can be used as an alternative to neorealism in order to explain security policies in the west. the article commenced by demonstrating the similarities between canadian and eu political cultures, while revealing important differences between canada and the eu on one hand and the us on the other. for instance, canada and the eu prefer multilateralism and the use of soft power, and the us prefers unilateralism and the use of hard power. this work then utilised two case studies which dealt with disarmament policies – anti-personnel land mines and iranian nuclear proliferation – to illustrate that despite political culture similarities between canada and the eu, they have adopted different paths when they tackled each issue. this again proves that political culture alone is not sufficient for two entities to have similar security policies, and that certain conditions need to be first satisfied in order for political culture to matter in forming foreign policies. the article argues that three conditions need to be satisfied simultaneously for political culture to count as an explanatory factor for states implementing certain security policies. first, the security issue which the state is dealing with needs to be perceived of as a low security threat. second, the public needs to be aware and involved in the matter. third, the political elite who is involved in the policy making process must be an idealist and a firm believer in the political culture that he represents. finally, by using the two case studies the article manages to demonstrate how these conditions were present in the landmines case and absent in the iranian one. the analysis of the case studies suggests that when the three aforementioned conditions are all present, political culture can be used as a viable supplementary to neorealism. thus, both political culture and neorealism are, independently, unable to provide a wholly convincing account of state decisions over the paths and priorities in foreign affairs. a new balance must be struck which incorporates these theories (among others) to produce a more realistic account of international politics today. review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 3/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 27 bibliography alexander’s gas and oil connections. news: iran may run out of oil in 90 years, 2005. available online from http://www.gasandoil.com/goc/news/ntm54300.htm angus reid global monitor: polls & research. harper falls to 29% in canada, 2007 available online from http://www.angus-reid.com/polls/index.cfm/fuseaction/viewitem/itemid/16582 axworthy, lloyd. navigating a new world: canada's global future. toronto: vintage canada, 2004 bbc news. analysis: iran’s nuclear fuel debate, 2006. available 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online from https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ir.html conference of radiation control program directors (crcpd). 47th general conference of the iaea: canadian statement, 2003. available online from review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 3/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 28 http://www.crcpd.org/international_issues-topics/iaea 2003/canada.pdf#search=%22canada%2c%20iran%2c%20nuclear%2c%20proli feration%2c%20security%2c%20threat%22 duffield, john. “political culture and state behavior: why germany confounds neorealism.” international organization. 53, no.4 (autumn 1999): 765-803 european commission external relations. european union and anti-personnel landmines challenge: eu mine action strategy 2005-2007, 2004. available online from http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/mine/intro/strat05_07.htm european policy center (epc). iran’s nuclear programme-a transatlantic assessment, 2006. available online from 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atomic energy agency (iaea). in focus iaea and iran: documents and reports— february resolution, 2006. available online from http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iaeairan/index.shtml -------. in focus iaea and iran: iran safeguards agreement, 1974. available online from http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iaeairan/index.shtml international campaign to ban landmines (icbl). landmine monitor report: bosnia-landmine and uxo problem, 2005. available online from http://www.icbl.org/lm/2005/bosnia.html#heading59 -------. landmine monitor report: major findings, 2005. available online from http://www.icbl.org/lm/2005/ -------. states not parties, 2006. available online from http://www.icbl.org/treaty/snp -------. states parties, 2006. available online from http://www.icbl.org/treaty/members international institution for strategic studies (iiss). iran’s strategic weapons programmes—a net assessment, 2005. available online from http://www.iiss.org/index.asp?pgid=5498 lenarcic, david. knight-errant? canada and the crusade to ban anti-personnel land mines. toronto: irwin publishing, 1998 long, david. “the european union and the ottawa process to ban on landmines.” journal of european public policy. 9, no. 3 (june 2002) matthew, richard, bryan mcdonald, and kenneth rutherford. landmines and human security: international politics and war's hidden legacy. new york: state university press, 2004 maxwell, cameron et al. to walk without fear: the global movement to ban landmines. new york: oxford university press, 1998 mcgrath, rae. landmines and unexploded ordnance: a resource book. london: pluto press, 2000 review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 3/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 29 new threat initiative (nit). issue and analysis: iran, 2004. available online from http://www.nti.org/e_research/e3_59a.html -------. nuclear chronology: iran, 2004. available online from http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/iran/1825_4398.html -------. nuclear weapons: g8 declaration on iran nuclear program, 2003. available online from http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/newswires/2003_6_3.html nye, joseph. soft power: the means to success in world politics. new york: public affairs, 2005 resnick, philip. the european roots of canadian identity. peterborough: broadview press, 2005 risse-kappen, thomas. “ideas do not float freely: transnational coalitions, domestic structures, and the end of the cold war.” international organization. 48, no. 2 (spring 1994): 185-214 strategic policy consulting (spc). biography: alireza jafarzadeh, 2005. available online from http://www.spcwashington.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id= 32&itemid=43 united nations department of disarmament (undd). peace and security through disarmament, 2006. available online from http://disarmament.un.org united nations mine action service (unmas). video: if there were landmines here, would you stand for them anywhere?, 2006. available online from http://www.stoplandmines.org/slm/index.html wendt, alexander. social theory of international politics. cambridge: cambridge university press, 1999 daniel augenstein_volume 4_issue 1 review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 44 ………………………………………………………………… christianity and tolerance: a genealogy of european identity daniel augenstein abstract in the process of european constitutionalisation, the european union continues to struggle for an identity that can generate widespread support amongst its peoples. against this background it has been suggested by some that a european identity should embrace the christian values that underpin europe’s national traditions and cultures. in this paper i shall argue that, instead of relying on a communitarian vision of a ‘christian europe’, a european identity should build on a culture of religious tolerance. a european culture of religious tolerance draws on the enduring of difference and the acknowledgement of persisting and intractable conflict as essential experiences of europe’s christian past. thus understood, tolerance lies at the roots of a european identity. at the same time, and through the conditional inclusion of religious diversity in the european nation-states, a european culture of religious tolerance creates over time new commonalities between europe’s religiously permeated national traditions. thus understood, tolerance only brings about the conditions for the development of a supranational european identity that amounts to more than (the sum of) its national counterparts. review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 45 introduction when john locke wrote his epistola de tolerantia in post-reformation europe he did not stress the value of religious diversity, nor did he defend religious homogeneity as a necessary backbone for social unity and political legitimacy. whereas the former must have seemed quite inconceivable to him, the latter was precisely the object of his critique. locke was committed to the ideal of a religious society deeply rooted in christian beliefs and values; yet he also realized that in the face of intractably conflicting beliefs over the true path to salvation, any attempt to bring about such a society other than through ‘light and evidence’ would prove fatal: “it is not the diversity of opinions, which cannot be avoided; but the refusal* of toleration to those that are of different opinions, which might have been granted, that has produced all the bustles and wars, that have been in the christian world, upon account of religion” (locke,1991:52). this is a rather defensive claim that may not satisfy those who, four centuries later, have rediscovered europe’s christian heritage as a potential engine for future european integration. in an era where functional integration has reached its limits, where a national ethos or a european demos is unavailable, and a european public sphere of collective will-formation remains out of sight, the conjuration of a common christian culture and tradition could, or so it is hoped by some, (re)gain citizens’ solidarity for the european project. thus, or so the argument goes, a european identity should build on the christian values that underpin europe’s national traditions and cultures. moreover, the shared commitment to uphold and foster these values should provide a sufficiently thick value-basis to unite the european family of nations. to be plausible, a genealogy of european identity must be about continuity and transformation: it must commemorate europe’s christian past and imagine it, in a * the author is grateful to maria b. cahill, mark dawson, jen hendry, oliver schmidtke and jason r. young for helpful comments and suggestions. review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 46 transformative way, as a common basis for europe’s future. moreover, it must be about unity and diversity: it must explain the self-constituting of the peoples of europe in a supranational european order that respects europe’s diverse national traditions and cultures. against this background, i shall defend the lockean view and argue that rather than on a communitarian vision of a christian europe, a european identity should build on a culture of religious tolerance. tolerance, the mere ‘putting up’ with religious diversity, embodies an ambivalent value; as derrida put it, tolerance “says to the other from its elevated position, i am letting you be, you are not insufferable, i am leaving you a place in my home, but do not forget that this is my home…” (derrida, 2003:127-28). it is embedded in an area of tension between straightforward rejection and full-hearted acceptance of minoritarian religious worldviews: while preferable to religious exclusion, it appears too negative an engagement with difference when compared to the equal inclusion of religious diversity. i submit that, paradoxically, religious tolerance thus lies at the roots of a european identity and only creates the conditions for its very development. at the outset, i briefly discuss john locke’s defence of religious tolerance in the context of 17th century christian europe. i contend that the european societies’ capacity to defuse the social destructiveness of religious conflict and to develop an institutional framework for the peaceful coexistence of conflicting religious worldviews is one of the most precious inheritances of the european enlightenment. it was not a homogeneous christian culture but an experience of religious conflict and the concomitant development of a culture of religious tolerance that created the conditions for political unity in the early-modern christian state. moreover, it was not the attempt to implement religious uniformity but the tolerance of religious diversity that lead to a more appreciative relationship between the christian denominations in the european nation-states. in a second step i consider the role of religious tolerance in the european nation-states, taking the ‘headscarf debates’ in germany and france as an example. in the nation-state, the christian denominations reached a status review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 47 of mutual acceptance and national belonging displaced religious belief as a means of social integration. at the same time, both religious-communitarian and secular-laic models continue to affirm, albeit in different ways, christian values as they have shaped their distinctive interpretations of nationhood. this has two major consequences: first, and within the nationstate, tolerance is relegated from the level of religious beliefs to the level of merely religiously permeated national traditions; secondly, and among themselves, the european nations disagree about what constitutes their common christian culture and tradition today. against this twofold background of a ‘christian europe’ and a ‘europe of the nation-states’ i develop in the final section an argument in favour of a european identity based on religious tolerance. drawing on josef weiler’s notion of supranationalism i argue that a european culture of religious tolerance can meet the two challenges for a genealogy of european identity identified above: it remains conscious of europe’s conflictive christian past yet creates, through the endurance of religious difference, new commonalities between europe’s religiously permeated national traditions. it respects europe’s diverse national identities yet transcends, through the conditional inclusion of religious diversity, the normative horizon of the nation-state towards a supranational european perspective. the european heritage of religious tolerance religious tolerance played an important role in the social and political conflicts that divided european societies along religious lines in the 16th and 17th centuries. the civil wars that swept europe from 1530 to the 1690s were not simply struggles for political power, but also religious conflicts. religious tolerance initially developed in a context where religious homogeneity was considered indispensable for both social stability and political legitimacy: ecclesiam et imperium esse unum et idem (lecler, 1965:137). christian believers and churches encountered each other on the basis of their conflicting claims to religious truth that review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 48 a priori excluded any kind of political compromise. at the same time, religious questions were politicised in their entirety, and any form of religious diversity therefore threatened the political authority of the early modern state. hence, the decision to have an established church was not merely a question of implementing religious dogma; it was also, importantly, a matter of political stability (böckenförde, 1991:36-7). and while it was generally assumed that the king should suppress false beliefs, pragmatic considerations led at times to concessions of tolerance as the second-best solution where the enforcement of religious uniformity seemed, for the time being, unachievable. accordingly, rather than asserting a general right to freedom of religion, tolerance only granted conditional and limited exceptions from the requirement of religious uniformity. it is against this background that 17th century protestant thinkers like john locke (1632-1704) aimed for a more principled justification of religious tolerance. as early as in the two tracts on government (1660), locke argued that religion had become a major source of civil unrest because christian leaders and ‘the clergy of all sects’ had inculcated two erroneous beliefs in both ‘princes’ and the ‘laity’: first, that it was a christian duty to uphold and spread the true way to heaven and, secondly, that this was to be done by force and compulsion. given the multiplicity of christian faiths, each of which considered itself orthodox, these beliefs necessarily culminated in the persecution by the government and religious revolts by the people: hence have the cunning and malice of men taken occasion to pervert the doctrine of peace and charity into a perpetual foundation of war and contention, all those flames that have made such havoc and desolation in europe, and have not been quenched but with the blood of so many millions, have been at first kindled with coals from the altar, and too much blown with the breath of those that attend the altar, who, forgetting their calling which is to promote peace and meekness (locke, 1967:160-61). locke’s response in the epistola de tolerantia consists of stressing the christian duty of charity and the social destructiveness of religious persecution. regarding the former, he emphasises two core moral beliefs as commanded in the scripture: that god allows each man to worship in the way he sincerely believes to be right and that christianity should be upheld review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 49 by love and persuasion (tully, 1990:15). regarding the latter, locke argues that because nothing but the essentials of the revelation can be known with certainty, religious diversity is unavoidable and religious differences will prove intractable. moreover, because “it is only light and evidence that can work a change in men’s opinions; and that light can in no manner proceed from corporal sufferings, or any other outward penalties”, the state cannot enforce religious uniformity (locke, 1991:19). hence, religious persecution is not merely morally wrong because it contradicts the two fundamental christian beliefs but furthermore irrational in that it cannot succeed in its stated objectives. under such conditions, locke concludes, “it is not the diversity of opinion, which cannot be avoided, but the refusal of toleration to those that are of different opinions, which might have been granted, that has produced all the bustles and wars, that have been in the christian world upon account of religion” (locke, 1991:52). locke’s argument against religious persecution issues in a (formal) separation of state and church, grounded in a (material) distinction between “the business of civil government” and “the business of religion”. the separation of state and church rests on a now familiar conception of ‘formal’ or ‘reason-based’ equality: religious considerations cannot justify political action because the commonwealth is “a society of men constituted only for the procuring, preserving, and advancing of their own civil interests” and “the whole jurisdiction of the magistrate reaches only to these civil concernments” (locke, 1991:17). the difficulties with such formal equality models are equally familiar, namely that they are not sufficiently sensitive to the consequences of state action. locke maintains, [if] such were the state of things, that the interest of the commonwealth required all slaughter of beasts should be forborne for some while, in order to the increasing of the stock of cattle, that had been destroyed by some extraordinary murrain; who sees not that the magistrate, in such a case, may forbid all his subjects to kill any calves for any use whatsoever? only it is to be observed, that in this case the law is not made about religion, but about political matter; nor is the sacrifice, but the slaughter of calves thereby prohibited (locke, 1991:37). however, while the farmer who cannot kill his calf until the stock has been sufficiently increased will merely suffer a temporal economic disadvantage, the religious believer, when review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 50 not engaging in the rituals required by her faith, will risk her salvation. and it is difficult to see why locke’s proposal should seem equally congenial to both of them. this dilemma points to a yet deeper problem with locke’s argument that concerns his material distinction between ‘the business of civil government’ and ‘the business of religion’, or between laws made about a ‘political matter’ and laws made about ‘religion’. the boundaries between state and church, locke maintains, are “fixed and immoveable” because both are “in their original, end, business, and in everything perfectly distinct and infinitely different from each other” (locke, 1991:26): it is easy to understand to what end the legislative power ought to be directed, and by what measures regulated, and that is the temporal good and outward prosperity of society. … and it is also evident what liberty remains to men in reference to their eternal salvation, and that is, that every one should do what he in his conscience is persuaded to be acceptable to the almighty, on whose good pleasure and acceptance depends his eternal happiness (locke, 1991:44). yet this did not prevent locke from rubberstamping the use of force against certain doctrines because they constituted, by their very nature, a threat to the civil order of the commonwealth. this is most obvious in locke’s categorical refusal to tolerate atheists: “lastly, those are not at all to be tolerated who deny the being of god. promises, covenants, and oaths, which are the bonds of human society, can have no hold upon an atheist. the taking-away of god, though but even in thought, dissolves everything” (locke, 1991:47). it must have been clear to locke that advocacy of intolerance against atheists was incompatible with his premise about the involuntary nature of religious belief insomuch as the atheist, too, could not simply take up a religious belief by will (dunn, 1991:179). however, locke can consistently maintain that people should not be persecuted for their religious (non-) beliefs but on the basis that what they believe amounts to a threat to public order. for locke, the existence of god and the natural law was a demonstrable truth that lies at the very foundation of morality, indispensable for good government and individual conduct: while the belief in god sustains moral values, the fear of divine punishment restrains rulers from abusing their powers and individual subjects from sedition (tully, 1993:54). atheists are not merely review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 51 irrational because they neglect the most obvious truth. they are furthermore immoral because their denial of the existence of god reduces the law of nature to the contradictory interests of individuals who, left to their own fallible devices, have no reason to trust each other and hence no capacity to form a peaceful and stable society. similarly, having argued that ‘mahometans’ should not be excluded from the civil rights of the commonwealth because of their religion, locke then maintains that a church can have no right to be tolerated by the magistrate, which is constituted upon such a bottom, that all those who enter into it, do thereby, ipso facto, deliver themselves up to the protection and service of another prince. … it is ridiculous for any one to profess himself to be a mahometan only in religion, but in every thing else a faithful subject to a christian magistrate, whilst at the same time he acknowledges himself bound to yield blind obedience to the mufti of constantinople; who himself is entirely obedient to the ottoman emperor … (locke, 1991:46-7). to the extent that the lockean state is grounded in religious tolerance, it is released from the unconditional nature of obligations to religious truth and becomes subject to the contingencies of politics directed towards the public good. considered this way, it was the tolerance of religious diversity, rather than the attempt to implement religious homogeneity, that created the conditions for a political unity in the early-modern european states. at the same time, however, locke’s defence of religious tolerance was still embedded in an overarching christian framework. his notion of state and society remain, as john dunn has maintained, “shaped and dominated by a picture of the earthly setting of human life as a created order, an order designed and controlled by an omnipotent, omniscient and also, mercifully, benevolent deity: the god of the christians” (dunn, 1990:11). and in such a world there was no place for atheists, ‘mahometans’ and other sects that had arrived at “such a degree of madness, as that [they] should think fit to teach, for doctrines of religion, such things as manifestly undermine the foundations of society, and are therefore condemned by the judgement of all mankind” (locke, 1967:45). hence, religious tolerance in postreformation europe embodied an ambivalent value. it was embedded in an area of tension between the full-hearted acceptance and the straightforward rejection of minoritarian religious review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 52 worldviews. on the one hand, rather than guaranteeing a general right to freedom of religion, tolerance merely granted conditional and limited concessions of public worship to some of the christian denominations. and rather than accepting the other as an equal moral partner, it merely required an act of non-reciprocal indulgence towards those considered to be inferior and categorically wrong. yet on the other hand, tolerance helped to defuse the social destructiveness of religious conflict in early modern europe. by contesting the justification of religious persecution from religious truth it offered, however, a volatile and imperfect protection against religiously motivated discrimination. by granting conditional and limited exceptions to the norm of religious uniformity, it challenged the association of social and political stability with religious homogeneity and therefore paved the way towards the liberal transformation of the european states. against this background, then, rather than conjuring a shared christian culture, a european identity should commemorate the way european christians have learnt to stabilize the tensions between their conflicting worldviews and to live together in difference. after all, the development of a culture of religious tolerance only created the conditions under which it became possible to discern commonalities between the christian denominations in the european nation-states. national traditions and christian culture the liberal transformation of the european moral and legal-political orders took place gradually. the process of secularisation, the french revolution and the emergence of the public sphere shaped a new vision of state and society, inaugurating the age of popular sovereignty and human rights. with the concomitant emancipation of the individual from traditional religious communities, and of the political state from the religious order, religion was relegated to the private sphere of society and protected as an individual human or review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 53 fundamental right (taylor, 2004). as a result of the transition to liberalism, the european states no longer endorse a distinctively religious conception of the good but purport to treat their citizens equally in their religious diversity. yet this process of transformation through emancipation also posed the question of how to integrate the individual into the secularised society. it is the evolving nation-state with its emphasis on national identity that fulfilled this task. the nation-state requires the universal conscription of its citizens who are tied together by virtue of a common history, language, tradition and culture. national belonging displaces religious belief as the new form of social integration. thus, on the one hand, the linkage between the state and religion is dissolved in favour of a new linkage between the state and the nation. on the other hand, however, and through its appeal to the nation’s history and culture, nationhood does not purge society of its now merely implicit religious heritage. the european nation-states, while no longer defined in distinctively religious terms, continue to affirm christian values as they have shaped their national cultures and traditions. these national cultures and traditions, in turn, inform the concrete interpretation of fundamental rights so that the recognition of citizens’ equal freedom of religion is, to a greater or lesser extent, conditional on and delimited by their acceptance of the nation’s christian heritage. this is perhaps most obvious in those european states that continue to appeal to their christian traditions and cultures in processes of political and legal decision-making. during what has become known as the ‘crucifix debate’ in germany – that is, the question of whether german school laws can require displaying a cross or crucifix in public school classrooms – a bavarian administrative court distinguished between the christian faith (as distinctive religion) and the christian culture (as merely religiously permeated common culture). on this basis it held that the display of crucifixes in classrooms was not the (in this context illegitimate) expression of a commitment to a particular religious faith but the (legitimate) affirmation of an essential component of the general christian-occidental tradition and review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 54 common property of its cultural realm (bverfge 93, 1 (kruzifix)). in the subsequent headscarf controversy, a german school board rejected the application of a muslim teacher unwilling to refrain from wearing her headscarf in school. it held that the wearing of a headscarf in public schools would contravene the principle of state neutrality. moreover, it considered the headscarf a symbol of cultural disintegration that would endanger social cohesion and school peace. the decision of the school board was upheld by two lower instance administrative courts and the federal administrative court (vg stuttgart nvwz 2000, 959, vgh mannheim njw 2001, 2899 and bverwg jz 2002, 254). the german federal constitutional court, distinguishing between the crucifix as a symbol of the state and the headscarf as an individual statement of the person concerned, held that the latter was in principle covered by the teacher’s fundamental right to freedom of religion. accordingly, it ruled that the headscarf could not be prohibited through an administrative decree but only by means of a parliamentary statute (bverfge 108, 282 (kopftuch ludin)). by now, many of the german länder have enacted legislation banning the headscarf while still sanctioning nuns teaching in their traditional costume. the law of baden-württemberg, for instance, provides that teachers shall not demonstrate any religious convictions that would contravene the principle of state neutrality. manifestations of christian values and traditions, however, are taken to be compatible with this requirement because they fulfil the educational mandate conferred on the state by the german constitution (amended law of april 1st, 2004 gvbl. baden-württemberg 178 (2004)). similar laws have been passed in niedersachen, saarland, hesse and bavaria (langenfeld and mohsen, 2005:86-94). a recent decision by the bavarian constitutional court confirmed that the preferential treatment of christian confessions was justified because a muslim teacher could not credibly convey to her pupils the christian values and traditions as anchored in the länder constitutions and the respective school laws (bayerischer verfassungsgerichtshof, january 15 2007, vf. 11-vii-05). while, as gerstenberg review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 55 puts it, “a distinctive feature of the german approach is the emphasis of freedom of conscience as a principle, another feature of the german approach is the assumption that christian culture occupies a privileged place in german public life and is, indeed, a postulate of german political identity and social cohesion”(gerstenberg, 2005:94, 96). hence, on the one hand, the constitutional protection of freedom of religion requires the state to remain neutral between different religions which, by implication, may justify the ban of headscarves from school; on the other hand, the state is not required to be neutral with regard to different cultural-religious traditions so that it may justifiably discriminate between the muslim headscarf and the christian habit. in contrast to locke’s times, it is no longer religious homogeneity but merely a religiously permeated national identity that is considered a necessary prerequisite of social unity and political legitimacy. accordingly, in the german nation-state the principle of state neutrality and the constitutional protection of freedom of religion are underpinned by a substantive commitment to a majoritarian christian culture and tradition. and quite similar to locke’s distinction between the ‘business of civil government’ and the ‘business of religion’, it would be naïve to believe that the affirmation of the latter did not impinge on the guarantee of the former. the inclusion of religious minorities is no longer conditional on their religious convictions but on their assimilation to a national tradition and culture that continues to affirm christian values as they have shaped germany’s distinctive interpretation of nationhood. european states that adhere to a secular-laic tradition, by contrast, insist on a stricter separation between state and religion. the laic state reacts with institutional blindness to the fact of religious, moral and cultural pluralism. thus, article 2 of the french 1958 constitution states that “france is an indivisible laïque, democratic and social republic. it ensures equality of all citizens before the law with no distinction made on the basis of origin, race or religion. it respects all beliefs.” the french principle of laïcité that commits french public schools to a review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 56 strictly secular education was challenged in 1989 when three female students insisted on wearing headscarves in class. the headmaster suspended the girls, claiming to apply a wellestablished french rule prohibiting religious symbols in state schools. in contrast to the german federal constitutional court, the conseil d’état held that the french school authorities were entitled to prohibit the headscarf on a case-by-case basis triggering further debate about the principle of religious neutrality in public education and the status of french national identity (langenfeld and mohsen, 2005:93). in 1994, the french parliament eventually passed a law prohibiting the wearing of any signs manifesting a religious affiliation in public schools (loi no 2004-225 du 15 mars 2004). unlike the communitarian model, the laic conception of liberal neutrality formally precludes the invocation of christian values for the justification of public policies and legal decisions. accordingly, the french ban of religious symbols from public schools does not provide exceptions for expressions of christian culture and tradition and thus seems to keep with the liberal promise of state neutrality and equal treatment of religious diversity. however, such argument overlooks the fact that the normative ideal of a strictly secular public sphere is itself the expression of a distinctively french national-republican tradition that is infused with christian values. in an insightful essay, cécile laborde distinguishes three different strands of the french laïcité principle that are, in one way or the other, linked to the evolution of the secular nation-state: laïcité as state neutrality qua abstention, that guarantees the inclusion of citizens in the state through the privatisation of religion; laïcité as promotion of individual autonomy providing the foundation for a perfectionist morality; and laïcité as a communitarian ideal that fosters a civic sense of loyalty to a particular historical community. for that purpose, laborde concludes, “laïcité has never really formed part of an autonomous juridical, political or philosophical theory, isolated from concrete historical moments, and has always been intimately linked to the republican project of the entrenchment of the modern liberal society review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 57 born out of the french revolution” (laborde, 2003:173). this very plausible interpretation of laïcité as a national tradition sharply contrasts with its claim to neutrality in all three dimensions identified by laborde. this is most noticeable as far the perfectionist ideal of individual autonomy and the communitarian emphasis on national loyalty are concerned. laïcité’s claim to ‘neutrality through abstention’ is also infused with the french nationalrepublican tradition. laïcité is a non-neutral principle in a double sense: most obviously, while it claims to treat different religions equally it cannot be neutral with regard to religious and secular doctrines as such. laïcité even fails on the weaker claim of neutrality between different religions as its distinction between a secular public sphere and a religious private sphere is already the result of a historical process driven by the interrelation between western protestantism and secularisation. hence today there exists an awkward alliance against the headscarf between french left-wing secular republicanism and right-wing christian catholicism: the right and the left can define the prohibition on islamic headscarves in the classroom as a defence of either french christian or french secular culture, because the two are not at all mutually exclusive. current western christian religious practice defines that women and men bare their heads in public, non-sacred buildings, and that convention – the absence of a religious marker – has been accepted as a secular practise. but the absence is also a marker, and for other religious traditions with other religious practices, going bareheaded may be seen as an overtly christian practice, or at the least one in weak disguise, especially if that practice is legislated in a dominantly christian country (moruzzi, 1994:664). the laic interpretation of liberal neutrality proves less neutral than it purports because it privileges, in effect or intention, a secularized christian culture and tradition. while, as modood puts it, “for some people, religion is about ‘the inner life’, or personal conduct or individual salvation [and] for others, it includes communal obligations, a public philosophy and political action … radical secular political arrangements seem to suit and favour the private kind of religions, but not those that require public action. it is surely a contradiction to require both that the state be neutral about religion and that the state should require religions with public ambitions to give them up”. (1998:393) in short, european christians will find it much easier to accept the liberal public-private divide with its privatization of religious faith than other religious communities simply because they contributed to its creation in the first place. more importantly, this problem cannot be review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 58 solved by a retreat to formal (reason-based) neutrality because this still leaves open the crucial question as to whether religions should be treated equally in a negative sense (equally restrictive) or in a positive sense (equally unrestrictive). as it has become apparent in the lockean paradigm, a formal separation of state and church and the exclusion of religious justifications of state action do not suffice to define the place of religion in relation to the ‘public good’. as a consequence, and similarly to the german model, the inclusion of religious minorities in the french state is no longer conditional on their religious convictions but on their assimilation to a french national identity that remains infused with christian values. with the transition to liberalism, state neutrality and freedom of religion formally forestall discrimination on grounds of religious belief. the liberal state does not merely tolerate its citizens’ religious convictions but purports to treat them equally. however, insomuch as liberal neutrality does not require the state to be neutral between absolutely everything, it remains a normatively dependent concept that needs to be interpreted in the light of some non-neutral background assumptions. in the european nation-states, liberal neutrality is substantiated against the background of national identities that continue to appeal to christian values as they have shaped their distinctive interpretations of nationhood. thus both religious-communitarian and secular-laic models privilege, albeit in different ways, a christian culture as it evolved out of the interplay between religion and secularisation. this has two main consequences: first, and within the nation-states, the realm of tolerance is relegated from the level of religious beliefs to the level of merely religiously permeated national identities. the inclusion of religious minorities in the nation-state no longer depends on their religious convictions but on their assimilation to majoritarian national traditions and cultures that remain infused with christian values. secondly, and among themselves, the european nation-states find it hard to agree on what constitutes their common christian review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 59 culture and tradition today. neither the religious-communitarian nor the secular-laic national model can serve as a blueprint for a genuine, supra-national european identity. european supranationalism and religious tolerance the peoples of europe, or so it is maintained in the preamble of the draft treaty establishing a constitution for europe, “while remaining proud of their own national identities and history … are determined to transcend their former divisions and united ever more closely, to forge a common destiny”. in this spirit, a european identity must be about continuity and transformation: it must commemorate europe’s conflictive christian past, but it must also transcend this past in view of creating a common european future. moreover, a european identity must be about unity and diversity: it must respect europe’s diverse religiously permeated national traditions, but it must also succeed in defining its own distinctive culture capable of holding out against them. continuity and transformation, unity and diversity: in the light of the foregoing considerations, the conjuration of a ‘christian europe’ seems ill-suited for satisfactorily meeting these challenges. a european identity cannot contend itself with shallow references to the christian origins of europe’s liberal traditions (taken for granted) or a shared christian culture as it has evolved in the european nation-states (taken to be uncontested). rather, it should build on a european culture of religious tolerance that remains conscious of europe’s conflictive christian past and respects europe’s diverse national traditions yet transcends the normative horizon of the nation-state towards a supranational european perspective. continuity and transformation: the conjuration of a shared european christian culture and tradition draws too positive and harmonious a picture of europe’s conflictive christian past. while the european union’s values of “respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights” (article i-2 draft constitutional review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 60 treaty) certainly have christian roots, they are also the result of an often painful and violent emancipation from these christian roots as part of the process of secularisation. at the same time, this fails to explain the transformation of europe’s religiously permeated national traditions with regard to creating a genuinely european identity. while both religiouscommunitarian and secular-laic models remain reminiscent of their christian heritage, they have interpreted this heritage in different ways in the process of formation of the modern state. as the recent controversy about whether to include a reference to christianity in the european constitution has shown all too clearly, europeans find it hard to agree on what constitutes their common christian culture and tradition today. cynically put, the greatest common denominator the european nations may agree on is discrimination against nonchristian denominations. yet apart from deterring the considerable part of europe’s nonchristian populations, such a proposition stands in sharp contrast to the european self-image of open and pluralistic societies. hence, rather than conjuring a shared christian culture and tradition, a european identity should commemorate and value the way european christians have learnt to peacefully live together in difference. it was a culture of religious tolerance that – through the contestation of the linkage between religious homogeneity, social stability and political legitimacy – created the conditions for political unity in the early-modern state and led over time to a more appreciative relationship between the christian denominations. a european identity based on religious tolerance draws on the endurance of difference and the acknowledgement of persisting and intractable conflicts as essential experiences of europe’s christian past. concomitantly, and through the conditional inclusion of religious diversity in the nation-state, a european identity based on tolerance creates over time new commonalities between europe’s religiously permeated national traditions and cultures. unity and diversity: what is at stake when comparing the religious-communitarian and the secular-laic model is not simply a choice between a ‘christian’ and a ‘secular’ europe review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 61 but also – and intrinsically tied to this – the choice between competing religiously permeated national traditions. neither of these national traditions can function as a blueprint for a genuine european identity. rather than developing a supra-national european perspective that respects europe’s diverse national traditions, the choice of either national model would transform the european union into some form of super-nation state and therewith collapse its often praised ‘unity in diversity’. yet it would, as weiler has remarked, “be more than ironic if a polity set up as a means to counter the excesses of statism ended up coming round full circle and transforming itself into a (super) state. it would be equally ironic if the ethos which rejected the boundary abuse of the nation-state gave birth to a polity with the same potential for abuse” (weiler, 1999:341). weiler’s ideal of a supranational european polity, by contrast, dwells on the notion of a “community as a transnational regime” that is “not meant to eliminate the national state but to create a regime which seeks to tame the national interest with a new discipline” (weiler, 1999:251). thus supranationalism does not seek to “redraw the actual political boundaries of the polity within the existing nation-state conceptual framework” but to “redefine the very notion of boundaries of the state, between the nation and the state, and within the nation itself” (weiler, 1999: 250). similarly to the transition from the christian to the national state that partly dissolved the linkage between the state and religion in favour of a new linkage between the state and a merely religiously permeated nation, the relationship between the national and the supranational is not one of mutual exclusiveness. rather, it denotes a process of continuous transformation that partly disentangles the state from the nation, yet retains elements of europe’s national traditions and cultures. in contrast to the former, this continuous transformation no longer rests on an exclusive unity between the state and its people but on a plurality of intersecting national and supranational orders. a european culture of religious tolerance is well-equipped to meet the challenges posed by a supranational identity that assumes a european unity in national diversity. in the european review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 62 union, religious tolerance retains its ambivalent status between wholehearted acceptance and straightforward rejection, between the inclusion and exclusion of minoritarian religious worldviews. it oscillates between the affirmation and contestation of europe’s religiously permeated national identities that, in turn, inform the concrete interpretation of state neutrality and freedom of religion in the european nation-states. on the one hand, tolerance remains anchored in europe’s national traditions and cultures. it merely promotes the partial and equivocal inclusion of religious minorities under the condition that they conform to the national leitkultur [cultural norm]. thus, the mere endurance of religious difference and the conditional inclusion of religious minorities in the nation-state functions as an act of national self-affirmation. on the other hand, however, tolerance is situated between and beyond europe’s religiously permeated national traditions and cultures. by claiming exceptions from the cultural norm with regard to a supranational european perspective, tolerance contests the association of national homogeneity with social and political stability that has traditionally underpinned the european nation-states. in the european union, religious tolerance builds on the reflexive awareness of individual actors to operate in a supranational space and a corresponding willingness to consider claims for religious inclusion beyond the justificatory context of the nation-state. thus understood, religious tolerance challenges europe’s national traditions and cultures as the exclusive reference point for the evaluation of religious claims for recognition in the evolving european polity. here, the conditional and partial inclusion of religious minorities functions as a contestation of europe’s religiously permeated national frames of reference. a european identity based on a culture of religious tolerance thus simultaneously draws on and transcends europe’s religiously permeated national traditions and cultures. it does not create a european unity by substituting itself for or positing itself above the nation-states. rather, it creates a european unity through the common endeavour of guarding against the dangers of communitarianism and religious exclusion within europe’s review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 63 national orders, and by mediating the tensions between these orders. through this common endeavour, a european culture of religious tolerance transcends the horizon of the nationstate and contributes to the development of a supranational european identity that amounts to more than (the sum of) its national counterparts. what we share is what divides us: a european culture of religious tolerance commemorates the way european christians have learnt to live together peacefully in difference; thus understood, it lies at the roots of a european identity. moreover, a european culture of religious tolerance transcends the normative horizon of the nation-state and therewith creates new commonalities between europe’s religiously permeated national traditions and cultures. as such, it is a precondition for the development of a genuinely supranational european identity. finally, a european culture of religious tolerance nurtures the hope that the european union may one day transform into a truly multicultural and pluralistic polity. at the very least it will become increasingly difficult to reject religious claims for recognition on the basis that they conflict with europe’s religiously permeated national traditions and cultures. those who continue to oppose this normative vision in the name of a ‘christian europe’ should recall that for christian thinkers like john locke, religious tolerance was both a christian moral virtue and a requirement of political prudence: “it is not the diversity of opinions, which cannot be avoided, but the refusal of toleration to those that are of different opinions, which might have been granted, that has produced all the bustles and wars, that have been in the christian world, upon account of religion”. review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 64 bibliography benedict, phillip. 1996. un roi, une loi, deux fois: parameters for the history of catholic-reformed co-existence in france 1555-1685. in tolerance and intolerance in the european reformation, edited by o. p. grell and r. w. scribner. new york: cambridge university press. böckenförde, ernst wolfgang. 1991. state, society, and liberty: studies in political theory and constitutional law, state, society, and society. new york: berg. derrida, jacques. 2003. autoimmunity: real and symbolic suicides. in philosophy in a time of terror: dialogues with jürgen habermas and jacques derrida, edited by j. habermas, j. derrida and g. borradori. chicago: university of chicago press. dunn, john. 1990. interpreting political responsibility: essays 1981-1989. princeton, n.j.: princeton university press. ______. 1991. the claim to freedom of conscience: freedom of speech, freedom of thought, freedom of worship. in from persecution to toleration: the glorious revolution and religion in england, edited by o. p. grell, j. i. israel and n. tyacke. oxford new york: clarendon press ;oxford university press. gerstenberg, oliver. 2005. freedom of conscience in public schools. international journal of constitutional law 3 (1):94-106. horton, john, susan mendus, and john locke. 1991. john locke, a letter concerning toleration, in focus, routledge philosophers in focus series. london; new york: routledge. laborde, cecile. 2003. toleration and laïcité. in the culture of toleration in diverse societies : reasonable toleration, edited by c. mckinnon and d. castiglione. manchester ; new york: manchester university press. langefeld, c. , and s. mohsen. 2005. germany: the teacher head scarf case. international journal of constitutional law 3 (1):86-94. lecler, john. 1965. die geschichte der religionsfreiheit im zeitalter der reformation. stuttgart: schwabenverlag. locke, john. 1967. two tracts on government. in two tracts on government, edited by j. locke and p. abrams. london,: cambridge u.p. moruzzi, norma 1994. a problem with headscarves. contemporary complexities of political and social identity. political theory 22 (4):653-672. tully, james. 1990. toleration, skepticism and rights: john locke on religious toleration. in papers from the 1990 symposium on truth and tolerance, edited by e. j. furcha. montreal faculty of religious studies, mcgill university press. review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 65 ———. 1993. an approach to political philosophy : locke in contexts, ideas in context. cambridge [england] ; new york, ny, usa: cambridge university press. weiler, joseph. 1999. the constitution of europe: "do the new clothes have an emperor?" and other essays on european integration. cambridge; new york: cambridge university press. ian morrison_volume 4_issue 1 review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved ………………………………………………………………… rethinking the ‘problem’ of religious pluralism in canada and the european union ian morrison abstract in recent years the nature of secularism and the rights of religious minorities have come to the fore as issues in debates concerning citizenship, multiculturalism and immigration, both in canada and the european union. unlike earlier campaigns of secularization, these recent discourses of secularisation concern not only the institutional separation of church and state but seek to protect modern secular society from the perceived threat of various externally rooted religious threats through the secularisation of subjects within public spaces. in an attempt to more fully understand this new form of secularisation, the consequences it has had and the debates it has generated in both canada and the eu, the proposed paper will proceed on four fronts. first, it will outline the earlier discourses and practices of secularisation. second, the article will posit that we are presently witnessing a different discourse of secularisation, one that is distinct from this earlier form. third, the article will offer a critique of both discourses, arguing that both involve the deployment of essentialised conceptions of the religious, the secular, and their interaction. fourth, an alternative approach will be offered, one that seeks to denaturalise the aforementioned categories. the article argues that it is only in this manner that a space and possibility for genuine dialogue concerning secularism and religious pluralism in canada and the eu can be created. review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 67 introduction in recent years the rights of religious minorities within secular society has come to the fore as an issue in debates on citizenship, multiculturalism and immigration in both canada and the european union (eu). from the controversy provoked by prohibitions on the donning of the hijab in educational institutions in france and québec, to the banishment of the burqa, the chador, and the niqab from public space in italy, the netherlands and several belgian towns (beginning with maaseik), to british cabinet minister jack straw’s urging of female muslim constituents to uncover their faces when communicating with him, there has been increasing calls to limit the right to display religious symbols in public spaces. much of the opposition to the public display of religious symbols arises from a fear that the religious practices of certain groups – primarily those associated with islam–, as well as the groups themselves, are a threat to social cohesion, democracy, pluralism and modern, democratic society. in response to this perceived threat, various actors have sought to protect secular society through the enactment of policies that delineate the appropriate place of religion and the religious subject in contemporary society. in line with the discourse espoused by these various actors, those considered to be a danger to secular institutions and society as a result of their perceived religiosity, must either be secularised or take on a secular persona in public space. the recent emergence of religion as a ‘problem’ in canadian and european society should not be seen as simply a re-emergence of historical concerns with the place of religion in society and a re-invocation of secularization. in order to point to the review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 68 specificity of the recent problematization of religion in canada and the european union, this article will discuss what i call two moments of secularisation: the secularisation of the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, and the secularisations that have occurred since the early 1990s. in order to grasp and contend with this new secularisation, its consequences, and the debates that it has generated in both canada and the eu it is necessary to understand these discourses and practices in their historical specificity. the article will proceed on four fronts; first, it will outline the discourse and practices of the first moment of secularisation, examining the manner in which this discourse was deployed, and the ends that it was to achieve. secondly, it will argue that we are presently witnessing a distinct second moment of secularisation. thirdly, it will offer a critique of the discourses of both moments, arguing that they involve the deployment of essentialised conceptions of the religious, the secular, and their interaction. finally, an alternative approach to dealing with these issues will be offered, one that seeks to denaturalize the aforementioned categories. the article will argue that it is only through this approach that a space for genuine cross-cultural dialogue on secularism and religious pluralism in canada and the eu can be generated. secularisation and secularisations by the 1970s, various theories purporting the progressive marginalisation, privatisation and decline of religion owing to the modernization of society had achieved the status of “reigning dogma” in the fields of sociology and the social history of religion (swatos and christiano, 1999: 209). theorists such as robert bellah (1964), peter berger (1967), thomas luckmann (1963), david martin (1978), and talcott parsons (1963) developed systematized and general accounts, as well as empirical studies suggesting that review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 69 the transition from pre-modernity to modernity has led, or will lead to: a) a marked decline in religious beliefs and practices; b) a structural differentiation of society into religious and secular spheres; and c) a marginalization of religion into the private sector (casanova, 1994: 7, 211). relatively quickly this discourse was challenged by authors such as jeffrey cox (2003), robin gill (1993), peter glasner (1977), jeffrey hadden (1987), david nash (2004), and perhaps most vociferously, by rodney stark (1999). these authors dismissed the secularization thesis as lacking theoretical sophistication and empirical verification. rather than a theory, critics asserted that the secularization thesis was a “religion” (swatos and christiano, 1999: 212), a “doctrine”, a “taken-for-granted ideology” (hadden, 1987: 588), a “belief” (nash, 2004: 306), a “story” (cox, 2003: 205), a “social myth” (glasner, 1977), or a set of “prophecies” (stark, 1999: 250). in sum, the secularization thesis was declared an idea that had itself become sacralized (hadden, 1987: 599). in recent years, the sociology of religion has been largely reduced to empirical jousting between critics of the secularization thesis and those who continue to rise to its defence, albeit often in a reformulated and limited form (bruce, 2002; dobbelaere, 1981; swatos and christiano, 1999; voye, 1999; yamane, 1997). these debates concerning the accuracy of the secularization thesis have generally involved an exposition of contradictory empirical studies. both proponents and critics of theories of secularization have undertaken and employed historical and statistical analyses in order to further their claims. these studies have produced largely inconclusive results. review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 70 rather than engage in this debate through the deployment of secularisation as a transhistorical concept, the following discussion will consider moments of secularisation. considering secularizations in this manner can take two related forms. first, in the tradition of nietzsche (1881; 1882; 1887), weber (1920), and löwith (1949), secularisation can be considered the re-orientation of concepts, meanings or ways of being deemed to be explicitly religious or theological towards what is not considered immediately theological or religious. in this form, the term secularisation remains closely related to its original usage, in the sense that it refers to two processes: the canonical process whereby clergy residing in cloisters returned to the ‘world’, and the historical process of the appropriation and expropriation of church property that followed the protestant reformation and the ensuing wars of religion (berger, 1967:106 ; casanova, 1994:12-13 ; mcleod, 2000:1; swatos and christiano, 1999:210; turner, 2003:350). secondly, and closely related, a study of moments of secularisation can take the form of a mode of analysis of specific instantiations of secularisation. this would involve an investigation into the manner in which notions of the secular and secularisation emerge and are deployed, as well as into the effects of such deployments. consequently, these conceptions of secularisation do not seek to promote or refute the notion of secularisation as a process of religious decline, nor do they seek to offer a more nuanced conception of secularisation as a transhistorical process. rather, in investigating moments of secularisation it is possible to examine the effects of particular historically specific practices of secularisation without becoming bogged down or distracted by debates concerning the accuracy of secularisation as a transhistorical process, and to avoid some review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 71 of the problematic elements of the secularisation thesis that will be discussed in detail later in this article. moment in speaking of moment, however, i do not refer to something exclusively temporal; rather, a moment is an assemblage of discourses and practices referring to a common problematic, which can be distinguished from other assemblages. i do not mean to suggest that elements of one moment cannot be located in another; there will always be a transference of elements from one moment to another, but they will always be transformed and re-interpreted in the process. each moment is comprised of particular instantiations of secularisation. the concept of instantiations is particularly useful as it implies simultaneously an instance and a materialization. as a result, instances are always materialisations of a set of distinct discourses and practices that come about through particular technologies and strategies. for example, the first moment of secularisation, through various technologies and strategies, was instantiated in different ways in france and germany, while the second moment was instantiated in different ways in france and québec. yet, despite intra-moment diversity, it is possible to determine a certain unity in this dispersion. the discursive unity of a moment is not the result of a shared reference to particular objects, style, concepts or themes. rather, the unity of a discourse is characterized by what foucault designates the positivity of discourse (foucault, 1969:141). the unity of a discourse is such that despite a diversity of oeuvres and books, disputes between individuals, and competition between positions, these exist within a review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 72 common field in which their emergence and interactions are made possible (foucault, 1969:143). the positivity of discourse is, therefore, the condition of existence common to a limited number of statements. it is the body of anonymous, historical rules, determined in a particular historical and spatial context, that define the possibilities of the actualization of statements, objects, concepts, and modes of enunciation. positivity, therefore, functions as the historical a priori of discourse (foucault, 1969: 131,143). thus, despite intra-discursive diversity, i argue that the second moment of secularisation can clearly be distinguished from the first moment in three important ways. first, while the discourses and policies of secularisation of late nineteenth and early twentieth century sought to institutionally separate church and state, the primary focus of the recent moment is the secularisation of subjects within public spaces. to this end, actors have aimed to secularise public spaces by removing the problematic influence of religion, as manifest in religious dress and practices. this recent discourse of secularisation no longer concerns only the control of public institutions, but also the desirability of the subjects that appear in public space. consequently, this recent instantiation of secularisation is an issue of citizenship, as it concerns the delineation of the characteristics of the ideal citizen, and demarcates who has access to public services and institutions. the ideal citizen, within this discourse, is one who does not allow (private) religious convictions and practices to interfere with their (public) participation in secular society. while the secularisation of the first moment delineated the realm of the citizen by determining the public/polis, the second moment is constituted by practices and discourses concerning the secular nature of the ideal citizen. review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 73 second, the first moment sought to make possible the attainment of rights and freedoms through limiting the influence of the church in the social and political affairs of society. in contrast, the second moment has involved a limitation of the scope of pluralism in order to protect universal values, and secularism itself. thus, the discourses of the second moment posit the paradoxical need to limit pluralism in order to protect pluralism. in doing so, they appeal to a need to protect the universal from the particular; not only must universal or natural rights and values (freedom of speech, women’s rights, democracy, etc.) be protected from the perceived particularism of religion, but the secular, as the universal, natural (public/political) subject, must be protected from the effects of particularist religious identities on public conduct. thus, this new wave of secularisation is implicated in debates concerning the nature and desirability of multiculturalism. unbridled multiculturalism is perceived as a threat to core, universal societal values. third, the first moment of secularisation was primarily directed towards combating the dominant influence of endogenous religious institutions. the second moment has, on the other hand, focussed on the protection of an already-secularised society from infiltration by religious threats that are constructed as exogenous. to this end, the new secularisation is intimately linked to discussions of immigration and integration. the religious practices of immigrants are seen as both an impediment to their integration into secular society and, if unchecked, a threat to that society. this is particularly evident in the recent dutch immigration requirements obliging applicants to view a two hour long film entitled coming to the netherlands, whose contents include nudity and homosexuality, in order to demonstrate their willingness and ability to review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 74 participate in liberal dutch society. it is also apparent in the implementation of the “code of life” in the québec town of hérouxville (where no immigrants or ethnic minorities actually reside), which outlines that practices such as stoning are prohibited, and that women should only cover their faces on halloween. in each of these cases, actors determined that it was necessary to demonstrate to ‘foreigners’ that they must be willing to put aside their ostensible religious beliefs and practices in order to be welcomed, and integrate into secular society. thus, religion becomes here not an endogenously generated entity that must be cleansed from the social body, but an external contaminant to an already purified space. the second moment of secularisation, therefore, should not be seen as simply a re-invocation or continuation of earlier campaigns of secularisation. rather it should be understood as a distinct set of discourses and practices. this is not say that elements of the first moment are no longer present in the second, but rather that they have been altered or re-directed in a manner that cannot simply be understood as a continuation of a grand socio-historical process of secularisation. in fact, such an understanding only serves to conceal the specificity of these new discourses and practices. approaching secularisation through this alternative framework makes possible a discussion of particular historical moments as distinct instantiations of secularisation, without having to locate these moments within a grand historical narrative of religious decline. rather, it can simply be stated that a particular moment was marked by discourses of secularisation that are fundamentally distinct from others. this is not to suggest that a particular moment does not contain elements or influences from earlier moments or that discourses, nor that elements located within one moment do not play a review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 75 role in a later moment. rather, it suggests that as a result of historical contingencies and struggles prior discourses become interrupted, reinterpreted and combined with other discourses in order to form a distinct historical object of analysis. first moment: institutional separation and structural differentiation approaching secularisation in this manner makes it possible to consider the distinctiveness of the discourses and practices of the secularisation of the second half of the nineteenth century and the early twentieth century. while an implicit differentiation between the secular and religious can be observed in ancient greece (nancy, 2006), medieval europe (kantorowicz, 1957) and early christian theology (pranger, 2006), it was at this moment that political movements and officials in several european states enacted reforms that clearly delineated the religious and the political spheres, resulting in the normalization of this differentiation. through the cavour reforms of the 1840s and the 1850s in piedmont, the kulturkampf of the 1870s within the german states, the reforms of the french third republic, the programs of the progressive party in spain following the revolutions of 1854 and 1868, as well as initiatives in other european states, the structural separation of church and state was consolidated. it was with this institutionalization of secularisation that being political came to be the grounded in the secular. the aforementioned included several features, including the expropriation of church property, the recognition of religious pluralism, and the exertion of state control over institutions that were previously under the tutelage of the church particularly and most successfully educational institutions. within educational institutions, this involved not only state control over the institutions themselves, but often also an increased review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 76 emphasis on civic instruction as a moral guide for citizens. in this manner, the societal functions of church and state were delineated, and a properly religious sphere, distinct from civic and other social spheres was constructed. further illustrative of the differentiation of the religious and secular spheres are the attempts within some states to specifically prohibit the church or religious figures from engaging in political affairs. for instance, in 1871 an addition was made to section 130 (agitation of the people) of the german criminal code (strafgesetzbuch) providing for a penalty of up to two years in prison for clergy who discussed politics from the pulpit. the enactment and promotion of civil ceremonies to mark rites of passage was another strategy through which the public and the religious were differentiated and contrasted. in germany in 1875, for example, civil marriage was introduced and religious ceremonies were made voluntary, private affairs with no legal standing. such a provision clearly separated the legal from the religious, giving precedence to the former and restricting the later to the realm of the private. initiatives were also undertaken in various states in order to break what was seen as the church’s monopoly over death rites. in paris during the 1860s, groups influenced by the ideas of auguste blanqui began to organize civil funerals as an alternative to catholic services (kselman, 1995:181). between 1881 and 1904 the french government also passed various laws removing church control over cemeteries, which had previously been used by clergy as a means of enforcing religious discipline (kselman, 1995:181; kselman, 2003:153). throughout the 1870s, cemeteries were increasingly moved from their location beside churches to regulated, walled-in areas on the outskirts of towns (kselman, 1995:184). moreover, in 1877 the right to a civil burial was enshrined in review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 77 french law. by the early twentieth century approximately forty percent of burials in paris involved civil ceremonies (mcleod, 1995:18). such measures concerning rites of death served not only to expand the functions of the state but also limit the influence of the catholic church over the population. the emergence of state funerals is similarly indicative of the state’s attempt to usurp church control over death rites. in 1877, the french state attempted to legitimize and consolidate the republican regime through the institution of rituals designed to promote devotion to the republic. amongst the most prominent of these rituals was the state funeral. combining aspects of both the previously mentioned blanquist civil burials and catholic services, state funerals sought to create and honour national heroes. the ceremonies made use of state institutions and monuments such as the invalides, the arc de triomphe and the panthéon (kselman, 1995: 183). the 1885 state funeral and entombment in the panthéon of victor hugo, which was attended by over one million individuals (kselman, 1995:183; kselman, 2003:153), can be seen as the apex of the legitimacy of civil burial in france. through the institution and persistent enactment of civil rites of passage, european states were able to further associate religion with the private sphere and the state with the public sphere. attempts to prioritize the state within the public sphere can also been seen in architectural reforms undertaken during the second half of the nineteenth century. particularly demonstrative of this are georges-eugène hassmann’s massive renovation of paris between 1858 and 1870. two aspects of these reforms are particularly striking. first, the number of state buildings proliferated. for instance, each of paris’s twenty arrondissements were given a prominent town hall. second, haussmann’s intentions review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 78 notwithstanding, with the creation of wide boulevards and green spaces, civic buildings and monuments attained visual prominence over the once dominant churches. while many of haussmann’s reforms continued to be implemented following the emergence of the third republic, this new political regime also contributed to the secularization of public spaces with a rapid multiplication of the number of public monuments dedicated to heroes of the republic. central to this was the raising of statues dedicated to local heroes in towns and arrondissements. as thomas kselman (1995) suggests, the presence of these monuments in prominent public areas was meant to remind citizens of their obligations to the republic. however, as with haussmann’s reforms, the construction of these civil monuments also served to further populate a public sphere, previously dominated by buildings and monuments associated with religion, with monuments of the state, the republic and the nation. in doing so, a further consolidation of an association of the state with the public sphere was permitted to occur. this is particularly evident in the “cult of marianne”, which materialized through the erection of immense statues of marianne in public spaces, and through the placing of busts in city halls throughout france (kselman 1995:183-184). thus, not only were public spaces increasingly marked by prominent civic buildings, these buildings themselves were marked by symbols of the state. not only did the construction and prioritization of civic monuments create a link between the state and the public sphere, but in attaching these monuments to rituals of commemoration, the public sphere was firmly established as a site of civic rituals. while the church was relegated to the site of voluntaristic private ceremonies, the public sphere review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 79 became the site of state funerals, military parades, and commemorations of what were constructed as national events. it is important to note that the initiatives of secularisation undertaken in the second half of the nineteenth century were not simply the result of a dominance of liberal or radical thought. in fact, as some of the examples from above demonstrate, some of the most stringent measures of secularisation were instituted in germany during the reign of bismarck. moreover, the presence of these measures of secularisation does not correspond to a decrease in levels of religious belief among the european population. as hugh mcleod has noted, rather than being the result of widespread anticlericalism, strict policies of secularisation often resulted in “a closing of ranks and an increased sense of loyalty to the clergy” (mcleod, 1995:28). what can be observed in this period is a problematization of the dominant role of religion in public life shared by liberals, radicals and secular conservatives. for these actors, religion was a threat to the state, both politically, and as a threat to the social cohesion of the populace. moreover, for many of these actors, the ascendancy of the church was a stultifying obstacle to social progress, to the advancement of knowledge, and to individual freedom. to counteract these threats and promote the advancement of human potential, these actors sought, through the measures mentioned above and many others, to reduce the influence of the church in society, particularly in the public sphere. in doing so they contributed to the institutionalization and normalization of a clear distinction between the religious and civil realms. review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 80 second moment: the secularisation of the public subject the most prominent and recurrent of the purported goals of the campaigns of secularisation which took place in the later half of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was an increase in individual freedom and autonomy through a reduction of the dominance of the church outside the religious sphere. the institutional separation of church and state was meant not only to allow the state to concern itself solely with the concerns of this world, and thus act in a more rational and effective manner, but the privatization of religion was meant to support freedom of conscience, promote the rights of religious minorities, and permit “a free market in opinions” (chadwick, 1975:27). by the late twentieth century, however, the freedoms that these earlier reforms enabled began to be seen as a threat to secularism itself. the claim was made that in reducing the dominance of the church individuals would have the opportunity to exercise rights to freedom of speech, conscience, and religion. recently, however, as is evident in various cases of across canada and the eu, attempts by individuals and groups to exercise these rights have come to be perceived as a threat to secular society itself. in the last decades of the twentieth century concerns of a purported return of religion were raised with greater frequency (dallmayr, 1999). anxieties regarding what was seen as a rising tide of fundamentalism, most often in an islamic guise, were voiced with increased urgency. since the 1990s, the focus of worries in canada and many of the member states of the european union surrounding this purported return of religion came to involve issues of domestic rather than international affairs. during this period, the overriding concern regarding the return of religion transformed from one involving external threats in the form of the anti-western theocratic regimes such as iran and review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 81 foreign islamist terrorists, to the threat posed by “home-grown terrorists”, and the religious beliefs of recent immigrant populations, particularly muslims.1 this problematization of the presence of muslim symbols and the muslim subject of whom they are manifestations, although calling upon elements of the discourse and practices of nineteenth and early twentieth century secularisation (as well as the process of secularization which was undertaken as part of québec’s quiet revolution), should not be seen as to a continuation of the purported transhistorical process of secularisation or merely a variation of intra-discursive themes. to do so would serve to conceal the specificity of this contemporary problematization and, as will be argued later on, create obstacles for the development of meaningful dialogue. the problematization of the religious subject in recent years, however, should also not be seen as a moral panic provoked by certain conservative, racist, and xenophobic elements within canadian and european society. while such voices have often tended to garner the most attention, the ‘problem’ of religious, particularly muslim immigrants has been raised in many spheres. while disagreeing with the many overtly racist premises of anti-islamic discourse, liberal, socialist and feminist voices have at times been at the forefront of the articulation of the vital need to contend with issues of islamic fundamentalism, the social integration of muslim immigrants, and the need to determine reasonable accommodation for religious minorities. in france, for instance, teachers associated with lutte ouvrière and the revolutionary communist league as well as socialist ministers laurent fabius and jack lang were among the voices calling for a prohibition on the hijab in the classroom. 1 of course, as marie-blanche tahon (1996: 172) argues, the popularization during the early 1990s of concerns about human rights in states such as algeria is not unrelated to a growing suspicion of muslim symbols and subjects in western states during the same period. review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 82 as the recent cases demonstrate, public displays of religious symbols and practices are not perceived as an enactment of rights made possible by the existence of a secular public sphere. they are increasingly perceived as a religious threat to secular society. thus, one can observe the emergence of a new discourse that claims that secular society needs to be protected from this threat. within this new discourse, the protection of society from this religious threat is to be accomplished by a secularisation of the subjects present in public space. this secularisation is carried out by reminding members of immigrant and minority religious groups of, and when necessary legislating the acceptable limits of the demonstration of religious difference in the public sphere. fundamental to this new discourse is the normalization and valourization of the secular subject. the secular subject is positioned as normal, neutral and natural in relation to its abnormal, deviant, and unnatural religious subject. borrowing from elements of the enlightenment, secular knowledge is depicted as the natural rational way of knowing to be attained when light is shone on the shadows of religious superstition. the secular subject is portrayed as the natural and neutral subject that exists in the absence of the alienating influence of religion. this transcendental subject is not conceived of as historically constructed but as transcendental, not produced but unveiled through a historical struggle against the domination of religion. the secular subject, secular knowledge and secular society appear as normal in various senses of the word: (1) as pure in the absence of the contaminating exterior influences of religion; (2) as natural, as opposed to the contrived character of religion; (3) as neutral and universal, as opposed to the particularizing and divisive effect of religion; and (4) as standard, as opposed to peculiar. the formulation of the secular review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 83 subject as natural, rational, free and modern provides justification for the exclusion of those who do not conform to these standards, casting them out of what marilyn friedman has dubbed “the legitimation pool” (friedman, 2000:196). the normalization of the secular subject legitimates the exclusion of those who cannot bracket and set aside comprehensive moral and religious doctrines in order to engage in neutral and objective deliberations (sandel, 1998). thus, the construction of the secular subject as norm permits racial, ethnic and religious exclusions to be cloaked in the language of irrationality and inability to adapt to modern society, and justifies such measures as necessary for the protection of progressive modern values. opening a dialogue: rethinking the secular and the religious crucial to the dominance of the ideas guiding the two moments of secularisation is the interpretation and theorization of secularisation in the social sciences. within the social sciences, the dominant interpretation of secularization as a transhistorical phenomena has been largely taken for granted. moreover, social scientists have attempted to provide theoretical support for the ideas guiding the practices of secularisation, through the formulation of what has come to be known as the secularisation thesis. prominent thinkers that can be associated with the secularisation thesis include robert bellah (1964), peter berger (2002), steve brice (2002), talcott parsons (1963; 1964), bernard lewis (1961), thomas luckmann (1963), david martin (1978), barrington moore (1966), and bryan wilson (1966). by the early 1970s, these accounts had come to be seen as the only valid interpretation of religious change within the social sciences (swatos and christiano, 1999:209). through the deployment of notions of differentiation, capitalisation, urbanisation, and rationalisation these thinkers review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 84 sought to demonstrate a positive interrelation between the decline of religious belief and influence to the modernisation of society. secularisation was considered to be the normal historical path for modernising nations. correspondingly, the secular subject is seen as the modern norm, contrasted with the religious norm of pre-modern society, and as developing teleologically through the process of modernization. the secular subject and secular society are portrayed as natural and normal within modern society, as opposed to the unnatural and abnormal place of religion as an historic remnant in modern times. moreover, many of these thinkers sought to demonstrate that such change was inherently positive, as they took for granted the claims that secularization necessarily brought about more individual freedom. as the recent debates concerning religious pluralism have demonstrated, the relationship between secularisation and individual freedom is not as unproblematic as it was portrayed by the social sciences. furthermore, the normalization and naturalization of the secular and secularization have served to obscure or at least mitigate the response to the limitations of minority rights involved in recent measures of secularisation. the creation of such natural universal categories always serves to problematize or mask difference, the difference that is necessarily present in but often obscured by these very universals. thus, we need to disrupt the relationship between secularisation and individual freedom and denaturalise their positive correlation. these theoretical conceptions of secularisation, while seemingly purely abstract, are in fact intimately related to present day practices of secularisation. they provide both the impetus for, and justification of the various practices that have recently been review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 85 witnessed. it is crucial, therefore, to engage with these ideas in order to develop new approaches to the problems of religious pluralism. one of the central limitations of these conceptualizations of secularization is their essentialisation of the secular and the religious. rather than investigating how certain objects and subjects came to be constructed as religious or secular, problematic and normal, theories of secularisation view these categories as given, unquestionable and ahistoric. moreover, in approaching these categories as necessarily oppositional, the possibility of engagement between the so-called secular and religious camps is nullified. this is precisely what leads to the perception that, for instance, one cannot wear the hijab while at the same time participating fully as a citizen, and engaging as a citizen with others in the public sphere. in order to open a space for genuine cross-cultural dialogue, rather than a paring of competing monologues, it is necessary to clarify the process through which groups and individuals have come to invest themselves in certain concepts and values. a study of the problematization of religious symbols and practices should not approach these symbols and practices as essentially religious or contrary to secularism, but as constructed as such as a consequence of numerous historical struggles. as talal asad (1993; 2003) and john milbank (2006) have demonstrated, the categories of the religious and the secular, as well as particular practices related to them, emerged historically as the result of various contingent struggles and interpretations. moreover, as brian turner (2003) has demonstrated, the boundary and relationship between the secular and the religious is fluid. the exclusion of particular practices and symbols, and the religious review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 86 subject they represent, emerge from various intersecting technologies of differentiation and problematization. approaching the religious, the secular and their interaction as historical, fluid concepts allows for a novel approach to issues of religious pluralism, one that challenges discourses of cultural incommensurability that naturalize and justify exclusionary practices through an uncritical association of the secular with autonomy, enlightenment and modernity, and religion with heteronomy, ignorance and pre-modernity. contestations regarding limitations of diversity and accommodation, such as the contemporary cases that problematize religion as a threat to secular society in canada and the eu, frequently entail an invocation of the immutability of particular values. this often involves the deployment of particular histories of struggle as an alibi for debate and dialogue. the use of rigid, ahistorical categories such as the religious and the secular in the formulation of historical narratives and their implementation into these debates often leads only to misrecognition. in order to permit debate on those categories and values that appear unquestionable, it is necessary to offer alternative histories, histories that point to the contingencies of these categories and values, the forces involved in their emergence, interpretation and reinterpretation, and thus, histories that de-normalise and de-naturalise that which claims to be normal, natural and unquestionable review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 87 bibliography: asad, talad. 1993. genealogies of religion: discipline and reasons of power in christianity and islam. baltimore: john hopkins university press. ______. 2003. formations of the secular: christianity, islam, modernity. stanford: stanford university press. bellah, robert n. 1964. religious evolution. american sociological review, 29(3), 35874. berger, peter. l. 1967. the sacred canopy: elements of a sociological theory of religion. new york: anchor. 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(pp. 16-33). oxford: rowman and littlefield. gill, robin. 1993. the myth of the empty church. london: society for promoting christian knowledge. glasner, peter. e. 1977. the sociology of secularisation: a critique of a concept. london: routledge. review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 88 hadden, jeffrey. k. 1987. towards desacralizing secularization theory. social forces, 65(3), 587-611. kantorowicz, ernst. 1957. the king's two bodies; a study in mediaeval political theology. princeton, n.j: princeton university press. kselman, thomas. 1995. the varieties of religious experience in urban france. in h. mcleod (ed.), european religion in the age of great cities, 1830-1930. (pp. 16590). london: routledge. _____. 2003. the dechristianisation of death in france. in h. mcleod, & w. ustorf (eds.), the decline of christendom in western europe, 1750-2000. (pp. 145-62). cambridge: cambridge university press. löwith, karl. 1949. meaning in history; the theological implications of the philosophy of history. [chicago]: univ. of chicago press. luckmann, thomas. 1963. the invisible religion: the problems of religion in modern society. new york: macmillan. martin, david. 1978. a general theory of secularization. oxford: blackwell. mcleod, hugh. 1995. introduction. in h. mcleod, & w. ustorf (eds.), the decline of christendom in western europe, 1750-2000. cambridge: cambridge university press. _______. 2000. secularisation in western europe, 1848-1914. new york: st. martin's press. milbank, john. 2006. theology and social theory: beyond secular reason (2nd ed.). oxford, uk ; malden, ma: blackwell pub. moore, barrington. 1967. social origins of dictatorship and democracy: lord and peasant in the making of the modern world. london: penguin. nancy, jean-luc. 2006. church, state, resistance (v. voruz, trans.). in h. d. vries, & l. e. sullivan (eds.), political theologies: public religions in a post-secular world. (pp. 102-12). new york: fordham university press. nash, david. 2004. reconnecting religion with social and cultural history: secularization's failure as a master narrative. cultural and social history, 1, 30225. nietzsche, friedrich. 1881. daybreak: thoughts on the prejudices of morality (r. j. hollingdale, trans.). cambridge: cambridge university press. review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 89 _______.1882. the gay science (j. nauckhoff, trans.). cambridge: cambridge university press. _______. 1887. on the genealogy of morality. k. ansell-pearson (ed.). cambridge: cambridge university press. parsons, talcott. 1963. christianity and modern industrial society. in e. a. tiryakian (ed.), sociological theory, values, and sociocultural change: essays in honour of pitrim a. sorokin. (pp. 33-70). new york: free press. _______. 1964. introduction. the sociology of religion. (pp. xxix-lxxvii). boston: beacon. pranger, m. b. 2006. politics and finitude: the temporal status of augustine's civitas permixta. in h. d. vries, & l. e. sullivan (eds.), political theologies: public religions in a post-secular world. (pp. 113-21). new york: fulham university press. sandel, michael. 1998. liberalism and the limits of justice. cambridge: cambridge university press. swatos, william. h. & christiano, kevin. j. 1999. secularization theory: the course of a concept. sociology of religion, 60(3), 209-31. tahon, m.-b. 1996. regards croisés sur les musulmanes au québec. in k. fall, r. hadjmoussa, & d. simeoni (eds.), les convergences culturelles dans les sociétés pluriethniques. (pp. 169-88). sainte-foy: presses de l'université du québec. turner, brian s. 2003. historical sociology of religion: politics and modernity. in g. delanty, & e. f. isin (eds.), handbook of historical sociology. (pp. 349-63). london: sage. voye, liliane. 1999. secularization in a context of advanced modernity. sociology of religion, 60(3), 275-83. weber, max. 1920. the protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism (t. parsons, trans.). los angeles,: roxbury. yamane, david. 1997. secularization on trial: in defense of a neosecularization paradigm. journal for the scientific study of religion, 36(1), 109-22. naozad hodiwala_volume 4_issue 1 review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved “the problem is never the faith, it is the faithful and how we behave towards each other” kofi annan ………………………………………………………………… europe and islam: internalizing the external ‘threat’ naozad hodiwala abstract this article will first characterize the nature of the islamic ‘threat’ facing modern day europe, by arguing that such ‘threats’ are fed by the forces of internalization. by specifically focusing on case studies found in jytte klausen’s “the islamic challenge: politics and religion in western europe”, this article will take as its departure point the basis that “europeans tend to ignore the fact that their established norms and policies are not necessarily secular, but reflects long-standing practices that were instituted in order to appease national churches”. three facets of european society will be examined; national laws, media coverage, and politicians and their actions. review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 120 introduction clichés abounded in tony blair’s march 5th, 2004 speech to his sedgefield constituents; blair spoke of a new “global threat” facing europe; one that was not only “real and existential…unlike anything the world has faced before” but “needed to be won…whatever the political cost”. in an attempt to justify military action in iraq and join an ‘alliance of the willing’ in a ‘war against terror’, blair warned “everything about our world is changing” and as such traditional ‘security’ words like terrorists, threat, tyrannical, cruel, nuclear, and war came to be freely used in the same breath as religion, migrants (specifically islamic immigrants) and countries such as pakistan and malaysia suggesting that war, security and migration were all somehow synonymous. blair’s remarks reflect a growing anxiety amongst europeans and their politicians over a perceived incompatibility between migrants, the european continent and its way of life. whilst the rest of the world looks outward, fearing the actions of transnational terrorist networks such as al qaeda, hizbollah and the plo, europe is facing a new supposed threat characterized by a different language, colour of skin, and culture. in 2002, jean-marie le pen, leader of the french far-right party the front nationale (fn), called migration the “biggest problem facing france, europe, and probably the world”, warning unless action was taken “we risked being submerged” (bbc, 2007). such hysteria seems to have found general support among the domestic electorate; for example, a 2005 uk mori poll found that migration was the second most important issue behind only foreign affairs/defence and international terrorism (van selm, 2005). review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 121 the ‘war against terror’ (and geopolitics to a great extent one can argue) has been transformed itself into, amongst other things, a bipolar religious fracture between the west and islam. furthermore, not only did islamic migrants pose a threat to europe but seemingly to its future as well; blair’s remarks at the time were echoed by french presidential hopeful, nicholas sarkozy, who on october 7, 2006, labelled turkey’s future entry into the european union as the “end of political europe” on the basis that “it would worsen the ‘problem’ of muslim integration in the continent” (le figaro, 7 october 2006). politicians were not the only ones speaking in such apocalyptic terms; journalists and academics are equally guilty. timothy savage, in europe and islam: crescent waxing, cultures clashing, remarks that given the current dynamics –he is referring here to the european-islamic nexus and the consequent muslim factor – europe faces additional complications for achieving its goal of an ever closer union and warns that if accommodation is not reached, europe’s increasingly “ghettoized but rapidly growing muslim minority” would result in national retrenchment and civil conflict forcing a “fortress of europe” and an inevitable “decline on the international stage” (savage, 2004: 26). preying upon this frenzy, the italian journalist oriana fallaci’s 2004 book, the force of reason has sold more than a million copies. fallaci passionately argues that “europe is no longer europe, but rather it is ‘eurabia’, a colony of islam, where the islamic invasion does not proceed only in a physical sense but also in a mental and cultural sense; servility to the invaders has poisoned democracy, with obvious consequences for the freedom of thought and for the concept itself of liberty” (walker, 2006: 1). the inclusion of the movement of persons within the security debate has drawn much deserved attention to the changing complexity of european society; it has not only complicated the migration debate facing europe and forced migration to the forefront of state review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 122 security discourse but has emerged at a time when the traditional ‘state-centred’ concept has been replaced by one that surrounds the individual – human security. inaccurate perceptions fed by a biased western media have been embraced by a number of european political parties, leading to the introduction of ‘knee-jerk’ national legislation that inevitably reflects the current external political and power conflicts (such as the 9/11 attacks, the israeli-palestinian conflict and the invasions of afghanistan and iraq). most of the research thus far has dealt directly with the effects european citizenship laws, employment discrimination, and religious/cultural differences have had on the integration of muslim migrants in europe, for example, jytte klaussen’s politics and religion in western europe, tariq ramadan’s to be a european muslim, john esposito’s the islamic threat: myth or reality and seyla benhabib’s claims of culture. however, this paper presents an alternative approach that examines the role the media, irresponsible leadership, and laws play in constructing a false sense of fear and threat in the hope of, both, illustrating and drawing attention to european examples where islamic migrants and long term residents are viewed and treated as state threats by the media, political leaders, and domestic law, and thus reasserting half-truths and negative stereotypes. sections ii and iii outline the attitude and common perception with which european media, political leaders/foreign ministers, and national laws are fueling the prejudices and insecurities of a changing populous struggling to come to terms with differences in language, culture, customs, and religion. instead of solving the issue of migration, state laws, political language, and the media’s often one dimensional portrayal of the islamic community appears to be worsening relations between europe’s diverse communities. based on the 2006 un report titled alliance of civilizations, section iv concludes by outlining some of the greater implications such a trend will have on eu policy initiatives and the possible changes necessary if the issue is to review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 123 improve. if the state can succeed in enacting xenophobic laws, such as the uk’s antiterrorism crime and security act (atcsa) or the german system of racial profiling that, according to fekete in anti-muslim racism and the european security state, equates migrants to criminals, then it should come as little surprise that the average citizen persistently describes feeling ‘threatened’ by the level of migration entering their country. i argue, europeans ‘internalize’ what they see and hear and project this onto their neighbouring pakistani taxi-driver or algerian hijab wearing school teacher. such a project can prove invaluable given the words of ex-british foreign office diplomat, patrick bannerman: how non-muslims think of islam conditions the manner in which they deal with muslims, which in turn conditions how muslims think of and deal with non-muslims (1988: 219). submerging europe? despite samuel huntington’s warning of a ‘clash of civilizations’ the muslim world is not as alien to europe as one might think. after all, judeo-christian civilization was shaped by the mediterranean sea, whose waters providing a common communication system; “north africa was a roman province, egypt’s queen cleopatra was a greek, southern spain was a muslim province for seven centuries, and the balkans were dominated by islam until the 19th century” (walker, 2006: 2). the crusades were more than a war between two monotheistic belief systems – they were a cultural exchange from which the european christians emerged enriched by ‘arabic’ numerals and medicine. furthermore, during the 1950s and 1960s during the post-war rebuilding phase, open policies inviting turkish and algerian ‘guest workers’ into germany and france were actively pursued. these ‘newcomers’ were, as mantouvalou describes, a source of “cheap and flexible” labour who were seen as indispensable, if the german and french economies hoped to rebound and meet the needs of its burgeoning review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 124 economy (2005: 120). germany’s guest worker program was based on a series of recruitment agreements with italy, spain, greece, turkey, morocco, portugal, tunisia, and yugoslavia. similarly, italians from the south moved to switzerland, and portuguese and spaniards to france. france received mostly african migration, while transoceanic migration from the west indies, india and pakistan was directed at great britain. successive economic recessions of the 1970s, along with increased social tensions and the first oil price shock, led to the abrupt abandonment of the franco-german ‘promotional’ immigration policy and the adoption of more-control oriented approaches. even though restrictive immigration policies had temporarily placed a moratorium on foreigners entering into their countries, the number of migrants “continued to rise due to the higher fertility rates and the admission of refugees and asylum seekers” (zimmerman, 1995: 47). two pertinent observations can be made from this brief account; first, contrary to the arguments of robert leiken; bernard lewis, and jean-marie le pen, migration is not a new phenomenon that has crept up on europe. migration has systematically maintained its presence through out the post-war era characterized by periods of elevation or decline. second, and perhaps more surprisingly, is that a great deal of migrants and asylum seekers between the 1950s and 1990s were from within europe; that is, germany attracted turks and people from former yugoslavia, france received africans and the united kingdom attracted mainly migrants from eu member states. interestingly enough it is likely that future migration streams will float along the same lines; eastern europeans to germany, austria and the benelux countries; turks to germany and the netherlands; africans to france, italy and spain; and asians to the united kingdom (zimmerman, 1995:52). papadimitriou reaffirms this in his paper titled, “think again: review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 125 migration” in which he disputes that immigration is ‘out of control’, labelling it a myth. papadimitriou points out that not only do ‘classic immigration’ countries like the us, canada, and australia “presently receive less immigration than they had at the beginning of the twentieth century…but, ‘non-typical immigration countries’ like france, germany, and japan have also experienced significant immigration movements in the past” (2005: 122). an alliance of civilizations in a recent poll conducted by the international polling firm globescan together with the university of maryland’s program on international policy attitudes (pipa), 27 countries, surveyed between november 2006 and january 2007 revealed that most people around the world “clearly reject the idea that islam and the west are caught in an inevitable clash of civilizations”: the tensions between islam and the west arises “from conflicts over political power and interests and not from differences in religion and culture”(program on international policy attitudes 2007). perhaps the strongest finding is that most people around the world clearly rejected the idea of an inevitable ‘clash of civilisations’ but rather, a majority of those surveyed, see the problem as the result of intolerance by minorities on both sides and not from either culture as a whole. finally, the idea that violent conflict is inevitable between islam and the west is rejected by muslims, non-muslims and westerners alike – 56 percent of respondents believed that ‘common ground can be found’. respondents were asked not only their religious affiliations but also to what extent their religion played a role in how they approached political and social issues. the analysis showed no consistent pattern; in a few countries, those who are more religious are somewhat more likely to say that conflict is inevitable (turkey and hungary), but in a larger number of countries this category those who review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 126 placed themselves in this category were slightly more likely to say that it is possible to find common ground (argentina, chile, nigeria, poland). the 2006 alliance of civilizations report released by the united nations reiterates these findings. it is said the alliance of civilizations was born on a flight from spain to new york, hours before spanish prime minister jose luis rodriguez zapatero was set to address the 59th general assembly (september 21, 2004) at the united nations. aimed at “bridging the growing cultural and political gap” (barrenada, 2006: 100), the alliance signified a shift in spanish foreign policy. after successfully removing the conservatives from power (who had held power for eight years), the social democrats were adamant on reversing some of the previous governments policies. the new government sought to follow a path of multilateralism that moved away from the united states and boosted not only its image in the east but its soft power as well. considered a “clear, timely, and necessary initiative” the idea was embraced by a variety of countries and regional authorities – the euromed parliamentary assembly, organization of the islamic conference and the league of arab states, brazil, argentina, costa rica, iran, italy, egypt, indonesia, and tunisia to name a few (barrenada, 2006:100). the report covers everything from possible causes of the west-islam divide to youth exchange programmes (like eramus mundus) as suggestions for fostering greater cultural understanding. however, of utmost pertinence are the observations made by the 16 member high-level group, encompassed of individuals with a cultural and/or geographic background, who unequivocally point to the “exclusivist ideologies, adversarial perceptions, cultural arrogance, and media stereotypes” as the root cause behind poor relations between western and muslim societies (alliance of civilizations, 2006). review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 127 furthermore, the report points towards the continued occupation by israel of palestine and other arab territories, as well as the unresolved status of jerusalem, as the “primary causes of resentment and anger” (alliance of civilizations, 2006). their reference to external events does not end there. mention is made of the soviet occupation of afghanistan (from 1979-1989) and the subsequent western support for the mujahadeen, the 9/11 attacks and the war in iraq as equally destructive. these attacks encourage bias in media projections that are then exploited by politicians who in turn implement strict anti-terrorism and border security regulations that inevitably serve to acerbate negative perceptions. european media the media is often referred to as a “bridge between cultures and societies” serving to educate and inform their viewers and readers (alliance of civilizations report, 2006: 6.24). globalization and improved technology permit both the west and muslim populations’ access to a broad range of mediums that cover a vast array of issues and events. however, since september 11, 2001, “an appreciably more nationalistic and anti-muslim tone has become evident in news and commentary” (alliance of civilizations report, 2006: 6.24). news stories that give time and space only to the most extreme of religious voices in the muslim and western world propagate a skewed perspective of islam, and its followers by falsely casting the euro-islam migration debate in narrow bipolar terms – western secularists against eastern religious activists. similarly, media focusing on radicalism and equating islam with extremism that threatens the west serves to portray muslims as instigators and protagonists. that is, by creating “a moral and actual panic by presenting the country as under attack”, the media legitimizes the myth that europe is being overrun by ‘jihadists’ here to not only steal european jobs and social security but also terrorize the local communities they live in and review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 128 spread fundamentalist thought. the european public sees osama bin laden and his fellow al qaeda members on tv and believes them to be the ambassadors of islam. terms like ‘islamic terrorist’, ‘muslim fundamentalist’, ‘sunni bombers’, and ‘arab killer’, have increasingly entered popular culture, print, and broadcast media. the tales of terror and oppression by terrorists projected by european media to europeans at large have had a role in islam’s negative portrayal. although the manifestation of jihadists has great audience appeal and allows “for media twists and dramatic flourish that bode well for the ratings” (abdullah, 2007), such pessimistic depictions help reassert halftruths and falsehoods. every time we see an article on the muslim-european community it is bizarrely accompanied by a praying man wearing traditional muslim dress, with his hands before him, as if to suggest that muslims do not wear jeans and t-shirts! the anti-islamic cartoons published in a leading danish newspaper, jyllands-posten (jp), under the guise of free speech, were similarly designed to offend and provoke danish muslims. fleming rose, the cultural editor for the jp, published the 12 anti-islamic cartoons (depicting the prophet mohammed in a variety of offensive, comical, and disrespectful ways) hiding behind the virtues of free-speech (see figure 1). when asked if the editors truly wished to antagonize muslims, rose’s response was that he supported freedom of speech and was against self-censorship and as such could not be held responsible for the ramifications. when the interviewer persisted and inquired if he regretted his decision knowing the uproar it caused, rose remarked, “[t]hat is a hypothetical question. i would say that i do not regret having commissioned those cartoons and i think asking me that question is like asking a rape victim if she regrets wearing a short skirt friday night to the discotheque” (bollyn, 3 february 2006). furthermore, in support of the danish editor, the comics were soon picked up by seven review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 129 other newspapers across europe. france, germany, italy, the netherlands, spain and switzerland who simultaneously reprinted the cartoons on february 1st suggesting a coordinated attempt at defending the rights of free-speech but seemingly quite willing to ignore any responsibility of journalistic integrity or the impact that such inaccurate depictions would have on how local muslims migrants would be perceived. as heiko henkel noted, to demand toleration from the targets of a racist slur coupled with blunt religious insult, and to brand those who refuse to be silent as fundamentalist – thus denying them any legitimate place within european society – is more than simply inconsiderate…it performs a double delegitimation of religious muslims on the grounds of being both foreign and intolerant (henkel, 2006:3). political leadership as american bombers were driving afghanistan’s taliban rulers from power in 2001, a reporter asked then defence secretary, donald rumsfeld, if the campaign was perversely boosting support for the islamists. his reply was that it was “very difficult to go down and do a gallup poll” so he was “not inclined to chase that rabbit” (the economist, march 10, 2007: 56-58). since then a variety of research pundits have tried to prove mr. rumsfeld wrong and although the aforementioned 2007 survey does not go that far, it does place the source of tensions between islam and the west squarely on the shoulders of conflicts that occur over power struggles within political circles. although there are a variety of dimensions one can look at to examine the role politics plays in shaping the migration debate for europeans, this article focuses exclusively on state leadership and speeches made by government representatives to their electorate. often the vocabulary, diction and tone used by prime ministers, presidents, foreign and interior ministers in their speeches have an “inflammatory and destructive” effect when “disseminated by the media” spreading hatred and feeding islamophobia, xenophobia, and review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 130 anti-semitism (alliance of civilizations 2006: 5.16). in the uk, locals are told that practices such as forced marriage and genital mutilation have persisted because of an over-emphasis on “cultural difference” and “moral relativism” (khundnani, 2002); in france, according to françois fillon (minister of social affairs, 2002-2004) a sense of ‘communautarisme’ is to blame for the loss of french values and history (le monde, 16 september 2003); in the netherlands, prime minister balkenende told the nation that his country “does not constitute an aggregation of different cultures” pointing to street gangs that consist entirely of foreign youth to prove his point that dutch society is failing; and finally in spain where in 2002 then prime minister aznar blamed multiculturalism as “one of the great threats facing europe: it is precisely what splits society” (fekete, 2002a; 2002b). in each case multiculturalism and immigrants are treated as a hazardous entity threatening a country’s homogenous identity, history, and culture. it comes as no surprise then that 58% of the british population, in 2005, wanted to see tougher immigration controls (van selm, 2005). add on the relentless focus paid by politicians to the ‘fight’ against illegal immigration, with constant reference to the large numbers of them that cross state borders, has left the impression that the state is defenceless, weak, and in disarray, leading to an increase in the popularity for right wing political parties such as france’s fn, germany’s npd, and the dutch list pim fortuyn, whose stated mandate is strict border management, tighter security, and restrictive measures towards migrants. although the issue of migration is most often dealt with at the national level, the european union and its members of parliament (mep’s) have shown an increased interest in protecting its borders from illegal entry establishing eurodac1 and frontex2; 1 an eu-wide finger printing database facilitating the identification of repeat asylum seekers and aliens; the act of finger printing is commonly related to criminals and criminal activity. review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 131 “regarding the fight against illegal immigration and management of borders, meps "recognise the need to adopt an equitable eu return directive" and stress that "mass regularisation of illegal immigrants is not a solution in the long term". finally, members urge member states to step up cooperation with frontex” (ep press release, 2006). by repeatedly referring to certain external spectacular events, they are producing a “false consciousness of impeding danger” linking the immigrant population to “perceptions of nonspecific and diffuse, but nonetheless serious threats” (fekete, 2004:7). framing the issue of migration with language that is most often associated with traditional understandings of security discourse (‘old security’), politicians and european leadership are enhancing their reach and extending, quite willingly, the arm of the law into daily european life apparently unphased by the subtle but progressively greater encroachments on immigrant civil liberties and fundamental human rights. examples of such laws will be examined below. acts and laws in the immediate aftermath of september 11, the eu reacted by passing the eu 2001 common positions and framework decision on combating terrorism; terrorism no longer exclusively referred to extreme acts of violence committed to further a political cause. according to the eu, any action designed to “seriously damage a country or international organization… [that] unduly compelled” a government to act in a particular way could be considered an act of terror (fekete, 2004: 5). furthermore “subsequent inclusion under the definition of all those who gave terrorism ‘any form of support, active or passive” were also considered terrorists (fekete, 2004: 5). member states soon began to incorporate the eu decision into domestic law leading some states to pass state of emergency legislation and new anti-terrorist laws. as fekete points out, “in effect, eu governments have used the opportunity that september 11 afforded to expand the definition of terrorism and spread the tentacles of 2 an independent body created to coordinate the operational cooperation between member states in the field of border security and management – the activities are intelligence driven. review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 132 the security state in previously unthinkable ways” (fekete, 2004: 5). one such example was the 2001 uk anti-terrorism crime and security act (atcsa), which legalized the internment of foreign nationals for a period of two years without trial. the danish police intelligence service (pet) and the norwegian police security service (pst) place a duty upon universities to collaborate with security services’ intelligence-gathering procedures on the grounds that foreign students my attempt to register at universities to access information or use equipment that might be used to produce weapons of mass destruction. the german system of profiling of foreign nationals from islamic states, which started with universities but has since been extended to private businesses, is unprecedented in scale. by april 2002, the federal states’ criminal investigation department had assembled 6 million personal records and singled out well over 20,000 potential suspects, even though there was no concrete evidence against them (fekete ,2004: 8). to qualify for inclusion on this list, suspects have to be of (presumed) islamic religious affiliation, ‘from an islamic state’, aged 18 to 24 and not previously have come to the notice of the criminal investigation department. of course, who is more suspect than a young muslim man without a criminal record? an interview conducted with a female muslim in the united kingdom on the role her government has played in fuelling the discrimination and social marginalization notes that the actions by the state, however unintended, are viewed by muslims as targeted specifically at them: all the legislation that is coming out, like the immigration stuff and the citizenship stuff, it’s all targeted at muslims. i’m sorry to say it but it is. no one goes on about how the australians will have to take citizenship tests. …i think a lot of the islamophobia arises from the fact that the muslims are perceived to be ‘a problem’ in terms of public disorder and socio-economics, and not doing very well at school and are ‘a burden on the state’(eumc report 2006a:29). review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 133 by linking immigration to terrorism and islamic fundamentalism, in the face of external instability and conflict, such laws are ‘old security’ attempts to deal with ‘new security’ issues. laws such as the atcsa unjustifiably portray the relationship between the state and immigrants as adversarial; seen as a security threat immigrants are not granted the same rights and freedoms that locals enjoy. this negative portrayal is internalized by the public who see no reason to treat their arab neighbours any differently. the problem however in securitizing and generalizing ethnic minorities, in the case of france, the uk and germany, is that a majority tend to end up living in isolation despising their fate and thus “provoking violent interaction between natives and the immigrant population” (mantouvalou, 2005: 123). religious profiling such as the already mentioned german system of spying on islamic university students, the over-policing of specific community groups, or incrimination based on association are just some of the after shocks felt by national xenophobic laws. according to statewatch more than 71,000 stop and searches were conducted in 2002-2003 as part of the anti-terrorist operations. in only 1.18% of cases, was an arrest made and a vast majority of which were not even connected to terrorism. in france, during recent years security measures have been tightened in the ‘islamic suburbs’, effectively militarizing french housing estates – the latest internal security act has introduced a 2 year jail term for the new offence of loitering in stairwells or other communal areas of tower blocks (fekete, 2004: 12). muslim migrants are locked in a cycle of discrimination, criminalization and stereotyping. as tariq ramadan put it in a recent interview with the radio show to the best of our knowledge on wisconsin public radio, the “issue is not a clash of civilizations, but a clash of perceptions” (march 25th, 2007). review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 134 present and future implications for the eu on the 13th of february 2007, dr. hans-gert pöttering, president of the european parliament, declared in his inaugural speech that, “europe’s future is dependant to a great extent on successful coexistence among cultures and religions within the european union and between the european union and our neighbours, first and foremost in the arab and islamic world” (pöttering, 2007: 14). based on truth and mutual tolerance, pöttering suggested that the euro-mediterranean assembly be used for dialogue with the middle east, israel and the rest of the arab world. he is not alone in his desire to use existing institutions within the eu to improve relations between europe and its migrant population. benita ferrero-waldner, the eu commissioner for external relations and european neighbourhood policy (enp), acknowledges the unique position the european commission is in to foster better understanding between europe and the islamic world arguing that the through the enp, the eu is “trying to manage migration better: welcoming those migrants we need for our economic and social well-being, while clamping down on illegal immigration” (ferrerowaldner, 2006: 141). through the enp, she argues, the eu will improve border controls, fight illegal immigration, and upgrade reception facilities for asylum traffic. furthermore, ongoing bi-lateral negotiations with algeria and morocco (the most popular points of origin for french and belgium islamic migrants) in 2004 spoke of “installing high-tech equipment in neighbouring countries” to limit the number of illegal migrants crossing into the eu from northern africa (johanson-nogues, 2004: 246). repeatedly what we are seeing from eu representatives is the framing of migration concerns as an issue of security that is apparently best addressed through ‘hard’ security measures. this is worrisome as immigrants, asylum seekers, and refugees are being framed as a security problem, reproducing the myth that a) a review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 135 homogenous national community existed prior to ‘their’ entrance and b) that it can be reestablished today through the exclusion or control of migrants. by involving police, border guards, and intelligence services the eu and members of national governments are giving off the wrong message to their constituents and fellow europeans. the way in which migration is rendered problematic, is the manner locals will view their migrant co-workers and neighbours: how this dynamic [of migration] is portrayed in the media, discussed by political and cultural leaders, and managed by policy makers will determine whether the populations view increased diversity as a source of strength or as a threat (alliance of civilizations report, 2006). conclusion late last summer former foreign secretary jack straw announced that he felt uncomfortable talking to his female blackburn constituents face-to-face when they wore a full veil. he suggested that the conversation would have “greater value if the lady took the covering from her face”. almost immediately, prime minister tony blair and his heir apparent, chancellor gordon brown, weighed in, giving their full support for straw’s comments arguing that, “a battle against the veil has been a long and continuing battle against the limitation of women” (gomez, 2006). statements such as these from europe’s political elite illustrate a serious misunderstanding when it comes to islam and its traditions. irrespective of one’s point of view on the hijab question, what is most disconcerting to this author, is the choice of words blair and brown elect to use when referring to the head scarf debate; its seen as a ‘battle’ taking place between islamic and western religious traditions on british soil. shore notes in his article “can the west win muslim hearts and minds?” that what “makes the head scarf so contentious is that people see in it what they want to see…ethnic europeans tend to look upon the headscarf and see 9/11” (shore, 2005: 484). for instance, in germany, two opinion polls published by the frankfurter allgemeine zeitung review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 136 (faz) in late 2004 asked respondents what they associate “islam” with and the most common responses were “suppression of women” (93 per cent) and “terror” (83 per cent) with only 6 per cent of respondents describing islam as “likeable” (eumc report, 2006b: 37). similar evidence can be found through out europe in spain, italy, denmark, the netherlands, austria, sweden, and the united kingdom. this paper illustrates the power words and images are having on europe’s understanding of the world and the people that live within its borders. the media and political leaders must use their authority responsibly by accurately reporting events and resisting the temptation to sensationalize them. standards have to be put in place to encourage a dialogue between ethnic, cultural, and religious groups to improve the quality of reporting, cognisant of the effect, “editorial decisions and opinions implicitly conveyed in reporting can have on the public’s perception of an issue” (alliance of civilizations report, 2006). furthermore, politicians and the media should work together to help deepen inter-cultural understanding and resist the urge to legitimate racism by supporting the political platforms of the extreme right that propose hatred, discrimination, and intolerance (especially during times of external turmoil) purely for the sake of short-term electoral success. on the contrary, it is their duty as our elected representatives to reflect more profoundly the multicultural dynamics of european society and impede hateful expression not through increased government interference in the media but by encouraging the establishment of a voluntary code of ethics. history has shown that laws such as the atcsa do more harm than good: for example, following the emergency provisions act of 1978, the catholic community in britain were left in widespread alienation and insecurity. however, britons at large resisted the urge to blame or suspect everyone with an irish accent. similarly, it is worth noting that everything review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 137 which is being said about the ‘unsuitability of muslims for life in a liberal democracy’ was at one point said to the catholic irish who upon their arrival to the united states in the 1830s, had their religious allegiances questioned for they were assumed to be loyal to a “foreign potentate who deplored the liberalism and republican values” for which america had come to stand for (legrain, 2006: 317). ironic considering that us politicians like pat buchanan have since 9/11 have lathed on to popular misconceptions that ‘islamic immigrants are terrorists’ so as to not only further their anti-immigrant agendas by exploiting their electorate’s weaknesses and further feeding their fears about what a handful of them might do. over 170 years later not much has changed. the media, politicians, and laws continuto exploit the apprehension locals feel about what a handful of extremists might do, internalizing such a fear and voluntarily or involuntarily projecting such anxiety onto migrants and immigration in general. the worry here is that it might be too late. the securitization of migration is seeping into the policies and programs of the eu replicating the very cause it hopes to overcome. a better understanding of the implications of existing policies, laws and media practices is essential if the eu hopes to successfully deal with migration. illustration 1: review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 138 bibliography abdullah aslam. 2007. “muslims and the media since post september 11”, http://www.wkconline.org/resources/pdf/2005muslim_aslam_abdullah.pdf (september 2, 2007). bannerman, patrick. 1988. islam in perspective. london: routledge. barrenada, isaías. 2006. “alliance of civilizations, spanish public diplomacy and cosmopolitan proposal”, mediterranean politics 11: 99-104. bollyn, christopher. “why the european press is provoking muslims”, http://www.rumormillnews.com/cgi-bin/archive.cgi?read=84976 (september 2, 2007) the economist. 2007. “testing muslim views: if you want my opinion”, economist: 56-58, march 10. european commission 2006a. “perceptions of discrimination and islamophobia: voices from members of muslim communities in the european union”, european monitoring centre on racism and xenophobia. http://eumc.europa.eu/eumc/material/pub/muslim/perceptions_en.pdf _____2006b. “muslims in the european union: discrimination and islamophobia”, european monitoring centre on racism and xenophobia, http://eumc.europa.eu/eumc/material/pub/muslim/manifestations_en.pdf european parliament, press release. 28 september 2006. “european parliament sets out views on immigration”, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/expert/infopress_page/019-10973-26809-39-902-20060922ipr10897-25-09-2006-2006-false/default_en.htm (september 2, 2007). fekete, l. 2002a. “centre-right opens up aggressive debate about immigration and integration”http://www.irr.org.uk/europebulletin/netherlands/immigration_law/2002/ak000 002.html (september 2, 2007) ______. 2002b. “centre-right attacks immigration and multiculturalism” http://www.irr.org.uk/europebulletin/spain/immigration_law/2002/ak000001.html (september 2, 2007) _____. 2004. “anti-muslim racism and the european security state”, race & class 46:1, 3 29. ferrero-waldner, benita. 2006. “the european neighbourhood policy: the eu’s newest foreign policy instrument”, european foreign affairs review 11: 139-142 review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 139 gomez, e, “britain's straw lifts veil on muslim-veil debate and ignites firestorm”, sf gate online article,http://www.sfgate.com/cgibin/blogs/sfgate/detail?blogid=15archive/&entry_id= 9731 henkel, heiko. 2006. “the journalists of jullands-posten are a bunch of reactionary provocateurs”, radical philosophy 137: 2-7. johansson-nogués, elisabeth. 2004. “a ring of friends? the implications of the european neighbourhood policy for the mediterranean”, mediterranean politics 9: 240-247. kundnani, arun. 2002. ‘the death of multiculturalism’, institute of race relations http://www.irr.org.uk/2002/april/ak000001.html legrain, phillip. 2006. immigrants – your country needs them. london: little brown book group. mantouvalou, kiriaki. 2005 “immigration as a security concern: the case of greece”, slovo 17: 119-136. papadimitriou, demetrios. 2005. “think again: migration”, foreign policy 109: 15-31 pöttering, hans-gert. 2007. “defending europe’s values – for a citizens’ europe implementing reforms – for democracy and the parliamentary system encouraging a dialogue of cultures – for partnership and tolerance.” strasbourg: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/eplive/expert/multimedia/20070213mlt03070/media_200702 13mlt03070.pdf program on international policy attitudes. 2007. “global poll finds that religion and culture are not to blame for tensions between islam and the west”, washington d.c.: http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/home_page/317.php?nid=&id=&pnt=317&lb =hmpg1 ramadan, tariq. 2007. “to the best of our knowledge”, radio interview with ramadan, tariq, march 25, 2007 on wisconsin public radio: http://www.wpr.org/webcasting/ideas_audioarchives.cfm?code=bok savage, timothy. 2004. “europe and islam: crescent waxing, cultures clashing”, washington quarterly 27: 25-50. shore, zachary. 2005. “can the west win muslim hearts and minds?” orbis 5: 475-490. united nations. 2006. “alliance of civilizations final report”. united nations, http://www.unaoc.org/repository/report.htm (accessed september 2, 2007) walker, martin. 2006. “europe’s mosque hysteria”, wilson quarterly 30: 1-10. review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 140 zimmerman, klaus. 1995. “tackling the european migration problem.” the journal of economic perspectives 9: 45-62 van selm, joanne. 2005. “immigration is becoming a key issue for europe’s future”, european affairs 6: 1-3. leif kalev and rein ruutsoo_rera_volme3_issue1 review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 1/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 19 ………………………………………………………………… marginal stories? the perspectives on citizenship of multiple citizens and multicultural persons of estonia leif kalev and rein ruutsoo abstract this article focuses on practices of citizenship in estonia by persons with multiple citizenship or multicultural background. in the previous stages of research on this topic primary attention was paid to national citizenship, multiple citizenship and european union citizenship as institutions, as well as the role of citizenship in the construction of european space. expected "configurations" of multiple citizenship as articulated in marshallian (1992) terms, as well as linkages between different spaces of membership (national and not-national) of citizenship as perceived by the national decision makers, mapped both avenues and bottlenecks for the future. our research raises questions and problems related to citizenship as both an essential tool of nation building and of eu integration (cf. ruutsoo and kalev 2006, ruutsoo and kalev forthcoming). review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 1/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 20 1. introduction this article focuses on practices of citizenship in estonia by persons with multiple citizenship or multicultural background. in the previous stages of research on this topic primary attention was paid to national citizenship, multiple citizenship and european union citizenship as institutions, as well as the role of citizenship in the construction of european space. expected “configurations” of multiple citizenship as articulated in marshallian (1992) terms, as well as linkages between different spaces of membership (national and not-national) of citizenship as perceived by the national decision makers, mapped both avenues and bottlenecks for the future. our research raises questions and problems related to citizenship as both an essential tool of nation building and of eu integration (cf. ruutsoo and kalev 2006, ruutsoo and kalev forthcoming). the aim of this article is to study how persons of multiple citizenship or multicultural background – the groups that likely have a more personal viewpoint on the issues of citizenship and are situated in the effective contact zone of estonian society – reflect the meaning of citizenship in its different forms in estonia. due to the link between (multiple) citizenship as a resource for constructing personal life-projects and the actual status of respondents in estonian society, research into both subjects is of interest to us. we also examine what reasoning guides political, civil and social participation, as well as what other factors are seen as important for participation and why. more concretely, this article focuses on (1) the general attitudes toward citizenship; (2) practical experiences with multiple citizenship; and (3) substantial dimensions of citizenship, including perceptions of full membership in society, loyalties and identities. we first discuss the key concepts, context and methodology of research. thereafter we present the main findings supporting our lines of argumentation. we will conclude with generalisations and recommendations. citizenship is a concept usually linked to exclusive membership in a political community, i.e. nation state. the relations between state institutions and citizens (as well as other types of residents, e.g. denizens, cf. hammar 1990) are manifold: mutual rights and duties linked to status are complemented by societal practices and influence each other constantly. due to the processes of transnational migration and globalization, the singleness of citizenship has become contested (cf. bauböck and rundell 1998, castles and miller 1998, castles and davidson 2000, waters 2001). there are many people who either temporarily of permanently live in a country other than their native one in contemporary world. some of them have developed real affiliations to both their country of origin and country of residence. some states have responded by legalizing dual or multiple citizenship in such cases. contemporary citizenship is notably diverse. in addition to the distinction of status and practice it is possible to differentiate between vertical and horizontal citizenship. vertical citizenship refers to various levels of membership, from a local community to regional, national, supranational, or even world citizenship (cf. heater 1999). multiple citizenship is usually understood as holding several national citizenships. horizontal citizenship encompasses both public and private spheres and is linked to different review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 1/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 21 areas of life, including civil, political, socio-cultural and socio-economic fields. additionally, horizontal citizenship may also be understood as a life-long learning process. it is useful to distinguish between citizenship as an analytical tool and citizenship as a legally based phenomenon. analytically, citizenship characterizes a person’s emancipation and membership in a given society, and andersen and hoff (2001: 3) define citizenship as having three analytical dimensions: rights (and duties), participation and identities. citizenship may also be understood as a cumulative or continual learning process. it may also be understood as an analytical tool that one can use to analyse citizenship as a legal status, as well as all the other statuses and memberships of persons. our subsequent discussion is based on citizenship as perceived by interviewees, i.e. primarily as based on the legal status. legally, citizenship is a clearly defined set of rights and duties setting the possibilities for citizenship as practice (in political, sociocultural and economic terms). a citizen is expected to act within an enacted space of rights and duties, to be loyal, and to take a passport when going abroad to show into which country he/she belongs and which country takes care of his/her needs, etc. 1.1. citizenship: a resource and a set of strategies of accommodation the years 1987-91 marked the period of estonia regaining its independence. independence mobilised historical and socio-cultural arguments, and also defined strategies in discursive construction of approaches to estonian citizenship and dual citizenship. recent discourse studies on nation building have revealed related security and state-building discursive formations, which obviously also have significant impact on citizenship discourse formation. all people are in touch with both “practical” and “symbolic” worlds in terms of citizenship: along with practical choice and legal options citizenship is the matter of belonging to “imagined communities” of identity and loyalty. both of these main dimensions of self-description were included in the structured questionnaire we employed for this study. we found out that the two play important roles as essential markers of self-image in different generations of immigrant residents of estonia, who have had to decide where they belong since the collapse of the former soviet union. to better understanding what constitutes the main object of our research, it should be remembered that estonia has not become a country of immigration since its independence was restored. since independence, estonia has accepted only ca. 7000 new legal permanent residents (postimees 10.10. 2005), mainly from neighbouring countries (latvia, lithuania) that do not allow dual citizenship. other new legal permanent residents come from germany, sweden and finland, which in recent years have become more positive about allowing dual citizenship. much of the movement has been related to family life but is also related to temporary studies in universities and employment. alongside these legal immigrants/residents, estonia has only small group of refugees. however, a residue of the soviet regime remained after independence: estonia needed to integrate a ca. 500,000-strong soviet-time immigrant community that had not yet review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 1/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 22 obtained noticeable qualities for adjusting to the local socio-cultural environment. attitudes of the bulk of immigrants were defined by the political task set by moscow, namely the consolidation of the soviet empire, the annihilation of local identity and the acculturation of captured nation. as a result, soviet estonia was effectively a segmented society, with the native (ethnic estonian) community enjoying some cultural rights, and the arriving immigrant population being developed towards a russophone “soviet people” segment (cf. also kalev and ruutsoo forthcoming). the restorationist citizenship policy that has been dominant in post-independence estonia maintained much of the segmentation of society, paving the way for the emergence of two communities with different statuses. that segmentation also became instrumental in producing rigid identity boundaries between the mainstream estonian societ and the bulk of mainly russophone, soviet-time immigrant residents. the discourse of “russopohones” popular among scholars is misguiding because it neglects to mention that, despite the spread of “monolinguality”, estonia bears traces of a multicultural community. russian speakers were in no way a homogenous “civil garrison” as politicians who supported exclusionist position preferred to treat it. yet at the same time the community of soviet immigrants was to a significant extent developed into the “soviet people”. the term, created in the 1970s, refers to the ideologised concept, which labelled de-nationalised minorities with multicultural background, whose ethno-cultural identity/belonging and linguistic affiliation was suppressed. at the same time, the term referred to discourse that equalised soviet citizens with the “soviet patriot”. main trajectories related to obtaining of estonian citizenship and retaining of the other citizenships have their background in an obvious logic of solving problems that are typical to a post-colonial and post-soviet country needing to come to terms both with political consolidation and maintaining its independence. both qualifiers – post-soviet and post-colonial – are very important in respect to estonian attempts to understanding the challenges faced by its residents, be they citizens or non-citizens. citizenship issues in practical terms are not problems of an abstract dispute on democratisation and do not target the european context first of all (the coming five years likely will not bring a fundamental change) but a pattern from past. proud patriots of “grossmacht” (in estonia’s case, the soviet union) are stilll very much in a state close to shock. they have lost their traditional landmarks, and the acquisition of new loyalties and identities related to a “resurgent state” is a point of great personal challenge (pettai and proos 1999, 21-25). the soviet system (based on state-socialist ideology) and the “grossmacht” approach (the building of russian empire) patterned quite rigid identities. in this perspective, the status of “dual citizenship” acquires a very specific meaning. 1.2. specifics of research context in contemporary estonia with regard to multiple citizenship and multiculturalism there are two key aspects placing estonian research into a different context than that performed by other countries participating in the dce project: review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 1/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 23 1. multiple citizenship is prohibited by law in estonia. this makes it hard to find (illegal) multiple citizen respondents and, in case of all others, to ask something more than general questions on multiple citizenship. the illegality of dual citizenship originates from the citizenship act, which prescribes that an estonian citizen shall not simultaneously hold the citizenship of another state (§ 1). however, as the constitution states that no one shall be deprived of estonian citizenship acquired by birth (§ 8), there is no effective sanction regarded as constitutional for native citizens holding dual or multiple citizenship. in practice, this is also the case for naturalized citizens, as there are no investigative procedures and the possible sanction of depriving estonian citizenship is not in use. thus, access to multiple citizenship can hardly be seen as up to personal choice. the individuals with multiple citizenship usually belong to the privileged group who, having obtained estonian citizenship by birth, cannot in principle be deprived of the estonian citizenship. the naturalised soviet-time immigrants and their descendants with multiple citizenship prefer to keep an especially low profile. in the last population census in 2000, 209 persons declared themselves as dual or multiple citizens (data of the statistical office of estonia). this may be due to the anonymity factor of censuses, and some of the respondents might have been temporary visitors to estonia (holding dual citizenships, both other than estonian). however, the groups of estonian-russian (78 persons) and estonian-finnish (72 persons) citizens indicate that dual citizenship is actually present in estonia. however, our experience in interviewing indicates a somewhat different range and composition of multiple citizenry in estonia than is reported by census. many of the dual citizens we reached hesitated or declined to speak about their experiences, and it is most likely they were not covered by the population census data. in sum, one can highlight at least three obstacles for data collection on multiple citizenship: • first, in estonia there is very little knowledge about a stock of people who hold multiple citizenship (statistics is fully incomplete). • second, due to the specific context (illegality of multiple citizenship), it is hard to agree on a more thorough interview. in addition to this, it is almost impossible to reach agreement on interviews with people who hold multiple citizenship illegally. • third, the respondents with multiple citizenship usually don’t display their specific status in everyday life and because of inevitable links to kin, it is hard for some estonians to reveal their citizenship status. for this reason respondents have limited experience in how the status of a dual citizen could possibly affect their everyday practices, their treatment by officials and employers, etc. review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 1/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 24 2. the personal background of the interviewees is in many ways very different from that of other dce project countries due to historical reasons. this gives us a specific interviewee pool. the estonian groups that could be seen as target groups for the survey are composed of people having trajectories of life histories that were historically inter-related but without shared characteristics. both resulted from soviet annexation that created (1) a large estonian diaspora (ca. 100,000), of which a part has now returned, and (2) the group of soviet-time immigrants and their descendants living in estonia. after 15 years of independence, the practical situation of both these groups is quite different from the target groups of other dce countries. at the same time, other similar groups are missing because, since regaining independence, estonia has been predominantly a country of emigration with very few new immigrants. the returned exiles that constitute a substantial part of multiple citizens in estonia are of ethnic estonian origin, and those of them who have stayed in estonia1 have already integrated into society relatively well.2 the persons with multicultural backgrounds belong to the soviet-time, mixedorigin, russian-speaking segment of the population that numbers ca. 400,000 people. it is relatively hard to decide which individuals to select for the 40 interviews. in any case, the interviews cannot be very representative of the whole segment of multicultural population. a significant part of the multicultural residents (i.e. at least one quarter) descend from the historical russian minority of estonia. also, the soviet-time immigrants have lived here at least 15 years, as immigration virtually stopped after estonia became independent. despite such a long period of residence, the levels of integration within the group vary greatly. in fact, we can still speak of a sizeable mono-cultural minority that effectively minimizes its everyday societal contacts and lives indoors watching russian tv. the above-described situation implied a particular strategy for planning interviews. we had to adapt the common frame questions to a situation of illegal dual citizenship. there was little sense to ask very detailed questions on dual citizenship (e.g. views on dual citizenship in education). in addition to this, our research was influenced by the results of the survey among decision makers conducted in 2004 in estonia (cf. ruutsoo and kalev forthcoming). the attitudes expressed in the survey were also good starting points for the interviews with multicultural persons and those holding multiple citizenship: 1 some of the returned exiles left estonia again due to various reasons, including quality of life, employment, family issues, etc. 2 we succeeded in finding some multiple citizens with some other (former soviet union) background as well, but not in considerable numbers (of course, a possible reason may also have been their preference to stay under cover.), and even these were usually reluctant to participate in the interviews. review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 1/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 25 1. the decision makers were generally in positions suitable for nation state building, i.e. the answers to questions about the general attitudes expressed patriotism, concerns about national culture, doubts about alternative modes of citizenship, etc. at the same time, the decision makers respected other cultures. 2. while a kind of nationalism prevailed in general attitudes, the positions were at the same time clearly influenced by legislative settings in force in the state, as indicated also by the data of other countries. 3. concerning everyday practical arrangements, the attitudes were much more instrumental and more compatible to a human rights discourse. the rights of multiple citizens were acknowledged in at least one country, in many cases both countries. attitudes on duties varied more, but some things, such as conscription, were also required in both countries. 4. as a result of such factors, national citizenship was predominantly understood in terms of patriotism and loyalty, as an exclusive relation between state and citizen. multiple citizenship was clearly rejected by respondents if they were directly asked, although respondents showed more pragmatism in everyday arrangements. european union citizenship was welcomed in its current form, but substantial deepening of the concept clearly wasn’t welcomed. 5. at the same time, respondents showed a significant lack of knowledge concerning the issues related to citizenship as reflected especially by openended questions. for example, some decision makers even didn’t know the eu citizenship existed. we were interested whether such patterns are also somehow reflected in the fact that the two groups of interviewees came from significantly different situations and positions in society, as some interviewees would likely have a more personal viewpoint both on the issues of citizenship and on being situated in the effective contact zone of the estonian society. 2. methodology of the study 2.1. research design we addressed individuals including: (1) people who were citizens of two or more countries, and (2) people who had a multi-cultural (multi-national) background but only one (or no) citizenship. as discussed above, these groups had some special characteristics compared to the other dce countries. due to the specifics of the estonian context we decided partly to diverge from the main research design and to concentrate on issues that are discussable in the estonian context. we developed a framing questionnaire with 12 thematic questions generally structuring the interview, and we added some questions on life direction if it seemed appropriate. the framing questionnaire focused to the following topics: review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 1/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 26 1. general attitudes on national, multiple and eu citizenships. this included interviewees’ understandings of the concepts and their relations, their positions on multiple and european citizenship, and their positions concerning the complicacy of naturalisation and the prohibition of multiple citizenship in estonia. 2. practical experiences with multiple citizenship. we asked what effects the interviewees expected while deciding to obtain multiple citizenship and how were/are these expectations met in practice. 3. substantial dimensions of citizenship. in this context we discussed interviewees’ personal viewpoints on identity and loyalty. the second subblock focused on belonging, i.e. being a full member of society covering both the interest to participate and reflections on actual personal status in society (using marshallian dimensions and focusing on local, national, eu and world levels). within each of these blocks, we asked some more detailed questions during the interviews, depending on the answers to the framing questions. semi-structured interviews that evaluate identity feelings, attachments to different institutions, explain visions of respondents on acquiring of citizenship etc. build up narratives, which have behind them sets of discourses. these discourses have a formative role in respect of perception of citizenship as an institution. the interviews were analysed qualitatively. the interviews of single citizens are used to analyse, compare and reflect the different meanings of citizenship and practices of membership. as already mentioned, the linkage between (multiple) citizenship as a resource for constructing personal life-projects and the actual status of respondents in estonian society mark the core interest of our research. we will first discuss the responses on the basis of the blocks of the questions and then try to bring out the main positions concerning citizenship, multiple and european citizenship, as well as perceptions on integration of the society. the answers will not provide us with representative information on overarching attitudes among multiple citizens and multicultural persons, but nevertheless the answers provide us with knowledge about the existing perceptions and lines of argumentation. 2.2. data collection and description the research data was gathered through semi-structured interviews carried through email and in person. the interviewing style was semi-formal when seeking answers to the common questions of the project. nevertheless, the respondents were also allowed to express themselves freely while maintaining the general direction and shape of the interviews. review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 1/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 27 altogether 78 interviews were conducted; 37 with persons who held multiple citizenship and 41 with individuals of a multicultural background. both “internal” (loyalty, identity) and “external” spaces (formal or attributed rights) of citizenship were studied in respect of both groups. the interviews were mostly carried out on a co-presence basis in the tallinn university facilities and in coffee shops, but also in the homes or workplaces of many respondents. first of all, persons holding dual citizenship were visited at their homes. a snowball approach became the most effective means of finding dual citizens from the émigré circles, who have built a small sub-community in estonia. there were about ten interviews received by e-mail as a result of special agreements with people with strict timetables or less opportunities to move. based on the experiences of interviewing we expect to have reached a more active and open group of interviewees than the target group average. most of the interviewees inhabit tallinn nowadays, but their background and experience range from saaremaa island of the southwest to the ida-virumaa region in the northeast if speaking about estonia, and from the vast territories of fsu in the east to the us in the west and africa in the south otherwise. all the interviews were conducted in tallinn (there were ca. five interviewees just visiting tallinn because of other issues and currently living elsewhere). some respondents mentioned difficulties in understanding certain framing questions. in such cases the interviewers reformulated the questions. explanations of the terms (such as multiple citizenship, social citizenship, etc.) were provided if asked for; in the beginning the respondents were free to define the terms themselves (and thus make their own questions in a way). there was some difficulty in answering the more abstract questions. the interviews were conducted in estonian or russian and, in some cases, to some extent also in english, but they were transcribed directly into estonian with very few exceptions (e.g. the e-mail responses). the interviews lasted between 45 and 90 minutes, with the longer interviews involving three additional questions for multiple citizens. we had to put much effort into finding the multiple citizens, into reaching an agreement on interviewing, and into conducting interviews in ways the respondents regarded as acceptable. according to our findings, the respondents with factual dual citizenship (estonians practising dual citizenship) have their background in the following groups of people: • estonian refugees or émigrés (usually referred to as exiles in this article) and their descendants, who obtained citizenship of the host country and actualised their estonian citizenship usually after estonia restored its independence (23). • they are children from the parents with different citizenships (estonian and other) (5). • they are children from the foreign parents who hold multiple citizenship (1). review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 1/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 28 people with multiple citizenship are sometimes embarrassed because of their status and are reluctant and often decline to give the interview. even if we decided to interview whomever agrees and used various techniques to reach multiple citizens (sometimes more reminiscent of the work of a detective than that of a researcher) to persuade them to agree to the interviews, many declined, especially among the group with roots in the fsu countries. on the other hand, there was no problem in finding people belonging to the group of those with multicultural backgrounds here the question was more one of whom to select. we decided to focus on the patterns of actual integration as reflected by the more successful groups, i.e. younger generations. this should show the various logics behind integration. however, the logics of marginalisation are also present, especially as reflected in the comments on parents or relatives, but also in case of some interviewees. represented segments of russophones are made up of these people with a multicultural background who have created a strategy for integration. this approach explains the relative weakness of the “desperate” attitudes or destructive ideologies among interviewees. a group of respondents with only one – estonian or russian – or no citizenship (in truth or possibly in some cases due to reasons of personal security) but with multicultural (multiple citizenship) backgrounds have obtained estonian citizenship by naturalisation, or via their parents’ naturalisation. we did not meet any estonian by birth that had given up or failed to restore his/her citizenship. naturalised estonian citizens obtain absolutely the same rights as the native ones. but in terms of practising multiple citizenship, they found themselves in a disadvantaged position because of loopholes in legislation. despite the fact that they usually have a good motivation for carrying multiple citizenship (multinational background, language competence up to bilingualism, shared cultural identities, etc.), their legal status as naturalised citizens makes sanctions, which prohibit multiple citizenship, effective. respondents with one citizenship but with multicultural backgrounds belonged mainly to the younger generations of soviet-time immigrants. the interviews aimed to touch to the discursive space that shapes ways of thinking and the acting strategies of people, who can be described as operating in the “border zone” or “contact area” in terms of multicultural background or multiple identity. their ways of perceiving estonian citizenship and of constructing their identities and loyalties to communities, etc., in many cases came out in the structured interviews. it was difficult to follow very distinct data collecting and research strategies in collecting some kind of representative sample. additionally, the comparison of these groups was complicated because our respondents did not build any constructed sample. the methods used to find respondents varied: the westward sample, which very much overlaps with sample of persons who have dual citizenship, was composed very much as based on snowball techniques. the sample of eastward respondents, which is very much the same as people with a multicultural background, was selected more deliberately. selecting the “control group” from respondents with multicultural background but with one or no citizenship would have been simplified if we had comparable objects and groups with more or less similar patterns. research was problematized because of review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 1/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 29 very large scope of issues, which made it hard to put research questions and hypotheses about expected regularities. but, in general, the structured interview looks to be a rather proper method for dealing effectively with such complex issues as the construction of discourses of/on citizenship and multiple citizenship. our study revealed that, along with appealing to practical purposes, popular discourses as socio-cultural resources and as patterns of identity formation play an essential role in self-construction of people in terms of citizenship. our research made it possible to follow to what extent subjective perceptions and experiences pattern practical discourse on citizenship, and also how they are used in the legitimisation of discourses. a “generation marker” seems to be an important discriminator in the formation of different discourses. 3. perspectives on citizenship: political nation vs. civil citizens 3.1. general attitudes both subgroups of interviewees showed broadly similar patterns with regard to general positions concerning national, multiple and european citizenship. most of the interviewees were influenced by the logic of nation state building. the answers to general questions contained many references to patriotism. quite logically, national citizenship was first of all interpreted in terms of patriotism and loyalty, reflected in the following samples: “i am a citizen of a state, loyal to it and supporting it” (toivo). “being a citizen is good if it makes you feel proud and good” (jüri). however, a sub-stream of instrumentalist attitudes was also clearly present in case of national citizenship, as the following sample demonstrates: “with my two passports i can travel through all eurasia” (tiina) with regard to access to estonian citizenship by naturalisation there existed a difference between perceptions and practical experiences. while the persons having actually passed naturalisation examinations characterised the questions as reasonable and possible to meet, the people without such experience suspected the examination requirements to be too hard. however, the answers to the question on whether the existing naturalisation conditions were justified were generally positive in both cases. the experiences and attitudes on civic education are also relatively homogenous. the only exception was between the youngest generation that has had to learn by themselves and the youngest ones that have already had civics classes at normal school. almost all the respondents stressed the importance of civics in case of educating new generations, while a few also stressed the importance of personal interest and activeness. as already explained, it was possible to discuss multiple citizenship only in general terms. discussions on multiple citizenship were as a rule conducted with a discursive review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 1/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 30 connection to patriotism. mostly, it was not regarded as a very positive solution. even multiple citizens themselves were often not too happy with their situation: “multiple citizenship is very dangerous. it can cause many problems” (sander) “i can see no conflict. it is technical – i obey the laws. in estonia i am citizen of estonia” (karl). some multiple citizens referred to real connections or affiliations with two states as a kind of justification (however, at the same time such a situation showed they felt necessity of justification in this issue.): “in both countries where i live and that are important to me, i have the destiny to participate” (juhan). there existed also some elements of cosmopolitanism. however, the main discourse we found was nation state oriented in terms of general attitudes and quite instrumental in most everyday practical issues. this was also the same case in responses from multiple citizens and multicultural persons: “dual citizenship is the possibility to travel freely from one state to another. the possibility to live in both states according to one’s will and to live in many states” (evi). “i feel loyalty towards all the states of the world” (maria). attitudes on eu citizenship were also in accordance with such a pattern. eu citizenship was warmly welcomed in its current thin form as a bonus package of rights complementing national citizenship: “in the form eu citizenship exists nowadays it is very good and beneficial for all. … however i wouldn’t like eu citizenship to be the main citizenship. big things are not good.” (anne) in the answers, eu citizenship was linked to two issues: patriotism and freedom of movement. instrumental attitudes were more prevalent in discussions of eu citizenship compared to discussions on national and especially multiple citizenship: “[eu citizenship] is good for travelling and doing business” (ants). just as in case of decision makers, most of the respondents were hesitant concerning significant expansion of the content of eu citizenship. “the eu will never develop according to the us model. …. senseless, it should be made in other way” (karl). however, the positions were often relatively moderate, and there were also positive attitudes on a deeper eu citizenship. while the respondents more negative towards eu also expressed more patriotic attitudes on national citizenship, more optimistic attitudes towards eu citizenship were connected to instrumentalist argumentation. review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 1/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 31 what is even more important in this connection is, however, a general lack of knowledge about eu citizenship: “if such a thing [eu citizenship] were invented, it would be positive” (olesja). many interviewees just expressed their general attitudes on eu as a first reaction, and usually the actual content of eu citizenship had to be explained. knowledge about multiple citizenship was also partial among multicultural people and, as a rule, only the people having multiple citizen acquaintances made at least some reference to cases of multiple citizenship. 3.2. practical experiences with multiple citizenship it was only possible for multiple citizens to answer this set of questions. as already mentioned, multiple citizenship is illegal in estonia, and it is evident that multiple citizens do not express their dual status very publicly. it is possible that their family members and close friends would have some practical experiences with multiple citizenship, but we were unable to reach any multicultural persons having very close contacts with multiple citizens and/or ones who would agree to talk about these experiences. all in all, there were relatively few aspects practically addressed in the context of multiple citizenship. even in case of multiple citizenship the first reaction usually was to discuss the issues of one’s identity and belonging. these were predominantly defined in the context of estonia by multiple citizens with both western and eastern background: “i feel only as estonian – even if i come from sweden and have lived also in germany” (uudo). “estonia is my homeland. canada is the land of birth, both are important” (juhan) “i am loyal to both countries [estonia and russia]” (evi). if directly asked about practical use of their multiple citizenship, the first reaction often was that of there being no practical effects. in subsequent discussion some more aspects were addressed. the main reason for obtaining multiple citizenship was real connections to the titular states: ethnic origin and/or the interviewee’s need to move to another country: “i came to work here in estonian-canadian law office. then i decided to stay here” (kristjan) “in both countries where i live and that are important to me, i have the destiny to participate” (juhan). review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 1/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 32 while the general pattern among multiple citizens was similar, the situation of returned estonian exiles and soviet time settlers of estonia differed. estonian exiles discuss their multiple citizenship in the context of involuntary flight from soviet army, practical necessities in the host country and gratitude to the former state of domicile. soviet-time settlers emphasised their connections to the friends and relatives in former ussr area. this topic was present in the discourse of exiles but not so prevalently. the soviet-time settlers are unhappy about the barriers to movement and treat their multiple citizenship as a personal strategy for overcoming the barriers imposed by competing post-soviet politicians. most of the motivation for obtaining multiple citizenship was related to guarantees of personal security and, in the case of exiles, employment considerations. nowadays the majority of returned exiles seldom or never use their other citizenship. however, among younger returned exiles there were cases where both travel and social benefits of the country of their other citizenship were used: “with my two passports i can travel through all eurasia” (tiina). “the advantages of dual citizenship are free medical aid and pension of canada and also some more possibilities to travel without visa requirements” (sander) the motivation for obtaining multiple citizenship for people with soviet background is predominantly related to travel possibilities for meeting their friends and relatives. in this context, multiple citizenship is also used in practice. estonians or people from mixed families living mostly abroad (i.e. they are not permanent residents of estonia) also use their estonian citizenship to access free public education here: “i came to study into university to estonia as it is free to citizens” (tiina). the persons with multiple citizenship generally seem to be a group of very active people (with the exception of retirees). multiple citizenship seems to be evaluated positively mostly because of the travelling opportunities, but also for business purposes (we found two persons in this category, namely cross-border business dualcitizen entrepreneurs ready to give an interview). summing up, multiple citizenship is mostly used for travel, not for residence. in order to bypass the visa and other requirements, appropriate passports are used without many other practical effects. however, in some cases multiple citizenship may open up additional possibilities concerning educational and social benefits, enabling those with multiple citizenship to use the best of both countries. in such cases multiple citizens hold an especially low profile. 3.3. substantial dimensions of citizenship and multiple citizenship the positions interviewees took on loyalty did not offer much surprise. both multiple citizens and multicultural persons generally declared loyalty to the country of their permanent residence or current stay, i.e. estonia: review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 1/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 33 “i am normally loyal to estonia” (kolja). however, quite a few interviewees also stressed the importance of friends and other contacts, as well as familiar environment: when asked how they define loyalty, the general response of the interviewees was that they will stand for estonia in public discussions. there was also some linking of loyalty to defending one’s country: “citizenship means i have the right to both praise and criticise my country” (katrin). at the same time, identity was also an issue for more consideration. while loyalty had predominantly political connotations, identity was addressed in connection to one’s friends and contacts in addition to the context of political belonging and cultural membership: “my identity is based on russia but my political loyalty is with estonia” (lydia). generally, the interviewees ended up speaking of multiple identities, with the estonian political identity being the most prominent or one of the prominent affiliations. while the returned exiles defined themselves as estonians, some of them defined themselves secondarily also as europeans, as intermediaries between their two countries of citizenship, or even as citizens of the world: “both are important. the usa has been an important period in my life – 12 years. now i live in estonia” (rain). “i also feel like a world citizen” (liia). the interviewees of non-ethnic-estonian origin in the case of our study, of russian or other fsu ethnicity generally defined themselves as culturally russian (or respective other fsu ethnicity), but as a russian of estonia. politically, they defined themselves as members of the estonian state: “i feel i belong to estonia although i was born in russia” (tolik). “my identity is based on russia, but my political loyalty is with estonia” (lydia). usually the non-ethnic-estonian interviewees clearly recognised the importance of the political and everyday socio-economic and socio-cultural experience of the country of residence: “my identity is that i belong to estonia. this is my country of birth. i feel close to the nature, mentality, culture, people, rhythm of life” (stir). review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 1/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 34 they even condemned the portion of soviet-time residents living in a kind of private escapism or isolation by watching russian tv at home and minimising practical contacts in everyday social and working life: “who doesn’t like to live in estonia, should leave” (pavel). thus we could observe the emergence of an estonian political identity irrespective of ethnic belonging among the interviewees. this is an encouraging indication of the possibilities of a republican basis of citizenship and citizenship identity. however, it must be noted that the interviews were hardly representative of the multicultural population of estonia as a whole, and it is most likely we reached only the betterintegrated segment of multicultural persons, while others rejected the interviews or could not be reached. while we could expect some instrumentalism in practical attitudes concerning the integration into everyday life on the basis of survey among decision makers, we were still surprised at the practically uncontested prominence of the role of individual performance in the responses of interviewees. the views of the two subgroups did not differ in this respect. the usual first reaction to the question on full membership was to state that everyone is equal before the law and thus everyone is a full member of society. in addition to that, one is seen as being the architect of his or her own fortunes. this holds both for the interest to participate and reflections on actual personal status in society. the fullness of citizenship or the quality of membership in society was seen as in principle depending on the activeness and success of the person himor herself and the notion that there is little to be done for other people or public institutions. such attitudes were compatible with the understanding of citizenship as an essentially political and legal phenomenon connected to nation state, patriotism and loyalty. the social dimension of citizenship seemed to be discursively weak, and the prevalence of individualistic attitudes provided a basis for neo-liberal discourse: “i participate little, but i know i have the right to participate as much as i wish” (tanja). “i am a business woman, too much a rolling stone to much participate in social life” (liia). at times it seemed as if the interviewees tried to persuade themselves that everything depends on their effort, that it is their own fault if they experience difficulties and that, if they struggle hard, they will end up being the masters of their own destiny and well-being: “i would have all the rights – if i just wanted to and was active” (pavel). many interviewees were clearly both rational and calculating when discussing their opportunities. here even the general patriotic attitudes were somewhat overshadowed. this was most visible in the context of possible emigration. while the older returned review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 1/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 35 exiles3 remained true to their decision to stay in their native country, the younger exiles and multicultural persons considered the practical option of leaving for employment: “i obtained dual citizenship in order to work in the estonian foreign service” (sch). expectedly, the main context for discussion on the participation in society was the national level. both local and eu levels of context were surprisingly weak, but for different reasons. the local level was usually discussed inseparably from the national. opportunities on the eu level, if generally welcomed in the context of freedom of movement, were in fact largely unknown and as such did not form an important point of reference. world citizenship was not part of how a substantial of the portion of respondents perceived the questions. **** all in all, the substantial dimensions of citizenship show a pattern compatible with the results of other stages of the interview. general patriotic sentiment was clearly dominant in discussions of loyalty and present in discussions of identity. identity was also connected to the interviewee’s social network. on the other hand, attitudes on full membership in society reflect the prominence of individualism, pragmatism and instrumentalism concerning everyday life. the issues of civil and social citizenship were not addressed as citizenship and sometimes not even in the context of full membership in society. if directly asked, interviewees usually discussed these issues in terms of public provisions of welfare, not citizenship. here, neo-liberal attitudes were relatively prominent, but the need for benevolence and some kind of social cohesion was also often expressed. despite a generally similar pattern concerning the substantial dimensions of citizenship, there seem to be some differences between the returned exiles and estonian multicultural residents. the nationalism of the exiles has been influenced by the experiences of mainstream tolerance in the former host society. in contrast, the attitudes of multiple citizens can be explained in the context of self-persuasion, primarily in order to overcome the situation of belonging to a minority attempting success in a restored nation state. 4. main discourses having examined the main positions of the interviewees, it is appropriate to proceed to the main lines of argumentation that we identified from the interviews. the basis of the subsequent discussion is the types of discursive logics developed by the interviewees. we will first bring out the discourses in general and then focus more 3 it is worth mentioning that many of the older exiles have retired. as a rule they are better off in estonia than in the country of former employment. this is because their pension goes further in estonia due to lower living expenses. however, this should not to be thought to lessen their patriotic sentiment, as expressed in the interviews. review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 1/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 36 specifically on the sets of attitudes prevailing among multiple citizens and multicultural persons separately. generalising the interviews, we can identify four main lines of argumentation with regard to national, multiple and eu citizenship: 1. mainstream pragmatism. national citizenship is the main context of reference in accordance with the above examination. the position is characterised by general patriotism and some flexibility regarding practical arrangements. thus multiple citizenship is not supported, but the current silent tolerance of multiple citizens is not criticized much either. the european union and eu citizenship are accepted and even liked in their present form (as an additional bonus to member state citizenship). but in case of eu citizenship being redefined so that estonian identity and sovereignty would seem to come under the threat of marginalisation, the attitudes of interviewees were clearly negative (even if not aggressively so). in some ways the attitudes are relatively conservative, with a classical concept of citizenship lying in the background. such lines of reasoning characterised the responses of the majority of respondents of various generations both ethnic estonians and russians, from east and west. 2. estonian nationalism. the main topics of interest (and concern) are the development of the estonian culture and the sovereign nation state. a conservative approach to citizenship is complemented by a strong cognisance of national political and cultural community. national citizenship is understood as an exclusive relation based on emotional affiliation and committed membership. multiple citizenship is rated negatively, even if it is sometimes accepted as tolerable in certain practical circumstances. eu citizenship is regarded with suspicion, although there also are some direct signs of opposition to. wishing to keep the eu experiment within „reasonable” limits, there should be even fewer supranational structures in some areas (although some respondents are supportive of common an eu foreign and defence policy). some respondents in this category were ethnic estonians, most of whom are exiles returned from the west. 3. eastern orientation. connections to the cultural space of russia and all the former soviet union. contacts with fsu countries are regarded as the most important. the idea of national citizenship and its exclusiveness is well understood and logically accepted. however, travel interests and interests in contacts clearly lean towards flexibility, resulting in mixed attitudes on multiple citizenship. the european union and eu citizenship are associated with the general pattern of westernisation in contemporary estonia, thus the general attitude toward westernisation – though not aggressively opposed, is one of reluctance. we can speak of a mostly culturally-based hesitation. sometimes the viewpoints have been more deeply considered, hence the opposition more concrete. among our interviewees there were only some people clearly falling into this line of reasoning. such weakness is somewhat surprising but may be explained by the composition of the body of interviewees. review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 1/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 37 4. welfare instrumentalism. the key issue of interest is maximising personal welfare. everything is good if it enhances personal well-being and material welfare. national and multiple citizenship are not of special relevance other than as the basis for employment and other socio-economic action. as long as european union is understood to be improving welfare, the strengthening of the supra-national features of the eu and eu citizenship are welcomed. a position that estonia is too small for economic efficiency clearly has prominence in this context, being the main reason for supporting the strengthening of european union. there are rather many supporters of these positions among both ethnically estonian and russian youth. the discourses can be better understood and interpreted with reference to other research concerning societal integration, which has been conducted mainly with regard to soviet-time immigrants in an emotionally ambiguous position after the collapse of the ussr. however, such people do not comprise a homogenous group. “soviet people” belonging to older generation perceive themselves as not being obliged to apply for citizenship in the “new” state (i.e. estonia). instead, they express their natural affiliation to place, which is in terms of mental identification with their country or votchina (historical territory) as they have learned from soviet-time narratives and have experienced for decades. this explains why an absolute majority of immigrants long (i.e. at least up to the middle of the nineties) perceived the “zero option” and dual citizenship (estonian/russian) as “fair” and as a “norm” (estonia’s experiment 1997; estonia’s non-citizens 1997). estonian eu membership and effective integration estonia into the market economy made the position of non-estonians more and more ambiguous and also created a visible gap between generations, particularly in the values of the old, middle-aged and younger generations. the middle-aged and younger generations show more respect toward the present estonia. some other studies reveal important changes in structure of values in the younger generation of immigrants. national security, the environment and independence occupy the last places in the concerns/values of younger and middle-age non-estonian residents. in families founded by a younger cohort of nonestonians, rationality, utilitarianism, the capability for adaptation, success, personal autonomy and so on have taken central place as dominant values (järva 2003). according to this study an absolute majority of parents maintain national heritage and only one quarter feel that they fully belong to estonia. at the same time they are highly interested in ensuring that their children are competent in the estonian language and culture. about two thirds perceived estonia as their homeland and a quarter both russia and estonia. only every tenth declared that they instruct children first of all to be citizens of russia, and almost one half believed their children to have become patriots of estonia. about one third saw descendants as citizens of eu or of the world and future residents of some eu country or the usa. only one tenth of parents perceived the future of their children as connected to russia (järva 2004). these and other findings are very informative for interpreting of our interviews. younger generations (both estonians and non-estonians) already do not share in the traumas of the past to the full. younger generations of immigrants and their children who have grown up in the estonian republic don’t face such a pressing need to redefine a “soviet” identity. citizenship requirements are just practical issues, and the estonian language is perceived as a symbolic value important for integration with review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 1/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 38 estonian society (vihalemm 2002). new competencies serve for naturalization/accommodation among the ruins of collapsed utopia. in political terms “citizenship requirements” serve as “marks of loyalty” and are connected first of all with the future. the younger generations of estonians also do not perceive themselves as “agents of history” or as members of the “community of fate” (kirch 2002,100). however, “securitizing discourse” rationalizing the citizenship policy of estonia, even if not entirely fair to them, may be seen as a justified “defensive” strategy. 4.1. profiles of multiple citizens we can distinguish three main lines of argumentation reflected in the interviews with multiple citizens: 1. nationally minded discourse. usually among the older returned exiles, also among some middle-aged and younger people. they understand citizenship principally in classical terms, based on mutual deep attachments and loyalties. the basis for identity is estonia as a homeland. their loyalty towards estonia is unquestioned but sometimes complemented by attachment to the country of exile as well. it concerns not only social networks, but this group has deep feelings of gratitude towards their former host countries. this observation firstly concerns persons belonging to the older generation. they also feel slightly ashamed of their multiple citizenships because they understand this as a partial disloyalty towards estonia. at the same time they either are afraid of possible russian aggression in the future and want to retain the opportunity to leave, feel partly attached (or at least thankful) to the country of exile, or just haven’t bothered to renounce their other citizenship. they usually consider themselves full-scale citizens in all of the marshallian dimensions. they expressed some confusion and complaints on being regarded not as “pure” estonians and on incomplete democratisation in the field of politics. but, in general, they are satisfied with their status. people from the older generation express doubts on active participation in estonian politics. they don’t feel at home in the domestic affairs of estonia, but the majority of them declared sympathies towards nationalist parties. multiple citizen interviewees of the older generation perceive eu citizenship as something instrumentally important, but they very strongly deny eu citizenship as a “real” citizenship or an alternative to estonian citizenship. 2. pragmatic cosmopolitan discourse. these attitudes characterise some people of both western (us and eu) and eastern (fsu) origins, but the latter may be prevailing (we even discovered some people from the fsu now holding multiple citizenships in the form of a citizenship in estonia and simultaneously in some other eu state). this category predominantly hosts socially active, middle-aged or younger people, many of mixed families. they regard citizenship instrumentally, without significant considerations of loyalty. the main question is: what can citizenship be used for? the identities and loyalties within this group are mostly connected with personal contacts, review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 1/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 39 especially friends. dual citizenship is a tool for personal purposes, especially travelling but in many cases also for looking for jobs. among them is quite a big share of foreign-born younger estonians, who, because of their excellent language competence, modern education, work experience, etc., were hired in estonian state administration. the postcommunist gap in development and civilisation between the west and postcolonial estonia (but nowadays also russia) opened up new career perspectives. this interviewees of this subgroup are not dominated by particular citizenships, and they consider the entire world their home. they usually consider themselves full-scale citizens in all the marshallian dimensions. within this group there is much concern about national-level issues and a very positive attitude towards eu and eu citizenship. 3. cautious privatistic discourse. these attitudes characterise some estonian emigrants (who left after estonia restored its independence for jobs in the west and who later returned) and some estonian inhabitants of fsu origin. the respondents in this category are usually less educated. citizenships and passports do not imply any special feelings and are used as tools for crossing borders, collecting social welfare, etc. people try to appear mainstream and unnoticeable and do not express strong national loyalties. the fsu respondents compare their current standard of living to the one of their contacts of the fsu countries and think that they are better off, but they have not adapted into estonian society well. one could notice some feelings of alienation. many such people did not agree to participate in interviews. these people cannot indicate their full usage of marshallian dimensions but are nevertheless stating they have no problems – everything depends on the person as an individual. 4.2. profiles of multicultural persons in cases of multicultural interviewees, we based our discussion on societal integration in the context of becoming full-scale citizens in marshallian dimensions. on this basis, we can distinguish four main discourses reflecting different stages of integration. as respondents in the multicultural group are generally younger, as well as more active and open, these attitudes reflect various perspectives of integration within the group but not reflect a reluctance to integrate: 1. path seeking. strong emotional connections to the fsu home country, predominantly with russia. parents late soviet-time immigrants, or russocentrics, or living in former military areas and/or some ida-virumaa cities that have mainly russians as inhabitants. clear self-identification as russia/belarus/ukraine but also as a non-estonian in estonia. there is also a clear cultural distance with the relatives in russia as experienced through practical experiences. the person has decided to remain into estonia and understands that in order to be successful one must be active in society. thus he/she learns estonian and looks for positions in estonia. usually he/she has already gotten estonian citizenship, normally via naturalisation. an important review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 1/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 40 step towards integration is university-level education in an estonian university rather than in a russian one with a department operating illegally in estonia. there is some frustration (especially among male respondents) due to the feeling of being disadvantaged from the start (i.e. disfavoured as non-ethnic estonians). a large share of this group had strong national feelings they actually dared to express. they perceive themselves, despite their efforts to integrate into estonian society, as somewhat alienated and distanced from the community of the estonians. such attitudes seem characteristic of a relatively large group of the russian-speaking minority that must somehow find its social place in the future. 2. integrating. participating actively in social life in instrumental terms. parents have some vague or, in some cases, more developed connections to everyday life in estonia. this group was educated in schools of russian-language instruction but adapted to both estonian and transnational popular culture at the consumerist level. they speak relatively fluent estonian and have ethnic estonian friends, acquaintances or partners. people of this group often regard both staying in estonia and leaving estonia as practical options: leaving estonia means life in the west and employment opportunities. their national sentiments are weak and their identities vague. estonia may look to be too tiny for people who are experienced to think in broader categories. estonia is a nice place, but it is not necessarily their destiny. general attitudes are quite pragmatic and based on personal welfare. all respondents have been very interested in estonian citizenship in instrumental terms and have obtained this some time ago either through naturalisation or already through parents (i.e. currently they are citizens). 3. fully integrated into estonian society. people in this group originate from well-adapted families that came with the first immigration wave to estonia during the forties or fifties and often are from mixed estonian/russian, russian/ukrainian, etc. families. sometimes they originate from some smaller estonian towns in the southern or western parts of the country, where the bulk of the population are ethnic estonians. they perceive themselves as being much different from the “late migrants” (who arrived in context of next migration wave in seventies) and as a group close to their estonian countrymen. they have decided to stay to estonia and hope to be successful in their life career. they often are hesitant in defining their ethnicity but regard themselves mostly as ethnic estonians. (a lot of problems take root from language deficit – there is no word in the estonian language for indicating estonian citizens of non-estonian ethnic origin). culturally, they are fully integrated and externally indistinguishable from other estonians, although there may be some minor internal confusions. in principle they are not different from other (“mainstream”) ethnic estonian youth. at the same time they well understand and evaluate their other culture and even use this for some purposes – even though they might have been the last generation from this wave of immigrants. they comprise a great resource of the estonian society, both in the context of review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 1/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 41 continuing integration and in developing effective contacts with many countries. 4. ethnic estonians with a multicultural background. these mostly are exchange pupils for one to three years, or they are children who are sent to study in estonia by parents who left estonia because of job opportunities, which allows them to make a subsequent choice of which state to declare as their country of residence. they often have rather noticeable national/patriotic sentiments, which are also reflected in attitudes toward the post-colonial diaspora as such (not on a interpersonal level) and are not necessarily pragmatic. at the same time they usually have warm feelings towards their other country of residence/experience. having grown up in a welfare society, they seem to be a bit less “grown up” when compared to the local people with tougher challenges in life. often they don’t have clear-cut attitudes concerning the issues of citizenship or actual participation in society. 5. conclusions and recommendations summarising the above discussion, we could broadly state that the key positions in the survey among decision makers were also broadly reflected in the attitudes of multiple citizens and multicultural persons. thus, their stories are not so marginal, after all. there is some kind of common architecture in the narratives of the elites and people in the contact zone. modern nationhood as general context of reference, complemented by pragmatic instrumentalism and relatively little information on citizenship issues, thus seem to be a relatively widespread pattern in estonia. the contradictions of general nationalism and pragmatic instrumentalism could possibly be used as a resource for changes towards more open solutions in national citizenship policies. however, people actually affected generally understand the current settings as reasonable. the attitudes of multiple citizens and multicultural citizens as such did not differ significantly; the orientations were more influenced by socio-cultural background (west vs. east). however, multiple citizens seem to represent a more active part of population in practice, irrespective of origin. multiple citizenship is not a popular concept in such attitudinal contexts, even among the groups of interviewees most likely to be in favour of it. multiple citizens themselves are sometimes embarrassed about their multiple citizenship. holding many passports simultaneously is mostly connected to travelling. european union citizenship is accepted in its current form, but there seems to be little rationale seen in significantly expanding its scope. there were almost no respondents who regard themselves as less-than-full participants in societal life within any of the marshallian dimensions, neither before nor after explaining the nature of civil, political and social citizenship and asking review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 1/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 42 further similar questions. at the same time the respondents were aware of their modest actual participation in many fields. the background logic behind this situation is that everything is perceived by interviewees as depending on personal effort. if one is interested and active, one can participate fully in whatever field one wants and may achieve almost whatever one wants to achieve. it is merely that the respondents do not want to participate. these attitudes may partly indicate a liberal type of articulation of self and societal consciousness. this is most probably related also to the underdevelopment of the concept of social citizenship in public discourse. there seems to be widespread instrumentalism and welfare orientation among younger interviewees. this may be partly explained by the fact that many of the soviet-time immigrants had predominantly economic (welfare) motivations, which possibly reflect also in the attitudes of younger generations. however, younger ethnic estonians also partly share these attitudes. as such, one possible explanation could be the general instrumentalisation of values and attitudes referring to a more homo oeconomicus type of behaviour. hegemony of such a kind of mindset is most likely related to the confused state organisation characteristic of most of the central and eastern european countries. both of these types of self and world conceptualisations are especially telling for policy makers. multiple citizens and multicultural persons, most likely almost all ethnic estonians, need some shared spaces to develop strategies enhancing their interest in engaging in public affairs. the nature of such strategies is a separate discussion topic. since the collapse of soviet union, minorities living within estonia have had to reconstruct their identities. estonia has been transforming into to a more multicultural society than soviet estonia was. instead of communitarian membership with the “soviet people”, the institution of citizenship is a constitutive element of present-day estonia. dilemmas related to citizenship pave the way for understanding the estonian nation-building process. adaptation into estonian society is seen both as inevitable for active participation and as a natural choice for anyone who wishes make career in estonia. the better-adapted ethnic russians were mindful that people who do not like estonia should prefer to emigrate. security comprises one of the discourses that has an important role to play in postcolonial estonia. it is obvious that there is a considerable variation in the ways in which the security discourse is linked with the identity/loyalty discourse, and also in the ways in which it has been articulated in terms of citizenship. in case of the russophones’ post-modern identity politics, the linkage remains relatively loose. collective/group but also personal security is not a topical issue for “russophones” as much the latter is essential to estonians. it is important to underline that despite significant frustration over the issue of security, signifiers such as security, success, achievement, freedom, etc. represent estonian citizenship (which now is eu citizenship). for “russophone” respondents, they are relevant labels for hope in an optimistic future, effective personal “agendas”, or “life projects”. shifts in citizenship status (i.e. gaining estonian citizenship) is first of all marked by the sense of relief and optimism. review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 1/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 43 discourses on estonia among immigrants usually do not contain any important structural elements, which were essential for building of the exclusive nationalist discourse. these discourses contained the following elements, which also are important for understanding attitudes of the estonians in respect of dual citizenship: a set of (historical) ideas related to the glorification of the pre-war estonian republic; narratives/assumptions on the existence of legal continuity between the past and modern estonian states; the display of estonians as the only agents of independence movement (which marginalised russians as immigrants); and citizenship as an element of fundamental value to the sustainability of the nation. effective citizenship policy expects that alongside substantial forms of identity there is also room for some other forms of membership. non-fundamentalist memberships operate as patterns of citizenship first of all for the “russophone” minority (as our study revealed, these can be shared also by some groups of the ethnic estonians). according to some studies, the formation of civic identity has made significant progress during the last decade (firstly among younger generation). civic identity is connected with political identity, and they support each other, but civic identity is feasible even when political identity is quite weak. in a broad sense civic identity is the feeling of attachment to state and society; a cognition of commonality of interests with all members of society (vihalemm 2001; jakobson 2002). civic identity has taken root when: 1) the norms and laws of the society are taken as a basis for discussion, the position of the dominant ethno-class is accepted and there is consensus that any change in its position could be achieved only according to the rules and laws of host society; 2) there are some cultural elements (communicative tools, cultural norms, symbols, etc.) common to different segments of society; 3) the different ethno-cultural and social parts of the society recognize that they have common interests and see themselves as parts of the same wider system (smith and wilson 1997). even if signs of frustration and alienation have made inroads in the russophone society, these elements of civic identity pattern integration (nation building) constitute the main resource of citizenship as an instrument of civic integration in estonia. along with the other perspectives, it appears that research on citizenship issues opened up one of the most promising/illuminating approaches for understanding/articulating new challenges related to the nation building and eu integration in the post-colonial estonia; a country which today is in a globalising world. both national, multiple and even eu citizenship are kinds of responses to the challenges of transforming realities in estonia and in europe. we discovered that a set of different types of identity constructions, loyalty constructions and practical strategies for paths in life have developed and can exist side by side. review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 1/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 44 an important difference can be observed in terms of attitudes towards dual citizenship and eu citizenship between groups of returned exiles and their descendants, which quite largely is coincident with the gap between older and younger generations. the older generations of the exiles with dual citizenship (40 years and older) share mainly a strong nationalist/exclusionist perspective on a dual citizenship. this understanding treats dual citizenship first of all from the perspective of the sustainability of the estonian nation and bears a strong emphasis on immigrant assimilation (or integration). they represent attitudes that are popular in estonia in general and close to methodological nationalism or “sedentarism”. sedantarism represents a notion that immobility and national/local rootedness constitutes the normal and described condition, whereas migration is a deviation from normality (cf. faist 2000). for many of the people who comprise this group, such emphasis has its background in not only nationalist mindsets (education at home), but also in the alarming experience from their host countries (canada, sweden england etc). largescale immigration and misuse of multiple citizenship have made many of former exiles, who returned from these countries, concerned about the future of estonia. the position of the younger generation of exiles (aged 40 or less) is closer to the transnational understanding of dual citizenship. their perspective is also quite taken with the nationalist view but is not as developed as the “methodological nationalism" of the older generation. they link multiple citizenship to the eu and perceive/interpret dual citizenship as an instrument to make use of transnational resources. this position has its background in their own experience of living and studying in different countries. yet this very “international” group/generation cannot abandon security issues from their discourse, as russia remains in the picture. the younger generation of “russophones” which formed the main group of respondents (i.e. soviet immigrants with multicultural background) tend to entertain multiple identities and loyalties simultaneously. “estonianess” is defined first of all in terms of loyalty. “russophones” seem to display a post-modern identity politics with multiple loyalties but lacking a clear pattern that fits with the findings of other scholars (cf. vetik 1999, 11). unfortunately, we had not planned to ask about the attitudes of people holding one citizenship (i.e. “russphones”) in terms of how they rank the option of dual citizenship. (according to other studies it is preferred by a big share of non-estonians form of citizenship.) however, a large number of narratives revealed that single citizenship is as relevant as dual citizenship to the identity structure of non-estonians. our study seems to support the idea that, for the ethnic estonians, primordial and hierarchic modes of identity politics are the most commonplace, and, among the russophones, post-modern identity construction prevails (cf. aalto 2001, 22). two processes run simultaneously – the integration of post-colonial space and the effective integration of estonia into the globalising world are in clear conflict in modern estonia. coming to terms with them demands policies that cannot be productive in all perspectives. some shift towards a more flexible and liberal approach in respect of dual citizenship appears to preferred. review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 1/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 45 in making estonian society more transparent and capable of coming to terms with challenges produced by globalisation and developing of transnational communities, the following are expected of estonian decision makers: • along with the identity policy typical to “nationalising state” exercised thus far, loyalty (civic citizenship) should be perceived as an exhaustive constitutive element for the development of effective societal bindings; • multicultural models of “estonianess” should be developed as an element of contemporary nation building; and • immigration policies should be developed to ease serious future problems likely to arise due to depopulation. multiple citizenship is one the instruments of such complex policies. review of european and russian affairs vol. 3 issue 1/2007 © rera 2007 all rights reserved 46 bibliography aalto, pami (2001). constructing post-soviet geopolitics in estonia. a study in security, identity and subjectivity. university of helsinki. andersen, jorgen goul and hoff, jens (2001). democracy and citizenship in scandinavia. houndmills and new york: palgravemcmillan. rainer, bauböck and rundell, john (eds.) (1998). blurred boundaries: migration, ethnicity, citizenship. aldershot, brookfield, singapore, sydney: ashgate; castles, stephen and miller, mark j. 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(1992) [1950], “citizenship and social class”. in thomas h. marshall and tom bottomore citizenship and social class. london: pluto press, pp. 3-51. pettai iris ja proos, ivi (1999). millal mitte-eestlasest saab eesti kodanik? kommenteeritud andmebaas. tallinn: eesti avatud ühiskonna instituut. ruutsoo, rein (2002). “discoursive conflict and estonian post-communist nation building”. in mati heidmets and marju lauristin (eds) the challenge of the russian minority. emerging multicultural democracy in estonia. tartu: tartu university press, pp. 31-54. smith, graham and wilson, andrew (1997). “rethinking russia's post-soviet diaspora: the potential for political mobilisation in eastern ukraine and north-east estonia”. europe-asia studies. vol. 49, no. 5, pp. 845-864. vihalemm, triin (2002). “eesti keele roll kultuuridevahelises kommunikatsioonis”. rmt. aune valk (koostaja). eesti ja eestlased võrdlevas perspektiivis. tartu: tartu ülikooli kirjastus, pp. 246-260. waters, malcolm (2001). globalization. 2nd edition. london and new york: routledge. jason r. young_volume 4_issue 1 review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 90 ………………………………………………………………… ‘making the margins of europe’: marginalization, europeanization and islam in the contest for public space. jason r young abstract this article intervenes into the debate around european identity, political islam, and turkey’s potential accession to the european union through treating samuel huntington’s “clash of civilizations” as a bordering discourse. the article argues that the ‘clash thesis’ highlights uncertainty around cultural change in europe as well as a tension within european integration itself between the nation as state and the nation as political and cultural identity. discourses which position specific groups as being uneuropean, or less european can be linked to the shifting meaning of europe in light of political and economic integration and its affects on the nation as titular owner of the state. the article argues that the debate around the compatibility of islam and europe and therefore, also the debate around turkey’s accession to the european union must be situated within the context of boundary formations driven by im/migration to europe and within europe and the rise in public visibility and assertiveness by second and third generation islamic communities, thereby moving the debate beyond the self /other dichotomy upon which the ‘clash thesis’ functions by understanding the boundaries of europe as negotiable and culturally situated within a publicly mediated discourse about ‘europe’. review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 91 introduction samuel huntington’s provocative 1993 essay, “the clash of civilizations?” appeared at a time of tremendous geopolitical, social and intellectual change. this was especially true of europe during the 1990s with the reconfiguration of western europe’s political, legal and economic space through the signing of the maastricht treaty and the creation of the european union. in many respects, the maastricht treaty had the effect of creating a ‘core’ of european integration, and alongside it, arguably also created a core of ‘europe.’ as new states emerged in east-central europe, south-eastern europe violently exploded in ethnic violence. the stark dichotomy between ‘western europe’ and ‘eastern europe’ was transformed into new distinctions between ‘european’ and ‘uneuropean’ amid a renewed debate about europe as a cultural and political space. the political and perhaps cultural definition as well of europe increasingly seems *to be one defined in terms of proximity in geography as well political and economic practices to western europe – or the core of europe and european-ness. as a new geopolitical definition of europe was framed in the 1990s, eastern european countries looking to secure their independence and reassertion of their national trajectories as ‘european’ countries began their ‘return to europe’ by seeking membership in western europe’s political, economic and security arrangements to both re-establish their ‘european’ credentials as much as to benefit from western europe’s economic strength (iankova, 2006). in effect, ‘europe’ as a political and cultural space and as an identity * drafts of this article were presented to the euca-net young researchers network regional conference, 27 march 2007 at the university of british columbia, vancouver and to the daad doctoral student conference, june 12-june 15, 2007 at the duitsland instituut amsterdam, universiteit van amsterdam. the author is grateful to merje kuus and elke winter for their comments and suggestions. review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 92 category is produced by interactions between dominant and subordinate discourses (kuus, 2004:472,474: lefebvre, 2001). amidst this period of change, huntington’s essay connected two important themes: first, a cultural and geopolitical imagination of western europe – and the united states – as the bastion of progress, rationality and order, in essence of modernity, or simply put as the benchmark of modern civilization, and secondly, his essay mapped out new geopolitical boundaries for a european world where national and cultural identities were increasingly questioned and where the perceived threat posed by immigration and integration to redraw the imagined character of nations raises fundamental questions about the place of the state, religion, and the nation in the complex relationship that is sovereignty. the immigration debate has become one of the central questions confronting the european union; indeed, as a special issue of the journal of common market studies on migration and minorities in europe succinctly put it, the current political context in europe – between the first and second round of the eu’s eastward enlargement and at a time when the whole notion of a eu constitution and future enlargement (in particular in the case of turkey) have been called into question by the french and dutch rejections of the constitutional treaty makes discussion about minorities and migration issues particularly relevant (sasse and thielemann, 2005:655). in the case of migration and the growth of the muslim population in european states there is an increasing sense among some that muslim culture and european – or christian – culture constitute opposing projects. one pair of observers have gone so far as to comment that “[g]eopolitics are increasingly being interpreted as a clash between the secular west (europe and america) and societies in which religion plays a more prominent role in public life” (rogowski &turner, 2006:13). likewise, reza aslan has written that conflict between the west and islam is not a clash of civilizations but rather a ‘clash of monotheisms’ (2005:xv). aslan raises one of the central questions posed by review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 93 migration, enlargement and european integration as a cultural and political project: where is europe, what is europe and who is european? this article intervenes into the debate around european identity and enlargement, political islam, immigration and the potential accession of turkey to the european union not by discussing turkey’s economic, political and social structure, or by taking on huntington’s loaded analysis, but rather approaches enlargement by considering the idea of europe as a political and geographical project in which space, culture and religion are bound up in describing and locating ‘europe’ and european society. by understanding boundaries as negotiable, shifting and situated within a publicly mediated discourse about the place and meaning of ‘europe,’ these questions take shape within the context of the cleavages between the european political integration project and the nation-state, and between migration and local particularity and the imagined national character of the state. adrian hastings captures this succinctly in his 1996 wiles lectures: a nation-state is a state which identifies itself in terms of one specific nation whose people are not seen simply as ‘subjects’ of the sovereign but as a horizontally bonded society to whom the state in a sense belongs. there is thus an identity of character between state and people. … in it, ideally, there is a basic equivalence between the borders and the character of the political unit upon one hand and a self-conscious cultural community on the other (hastings, 1996:3). europe’s challenge is two-fold challenge: first, negotiating its external boundaries, of which turkey is a prime example; and second, negotiating its internal cultural dimension of which the questions of religion, migration, and the muslim population are core issues (delanty, 2006:139; dittmer, 2005:78; scott, 2005:432). it is increasingly possible to speak of multiple europes that correspond to neither the discursive framework of membership in the european union nor the core boundaries of the european nation-state (kuus, 2005:567). review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 94 making modern europe? the very idea of europe-ness or belonging to europe, and, therefore, questions about turkey and islam in europe, “involves a demarcation with respect to the noneuropean” (strath, 2000:405). the speed at which eastern and central europe was incorporated into the european discourse as ‘returning to europe’ starkly contrasts turkey’s efforts to join first the european community (ec), and now, the eu. while turkey applied for membership in 1987 to the then-ec seven years prior to the central and eastern european countries’ (ceec) applications to join its successor, it was only in october 2005 that turkey began accession talks while the ceecs, the mediterranean countries of cyprus and malta, and the former soviet republics of estonia, latvia and lithuania had already gained membership (nugent, 2004:39). it is perhaps accurate to say that the project of european integration is underwritten by a fundamental question that defines both eastern enlargement as well as the potential geographic and cultural limits of europe: is ‘europe’ a political, a geographically defined or a cultural/ civilizational project? valerie giscard d’estaing, formerly the chair of the convention for the drafting the european constitution, somewhat famously remarked “that an unbridgeable cultural divide existed between turkey and europe”; his assertion that turkey is not a european country and that its membership would bring about the end of the eu highlights such a civilization or cultural imagination of europe (wrr, 2004:15,22). western europe’s sizable and growing muslim population and the association of islam in general with fundamentalism form key elements of europe’s internal tensions; reza aslam has hinted that there is the fear the growing presence of muslims in europe review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 95 may in fact be reshaping europe as both physical and cultural spaces in a way that challenges european assumptions of cultural and political superiority (baker, 1997:33;.glavanis, 1998:392). in many senses this is the key question within which the turkish question must be situated. jocelyne cesari notes that the changing demographic make-up of europe and a growing muslim population has forced european society and europe as a cultural space to reopen an issue long considered ‘case-closed’ – the relationship of religion and the public sphere within officially secular society (cesari and mcloughlin, 2005:3). roger ballard has argued that the categories ‘european’ and ‘muslim’ are built upon constructed categories of oppositional cultural characteristics: european society is liberal and muslim society is fundamentalist, european society as progressive and modern while muslim society is traditional and backward-looking, democratic versus authoritarian, etc (ballard, 1996). the perceived conflict between islam and western society was dramatically catapulted to the forefront of the european public sphere with the debate over multiculturalism and islam in europe in the wake of the publication of salman rushdie’s novel, the satanic verses. europe’s self-identification with a rationalist and humanist heritage was confronted by european muslims’ expressions of outrage over the depiction of islam and the prophet as a false religion. at nearly the same time, the headscarf issue which would endure throughout the next decade and into the present day first emerged as a political and cultural debate in france following the 1989 expulsion of three muslim girls from a french school for wearing the traditional headscarf. the debate over the wearing of the islamic headscarf in french schools – and the headscarf ban eventually passed by the french assembly–revealed how closely narratives review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 96 of national identity are connected with notions of culture and identity. l’affaire du voile, or l’affaire foulard carried with it a sense – certainly one played up by right leaning politicians – that french society, cultural identity and even the french republic itself were under attack by minorities who not only refused to be french but were intent on undermining french identity (neilson, 2004:18-19; baban, 2006:186). in similar events to the controversy over the publication of the satanic verses, the so-called cartoon crisis, which recently swept throughout europe, is a further indication of tensions between cultural identity, multiculturalism, and pluralism. as with the rise in popularity of france’s far right front national during the 1990’s in the wake of the continuing controversy of the headscarf, heiko henkel observes that the recent electoral success in danish elections by the centre-right ventsre party was, in part, a result of the party’s electoral promises to address the problem of immigrants who refused to integrate into danish society. henkel observes, “danish society, with its traditionally strong ethos of equality and social proximity, have found it difficult to come to terms with the challenges of cultural heterogeneity produced by transnational migration” (2006:3). these events are central to looking at migration and european political integration as the nation-state remains, despite post-national claims around belonging and citizenship (soysal, 1994), the bedrock foundation of the european project; the nation-state and tensions between national identity and integration are likely to play out on the pan-european level, as the french and dutch rejections of the constitution treaty reflect. anthropologist paul silverstein notes, “muslims in europe remain racially suspect (like the jews and gypsies before them) as “witches”, as potential enemies review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 97 within, with states and scholars speculating on the orientation of their ultimate loyalties, whether towards european host polities or towards particular muslim homelands (or a more general dar al-islam) geographically and imaginatively located elsewhere”(silverstein, 2005:366). tariq ramadan has noted that to be critical of western european or american treatment of muslims and be a muslim is discursively redacted into a oppositional binary, that is to say, one is more muslim then french, or dutch, or american, for example, and thus closes off the debate about multiculturalism into questions of loyalty and the maintenance of the cultural and political status quos (silverstein 2005:29). on the national and local levels, the construction of mosques, the shift in demographics, and the emergence of assertive migrant communities making spatial and identity claims create not only ethnic spaces and reshape the local face, they also reshape national space from the local level upwards (hudson, 2000:409-10). as muslim activist abdelaziz eljaouhari acutely illustrated: …france's so-called "republican model," he said furiously, means in practice "i speak french, am called jean-daniel, and have blue eyes and blond hair." if you are called abdelaziz, have a darker skin, and are muslim to boot, the french republic does not practice what it preaches. "what égalité is there for us?" he asked. "what liberté? what fraternité?" and then he delivered his personal message to nicolas sarkozy, the hard-line interior minister and leading right-wing candidate to succeed jacques chirac as french president, in words that i will never forget. "moi," said abdelaziz eljaouhari, in a ringing voice, "moi, je suis la france!"(ash, 2006) that simple, yet striking evocation, “je suis la france,” gets to the core of europe’s identity crisis. alongside migration from former colonies in north african and south asia to the united kingdom, france, and the netherlands and labour migration to germany from turkey changes in europe have redrawn the political and cultural formations of both the locality as well as the national identity. anssi passi points out a tendency to speak of europe and the european union as one and the same entity. this is revealing of how deeply the discursive framework of europe and producing europe has review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 98 been enveloped within and in some senses been taken over by the political and economic performances of europe as a social, geographic and cultural space linked with european integration (passi, 2005:582). the civilization question notwithstanding, germany’s foreign minister, joschka fischer, has commented that, “european enlargement will have to end somewhere” (hudson, 2000:411). on a continental level the accession of turkey would expand the european union’s political and geographical borders creating a shared border with iran, syria, the republic of georgia and armenia. such a wide reaching expansion holds important ramifications for the imagination of europe’s physical and cultural boundaries. as the borders of europe are pushed further from the ‘core’, questions about a european identity are being pushed to the forefront. on the national level, the immigration question has intensified debate about the social and cultural practices that define national identity, just as enlargement has done politically for europe. henkel has argued the growing presence and practice of religious muslims, and the growth of islamic religious/cultural associations and institutions has advanced an “extraordinary provocation” to liberal society already anxious over their muslim populations (henkel, 2006:2-3). like henkel, barbara thériault and frank peter argue that muslim practices, such as religious rules on the slaughter of cattle, demands for muslim confessional schools and mosques, and the growth of muslim representative bodies all raise important questions about the role of religion in the public sphere (thériault and peter, 2005:261). the increasing visibility of islam evokes fears that european secularism as a cultural norm, and thus potentially european-ness is under attack (cesari, 2005:4). taking into account that europe currently has a population of approximately 23 million muslims, or comprising around 5% of europe’s population, the review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 99 addition of turkey would only bolster that figure to around 15% (savage, 2004:26-27). perhaps the most moving figures for a civilization bordering of europe, besides the history of europe which reveals that muslims have long been a part of europe, are figures that suggest upwards of half of western europe’s muslim population were in fact born in western europe and therefore are by a geographical definition ‘europeans’ (savage, 2004:28). robert leiken, director of the immigration and national security program at the nixon center writes in the same journal that catapulted the “clash thesis” to fame, “muslims of western europe are likely to be distinct, cohesive and bitter” (leiken, 2005:120-35). the bitterness leiken points to hints at the frustrations of muslims in europe as they engage in the social and political emancipation processes through which minority groups attempt to acquire a place within the nation-state. muslims, thijl sunier argues, are obliged to organize themselves as muslims in order to bring the associational and community aspects of their identity together to pursue political goals relative to their position in the host society (2005:321). national identity and european identity are locked into a binary; migration is changing the national character as upward pressure on the nation-state while european political integration compresses the traditional markers of the state while perhaps also framing new external boundaries that supplant the nation-state’s (asad, 2002:217). the public sphere where identity is presented and debated is conceptualized by liberal idealism as a value-neutral space, but is, in fact, quite the opposite. it is a space framed by discourses of national, cultural and even continental imaginations, such as the review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 100 imagined nature of the community and the nation (sunier, 2005:325; wimmer 2002:8587). france if boundaries between cultures are lenses through which ‘europe’ should be understood as a discourse, then the muslim question might be best situated and understood within the cultural context of the nation. here france is an excellent example. one of the key aspects of french political culture and identity is a strict separation between the pubic sphere and the religious sphere. the strong assimilationist ethos of french political identity demands the ultimate loyalty of the citizen to the french state; on the surface this discourse asserts that individual identity is first and foremost constituted, regardless of ethnic, religious or cultural differences, as french. in a larger sense this is part of what jørgen nielsen describes as the liberal myth of europe, the social reality of a multicultural europe and the reality of cultural encounter in europe (2004:154-55). modern day france’s muslim population can be traced to waves of migration from the north african colonies as a result of both decolonization and french industry’s demand for cheap unskilled labour during the 1950’s and 60s. these waves of migration increasingly altered the physical landscape of french society by creating ‘ethnic’ communities isolated from the surrounding political and cultural landscape. from an original influx of around 846,000 algerians, 270,000 moroccans and 150,000 tunisians, muslims now number between four and six million, or about 8% of france’s total review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 101 population. they are also the largest and fastest growing minority population and france’s second largest religious denomination (pauly, 2004:33,36). this migrant body brought with them their religious and cultural traditions, and, given their marginalization in french society, the retention of these identities, especially in the face of exclusion, was central to both individual as well as the community’s integrity and survival (pauly 2004:37; neilson 1999:8). as france’s foreign labour immigration policies changed in response to the economic stagnation that swept through western europe in the 1970’s, the majority of migrant workers permanently settled in france and increasingly made use of provisions under french law to reunite their families, creating a permanent muslim population (pauly, 2004:37). the first generation of muslim migrants saw themselves as outsiders and placed more emphasize on maintaining their cultural community than in attempting to break down the barriers against inclusion into a society that rejected them as culturally different. their exclusion led to the rise of immigrant associations and communities concentrated in the suburbs around major metropolitan cities. it is essential to note the structural basis of french citizenship and naturalization laws at this junction for they become increasingly relevant. france’s jus soli citizenship model grants automatic french citizenship, regardless of the parent’s residency and citizenship status to children born in france provided they remain throughout their adolescence. children born on french soil gain french citizenship at the age of 13 by the request of their parents, at 16 by their own request and automatically at age 18 (benhabib, 2004:157). in contrast to first generation muslims, second and third generations of muslims, raised, educated and socialized to the values of french society and culture, were less wiling to abide continued review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 102 marginalization and wrestled with being both french by citizenship and muslim by religion and culture (pauly, 2004:49). as french-algerian writer sadek sellam points out, having seen the way their parents were received in french society and, likewise, how they as secondand third-generation muslims were received, they advanced a fundamental challenge to the french political identity by demanding and asserting a stake in that identity through political, cultural and social institutions which paralleled and even began to challenge french institutions (pauly, 2004:49). unemployment among france’s muslim youth, with unemployment rates high among french youth in general as the recent attempt to introduce the first contract laws reflect, are strikingly higher and increasingly seen as racially motivated among muslims; for them, the banlieues become spaces of exclusion (pauly, 2004:55). here in the banlieues the contest for space takes center stage: the contest for mosques and the attendant spiritual requirements of muslim faith. the building of a mosque is a visual and architectural statement that french society has changed permanently. james corbett has argued that france has never been a multicultural society: foreigners are expected to fit into the french model (pauly, 2004:46). the mosque as both physical and cultural space is therefore a reshaping of the visible face of the local community as islam moves from the private sphere to the public. jocelyne cesari writes the “mosque is central to islam’s urban visibility and is the centre of muslim communal life. it is not only a space for prayer but also a “community centre; where pre-existing social networks of solidarity come together…”(cesari, 2005:1017). the building of a mosque reflects not only a community centre, physically, but also a claim on permanence and presence. cesari argues that the act of requesting space, that is seeking building permits, or engaging in review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 103 the bureaucratic process of purchasing land for a purpose built religious space represents a dialogue between islamic and secular society. as france’s muslim population has grown beyond the confines of prayer rooms in the back of stores and private homes the necessity of larger purpose built religious spaces began to reshape the public’s awareness of islam. in the case of mantes-la-jolie, stiff resistance against the purchase of space within the town core and tensions within the local community and among local politicians was the most significant factor in the contest for space. the successful negotiation of space and building of the mosque, complete with an 18 meter high minaret, in this instance, represented not only a combination of personal and political entrepreneurship between representatives of the local muslim community and the mayor, but also a realization that the contest for space involved a recognition that the community’s ethnic and cultural make-up had changed. the mosque represents not only the local muslim community’s presence it also represents the evolutions of french society and the muslim community. second and third-generation muslims have led this shift from private and small prayer rooms to the building of public mosques. although notable reservations and resistance to the changing of local space have culminated in specific incidents such as the destruction of a local prayer room in one town or the refusal of the paris city council to allow the expansion of the addawa mosque in the 19th arrondissement, muslims are increasingly and successfully changing the particularities of local space as their community grows and they enter into a dialogue with french society, and likewise as french society enters into a dialogue with the muslim community (cesari, 2005:1028). in a striking paradox, cesari has shown that conflict and competition to lead the community between muslim groups, review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 104 backed by different traditions within islam and also affiliations with foreign religious organizations and countries of origin, have proven in two specific cases the larger obstacle to the building of a mosque than local levels of government. since the rushdie and headscarf affairs, the building of mosques in france has actually increased with the local community as well as national levels of government being increasingly more involved in negotiating the boundaries of space. the creation of a muslim advisory council by the minister of the interior further contributed to reshaping the public perception and visibility of islam in france by bringing islam into dialogue with the state. it is worth reflecting that the effort to create a privileged interlocutor between the state and the muslim community also carries with it efforts to bring some form of french political control over islam in french society, a clear departure from the established policy of laïcité. (ferrari, 2005:17). increased dialogue, as well as the rise of a professional body educated and steeped in the cultural specificity of french society and able to speak to french society in its own terms of references has started to change french perceptions of muslims and resistance to the visible representation of muslims in french society. indeed, it seems remarkably ironic that efforts to build a new large mosque in marseilles were stalled not by mainstream french society and politicians but rather by a rift between muslim groups over control of the mosque. it is even more striking that local non-muslim politicians played the role of intermediary and mediator between two separate muslim groups (cesari, 2005:1032). in the case of marseilles, during the peak of controversy and tensions between french society and muslim society, the local mayor voiced strong support for the building of a large mosque. he was widely attacked from review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 105 across the political spectrum and especially by the far right for his position (neilson, 2004:165). the front national’s leader, jean-marie le pen, argued against inclusion and allowing, to say nothing of creating, a visible presence for muslims by advancing a notion of muslims as the threat within, whose loyalties rest outside of france: there are six million muslim citizens who are recent arrivals. they entered in civilian dress, in jeans. they would never let six million people with weapons enter our territory. but a person in jeans can become a soldier. if, despite their french citizenship, these muslims feel an affiliation with another entity, they naturally become suspect in the eyes of those who one day will be compelled to confront them. (european islam, http://www.euro-islam.info/pages/france.html (accessed june 1, 2007.) in contrast to voices from the right, such as le pen, who constantly evoke an anti-migrant anti-minority platform, the election campaign of jean-claude gaudin for mayor of marseilles 10 years later made completing marseilles’ large mosque a central goal of his administration. the building of mosques has another dimension in french politics: the growing size of the muslim electorate and its ability to force local mayors through the power of the ballot box to, if not cater to their concerns, at least give heed to them. this has been reflected not only in the rise of halal butchers and a body among france’s muslim society to certify meat as halal, but also in the creation and sectioning off of muslim only sections in local cemeteries. the public contest for space over mosques also plays out on a individual level; the headscarf affair is a prime example of this, for the contest for space is not just individual, but also social and self-identification in that the visible representation of religion challenges the french political sense of laïcité, as well as national identity in ways which the building of a mosque may not. the headscarf is frequently mobilized by anti-islamic discourses as a symbolic representation of the rejection of progress, of female review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 106 emancipation and islam’s fundamentally backward nature and anti-modern character. in short, it is the characterization of islam as the antithesis of french society. in september 1989 three muslim students at the collège gabriel havez were suspended from school for wearing the headscarf. nilüfer göle writes, “the public school is the pillar of the formation of citizenship in the republican french sense; it is in the school that individuals are distanced from their local attachments, class origins, regional accents, ethnic differences, and religious convictions in order to embrace a universal knowledge and become french citizens” (göle, 2006:252). ironically, the initiation point for the headscarf affair had little, if anything, to do with muslims; it was the small town of creil when the local school board passed a ban on overt expressions of religion as a response to the routine absence of pupils from the local jewish community for the first 10 days of the school year and from saturday classes on religious grounds. quite quickly a debate emerged on the national level which culminated in the passage in november 1989 of a national law on secular society which articulated that public officials must remain religiously neutral though remained silent on whether the wearing of religious symbols by students or users of public services contravened the principles of the republic (european commission, 2004:15). the issue was quickly raised to the conseil d’etat (the french supreme court), which ruled that the state must allow personal freedom on conscience but placed the power to define when the wearing of religious symbols was disruptive of public order and the learning environment back into the hands of local schools. the larger issue posed by the headscarf in the public realm was its perception as a direct attack on secularity and the public school as a tool for the integration of migrants into french school, and the transforming of the public school review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 107 into a site for the maintenance of difference (neilson, 2004:165). this debate continued through many interventions and culminated after fifteen years in the passing of a bill in 2004 banning ostentatious religious symbols from public schools. the place of the headscarf and the trajectory of l’affaire du foulard, the building of mosques and the role of religion in french society are all interwoven and have came to represent the ‘dilemmas of french national identity’ in light of increasing cultural diversity, french traditions of laïcité and an emerging european level of citizenship which breaks down the barriers of strictly national citizenship and identity as they force a retelling of the national myth in which the stakeholders have changed (benhabib, 2004:190). nations do not exist in time eternal, but rather must be imagined and reaffirmed constantly (anderson, 1983; billig, 1995). as the demographic and cultural make-up of french society changes and as second and third generations of muslims increasingly take a more active role and engage in the public discourse of french society, the visible, physical, and architectural face of french society and the public sphere is likewise changing. holland in holland, the contest for public space, as in france, is equally intertwined with the changing shape of the nation and debates over whether muslims can belong to the nation, and if so, can they maintain their own cultural and religious identities within the public sphere (sunier, 2005:319). the parallels with france are striking, as religion in the netherlands is increasingly being pushed from the public sphere as the defining character of the nation – it is worth recalling the calvinist heritage of the netherlands – the growth review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 108 of the netherlands’ muslim community and the emergence of islamic communities and associations have increasingly placed religion back on the public agenda. as in france, the local muslim community tends to live in the poorer suburbs of larger cities, in the achterstandswijken, or backwards neighbourhoods where they have developed and utilized a network of private and communal arrangements to cater for personal and community needs, such as private prayer rooms that emerged first to cater to temporary migrant workers (sunier, 2005: 326). the turning point was reached when both the muslim community and local governments realized that the ‘myth of return’ was exactly that, and that the netherlands’ muslim population was a permanent fixture. muslim migration into the netherlands, as was the case in france, initially stemmed from the netherlands’ former colonial possessions and economic migration. turkish migrants comprise the largest source of muslim immigration, and as in france, the migrant body has used family reunification laws to reunite families in the netherlands. dutch statistics placed holland’s foreign born muslim population at 405,000 in 1989, a decade later those numbers had grown to 700,000, with those from turkish extraction making at the largest segment at 285,000 (savage, 2004:32). over two-thirds of dutch muslims now hold citizenship (neilson, 2004:63). there are some key differences in terms of the contest for space: first of all, unlike german and french citizenship models, the dutch model grants city-voting rights to those who have been resident in a city after five years. this translates into non-nationals, such as migrants or those on work contracts, after five years obtaining a stake in shaping the local political environment, and through the local level influencing the national level (benhabib, 2004:157-58). review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 109 alongside the growth of the muslim community was a growth in what sunier has termed ‘entrepreneurs’ who actively advocated for the pillarization of islam in dutch society, and alongside it the educational and social infrastructure necessary for the inclusion of muslims into the fabric of dutch society. as in france, the physical face of dutch society was the touchstone for a serious reevaluation of the place of muslims in dutch society in light of a proposal to build a large central mosque in amsterdam. the amsterdam mosque was a political as well as cultural lighting bolt, bringing the local muslim community and local government into conflict with the local muslim association (mili görüsh) not only over the construction of a foreign or islamic symbol in the heart of the baarsjes neighbourhood but also into conflict with the local government’s plans for urban renewal and the addition of more housing, which the presence of the mosque would have blocked. as the debate dragged on obstentiously over urban planning, the comprise that was reached is telling about the underlying issues: the visual representation of islam and the creation of alien or ethnic geography in the heart of amsterdam. as one representative put it, after nearly two decades of conflict over the building the mosque: we do not want an ugly big white pastry in our neighbourhood, like you sometimes see when they build a new mosque. our mosque will be completely in style of the ‘amsterdam school’ (architectural style) so that it fits perfectly in the neighbourhood and becomes a real dutch mosque (sunier, 2005:325). the decision to design the mosque in line with the amsterdam school of design represents as much dutch local fears and resistance to the islamicization of amsterdam as it does a conflict over the use of the particular site (sunier, 2005:88). in rotterdam, the local muslim association’s plan to build the “biggest mosque in europe” likewise ignited a heated debate not only about architecture and visible space, but also the core identity of dutch society and the place, if any for islam in dutch society review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 110 (sunier, 2005:325). in terms of religious infrastructure, data from 1999 places the number of purpose-built mosques in the netherlands at 30. this is in large part to earlier dutch experiments in the pillarization in which the dutch state actually gave money to various muslim associations for the express purpose of constructing purpose built mosques. this policy ended in the mid 1980s as the dutch state and dutch society shifted towards a form of laïcité (neilson, 2004:64). the larger number of mosques is also joined by a number of muslim confessional schools (some 32 had opened by 2000). the debate over space in the netherlands therefore differs substantially from the french case, given earlier state involvement and management through labour contracts with third countries; it does, however, have the same context, as the debate over national identity as urban renewal projects illustrates. it is striking, however, that the engagement and dialogue between the local muslim community and muslim associations and local government was seen as essential in order to bring the government’s urban renewal pans to fruition. this raises important questions about the demographic shift and likewise the shift in electoral power. the active engagement with muslim associations and the muslim community was a bargaining or negotiating process in which the local rotterdam government reached an agreement for the building of large purpose built mosque in exchange for change in architectural design, and a reshaping of urban space through an agreement to build one large mosque rather than the creation of smaller mosques throughout the neighbourhood. this process reflects both a politics of recognition as well as a politics of space. in this example, the local dutch community accepted the visible place of islam within rotterdam and the muslim community accepted that space, through the public dialogue review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 111 and agreement between the local government and the muslim community on building a number of big mosques and restricting the construction of smaller mosques, as a mediated location in terms of both physical, cultural, architectural space as well as social space in which co-existence and cooperation was not only possible but preferable. the discursive space of national inclusion and national identity is continually fraught with disjunctions, and for some, the sentiments evoked during the rushdie affair of muslims as a ‘fifth column’ or potential threat (ala le pen) came flooding back into the discursive narrative of europe and the cleavages between societies with the events of 2001 and the subsequent war in the middle-east directed at muslim fundamentalism, the assassination of right leaning politician pim fortuyn in 2002, and the assassination of theo van gogh by a moroccan immigrant (sunier, 2005:324). these events shifted concerns about migrants and islam back onto the level of national identity, with laws now in place to restrict the import of imams from outside of the netherlands over concerns that imported imams will bring non-dutch perspectives and fundamentalism into holland and radicalize muslims in dutch society (sunier, 2005:92). space, visibility and the contexts of national and pan-national identities are still deeply contested; the ‘politics of cultural avoidance,’ as nilufer göle has termed it, can no longer work in either the netherlands, nor in france, nor in the european union (göle, 2006:11). in a sense, during a debate with a representative of the christian democrat party, a representative from the arab league summed up the new reality: “we [muslims] are no longer asking for something as if we are guests. we demand our place in society as equal citizens, whether you guys like it or not.” unless european countries, and the european union as an overarching body, are willing to conscience stripping muslims of their citizenships, as review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 112 jean-marie le pen has advocated in the case of france, the question of turkey and cooperation and co-existence between differing religious and cultural traditions is best framed in terms of governance capacity, electoral and institutional design than as a clash of civilizations. conclusion in terms of mediating conflicts between islam and ‘european’ society, neither europe, nor the civic nation-state, as in the case of france, provides a neutral public sphere. the resistance to change, both in the sense of public recognition of differing cultural traditions nor in creating the space for entering into an equal dialogue are underwritten by value assumptions which new culturally distinct groups, such as islamic migrants are forced to contend with. central and eastern europe, in the context of european integration and ‘returning to europe,’ did not enter into negotiations as equal partners, nor have muslims entered into a dialogue with european society as equal partners. as william connelly remarks, “[i]dentity requires difference in order to be, and it converts difference in order to secure its own self-certainty” (1991:64). this is in part both ‘europe’ and the european nation-states’ dilemma. the national identity, which immigrants are expected to purchase, or buy into, in fact requires the constant evocation of the national identity, in effect the constant performance of being french or dutch or british and even european as an identity. immigrants and european integration challenge that reenactment by changing the participants. europe is more than an economic and political space; europe is also a space where ideological and modernization have highlighted differences with others, and produced borders and boundaries through which review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 113 to secure self-identity. however, as anssi paasi notes, territories and their meanings are created and made by human beings; certainly the european project is perhaps one of the best examples (2005:580). the accession of a country of nearly 70 million muslims, the shifting and artificial and discursively constructed boundaries of europe, a markedly higher birth rate among muslims, the building of mosques and the wearing of the headscarf in the streets, in the classrooms and the presence of islam in the public sphere is changing the visible and demographic face of europe and directly contests a europeanization agenda by asking ‘what is europe?’ change on the local level, as the contest for muslim space within french and dutch society illustrates, is challenging the national identity myth and european identity while the expansion of a political order above the national order, and to which the western european nation-state is both legally and given the political experience of europe in the twentieth society, perhaps morally bound too, is likewise challenging the nation-state definition illustrated by hastings. europe and the meaning of europe are constantly shifting discursively and publicly negotiated identity category rather than a given and fixed a culturally or civilizationally situated category. one researcher has commented, “turkey can provide a vital bridge between islam and the west and try to reduce the threat of religious extremism between the west and east” (bbc, 2007). the accession question is not a one-way dialogue, dominated by european debates about whether or not to admit turkey, but also a debate about the place of islam and muslims in european identity. tensions and uncertainty in western europe over the presence of muslims in europe and the potential accession of turkey to the eu is not indicative of a ‘clash of civilizations’ but rather is indicative of europe’s internal identity review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 114 crisis. the religious and racial markers that have been mobilized to produce otherness is a context for space both at the national level as it is europe wide as the discursive framework of ‘europe’ continues to evolve and is shaped by cultural interaction. defining turkey as europe’s new ‘other’ would, in all likelihood, produce a sharp border between ‘christian’ europe and islamic turkey that would continue to play out as further tensions between europe and the muslims within nation-states (passi, 2005:581). in a 1995 interview, the polish diplomat tadeusz marowiecki, following his resignation as the united nations representative for human rights in bosnia with the outbreak of civil war, when asked if as a pole and a christian he found it strange that he should be defending the rights of bosnia’s muslims, expressed no surprise at the premise, that as a eastern european by geography, and a christian by faith he should stand up and criticize the international and european community for failing bosnia’s muslims. his comment, “it bodes ill for us...if, at the end of the twentieth century, europe is still incapable of coexistence with a muslim community” stands as a warning to ‘europe’ as a community, as an emerging pan-national political body and as a political culture for the future (asad, 2002:213). the clash of civilizations thesis is constantly evoked to reduce the cultural meaning of europe as a space into a new binary of european /modern and islam/backwards as europe grapples with the external boundaries of both the nation-state and the political integration project. boundaries are negotiated spaces both on the individual and the international level. the debate over turkey is perhaps the mirror image of europe’s efforts to find itself in a changing world. review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 115 bibliography anderson, benedict. 1991. imagined communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism. rev. and extended ed. london; new york: verso. arikan, harun. 2006. turkey and the eu : an awkward candidate for eu membership? 2nd ed. aldershot, hampshire, england; burlington, vt: ashgate. asad, talad. 2002. muslims and european identity: can europe represent islam. in the idea of europe: from antiquity to the european union, edited by a. pagden. washington, dc cambridge; new york: woodrow wilson center press ;cambridge university press. ash, timothy garton 2006. islam in europe new york review of books 53 (15). aslan, reza. 2005. no god but god: the origins, evolution, and future of islam. new york: random house. baban, feyzi. 2006. from gastarbeiter to ausländische mitbürger: postnational citizenship and in-between identities in berlin. citizenship studies 10 (2): 185 201. ballard, roger. 1996. islam and the construction of europe. centre for applied south asian studies university of manchester. beckford, james a. 2005. muslims in the prisons of britain and france. journal of contemporary european studies 13 (3): 287-297. benhabib, seyla. 2004. the rights of others: aliens, residents and citizens, the john robert seeley lectures; 5. cambridge; new york: cambridge university press. billig, michael. 1995. banal nationalism. london; thousand oaks, calif.: sage. british broadcasting service. 2007. turkey's eu bid: readers' views: bbc. caeiro, alexandre. 2005. religious authorities or political actors? the muslim leaders of the french representative body of islam. in european muslims and the secular state, edited by jocelyn cesari, et al. europe. aldershot, hants, england; burlington, vt: ashgate pub. co. cesari, jocelyne. 2004. islamic minorities’ rights in europe and the usa. in the legal treatment of islamic minorities in europe, edited by r. aluffi beck-peccoz and g. zincone. leuven: peeters. review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 116 ———. 2005. mosques in french cities: towards the end of a conflict? journal of ethnic and migration studies 31 (6):1025-1043. connolly, william e. 1991. identity/difference: democratic negotiations of political paradox. ithaca, n.y.: cornell university press. de galembert, claire. 2005. the city's nod of approval for the mantes-la-jolie mosque project: mistaken traces of recognition. journal of ethnic and migration studies 31 (6): 1141-1159. delanty, gerard. 1995. inventing europe: idea, identity, reality. houndmills, basingstoke, hampshire: macmillan press. ———. 2006. europe becoming: the civilizational consequences of enlargement. in the shape of the new europe, edited by r. rogowski and c. turner. cambridge, uk ; new york: cambridge university press. delanty, gerard, and chris rumford. 2005. rethinking europe: social theory and the implications of europeanization. london; new york: routledge. dittmer, jason. 2005. nato, the eu and central europe: differing symbolic shapes in newspaper accounts of enlargement. geopolitics 10 (1):76 98. european commission. 2004. islam and fundamental rights in europe, edited by d.-g. j. a. h. a. european commission. brussels european commission, directorategeneral justice and home affairs. ferrari, silvio. 2004. islam in europe: an introduction to legal problems and perspectives. in the legal treatment of islamic minorities in europe, edited by r. aluffi beckpeccoz and g. zincone. leuven: peeters. ———. 2005. the secularity of the state and the shaping of muslim representative organizizations in western europe. in european muslims and the secular state, edited by j. cesari and s. mcloughlin. aldershot, hampshire, england; burlington, vt: ashgate. glavanis, pandeli. 1998. political islam within europe: a contribution to the analytic framework. innovation 11 (4): 391-410. gole, nilufer. 2006. islam resetting the european agenda? public culture 18 (1): 11-14. ———. 2006. europe's encounter with islam: what future? constellations 13 (2): 248262. review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 117 hastings, adrian. 1997. the construction of nationhood: ethnicity, religion, and nationalism. cambridge; new york: cambridge university press. henkel, heiko. 2006. the provocation of islam: reflections on the encounter of contemporary german society and turkish islam. islam in the european public sphere. brigham young university. ———. 2006. the journalists of jyllands-posten are a bunch of reactionary provocateurs. radical philosophy 137 (may-june): 2-7. hudson, ray. 2000. one europe or many? reflections on becoming european. transactions of the institute of british geographers 25 (4): 409-426. iankova, elena. 2006. eastern european capitalism in the making. new york: cambridge university press. kuus, merje. 2004. europe's eastern expansion and the reinscription of otherness in eastcentral europe. progress in human geography 28 (4): 472-489. ———. 2005. multiple europes: boundaries and margins in european union enlargement. geopolitics 10 (3): 567-570. lefebvre, henri. 1991. the production of space. oxford, ox, uk; cambridge, mass., usa: blackwell. leiken, robert. 2005. europe's angry muslims. foreign affairs 84 (4): 120-135. nielsen, jørgen s. 1999. towards a european islam, migration, minorities, and citizenship. houndmills, basingstoke, hampshire, new york: macmillan press; st. martin's press. ———. 2004. muslims in western europe. 3rd ed, new edinburgh islamic surveys. edinburgh: edinburgh university press. nugent, neill. 2004.the unfolding of the 10 + 2 enlargement round. in european union enlargement, edited by n. nugent. houndmills, basingshire, hapshire; new york: palgrave macmillan. osman, bakar. 1997. islam and civilizational dialogue : the quest for a truly universal civilization. kuala lumpur: university of malaya press. paasi, anssi. 2005. remarks on europe’s transforming meta-geography. geopolitics 10 (3): 580-585. pauly, robert j. 2004) islam in europe : integration or marginalization? aldershot, hants, england ; burlington, vt: ashgate. review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 118 ramadan, tariq. 2005. europe's muslims show the way. new perspectives quarterly 22 (1): 28-33. sasse, gwendolyn, and eiko thielemann. 2005. a research agenda for the study of migrants and minorities in europe. jcms: journal of common market studies 43 (4): 655-671. savage, timothy. 2004. europe and islam: crescent waxing, cultures clashing. the washington quarterly 27 (3): 26-27. scott, james wesley. 2005. the eu and wider europe: toward an alternative geopolitics of regional cooperation? geopolitics 10 (3): 429454. silverstein, paul a. 2005. immigrant racialization and the new savage slot: race, migration, and immigration in the new europe. annual review of anthropology 34 (1):363-384. soysal, yasemin nuho glu. 1994. limits of citizenship: migrants and postnational membership in europe. chicago: university of chicago. sunier, thijl. 2005. interests, identities and the public sphere: representing islam in the netherlands since the 1980’s. in european muslims and the secular state, edited by j. cesari and s. mcloughlin. aldershot, hants, england ; burlington, vt: ashgate pub. co. ———. 2005. constructing islam: places of worship and the politics of space in the netherlands. journal of contemporary european studies 13 (3): 317-334. wetenschappelijke raad voor het regeringsbeleid (wrr-netherlands), and erik jan zürcher. 2004. the european union, turkey and islam. amsterdam: amsterdam university press. wimmer, andreas. 2002. nationalist exclusion and ethnic conflict: shadows of modernity. cambridge: cambridge university press. microsoft word per a. rudling_denmark as the big satan projections of scandinavia in the arab world and the future of multicu review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved ……………………………………………… denmark as the big satan: projections of scandinavia in the arab world and the future of multiculturalism per anders rudling abstract during the winter and spring of 2006, denmark and scandinavia faced its most serious crisis since world war ii. the conflict started as a danish newspaper published a number of cartoons, some of which portrayed the prophet muhammad. after the danish government rejected their requests to censor the media, danish islamists distributed these pictures to some senior political and religious figures in the middle east and requested their support against denmark. to these pictures, they added a number of more offensive images, never published in any danish newspaper in order to infuriate muslims around the world. muslim clerics, assisted by the governments of saudi arabia, syria and iran caused the region to explode in protest and violent riots, in which 44 people were killed. danish products were boycotted across the muslim world; scandinavian embassies were attacked and set ablaze in syria, iran, lebanon and indonesia. islamists promised substantial rewards for anyone who would murder danish and norwegian peacekeepers, and scandinavian un forces were attacked in palestine and afghanistan. the scandinavian countries and the eu are struggling to find a way to address the issue of radical islam within their societies, and how to defend liberal democratic values from attacks from its enemies. this process may lead to a redefinition of values, a shift from multiculturalism to an embrace of the democratic western values upon which the european states are based. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 74 in the summer of 2005, världskulturmuseet, the museum of world culture in gothenburg, sweden, decided to censure an art exhibit and remove a painting, which was said to offend muslims. the painting removed by the museum had a sexual motif and a quotation from the koran. a discourse of multiculturalism and fear of offending the sizable muslim community dictated what predominantly non-muslim museum visitors in a secular country were allowed to see. a few months later, the tate gallery in london cancelled an exhibit by avant-garde artist john lathham depicting the koran, bible and talmud torn to pieces.1 in september the same year, kåre bluitgen, a danish writer of books for children had trouble finding an illustrator for a book about the life of muhammad. out of fear for terror and physical repercussions, three artists turned down the offer. when an artist, prepared to illustrate the children’s book was finally found, she/he agreed only on conditions of strict anonymity. shortly thereafter liberal danish prime minister anders fogh rasmussen was approached by a delegation of imams, demanding that the prime minister to interfere with the danish press in order to produce a more positive coverage of islam. concerned about increasing self-censorship across the european union, and perceiving that intellectual freedoms were under siege, flemming rose, citing these specific events, the cultural editor of the provincial danish newspaper jyllands-posten decided to announce a competition about the best cartoons of muhammad. rose has a background as correspondent in the soviet union, and professes to have a particular sensitivity to censorship on the ground of insult. 1 “inget öppet samhälle untan hädelse, ” dagens nyheter, january 11, 2006. fleming rose, “why i published those cartoons,” jyllands-posten, february 19, 2006. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 75 this is a popular trick of totalitarian movements: label any critique or call for debate as an insult and punish the offenders. that is what happened to human rights activists and writers such as andrei sakharov, vladimir bukovsky, alexander solzhenitsyn, nathan sharansky, boris pasternak. the regime accused them of anti-soviet propaganda, just as some muslims are labeling 12 cartoons in a danish newspaper antiislamic. the lesson from the cold war is: if you give in to totalitarian impulses once, new demands follow. the west prevailed in the cold war because we stood by our fundamental values and did not appease totalitarian tyrants.2 on september 30, 2006, the danish newspaper jyllands-posten published 12 cartoons, some of them said to portrait muhammad, others making fun of suicide bombers, danish politicians, and talibans. few people in denmark would have guessed the commotion that was to follow. the conflict very soon escalated into something much more than just a conflict between a newspaper and its readership. to be sure, this was not the first, nor will it be the last time representatives of religious establishments have felt their ideological or esthetic sensibilities offended. as the finnish contribution to the eurovision song content in athens, greece later on in 2006 was a heavy metal band by the name “lordi,” consisting of a number of axe and chain-saw wielding monsters singing a song titled “hard rock hallelujah,” representatives of the orthodox churches of finland, greece and cyprus protested, complaining about the name “lordi” as sacrilege, and attempted to prevent them from participating in the eurovision contest, which they subsequently won.3 these vain attempts at preventing a rock band from participating in the eurovision on grounds of offending orthodox clergy made it to the mainstream mass media only by its curiosity value. by and large, christian charges of blasphemy are not taken very seriously in europe in the 21st century. 2 fleming rose, “why i published those cartoons,” jyllands-posten, february 19, 2006. paul reynolds, “cartoons: divisions and inconsistencies”, bbc news, february 13, 2006. 3 “finns shocked by eurovision band,” bbc new online, april 20, 2006. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 76 therefore it came as a shock that an editorial decision of a provincial danish newspaper would create an international crisis that would lead to dozens of people killed around the world and european embassies burned by fanatical mobs.4 protest, formally aimed against the publications of cartoons turned into violent attack on danish and other european embassies around the world, and an outright onslaught on their open societies. as of march 22, 2006 the conflict surrounding the cartoons has left 139 dead (not including the 146 killed in related riots in nigeria), over 800 injured. in addition, more than 10,000 are unemployed as a result of political embargoes; dozens of buildings, not only european embassies and consulates, but also christian churches, and fast foods restaurants have been torched and vandalized.5 for denmark, one of the most secular countries in the world, this was the first time since the thirty years war that a conflict with religious connotation had had such an impact. the publication of these cartoons violates a convention in the salafi and wahhabi strains of sunni islam that the prophet should not be depicted. this influence of this strain of sunni islam has grown during the past decades. this is partly due to saudi financing and increasing influence of muslim communities world wide. there is no prohibition against depicting muhammad in the koran. the prohibition of reproducing images of muhammad postdates his death. palaces and mosques from the earliest period of islam contain pictures of men and animals.6 images of muhammad can be seen in mosques and museums across the muslim world: in istanbul, bukhara, samarkand and haroun-walat (a suburb of isfahan, iran). several contemporary iranian and arab 4 by march 6, 2006, 44 people had been killed in protests against the cartoons, most of them in nigeria, afghanistan and pakistan. svenska dagbladet, march 6, 2006. 5 see http://www.cartoonbodycount.com/ (accessed march 22, 2006) 6 leif stenberg and torsten janson, ”bildförbudet utan stöd i koranen”, svenska dagbladet, march 8, 2006. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 77 sculptors have made busts of the prophet. one can even be seen at the building of the u.s. supreme court.7 in the shiite tradition, there is a production, sale and public use of pictures of muhammad and other persons muslims consider holy. other muslim countries are stricter. when newsweek re-published a persian miniature of muhammad, the issue was censored in malaysia, indonesia and bangladesh.8 the decision to publish these cartoons outraged some high-profile islamists within denmark. 3,500 muslims protested on the streets of copenhagen against the cartoons. a 17-year old muslim boy was arrested for attempting to kill one of the cartoonists. on october 12, eleven ambassadors from muslim countries demanded a meeting with prime minister fogh rasmussen to discuss what they considered to be an anti-islamic campaign in the danish press.9 the danish government, citing adherence to freedom of expression and speech, refused to see them, arguing that that would be a violation of his constitutional duties to discuss articles published by an independent newspaper with representatives from foreign states, most of which lack an independent press and democracy themselves.10 the prime minister’s office explained that in denmark the government is not responsible for what independent provincial newspapers publish, and communicated that protests needs to be addressed to jyllands-posten, not to the prime minister. on october 17, shortly after their publication in denmark, six of the 7 amir taheri, “bonfire of the pieties: islam prohibits neither images of muhammad nor jokes about religion,” wall street journal, february 8, 2006. http://www.opinionjournal.com/editorial/feature.html?id=110007934 (accessed february 9, 2006) and paul marshall, “misrepresentations of islam: not all muslims shun depictions of muhammad,” center for religious freedom: a division of freedom house. february 21, 2006. http://www.freedomhouse.org/religion/news/bn2005/bn-2005--2006-02-21a.htm (accessed may 10, 2006) 8 “inget billedforbud i koranen”, verdens gang, february 11, 2006. 9 “ambassader i danmark protesterer mot karikatur av muhammad”, ntb october 10, 2005. 10 ole rothenborg, “fogh rasmussen muhammedkrisens stora förlorare,” dagens nyheter, march 11, 2006. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 78 cartoons were re-published in the egyptian oppositional paper al-fagr. there were no protests on the streets of egypt.11 it seems as if the foreign minister of egypt, ahmed aboul-gheit has been the coordinating figure, pushing this issue from the beginning of october. this appears to have served a dual purpose: it helped to ease pressure from the eu, which has been demanding the egyptian government implement a number of legal and political reforms. it also enabled him to show the people that the egyptian government were just as good at defending islamic principles as the islamist opposition.12 on october the 25 the egyptian foreign ministry urged the danish government to distance itself from the cartoons. after both foreign pressure and street protest had failed to convince the prime minister of the need for censorship in denmark, some leading danish clerics decided to seek support among “some esteemed figures in the muslim world.”13 in the end of december of 2005, a 31-year old danish imam by the name of ahmed akkari traveled down to the middle east with a 43-page folder of cartoons, letters and drawings. he represented an organization called islamisk trossamfund i danmark, or the islamic faith society of denmark, claiming to represent 29 muslim organizations in denmark, with 170 000-200 000 members. akkari was sent on this mission by a man by the name of abu laban, the leading imam in copenhagen. akkari contacted religious and political leaders in some of the most repressive states in the world, such as saudi arabia, syria and iran to put pressure on the danish government. 11 paul reynolds, “cartoons: divisions and inconsistencies”, bbc news, february 13, 2006. 12 bitte hammargren, “egyptisk minister drev karikatyrbråk”, svenska dagbladet, march 6, 2006. 13 doug sanders, “’it is not what i want to happen’”, the globe and mail, february 8, 2006. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 79 akkari’s folder introduces the danes as decadents and infidels. the document is written for an ignorant reader: the targeted audience is assumed to be largely uninformed of danish and european geography and culture: “this country has its own language. it has a constitutional and monarchic system of government. the country consists of a number of islands, its capital is copenhagen, it has a population of five million and most of them are protestants. although they claim allegiance to christianity, secularisation has gained the upper hand, so even if you were to refer to them as infidels you would not be wrong. (…) one of the issues is an atmosphere that fuels a growing racism, which has gained strength of expression since the events of 9/11. and it (the racism) has many different guises, the common denominator being the disparaging reference to islam. (sometimes the veil is the issue, at other times circumcision, or the diseases that prayer causes … and so on)”.14 the document presents a gloomy picture of denmark. the document is a prime example of orientalization of “the other.” its author assumes the moral superiority of muslim culture over the danish “infidels.” the reader gets the impression it is denmark, not syria or egypt which lacks freedom of religion. for being a document produced in a european capital in the 21st century, the document is remarkable in that it makes claims of sorcery. akkari’s binder is a revealing document. it reflects the orientalist attitudes of radical islam vis-à-vis the decadent west and its liberal democracy. the document is a mixture of ignorance, superstition, moralizing and an outright misrepresentation of danish society. the document presents denmark as an oppressive society, seeking a conflict with the muslim world. we, all the muslims in denmark, are under attack from them, the danes. in denmark, they talk about the diseases caused by muslim prayers. relations between the west and islam are entering a dark tunnel. and in printing 12 drawings of the prophet muhammad in september 2005 it was really jyllands-posten’s intention to curb muslim opinion and 14 allan larsen and kåre quist, “imamens vantro danmark”, ekstra bladet, january 15, 2006. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 80 protests. 15 akkari compiled twelve cartoons published in jyllands-posten on september 30, 2005. it appears akkari must have had some doubts about the offensive nature of these cartoons, as they had already been published in the press in the middle east without much notice. in order to make the claim of anti-muslim sentiments in denmark more effective, akkari now added a number of other images, which had never been published by jyllandsposten or any other danish newspaper. these were quite different than the cartoons published in the cultural section in jyllands-posten: one depicted a man, allegedly a muslim, being humped by a dog while praying. another picture depicts a “pedophile muhammad”, presumably referring to aisha bint abu bakr, whom muhammad, according to the haddith, married when she was six while the marriage was consummated when aisha was nine and muhammad fifty-two.16 a third picture of the frenchman jaques marrot dressed up as a pig, with a plastic snout and a pink baby hat with plastic ears during the “annual pig-squealing competition” in the tiny french village of trie-sur-baines in southern france.17 in akkari’s binder, this picture carried the added text: “this is the true picture of muhammad” in danish and arabic and was represented as being a depiction of muhammad in danish press.18 akkari presented this binder to the grand mufti of egypt, the chief cleric and the predominant scholar of islamic law within egypt. he also presented it to the secretary 15 ibid. 16 see hadith vol. 7, no. 65, no. 88 and vol. 5, no. 234 in bukhārī, muhammad ibn ismāīl, hadith albukhari: the translation of the meanings of hadith al-bukhārī, arabic-english/ muhammad mushi khan, (medina: dar al-fikr, 1981). the same claims are to be found in the hadith of sahih muslim volume 2., no. 3309, the hadith of the sunan of abu dawud, vol. 2, no. 2116. 17 rima iraki, hege lyngved odinsen, “fransk grisehylter vist frem som momammed-hån,” verdens gang, february 8, 2006. 18 akkari’s folder, containing the cartoons from jyllands-posten as well as the pictures gathered to misrepresent denmark is available online on http://www.ekstrabladet.dk/visartikel.iasp?pageid=332707 review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 81 general of the arab league and others. according to akkari, “[t]hey stared in amazement at the images in the book, (...) and vowed to take action to help him. “they said to me, ’do they really say this is the prophet muhammad? they must really have no respect for religion up there in denmark,’ and they said they would make it known.”19 meanwhile, abu laban also tried to reach the influential qatar-based cleric yusuf alqaradawi, whose fatwas many muslims consider binding. even though the meeting was ultimately called off, al-quaradawi called “for a global day of anger.”20 political and religious leaders in the arab world were quick to exploit the situation, and soon distorted reports about danish media soon circulated the muslim world, causing millions of muslims to believe that the nordic countries were nests of blasphemy.21 after distributing these pictures across the middle east, akkari insisted that “he had never meant this to be more than an internal danish conflict,”22 and denies that his representation of danish media contributed to the violent protests in the middle east. he insists that what made the protests turn violent were two or three of the cartoons in jyllands-posten. akkari claimed to be unable to comprehend “why it is at all interesting that other and more offensive pictures were presented when the jyllands-posten case is discussed in arabic and muslim countries.”23 yet, when the protests broke out, many, including western media networks such as the bbc were under the impression that the picture of marrot at his pyrenean pig-squealing competition and others had been 19 doug sanders, “’it is not what i want to happen’”, the globe and mail, february 8, 2006. 20 david rennie and anton la guardia,”growth of outrage: danish imams credit grassroots for protests,” national post, february 7, 2006. 21 ibid. 22 doug sanders, “’it is not what i want to happen’”, the globe and mail, february 8, 2006. 23 bjørnar hjellen, hege lyngved odinsen, “dansk imam-delegasjon viste fram pedofil muhammad, verdens gang, february 8, 2006, ritzau, “imam: ok at vise profet med grisetryne,” january 31, 2006. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 82 presented as a picture of muhammad, published by the danish media.24 before the content of the folder had been translated into danish and made available to the scandinavian media, there was much confusion. as the public and governments of the scandinavian governments were trying to understand what had been presented to the muslim world, there were speculations in scandinavian papers that the imams had presented images produced by christian fanatics in the united states.25 the misrepresentation of the danish media was not the only lie to originate from abu laban. in addition to linking jyllands-posten’s cartoons with material never published in danish media, it soon turned out that many of the supposed 29 organizations on whose behalf abu laban supposedly acted did not exist while others were not asked, before abu laban spoke on their behalf. abu laban’s claim to represent 200,000 muslims was a fabrication. in reality laban represented no more than 5,000 – 15,000 danish muslims.26 abu laban moved to denmark from palestine in the 1980s, as the muslim congregation needed an english-speaking imam. from his mosque in copenhagen, abu laban is well-connected to an international network of islamic radicals: he has had contact with almost all known al-qaeda sympathizers residing in denmark as well as leading figures within al-gama’a islamiya, who carried out the assassination of anwar sadat in 1981.27 through his extensive network abu laban was able to utilize his contacts with hard-line salafist television stations in saudi arabia and the united arab 24 paul reynolds, “a clash of rights and responsibilities,” bbc news, february 6, 2006. kåre quist, “labans mange løgne”, ekstra bladet, febraury 6, 2006. 25 bjørnar hjellen, helge lyngved odinsen, ”tror muhammed-tegninger er laget av kristne ekstremister,” verldens gang, febryary 1, 2006. 26 kåre quist, “labans mange løgne”, ekstra bladet, febraury 6, 2006. 27 “vennerne er ikke allahs beste børn”, ekstra bladet, february 5, 2006. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 83 emirates such as al-majd and iqra, which were able to stir up emotions across the muslim world.28 another leading figure behind the idea of seeking muslim support against the danish government was the radical imam of århus, raed hlayhel. hlayhel made headlines in danish media when during a friday prayer in 2004 he stated that danish women who are scantily clad have themselves to blame if they are being raped. in march of 2005 he was sued by forty immigrant women after having claimed that women are the instrument of satan against men and that women who visit hairdressers and use perfume on the street will end up in hell.29 after the cartoon row had turned violent across the muslim world, hlayhel used al-jazeera to reach large audiences with his radical message."this type of democracy is worthless for muslims. muslims will never accept this kind of humiliation."30 akkari demanded guarantees that no danish newspaper would publish cartoons of muhammad in the future. “we want the newspaper to promise that this will never happen again, or this will never stop."31 not only radicals such as abu laban raed hlayhel, but entire muslim umbrella organizations in the scandinavian countries and the eu sided with the dictatorships against denmark. sveriges muslimska råd, the muslim council of sweden condemed what it labelled ”a provocation against muslims in the whole world,” denied that the publication of the cartoons had nothing to do with freedom of expression and supported 28 david rennie and anton la guardia,”growth of outrage: danish imams credit grassroots for protests,” national post, february 7, 2006. 29 piet baunø, “århusiansk imam fuld af løgn”, ekstra bladet, january 31, 2006. “invandrerkvinder politianmelder imam” ekstra bladet, march 8, 2005. 30 paul reynolds, “cartoons: divisions and inconsistencies”, bbc news, february 13, 2006. 31 thomas buch-andersen, “danish muslims split over cartoons,” bbc news, february 8, 2006. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 84 the boycott of danish goods.32 hassan moussa, the president of the swedish council of imams, urging the swedish government to protest against denmark.33 on january 10, the small fundamentalist christian newspaper magazinet in norway published the cartoons. the arab league now decided about collective action against denmark. on january 29, oic, the islamic conference and the arab league declared that they would aim at introducing international laws against blasphemy and the desecration of religious symbols. 56 muslim countries turned to the un in order to protest against denmark.34 perhaps not surprisingly, the harshest stances were taken by some of the most repressive states: in addition to egypt, saudi arabia, libya, syria and iran all played leading roles.35 on january 26, saudi arabia recalled its ambassador from denmark. it was followed by libya on the 29th.36 syria went even further, demanding that denmark would punish what syria described as the “criminals” at jyllands-posten. furthermore, syria wanted denmark to prevent the editors from publishing insulting material in the future.37 the organization of islamic conference, representing 57 muslim states demanded a un resolution against denmark, backed up by economic sanctions. they also wanted a un resolution, banning attacks on religious faith.38 given its laws and constitution, denmark could do little to appease governments that demanded the reintroduction of a crime that had not been taken seriously since before the enlightenment. 32 sveriges muslimska råd (smr) följer utvecklingen i danmark med stor oro, ”press release, february 1, 2006. http://sverigesmuslimskarad.se/firstpage.html (accessed february 8, 2006). 33 “inget öppet samhälle untan hädelse, ” dagens nyheter, january 11, 2006 34 “inget öppet samhälle untan hädelse, ” dagens nyheter, january 11, 2006. 35 insert footnote here about arab league, 57 ? states, threats of un sanctions, et.c. 36 “libyen lukker sin ambasade i danmark”, ritzau/dpa, january 29, 2006. 37 “syrien: jp-forbryderne må straffes”, ritzau/dpa, january 29, 2006. 38 “kræver fn-resolution mod danmark”, ritzau/afp, jan 29, 2006. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 85 one day later, on january 30, armed al-fatah supporters storm the eu office in gaza, demanding a danish apology. a boycott, initiated by the saudi arabian government spreads across the arab world. in the muslim world, government-organized or – incited protests turned violent. most eager to exploit this situation were syria and iran, both rogue states with beleaguered governments, desperately in need to shore up support for their fledging autocracies. neither one hesitated to play the islamic card. what started as a peaceful demonstration in damascus on february 4 turned violent, apparently after protesters received text messages on their cell phones that the koran was being burnt in denmark. embassy personnel tried to contact the police to keep the protesters at bay, but to no avail. the danish and norwegian embassies were stormed and burnt. the swedish and chilean embassies, located in the same building, were damaged. the crowd was guided by men with walkie-talkies, strongly suggesting involvement and support from the syrian government. so lax was the police presence that journalists were able to accompany the rioters into the buildings and to cable the pictures to the rest of the muslim world. likewise in beirut, syrian agents guided the attack on the danish consulate general the next day. people were bussed in from the lebanese countryside and syria. according to the lebanese authorities, as many as one third of the attackers were syrians.39 in teheran, crowds attacked the danish and austrian embassies with stones and gasoline bombs on february 6.40 attacking embassies is a violation of the hague convention, and, by international law, tantamount to an act of war. 39 “manipulation av folklig frustration”, svenska dagbladet, february 6, 2006. “syria anklages for muhammed-opptøyer i beirut”, ntb february 5, 2006, “mutual incomprehension, mutual outrage,” the economist, febraury 11, 2006. 40 marlowe hood, “protests grow, turn deadly,” national post, february 7, 2006. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 86 the syrian and iranian governments, both being holocaust deniers, were not slow to exploit the situation for an anti-semitic attack on jews. an iranian newspaper announced they would announce a competition about the “funniest holocaust cartoons,” while the largest private university in ukraine, an anti-semitic organization partly funded by syrian, palestinian and saudi money, made a statement blaming a jewish world-wide conspiracy for the publication of the cartoons.41 a belgian muslim group began publishing cartoons of anne frank in bed with hitler.42 across europe, in what seems to have been a centrally organized action, muslims took to the streets. in oslo, about 1,500 protesters gathered outside the norwegian parliament on february the 10th, protesting the cartoons and demanded that norway should re-activate an old paragraph, banning blasphemy.43 in germany, 1,200 muslims protested outside the danish embassy in berlin, demanding censorship under banners such as ”freedom of press – yes, press impertinence no” and ”we demand censorship of caricatures of muhammad”.44 in london, protesters gathered outside the danish embassy, some dressed up as suicide bombers, others holding posters with texts such as “behead those who insult islam,” “europe, prepared for the real holocaust” and placards, threatening a repeat of the september 11, 2001 and july 7, 2005 attacks.45 in the eu 41 heorhii shchokin, “address of the international personnel academy concerning caricatures in european publications”, february 7, 2006. 42 michael valpy, “why the global rage hasn’t engulfed canada”, globe and mail, february 8, 2006. 43 norway has an archaic constitution, from 1814, the second oldest in the world. paragraph 142 in the norwegian penal code, known as the blasphemy paragraph remains on the books but have not been used since 1933, when there was a legal case against arnuld øverland, who had delivered a lecture titled “kristendommen – den tiende landeplage” or “christianity – the tenth national pandemic”. andreas fosse, “respekter våre verdier”, verdens gang, febraury 11, 2006. “ny norsk lov forbyr blasfemi”, verdens gang, february 15, 2006. 44 thomas hall, “krav på bildcensur i tyskland”, dagens nyheter, february 11, 2006. 45 george jones, ”scotland yard will investigate protesters,” national post, february 7, 2006. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 87 candidate member state turkey; radical muslims, shouting “allah is great”, murdered an italian roman catholic priest. denmark suddenly found itself in its most serious crisis since world war ii. as danish products were boycotted across the muslim world, the farmers were paying the price for an editorial decision by a provincial paper. in palestine, creative businessmen made money by switching their production from the customary us and israeli to danish and norwegian flags in an attempt to meet the demands of the local flag burning market. danish flags were sold for eleven dollars apiece. one of the more bizarre episodes of this conflict was an official iranian decision to rename danish pastries to “the prophet muhammad’s roses.”46 apparently pastries bearing the name of the muslim prophet are not to be regarded as blasphemic or graven images. in afghanistan, taliban insurgents promised five kilos of gold to anybody who would kill a norwegian, danish or german peacekeeper. on february 6th, 200-300 protesters armed with fire-arms and hand grenades attacked a joint nordic-baltic peacekeeping force in maymaneh. the norwegian peace keepers were forced to use tear gas and rubber bullets. when that did not deter the crowd, they open fire. four protesters were killed and 23 wounded. of the peace keepers, six norwegian soldiers were wounded.47 mohammed yaqoob qureshi, minister in the indian state of uttar pradesh, offered the equivalent of 13 million us dollars and his weight in gold for anyone who would kill any of the cartoonists. in pakistan, a muslim leader promised a million dollars and a car for every murdered danish cartoonist.48 on february 8, the part-scandinavian unarmed tiph force 46 “danska bakverk döps om i protest”, dagens nyheter, february 16, 2006. 47 robin steiersen, anne vinding, “betaler for drap på nordmenn”, verdens gang, february 8, 2006. robert holender, “svenskar angreps i afghanistan,” dagens nyheter, february 7, 2006. 48 “miljoner utlovas för döda tecknare”, lucknow/tt, february 18, 2006. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 88 (temporary international presence in hebron), established in 1994 after a jewish settler murdered 29 palestinians in a mosque, was attacked by hundreds of palestinian protesters. the danish tiph members had been evacuated one week earlier, following violent protests. as a result of the renewed violence, tiph temporarily ended their activities in hebron.49 in copenhagen there was a feeling of anger, defiance and disbelief. the danish political establishment, from the right to the left, raged against the imams and the muslim organizations that had supported abu laban and akhmed akkari’s campaign. the leader of the nationalist danish people’s party, pia kjærsgaard, accused the danish islamic league of treason, accusing the imams of “conducting a smear campaign against denmark.”50 citing solidarity with the danish press, papers across the eu and the world re-printed the cartoons from jyllands-posten. by early march, the cartoons had been published in 143 papers in 56 countries, nine of them muslim. several newspapers were closed and editors fired.51 a clear majority of danes believed that fogh rasmussen had acted correctly in taking a principled stance by not receiving the muslim ambassadors and standing by the danish constitution and democratic principles by refusing to apologize for what an independent newspaper has written. at the same time, many europeans felt let down by the american and british governments, which failed to take a principled stance on free speech. after all, they have increasingly relied of the pretence of spreading democracy as a justification for their war in iraq, after failing to find weapons of mass destruction or 49 lotta schüllerqvist, ”svenskar attackerades i hebron,” dagens nyheter, february 8, 2006. 50 bjørnar hjellen, hege lyngved odinsen, “dansk imam-delegasjon viste fram pedofil muhammad, verdens gang, february 8, 2006. 51 “muhammedbilder i 56 länder”, tt, march 2, 2006. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 89 establish links between saddam hussein and al-qaeda. the response from george w. bush was limited to calls to stop the violence and be “respectful” towards religion.52 the crisis brought political consequences to denmark and norway. a widely perceived lack of international support benefited pia kjærsgaard, who declared that denmark would settle the scores with their islamists “on their own.” polls in both showed that the danish people’s party, as well as the progressive party in norway, have grown significantly. in norway, the populist progressive party received the support of 31.8 per cent, making it the largest party in the country. the nationalist danish people’s party increased its support to 17.8 per cent, making it the country’s third-largest party.53 the danish government reacted by ending the participation of imams in an integration think-tank run by the danish government. integration minister rikke hvilshøj stated "it is very clear that we cannot trust the imams any longer if we want integration to succeed in denmark.”54 the firm attitude of the danish government had solid support among the danes, who felt that prime minister fogh rasmussen had handled this crisis, the most serious since world war ii, well. in an opinion poll, 58 per cent of the danes blamed the danish imams for the conflict, 22 per cent blamed jyllands-posten, and 11 per cent blamed the authorities in the middle east for the conflict.55 79 per cent of danes stood behind their prime minister’s refusal to apologize. when asked whether jyllands-posten ought to apologize, 62 per cent of danes said no, according to a january poll.56 52 “mutual incomprehension, mutual outrage”, the economist, february 11, 2006. 53 ole rothenborg, “fogh rasmussen muhammedkrisens stora förlorare,” dagens nyheter, march 11, 2006. björn lindahl, “högerpopulister tar täten i norge”, svenska dagbladet, march 8, 2006. “norsk och dansk högerpopulaism ökar,” svenska dagbladet, february 20, 2006. “reaping the whirlwind”, the economist, february 18, 2006. 54 thomas buch-andersen, “danish muslims split over cartoons,” bbc news, february 8, 2006. 55 camilla ryste, “danskene legger skylden på imamene”, verdens gang, february 10, 2006. 56 “ingen undskyldning til muslimske lande”, ritzau, january 28, 2006. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 90 the danish government instead attempted to fight the disinformation spread by media across the muslim world by having fogh rasmussen interviewed by al-jazeera. the ministry of foreign affairs of denmark initiated an information campaign, responding to some of the lies about denmark that circulated in the muslim world. their web site attempted to respond to the rumors and lies circulating in the muslim world. • what is the status of the danish newspaper that published the 12 drawings of the prophet muhammad? the newspaper jyllands-posten is a private and independent newspaper in denmark. it has no relations, whatsoever, with the government of denmark. the danish government cannot in any way influence what is or what is not printed in the danish media. • is denmark rewriting the koran? the danish government respects islam as one of the world’s major religions and no danish authorities would ever initiate such a disrespectful project. • has there been published a drawing in jyllands-posten or any other danish news with the prophet depicted as a pig? no. • has [sic] posters been put up in denmark with pictures of the prophet muhammad? no. • will the danish government make a movie about the prophet muhammad? the danish government has no such plans. • does religious freedom exist in denmark? yes. the danish constitution explicitly states that there is religious freedom in denmark. denmark houses a considerable number of religious congregations, among them islam, and they all enjoy full freedom to religious worship. • is it correct that the koran will be burned in denmark? with reference to the rumours of burning the koran circulated (sic) on sms, the danish police has warned that participation in demonstrations, where such acts take place, can be criminal and led (sic) to a prison sentence.57 57 press release, “drawing in a danish newspaper: questions and answers”, utenrigsministeriet/ministry of foreign affairs of denmark, february 8, 2006. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 91 by the end of march, the muslim boycott of swedish-danish dairy giant arla foods had cost them 500 million swedish crowns (cad $ 80 million). in response, arla launched a charm offensive by putting adds in 25 arabic newspapers, ironically and confusingly explaining that they “understood and respected” the boycott of their products. our presence in the region has given us an insight into your culture and values about islam. this understanding has, over many years, enabled us to supply high quality products which meet your preferences. through your confidence in our products, we have succeeded in building up brands such as lurpak, puck, the three cows and dano. therefore, we understand and respect your reactions that have led to a boycott of our products following the danish newspaper’s irresponsible and unfortunate action.58 in denmark, arla’s campaign was immediately condemned by the leader of the governing liberal ventre party as “a spineless submission to angry muslims,” while pia kjærsgaard stated: “arla says it understands the boycott. we ought neither to understand, nor accept it.”59 in sweden, which was not actively involved in the conflict, a scandal forced the foreign minister to resign. in january, a swedish right-wing nationalist party attempted to capitalize on the situation by announcing their own muhammad cartoon competition in their online journal. after the swedish secret police got specific threats from “credible sources” that such a publication would endanger swedish interests, the foreign minister authorized the closing of the internet site without consulting the prime minister. in the scandal that followed – this was the first case of implicit government 58 “arla foods has distanced itself from cartoons: statement from arla foods,” press release from arla foods, march 20, 2006. http://www.arlafoods.com/appl/hj/hj202com/hj202d01.nsf/2c8e5576cd3bf4c4c1256d030047be36/d db7c44e9ffbbf01c1257137004d4529/$file/statement%20in%20advertisement.pdf (accessed march 21, 2006) 59 “arla startar charmoffensiv i arabvärlden,” dagens nyheter, march 21, 2006. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 92 censure of media for a generation swedish foreign minister laila freivalds was forced to resign.60 as the conflict began cooling down, a debate started in scandinavian countries, following patterns similar to those in the netherlands after the murder of film maker theo van gogh by a moroccan islamist, or in france following the massive 2005 riots. the immediate benefactors in this conflict were various nationalist parties. however, the long-term results of this crisis appears to further accelerate the departure from the policies of multiculturalism which until recently whereas promoted by european elites and to a reaffirmation of the western tradition of liberal democracy and civil liberties. to many danes, this crisis has validated much of the popular dissatisfaction with multiculturalism and a reinforced the perception that the two are not necessarily compatible.61 proponents of multiculturalism, such as bhiku parekh, have emphasized that a multicultural society cannot be based upon shared cultural or ethnic characteristics, but must seek other forms of identity. neither could a multicultural society set up too ambitious goals for the integration of society, since the demographic basis of society may prove too diverse for far-reaching communal goals. the commitment to society ought to be political, and “does not involve sharing common substantive goals, for its members might deeply disagree about these, nor a common view of its history which they may read differently, nor a 60 “jk utreder stängningen av sd-kurirens sajt”, dagens nyheter, march 20, 2006, laila freivalds chockad over frågan om ud:s censurering”, dagens nyheter, march 20, 2006. “ytterligare ett skäl för persson att peka ut sin efterträdare”, dagens nyheter, march 21, 2006. 61 by multiculturalism i mean a system of political strategies to maintain a culturally and ethnically diverse society; a doctrine which, broadly speaking, strives to maintain diversity by encouraging the identification of its members with the culture of their ancestors rather than actively encouraging integration and assimilation. this multiculturalism, broadly speaking, has been identified by hall as pluralist multiculturalism, as system which “formally enfranchises the differences between groups along cultural lines and accords different groups rights to different communities with a more … communitarian political order.” s. hall, ”conclusion: the multi-cultural question” in b. hesse, un/settled multiculturalisms, (london: zed books, 2000) 210. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 93 particular economic system … commitment to the political community involves commitment to its continuing existence and well-being… and implies that one cares enough not to harm its interests and undermine its integrity.”62 the behavior of the danish imams confronted multi-ethnic denmark with a scenario which the architects behind danish multiculturalism had not planned for. sometimes, liberal democratic values such as freedom of speech, expression and conscience are incorrectly referred to as “universal,” or “culture-blind.”63 therefore, in the eyes of many multiculturalists there is no conflict between multiculturalism and liberal democratic values. such were the arguments presented in favor of sharia arbitration courts when they were introduced in ontario in 1991. the 1991 ontario arbitration act granted religious leaders the right to mediate in legal disputes, such as divorce and child custody. in 2004, a group calling itself the islamic institute for civil justice (i.i.c.j.) proposed creating a formalized tribunal to implement sharia law. the intention was that it would enhance canada’s official doctrine of multiculturalism, and enrich the society through encouraging ethnic groups to preserve and share their values. the intention was to use islamic sharia law to avoid costly litigation, and to be used mainly in arbitrating family disputes, particularly divorces. the i.i.c.j. spokesperson syed mumtaz ali, who had previously argued that canadian muslims ought to be treated similarly to aboriginal nations in regards to their own legal systems, declared this to be “the beginning of a sharia court in canada,” arguing that henceforth i.i.c.j. would offer a parallel legal system in ontario, based upon sharia law.64 this act drew criticism both 62 bhiku c. parekh, rethinking multiculturalism. (london: macmillan, 2000), 341-342. 63 hall, 211. göran rosenberg, ”mångkultur är inget val” dagens nyheter, september 22, 2005. 64 marion boyd, “religiously-based alternate dispute resolution: a challenge to multiculturalism” canadian diversity/diversité canadienne, vol. 4:3 (fall 2005), 71-74. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 94 within and outside canada, particularly by canadian muslim women’s groups and even caused hostile protests outside canadian embassies abroad. the proposal was overhauled in september 2005, after a government review of the law.65 the sharia law debate may represent the high water mark of canadian multiculturalism. implementation of sharia law would be a logical consequence of institutionalized multiculturalism. paul scheffer, urban sociologist at the university of amsterdam, argues “multiculturalism should lead, when you take it seriously, to legal pluralism,” adding that canada is about ten years behind the netherlands in challenging multiculturalism’s practical flaws. “people have never been told that their rights go together with obligations. we have simply been looking the other way in the name of tolerance.”66 the struggle against sharia law has therefore been led by the weak members of the canadian muslim community itself. alia hogben, president of the canadian council of muslim women, described sharia family arbitration “an abuse of multiculturalism.” homa arjomand, an iranian immigrant leading an international campaign against the ontario arbitration act said it laid bare the greatest flaw of multiculturalism, which she described as “ghettoism.”67 recent opinion polls show a fall in public support for multiculturalism also in canada.68 yet, as will kymlicka has pointed out, the immigrant situation in canada differs sharply from that in europe. muslims constitute a small minority, 2% of the canadian population, and 90% of recent immigrants to canada are non-muslim. in france, spain, italy and germany on the contrary, 80 to 90% of immigrants are muslim. at the same time, due to its geographic 65 susan bourette, “can tolerant canada tolerate sharia?” christian science monitor, august 10, 2004. c. mallan, “report called ‘betrayal’ of women,” toronto star, 21 december, 2004. boyd, 71-74. 66 bruce cheadale, “terror in europe, sharia in canada spark multiculturalism row,” canoe network, cnews, july 23, 2005. http://www.cnews.canoe.ca/cnews/canada/2005/07/23 (accessed may 31, 2006) 67 cheadale (2005). 68 david ley, “post-multiculturalism?,” vancouver centre f excellence: research on immigration and integration in the metropolis working paper series no. 05-18, (september 2005), 14, n. 2. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 95 location canada probably has the lowest number of illegal immigrants among all western democracies.69 kymlicka emphasizes the connection between the number of illegal immigrants and acceptance for multiculturalism. while close to 80 per cent of canadians express a support for the official multiculturalism, in many european countries, such as the netherlands, the very term “is relegated to the dunghill of history.”70 after 1996, australian prime minister john howard closed the office of multicultural affairs, and the term multiculturalism itself so discredited that it is commonly referred to as the “mword.”71 in both canada and the european union, the origins of immigrants seems to be the key to public acceptance of multiculturalism. official canadian multiculturalism was established in response to demands from groups of european immigrants, such as ukrainians and poles, whose allegiance to liberal democracy was not in question. european, latin american, caribbean and east asian immigrants to canada are not seen as bringing “barbaric” practices with them, such as arranged marriages of underage girls, female circumcision and honor killings. the european general public is not willing to accept the risk of multicultural policies be used as a vehicle to perpetrate or accommodate such practices. kymlicka, a high-profile promoter of multiculturalism, argues that the experience of multiculturalism across the western democracies “suggests that many 69 will kymlicka, ”the uncertain futures of multiculturalism,” canadian diversity/diversité canadienne, vol. 4:1 (winter 2005), 82-85. 70 jeroen doomerik, ”the state of multiculturalism in the netherlands,” canadian diversity/diversité canadienne, vol. 4:1 (winter 2005), 35. 71 ley, 7, citing i. ang and j. stratton. “multicultiralism in crisis: the new politics of race and national identity in australia” in i. ang (ed.), on not speaking chinese: living between asia and the west (london: routledge, 2001) 95-111. furthermore, of canada’s 580,000 muslims, 61 per cent live in toronto. yet the muslim population of toronto is less than seven per cent of the city’s population, compared to over 25 per cent in many european cities, such as amsterdam. cheadale (2005). review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 96 citizens are willing to accept multiculturalism policies when they are perceived as lowrisk, but oppose them when they are perceived as high-risk.”72 clearly, many people in democracies across the world see multiculturalism as a high-risk policy. the united states never embraced multicultural policies. in australia, italy, the netherlands, denmark and norway and most other liberal democracies, multiculturalism is in drastic retreat in accordance with the desires of their populations.73 denmark and the netherlands used to be among the european countries most open to multicultural policy claims.74 the one exception is canada, the only country that has elevated multiculturalism to official policy. but canada too has seen a reaction against multicultural policies such the sharia arbitration in ontario, which was recently rejected. in addition, while canada has a point system in place, largely recruiting immigrants on the basis of their potential economic contributions to society, this is not the case in scandinavia, where the vast majority are refugee claimants or given residence permits on “humanitarian grounds” such as family reunions. a result of this is that immigrants to canada are, on average, much better educated that the average canadian. over 40 per cent of the immigrants to canada during the 1990s had at least one university degree, compared to the canadian average of 22 per cent.75 in denmark, 59 per cent of men and 43 per cent of women immigrants from outside the eu are active in the work force, compared to 83 and 75 percent for danish men and women. among some groups 72 kymlicka, 83, 85. 73 veit bader, “dutch nightmare? the end of multiculturalism?,” canadian diversity/diversité canadienne, vol. 4:1 (winter 2005), 9-10. 74 leonie sandercock, “rethinking multiculturalism for the 21st century”vancouver centre for excellence: research on immigration and integration in the metropolis working paper series no. 03-14, (october 2003), 20. 75 the annual report of the operation of the canadian multiculturalism act 2004-2005 (gatineau, quebec: minister of public works and government services canada, 2006), 31, citing education in canada: raising the standard, 2001 census: analysis series, statistics canada, march 2003). review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 97 of recently arrived immigrants the participation in the danish work force is less than 20 per cent.76 furthermore, until denmark restricted their immigration laws in 2001, an estimated 80-90 per cent of young turks and pakistanis in denmark married someone from outside the country and sought to bring their foreign spouse to denmark.77 arguments similar to those made by canadian multiculturalists have been frequently raised by the intellectual elite in sweden. writes public intellectual göran rosenberg in sweden’s largest morning newspaper, liberal dagens nyheter, repeating nathan glazer’s argument from the 1990s that “we are all multiculturalists now:” more and more often it is claimed that the pre-condition for integration is a common set of values. i am not so sure. in any case i am not so sure of what is meant by common values. if by values you mean praxis, which find expressions within the legal norms and rules of a democratic society, then the values are already established. it is then only about implementing the most basic principles of the civil society: everybody’s equality before the law. citizens whose values allow them to break the law is a matter for the police and courts – not a cultural problem. but what is meant by common values here is something different, something going beyond the law and legal precedent, something that ultimately says define the very community, but nevertheless is not shared by everybody in the multi-cultural society. what the society subsequently then is said to require is that we set up “demands” on citizens who insist on having values opposed to those of the common set of values but are not necessarily against the law. but what demands can we have on citizens with “wrong” values beyond those that the law demands from us all? and what happens to the principle of everybody’s equality before the law if we, like in denmark and the netherlands, nevertheless start to make such demands? and who are “we,” by the way? ... [w]e are all multiculturalists now and we do not have any better alternatives.78 76 karen bird, ”multiculturalism in denmark,” canadian diversity/diversité canadienne, vol. 4:1 (winter 2005), 39, citing sopemi report for denmark, 2001, as reported in roseveare and jorgensen (2004), p. 16.. 77 bird, 41-42 citing garbi schmidt, “the right to choose: patterns of partner choice among ethnic minorities in denmark.” paper presented at the 13th nordic migration conference, aalborg, denmark (november 2004). 78 göran rosenberg, ”mångkultur är inget val,” dagens nyheter, september 22, 2005. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 98 however, the recent controversy over blasphemy reminds us that liberal democracy is not compatible with islamism. to significant sections of the religious establishments in saudi arabia, iran, pakistan and other autocracies, democracy constitutes a threat. they do understand that democracy would spell and end to their systems. as much as we sometimes would like to think of them as universal, the values of locke, montesquieu and mills, upon which much of the european democracy is based, are western values and products of european cultural tradition. in a legal order based upon liberal democratic principles, the rejection of islamism needs to be accompanied by a rejection of other religious dogmas as well, in order to give the separation of the (christian) church and state any meaning. this seems to be the direction in which the european union is heading. motions from the vatican europe’s last theocracy about writing christianity or christian values into the european constitution have been soundly defeated. other than the polish government, few supported such a paragraph. likewise, opposition from the catholic church to same-sex marriages was largely ignored in spain. dutch scholar and multicultural activist veit bader laments that “dutch politics is now under the spell of republican or liberal assimilationism and aggressive secularism.”79 in denmark, the government has ended its praxis of consulting imams before setting policies. instead, the danish government has increased its efforts to explain what democracy is and how it works, both to muslims within denmark and to the muslim world. imam ahmed akkari has been deposed as a spokesperson for islamisk trossamfund i danmark after threatening to send bombers to blow up nader khader, a secular muslim member of folketinget, the danish parliament, after khader spoke out 79 veit bader, “dutch nightmare? the end of multiculturalism?,” canadian diversity/diversité canadienne, vol. 4:1 (winter 2005), 11. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 99 against akkari’s organization.80 as for imam ahmed abu laban, he is under investigation by the police after threatening suicide bombings in denmark.81 on may 11, he declared that he would leave denmark, adding that “i think the islamic cause has become a challenge for western democracies. it has been proven that western democracies do not allow human rights.”82 early in may, there were reports that twelve young men from afghanistan and pakistan were on their way to denmark to murder the artists who painted the muhammad cartoons. soon thereafter, a video, supposedly from al-qaeda, appeared on the internet, urging “muslims, revenge our prophet. we deeply and solemnly wish that the little country of denmark, norway and france should be mercilessly attacked and devastated … devastate their buildings, make their soil shake and turn it into lakes of blood,” a libyan man by the name of sheikh abu yahia al-libi, stated, following three weeks after the al-qaeda leader osama bin laden urged a boycott of american and european products from countries that supported denmark during the crisis.83 in france, the government has reaffirmed the republican and liberal democratic principles of separation of church and state by banning religious uniforms or visual religious symbols in public schools in order to provide a non-sectarian environment for 80 “danske imamen ahmed akkari slutar som talesman,” dagens nyheter, march 25, 2006. naser khader was born in damascus, syria, and represents the liberal party radikale venstre in folketinget since 2001. he was previously called a “rat” by abu laban after setting up the network “democratic muslims” and refusing to accept radicals like abu laban and akkari claiming to speak on his behalf. he has received several death threats from islamists, and is constantly accompanied by two body guards. in a recent opinion poll, 66,7 per cent of the danes stated that he was the danish politician with the strongest leadership skills – a number even higher than those of prime minister fogh rasmussen. ole rothenborg, “’fanatisk demokrat’ väcker respekt i danmark,” dagens nyheter, march 25, 2006. 81 “dansk polis skall förhöra imam,” dagens nyheter, march 25, 2006. 82 cammilla ryste, omstridt imam flytter fra danmark,” verdens gang, may 11, 2005. 83 anne vinding, ”12 menn på vei til danmark for å drepe,” verdens gang, may 4, 2006 and roar dalmo moltubak, ”al-qaida oppfordrer til angrep på norge – ønsker inderlig at norge skal bli ødelagt,” verdens gang, may 15, 2006. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 100 the students.84 french interior minister nicolas sarkozy of the gaullist ump party has proposed a “contract of welcome and integration” with new immigrants, in which they would have to receive education in democracy and take a test for immigrants to france, in which they will be asked to confirm their allegiance to democracy and human rights. 84 the scandinavian countries, which have a different tradition than france, have attempted a “softer” approach. it is also a contradictory policy. in 2003 when students at the burgården high school in gothenburg, sweden started coming to school in complete burqa of the same design as those imposed on afghan women by the talibans, covering the entire body while their eyes were covered behind a veil, the swedish school authority agreed that banning burqas is in accordance with swedish law and the pedagogical mandate of the school. the swedish school authority established that “attitudes in regards to whether the wearing of burqa or other all-covering clothing has a religious connotation or whether it is merely an expression of culture differ. the predominant opinions among historians of religion and the discrimination ombudsman (do) seem to support the notion that the wearing of all-covering gears would be of religious importance are not supported by religious documents. however, it has not been established whether the wearing of burqa is a manifestation of religion or not. there are those who claim that our definition of religion requires that it is up to the individual to determine what his or her religion means. freedom of religion has a positive and a negative side. positive freedom of religion means the right to have and manifest certain religious views. the negative side is the right not to have and not having to be subjected to religious manifestations. despite the fact that clothing normally is something that is decided by the individual, clothing that has religious connotations is something that does not fall within the private sphere, given other peoples’ desire not to be subjected to this religious manifestation. if it was the case that the girls were wearing burqa for religious reasons we would be confronted with the question on where to draw the line between the positive right to demonstrate one’s religion and the negative aspect of religious freedom of having the right of not being subjected to religious manifestations. the precedence from the european court has shown that the negative aspect of freedom of religion has been given much weight. however, precedent is limited. (tidskrift for rettsvitenskap 3-5/2002, professor reinhold fahlbeck, university of lund) (…) it can not be considered a right to use the school as a vehicle for religious manifestations or for very specific expressions of culture. in terms of expression of religion, school ought to be a neutral space. if burqa is a religious manifestation, the discussion of whether burqa should be allowed or not ought to be subordinated the consideration of the pedagogical mandate of the school. thus, a school leadership do have both the right and the duty to step in and prevent expressions of religion or specific manifestations of culture, which may disturb the order. they also have the right to do so if these expressions impact the security of the school or if the school would be prevented from fulfilling its pedagogical mandate. if these expressions are otherwise perceived to stand in opposition to fundamental democratic values, the school’s freedom of action and duty to act is limited to the realm of what can be described as education of, and dialogue about values, equality, and democracy. we would not recommend a prohibition, not accompanied by such educational activities. why do the girls want to wear burqa and how does their surrounding see this? it is important that nobody is denied education or left out of society.” “skolverket, skrivelse: flickor med burqa/niqab i skolan,” per thullberg, general director and ingegärd hillbom, senior legal consultant, october 23, 2003. http://www.skolverket.se/content/1/c4/05/01/svar_om_burka.pdf (accessed june 6, 2006). see also the press release ”skolor har rätt att förbjuda burqa,” october 24, 2003. http://www.skolverket.se/sb/d/246/a/501;jsessionid=98aa932844450d4c58e16142a64532c7 (accessed june 6, 2005). however, two years later when a school in umeå, sweden, banned veils and head scarves they were criticized by the discrimination ombudsman (do) for violating the swedish freedom of religion. press release “skolan skall vara open för alla elever,” may 22, 2006. http://www.skolverket.se/sb/d/1271/a/6361 (accessed june 6, 2006). review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 101 immigrants who fail to do so would face expulsion. sarkozy also declared that france will be selective in who will be let in to the country: we no longer want immigration that is inflicted [on us]… we want selected immigration. the system of integration to the french way no longer works. … in case of a woman kept hostage in her home without learning french, the whole family will be obliged to leave.85 as the muhammad conflict took place, germany was involved in a debate regarding a similar test, administered to immigrants to the bundesland of badenwürttemberg who are seeking german citizenship. in the test, the immigrants are required to show their allegiance to the liberal democratic principles of their new country of citizenship. they are given questions such as: “some people accuse the jews of being responsible for all that’s bad in the world. ... what do you think of such accusations?” and “in germany, sport and swim classes are part of the normal school curriculum. would you allow your daughter to participate?”86 the introduction of the test was caused by heightened attention to muslims in germany following the discovery of numerous terror cells in germany following the september 11 attacks. there have been increased efforts to integrate germany’s 2.5 million turks following the 2005 violent riots in france. the controversy surrounding the test has largely been centered on the state’s praxis of applying this test to immigrants from patriarchal and undemocratic muslim societies while exempting europeans and americans and other immigrants from democratic states. the netherlands implemented a similar policy, requiring all immigrants to the netherlands to pass an integration test. as a part of the preparation for this test, immigrants have to watch a movie on the netherlands, containing footage of two 85 henry samuel, “french plan would force immigrants to integrate,” national post, february 7, 2006. 86 charles hawley, “a german state quizzes muslim immigrants on jews, gays and swim lessons”, spiegel online, january 31, 2006. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 102 gay men kissing each other, clips of topless women and information that handguns are illegal in the netherlands, that female circumcision is not allowed and that dutch law gives women equal rights under the law. the idea is to create understanding for dutch values, and make prospective immigrants aware of what sort of society to which they are considering moving to. much like in germany, the critique has been that this test obviously is targeting muslims, while eu citizens, americans and citizens of other democracies are exempt from taking this test.87 proponents of multiculturalism and adherents of a neo-colonial model of explanation for the divide in european societies still have strong positions, particularly in sweden. following the burning of scandinavian embassies, voices were heard in the swedish debate, arguing a moral equivalency between the islamists and denmark, and even that the violence actually stems from the west. under the headline “the new crusade,” masoud kamali, professor at the department for multi-ethnic studies at uppsala university wrote in sweden’s largest morning paper: colonialism and neo-colonialism have changed their guise and been internalized. the internal colonialism is multi-facetted segregation, which defines as good every western society today. ... jyllands-posten's cartoons of the prophet muhammad are thus no coincidence. the symbolic violence against muslims has been intensified in a number of european countries. during the past few years denmark has conducted a racist policy and deepened the wedge between “us” and “them.”... the roots of the conflict are to be found in a long history of oppression, racism, western violence, broken promises and exploitation.88 given a widely perceived cultural division between immigrants and native europeans, the question is whether a super-national, non-ethnic secular identity, which is nevertheless european, will be able to compete effectively with the national or ethnic 87 marianne björklund, ”holländsk synd skall avskräcka invandrare,” dagens nyheter, macrh 29, 2006. 88 masoud kamali, “det nya korståget”, dagens nyheter, february 15, 2006. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 103 identities of the individual countries. denmark and sweden have consistently been among the most eu-skeptic countries in the union. politicians such as pia kjærsgaard have made a career by articulating the widespread and deeply felt concerns about immigration and european integration that many danes feel. at the same time, the largest danish political parties, including the liberal ventre party of prime minister fogh rasmussen, are enthusiastic eu supporters, while taking a firm stance against islamic demands of censorship. it seems like this conflict has crystallized two political alternatives in the debate; multi-culturalists and proponents of western, liberal democratic values. certainly, ethnic nationalists remain important actors. in the wake of this conflict they have strengthened their positions further. however, with the possible exceptions of austria and italy, they have not come to power in any eu country, nor have parties, such as haider’s fpö seriously attempted to challenge the foundations of western liberal democracy. the debate which publication of the cartoons opened can no longer be overlooked or ignored. it is long over due, and ought to be welcomed. the suicide bombings carried out by three british-born muslims and a jamaican-born immigrant and convert to islam in london on july 7, 2005 which killed 52 people highlight the urgent need for this discussion. multiculturalism opens up the creation of fractured societies with parallel value systems and legal pluralism, which effectively has turned in to a direct affront to the liberal values of the european union. this, in turn, has fuelled homegrown terrorism among europe’s muslim communities. the findings of the intelligence assessments branch of csis show that many of the radical islamists in western societies are raised by review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 104 their fathers to become extreme believers.89 “european jihad” is increasingly often used to describe the new wave of young men, born in western democracies and considering these societies legitimate terrorist targets. after the arrest of seventeen young muslim men in toronto on june 3, 2006, planning a massive terrorist attack in ontario, a “canadian jihad” appears to be underway.90 at the core of this issue is the conflict between secularism and militant religiosity. militant islam demands that the state should submit itself to religious demands, and use violence or threat of force to impose its ideals upon others. naturally, this is a conflict with many components: social inequalities, segregation and alienation feed radicalism and play into the hands of the islamists. but at its core this remains a conflict about values and about what sort of society europe should be. liberal democratic values and civil liberties are vulnerable, and needs to be defended. lee harris fears that denmark was too accommodating in the face of threats. does the so-called “cartoon war” represent the clash of civilizations? i wish i could answer “yes”, but i can’t. in order for there to be a clash of civilizations, it is necessary for there to be two civilizations, both of which are prepared to defend their deepest cultural values. ... the behavior of the danish government does not suggest that we are in the midst of a clash of civilizations, but, rather, that we are watching a civilization that has lost its sense of purpose capitulating before a civilization that continues to believe, and believe fanatically, in its own mission. a civilization that no longer believes in itself, and in its values and traditions, is no longer in a position to defend itself from the onslaught of a civilization that does. it is only in a position to appease.91 yet this conflict seems to suggest that respect for individual expression has become a part of european identity. no eu governments has been prepared to yield to 89 stewart bell, “nevermind foreign terrorists, why is canada growing its own extremists?” national post, june 3, 2006. 90 bell (2006). 91 lee harris, “there’s no clash here: only one civilization cares to put up a fight”, national review, february 7, 2006. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 105 muslim demands or threats in regards to central liberal democratic values such as freedom of expression. rather, they have rejected muslim claims that non-muslims ought to adhere to the internal provisions of a particular stand of islam. demands for a global ban on blasphemy are therefore unlikely to pass in the united nations. few europeans agree with the proposition that danish society should adjust to the islamists. the emerging consensus is that muslims need to adjust to, or at least accept liberal democratic principles if they chose to live in western democracies. as amir taheri argued, “[islamists] are not the sole representatives of islam, just as the nazi party was not the sole representative of german culture.”92 the muslim communities in the western world have a lot of soul-seeking to do, and needs to take a clear stance on issues such as freedom of religion and freedom from religion, both of which are central values in the liberal democratic tradition. in denmark, the former editor of the daily politiken, the liberal humanist herbert pundik, started a fundraiser for a danish mosque in order to prevent saudi financing, which he feared would further strengthen the reactionary forces within the islamic community in denmark.93 according to flemming rose, if there is one winner in this conflict, and it is the moderate muslims of europe. since the sept. 30 publication of the cartoons, we have had a constructive debate in denmark and europe about freedom of expression, freedom of religion and respect for immigrants and people’s beliefs. never before have so many danish muslims participated in a public dialogue. ... the radical imams who misinformed their counterparts in the middle east about the situation for muslims in denmark have been marginalized. they no longer speak for the muslim community in denmark because moderate muslims have the courage to speak out against them. ... the muslim face 92 amir taheri, “bonfire of the pieties: islam prohibits neither images of muhammad nor jokes about religion,” wall street journal, february 8, 2006. http://www.opinionjournal.com/editorial/feature.html?id=110007934 93 “manifest főr en ny upplysning,” dagens nyheter, march 2, 2005. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 106 of denmark has changed, and it is becoming clear that this is not a debate between “them” and “us”, but between those committed to democracy in denmark and those who are not.94 it is not the historian’s role to make projections for the future. however, there are reasons to believe that the development in europe is one away from multiculturalism and reaffirmation of liberal democratic values and the principles of separation of religion and politics. the challenge to liberal democracy by forces fundamentally opposed to it has forced the governments of europe to re-affirm their adherence to democratic principles, retreating from multiculturalism.95 as the editor of the largest swedish morning paper dagens nyheter expressed it: no open society without blasphemy.96 london-based the economist made a similar point: “it is not a good idea for newspapers to insult people’s religious or other beliefs just for the sake of it. but that is and should be their own decision, not a decision for governments, clerics or other self-appointed arbiters of taste and responsibility.”97 many papers in continental europe that re-printed these cartoons did so because they do feel that freedom of press has been under threat. danish journalists have received death threats, dutch filmmaker theo van gogh was murdered for questioning islam. the diversion of values has become a european problem. across europe, there is increased skepticism towards the concept of multiculturalism. here, i use australian political scientist ross poole’s definition of multiculturalism as a system where immigrants who want to become permanent members of a society get government assistance in resisting assimilation into the political cultures of their new home countries. 94 fleming rose, “why i published those cartoons,” jyllands-posten, february 19, 2006. 95 see christian joppke, ”the retreat from multiculturalism in liberal nation-states” (russel sage foundation, 2003) get complete citation. and rogers brubaker, “the return of assimilation?,” ethnic and racial studies. vol. 24 no. 4, (2001): 531-548. 96 “inget öppet samhälle utan hädelse”, dagens nyheter, january 11, 2006. 97 “cartoon wars”, the economist, february 11, 2006. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 107 multiculturalism, poole argues, was intended as a greater involvement in minority problems, but instead came to mean an end to the assumption that immigrants would assimilate into the existent culture. multiculturalists assume diversity of values to be a value on its own, and that immigrants would contribute by not assimilating. in this quest, they would be assisted by the state, which would work to sustain diversity.98 poole argues against multiculturalism on the basis that identities are formed within cultures, as we are all members of a society. if that principle is abandoned, you see alienation and dislocation. since culture, education and government require and give priority to one dominant language, the “neutral political culture” of the multiculturalists is an impossible fantasy,99 since it ignores the cultural dimension of government. the loss of culture and language is an inevitable consequence of migration, and those who make the choice to migrate must be aware of these consequences, poole argues.100 liberal democratic societies can make exceptions in case of refugees, knowing that their identity and commitment will lie with their native countries, given that they are temporary visitors and that they will not become full members of their host countries. the normal standard for immigrants, however, needs to be that they are treated as potential citizens, and should be included in the political systems and expected to participate in the civic life of their adopted countries.101 in the end of february, eleven intellectuals published an open manifesto against what they described as “a new totalitarianism,” which was reprinted across the european union: 98 ross poole, nation and identity, (london and new york: routledge, 1999), 115-117. 99 bader, “dutch nighmare? the end of multiculturalism?,”canadian diversity/diversité canadienne, vol. 4:1 (winter 2005), 10. 100 poole, 118-124. 101 poole, 125. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 108 after having overcome fascism, nazism, and stalinism, the world now faces a new global threat: islamism. ... islamism is a reactionary ideology, which kills equality, freedom and secularism wherever it is present. its success can only lead to a world of domination: man’s domination of woman, the islamists’ domination over all the others. ... we reject “cultural relativism”, which consists in accepting that men and women of muslim countries should be deprived of their rights to equality, freedom and secular values in the name of respect for culture and traditions. we refuse to renounce our critical spirit out if fear of being accused of “islamophobia”, an unfortunate concept which confuses criticism of islam as a religion with stigmatization of its believers.102 among the signatories were salman rushdie, taslima nasreen and ayaan hirsi ali, all living under constant death threats, as well as bernard-henri levy and irshad manji. they made their point very clear: the problem is not too much freedom of expression of denmark, the problem is fanaticism and intolerance from a global antidemocratic movement, which feeds off the lack of democratic rights in the countries were the worst excesses of anti-danish manifestations have taken place.103 it is the absence of an open discussion of religion in these dictatorships that is the root cause of these problems, not the discussion of these problems in the west. to the peoples of scandinavia, it was a shock to suddenly be singled out as an object of scorn and hatred. for the longest time, there has been the feeling that their crossed flags symbolized democracy, dialogue and faith in the international community. 102 “manifesto: together facing the new totalitarianism”, jyllands-posten, february 28, 2006. 103 in many islamic countries, the authorities extend their blasphemy bans on artistic expressions that could possibly be interpreted as challenging religions, other than islam. curiously, pakistan, where much of the violence following the cartoon controversy took place, took the step on june 3, 2006 to ban the movie the da vinci code “out of respect for the country’s minority christians” since pakistani officials claimed that it contained “blasphemous material about jesus.” “da vinci code banned in pakistan,” edmonton journal, june 4, 2006. at the same time, pakistan has a poor record regarding religious freedom for their christian minority. while there is no death penalty on apostasy, social pressure is so strong that conversion often has to take place underground, and several christians and members of other religious have been persecuted and punished for “blasphemy” in the past few years. “u.s. department of state: pakistan: international religious freedom report 2004, released by the bureau of democracy, human rights, and labor.” released on september 15, 2004. http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2004/35519.htm (accessed june 4, 2006) review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 109 much of this has been shattered as scandinavians in disbelief were broadcasted pictures of their flags being burned by people who most likely would not be able to find the scandinavian countries on a map. a danish flag or a danish passport is longer a protection in the muslim world. even more disturbing was the discovery that muslim organizations within their countries actively and openly sought assistance from brutal dictatorships in their conspiracies against their adopted countries this shock may very well bring the scandinavian countries closer to the european union. it was no coincident that the manifest by the twelve intellectuals was given much attention in the nordic countries; many scandinavians can identify with rushdi and nasreen. the vast majority of scandinavians, much like rushdie and the editor of jyllands-posten, who has received 104 threats, refuse to live in fear.104 there are few reasons to believe that appeasement of radical islam will be a successful strategy. if cartoonists and writers in democratic countries rein in their satire and if our intellectuals and elected representatives impose a self-censorship of their language, islamists will regard this as a victory. this would mean a betrayal not only of core european values, but also of the part of democratic muslims who left islamic societies due to the absence of civil societies and rule of law. one way out of the crisis in which the eu has found itself following the french and dutch voters rejection of the constitution may be a eu which could shift its focus from the creation of a pan-european identity and symbolism and instead provide a “civic citizenship” and a strong framework of liberal democratic values within which the individual nation states and regions states can operate. such a solution would arguably have good chances to be successful, since liberal democratic values are agreeable to the 104 fleming rose, “why i published those cartoons,” jyllands-posten, february 19, 2006. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 110 vast majority of eu citizens, regardless of nationality. across the european union, it is commonly perceived that these values have come under threat lately, both from radical islam and the heavy-handed response to it. it is enough to look across the atlantic to see how the reaction to an anti-democratic challenge has resulted in the patriot act, eavesdropping, indefinite and extralegal arrests and extralegal renditions, some done with the silent approval of some european governments. islamism constitutes a serious challenge to liberal democratic values. the remedy spells more stressing of the importance of liberal democracy, not less. howard duncan argues that liberal democracy itself is “a prerequisite to the application and very formulation of multiculturalism theory. my view is that these two concepts work at different logical levels, one being the precondition for the other. simply put, if you don’t have liberalism you are not going to have multiculturalism.”105 my interpretation is that multiculturalism, rather than integrate immigrants into their new countries of residence can weaken and undermine the foundations of liberal democracy. liberal democracy cannot exist in a vacuum, and is not independent of the conditions under which society works. no society is so void of values that it can provide that “neutral” cultural framework which multiculturalists so desire. the process of constructing this “neutral” society – itself an oxymoron necessarily includes the retreat from liberal democratic values. these require equality in the eyes of the law; it requires that the principles of democratic ground rules are universally accepted by the members of society. for reasons of culture, religion and socio-economic conditions, in denmark, the netherlands, france and other european countries, a non-neglectable part of their 105 howard duncan, “multiculturalism: still a viable concept for integration?,” canadian diversity/diversité canadienne, vol. 4:1 (winter 2005), 13. review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 111 immigrant populations, often muslim men, have not shown this commitment. in many cases, multiculturalism has fostered segregation and fractured societies. in countries such as sweden, media and the political elite long kept silent on arranged marriages and honor killings among certain immigrant communities in fear of being coming across as xenophobic and or even racist.106 in doing so, they not only failed to support women of patriarchal communities, but they failed the very principles of liberal democracy, upon which their societies are built. policies regarding immigration and multiculturalism have been set behind closed doors, and often out of tune with the attitudes of the desires and preferences of the populations in the individual countries. this has opened up a market for various nationalist and anti-immigration parties across europe, capitalizing off this divide between people and politicians. in some cases, these parties have benefited from the conflict regarding the muhammad cartoons. poorly constructed immigration and integration policies has in many cases led to alienated and fractured societies, where many people increasingly perceive a lack of values. an increasing number of policymakers and eu citizens hold multicultural policies responsible for this development, leading to an across-the-board retreat from unpopular and counterproductive multicultural policies. the cartoon controversy did not create european dissatisfaction with multiculturalism, but forced a debate long overdue. 106 one high profile case which got much media attention in sweden and abroad was the “honor killing” of 26-year-old fatime sahidal in uppsala, sweden, by her father after she dated an ethnic swede. sahindal had been repeatedly abused by her brother and father and had lived under death threat for a number of years before her father murdered her. already in 1998 did she approach leading swedish feminists and politicians, publicly criticized them for their reluctance to speak out against patriarchal oppression against immigrant women in sweden. she became widely known in scandinavia when she appeared in the riksdag, the swedish parliament and spoke about her and many other muslim immigrant women’s plight. after sahindal’s murder mona sahlin, swedish minister of integration expressed her regrets. ”i was simply afraid to sound like [anti-immigrant party] sverigedemokraterna: ‘look, that’s how the immigrants are. just thrown them out.’ i was too timid, and i closed my eyes.” “’jag har gråtit hela förmiddagen:’ mona sahlin hade hela tiden kontakt med den mördade” aftonbladet, jan 22, 2002. http://www.aftonbladet.se/vss/nyheter/story/0,2789,125012,00.html (accessed may 10, 2006) review of european and russian affairs vol. 2 issue 3/2006 © rera 2006 all rights reserved 112 this is a debate of the greatest importance for the eu, and can no longer be avoided. in fact, it is intimately connected with the european project, and a satisfactorily solution is necessary in order for the stalled constitution project to be resumed, as these are issues, the solution of which will determine the very nature of the future european societies. liberal democracy needs to be the basis for the european union and its member states. a gradual straying away from these principles has strengthened the enemies of liberal democracy, both among the nationalist right and the anti-democratic islamists. this has played a role in the rejection of the constitution and to doubts about the very cornerstones of european identity and unification. the cartoon controversy is one of many warning signals during the past few years, adding to the van gogh murder and the london and madrid bombings. the response spells liberal democratic or republican assimilation policies, and a strong affirmation of democracy. the risks of liberal democracy and assimilationism far outweighs the risks involved in ignoring popular desires and the continuation of the multicultural policies of the 1980s and 1990s. microsoft word susanna_kislenko_1_1.doc review of european and russian affairs vol. 5 issue 1/2009 © rera 2009 all rights reserved ………………………………………………………………… between economic utility and regional attachment: the emu and eastern enlargement in the spanish eye susanna kislenko abstract this paper uses spain as the case study in furthering understanding of the forces that influence public opinion, specifically as they exist within the contemporary european context. to evaluate this, the focus is on two primary issues: the european monetary union (emu) and the eastern enlargement. in order to explore the relationship between opinions towards eu membership, the euro and support for enlargement, ordinary least squares (ols) and logistic multivariate regression methods are used to model public opinion development. the argument put forth in this paper is that the formation of public opinion is influenced by both regional dynamics and utilitarian economic considerations. within this framework, the concept of political symbolism is explored in uncovering the influence of cognitive mobilization, group attachment and cost-benefit factors as they relate to spanish opinion on widening and deepening of the european union. review of european and russian affairs vol. 5 issue 1/2009 © rera 2009 all rights reserved 2 introduction “the only feeling that anyone can have about an event he does not experience is the feeling aroused by his mental image of the event. that is why until we know what others think they know, we cannot truly understand their acts.” walter lippmann (public opinion, 13) it has been widely acknowledged that at its onset, the european integration project was primarily elite-driven, lacking active engagement of the general public. as a result, during the early stages of unification, there existed a consensus among political scientists and sociologists that the study of public opinion was not entirely relevant to the analysis of the european community (ec), which would later become the european union (eu). now at the forefront of the 21st century, as the eu celebrates its silver anniversary, there is a palpable need to study the development and evolution of public opinion in order to better understand the mechanics of european integration and align the interests of the general public with those of political elites. the intention of this study is to further understanding of the dynamics of public opinion, specifically as it exists within the contemporary european context. spain is employed as the case study in evaluating the factors that have exhibited the greatest influence on the formation of opinion about key matters related to european unification. more specifically, this project is an analysis of the structure of policy attitudes on two primary issues around which the spanish public began to formulate strong views and which they saw as reflection of eu membership and european integration in the larger sense. the first of these is the european monetary union (emu), arguably the most review of european and russian affairs vol. 5 issue 1/2009 © rera 2009 all rights reserved 2 ambitious deepening attempt to date, with the second issue being the eastern enlargement.1 the spanish lens is an interesting one through which to view the eastern enlargement. paralleling the present position of many eastern european countries, when spain first entered the ec in 1986, the country was politically isolated on the continent and viewed ec membership as its ticket back into the exclusive club of western europe. as juan díez medrano explains, “in spain, the eu has been represented as an opportunity to modernize the country and to break with spain’s secular isolation.”2 this study will illustrate that this understanding has framed much of spanish public opinion on the eu, specifically as it applies to widening and deepening of the union. the paper begins with a review of the existing literature on public opinion and its foundations within the european context. the second section discusses the regional and socioeconomic dynamics that influence opinion formation in spain. these messages are then compared to the individual-level variables that affect public opinion on the emu and the eastern enlargement, which are evaluated using ordinary least squares (ols) and logistic multivariate regression analysis of eurobarometer study 58.13, in sections three and four. the discussion and conclusions follow. 1 in 2004, ten new countries were admitted into the eu: cyprus, the czech republic, estonia, hungary, latvia, lithuania, malta, poland, slovakia and slovenia. bulgaria and romania joined in 2007. 2 juan díez medrano, "democracy, legitimacy and the european union," in a european public sphere: how much of it do we have and how much do we need? (amsterdam: network of excellence connex and the amsterdam school of communications research ascor, 2005), 4. 3 at times referred to as “study 58.1” or simply “58.1” in this paper. review of european and russian affairs vol. 5 issue 1/2009 © rera 2009 all rights reserved 3 section 1: existing knowledge about european public opinion due to the fact that public opinion was not considered important or even relevant to the european integration project in its infancy stages, it was only over the last thirty years that this branch of political and sociological study began to surface in the european context. european scholars, however, did not need to start from scratch as studies about the north american public provided european theorists with a starting point in examining public opinion patterns.4 in contrast to the north american debate however, within the european sphere, there has been much less deliberation about whether or not public opinion has the potential to be stable and ‘rational’ over time. rather, much of the work in this area has been focused on the factors that exert the strongest influence on the formation of opinion patterns. in reviewing european literature about public opinion formation, the primary groupings of ideas can be classified into four categories: political awareness, elite influence, economic utilitarianism and group/regional identities. the political awareness5 hypothesis was first explored by philip converse in the united states.6 within the context of european integration, this is explained through the understanding that since a great deal of the information presented about the european union is fairly abstract for the average person, well-developed cognitive skills are required for a sound understanding of the concepts in order to formulate opinions on the issue. linked to this is the idea that increased exposure to an issue and its various facets 4 rooted primarily on the work of such scholars as walter lippmann, gabriel almond, philip converse and, more recently, benjamin page and robert shapiro. 5 also known as cognitive mobilization. 6 converse built upon much of almond’s work in distinguishing between elite and mass beliefs. however, in contrast to almond’s emphasis on education as a key predictor of opinion patterns, converse focused on political involvement as the primary source of distinctions between opinion groups. for more info, see philip e. converse, "the nature of belief systems in mass publics," in ideology and discontent, ed. david e. apter (new york: the free press, 1964). review of european and russian affairs vol. 5 issue 1/2009 © rera 2009 all rights reserved 4 leads to greater familiarity with the subject and a deeper understanding of the broader consequences of particular policies.7 according to inglehart, the more educated groups in society (who can be classified as elites), are the agents who trigger the dispersion of public opinion and orientations related to remote issue areas.8 within this framework, there exist two explanations about how elite and mass opinions are tied together. the first of these, known as the push model, describes how the public “pushes” elites into certain actions or activities by emphasizing the importance of modernization, value change and cognitive mobilization.9 on the other side, the pull model, explains how elites “pull” the public into accepting and supporting their ideas. the theory of economic utilitarianism, an understanding shaped by matthew gabel, is based on the idea that each tendency of opinion on a particular issue is essentially a costbenefit analysis of what the individual stands to gain from the particular policy choice. economic utilitarianism uses the rational-choice framework to explain that as eu citizens in different socio-economic situations experience distinct costs and benefits from integrative policy, their support for eu integration is directly linked to their perceived welfare gains. it has been shown that economic factors, particularly perceived personal 7 for more on this, see lauren m. mclaren, identity, interests and attitudes to european integration (new york: palgrave macmillan, 2006), 14. 8 ronald inglehart and jacques-rene rabier, "economic uncertainty and european solidarity: public opinion trends," annals of the american academy of political and social science 440, no. nov. 1978 (1978): 139. 9 oskar niedermayer and richard sinnott, eds., public opinion and internationalized governance (new york: oxford university press, 1995), 137. review of european and russian affairs vol. 5 issue 1/2009 © rera 2009 all rights reserved 5 material benefits from eu membership, do play an important role in the formation of public attitudes towards the eu.10 group identities have also been proven to be extremely important in influencing opinion formation. in the european context, this line of thinking is related to work by michael hechter who argues that “the greater the actor’s dependence on the group, the more likely he is to comply with its obligations.”11 in the case of the eu, there is an additional layer of analysis because of the regional and sub-regional dimensions. building upon the work of pioneers of public opinion study such as lippmann and converse, a new area of understanding has recently surfaced as an amalgamation of political, sociological and psychological understandings of the way in which public opinion is formed. as john zaller points out, “every opinion is a marriage of information and predisposition: information to form a mental picture of the given issue and predisposition to motivate some conclusion about it.”12 the information in question comes from the world external to the individual and in large part rests with the media messages that exist within the reference groups that the individual trusts. section 2: structure of spanish policy attitudes it has been shown that in spain, it is often the seemingly specific matters – such as suppressing the letter ñ from the alphabet or banning bull-fighting – that matter in 10 vincent a. mahler, bruce j. taylor, and jennifer r. wozniak, "economics and public support for the european union: an analysis at the national, regional and individual levels," polity 32, no. 3 (2000): 447. 11 michael hechter, "a theory of group solidarity," in the microfoundations of macrosociology, ed. michael hechter (philadelphia: temple university press, 1983), 21. 12 john zaller, the nature and origins of mass opinion (cambridge: cambridge university press, 1992), 6. review of european and russian affairs vol. 5 issue 1/2009 © rera 2009 all rights reserved 6 driving opinions about the eu.13 the reason for this is linked to political symbolism; these symbols have an emotional, symbolic representation of an individual’s identity, especially in those regions that are more closely attached to spain as a nation. the country is presently divided into 50 provinces, which are grouped into 17 administrative regions.14 each has a distinct history, dialect/language, culture and, accordingly, opinions when it comes to eu-related matters.15 2.1 the cues from the spanish media on the euro in order to examine how the various regional dynamics play out in the public sphere and how these forces then influence public opinion patterns, it is important to look at the cues that were coming from the national media vehicles during the time period leading up the eurobarometer 58.1 study.16 the factiva database tool was used to examine three major national newspaper vehicles – abc, el mundo and el país. due to the unique status of catalonia in spain, two catalan newspapers were reviewed as well: la vanguardia and el periódico de catalunya, the latter of which is available in both spanish (castilian) and catalan.17 13 carlos closa and paul m. heywood, spain and the european union (new york: palgrave macmillan, 2004), 33. 14 these are andalucia, aragon, principality of asturias, balearic islands, basque country, canary islands, cantabria, castile-la mancha, castille and leon, catalonia, extremadura, galicia, la rioja, madrid, region of murcia, foral community of navarre and valencia. 15 with regard to specific regions, thomas lancaster has found that individuals from catalonia (cataluña) are more likely to have defined opinions about political issues when compared to the rest of spain, with those from galicia being the least knowledgeable about the overall international political environment and spain’s role within it. for more on these divisions, see lancaster, thomas d. "regionalism, nationalism and state institutions: an assessment of opinions in spain." publius 27, no. 4 (1997): 115-33. 16 to be discussed in more detail in sections 3 and 4. 17 the possibility of reviewing the basque papers was considered as well, but the difficulty in understanding the euskera language prevented such analysis in this study. two basque country papers were available in castilian in factiva: el correo and el diario vasco. however as both publications were only launched in 2004, this did not qualify them to be evaluated during the prescribed time frame of june to november 2002. review of european and russian affairs vol. 5 issue 1/2009 © rera 2009 all rights reserved 7 the keyword search was conducted using the headline and lead paragraph function in factiva, which is accepted to be more precise and thus more likely to capture the most relevant articles than a subject search alone. the same process was used for the searches on both the euro and the eastern enlargement.18 the articles encountered on the euro were divided into five primary categories: those that discuss the policy of the spanish central bank, prices and the state of the spanish economy, the euro-dollar parity19, how the euro is faring in other euro-zone countries and a discussion of other eu policies. an additional “other” category was added for all articles that were relevant to, and might influence, opinion about the euro, but which did not fall into one of the more clearly defined groupings. overall, when considering all five publications, the largest group of articles centered on the state of other euro-zone countries, followed by the euro-dollar parity. although the issue of prices and the state of the spanish economy comes in as a close third, it is interesting to note that it was consistently not the primary issue emphasized. for el país, the two largest topic groups were the prices/state of the spanish economy and the state of other eu economies. el mundo also focused quite a bit on other eurozone countries, but the primary topic was the comparison of the euro to the us dollar. within the two catalan publications, there is a perceptible distinction. la vanguardia, much like the national papers, brings more focus to the way that other countries are receiving the euro and the manner in which the new currency appears on the international stage. el periódico de catalunya, on the other hand, focuses the majority of its articles on 18 the keywords that were used are “euro” and “ampliación”, respectively. 19 although most articles compared the euro to the us dollar, a number of comparisons to the japanese yen were also made. review of european and russian affairs vol. 5 issue 1/2009 © rera 2009 all rights reserved 8 the state of the spanish economy and the relative difference in prices since the euro’s arrival. although el país is generally not viewed to be as nationalistic as abc20, when it came to the issue of letting go of the peseta, there was a strong sense of reluctance expressed. on november 24, el país published an article that discussed the history of the peseta as the national currency, effectively acting as the final, nostalgic goodbye to the national symbol. 21 although there were a few articles published earlier in the year that formally welcomed the euro, there is an evident expression in el país of the difficulty in parting with the national currency. within the catalan publications, articles about the euro focused more on logistics; for example issues such as having to change the way vending machines function across spain.22 even though it published a few articles on how the switch affected prices in barcelona,23 el periódico de catalunya had more of an eye on the positive outcomes of the introduction of the euro and the importance of spain being in the first wave of countries in the euro-zone. through this evaluation, it is evident that the main cues on the topic of the euro are rooted in the logistical difficulty of the switch and the emotional journey of parting from the peseta as a national symbol. 2.2 the cues from the spanish media on the eastern enlargement as the euro was introduced almost a full year prior to the collection of data of eurobarometer 58.1, opinions on that topic, in large part, stemmed from the immediate, 20 juan díez medrano, framing europe (princeton: princeton university press, 2003), 152. 21 "la última pesetilla antes del euro," el país november 24, 2002. 22 "ibervending se recupera del efecto euro," la vanguardia, october 21, 2002. 23 for example, "un altre error als taxis," el periódico de catalunya, november 30, 2002. review of european and russian affairs vol. 5 issue 1/2009 © rera 2009 all rights reserved 9 first-hard experiences with the new currency. when it came to the eastern enlargement on the other hand, the study was conducted two years prior to the date of the actual enlargement, which formally took place on may 1, 2004. consequently the media pieces and opinions associated with the issue that emerged in 2002 had to do more with expectations and hopes/fears about the future rather than the situation at hand and the daily reality of the spanish citizens. with this in mind, in contrast to the articles/messages about the euro coming from the papers in question, the issue of the eastern enlargement seemed to focus on an assessment of how other european countries were reacting, before looking inside spain for a more local assessment of the matter. at two years prior to the actual enlargement taking place, it appears that spanish media, much like the rest of the spanish citizenship, was uncertain about what the consequences would be for spain and which stance to take on the enlargement. when evaluating the five newspapers in questions, four primary categories of articles emerge: the effects on structural funds and the common agricultural policy (cap), the experience of the incoming countries, economic consequences for spain and reaction from existing eu countries. although structural funds are generally perceived to be at the top of concerns for the spanish public, what is clear from the analysis here is that more than the issue of the structural funds being taken away and threats to the extensively nurtured cap of the eu, it is the matter of immigration that was being emphasized in the time period leading up to the eurobarometer survey in question. when it comes to the catalan publication of la review of european and russian affairs vol. 5 issue 1/2009 © rera 2009 all rights reserved 10 vanguardia, there were at least three instances during which the publication released an article about the onslaught of immigration that enlargement would bring on.24 overall, it is evident that the reason for this widespread acceptance of the enlargement is generally blind support, with most spaniards not having sufficient information about the issues at hand and of how the enlargement would likely affect spain. the issue of the enlargement is highly influenced by the transfer of support for both eu membership and the emu.25 section 3: letting go of the peseta: spain and the euro in order to have a sufficiently large sample size and a credible information source, the data consulted for this study was collected through the eurobarometer project of the european union. the specific survey evaluated is eurobarometer 58.1: the euro, european enlargement and financial services, which was conducted between october and november 2002. this particular eurobarometer study was chosen for a number of reasons. the first was the year that the study was conducted. the intention in this analysis was to focus on a time period that captured the hopes and fears of what the future of the new currency would mean for citizens within spain, as well as an assessment of how the euro has tangibly touched their lives during the year it was introduced. this is a unique instance in time as it was possible to see the past, the present and future views towards the euro all coming together in a critical moment. 24 june 10, 16 and july 8. 2002. 25 this will be explored and discussed in more detail in section 4. review of european and russian affairs vol. 5 issue 1/2009 © rera 2009 all rights reserved 11 in evaluating opinions towards the euro, two dependent variables are defined. the first is that of support for emu policy. this is an important aspect of assessment as it provides the broader picture of how the euro is viewed. in order to capture the individual-level analysis, it was important also to examine the personal level of attachment to the euro as a currency and what it means for people on an emotional level. thus the second dependent variable was defined as attachment to the euro. the four primary explanatory variables are: support for eu membership, attachment to a regional identity, attachment to spain and perceptions of personal benefit from eu membership. the effect of these four independent variables on both of the existing dependent variables were tested using multivariate regression analysis, both logistic and ols, as appropriate. in order to ensure that the relationship between the dependent and independent variables is nonspurious, three control variables were also included in the model. these are income, education and knowledge of the european union. 3.1 support for the european monetary union although the spanish elite have traditionally displayed a unified front on the topic of the european union and spain’s membership within it, “the debate on the european monetary union was the first symptom of an emerging elite split between those still wanting a greater transfer of sovereignty to the european union and those content with leaving things as they currently stand.”26 prior to the common monetary union coming into existence, eu policies generally left room for national government involvement on a 26 juan díez medrano, "the public sphere and the european union’s political identity " in the politics of european identity construction, ed. peter katzenstein and jeffrey checkel (cambridge: cambridge university press, forthcoming), 23. review of european and russian affairs vol. 5 issue 1/2009 © rera 2009 all rights reserved 12 variety of levels. in many ways, the emu took away this opportunity for spanish elites to exercise their long-standing control over the political and economic activities of the country.27 by taking monetary and fiscal autonomy away from the member states and granting exclusive authority to the european central bank, the emu presented a policy matter that could not be divided across levels of government, thereby taking away power from national elites. within this framework, we now turn to table 1, below which shows the coefficient estimates that were generated using multivariate logistic regression for the dependent variable testing support for the european monetary union. table 1. factors influencing support for emu as a policy choice independent variables dependent variable support for emu support for eu membership 1.39*** (0.22) 4.03 personal advantage of eu 0.50** (0.20) 1.65 attachment to region 0.05 (0.24) 1.06 attachment to spain 0.07 (0.24) 1.07 eu knowledge 0.09 (0.09) 1.10 education 0.09 (0.05) 1.09 income 0.12** (0.06) 1.13 constant 5.55* (1.03) pseudo r2 0.28 n 526 standard errors appear in parentheses. italicized figures are the odds ratios. * p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01 (two-tailed) 27 ibid., 24. review of european and russian affairs vol. 5 issue 1/2009 © rera 2009 all rights reserved 13 the above-reported regression analysis shows that there is a positive and significant relationship between support for eu membership and support for the emu. this signals that the predisposition towards supporting spain’s membership in the european union is a reliable indicator as to whether or not a person will choose to support the european monetary union as a policy goal. the second independent variable illustrates that the more personal advantages an individual believes to have received from the european union on a personal level, the more likely (s)he is to support the emu. this is significant in terms of evaluating the economic utility hypothesis in the spanish case. from this regression analysis, it can be inferred that, at least at the policy level, the economic considerations are weighed heavier than other factors. when it comes to the two attachment factors, national attachment emerges as being only slightly higher than that of the region. overall, in the larger policy matter, it is the identity issue that does not resonate as much as it does in the case of the emu. in terms of the control variables, income evolves as the strongest factor followed equally by eu knowledge and education. this ties in well with the high correlation between the personal advantage of the eu and the support of emu as a policy. 3.2 attachment to the euro in 2002, during the year that the euro was introduced throughout the euro-zone, visible regional distinctions began to emerge throughout europe. as robert fishman points out, “the meaning of that shared moment for citizens of europe was either review of european and russian affairs vol. 5 issue 1/2009 © rera 2009 all rights reserved 14 national, regional or local in nature.”28 for catalan nationalists, the euro’s adoption was seen as an opportunity to cut the national umbilical cord to their nation, making it very much a regional issue. due to the strong nationalistic roots within the province, the euro was a way for the catalan population to “break themselves from the spanish peseta”29, a way of signalling a larger separation away from spain as a political parent to the region. as noted in the previous section, this was evidenced as well in el periódico de catalunya, which consistently expressed prices in pesetas and discussed the difficulty of switching over to the euro. it was the regional papers that had more of a focus on the logistical and shorter-term difficulties of switching over to the euro, while the national dailies put forth more of a larger-picture approach to place emphasis on the fact that although there is an emotional difficulty to detaching from the peseta, the economic and political advantages for both spain and the eu in the larger sense warrants its short-term costs. within this understanding, the evaluation comes to the second dependent variable, that of attachment to the euro at a more emotional level, for which ols multivariate regression figures are listed in table 2 below. 28 robert m. fishman, "identity, social practice and the currency change: catalonia in the year of the euro," in the year of the euro: the cultural, social, and political import of europe's common currency, ed. robert m. fishman and anthony messina (notre dame: university of notre dame press, 2006), 81. 29 ibid. review of european and russian affairs vol. 5 issue 1/2009 © rera 2009 all rights reserved 15 table 2. factors affecting attachment to the euro standard errors appear in parentheses.* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01 (two-tailed) support for eu membership is significantly and positively related to the euro attachment variable, much like with the first dependent variable, which again emphasizes the importance of historical predispositions in setting the stage for opinion formation on specific eu policy matters. although this initial similarity does exist between the two dependent variables, the factor of the personal advantage of the eu is not as significant once the discussion is brought down to a more emotional level. interestingly, when the focus is on personal feelings of attachment, the more pragmatic, economic considerations become sidelined. independent variables dependent variable attachment to euro support for eu membership 0.23*** (0.07) personal advantage of eu 0.09* (0.05) attachment to region 0.10* (0.06) attachment to spain 0.12** (0.06) eu knowledge 0.01 (0.02) education 0.01 (0.01) income 0.06*** (0.02) constant 0.38 (0.26) adjusted r2 0.12 n 541 review of european and russian affairs vol. 5 issue 1/2009 © rera 2009 all rights reserved 16 3.3 regional attachments for the purpose of this study and in order to ensure that the findings are meaningful and free of the degrees of freedom error, the original regional breakdown variable was recoded and re-grouped into geographical regions that had 30 or more observations within each category. table 3 below shows the percentage breakdown of feelings of attachment towards the region, the european union and the euro in each of the major spanish regions. table 3. attachment to region, spain, eu and the euro prior to evaluating the relationship between attachment to the region and how it plays into connections to the eu, it is important to examine the connection between attachment to the specific region in question and spain as a nation. at 54%, we see the lowest attachment to spain coming from the basque region. based on its history of separatism and pursuit towards disassociation from the nation, this is not a surprising region attachment to region (%) attachment to spain (%) attachment to the european union (%) attachment to euro (%) catalonia 85 80 58 71 basque/navarra (north–east) 85 54 56 66 north 86 86 44 62 canary islands 82 66 50 59 madrid 71 87 30 58 galicia 86 79 32 54 centre 81 88 39 54 east 77 81 48 52 aragon, rioja 66 79 16 51 andalucia (south) 88 86 49 48 spain 82 81 55 57 review of european and russian affairs vol. 5 issue 1/2009 © rera 2009 all rights reserved 17 finding. the highest level of national attachment comes from the central madrid region, which is also to be expected as it is the political capital of spain. what is interesting to note, however, is the relatively low level of regional attachment that is evident in the capital region. this shows that national identity is so strong in the central region that the regional attachment is minor by comparison. geographically, the regions that are the furthest from the centre are also most attached to their region and least attached to the capital and the nation as a whole. turning attention to the issue of the eu, at 71% attachment to the euro, it is evident that catalonia is the most connected to the new currency from all regions of spain, followed closely by the basque country. overall, even though it is clear that there are certain groups within the country that are dissatisfied with the euro because of expectations of disruption in their daily lives, they are still the minority as there appears to be an understanding throughout the country that it is to the advantage of spain to be part of the european union, even if that means giving up their national currency and part of their regional identity. as long as they do not feel their strong regional roots being compromised, north eastern regions in particular can accept further deepening of the eu and the consequences they bring for spain. 3.4 the information effect on eu membership and emu opinions to test the limits of the political knowledge hypothesis in this study, two additional variables were created to evaluate the existence of opinion on eu membership and of the emu as a policy. both are dummy variables based on whether or not there was review of european and russian affairs vol. 5 issue 1/2009 © rera 2009 all rights reserved 18 an answer for survey questions 12 and 26, respectively.30 the primary explanatory variable is eu knowledge, in the same way that it appears in earlier tests in this section. the education and income control variables were also included, with the results of the logistic regression presented below in table 4. table 4. effect of eu information on opinion formation standard errors appear in parenthesis. italicized figures are the odds ratios. * p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01 (two-tailed) what is evident from the above figures is that the eu knowledge variable has the same effect on opinion formation about eu membership in the larger sense and the european monetary union more specifically. the education factor, which was notably absent when evaluating its impact on support for the emu, becomes significant when testing solely for opinion formation. consequently, people who are more educated are more likely to hold a defined opinion about spain’s membership in the european union. as the second part of table 4 illustrates, education also has a positive and significant effect on opinion formation about the common currency. this shows that longer-term predispositions may actually be more important here than short-term 30 q26, phrase 1 that references the common currency. independent variables dependent opinion formation about eu membership variables opinion formation about emu eu knowledge 0.10 (0.19) 1.11 0.10 (0.12) 1.10 education 0.58* (0.31) 1.79 0.15* (0.08) 1.17 income 0.09 (0.10) 1.09 0.02 (0.08) 0.98 constant 1.43* (0.89) 2.36*** (0.69) pseudo r2 0.14 0.03 n 589 589 review of european and russian affairs vol. 5 issue 1/2009 © rera 2009 all rights reserved 19 information effects. moreover, as the effect of the information variable is not statistically significant, it can be concluded that it is unlikely to affect opinion formation for the particular issues of eu membership and the emu. section 4: spain and the enlargement to evaluate the way in which these factors play into opinions of the general spanish public, logistic multivariate regressions were conducted to uncover the factors that impact the dependent variable of support towards enlargement. additionally, there were four other explanatory variables which addressed issues associated with the eastern enlargement specifically. the first of these addresses the potential shift in spain’s position within europe after the new countries are added into the union. the second factor is the way in which unemployment rates within the country would be affected after the new incoming countries joined the european union. the third variable that was tested is that of the effect on the eu funds directed towards spain. the final factor that was evaluated in the framework of the eastern enlargement is the consequence for europe’s position on the world stage. review of european and russian affairs vol. 5 issue 1/2009 © rera 2009 all rights reserved 20 4.1 support for the eastern enlargement due to the fact that the dependent variable is dichotomous, logistic regression methods were employed to estimate the effect of the independent variables on support for the enlargement. the coefficients from the multivariate regression are listed below in table 5. table 5. factors influencing support for enlargement standard errors appear in parenthesis. italicized figures are the odds ratios. * p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01 (two-tailed) 31 the reason for the lower n in this model has to do with the fact that four of the independent variables originate from the same survey question (question 43), which had a higher level of missing answers than the explanatory variables in section 3. the missing data figures on these answers range from 159 (world importance variable) to 249 (unemployment variable). this in itself is significant in exemplifying the high level of confusion on the consequences of the enlargement, with so many people choosing to abstain from answering rather than take a stance on concrete outcomes of this policy. independent variables dependent variable support for enlargement support for emu 1.40*** (0.50) 4.05 effect on spain’s importance in europe 1.16** (0.47) 0.31 effect on spain’s unemployment rate 1.30*** (0.48) 0.27 effect on eu funds for spain 0.16 (0.48) 0.85 effect on europe’s world position 0.95** (0.45) 2.59 enlargement information 0.58* (0.32) 1.79 eu knowledge 0.06 (0.12) 0.94 education 0.14** (0.07) 1.15 income 0.01 (0.08) 1.01 constant 0.27 (0.99) pseudo r2 0.30 n 29631 review of european and russian affairs vol. 5 issue 1/2009 © rera 2009 all rights reserved 21 even though there are a number of independent variables that show a significant correlation to the dependent variable, the strongest relationship is with that of support for the common european monetary policy. this shows that individuals who support the emu are significantly more likely to support the eastern enlargement as well. when reviewing the independent variables measuring effect of the enlargement on spain’s situation within europe, there is a strong relationship between those people who believe that spain will lose its position within the european union after the eastern enlargement and those that do not support the enlargement at all. the variable associated with europe’s position within the world shows an equally strong relationship to the dependent variable, in essence emphasizing the importance of the larger understanding that there are greater benefits to implementing the proposed eu policies, both about the euro and the eastern enlargement for the benefit of spain within europe and for europe within the world. the factor related to unemployment rates also exhibits a significant relationship with the dependent variable. this issue is closely tied to the larger immigration framework for spanish citizens as an inflow of new immigrants could equal the loss of jobs. although the issue of the structural funds displays some influence, this variable does not show up in this model to be as strong of a factor in determining whether or not there is support for the enlargement. those that agree that spain will receive less funds after the enlargement are less likely to support it, but not greatly so. the relationship is much less significant compared with the other independent variables and thus dispels a great deal of the expected fears and emphasis on the funding issue that was believed to have extensively framed spain’s understanding of its role within the european union. review of european and russian affairs vol. 5 issue 1/2009 © rera 2009 all rights reserved 22 the question about eu’s overall position in the world and how it is affected by the enlargement surfaces as a significant factor here. those people that agree with the fact that widening the eu will grant the region a greater position on the world sphere are also more likely to be supportive of the enlargement, by a large degree. in this evaluation, the media cues are clearly coming through as influences, but in an unexpected way. in fact, it appears as though it is actually the messages coming through about the euro that are having more of an effect here than those about the enlargement. as noted in section 2, the media messages about the euro were much more defined than those about the eastern enlargement. a large group of the articles that were published in 2002 were focused on the euro/dollar parity, essentially as a symbol for the way in which the eu is perceived internationally. these messages appear to work together with pre-existing dispositions related to the eu in the larger sense, which is helping individuals assess the larger benefits of eu initiatives, whether they were targeted towards a vertical or horizontal expansion of the european union. this finding once again emphasizes the potential effects of euro information on opinions being formulated about the enlargement because spanish citizens feel that they are much better informed about other eu issues. although they do not exert as strong of an effect on the dependent variable, the eu knowledge and education variables do prove to be statistically significant, showing some evidence for the cognitive mobilization theory in this model. review of european and russian affairs vol. 5 issue 1/2009 © rera 2009 all rights reserved 23 4.2 attachment and the enlargement as there is a perceptible relationship between regional attachment and attachment towards the euro as presented in the previous section, it is important to review the same attachment factor in the case of the eastern enlargement. due to the fact that it is not possible to create a variable that represents attachment to the eastern enlargement as it is an abstract concept, the dependent variable is defined as support for the enlargement, while the independent variables of attachment to the region, spain and the eu are presented in the same way as they appear in section 3. the logistic regression coefficients are presented in table 6 below. table 6. attachment and support for enlargement independent variables dependent variable support for enlargement attachment to region -0.08 (0.15) 0.92 attachment to spain -0.41*** (0.15) 0.66 attachment to the eu 1.22*** (0.14) 3.38 constant 0.33* (0.43) pseudo r2 0.13 n 776 standard errors appear in parentheses. italicized figures are the odds ratios. * p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01 (two-tailed) what is noticeable from the above figures is that there is a very strong and significant relationship between attachment to the european union and support for the eastern enlargement. those people who are attached to the european union are also much more likely to support the enlargement. this is likely to surface some of the review of european and russian affairs vol. 5 issue 1/2009 © rera 2009 all rights reserved 24 longer-held feelings related to the eu in the understanding that the enlargement will benefit the eu overall. reviewing national influences, attachment to spain exhibits about half as strong of an impact on whether or not an individual would support the enlargement. the relationship is negative, which illustrates that those people who are more attached to spain as a nation are less likely to support the enlargement. this brings forth some of the nationalistic beliefs and predispositions related to immigration and how it could affect spanish identity. 4.3 the information effect on enlargement opinions although knowledge about the eu does not have a significant effect on spanish citizens supporting the enlargement, there remains a larger question about whether or not information actually helps to formulate an opinion at all.32 the first independent variable is that of eu knowledge. the variable of information about the enlargement was added, as well as education and income as control factors.33 the coefficient estimates from the logistic regression analysis are presented in table 7 below. 32 in order to get at this factor, responses to question 26 were used in order to create a dichotomous variable that would represent opinion formation when it came to the enlargement. if there was an answer provided to the enlargement phrase in question 26, it was coded as 1. all “don’t know” or missing answers were coded as 0. 33 although there may appear to be multicolinearity between the eu knowledge and enlargement information variables, the correlation figure is only 0.50. the vif figures for the model range between 1.25 and 1.44 low enough to conclude that multicolinearity is not a concern here. review of european and russian affairs vol. 5 issue 1/2009 © rera 2009 all rights reserved 25 table 7. effect of eu and enlargement information on opinion formation standard errors appear in parentheses. italicized figures are the odds ratios. * p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01 (two-tailed) according to the figures above, it is apparent that eu knowledge does have a significant effect on whether or not there will be opinion formulation on the matter of the eastern enlargement, in a way that is stronger than for the issues of eu membership and the emu. this illustrates that people who have more knowledge about the eu in the larger sense are more likely to form a defined opinion about the eastern enlargement than those that have no information at all. moreover, eu knowledge clearly outweighs enlargement information when it comes to opinion formation about the enlargement. this reaffirms the fact that as there weren’t clear messages about this issue coming through the daily media, the spanish public relied more on the larger issue of the eu to form opinions on the matter. moreover, the more salient subject of the euro dominated media independent variables dependent variable opinion formation about the eastern enlargement eu knowledge 0.21*** (0.07) 1.23 enlargement information 0.06 (0.18) 1.06 education 0.03 (0.04) 1.03 income 0.04 (0.04) 1.04 constant 0.26 (0.83) pseudo r2 0.04 n 579 review of european and russian affairs vol. 5 issue 1/2009 © rera 2009 all rights reserved 26 coverage during this time period and provided a clearer symbol and touchstone from which to formulate opinions. discussion and conclusions in the form of a new currency, the euro brought with it a common european symbol that had never existed before. the euro possesses something that other social symbols do not: an economic and political purpose that at its core has the underlying reasons for unification – those of becoming a unified power to rival the united states on the international stage. from this study, it is evident that in the spanish case, this common goal and the country’s long-held interest of being accepted as a member of the exclusive western european club, outweighs any inconveniences that it may have initially encountered. while the common european currency completed the economic unification goals of the union, the eastern enlargement has been the catalyst in unifying the continent geographically and bridging the long-held cultural divides that have existed between the two main regions of europe. historically, there have been ongoing conflicts, both economic and political in nature, that have defined the way in which eastern europeans and western europeans approach one another. in terms of the eastern enlargement, the overall perception of the consequences of this eu policy for spain was not as clear from the media analysis. many of these messages reappeared within opinion groupings when the regression analysis was conducted. in terms of the euro, what becomes clear is that support for eu membership predisposes individuals to support the emu as a policy as well. moreover, the personal advantage factor plays a large role in weighing out the pros and cons of accepting the review of european and russian affairs vol. 5 issue 1/2009 © rera 2009 all rights reserved 27 new currency. in this broader perspective, economic factors play a large role. when considering the issue at an emotional level, however, a different picture emerges. although predisposition towards eu membership is still a large factor, regional and national attachments also play an important role in influencing attachment towards the euro. with regards to the eastern enlargement, the same vagueness and uncertainty evident in the media evaluation came through in the way opinions on this issue were formed. much of the understanding of the enlargement was based on previous evaluations of the eu in the larger sense and, more specifically, the euro.34 overall, in terms of the enlargement, despite the confusion, there was consensus on the fact that the enlargement weighed heavily on the way in which spain’s present role and overall position in europe would shift in the future after the new countries officially entered the union. while education was a significant factor for determining whether or not there would be opinions formed about the emu, it evolved as the strongest determinant of opinion formation about eu membership. this may be due to the fact that knowledge and information about the eu have been integrated into the education system, while the emu is still a fairly fresh concept that has existed in the media, but one that has not yet been integrated into the education curricula.35 34 it is important to note that much of this had to do with the fact that media analysis and survey questions were evaluated in 2002, during the year that the euro was introduced. 35 to that end, it would be interesting to expand this study into an evaluation of the way in which the eu appears in the education system and the way that both the emu and the eastern enlargement would be integrated into formal study at various levels. this would be an especially intriguing issue to explore after the completion of the bologna process, which aims to regulate and unify education systems across the european continent. review of european and russian affairs vol. 5 issue 1/2009 © rera 2009 all rights reserved 28 from this analysis, it is possible to conclude that both predisposition and political symbols come into play when spanish citizens evaluate the way in which widening and deepening of the european union will affect them on a personal level and how it will play out in the future. as people, we need a foundation, something to build from in order to have room to define our own individual opinions on a particular issue. this study illustrates that reference groups in the form of the media, regional influences and national elites all factor in and co-exist with utilitarian considerations and emotional attachments to the symbols that define our individual identities. bibliography closa, carlos , and paul m. heywood. spain and the european union. new york: palgrave macmillan, 2004. converse, philip e. "the nature of belief systems in mass publics." in ideology and discontent, edited by david e. apter. new york: the free press, 1964. díez medrano, juan. "democracy, legitimacy and the european union." in a european public sphere: how much of it do we have and how much do we need? $amsterdam: network of excellence connex and the amsterdam school of communications research ascor, 2005. ———. framing europe. princeton: princeton university press, 2003. ———. "the public sphere and the european union’s political identity " in the politics of european identity construction, edited by peter katzenstein and jeffrey checkel. cambridge: cambridge university press, forthcoming. fishman, robert m. "identity, social practice and the currency change: catalonia in the year of the euro." in the year of the euro: the cultural, social, and political import of europe's common currency, edited by robert m. fishman and anthony messina, 81-96. notre dame: university of notre dame press, 2006. hechter, michael. "a theory of group solidarity." in the microfoundations of macrosociology, edited by michael hechter, 16-55. philadelphia: temple university press, 1983. review of european and russian affairs vol. 5 issue 1/2009 © rera 2009 all rights reserved 29 "ibervending se recupera del efecto euro." la vanguardia, october 21, 2002. inglehart, ronald , and jacques-rene rabier. "economic uncertainty and european solidarity: public opinion trends." annals of the american academy of political and social science 440, no. nov. 1978 (1978): 66-97. "la última pesetilla antes del euro." el país november 24, 2002. lippmann, walter. public opinion. new york: the macmillan company, 1922. mahler, vincent a., bruce j. taylor, and jennifer r. wozniak. "economics and public support for the european union: an analysis at the national, regional and individual levels." polity 32, no. 3 (2000): 429-53. mclaren, lauren m. . identity, interests and attitudes to european integration. new york: palgrave macmillan, 2006. niedermayer, oskar, and richard sinnott, eds. public opinion and internationalized governance. new york: oxford university press, 1995. "un altre error als taxis." el periódico de catalunya, november 30, 2002. zaller, john. the nature and origins of mass opinion. cambridge: cambridge university press, 1992. microsoft word marisa boyd_2_1.doc review of european and russian affairs vol. 5 issue 1/2009 © rera 2009 all rights reserved ………………………………………………………………… the success of france’s youth: children of algerian descent in the classroom marisa boyd abstract the purpose of this exploratory research is to elucidate the connection between the institution of the french educational system and its function as a vehicle of integration for the children of immigrants. focusing on those of algerian descent, this paper asks if and how the educational system is failing this particular demographic. by contextualising colonial france in algeria, this paper shows the connection between history and the educational institution as it relates to contemporary french culture. this paper argues that the french educational system, although well established, does not recognise nor meet the needs of the multi-ethnic classroom. by identifying integration as a key player, this paper explores the relationships between citizenship and integration and how perceptions of both concepts are produced and reproduced in the school system. this paper notes the need for a shift in the current discourse for the “second generation” from one of “immigrants and immigration” to a more precise discourse on ethnic minorities. review of european and russian affairs vol. 5 issue 1/2009 © rera 2009 all rights reserved 31 in every country that receives significant numbers of immigrants, the question of the “second generation” usually becomes highly significant; france is no exception. it has experienced high levels of immigration over the past 50 years, and the children and grandchildren of these immigrants are now an important part of french society. immigration is not a new subject and has been the focus of many debates over the past two decades. the social and economic attainment of the children and grandchildren of immigrants has become a political issue and it has taken precedence in the media. on a more significant level, this attainment will have a durable impact on france as a whole. nowhere has their presence led to more debates than in the educational system, in fact, the schools have become equal grounds for political and religious debates alike. the purpose of this paper is to elucidate preliminary findings of the connection between the institution of the french educational system and its function as a vehicle of integration for the children of immigrants, more specifically algerian descent. this paper questions whether the educational system is failing this particular group in terms of integration, in other words, socially, economically and culturally. recognising these issues have many facets including history and how culture is perceived in france, this paper will primarily focus on the classroom and how the school as an institution is a vehicle to integrating france’s students with algerian roots. i will contextualise colonial france in the latter years and will describe and relate it to the current relationship it has with algeria. secondly, i will focus on the history of the educational system, its goals, and how it relates to the present day french culture. lastly, the paper will discuss the relationship between citizenship and integration of the children with algerian roots, how citizenship is linked to the educational system and the multi-ethnic classroom. this research will define and discuss integration in terms of how the educational system functions in an ethnically diverse environment. identifying integration as a key player in the success or failure of the students in the educational system will reveal the family effect and cultural effects on these children. review of european and russian affairs vol. 5 issue 1/2009 © rera 2009 all rights reserved 32 historical context at a glance the importance of history lays at the root of france’s immigration trends and its policies regarding assimilation and integration. the impact of large scale immigration was further magnified by family reunification and the emergence of a “second generation” of french born children. this is the group of interest for this paper because of their historical and contemporary importance in the development of france and the challenges posed to institutions such as the education system. the issues concerning immigrants and their children derive from a combined history of colonialism, political agreements, wars and integration ideologies. however, from the beginning of the third republic in the 1880s, immigrants and immigration became a social and political issue in the public sphere (schor 1996: 13). immigration trends until the early 20th century in france included groups such as italians, poles, belgians and spaniards; later came the portuguese, north africans followed by the turks, and others (schor 1996: 5). during the second world war, many immigrants engaged in forced labour and xenophobia took the spotlight as a social and political issue as foreigners and jews were identified by the vichy regime as problematic (schor 1996: 167). after the regressions made during the second world war, france maintained its colonial control in algeria while experiencing a drastic flux in immigration to support the booming economy of the “trente glorieuses” (tribalat 1995 : 18, schor 1996: 192). however, it was after algeria’s independence in 1962 and throughout the seventies where their immigration to france peaked (tribalat 1995: 18). the motivation for immigration was mostly for economic reasons, especially in the case of the algerians who were leaving a country exhausted of its resources. however, it is important to note that in 1930 france’s immigrant population represented 7% of the total population and in large part the immigrant population became french citizens during the interwar years (schor 1996: 81). in fact, in 1930, france had become the number one country in the world, surpassing the united states, in accepting immigrants (schor 1996: 6). at the same time, any potential social issues arising around the fact that immigrants were contributing to the nation’s economy were overlooked (sayad 1999: 31). the assumption from the host society that immigrant workers will always be available and willing to work under any condition was and arguably is still present in our perceptions of the review of european and russian affairs vol. 5 issue 1/2009 © rera 2009 all rights reserved 33 immigrant. the historical significance of immigration in france is often forgotten when examining the issues on the “second generation” and how “minorities” are integrated into that society. in terms of numbers, algerians have been one of the largest (at time the largest) groups immigrating to france from the 1970s to present day. the 1970s in many ways marked the end of the migration of the first generation of algerians and other north african immigrants. over the following decades, their children emerge as an increasingly important segment of french society. for the purpose of this paper, the children of one or two foreign or immigrant parents are treated as the same demographic in this paper. additionally, it is important to reiterate the preferred group of children studied are those with algerian roots, however this analysis includes and accepts the grouping called ‘north african’ because of the fluidity of these terms in the current literature and because the majority of these groups is of algerian decent. accepting a more general, overarching definition of students with algerian roots allows for a broader scope for information. often, the algerian “second generation” is referenced as immigrants, foreigners and algerians and we inaccurately fall into a discourse of immigrants and immigration rather than treating this group in terms of minorities in a french secular society. the school system has the potential to mark a difference in how students with algerian roots are different from their foreign origins. the school system at a glance the durkheimian perspective on the purpose of the educational system is to prepare young adults with the accepted and appropriate skills for a functional, successful adulthood. this approach to teaching would warrant the successful integration of the young adult from school into a productive individual within france. it is also possible to interpret durkheim’s educational ideology as a means of assimilating individuals into society. for durkheim, the emphasis is on collectivity, and how society imposes the way in which the individual lives. another key actor in the creation of france’s universal, secular education during review of european and russian affairs vol. 5 issue 1/2009 © rera 2009 all rights reserved 34 the 1880s is ferdinand buisson. he explains the school’s role is to train and eventually make individuals transform society. according to buisson, the republic consists of the ‘utopias of yesterday’, and transforms them to today’s ideals in preparation of tomorrow’s reality. buisson’s perspective is a progressive point of view (maury 1996: 35) and allows for more of a dynamic, timeless approach to education as a player for society’s overall functional needs including the multi-ethnic classroom on a global and local scale. the importance of institutions and their methods to train individuals transform society as a whole. relating this to the french case, the efforts to maintain “french culture” through laws and practices like laïcité may be impossible because the country in fact transformed when it accepted immigrants in vast numbers. we are therefore left with issues of whether the changes from immigration are recognised for their french born children in institutions such as the school system. the french educational system is unique compared to other european union countries and canada. administratively, france is divided into 30 ‘academies’ covering the ‘départements’ representing the regions in the country. each academy is an administrative constituency or district headed by an appointed rector (ministère de l’education nationale). although the system is centralised, the departments have administrative responsibilities such as the partial management of certain personnel in the school, the allocation or appointment of students, la vie scolaire including the students’ experiences within the institution and the organisation of exams and competitions (ministère de l’éducation nationale).traditionally, the lycée (high school) has had a national responsibility to reproduce the nation’s middle and top management, as well as make future leaders (lewis 1985: 72); the production of an elite class was the objective of the school system (barrère 1998). however, from the mid 1960s as the pupil population drastically increased, syllabuses started to change and new courses such as economics, social sciences and technical options were introduced to better accommodate the general population and the changing world (lewis 1985: 76). in 1981, savary, then french minister of education recognised problems within the system and attempted a new approach to the system and created the educational priority zones (zones d’éducation prioritaires or “les zep”) (lewis 1985: 48). the zeps were implemented as an effort to help the more depressed areas of the country where ‘failure’ turned into a cyclical pattern review of european and russian affairs vol. 5 issue 1/2009 © rera 2009 all rights reserved 35 (lewis 1985: 49). the criteria for ‘depressed’ areas included underachieving pupils, violence, absenteeism and a high concentration of immigrants (lewis 1985: 49). here, the government considered social and economic characteristics before creating the zep. placing aside evident problems of the zep in terms of stigmatism and labelling, changes have been made to this well established institution. although a detailed discussion on the positive and negative aspects of the zep is beyond the scope of this paper, this is an example illustrating the possibilities of change in the educational system. it is an old, centralised system with heavy historical ties, but change can occur and is possible within that system. the nature of the centralised french school system also relies heavily on bureaucracy and democracy. the term democracy in the context of the french administration refers to the power deriving from the central government (halls 1976: 38). however, the management of schools shifted from a heavy reliance on the ministry to a more autonomous approach in the administration (ministère de l'éducation nationale). today, as part of the department responsibilities, the lycée manages the organisation of classes, a break down of hours taught and an outline of the institution’s economic and social environment (ministère de l’éducation nationale). furthermore, the public’s relatively positive attitude toward their school system may derive from the weight the institutions have placed on equality; another tradition of the french schools. the law laïcité as described below, emphasises the importance of equality and stresses that all are treated the same and will therefore have the same experience and level of education. theoretically this law is sound and appears to have great possibilities in achieving a certain level of education and respect in a multi-ethnic setting. however, in practice, this law emphasises the differences in students and does not consider equity. an institution designed for the integration of its pupils into the rest of society should consider the issues around equity and consider and contextualise its students. however, these considerations may challenge the country’s educational system as it stands in relation to integration, citizenship and nationalism. review of european and russian affairs vol. 5 issue 1/2009 © rera 2009 all rights reserved 36 integration, citizenship and nationalism integration and assimilation the term integration is problematic and much discussed in the social sciences. as a term used by the elite to achieve their own interests, “integration” has become divisive in nature. also, being an unclear term it has become yet another loaded concept complete with negative connotations focusing on difference (noiriel 2005: 9). however, the term “integration” can reflect a variety of quotidian activities such as economic, social, cultural and political activity. for lack of a better word, i will refer to integration in social terms while touching on the importance of economic standing. i am consciously avoiding “culture” as a means to an end for “integration”; the debate of cultural integration can easily fall into ethnocentric value judgements with a primary focus on an immigrant population. cultural integration in the french context for french born children of immigrant parents would inaccurately treat this demographic as immigrants. education is used as an example of social integration via test results, academic success in a streamed system and lastly the eventual entrance into the workforce. according to tribalat (1995), the term integration has become consecrated and its familiar partner in the integration discourse, “assimilation” provides an imagery which is a throw – back to colonial france. however, depending on space and time, assimilation varies in definitions and explanation of outcomes. assimilation could be interpreted as radical where an individual’s identity completely disappears in a new society (grange 2005: 42). it can also refer to the changing towards something that is more similar to the majority, conformity and an irreversible process (grange 2005: 42). on a less radical note, assimilation also explains the decline of “particulars” pertaining to groups through the mixing of populations, as a result their behaviours will change (tribalat 1995: 13). using tribalat’s definition of assimilation best suits france’s integration policy of not only immigrants, but of all inhabitants. what is citizenship? depending on the country, citizenship has judicial implications including specific rights and responsibilities such as voting. children with algerian lineage but born in france are legally french citizens. however, this paper will refer to the social aspect of citizenship; review of european and russian affairs vol. 5 issue 1/2009 © rera 2009 all rights reserved 37 according to barrère (1998), citizenship has become the implicit solution to a crisis in the schools’ roles in french society. citizenship is used to clarify the “collapse of the authority of the teachers” while it pushes for a true democratic institution as it recreates the effect of the student in the establishment (barrère 1998: 652). most importantly, the citizen is a member of a recognised collectivity who identifies with a nation. barrère notes how this essential condition of citizenship brings us to identifying “who is in” and “who is out” (barrère 1998: 652). barrère refers to four other characteristics of the citizen. she explains how the citizen possesses rights, meaning the necessary rights for an individual to have freedoms such as speech, beliefs and social freedoms including economic and social well-being. she explains how the citizen is a social actor who participates in public life. citizens have groups of peers and a youth culture, and a form of public and public life teachings (done in the schools and on the streets) (barrère 1998: 654-657). this becomes problematic for children of immigrants who are not a part of the immigrant population yet are not considered to be “french”. the recognised collectivity, it can be argued, is the “second generation” collectivity. however, this term alone tends to have negative connotations and also excludes the third and fourth generations born in france. the children with algerian origins do not fit into barrère’s four supporting characteristics of citizenship; this group is excluded in an in-depth discussion on citizenship. although the french educational system plays a role in creating and maintaining citizens, there are conflicts in terms of the system and democracy; there is conflict between individual rights (as seen from laícité) and the collectivity. the french educational system practices equality to a fault, and is leaving behind those students who do not fit into the strict framework of what is officially considered a good citizen, or french. to break down the relationship between school, democracy and citizenship, it is important to understand the paradoxical nature of these issues. under the concept of democracy, french schools are occupied with equality to the extent that the structure of the system becomes unequal because it does not consider the differences in social production and the autonomy of the individual (barrère 1998: 660). the system accepts students on the premise all pupils are a type of blank slate and easy to configure. the review of european and russian affairs vol. 5 issue 1/2009 © rera 2009 all rights reserved 38 system creates as democratic in nature problematises the individual rights by not considering the students’ different social backgrounds in the classroom. this form of assimilation in the classroom is historical as it follows the durkheimian belief that assimilation is good and strives for the betterment of french life. the connection to citizenship lays in the fact that those students who do not fit the “french” mould as such, are not perceived as being french; they tend to be forgotten students, or students who “fall through the cracks” and are not active participants in the school. when further probing into the notion of equality in the schools, we can argue that equality as defined by the french school system, perpetuates inequalities amongst the students. khamès (1993) and derderian (2004) illustrate that xenophobic tendencies are related to policies created by and applied to specific institutions; disabling the full participation of individuals. the ability of full participation reflects how the state either helps or hinders the collective integration process. for example, french school attendance has become obligatory and increasingly longer. here lays the responsibility of representing values perceived as being collective and in a social hierarchy while contributing to the homogenisation of the country (bordes-benayoun 2007 : 62). a system organised to value the equal treatment of its pupils misses numerous other variables in a student’s life which may help or hinder their success in academics. the organisation of the school system is based on egalitarianism, participation and it was also structured to assimilate students (lelievre 2000: 8). this assimilation is based on the french model focusing on the value of the individual, the formal, legal and political equality of all citizens (lelievre 2000: 8). however, the current educational system in france is not helping students’ needs of social mobility and is neither the answer to france’s current socio-economic issues of families with algerian origins. in fact, pierre bourdieu believes that french schools as presently organised are not liberating institutions but rather they are reproducing inequalities and elitism through the reproduction of social ‘acts’ which are taught as natural (halls 1976: 165). however, it is arguable that schooling brings a better equality of “democratisation” to the overall society (halls 1976: 165). the french example illustrates how “democratisation” plays a role to universalise historical norms “of a learned culture” (halls 1976: 165). this learned culture originates from the social élite whose emphasis on high culture has (according to review of european and russian affairs vol. 5 issue 1/2009 © rera 2009 all rights reserved 39 castel and passeron) mitigated against the success of educational reform (halls 1976: 165). contextualising the student given the above description of the french school system, this paper also establishes how the student fares in french schools in recent decades and whenever possible i will focus on students with algerian origins. to better contextualise the student, i will draw on three major themes affecting their school experience. the familial effect on students, the values of the system including laïcité and the structure of the french educational system will be considered for analysis. integration through the school system in general is not easy for young people in france, especially for those with algerian roots. high drop out rates and high percentages of unemployment amongst the children of immigrants are reflected in studies showing their difficulties in the educational system and in their apparent lack of professional gains. however, it is important to note the overall ‘second generation’ as a group has shown social mobility compared to their parents’ experience living in france (simon 2003: 1092). despite difficulties, students with algerian roots often have higher literacy and educational backgrounds than that of their parents’. the evidence of such social mobility shows the school system is not completely failing the students. however i argue the schools as primary socialising institutions could better integrate its students into french society, especially those with algerian origins. in fact, this paper probes into the issues of why those of french-origins tend to perform better than their peers of algerian descent even if they are both socialised in the same institution at the same time? for those children whose parents are algerian, the experience is different from their french origin peers’ experience because of underlying issues the school system formulates such as nationalism and citizenship. the presence of young people with algerian origins is challenging france’s perception of national identity, citizenship and institutions such as the school system. in general, young people are known to have a magnified perception of discrimination and admit to being ostracised in their schools, by their peers (galland 2006: 154). studies have identified a variety of ways young people are ostracised; review of european and russian affairs vol. 5 issue 1/2009 © rera 2009 all rights reserved 40 according to galland (2006), one young person out of four with a non european background has experienced poor treatment because of their origins (galland 2006: 151). it is important to note that boys with north african roots feel particularly stigmatised in france while their sisters tend to be less stigmatised (gallard 2006 : 151). stigmatism for boys is clear as seen in the media on violent outbreaks in france. however, stigmatism or creating the ‘other’ is also presented in the recent reinforcement of the laïcité law which focuses primarily on girls with north african roots who wear the hijab. those with a non – european lineage not only experience difficulties at school, but also during the first years after their schooling (tribalat 1996). the transition to the working world is difficult for all french youth because of the economy. the state of the economy plays a key role in this lack of transition; however the beginnings of the “work life” tends to be more difficult for those with algerian roots, especially for the young men (tribalat 1995: 176). the differences between the young men with algerian roots and their sisters are important to note because of their levels of education and the work obtained once they leave school. citizenship and laïcité the educational system needs to reflect its pupils and in france, it has yet made a shift to better accommodate the multiethnic classroom. social groups have the ability to sustain themselves through renewal (dewey 1916: 11). this renewal is focused on the young population of any group in question by means of “educational growth” (dewey 1916:11). in a similar vein, the republican tradition of the school unites the nation. its role is to develop and promote talent for society (barrère 1998: 651). the training and production of good citizens has its origins in the french school system and assures the training of the civic “moral” of the citizen (barrère 1998 651). briefly, there are many opinions regarding durkheim’s “moral”, however, it refers to the idea there is a sense of non religious obligation in a given society. since durkheim, there have been uncountable definitions and interpretations of ‘moral’. for example, ferdinand buisson believes ‘moral’ should have absolutely no connection to schools or any educations (maury 1996: 18-19). jules ferry, on the other hand held the belief for a laïque “moral” in order to separate religion and the state (maury 1996: 18-19). coupled with the lacing of review of european and russian affairs vol. 5 issue 1/2009 © rera 2009 all rights reserved 41 citizenship in the discourse and the lack of consensus of the meaning of “moral”, laicité has become one of the most pressing issues in the french school system. the french laic system is one which does not recognise religion; it takes pride in its efforts for an egalitarian, gender neutral and equitable system. this practice has been successful in the past; french society enjoyed a system which provided their children the same method of schooling throughout the country. following the ideology that all are equal and thus treated equally, the french educational system has been successful in building a sense of nationalism with citizens playing key economic and social roles for the functioning of the country. however, such a system in practice today also creates problems as it focuses on the absence of religious symbols and therefore creates hostility amongst those who do not fit into the homogeneous grouping of french society. the ‘conseil d’état1’ from november 27th 1989, confirmed and clearly identified the following exclusive principal of laïcité: « le port de signes ou tenues par lesquels élèves manifestent ostensiblement une appartenance religieuse est interdit » in the schools and public scholarly establishments (lorcerie 2005: 75). it is argued, this principal helps to ensure the equality of treatment of pupils. noted in the stasi commission, the laícité law maintains a “moral” obligation to ensure equality between men and women (beaubérot 2006: 256), and therefore it is logical to forbid the headscarf. this debated question is reflected in the debré commission, as it notes how many professionals in the schools were divided on the issue (lorcerie 2005: 74). also, amongst those schools mostly affected by the enforcement of the laïcité law are not in agreement with the sanctioning of students. however, the government and other decision – makers did not consult with students nor include them in debates and therefore it is essential we not assume students are either for or against laïcité (lorcerie 2005: 93). many of jules ferry’s contributions from 1881 remain in contemporary france. what we refer to today as laícité was his goal to secularise france. as opposed to other european union countries where secularism is within a context of recognising religious pluralism, france maintains a complete separation between public space and religion affiliation; a space where there is a shared moral vision within the nation (lelievre: 2000: 1 conseil d’état counsels the government on a variety of issues pertaining to legislative or administrative reforms. review of european and russian affairs vol. 5 issue 1/2009 © rera 2009 all rights reserved 42 7). to reiterate, the equal treatment in school or lack thereof is not considered at the level of the individual. this is in line with the tradition of the school system of its focus on the collective. in a centralised system, it is impossible to consider the individual and accepts there are students ‘falling through the cracks’ of the system. an example of the school system failing students can be found in the hijab debate. the full laïcité debates and the wearing of the headscarf is a complex sociological phenomenon, a rich discussion of this is beyond the scope of this paper however, i will outline key concepts and arguments for a better understanding of how laïcité relates to the french school system and how it in fact has created hostility because of its focus on the absence of any religious symbols. laïcité in the name of egalitarianism has ignored the backgrounds of students and has negatively effected students’ school experiences. the experience includes their success in the classroom as well as their social success in better integrating into the rest of their communities. it is difficult to integrate when there is a constant presence of difference surrounding the school yard. as the school system is not organised to acknowledge and address the individual, but the collective, the importance lies in the construction of inequality in the name of equality. the difficulty of achieving in school for students coming from a lower socio-economic background has been established, this coupled with a renewed focus on difference via religious symbols can only hinder students in general. however, the conseil d’état is transparent in their view that the wearing of the headscarf is a political – religious sign that is an obstacle of integration (lorcerie 2005: 80). on the other hand, it can be argued that the emphasis on difference in fact hinders students’ integration in the schools and later into the workforce. luc ferry2, the former minister of education (2002-2004), believes there is a need in restoring “republican sanctity”. his attitude on pupil’s attire in school is reflected in his actions as minister seeking to forbid all religious and political signs in schools. he plays an important role in the french law on secularity and conspicuous symbols in school (lorcerie 2005: 80). this general concept of protecting schools of a collective identity imposed by the “headscarf affair” has turned to an affair of girls and education, a 2 luc ferry is mostly known for the law on “french law on secularity and conspicuous religious symbols in school”. review of european and russian affairs vol. 5 issue 1/2009 © rera 2009 all rights reserved 43 concept of interpersonal relations, and an education that is no longer regarded as french (lorcerie 2005: 80). the current discourse on the wearing of the headscarf coupled with the above mentioned ‘affairs and concepts’ is also described as a type of war brought through laïcité by those oppressors behind north african girls who happen to be muslim, making them cover their hair in schools (lorcerie 2005: 80). here, young muslim girls with algerian roots or otherwise, are viewed as pawns in a type of battle against the establishment. others in the ministry of education with ferry such as claude durandprinborgne recognise their apparent ethnocentrism but believe the headscarf corresponds with the “feminine condition”. duran-prinborgne believes we can justify an intervention and that this phenomenon has a direct relationship with religion, sexuality, and a personal dimension associated with adolescents (lorcerie 2005: 84-85). laïcité has successfully stigmatised boys and girls alike in the school system. reinforcing the laïcité law also reinforces france’s perspective on women, especially those who happen to be muslim and their male counterparts. this aspect of the school system is value centric and leaks down from the ideology of education and egalitarianism to the school grounds. laïcité as an enforcer of egalitarianism pushes for a form of assimilation, changing an individual’s values taught in the household towards the prescribed civic standard. a result of this approach is the identification of the ‘other’ and the changing of real or perceived ethnic identities including cultural traditions. a prime example is the emphasis on the absence of religious symbols in french institutions. although laïcité stresses the headscarf as a main issue in the school system, it is important to address how this concept of equality or result of inequality effects both boys and girls in the system. it seems the essentialist approach to laïcité alienates large groups of boys and girls whose roots may come from north africa or other historically muslim countries. these students are automatically perceived as “the other” whether they agree or disagree with the law in question. having to address and question their own religious, moral and social beliefs, is not evident during such a time in a student’s life. one possibility of the lack of success in the classroom could derive from the lasting effects of stigmatism coupled with being forgotten in a system which stresses egalitarianism more than the student. another example of how the emphasis on equality based on laïcité creates review of european and russian affairs vol. 5 issue 1/2009 © rera 2009 all rights reserved 44 inequalities amongst pupils is exemplified in 2003-2004 when the school and its professionals played a paradoxical role in the politicisation of the hijab (lorcerie 2005: 73). the school became the heart of the hijab “problem” and it became the example of the ‘ultra-laïque’s’ platform in order to conceive a solution to ban the headscarf (lorcerie 2005: 73). unfortunately, the objectification of schools in its relation to laïcité law is being used for political opportunism and ultimately at the cost of students’ education (lorcerie 2005: 75). girls are being forced to challenge their religion at an early age and some choose their religion above education. having to make these choices at a young age does not complement an egalitarian society which promotes educational equality between the sexes. this system in contemporary france refuses to identify the problems of trying to obtain a collective identity in such a diverse society. the prohibition of religious signs by this law is more cyclical in nature because it does not regulate problems in the schools (lorcerie 2005: 94). in fact, it appears to be a solution for a problem that does not exist in the schools. with or without the reinforcement of laïcité, students and staff know who have north african roots, who observe certain religious days and who are the “believers”. those students mostly affected by laïcité would continue to be considered foreign and not french; however laïcité legitimises the stigmatisation against children of immigrants and it reinforces the accepted practice to identify the ‘other’. although it touches on gender roles, laïcité is not the only issue to consider for the differences between male and female students are at an international and national level. girls are doing better in school on a global scale, however, this is clearer in the french context and the difference is even more evident when examining the students with algerian origins. gender differences in the system students’ success depends on how well they utilise their resources, even if the resources are limited. although difficult to measure, the amount of times a student fails is important to consider when addressing a successful academic experience. in france, when students fail a class, they have to repeat that entire academic year; meaning, all the classes at that level. almost two thirds of students with algerian origins have had to repeat a year in elementary school; this is compared to the national percentage of 40% review of european and russian affairs vol. 5 issue 1/2009 © rera 2009 all rights reserved 45 failure at the elementary level (tribalat 1995: 146). when looking at the numbers of graduation or the years spent in school, researchers have probed further into the numbers and consider the frequency of repeating a year. the boys and girls of algerian descent tend to have a higher rate of repeating a year at 1,4 compared to the national level of 1, 08 for the boys and 0,96 for the girls (tribalat 1995: 145). therefore, the amount of years in the school system is not an indicator of success. however, a year count could reflect the value of education in the household and pressures the parents and students alike apply to achieve certain goals. additionally, if students do not do well in elementary school (collège), they are automatically streamed into either a ‘professional’ or ‘technical’ school. the purpose of these schools is to provide students trade or industry skills (e.g. learning how to cast plastic for boats and airplanes). in many cases, the parents coming from algeria are unable help their children obtain their desired results in school (tribalat 1995 : 146). in general, students with weak grades tend to follow the less desirable technical stream. also, the boys are leaving school a little earlier than their sisters (at the age of 16), but in general terms, girls with immigrant roots are very similar to that of the national numbers. about ten years ago, less than one fourth of students with immigrant origins obtained their high school diploma, compared to the national rate of 36% of boys and 44% of girls (tribalat 1995 : 148). the french ministry of education offers different, more contemporary results of the same demographic, revealing the school is not completely failing the students but improvement is still needed. therefore we must also consider the social class and the aspirations of the parents to better understand how these students fit into the bigger picture of the school system. family influence and the school system depending on where the family comes from, the degree of literacy from that country often affects the level of value placed on education “educational baggage” which can further be probed into the family’s eventual problems of adapting into the french lifestyle (tribalat 1995: 23). for example, weak or strong, those coming from european countries tend to have some educational background. this is not the case for those born in algeria or morocco; 41% and 31% of male immigrants have never been to school. for women, review of european and russian affairs vol. 5 issue 1/2009 © rera 2009 all rights reserved 46 45% have never been to school (tribalat 1995: 23). these numbers may prove to be paradoxical because of the valuation of education for both girls and boys coming from algerian or north african origins. the trends outlined in works from the ministry of education and more contemporary works tend to hold the perception that those with a higher value of education come from lower socio-economic backgrounds. an explanation of this may be found from algeria’s colonial past where the value of education is more of a cultural phenomenon and less of a class issue. in many cases, foreign parents see the obtaining of a high school diploma as a concrete measurement of integration (brinbaum et al 2005: 60) considering the socio background of a student’s family should not be forgotten, however many scholars such as tribalat places an emphasis on their learning a second language. in many cases, parents whose mother tongue is different from that of their host country tend to place a high value on their children’s learning and maintenance of their ‘mother tongue’. often, parents believe the learning of their language and the host country’s language is better for their children’s learning process in the school. however, some researchers believe this is not always the case or a factor of success throughout their academic careers (tribalat 1995: 152). in fact research often shows how bilingualism tends to have an effect on the child’s learning process in the negative sense and is regarding as being more of a ‘handicap’ than an advantage (tribalat 1995: 137). the full debate regarding the learning of language is beyond the scope of this paper, however, this perspective of learning two first languages may be irrelevant for adolescents. the counter argument to the language debate stipulates that beyond the cultural implications of learning a different language in the home, researchers have found specific cognitive advantages including problem solving and the ability to process information (genesee, 2007: 5). considering the growth of the infant, studies have shown a delay in the learning process of 2-3 months. this delay is lost at the infant stage and studies show there is no evidence of children becoming confused as they are raised in a bilingual environment (genesee, 2007: 5-6). the current debates focus on infants does not provide information regarding long term negative effects. therefore, considering a ‘language barrier’ for “second generation” students as an explanation for their weak school results is not a viable variable. review of european and russian affairs vol. 5 issue 1/2009 © rera 2009 all rights reserved 47 the educational background of a parent on the other hand is a feasible area to consider. in the case of algerian immigrant families, it is not uncommon that many parents living in france never had the opportunity to go to school. given this context, it is even more uncommon for women to have been educated (tribalat 1995: 138). in the case of these same immigrants in france, those coming from a more traditional household where the mothers are the caregivers and spend most of their time with their children, compared to the fathers, there is not a parent that could help this child in his or her homework from an early age until the end of the child’s academic career. in addition, the ministry of education’s studies have found that depending on the family origins, scholarly pursuits differentiate. young people with north african origins tend to accommodate the ambitions of their parents, they tend to take more of the professional and technological curriculum (brinbaum et al. 2005 : 53). however, in more general terms, children with foreign born parents tend to have positive aspirations for succeeding in school because of the value of education within the household. this has become apparent in france based on qualitative studies from the 80s and 90s (brinbaum et al. 53). in fact, 14% students with algerian origins stay in school until they are about 23 years old, this is comparable to their peers with french origins (tribalat 1995: 145). on the other hand, their peers with portuguese origins remain in school for less amount of time (6% stay in school until the age of 23). these numbers illustrate a distinction between groups of students with varying backgrounds. therefore, there is an apparent correlation between the values of education deriving from the family, which effects the french born children’s results in school. having support in the household to pursue a certain level of education is only one part of the story. despite the familial support to do well, students of algerian descent continue to be slightly below the national numbers. this indicates a problem in the system and relates back to the fact that the laic approach to teaching is problematic. socio-economic considerations this consideration is deliberately placed as the last point of discussion. explaining differences and similarities between groups of the same socio-economic review of european and russian affairs vol. 5 issue 1/2009 © rera 2009 all rights reserved 48 backgrounds is acceptable in cases where the group in question is relatively homogeneous. to measure the working class from algeria to the working class in france are not fairly comparable because of the economic and historical implications. therefore, to analyse and compare children whose parents may come from a completely different type of “working class” is a complex issue. recognising the possibility of such a distinction between groups, this paper provides an overview of certain socio-economic considerations for further analysis. research has shown the value of education in the home affects the student/child more than the actual education of their parents. an ‘educogenic’ family will be more ambitious and motivating to their children (halls 1976: 163, 165). this may reflect what bourdieu describes as ‘cultural capital’ as ethos is shifted from generation to generation (halls 1976: 165). the literature also suggests those students coming from the working classes and those coming from households with immigrant parents do not fare as well in school (simon 2003: 1102). researchers consider factors such as living standards and socio-economic backgrounds to explain educational attainment (halls 1976: 163). studies have found a correlation between those children of industrial workers and a more frequent failure rate or ‘grade repeat’ (hall 1976: 163). students coming from an algerian background tend to be a part of the demographic in which their parents are industrial workers. many parents who migrated to france before and during the algerian war did not have an opportunity to obtain a formal education. the literacy rates of these adults tends to be low, however, the ministry of education stipulates that often those students coming from an algerian background, have parents who have high expectations for their children’s academic pursuits. the lack of opportunity for parents or grandparents coming from algeria could be an explanation as to why this demographic has a high value of education. in general, the ministry has concluded that those students with immigrant parents have higher academic goals than their fellow students with french born parents from the same social background (brinbaum et al. 2005: 53). although the family’s aspirations are relatively high for their children’s education, many students are being left behind in a system that no longer works. as mentioned above, treating students as a homogeneous group is problematic because of the students’ various socio-economic backgrounds. this durkheimian review of european and russian affairs vol. 5 issue 1/2009 © rera 2009 all rights reserved 49 approach to education is challenging because his theory was never intended for a multiethnic classroom and the french educational system cannot maintain such a valuation on sameness. the actors have since changed and thus the system needs to be altered to accommodate difference. conclusions this paper situates the multi-ethnic context of the children of algerians and other immigrants in france. by contextualising the children and grandchildren of immigrants in the educational system, we have a better understanding of arguably one of the most important institutions in france and how it relates to citizenship and nationalism. the implications of citizenship and nationalism in the school system have historical significance, affecting all students in the educational system. french education and its educational system have been a source of national pride, however, the values of laïcité reveal a flawed system failing the students. the implications laïcité have on france’s perceptions of citizenship and nationalism forget the children of immigrants who are not considered “french” nor who are considered “immigrants”. in addition, laïcité elucidates the gender differences in the educational system revealing a gap between the success of boys and girls. the preliminary findings described above show the importance of familial support, yet this is not enough. for all students to be better integrated into french society, the educational system has to make a shift to accommodate the multiethnic classroom. this is just a part of a larger picture of how children of immigrants are perceived in countries which received and continuously rely on a large amount of immigrants. review of european and russian affairs vol. 5 issue 1/2009 © rera 2009 all rights reserved 50 bibliography barrère, anne & danilo martuccelli. 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(1995). faire france: un enquête sur les immigrés et leurs enfants. éditions la découverte : paris. review of european and russian affairs 6 (1), 2011 issn 1718-4835 © 2011 the author(s) www.carleton.ca/rera migration and the extreme right in western europe harry nedelcu carleton university chris miller carleton university abstract the relationship between migration and extremist parties has been an overlapping topic in studies of party systems, citizenship, and migration. this body of work has collectively challenged the view that the success of radical right parties in western europe is an unavoidable consequence of increased immigration flows. through a review of four recent studies, this article will attempt to unpack recent scholarly literature with the aim of investigating the salience of the causal link between immigration and the success of radical right parties. the four works studied arrive at separate conclusions due to their different conceptual understandings of agency in party systems as well as their assumptions about the nature of political mobilization. while three feature the mobilization of immigration as an electoral issue as being an important factor for the success of far right parties, one makes the claim that national definitions of citizenship shape both responses to migration within the host state as well as the space available for the radical right. review of european and russian affairs 6 (1), 2011 56 introduction the relationship between migration and manifestations of political and social extremism has been an overlapping topic in studies of party systems, citizenship, and migration. this diverse body of work has collectively challenged the view, particularly prevalent in public spheres, that the success of radical right parties in western europe is an unavoidable consequence of immigration or increased immigration. the link between the two has been visited by a number of authors, with a number of factors proffered to explain how social discontent is processed into a unique form of politics sensitive and hostile to the presence of outsider groups. among such factors are forms of party organization, institutional constraints, challenges to identity, and conceptions of citizenship. in recognizing these contributions, it is worth asking how the link between patterns of immigration and the success of far-right parties has been conceptualized. four recent studies have provided a fertile basis for exploring this question: cas mudde’s populist radical right parties in europe, michelle hale williams’ the impact of radical right-wing parties in west european democracies, terri givens’ voting radical right in western europe and contested citizenship: immigration and cultural diversity in europe by ruud koopmans, paul statham, marco giugni, and florence passy. by no means is this review aimed at unravelling general theories of far right parties in europe, a party family that commands a significant amount of attention in comparative research.i consequently, the intent is not to define the radical right or to determine the motivations of their electoral bases. studies particularly and exclusively focused on the far right have contributed to such debates for over two decades and are still active. instead, this review will unpack recent scholarly literature (with an eye to western europe) with the aim of understanding the debate surrounding the question of radical right parties and their relationship to immigration. we conclude that the four works arrive at different conclusions due to their approaches as well as assumptions. while the first three feature the mobilization of immigration as an electoral issue as being an important factor for the success of far right parties, koopmans et al. claim that national definitions of citizenship shape both responses to migration within the host state as well as the space available for the radical right. why now? throughout and beyond the 1990s, a surge in radical right politics in western europe captured the attention of observers both inside and outside the eu, peaking with jean-marie le pen’s surprise secondplace showing in the 2002 french presidential election. givens and williams note that such a victory would have seemed unimaginable only a decade earlier. but what is the larger significance to party systems in these developments? both scholars and political figures have “long alluded to a threat potential from radical right-wing parties” (williams 2006, 12), but evaluation of this rhetoric is an ongoing debate that highlights different assumptions about the agency of political parties. conventional models of party systems which stress the role of broad, brokerage parties suggest that these new far right parties are marginal, and that concern regarding the role they may play in substantive policy-making is likely overstated. radical right parties, it is noted, are often small and lacking in legislative representation and at most operate as junior partners in coalition governments (williams 2006, 3). yet this is a limited view of party systems, and indeed, of politics in general, and undersells the impact that such parties have throughout western europe. agenda-change is available to parties outside government, with consequences that have manifested themselves in the priorities of western european states. the debate thus has implications beyond the link between migration and radical right parties. it is, as williams states, “about understanding political change in advanced capitalist, western democracies” (williams 2006, 3). it is about recognizing that marginal politics do matter, but at the same time recognizing that they require different understandings than do mass politics. 57 review of european and russian affairs 6 (1), 2011 migration and the radical right mudde’s populist radical right parties in europe represents a useful starting point for exploring recent scholarly insights into the relationship between migration and radical right parties. although mudde’s work is too extensive to be summarized here, his conclusions on the secondary role of economic factors in the immigrant-radical right relationship as well as his typological model for the success of radical right parties are crucial to this discussion. central to mudde’s understanding is his observation that populist radical right parties are not, as he terms it, “passive consequences of macro-level socioeconomic indicators”. instead, he argues that such parties also “supply” their own relevance to the extent that they “actively shape part of their own destiny” (mudde 2007, 293). mudde’s emphasis on the role of the party does not necessarily neglect the “demand” dimension of such parties. he does note, in fact, that social changes brought about through forces of modernization and globalization have provided a context for xenophobia and political resentment (mudde 2007, 230). rather, he stresses the useful observation that this environment is not the only explanatory factor underlying the growth of radical right parties. their success is as much an account of the ability of these parties to effectively link with voters on issues of identity. consequently, mudde finds that nativism (the congruence between a state’s population and a “native” group), authoritarianism and populism are reoccurring features of such parties and in fact constitute what he terms the “three pillars” of the populist radical right (mudde 2007, 294). this classification operates rather broadly and as a result mudde’s populist radical-right sub-family includes a vast array of members such as the french national front, the freedom party, flemish interest, germany’s republican party and the danish people’s party, as well as eastern european far-right parties such as the greater romania party, croatia’s democratic movement, and latvia’s national independence movement. however, for mudde, these parties, despite their differences, are similar in their ability to capture the discontent related to the three core features of their ideology (mudde 2007, 298). one of the implications of this argument is that it challenges a well-established assumption about the central role of socioeconomic changes in party systems. mudde considers the economy as a secondary issue for the radical right, arguing that the three mentioned components of their agenda are the ones which truly stand at the centre of party ideology (mudde 2007, 137). if ideological implications about the economy matter at all, for mudde, it is because they stem from the ‘three pillars’, not the other way around. he argues that populist radical right parties garner support regardless of their pro-market or welfare-chauvinist messages. this conclusion challenges the extent to which earlier studies link the radical right phenomenon to socioeconomic developments and therefore complicates the radicalright/migration picture. however, more importantly for the purpose of this review, mudde’s first pillar, nativism, and to a certain degree his third pillar, populism, reveal significant features about the relationship between the radical right and migrants. through his emphasis on ‘nativism’, mudde stresses the importance of local ethnic identities and implicitly the ability of the far right to tap into them as a result of competing identities. in summarizing the existing literature, he notes that the main reason for the support of populist radical right parties is “a nativist position on the immigration issue” (mudde 2007, 220). it is this previously established conclusion which mudde does not challenge in his examination of the nativist pillar. nonetheless, for mudde, the immigrant is just one type of enemy that comes to the fore out of the us-them, good-bad, inside-outside, and friend-enemy dichotomies which nativism implies. therefore, the image of the immigrant as an outsider is complemented by additional “others”. as nativism is largely about the politics of identity in terms of the nation and the state, mudde classifies these others in relation to their position within the latter two. he distinguishes between enemies outside the state and outside the nation, outside the state and within the nation, within the state and within the nation and finally, within the state and outside the nation. only the final category encompasses immigrant communities. the first group includes foreign powers as well as international organizations such as the european union and the united nations. enemies outside the state and within the nation include review of european and russian affairs 6 (1), 2011 58 countrymen who have moved abroad, artists, intellectuals and politicians who have emigrated and who are accused of corruption, leftism and treason (against their native country). enemies within the state and within the nation are the economic, cultural and political elites. the national elites are characterized both in nativist and populist terms as traitors to the nation and as corrupt elements. this is observed both in the east through examples such as bulgaria’s ataka, greater romania party or hungary’s miep but also in some cases from western europe such as germany’s republicans who blame the mainstream political elite for ‘re-educating’ the native population with the aim of making it passive and self-hating (mudde 2007, 66). the media as well as the cultural elite are also amalgamated under the ‘traitor’ category for aiding and abetting the establishment. more importantly however, another dimension of the ‘treachery’ of this broad coalition of elites is linked to the issue of immigration as it is these elites which are deemed the true culprits of mass immigration. immigration is therefore seen as a conspiracy of the aforementioned groups who want to increase their support base and pool of cheap labour at the expense of the nation. mudde names italy’s northern league and austria’s freedom party among those parties whose programs or party member speeches made references to this aspect. the examples of greater romania and bulgaria’s ataka, similarly demonstrate that the role of the immigrant is replaced by the ‘roma’ or the ‘turk’ in the east where mass immigration has not yet started. finally, mudde distinguishes the aforementioned ‘others’ from the enemy within the state and outside the nation. as previously mentioned, it is only this latter ‘other’ which specifically includes the ethnic minority. in western europe this is the immigrant community whereas in eastern europe this tends to be larger indigenous ethnic minorities. mudde identifies the german republicans, belgian flemish interest, hungarian miep, slovak sns, bulgaria’s ataka and greater romania party as parties which highlight this type of ‘other’. he argues that the principal accusation is that these minorities, whether immigrants or indigenous, are not loyal to the state they live in and therefore “constitute a fifth column of their kin state” (mudde 2007, 72). together with the aforementioned enemies inside the state and inside the nation (the elites) which have allowed for this mass migration or tolerated these fifth columns, ethnic minorities represent an additional element of opposition against the native population. as his analysis is a party-centric one, mudde does not explore this further and as previously stated only superficially does he link this to exogenous institutional constraints or demand-side dynamics. mudde’s explanation for the far right lies instead in their ability to occasionally mobilize their voters or those who plan to cast protest votes effectively. the capacity of parties to properly do this is strongly linked to their party organization and leadership. he states that successful parties are characterized either by a moderate ideology, a charismatic leader or well-structured organization (mudde 2007, 275-276). charisma can play a crucial role for short-term success, but it cannot help the party remain in such a privileged position for long. similarly, mudde points out that the other two factors likewise do not guarantee success if considered in isolation. mudde argues, therefore, that those parties such as the national front in france or flemish interest in belgium which are able to combine charisma with administrative competence are the ones which will be most successful in rallying protest voters. essentially, by emphasizing the importance of party organization in rallying voters, mudde claims that the demand side weighs little importance and even when it does, a well organized party with a strong leadership can manipulate it in such a way that success is assured regardless. it is therefore up to the party to successfully employ the image of the immigrant as a useful point against which a certain segment of the population can rally against. however, as the four typologies of enemies illustrate, it is not simply the image of the immigrant which these parties use. instead, it is the image of the ‘other’ (resulting from the nativist and populist pillars) as a treacherous and disloyal opponent of both the state and the nation. this image is what ultimately implies a notion of asphyxiation and fosters conspiracy narratives against the native group. consequently, it is the ability of radical right parties to tap into popular discontent (towards actors perceived as working against the public interest) using a narrative based on their three ideological pillars through an effective organization and leadership that allows for their success. simply put, for mudde, the nativist position on the immigrant issue is indeed a cause for the radical right. in this respect mudde does 59 review of european and russian affairs 6 (1), 2011 not challenge the validity of this claim. however, his argument is that this picture is complicated by the fact that the immigrant is a mere facet of a multi-dimensional enemy which includes national elites and international organizations which together aim at assaulting the state and the nation. it is this multifaceted enemy which helps create the image of siege against the native who, subsequently, can be converted into a radical-right voter. michelle hale williams’ analysis of the radical right in western europe uses france, germany, and austria as primary case studies. similar to mudde, her belief is that the survival and success of such parties depends on their ability to create political opportunities and manoeuvre around existing institutional constraints (williams 2006, 2). her institutional analysis is at odds with more traditional explanations that the success of extreme-right politics is dependent on the presence of a socioeconomic climate amenable to such politics. for williams, party systems matter, electoral systems matter, but most importantly, the ways in which actors are able to interact with these systems matter. all of this ties into a focus on the ability of radical right parties to engage in a broader process of agenda-setting beyond their own internal party dynamics or the political economy of the society in question. as williams notes, existing studies presume the “electoral success of radical right-wing parties as the dependent variable and then suggest socioeconomic factors as the causal, independent variables” (williams 2006, 2). such socioeconomic factors are typically elaborated as rising immigration rates, unemployment, high population density, and economic stagnation. she largely accepts this environment as a basic explanation for the broader pan-european rise in the radical right but maintains that the influence and success of radical right parties are contingent on other organizational features. what is central to williams’ model is that immigration concerns, as a vehicle for radical right political mobilization, are not endogenous to radical right politics. she suggests that “to some extent the radical right attempts to create the popular interests that provide a basis for party organization” (williams 2006, 4). because mainstream parties frequently emphasize issues related to the economy and foreign policy, far right parties must expand into new issue areas. hence, political opportunity must come “not from reacting to issue concerns but from creating new ones” (williams 2006, 4). what this suggests is that the presence of immigration as a mobilizing issue is influenced by the context set by the broader political system and that ultimately there is a high degree of agency attributable to the parties of the radical right themselves. more importantly, her work also raises a far more interesting issue for the future: if more mainstream parties come to embrace immigration issues, as has been apparent with the labour party in britain and the ump in france, what does this mean for the long-term viability of the radical right? the latter party family has been in many ways a chameleon, adopting particular images to suit its needs at particular times. would the right continue to pursue anti-immigration politics ad infinitum, constantly moving the agenda of political systems further in that direction? would it abandon the issue as a central plank, having successfully achieved policy change in that issue area? these are interesting questions for the future. if one extrapolates from williams model, it may well depend on the particular party in question. williams establishes a typology that differentiates between fascist legacy parties and the more successful “entrepreneurial” parties who have displayed a willingness to consolidate internal factions and develop coherent platforms in order to maximize electoral votes (williams 2006, 94). under this typology, one would presume that legacy parties would be more inflexible towards de-emphasizing immigration, while the latter type could conceivably manoeuvre into other issue areas, at the expense of their immigration politics. fundamentally, williams also challenges the idea that only government-forming parties can wield political power. the common notion that radical right parties are ineffective due to their sizes or statuses as political pariahs is replaced with a more complex interaction in which such parties take a role in formulating policies and political agendas through institutional processes. hence, the causal link between levels of immigration and immigration backlash is severed, with the institutional frameworks of party politics (both the internal organization of radical right parties and their leaderships, and the national party system as a whole) and legislative/executive systems emerging as intervening variables. within this model, the primary enabler of radical right sentiment is the ability for such parties to “select the salient issues to make central in their positions,” “to look for events in the status quo that can review of european and russian affairs 6 (1), 2011 60 be manipulated,” and to “transform these events into threats” (williams 2006, 4). in this respect, williams comes close to mudde in emphasizing the party’s internal structure and dynamics as a catalyst for issue formation. hence, it is only by “connecting real problems to loss of identity and pointing to foreigners as the culprits, the radical right has woven together an elaborate scenario for threat.” among the more successful “real problems” that parties have emphasized are security (particularly post-9/11), the further integration of the european union (and its resultant effects on issues of identity), and the decline of the welfare state. moreover, agreeing somewhat with mudde, williams admits that the ability of the far right to elaborate such scenarios for threat is not independent from the larger framework of party politics. indeed, williams does find that there have been successes in the form of policy-making. she uses the advocacy of restrictive immigration declarations and the downplaying of the significance of xenophobia, along with the blocking of legislation promoting multiculturalism as the “goals” of radical right parties. what she finds is that actual declines in immigration coincided with a concurrent increase in legislation designed to inhibit immigration and a decrease in legislation designed to combat racism (williams 2006, 72-73). how has this been accomplished by a set of parties not known for broader electoral success? this is where williams’ unique model comes into play. williams elaborates a process whereby far right parties use social forums, such as the media or even the european parliament, as a means of forcing actual socioeconomic issues through a tenuous “funnel” issue, in this case immigration. unemployment, crime, insecurity, and poor education are pushed through this lens in order to give salience to the funnel issue by attributing to it a variety of social problems. this form of scapegoating therefore explains how immigration can have such political saliency independent of actual levels of immigration. ultimately, this leads her to conclude that the immigration issue is created rather than contextual (williams 2006, 5). unlike williams, who generally accepts unemployment and concentration of immigrants can be useful springboards for the radical right, terri givens sets out to empirically test (using the same case countries as williams) whether such factors are causally related to the success of radical right parties, ultimately finding it to be an untenable link (givens 2005, 68). citing prior research by swank & betz, nonna mayer, and pierre martin, she notes that while asylum rates are associated with support for radical right parties, this does not hold in general for net immigration. similar findings are noted for unemployment rates. reasons why this is the case are quite similar to williams’: rather than perceptions of immigration levels mimicking actual levels of immigration, givens finds that far-right politicians frequently link levels of unemployment to the presence of immigrants, whether such effects are warranted. hence “if the immigration pressure in a situation of economic crisis provides the general catalyst for the mobilization of the movements of the extreme right, it does not translate directly into a greater mobilization capacity of these movements” (givens 2005, 78). this is closely in line with mudde’s and williams’ theses that the ability to connect other meaningful issues to immigration is a key variable in the success of radical right parties to implement their policy goals, either directly or indirectly. she also includes, however, a heavy institutional emphasis that is missing from williams. givens makes it clear that she rejects a simplistic focus on economic and political change in western europe. while on some theoretical level factors such as unemployment could potentially play a role in stimulating radical right politics (given particular country circumstances), the empirical variations she uncovers means that relying on economic and political conditions alone cannot provide a complete picture of the radical right’s rise. givens embraces prior work that has emphasized the processes of globalization and immigration and their effects on exposed economic sectors. however, immigration is found to be at most an intervening variable, with the propensity for strategic voting (via institutional arrangements encouraging particular coalition structures, factionalism within mainstream parties, and electoral outcomes) being the primary determinant of the successes of radical right politics. this emphasis on institutions is highlighted by her belief that they determine the “rules of the game” and that voters and parties, far from being automatons that reflexively respond to societal conditions, “instead pursue strategies to achieve their goals” (givens 2005, 153). while this plays into the debate in the sense that successful radical parties are better able to enlarge their political base and clout, it lacks a genesis account 61 review of european and russian affairs 6 (1), 2011 of radical right politics. indeed, within her model “it is assumed that a radical right party has already been successful in entering the party system” (givens 2005, 8). one interesting finding is the observation that the saliency of each variable is highly contingent upon the given country. germany’s far-right movement is not tied to immigration influx, while austria and france are slightly sensitive to such changes, though as a variable it is still weaker than originally anticipated by the existing literature (givens 2005, 85). why this is so is still unclear. it could be that radical right parties expend more effort in areas affected by unemployment, or that voters in these areas are more responsive to messages of the radical right. if the latter is the case, it would open the door further to mudde’s findings on identity and nativism. what is clear is that this is the point where the interaction between party strategy and socioeconomic factors takes place. it is the point at which common fears or tensions are transformed into social criticism by radical parties and directed at mainstream political establishments. overall, givens offers an interesting picture of how intervening variables interact differently in different states, perhaps giving credence to the historical-sociological method of single-case study analyses typically favoured within studies of far-right politics. though her account ignores the genesis of such politics, her findings strengthen the idea that the radical right is not dependent on increasing levels of immigration for their electoral successes. finally, in their discussion of citizenship, ruud koopmans et al. revisit the problem over migrant integration as well as far-right parties in light of institutional constraints. they set out to account for both phenomena by juxtaposing two alternate theories and testing them in five western european states with the objective of discovering the reasons why differences do exist between different countries. the first theory is based on ethnographic studies and emphasizes cultural, ethnic and political characteristics which might allow both actors (migrants and far-right parties) to highlight such cultural differences. the second lies in institutional and discursive opportunities provided by national citizenship and integration politics (koopmans 2005, 108-109). admittedly, there is an implicit weakness in this study as it alludes to a superiority of one over the other without allowing for the possibility that perhaps both are accountable. nevertheless, koopmans et al. stand out from the other three works discussed as they challenge already established assumptions about the causal relationship between voter preferences (in large part due to societal changes such as mass immigration) and radical right parties. for this reason, the contributions by koopmans et al. are even more significant as having been published in 2005 and thus earlier than the other works which have nonetheless accepted in some form or another some sort of causal relationship between the two. therefore, albeit being five years old, their study is still quite relevant in this discussion of recent literature on the subject. in their five case studies, netherlands, great britain, france, germany and switzerland, koopmans et al. conclude that there is little evidence for cultural explanations in relation to migrants exhibiting strong homeland orientation or homeland-directed activism. instead, they argue that strong migrant transnational orientation (and implicitly lack of integration within the host nation) is a result of “traditional, exclusionary citizenship regimes that put up high barriers to migrants’ access to the political community” (koopmans 2005, 142-143). this is evident from differences across the five states. while in switzerland and germany most migrants do not have voting rights and cannot access the policy process, in france cultural demands for minorities are considered illegitimate and only the uk and netherlands can be considered self-declared multicultural countries. it is these conceptions of citizenship as well as the general national opportunity structure which affect the repertoires of migrants (koopmans 2005, 136). therefore, among all their case studies, france, netherlands and britain are the countries that have attempted to make their immigrants into citizens. however, while france has discouraged particular identities, netherlands has been characterized by too much cultural pluralism, while britain has managed to find the best balance between tolerance for cultural diversity and adaptation of immigrants. consequently, effects on migrant homeland-oriented mobilization differ substantially between states. the exclusionary policies of switzerland and germany as well as the strong state sponsorship of particularist identities in the netherlands has allowed for migrants in these states to reveal an increased identification with their home-country. by contrast, despite the review of european and russian affairs 6 (1), 2011 62 differences between france and the uk, one observes the lowest levels of ethno-national identifications and homeland-oriented mobilizations among immigrants in these countries (koopmans 2005, 144). this is because france’s rejection of particularist identities, allow for mobilization around universalist identities. in terms of the far-right, koopmans et al. reject the often-made demand-side versus supply-side dichotomy as a path towards explanations for these parties. instead, they opt to look for similar exogenous variables: on the one hand, those focusing on grievances and ethnic competition and on the other hand, opportunities and institutional frameworks. while grievances are direct responses to foreigners and migrants, opportunities theories emphasize the role of other political elites and institutions shaping the mobilization of extreme-right parties (koopmans 2005, 182). ultimately, they conclude that societal definitions of citizenship provide different sets of discursive opportunities that determine the degree of visibility and resonance of the extreme-right and its claims. the authors argue that it is the latter national configurations of citizenship alongside the party alignments of other parties which accounts for the presence of the radical right (koopmans 2005, 202). in essence, their argument is one stressing the space which the radical right is allowed to occupy as a result of the positioning of the mainstream parties. therefore, depending on the configurations of citizenship and political institutions in each of the five states the radical right can become institutionalized, radicalized or marginalized. in switzerland but most importantly in germany, where the christian democratic party already has a well established antiimmigration position taking enough space on the right and where citizenship configurations do not allow for much migrant integration, the radical right becomes radicalized. this is because it benefits from strong discursive opportunities but narrow political space. in france, where there is a rejection of cultural groups and where mainstream parties accept republican universalist notions of citizenship, there is both the discursive opportunity as well as the political space for the radical right to denounce migrants as ‘faux français’. this leads to an institutionalization of the radical right. in britain, where there is both a lack of political space as well as weak discursive opportunities there is a marginalization of the party family. finally in the netherlands where there are weak discursive opportunities but ample political space, the authors argue that it is here where the radical right experiences populist mobilization (koopmans 2005, 190). ultimately, national configurations of citizenship account for both the ability of the migrants to detach themselves from ethno-national identifications and homeland-oriented forms of mobilization as well as the ability of the far-right to emphasize the ‘otherness’ of the immigrant versus the native. essentially, while many nuances of citizenship configurations may be able to achieve the former, it is only the british configuration of citizenship which is successful at squeezing the radical-right voice out of major political debates while also ensuring no migrant homeland-oriented mobilization. this is because, as previously mentioned, while the french notion of citizenship is based on the rejection of cultural group rights (a notion to which the radical-right can speak to as well), the british citizenship configuration allows for cultural differences (koopmans 2005, 202). ultimately, it is this latter aspect that delegitimizes the radical-right message aimed towards pointing towards the ‘otherness’ of the immigrant. contrasting conclusions in essence, through their different starting assumptions, all four works discussed arrive at substantially different conclusions about the radical right party family and migration. mudde accepts an already existing public discontent. however, his party centric approach provides for an explanation which focuses on the party’s ability to capture this discontent through a narrative containing nativism, authoritarianism and populism that presents the voter with a multi-dimensional enemy that is attacking his/her nation and state. the immigrant for mudde represents only one such dimension alongside a plethora of other dimensions ranging from international organizations such as the eu to national mainstream political elites or cultural leaders. immigrants are thus one of the causal factors yet by no means are they the sole variable responsible for the success of the radical right. success lies within the party’s very own ability to organize and produce an effective leadership which could seize votes. 63 review of european and russian affairs 6 (1), 2011 like mudde, both williams and givens reject the claim that radical right parties are solely dependent on rising immigration levels for their electoral and policy successes. instead, they argue for intervening variables that mobilize anti-immigration sentiment. but how is this done? williams and givens offer separate explanations for why this occurs. givens gives an institutionalist account, arguing that the ability to form coalitions and exploit factionalist divisions in legislative bodies accounts for the post-1980s successes of the radical right. hence, most of the growth of right wing parties is removed from direct socioeconomic factors. as an explanation, this lacks emphasis on how parties and the discontent they exploit are formed in the first place, and fails to explore necessary variables for radical party genesis. williams generally accepts socioeconomic tensions as the starting point for radical right politics, but attributes the successes of radical right parties to their ability to link socioeconomic tensions to issue areas that they are prevalent in, such as immigration as opposed to economics or foreign policy. williams’ account is more focused on the social construction of ideas, which makes her a suitable companion for mudde, and ultimately helps fill the hole in givens’ account regarding the relationship between radical parties and their voters that antecedes the relationship between radical parties and the legislative system. though williams’ sociological perspective gives her a viewpoint that institutionalist approaches do not afford, it has its own weaknesses – explaining whether one society is more amenable to messages from the radical right than another is difficult, one can only identify whether a party has been successful at relating to voters once it has happened. finally, although having been published ahead of the other works, koopmans et al. move completely away from the accepted causal relationship between migration and the radical right party family which the other works only partially challenge. their conclusions lie perhaps in the different questions which they try to answer. they are not looking to identify independent variables that account for the dependent variable the radical right. such an approach would inevitably have to include a discussion of migration and ultimately taking a position on the causal relationship debate. instead, their focus is on explaining both the integration of migrants as well as the radical right. having identified national configuration of citizenship as an independent variable for the former, they test the same variable in the case of the radical right. their approach leads them to a significantly different conclusion than the other works. they illustrate that configurations of citizenship are in fact responsible for both migrant mobilization and the political space available for the radical right. however, although novel, their conclusions are not any less deterministic than the other three works. in essence, they argue that while france’s universalism and britain’s tolerance prevent homelandoriented mobilization among migrants, the particularist identities sponsored by germany and switzerland as well as the universalist ones by france foster the presence of the radical right. only the uk’s right balance between inclusion and tolerance can prevent both. the model would subsequently imply that there is no clear relationship between immigration and radical-right parties but most importantly, that a british model is the only one available for securing migrant-inclusion and a marginalization of the party family. the problematic aspect of this is quite obvious as constitutional, societal as well as institutional factors would obviously prevent states from becoming ‘like britain’ as koopmans’ conclusions seem to suggest. conclusion conclusively, cas mudde’s populist radical right parties in europe, michelle hale williams’ the impact of radical right-wing parties in west european democracies, terri givens’ voting radical right in western europe, and ruud koopmans’ contested citizenship all attempt to dissect the apparently causal relationship between migration and the far-right movement and its political manifestation in western europe. in essence, while mudde does not dispel this assumption; givens brings in institutional factors as well. williams, although not focusing so much on institutions, attempts to link the capitalization of radical right parties on the presence of immigrants with equally important economic factors such as unemployment. finally, ruud koopmans argues that national configurations of citizenship account for both the ability of the migrants to detach themselves from ethno-national forms of review of european and russian affairs 6 (1), 2011 64 mobilization as well as the ability of the far-right to engage in ‘nativist’ discourse successfully. subsequently, for mudde the relationship remains largely causal although not unicausal. for williams, it is causal with institutions as intervening variables. for givens, the relationship is complicated by the ability of the party to project its perception onto the voter in light of economic obstacles, while finally for koopmans, the integration of immigrants as well as the voice of the radical right are both determined by institutional factors. finally, questions regarding immigration and the radical right still remain. are the two linked or is the latter only marginally related to the former? if they are linked, does this say anything about the implication migration has for the future success of the party family? are there institutional factors which can affect them or can particular forms of migrant mobilization along ethnic lines as well as far-right party internal dynamics circumvent some of these institutional constraints? lastly, is it even possible or desirable to establish generalized inferences about the two as mudde does with examples from both eastern and western europe? or is it more prudent to establish cross-national differences as illustrated by koopmans? we do not hope to elaborate an answer for these questions, however, what we do hope to have achieved through our book review is a general synopsis of some of the debates which surround this particular aspect of both studies on immigration as well as studies on the radical right party family. ultimately, we do believe that despite being marginal parities, the radical-right are not at the periphery of agenda-setting nor at the periphery of politics. in a world where globalization and modernity are not less important than the 1990s or early 2000s and where the movement of people is an ongoing reality, it is crucial to continue the effort of understanding both the party family itself as well as the phenomenon of migration with which it is so often associated. notes i the terms radical-right, far-right and new-right are often used inconsistently in scholarly literature. they all attempt at categorizing a post 1980s wave of parties that advocate economic deregulation but social conservatism and even xenophobia. in this review we will not pick one terminology over the others and we use these terms interchangeably to refer to the same party family. references givens, terri. 2005. voting radical right in western europe. new york: cambridge university press. koopmans, ruud. 2005. contested citizenship: immigration and cultural diversity in europe. minneapolis: university of minnesota press. mudde, cas. 2007. populist radical right parties in europe. new york: cambridge. williams, michelle hale. 2006. the impact of radical right-wing parties in west european democracies. new york: palgrave macmillan. patricia t. young_volume 4_issue 1 review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved ………………………………………………………………… democratic and market governance in romania: between domestic politics and eu accession patricia t. young abstract institutional reforms to regulate the market environment and the proper functioning of democracy have been mandated by the european union to accession countries. in spite of the uniform creation of such regulatory frameworks, governance problems persist, especially in the newest members of the eu. i analyze the institutional reform record in both market and political governance, as well as the effectiveness of these institutions, in the case of romania, one of the laggards of reform. i argue that the eu did significantly support reform efforts, but insufficient domestic commitment to reform has resulted in ineffective institutions. keywords: democratic governance, market governance, eastern europe, european union, accession, institutional reform, romania, political opposition. review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 74 introduction institutional reforms to regulate the market environment and the proper functioning of democracy have been mandated by the european union to accession countries, resulting in the uniform creation of basic regulatory frameworks. these reforms include political governance (anti-corruption legislation, justice system reforms, public procurement and freedom of information laws), and economic governance (incorporation, contract law, corporate governance, bankruptcy, competition legislation). in spite of these advances, enduring corruption and conflicts of interest of politicians, as well as incomplete and cumbersome business regulations persist in the eastern european members of the eu, most notoriously in the newest such members. in spite of years of reform, romania is the eu member with the most governance problems. comprehensive indicators from the world bank show romania faring worst among central and eastern european countries in all years available and for all areas of governance, with the least impressive performances in rule of law and control of corruption (see table 1).1 the freedom house nations in transit democracy and governance indicators2 also show the romanian democracy faring badly in 2005, with a score of 3.39, in contrast to values around 2.0 for most other eastern european eu members. for corruption, the area with the worst score, romania is at the same level in 2005 as it was in 1998, albeit slowly recovering from a low in 2000. 1 these indicators are measured using surveys of firms and individuals, as well as the assessments of commercial risk rating agencies, non-governmental organizations, and a number of multilateral aid agencies (kaufmann et al., 2006). 2 these indicators measure electoral process, civil society, independent media, national and local democratic governance, judicial framework and independence, and corruption. they are on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 the highest level of democratic progress. 2006 ratings are measured for 2005, and are based on country reports commissioned to local think tanks. review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 75 in economic terms, from 2000 to 2006 romania has been the fastest growing eu economy, starting, however, from a low base; gdp per capita rose over the period by 30%, while inflation and unemployment dropped sharply (imf, 2007). in addition, in the doing business survey, the world bank placed romania second among countries that have improved their business environment the most in 2005. there were improvements in many areas, including dealing with licenses, employing workers, getting credit, protecting investors, trading across borders and closing a business (world bank, 2006: 2). the european bank for reconstruction and development (ebrd) assessment of romanian market institutions is mixed: the quality of insolvency and secured transactions laws is considered high, unlike in more advanced eastern european countries like poland or slovenia, but there are still many problems, such as the low quality of the corporate governance law (ebrd, 2006). moreover, even in 2006, after much recent progress, romania still placed last among eu members in many ebrd transition indicators, including the extent of privatization and restructuring, banking reform and competition policy (see table 2). the state of economic and political reforms suggests that while problems persist in all reform domains, economic governance is improving faster than political governance in romania. one of the aims of this paper is to look at these two institutional domains comparatively, both in terms of reform progress, and in terms of eu influence. however, the main task of this paper is to assess to what extent eu conditionality has been an effective force in recent reform activity. it is hard to deny that the eu has significantly influenced the reform process in romania, especially since the year 2000, when the accession negotiations started, and perhaps even more so in 2005 and 2006, when the specific date of accession was uncertain. i look, however, at the effectiveness of this conditionality in terms of the quality of institutions created. i argue that the review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 76 pace and shape of reforms since 2000 has followed domestic politics quite closely. while it appears that governments of all stripes have readily engaged in the reform activity promoted by the eu, i show that many reforms were passed strategically to appease eu concerns, but with no real impetus for reform. the institutions created in this way, while an improvement over the past, have many loopholes, are still ineffective, and their implementation is slow. these problems were more visible during the ex-communist nastase government, though the present government’s commitment to reform is also questionable. in order to tackle the questions i posed, i will detail the history of several market governance and political reform areas, and outline reform efforts and eu activity in each case. i start, however, with a review of existing arguments about eu influence on eastern european institutional reforms. conditionality and integration: the literature many observers consider the opening of accession negotiations with romania in 2000 as a rather fortuitous event for this country, caused mostly by the external circumstances of the kosovo conflict in 1999, and by the need for stability in the region (phinnemore, 2003; gallagher, 2006). tom gallagher, a long-time observer of romanian politics, has expressed harsh criticism towards both romanian politicians and the eu officials that pursued romania’s accession. he calls psd (social democratic party) politicians “a network of businessmen who mouth left-wing platitudes while systematically grabbing the most desirable economic plums for themselves in a chaotic lurch towards the free market”, and notes that “a disastrously low-grade eu accession process has accentuated this political backwardness” (gallagher, 2006: 2). the actors of this drama are, on the romanian side, psd prime-minister adrian nastase, who is accused of building up an influential lobby in brussels by opening the economy to eu review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 77 multinationals, and on the eu side, the eu commissioner for enlargement, gunter verheugen, and “his patron”, german chancellor gerhard schroeder.3 in 2005, olli rehn (from finland) succeeded verheugen as enlargement commissioner, and insisted that additional reforms be carried out. this coincided with a relatively reformist government taking power in bucharest, resulting in some reform progress in 2005 and 2006. gallagher sums up the story of eu and romania as “the consolidation of backwardness” (2006: 9-10). there is some truth in gallagher’s assertion that many strategic sectors of the romanian economy are dominated by eu banks and multinationals (e.g. banking and insurance, office buildings real estate, sugar, part of the energy sector) and that eu’s political conditionality has sometimes taken a back seat to the pursuit of economic liberalization. in this paper, i do not address eu officials’ motivations in the negotiation process; i look only at the effects of conditionality. however, it is exaggerated to say that the eu has shown “complete inability to export sustainable economical and social reforms, improved governance, and ultimately stability” (gallagher, 2006: 10) to romania. gallagher’s pessimistic view about the eu’s ability to promote democracy and good governance is a far cry from the conventional view in the literature. vachudova (2002), popeleches (2007) and ekiert et al. (2007) argue that it is precisely the meritocratic criteria set by the eu for enlargement that made the accession process so successful in promoting democracy in eastern europe.4 this democracy export has been particularly important in those countries initially displaying a nationalist (as opposed to a liberal) model of politics (vachudova, 2002; pop-eleches, 2007). according to vachudova, the threat of exclusion from the eu between 1995 3 according to gallagher, the chancellor signed a 1 billion euro contract with the romanian government for a german group to secure the country’s borders (2006: 7). 4 see also pop (2006: 121) on the positive effect of international organizations on economic reform efforts by way of instilling a sense of continuity to these efforts. review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 78 and 1999, which she calls “active leverage”, made “rent-seeking strategies of ethnic scapegoating and economic corruption less tenable, and contributed to the victory of opposition political parties that organized themselves around a pro-eu platform” (2002: 36). however, these borderline countries where active leverage is most important are often those that the eu has the least ability to influence, due to stronger communist legacies and less informal attraction from the eu at the societal level. in romania, these legacies5 translate in stronger domestic opposition to reform than in central european countries, which has resulted in more attempts by politicians to subvert reforms. thus, even when the promise of membership is credible, eu influence may be least effective in the borderline cases. active leverage was important in romania, supporting the liberal opposition’s victory in 1996 over ex-communists on a ‘return to europe’ platform. however, these new parties were unable to carry out their reform plans, and when romania was not invited to open accession negotiations in 1997 reforms did not intensify; rather, they stalled, raising questions about the effectiveness of gate-keeping as a conditionality mechanism. the return to power of the ex-communists in 2000 also shows that the lure of europe was only a small part of domestic preferences. it is true that the ex-communists had abandoned their nationalist rhetoric by 2000, and had embraced pro-europeanism, but it is unclear to what extent this party (now called psd) has indeed reformed like the ex-communist parties of central europe (pop-eleches, 2001).6 another mechanism of active leverage on domestic politics is the endorsement of opposition parties at critical electoral junctions, like in the case of slovakia, where the eu indirectly tied the promise for opening the accession negotiations to vladimir meciar’s electoral 5 romania experienced its own version of stalinism under ceausescu, which manifested in the elimination of any attempts at political opposition and in an excessive focus on large heavy industry plants, which are especially difficult to restructure. 6 for an account of the transformation of ex-communist parties into modern leftist parties in central europe see anna grzymala-busse’s redeeming the communist past (cambridge university press, 2002). review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 79 loss (pridham, 2005; pop-eleches, 2007). however, in the romanian case in 2004, the eu might have had the opposite role. less than a month before the november 2004 elections, enlargement commissioner verheugen declared that romania was on track to complete eu accession negotiations before the end of the year. some believe that this announcement amounted to the commission’s endorsement of the incumbent ex-communists (gallagher, 2006). whether or not this was the case, the ex-communists narrowly lost the presidency and the control of government. beyond vachudova’s passive and active leverage concepts, there is a literature on the effects of different conditionality mechanisms. these mechanisms are, according to grabbe, gate-keeping (vachudova’s active leverage), benchmarking and monitoring, models (provision of legislative and institutional templates), money (aid and technical assistance), and advice and twinning (grabbe, 2001: 1020). grabbe argues that gate-keeping is the most powerful, but also the most blunt conditionality instrument, and faults the other instruments for vagueness resulting in diffusion of influence. for instance, she notes the difficulties in pinpointing when the accession conditions have been met by the candidate countries, given that the copenhagen criteria, unlike for instance imf conditionality, are not a checklist of clear objectives or quantitative targets (grabbe, 2003: 255). at the core of eu conditionality are the highly debatable concepts of “democracy,” “functional market economy” and “the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces”, and even these broad aims are moving targets, with justice and home affairs, foreign and security policy and the common currency added as they develop inside the union itself (grabbe, 2003: 255-6). the eu does not have formal rules on effective implementation or enforcement of reform policies, or specific tests of institutional change or compliance, which makes it hard to identify european influence on institutional change (grabbe, 2001: 1024). review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 80 moreover, the eu’s executive bias in the accession process, based on the notion that adopting eu norms is merely an administrative exercise, may result in the export of the eu’s democratic deficit (grabbe, 2003: 259; pridham, 2005: 58). furthermore, the eu’s own internal diversity makes it difficult to export a single model of good governance, and the conflicting demands arising often provide ammunition for different sides in domestic political battles (grabbe, 2003; o’dwyer, 2002; pop, 2006). grabbe’s conclusion about the eu’s role in promoting domestic reform is that the prospect of eu membership simply provides an anchor to the reform process (2003: 262), and that it is difficult “to use eu membership conditionality as a scalpel to sculpt institutions and policies during the accession process; rather, it is a mallet that can be used only at certain points in the process to enforce a few conditions at a time” (grabbe 2001: 1026). as i will show in the following pages, grabbe’s conclusions resonate well in the case of romania, where the safeguard clause threatening delayed membership by one year (the gate-keeping mechanism) was the most powerful conditionality instrument, but also a very blunt one. this instrument was incapable of ensuring that elements of continuity with corrupt past practices are eradicated from new institutions. it is worth noting that the gate-keeping implied by the safeguard clause is slightly different from vachudova’s notion of active leverage, which refers to the threat of withholding membership altogether, rather than simply delaying accession. in the case of the safeguard clause, the consequences of failing to fulfill the conditions are not quite as severe as for the decision to open negotiations. if the safeguard clause is applied and membership is delayed, it is likely that the respective government would be encouraged to speed up reforms to make sure it does not miss the next deadline.7 in contrast, when membership negotiations were denied to 7 pop (2006: 133) also notes that because international institutions have repeatedly given the romanian government another chance, economic reforms have slowly deepened. review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 81 romania in 1997, the disappointment about ‘missing the train’ of accession was quickly replaced by criticism towards the eu for being too harsh and unfair towards romania. apart from the literature focusing on conditionality, we can think of the influence of the eu as manifested in the domestic process of policy-formation. emulation of eu rules has been important in the creation of governance institutions in eastern europe. these institutions can be assessed based on how faithful and how voluntary emulation has been (thresholds, patches, copies or templates), as well as based on the outcome of emulation (homesteading, scaffolding, continuous learning and open struggle), which depends on the density of actors and rules in each policy domain of interest (jacoby, 2005). jacoby (2005) does not analyze the areas of political or economic governance; rather, he focuses on agriculture, health care, consumer protection and defense, but his analysis can conceivably be extended to the fields of interest here. the anticorruption policies, for instance, have a high density of actors, so the outcome of emulation could be somewhere between jacoby’s concepts of continuous learning and open struggle, while market governance has a lower density of actors and higher density of rules, resulting in a scaffolding outcome. while this approach offers a way of understanding the process of reform, it does not indicate how this process is impacted by politicians’ dissimulation strategies vis-à-vis the eu. therefore, the problems with institutional outcomes that arise from such dissimulation are not captured in this model. integration of eastern european political regimes and economies also happens at a broader level, beyond specific conditions determined by the eu (pridham, 2005; schimmelfennig and sedelmeier, 2005). pridham (2005) adopts this broader approach to eu influence, emphasizing the dynamic interaction between the “pull” (democracy promotion, e.g. through political dialogue) and “push” (political conditionality) factors. according to pridham review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 82 (2005: 15-9), integration theory teaches three main lessons pertinent to enlargement and democratic conditionality. the first lesson is that the eu, as a political system rather than a state, functions through diffused decision-making (multilevel governance), with imperfect separation between domestic and international politics. second, integration theories teach us not to ignore informal integration, and third, they emphasize the contributions of both elites and masses to integration, and the interaction of these contributions through elite learning. pridham (2005:228) brings to the discussion of eu influence a useful distinction between democratic transition and consolidation, noting that eu conditionality is only effective as a mechanism for promotion of democratic consolidation, after the initial transition phases have been secured. this consolidation phase consists in the institutionalization and deepening of new democratic rules, the main concern of this paper, as well as in the transformation of political culture to internalize democratic rules. finally, pridham makes the important point that the moment of eu entry is not final for democratic consolidation in eastern europe, in spite of brussels’ proclamation that the accession candidate is ready to take on the obligations of membership into the union. instead, “the final big test of this conditionality…remains ahead” because it is not clear what happens to democratic consolidation when disillusionment sets in and conditionality ceases (pridham, 2005: 229). most of the literature on the effects of enlargement on democratic consolidation and economic reforms in eastern europe presents a basically optimistic view of this process, even when discussing various shortcomings of the mechanisms the eu uses to affect change. in part, this optimism is a side-effect of the focus on international dimensions of democracy. by centering on the difference between the eu’s ability to influence democratization and that of other international organizations (ekiert et al. 2007; dimitrova and pridham, 2004), these works review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 83 tend to overemphasize the effectiveness of this influence. while most of these accounts still attest to the importance of domestic politics (pridham, 2005; grabbe, 2003; pop, 2006), they do not tell us how the lack of political will can derail the process of reform when this process is constrained by eu pressures.8 my paper attempts to fill this gap by investigating where we can see the effects of the lack of political will and how institutional outcomes are shaped by domestic politicians’ weak commitment to reform. some previous literature does note that there is a difference between the passage of legislation and its effective implementation; for instance, pridham (2005: 138) points out that romania “has a reputation in eu circles for producing finesounding documents that remain on paper”, but so far there is little investigation of opportunities to avoid reforms at different points in the policy process other than the passage of legislation. when implementation problems are noted, they are usually attributed to lack of trained staff or more broadly lack of administrative capacity. i bring attention to the idea that lack of political will prevents reform not just by opposition to the passage of legislation, but also through adoption of contradictory or weak enforcement and monitoring procedures for various institutions, through purposeful lack of coordination among complementary reforms, and through the maintenance of regulatory institutions under political control, so that implementation of laws remains dependent on political configurations. studies emphasizing the external influences on the eastern european transformation are far from representing the only line of research, or even the majority of research on the causes of postcommunist reforms. there is a vast literature on domestic causes of reform that emphasizes causes ranging from legacies of communist rule (e.g. ekiert and hanson, 2003; stark and bruszt, 1997; roeder 1999) to various aspects of political competition (e.g. frye, 2002; grzymalla 8 a partial exception is schimmelfennig and sedelmier (2005), who mention that there are different degrees of rule adoption (rhetorical, formal, behavioral), but do not develop this insight further. review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 84 busse, 2006; fish, 1998). this type of arguments downplays the role of eu conditionality in the adoption of governance institutions by highlighting the significant variation in the extent of reforms among countries that have been under similar pressure from the eu (e.g. grzymallabusse, 2006). in my discussion of domestic politics i cannot engage at length with any of these arguments. rather, i focus on the interaction between domestic politics and eu demands. eu influence on reform the recent history of eu-romanian relations begins with the opening of negotiations for accession in 2000. starting with this year, the monitoring reports on reform progress prepared by the commission since 1998 took on a new importance. they became part of the negotiation process, signaling to the romanian government and beyond, often in strategically vague terms, how close romania was to accession, and what it had to do to get there. through these documents, the eu carefully used the carrot of accession and the stick of conditionality in order gain as much leverage as possible on the reforms of interest. negotiations were finished in 2004, followed by the signing of the accession treaty in 2005. full membership was achieved on january 1, 2007. the most important conditionality instrument employed by the eu after negotiations ended was the safeguard clause, according to which romania’s (and bulgaria’s) membership would have been delayed by one year if the required reforms had not been implemented. this clause was in effect from the december 2004 european council to the september 2006 monitoring report. readiness for accession was announced with the release of this report. since then, the commission uses a benchmarks-based monitoring system for specific reform areas, backed by the (less credible) threat of a safeguard clause that would allow member review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 85 states to disregard romanian court decisions if reform progress is insufficient. in spite of repeated warnings, that clause has not been activated so far. on paper, romania’s progress towards meeting accession criteria has been impressively fast. in 2002, mid-way through the accession negotiation process, reform progress was still at an early stage. the commission notes in its regular report for romania that judicial reform has been limited, the executive interferes with judicial affairs, the courts are overburdened, the general prosecutor has the dictatorial power of introducing extraordinary appeals, and the justice system is generally strained (cited in freedom house, 2003: 17). in contrast, the eu commission’s september 2005 comprehensive monitoring report notes that romania “has taken decisive steps to further reform the judiciary system towards more independence” (p.3). this report still notes shortcomings in several areas: the reform of public administration, the implementation of justice system reform, and the effectiveness of the fight against corruption, including high-level corruption. eleven specific issues in the areas of justice and competition are highlighted in particular as potential triggers of the safeguard clause. half a year later, the may 2006 monitoring report notes that the fight against fraud and corruption is no longer the subject of serious concern (or a potential trigger of the safeguard clause), while still requiring further efforts (ec, 2006a). in its last monitoring report before accession (september 2006), the eu commission acknowledged progress and lifted the safeguard clause, mentioning new party finance legislation and non-partisan investigations by the national anti-corruption directorate (dna). the commission, however, clearly indicated that there is a lot left to do, including achieving a fully consistent interpretation and application of the law, and establishing an integrity agency that would verify assets, incompatibilities and potential conflicts of interest of public officials, and review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 86 that would issue mandatory decisions in this respect. the monitoring report also cautions: “there needs to be a clear political will to demonstrate the sustainability and irreversibility of the recent positive progress in fighting corruption. in the parliament there have been some attempts to substantially reduce the effectiveness of such efforts” (ec, 2006b: 5). both bulgaria and romania are to report regularly on progress regarding specific benchmarks even after accession, with the first report to be submitted by march 31, 2007. in this first post-accession report, the eu notes yet more progress in judicial system and anti-corruption reforms, but declares that sensitive points remain, in particular deploring the still missing (at the time) adoption of the agency for national integrity (ani) law (eubusiness, 2007). domestic politics not all the missteps of the reform process can be blamed on political opposition. some difficulties arise due to the unavailability of skilled civil servants to draft good legislation, to the lack of state capacity to implement it, and to the mixed signals coming from eu advisors, each promoting the legal tradition of their own country, rather than a unified eu framework (freedom house, 2006: 19). however, i show that political opposition to reform has strongly impacted progress. such opposition has been significant both during the leftist psd government of 20002004, an during the center-right government that followed. while there has been alternation in power of the two main political camps, the centerright and the center-left since 1996, the freedom house 2003 country report considered meaningful and constructive political opposition t be absent, and deplored the fragmentation of the opposition and the large-scale political migration of local officials from the opposition to the ruling party. at the time, the communist-successor party, the center-left psd (social democrat review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 87 party) was in power, after significantly increasing its vote and seat share in the 2000 elections to 36.6% of votes and 45% of seats, while the center-right alliance that had formed the previous government did not even make it to parliament.9 the freedom house (2003) report also noted the limited ability of parliament to scrutinize legislation, due to the fact that one-third of laws were put forth by the executive as emergency ordinances, and then eventually approved by parliament in their initial form or only with minor amendments. corruption scandals abounded during psd’s 2000-2004 government. many privatizations, especially in strategic fields like energy and banking, as well as many public procurement contracts (e.g. highway construction) are believed to have illegally benefited psd associates. ex-prime-minister nastase of the psd, otherwise considered a reformist in the party’s ranks, is also embroiled in a high-profile corruption scandal, and has an open file with the anti-corruption authority. the asphalt, energy and transport industries are the main ones involved in corruption scandals. the commission’s may 2006 report notes that the energy, transport and mining are the main industries still requiring restructuring and privatization. the last romanian elections were held in november 2004, and resulted in a fragile center-right government coalition of the truth and justice alliance (da, composed of pnl – national liberal party, and of pd – democratic party), the conservative party (led by allegedlycorrupt businessman voiculescu) and udmr (the hungarian minority party). this new political configuration allowed for important reforms in 2005 and 2006, especially thanks to reformist elements of the executive, such as the justice minister monica macovei. however, “the whole reform process met with tremendous opposition” (freedom house, 2006: 9). the sources of this opposition were many: government infighting, the conflict between the president and the prime 9 the other signal of weak opposition during the 2000-2004 term, according to grzymala-busse’s (2006) notion of robust competition, is the high vote share of an anti-system party, the extreme-right greater romania party (prm), which got almost a quarter of the seats in parliament. review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 88 minister (pm), parliamentary opposition to reform, and slowly changing mentalities in the justice system. relations within the ruling coalition have deteriorated rapidly after the 2004 elections. upon the refusal of the prime minister to organize early elections in the summer of 2005, the president accused him of falling prey to oligarchic interests in his party, especially due to the pm’s connections to oil magnate dinu patriciu, who was also a prominent politician in the pm’s liberal party. when the finance minister was replaced by one of the pm’s former business partners in august 2005, the press charged that the finance minister had been dismissed for attempting to clean up the corrupt customs service (freedom house, 2006: 17). even the european parliament was noting, as late as september 2006, that an oligarchy composed of businessmen active in politics – either directly or through compliant allies – fears… that eu efforts to improve standards in public life will alter the rather lax climate that has enabled them to grow very rich. inside tariceanu’s liberals, they have acquired almost full control. … substantive policy issues are not being given serious attention, and… the eu may find it hard to identify local partners with whom it can promote a durable reform agenda” (directorate b, 2006). president basescu, who appears to lead anti-corruption efforts, is also accused of being embroiled in shady business schemes, and there is a corruption file against him. the president has made little progress in reforming the secret service, although this lies clearly within his authority, and has integrated the many information services into a single “community of information” which causes much concern, given the fear that former members of the securitate, the communist secret police, are infiltrating parliament, government, and even the media (freedom house, 2006: 18). as recently as april 2007, the president was suspended by parliament for allegedly acting unconstitutionally, but returned to the presidency in may after review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 89 gaining overwhelming popular support in a national referendum in which he successfully presented himself as an anti-corruption champion. unfortunately, the new government lost much of its reform impetus when relations between the president’s and the pm’s parties worsened, incapacitating unitary government action. in march 2006, justice minister macovei accused the secretary general of the government of publishing new laws in a form different from that agreed upon in government meetings (lacatus, 2007; realitatea tv 2007). she also accused the government of passing laws “with destination”, referring to 20 companies that were declared exempt from new bankruptcy regulations (cocvaci, 2007). this tension between various members of the government eventually led to the break-up of the pd-pnl coalition, and the change in government. the new government has no pd members, and macovei has been ousted as well (even though she was an independent). the prospects for the new government to continue the pace of reform, especially in the anti-corruption field, appear weak in mid-2007. six new ministers have been contested by the coalition for clean government, an ngo promoting politicians with untainted personal histories, and the press has pointed to connections between several ministers and two powerful businessmen (corlatan and gheorghiu, 2007). there were also many signs that politicians in parliament were not appreciating the reform impetus of the justice minister. in february 2007, a motion of the opposition parties was debated in the senate, accusing the justice minister for lacking a reform strategy, abandoning responsibility, and blocking the new criminal code adopted in 2004, but not yet enacted. this was in spite of the positive signals of the commission towards these aspects of reform, and the repeated singling-out by the eu of the justice minister for this progress. as for the criminal code, macovei answered the accusations by saying that the 2004 law proposed and passed by the review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 90 psd was badly written and would have virtually blocked the functioning of the criminal justice system; therefore, she was preparing a new legislative proposal for the criminal code (realitatea tv 2007). what code ends up being adopted will be very important, because it will determine the effectiveness of anti-corruption prosecution. the battle over the national agency for integrity (ani), an institution supposed to verify and enforce public officials’ wealth declarations, is most telling for the means of political opposition to reform in the presence of eu pressure. macovei’s legislative proposal for this agency was adopted by the house in october 2006, after many months of debate. nonetheless, the form of the adopted law had been significantly changed from the original proposal, prompting minister macovei to complain that this law has been significantly diluted, because it left out conflicts of interest of the mps, and it subordinated ani politically (realitatea tv 2007). the draft legislation for this agency was then sent for adoption to the senate in march 2007. given the apparent anti-reform turn of the government after the reshuffle, it was unlikely that the law would ever be adopted, but ‘the miracle’ happened on may 9, 2007. the final version of the law, however, is considered weak,10 in spite of changes introduced by the new justice minster. the new institution is politically subordinated to the senate, and does not have a mandate to verify conflicts of interest (pirvu and blagu, 2007). 10 transparency international’s (2007) position on this law is somewhat contradictory: on the one hand, they salute the passage of the law, consider it to be in accordance to basic anti-corruption principles, and express hope that it will be implemented properly; on the other hand, they acknowledge political subordination and the agency’s inability to investigate conflicts of interest. review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 91 assessment of political governance reforms one important problem of the institutional environment for the fight against corruption in romania is the presence of loopholes in the laws comprising this environment.11 this prevents much-anticipated and well-sounding laws from having the expected effects. the 2000 anticorruption law, for instance, was a welcome milestone, but it failed to distinguish between petty and more serious corruption, often leading to excessively harsh punishments for petty corruption and too lenient ones for grand corruption. similarly, the 2002 law on public procurement introduced electronic procurement procedures, which made the process more transparent, but did not establish an independent body to supervise the operation; several newspapers charged that most winning bidders were companies close to the ruling party (freedom house, 2003). another main problem leading to the ineffectiveness of democratic governance is the overlapping competency of the different institutions, coupled with contradicting laws. for instance, the law on access to public information (544/2001), while saluted by ngos, was weakened by the almost immediate passage of the law on state secrets and classified information, which allows for arbitrary restrictions on what qualifies as classified information (freedom house, 2003). a related issue is jurisdictional overlap among corruption-fighting bodies; apart from the national anticorruption prosecutor’s office (napo), the financial guard and the audit court also have anti-corruption mandates, while the ministry of the interior has its own anti-corruption agency, the adg (general anticorruption directorate), supposed to control police and customs officers (ibid.). this problem is compounded when institutions fail to 11 this institutional environment consists, apart from national anti-corruption department (dna, ex-napo), of the national control authority (created 2003), which focuses on economic fraud, smuggling and fiscal evasion, the national ombudsman (an autonomous institution created through law 35/1997), which reports to parliament or to the constitutional court about violations of citizens’ rights, the court of accounts (law 94/1992) in charge of external audits of public administration), the prime-minister’s office fight against fraud department (government ordinance 1348/2004), and the national office for prevention of money laundering (law 656/2002). review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 92 coordinate effectively. for instance, napo and the prosecutor’s office at the high court of cassation and justice often had difficulties in sharing cases for which both had jurisdiction (greco, 2005: 7). the greco (group of states against corruption) 2005 evaluation report on romania also notes the low capacity of anti-corruption prosecution services, especially outside bucharest, due to lack of training and specialist knowledge and to case overload12, which can be remedied if politicians make higher budgets for anti-corruption prosecution a priority. apart from loopholes, contradictory laws and low budgets, lack of political independence of the anti-corruption institutions has been a major problem. in an audit of anti-corruption reforms commissioned by the ministry of justice in 2005 (after the psd government was ousted from power), freedom house makes the point that napo treated top-level officials as untouchables. the napo prosecutor was appointed by the president upon recommendation by the minister of justice, and there were no potential conflict of interest provisions in the law. before 2005, the napo head prosecutor was the brother of a psd mp, and as a result napo did not address allegations of corruption within the ranks of psd, in spite of public outrage about several cases13 (freedom house, 2005: 85). excessive financial and decisional dependence on the top leadership added to the problem of lack of political independence. napo prosecutors did not have approved budgets for their investigations, and had to ask their directors even for small expenses, as well as before making any decisions. of the cases napo considered in 2004, only 7% ended up in an indictment. the decisions to withdraw actions and close the file, which happened in almost half the cases before napo in 2004, cannot be checked by external bodies, creating a large opportunity for preferential treatment (freedom house, 2005: 89). political 12 the greco report notes that a public prosecutor often deals with 50 cases simultaneously and a judge deals with at least 80 cases per hearing (greco, 2005: 6). 13 for instance, the minister of transport was accused of disbursing county funds without clear criteria, and lost his job amid public outcry, but the napo investigation only started after the change in government in 2004. review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 93 interference also remains an important factor in recruitment and promotion of civil servants in spite of the reasonably developed legal framework (freedom house, 2003). the open society institute’s evaluation of romanian anti-corruption policies (osi, 2002) makes observations similar to those of the greco and freedom house reports. the national anti-corruption strategy and the changes to the public procurement system are noted as important improvements, but the focus on low-level corruption and the refusal to prosecute members of the political establishment in power are presented as major flaws. attempts to entrench political power were not limited to keeping institutions politically dependent. some of the policies adopted by the psd government, while appearing to improve the formal independence of the justice system, had the opposite effect. the most notable example is the transferring of responsibilities for promotion and training of judges and other justice reform issues to the superior council of the magistracy (csm) from the ministry of justice. this had the positive implication of granting more political independence to this body. at the same time, however, the transfer of responsibility precludes a future reformist justice minister from exerting much influence in those areas of reform, and gives the power over these important aspects of reform to elite judges known to favor the psd. this is the problem that the 2005 reformist minister macovei confronted. in spite of 2005 revisions to the justice reform laws, accountability mechanisms for the csm are basically inexistent. the csm is being accused of failing to be a reformer and controller of the judiciary. its members have kept their double capacity as heads of courts and controllers of the same courts, they have denied the existence of corruption within the judiciary, hired former employees of the ministry of justice who had been accused of delaying the reforms, and delayed long-discussed reforms like the criteria for evaluation and promotion of judges (freedom house, 2006: 9). recently, judges have also been review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 94 accused by the head anti-corruption prosecutor of allowing too many procedural delays in corruption cases, which has resulted in the lack of jail convictions in spite of numerous cases sent to court (bbc romania radio, 2007). the passive attitude of the csm, its ethics problems and conflicts of interest were noted by the commission’s september 2006 report, and have prompted minister macovei to declare in 2006 that if nothing is changed in the structure and the practices of the csm, two years later the romanian justice system will be in a worse condition (minister’s office, 2007: 6). in 2005, under the new government, reforms intensified. napo was reorganized as the anti-corruption department (dna), and its responsibilities were restricted to only the highest corruption cases (bribe over 10,000 euros or material damage over 200,000 euros). the new powers of the dna allowed it to charge 744 defendants in 2005, including a former mp, 4 judges, and 8 high-level bureaucrats (freedom house, 2006). in 2006, dna prosecuted, among others, 7 mps, one minister and 2 assistant-ministers not just from the previous party in power, but also, for the first time in romania, from the government party (freedom house, 2006). unfortunately, the 2005-6 coalition in-fighting and slim majority in parliament reflected negatively in the progress of reform, prompting observers to complain that there has been insufficient effort from the new government in fighting corruption. transparency international romania, for instance, cautions in its 2006 national corruption report that several anticorruption laws established by government ordinance did not gather enough support in parliament, so the laws ultimately adopted were often compromise solutions or diluted versions. this is a point strongly made in this report: in spite of anti-corruption policy support from the president and the ministry of justice, there has been “ a decrease of the engagement of parliamentary parties towards supporting anti-corruption policies and promoting legislative review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 95 initiatives….the resistance comes, not only from the deputies and senators in the opposition, but also from those representing the government coalition” (p. 17). in the case of the national integrity agency, this parliamentary opposition to reform has meant a significant delay in the adoption of the law in spite of eu insistence. the other problem strongly noted in the transparency international report is ineffective implementation. about the justice system, for instance, transparency international (2006) says that it “is not yet reformed. it may be so on paper or from the legislative point of view, meanwhile the old practices are still persisting. the level of implementation of reforms is still very low” (2006: 16). in spite of the increase in the number of dna prosecutions, “not one of the high-level romanian politicians that have been charged has seen jail time” (radu, 2006). reflecting the concerns of transparency international, forty-eight percent of romanians believe the corruption level has not changed since the new government took power, and 24% are convinced that corruption has increased (radu, 2006). corruption perceptions are not necessarily reliable indicators of progress in reform,14 which is why the eu also uses measures like the numbers of investigations to assess the fight against corruption. however, until a number of significant convictions rock the political scene with the power of example, perceptions of corruption and actual levels of this phenomenon are not likely to change. in conclusion, the 2005 da government has registered progress on some counts, improving on previous anti-corruption legislation and showing willingness to prosecute members of the parties in power. however, notable weaknesses of the anti-corruption framework before 2005, such as the lack of regulation of conflicts of interest, have persisted even as new legislation supposed to eliminate these weaknesses (the national integrity agency) has been passed. on political independence of anti-corruption institutions there is a mixed record; presently, the top 14 perceived corruption appears to be significantly higher than experienced corruption in romania (mj 2005). review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 96 anti-corruption prosecutor is considered relatively politically independent, due to its ability to prosecute members of the parties in power. it is not clear, however, how long this independence can be maintained15. the national integrity agency, the newest institution of the anti-corruption framework, is also politically subordinated to parliament. thus, politicians opposed to reform have found ways, through the various mechanisms presented above, to protect the weak status quo of democratic governance even while passing the eu-required laws. assessment of market governance reforms the second question i investigate in this paper is whether there were any differences between eu conditionality in different types of reforms, namely between political and market governance reforms. given the origins of the eu as a primarily economic organization, we might expect that it is most concerned with the market environment, which could mean stronger conditionality in this field. at the same time, the eu is not the only international organization providing economic policy advice and conditions to romania. also, market governance reforms may not be as controversial as political governance reforms, because politicians are not threatened directly by these changes. the main economic concerns voiced by the commission in 2005 were state aid, enforcement of bankruptcy decisions, and privatization and restructuring. these were indeed main areas of reform in the period under study, and while there is still much room for improvement, these reforms do not appear to have suffered from the same political interference as the political governance reforms. 15 however, the new minister of justice tudor chiuariu recently attempted to change one of the prosecutors working for the dna. review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 97 competition policy competition policy seems to be a field where the eu has recently been very firm. by making commission approval necessary for the disbursement of state aid, the december 2006 amendments to competition law were a vehicle for bringing about significant change in the government’s way of doing business in one of the traditional areas for corruption and state capture, namely state subsidies. competition law was first enacted in march 1996. this law came much later than the equivalent laws in central european countries and even in russia, but at the time, the vast majority of romanian industrial production still came from state-owned enterprises. the desire to eventually become part of the european union was reflected in the fact that this law was modeled on articles 85 and 86 of the treaty of rome (pittman, 1997: 164). the political debate around the law was about the independence of the institution to be created for enforcement of competition law. the initial compromise solution was to create two institutions: an investigative body, the competition office, subordinated to the government, and an autonomous adjudicative body, the competition council. in may 2004, law 184 made the competition council the only institution responsible for competition policy implementation. the competition council’s administrative capacity was improved in 2005, when its budget was raised by 30%, and salary increases reduced staff fluctuations (ec, 2005: 39). the anti-trust branch of the council has developed its enforcement record, registering record fines in the cement sector (ec, 2005). complete legislative alignment, improved decisions and increased activity were achieved in 2005.16 however, the state aid area of competition policy was still one of concern for the commission. enforcement was still hampered by the poor quality of the 16 fines of eur 38.5 million were levied between september 2004 and august 2005, more than 1000 times higher than the fines for the previous year. review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 98 council’s pre-notifications (ec, 2005: 87), though the quality of these decisions was improving. recovery of state aid ruled to be illegal had also not yet started. the commission is particularly interested in the steel industry, and is monitoring the implementation of the national steel restructuring strategy, focusing on the government’s commitment not to grant any further state aid to the sector. some of the firmest language of the commission, and an alternation of accusatory and encouraging language, is used with respect to this sector. on one hand, the commission states that romania “shows a strong commitment to apply fully the state aid rules as regards the steel industry” and “a fulfillment of the accession treaty obligations is likely” (ec, 2005: 90). on the other hand, the commission notes that some steel companies not included in the national restructuring programme (and therefore not monitored by the competition council) “appear to have benefited from restructuring aid although these companies were not allowed to receive such aid” (ec, 2005: 90). this aid amounts to the write-off of historical debts during privatization, a common strategy meant to make privatizing companies sellable. where the existence of such aid can be confirmed, the commission requests that “the aid will have to be recovered with interest” (ec, 2005: 89). to further investigate the issue, the commission asked romania to submit detailed information about the privatization of companies not included in the national steel restructuring strategy, and complained that “the information submitted by romania so far in this context is incomplete” (ec, 2005: 89). in december 2006, the competition council got a large boost from the commission, which made it the liaison between the commission and the government on the issue of state aid. the council has to be notified of all state aid prior to disbursement of funds, and give preapproval for such aid, after consulting the eu commission. this probably makes the competition council the most autonomous institution of market governance in romania. the review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 99 council achieved this position thanks entirely to the eu commission’s specific concern with state aid; this makes competition policy an area of governance strongly influenced by the eu. commercial legislation in terms of the reform of commercial regulation, there was a major breakthrough in 2004 in the simplification of incorporation procedures for new companies (law 359/2004), but the procedures for inspecting private companies were not unified and simplified, leaving businesses captive to numerous inspectors from various agencies (tax collection, environmental agencies, fire codes etc.), who demand fines in the name of rapidly changing legislation (freedom house, 2005: 54-61). the companies and securities laws were also amended in 2003 and 2002 respectively, improving the corporate governance framework, so that by 2005 the commission was satisfied with the company law chapter of negotiations, asking only for efforts to improve financial reporting and efficient follow-up of these provisions (ec, 2005: 37). law 469/2002 was meant to improve contractual enforcement, by imposing fines to encourage debtors (including state-owned enterprises) to pay on time, but in practice these fines are not applied (ec, 2005: 67). privatization law was also reformed in 2002 (137/2002), but the main problems, lack of transparency of the agencies implementing privatization, and the difficulty for buyers of obtaining information about the companies to be privatized without bribing the privatization agency officials, have not been solved (ec, 2005: 70). some of the problems with privatization, however, are not related to the law; rather, non-achievement of contractual obligations of new owners sometimes leads to the bounce back to state ownership, slowing the pace of privatization (ec, 2005: 58). review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 100 it is also worth noting that unlike company law and competition policy, some issues of market governance, such as corporate governance and bankruptcy, do not have their own chapters in accession negotiations and monitoring reports, and thus received less attention during the negotiation process. eu advice in these areas in the annual reports has been limited to noting that both enforcement and legal provisions require further improvement (ec, 2005: 4). however, these fields of law display the same combination of relatively developed legal framework and ineffective implementation as eu-monitored laws. the ebrd mentions, for instance, that the effectiveness of minority shareholders’ rights provisions is “well below what could be expected in terms of prevailing legislation” (cigna and enriques, 2005: 30). bankruptcy law presents a similar picture. while freedom house (2005) considers bankruptcy legislation as still being a major problem area, especially due to permissive reorganization provisions, the ebrd considers the romanian insolvency law one of the leading such laws in ebrd’s countries of operation and highly compliant with international standards (ebrd, 2006: 13). the whole eastern european region has experienced an explosion of reforms in the fields of creditor and shareholder rights, leading to highly developed legislation by 1998 (pistor et al., 2000). however, pistor et al. (2000) note that across the region, law on the books does not correlate with legal effectiveness, which negatively affects the availability of external finance. the ebrd (2006: 15) also notes, in the case of the romanian bankruptcy law that a large gap exists between the quality of the law and the insolvency regime in practice. the similarities between the state of reforms in market regulation areas that are specific eu concerns and those that are not suggests that it might be difficult to distinguish the eu’s impact in market governance from the more diffuse international influence coming from other organizations, such as the ebrd or the imf, and from foreign legal consultants. imitation of the review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 101 western market governance framework sometimes almost word by word in hopes of attracting foreign capital may be what drove market governance reforms independently of eu accession negotiations. such law transplants, however, have resulted in a disconnect between the law on the books and the law in practice, so that even good laws on paper have not had the expected effects in terms of attracting foreign finance (pistor et al., 2000). the remaining problems with commercial legislation point to the close relationship between political and market governance reforms. if anti-corruption policies were effective, and if the rule of law and the court system were strengthened, many of the problems with market regulations would disappear. thus, in spite of the more continuous pace of market governance reforms – many reforms were passed in the middle of the psd term, and reform activity was more evenly distributed over the electoral cycle – the problems of corruption and unreformed judiciary are replicated in the market environment, where they impair the efficiency of otherwise relatively well-written market governance laws. conclusion the eu’s influence on romanian reforms has been extensive, due to this organization’s ability to credibly promise much higher and more tangible benefits that any other international organization, as well as to the eu’s specific and credible conditionality. however, even in this most-likely case scenario for international influence, i have shown that there is still room for domestic politicians to subvert specific reforms. i have highlighted the ways in which eu influence can be undermined by studying the effects of lack of political will on governance reforms mandated by the eu. against the unqualified argument that the eu has successfully promoted democratic governance in romania, i have argued that many legislated reforms have review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 102 yet to be effective. the main ways in which politicians have been able to subvert these reforms have to do with the quality and effectiveness of legislation, and not just with its passage. new romanian institutions of democratic governance are often not politically independent, have weak operational capacity (low budgets), and lack coordination with other laws. while the pattern of law adoption follows the eu membership negotiations closely, the problems mentioned suggest that conditionality has not fully achieved its purpose, effecting legal changes more than real changes. in other words, when conditionality is strongest, opposition to reform ‘mutates’ from affecting the timing of reform to influencing the effectiveness of the adopted rules. effectiveness problems were particularly prominent during the ex-communist’s time in power (2000-2004), but persisted in 2005-6 as well, reflecting continued weakness of political support for reform and coalition disagreements. recent coalition problems evoke the inability of the 1996-2000 reformist coalition to implement their plans in spite of their pro-reform orientation. in terms of market governance reforms, the pace of change has been more even, and the eu’s influence has been compounded by other international organizations, and by the government’s desire to attract foreign investment. however, inefficient firms connected to politicians still have plenty of opportunities to navigate the market environment, due to both imperfect legislation and ineffectiveness of market governance laws. domestic politics and international influence are not starkly opposed concepts, but rather interact in many ways in the transition process in eastern europe, and have to be analyzed together. one of the few attempts to truly combine these two types of influence analytically in the discussion of reform outcome comes from jacoby (2006). he points out that international actors change domestic politics in three ways: by lengthening the time horizons of postcommunist politicians, by making more domestic actors interested in reform, and by review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 103 deterring the opponents to reform (jacoby, 2006: 625). the best way for external actors to achieve any of these objectives, jacoby argues, is to build informal coalitions with domestic actors, rather than attempting to coerce change by substituting domestic politics (e.g. as in the management of bosnia), or by simply aiming to inspire domestic politicians. because coalitionbuilding is the most effective strategy, studies discussing international influence should focus on the extent to which this strategy is followed. jacoby does not suggest that these coalitions are always successful in producing the desired change, just that they are more successful than alternative courses of action. this useful research agenda would benefit also from distinguishing the factors that make domestic-international actor alliances successful. in the romanian case, further research on the specifics of the euromanian government relationship starting in 2000 would be very helpful in shedding light on why this coalition has not been as successful as it could have been. politicians’ strategies aimed at preserving their advantages and avoiding real change may not be sufficient to prevent incremental change, and may only succeed in slowing down the process of adoption of western standards of democracy. however, the danger is that these strategies could also result in equilibrium of partial governance reforms, not at the most visible level of institutional adoption, but at the more intimate level of institutional functioning and coordination. institutions are not the only important aspect of a consolidated democracy, but their ability to stabilize actors’ expectations is a key part of democratic consolidation. therefore, strengthening the effective functioning of these institutions is an important challenge for romanian democratic development. review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 104 tables table 1. world bank governance indicators romania’s governance indicators 1996 1998 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 voice and accountability -0.04 0.20 0.42 0.38 0.39 0.38 0.36 political stability 0.31 0.10 -0.18 0.22 0.24 0.15 0.03 government effectiveness -0.88 -0.63 -0.67 -0.32 -0.16 -0.11 -0.03 regulatory quality -0.59 0.23 -0.31 0.01 -0.20 0.13 0.17 rule of law -0.34 -0.35 -0.32 -0.23 -0.22 -0.23 -0.29 control of corruption -0.18 -0.44 -0.50 -0.35 -0.29 -0.29 -0.23 * estimates are between –2.5 and 2.5. source: kaufmann et al (2006). table 2: economic reform indicators eu eastern european members large scale privatisation enterprise restructuring competition policy banking reform & interest rate liberalisation securities markets & non-bank financial institutions overall infrastructure reform bulgaria 4.00 2.67 2.67 3.67 2.67 3.00 czech 4.00 3.33 3.00 4.00 3.67 3.33 estonia 4.00 3.67 3.67 4.00 3.67 3.33 hungary 4.00 3.67 3.33 4.00 4.00 3.67 latvia 3.67 3.00 3.00 3.67 3.00 3.00 lithuania 4.00 3.00 3.33 3.67 3.00 3.00 poland 3.33 3.67 3.00 3.67 3.67 3.33 romania 3.67 2.67 2.67 3.00 2.00 3.33 slovak rep. 4.00 3.67 3.33 3.67 3.00 3.00 slovenia 3.00 3.00 2.67 3.33 2.67 3.00 average 3.77 3.24 3.07 3.67 3.14 3.20 * these measures are on a scale of 0 to 4.5. source: ebrd transition indicators 2006. http://www.ebrd.com/country/sector/econo/stats/index.htm review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 105 appendix 1. comparison of romania’s eu accession path and the timing of reforms timeline of romania’s eu accession path: • 1995: romania applies for eu membership • february 2000: official start of membership negotiations • december 2002: copenhagen summit: eu leaders set 2007 as target date for romania’s membership • june 2004: safeguard clause is put in place to delay admission until 2008 if judicial reform targets are not met and if the council unanimously approves such a delay • may 2004: timeline of selected romanian reforms: • law 64/1995 first bankruptcy law, revised 1996, 1997, 1999 • law 115/1996: obligation of public officials to declare their personal wealth • law 35/1997 ombudsman is established (initially weak) • july 1999: first state aid law setting up procedures for subsidies (law 143/1999) • law 21/1999: prevention and punishment of money laundering • law 188/1999: forbids civil servants to take outside employment in for-profit activities, but is not properly enforced; • law 115/1999: ministerial responsibility and conduct of public officials • 1999 first law on civil service • ordinance 5/2000, forbids several prominent positions in private companies (including board members) from elected officials and civil servants • law 78/2000 on the prevention, detection and punishment of acts of corruption: petty and more serious corruption are not distinguished • law on access to public information (544/2001) and law on state secrets and classified information • 2002: national anticorruption strategy and the adoption of the national anticorruption prosecutor’s office (napo, later dna) for prosecution of grand corruption • law 137/2002; revises privatization rules • law 468/2002 on public procurement: electronic procurement procedures are introduced, but there is no independent body to supervise the operation; • national office for prevention of money laundering (law 656/2002) • 2003: national control authority created • december 2003: law 603/2003 modifies the state aid law so that the competition council has to be notified of state aid • may and november 2004: creditors’ rights and incorporation laws amended • 2004: first 3-law package of justice reform passed under the spd government. this reform transferred many of the ministry of justice’s powers to the supreme council of the magistracy (csm), a non-accountable body representative of the top echelons of judges who usually favored the spd. no review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 106 romania joins nato • april 2005: european parliament overwhelmingly supports for romania’s eu accession bid • april 2005: romania signs the eu accession treaty • october 2005: commission’s comprehensive monitoring report • may 2006: another commission monitoring report • september 2006: final commission report before membership: january 2007 date is (only) now certain • january 2007: romania joins the eu • march 31, 2007; first postaccession report due accountability mechanism for the head of the national anticorruption prosecutor (nap). • prime-minister office’s fight against fraud department created (government ordinance 1348/2004) • november 2004: law 538/2004 harmonization of competition law with eu legislation; state-owned enterprises are now treated the same way as other companies • march 2005: government adopts judiciary system reform strategy for 2005-2007 (hg 232/2005), and the national anti-corruption strategy (hg 231/2005), and sets up (through an emergency government ordinance) an independent body to check the use of structural funds to be received from the eu (external audit of ipsa and sapard) • april 2005 romania eliminates criminal immunity of exministers, notaries, and justice system workers • may 2005: law on public procurement was enacted as an emergency ordinance; it increases transparency in the acquisition of advertising space for public institutions • may 2005: new guidelines for public officials’ wealth declarations • june 2005: another wave of judicial reforms, which improved on the 2004 reforms (passed in parliament in mid-july) • september 2005: new ethics code for judges drafted by the ministry of justice and csm, stipulating for the first time that judges and prosecutors must not have cooperated with the former securitate or be working for any intelligence agency • september 2005: amendments to the law on preventing money laundering, but effectiveness “seriously hampered by corruption, by organized crime and by the large informal economy” (2005 monitoring report: 37) • 2005: civil and criminal procedures amended to speed up and simplify judicial procedures • 2005: pna transformed into dna (national anti-corruption directorate) within the office of the prosecutor general (opg), which increased its powers by allowing it to prosecute corrupt mps (law 161/2005) • 2006: new party finance legislation and non-partisan investigations by the dna. • december 2006: law 441/2006 substantially amends commercial enterprise law to harmonize it to eu law and oecd corporate governance principles • march 2006: law 85/2006 bankruptcy law revision, makes bankruptcy procedures more efficient • december 2006: emergency government ordinance 117/2006 abrogates state aid law 143/1999 to further harmonize with eu law, the government now has to consult the competition council before giving out state aid, and the competition council then notifies the eu commission • 2006 new law on public procurement review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 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greco (group of states against corruption, council of europe). 2005. evaluation report on romania: second evaluation round, strasbourg, (14 october 2005), www.coe.int/t/dg1/greco/evaluations/round2/grecoeval2(2005)1_romania_en.pdf grzymała-busse, anna. 2006. “the discreet charm of formal institutions: postcommunist party competition and state oversight.” comparative political studies 39(10): 1-30. international monetary fund. 2007. “romania 2007 article iv consultation, concluding statement of the mission” march 7, 2007 http://www.imf.org/external/np/ms/2007/031307a.htm (accessed april 14, 2007) review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 109 jacoby, wade. 2006. “inspiration, coalition, and substitution: external influences on postcommunist transformations” world politics 58: 623-51. jacoby, wade. 2005. the enlargement of the european union and nato: ordering from the institutional menu in central europe. cambridge uk: cambridge university press. kaufmann, daniel. a. kraai and m. mastruzzi. 2006. governance matters v: governance indicators for 1996-2005. washington: world bank. lacatus, george. 2007. “fabrica de falsuri de la palatul victoria” (the falsities factory at the victoria palace) march 15, 2007 cotidianul (the daily). minister’s office, romanian justice ministry. 2007. “punctul de vedere fata de motiunea semnata de senatorii pc, psd si prm, supusa dezbaterii senatului la 13 februarie 2007” (cabinet minister’s point of view regarding the motion signed by the pc, psd and prm senators debated in the senate on february 13, 2007) www.just.ro (accessed march 17, 2007), now at http://www.dreptonline.ro/comunitate/ raspuns_ministrul_justitiei_motiunea_13februarie2007.php (accessed may 2, 2007). mj (ministerul justitiei) justice ministry romania. 2005. strategia nationala anticorruptie 2005-2007 (national anticorruption strategy), (7.2 corruption levels), www.just.ro (accessed april 2, 2007). o’dwyer, conor. 2002. “civilizing state bureaucracy: the unfulfilled promise of public administration reform in poland, slovakia, and the czech republic (1990-2000).” berkeley program in soviet and post-soviet studies working paper series, university of california, berkeley. osi (open society institute). 2002. monitoring the eu accession process: corruption and anticorruption policy in romania, http://www.eumap.org/reports/2002/corruption/international/ sections/romania/2002_c_romania.pdf. phinnemore, david. 2003. “romania and the european union: from marginalisation to inclusion?” paper presented at the conference romania and the european union: the challenge of domestic reform, hellenic observatory, european institute, london school of economics, 31 october 2003. pirvu, l, and blagu b. 2007. “agentia de inegritate – un organism formal, supus politicului” (the integrity agency – a formal organism, subordinated to politics), may 10, 2007, www.hotnews.ro (accessed may 12, 2007). pistor, katharina, martin raiser and stanislaw gelfer. 2000. “law and finance in transition economies.” economic of transition 8(2): 325-68. review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 110 pittman, russell. 1997. “competition law and policy in romania.” in romania in transition, ed. lavinia stan, 163-81. brookfield, vermont: dartmouth publishing. pop-eleches, grigore. 2007. “between historical legacies and the promise of western integration: democratic conditionality after communism.” east european politics and societies, vol. 21 (1): 142-61. pop-eleches, grigore. 2001. “whither democracy? the politics of dejection in the 2000 romanian elections” berkeley program in soviet and post-soviet studies working paper series, university of california, berkeley, institute of slavic, east european and eurasian studies. pridham, geoffrey. 2005. designing democracy: eu enlargement and regime change in postcommunist europe. new york: palgrave macmillan. pop, liliana. 2006. democratizing capitalism? the political economy of post-communsit transformations in romania. manchester uk: manchester university press. radu, paul. 2006. “reporter’s notebook: romania” 2006 global integrity country reports: romania, www.globalintegrity.org (accessed april 4, 2007). realitatea tv. 2007. “suta la suta” (a hundred percent) interview with monica macovei, by robert turcescu (march 13, 2007). roeder, philip. 1999. “peoples and states after 1999: the political costs of incomplete national revolutions.” slavic review 58(4): 854-82. schimmelfennig, frank and ulrich sedelmeier (eds.). 2005. the europeanization of central and eastern europe. ithaca, ny: cornell university press. stark, david and laszlo bruszt. 1997. post-socialist pathways: transforming politics and property in east central europe new york: cambridge university press. transparency international romania. 2007. national corruption report 2007: april 2006 – april 2007 (published may 24, 2007), www.transparency.org.ro/politici_si_studii/studii/ national_coruptie/2007/ncr_2007_final_site_eng.pdf (accessed june 5, 2007). transparency international romania. 2006. 2006 national corruption report, www.eumap.org/library (accessed march 15, 2007). vachudova, anna milada. 2002. “the leverage of the european union on reform in postcommunist europe.” paper presented at the workshop enlargement and european governance, ecpr joint session workshops, turin, 22-27 march 2002. world bank. 2006. doing business 2007: how to reform. washington: world bank and international finance corporation. microsoft word thorfinn stainforth_4_1.doc review of european and russian affairs vol. 5 issue 1/2009 © rera 2009 all rights reserved ………………………………………………………………… the danish paradox: intolerance in the land of perpetual compromise thorfinn stainforth abstract what explains the apparent contradiction between denmark's reputation as a liberal, tolerant society, and the recent rise in wide-spread xenophobia there? the root causes of the present wave of xenophobia are fundamentally similar to the rest of europe: they grow primarily out of the tensions inherent in the transition from an industrial to postindustrial society. however, its unusual virulence across an apparently inclusive mainstream political spectrum, and departure from the established norms in the country, is an outgrowth of the present challenge to the egalitarian, anti-modern ethos that has steered denmark toward its present state. modern danish nationalism, heavily influenced by the ideas of n.f.s. grundtvig, has emphasized anti-elitism, decentralization, and egalitarianism. however, for the first time since at least the 1920s these political cornerstones are being seriously challenged and re-examined. immigration has become one of the symbols of, and primary battlefield in, the challenge to the social consensus that has existed throughout most of the 20th century. review of european and russian affairs vol. 5 issue 1/2009 © rera 2009 all rights reserved 84 on february 4th and 5th, 2006 the danish embassies in beirut and damascus were set ablaze by angry mobs. in the weeks preceding and following, danish flags were repeatedly burned by angry protestors, hundreds were killed in violent demonstrations, danish goods were boycotted, ambassadors were withdrawn, and danish citizens were advised not to visit primarily islamic countries for fear of violence. to many observers, particularly in the west, the spectacle seemed quite ludicrous. denmark has a reputation as a liberal, open-minded, peaceful, and generous nation: a paragon of civilization and moderation. on balance this reputation is fairly well deserved: denmark has a commitment to multilateral institutions, an unusually generous foreign aid programme, a well educated population, an open media, and a comprehensive welfare system. the violent rhetoric and images directed toward this country would be almost laughable, were the consequences not so serious. however, such violence and depth of emotion do not arise out of nothing — danes, a group of danes at any rate, did provoke the violent reaction. the crisis was merely the most dramatic expression of a recent trend toward ethnic conflict and the rise of a strong current of xenophobia in denmark. the country’s recent treatment of immigrants from outside the eu or nordic countries does not fit its tolerant reputation. today, denmark has some of the world’s toughest restrictions on immigration; the government depends on the support of an overtly xenophobic, and many would argue racist party, the third largest in parliament; ethnic street violence is not uncommon; nationalist and almost racist rhetoric appears on a frequent basis in the press, and even the left wing of the political spectrum does not always forcefully counter racist discourses as it has in many other countries.1 the result is a situation of distrust and low-level conflict between many recent immigrants and much of the established population. what are we to make of the contradiction between the imagery of danish society as almost uniquely pacific, civil, tolerant, and inclusive, with the remarkable recent 1 see, peter hervik, ‘the emergence of neo-nationalism in denmark,’ in neo-nationalism in europe and beyond: perspectives from social anthropology, eds. andré gingrich and marcus banks (new york: berghahn books, 2006), 92-106. and clarissa berg and peter hervik, ‘“muhammedkrisen.” en politisk magtkamp i dansk journalistisk.,’ the academy for migration studies in denmark, amid working paper series 62/2007. review of european and russian affairs vol. 5 issue 1/2009 © rera 2009 all rights reserved 85 success of xenophobic discourses and parties in denmark? the positive imagery and reputation are not undeserved. denmark has been an extraordinarily peaceful and successful society by any number of measurements for most of the past century. its peacefulness has been particularly notable during a violent century in europe. liberal democracy and the rule of law have had a particularly strong hold — almost no fascist groups developed even at the height of the phenomenon in europe, and the country has been free of fundamentally divisive political conflicts since the 1940s. in other countries with more overtly nationalistic, heterogeneous, or insular histories, a xenophobic reaction to foreigners might be more expected, and perhaps easily acknowledged by their populations. however, in denmark, ethnic homogeneity and the re-emergence of an age-old societal split, which has lain dormant for much of this century, makes the accommodation of new societal groups unusually difficult. although denmark has a reputation as a bastion of equality and civilization, foreign observers would do well to remember the historical roots of this phenomenon. the new less tolerant picture of denmark is a logical by-product of the same forces that created egalitarian denmark. of course, xenophobia is a general phenomenon in europe today, and has arisen along similar lines in many countries across the continent. racist discourse is common across the continent, and anti-immigrant parties have had considerable success in the last twenty years, notably in austria, belgium, france, italy, norway, switzerland and the netherlands.2 a consensus seems to have emerged that the rise of xenophobia, and certainly its most overt political expression in the so-called “radical right wing populist parties” (rrp) is a result, fundamentally, of the transition from an industrial economy to a post-industrial one. this process has had at least two pivotal effects, as jens rydgren explains: first, traditional working class milieus have been decomposed, as a result of both the shrinking size of the industrial sector and the increased diversification of the working class, being the result of specialisation and a growing demand of technical skills. as a sign of this development we see declining levels of class voting, 2 jens rydgren. “introduction.” movements of exclusion. (hauppauge: nova science publishers, 2005), p. 1-25. review of european and russian affairs vol. 5 issue 1/2009 © rera 2009 all rights reserved 86 especially among young workers. second, the postindustrialisation process has created new ‘loser groups’ – not coping with the increased demands of education, internationalisation and flexibility – which are prone to support political programmes promising a return to the stable values and virtues of ‘the status quo ante’.3 this is a phenomenon broadly observable across the continent, and goes some of the way to explaining the xenophobia seen today. however, this still leaves open the question of why some countries have seen parties gain significant influence running on anti-immigrant policies, while others, sweden for example, have not. here researchers have not found a consensus, but have identified several factors that seem to be important, including: the degree of policy convergence of traditional parties, the speed of adaptation of existing parties to new social cleavages, public trust in politicians, media attitudes, the degree of institutional openness to new ideas and parties, international examples, the state’s capacity for repression, and the voting system in use.4 those are all important issues to be examined when studying the institutionalization of xenophobia through political parties. the growth of xenophobia and the success of those discourses in denmark share many of these same immediate causes as in the rest of the continent. however, this paper will turn to the history and particularities of danish nationalism, the same forces that resulted in the country’s characteristic egalitarianism and social-inclusiveness, as an explanation for the dramatic and successful growth of xenophobia there. traditional danish nationalism the most important single factor in the apparent discrepancy between typical danish openness and attitudes toward immigrants, particularly muslim immigrants, lies 3 jens rydgren, “explaining the emergence of radical-right wing populist parties: the case of denmark,” west european politics (spring 2004) 27:3, 478. (474-502). 4 see, kitschelt & mcgann (1995), mcadam (1996), kriesi et al (1995), and rydgren (2003) for discussion. review of european and russian affairs vol. 5 issue 1/2009 © rera 2009 all rights reserved 87 in the peculiarities of danish nationalism. this peculiarity stems from the foundations of modern danish nationalism in the mid-19th century following a series of geo-political failures for the danish state. the result was a blend of the previous national culture based on lutheranism, traditional state patriotism of the composite monarchy, and a new peasant “folk” nationalism. these three strands of self-understanding have competed in denmark in some way since the late 18th century,5 but it wasn’t until the mid 19th century that their conflict was articulated in its modern form. the newer “folk” ideology emphasized a romantic idea of danish “smallness”, self-sufficiency, innate cultural traditions, and a collective national spirit and community.6 although not completely unusual — a similar form of nationalism is also seen in eastern europe — these ideas were unusually successful in permeating mass consciousness in denmark, and differed from the earlier “patriotic nationalism” more common in western europe.7 nationalism of this type is common to scandinavia, but important differences exist between countries, especially between denmark and sweden. this newer form of nationalism has dominated danish culture and politics for most of the 20th century, largely, but not completely, displacing the earlier strands.8 danish nationalism emerged as a mass phenomenon around 1848, coinciding roughly with the schleswig-holstein war and then the loss of those two duchies, followed by the end of absolutism in denmark. the trauma of losing these territories, some of the richest within the kingdom, reinforced the trends already apparent in danish nationalist thought. the loss of the duchies was only the most recent in a series of territorial losses for the danish state going back a couple of hundred years. much of the nationalist emphasis can be summarized in a popular slogan of the time, “what we lost 5 ole feldbæk, ‘clash of culture in a conglomerate state: danes and germans in 18th century denmark,’ in clashes of cultures, ed. c.v. johansen and p.e. ladewig (odense: odense university press, 1992), 80 93. 6 l. yahil. “national pride and defeat: a comparison of danish and german nationalism.” journal of contemporary history, (september 1991), vol. 26 issue 3/4, p453. 7 uffe østergård, “the danish path to modernity,” thesis eleven 77 (may 2004), 25. 8 benedikte, bricker. “a ‘small great national state’: an analysis of the cultural and political factors that shaped danish nationalism 1760–1870. journal of historical sociology, (december 2003), vol. 16 issue 4, p. 407-431. review of european and russian affairs vol. 5 issue 1/2009 © rera 2009 all rights reserved 88 externally, we shall gain internally.”9 it was an explicit rejection of the traditional elitedriven, multi-ethnic danish state. nicolai frederik severin grundtvig is the figure most associated with the formation of modern danish nationalism and national consciousness. one biographer argued that no other man “has meant so much to denmark as n.f.s. grundtvig — no one had so much all around significance as he did.” 10 he was a priest and a poet who came to prominence early in the 19th century. although he was a strong christian, he rejected the “enlightenment ideology” of rationalism that dominated the lutheran church at the time, which he felt robbed the church of its soul.11 he often fought with the church hierarchy — he was even barred from preaching for a time — but he eventually gained followers and acceptance within the government and church. he even played a role in writing the new constitution in 1848.12 he argued that to be a good christian a person had to be profoundly self-aware; in order to be properly self-aware the believer had to be in touch with his or her cultural and historical background. he believed that every people had a unique “folk spirit”, through which its members could find their true nature. this background, or “folk spirit” was expressed most clearly in traditions such as song, dance, language, literature and so on. he, and his growing number of followers, valued the eccentricities of local customs, legends (such as norse mythology), dialects, self-sufficiency, tight communities, and distrusted “foreign” influences such as were often found in copenhagen, for example at the university.13 this mode of thinking became very important in the formation of danish national consciousness — in the formation of the imagined community of denmark. 14 it grew initially out of the countryside, propagated by a class of wealthy land-holding peasants through a concrete political programme. although grundtvig believed in an “organic” 9 brincker, 424. 10 yahil, 454. 11 buckser, andrew. “rescue and cultural context during the holocaust: grundtvigian nationalism and the rescue of danish jews,” shofar 19:2 (2001) p. 16. 12 ernest stabler, innovators in education 1830-1980 (edmonton: university of alberta press, 1986), 4. 13 buckser, 17. 14 benedict anderson, imagined communities, (london: verso, 1991). review of european and russian affairs vol. 5 issue 1/2009 © rera 2009 all rights reserved 89 form of nationalism, he, and his followers, set up institutions that were important in building a sense of “danishness” across the country. first were “folk high schools” which emphasized the importance of the folk spirit, the danish language, egalitarianism. the schools’ purpose was quite explicitly to help “awaken the inner spirit” of the danish peasants; to help them realise their full potential, and to compete with the educated class in copenhagen. 15 this class came to play a very important role in the ensuing political struggles and societal transformations.16 flowing in part from this model of education came the highly successful agricultural cooperatives, which helped reinforce the independence and importance of peasant farmers.17 another reason for the successful diffusion of grundtvigian nationalism was an effective campaign of promoting national symbolism.18 starting around the time of the loss of the duchies in 1864, the danish flag, for example, was used with unusual frequency in the most banal situations as a form of “solidarity” with the danes living in germany; this highlighted grundtvigian nationalism to the general population. today the flag continues to appear regularly at children’s birthday parties, religious festivals of all kinds, blow out sales, flying in back gardens, decorating food, on kitchen ware, and in many other everyday places.19 in line with michael billig’s theory of banal nationalism,20 this flagging has helped to identify “denmark” with house and home, hospitality, family, local businesses, and other familiar aspects of daily life, reinforcing the power of the “people’s” denmark as an imagined community. the flagging has helped to familiarize all aspects of the danish state, to identify if with peoples’ lives, and thereby built an unusually strong sense of national solidarity. because of late 18th century property reforms which had allowed for the creation of a relatively large property owning class of peasants, the economic success of 15 steven m. borish, the land of the living: the danish folk high schools and denmark’s non-violent path to modernization (nevada city: blue dolphin publishing, 1991), 203. 16 povl bagge, ‘nationalisme antinationalisme og nationalfølelse i danmark omkring 1900,’ in dansk identitetshistorie 3: folkets danmark 1949-40, ed. ole feldbæk (copenhagen: reitzels forlag, 1992), 456. 17 brincker, 415. 18 brincker, 414. 19 wren, 149. 20 michael billig, banal nationalism, (london: sage, 1995). review of european and russian affairs vol. 5 issue 1/2009 © rera 2009 all rights reserved 90 cooperatives, and the cultural and educational success of folk high schools, a class of wealthy peasants came to dominate the small and largely agricultural country. the “urban” elite of the suddenly smaller and democratising unitary nation state, was not able to resist the political power of the reorganised peasant classes. unlike in many other countries, the urban working class, such as it was, allied with the peasants and participated in their political and cultural discourses, mostly because of its relatively small size.21 grundtvigianism had permeated danish society to such an extent by 1913 that the social democrats explicitly adopted it as their ideology too.22 although the original grundtvigians, and many in the cooperative movement, did not consider urban labourers to be part of the “real” danish people, their ideas had sufficiently influenced danish industrial society, which also relied primarily on small-scale production, that they were essentially co-opted. the social democrats, the party of the urban labourer, accepted the power of the prosperous peasants, again reflecting their dominance, but extended their ideology to the whole country, incorporating the urban working class as the “backbone” of the danish people. their ideological revision was compatible with grundtvigianism, and borrowed most of its themes, but was not identical. it stressed the land and the people, but put renewed emphasis on the ability of the people to “build” their own society in their own land.23 working together, the liberals (venstre), and the social democrats revised the constitution in 1915 marking a victory against the older, patriotic, elitist school of thought, born out of the composite state. the revision marked a return to the spirit of the 1848 constitution after the reactionary amendments of 1866. 24 the 1915 constitution marked a transition to a more inclusive form of democracy and the beginnings of the ideological hegemony of the “folkist/grundtvigian” school. the compromises made by 21 østergård, 37. 22 østergård, path to modernity, 36. 23 lene hansen, ‘sustaining sovereignty: the danish approach to europe,’ in european integration and national identity: the challenge of the nordic states, ed. lene hansen and ole wæver (london: routledge, 2002), 60. 24 in the years after the original constitution, its more radical reforms and provisions were gradually whittled away, and the 1866 constitution marked a victory for conservative forces. review of european and russian affairs vol. 5 issue 1/2009 © rera 2009 all rights reserved 91 the social democrats, and their acceptance of rural power prevented their own domination of the state (as in the case of their sister parties in sweden and norway), but was critical to ensuring social peace for the 20th century.25 the party simply recognized that it would not be able to hold onto power without reaching some sort of accommodation with the liberals. this bargain, between the urban labourer and the wealthy peasants marks the beginnings of the ideological hegemony of grundtvigianism in denmark.26 grundtvigian thought was strongly contested in the late 19th century and into the 20th. the lutheran culture of denmark, which had existed in a similar form from the time of the reformation until grundtvig’s time, emphasized conformity and social cohesion to a large degree. the reformation had been unusually state driven in scandinavia, and the “top-down” nature of the project had prevented the social fracturing that had occurred in germany and the netherlands. as a result, state and church were unusually united, helping to develop a strong national consensus with regards to morality, law, and institutions. the resulting mentality in much of the population emphasized solidarity, but also conformity.27 this aspect of the existing culture adapted itself relatively easily to grundtvigianism, although tension existed between its conformity and respect for institutions, and the populism and individualism of the newer ideology. however, elite, conservative groups, such as civil servants, the urban bourgeouisie, the monarchy, and the remnants of the aristocracy clung to an older patriotic nationalism based on the idea of denmark as a top-down composite state. until the 1920s at least, the “right” party (højre), and its successor the conservative people’s party, representing mainly the landed nobility and other conservative elements, advocated a less “people/folk” oriented vision of denmark.28 they promoted “the defence movement” which advocated a strong danish military, capable of fighting germany long 25 østergård, path to modernity, 37. 26 østergård, 35. 27 henrik stenius, ‘the good life is a life of conformity: the impact of lutheran tradition on nordic political culture,’ in the cultural construction of norden, ed. øystein sørensen and bo stråth (oslo: scandinavian university press, 1997), 163. 28 tim knudsen, da demokrati blev til folkestyre: dansk demokratihistorie i (copenhagen: akademisk forlag a/s, 2001), 114. review of european and russian affairs vol. 5 issue 1/2009 © rera 2009 all rights reserved 92 enough for political manoeuvring from great power allies to promote denmark’s objectives, namely the establishment of the dano-german border at the ejder river and incorporating large german speaking areas into the danish state, against their will. this cleavage in danish society became a fundamentally defining “anti-elite” and anti-modern one, which would have strong ramifications through the century. grundtvigianism would become so successful, and its core anti-elite, and especially anti-modern message, so ingrained, that it has a profound impact on politics today. questions surrounding the danish state’s attitude toward the duchies after the first world war marked the final struggle concerning the nature of the danish state. the conservative faction, espousing a pre-grundtvigian notion of the nation pushed for an aggressive attitude, still hoping to re-incorporate largely german speaking areas, for example the relatively large city of flensborg. the king was sympathetic to this position, and he attempted to intervene by naming a new government, not based on the elected parliament, which would have pursued a conservative line. in the ensuing “easter crisis” the king was finally forced to recognize the legitimacy of the parliament as the basis of danish government, which had so far been a point of contention with the monarchy. as it turned out, a non-military policy was relatively successful. in northern schleswig, where danish language teaching was forbidden, and the german state officially tried to germanize the population, grundtvigian thought and institutions were crucial in maintaining danish feeling until 1920 when a plebiscite returned it to the danish state. 29 this was perceived as a victory for the danish “people” as a cohesive group resisting the outside world. although traditionalists were disappointed that flensborg and other primarily german areas remained as part of germany, the question was largely settled in the popular imagination.30 this apparent victory for “the people’s” denmark, coming as it did through their self determination, and cultural autonomy, contrasting with the military disasters of 1864, convinced many that denmark should pursue an actively “anti-power politics.” this politics of patience, negotiation, and non-confrontation led to a broad consensus on 29 buckser, 19. 30 hansen, danish approach to europe, 58. review of european and russian affairs vol. 5 issue 1/2009 © rera 2009 all rights reserved 93 denmark’s role in europe, as well as final acceptance of the grundtvigian “people” across the political spectrum. 31 final remnants of the old-school objections to the new democratic, limited denmark apparently disappeared during the second world war when the monarchy and population rallied behind the symbols of danish smallness and democracy in the grundtvigian tradition.32 the ideological congruence between the social democrats and the liberals, and the acceptance of “anti-power politics” starting in the 1920s established a cultural and political hegemony which now marks almost all aspects of danish life. the social democrats were successful in establishing a social welfare state more or less on their terms, and that social welfare state is now strongly associated with the danish state itself. in fact, hardly any elements of the political spectrum question the fundamentals of the welfare state, although they may attack details of it. it is now seen, by many, as an expression of solidarity and respect for the individual in the grundtvigian tradition. it is also seen, by many, as explicitly superior to rival models in the rest of europe.33 however, the schism in danish society between elite and popular has never disappeared, manifesting itself in subtle ways for the last half century. though it has enjoyed a long ascendancy, it seems that some of the assumptions of the grundtvigian model are being challenged by different facets of globalization, both economic and cultural. some of the older strains of elite discourse are re-emerging in the first serious challenge to the danish societal model in sixty or seventy years. this duality of the danish national culture is aptly symbolized in the use of two national anthems: one, more militaristic, derived from the earlier composite state era, and the other, romantic and humble, from the post-grundtvigian, homogeneous denmark.34 31 knudsen, demokrati til folkestyre, 145. 32 henrik s. nissen, ‘folkelighed og frihed 1933: grundtvigianernes reaktion på modernisering, krise og nazisme,’ in dansk identitetshistorie 3: folkets danmark 1949-40, ed. ole feldbæk (copenhagen: reitzels forlag, 1992), 673. 33 richard jenkins, ‘not simple at all: danish identity and the european union,’ in an anthropology of the european union, ed. irène bellier and thomas m. wilson (oxford: berg, 2000), 167. 34 tim knudsen, ‘a portrait of danish state-culture: why denmark needs two national anthems,’ in european integration and denmark’s participation, ed. morten kelstrup (copenhagen: copenhagen political studies press, 1992), 262. review of european and russian affairs vol. 5 issue 1/2009 © rera 2009 all rights reserved 94 grundtvigian nationalism and the politics of xenophobia some writers believe that grundtvigian nationalism was vital in shaping the danish response to nazi persecution of jews in denmark during the second world war.35 andrew buckser explains: the jews had long maintained their own culture, their own language, and their own religious beliefs despite political disenfranchisement and geographic dispersion. they had done so in ways which grundtvig would have found very appealing. they had cultivated an ancient ancestral language; they had maintained their rituals and celebrations; they had held close to the religious beliefs of their ancestors… and the predicament of the jews during the war mirrored that which the grundtvigians imagined for the danes.36 the danish population’s reaction to the situation of the jews is often considered to be unique amongst the peoples of europe. academics have had some trouble explaining the spontaneity and solidarity of the rescue despite the fact that anti-semitism had been widespread in the country before the war. the key to the rescue, along with geographic and political realities such as the proximity of neutral sweden, or the unusually lenient attitude of german authorities, lies in the empathy felt by many danes for another small ethnic group struggling for self-preservation during the war. how then can we explain the current reactions to refugees and other immigrants? a population heavily influenced by grundtvigian respect for tradition, moved to protect a persecuted minority might be expected to be charitable toward bosnian or somali immigrants fleeing war and persecution. however, the evidence indicates that relations between ethnic danes and recent immigrants are strained.37 many danes are openly suspicious of immigrants, particularly muslims. the danish people’s party, running on 35 yahil, 454. 36 buckser, 21. 37 anders linde-laursen, ‘is something rotten in the state of denmark? the muhammad cartoons and danish political culture,’ contemporary islam 1:3 (2007): 265. review of european and russian affairs vol. 5 issue 1/2009 © rera 2009 all rights reserved 95 an explicitly anti-immigrant platform is now the third largest party in parliament, and its votes are vital to the liberal/conservative coalition government. interestingly though, the relationship between the established danish population and the immigrants was not always so adversarial. when relatively large numbers of immigrants first came to denmark in the late 1960s, many report feeling welcomed by the population. one turkish woman described her experience: it was a bit strange and there were hardly any foreign workers and dark-haired people and such like, so they thought we looked very nice and we got sweets and we got money and we got bikes and we got clothes and everyone clapped their hands because we looked so nice. it was a lovely time the first two years.38 this passage reflects some of the paternalism of the time, but also the openness and good relations between the groups. public opinion, as reflected in the media, was mixed on the idea of mass-immigration, but not overtly hostile to foreigners. employers, and even some unions accepted the idea of importing foreign workers in aid of the labour shortage.39 however, within a few years hostility increased and the government restricted immigration procedures, partially in response to social pressure. in 1973 it froze all nonrefugee immigration, largely due to the economic problems brought on by the oil crisis.40 the early acceptance of immigrants might be explained by the good economic times, or the danish economy’s need for workers. the immigrants were not seen as a burden on danish society yet. perhaps it was because of their newness, and relatively low numbers.41 they could still be viewed as a curiosity, not a fixture in danish life. many 38 karen wren, “cultural racism: something wrotten in the state of denmark?” social and cultural geography, vol. 2 no. 2 (2001), 145. 39 bent jensen, “thirty years of press debate on ‘the foreigners’ in denmark part i: migrant and guest workers, 1963-80,” in immigration to denmark: intrenational and national perspectives, eds. david coleman and eskil wadensjö, (aarhus: aarhus university press, 1999), 199. 40 søren pedersen, “migration to and from denmark during the period 1960-97,” in immigration to denmark: intrenational and national perspectives, eds. david coleman and eskil wadensjö, (aarhus: aarhus university press, 1999), 199. 41 pedersen, 151. review of european and russian affairs vol. 5 issue 1/2009 © rera 2009 all rights reserved 96 danes thought that the “foreigners” would go home when their jobs finished, as many had not yet brought their families with them to settle.42 this initial reaction to immigrants can also be explained by a grundtvigian interpretation of danish nationalism. at this time immigrants were still so few in number and so remote from most danes’ daily experiences that they could still belong to a category of foreign people, whose customs and lives had little impact on danish society. they were no threat to the “spirit” of the danish people; immigrants did not interrupt the homogenous traditions of an essential denmark. the dominant concerns were economic, as reflected by the danish press and government.43 as can be seen in the remarks of the turkish woman, danes were impressed and amused by the peculiarities of the foreigners, treating them like curious children, with no overt racism. as the 1970s and especially the 1980s wore on, the tone of relations became increasingly negative. media and press reports reported more and more on the problems of immigration to the point that this discourse came to be a dominant theme in the danish press.44 studies have shown that a large majority of news stories on immigrants focus on crime, social problems, or conflict with danish society, especially in, but not limited to, popular tabloids and right leaning broadsheets. often the coverage even breaches the organizations’ own codes of ethics. this phenomenon is well known, and has been pointed out by numerous international organizations such as the european union, the council of europe, the international federation of journalists, and others, but these criticisms have been generally disregarded.45 a new protest party, the progress party of mogens glistrup, founded in 1972, helped to politicize islamic immigration, framing it as a threat to danish society.46 the party did not pick up on anti-immigrant issues in a big way until the 1980s when its fortunes were waning. the progress party made calls to expel all muslims, and various 42 jensen, 191-251. 43 jensen, 191-251. 44 wren, 155. 45 mustafa hussain, “islam, media and minorities in denmark,” current sociology, october 2000, vol. 48(4): 110. 46 hussain, 99. review of european and russian affairs vol. 5 issue 1/2009 © rera 2009 all rights reserved 97 party members have frequently made blatantly racist remarks, for example calling muslims “mad dogs” or saying that they “breed like rats.”47 the progress party never had as much success when running its xenophobic campaign as its successor, the danish people’s party, probably because of its lack of appeal in the working class due to its opposition to the welfare state, and because of its explicit appeals to biological racism.48 in 1986 another influential new group, the danish society (den danske forening), was founded, to reform danish immigration laws and drastically cut the number of immigrants. the society was also an important factor in framing immigrants, especially muslims, as a problem for danish society. several of its members went on to become members of parliament; one member, søren krarup, became a well-known opinion leader. the group launched a campaign to flood newspapers with anti-immigrant letters. this all occurred during a time that the number of “family class” immigrants, family members joining immigrants already in denmark, and above all refugees, increased dramatically. although the 1973 immigration “freeze” remained in effect, the danish parliament passed a new immigration law in 1983. this act continued to limit economic immigrants severely, but actually increased the rights of refugees. previously, only refugees recognized under the geneva convention were granted status in denmark, but under the new law, de facto refugees were also recognized. as a result, the recognition of refugees increased dramatically: 16,374 refugee claims had been accepted between 1956 and 1984, but in the four years between 1985 and 1989, 26,352 were accepted.49 denmark gained a reputation for having a very liberal refugee policy because of this law. however, it should be noted that the total foreign-born population, or foreign descended population, remained on the low end of european norms at about 3%.50 nonetheless, the law drew a great deal of criticism, with some commentators making extrapolations of how long it would be before denmark became a majority 47 bashy quraishy and tim o’connor, “denmark: no racism by definition,” race & class, 32 (3) (1991), 118. 48 jens rydgren, “explaining the emergence of radical right-wing populist parties: the case of denmark,” west european politics vol. 27:3 (may 2004), 487. 49 pedersen, 164. 50 hussain, 97. review of european and russian affairs vol. 5 issue 1/2009 © rera 2009 all rights reserved 98 muslim country under the new law. many picked up on the theme that denmark was being swamped by its own generosity, and that it was taking in far more refugees than were its “fair share” to the detriment of its own population at a time of economic stagnation. however, it was also a time when the numbers of people applying for refugee status in europe had also increased significantly due to political instability and population growth in source countries.51 over the late 1980s and early 1990s the government slowly added new restrictions to the immigration act in response to public pressure. however, the number of refugees granted status did not go down appreciably. pressure continued from many actors in society to further limit immigration. during the war in yugoslavia, many thousands of immigrants came to denmark, further focusing attention on the issue. by the mid 1990s the progress party was in disarray and was replaced by the danish people’s party (dpp), a party even more focused on immigration issues. the dpp had an enormous influence. led by popular pia kjærsgaard, a more likable figure than mogens glistrup, it quickly took the place of the progress party as the “anti-establishment party.” already in its first election it became the fourth largest party in parliament, followed by an even better showing in the revolutionary election of 2001 in which it became the third largest party. more importantly, it became the centre-right coalition government’s support party. the government turned to the dpp to pass most of its legislation, which required some concessions on immigrant policy. at the same time, the popularity of the dpp had led the liberal and social-democratic parties to take a more exclusionary tone as well in an attempt to keep their voters.52 under the government of anders fogh rasmussen, the danish government tightened up immigration procedures considerably. while denmark had been known for its liberal refugee laws in the 1980s, it came to be known for unusually harsh laws at the turn of the millennium. various international organizations, such as the unhcr and amnesty international criticized the changes.53 51 pedersen, 163. 52 hussain, 97. 53 eva østergaard-nielsen, “counting the cost: denmark’s changing migration policies,” international journal of urban and regional research, volume 27.2 (june 2003), 454. review of european and russian affairs vol. 5 issue 1/2009 © rera 2009 all rights reserved 99 the danish left-wing has been hobbled by the immigration issue. studies have shown that a large portion of dpp voters are former social democrats, working class and in favour of the welfare state.54 by attacking the social democrats’ “elitism” and supposed catering to immigrants, the dpp managed to topple the “natural ruling party” from its position as the largest party in parliament.55 a schism has arisen within the social democratic party over how to respond to this threat to their base. however, the general tendency has been to try to be seen as “getting tough” on immigrants. the danish left has, in general, not confronted the racist rhetoric of the dpp, media, and various organizations. rather, left-wing intellectuals and politicians have generally participated in these discourses, talking about the muslim “threat to women” and by extension, danish society.56 the factors that created the dpp, the danish society, left wing apathy toward minorities, and muslim alienation are the same that have shaped danish society for a hundred years, including the generally lauded egalitarianism and the rescue of denmark’s jewish population. although a grundtvigian inspired society has great potential for egalitarianism and outward tolerance, it also has a homogenizing tendency, defensiveness, and “othering” capability, as many forms of nationalism do.57 from a liberal, egalitarian perspective, this model of nationalism has served denmark fairly well for over a hundred years, but it has had some downsides, for example a fairly real racism manifested toward the few visible minorities in denmark such as greenlanders, drives for “ethnic and genetic purity” through sterilization programmes,58 and a strong and often remarked social conformity mechanism, manifested for example in janteloven, which describes an attitude hostile toward anyone who tries to be different, or who is perceived as thinking too highly of themselves. however, the apparent success of danish society and a possibility of escape in the form of emigration to the new world, kept potential 54 daniel skidmore-hess, “the danish party system and the rise of the right in the 2001 parliamentary election,” international social science review, 2003, vol. 78 issue 3/4, 98. p. 89-110. 55 rydgren, 487. 56 wren, 158. 57 allan pred, even in sweden: racism, racialized spaces, and the popular geographical imagination, (berkeley: university of california press, 2000), 27. 58 wren, 145. review of european and russian affairs vol. 5 issue 1/2009 © rera 2009 all rights reserved 100 conflicts more or less under control. the presence of a relatively large population, unresponsive to the mechanisms of grundtvigian society, has for the first time really tested this model of nationalism, and exposed some of its weaknesses in a modern globalized context. a great deal of the concern in denmark focuses exclusively on islamic immigration, rather than immigration in general. often people will talk about immigration in general, when it is clear by their words that they mean islamic immigration.59 this is certainly partially a result of most immigrants being islamic. however, there are also some sizable non-islamic groups such as tamils and vietnamese. some of this attitude is derived from world events, such as islamic terrorism, or “fundamentalist” islamic movements that receive a lot of attention in denmark. these events feed a general perception already existing in denmark that islam is a pre-modern, barbaric religion. however this arose, the key fact to consider is that islam is often seen as a threat to denmark. some politicians, such as mogens glistrup, have expressed a belief that there is an islamic plot to infiltrate denmark in order to spread the religion.60 the key differences between the muslim and jewish minorities are that the jewish population is small, long established, and thoroughly integrated into the general population. it is also interesting to note that since the second world war, when the danish population came to sympathize with the jews, anti-semitism has all but disappeared from denmark. 61 however, prior to the war anti-semitism had been a feature of life, though not on the same scale as in much of continental europe. had the second world war not occurred, it is likely that denmark’s jews would still face mild antisemitism. the historical anomaly of german occupation and oppression of the jews helped to legitimise their plight in a way that danes could relate to, and did explicitly.62 now, the muslim minority is seen as a threat to danish society because of media discourses and a lack of familiarity with muslim people and culture. 59 quraishy and o’brien, 115. 60 wren, 155. 61 andrew buckser, “chabad in copenhagen: fundamentalism and modernity in jewish denmark,” ethnology, spring 2005, vol. 44 issue 2, 128. 62 buckser (2001), 20. review of european and russian affairs vol. 5 issue 1/2009 © rera 2009 all rights reserved 101 at the same time, the muslim minority represents a symbol of the unravelling of danish society as it has existed for the past fifty years.63 many compromises have been made over the last twenty years, both in surrendering powers to a centralized, professional, bureaucratic, multi-ethnic european authority, anathema to grundtvigians; compromising the welfare state in a variety of ways in the face of international economic problems and competition; and changing the face of danish homogeneity with the introduction of many immigrants with different cultural understandings. these factors are all confronting the grundtvigian orthodoxy in ways that are very disturbing for those raised in its comforting embrace. hence, the difficulty with its most visible symbol, the presence of relatively large immigrant populations. the religious factor in difficulties with muslims is likely not as important as the fact that this happens to be the largest widely identifiable group.64 however, the seeming ease with which denmark has adapted to some of these changes is leading to an increasing acceptance of change.65 danes seem to be slowly adjusting to the reality of european integration and economic globalization in their own very danish way. although not all sectors of society are doing so, as shown by the continued success of the danish peoples’ party, new developments such as naser khader’s pro-immigration new alliance party, and the increasing popularity of european monetary union and other eu projects, and a surprising new acceptance of nato, show an increasing acceptance of a new form of modernity and transformation of the danish state. although the picture is muddled, to generalize, it seems that an urbanized, educated, white-collar elite is driving the changes, while an older blue collar population clings to a more traditional concept of denmark. the last major division in danish political culture was centred around a “people” versus “elite” discourse, which may be returning to the fore now, centred around the general issue of whether to open denmark up to the rest of the world and europe, through the eu, its institutions, immigration, and other aspects of globalization, or to keep it relatively self contained, ruled strictly by its 63 linde-laursen (2007), 269. 64 however, it may be worth investigating the religious dimension of this relationship, as christianity was enormously influential in the foundation of the danish identity. grundtvig was, after all a pastor. 65 robert kuttner, ‘the copenhagen consensus: reading adam smith in denmark,’ foreign affairs 87:2 (march/april 2008): 78-94. review of european and russian affairs vol. 5 issue 1/2009 © rera 2009 all rights reserved 102 own institutions, rather than the earlier conflict around relations with germany, german minorities, and the legitimate source of domestic power. conclusion while distrust of newcomers, especially those with alien cultures, is widespread in the world, and by no means a unique phenomenon in denmark, some particular features of danish nationalism help to explain the reaction there, and may indicate further difficulties ahead for denmark in a globalized era. in other countries with more overtly nationalistic or insular histories, the reaction to foreigners might be more expected, and perhaps easily acknowledged by their populations, and hence more easily discussed and managed. although danes have been known for their open-minded attitudes, the arrival of immigrant communities exposes some of the deeper aspects of danish nationalism, which are often unacknowledged in denmark. the homogenizing and essentializing of culture that exist, embedded in danish nationalism, are more evident now than in the past. these are aspects of their culture that many danes have perhaps not considered much in the past, but now must in order to live up to the government’s self-stated goals of engaging in the modern world. many people consider tensions with muslims to arise out of the “backward” or insular character of the religion, contrasting with a more enlightened “modern” danish culture. it will be hard for the country to be as cosmopolitan or dynamic as many, including the current government, would wish unless the xenophobic and insular side of the danish character is confronted more openly than it is today. this is the central fault line of danish politics today, and it is a fundamentally restructuring one. denmark may well change dramatically because of it over the next decades. the conflict over immigration to denmark shows how the country is similar to the rest of europe, but also different. the root causes of the difficulties are fundamentally similar to the rest of europe. they grow primarily out of the transition from an industrial society to a post-industrial society. the growth of xenophobia arising from the tensions in this transition are common not just to europe, but are seen around the world. however, its unusual virulence across an apparently inclusive mainstream political spectrum is an review of european and russian affairs vol. 5 issue 1/2009 © rera 2009 all rights reserved 103 outgrowth of the egalitarian, folk centred, bottom up, anti-modern ethos that has steered denmark toward its present state. it is a necessary by-product of that ideology, given its new setting. contrary to the situation in sweden, where opposition to the state is a much less engrained part of the national character, danes have an instinctive opposition to modernization and centralization. in denmark muslim immigration has come to represent a modernization which many feel threatens the traditions of their state, whereas in sweden this symbolism is much less potent, perhaps explaining the more muted character of xenophobic discourses there, and the failure of radical right wing populist parties. the current conflict over modernization, symbolized in the muhammed cartoons affair, and conflict over immigration, may bring denmark more into line with broader european norms. although denmark has a reputation as a bastion of equality and civilization, foreign observers would do well to remember the historical roots of this phenomenon. the new less tolerant picture of denmark emerging, most dramatically from the cartoon controversy, is a logical by-product of the same forces that created egalitarian denmark. the over-riding national discourse has not changed suddenly; social conditions in the country have changed and for the first time the rigidity of danish cultural conditioning is readily apparent. bibliography anderson, benedict. imagined communities. london: verso, 1991. bagge, povl. “nationalisme antinationalisme og nationalfølelse i danmark omkring 1900.” in dansk identitetshistorie 3: folkets danmark 1949-40, edited by feldbæk, ole, 443-467. copenhagen: reitzels forlag, 1992. berg, clarissa, and peter 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vindication of their ideals. though perhaps surprising given their track record, this paper will argue that political scientists, especially those concerned with democratization, can also be optimistic about what the eu has brought to the table in terms of how we conceive processes of democratic development. throughout the paper it will be demonstrated that the creation and maintenance of the european democracy has challenged much of the literature’s fundamental assumptions of what makes democracy work. five key lessons from the european democratic experience will be presented in an attempt to disrupt some of these assumptions including lessons regarding the diversity of the demos, the contingency of democratic upkeep, the challenges of the state, the role of elites in political transformation, and the necessity of exclusion within inclusive spaces. though a general theory of democracy will not be presented, suggestions will be made as to how we can incorporate some of these lessons into the dominant approaches to democracy found in the literature. 2 review of european and russian affairs 7 (1), 2012 introduction for the casual north american observer, the european union (eu) appears as a political and economic entity which has seemingly gone from crisis to crisis. from early questions of legitimacy, to the failure of the constitutional ratification referenda in 2005, to the current eurozone debacle, the eu has not been subject to the most positive press, especially over the last decade. however, insiders, directly involved in the processes of integration and the evolving operations of the eu as well those who have dedicated much of their time and energy to understanding this evolution, certainly have a more balanced view. indeed, the eu has been posited as something worth striving for and, in times of crisis, saving for the simple reason that the union has provided both participants and onlookers with a sense of hope when it comes to solving old political problems and, for some, even the possibility of a post-national progressive space (rifkin 2004; levy, penksy and torpey 2005). however, one of the biggest debates which has continued throughout the eu’s history is the question of the democratic deficit. certainly the more powerful institutions of the union such as the european commission are less directly democratic than the less powerful ones such as the european parliament, and even within those more democratic but less powerful institutions, participation in them by the european demos (if there exists such a thing at all), is quite low. yet it is here that i am willing to suggest that the european union has arguably been a success when it has come to democracy, albeit in a less conventional sense. despite its shortcomings in terms of substantive participation, the european union exists as one important case which has challenged older assumptions about the conditions necessary for democratic institutions, procedures, and law to take root and be sustained. in doing so, the eu has not only opened up the possibility of thinking about the development of democracy in an altogether different way, it has also opened up the possibility of further democratic expansion in different locales across the world. the development and sustenance of democratic laws and institutions should not be understood as being restricted to particular conditions such as socio-economic and class compromises or the appropriate general political culture. it is the purpose of this paper to demonstrate this point while remaining committed to a critical analysis of the democratic processes that the eu has exhibited. as history has shown, democracy is no panacea for political or socio-economic problems and in some cases has even contributed to them. of course, the word democracy carries with it a plethora of competing meanings in political studies. as previously stated, the european union is often seen as a fundamentally undemocratic entity due to its powerful elite institutions and its low levels of participation from the european citizenry (georgi, von homeyer and parsons 2006). others claim that the eu is not democratic because it does not represent the general will of a sovereign people and that, at this time, only the eu’s member states can truly claim democratic legitimacy (georgi, von homeyer and parsons 2006). radical critiques would point to the fact that ordinary citizens do not see this democratic space translated into real control over social and economic processes and view the eu as another apparatus of vested interests (giorgi, von homeyer and parsons 2006). of course, if these are the measures through which european democracy is evaluated, cases can most certainly be made for the eu’s lack of democracy. yet, despite all of these, it must not be stated that the eu completely lacks any democratic credentials whatsoever. important features which have historically been heralded as democratic do exist when it comes to the functioning of the eu’s governing institutions; features including the ability of citizens to participate freely in the political process through the european parliament and the ability of citizens to freely oppose the directives of the review of european and russian affairs 7 (1), 2012 3 eu without being repressed or reprimanded. rather than simply mechanical aspects of what some would pejoratively call mere procedural democracy, these features carry significant normative weight as they are founded on the notion of the political equality of human beings. with that said, procedural democracy must be viewed as something of great value in-itself. however, the european union cannot be exclaimed as a democratic success simply because of this. indeed, all of its member states had achieved these types of democratic credentials before joining the eu and likewise many states around the world have similarly achieved this level of democracy. instead, what can be described as an achievement for the european union is not what has been achieved, but rather how it has been achieved. indeed, the eu has challenged some of the most basic assumptions about what allows democracy to come into being and what allows it to be maintained. specifically, the eu has been able to challenge many of the frequently posited necessary conditions for democracy that have been laid out by scholars of democracy and democratization over the last few decades, showing that, indeed, democracy can be done in a different way. so what exactly is it that the eu has challenged and what are its implications? it is my contention that the challenge which the european union brings to many of our current understandings of democracy and democratization can be seen clearly through five lessons that the eu has taught us through its historical process of democracy building. with this task we will soon proceed. however before any of that is possible, we must first clearly define what is meant when we speak of democracy. specifically, what are the characteristics that make what we are calling democracy what it is? given what has been already stated about the normative importance of procedural democracy and given that the case of the eu can shed new light on the requirements for such a democracy against much of the established literature, a definition which encompasses essentially procedural elements will be employed. thus, when speaking about democracy, what will be meant is a system of government whereby a) political rule is not arbitrary, but rather authorized by the polity's constituent population (however institutionally arranged) through regularly held competitive elections and b) opposition to this political rule and the expression of this opposition, given that it too does not attempt to rule arbitrarily, is respected as legitimate and not politically repressed. from here the five lessons from european democracy can be elucidated. lesson 1: democracy does not require the existence of a uniform political culture, only a negotiated compromise between divergent political cultures for authors as diverse as seymour martin lipset, gabriel almond, and robert putnam, all who have contributed quite substantially to the democratization debate, democracy is understood as being produced and upheld through the development of a common democratic political culture, albeit for different reasons and through different processes and mechanisms for each author. yet however a given polity gets to this appropriate political culture, a situation is created whereby citizens view themselves as such in perhaps its truest sense and participate in the polity’s political issues and institutions due to their civically-inclined attitudes (lipset 1994; almond and verba 1989; putnam 1994). lipset (1994) for example, in his revisiting of the social requisites for democracy, suggests along classic modernization theory lines, that a polity's turning away from more traditional modes of organization and towards more common and civic forms is crucial for the weakening of divisive and contentious tendencies amongst the population which could otherwise result in undemocratic forms of political domination. the establishment of a 4 review of european and russian affairs 7 (1), 2012 stable democracy for lipset (1994) thus requires a high degree of common orientation. almond and verba (1989) in their civic culture likewise place a large focus on the necessity of consensus for a democratic polity when it comes to the values and attitudes that are upheld within a citizenry. as a part of this consensus of “participatory culture” a general engagement with institutions must be forged with both a respect for internal diversity and a balancing of modern and traditional norms under a common civic umbrella in order for democracy to come to fruition (almond and verba 1989). putnam (1994) as well, especially within his account of civic attitudes in modern italy, also pinpoints the existence of a common culture as key for democracy to take root and be sustained. in his comparison of regions within the italian state, he finds that those regions which have high participatory attitudes and a culture of civic engagement tend to fare better in terms of his measurements of democratic performance than those regions which have less of a culture of engagement (putnam 1994). as such, for all of these scholars, despite their substantial differences in terms of cases and aims of their research agendas, a general political culture of civic orientation and engagement is central for the establishment and upkeep of a democratic system of government. it is here, however, that the experience of the eu can offer an important intervention into this one major approach. slightly against the grain of these aforementioned thinkers, as the eu has demonstrated, the establishment of a democratic system often relies more heavily on the perpetual negotiation of plurality, along with its eventual compromise, as opposed to either its withering way or the existence of a strict commonality. here, the processes of democratization at the eu level, both historical and ongoing, provide a social phenomenon that acts somewhat like a microscope, allowing us to “zoom in” and “enlarge” the field of analysis to pinpoint important developments that can be more difficult to identify at democratization studies’ more frequent level of analysis: the state or national level. at the european level, it is clearer to see that european integration, both at its origins and through its expansions, as well as through the subsequent implementation of more explicit democratic institutions such as the european parliament, has not happened on the back of a common political culture across 27 member states. even at the very beginning of the continental integration process, the eventual expansion of the european coal and steel community (ecsc) into the european community required negotiation and deal making across western european states. this process of course was not simply one of deal-breaking between identical elites across different states, but between actors who were situated in particular national or sub-national political cultures, with their own values, norms, and ways of doing politics. in more recent times, with the advent of the eu, the need for compromise between divergent political cultures across european states has become more pertinent, with accession into the union resting upon candidate states’ ability to abide by democratic norms according to the acquis communautaire. with the new member states of eastern europe having engaged in post-communist transitions over the past 20 years, this has required the respective eastern governments to implement greater anti-corruption measures, democratic reforms, and sometimes, the admission of crimes committed by previous regimes. while this has required a shift in the way that some states conduct themselves domestically, this has been a process of negotiation and compromise rather than of wholesale societal transformation. as such, processes of democratization that have rested upon rules of accession have not entailed a wholesale shift away from the particularities of their own political norms. since these particularities remain, the fact that negotiations and compromises have the potential to be reversed based on the future manifestation of these particularities must not be discounted. review of european and russian affairs 7 (1), 2012 5 although it can be said that a common commitment to democratic norms is necessary for eu integration as well as democracy, such a necessity is not developed across states through political cultural commonality but continuous negotiation between states and their norms. indeed, the continuation of european governance in its 27 state form, including through its democratic institutions, requires that member states maintain their commitment to these norms. yet, of course, this in turn relies upon the negotiation and compromise across divergent political cultures within member states. it is here that the eu provides us with an insight into how we can analyze processes of democratization in a new way, within the traditional level analysis of member states. as the case of the eu shows, what can appear as commonality is often in reality the result of continuous compromise and agreement between divergent actors. just as it is incorrect to speak of a common political culture in the eu, is it also incorrect to speak of state or national political cultures, whether in terms of civic orientation or participatory tendencies, in such homogeneous terms. for these aforementioned authors including lipset and putnam, however, meaningful diversity at the state level is problematically viewed as having been eroded either through processes of modernization or weakened through the development of civic traditions, rather than perpetually existing and being continuously negotiated. as such, they have remained unable to account for instances whereby diverse groups clash within a democratic system, sometimes pulling the system apart and into an authoritarian outcome. though political culture is certainly an important factor for actors’ behaviour since it provides meanings through which agents act, a single overarching political culture can never permanently engulf an entire polity and determine citizens' political behaviour. societies are always divided along various social, cultural and political lines, which can come to manifest themselves politically if divisions are not negotiated properly. as such, when it comes to the reasons for the existence of a democratic system of government, what is often attributed to the formation of common civic orientations, or even a culture of respect for diversity, should instead be understood as the product of more contingent negotiations between diversity which, in leading to compromise, often gives off the appearance of commonality. in short, these accounts, which focus on a holistic political culture, end up facing difficulties as they misrecognize stable, yet negotiated and contingent, configurations of diversity for a situation of homogeneity. the eu example shows that, in order to understand how a democratic system is established, the negotiation of plurality must be taken seriously as a factor. lesson 2: negotiations and subsequent compromises conducive to producing democratic outcomes are always contingent rather than structurally determined other authors who have conducted empirical observations of the conditions necessary for democracy may have rightly viewed social plurality as an important element to be negotiated for the consolidation of democracy, but have instead recognized it solely in terms of class or economic negotiation. some of the authors in this more structural school of thought have included moore jr., pzerworski and limongi, acemoglu and robinson, rueschemeyer, stephens and stephens, and carles boix. even charles tilly, who through his process-oriented approach has tried to move beyond some of the limitations of a structural approach, categorized the insulation of categorical inequality from politics as one of three key variables for democratization and, as such, must be included within this approach. in these studies of democracy, economic determinacies are central with particularly defined class and economic 6 review of european and russian affairs 7 (1), 2012 compromises understood as producing democracy and, in other cases, dictatorship. for example, such explanations include democracy coming to fruition through factors and developments such as the existence of a large middle class, the incorporation of the working class into the welfare state, or a more generalized greater level of income parity (moore 1966; przeworski et al 2000; acemoglu and robinson 2009; rueschemeyer, stephens and stephens 1992; boix 2003; tilly 2007). according to barrington moore jr. (1966), author of the now classic social origins of dictatorship and democracy, the development of a democratic system of government is explained as historically relying on the ascendency and eventual dominance of the bourgeois class relative to other classes within the same state. quite simply, for moore (1966): no bourgeoisie, no democracy. other scholars who have followed moore in his historical sociological approach such as rueschemeyer, stephens and stephens as well as carles boix have also put forth a similar structuralist account, though with crucial modifications. by expanding the scope of the historical case studies into other regions, most notably latin america, rueschemeyer, stephens and stephens (1992), along with boix (2003), have demonstrated how it has in fact been the ascendency and incorporation of the working class into official sociopolitical institutions that has been the determining factor for democratization. others have even modified this further, abandoning the explanatory dependency on a specific class and opening up the explanation to one in which the general dynamics of inequality determine a state's regime outcome. for acemoglu and robinson (2009), and pzerworski and limongi (2000), for example, who employ game theoretical models very centrally in their analyses, a particular threshold of socioeconomic inequality is sufficient to determine whether a regime will be dictatorial or democratic. charles tilly (2007), who in his work democracy has utilized more qualitative historical analyses, presents an explanation for the maintenance of democracy whereby the question is not whether socioeconomic, or as he calls it, categorical, inequality is kept within a certain limit but one of whether public politics has been insulated from this inequality. these approaches certainly face challenges when presented with an analysis that places the eu front and centre. this is both with regards to the now legally necessary democratic outcomes within individual member states, negotiations between elite, as well as the actions of eu citizens within official institutions such as the european parliament and in what has been described as european civil society. first of all, much can be learned from the confrontation of class or economic compromise accounts of democratization with the histories of democracy in the member states. with 27 divergent histories of democratization, some stemming from so-called bourgeois revolutions, others having come out from military dictatorships, and a large number having transitioned from socialist regimes, the suggestion that democracy in european member states has been the result of one particular class or a particular economic threshold is an untenable one. as such, though democracy in the eu has relied on democracy’s sustenance in its member states, the processes have been too diverse to rely on a single economic explanatory variable. with regards to what keeps european democracy functioning across member states, whether in terms of elite negotiations or in terms of the demands of different member state citizens in european civil society, economic or class compromise has not been something that has been central in the upkeep of the common political structure. in terms of elite negotiation, with poorer countries having looked towards the economic benefits of the union’s market, there has been little talk of policy being aimed at economic levelling between nation-states. more notable however is the fact that there have been very few expressions of this desire among citizens in review of european and russian affairs 7 (1), 2012 7 member states, despite the inequalities in wealth between countries (petrakos et al 2005). nonetheless, however, democracy has been able to survive. finally, in terms of the effects that the continental horizontal class division has had upon democracy, the result has been the same. despite the fact that some on the european left have pushed for a “social europe”—thicker economic regulations and social policy at the european level to offset the inequalities of the marketplace—policies have not been implemented to the extent that serious inequalities in europe are no longer a problem (daly 2006). yet, despite the fact that they are still prevalent and, in many cases, have increased over the last several decades, this has not had an impact on european democracy or on democracy in the member states—at least not yet. lesson 3: democracy does not necessarily require the elimination of autonomous centres of power. in much of the academic literature on democracy, the idea that democratic systems exist within states is often simply assumed, with comparativists dedicated to analyzing one state-bounded system in contrast to another. since democracy has historically been territorially consolidated within states, there has been an implicit understanding in many works that the existence of a consolidated state remains a condition for democracy despite this fact frequently not explicitly appearing in much of the literature, including in those schools of thought which have been previously discussed. in many ways, the territorial state has become so normalized that it has become difficult to understand democracy in any other way. despite this, however, other authors in contrast have been much more explicit in terms of the need for a state, and particularly a strong one, for the existence of a democratic system (tilly 2007; sorensen 2007). georg sorensen (2007) in his democracy and democratization stresses the importance of the consolidation of state power in the weberian sense as being one of the, if not the, most important developments necessary for democracy to take root and be sustained. without such a development, divisions of coercive power are likely to result in politics being played out external to parliamentary and deliberative institutions (sorensen 2007). likewise, tilly (2007), also in his more recent work democracy, posits a similar claim to sorensen, historically demonstrating that the reduction of autonomous centres of power is conducive to democratization whereas their strengthening results in what he labels de-democratization. this is due to the tendency for autonomous groups to coercively compete for state power when such capacities are available for deployment. with the case of the eu, however, both the implicit and explicit understandings of the role of the state in democracy have been radically challenged. in terms of implicit understandings, the eu has given authors much to think about since it has expanded the democratic imaginary and passed the traditional territorial boundaries of the nation-state. in doing so, the eu has challenged more limited accounts of what makes democracy possible and has in turn demanded more expansive explanations of this democratic outcome than simply the interaction and relationships between state-bounded actors. most obviously, on top of these various bounded conditions that many of the aforementioned authors have put forth, the role of interstate relationships that the eu has made obvious—relationships between actors with the capacity for violence—has become an important variable in its own right that needs to be unpacked. perhaps more importantly, those authors who have been more explicit in their understanding of the role of the state in democracy have also been fundamentally challenged along similar lines. for these authors, the existence of diverse actors who possess coercive capacities has 8 review of european and russian affairs 7 (1), 2012 already been understood as being crucial for democratic outcomes, and thus is not a new revelation. what is new however is the fact that democracy remains a possibility despite the existence of these autonomous coercive power centres. as previously stated, for authors such as tilly (2007) and sorensen (2007), the disappearance of these autonomous centres is posited as a condition for democracy as their existence often triggers political issues between divergent forces being solved via coercion rather than through more civic channels under a monopoly of coercion. however, as the eu case has demonstrated, autonomous power centres are not necessarily a detriment to democratic relations or institutions becoming successfully utilized between divergent groups. as the history of european integration has demonstrated, autonomous power centres such as states do have the ability to negotiate with each other and come to agreement about models of cooperation, including democratization across state lines. although the european integration process has been a historically specific project and cannot easily be applied to other regions, the fact remains that there is nothing inherent about autonomous power centres that make them inhospitable to democratization beyond their reach. rather, what fundamentally does matter and will determine the possibilities for larger projects of democracy, such as that of the eu, are what those in control of the means of coercion wish to do with their power. one element that this condition does fundamentally change, however, is our understanding of how democracy can be torn apart. rather than being cancelled out with the repressive act of a single centre of coercive power, autonomous power centres can put larger democratic formations into jeopardy through secession or, in the worst scenario, war. lesson 4: elites can be democrats too. in much of the literature, including in both the class configuration and political culture types of argumentation we have seen, democracy is frequently being posited as a bottom-up process. for the political culture analysts, democracy is viewed as an outcome that will not come to fruition without a culture of civic engagement among the citizenry. otherwise, in their view, politics will unfold solely through the wishes of the elite, producing forms of authoritarianism and elite corruption. likewise, in terms of the class configuration school, democracy is understood as a bottom-up process coming as a demand from the subordinate classes, with the elite only giving in to the establishment of demanded democratic institutions if their particular class interest can be maintained. the elite thus are not viewed as wanting to establish democratic institutions for their own sake. schools of thought, including the consociational approach developed by arend lijphart and the elite-pact approach originally brought into discussion by guillermo o'donnell and phillipe schmitter and subsequently taken up by other democratization scholars (pzerworski is also an important figure here), have also tended not to view elites as true democrats in their own right. rather, elites are posited as pursuing their own interests and, more specifically, their own political and economic projects independent of any primary concern for a democratic regime outcome (lijphart 1969; o'donnell and schmitter 1986). democracy, if it comes to fruition, is viewed as the mere residue of a balancing between other elite interests and not as the result of any desire for a democratic system itself. here it can be said that the development of democracy in the eu has turned these assumptions on their head. in terms of a general tendency, what began as an elite project with the ecsc has continued as an elite project with major developments of further integration having been pushed along by the eu’s top institutions such as the commission, rather than having review of european and russian affairs 7 (1), 2012 9 originated from more popular forums. in terms of the origins of the eu’s more directly democratic institutions such as the european parliament, this has also been the case. unlike many historical examples of the implementation of parliaments or assemblies which were frequently fought for by members of the populace and awarded as a form of concession by the elite, with the european parliament, implementation was just the opposite. seeing that the eu was needing further channels of democratic legitimation, direct election for and strengthening of the european parliament were put into place without mass mobilization on the part of the european citizenry. rather, as part of a larger effort at “building” europe along with the attempts at constructing a common european identity and citizenship, there has been an effort to build a common european democracy (rittberger 2005). with this, as oxymoronic as it may sound, the case of the eu has shown that elites can be democrats too. likewise, this also has important implications for the frequently expressed notion that democratic systems depend upon popular consent. for although substantive participation in the eu is generally low among its citizens it cannot be said that the democratic aspects of the integration project will simply slip away if they are not utilized by the european citizenry. although it can be argued that a lack of participation is not helpful when it comes to the question of substantive legitimation, it has played no part in the eu becoming less institutionally democratic. in fact, because of the impetus from the elite, who firmly believe in the process of democratizing the eu, the channels for participation within european institutions have increased rather than decreased. here the eu can provide one possible explanation for the continuation of procedural democratic systems across global northern countries. although political participation, especially in terms of elections, has declined substantially over the last 30 years across nearly all developed countries (blais, gidengil, nevitte, nadeau 2004) procedural democratic institutions have held up from the top despite a shrinking participatory foundation from below. for reasons that ought to be further explored, elite engagement in procedural democratic norms has persisted despite this tendency of the citizenries. lesson 5: democracy fundamentally rests upon the subordination of some groups, varying in terms of degree and content the idea that democracy is, by nature, an exclusionary form of governance is a critique that has been taken up more readily by contemporary political theorists than by those who study democracy via the lens of comparative politics or political sociology. chantal mouffe (2000), for example, in borrowing from carl schmidt’s understanding of the democratic paradox, has argued that the formation of any democratic system necessitates the drawing of a line around a given demos, defining who is included and who is excluded. as such, despite its emancipatory appeal, democracy rests upon this fundamental division. others, such as etienne balibar (2004), have directly applied this notion of demos-making to europe itself, suggesting that it has resulted in the construction of a tiered citizenship with those unable to obtain official documentation based on member state belonging, facing exclusion from the eu’s democratic project despite living, working and contributing in european space. although scholars of citizenship have often focussed on this tension within nation states, once again, it has been the eu that has magnified a particular problem. whereas studies of political formations of the past have never highlighted this process of exclusion as central to the foundation of democracy, the eu, with its newly instituted project, has demonstrated the existence of this process as an unavoidable factor. 10 review of european and russian affairs 7 (1), 2012 however, the eu has also shown that subordination does not simply equate to absolute exclusion from the project. as in every democracy, the legitimacy of the system rests upon the opposition agreeing to the rule of the government, often taking the shape of the minority agreeing to the rule of the majority (dahl 1971). to ensure that the democratic system is safeguarded against a revolt from below, defensive coercion from above, or even secession, those who are not in power must feel sufficiently satisfied with the state of affairs overseen by those in power. the upkeep of this situation, however peaceful it may be, does require a degree of subordination, whether simply in terms of political power, or often more expansively in terms of other social categories including socio-economic, socio-cultural, religious, racial, gender-based or, in the case of the eu, national position. indeed, democracy has its winners and its losers and in understanding how democracy both comes to fruition and is subsequently maintained, we must continually keep a close eye on the changing dynamics and interplay between winning and losing, dominant and subordinate forces. this dynamic, of course, is not unique to the eu. yet once again these dynamics which are at play across such diverse cleavages in the european polity shows the key relation of subordinations to democratic outcomes in a larger setting, rerevealing particular circumstances that may go left unnoticed in what are normal “units” of analysis in the nation-state. looking at democracy differently for those who have been committed to developing an understanding of how democracy comes to fruition, these five lessons from the european union’s ground-breaking democratic experiment provide much to think about. when put into conversation with some of the existing accounts of democratization that have been discussed here, these lessons have the potential to push our understanding of political outcomes further, potentially towards a reformulation of existing approaches and models. with the eu case having broken down many essentialisms which have been endemic to the study of democracy, we can begin to move forward with an approach that is more open to contextual and contingent relationships between important forces at hand rather than broad-reaching theories which assign pre-defined value roles to particular groups including classes, masses, the elite, or even entire nations. the goal that stems from these lessons thus is to design new frameworks of understanding which can encapsulate these contingencies into an overall reformulated democratic theory. though such an undertaking is an ambitious task, the developments of the eu have provided us with certain directions which we can follow when it comes to analyzing more traditional units of analysis. as such, these lessons can have a formative role in terms of theory building. beyond these more academic purposes however, the case of democracy in the eu, especially in terms of how it has come to be, also has some very positive normative implications. with the eu demonstrating that democracy fundamentally rests upon the identities and capacities of groups, as well their relationships with each other, the question of “who can have democracy?” can no longer be answered in terms of certain societies which possess a certain political culture, class configuration, or state-bounded existence. indeed, the case of the eu shows that democracy could potentially exist in a multiplicity of situations, as long as contending groups, whatever their makeup, can come to an agreement upon it. quite simply: no agreement, no democracy. yet despite this existing as a restrictive condition itself, it is a flexible one and shows that democracy review of european and russian affairs 7 (1), 2012 11 has the potential to be constructed across a variety of fragmenting cleavages. importantly, it also goes to show that the establishment of a truly democratic system—one that is inclusive across a polity—has little chance of succeeding through coercion, whether originating internally or externally. equally as important, the eu forces us to take a serious look at the exclusionary underbelly of democratic formations. although often used as a type of silver bullet in political rhetoric, democracy in itself is no perfect solution for having all voices heard or represented in a single political space. as stated, although this has been a frequent criticism made by political theorists, it has not featured so heavily in empirical or explanatory accounts of democratic formations. here too, the eu has magnified a more general problem and, in doing so, has created space for us to examine exclusions and subordinations as part and parcel of democracy and democratization itself. thus, in borrowing an approach from more critical investigations of eu’s democratic enterprise and applying it to other polities, not only are we able to pinpoint processes of marginalization, but we are provided an opportunity to reimagine representation and inclusion in new ways. as such, whatever may come of the european union, we can at least hope that we will be able to learn from a few of its lessons. 12 review of european and russian affairs 7 (1), 2012 references acemoglu, daren and james a. robinson. 2009. economic origins of dictatorship and democracy. cambridge: cambridge university press. almond, gabriel and sydney verba.1989. the civic culture. new york: sage publications. balibar, etienne. 2004. we, the people of europe? reflections on transnational citizenship. princeton: princeton university press. blais, andre, elisabeth gidengil, neil nevitte and richard nadeau. 2004. “where does turnout decline come from?” european journal of political research. 43(1): 221-236. boix, carles. 2003. democracy and redistribution. cambridge: cambridge university press. dahl, robert. 1971. polyarchy. new haven: yale university press. daly, mary. 2006. “eu social policy after lisbon.” jcms. 44 (3): 461-481 giorgi, liana, ingmar von homeyer and wayne parsons (eds.). 2006. democracy in the european union: towards the emergence of a public sphere. new york: routledge. lijphart, arend. 1969. “consociational democracy.” world politics 21 (2): 207225. lipset, seymour martin. 1994. “the social requisites of democracy revisited.” the american sociological review. 59 (1): 1-22. levy, daniel, max pensky and john torpey (eds.). 2005. old europe, new europe, core europe. new york: verso. moore jr., barrington, 1966. social origins of dictatorship and democracy. boston: beacon press. mouffe, chantal. 2000. the democratic paradox. new york: verso. o'donnell, guillermo a. and phillipe c. schmitter. 1986. transitions from authoritarian rule: tentative conclusions about uncertain democracies. baltimore: john hopkins university press. petrakos, george et al. 2005. “growth, integration, and regional disparities in the european union.” environment and planning. 37 (10): 1837-1855. przeworski, adam et al. 2000. democracy and development. cambridge: cambridge university press. review of european and russian affairs 7 (1), 2012 13 putnam, robert. 1994. making democracy work: civic traditions in modern italy. princeton: princeton university press. rifkin, jeremy. 2004. the european dream. boulder: tarcher press. rittberger, berthol. 2005. building europe’s parliament. oxford: oxford university press. rueschemeyer, dietrich, evelyne huber stephens and john d. stephens. 1992. capitalist development and democracy. chicago: university of chicago press. sorensen, george 2007. democracy and democratization: processes and prospects in a changing world, 3rd edition. boulder: westview press. tilly, charles. 2007. democracy. cambridge: cambridge university press. correct citation: matijasevich, david. 2012. “five lessons from european democracy”. review of european and russian affairs 7 (1): 1–13. published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada. available online at: www.carleton.ca/rera/ rera is an electronic academic peer-reviewed journal that publishes graduate, post-graduate, and young scholarly works. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is a joint project supported by the canada-europe transatlantic dialogue—a cross-canada research network supported by the social sciences and humanities research council of canada (sshrc)—along with the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies (carleton university) and its associated research unit, the centre for european studies. rera aims to provide an accessible forum for research, to promote high standards of research and scholarship, and to foster communication among young scholars. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive, ottawa, on k1s 5b6canada tel: +01 613 520-2600 ext. 1179; e-mail: rera-journal@carleton.ca creative commons license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ this working paper is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial-no derivs 3.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 3.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced provided the source is acknowledged. no use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes. issn: 1718-4835 © 2012 the author(s) http://www.carleton.ca/rera/ mailto:rera-journal@carleton.ca http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ review of european and russian affairs 6 (1), 2011 issn 1718-4835 © 2011 the author(s) www.carleton.ca/rera money, security, and the relationships of trust: toward an integrated understanding of gorbachev’s role in german reunification sean eedy carleton university abstract constructivist theory has been part of the historiography of the cold war’s end and the unification of germany since the late 1990s. however, much of the literature on the subject of gorbachev and german unity interprets events using security and economics as having dictated soviet policy of the period. this paper discusses materialist, realist, and constructivist theories and their necessary interaction to provide a more thorough analysis of gorbachev’s role in german unity. it argues not only that german unification was the unforeseen byproduct of gorbachev’s policies meant to revitalize the soviet economy, but also that german unity was not possible until gorbachev’s economic and security concerns for the ussr’s future were allayed. these concerns were not addressed by traditional measures, but through the trust developed between gorbachev, west german chancellor helmut kohl, and the federal republic of germany. constructivist theory adds significant dimensions to the existing interpretations of materialist and realist theories in explaining how gorbachev addressed soviet concerns and policies of reform during the process of german unification where earlier confrontationist policies failed. 32 review of european and russian affairs 6 (1), 2011 introduction shortly after his election to general secretary of the central committee of the communist party of the soviet union (cpsu), mikhail gorbachev instituted a policy of perestroika (restructuring) in order to correct flaws in the soviet economy caused by the stalinist top-down, command economic structure and reverse the slow economic downturn prevalent through the 1970s and 1980s. when coupled with his policy of glasnost (openness), perestroika not only sought to rebuild the soviet economy, but also to restructure the political institutions initially responsible for the contraction of the soviet union’s gross national product (gnp). by instituting a more democratic means of governance, it was hoped that socialism could be brought “more in accord with man’s interests and needs (gorbachev 1989b, 19).” that is, to increase the soviet standard of living, as opposed to the continuation of measuring success based solely on the numbers of material output present in the stalinist model of the planned economy. effectively, gorbachev’s policies sought a third-way that might navigate the economy between sovietstyle communism and western capitalism and grant socialism a degree of popular legitimacy without the total abandonment of marxist-leninist ideals (gedmin 1992, 3). however, through closer cooperation with the west, in particular with the federal republic of germany (frg), gorbachev’s calls for reform invited comparison between the perceived prosperity of capitalism and the previously closed system of soviet-style economics. when these economic and democratic reforms were exported to the soviet satellite states, in particular the implementation of glasnost in late 1986, the retroactively pronounced sinatra doctrine in 1989, and the widening political latitudes these policies afforded eastern bloc societies, they rapidly unleashed forces that culminated in the democratic turn of 1989, the reunification of germany in 1990, and, ultimately, the collapse of the soviet union (ussr) in 1991. since the early 1990s, gorbachev’s reforms, policies, and deutschlandpolitik (policies relating to germany) have been judged largely in terms of their effects on soviet security and economic policies. it is my purpose here to demonstrate how the materialist and the realist approaches, those of soviet economic and security policies in the european arena respectively, are insufficient in themselves to explain gorbachev’s actions and policies throughout the period of the collapse of the socialist unity party (sed) regime in east germany and german reunification. the materialist arguments claim that west german economic aid served solely as a payment for the soviet union’s renunciation of spoils from the second world war and gorbachev’s sale of the german democratic republic (gdr) to the western federal republic of germany (frg). this view downplays the role and significance of soviet military power and concerns (forsberg 2005, 142) and long-standing cold war divisions. it is, however, important to note how soviet economic policy and security in europe and the world fed one another in the formulation of gorbachev’s relationship with the two german states in his ultimate support for a united germany. that is, german economic incentives and soviet economic policy and openness to western economic institutions reduced the need for a sustained military hard-line against the west. at the same time, those economic policies and incentives were only possible once soviet military concerns were addressed. the soviet role in german reunification historians such as randall newnham (“the price of german unity: the role of economic aid in the german-soviet negotiations,” 1999) and mary elise sarotte (1989: the struggle to create post-cold war europe, 2009) both describe the fall of the gdr in terms of a financial transaction between the frg and the ussr. in arguing this, gorbachev is stripped of agency in the events he himself set in motion and is instead portrayed as reacting to circumstances in which he had little or no choice but to comply. there is little to no debate that perestroika, as initially envisioned by gorbachev and the cpsu, was meant to be a policy of economic reform. however, both the materialist and the realist approaches are concerned with soviet interests—economics and security, respectively—and treat gorbachev’s role in german reunification and the soviet withdrawal from empire in terms of these two underlying forces. alternately, historians such as tuomas forsberg, jefferey gedmin, and andrew bennett propose more theories review of european and russian affairs 6 (1), 2011 33 complicated when discussing the soviet role in german unification. while the materialist and the realist approaches present interesting interpretations of gorbachev’s agency in the last days of the gdr, it is also necessary to integrate them with the concepts of trust and learning theory, this latter being referred to by forsberg alternately as constructivist and ideationalist theory, to demonstrate the importance and interrelatedness of the economic and security interests of the soviet union. agency and gorbachev: a theoretical understanding forsberg describes the core of the constructivist approach as the achievement of political change through identity change (forsberg 2005, 145) among one or more of the actors involved. in an analysis of the relationship which developed between gorbachev and west german chancellor helmut kohl, financial incentives acted as symbols of trust and gorbachev’s belief in kohl’s commitment to future aid and support enabled gorbachev to meet soviet economic and security concerns until the collapse of the ussr in 1991. through this approach to gorbachev’s agency in the events of 1989-90, the constructivist approach not only points to the materialist and the realist as being dependent upon “ideational constructions,” but also expands the approach through the incorporation of learning theory (forsberg 2005, 145). this is the process by which gorbachev’s biography serves to explain the new thinking of soviet leaders since 1985. apart from biographical accounts that contributed to gorbachev’s thinking and policies, learning theory also draws upon previous soviet policies, both successful and not, and how these earlier efforts affected the lens through which gorbachev viewed soviet foreign policy. constructivism constructivism as a named theory has appeared in the historiography of the end of the cold war and the reunification of germany since, at least, the publication of forsberg’s article “power, interests, and trust: explaining gorbachev’s choices at the end of the cold war” (1999). though, this is pre-dated by the approach used by gedmin already in 1992. regardless, much of the literature on the subject of gorbachev and his role in german reunification before and since forsberg’s publication, including that which was published in anticipation of the twentieth anniversaries of the opening of the berlin wall and the collapse of the communist establishments in the eastern european states in 2009, described and reduced events to their security and economic components arguing that these elements dictated soviet policy and gorbachev’s sale of the gdr. thus, the historiography is left with disparate understandings of gorbachev’s rationale as opposed to the integrated and more complex analysis necessitated by constructivist theory. this paper discusses the three theoretical approaches introduced above and their necessary interaction in order to provide a more thorough analysis of gorbachev’s role in german reunification. it argues that not only was german reunification the unforeseen by-product of gorbachev’s policies of perestroika and glasnost, but also that despite the fall of the berlin wall on 9 november 1989, the reunification of germany could not be considered a foregone conclusion until gorbachev’s economic and security concerns for the future of the ussr were met. these concerns were not addressed by traditional measures, but through the trust developed between gorbachev and the frg, through chancellor kohl. constructivist theory serves to explain how gorbachev addressed soviet concerns and his own policies of reform during the process of german reunification where earlier confrontational policies failed. as a significant trading partner of the soviet union and co-member of the council for mutual economic assistance (cmea or comecon), the cpsu extended gorbachev’s policy of perestroika to the gdr as it did to all other states in the cmea. in his address at the 40th anniversary of the gdr on 6 october 1989, gorbachev stated that “we vitally need perestroika and we firmly believe that it will take our country to further heights and make it possible to bring out the great potential of socialism (gorbachev 1989a, 13).” with this, gorbachev did not intend to bring an end to soviet hegemony or an end to sed authority in the gdr through openness and restructuring, but sought to revitalize socialism through the “free development of all people and their equal participation in the common affairs of the 34 review of european and russian affairs 6 (1), 2011 country (gorbachev 1989a, 13),” which included an increase in the standard of living and the assurance of the legitimacy of soviet-style communist authority in the cmea states. in promoting this policy, however, gorbachev did not take into account, either as a failure or as a conscious decision due to his dealings with the frg and chancellor kohl in bonn, the gdr’s need to define itself in direct opposition to the frg. being on the front lines of the cold war and part of a divided state, the gdr survived in direct competition with the frg. the sed’s own struggle for legitimacy found its source in that competition. the sed, and through the party the whole of the gdr, defined itself as an anti-fascist and socialist alternative to the frg (dennis 2000, 18). any measure to democratize the political or economic structures of the gdr, as was mandated by perestroika, served to erode the foundations of the state. were the gdr to adopt a western market-style economy and reformed democratic political institutions, little argument could then be made against the continued division of two equally peaceful, democratic and capitalist german states as nothing but the inner-german border would serve to differentiate the two. in short, gdr independence was itself dependent upon the sed’s hard-line, neo-stalinist regime. already the legitimacy of sed rule proved itself almost entirely dependent upon repression and the presence of soviet occupying forces inside east german borders. on 16-17 june 1953, following an sed reversal of policy and admission of fallibility made at the insistence of the cpsu, a spontaneous worker revolt forced the sed leadership into disarray until soviet military authorities crushed the uprising (dennis 2000, 66). in august 1961, in order to curb the rising numbers of east german citizens fleeing to the west via the escape hatch provided by west berlin, the sed constructed the berlin wall (or the “anti-fascist protection barrier” as it was known by the sed). although the wall was built in order to preserve the gdr’s existence by stemming the westward flow of east germany’s labour force and intelligentsia, this was not accomplished without the kremlin’s consent (taylor 2006, 136-7). after hungary opened the border with austria in spring 1989 as part of its own experience with perestroika, the sed restricted travel to their cmea-partner state (sarotte 2009, 31), once again closing the valve on east german emigration to the west. throughout this period (1949-89), however, the sed, with soviet support, was in complete control of the gdr with only one change in leadership in 1971, which came at the insistence of leonid brezhnev (taylor 2006, 350). the implementation of glasnost revealed that the gdr was not as economically sound as believed, with a foreign debt of $20.6 billion, a dependency on dm 2.5 billion in annual transfers from the frg by 1989 and a sliding gnp. the revelation of gdr debt refuted sed claims that all was well with the gdr economy and undermined sed efforts to ignore perestroika (jarausch 1994, 101). unlike the rest of the soviet bloc, however, by 1989 any east german could readily see the differences in material wealth and living standards between east and west as 85-90 per cent of gdr citizens received west german television stations (rumberg 1988, 213). with the ease of access to west german media outlets and the perpetual threat to sed control posed by the existence and perceived prosperity of the frg, potential democratic and economic reform equated to an admission of sed fallibility similar to the one made in 1953. this then threatened the perception of the gdr as a successful, socialist alternative to the west. the learning model in “power, interests and trust: gorbachev and the end of the cold war” and “economic incentives, ideas, and the end of the cold war,” forsberg suggests learning theory and trust guided gorbachev’s decisions. to these, andrew bennett adds that the position gorbachev took against the use of force against the east german protesters in leipzig and berlin precipitated the fall of the berlin wall. these concepts do not in themselves explain soviet-west german relations in the lead-up to german reunification, but serve to fill necessary gaps in logic in both the materialist and the realist theoretical approaches. bennett argues that gorbachev’s need to develop a relationship of trust is best explained in terms of its effect on the aforementioned theories. just how does the learning model proposed by forsberg and bennett serve to explain gorbachev’s decisions in 1989-90? review of european and russian affairs 6 (1), 2011 35 in his own explanation of perestroika in 1989, gorbachev supports the notion that, in the confrontation with democracy and the western systems, soviet communism ignored “equality of all before the law [and] the rights and freedoms of the individual (gorbachev 1989b, 18).” moreover, in his address to the gdr, gorbachev recognized that, “in the nuclear age…the most acute problems of the times can be solved only through joint efforts (gorbachev 1989a, 13).” when gorbachev began his policy of perestroika, he consciously evoked language about the “common european home.” this rhetorical device implied a reorientation on the part of gorbachev and soviet foreign policy makers towards an established relationship with western europe. in terms of security, as europe would undoubtedly prove the battleground in the event of the cold war turning hot, gorbachev’s “common european home” was predicated on the notion of shared responsibility for european security (forsberg 2005, 157). the relationship developing between gorbachev and kohl allowed the soviet leader to believe that european policy making, especially that between the ussr and the frg, could facilitate the true international partnership required for this shared responsibility (forsberg 2005, 158). evidence of this notion of partnership can most easily be found in the bonn joint declaration of june 1989. while little change was noted on the issue of german unity, improvements were made to economic relations between the states stimulating frg investments in the soviet union and vocational training for soviet managerial personnel in west germany (sodaro 1990, 362). even before german reunification became a pressing concern following what has come to be known as the peaceful revolution in germany and the fall of the berlin wall, chancellor kohl sought détente with the ussr and the development of a mutual trust with gorbachev, demonstrating west german support for soviet reform policy, and facilitating future relations. beyond the obvious economic successes between the states, both affirmed the right of self-determination “at bonn’s insistence (sodaro 1990, 361).” angela stent interpreted this declaration as having achieved the prime objective of overcoming the division of europe. and if the division of europe was overcome, the division of germany was meant to follow at some point in the future as it was the source of that european division (stent 1999, 80). although this may be viewed as bonn laying the groundwork for german unity should the opportunity arise, as it came to pass in november of that year, gorbachev’s agreement is demonstrative of his potential flexibility on the issue in viewing reunification not as a reward for west german economic assistance but through the long-term process of soviet-frg cooperation. that this was part of a larger west german-soviet relationship, and part of an economic process of signalling closer cooperation finds evidence in gorbachev’s anger at the frg’s decision not to inform the ussr of its moves toward actualizing german unity, in particular kohl’s ten point plan for german unity of 28 november 1989 (forsberg 1999, 618). further arguments can be made that the process of german reunification was inevitable by the time of the caucasus agreement of july 1990, but it is the contention here that this was yet another step in the development of a west german-soviet partnership along the lines of gorbachev’s new thinking on international policy. despite the sinatra doctrine’s approach to the soviet satellites allowing each the freedom to chart its own course through perestroika, had east german sovereignty conflicted with soviet interests, the fall of the sed regime could have been prevented at any time. by not authorizing the use of military force in the suppression of east german popular dissent, gorbachev chose the relationship built with chancellor kohl and the incorporation of the soviet union into the international political and economic spheres over the importance of maintaining a socialist regime in the gdr (shumaker 1995, 100 & 140). additionally, gorbachev removed the concern of a united germany’s membership in the north atlantic treaty organization (nato) as a potential stumbling block on germany’s road to unity. as most east germans and a large number of those in the frg were opposed to full membership of a united germany in nato, gorbachev had the option of forcing germans to choose between reunification and its western allies if this conflicted with soviet security concerns. in not pursuing this avenue, moscow demonstrated that it experienced a significant re-evaluation of economic interests above those of state security as was, historically, of utmost importance (forsberg 1999, 611-2). gorbachev was then reluctant to endanger the newly founded soviet relationship with the frg, western europe, and the united states. the security ramifications of this policy for the ussr were significant as they no longer considered east 36 review of european and russian affairs 6 (1), 2011 germany to be the frontline in a potential east-west conflict and that a united germany did not pose a threat to future european stability. rather, german unity would facilitate soviet incorporation into the established western-european structure. it is important to note that gorbachev’s policy on germany and nato gained highly valued west german support for the ussr’s entry into the european order and the promise of addressing soviet security in the caucasus agreement of july 1990. this agreement reduced german military forces, temporarily prevented the extension of nato structures into the territories of the gdr, and promised that nuclear arsenals would not be stationed in eastern europe in exchange for bonn’s economic help and cooperation (jarausch 1994, 158). bennett argues that soviet force in the suppression of the eastern european revolutions “would have resulted in unacceptable levels of military casualties, large direct economic costs, and huge indirect economic costs (bennett 2005, 85).” this article has already developed the idea that military force would create a financial cost for the ussr’s ailing economy by endangering the relationships fostered within the “common european home.” though learning theory is speculative in nature and limited by an inability to accurately determine what gorbachev learned and when (bennett 2005, 102), bennett stresses that gorbachev’s new thinking was informed by costly soviet military failures in afghanistan, angola, and cambodia, the growing ineffectiveness of military intervention, and the formative experiences regarding the morality of force (bennett 2005, 93-4). forsberg concurs with bennett’s notion, claiming that gorbachev’s “aversion to war tells us why the soviet union did not use military power in east germany” (forsberg 1999, 610). this aversion to war on the part of gorbachev is evident in his reorientation of security policy and his unilateral and bilateral agreements to reduce conventional and nuclear forces. however, the developing relationship with the frg and west germany’s reciprocation of an honest partnership with the soviet inclusion in european affairs highlighted the failure of the soviet union’s previous foreign policy of confrontation (shumaker 1995, 69). while the constructivist and learning models must be carefully used and do not in themselves provide a single explanation for gorbachev’s new thinking, constructivism adds a critical dimension to gorbachev’s perception of soviet military power, its costs, its consequences in relationship-formation with the west, and the arguments made by the realist theoretical approach. as such, the approaches of forsberg and bennett should be kept in mind in any analysis of soviet security and economic interests as they add important dimensions towards an explanation of gorbachev’s german policy in the late 1980s and early 1990s. a realist approach the realist approach deals largely with soviet security interests in the relationship between the ussr and the frg. david shumaker’s study, gorbachev and the german question: soviet-west german relations, 1985-1990, adopts such an approach. in tracing the significance of soviet security interests as the core of soviet-west german rapprochement and how this related to the gdr, shumaker argues that, by 1989, the gdr was no longer necessary to the security of the soviet state. through the development of long-range missiles able to deliver nuclear payloads, the gdr outlived its original purpose as a buffer zone for conventional military forces between east and west. this assurance of soviet state security without the gdr allowed for gorbachev’s westward turn and the potential for german unity (shumaker 1995, 102). throughout his study, however, shumaker is unable to detach soviet security from its economic policies. this concept was introduced in the previous section through the analysis of the effects of the politics of trust and relationship building of the “common european home.” as shumaker was unable to discuss security concerns without addressing their impact on soviet economics and vice versa, he demonstrated that the two concepts were, in fact, intertwined in gorbachev’s approach to german reunification. rather than attempt to separate the realist argument from that of the materialist, shumaker argues that the redefinition of soviet security interests allowed its economic interests to take priority through the development of perestroika (shumaker 1995, 99). through the incorporation of the previously detailed constructivist theory, this conception of the realist theory demonstrates how the development of trust between the soviet union and the frg, and between gorbachev and chancellor kohl in particular, acted in the interests of meeting the needs of review of european and russian affairs 6 (1), 2011 37 soviet security. the soviet petitioned, and west german supported, incorporation into the “common european home” was meant to serve soviet security interests in ways that traditional military force could not. this policy reduced the obvious need for a large military and, coupled with the nuclear deterrent, shrank the borders in need of military defence. simultaneously, the “common european home” reduced the need for that nuclear deterrent by allying the two opposing ideological forces of the cold war. the application of forsberg’s learning theory model is then able to explain how the rising costs of nuclear and conventional military parity and military setbacks in afghanistan, angola, and cambodia affected gorbachev’s approach to nuclear proliferation. the failure of a costly aggressive posture in soviet security policy allowed gorbachev the opportunity to achieve the desired ends of state security through economic negotiation and bi-lateral and multi-lateral cooperation. by the late 1980s, the soviet union was spending an enormous percentage of its annual gnp on its immense conventional weapons arsenal and on maintaining nuclear parity with the united states. at the same time, however, gorbachev did not fear war coming from the west and considered the soviet state secure due to its nuclear arsenal (forsberg 1999, 613). this did not make the eastern european states expendable as suggested by shumaker, but greatly reduced their overall importance in soviet strategic thinking as they no longer provided the buffer zone they once did due to u.s. missiles stationed throughout europe, more generally, and the frg, in particular. moreover, the ailing soviet economy could no longer afford to maintain the arms race (forsberg 1999, 608). as previous soviet strategy seeking to meet the west with force proved ineffective, gorbachev sought a more productive diplomatic relationship with the west and bonn (shumaker 1995, 4). to facilitate cooperation with bonn, in december 1988 the soviet union unilaterally announced a reduction in its overall conventional forces stationed throughout europe (shumaker 1995, 72). although potentially counter-productive to soviet security, nuclear parity and mutually assured destruction maintained the security of the state. reducing soviet conventional forces was a direct response to a decision made the previous year by chancellor kohl not to modernize the pershing 1a missiles stationed in the frg. as any new war would start on german soil, the meeting point between the communist east and the democratic west, this was an important step in fostering trust between the gorbachev and kohl (shumaker 1995, 72). with his response, gorbachev signalled to the western world, especially to those hawks attempting to justify the continuation of the arms race through a comparison to soviet capabilities, that soviet foreign policy was no longer dictated by confrontation with the west (shumaker 1995, 83). from these actions, it is possible to understand how the re-conceptualisation of soviet security informed gorbachev’s understanding of relations between the ussr and the frg. considering sovietus nuclear parity and the improbability of war through mutually assured destruction as being sufficient to meet soviet security interests, gorbachev turned his attention to fostering relations with kohl and the federal republic through the reduction of conventional arms and the incentive of reopening the german question. already in 1987, valentin falin said that the 1971 quadripartite agreement was “not the last word on berlin (sodaro 1990, 353).” this did not imply that german reunification would happen soon, if at all, but was intended as an olive branch to the frg. however, it is impossible to claim that security issues were the only forces guiding gorbachev in the late 1980s. shumaker’s study necessarily explains soviet security and the reorientation of security interests as having informed economic interests which allowed those economic interests to take precedence. this being the case, i do not treat the economic signals from moscow as being separate from its security concerns, but rather wish to demonstrate how these processes were connected in the process of german reunification. drawing on constructivist thought and learning theory, the failure of previous soviet foreign policy allowed for this re-evaluation of the soviet approach to security and economic concerns and found both to be adequately met through the development of soviet relations with the bonn government. as briefly described above, gorbachev’s policy of perestroika began life as an economic policy designed to improve the quality of life for the soviet population and bring an increase to the ussr’s lagging gnp. in the opening paragraphs of gorbachev’s address on “the socialist idea and revolutionary perestroika,” already five years into the reforms, he states that: 38 review of european and russian affairs 6 (1), 2011 as perestroika reaches the “dense layers” of economic and public life…we have come to the realisation that a radical overhaul of the entire social edifice, from its economic foundation to the superstructure, is essential (gorbachev 1989b, 5). a materialist approach while this involved a deliberate withdrawal from the soviet empire in terms of directing and financing fraternal regimes, those states of the cmea, there was no intent to abandon socialism within the soviet union or within the satellite states (gedmin 1992, 2). the materialist approach claims that economics and the search for western funding to promote gorbachev’s restructuring of soviet economic institutions were the most fundamental forces behind gorbachev’s withdrawal from empire and soviet acceptance of german reunification. while not wholly a subscriber to this theory himself, forsberg breaks down the materialist into three distinct categories: as “a face-saver, a payment, or a signal (forsberg 2005, 147).” forsberg understands economic transfers as face-savers in that they “are important in facilitating agreement under coercion (forsberg 2005, 148).” that is to say that when one side in this relationship is forced to relinquish something to an adversary, in this case the ussr being forced to give up the gdr to the frg, financial payments allow the first party to retain its honour at the same time as it allows future relations between the two parties to proceed without “unnecessary embitterment (forsberg 2005, 148).” in this case, the soviet union was not forced to concede the gdr. the frg lacked the military force necessary to coerce gorbachev to give up east germany. if anything, moscow’s perceived control over the socialist gdr placed the soviet union in a position of strength over its negotiating partners in bonn. however, as bonn was not forced, but willing to concede financial transfers to the ussr, the relationship being developed between the two states does not fit this conception of economic transfers as face-savers. the materialist idea of economic relations between the frg and the soviet union as a payment are the basis of the theory alternately referred to as kohl’s buy-back or gorbachev’s sale of the gdr. while it is widely known that the soviet union’s economy was in a state of significant stagnation while the costs of the cold war with the united states and western europe mounted, reaching 19-25 per cent of the soviet union’s total 1.4 trillion gnp, the idea of payment, like face-saving, fails to account for frgussr relations beyond the immediate context of german reunification (gedmin 1992, 8). payments are typically treated as one time affairs. as arrangements between bonn and moscow were intended to work towards long-term cooperation and the social and economic introduction of the ussr into a “common european home,” as opposed to a single financial transaction, the idea of economic relations as payment for gorbachev’s sale of the gdr equally does not fit this soviet-west german relationship. in considering the materialist idea of economic transfers as a signal and how they play into gorbachev’s involvement in the reunification of germany, it is important to understand the turn taken by soviet foreign policy in 1985 when the policy of perestroika came into effect. in developing a foreign policy in line with perestroika, gorbachev made an integral link between the soviet economy and international relations (gedmin 1992, 8). in doing so, gorbachev understood economic progress and scientific and technological advancements, which the ussr was sorely lacking, to be essential ingredients for national security. this understanding, in turn, established a connection in gorbachev’s new thinking between the materialist and the realist approaches. security was then linked to the international sphere in that “the security of one state could not be achieved at the expense of others (sodaro 1990, 325).” this security entailed a significant détente between the ussr and the west and a distancing of the ussr from the economic burdens of the cmea states. in addition, the ussr applied to both the international monetary fund (imf) and the general agreement on tariffs and trade (gatt) as part of the soviet union’s move to incorporate its economy into the global economy (gedmin 1992, 8). however, with the soviet economy still lagging, in 1989 gorbachev stated that “socialism has proved itself incapable of becoming the leader of structural perestroika” and that the necessary economic reforms needed cash (gorbachev 1989b, 25). mary elise sarotte indicates that by this time the frg was the only western state left that would still consider investment in the ussr (sarotte 2009, 151). as the frg, led by helmut kohl, demonstrated its willingness to support soviet reforms, west germany review of european and russian affairs 6 (1), 2011 39 extended the prospect of long-term economic partnership that proved “more important than their direct economic utility (forsberg 2005, 146).” regardless of kohl’s intentions at the time, this should not be interpreted as part of the supposed buy-back of east germany. this partnership predates the political upheavals of 1989 in the gdr by two years and commits the frg to long-term investment in the ussr rather than a one-time payment (newnham 1999, 425) necessitated by either the concepts of economic transfers as face-saver or of payment toward the purchase of the gdr. in her own study of german unification, sarotte identifies west german payments to the soviet union, a dm five billion credit on 13 may 1990 followed by dm 12 billion and an additional interestfree dm three billion credit on 10 september of the same year among other incentives (sarotte 2009, 160), as an effort on helmut kohl’s behalf to bribe the ussr out of its world war ii claims to the gdr and acquire gorbachev’s consent for reunification (sarotte 2009, 192-3). for gorbachev’s part, these west german gifts allowed him to save face among other members of the cpsu and the politburo as a demonstration that the loss of the gdr, and subsequently the nullification of gains from the soviet victory in the second world war, served a significant end (sarotte 2009, 151). one can assume that chancellor kohl and all chancellors since willy brandt and his policy of ostpolitik (the frg’s east german policy), considered reunification to be a potential component of any and all dealings with the soviet union. however, sarotte’s study covers only the period from summer 1989 until german reunification in october 1990. given such a narrow window of focus, one may come to view frg-soviet relations as a financial transaction towards the goal of german unity. sarotte’s approach, however, fails to consider important details of west german-soviet relations throughout the gorbachev era. in his own interpretation of materialist theory as a form of payment between states, here the ussr and the frg, forsberg contends that two problems were inherent in such an exchange. first, there is an extreme level of difficulty in determining a dollar value for the gdr or any other state, for that matter. second, and perhaps more important, adversaries, such as the ussr and the member-states of the nato, are less likely to engage in this type of exchange on issues closely tied to national security (forsberg 2005, 149-50). while this latter concept treads dangerously close to the realist theory discussed above, part of it is necessary for discussion here. throughout the cold war, the division of germany was considered necessary for the continuation of european peace. apart from the notion of a divided germany serving as a buffer and potential frontline between east and west, the membership of a united germany in nato proved an unacceptable shift in world power and security (jarausch 1994, 163). in his address at the 40th anniversary of the gdr, gorbachev touched on this idea, stating that “we do not idealize [the situation in europe]. the heart of the matter is…that to this day it is a recognition of the post-war realities which has ensured peace (gorbachev 1989a, 10).” as noted by forsberg, in 1988 gorbachev received an offer of dm 500 billion from german industrial circles for his consent to german reunification (forsberg 2005, 154). had gorbachev been inclined to sell the gdr, as implied by sarotte and newnham elsewhere in this paper, the offer of dm 500 billion would more than settle accounts between the soviet union and the frg and was well in excess of the actual credits extended to the ussr by the kohl government in 1989-90. this offer did nothing to satisfy soviet security concerns and was rejected as “it simply did not seem serious at the time (forsberg 2005, 154).” although payments to the soviet union from the frg were ultimately substantial, randall newnham estimates this figure to be around dm 87.5 billion through direct and indirect aid, money was unable to purchase the security required by the soviets or maintain the status quo of post-war europe (newnham 1999, 437). additionally, forsberg contrasts the issue of german reunification to japanese attempts to buy the independence of four kurile islands in 1991. in this case, economic efforts at a payment solution failed to do anything beyond strengthen moscow’s resolve against them, as there was no relationship of trust built between the two states (forsberg 2005, 161). the problem with sarotte’s interpretation of german reunification solely as an economic transaction is that it implies that the ussr was coerced into relinquishing its rights to the gdr by forces beyond those of economics. the frg lacked the military capacity or will to force the soviet union from gdr territory. as the ussr had a standing army of approximately 400,000 inside east german borders, in addition to residual occupation rights from the second world war, this always allowed the soviet 40 review of european and russian affairs 6 (1), 2011 union the final say regarding german reunification (sarotte 2009, 9). although it is true that, following the opening of the berlin wall on 9 november 1989, the drive toward unity was immense and soviet options grew more limited as events progressed, not once did gorbachev, the cpsu, or the soviet military attempt to stop or even slow those events (bennett 2005, 97; gorbachev 1989a, 7). this followed the whimsically named sinatra doctrine, allowing east european states to chart their own course through perestroika and to do so their way. as such, the lack of coercive forces in the events leading to german reunification, beyond the perceived will of the german people themselves, contradict sarotte’s notion of gorbachev’s sale of the gdr and that of economics playing the role of a face-saver. conclusions it is therefore necessary to understand how economic policy between the frg and moscow acted as signals from one government to the other as emblems of each regime’s genuine intentions. in doing so, materialist and constructivist thought are connected as money was a tangible signal of the development of cooperation and trust between gorbachev and kohl. through perestroika, gorbachev sought to restructure soviet economic institutions through their incorporation into the global markets. regardless of kohl’s possible intention to foster the notion of german unity at some time in the future, as embedded in the preamble to the frg basic law, kohl was responsive to soviet manoeuvres and gave gorbachev faith that the ussr was on the correct course and would be welcomed into the european system in its efforts to reform (forsberg 2005, 157). such long term relationships, and relationships that extend beyond the realm of pure economic relations, cannot therefore be solely explained by the materialist notions of either face-saving or payments transactions. the process of german reunification only became inevitable after gorbachev laid the groundwork to facilitate the soviet union’s entrance into the “common european home.” he was not coerced into allowing the collapse of sed control nor was he a bystander as the gdr was enveloped by the economic might of the frg, as argued by mary elise sarotte and randall newnham. rather, gorbachev enabled german unity through his reorientation of soviet policy and his reluctance to use military force. by the time the berlin wall fell on 9 november 1989, gorbachev already allowed the formation of a pluralist political structure and the election of a non-socialist government in poland and the opening of the hungarian border with austria. while hopes of a reform minded socialist government coming to power in the gdr was not to come to pass, gorbachev fully supported the selfdetermination of the east european states (beissinger 2009, 335). gorbachev’s foreign affairs minister eduard shevardnadze said that “the wall would fall when the conditions were right, but that this required a certain degree of trust and respect among all sides (stent 1999, 80).” through gorbachev’s relations with the frg, these conditions, the trust, and the respect spoken of by shevardnadze were met without the aggression displayed by previous generations. this paper has demonstrated that no single theory is sufficient to explain gorbachev’s decisions at the end of the cold war. instead, it was the goal of this paper to emphasize the interplay and interrelatedness of these theories and, more importantly, to show how soviet economic and security policies each informed gorbachev’s approach to the other and to his dealings with helmut kohl and the frg. the extension of kohl’s economic incentives toward gorbachev’s soviet union remains at the heart of the materialist argument. the constructionist view allows us to interpret these manoeuvres not as face-savers or as payments, which make the assumption that german reunification was inevitable by early 1990 as suggested by sarotte and newnham, but as signals towards the formation of a deeper west german-ussr relationship through kohl’s support of gorbachev’s notion of the “common european home.” likewise, realist thought considers that soviet security was met by nuclear-parity. this allowed the re-conceptualisation of the eastern european states, the gdr most importantly, in terms of their strategic importance and turned gorbachev’s thoughts towards economic concerns. however, constructivism adds a significant dimension to this by way of gorbachev’s apparent aversion to war and previous military failures. gorbachev’s reduction of soviet conventional forces in eastern europe was just as much a signal as were kohl’s economics. gorbachev sacrificed soviet security to demonstrate his commitment to west germany and east-west integration, thereby further securing the ussr in both review of european and russian affairs 6 (1), 2011 41 economic and military terms. in this way, constructivism informs our view of both the materialist and the realist approaches. at the same time, economic and security interests operated simultaneously in gorbachev’s new thinking and in the relationship between gorbachev and kohl, both working toward the goal of securing the future of the ussr. references 1. secondary sources beissinger, m.r. 2009. “nationalism and the collapse of soviet communism.” contemporary european history 18 (3): 331-347. bennett, a. 2005. “the guns that didn’t smoke: ideas and the soviet non-use of force in 1989.” journal of cold war studies 7 (2): 81-109. dennis, m. 2000. the rise and fall of the german democratic republic, 1945-1990. harlow: pearson education limited. forsberg, t. 2005. “economic incentives, ideas, and the end of the cold war: gorbachev and german unification.” journal of cold war studies 7 (2): 142-164. ---. 1999. “power, interests and trust: explaining gorbachev’s choices at the end of the cold war.” review of international studies 25: 603-621. gedmin, j. 1992. the hidden hand: gorbachev and the collapse of east germany. washington: aei. jarausch, k.h. 1994. the rush to german unity, new york: oxford university press. mandel, e. 1989. beyond perestroika: the future of gorbachev’s ussr, london: verso. newnham, r. 1999. “the price of german unity: the role of economic aid in the german-soviet negotiations.” german studies review 22 (3): 421-446. oldenburg, f.s. 1989. “correlations between soviet and gdr reforms.” studies in comparative communism 22 (1): 77-91. pons, s. 2009. “western communists, mikhail gorbachev and the 1989 revolutions.” contemporary european history 18 (3): 349-362. rumberg, d.w.w. 1988. “glasnost in the gdr? the impact of gorbachev’s reform policy on the german democratic republic.” international relations 9: 197-227. sarotte, m.e. 2009. 1989: the struggle to create post-cold war europe. princeton: princeton university press. shumaker, d.h. 1995. gorbachev and the german question: soviet-west german relations, 1985-1990. westport: praeger. sodaro, m.j. 1990. moscow, germany, and the west: from khrushchev to gorbachev, ithaca: cornell university press. stent, a.e. 1999. russia and germany reborn: unification, the soviet collapse, and the new europe. princeton: princeton university press. taylor, f. 2006. the berlin wall: a world divided, 1961-1989. new york: harper. tismaneanu, v. 2009. “the revolutions of 1989: causes, meanings, consequences.” contemporary european history 18 (3): 271-288. willnat, l. 1991. “the east german press during the political transformation of east germany.” international communication gazette 48: 193-208. 2. primary sources gorbachev, m. 1989. address by mikhail gorbachev at the meeting to mark the 40th anniversary of the german democratic republic. berlin, october 6, 1989, moscow: novosti press agency. ---. the socialist idea and revolutionary perestroika. moscow: novosti press agency. 42 review of european and russian affairs 6 (1), 2011 ---. to build up the intellectual potential of perestroika. moscow: novosti press agency. plenary meeting of the cpsu central committee. moscow, kremlin, september 19-20, 1989, moscow: novosti press agency. review of european and russian affairs 7 (1), 2012 issn 1718-4835 © 2012 the author(s) www.carleton.ca/rera review essay: gender politics in post-socialist central eastern european states ela rossmiller american university gal, susan and gail kligman. 2000. the politics of gender after socialism: a comparative historical essay. princeton, nj: princeton university press. galligan, yvonne, sara clavero, and marina calloni. 2007. gender politics and democracy in post-socialist europe. opladen, germany: barbara budrich publishers. guenther, katja m. 2010. making their place: feminism after socialism in eastern germany. stanford, ca: stanford university press. introduction this article reviews three books that explain why there have been no grassroots, large scale feminist movements in post-socialist central eastern europe 1 in the twentieth century, despite conditions which would seem to provoke collective mobilization around women’s interests. although this is not the central or only research question addressed by the authors, all devote significant attention to explaining how the socialist past came to definitively shape public discourses on feminism in ways that inhibit popular support for mass feminist movements. the selection of books represents tremendous breadth on the topic: gal and kligman’s book, the politics of gender after socialism: a comparative historical essay, offers an anthropological and historical perspective on gender politics in the region during the twentieth century; galligan, clavero, and calloni’s book, gender politics and democracy in post-socialist europe, approaches the topic from the discipline of political science; and guenther’s book, making their place: feminism after socialism in eastern germany, presents a sociological perspective. whereas gal and kligman rely primarily on secondary sources, galligan, clavero, and calloni combine secondary sources with their own survey research, and guenther’s study is 1. this essay uses the term “central eastern europe” to refer to the czech republic, the former east germany, hungary, poland, and slovakia. 2 review of european and russian affairs 7 (1), 2012 grounded in fieldwork conducted over several years. guenther’s careful case study of two cities in eastern germany complements and illustrates more general themes discussed in the regional analyses offered by the other two books. finally, the dates of publication ensure that the analyses include not only research conducted in the 1990s, but also more recent research up to and including 2010. in short, the selection of books provides a range of disciplinary perspectives and methods, as well as broad geographical and temporal coverage. the first part of this essay will describe the phenomenon it seeks to explain, namely, the absence of mass feminist movements despite the presence of conditions which would seem to favour them. the second part of the essay explores the authors’ explanations for this absence. galligan, clavero, and calloni, as well as gal and kligman, argue that feminism and socialism are discursively constructed in central eastern europe in ways that connect and undermine both. guenther agrees that the discourse connecting feminism and socialism is consequential but demonstrates that this connection can aid, not only hinder, feminism’s reception. because the focus of their analysis is on the discursive construction of socialism and feminism in a particular time and place, the authors are less concerned with assessing the transferability of the wide range of feminist schools of thought developed in the west and more concerned with demonstrating how hegemonic discourses in central eastern europe stigmatize the term “feminism,” regardless of its particular variety or correspondence to what westerners would classify as feminism, frequently drawing upon an oversimplified caricature that erases its diversity and internal debates. thus, this essay uses the term “feminism” as the authors do to describe a nodal point in a discourse. finally, this essay concludes by considering how an expanded conceptualization of gender ideologies can offer a richer, more complete explanation of gender politics, and how discourse analysis can complement other explanatory factors. the dog that didn’t bark the topic of this article takes into consideration tilly and tarrow’s (2007, 198) suggestion to investigate not only cases of contentious politics but also instances where mobilization does not occur despite conditions that would seem to favour it. referring to the title of the sherlock holmes mystery, they implore us not to overlook “the dog that didn’t bark.” this essay asserts that one can learn much about gender politics in central eastern europe by investigating the absence of feminist movements in the region. there is remarkable agreement among the authors reviewed in this article that feminist discourse does not resonate for most women in central eastern europe. there have been no largescale feminist movements anywhere in central eastern europe during the twentieth and early twenty-first century, and gendered political discourse does not receive popular support (galligan, clavero, and calloni 2007, 83). in fact, european union (eu) enlargement resulted in a clash between western liberal feminists and central eastern european women who considered feminist discourse hopelessly out of touch with reality and destructive for society (28). despite the proliferation of women’s groups thanks to funding from other states (particularly the netherlands and sweden), this tendency has not so far stimulated broad-based mobilization around women’s interests. most women’s groups are staffed by women who do not consider themselves feminist and lack a political, social, and financial base in their local communities (guenther 2011). gal and kligman succinctly summarize the observations of many: “the term review of european and russian affairs 7 (1), 2012 3 ‘feminism’ is treated with ridicule and derision in public forums, often by women as well as men. feminism is not just controversial; it is stigmatized” (98). though there are exceptions to this view, including those carefully described by guenther, many central eastern european women consider feminism not to be merely irrelevant or uninteresting, but discredited and dangerous. however, this does not signal the absence of gender politics in the region. gal and kligman carefully analyze the role of gender politics under socialism and after the transition to democracy. for example, gender politics topped the agendas of the (mostly male) political leadership immediately after 1989. in the context of tremendous political challenges and economic crises—writing constitutions, reforming legislative politics, and state-building— politicians debated at length questions of abortion and contraception, birth rates, childcare, and proper sex, and most countries had revised abortion laws within two years of the fall of the old regimes in the absence of any grassroots mobilization or pressure to enact such reforms (15). gal and kligman explain that gender politics make good politics because they cut to the core of the nature of the new state and state-citizen relations. for example, political debates over abortion and day care concerned the identity of the state. would it be catholic or secular? would it be a social welfare state or not (gal and kligman 2000, 24)? politicians revised policies to assert the morality of the new state while condemning the immorality of the old one. for example, gal and kligman write: “whereas communism, it was claimed, corruptly allowed the killing of foetuses, or equally corruptly cared only about increasing the labour force, postcommunist states could and should make principled, moral decisions about such matters” (29). similarly, abortion debates after the unification of west and east germany concerned issues of citizenship and representation. when east germans learned that they would lose access to abortion under west german laws, many east german men and women protested, arguing that this constituted a loss of democracy and individual rights for women. when their protests were not registered, many felt like second-class citizens in a state designed to represent west german men ( gal and kligman 2000, 24; guenther 2010, 35). gal and kligman point out that nationalist discourse pays special attention to the politics of reproduction. politicians have long had a tendency to assess the health of the state by the size of the nation (18-19). population decline is disturbing because it means that nationals are migrating out and because immigration is viewed as an undesirable means of increasing the population (29). thus, politicians focus their attention on birth rates. but nationalist discourses contain internal contradictions: because national movements are most frequently conceptualized as ‘deep horizontal (male) fraternities,’ they often implicitly adopt the logic of patrilineal systems in which women are not only the indispensible locus of continuity, but also the outsiders who must be controlled. [. . .] a classic means of such control is the regulation of women’s reproductive capacity, whether by forcing unwanted births or restricting wanted ones. (gal and kligman 2000, 26) the reforms ushered in after 1989 had a dramatic impact on women. parliaments reduced maternity leave, access to childcare, and pensions. at the same time, market liberalization brought with it the privatization and restructuring of women-dominated sectors such as healthcare, education and banking, resulting in higher unemployment for women compared to men. this, combined with unequal pay, job discrimination, and women’s overrepresentation in 4 review of european and russian affairs 7 (1), 2012 informal-sector jobs offering no benefits, resulted in the “feminization of poverty” (56, 82). even policies that did not systematically favour the male breadwinner nonetheless had disparate effects on women (73). however, despite new forms of social stratification along gender lines, the absence of gendered political discourse rendered these changes invisible and difficult to name and address. galligan, clavero, and calloni explore the absence of gendered political discourse by examining women’s representation in the political sphere. they do not define representation exclusively in terms of the number of women politicians; indeed, under socialism, women held political office at rates higher than in west european countries, but they were not democratically elected and had little real political influence (89-90, 93). on the other hand, women were quite active in pro-democracy groups and mobilized on issues of particular interest to women. unfortunately, their contributions to democratization were marginalized after the transition, and their ability to influence the political agenda on women’s issues was limited. most instances of women’s mobilization at the national level typically did not last for more than a few years after 1989. for example, poland’s solidarity trade union created a women’s section after 1989, but then disbanded it upon learning that its members supported the legalization of abortion. second, during the period of 1989-2005, the average percentage of women politicians in central eastern europe dropped from 27 percent to 17 percent, while it rose from 13 percent to 22 percent in other european union countries during this time (92). to be fair, women have moved into previously male-dominated positions in foreign affairs, trade, and interior affairs, and a few women have served as prime ministers, speaker to the national assembly, and party leaders in the czech republic, hungary, poland, and slovakia (73-74). still, the exodus of women from politics warrants explanation. galligan, clavero, and calloni identified both “supply” and “demand” barriers to women’s involvement in public office by interviewing women in the region. some supply barriers include self-inhibition, expectations of women’s family responsibilities, and negative stereotypes of women in politics. the women interviewed felt that some women would opt out of politics due to political apathy, defeatism, and the belief that politics is a dirty business belonging to a man’s world. others felt that women’s family responsibilities leave no time for political involvement. still others were intimidated by widespread stereotypes of, and negative treatment toward, women in politics. women politicians interviewed for the study said they were routinely ignored, dismissed, rebuked, and patronized by male colleagues, and that the media treated them as beauty contestants rather than as consequential politicians. moreover, the families of women in politics were closely scrutinized for any problems, which would then be blamed on the woman’s political involvement. despite these obstacles, the women interviewed did not identify discrimination as a barrier. in addition to these “supply” barriers, there are demand barriers in that women’s contributions are not valued. women are routinely relegated to low-rank positions and excluded from the informal networks male politicians use to rise up the ranks. they feel pressured to act like men to be accepted and are therefore inhibited from representing women’s interests. even when they conform, they do not receive the same level of support and investment that male candidates receive (96-101). in sum, despite political debates about issues that disproportionally affect women, women are not taking the lead in these debates. not only is there a decline in women’s political representation but also (and perhaps more importantly) gendered political discourse is resisted. the question is, why? review of european and russian affairs 7 (1), 2012 5 the power of discourse galligan, clavero, and calloni, as well as gal and kligman, argue that some feminist critiques developed in western liberal democracies are rejected in post-socialist european countries because they are premised upon historical experiences not shared by central eastern european women during the twentieth century and may propose solutions that appear irrelevant if not destructive. however, gal and kligman further argue that historical events alone do not explain the hostility toward feminism. in addition, feminism and the socialist past are discursively constructed in ways that connect and discredit both simultaneously. this section will begin by presenting gal and kligman’s discussion of some of the important differences in the historical trajectories of central eastern european countries and western liberal democracies to provide a context for their detailed discourse analysis. next, it will explore their analysis, which makes the case that the discourse surrounding the socialist past and feminism connects and undermines both. finally, it will discuss how guenther’s case study of two eastern german cities departs from the other two books in terms of empirics but supports the thesis that the discursive linkages between feminism and socialism explain hostility or receptivity to feminism. gal and kligman reconstruct the historical development of the public and private spheres in western liberal democracies and in central eastern european socialist societies to show how these spheres were differently configured and what implication such differences had for women. before introducing their analysis, it is helpful to summarize the historical backdrop against which their analysis is positioned. in western liberal democracies, the division of the public and private spheres can be traced to the advent of industrialization. whereas men occupied the public sphere and could participate actively in economic and political life, women occupied the private sphere and were deprived of political influence. this social bifurcation constructed women—as distinct from men—as a politically disenfranchised class with distinct interests born from shared collective experiences within the private sphere that were not represented by their democratic governments. one purpose of feminist mobilization was to assert women’s place in public life and to give women equal representation in democratic politics. in contrast, gal and kligman point out that pre-socialist central eastern european economies were not predicated on urban male workers and female housewives but on landless agricultural labourers of both sexes; in most cases, industrialization arrived with the advent of socialism (45). because industrialization and socialism came hand-in-hand, configurations of public and private spheres, as well as state-citizen relations, emerged that differed dramatically from those that developed in the west. this, in turn, shaped the kinds of claims women would and would not raise. gal and kligman argue that socialist states attempted to erase the public/private distinction by abolishing the private sphere completely but instead unintentionally created new divisions. socialist states defined citizens as workers first and foremost; virtually all women were required to work outside the home and all work was public. moreover, states socialized household (private) work by setting up at least rudimentary childcare facilities, public cafeterias, laundry facilities, and other means for handling household tasks, while at the same time encouraging men to help out with household chores. however, because these institutions and policies required extensive state funding, were resisted by the population, and were not enforced, women still retained sole responsibility within the home for household tasks and childrearing, while also managing the double burden of full-time employment. whereas many western liberal feminists 6 review of european and russian affairs 7 (1), 2012 sought to free women of their confinement to the private sphere so that they could fully participate in public life, central eastern european women were thrust into a public life controlled by the state and struggled to protect the private sphere. just as some activities were pushed into the public domain, others retreated to the private sphere. this was especially true of economic production and of civic and political life. low wages forced families to turn to the second economy to survive. most production occurred within the household, making the household the locus of real economic activity. both men and women participated in the second economy, and yet the household was feminized. even greater partitioning occurred within this realm, as civil and political engagement repressed in public life retreated to the private sphere. political action, resistance, and activities associated with civic life took place in the home, and these could be further subdivided into (male) resistance and (female) support (gal and kligman 2000, 47-52). state-citizen relations differed in other ways as well. most obviously, socialist states repressed political expression and violated the human rights of both men and women. women could not claim, as in the west, that they were denied democratic rights already enjoyed by men, since both were oppressed by the state. gal and kligman write: “people perceived a fundamental distinction between the state, understood as a powerful ‘they’ who ran the country, and the family, the private ‘us’ who sacrificed and suffered. the private/public distinction was mapped onto us/them in a way that departed from bourgeois logic” (50). the fact that both men and women felt oppressed by the state encouraged an ethic of collusion between them against the state. because the private sphere was seen as the only realm free from state intrusion and the locus of authentic expression, civic values, political engagement, and economic production, the private sphere was valued more highly than the public sphere. galligan, clavero, and calloni point out that the importance placed on the family as a refuge from a grey socialist public life, and on women as transmitters of culture and protectors of threatened national and religious values, reinforced women’s traditional gender roles, while also raising their authority within the home. strong and feminine women were idealized, and “feminization” became a form of political dissent (23-24). in contrast, public politics came to stand for oppression, not freedom. thus, gal and kligman explain that the motto “the personal is political” alarmed some central eastern european women, who thought that bringing politics into the private sphere would not bring democracy and fairness into the family, but “surveillance, corruption, and humiliation into the home, destroying the only social arena that, despite its actual problems, seemed to many a realm relatively free from state intrusion” (101). another significant point is that the socialist state claimed to have fully emancipated women, although the reality did not live up to the ideal. socialism promised women full employment, pregnancy and maternity leaves; the state provided paid leave to attend to children’s needs, children’s allowances, childcare and afterschool care, access to birth control and abortion; liberal divorce laws enabled women to retain their children and housing; and many household tasks were socialized. in many ways, such policies did equalize gender relations. women under socialism did not experience some of the forms of discrimination decried by western feminists such as exclusion from the workforce. moreover, women were not dependent on men but on the state (gal and kligman 2000, 5). however, some forms of inequality remained: low and unequal pay, sex segregation that pushed women toward unchallenging jobs in traditionally female sectors, no possibility for advancement, and no possibility to opt out of the workforce to avoid the “double burden.” despite these problems, the party line was that women were fully review of european and russian affairs 7 (1), 2012 7 emancipated and no one could claim otherwise without undermining the state. thus, many women’s primary experience of “state feminism” was negative: it was imposed from above, poorly carried out, and hypocritical. to summarize, gal and kligman argue that the collective experience of women under socialism differed substantially from that of women in western liberal democracies. they were not excluded from the workplace, and the state made provisions for childcare and other forms of labour traditionally assumed by women. women were politically disenfranchised, but so were men; they felt victimized as ungendered citizens of socialist states, not as women. nor were women economically dependent on men; both worked, and both were mutually dependent on each other to cover basic household expenses from their meagre wages. the private and public spheres were differently constructed such that the private sphere was more highly valued than the public one, increasing women’s status within the home rather than diminishing it. finally, socialist states claimed to have officially emancipated women. however, many women were ambivalent about the forms such emancipation took. the authors insist that divergent historical experiences alone do not explain hostility to feminism. rather, this hostility can be explained by the way in which feminism is discursively constructed. for example, western feminism was portrayed in central eastern europe by its most negative, simplistic, and discredited stereotypes and consequently rejected out of hand (gal and kligman 2000, 103). as a result, western feminism is viewed either as a bourgeois foreign import or as an ideology opposed to men, family, and femininity (galligan, clavero, and calloni 2007, 28, 82; guenther 2010, 42). this contradicts local discourses emphasizing the need for cooperation between men and women against the state to protect family life from state intrusion. in more recent times, the fact that most women’s non-governmental organizations in central eastern europe are funded by western donors has led some to criticize western feminists for taking the same top-down approach used by socialist states (galligan, clavero, and calloni 2007, 82). perhaps most damning is the way that regional discourses view feminism as inextricably bound to socialism. some argued that since socialism had already emancipated women, there was no need for feminism (galligan, clavero, and calloni 2007, 56, 82). others associated feminism with socialism’s more negative qualities, ridiculing both. because women’s equality was imposed top-down without grassroots support, it was discredited as unauthentic, unnatural, and oppressive. socialist states created women’s organizations and quotas for women politicians, but these did not increase women’s substantive representation. instead, women’s organizations were used to rally support for the regime and the party, and women politicians were viewed as mere tokens without any real political influence, much less a mandate to represent the interests of a democratic polity. such institutions undermined the project of women’s emancipation, delegitimized women’s activism, equated feminism with the repression of democracy, freedom, and human rights and made it difficult for people to take feminist discourse seriously (galligan, clavero, and calloni 2007, 56, 72, 82; gal and kligman 2000, 101). moreover, the special policies for women sometimes worked against them. gal and kligman note: “in hungary and the german democratic republic women were increasingly accused – as much by system critics as by system supporters – of being unfairly advantaged, denatured, and perverted by their alignment with the state” (52). in short, for most of the twentieth century, feminism was wedded to the state, and this forced marriage was not a happy one. post-socialist discourse draws on this historic experience to argue for minimal state intervention in matters concerning family and gender relations. gal and 8 review of european and russian affairs 7 (1), 2012 kligman point out that “pension schemes and unemployment insurance receive far more sympathetic political attention than parental or child support arrangements”(70). moreover, there is a rise in conservative parties promoting “family values” that present feminism and socialism as partners in crimes against families (guenther 2010, 127; galligan, clavero, and calloni 2007, 82). in the context of the region’s political cultures, increasing the involvement of the state in women’s issues is not seen as a desirable or effective way to advance women’s interests and political representation. although there is great convergence among authors in explaining post-socialist anti-feminist sentiment, guenther’s case study offers a fascinating counterpoint. she examines feminist movements in two eastern german cities: rostock and erfurt. rostock’s feminist movement thrived whereas erfurt’s never gained traction. the research design is intriguing because guenther selected cases to induce variation on the dependent variable (presence vs. absence of a feminist movement) while controlling for country differences by selecting cities in the same country. her study reveals that the success or failure of feminist movements depends on the way feminism and the socialist past are discursively constructed. she argues “[r]ather than being repressive, under specific conditions, socialist legacies may actually be progressive, enhancing, instead of limiting, the efforts of feminist movements to achieve gender equality” (7). similarly, western feminism can be construed either positively or negatively in public discourse. her conclusions depart from the other two books in showing that socialism does not inevitably lead to an anti-feminist backlash; nonetheless, her findings reinforce the thesis that public discourse created an indissoluble bond between feminism and socialism. for example, citizens of rostock were nostalgic for some aspects of the old socialist regime, as demonstrated not only through public discourse but also by significant electoral support for refashioned communist-successor parties such as party of democratic socialism and the social democratic party (guenther 2010, 69). rising unemployment—especially for women—was an unexpected and unwelcome result of german reunification. residents accepted the notion of state intervention to remedy economic and social problems, and neo-socialist feminists who emphasized employment opportunities and programs that would help women balance work and family found attentive ears. consistent with values developed under socialism, feminists in rostock avoided discourses that pitted women against men, instead emphasizing cooperative collaboration. additionally, feminists linked their claims to the city’s pre-socialist history. rostock is a port city on the baltic sea that has a centuries-long tradition of women working and managing households alone during their husbands’ long absences at sea. feminists’ advocacy for equal employment opportunities and programs that would help women balance work and family did not seem particularly “socialist,” since they tapped into gender roles developed over centuries (guenther 2010, 61, 187). guenther elaborates: “in some other post-socialist areas, the socialist family model was received as a state-imposed emancipation of women and emasculation of men. this was not the case in rostock, where the gdr’s model of gender relations was congruent with existing local practices and traditions” (61). finally, feminists in rostock linked their claims to eu accession and to neighbours such as sweden. instead of delegitimizing feminism as a foreign western import, this strategy legitimized it by tapping into the city’s identity as an outward-looking port open to exchanging review of european and russian affairs 7 (1), 2012 9 ideas with other european countries, particularly neighbouring baltic states (guenther 2010, 72, 90-99). rostockers’ acceptance of state involvement in women’s issues made them receptive to eu programs that emphasized women’s employment and gender mainstreaming (87-90). in contrast, erfurt rejected its socialist legacy and aligned with western german models rather than swedish models. restructured socialist parties received negligible electoral support, and neo-socialist feminism was discredited. the feminist movement in erfurt was splintered into two groups: conservative feminists aligned with the christian democratic union and radical feminist aligned with western german feminism. neither of these gained traction in erfurt, and their competition with each other prevented the formation of a strong coalition necessary to win the city’s support (110, 145). moreover, women’s organizations in erfurt did not seek funding from the european union in part because european union programs emphasizing employment and gender mainstreaming did not resonate with them (157-158). guenther’s study shows the importance of public discourse in shaping support for feminism. the greatest strength of her analysis is its identification of critical causal mechanisms and processes such as the relative strength or weakness of electoral support for restructured socialist political parties, the degree of tradition, conservativism and religiosity in a particular location, the ability of a feminist movement to link its claims to local traditions, the city’s geography and the neighbours with whom the movement aligns itself, and the movement’s ability to scale-shift up and across. however, her explanation of the causal link between erfurters’ religiosity and lack of support for feminism is confusing given the evidence she presents. for example, guenther (111-112) notes that women’s groups in erfurt got their start meeting in churches. this suggests that churches were at least nominally supportive of women’s organizing. additionally, rostockers named their women’s centre after the beguines, a medieval women’s lay roman catholic community. if religious traditions were so detrimental to feminist movements in erfurt, why did feminist organizations draw upon them? reflections on gender ideologies and discourses the three books reviewed in this article share a tendency to examine gender ideologies by examining feminism. this presents an analytical problem because it artificially constricts the universe of cases to two types of cases: those where feminism is absent, and those where it is present. this renders invisible a wide range of gender ideologies. while all authors sensed there was more to the story and touched upon masculinism, conservatism, anti-socialism, and religiosity, what is needed is a broad analytical framework encompassing a wider range of gender ideologies and linking them to governing ideologies. this is particularly important if we seek to construct concepts that travel, for, as gal and kligman point out, “western feminists seemed to have forgotten that far from being an exception, the case of east central europe is fairly typical: large feminist movements are rare in the world” (99). georgia duest-lahti’s (2008) spectrum of gender ideologies could be useful in this regard. she defines gender ideologies as “structured beliefs and ideas about ways power should be arranged according to social constructs associated with sexed bodies. it is ideas about how gender and power should be put into action” (160). she proposes a spectrum of gender ideologies along the dimensions of feminalism and masculinism, where feminalism is defined as an ideology “that begins from and generally prefers that which is associated with human females, often conferring advantages on them that can include equality with males,” while its counterpart, 10 review of european and russian affairs 7 (1), 2012 masculinism, is defined as an ideology “that begins from, and generally prefers, that which is associated with human males, usually giving advantages to them, and may include the option of gender equality as advantageous” (174, 183). she demonstrates how these dimensions can elucidate gender politics in the united states by identifying twelve families within these dimensions arranged according to their affinity with governing ideologies from the left to the right of the political spectrum (176). for example, at the far political left of the spectrum is social democrat feminism and enlightened left masculinism, while at the far political right of the spectrum is new right feminalism and new patriarchism (176). this typology is not intended to be universal and can be adapted to various contexts to show how feminalism and masculinism encompass a range of gender ideologies that offer researchers a lens through which to see a more complete picture of gender ideologies. duest-lahti’s (2008) conceptualization of gender ideologies offers several important insights worth highlighting. first, masculinism and feminalism are interrelated dimensions; to understand one, we must examine both. so often masculinism remains invisible to researchers because it is the hegemonic norm against which feminalism appears aberrant. placing masculinism at the front and centre of analyses of gender politics enables us to better understand and question political behaviour (duest-lahti 2008, 165). indeed, galligan, clavero, and calloni, as well as gal and kligman, describe transformations that point to the increasing influence of masculinism in post-socialist politics. a more detailed investigation of masculinist discourses would offer a more complete explanation of popular resistance to feminism. second, the spectrum sensitizes us to the range of feminisms constituting feminalism, reducing the risk of faulty analyses due to having overlooked particular varieties of feminism. at the same time, it offers “a means to take seriously pro-woman political thought by women who do not consider themselves feminists” (duest-lahti 2008, 190). such a conceptualization is better suited for examining black womanist thought and postcolonial pro-woman thought (190). it could be particularly useful for investigating gender politics in predominantly catholic countries such as poland with a long tradition of marianism, a current political scene in which women politicians are most prominent in conservative right-wing parties, and a civil society featuring women’s groups aligned with the catholic church. a major strength of the works reviewed here is their detailed investigation into the ways that discourse shapes behaviour. analyses of public discourses offer a deeper and richer understanding of the logic and emotions underpinning political phenomena than one would gain from, for example, survey results. nonetheless, we do not know how widely such meanings are held. moreover, generalizations applied to many countries minimize within-country variation, masking contradictory empirical evidence such as that found by guenther. this critique notwithstanding, all authors convincingly demonstrate the explanatory power of discourse. guenther’s work is particularly thought provoking in that it disentangles conflicting attitudes toward socialism and teases out their contradictory consequences for feminist discourse: whereas strong anti-socialist discourse stigmatizes feminism, the discourse of post-socialist dystopia and nostalgia for elements of the past assesses feminism more sympathetically. these analyses invite us to speculate on the implications of other potential permutations and combinations. for example, how might the discursive construction of feminism shift if it were unbound from socialism and linked to pre-socialist women’s movements or post-socialist eu accession? additionally, future research could examine the ways in which institutions and discourses interact. for example, the weakness of civil society in the region presents institutional barriers to mobilization, but this phenomenon is itself shaped by public discourses that denigrate review of european and russian affairs 7 (1), 2012 11 involvement in the public sphere. in his analysis of the weakness of civil society, howard (2003) identifies three contributing factors: mistrust in communist organizations, the persistence of friendship networks, and profound disappointment with developments of the post-socialist period, resulting in a general preference for pursuing one’s goals in the private sphere rather than the (discredited) public sphere. discourses surrounding the past shape current behaviour, including the willingness (or lack of willingness) to engage with public institutions. howard’s (2003) analysis sheds light on the reasons why “ngo feminism,” rather than grassroots, broad-based feminist movements aimed at large-scale structural transformations, has become the dominant model of feminism in the region (guenther 2011). feminist nongovernmental organizations (ngos) contribute to feminist goals largely by building up feminist civil society, offering services to women, and engaging in limited, issue specific advocacy on public policies concerning women. less, if any, effort is made to address gender inequality by mobilizing the public to engage in formal politics aimed at challenging the status quo. instead, feminist ngos work closely with eu organizations, international non-governmental organizations (ingos), and states to advance their goals. in fact, some feminist ngos have been able to garner a measure of legitimacy by tapping into the eu’s discourse on equality and by drawing upon eu expectations, policies, and programs to push for more egalitarian policies at the state level (guenther 2011, 873). returning to the metaphor of the dog that doesn’t bark, perhaps it is time to shift from asking why it doesn’t and when it will, to observing the other dogs in the pack and how they interact. acknowledgements the author would like to thank steve silvia and anonymous reviewers for their comments. references duerst-lahti, g. 2008. gender ideology: masculinism and feminalism. in politics, gender, and concepts: theory and methodology. edited by gary goertz and amy g. mazur. cambridge, ma: cambridge university press, 159–192. guenther, katja m. 2011. “the possibilities and pitfalls of ngo feminism: insights from post socialist eastern europe.” signs 36 (4): 863–887. howard, marc morjé. 2003. the weakness of civil society in post-communist europe. new york, ny: cambridge university press. tilly, charles, and sidney tarrow. 2007. contentious politics. boulder, co: paradigm publishers. correct citation: rossmiller, ela. 2012. “review essay: gender politics in post-socialist central eastern european states.” review of european and russian affairs 7 (1): 1–11. published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada. available online at: www.carleton.ca/rera/ rera is an electronic academic peer-reviewed journal that publishes graduate, post-graduate, and young scholarly works. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is a joint project supported by the canada-europe transatlantic dialogue—a cross-canada research network supported by the social sciences and humanities research council of canada (sshrc)—along with the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies (carleton university) and its associated research unit, the centre for european studies. rera aims to provide an accessible forum for research, to promote high standards of research and scholarship, and to foster communication among young scholars. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada tel: +01 613 520-2600 ext. 1179; e-mail: rera-journal@carleton.ca creative commons license this working paper is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial no derivs 3.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 3.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced provided the source is acknowledged. no use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes. issn: 1718-4835 © 2012 the author(s) http://www.carleton.ca/rera/ mailto:rera-journal@carleton.ca dagmar soennecken_volume 4_issue 1 review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 10 ………………………………………………………………… the growing influence of the courts over the fate of refugees dagmar soennecken abstract a number of migration scholars suggest that domestic courts have become the key protective institution for refugees. how can we explain this claim? one prominent explanation identifies group litigation as the key source of the increasing influence of the courts. how well does this explanation travel empirically? the article evaluates this explanation by examining the puzzling behaviour of german refugee ngos. they have not entered the legal arena directly (either as parties or as interveners), nor have they concentrated on developing extensive litigation campaigns. still, they are remarkably ‘judicialized’: their frequent engagement with the law in other respects has heightened their legal consciousness. why have german refugee ngos made such different choices than their north american counterparts and what do these choices tell us about the expanding influence of the courts over the fate of refugees in germany and north america? to make sense of the different choices that these organizations have made, we need to understand the role that institutional norms and procedures, in particular policy legacies, have played in directing the behaviour and identity of these groups. for a number of reasons, german refugee ngos historically have been discouraged from directly accessing the courts in favour of indirect participation. since canadian and american refugee organizations follow a pattern closer to the expectations of the (largely north american) literature on the subject, we need to be more careful in thinking through our presuppositions when constructing a theory of the worldwide expansion of judicial power. review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 11 introduction scholars of citizenship and immigration have recently begun to argue that the domestic courts have grown to become the key protective institution for immigrant aliens, including refugees, for it has been the courts that have tended to strengthen rather than deny or curtail access to rights traditionally granted exclusively to citizens (hansen, 1999:428; jacobson, 1997:13). “immigration matters across the west,” writes matthew gibney, “have been increasingly judicialized in the last few decades” (2001:12). “[the immigrant] right expansion,” christian joppke explains further, “originates in independent and activist courts, which mobilize domestic law (especially constitutional law) and domestic legitimatory discourses, often against restriction-minded, democratically accountable governments” (2001:339). this is quite a remarkable development, considering that immigration-related matters have historically been excluded from the reach of the courts in a number of advanced industrialized countries such as canada and the united states (hawkins, 1972:103; legomsky, 1987). in europe, the courts have expanded their reach, both procedurally and substantively, over immigration and refugee matters. as in north america, until the 1970s, “the handling of immigration in [france and germany] was characterized by …the arbitrary power of the administration,” as virginie guiraudon puts it, which has meant multiple, obscure regulations, often not made public and without judicial oversight (1998:298). in many european countries, this change did not go undisputed. in germany, historically home to a large number of asylum seekers, a number of commentators have long bemoaned the loss of state sovereignty in asylum matters and criticized the dominance of the judiciary and due process norms in this area (korbmacher, 1987:906). review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 12 despite the recent rise of national security concerns, the general trend towards a judicialization of the refugee determination procedure seems to be here to stay. a recently approved directive by the council of the european union reflects “a basic principle of [european] community law” that decisions taken with respect to refugee status are “subject to an effective remedy before a court or tribunal”.1 that refugee matters have been judicialized may not seem initially surprising given that refugees are governed by a number of international agreements, in particular the 1951 convention relating to the status of refugees (‘the convention’) and the 1967 u.n. protocol relating to the status of refugees (‘the 1967 protocol’). yet translating international treaties into domestic reality remains fundamentally problematic, even for states that have incorporated these agreements into domestic legislation. more precisely, international norms do not inherently mandate a judicialized refugee determination procedure. in short, international factors alone cannot explain the increasing judicialization of this policy area. how do we then explain this trend? what are the factors driving this expansion of judicial power? how exactly did such an expansion occur in these different national environments? north american scholars interested in the expansion of judicial power have identified domestic interest groups (and/or social movement) litigation as a key source of the courts increasing influence. interested in “the systematic, policy-oriented use of judicial power,” the ‘court party’ as canadian writers ted morton and rainer knopff (2000:59) have termed a variety of equality seeking, civil libertarian and post-materialist groups – is attracted to the courts for political reasons and pursues litigation opportunistically out of what they term ‘immediate self-interest,’ i.e. with goals in mind that are judged to only benefit their direct constituency (2000:63). ultimately, they, and other writers argue, it is the efforts of these groups in the courts 1 (commission of the european union 13.12.2005) see also chapter v, art. 39," appeals procedures.” for the latest comment by the eu commission on the implementation of the caes with respect to appeals, see (european communities 15.07.2004) review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 13 that have shifted political debate away from the legislative arena, where discussion reigns, into the judicial arena, where coercion is the rule, by transforming any and every political issue into a rights-based claim, thereby inflating “a policy claim with higher, indeed ultimate, moral status” (knopff & morton, 2000:155). normative implications aside, how well does this explanation travel empirically? and what do the differences we might find in applying this explanation to different national contexts and policy areas tell us about the global expansion of judicial power more generally? in this article, i evaluate the interest group explanation by critically analyzing the role that refugee support organizations play in the expanding influence of the courts over the fate of refugees in germany. my case analysis focuses on developments in germany, though the larger goal is comparative. germany is a particularly interesting case for studying the increasing influence of the courts over the fate of refugees since it is not only a federal country with a highly developed court system and an influential constitutional court, but also has traditionally been the destination of choice for a large number of asylum seekers. though germany can be characterized as a reluctant immigration state with a low refugee (geneva convention) acceptance rate, it has consistently topped the list as “the most generous country in the european community” due to the large volume of migrants it receives (devine, 1993:801). more recently, german officials have also taken the lead in shaping the harmonization of asylum procedures within the european union (‘eu’). germany, like canada and the united states, where the interest group explanation i want to examine in more detail is most popular, is likewise a federal state with influential interest groups and social movements, a high rate of litigation, a strong system of constitutional rights protection with a constitutional court whose jurisprudence has left few areas of life untouched, as donald kommers (1994:485) put it. yet in contrast to the north american literature, few review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 14 german writers have discussed interest groups and the courts in one breath, foreshadowing that a growth of judicial power in germany may have taken place without interest groups as key agents, or at least with them playing a very different role. the behaviour of german refugee support organizations (‘refugee ngos’) is indeed puzzling in comparison to their north american counterparts. refugee ngos have not entered the legal arena directly (neither as parties nor as interveners), nor have they concentrated on developing extensive litigation campaigns similar to the naacp in the united states. still, they are remarkably ‘judicialized’; their frequent engagement with the law in other respects has heightened their legal consciousness (sarat, 1990:483). why have german refugee support organizations made different choices than their north american counterparts and what do these choices tell us about the expanding influence of the courts over the fate of refugees in the two countries? my analysis suggests that german refugee support organizations have significantly contributed to the expanding influence of the courts over the fate of refugees. to understand the differences in their contribution, it is not enough to merely look at their litigation efforts, as most of the north american literature suggests. to make sense of the different choices these organizations have made, we need to understand the role that institutional norms and procedures, in particular policy legacies, have played in directing the behaviour and identity of these groups. german refugee support organizations have been historically discouraged from directly accessing the courts by the cultural script underlying access to this institution: a notion of neocorporatism, together with a set of legal rules and procedures that prevent groups from directly engaging or appearing in litigation as parties or interveners, have led these groups to not only seek other avenues of conflict resolution first, but to circumvent direct engagement with the law in favour of indirect participation. review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 15 the following argument is divided in two sections, beginning first by connecting the increasing influence of the courts over the fate of refugees to a larger debate in the social science literature on the global expansion of judicial power. i begin by showing how judicial power over the fate of refugees has expanded in germany over time. i then move on to evaluating the importance of interest groups (here also called ‘refugee support organizations’ or ‘refugee ngos’) in contributing to the growth of judicial power. the final section urges us to look beyond the case study and to continue to explore the implications of applying institutionalist approaches to a comparative study of law and public policy. overall, i suggest that we cannot make sense of the different behaviour of political actors and their effect on the growth of judicial power without taking into account the crucial, independent effect that institutions have had on the path that judicial empowerment takes in the different national contexts and policy environments. conceptualizing and explaining the growth of judicial power the recent expansion of judicial power around the globe has generated a flurry of writing, largely among legal observers based in north america. “an expansion of judicial power is under way in the world’s political systems,” noted neil tate and torbjörn vallinder in an influential collection of articles. they suggest, this development has brought about “an infusion of judicial decision-making and of court-like procedures into political areas where they did not previously reside”(1995:13). considering that as ran hirschl (2004:1) notes “more than eighty countries and … several supranational entities” have experienced this infusion of judicial power, the rising influence of the judiciary around the globe is often referred to as one of the most dramatic institutional transformations of the last century (gibson et al, 998:343; hirschl, 2004:1; tate and vallinder, 1995:5). yet establishing the empirical basis for this institutional shift is still a work in progress, particularly from a global perspective. i want to begin by distinguishing between three review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 16 different types of judicial power before moving on to a more detailed discussion of the role of interest groups and the independent effect of institutions already mentioned above. most academics interesting in tracing the growth of judicial power so far have concentrated on an expansion of the courts’ adjudicative function. the ability to settle disputes and to review legislative and executive actions (adjudicative function) is the most visible demonstration of judicial power. writers have studied the growth of this type of judicial power by assessing the depth and breadth of the increasing penetration of government policy. some writers refer to this expansion as a ‘judicialization from without’ (vallinder, 1995:16). secondly, judicial power is also transmitted and institutionalized through a set of norms and procedures. if government decision-making arenas are transformed or judicialized, often together with an increase in the presence of legally trained actors, we observe a ‘judicialization from within’ (vallinder, 1995:16). this expansion of judicial power has been less frequently studied. thirdly, judicial power can expand into the societal realm. we will either find an increase in the number of actors attracted to law and the official legal realm or societal actors transformed (or ‘judicialized’) by their encounter with law or the courts. marc galanter (1983) refers to this type of expansion as the radiating power of the law. since courts are part of the political system of government, they possess a great degree of legitimate authority, including the power of coercion. these three components are presented separately here largely for heuristic reasons. certainly in the real world, they are interrelated. judges comment on norms and procedure, the type of decision making arena will lead to new litigation involving societal actors and so on and so forth. one may even offset the other. the central point is that concentrating on judicial decisions is simply not enough to fully understand the growth of judicial power over time, especially in a comparative context. finally, there are also important limitations to the courts’ powers. for example, the often-cited lack of control over ‘sword and purse’ (trochev 2005:7, 46) is but one review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 17 important constraint on their influence. the degree of institutional independence, public and political support are further examples of important limitations on the power of the judiciary. writers studying law and the courts in the social sciences have identified a broad range of actors involved in political life as responsible for judicial empowerment, with not much agreement so far. the activities of interest groups in the courts have received particular attention. numerous authors have discussed the success or failure of these groups in court, shed light on access requirements and support structure needed, detailed a groups long-term strategies, tactics and resources and debated the impact of their involvement on social change. groups provide information about the preferences of societal actors that judges take into account when crafting their decisions. with their frequent appeal to the courts, groups not only enhance the quantity and quality of litigation, they also give the courts an increased opportunity to exercise their decisionmaking powers. they may even lobby for procedural changes, in particular due process, thereby facilitating a judicialization from within. the fact that courts have become more open to influence by organized interests also represents a “democratization of access to the courts,” notes charles epp (1998:203). this democratization does not leave these groups unaffected. courts are transmitters of important symbolic information, including norms and procedures, which confer upon parties a set of regulatory powers or “bargaining endowments,” which “enable the law to be educative even where there is no direct participation [by the party in a dispute before a court].”2 in other words, the power of the courts may be transferred to actors outside the courtroom. this type of societal empowerment will lead to changes in the actor’s attitude and behaviour. not only that, if actors are transformed in their identity or behaviour by such contact with the courts, then the judiciary’s sphere of influence or power has grown as well. 2 galanter refers to a concepts introduced by robert mnookin and lewis kornhauser in a classic article here. see (mnookin and kornhauser 1979) in (galanter 1983) review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 18 yet social movement scholars have pointed out that a movement’s identity and tactics also develop independently from state structures. as smith underlines, movements not only make demands of the state, they often also challenge the wider society’s values and culture(1999:7,15). in short, litigation is only one political tactic among many for these groups, making their involvement with the law, more particularly with litigation, less than automatic. not all groups are automatically drawn to the courts, as smith (2002:16) points out, some groups even consciously decide against litigation. alter and vargas, in their study of challenges to equal opportunity laws in britain notes that many women’s groups had shunned a litigation strategy for ideological and organizational reasons but eventually turned to one after other efforts of influencing the national political agenda failed (alter and vargas, 2000:457). historic institutionalists further note that the past “informs how political actors define what they want to accomplish,” as katzenstein put it (1996:ix). timing and sequencing of actions and events matter; previously enacted policies (or ‘policy legacies’) imprinted themselves on the identity of political actors to such an extent that some choices become much more viable than others (and thus influences behaviour). moreso, opportunities for change do not occur in a vacuum. in the end, political actors bring about this change by choosing a certain path of action over another based on a set of institutional norms and procedures imprinted on them over time. ultimately, an expansion of judicial power will occur only slowly over a long period of time, notwithstanding more dramatic change at critical junctures. the evolved institution represents a gradual adjustment (via a process of institutional ‘layering’ or ‘conversion’) to the cultural script underlying the institution (i.e. the shared norms and procedures that allow a society to function) but not necessarily the will of its creators (thelen, 2004: 225ff). review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 19 the expanding influence of the courts over the fate of refugees in germany german courts play a vital role in all aspects of today’s refugee determination process. refugees support organizations play an equally important role as most refugee claimants are particularly dependent on external support to make sense of the bureaucratic maze that is the refugee determination process and, if necessary to launch an appeal of their (initially unsuccessful) claim in the courts.3 with respect to the courts, their jurisprudence has shaped all substantive aspects, from the definitions (i.e. who is considered a refugee? what is political persecution?) to the procedural side (i.e. what rules and procedures are used to determine refugee status?). as appeal bodies, administrative courts (‘verwaltungsgerichte’) around the country are involved in reviewing the initial status determination by the federal office for the recognition of refugees (‘bundesamt für flüchtlinge und migration’) and removal orders. asylum law cases makes up over 50 percent of the business of administrative courts in germany today a weighty presence indeed that has only increased with the coming into force of germany’s first anti terrorism act (‘terrorismusbekämpfungsgesetz’) in 2001. numerous disputes have made it all the way to the federal constitutional court (‘bundesverfassungsgericht’) due to a constitutional right to asylum added to the german basic law (‘grundgesetz’) in 1948. in 1995, refugee cases brought before the federal constitutional court peaked at an all time high of 1192 submissions, representing 20 percent of all cases brought before the court that year. viewed over time, the courts’ expanding influence mirrors major shifts in germany’s approach to asylum. major policy changes were typically reactive, driven by changes in migrant flows and later on, an increasing politicization of the asylum issue and even violence against foreigners, including refugees. jurisprudence not only responded to these changes but filled a void left by an executive reluctant to get into the ‘thick and thin’ of both substantive and 3 in the two countries under review here, most cases that end up in the legal system are appeals of previously denied cases. in canada, only about 2 percent of cases are government appeals, i.e. appeals of cases initially decided in the claimants favour. review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 20 procedural refugee determination issues (see for example, (renner 1987)) which lead to a judicialization from without. although a judicialization from within began in earnest during the 1960s, it was a later shift to controlling (and ultimately reducing) access to the courts for refugee claimants in the late 1970s and 1980s that not only became an important tool for parliamentarians in their battle to stem the flow of refugees to germany, it also expanded the power of the courts. judges at all levels of the administrative court hierarchy were granted more and more control over their caseload, further facilitating the reach of the courts and the law over the fate of refugees. the oldest refugee support organizations in germany are church-based agencies. they have traditionally provided varying types of social assistance to refugees upon arrival since the 1950s, yet underwent a process of politicization in the late 1970s to early 1980s due to the government’s increasingly restrictive admission procedures. in germany’s neocorporatist system of governance, they further hold a privileged status in terms of representation and access to political power. other ngos (typically those with a broader human rights mandate founded in the 1960s and 1970s, e.g. amnesty international) also turned their attention increasingly to refugee advocacy during that time (ferris, 1989:162). new ngos, specifically dedicated to refugee advocacy were also founded during that period. these ngos have comparatively less institutionalized access to political power, though the rise of the green party has offered these group a new opportunity for opposition and change. while these differences in origin and entrenchment in german society have influenced their choice of political tactics and specifically, their willingness to go to court, they have nevertheless contributed to the increasing influence of the courts over the fate of refugees. overall, in the 1950s and 1960s, courts became involved in the refugee determination procedure to clear up confusion due to a lack of executive direction on both substance and review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 21 procedure in determining asylum vis-à-vis an overzealous administration. beginning in the mid 1970s, courts served as reminders of procedural standards and historic commitments in light of increasing government restrictiveness. due to ever lower initial acceptance rates and activism by the federal representative for asylum (‘bundesbeauftragter für asylangelegenheiten), administrative courts (in particular administrative courts of the first instance) became a de-facto step in the determination procedure in the 1980s, since under the basic principles of german administrative law, the administrative courts possess the power to re-hear a case in its entirety, i.e. they can re-assess existing facts, consider new evidence and call witnesses if they deem it necessary (par. 86 ff vwgo, par. 74-83 b asylvfg). though the constitutional amendment negotiated at the end of 1992 was interpreted as an ‘expression of the executive’s deep distrust of the courts’ by some (plaff cited in bosswick, 1995:51) it only partly succeeded in reducing the influence of the courts since the amendment concentrated on reducing access to the determination procedure but did not substantially alter the norms and procedures governing it. still, many refugee activists argue that the constitutional amendment represents a paradigm shift because it started a more conservative period in the rulings of the federal constitutional court.4 not only that, the centre of policy initiatives in the area of immigration and asylum shifted to the eu level. the eu argue some observers, was in fact crucial for subsequent policy changes because it serves as a moderator and an creator of independent norms and expectations. although it is easy to imagine that the judicialization of the german refugee determination procedure is anchored in the constitutional right to asylum put in place in 1948, this provision would have been of little effect later without the procedural guarantees put into place earlier on which assured access to the administrative court system for refugee claimants, together with an expansive interpretation of said constitutional provision by the federal 4 this was the unanimous conclusion drawn from a number of interviews i conducted with various ngo activists between july and september 2002. review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 22 constitutional court. in fact, the 1953 asylum decree completely ignored the constitutional provision and referred instead to the geneva convention, which began a long period of diverging interpretations over the proper scope of protection that was ultimately not resolved until the federal administrative court (‘bundesverwaltungsgericht’) finally ruled on it in 1983. the 1953 legislation also created the federal office and placed it in charge of refugee determination. the local administrative court in ansbach, and the bavarian administrative court were put in charge of any appeals. during this early period (1953 to 1972), germany saw only a small, annual flow of refugees of 5,000 (1950s and 60s) to 8,000 (mid 1970s). early on, traditional ‘free’ welfare organizations, such as the caritas, the social policy and welfare arm of the catholic church in germany, became involved in offering support to refugees. an important step to a judicialization from within was laid with the 1965 foreigner’s act (‘ausländer gesetz’). it created a quasi-judicial process for judging asylum applications (independent jury with one chairperson and two lay members) and also offered rejected claimants an appeal option at the federal office before further action was taken up the judicial appeal ladder of the administrative courts. the late 1970s and early 1980s saw a first dramatic peak in refugee flows (in 1980, around 107,000), largely refugees from outside the eu (e.g. turkey) and from asia (e.g. vietnam, chile, thailand), the latter brought in through special amnesty programs (‘kontingentflüchtlinge’). during this period (1972-1987), the government’s and the german public’s response to the flow of asylum seekers gradually changed from accommodation to deterrence. a key decision of the federal administrative court in 1971 signifies this accommodation: the ‘republikflucht’ decision allowed more (communist) refugees from eastern europe recognition and status (bverwge v.26.10.71,“republikflucht”). similarly, in 1975, asylum seekers from eastern europe were issued work permits, although the government had just stopped issuing the same to guest workers in 1973 (höfling-semnar, 1995: 11). refugee support review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 23 organizations responded to the increased flow of refugees by expanding the service they offered. aided by funding from a 1979 federal refugee program, the number of lawyers employed by the caritas alone tripled between the 1970s and the 1980s ((e.v. 1985)). yet it did not take long for the political tide to turn. first violent attacks on foreigners appeared. the discourse (in government and in public) also shifts to a language that increasingly focused on asylum abuse and criminalized asylum seekers. government measures in the late 1970s and early to mid 1980s (shortly before and after kohl’s cdu took power in 1982) were aimed at dramatically reducing the flow of asylum seekers into germany. work permits were permanently denied in 1980, and housing and social benefits made less attractive. carrier restrictions and visa requirements were increased. jurisprudence did not necessarily follow this trend: for instance, the 1980 and the 1987 ‘ahmadi’ decisions by the federal constitutional court clarified treatment of religious minorities and changes in an asylum seekers circumstances after leaving the country (bverfge 54, 341-36; bverfge 76, 143-170). but key measures of the 1978 and the 1980 acceleration laws (‘beschleunigungsgesetz’) also lead to a further judicialization from within. administrative courts significantly expanded their scope of influence in 1978 when the government decided to decentralize the processing of refugee appeals and distribute decision-making for the first instance to administrative courts country-wide. subsequently, individual judges at each level of the appeal ladder gained substantial control over the fate of refugee claimants through the introduction of special leave requirements, the creation of a ‘manifestly unfounded’ category and the institution of single judge panels. interestingly, the return of bureaucratic control over the refugee determination procedure with the introduction of independent decision-making officers (‘einzelentscheider’) in 1980 would in the long run only strengthened the influence of the courts, as the high number of negative decisions at the bureaucratic level led to a large number of appeals. review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 24 ngos responded to the turning tide, both at the local, state and national level. for instance, in 1980 the berlin refugee council was founded. it has its origins in a number of meetings organized by the foreign aid committee of the protestant churches in the region of berlin-brandenburg. these meetings attracted a diverse audience, ranging from affected migrants to social workers, church representatives, to more ‘radical’ refugee activists5 and local politicians and eventually, a loose coalition of individuals and representatives of organizations formed that began to get involved in refugee politics. the caritas refugee lawyers’ network also expanded further. in 1982, it started offering legal aid funds. in 1985, the program was further expanded with funds from unhcr and additional support from the german red cross, having previously gained support from the diakonie, the german protestant church’s welfare arm. in 1986 a national working group for refugees, pro asyl (‘pro asylum’) was founded, that began to successfully employ different techniques for attracting public attention than other refugee support groups, in particular vivid ad campaigns and direct use of the media, and quickly attracted significant amounts of funding (donations/membership dues). the subsequent period between 1987 and 1996 represented a key turning point in the relationship between the german legislature and the courts in the area of refugee policy. arguably, it was the most dramatic engagement of the legislature and the judiciary on the issue thus far. after an extended period of sticking its head in the sand and letting the judiciary guide the way (korbmacher, 1987),6 german legislators finally asserted their authority in a policy area dominated by a murky historical legacy of intolerance and exclusion, though not necessarily to the benefit of the claimants. the kohl government began this engagement by arguing that changing art. 16 was inevitable and in fact, the only solution to the german asylum problem, yet 5 there is a word for these more radical activists in german (‘autonome’) that connotes their extremely critical attitude to ‘established’ organizations, their ideological position, their goals and tactics. for a discussion of similar organizations in the british context see kaye, 1992. 6see also sendler (1987) who calls the dominant perception of substantively regulating refugees by the legislature a “forbidden act,” although legal experts agreed that there was in fact room to act for the legislature. review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 25 without the support of the opposition, this was not possible according to the german rules of constitutional amendment. yet after a period during which violent attacks against foreigners increasingly made the headlines and the number of refugee claimants kept rising (reaching an all time high in 1991), politicians of all political stripes began to engage in a heated debate. this eventually led to a compromise between the parties and a constitutional amendment of art. 16 of the german basic law in december 1992. previously an amendment of this article was considered an absolute taboo, yet it slowly moved to the centre of the debate as some saw it as the cause of all evil that had paralysed the government, preventing it from making substantive, rather than merely procedural changes to its asylum policy and legislation.7 the amendment allowed the german government to fully implement three key diversion policies based on recently concluded conventions with its european neighbours. this in effect shifted some power away from the courts towards border officials and other neighbouring states. yet ultimately, the amendment was more about preventing asylum seekers from reaching german soil and from distributing the burden among the eu member states, than about reducing the influence of the courts. first, the so called ‘airport procedure’ holds most claimants at the point of entry (especially those from ‘safe country of origin’ and those without proper documentation) and severely limits their access of recourse mechanisms (by imposing extremely short time limits on the claimant) in case of a negative decision while increasing the threat of deportation, prompting some ngos to start up emergency legal services at major airports (heinhold, 2000:41). the so-called ‘safe third country’ provision basically refuses to accept all claims by those arriving from neighbouring countries. although an appeal exists, similar time limits have been put in place. the federal constitutional court, in a trilogy of cases, 7 a prominent berlin senator publicly campaigned against the power of the courts over asylum. in a chapter in his book titled “the paralyzed parliament – how our asylum law became judge-made law,” he states: “no other parliament in the world has had its ability to act taken away in such an important policy area.” see lummer, 1992. review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 26 subsequently sanctioned this constitutional amendment in 1996.8 ngos and other refugee advocates agree that the constitutional amendment has made it much more difficult to obtain asylum in germany (bosswick, 1994) . observers have argued that the sanctioning of the constitutional amendment in 1996 represented a paradigm shift in german asylum policy in a number of respects. while refugee activists reacted with shock and exhaustion to the change, politicians were glad to have the asylum question out of the headlines for a while.9 since 1996, the main impetus for policy change has come from discussions around the harmonization of asylum proceedings in the eu. the change to a green/social democratic government in 1998 also lead to a number of policy changes, notably the introduction of an immigration law (‘zuwanderungsgesetz’) in 2001.10 evaluating the impact of refugee support organizations: refugees are particularly dependent on external support to make sense of the bureaucratic maze called the refugee determination process and, if necessary to launch an appeal of their (initially unsuccessful) claim in the courts.11 the circumstances of their departure may not have allowed them to prepare for navigating a complex bureaucratic procedure in a foreign country, language and culture, let alone to transfer sufficient funds for a lawyer or a potential court challenge.12hence, refugee claimants often turn to supportive organizations (e.g. exile communities or other refugee support organizations) or family members and friends already in the host country for help. this external support becomes even more important if the refugee 8 for a discussion of the decisions see for example hailbronner, 1996. 9 interview with ngo activist, 22. august, 2002. interview with refugee lawyer, 20. september, 2002. 10 entered into force january 2005. for a critical evaluation, see pelzer, 2005; roßkopf 2001. 11 in germany, the number of government appeals of initially successful cases is substantial, some estimate it to be as high as 60 percent because the government pursues a much more aggressive litigation strategy via the federal commissioner for asylum affairs (‘bundesbeauftragter’). for some of the controversy around this office and estimates of appeal rates, see heinhold, 2000; liebaut 2000. 12 for a detailed discussion of the cultural and psychological difficulties refugee claimants face after arrival see for example, laier 1999 ; macklin 1997. review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 27 receiving state is a reluctant state of immigration, as is germany. ngo representatives point out that over the years, german state officials have closed down most of the traditional avenues of communication with refugee support organizations, though the change in government in 1998 seemed to reverse this trend somewhat.13 historically, restrictive standing laws have also prevented german refugee support organizations (or ‘ngos’) from directly entering the legal arena as parties or interveners.14 more surprisingly perhaps, refugee support organizations have also not developed litigation campaigns similar to the naacp behind the scenes.15 instead, german refugee support groups have founded a refugee lawyers’ network and regularly send affiliated lawyers to court on their behalf to provide expert testimony. these groups also fill a gap in the official system by taking on the role of legal aid providers, with the operation of (albeit limited) private legal aid funds since government-funded legal aid is not only insufficient but also very hard to come by.16 some groups with the relevant expertise also furnish courts directly with expert advice on country conditions. all in all, groups not only connect refugee claimants with affiliated (and funded) lawyers, regularly educate their own staffers and others as part of a broad refugee advocacy network on the latest developments in refugee case law, they also hold seminars and conferences to train judges and bureaucrats – mostly without appearing in the official legal realm themselves.17 13 this is a historical assessment and does not mean that no communication exists. for example, the federal office and the department of foreign affairs both participate in working groups on asylum questions (‘gesprächskreis’ or ‘arbeitsgemeinschaft’). moreover, communicating does not imply listening. 14 these restrictive standing laws are not based in germany’s civil law system. other civil law systems, for instance the netherlands, have developed interest group litigation similar to north america. see groenendijk 1985. 15 interview with refugee lawyer, 20. august, 2005 16 for more detail, see dagmar soennecken, "justice served?" legal aid and access to the courts for refugees in a comparative context” (paper presented at the annual meeting of the law & society association, chicago, june 2004). 17 there is very little published on their activities in academic journals. for an example of ngo publications discussing their activities, see (ism, 2001. see also dagmar soennecken, “the judicialization of refugee support organizations in germany” (paper presented at the annual meeting of the law & society association, las vegas, nevada, june 2005). review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 28 in light of a reluctant and unresponsive state, it would be easy to imagine that german refugee support organizations would have turned to the courts, as the north american literature would suggest. the obvious explanation for the differences would be differences in standing laws. german standing laws have indeed posed a significant barrier for interest groups participation in the courts. yet not only have similarly restrictive standing laws been challenged and subsequently softened somewhat, standing only refers to direct participation in a lawsuit. german intervention rules are less restrictive, yet there is no evidence to suggest that organizations have obtained access to the courts in this manner either. nor have they been particularly concerned with mounting litigation campaigns behind the scenes. what else explains their choices? i will first make the case for germany as a reluctant state of immigration before moving on to a discussion of germany’s standing laws. subsequently, i want to suggest that the answer to their behaviour can be found in germany’s neocorporatist heritage. german refugee ngos face a historically reluctant immigration state, as exemplified in germany’s low acceptance rates for refugee claimants and in the government’s historic disinclination to consider germany a country of immigration (joppke,1999). government officials have also done their utmost to use the fact that the refugee determination procedure is highly front-loaded and path-dependent to their advantage, trying for the most part to obtain a refugee claimant’s story of flight ‘fresh’ and uncoached as quickly as possible and ideally, without prior consultation with a lawyer or ngo representative, officially because they believe that this practice aids in assessing the credibility of the claimant. in reality, however, contradictions between evidence obtained early on in the determination process and statements made later on in the process are often used against the claimant, without taking into consideration possible trauma, exhaustion and cultural differences.18 the ‘reluctant state’ stance is further exemplified by the fact that refugee claimants entering germany via air are contained by the 18 for a similar discussion in the canadian context, see macklin, 1997. review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 29 border police and a first assessment of the case takes place right at the airport, making it difficult for outsiders, be they relatives, lawyers or ngo staff, to access get them. however, the transit area of the frankfurt airport is also home to the airport social welfare office (‘flughafensozialdienst’), which is operated collaboratively by the welfare branches of germany’s two major churches. it functions as an important point of reference for refugee claimants, offering advice about everything from procedure to contacting a lawyer to applying for legal aid, if time permits.19 once in the country, refugee claimants are not only forbidden from working while their claim is being assessed, they also need to spend at least the first two months (max. three months) of their (official) stay in the country in a government-operated reception centre, although they are eligible for welfare and (at least technically) legal aid. while at the centre, their freedom of movement is restricted, often times making it more difficult to meet with a lawyer or others interested in assisting them with their claim.20 as a consequence of these practices, refugee claimants coming to germany often do not come into contact with refugee ngo representatives until close to their determination hearing or even until their all important first hearing is already over. a prominent refugee lawyer noted that since a number of procedural changes implemented with the constitutional amendment in 1993, most of his clients do not come to him until after the hearing before the federal office for the recognition of refugees (bafl), leaving him to do mainly ‘damage control.’21 as a result, many german refugee ngos have increasingly concentrated on increasing the refugee claimant’s knowledge about the highly complex determination procedure – whenever they 19 the office started operations in 1975 with the mandate similar to traveler’s aid. however, over the years the office has increasingly catered more and more to refugee claimants. as a consequence, it also obtains funds from both the state of hesse and the frankfurt airport authority to be able to better fulfill the growing need in this area. for a detailed discussion of the airport procedure and the function of the airport’s social welfare office, see laier, 1999. 20 for a critique of the reception centres, see for example heinhold 2000; joppke 1999. 21 interview with refugee lawyer, 19. september, 2002. review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 30 can get access to the refugee claimant. indeed, over time, german refugee ngos have become judicialized themselves; as their engagement with the law on behalf of refugee claimants has not only politicized them but also transformed their relationship with the law. instead of leaving legal matters entirely to outsiders (i.e. ngo friendly lawyers) and concentrating on traditional ngo functions of reception and integration of newcomers, they have not only made themselves very knowledgeable about refugee law and the asylum procedure, including court appeals, but have reoriented their behaviour and organization towards law and the courts. still, unlike many of their north american counterparts, they have not entered the legal arena directly, nor have they mounted substantial litigation campaigns behind the scenes.22 as a prominent refugee lawyer put it when asked to reflect on the surprising lack of legal mobilization around the 1992 constitutional amendment: i spent some…time thinking about the surprising fact that the german refugee movement, lawyers etc. did not prepare itself better and with more concentration for the legal fight before the federal constitutional court…i think that a more concerted effort would not have achieved anything anymore, since the main groups in society had already yielded to the pressures of the political pundits and election fighters. in some sense our behaviour in germany was a reflection of the reality: the fight was already lost.23 this observation already suggests that standing laws are not the true reason for the lack of legal mobilization in the courts. the cause can be found in an older pattern of how conflicts are resolved in german society. i will now turn to a discussion of germany’s standing laws before moving on to a discussion of the importance of germany’s neocorporatist legacy for shaping the choices of refugee support organizations. under german standing laws the ability of interest groups to launch a lawsuit of their own is severely limited. the fundamental principle behind this restrictive stance is wariness towards excessive litigating which may arise from allowing “popular” or citizen suits (“popularklagen”). 22 the legal advisors’ conference (‘rechtsberaterkonferenz’), constituted of refugee lawyers, meets four times a year. the board discusses political demands and legal strategy. even lawyers participating in the network remarked that the conference serves more as a place to exchange information and are less of a forum for legal strategizing. interview with refugee lawyers, 19. and 22. september, 2002. 23 personal written communication with refugee lawyer dated 21.august, 2002. review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 31 german law is based on a very strong individual rights principle, which constitutionally guarantees access to the courts (and by extension standing to sue) only to those individuals whose personal rights have been violated by a government authority (art 19 (4) gg). this does not mean that organizations cannot sue. but they must conform to the same standards as an individual person, which in administrative law means that they have to demonstrate that an administrative action has injured them in their personal rights in order to gain standing to sue (par. 42 (2) vwgo). someone whose broad economic, cultural, ideational or political interests only have been affected will regularly not be granted standing to sue, unless legislation allows for an exception.24 however, under certain circumstances so called ‘neighbour’ suits or ‘third party’ suits allow for someone affected by the actions of a neighbour to launch a law suit if they can demonstrate a legitimate (and personal) danger to them emitted from the neighbour’s actions, for example if there are plans to build an alternative energy (power) station nearby.25 germany has undergone a liberalization of standing laws, similar to other western european countries, although environmental groups and local citizen associations have not managed to transform the law of standing more generally (greve, 1998:197). the environmental movement, greve argues, has been at the forefront of attempts to liberalize standing laws to initiate group-based litigation for strategic purposes. judges exercised their power to grant standing to sue by either allowing or not allowing ngos to launch legal challenges in this area or by gradually expanding the definition of ‘neighbourhood.’ eventually, legislators created limited opportunities for grassroot ngos to become involved in specific laws, primarily concerning environmental protection and construction. however, after this period of moderate expansion in the 1970s, german legislators and administrative courts (in whose turf environmental battles 24 see discussion in schmidt, 1998; greve 1989. 25 apparently, the construction of windmills to generate alternative (wind) energy particularly in the north of germany has lead to a flurry of lawsuits by neighbours. see for example vg oldenburg decision 23.07.01, az.: 4 b 1916/01; vg oldenburg decision 27.03.03, az.: 4 a 4333/00. see also ovg rheinland-pfalz, decision 01.03.05, 8 a 11492/04.0vg/5 k 173/03.tr. review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 32 were fought) and legislators grew increasingly reluctant to further liberalize standing laws in administrative law. some highly publicized cases, for example about the viability of nuclear reactors were argued all the way up to the federal constitutional court, yet without the direct involvement of environmental groups (see 49 bverfge 89 (“kalkar”),greve,1989). interestingly, no other groups have stepped into the fold demanding standing to sue in other policy areas since, despite considerable public debate and a favourable political climate for making changes to the standing laws at the time. germany’s provisions for obtaining intervener status may (muldoon, 1989)also shed light on the choices interest groups make. intervention as a ‘friend of the court’ under the common law and under most procedural court rules in canada and the united states allows a ‘friend’ (as opposed to a ‘party’) to offer assistance to the court, often in the form of the right to make (written) representations before the court (muldoon, 1989: 4). intervener rules can thus represent important ‘push’ or ‘pull’ factors for interest group participation in the courts. although german law generally recognizes the conception of intervention or ‘co-invitation’ (‘beiladung’) to an ongoing case, it does not know intervention as a friend of the court (amicus curiae). suffice it to say here that the absence of this provision does not prevent german courts from consulting with experts of their choice either orally or by requesting their written opinion, yet the absence of such a provision eliminates a popular north american avenue for direct interest group participation in court proceedings.26 german administrative law does however recognize the concept of ‘added party intervention,’ which is also known in canadian (and american) law, yet not discussed in the judicial empowerment literature. this type of intervention is more powerful than amicus 26 it would be difficult and labour intensive to get a quantitative and qualitative understanding of the number and kinds of people consulted by the courts as they only appear in judgments if the judge writing the decision refers to them in the summary of the proceedings, which may or may not be the case. the same goes for interveners. see par. 87, 93a, 96, 97 vwgo for recruitment of experts before the administrative courts, par. 404 ff. zpo for expert involvement before civil procedure courts and par. 27a, 28 and 29 bverfgg for expert opinions to assist the federal constitutional court. par. 65 and 66 vwgo govern intervention before the administrative courts and par. 64 to 66 zpo interventions before civil procedure courts. review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 33 curiae intervention in that it grants party status to the former ‘stranger’, which allows the new participant to fully participate in the case. the new participant has a right to file motions and raise new issues, as long as they are in keeping with the general tenor of the case as it was set by the original parties, i.e. the added party intervener cannot dramatically change the fundamental nature of the dispute between the parties. the court is even required to invite certain parties to participate in the legal proceeding if their legal interests are affected. other parties may be added at the discretion of the court.27 in contrast to the debates about loosening the standing to sue requirements in the 1970s, there is no indication in the german literature on intervention that interest groups have tried to gain access to court proceedings by requesting ‘added party’ status. similarly, none of my interviewees even raised this point as a possible strategic option. however, a number of german interviewees confirmed that they personally or their organization had served as experts for court proceedings related to asylum seekers. indeed, this is probably the most direct form of participation for ngos, in particular affiliated refugee lawyers, before the courts in germany. note that the invitation to appear or to provide expert advice to the court is either directly made by the court or, if one of the parties requests to have an expert heard, the decision to grant the request is similarly made by the court. two other pieces of legislation need to be discussed because they directly influence the ngos and their lawyer’s engagement with the law on behalf of a client. first, persons offering legal advice must comply with the legal counselling act (‘rechtsberatungsgesetz’) from the 1930s, which grants lawyers a monopoly over offering legal advice.28 the law states that nonlawyers cannot regularly and in a “business-like fashion” offer legal advice to individuals, including refugee claimants. this law not only prevents german ngos from opening community 27 see par. 66 vwgo for details on the rights of the added party intervener. 28rechtsberatungsmissbrauchsgesetz, rgbl. i s.1478; since 1980: rechtsberatungsgesetz (rberg), bundesgesetzblatt teil iii, gliederungsnummer 303-12, veröffentlichte bereinigten fassung, zuletzt geändert durch art. 21a des gesetzes vom 21. juni 2002 (bgbl. i s. 2072). review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 34 law clinics similar to the ones found in canada and the united states, it also sets boundaries for the kind of advice staff in refugee service centres are able to provide. however, two of germany’s largest welfare organizations, caritas and diakonie, are technically not subject to the restrictions of this legislation due to a difference in the legal status of their ‘mother’ organizations, germany’s two major churches. yet ngo activists note that many of these organizations do not make ‘expansive’ use of their somewhat privileged position in this respect, i.e. they are not known to regularly push the boundaries of this legislation. according to the federal social assistance act, all of germany’s free welfare organizations are even explicitly allowed to offer advice, including legal advice, similar to government agencies, when it comes to broader matters concerning social assistance, including matters involving the alien act. however, they may not assist their client with the preparations of a court proceeding, including providing legal representation. the legal counselling act and related provisions certainly represents yet another important barrier for growth of direct ngo involvement in the courts but as we will see german refugee ngos are also not big on indirectly sponsoring test cases either. this suggests that germany’s long history of restrictive regulations of interest group participation in the courts conditions the larger behaviour and preferences of the groups in question. this excursion into standing laws is important for our discussion of the role of interests groups in the growth of judicial power because it underlines the comparative importance of the political opportunity structure to use language utilized in the study of social movements or shifts in the formal and informal structures of power relations in a given political system (mcadam, 1996:26). as a brief glance across the border to the netherlands further proves that this difference is not due to the obvious common law versus civil law system difference, as the netherlands have developed interest group litigation similar to that expected by the north review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 35 american literature, even in the area of immigration and asylum (groenendijk,1985:337-50).the discussion further underlines that the power to include participants in court proceedings remains firmly (and restrictively so) within the hands of the judges and legislators. in fact, both courts and legislators have ultimately rejected the efforts of organized interests (in particular, environmental groups) to broaden german standing laws. while it would be easy to conclude that refugee support groups have therefore not played a significant role in furthering the growth of judicial power, i want to suggest that we need to look beyond germany’s restrictive standing laws to understand their choices and ultimately, their impact on the growing influence of the courts. an older, institutionalized script about the way in which conflict is resolved has further discouraged these groups from directly entering the legal arena: germany’s neocorporatist system of governance has privileged some groups dealing with refugees over others, making them more reluctant to confront the state in the courtroom, instead preferring a different kind of opposition. in the neocorporatist model, interest groups are formally incorporated into the process of governance and therefore occupy a prominent role in state-society relations. such groups enjoy a large degree of access and influence over policy making, suggesting that they may also be less likely to want to mount litigation campaigns for political gain.29 groups in germany are organized into a few unified organizations, which are “recognized or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and controls” (schmitter, 1982: 65). large associations represent most socioeconomic forces in german society. german political parties also hold significant, traditional ties with a number of these unified organizations. this system of organization implies that certain groups will remain outside and without such institutionalized influence. germany possesses a long history of citizen 29 karen alter (2000) has recently argued that groups may actually prefer to work through political channels. review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 36 protests along with a number of strong social movements, particularly environmental groups, which have largely operated outside of the neocorporatist model. nevertheless, many scholars point to the rise of the green party as an important avenue of institutionalizing some of these protest groups and their concerns, which in turns points to a pattern of conflict solution focused on the classic, ‘political’ realm. the neocorporatist model is also evident in the administration of german welfare state policy and in the organization and incorporation of migrant groups (soysal, 1994:37). research has shown that settler societies possess stronger migrant networks, which will advocate for an expansive immigration policy alongside labour and business associations, while many european states lack such powerful migrant associations, making migrants and their supporters overall weaker political actors in european states, such as germany (freeman, 1995:441ff). germany has a history of a strong welfare state that is largely operated by a significant voluntary or ‘third’ nonprofit sector, with influential churches and powerful labour unions.30 the six organizations are: caritas (catholic), diakonie (protestant), arbeiterwohlfahrt (or awo, labour movement basis), red cross (humanitarian), the jewish welfare agency and finally the parity association, a nondenominational organization largely comprised of grass-roots, self-help groups (anheier & seibel, 2001). all were largely founded during germany’s age of industrialization but did not achieve their privileged status until the 1950s and 1960s, “when the political constellation at the time favoured a weak state and the development of a buffer zone between state and citizen,” as anheier and seibel explain (anheier & seibel, 2001:97). a 1967 decision by the federal constitutional court further entrenched the privileged position of the group of six by sanctioning the so-called ‘subsidiary principle,’ which proclaims: “the state takes on only those functions that the private sector cannot meet, and that large units, such as the central government, concern 30 as hesse and ellwein (1992) note, the two major churches react a bit ‘allergically’ to being called mere ‘interest groups,’ since they occupy a special tax and legal status. on the relationship between the churches and their welfare arms see broll, 1999. review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 37 themselves only with tasks that are beyond the capabilities of smaller units” (boeßenecker, 1998; anheier & seibel, 2001; bverfge 22, 180 (decision from 18.07.1967). compared to grassroots organizations, such as human rights groups dedicated to the cause of refugees and migrants (for example, amnesty international) as well as other grassroots organizations (i.e. pro asyl), these organizations dwarf the others in the number of refugee service centres, funding available for litigation and lawyers sponsored as part of the refugee lawyers network. the older organizations have traditionally been much more reluctant than smaller advocacy groups to confront government officials on refugee policy, as they have much more to lose (i.e. substantial government funding for their other welfare-state activities, e.g. the operation of hospitals and day-care centres), preferring instead to oppose the increasingly restrictive refugee policy more ‘indirectly,’ which includes providing funding for litigation and access to activist lawyers.31 smaller advocacy groups have opposed the state’s restrictive policy towards refugees and migrants more openly (often with the backroom support of the older refugee support organizations)32 and have further thrown their support openly behind germany’s traditional ‘protest party,’ the greens, in hope of a friendlier, more inclusive immigration policy, though some analysts have felt let down once the greens came to power.33 some human rights organizations also display a strong wariness of the courts, pointing to their conservative jurisprudence and the limited impact of their decisions on the ground. overall, the ngos involved in the refugee field in germany vary greatly in their size, level and source of funding, aims, stance and degree of influence. in fact, there is a dizzying, ever shifting array of formal organizations and associations, working groups, networks and coalitions. 31 i conducted a total of 20 formal interviews with ngo representatives, lawyers, bureaucrats and judges (lower and upper administrative court, federal constitutional court) while in germany. i also attended refugee hearings, both at the bureaucratic level and in court during which i spoke to other participants more informally. these conclusions are largely based on my interviews and on documents given to me by ngos. 32 interview with ngo activist, 6. august, 2002. 33 interview with ngo activist 22. august, 2002. review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 38 individuals are often members of multiple groups and some of the leading activists have been involved in refugee work for over 20 years. the unhcr further occupies an important position in the larger network. strengthening national ngos (also called ‘capacity building’) through financial contributions and developing a solid body of jurisprudence in “in favour of a liberal interpretation of the 1951 convention” has been part of unhcr’s strategy for years (unhcr, july 1998:19-20. not only that, unhcr holds a more advantageous position when it comes to access to government officials; their nuremberg office, for instance hold close, informal ties to officials of federal office there. according to one observer, friday afternoons are regularly used for discussing important policy issues and emergency cases with unhcr.34 although i have highlighted individual organizations in my discussion so far, it is important to see them as complimentary and overlapping members of a larger refugee network in order to fully understand their judicialization or their ‘radiating’ influence on the courts. as suggested earlier, we need to look beyond litigation to understand their transformation and their ultimate importance. many refugee ngos employ legally trained staffers and belong to formal or informal networks distributing detailed information about the latest case law developments together with related conference announcements, reports on legislative work of interest, countryspecific information, etc. many ngo staffers also meet regularly among each other and with government officials to discuss latest developments in law, politics and ngo activities. moreover, the language, publications and legal focus of these ngo networks are a key aspect of the radiating effect of the courts as described by galanter. sifting through the stacks of publications, interview notes and web page links i obtained as part of my research, i noticed repeated references to and detailed, sophisticated engagement with court decisions.35 moreover, publications distributed by the free welfare organizations dealing with immigrants other than 34 interview with government official, 10. september, 2002. 35 interestingly, the word ‘rights’ appears only infrequently. more common are the words ‘obligation’ and ‘responsibility.’ review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 39 refugees were almost free of such references. this is an important observation as it underlines significant differences in two related policy communities and it also somewhat fends off the charge of selection bias (i did set out to examine refugee ngos that focus on the law after all). although ngo activities and organization discussed here also highlight the absence of direct engagement with the courts, the centrality of law and the courts to german refugee ngos in their communicative activities is a more subtle indicators of their heightened legal consciousness. as already discussed earlier, this awareness exemplifies the radiating power of the law, which creates “bargaining endowments,” that “enable the law to be educative even where there is no direct participation [by the party in a dispute before a court].36” conclusion to sum up, german and canadian refugee support organizations have significantly contributed to the expanding influence of the courts over the fate of refugees but in a way surprising to most north american observers. to understand the differences in their contribution, it is not enough to look at their litigation efforts. organizations that have become sufficiently judicialized themselves can equally foster the growth of judicial power. to make sense of the different choices that these organizations have made, we need to understand the role that institutional norms and procedures, in particular old policy legacies, have played in directing the behaviour and identity of these groups. german refugee support organizations have been historically discouraged from directly accessing the courts by the cultural script underlying access to this institution: a notion of neocorporatism, together with a set of legal rules and procedures that prevent groups from directly engaging or appearing in litigation as parties or 36 galanter refers to a concepts introduced by robert mnookin and lewis kornhauser in a classic article here. see mnookin and kornhauser 1979, in, galanter 1983. review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 40 interveners, have lead these groups to not only seek other avenues of conflict resolution first, but to circumvent direct engagement with the law in favour of indirect participation. in a seminal piece in 1988, roger smith suggested that new institutionalism represents an important unifying force for students in public law because it balances “the dialectic of meaningful actions and structural determinants”(skocpol cited in smith, 1988:90). following smith, new institutionalism offers a theoretical and empirical avenue of inquiry that promises to overcome the existing divisions among those studying law and courts in the social sciences. a number of works have since heeded smith’s call and made important contributions to overcoming this impasse using insights from both the rational-choice and the historic institutionalist variety of new institutionalism, yet more work needs to be done, in particular in understanding the global expansion of judicial power. both the german and the canadian government at times have explicitly tried to limit the influence of the judiciary over the fate of refugees by reducing the scope of judicial review and by limiting access to the courts, with varying results. the point in engaging in a detailed analysis of the sequence of events, the changing institutional context and the behaviour of the political actors over time, is it precisely to highlight “the combined effects of institutions and process,” as pierson and skocpol (2000:693) put it, which in this case, resulted in a remarkable expansion of judicial power. review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 2/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 41 bibliography alter, karen. (2000). the european union's legal system and domestic policy: spillover or backlash? in legalization and world politics, edited by j. l. goldstein, m. kahler, r. o. keohane and a.-m. slaughter. cambridge, mass: mit press. anheier, helmut k., and wolfgang seibel. (2001). the nonprofit sector in germany: between state, economy and society. manchester, u.k.: manchester university press. boeßenecker, karl-heinz. (1998). spitzenverbände der freien wohlfahrtspflege in der brd: eine einführung in organisationsstrukturen und handlungsfelder. 2d rev. ed. münster, germany: votum. broll, berthold. (1999). steuerung kirchlicher wohlfahrtspflege durch die verfaßten kirchen. gütersloh, germany: chr. kaiser gütersloher verlagshaus. communities, commission of the european. 15.07.2004. com (2004) 503 final. communication from the commission to the council and the european parliament. a more efficient common european asylum system: the single procedure as the next step. e.v., deutscher caritasverband. 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(1987). gesetzesund richtervorbehalt im asylrecht. in festschrift für wolfgang zeidler, edited by w. fürst. berlin, germany: de gruyter. union, council of the european. 13.12.2005. council directive 2005/85/ec of 1 december 2005 on minimum standards on procedures in member states for granting and withdrawing refugee status. rajkovic nikolas_vol 4_issue 1 review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 27 ………………………………………………………………… the limits of consequentialism: icty conditionality and (non)compliance in post-milosevic serbia nikolas milan rajkovic abstract since 2000—the dusk of the milosevic-era—three successive serbian governments, the djindjic, zivkovic and kostunica administrations, have amassed an inconsistent and oscillating record of (non)compliance with eu and us conditionality for full cooperation with the international criminal tribunal on the former yugoslavia (icty). how do we explain this changing pattern of compliance and noncompliance by serbia? this paper contends that international rules and norms which attempt far-reaching institutional and social change, such as icty conditionality in serbia, will likely elicit a historical process that is multidimensional and diachronic, more politically complex than the parsimony suggested by incentives-based, model-driven theorizing. the paper argues for a more contextual and practice-oriented approach to the study of compliance politics; focusing on how material, normative and temporal dimensions interact historically to form particular compliance processes & outcomes. the empirical section uses inductive process-tracing to make a temporal reconstruction of the process and experience of serbian (non)compliance with icty conditionality during the kostunica government; focusing on the interaction between three dimensions of compliance politics: (1) strategic calculation; (2) identity & cultural resonance; and (3) temporality. keywords: conditionality, compliance, serbia, european enlargement and international criminal tribunal on the former yugoslavia (icty) review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 28 introduction1 since 2000—the dusk of the milosevic-era in serbia—three successive serbian governments, the djindjic, zivkovic and kostunica administrations, have amassed a checkered record of compliance with eu and us conditionality for full cooperation with the international criminal tribunal on the former yugoslavia (icty). the aforementioned governments have addressed icty conditions in an inconsistent and oscillating fashion: sometimes complying, regularly stalling and often resisting compliance. more remarkable is the fact that protracted delays and outright resistance have been exercised in the face of—or as some would argue in spite of—eu and nato membership conditionality as well as us financial assistance and sanctions. how do we explain this changing pattern of compliance and noncompliance by serbian governments? why did serbia sometimes comply, while at other times resist cooperation with the icty? a rational-consequentialist approach frames compliance politics as a matter of getting the incentives and punishment right relative to “domestic adoption costs” (schimmelfennig and sedelmeier, 2004 & 2005; schimmelfennig et al., 2003). in this way, compliance problems are reduced to the following bargaining model: even when determinate and credible prescriptions are combined with substantial rewards or punishment, the size of 1 i extend my thanks to professors friedrich kratochwil, michael keating, pascal vennesson, nicole lindstrom, florian bieber, joan debardeleben, stefano guzzini and antje wiener for their comments and suggestions during my research. my further thanks to anna sobczak, andrew glencross and those which reviewed this article in its earlier drafts. review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 29 domestic adoption costs and their distribution among domestic actors are likely to determine whether prescriptions are accepted or rejected (schimmelfennig & sedelmeier, 2004: 674). as a result, incidents of serbian noncompliance are explained as outcomes where the domestic political costs of complying with prescriptions proved prohibitively high relative to the rewards, or even the sanctions, on offer; with the vice-versa holding true for cases of compliance. this paper, however, questions the insight of the above model in the case of icty conditionality and (non)compliance in serbia. i argue that the nature of compliance sought, in terms of the quality of the rules and norms prescribed, greatly influences the extent to which a rational-consequentialist approach can explain the politics of compliance with respect to both process and outcome. in particular, i contend that prescribed rules and norms, which attempt far-reaching institutional and social change, such as icty conditionality in serbia, will elicit a historical process that is multidimensional and more politically complex than the parsimony suggested by a rationalist model. to probe this claim, i perform a temporal reconstruction of the process of serbian (non)compliance with icty conditionality during the kostunica government (2004 to the spring of 2007).2 this period of history, i argue, provides a useful glimpse at how an 2 owing to the size restriction of the article and the inductive process-tracing employed, a broader survey involving the djindjic and zivkovic governments was not possible here. i chose the kostunica years because they were the most recent and best encapsulated incidents of serbian compliance and noncompliance. one of the drawbacks with the chosen time period is that it revolved largely around eu incentives and therefore there was relatively little us involvement—which is in contrast to the earlier mentioned governments. review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 30 incentives-based, model-driven approach is explanatively constrained when dealing with the problematique of icty compliance. specifically, the approach downplays the importance of normative and temporal aspects, which together with material incentives form the contextual gestalt of the serbian case. in the alternative, i argue, we need to develop a more contextual way of studying compliance politics beyond the monological limitations of model-driven and rationalist-inspired theorizing; approaches which reveal the unique material, normative and temporal dimensions of compliance politics and practice. the analysis that follows therefore is structured into four parts. in the first section, i review and critique the rationalist-consequentialist approach which has been the foundation for the study of compliance politics thus far. next, i present a short outline on how a more contextual approach might develop as an alternative to a rationalist model of inquiry; problematizing key (meta)theoretical and methodological aspects. subsequently, i use inductive process-tracing to follow the sequential history of icty compliance in serbia during the kostunica government; focusing on the interaction between three dimensions of compliance politics: (1) strategic calculation; (2) identity and cultural resonance; and (3) temporality. finally, i summarize the findings of my process-tracing and discuss its implications for our understanding of compliance theory and practice. 1. is compliance merely about getting the incentives and punishment right? at first glance, there may appear to be little to puzzle over regarding inconsistent serbian compliance with icty prescriptions. scholars of euro-atlantic enlargement have review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 31 typically proposed the logics of consequentialism and appropriateness (march & olsen, 1998 & 2005) as stylized rationalist versus constructivist answers to the puzzle of how and to what extent euro-atlantic institutions have promoted domestic change within accession or target states? in this way, the enlargement scholarship can be said to generally cluster around two poles of interpretation. the first pole emphasizes the manipulation of material incentives as crucial for the adoption of euro-atlantic norms and rules (long, 1996; pridham, 2002; hughes & sasse, 2003; schimmelfennig et al., 2003; schimmelfennig & sedelmeier, 2004 & 2005; kelley, 2004 & 2005; schimmelfennig, 2005). the second pole proposes alternatively that normative suasion and/or interaction are salient for changing the substantive beliefs of target leaders and target societies (ikenberry & kupchan, 1990; johnston, 2001; manners, 2002; checkel, 2005; flockhart, 2006). the former approach however has traveled furthest within the scholarship through force of persistent advocacy, and hence become a kind of ‘orthodoxy’ for compliance thinking and theorizing. therefore the aim of what follows is not to provide a sweeping review of the literature as a whole but rather critique the general ‘conditionality’ approach which has gained sway over the ‘mainstream’ field. as noted above, mainstream theory on euro-atlantic enlargement is characterized by a rational-consequentialist approach that reduces rule and norm compliance to the following function: faced with the proper incentives and/or punishment, state agents are suppose to engage in cost/benefit calculations that lead them to align domestic policy with international rules and norms (checkel, 2000: 4). indeed, many rationalists are likely to protest at such an austere categorization by pointing to their professed review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 32 commitment to bior ‘multi-causality’ and how fuzzy ‘variables’, such as norms, persuasion or legitimacy, have also been incorporated into research designs. however, the forthright truth, i claim, is that while many rationalists speak loudly about intellectual evenhandedness, in the end their rationalist understanding of human behaviour obstructs—whether expressly or implicitly—any meaningful interpretation of how culture, norms and identity play a significant and constitutive role in the process of euroatlantic enlargement; thereby leaving material forces as the a priori and ‘dominant’ explanatory factor. rationalist approaches obfuscate the social in different ways and do so at the levels of theoretical specification and analytical application (reus-smit, 2002). what is common to most rationalist scholars is that they acknowledge the importance of ‘normative’ factors, yet subsequently circumscribe the significance of that concession by delimiting the role of norms and emphasizing exogenous ‘material interests’ as the real engines of political action. in this way, an artificial and stylized barrier is placed between ‘norms’ and ‘material interests’ such that profound appreciation is lost vis-à-vis how ‘norms’ influence the constitution of actor identities and interests. it is a dichotomy grounded upon the false assumption that ‘material incentives’ and ‘norms’ can be characterized as discrete or adversarial ‘mechanisms’; which in turn leaves no prospect for any meaningful and practical understanding of how cultural context and time influence the process of enlargement—other than as a ‘constraint’ or strategic “switchman” a la weber (weber, 1948: 280). review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 33 how the dichotomy between incentives and norms is formulated varies from scholar to scholar: some have made the separation explicit by casting essentialized definitions of ‘normative influence’ and ‘material suasion’ into discrete and adversarial ‘models’; while others have employed a more subterranean approach, stressing the rhetoric of bior ‘multi-causality’ but yet privileging the force of material incentives. the works of frank schimmelfennig and ulrich sedelmeier (schimmelfennig & sedelmeier, 2004 & 2005) and judith g. kelley (kelley, 2004 & 2005) exemplify these two discursive strategies in the rationalist literature. both contributions advocate the effectiveness of ‘conditionality’ over variously defined ‘socialization mechanisms’; however schimmelfennig and sedelmeier employ explicit contending models, while kelly invokes the language of bicausality. in the end, the noted differences are more a matter of form as opposed to substance as, i argue, their desire to privilege or test one idealized ‘variable’ over another reveals a profound misunderstanding of how entangled materialism, cultural legitimacy and temporality are in the process of enlargement: ‘norms’ mattered for more than the ‘sweet talk’ and rhetorical pressure exerted by euro-atlantic officials; ‘the return to europe’ defined how accession states identified with and construed the benefit of the european project as a whole. in governance by conditionality (2004), schimmelfennig and sedelmeier discuss eu “rule transfer” to central and eastern european accession countries (ceecs) in the runup to the eu’s eastern enlargement. the authors characterize this political process as primarily a “bargaining process” of “reinforcement by reward” or ‘conditionality’, whereby international entities, such as the eu, the council of europe (ce) and the review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 34 organization for security and cooperation in europe (osce), provide external incentives (e.g. financial assistance, market access, technical expertise and institutional ties) to a target state so as to alter its behaviour and/or policies. schimmelfennig and sedelmeier develop the external incentives model (eim) to encapsulate this process, positing that target actors are “strategic utility-maximizers interested in the maximization of their own power and welfare (schimmelfennig & sedelmeier, 2004: 671).” further, they hold, the main factor conditioning target state ‘choice’ is how incentives of ‘the bargaining structure’ affect the “domestic equilibrium” of preferences and bargaining process in domestic society. the central proposition of schimmelfennig and sedelmeier’s eim is that a target state adopts external prescriptions if the benefits of incentives exceed the ‘domestic adoption costs’. the authors approximate this costbenefit calculation based on the following factors/mechanisms: “(i) the determinacy of conditions, (ii) the size and speed of rewards, (iii) the credibility of threats and promises, and (iv) the size of adoption costs (schimmelfennig & sedelmeier, 2004: 672).” alongside the eim, schimmelfennig and sedelmeier consider alternate ‘models’ of ‘behavioural’ change informed by approaches such as ‘social learning’ and ‘lessondrawing’. each model is furnished with contending hypotheses intended to reveal and test noninstrumental ‘mechanisms’ of compliance. for instance, the general proposition of the ‘social learning model’ is that: “a state adopts eu rules if it is persuaded of the appropriateness of eu rules (schimmelfennig & sedelmeier, 2004: 675).” however, due to the author’s model-driven design, these non-instrumental processes are effectively relegated to the function of ‘control mechanisms’: to identify whether, in a particular review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 35 context, noninstrumental processes have superseded the “dominant’ logic of strategic bargaining. hence, in this way, and as schimmelfennig and sedelmeier reveal themselves, incentives become privileged in large part because of the manner in which the authors’ frame the inquiry, as an essential choice between discrete models of representation: “these models [i.e. external incentives and social learning] are not necessarily mutually exclusive; they may be partly competing, partly complementary explanations. but we can ask whether there is a dominant model that explains effective rule transfer from the eu to the ceecs. […] the main finding of this project is that rule transfer from the eu to the ceecs and the variation in its effectiveness are best explained according to the external incentives model and in particular with the credibility of eu conditionality and the domestic costs of rule adoption (schimmelfennig & sedelmeier, 2004: 671).” in ethnic politics in europe (2005), judith kelly entertains—what i claim is—a similar incentives versus socialization dynamic in her study of how the osce, the ce and the eu influenced ethnic minority policy in latvia, estonia, slovakia, and romania; however she articulates her research design in a more subtle and less adversarial manner. kelley looks at how two distinct “mechanisms” or “institutional strategies” for influencing state behaviour, “normative pressure” and “membership conditionality”, were used to shape policy behaviour and implementation in the aforementioned countries. kelly circumscribes the former ‘mechanism’ to the sole use of “norms to persuade, shame, or praise actors into changing their policies”, while the latter is characterized as “linking institutional membership to the fulfillment” of a policy recommendation (kelley, 2005: 3). kelley later blurs this conceptual distinction with the use of caveats such as: “membership conditionality and socialization-based efforts [were] not mutually exclusive” (kelley, 2004: 428); and the eu and the ce found “membership conditionality...a convenient extension (kelley, 2004: 429)” to an existing mix of review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 36 normative and diplomatic arguments. however, i claim, these qualifications merely soften the inherent rationalism which guided kelley’s research; despite her adroit use of ‘bridge-building’ language. at first glance, kelley’s commitment to ‘bi-causality’ appears unquestionable. not only does she profess a synthetic approach but further she insists that her work “...feeds into the debate about the respective role of norms and incentives, and advances beyond the either/or debate between rationalists and constructivists (kelley, 2005: 8).” moreover, kelley advises readers on how “rational-choice scholars focus on behaviour change, while socialization scholars traditionally focus on belief change. with the proper caution, it is nevertheless useful to study both mechanisms in terms of their policy effects (kelley, 2004: 428).” however, closer scrutiny of kelley’s analytical frameworks and empirical findings, i argue, reveal a subterranean rationalism which privileges material over normative factors. for instance, absent within kelley’s theoretical discussion is any serious consideration of how social identities (and consequently social norms) influence interest-formation; and this brings kelley to adopt—whether wittingly or not—the conventional rationalist view that material interests (desires) stand in priority to social norms (beliefs) (see wendt, 1999: 34-35). hardly surprising therefore is her later finding that eu and ce membership conditionality was frequently the “decisive” factor in shaping domestic policy on ethnic issues. in fact, kelley’s subsequent discussion on the practical role of ‘norms’ revealed an instrumentalist—as opposed to a constitutive—view. this was review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 37 exemplified with her conclusion that if the change in ‘payoffs’ were “large enough”; policy actors were likely to change their policies and even ‘rationalize’ the change to their constituencies; “even if they [do] not accept the normative argument (kelley, 2004: 431).” yet nowhere was it contemplated by kelley that the very ‘payoffs’ referred to were nested within the broader social lure of a united ‘europe’, and that this may have also contributed to the above-described ‘calculations’ and subsequent ‘rationalization’ of policy choices. in this way, what was occluded by kelley was a consideration of the relational and cultural meaning of ‘policy compliance’ within the framework of ‘european’ accession; or to paraphrase marshall sahlins’ argument: how the “material effects” of policy choices ultimately depend upon “their cultural encompassment (sahlins, 1976: 194).” 2. bringing context ‘back-in’: compliance politics as the study of historical circumstances and time the purpose of the above criticisms however has not been to deny the analytical value of rationalist approaches to compliance politics. to the contrary, rationalist approaches can provide important heuristic insights at particular political junctures; yet the common problem with rationalist theorizing is its tendency to overstate the salience of material incentives and neo-liberal bargaining in particular processes and outcomes. in this way, while conventional rationality and material forces need to be acknowledged as important explanatory factors in specific situations, where brute ‘material facts’ induce actors into ‘cost/benefit’ calculus (checkel, 2001: 556); at the same time, however, what is also review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 38 needed is greater appreciation of how temporal and cultural contingencies make ‘rationalist’ reasoning practically possible at discrete times and in particular contexts. this means that the above critique should not be construed as a wholesale rejection of material incentives, as a refutation of this sort flies in the face of rationalist aspects (e.g. rewards and sanctions) which are embedded within cases of compliance politics. rather, my argument here is that the parsimony of an incentives-based and model-driven explanation, while potentially robust in terms of predicting some outcomes, runs the risk of providing only a partial explanation of political practice in many complex cases. and it is worth emphasizing: complex cases are complex because they involve a multidimensional context and process, exhibiting changing constellations of material, normative and temporal factors. thus, any claim of profound analysis requires that one explain these various dimensions which make up the contextual gestalt of compliance cases. yet, such a stance brings us to an important question: how do we theorize and study context? moreover, should you? these are profound and difficult issues which are linked inherently to conflicting stances on what constitutes proper scholarly or ‘scientific’ inquiry in the study of social and political ‘reality’—a significant metatheoretical debate beyond the scope of this paper (beyerchen, 1992/1993; davis, 2005; kratochwil, 2000; kratochwil, 2006; kratochwil, 2007; lebow, 2007; stewart, 1997; watts, 1997/1998). however, the brief remarks which follow aim to engage with various aspects of this controversy: as i foremost claim that we should analyze ‘context’ in compliance politics, review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 39 however not as monological theory but rather as a field of practice with variable realizations and meanings across time. with this assertion i attach an important caveat: the goal of this section is not to present a ‘contextual theory’ of compliance politics or to set out the fine-print of a contextual research programme, instead it is to provide a short outline of how a more contextual approach might develop, touching upon key (meta)theoretical and methodological issues largely silenced by the environs of modeldriven theorizing. first, a more contextual understanding of compliance politics may require a profound philosophical reorientation at the very outset. to paraphrase the words of r.b.j. walker: our philosophical premises often prefigure our concepts and theories (walker, 1989: 178). therefore, for the contingent logic of practice and context to be brought back into compliance analysis, we need to reconsider the epistemology-centred view of cartesian science which has been the backbone of modernist social and political thought (taylor, 1984). in other words, we need to acknowledge the inherent limits of epistemic (universalized) theory in terms of what it can tell us about the sui generis experience of social and political practice. simply put: for all its parsimony and elegance, we have to problematize deductive theory as practice and begin to appreciate bourdieu’s insight “that practice has a logic which is not that of logic (bourdieu, 2005: 109).” the intent however is not to refute the heuristic value of deductive theories or hypotheses, or say that ‘anything goes’ in the realm of compliance analysis, but rather to emphasize that the practice of compliance politics is both multi-dimensional and diachronical. such a metatheoretical stance, i claim, becomes important in the analysis review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 40 of complex cases like icty conditionality and compliance because of what i call ‘thick contexts’: multiple means of variable influence (e.g. incentives, normative and identity suasion) interacting in variable time with multiple decision-making dimensions (e.g. problems of interest-formation and identity framing), producing synergistic and nonlinear processes that surpass the monological capacity of model-driven theory (rationalist or constructivist). it bears highlighting that model-driven theory is considerably disadvantaged when studying such multifarious scenarios because of its (1) either/or stance between material and normative structures, (2) desire to ascertain ‘primary’ mechanisms (checkel, 2005) and (3) embrace of temporal abstraction (sewell, 1996). profound explanation in ‘thick’ contexts, i argue, cannot arise via approaches which focus on a single dimension (e.g. incentives) or articulate compliance as consisting of a priori mechanisms producing self-evident outcomes. rather, they require a type of analysis attentive to the historical conditions which have produced compliance outcomes; an approach that recovers options made unthinkable (taylor, 1984) by political and social practice; an inquiry which is skeptical of the alleged dichotomy between norm-governed versus strategic behaviour (march & olsen, 1998 & 2005); and finally, a historical stance that questions temporal abstraction, emphasizing instead the force of sequences and events upon political outcomes (abbott, 1983 & 1988; sewell 1996; sommers, 1996). how might we implement this revised (meta)theoretical outlook in methodological terms? i propose that so-called process-tracing is the preferred method of inquiry. generally speaking, process-tracing implies a close, historical study of political processes review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 41 in order to reach a ‘thicker’ explanation of specific political events. yet, the mere mention of this method does not resolve the philosophical cleavages (metatheoretical stances) identified above: advocates of process-tracing differ on whether to use the method deductively or inductively. george and bennett, for instance, define processtracing with a variable-oriented language common to model-driven theorizing, it: “attempts to identify the intervening causal process—the causal chain and mechanism— between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable (george and bennett, 2005: 206).” davis, however, approaches process-tracing in a more diachronic manner: “characterizing the social world as a collection of cases understood in terms of discrete events or outcomes may lead us to overlook the wealth of historical experiences that are represented in each individual case. although for some purposes it might make sense to conceive of cases as discrete empirical entities that permit only a single observation for measurement and coding, this is not always true. rather, for some purposes it makes more sense to think of cases as complex phenomena, each of which comes with a history (davis, 2005: 175).” the difference between the two stances is not trivial, and with growing interest in the method i expect a chasm to develop. why? the difference articulated between bennett and george vis-à-vis davis touches upon a large debate located—this time—within the historical sciences on the nature of ‘historicity’; or, as e.h. carr aptly put it, the problematique of “what is history? (carr, 1961)” for our present purposes we need not plunge into the depths of this important controversy but rather remain cognizant of it with respect to two key points. first, we need to be weary of teleological or “confirmatory” analyses of history intended to support a particular deductive theory or hypothesis (lustick, 1996; kratochwil, 2006: 14; see roberts, 1996). second, compliance analysis should take temporality more seriously relative to causality, focusing on the very process review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 42 of compliance politics, specifying its contexts across time (sewell, 1996; sommers, 1996). in a nutshell, a genuine rethink is in order regarding how sequences and events fundamentally interact with material and normative structures to form particular compliance scenarios. such reflection brings us to an important point expressed by pierson: “that any event or process is environed by its temporal location, its place within a sequence of occurrences, and by its interactions with various processes unfolding at different speeds (pierson, 2004: 172).” in sum, a more temporal orientation towards the study of compliance politics means that history is far from “bunk”; and instead of viewing historical analysis as the valet of causal hypotheses, we need to pay greater attention to how material, normative and ‘eventful’ dimensions interact and constitute compliance outcomes across time. 3. kostunica’s icty ‘odyssey’: a multidimensional and diachronic reconstruction in the foregoing section, therefore, i have presented an argument for a contextual approach to the study of compliance politics. in particular, i have attempted to rearticulate compliance theory and practice by questioning some of the (meta)theoretical and methodological postulates that anchor the present-day, rationalist study of compliance politics, such as: the epistemology-centred view of cartesian science; the theory as practice of the epistemological model; and the primacy of causality over temporality. all these arguments come as first intimations and, indeed, further theoretical elaboration and argumentation will be required. however, as any good lawyer or even mathematician will tell you, argumentation alone cannot bring ‘context’ to any review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 43 meaningful standing within compliance theorizing, as demonstration also plays some meaningful and persuasive role—“the proof is in the pudding” so the saying goes. therefore in this section i turn to empirics and process-tracing to address the ultimate question of ‘why bother?’ or, more specifically, what analytical difference would a more contextual approach make in the analysis of compliance politics? the case of icty conditionality and compliance in serbia is a useful opportunity for this purpose. obviously, a study of serbia alone can neither prove nor disprove the case for a contextual approach, but it can serve as an initial probe to reveal the potential valueadded. in this vein, the goal here is rather simple: to reveal the history which is ‘forgotten’ when a rationalist model of compliance ‘reality’ is relied upon. the remainder of this section, therefore, performs a temporal reconstruction of icty compliance in serbia during the recently expired kostunica government (2004-2007); starting with the election campaigns that brought it to power in the fall of 2003, and ending with the present-day mladic crisis. the method of process-tracing used is expectantly inductive and temporal as opposed deductive and teleological; something atypical for the compliance mainstream which has largely conflated the deductive approach with process-tracing (e.g. schimmelfennig and sedelmeier, kelley). the objective here is to reconstruct in a “post-mortem” fashion the sequence of events which played out before, during and after particular extradition crises; endeavouring to uncover how material incentives, identity politics and events interacted in time to constitute compliance processes and outcomes. in this way, three hypotheses review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 44 are considered in a heuristic fashion: (1) strategic calculation—target actors engage in cost/benefit calculations that lead them to adopt international prescriptions (schimmelfennig and sedelmeier, 2004 & 2005; kelley, 2005); (2) identity and cultural resonance—target actors operate in a culture space that defines what is a legitimate policy, action or belief (barnett, 1999; wiener, 2004); and (3) temporality—“the course of history [is] determined by a succession of largely contingent events (sewell jr., 1996).” it bears emphasizing: these hypotheses are construed as interacting and nonlinear ‘dimensions’ rather than as a priori ‘mechanisms.’ therefore, the historical narratives which follow do not subsume historical phenomena under a universal ‘covering law’ of one or another hypothesis, but instead emphasize how and when a particular incentive, identity frame or event became salient in a historical sequence and how it interacted with other dimensions. in total, the kostunica government faced three major extradition crises (the four generals crisis; the feasibility study deadline; and the mladic crisis), critical junctures that will guide our empirical analysis and be examined in historical sequence. the primary sources used for my historical reconstruction are online news archives: news clippings, bulletins and press releases found in either the serbian (e.g. b92 news) or foreign (e.g. reuters; agence france presse; new york times) news media. to supplement this survey of the public record, individual interviews were conducted with former and current serbian government officials and foreign diplomats in belgrade. review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 45 a. the power of bad timing: carla del ponte and the elections of 2003 the following history of icty compliance in serbia begins with the country’s 2003 presidential and parliamentary elections, conducted respectively in november and december of that year. the aforesaid campaigns were characterized by a number of electoral issues; however unexpected contingency made icty cooperation a dominant one. how? within weeks of the respective votes, icty chief prosecutor, carla del ponte, broke an alleged agreement with serbian authorities3 and served public indictments against four serbian generals (pavkovic, lazarevic, lukic and djordjevic). the indictments came as a shock to both the serbian electorate and the ruling dos (democratic opposition of serbia) coalition, headed by then prime minister zoran zivkovic. in fact, the shock was so great that, despite its previous extradition of slobodan milosevic and its decidedly pro-western stance, the dos government steadfastly refused to arrest and extradite any of the newly indicted generals. the effect of the public indictments amounted to a kind of political chemotherapy: while del ponte reasserted the icty’s mandate over the serbian government in the international sphere, she simultaneously hurt the electoral fortunes of zivkovic’s prowestern and liberal-leaning coalition—the mostly likely domestic allies to secure cooperation with the icty. entering the electoral campaign, the icty was highly unpopular: polling data not only suggested that 75 percent of serbian citizens “did not trust” the icty4 but, in addition, 59 percent indicated that they were against 3 interview with former prime minister zoran zivkovic, interview by author, 20 april 2005. 4 see centar za politikoloska istrazivanja i javno mneje, institut drustvenih nauka, stavovi gradjana o medunarodnoj zajednici i odnosima srbije i crne gore krajem 2004. godine (belgrade: centar za review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 46 cooperation.5 the calamitous prospect raised by the indictments was further evidenced by the public appeals made by zivkovic’s coalition partners for international empathy and savvy. dos presidential candidate dragoslav micunovic implored that: “the indictments had destabilized democratic progress in the country.”6 nenad canak, social democrat and vojvodinian regional leader, was less diplomatic and argued that: “the indictment of the four generals was political timing of an unseen stupidity, which would forestall future steps toward democratization in serbia.”7 further, as if to confirm that even the “serbian street” understood the public storm that del ponte had instigated, the serbian daily politika released a survey on the eve of the presidential election which revealed that two-thirds of respondents thought the indictments could not have come at a “worse political time.”8 in the end, there were two principal beneficiaries from the above-described meltdown: initially the serbian radical party and later vojislav kostunica. the radicals ran on a presidential and parliamentary platform that placed their anti-hague agenda front and politikoloska istrazivanja i javno mneje, institut drustvenih nauka, 2005) <www.cpijm.org.yu/scharts/izvestaj1.pdf> (february 11, 2005). 5 ‘sednica saveta za saradnju sa haskim tribunalom naredne nedelje,’b92 news, 26 october 2003, <www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2003&mm=10&dd=26&nav_id=123045&nav_category=11> (november 29, 2004). 6 ‘micunovic: optuznice destabilizuju demokratski poredak u zemlji,’ b92 news, 26 october 2003, <www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2003&mm=10&dd=26&nav_id=123052> (november 29, 2004). 7 ‘canak: haska optuznica protiv cetvorice-‘nevidjena budalastina,’’ b92 news, 26 oct 2003, <www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2003&mm=10&dd=26&nav_id=123012&nav_category=11>, (november 29, 2004). 8 ‘anketa: optuznice stigle u najnezgodnijem trenutku,’ b92 news, 3 november 2003, <www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2003&mm=11&dd=03&nav_id=123650&nav_category=64>, (november 29, 2004). review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 47 centre;9 they profited handsomely from this strategy. when the returns came in from the serbian presidential election on november 17, the radicals emerged the clear winners, taking 46 percent of the vote.10 similarly, the parliamentary vote on december 28 revealed that the radicals had again come out on top with 28 percent. the remaining spectrum of democratic parties could fair no better than the high teens: kostunica’s democratic party of serbia (dps) got 18 percent, zivkovic’s democratic party (dp) 13 percent, the liberal economic g17plus 12 percent, and the serbian renewal movement/new serbia 8 percent.11 in his victory address to the party faithful, the radical party deputy leader and presidential candidate tomislav nikolic declared: “this is a clear message from the citizens of serbia that patriotic forces and the anti-hague lobby have prevailed.”12 but nikolic and his party were unable to cash-in on their electoral gains. first, the presidential election failed to garner the minimum number of votes required by law to 9 article 5 of the serbian radical party’s december 2003 election platform: “the serbian radical party will fight with all political means against the destruction of the serbian national being, as well as against the false accusations and the ostensible guilt of serbs for the conflicts in the former yugoslavia. serbian radicals will do everything to show to the serbian citizens and world public the real, dangerous sense of the hague tribunal, to unmask its activities and to give political and every other kind of support to the imprisoned serbs, especially to the president of the srs, vojislav seselj.” “program srpske radikalne stranke,” velika srbija (belgrade: serbian radical party, december 2003). available in cyrillic at <www.srs.org.yu/onama/program.php?izbor=onama>. 10 ‘izbori propali, nikolicu najvise glosova,’ b92 news, 16 november 2003, <www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?nav_category=11&dd=16&mm=11&yyyy=2003> (november 29, 2004). 11 ‘cesid: najvise radikali, slede dss, ds, g17, spo-ns, sps,’ b92 news, 28 december 2003, <www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?nav_category=11&dd=28&mm=12&yyyy=2003> (november 29, 2004). 12 ‘nikolic: u srbiji pobedjuju patrotske snage i antihaski lobi,’ b92 news, 17 november 2003, <www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2003&mm=11&dd=16&nav_id=124891&nav_category=11> (november 29, 2004). review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 48 validate the result, and hence the outcome was annulled.13 second, while the radicals attained the highest number of votes in the parliamentary election, they did not have a parliamentary majority and therefore needed a coalition partner from the democratic block to form a government; something very unlikely considering the country’s recent past. in short, with the radicals stuck and zivkovic’s dp wounded, the door was open for kostunica, whose party was the second-highest vote getter, to seize the initiative and form a coalition government. on february 21 2004, after weeks of intense negotiations with the remaining democratic parties, kostunica formed a minority government consisting of his dps, the g17plus party under liberal economist miroljub labus, and the serbian renewal movement/new serbia led both by veteran democracy campaigners vuk draskovic and velimir ilic.14 yet, the coalition was not without controversy. to secure a parliamentary majority, the incoming coalition had to obtain legislative support from milosevic’s former party, the socialist party of serbia.15 what did this new coalition government mean for the future of serbia-icty relations? in a campaign interview given by kostunica to serbian broadcaster b92 news on october 23, he gave an indication of what lay ahead in the coming weeks and months: 13 ‘izbori propali, nikolicu najvise glasova,’ b92 news, 16 november 2003. 14 ‘koštunica i zvanično mandatar za sastav vlade,’ b92 news, 21 february 2004, <www. http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?dd=20&mm=2&yyyy=2004> (april 29, 2004). 15 ibid. review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 49 “the justice of the hague tribunal is selective and we have to take a different, more aggressive approach; to make it clear that we will cooperate with the hague, but not in a way where it appears that only one side is responsible for the war. […] i have one political agenda, and that is the protection of state interests in some national sense, whether its’ about the reputation of the country, or in a material way….”16 in sum, kostunica’s skeptical opinion of the icty signaled more dysfunctional relations between serbia and the international community. however, as the rise of the radicals showed, this was not merely one man’s or one party’s crusade against the icty. antihague sentiment was a significant part of the serbian political landscape, and it commanded votes. to get icty cooperation now would require convincing not only the leaders but the led as well. del ponte’s public and ill-timed hard-line had given impetus to the surging radical party and allowed kostunica to harden rather than soften serbia’s approach to icty compliance. b. critical junctures & the power of incentives: the road to brussels goes through the hague during the first ten months of kostunica’s premiership (february to december 2004), cooperation between serbia and the icty “amounted to zero,” according to then us war crimes envoy pierre-richard prosper.17 prosper’s rebuke of kostunica on december 6, 2004 was not without foundation. first, since kostunica’s coming to power, there had been no arrests of high-ranking indictees such as generals mladic, lukic, lazarevic, 16 ‘kostunica: vlast vodi pogresnu politiku u odnosu na haski sud,’ b92 news, 23 october 2003, <www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2003&mm=10&dd=23&nav_id=122844&nav_category=11> november 29, 2004). 17 ‘prosper: saradnja beograda na nuli,’ b92 news, 6 december 2004, <www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2004&mm=12&dd=06&nav_id=157289> (december 7, 2004). review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 50 pavkovic and djordjevic, as well as former bosnian serb leader radovan karadzic. moreover, it was common knowledge that three of the abovementioned generals (lazarevic, pavkovic and lukic) were living freely and openly in serbia despite their indictment by the icty.18 second, kostunica himself seemed to be in no hurry; playing a waiting game of sorts with the tribunal. in an interview given to b92 news on november 20 2004, kostunica stated: “we have to cooperate with the hague, but like with all matters, some things can be done today, some things tomorrow, while others just need more time. […]”19 international condemnation quickly translated into criticism at home. in the days that followed prosper’s reprimand, both newly-elected serbian president boris tadic and one of kostunica’s coalition partners, serbia and montenegro foreign minister vuk draskovic, expressed their public concern over kostunica’s icty policy, or the lack thereof. tadic emphasized: “without cooperation there is…no entry into the eu, no increase in the standard of living. our poverty rate will rise, we will have no political stability, so long as we are excluded from the international community….”20 draskovic stressed that europe wanted serbia amongst its ranks and was waiting for serbia to joint 18 ‘kostunica guilty for hague obstruction,’ b92 news, 7 december 2004, <www.freerepublic.com/focus/fnews/1297152/posts> (may 25, 2005). 19 ‘srbija mora da saradjuje sa hagom,’ b92 news, 20 november 2004, <www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2004&mm=11&dd=20&nav_id=156197> (november 21, 2004). 20 ‘tadic i draskovic: u evropu preko haga,’ b92 news, 9 december 2004, <www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2004&mm=12&dd=09&nav_id=157512> (december 9, 2004). review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 51 it, however europe’s patience was limited and serbia faced the prospect of “selfisolation.”21 yet, kostunica and serbia were not the sole targets of criticism. the lack of results had also cast scrutiny on the policy of icty conditionality itself as well as one of its chief handlers, carla del ponte. in an op-ed piece for the montenegrin daily republika on october 16 2004, former us ambassador to serbia and montenegro, william montgomery, expressed second-thoughts about the practice of icty conditionality, with especially harsh words for how del ponte had exercised her discretion: … “[…] …i believe the us congress’ policy that, like in the case of milosevic’s arrest and extradition to the hague, aid to serbia is conditional upon further cooperation with the hague tribunal has revealed itself to be counterproductive. we are witnesses to how the number of indictees grew and how this type of policy reinvigorated nationalism in serbia and made the work of democratically elected governments more difficult. […] … […] the aggressive and arrogant posture of the chief prosecutor, carla del ponte, strengthened nationalist forces and brought into doubt the work of democratic governments. in this way, she made it difficult for any politicians to cooperate with the tribunal. […]”22 in sum, prosper’s condemnation, tadic’s and draskovic’s domestic intervention and montgomery’s criticisms of icty conditionality itself indicated that perhaps serbiaicty relations were coming to a cross-road. if so, the question was: where was the road 21 ibid. 22 ‘karla del ponte nanosi stetu,’ republika, 16 october 2004, <www.republika.cg.yu/arhiva.phtml?akcija=vijesti&id=3693> (october 16, 2004). review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 52 headed, to greater stalemate or a watershed? furthermore, did the international community have any cards to play? it turned out that the eu had a sizeable ‘carrot’ left: its feasibility study of serbia’s preparedness for a stabilization and association agreement (saa). the study was launched officially in october of 2004 by then eu external relations commissioner chris patten. however, when the announcement was made, there was no emphasis on the connection between icty compliance and a positive assessment.23 on january 20 2005, olli rehn, the eu’s new commissioner for enlargement, made that condition explicit at a meeting of the european parliament’s committee on foreign affairs.24 rehn advised that serbia’s feasibility study was near completion and that his delegation was due to arrive in belgrade on january 25. moreover, rehn stressed, serbia had to make serious progress on cooperation with the icty because that was a precondition for a positive assessment.25 to add further credibility to rehn’s admonishment, eu high commissioner javier solana publicly cancelled his scheduled visit to belgrade planned for the same day as rehn’s address to the committee. solana’s key ground for the snub: inadequate cooperation with the hague.26 23 eu external relations commissioner, chris patten, ‘commissioner patten announces launch of feasibility report on serbia and montenegro,’ 11 october 2004, ip/04/1202, brussels, <http//europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/see/news/2004/ip04_1202.htm> (april 29, 2005). 24 ‘sedam dana do odluke,’ b92 news, 20 january 2005, <www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2005&mm=01&dd=20&nav_id=160368&nav_category=11> (january 21, 2005). 25 ibid. 26 ‘solana ne dolazi u beograd,’ b92 news, 20 january 2005, <www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php??yyyy=2005&mm=01&dd=20&nav_id=160393&nav_category=11> (january 21, 2005). review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 53 the message from strasbourg and brussels on the tie-in between cooperation and feasibility had near instantaneous affect. upon his arrival in belgrade on january 25, rehn received assurances from kostunica that his government would fulfill its obligations to the tribunal. furthermore, kostunica advised, a number of “voluntary surrenders” were expected shortly.27 on january 26, then deputy prime minister miroljub labus gave a public interview indicating that the kostunica’s government took rehn’s stipulation very seriously: “we [the serbian government] understand this moment not as whether we want to cooperate with the hague but whether serbia wants to join the eu. the time has come for us to decide whether or not we are in favour of joining the eu. if we decide in favour, then we know what kind of policy we have to follow regarding cooperation with the hague, and likewise all other issues…. […].”28 both kostunica and labus were not bluffing. no later than january 29, three days after rehn’s visit, general lazarevic, a high-ranking indictee, announced that he would surrender “voluntarily” to the tribunal.29 in response, and in what should be noted as distinct break from the past practice of issuing hard-and-fast deadlines (e.g. the serbian elections of 2003), rehn rewarded the serbian government with more time: they had until the end of march to achieve “full cooperation.”30 kostunica and labus made expeditious 27 ‘oli ren: scg mora da ucini znacajan korak u sradnji sa haskim tribunalom,’ danas, 26 january 2005, <www.danas.co.yu/20050126/frontpage1.htm> (january 26, 2005). 28 ‘trenutak odluke?’ b92 news, 26 january 2005, <www.b92.net/info/emisije/kaziprst.php?nav_id=160835&yyyy=2005&mm=01> (january 26, 2005). 29 ‘jedan se predao, ostala jos trojica,’ b92 news, 29 january 2005, <www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?dd=29&mm=1&yyyy=2005> (january 29, 2005). 30 it is interesting to note that the definition of “full cooperation” has been a contested term throughout the history of icty compliance. regarding the cited deadline see ‘eu: rok do kraja marta,’ b92 news, 31 january 2005, <www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2005&mm=01&dd=31&nav_id=161146> (february 1, 2005). review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 54 use of it. lazarevic’s surrender marked the beginning of a wave of “voluntary surrenders,” which averaged at times one indictee per week and reached a total of 16 new extraditions by the end of april. included in this list of extraditions were such highprofile indictees as generals lukic (surrendered april 4)31 and pavkovic (surrendered april 25).32 while neither general mladic nor radovan karadzic were included as part of this intense move towards cooperation, the eu was nonetheless satisfied. on april 12, the commission confirmed sufficient progress to open negotiations on a saa.33 c. cultural resonance as the (not-so) ‘silent’ partner: ‘it is your patriotic duty to surrender’ on march 10, 2005, the serbian daily blic published an open letter from eu enlargement commissioner, olli rehn, to the citizens of the western balkans. in the letter, rehn proclaimed the high rate of surrenders to the icty from serbia were proof that membership “conditionality gets results.”34 to a certain extent, he was right. however, his focus on incentives missed out on another equally important dimension in serbia’s move toward full cooperation with the icty: the use of justifications to persuade the nation as to the legitimacy of icty compliance. 31 ‘lukic u hagu,’ b92 news, 4 april 2005, <www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?dd=48&mm=4&yyyy=2005> (april 4, 2005). 32 ‘pavkovic stigao u hag,’ b92 news, 25 april 2005, <www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2005&mm=04&dd=25&nav_id=167173> (april 25, 2005). 33 european commission, ‘serbia and montenegro: commission confirms sufficient progress to open negotiations on a stabilization and association agreement,’ 12 april 2005, ip/05/421, brussels, <http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/see/news/2005/ip05_421.htm> (april 15, 2005). 34 olli rehn, ‘zapadni balkan i napredak ka eu: zeleno svetlo za scg u aprilu,’ blic, 10 march 2005, <www.blic.co.yu/arhiva/2005-03-10/strane/politika.htm> (march 11, 2005). review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 55 entering 2005, the icty was as much an affront to serbian perceptions of “national interest” and patriotism as it had been in prior years. surveys commissioned in july 2004 by the federal ministry of human and minority rights (serbia and montenegro) told a familiar story to observers and practitioners of serbian politics. 76 percent of respondents considered the icty to be a “political” rather than a “legal” institution.35 62 percent of serbian citizens did not think that the extraditions of generals lazarevic, lukic, pavkovic and djordjevic were in serbia’s “national interest.”36 therefore, whatever medium to long-run benefits the eu could offer serbia in exchange for icty compliance, kostunica’s government had to deal with the certain and calamitous risk of being labeled “unpatriotic” or working against the “national interest.” after all, what made the task of icty cooperation so politically distasteful was the fact that most citizens viewed the indictees as military men that simply “did their jobs” on behalf of the nation.37 if compliance were to be cast as unpatriotic, this would not only suggest electoral disaster but would also render impotent any public pressure campaign for “voluntary surrenders.” to avoid such a scenario, kostunica’s government chose to play the “patriotic card” before the generals or anybody else could. the scope of the strategy quickly became apparent once general lazarevic broke the ice and decided to “voluntarily surrender” on 35 see poll conducted by the strategic marketing agency between july 23 and 25, 2004: ministry of human and minority rights, serbia and montenegro, ‘iztrazivanje javnog mnenja o haskom tribunalu,’ (belgrade: strategic marketing agency, july 2005), <www.humanrights.gov.yu/files/doc/stavovi_prema_icty_jul_2004.doc> (february 15, 2005). 36 ibid., 9. 37 judy dempsey, ‘in belgrade, unity falls into history,’ international herald tribune, 25 october 2004, p.1. review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 56 january 29. mihajlo bakrac, lawyer for general lazarevic, announced the following on behalf of his client: “general lazarevic has decided to accept his indictment…as a citizen of this country that is prepared to fulfill his duty.”38 in the days leading to lazarevic’s departure, more such messages followed, framing surrender to the icty as a noble act of patriotic sacrifice. on february 3, the day before lazarevic’s transfer to the hague, the general and the prime minister paid a visit to serbian patriarch pavle. in a press release issued by the serbian orthodox church, the general was praised: … “throughout our history, said the patriarch, we have examples of honourable officers who courageously represented the interests of the people and defended the truth to the end. the serbian orthodox church respects and holds in the highest regard the decision of general lazarevic to take this difficult path in the interest of the homeland.”39 further, that evening and as part of a final goodbye, the mayor of nis, smiljko kostic, whose party was a member of serbia’s governing coalition, held a cocktail reception in honour of general lazarevic. in his address to the reception, kostic paid tribute to the general as a national hero: “i want to thank you as a great general of the serbian army for what you have done for the nation now in peace, as you had previously in war. […] i want to, on behalf of the city and citizens of nis, wish you a save journey to where, well, fate says you must go, but i believe that we will see each other again one day and that we will likely pass our pensioner days together.”40 38 ‘jedan se predao, ostala jos trojica,’ b92 news, 29 january 2005. 39 serbian orthodox church, ‘patriarch pavle meets with prime minister kostunica and general lazarevic,’ 3 february 2005, <www.spc.org.yu/vesti-2005/02/01-2-05-e.html#laz> (february 4, 2005). 40 ‘lazarevic stigao u hag,’ b92 news, 3 february 2005, <www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?dd=3&mm=2&yyyy=2005> (february 3, 2005). review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 57 with lazarevic’s surrender and send-off, kostunica’s coalition framed the issue of icty cooperation in the serbian political discourse by constructing a powerful equation linking “voluntary surrender” with serbian patriotism. this framing of the issue served as a powerful persuasive mechanism (see risse et al., 1999) to get the rest of the indictees to surrender. it was now difficult for the remaining generals or hard-nationalists, such as the serbian radical party, to monopolize the mantle of serbian patriotism in an argument against icty cooperation: if an indictee loved and cared for his country, then he would not stand in the way of his homeland becoming a member of the european family of nations. this ‘patriotic’ formula proved remarkably effective, within a matter of months an unprecedented 15 indictees followed lazarevic voluntarily—more or less—to the hague without any significant public backlash. in sum, olli rehn was right, conditionality did do its’ job. however, what he did not acknowledge was the work that political justification and framing did in the serbian public sphere, which legitimized the project to the serbian public. the kostunica government did not simply seize the abovementioned generals in immediate response to eu incentives. rather, a delicate combination of public persuasion in the form of issue framing and “voluntary surrenders” was used to ensure that icty cooperation remained consistent with prevailing serbian perceptions of patriotism. in fact, serbian compliance amounted to a somewhat quizzical formula: military officers indicted by the icty for alleged war crimes were voluntarily and ceremoniously transferred to the hague as national heroes. how this squared with the premise behind icty conditionality was certainly a matter for debate. review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 58 d. the problem of legitimacy: ‘general mladic, it is our (patriotic) duty to arrest you’ the normative limits of the ‘voluntary surrender’ policy and the fact that the serbian government was reluctant to stretch beyond it soon became apparent however with the case of general ratko mladic. at the start of stabilization and association negotiations in october 2005, the eu commission stipulated that further negotiations in the coming year were conditional upon serbia’s continued cooperation with the icty.41 a key indicator of such cooperation was the extradition of the abovementioned icty indictee. yet, as the weeks and months past, it became increasingly clear that the policy of “voluntary surrender” had reached its end with respect to mladic. despite a plethora of media reports and speculation, the aforementioned indictee had not only failed to surrender but there was apparently no knowledge of his whereabouts.42 further still, the kostunica government was not ready to engage in harsher measures, such as arrest and forcible extradition; notwithstanding that eu membership conditionality was at stake. the serbian government’s hesitancy was to a considerable extent explainable on pragmatic political grounds. first, while serbian public opinion had warmed to icty cooperation, such approval was largely limited to support for voluntary surrenders as a matter of pragmatic necessity.43 second, mladic’s prolonged flight from authority cast 41 enlargement commissioner, olli rehn: european commission (2005) ‘ceremony to open saa negotiations federal palace, belgrade’, <http://www.eudelyug.org/en/news/news/final20051010/final20051010.htm> (october 11, 2005). 42 ‘kostunica: cinimo sve sto mozemo,’ b92 news, 24 february 2006, <http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?dd=24&mm=2&yyyy=2006> (july 31, 2006). 43 the earlier-noted survey commissioned in july 2004 by the federal ministry of human and minority rights also found that 56 percent of respondents considered voluntary surrender a ‘patriotic act’. see <www.humanrights.gov.yu/files/doc/stavovi_prema_icty_jul_2004.doc> (february 15, 2005). review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 59 him as a folk-hero among many on the serbian political-right.44 the right-wing was no political backwater: polls in early 2006 revealed that the leading party of the right, the serbian radical party, was not only the most popular party in the republic but, further still, it could form the next government. third, milosevic’s socialist party of serbia, which kostunica relied on in parliament, declared that it would rethink its support for the government should mladic be arrested.45 lastly, the anticipated prospect of montenegrin and possibly kosovo secession also raised the chances of further nationalist reactions in serbia and hence added political turbulence for the government. all told, the above factors likely caused the kostunica government to question whether it was capable of a forcible but yet political feasible extradition of mladic. therefore, despite a number of public admonishments and grants of extension by the eu between february and april of 2006, belgrade proved incapable—publicly at least—of locating and extraditing the impugned general.46 as a consequence, the commission on may 3 announced the suspension of negotiations with serbia regarding a saa.47 further, the eu added, negotiations would remain suspended until such time as mladic was delivered to the hague. 44 ‘mass pro-mladic rally in belgrade,’ bbc news, 24 february 2006, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr//2/hi/europe/4749420.stm> (february 24, 2006). 45 ‘kostunica nije dao tvrdo obcecanje,’ b92 news, 8 may 2006, <http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2006&mm=05&dd=08&nav_id=196941>(july 30, 2006). 46 ‘eu: ili mladic ili evropa,’ b92 new, 28 february 2006, <http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2006&mm=02&dd=28&nav_id=189979> (july 30, 2006). 47 ‘ode evropa, ali ceka na mladica,’ glas javnosti, 4 may 2006, <http://archiva.glasjavnosti.co.yu/archiva/2006/05/04/srpski/p06050301.shtml> (july 30, 2006). review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 60 kostunica had now made his second 180 degree turn in relations with the icty. one year earlier, his government went from noncompliance to compliance with the extradition of 16 generals in the span of mere months. now, the government reverted back from compliance to noncompliance because of its failure to deliver mladic. in both cases, similar incentives were at work and similar commitments were made to european integration and cooperation with the icty. however, this time the result was different. kostunica was constrained by the norms behind his voluntary surrender policy and instability manifested by montenegrin and kosovan secessionism. yet, mladic’s failure to surrender and the eu’s subsequent sanctions revealed that the status quo was not enough. mladic had to go forcibly; but how would the government manage this in light of its previous policy and the above-identified constraints? in the days that followed the suspension, the kostunica government indicated it was prepared to take a tougher stand on mladic. arrests of those alleged to have sheltered the general soon came.48 police searches publicly intensified.49 further, in july 2006, the government presented to the eu council of ministers an ‘action plan’ for full cooperation with the icty; a plan which included the prompt arrest and extradition of mladic.50 the councils’ reaction to the document was so positive that it even debated whether to allow negotiations to continue based on the plan alone; however in the end 48‘zavrsena akcija oko mladiceve kuce,’ b92 news, 5 may 2006, <http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?dd=5&mm=5&yyyy=2006> (july 31, 2006). 49 ‘potraga za mladicem u valjevu,’ b92 news, 7 may 2006, <http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?dd=7&mm=5&yyyy=2006> (july 31, 2006). 50 ‘vlada usvojila akcioni plan,’ b92 news, 20 july 2006, <http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?dd=20&mm=7&yyyy=2006> (july 31, 2006). review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 61 this came to no avail as a promise was merely given that negotiations would restart once mladic was caught.51 yet, what proved most interesting in this turn affairs was the framing used by the government—yet again—to justify its new arrest and extradition policy to the serbian public. a new equation was added to the previous frame of ‘voluntary surrender means serbian patriot’: true patriots do not hold their nation hostage. this frame built upon its predecessor and was the normative pretext for an active campaign of apprehension and extradition. kostunica’s coalition partners made frequent use of this justification in wake of the suspended negotiations. for instance, on may 5, in response to a police raid on mladic’s house, interior minister dragan jocic exclaimed: “we are giving everything we have to finish this final task. i have to say that no one has the right to choose himself over his nation, especially when he has a duty to defend his people.”52 further, following a meeting with eu representatives on may 12, the serbian minister for capital investment, velimir ilic, implored: “mladic has to understand the position of his nation, which has a big problem. he has to be selfless, to surrender, go before that court and let his nation go forward. if i were in his position, i wouldn’t think a minute. i would come out and say, ‘here i am, please. just or unjust, i am a victim, do what you want, but let my people go.’”53 51 ‘uhapsiti mladica do septembra,’ b92 news, 19 july 2006, <http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2006&mm=07&dd=19&nav_id=205157> (july 19, 2006). 52 ‘zavrsena akcija oko mladiceve kuce,’ b92 news, 5 may 2006 53 ‘i dalje finansijska podrska eu,’ b92 news, 12 may 2006, <http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?dd=12&mm=5&yyyy=2006> (july 31, 2006). review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 62 finally, upon a may 13 visit to moscow, then foreign minister vuk draskovic declared: “we are now in a tragic situation where instead of the nation arresting mladic, mladic has arrested the serbian nation.”54 at the time of writing this paper, draskovic’s metaphor retains its applicability vis-à-vis serbia’s status on icty cooperation, albeit to a lesser extent. general mladic still remains at large; however the near rise to power of the serbian radical party following the january 2007 parliamentary election prompted the eu to significantly lessen its conditions for the resumption of stabilization and association talks. following the formation of the new kostunica/tadic/dinkic coalition government in mid-may, the european commission announced the continuation of saa negotiations on june 13, 2007, revising its key proviso that ‘full cooperation’ with the icty was no longer a prerequisite for continued talks but rather an executed agreement. yet synchronized with this policy change were two new apprehensions made by the serbian government: first, on may 31, indictee zdravko tolimir was caught at the serbia/bosnia border and extradited to the hague;55 followed on june 17 by the apprehension of vlastimir djordjevic in the montenegrin resort town of budva.56 54 ‘bezbednosne sluzbe stite mladica,’ b92 news, 13 may 2006, <http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2006&mm=05&dd=13&nav_id=197584> (august 1, 2006). 55 “potvrdjeno hapsenje tolimira,” b92 news, 31 may 2007, <http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/u_fokusu.php?id=7&start=15&nav_id=249195> (june 24, 2007). 56 “reakcije na hapsenje djordjevica,” b92 news, 17 june 2007, http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/u_fokusu.php?id=7&start=0&nav_id=251702 (june 17, 2007). review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 63 clearly, the complex history of icty compliance in serbia faces an uncertain end, with key indictees (e.g. mladic and karadzic) continuing to elude capture. however, the intent of the above history was not to provide fuel for prognostication and prediction, rather the goal was more basic: to empirically challenge a rationalist and model-driven outlook of political ‘reality.’ in other words, to demonstrate empirically the distinction between ‘modellised’ theory and the complexity of political practice, so that we may reflect upon both the nature of the icty problem and the problematique of theory as practice in the study of international politics. in this light, what should be foremost derived from the above historiography is that ‘modellised’ theory can be fundamentally detached from the actual practice of compliance politics. compliance can be profoundly messy and non-linear due to an intertwining of material, normative and temporal aspects; which are contrary to ‘modellised’ representations “of the way things obviously are (taylor, 1984: 17-26).” complex cases, such as icty compliance, reveal this tension between essentialized theory and practice as they engage not only cost-benefit calculations but also fundamental problems of time and cultural meaning. by putting the particulars of the kostunica case into focus, therefore, and returning context to the analysis of compliance processes, we can begin to appreciate compliance politics not in terms of stylized ‘bargaining’ versus ‘arguing’ schematics but as a delicate political experience profoundly influenced by variable material, normative and temporal aspects. review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 64 indeed, one could assert, a la schimmelfennig, sedelmeier and kelley, that ‘dominant’ or ‘primary’ mechanisms can be ascertained at various instances. in the above case study, this is clearly visible at particular times when a given dimension (e.g. material, normative or temporal) had a parochial—rather than ubiquitous or universal—influence over the sequence of events (see roberts, 1996: 67). for instance, the kostunica government’s later conversion to a ‘voluntary surrender’ policy in the spring of 2005 could be argued as ‘proof’ that olli rehn’s incentives ‘worked’. however, having traced the sequence of events which came before, during and after the feasibility study deadline, we can also counter that the material incentives involved were a necessary but not sufficient condition for what transpired (see mcintyre, 1978: 196). the added historical context revealed that rehn’s incentives did not perform as a “lever” would in mechanics, bringing about a particular effect (ringer, 1989: 157).” rather, a number of dimensions (material, normative and temporal) had to coincide together. this distinction, i argue, is an important one for the study compliance influence and practices as it reveals a priori formulations to be profoundly misleading: the experience of compliance politics is not intrinsically linked to sticks, carrots, or any other practical ‘hammer’. rather it is a politics that is inherently practical in the sense that it “deals with doing the right thing at the right time in view of particular historical circumstances (kratochwil, 2006: 6).” what i have tried to do with this inductive study of the serbian case is illustrate that such a practical awareness can only come about through a sui generis understanding of historical context of a case—a form of thinking antithetical to monological theory and entrenched models. review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 65 4. concluding remarks —compliance politics and the problem of theory as practice imagine for a moment that you are professor of international politics and an eager student asks you a question related to the one addressed here: how do you explain serbia’s inconsistent pattern of compliance with icty conditionality? what would you answer? would you say that compliance politics is based on a cost/benefit calculation, stimulated by the right combination of ‘carrots and sticks’? alternatively, would you say that compliance is foremost about cultural politics and how particular conditions relate to the identity of a target actor? or, would you assert that theories are indeed pointless and alternatively proffer an exhaustive historical account which traces events leading to various compliance outcomes? if you identified all the above answers as singularly false, and focused instead on the dimensions and processes which might have led to the questioned compliance pattern, then the chances are good that this paper made its intended impression upon your manner of compliance analysis. in sum, this paper has challenged the tendency to generalize about patterns of compliance that fit neatly within a given rationalist model; while such assumptions may prove helpful in the initial stages of a research design, the inclination often meets frustration when confronted by the actual practice of complex cases such as icty compliance in serbia. rather than shun the complexity of historical context, it is argued here, we should embrace it within our theoretical and historiographical frameworks; recognizing the inherent multidimensional and diachronic nature of compliance politics. review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 66 inductive process-tracing of the serbian case revealed compliance as incommensurate with a model of causal efficiency and linear effectiveness. the compliance process was complicated by the interaction of material incentives, normative concerns and contingent events; factors inherent to the making of compliance outcomes yet something which the rational-consequentialist model ‘brackets’ away. to many dyed-in-the-wool ‘scientists’, this bracketing—or ‘forgetting’—is entirely unproblematic as the identity of political and social science is firmly tied to a classical perception of scientific inquiry: scholarly investigation and theory is nothing more than a passive recording of an independent and objectified world. yet, a more reflexive outlook on the relationship between theory and ‘reality’, i argue, radically impinges upon that presumption, as the work of theorizing is more closely associated with the construction of social meaning, influencing the very actions which form political and social practice. from this perspective, the ‘modellised’ status quo becomes more than a ‘scientific’ adventure into the abstract, as the cognitive pretense to represent “the way things obviously are” links ‘the model’ to our exercise of political judgment: its claim ‘to know’ becomes the foundation for advising ‘what to do’ and when. simply put, as theory produces reality, theoreticians becomes the artificers of ‘reality,’ and flowing from this ascription come important questions of responsibility and ethics on the manner in which we represent ‘the political.’ the hope of the author is that the metatheoretical and historiographical orientation of the paper has developed, to some extent, this sorely needed practical awareness within the field of compliance theory. review of european and russian affairs vol. 4 issue 1/2008 © rera 2008 all rights reserved 67 bibliography abbott, andrew (1983) ‘sequences of social events: concepts and methods for the analysis of order in social processes’, historical methods 16(4): 129-147. abbott, andrew (1988) ‘transcending general linear reality’, sociological theory 6(2): 169-186. barnett, michael (1999) ‘culture, strategy and foreign policy change: israel’s road to oslo’, european journal of international relations 5(1): 5-36. beyerchen, alan (1992/1993) ‘clausewitz, nonlinearity, and the unpredictability of war’, international security 17(3): 59-90. bourdieu, pierre (2005) outline of a theory of practice. cambridge: cambridge university press. carr, e.h. 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“iztrazivanje javnog mnenja o haskom tribunalu.” belgrade: strategic marketing agency, july 2005). <www.humanrights.gov.yu/files/doc/stavovi_prema_icty_jul_2004.doc> (february 15, 2005). review of european and russian affairs 6 (1), 2011 issn 1718-4835 © 2011 the author(s) www.carleton.ca/rera ethnic conflict in nagorno-karabakh melita kuburas university of toronto abstract twenty years since the conflict between azerbaijan and armenia over the nagorno-karabakh region first began, 610,000 people are still internally displaced in azerbaijan, living in poverty and in wretched housing conditions. the causes of violence in the ongoing ethnic conflict between armenia and azerbaijan, which began in the late 1980s and has since resulted in 30,000 deaths, can mainly be analyzed using a constructivist framework. however, elements of a primordialist approach to national identity were also used by mobilizers to trigger political and social uprisings. this paper presupposes that the constructivist theories on identity formation and territorial claims offer a better explanation as to why the war over nagorno-karabakh broke out in the 1990s, and why, in 2010, the two parties are no closer to a resolution and the nagorno-karabakh region remains in limbo. review of european and russian affairs 6 (1), 2011 44 introduction in central baku, an abandoned, decrepit, soviet-era factory today serves as home to about 20 azerbaijani families who were displaced in the early 1990s from nagorno-karabakh. a series of photos taken by a reporter in march of 2010 show makeshift apartments divided with leaning slabs of cardboard and plaster. young boys play on the remains of an old vehicle, later moving to the slightly more welcoming indoors, where colourful curtains and carpets are carefully arranged by their mothers – a desperate attempt to make the place look more like home (atilay 2010). the families featured in the photo essay by a radio free europe correspondent represent just a handful of about 610,000 azerbaijani refugees displaced by the conflict between their country and neighbouring armenia over the nagorno-karabakh region. rightful ownership of the mountainous area in south-western azerbaijan has been the subject of debate between armenians and azerbaijani for centuries. the dispute came to a head in the late 1980s when armenians requested to have the region annexed to the republic of armenia, and used military force to occupy the territory when the call for sovereignty was denied. the dismal living situation for internally displaced persons (idps) 16 years after the 1994 ceasefire represents the severity of armenian military operations that cleansed the mountainous region of ethnic azerbaijani residents. however, the refusal by azerbaijan’s government to accommodate idps into society indicates there is no imminent resolution or agreement between the states over the nagorno-karabakh territory. argument in an examination of the events leading up to the ethnic violence in nagorno-karabakh that started in the late 1980s and which has since resulted in 30,000 deaths, this paper argues that the leading causes of war fall under the umbrella of perception and opportunity – the role of key players and institutions since 1989. this includes russian military policies in the 1990s, and that the actions of political elites in armenia and azerbaijan’s domestic governments. at the epicentre of the conflict is the concept of territory, which both parties view as having an intrinsic worth and value to their respective groups. the primordial claim to territorial ownership establishes historic legitimacy based on the ancestral tenure of a given ethnic group, and gives more weight to a land claim if an ethnic group is autochthonous to the land (astourian 1994, 73). in contrast, the constructivist approach recognizes the unreliability of this argument for ownership (because identity is a fluid concept), and it instead uses the maps and border definitions of centuries past as evidence or affirmation of territorial claims. central to this conflict is the influence of the soviet union and the nation-building policies of the 20 th century, which contributed to political and economic grievances among irredentist minorities in the caucasus. primordial views of nationality and territory do provide an important context for the region, as they were used in the soviet period in an effort to affect popular consciousness. joseph stalin and other bolshevik leaders believed that hatred between nations was fuelled by capitalism and communism would lead to cooperation between different nationalities (tillett 1969, 22). however, stalin later made telling allusions to the weaknesses of the “great friendship,” which was a belief that communism would stifle the nationalist feeling and chauvinism among different soviet peoples. for example, in a speech in tbilisi in 1921 he noted that “among the workers and peasants nationalism has developed, a feeling of distrust for their comrades of other nationalities has intensified” (tillett 1969, 25). later, it was because of mikhail gorbachev’s glasnost reforms that these grievances were aired in the form of protests, referendums and calls for secession, igniting the bloody and irresolute war in nagorno-karabakh. primordial attachments to the nagorno-karabakh territory are often cited as a cause of this war by people on the ground the victims and the perpetrators of violence. yet this notion of hatreds resulting from ancient cultural myths is often dismissed by scholars as a simplistic analysis of identity formation and causes of conflict. this is correct, as in the nagorno-karabakh case. it was the border treaties and mapping of nations throughout the 20 th century that were used to construct territorial claims and cause 45 review of european and russian affairs 6 (1), 2011 grievances and perceived institutional inequalities. while primordialist claims played an important role in the shifting political tides at the moment, including the development of popular front and nationalist movements in the region, these hostile views held within armenia and azerbaijan were manipulated by political elites who, because of the instability of both states at the time of the breakup of the soviet union, were able to mobilize an armed rebellion in the early 1990s. a more accurate view of the ethnic strife at the time then would be to consider the political changes within the two states in question, as well as the international realm, and the actions of the military and local elites who manipulated events to make their case for ownership of nagorno-karabakh. theory this paper presupposes that the constructivist theory on identity formation, which explains national histories and identities as fluid, evolving, and formed over time (suny 2001, 865), offers a better explanation as to why the war over nagorno-karabakh broke out in the 1990s, and why, almost 20 years later, the two parties are no closer to a resolution and the nagorno-karabakh region remains in limbo. a primordialist land claim views the nagorno-karabakh territory as being fixed and bound to a particular ethnic identity; as the cradle of a group’s linguistic, cultural or religious origins. since both azerbaijanis and armenians living in the region do make a claim on the territory based on this type of narrative, the conflict can be seen as the result of ancient grievances between the two groups – as embedded hatreds that are “permanent and ineradicable” (laitin and suny 1999, 153). however, the primordial approach ignores the periods of relative peace and stability between the two groups, and it does not account for other triggering factors, such as soviet nationalization policies, elite mobilizers and opportune military strategies, all of which contributed to the conflict as well. while ethnic conflict is statistically a rare cause of war, between 1989 and 2007, the wars in the post-soviet union and the former yugoslavia accounted for 30 per cent of all internal wars around the world (zurcher 2007, 219). soviet policies on nation-building and indigenization contributed to feelings of deprivation among armenian minorities living in nagorno-karabakh. in roger d. petersen’s theoretical approach to ethnic conflict, an emotion-based framework explains the emotive sequence that turns resentments, fears and group consciousness into violence or support for institutional discrimination (petersen 2002, 23). even though his is a constructivist approach, one of the components is the primordial view of “ancient hatreds,” or how targeted violence against a particular group can be repeated throughout history once there is an opportunity that results from the structural collapse of a governing centre (petersen 2002, 25). this theory applies to the argument in this paper where the ethnic conflict in nagorno-karabakh is analyzed using mainly a constructivist approach, while maintaining that certain primordial elements are still instrumental to the causes. emotion-based theory takes into consideration the role of elites in framing the situation in a particular way to affect national consciousness (petersen 2002, 34), which can be applied to the case study of nagorno-karabakh examined below. territory and national identity – a primordial outline individuals who belong to the same ethnic group may share traits such as language, race or religion, as well as a belief in a common destiny or heritage – but all these are often encompassed by, or associated with, a given territory (duffy toft 2003, 19). azerbaijani and armenian historians have written extensively about their collective cultural memory and myths, arguing that their respective ancestors originated from nagorno-karabakh. the soviets encouraged the writing of histories of the non-russian peoples by encouraging primordialist national myths, for instance the history of the kazakh s.s.r., which was devoted to the kazakh military traditions, emphasized struggles for independence in tsarist times and praised kazakh heroes such as sultan kenesary kasymov (tillett 1969, 73-73). through such direct involvement in the writing of historical narratives, “the themes of the elder brother and the friendship of peoples were popularized in a growing number of publications on the cultural contacts of russians and non-russians” (tillett 1969, 252). these myths contribute to the primordial construction of national review of european and russian affairs 6 (1), 2011 46 identity, which supports a group’s ownership claim to a “homeland” based on the length of time their ancestors have resided there. if there are conflicting claims by two ethnic groups to the same land, the disagreement is often viewed as the result of ancient, religious, or traditional hatreds. after the 1950s, this type of behaviour was portrayed by stalin as common to the non-russian peoples. after the second world war, the russians themselves were considered by stalin to be of a superior culture that needed to influence and defuse the growing nationalism of the non-russian peoples (tillett 1969, 382). primordial cultural myths and territorial claims armenians believe that caucasian albania (which ruled the caucasus until the 2 nd century bc when parts of it were conquered by armenia) was influenced by bishop grigoris, of armenia, who is buried in the oldest church of karabakh, in the hadrut region (walker 1996, 89). in the eighth century, armenia was recognized as an administrative province by the arabs, outgrowing albania as a state. this area, known as artsakh, is viewed by armenians as “the cradle of armenian identity” (stern 2003). it is where the first armenian school was opened, in present-day martuni district of nagorno-karabakh. earlier, in 301, armenian scholars believe that armenian preacher and military leader mesrop mashtots had created or revived the armenian alphabet (stern 2003). this narrative therefore contributes to the armenians’ primordial argument for their nagorno-karabakh land claim, which insists that armenian christian and linguistic origins are rooted in the nagorno-karabakh region. as the centuries passed and the caucasus were handed over and traded by international powers with expansionist ambitions, nagorno-karabakh remained the commune of armenian culture preserved by their ancestors the meliks. the development of armenian political nationalism in the nineteenth century, which continued in armenia after sovietization, became associated not just with the movement for armenian independence but also with the grievance over nagorno-karabakh. the armenian national movement, whose roots can be traced back to young activist groups that emerged in yerevan university in the mid-1950s, is also linked to the karabakh committee whose concern was the “lack of cultural freedom and the obstacles to their interacting with their kin in armenia proper” (hunter 2006, 29). in the late 1980s the armenian nationalist movement began to develop its agenda with respect to its external relations. some members of the new leadership began to argue that irredentist claims might negatively impact its relations with turkey, a country that it needed as an ally if it was to stop relying on russia for security (hunter 2006, 30). armenians have what scholar ronald grigor suny refers to as an “unusually strong primordial identity” that shapes their nationalist rhetoric and expression. armenians emphasize that their collective identity is based on the shared “blood, territory, language and history” of a people who were the original inhabitants of the south caucasus region. suny suggests that the essentialist approach to primordial identity, or viewing identity as something that is “fixed, singular, internally harmonious and distinct from others at its boundaries” is comforting to nations. it “cannot be reduced to a mistake, self-deception, or false consciousness” (suny 2001, 892). armenian scholars who favoured the primordialist view argued that, the azerbaijani national identity is solely a product of soviet ethno-national construction, hence delegitimizing the azerbaijani claims to nagorno-karabakh. however, the azerbaijanis reject the suggestion that their nation is merely a by-product of the soviet struggle to keep together a multi-national state. they have identified with clans, tribes and muslim peoples who have also lived in the area for centuries, hence creating their own primordial claim. according to the azerbaijani narrative, the meliks are descendants of the jalalid, with no armenian ancestry. they see the karabakh area as “one of the historical hearths of the turkic culture of azerbaijan” (alijarly 1996, 129). from the 4 th century onwards, karabakh was aligned with kingdoms to the east – in present-day azerbaijan (goldenberg 1994, 157). they refer to early arab authors who drew maps of nagorno-karabakh as belonging to caucasian albania, “the most ancient state of northern azerbaijan” (stern) as far back as the year 731 (alijarly 1996, 113). azerbaijanis also believe that some of their authors, poets, artists and scientists were from the region and are buried in nagorno-karabakh. 47 review of european and russian affairs 6 (1), 2011 this argument over land entitlement that takes its cues from ancient myths and essentialist national identity formation can be seen as contributing to the tense ethnic conflict in nagorno-karabakh. the religious overtones especially paint this as an ecclesiastical dispute, fought over by christian and muslim rivals. however, religious framing alone doesn’t explain why armenia and iran, a muslim state, have maintained diplomatic relations for a long time. there is the perception of “pan-turkic” oppression. some armenians see azerbaijani hostility as akin to the assault by the turks during the first world war, which resulted in the death of more than one million armenians in 1915. armenians consider the deaths to be an act of genocide, which turkey has vehemently denied. this difference in the nations’ opinions contributed to the chaotic violence that ensued during the war (hunter 2006, 45). turkey’s influence in the region has had an important impact on nagorno-karabakh, not least because of interpretations of azerbaijani language and culture that point to turkish origins. turkish influence among the muslim states of central asia and the caucasus has led to turkey adopting a decidedly pro-azerbaijan stand towards the conflict as part of its strategy to maintain influence in the country (hunter 2006, 45-46). both sides believe their stories offer a form of historical legitimacy to the nagorno-karabakh land claim. it follows that central to the primordial argument, with respect to the causes of the current war, nationhood, in its full realization, “requires the form and frame of territorial polity” (brubaker 1996, 55). however, the ancient hatreds argument does not wholly explain why the ethnic violence in this case erupted in 1988. until then, there were about 724,000 ethnic azerbaijanis living in armenia (international crisis group 2005) and about 360,000 armenians in azerbaijan who emigrated between 1988 and 1993 (the un refugee agency 2004). while the historic suffering of the armenians cannot be dismissed as an essential factor that helped mobilize nationalist sentiments and fuel ethnic violence, azerbaijanis and armenians had coexisted without incidents of violence or pogroms for most of that time. their unwavering attachment to the territory and propensity towards violence could be explained using the constructivist approach to identity formation, which argues that the ethno-territorial dispute is a result of key events and agreements in history. territory a constructivist outline the following section refers to the various treaties and agreements that attempted to resolve the issue of the contested territories, but in turn only provided for more resentments and caused each side to argue that nagorno-karabakh should belong to them. at the outset of political instability in the late 1980s, the challenge for both nations, if they wanted to assert themselves in the international realm, was to construct an argument that the enclave should belong to them – an argument that went beyond the ancient historical presence of their people, and incorporated the role of external players in the ownership claims of their territory. in this sense, the constructivist theoretical approach to territorial claims begins to take on a more important role than the previous primordialist claims. one of the key obstacles to a rational settlement in territorial disputes is what social scientists refer to as the “indivisible issue” – this is precisely the issue with nagorno-karabakh where the territory is viewed by both ethnic groups as being an undividable homeland (duffy toft 2003, 2). when there are calls for sovereignty by a nation, a contested territory becomes the root of ethnic conflict when “competing claims are not prevented, regulated or managed by political control or institutionalized compromise” (hughes and sasse 2002, 4). the rightful, legal and historical ownership of the territory is asserted by both parties in order to support their claim over the lands today. azerbaijanis, for instance, will often refer to the batum treaty of 1918 between the ottoman empire and armenia which gave the state “only the erevan and echmiadzin districts, some 10,000 sq. km” (stern 2003). this treaty however, was by no means respected, and a bloody ethnic conflict raged in nakhichevan, karabakh and zangezur throughout the year. turkish troops invaded nagorno-karabakh later that year but left soon after, and the british believed that territorial disputes should be presented and resolved at the peace conference following the end of the war (hille 2010, 163). when a british representative negotiated land claims at the end of the war with the ottoman turks in 1919, khorsov bek sultanov, a wealthy landlord in karabakh and member of the musavat, a nationalist bourgeois party in review of european and russian affairs 6 (1), 2011 48 azerbaijan, was installed as governor of karabakh – an order that the armenians found unacceptable because of sultanov’s “pan-turkic” views (walker 1996, 99). azerbaijanis see the settlement that unfolded with the help of the british as recognition that the territory rightfully then belonged, and still belongs, to the republic of azerbaijan. armenians, however, see the inclusion, negotiated in 1919 in the treaty of sevres and signed by armenian president avetis aharonian and representatives of the ottoman empire, as a coercive agreement that took advantage of their “exhausted and dispirited” people (walker 1996, 100). the dissatisfaction over territorial settlements continued into the period of soviet rule, and was, in fact, exacerbated by the soviet political agenda. in november 1920, the azerbaijan revolutionary committee, a soviet organization that overthrew the government of the musavat party, recognized the disputed regions of zangezur and nakhichevan as integral parts of soviet armenia and granted nagorno-karabakh the right to selfdetermination. this mediation was intended to resolve some of the regional disputes in transcaucasia and initially helped bolsheviks take power in armenia. on july 4, 1921 it was officially decided that nagorno-karabakh would be unified with armenia, but this decision was reversed the following day and nagorno-karabakh was instead recognized as part of azerbaijan with the status of an autonomous oblast (hille 2010, 168). armenia was satisfied to be able to retain zangezur, which in 1918 was the location of the ethnic strife between the two groups. but this allocation was implemented not out of concern for armenia, but out of the soviets’ own political and economic strategy. lenin wanted to separate azerbaijan and turkey, so he assigned the zangezur southern tip to armenia. armenians did not want to be landlocked by turkey and azerbaijan, and therefore preferred this connection to iran. it is important to consider why the soviets refused to annex the region to armenia, especially when their claim to the territory technically adheres to the principle of majority rule, and, if we are to accept the argument that their ancestors were the first to settle the territory, the principle of tenure. the decision to assign nagorno-karabakh to azerbaijan therefore was mainly one of strategic economics. the bolsheviks saw that azerbaijan, with its larger population and oil resources was, a more important player to appease than armenia (hille 2010 169). this serves as an example of how the interests of states can help contribute to antipathy among different ethnic groups and contribute to nationalist feelings that can result from a perception of being collectively wronged or victimized. nagorno-karabakh was declared an autonomous oblast (nkao) in 1923, but it was to be financially and politically dependent on baku. it wasn’t just this declaration that armenians in armenia took issue with – it was also the drawing of the new border, which excluded a north-western part of karabakh from the oblast and established the lachin corridor to physically separate the region from zangezur. the physical construction of the border was meant to provide distance between the armenian majority in nagorno-karabakh, comprising about 90 per cent of the population in nkao, and the republic of armenia proper. but a six-mile swath of land, that is the lachin strip, is not enough to reduce the likelihood of secession and conflict, especially when one ethnic group has a neighbouring “big brother” to look out for it and intervene on its behalf (zurcher, 2007, 184). the soviet management of territorial borders showed the struggle to build and maintain a multinational state. across the union, societies living within the newly drawn borders were far from homogenous representations of the ethnicities and culture that lived there. armenians were a minority in azerbaijan, and as a minority they were concentrated in nagorno-karabakh. to have annexed this enclave and made it part of armenia would have fuelled a political crisis in the region, and set a precedent for minorities living in similar circumstances across the union. ultimately, this is exactly what happened in 1987 when armenians living in nagorno-karabakh began to protest asserting that nagorno-karabakh should be transferred to armenia, officially voting for accession a year later. the next section of this paper will explore why minorities felt these grievances, the reasons they felt they could assert their nationalist rights in the soviet union, and how the supranational government in moscow shaped this discourse from 1920s onwards with respect to nation-building policies. 49 review of european and russian affairs 6 (1), 2011 soviet nation building and identity construction in the caucasus, claims over territory are made in accordance with group interpretations of national histories (astourian 1994, 41). after the october revolution, the soviets did not want to replicate the geographic divisions as they existed in tsarist times – they wanted to form national-territorial borders that would consolidate ethnic identity by institutionalizing nationality at the state level (saroyan 1997). for example, cultural organizations like state publishing houses and ministries of culture were established according to the indigenous national community in a given region, and unions were set up to aid in the development of their national cultures, arts, languages, and architecture (saroyan 1997, 177). because the soviets believed geographical boundaries were supposed to link up with ethnic demographics, a “strong sense developed that each nationality ought to have its own territory” (laitin and suny 1999, 148). when this did not occur or was not possible, nations felt anger and resentment that translated into bitterness against those who did, aiding in the construction of nationalist sentiment due to perceived oppression and the unjust superiority of the other. before 1905, the azerbaijanis were known as caucasian turks, tatars, or muslims, and it was soviet power in the 1930s that gave them the “azerbaijani” identity. the soviets trained local political, economic and cultural elites, stressing a form of genealogical nationalism, which is one of the reasons for the rise of secessionist ethnic conflict and irredentist struggles (astourian 1994, 69). by depositing local elites in government who would remain loyal to the soviet leadership, indigenization policies were, in essence, designed to concentrate power in the moscow centre. until the mid-1930s these policies included language preservation intended to fertilize a “blossoming” of the nations and strengthen the consciousness of national identity. it accomplished this in part by guaranteeing that schools would be taught in the local ethnic languages as opposed to russian. in the 1920s the soviet centre also for the first time began to promote locals to the soviet party apparatus (fowkes 1997). while stalin abandoned this “localist” approach by the mid-1930s, it was later resuscitated by nikita khrushchev during the late 1950s and 1960s, and would eventually help mould local and national identities into political movements. this process strengthened the core ethnic group living within a republic, and it furthered their nationalist claims over the territory that their republic’s border covered. minority groups who were living within these same boundaries saw this as the soviets giving preferential treatment to the core majority, and hence as diminishing their own claims to the land. there is proof that minorities were subordinated to the titular nations in the republics, and often encouraged to migrate back to their “homeland” under stalin in the 1940s and again in the 1980s (suny 2001, 148). this perceived depravation is a central point of the armenian grievance with respect to nagornokarabakh. because karabakh was a part of the azerbaijan republic, armenians argue that education was severely underfunded; that there were no armenian-language textbooks or tv broadcasts; and no subsidies for armenian cultural development (saroyan 1997, 178). by restricting the use of armenian language in education, by not providing health clinics in armenian villages and leaving historical monuments to rot away, armenians claimed that the azerbaijanis tried to destroy armenian roots and culture, which became the core argument for their claim to secession in the late 1980s. the other argument made by armenians living in nagorno-karabakh was that of economic deprivation – they asserted that the region was disadvantaged and its agriculture industry neglected by the republican centre in baku. however the claim that nagorno-karabakh suffered regional economic deprivation was likely exaggerated by the armenians. karabakh was a “backward region” when compared to urban centres such as erevan and baku, but “according to most economic indicators, it was more prosperous than other regions in azerbaijan” (zurcher 2007, 221). the economic argument also lost credibility after henrik pogosian, first secretary of the regional committee in karabakh and a supporter of the armenians, delivered a speech in 1988 that instead portrayed nagorno-karabakh as an economically productive region that was, in fact, financially supported by the azerbaijan republic at large (zurcher 2007, 160). this speech also came just after ethnic violence broke out in sumgait, after which pogosian demanded the review of european and russian affairs 6 (1), 2011 50 separation of karabakh from azerbaijan. perhaps, what is more important than accurately assessing the level of economic prosperity of nagorno-karabakh at the time is the underlying sentiment of both versions of the story – that the time had come when the two groups could no longer live together. while the soviet nationality policy ultimately aimed for a sblizhenie, or coming together of the new socialist people, by “embedding ethnicity into politics,” (suny 2001, 149), it was a goal that failed. this is evidenced by the nationalist and popular front movements that bulldozed out of the 1980s and helped establish sovereign, nationalist states. one of the outcomes of the korenizatsiia or indigenization process that had the greatest impact with respect to mobilizing ethnic conflict was the formation of local elites. by favouring ethnic azerbaijanis for political and economic promotions over russian or armenian candidates, the soviets enabled azerbaijani elites to dominate the political sphere. minorities in the republics saw this as political disenfranchisement (saroyan 1997, 178). whether or not there is evidence to support the view that armenians were marginalized by these policies, it cannot be denied that the role of the nomenklatura in the mobilization of ethnic conflict was a central one. this became most apparent at the start of the conflict in the late 1980s when incumbent and challenging elites, using the institutional power officially afforded to them but never before exercised in the soviet union, called for the annexation of nagorno-karabakh to armenia. this was only possible because of the change in soviet leadership, as gorbachev’s perestroika reforms allowed open protest and hence had a direct impact on the war in nagorno-karabakh. such grievances can be seen through the framework of petersen’s emotionbased theory on ethnic conflict, where resentments based on status relations are turned into rage and contribute to the violence in the region. in february 1988, the nagorno-karabakh supreme soviet legislative body appealed to the supreme soviets of armenia, azerbaijan and the ussr to allow nkao to join the armenian soviet socialist republic. two days later, the azerbaijani ssr rejected it. because such a clash between union republics was without precedent in the ussr, moscow had to make a quick decision on how to respond to the dispute. in july 1988, the central soviets decided to maintain the disputed region within azerbaijan, however as the situation escalated, in january 1989, moscow established direct governance over nagorno-karabakh. rebellions that led to accusations of a pogrom in sumgait helped mobilize the armenian public to support the new nationalist karabakh committee, a dissident group of armenian intellectuals formed in response to gorbachev’s glasnost reforms who concerned themselves with armenia’s future – starting with a campaign to annex nagorno-karabakh to armenia proper (hunter 29). official reports suggest that the violence and bigotry went both ways. more than six azerbaijanis were among the 30 deaths in sumgait, and azerbaijanis complained that the armenians were discriminating against them as a minority within nagorno-karabakh, “where government and party bureaucracies were predominantly armenian” (altstad 1996, 231). the violent outburst is likely to have been the culmination of grievances on the part of armenians in nagorno-karabakh for being subordinated to the azerbaijani nation, or what jeremy smith calls “national hierarchisation” – where the core nationalities of titular republics were considered superior to the minorities who also lived within the same borders (smith 2000). therefore, while the soviets perhaps looked forward to one day eroding nationalities and conflicts through modernization and promotion of marxism, paradoxically, their indigenization policies only enhanced the cohesion of titular nations, and in turn fuelled the inter-ethnic hostilities within the borders that they resided in (suny 2001, 875). in the caucasus territorial borders cannot easily be drawn to coincide with cultural or ethnic realities. hence the “ethno-cultural” model (brubaker 1996, 56) that the soviets favoured could not align with the mixed populations of armenia, azerbaijan, and georgia. the soviets tried, using the best means available to them at the time, but this often resulted in an arbitrary ethno-territorial design. by the 1990s, it had been clear that minorities living in a nationalizing state such as azerbaijan would not enjoy the perks of national representation and access to administration that the core nations had within the soviet empire. but the main difference, at that point in history, was that minorities were finally able to voice their concerns, which they were not able to do under earlier soviet leadership. in 1988, mass demonstrations in erevan and stepanakert, the administrative capital of nagornokarabakh, were accompanied by an appeal to moscow to transfer the enclave to armenia. gorbachev, 51 review of european and russian affairs 6 (1), 2011 fearing an uprising in azerbaijan, did not want to openly side with armenia and is quoted as saying: “the only exit from the situation is a political one. we could not bring about a decision in afghanistan and here it is the same” (fowkes 1997, 159). he placed nkao under special administration citing article 78 of the ussr supreme soviet constitution, which forbids territorial changes without the agreement of all republics concerned (altstadt 1997, 231). as a result, both parties were dissatisfied with moscow. armenians claimed that the calls for secession were in accordance with the ussr law on the “procedure for solving issues of secession of a soviet republic from the ussr.” article 3 of this law provided autonomous republics within the soviet union with the right to determine independently, by referendum, whether they wished to remain within the ussr or secede from it. while many in azerbaijan had feared moscow would side with the armenians because of the accusations that there had been a pogrom, the fact that nkao remained within the country did not appease the azerbaijani government, because baku did retain direct administration of stepanakert (altstadt 1997, 232). therefore, the political institutions of the ussr and the flip-flopping and weakness of the gorbachev regime contributed to the ethnic grievances in the caucuses. some, however, argued that the soviet interference was even more direct – that soviet soldiers sold weapons to both sides and fought on both sides during the war, “even after the fall of the soviet empire” (altstadt 1997, 232). soviet nation building and identity construction when political shuffling and military actions contribute to fears and resentments, a solely primordial approach is insufficient for understanding and explaining the conflict and omits several additional key factors that led to the rise in violence in 1988. azerbaijan and armenia declared independence in august and september of 1991, respectively. operation koltso (ring), launched in 1991 by azerbaijani forces to disarm armenian militia failed – they underestimated the resistance of the armenians troops who continued to mount assaults against civilians in the region. azerbaijan, like other former soviet union states at the time, was inefficient and discombobulated, and could not gather enough troops to fight the attack from within its borders. a weak department of defence and internal security is, in part, to blame, and this was a residual effect of the collapse of the soviet union, which “left the successor states without any meaningful institutions that could have claimed the monopoly on violence” (zurcher 2007, 213). it was also this weakness of the central state that increased armenian paranoia – they felt that if ethnic violence was directed from baku, they would not be protected by the soviets. therefore, while azerbaijan was too weak to defuse any growing secessionist movement, armenians, in turn, felt empowered to pursue it. armenian military success and azerbaijan’s failure to preserve its borders can, in part, be attributed to the two very different paths that domestic political elites took in the nascent years of the nations’ independence. armenian president levon ter-peterossian rode the tide of the anti-communist movement, maintaining close ties with neighbouring russia. in contrast, azerbaijan “stumbled from coup to coup until state power reverted to the former communist party boss, heidar aliev” (laitin and suny 1999, 154). the fragility of the azerbaijani state can be attributed to the ethnic conflict raging within the region, but also to the lack of solidarity and of a nationalist movement, the absence of which allowed the communist elites to stay in power long past their prime (laitin and suny 1999, 156). this collapse of the centre translated into an opportunity for the mobilization of ethnic conflict, as is outlined in the emotionbased theory of ethnic violence. in 1992 armenians attacked the town of khojaly in azerbaijan, killing hundreds of azerbaijani citizens. within a year, they dominated the region and have had a military presence in azerbaijan ever since. it was this bloody battle that led to the fall of the inactive communist government and allowed for a nationalist reorientation away from russia and the commonwealth of independent states (cis), towards turkey. but this government, led by ablufaz elchibey, also proved unable to stop armenian forces. these circumstances heralded the return of aliev, a savvy politician and former kgb member who, despite continued losses in nagorno-karabakh, was able to maintain power. he beat back a coup in 1994, and, together with the armenians and russians, helped arrange a ceasefire in nagorno-karabakh (laitin review of european and russian affairs 6 (1), 2011 52 and suny 1999, 156-157). aliev understood that his alliance with russia meant that azerbaijan would have to rejoin the cis, but he was also aware of the anti-russian sentiments in the country, which were a result of the bitter memories of the russian military attack on baku in 1990. from 1992 until mid-1993, the russians withdrew about 60,000 troops from azerbaijan, and another 25,000 from armenia (baev 1997, 38), however erevan later negotiated for the retention of russian troops in the capital and establishing of a formal russian military base. russia wanted to maintain relations with oil-rich azerbaijan, but russian president boris yeltsin also unabashedly supported armenian president ter-peterossian. such conflicting foreign policy in the caucasus, some argue “make it obvious that russia is not interested in a peaceful solution for nagornokarabakh – peace will inevitably devalue russia’s military assets” (baev 1997, 43). ter-peterossian benefited from the victories in the karabakh, for which there was great, nationalist support on the part of the armenian electorate. while armenia’s own economy was in disarray, especially after the earthquake in 1988, the president benefited from military successes such as the capture of the lachin strip and the stabilization of the front in 1994. the nagorno-karabakh dispute can therefore be seen as contributing to the construction of nationalist sentiment in both of the nations in question. despite the ceasefire arranged that year, occasional violence does still erupt in the region, for example in march 2008 when a 20-day state of emergency was declared in armenia and several casualties were reported by both groups (radio free europe 2008). the conference on security and cooperation in europe or the osce minsk group, which includes russia and the us, has not been able to resolve the dispute. the legal balancing act sets the armenian right to self-determination against the territorial integrity of azerbaijan. agshin mehdiyev, permanent representative of azerbaijan to the united nations, has argued to the security council that the nagorno-karabakh region of the state “has been captured and held by armenia, whether directly by its own forces or indirectly by forces forming part of the nagorny karabakh republic” (compilation on the un documents 2008, 156). supporting the argument that armenians have undertaken an illegal occupation is the international covenant on civil and political rights (iccpr) assertion that there is no provision that statehood must be granted to all the peoples within a particular territory. this was outlined in a case on the legal status of gagauzes in moldova. according to the iccpr there is no generally accepted view that the right to self-determination should be applied to any given state. this means there is no hard, legal support for the armenians’ declaration of sovereignty (stern 2003). not even armenia has recognized nagorno-karabakh as a state, as that would jeopardize its role as a supposed mediator in the dispute between the politicians in nagorno-karabakh and azerbaijan. armenian officials continue to deny that their state has meddled in azerbaijan’s internal affairs. in order to better align with international law, the request by nagorno-karabakh for annexation with armenia was dropped in favour of the call for self-determination. conclusion the commission on security and cooperation in europe (csce) and russia have throughout the past two decades disagreed on the best way to mediate the situation in nagorno-karabakh. the csce wanted to upgrade from a mediating role to having a peacekeeping force, while the russians thought russia or the cis should have a military presence. armenians, who are suspicious of the international community, believe karabakh has since moved from being a local conflict in the caucasus to an international game of power politics because of the presence of caspian oil (stern 2003). a poll conducted by the armenian academy of sciences found that an overwhelming majority would prefer a russian peacekeeping force. meanwhile, armenian forces continue to occupy about 20 per cent of azerbaijan’s territory – not just nagorno-karabakh, but also much of the south-western region of the country. armenians believe that nagorno-karabakh has already honoured its part of the compromise by renouncing its claim to be conjoined with armenia, and instead asking for independence. they argue that nagorno-karabakh’s sovereignty does not depend on international recognition, because nagorno-karabakh has a territory, a homogenous, unified population, as well as an elected, organized and functioning authoritative body 53 review of european and russian affairs 6 (1), 2011 (stern 2003). the government of azerbaijan, however, continues to appeal to the united nations security council on the grounds that there has been a violation of international treaties and un human rights conventions. to date, the conflict remains unresolved and despite the fact that the war has resulted in extremely high political and economic costs for both states, neither is willing to concede the territory to the other. as this paper has argued, the extent to which the ethnic conflict is embedded in nagornokarabakh is, in part, due to the relationship that both groups have with the territory – they argue it is the cradle of their distinctive religious, cultural and linguistic identities. both the armenians and azerbaijani have constructed primordial arguments around their ancestors’ historic tenure in the region. some see this as bolstering the legitimacy of the armenian claim to the territory, especially since it suggests the resilience of their cultural or ethnic identity. although primordial arguments alone could not explain what caused the violence in the late 1980s in this region, it was an important element in the construction of nationalist sentiment needed to mobilize it. politicians made their territorial claims using the various treaties that divided lands in the caucasus, and when combined with resentments among nations cultivated by the soviet indigenization policies, this proves that the constructivist theoretical approach to the formation of nationalist sentiment better explains the leading causes of the war and violence in nagorno-karabakh. but what is unique to the region is that certain primordial aspects played a role as well, specifically with the people on the ground who came to resent their neighbours because of perceived injustices committed against them. in the mid-1960s, armenians complained to soviet leader nikita khrushchev that “not a single road” had been built and that nothing was done to develop agriculture in nagorno-karabakh autonomous oblast (fowkes 1997, 137). they also complained of a “retrograde nationalism” that subordinated their national identity to that of the majority within azerbaijan. the soviet drawing of ethno-territorial borders and the use of them for the pursuit of indigenization policies, such as the seeding of local elites in government, exacerbated national ambitions of the titular nations living within heterogeneous republics. but it was impossible to construct homogenous national communities in mixed settlements (brubaker 1996, 55) and this resulted in the stirring of ethno-nationalist sentiments, which aggravated the conflict in nagorno-karabakh. this, in part, is what led to the build-up of grievances and the uprising of minorities in the caucuses, specifically the armenians in nagorno-karabakh. meanwhile, gorbachev’s glasnost policies allowed for these grievances to be aired through the form of public protest, which, in nagornokarabakh, ignited mass violence because of tensions that had been building over the decades. however, the rebellions and violent clashes may not have exploded into a full-scale war had it not been for mobilizing elites in azerbaijan and armenia who commanded the armed forces. they implemented military strategies that simultaneously took advantage of azerbaijan’s political instability and armenia’s nationalist ambitions. ethnic groups engaged in conflict often spew hateful and derogatory words against one another, and this makes their dispute appear as if it is rooted in primitive grievances that have been brewing for centuries between people who must, but refuse to, share a given territory. however, this alone does not explain why ethnic wars occur at the time that they do. references alijarly, s. 1996. “the republic of azerbaijan: notes on the state borders in the past and the present.” in transcaucasian boundaries, edited by j.f.r.wright, s. goldenberg , and r. schofield, 113-33. london, uk: ucl press. altstadt, a. 1996. “ethnic conflict in nagorno-karabagh.” in ethnic conflict in the post-soviet world: case studies and analysis, edited by drobizhova l., et. al., 227-54. armonk, new york: m.e. sharpe. “armenia/azerbaijan: deadly fighting erupts in nagorno-karabakh.” 2008. radio free europe (march 4). accessed on april 10, 2010. http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1079580.html http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1079580.html review of european and russian affairs 6 (1), 2011 54 astourian, s. h. 1994. “in search of their forefathers: national identity and the historiography and politic of armenian and azerbaijani ethnogeneses.” in nationalism and history: the politics of nation building in post-soviet armenia, azerbaijan and georgia, edited by d. v. schwartz and r. panossian, r. university of toronto: centre for russian and east european studies. atilay, a. 2010. rfe/rl azerbaijani service correspondent photo gallery. (march). accessed april 10, 2010. http://www.rferl.org/photogallery/3710.html baev, p. 1997. russia’s policies in the caucasus, the royal institute of international affairs, russia and eurasia programme. london, uk: chatham house. brubaker, r. 1996. nationalism reframed: nationhood and the national question in new europe. new york: cambridge university press. “compilation on the un documents on the armenia-azerbaijan nagorny karabakh conflict.” 2009. general assembly security council. sixty third session, letter dated december 2008, from the parliament representative of azerbaijan, 156. duffy toft, m. 2003. the geography of ethnic violence. new jersey: princeton university press. fowkes, b. 1997. the disintegration of the soviet union – a study in the rise and triumph of nationalism. new york: st. martin’s press. goldenberg, s. 1994. pride of small nations. new jersey, usa: zed books ltd. hille, charlotte. 2010. state building and conflict resolution in the caucasus. leiden, the netherlands: brill. hughes, j. and sasse, g. 2002. ethnicity and territory in the former soviet union. london, uk: frank cass publishers. hunter, shireen. 1994. the transcaucasus in transition. washington, dc: the center for strategic & international studies. laitin, d. and r. g. suny. 1999. “armenia and azerbaijan: thinking a way out of karabakh.” middle east policy 7 (1): 145-76. “nagorno karabakh: viewing the conflict from the ground”. 2005. international crisis group, europe report no. 166, (september 14). petersen, roger d. 2002. understanding ethnic violence. cambridge, uk: cambridge university press. saroyan, m. 1997. minorities, mullahs and modernity: reshaping community in the former soviet union, edited by e. walker. berkley: regents of the university of california. “some 65,000 refugees from azerbaijan gain refugee citizenship.” 2004. the un refugee agency. (february 6). accessed on april 10, 2010. http://www.unhcr.org/40239bba4.html smith, jeremy. 2000. “national hierarchisation and soviet nationality policy from lenin to putin.” paper presented at the vi iccees world congress, tampere, finland, (august 1). stern, d. 2003. moderator, council of europe. (march 31-april 2). accessed on april 10, 2010. http://www.coe.int/t/f/com/dossiers/evenements/2003-04-jeunesconflit/nagorno_conflict.asp#p62_3950 suny, r. g. 2001. “constructing primordialism: old histories for new nations.” the journal of modern history, 73 (4): 862-96. tillett, lowell. 1969. the great friendship. durham, n.c.: the university of north carolina press. walker, c. j. 1996. “the armenian presence in mountainous karabakh.” in transcaucasian boundaries, edited by j.f.r.wright, s. goldenberg, and r. schofield, r., 89-112. london, uk: ucl press ltd. zurcher, c. 2007. the post-soviet wars. rebellion ethnic conflict and nationhood in the caucasus. new york and london: the new york university press. http://www.rferl.org/photogallery/3710.html http://www.unhcr.org/40239bba4.html http://www.coe.int/t/f/com/dossiers/evenements/2003-04-jeunes-conflit/nagorno_conflict.asp%23p62_3950 http://www.coe.int/t/f/com/dossiers/evenements/2003-04-jeunes-conflit/nagorno_conflict.asp%23p62_3950 microsoft word erin j. black_3.doc review of european and russian affairs vol. 5 issue 1/2009 © rera 2009 all rights reserved ………………………………………………………………… eu equality commitments and shifting meanings of gender equality erin j. black abstract this article follows the development of a european union gender equality regime through three broad periods: equal treatment policies, positive action measures, and gender mainstreaming. the policy-making process entails conflict between competing policy frames; unequal resources behind each secures the dominance of an economic frame. strategical framing practices have been employed by equality advocates to overcome this disadvantage. this article traces the gradual shifts in meaning within each period until equality goals are integrated into the dominant economic policy frame. it concludes that equality advocates need to engage in deeper analyses of power in order to sustain attention to equality goals over longer periods of time. review of european and russian affairs vol. 5 issue 1/2009 © rera 2009 all rights reserved 53 introduction the european union (eu) has held commitments to gender equality since the treaty of rome in 1957. gender equality is a central commitment of the eu and has expanded into the most far-reaching gender regime of any regional organization worldwide. it is essential to examine the way in which this regime has developed and the broader context where the meanings of gender equality have been negotiated. economic growth, which has always been a fundamental objective and focus of the eu, has been the dominant policy frame and has shaped understandings and representations of gender equality concepts within legislation. the consequence of considering gender equality from an economic frame has been the gradual subordination of equality concepts and their eventual co-optation of meaning in support of the pursuit of employment targets and economic growth, rather than equality between women and men. approaches to gender equality adopted by the eu can be grouped into three broad time periods: equal treatment measures which were adopted during the 1970s; positive action measures which were largely used in the 1980s and 1990s; and gender mainstreaming (gm) which was introduced in the 1990s. these approaches were initially modeled on feminist understandings of equality, but during each period there was a gradual shift back towards economic concerns. a historical perspective reveals that the eu has maintained a liberal approach to equality as ‘sameness’ and has promoted female participation in the labour market as the most suitable way to achieve both equality and employment targets simultaneously. feminists have often created connections between competing policy goals such as equality and economic growth in order to find a resonance between them. this resonance increases the likelihood that equality goals will be incorporated into the dominant policy agenda. this act of creating linkages is known as strategical framing and has been employed by feminists in each of the three time periods. strategical framing has been effective in creating space for equality concepts, but over time there has been a gradual shift away from the original meaning of the concepts and they have been infused with alternative meanings which support other priorities. such shifts in meaning have occurred incrementally and unevenly. this has resulted in the coexistence of policies which reflect conflicting notions of gender equality, and in some cases the coexistence of conflicting meanings within one policy document. when eu equality review of european and russian affairs vol. 5 issue 1/2009 © rera 2009 all rights reserved 54 legislation is examined from a broader historical perspective it becomes evident that over time dominant policy frames have absorbed equality concepts so that equality goals become secondary issues of concern and are used to legitimate a focus on employment targets and economic growth. while strategical framing can be a very powerful and useful strategy to help stimulate the adoption of new goals onto the eu policy agenda, it must be done carefully as it increases the risk of full co-optation of the initial meaning. i will begin by looking at policy frames and examine the policy-making process using a frame analysis. given that there are numerous interpretations of any policy issue and various ideas of how issues should be prioritized, the policy creation process is a struggle over domination and subordination, which determines how issues will ultimately be given priority on the policy agenda. i will then examine how eu gender policy has developed within each of the three defined periods, with attention to women’s activism and organization and the impact this has had upon policy development, the extent to which strategical framing was employed, and gradual shifts in the meaning of equality concepts. this historical analysis reveals that, despite the extensive gender regime of the eu, equality legislation has faced numerous challenges which continue with current practices of gm. gm is a promising policy approach which has significant potential to be transformative of the dominant order, but faces inherent dangers of co-optation and so far has merely been integrated into dominant policy frames. in order for gm to retain coherence as an innovative policy which can achieve equality between women and men, it must retain the ability to challenge dominant norms. strategical framing, while sometimes advantageous when used with other approaches to equality, is detrimental when employed within a strategy of mainstreaming as it reshapes gm within an integrationist approach instead of striving for its transformative potential. strategical framing practices require a deeper analysis in order to understand how power functions between two competing policy frames. further development of equality policy within the eu demands greater attention from both policymakers and feminists to ensure that equality legislation retains coherence and effectiveness at bringing us closer to a society free from the inequalities of gender. review of european and russian affairs vol. 5 issue 1/2009 © rera 2009 all rights reserved 55 approaches to gender equality the effect of political discourses and policies upon individual citizens and relationships is mediated by gender. state policies constrain gender roles and shape notions about both the differences, and similarities, between men and women. even policies that claim not to focus on gender have gendered consequences for men and women. the traditional policy frame of the eu was one of economic growth and gender concerns were generally disregarded in the design of state family and welfare policies; yet, such policies were founded upon the traditional division of labour and the male breadwinner family form, with a dependent wife and a working husband (mazey 1998: 135). state policy is an important terrain within which to employ a gender critique as it has significant implications for how individuals organize their private lives. feminists have not come to any general consensus on a theory of the state and debates within feminist literature continue to this day about where the problem of gender inequality lies and what the solution is. the vision of a society free from the inequalities of gender has been conceptualized in at least three different ways, all of which translate into different political strategies. gender equality can be seen as ‘sameness,’ ‘difference,’ or the transformation of all established norms and standards related to gender and what it means. these have been articulated as the strategies of ‘inclusion,’ ‘reversal,’ and ‘displacement’ (squires 2005: 367). those pursuing a strategy of inclusion wish to extend dominant values to men and women equally, aspire to objectivity, conceive of people as autonomous and the state as neutral, and are often defined as liberal feminists. the strategy of reversal takes up a politics of difference, seeks recognition of a distinctive female identity, and views the state as patriarchal and thus has a key role in perpetuating gender inequalities; those pursuing this strategy are often labeled radical feminists. the strategy of displacement aims to move beyond gender by deconstructing those discursive regimes which actively engender the subject; this is most often defined as a postmodern perspective (squires 2005: 368). these are conceptualized as an ‘equal treatment’ policy frame, a ‘woman’s perspective’ frame, and most recently a ‘gender’ policy frame, respectively. all three approaches to gender equality have been employed by the eu and can be situated within fairly distinct time periods of the eu’s history. the introduction of equal opportunities legislation as a concern for the eu stemmed from article 119 of the 1957 treaty of rome, which referred explicitly to the right of women to equal review of european and russian affairs vol. 5 issue 1/2009 © rera 2009 all rights reserved 56 pay with men in the labour market. this article has been the cornerstone for all subsequent eu social policy. inclusion of article 119 was precipitated by the french government, which had expressed concern that its highly paid female labour force would be undercut by lower wages from elsewhere (duncan 2002: 306). it was intended to create fair and equal competition between member-states by preventing any one state from gaining a competitive advantage by paying women at lower wages. thus, gender equality initially became an area of concern to the eu through a frame of competition and economic growth, rather than through one of equality and social justice. thus, from its very inception within the treaty of rome, gender equality was tied to employment and labour market concerns. this constitutionally limited the social dimension of the eu to labour market creation, and subsequent social policy expansion was compelled to find its justification from within employment arguments (young 2000: 84). in the early years of the european economic community (eec), interest in equality between men and women coincided with second-wave feminism, and gradually community institutions extended their purview to address some of the various aspects of women’s economic activity. teresa rees outlines three phases of the european commission’s (ec) approach to gender equality over the last three decades: equal treatment in the 1970s, positive action in the 1980s, and gm in the 1990s. equal treatment measures are primarily concerned with the inclusion of women into already-existing structures and norms and is largely a “legal redress” to treat men and women the same. positive action recognizes differences between men and women and maintains that specific actions are necessary in order to assist women in a overcoming their disadvantage in a patriarchal society. gm involves the incorporation of gender issues into all policies and institutions. gm identifies how institutions and structures implicitly and perhaps unwittingly reinforce gender disadvantages and maintain male patriarchy. it then redesigns these structures and institutions appropriately in order to transform the policy process in a way that is not gendered (squires 2005: 370). these three approaches are generally viewed to be complementary, cumulatively building upon each other and have emerged progressively within the eu over time. she labels these approaches ‘tinkering,’ ‘tailoring,’ and ‘transforming,’ in terms of their relationship to dominant norms (rees 1998: 48). the development of eu gender policy has paralleled the development of feminism in its various strands (liberal, radical, and post-structural feminism). this is largely due to the fact that the eu is a relatively young institution and has allowed groups multiple points of access within eu political structures. review of european and russian affairs vol. 5 issue 1/2009 © rera 2009 all rights reserved 57 various gender equality offices have been inserted into the european institutional machinery and have forged strong networks with independently organized women’s groups. this velvet triangle has been active within all periods of eu gender policy and has encouraged the placement of equality goals on the eu policy agenda but has still been met with resistance from policy actors. conflicting policy frames have restricted the scope of equality goals, leading feminists to employ different strategies to further increase the likelihood of placing equality goals on the policy agenda. policy frames and strategical framing carol lee bacchi has argued that inherent meaning does not pre-exist a policy issue or problem; rather, meaning is constituted within a broader context or frame of understanding (bacchi 1999: 9). rein and schon define policy framing as “a way of selecting, organizing, interpreting and making sense of a complex reality in order to provide guideposts for knowing, analyzing and acting” (rein and schon 1991: 263). in other words, a policy frame provides a perspective from which an issue can be interpreted in order to determine how to respond or interact, which originates in underlying structures of belief. state policies are grounded within a particular policy frame. for instance, gender inequality in politics can be depicted as “women trailing behind men,” in which case the solution would target women’s behaviour, or it can be depicted as “men dominating positions of authority and excluding women,” in which case the solution would target the issue of men’s domination. the language or discourse of the policymaking process is important in defining and representing the policy issue at hand. carol lee bacchi argues that every policy proposal contains an implicit or explicit diagnosis of what the ‘problem’ is, which she calls “problem representation” (bacchi 1999: 1). the problem representation of a policy proposal defines the problem and creates the solution, impacting both the subject and the object of the resultant policy. frame analysis is concerned with identifying dominant and subordinate policy representations with a focus on language and discourse, as well as identification of the processes by which meanings are constructed in specific contexts (peterson 2007: 266). frame analysis starts with the assumption of numerous interpretations in the creation of policy and examines review of european and russian affairs vol. 5 issue 1/2009 © rera 2009 all rights reserved 58 issues of dominance and subordination as they are made manifest. this creates space for a discussion of normative goals and increases awareness of the role that ideology plays in the creation of policy. the process of creating policy is a territory of struggle to determine which actor(s) will be involved in shaping the issues to be considered and to determine how they will be constructed or represented. this process is a conflict over competing policy frames and entails struggles over power. resources allocated to each frame are likely to be unequal, making it more difficult for the subordinate frame to displace, or question, the dominant frame. nancy fraser notes that under conditions of inequality, deliberative processes are inclined to serve dominant processes and they fail to provide subordinated groups with an opportunity to articulate their voice or concerns (fraser 1997: 81). in other words, subordinate frames are likely to be simply absorbed into the existing dominant frame. maria stratigaki has referred to this as the process of co-optation, which occurs when “the concept itself is not rejected, but its initial meaning is transformed and used in the policy discourse for a different purpose than the original one” (stratigaki 2004: 36). strategical framing practices, which attempt to construct a “fit” or “resonance” between different frames to increase their chance of being incorporated into the policy agenda, increases the likelihood of co-optation of a concept’s meaning. strategical framing is based on the understanding that an inequality of power resources backing various frames impacts the likelihood of success. a dominant frame is more likely to incorporate another frame which is compatible, rather than in contradiction and conflict with it (snow and benford 1992: 137). this effectively provides a link between the two frames by stretching the meaning of the goal in order to secure the allegiance of those acting from within the dominant frame (verloo 2005: 359). feminists have often employed this strategy in order to facilitate the adoption of equality issues into the policy agenda. while this is certainly more effective in securing initial acceptance, there is an inherent danger in the strategy. the shape of ensuing power struggles are altered so that when the feminist goal is stretched, it is conceptualized as weaker than its original manifestation, and ultimately further potency is accorded to the dominant frame. this increases the likelihood for co-optation of the equality concept’s original meaning as the dominant frame subsists and prevails, unchallenged in its various forms of inequality. strategical framing of an equality goal can therefore be seen as a mix of enabling and constraining forces (verloo 2005: 345). it provides an initial introduction onto the policy agenda which comes with additional mechanisms review of european and russian affairs vol. 5 issue 1/2009 © rera 2009 all rights reserved 59 and increased opportunities to institute real change, but then the reshaping of equality goals to fit with the dominant frame results in a mere continuation of current understandings and practices. this has worked against the mobilization of feminists, as it has become more difficult to oppose new meanings of concepts which they originally championed (stratigaki 2004: 36). while strategical framing was employed during each of the three periods identified in the eu’s development of gender policy, it has been particularly within the most recent period of gm that it has been most detrimental to equality aims. the transformative potential of gm lies in its ability to challenge dominant norms and gendered processes; strategical framing practices weaken the conceptualization of gm and detract from its ability to address and redress gendered systems and processes. this weakens the transformative potential of gm and instead reshapes it into an integrationist approach, incorporating gender issues into existing policy frames rather than rethinking their fundamental aims. an analysis of all three periods of the eu’s approach to gender equality further reveals representations of equality as understood through various policy frames, the strengths and limitations of strategical framing, and the extent to which there were shifts in the meaning of equality concepts. equal treatment policies liberal feminists view the role of the state, as it ought to be, as a neutral arbiter between conflicting interests and the guarantor of individual rights as promised by citizenship (connell 1994: 141). they argue that the neutral state has been “captured” by men, and that redress is necessary in order to recover gender equality. liberal feminists characterize the problem as men in command of governments, business, the military, and other institutions; as such, the solution is characterized as greater access for women to positions of authority in order to restore a more suitable balance (connell 1994: 142). liberal feminism emerged as a parallel discourse to european integration in the 1960s and 1970s, and both were critical in the adoption of ec measures ensuring women’s equality in the labour market. the equality frame during this period can be identified as an ‘equal treatment’ policy frame. the activities of liberal feminism during the late 1960s and early 1970s were catalytic to the increased attention to equality issues between women and men in the labour market. feminist review of european and russian affairs vol. 5 issue 1/2009 © rera 2009 all rights reserved 60 ideas and demands were a significant challenge to long-standing and traditional notions regarding the status of women. european feminists sought to reframe government policy which had significance for women, arguing that most importantly, there was a critical need to address discrimination in the labour market. wage differentials between women and men were common throughout europe, and equal pay for equal work became a central demand of women’s protests. however, most national governments remained unreceptive to women’s demands. when they were met with little response by national governments, feminists strategically turned to the eec as a focus for their lobbying activities (mazey 1998: 137). they invoked article 119 in national equal pay campaigns, and it was belgian women who were successful in placing the new gender equality policy frame on the european agenda – an equal pay strike in a munitions factory resulted in an increase to the wages of all female workers and garnered widespread publicity throughout europe. belgian lawyer eliane vogel-polsky argued for a strong definition of article 119 in the defrenne case1 in front of the european court of justice (ecj). this decision confirmed the direct applicability of article 119 and extended it further, applying it to contracts between individuals and collective agreements (hoskyns 1996: 93). while article 119 provided feminist groups with an entry point to support their demands for stronger gender equality legislation, other factors also made the eu more receptive to feminist demands. the eu was relatively unconstrained by pre-existing policies and a deeply entrenched policy frame given that it was a new political system, allowing easier adoption of the ‘equal treatment’ policy frame offered by women’s groups. women were strategic in targeting multiple access points to the policy process, and the eu was searching for new ways to extend its mandate in order to respond to recession and stagflation. consequently, it cultivated strong connections with women’s groups in order to legitimate its intervention in social policy areas. these connections were instrumental in placing gender equality on the european policy agenda in accordance with an ‘equal treatment’ perspective (mazey 1998: 138). feminist mobilization was met with relative receptiveness of the eu in light of the fact that extending gender policy would also extend eu jurisdiction. 1 an air hostess had been forced to retire at age 40 from belgian state airline sabena, following company policy. she suffered loss of pay and pension entitlements, and had to search for work at a vulnerable age; this was further aggravated by company policy which gave any member of the air crew high pension entitlements which came close to full salary, except for air hostesses who received very little (hoskyns 1996: 70). review of european and russian affairs vol. 5 issue 1/2009 © rera 2009 all rights reserved 61 the introduction of a 1974 council resolution concerning a social action program (sap) authorized the eu to become involved with social issues and initiated a more active social policy engagement. the sap included a section on equality between men and women in the labour market with the main emphasis being on increasing employment rates. various women’s groups were inserted into the eu political machinery, including the women’s bureau, the european women’s lobby (ewl), and the women’s committee of the european confederation of trade unions. these groups increased attention to equality issues and had considerable impact in the implementation of several equality measures. these measures addressed various aspects of equal treatment in the labour market. the 1975 equal pay directive reaffirmed the principle of equal pay between men and women for work of equal value, the 1976 equal treatment directive provided for equal treatment as regards access to employment, and the 1978 directive concerned equal treatment in social security benefits. these were followed by a directive in 1986 on equal treatment in occupational social security schemes, and another 1986 directive on equal treatment in self-employment. vocational training and employment schemes offered by the european social fund (esf) aimed to promote equal opportunities for women in the labour market and in 1988, “equal opportunities between men and women” was adopted as a specific measure under objective 3 of eu structural policy (stratigaki 2005: 170). the emphasis of these measures was on increasing women’s access to the labour market rather than on a redistribution of opportunities, reflecting an ‘equal treatment’ policy frame which emanated from liberal feminists. while feminists understood gender equality as equal treatment, there was an increasing sense that positive action was also necessary in order to achieve true gender equality. jacqueline nonon, an official in the directorate general employment and social affairs (dg v), had been given responsibility for preparing the equality directives and she initiated an ad hoc working group on women’s issues. the group believed that women needed equal treatment as well as positive action measures to achieve true gender equality; however, it was deemed more likely that the wider community would adopt directives focused on equality within the labour market. indeed, the ec stated that it was concerned only with family policy insofar as it directly affected women’s employment in the labour market (hoskyns 1996: 102). as such, strategical framing was employed in order to create a “fit” with the economic frame of the ec, and the resultant review of european and russian affairs vol. 5 issue 1/2009 © rera 2009 all rights reserved 62 directives reflected this, addressing equality concerns of feminist groups (limiting the scope to an ‘equal treatment’ perspective) as well as economic concerns of the wider community. there were gradual shifts in the meaning of the equal treatment directives and the ways they were implemented in various member states. equal treatment directives were used by various national governments to reduce social expenditures and encourage participation in the labour market, rather than being used to pursue positive integration through institutionalizing protective legislation for all employees in the labour market (young 2000: 86). legislation on supplementary benefits was revised to incorporate gender-neutral language, but effectively excluded access to many women who had domestic care giving responsibilities (duncan 1996: 403). this illustrates some of the difficulties inherent in eu-level legislation – a multitude of political actors and arenas increases the likelihood that equality goals will be sidelined in the process of implementation. while they faced numerous difficulties upon implementation, application of these equality directives was still undoubtedly of benefit to women in providing them with a legal redress for discrimination in the labour market. these “hard law” directives are judicially enforceable and remain at the heart of eu interventions on gender inequality (walby 2004: 7). feminists were required to use strategical framing only to a moderate degree, as feminist ideas were resonant with the eu’s dominant economic policy frame. an ‘equal treatment’ frame encouraged a focus on employment targets, and this focus continued within the eu’s shift towards positive action measures and work/life reconciliation policies. work/family reconciliation policies in comparison with liberal feminists who understand the state in terms of its political institutions, radical feminists extend their analysis to the broader structures of state and society. radical feminism is not easy to define because it takes many forms. for the purposes of this paper, a rough sketch is sufficient although this is by no means a comprehensive account. radical feminism is predicated on an understanding of intrinsic connections between the family, the labour market, and the state; inequalities reproduced in one sphere will be propagated within all three spheres. the state is viewed as “male” in that the social order is constituted in the interest of men and thereby reproduces gender inequalities, not only through legislation but also review of european and russian affairs vol. 5 issue 1/2009 © rera 2009 all rights reserved 63 through social norms and regulation of the family structure (mackinnon 1989: 162). the state’s role in the oppression of women is often seen to be indirect – it regulates ‘systems’ such as the family and the labour market which reproduce inequalities of gender and are oppressive to women (connell 1994: 144). the cultural distinction between public (masculine) and private (feminine) is problematized; the proposed solution, however, is not as evident. some perceive this to be the end of the state itself given that it is predicated upon this distinction. others argue in favour of state expansion, so that the state would effectively become broader and thinner and reshaped in the image of radical democratization of social interaction instead of favouring male privilege (connell 1994: 165). still others argue that the category “woman” has not been misdefined so much as it has been undervalued; they argue for a concept of equality that values caring responsibilities (cain 1989: 836). from all accounts, the goal is to recreate reality from a woman-centred perspective. whereas liberal feminists assume similarities between women and men, radical feminists tend to build their arguments around inherent differences between men and women, arguing that equal treatment is capable of only treating the symptoms of gender inequality but not the root causes; as such, politics must be reconstructed in order to recognize the distinctive perspective of non-hegemonic gender identities (verloo 2005: 346). given that radical feminists see patriarchy as embedded in state procedure, change must originate outside of the state in civil society, as actions within the state system will instinctively reinforce the patriarchal structure (kantola 2006: 6). the concept of the “double day” of paid and unpaid work suffered by women first appeared within feminist writing in the early 1970s as the number of women entering the labour market dramatically increased. this became an issue of concern for feminists as the need for non-parental child care strategies was compounded by increased participation in the labour market by women. women’s disproportionate share of care and domestic responsibilities came to be recognized as a direct cause of perpetuating gender inequalities in the family, as well as within the market and the state. as such, the pursuit of a gender equal society demanded a recognition for women’s caregiving work as well as a redistribution of caring responsibilities to alleviate the double burden carried by women (hoskyns 1996: 199). the concept of ‘work and family reconciliation’ was developed by feminists in order to highlight the connection between gender inequalities in the labour market and the home, and they demanded reconciliation policies which would provide caregiving services to allow women to move freely within the family and review of european and russian affairs vol. 5 issue 1/2009 © rera 2009 all rights reserved 64 the labour market. feminists lobbied for a need to reconceptualize care work to achieve an equal division of labour in the family, as well as the need for state policies to support unpaid care responsibilities. this discourse was embraced by the eu, and soon came to characterize the majority of eu equality policies during the 1980s and early 1990s. these policies were based on the feminist understanding that state provision of two types of care services can help alleviate these gender inequalities: first, non-parental childcare services help to alleviate women’s care giving responsibilities and can facilitate participation in the labour market; second, parental leave policies allow a temporary absence from work, and can alternatively alleviate women’s responsibilities in the workforce and encourage a return to the domestic sphere. the provision of one type of program or the other would not increase women’s choices, nor would it challenge assumptions about women’s work, but would simply shift their burden of responsibility from one sphere to another. it is the combination of these two supports that can assist women and men to balance their responsibilities in the labour market and the domestic sphere, and contribute to the pursuit of gender equality.2 women have fought for a reconceptualization of their identity as caregivers and for a more egalitarian division of labour, as well as for targeted services; the equality frame during this period can be identified as a ‘woman’s perspective’ frame. feminism of this brand influenced the eu’s understanding of gender equality but it was in particular the equality machinery of the eu which facilitated a shift in the eu’s approach to gender equality in the 1980s, from a strategy of inclusion to a strategy of reversal. a european feminist network had begun to emerge by the 1980s and as women began to work at the ec and european parliament (ep), the eu increasingly adopted positive action measures and reconciliation discourse. the 1974 sap was the first european document to allude to childcare as a means to enable mothers to reconcile family responsibilities with working life, marking the eu’s entry into the realm of childcare policies. subsequently, many european texts focused on the connection between childcare and gender equality. the 1989 community charter of the fundamental social rights of workers contained equality of treatment provisions, not simply in paid employment but also in education, social protection, and in reconciling work and family 2 however, there is disagreement within the feminist discipline surrounding reconciliation discourse, as it is associated with the meaning of motherhood. for some feminists, the family was seen as an oppressive institution and insofar as motherhood was the means in which women were subordinated, it was also rejected (randall 1996: 497). one of the consequences of this rejection of motherhood was a reluctance to engage with the issue of childcare for fear of perpetuating patriarchy through association. there was also disagreement as to the real value of paid work. review of european and russian affairs vol. 5 issue 1/2009 © rera 2009 all rights reserved 65 obligations. it included a chapter devoted to equal treatment for men and women as a social objective (commission of the european communities 1990a: 17). a series of action programmes focused on the need to develop public services such as childcare and established pilot projects and networks of experts and women’s rights advocates (pollack and hafner-burton 2000: 433). jacques delors, ec president from 1985 – 1995, was an instrumental player in facilitating europe’s expanding role in social citizenship. the delors commission sought to mobilize political support for new ec initiatives in a variety of areas from interest groups and social movements and, in an effort to achieve this, created bodies of experts to establish strong connections with these communities (ross 2001: 197). the european commission childcare network was established in 1986 by the women’s bureau to develop childcare policy. the childcare network was given a broad mandate and left relatively unconstrained by the delors commission to promote a feminist agenda (ross 2001: 197). peter moss, coordinator from 1986 – 1996, understood childcare issues as an essential component to addressing unequal gender roles in the domestic sphere and adopted a ‘woman’s perspective’ policy frame. if male and female relationships were equal in the home, then shifts in labour market relationships would subsequently follow (ross 2001: 187). the childcare network became a significant actor in disseminating information about gender equality to member states and conducting advocacy work alongside feminists and was supported by the equal opportunities unit. during the span of its existence (1986 – 1996), it produced 31 reports, created an extensive database of information and stimulated the informal policy process (randall 2000: 355). in 1990, the childcare network explicitly articulated the need for greater involvement of men in the care of children: childcare is a “men’s issue” as much as a “women’s issue.” no formula can be applied uniformly in all families–how responsibilities are shared may vary between families and, within the same family, may vary over time with one parent doing more at one stage and less at another. having acknowledged this, there is still plenty of scope, and an urgent need, for greater involvement by men in childcare (particularly in families but also as workers in services) and for policies to encourage and support this process. (european commission childcare network, 1990, p. 3) the advocacy work of the childcare network was critical to the eventual adoption of the recommendation on childcare in 1992. the childcare network had fought for the introduction of binding measures on childcare through the adoption of a framework directive; while it was review of european and russian affairs vol. 5 issue 1/2009 © rera 2009 all rights reserved 66 successful in propelling this onto the ec policy agenda, it was then presented to the council of ministers as a recommendation rather than a directive. a directive on this issue, which had significant costs to the state and risked being perceived as an encroachment into the realm of the family, was not likely to pass and so the decision was made to instead pursue a non-binding, “soft law” recommendation (hoskyns 1996: 156). the ec employed strategical framing and presented the proposal for a recommendation as a means to achieve both gender equality between men and women and economic growth (bleijenbergh et al. 2006: 323). the council of ministers then shifted the justification of the recommendation away from substantive equality for women to arguments for economic growth and a more traditional understanding of formal equality in the labour market (bleijenbergh et al. 2006: 324). this made the document acceptable to all member states, including the uk. while there had been concern that britain would exercise its veto right and block the recommendation, prime minister tony blair supported childcare services from an economic frame in order to encourage employment growth (bleijenbergh et al. 2006: 327). thus, the recommendation on childcare was adopted by the council of ministers in 1992. the final text of the recommendation embraced a broad definition of childcare and identified four key areas where state measures were needed: childcare services, parental leave for employed parents, family-friendly policies at the workplace, and measures to promote the increased participation by men in caring responsibilities (lewis 2006: 428). significantly, this was the first commission document to target male behaviour (hoskyns 1996: 157). the recommendation illustrated multiple understandings of reconciliation throughout the document and employed several policy frames. a ‘woman’s perspective’ frame was employed to argue for an equal division of labour within the family and arguments about children’s well-being were also taken up, but the majority of the recommendation viewed provision of childcare services as advantageous to the pursuit of other policy goals, such as increasing mobility of the european labour market and economic growth (council of european communities 1992: 1). the recommendation’s conflicting use of reconciliation language highlights the various actors involved in its creation: the childcare network had established reconciliation as meaning “the renegotiation of gender roles beyond the labour market and within the family,” but the commission was tied to more standard arguments as it was mandated to legitimate its actions through article 119 of the treaty of rome. the constraints of the commission and the latitude review of european and russian affairs vol. 5 issue 1/2009 © rera 2009 all rights reserved 67 of the childcare network, in addition to the effects of strategical framing practices, had led to a combination of policy frames throughout the document (ross 2001: 194). the recommendation was significant as it was the first time that european social policy had extended beyond paid employment into the realm of unpaid as well as paid care (bleijenbergh et al. 2006: 316). nevertheless, its impact was limited among member states as its soft law status prevented judicial enforcement and many member states already had childcare arrangements established (bleijenbergh and roggeband 2007: 451). after the delors’ presidency came to an end in 1995, there was a backlash across europe in reaction to the activism of the commission and member states became more protective over what they saw as incursions into state sovereignty. the childcare network was dissolved in 1996 and no equivalent organization was established in its place. subsequent commission activity was more conservative and restrained, and it shifted away from a regulatory function to one more concerned with coordination and monitoring (ross 2001: 206). the santer commission, which followed the presidency of jacques delors, focused almost exclusively on mass unemployment, low growth, and the creation of the economic and monetary union (emu) in order to restore economic competitiveness to european countries. in 1995 the budget of the equal opportunities unit was cut in half, followed closely by the removal of the director of the unit, agnès hubert. while nine gender expert groups in various policy areas had been struck under the third action programme, seven of them were dismantled and discontinued (stratigaki 2005: 173). this was done against the backdrop of the single european act and the unanimous decision by member state governments to improve competitiveness and complete market liberalization (hoskyns 1996: 141). these decisions signaled a fundamental change in emphasis of the eu, establishing market liberalization and deregulation as the new orthodoxy of the eu. childcare continued to be an area of interest to the commission, but subsequent commitments were more explicit in their understanding of childcare through an economic frame. while the first and second medium-term community action programmes used a ‘woman’s perspective’ frame to interpret reconciliation, the meaning of the term began to shift in the third community action programme (1991-1995). reconciliation policies were delineated as a way to “reduce barriers to women’s access to and participation in employment” (commission of the european communities 1990: 4). the new community initiative now (new opportunities for women) was introduced under this programme as a means to encourage review of european and russian affairs vol. 5 issue 1/2009 © rera 2009 all rights reserved 68 women’s participation in the labour market, stating that insufficient childcare services constituted a barrier to women’s integration into the labour market. this reflected the eu’s economic, and specifically employment, concerns. although the third and fourth medium-term community action programmes were framed as involving both men and women as opposed to targeting women only (as in the first and second community action programmes), the measures emerging from these programmes addressed women exclusively (stratigaki 2004: 43). the understanding was that it was women who would do the reconciling, which represented a shift away from understanding gender equality as a rebalancing of roles in the family sphere, and back towards a strategy of inclusion in the labour market. parental leave programs are perceived to be a crucial component of state services by feminists espousing a strategy of reversal and a ‘woman’s perspective,’ as it is the combination of parental leave and childcare services which will provide women with greater flexibility and freedom in shaping their lives. parental leave enjoyed only a brief presence on the ec agenda, appearing at a time when fertility rates were declining in many european states and populations were aging. this raised concerns about a diminishing labour supply in years to come, prompting the ec to focus on policies which would encourage a greater reproduction of labour in order to sustain the economy (duncan 2002: 310). a 1994 white paper proposed a series of measures that would reduce the risks of economic convergence for member states. one of these was parental leave, and the white paper connected it to working flexibility and the reconciliation of family and work life, as well as the “individualization of taxation and social security systems” (european commission 1994b: 150). a directive on parental leave was adopted in 1996, more than a decade after it had first been proposed (and eventually dropped because it was considered too prescriptive in its intention to change men’s behaviour through non-transferable entitlements). the commission’s dg v introduced the directive through reconciliation discourse and employed strategical framing to justify its existence through arguments for gender equality as well as economic growth. it was argued that a changing job market required more female workers; measures assisting workers to reconcile their working life with their family life would allow women to become more active in the labour market (ross 2001: 200). the final text of the parental leave directive employed various policy frames throughout the document. first, a ‘woman’s perspective’ frame was used: parental leave was recognized as an individual and non-transferable right for both women and men. there was also a provision for review of european and russian affairs vol. 5 issue 1/2009 © rera 2009 all rights reserved 69 emergency leave in the event of family illness or a medical accident. there were indications of an economic frame as the majority of details, including pay and social security matters, were left to be negotiated by each member state. no minimum remuneration requirements were specified, which suggested that men were much less likely to take it (as concluded by bruning and platenga in their 1999 study of eight european countries). parental leave entitlement was only to be granted once a worker completed a certain period of work, and allowed employers to postpone the parental leave for “justifiable reasons related to the operation of the undertaking” (council of the european communities 1996: 5). the text of the directive suggests that there was a greater concern with increasing flexibility in the market place than with gender equality. by the time the directive was implemented, its stipulations were so minimal that it marked an improvement for only a few member states: belgium, luxembourg, and ireland (the uk had opted out of the agreement on social policy and so was not obliged to abide by these stipulations). the 1997 treaty of amsterdam also included provisions pertaining to parental leave, specifying that all member states must offer three months of unpaid leave to both men and women through a nontransferable credit until the child’s eighth birthday. however, attention to parental leave was short-lived and the commission quickly resumed its primary focus on the provision of childcare programs, which were of greater benefit within an economic frame. despite the colder political climate in the later years of the 1990s, the ewl mounted an effective campaign to have broader equality measures included in the amsterdam treaty. the ewl adopted a strategy premised on the understanding that they would need to provide a perspective of expertise in order to gain legitimacy, and they set up meetings with member states to explain the significance of the treaty, as well to garner support for extending gender equality provisions within it. the ewl positioned itself as an ally of the commission by arguing on behalf of the ec that the treaty was worth adopting in its own right; it was subsequently granted the opportunity to comment on treaty drafts and articulate its demands in position papers (helfferich and kolb 2001: 151). it helped to disseminate a ‘gender’ policy frame and influenced the adoption of gm measures. pressure from sweden, finland and denmark also had an impact upon the equality provisions of the amsterdam treaty and to the adoption of gm as a formal strategy of the ec. upon joining the eu in 1994, the governments of sweden and finland were under considerable pressure to prove to their constituencies that the eu was women-friendly, as a series of referenda before accession had revealed that women in these countries were doubtful review of european and russian affairs vol. 5 issue 1/2009 © rera 2009 all rights reserved 70 of the eu’s receptiveness of gender equality. swedish women had voted against joining the eu, female constituents in denmark voted against the maastricht treaty because of its limited consideration of gender equality, and only by a slight majority had women in finland voted in favour of joining (duncan 2002: 309). the final amsterdam treaty included article 13, which allowed the eu to challenge discrimination practices, and article 141 which extended article 119 from the treaty of rome, stipulating that women and men should receive equal pay for work of equal value (zippel 2004: 77). the most far-reaching provisions of the treaty were articles 2 and 3, which made gender equality between women and men a central objective of all eu activities. the meaning of reconciliation continued to shift towards a more purely economic policy frame. reconciliation was identified as an integral part of the european employment strategy (ees) process in order to promote female labour market participation (lewis 2006: 429). childcare had regularly been identified as a factor in strengthening the equal opportunities pillar in the national action plans on employment since 1998. the 2000 lisbon summit suggested setting national targets with respect to childcare based on best practice which were accompanied by commitments to full employment and specific targets to increase women’s employment. this effectively narrowed the rationale for providing childcare services to reaching employment targets and limited the understanding of childcare to formal provision rather than parental leave (lewis 2006: 430). this was followed by the barcelona european council in 2002 which agreed on targets for the provision of non-parental childcare facilities in order to facilitate higher employment rates for both women and men. during this period, there were few indications of concern with gender equality as a goal, as the ‘woman’s perspective’ frame slipped off the policy agenda and childcare came to be seen as a means to achieve full employment rates within an economic frame. a further indication of the gradual shifts in meaning of equality concepts was the fact that reconciliation discourse began to be employed outside of gender equality and social policy documents. the 1994 white paper “growth, competitiveness, employment” referred to the need for increased flexibility in the labour market, to which parental leave could positively contribute, and referred to reconciliation of work and family life in order to reduce indirect labour costs (european commission 1994a: 150). reconciliation became increasingly detached from equality discourse and instead was tied to new commitments of flexibility and security in the workplace; review of european and russian affairs vol. 5 issue 1/2009 © rera 2009 all rights reserved 71 in other cases it was used to address falling birth rates. during the latter half of the 1990s, reconciliation began to be seen as the ultimate compromise able to simultaneously address demographic concerns, economic concerns, and gender equality, and it came to be included in all major eu policies related to organization of work or employment (stratigaki 2004: 46). for instance, the 1996 green paper “living and working in the information society: people first” discussed the use of technology in improving the balance between work and family life (european commission 1996: 25). the meaning of reconciliation had shifted dramatically since its inception into eu discourse, from a concept able to highlight the significance of care programs in the pursuit of gender equality, to one which legitimated economic aims. ultimately, gender equality goals had been co-opted and subsumed into an economic frame. in this phase of eu policy formulation, many of the initiatives on gender equality were catalyzed by lobbying activities of the feminist movement, spearheaded by institutions of the equality machinery of the eu. the childcare network was instrumental in disseminating knowledge about the need for childcare services in pursuit of gender equality between women and men, and portions of the final text of the recommendation reflected this policy frame. the parental leave directive was introduced by the dg v through a ‘woman’s perspective’ frame, and the ewl spearheaded a large lobbying campaign in order to incorporate stronger equality legislation within the treaty of amsterdam. strategical framing was employed by each of these actors to varying degrees, in an attempt to increase the likelihood of adoption into the eu’s policy agenda. the final texts illustrated shifts in meaning away from the initial ‘woman’s perspective’ policy frame. over time, eu commitments to gender equality articulated through reconciliation discourse became increasingly weaker, and equality activity was recast within a broader economic frame which coincided with a liberal understanding of gender equality – ‘equal treatment’ in the labour market. despite this preoccupation with economic priorities, gender equality became even more entrenched within the eu. in 1996, the commission issued a communication which committed to examining all eu policies with a gendered lens. this marked the formal introduction of gm into eu politics, which has since become the major focus of eu gender equality efforts. review of european and russian affairs vol. 5 issue 1/2009 © rera 2009 all rights reserved 72 gender mainstreaming the third and most recent phase of the ec’s approach to gender equality has been gender mainstreaming (gm). gm is grounded in a strategy of displacement and poststructuralist feminism. poststructural feminists view the state as a discursive process rather than merely as institutions; the state is not seen to be inherently patriarchal in nature but was historically constructed as patriarchal. the state, therefore, is at the centre of a reverberating set of power relations and political processes which both construct and contest patriarchy (kantola 2006: 12). poststructural feminists see the state as a terrain of struggle which can be both a positive and a negative resource but they focus on displacing patriarchal relations and deconstructing those discursive regimes which ascribe gender roles. such discursive processes are conceptualized as the location of both the problem and the solution of gender inequality (kantola 2006: 13). gm claims to address and redress gendered systems; as such, it has attracted a great deal of attention from academics as it contends that it can lead to a world beyond gender. the incorporation of gm into the eu equality agenda in 1996 resulted in a much broader purview for equality policies. mainstreaming builds upon previous understandings of gender equality and inequality. gm has been called a “three-legged equality stool” in that it is must work with both ‘legs’ of equal treatment and positive action measures in order to be successful (booth and bennett 2002: 434). it focuses on issues of gender rather than on women, widening its view of what contributes to gender inequality. gender issues are relevant within all policy areas and gm brings this to the fore, expanding responsibility for who, and what, contributes to inequality. gm demands the redefinition of policy goals to incorporate the promotion of gender equality as an overarching policy objective, and calls for the re-examination and reformation of the policy process to incorporate a gendered perspective. it refers to both a strategy to achieve equality as well as a process, and prescribes a specific set of tools and methods with which to implement the strategy (booth and bennett 2002: 442). the equality frame during this period can be identified as a ‘gender’ frame. while gm is widely perceived to be a new strategy of gender equality, it is worth noting that the three strategies of inclusion, reversal, and displacement can be constituted within mainstreaming practices themselves (squires 2005: 370). mainstreaming can be understood to mean different things, and the ways in which mainstreaming practices are applied impact review of european and russian affairs vol. 5 issue 1/2009 © rera 2009 all rights reserved 73 whether it fits within a strategy of inclusion or achieves its transformative potential. strategies of inclusion, or integrationist approaches, address gender issues from within existing policy paradigms, whereas strategies of reversal imply the transformation of policy structures through increasing women’s participation as decision-makers (jahan 1996: 829). it is widely accepted that mainstreaming must employ a transformative approach in order to adequately address fundamental issues of gender inequality, as both a strategy of inclusion and reversal fail to challenge dominant gendered norms (beveridge and nott 2002: 300). in february 1996, the commission officially adopted gm as a strategy. gm was defined as: mobilizing all general policies and measures specifically for the purpose of achieving equality by actively and openly taking into account at the planning stage their possible effects on the respective situations of women and men (gender perspective). (emphasis in the original) (commission of the european communities 1996a: 2). the communication stressed the importance of using a gendered lens to examine various policy areas, but failed to provide any overarching goal or objective, an expectation of outcomes or timeline, or a strategy for the implementation of gm. it made no reference to the connection between gm and women’s participation in decision-making, nor did it suggest how to allocate human resources or funds in the implementation of gm (stratigaki 2005: 175). it was drafted by two male officials, neither of whom had any prior experience dealing with gender equality. they had rejected requests from the equal opportunities unit to provide input, stating that this would adopt a “woman’s ghetto” approach and was therefore not appropriate for gm, which could be designed by anybody (stratigaki 2005: 175). arguably, this contributed to a confusing definition of gm. the first progress report on the follow-up to the communication was adopted in 1998, this time with greater input from the equal opportunities unit and other women. the progress report included a new definition of gm which was much more comprehensive: the systematic integration of the respective situations, priorities and needs of women and men in all policies and with a view to promoting equality between women and men and mobilizing all general policies and measures specifically for the purpose of achieving equality by actively and openly taking into account, at the planning stage, their effects on the respective situation of women and men in implementation, monitoring and evaluation. (commission of the european communities 1998: 2). review of european and russian affairs vol. 5 issue 1/2009 © rera 2009 all rights reserved 74 this report outlined the need for a “dual strategy” approach (combining gm with positive action measures). such a strategy was officially launched within the ec and it was particularly due to the individual efforts of female commissioners that it was effectively implemented using a ‘gender’ policy frame. a strategy and action plan on ‘women in science’, the daphne initiative combating violence against women, and the incorporation of a gm strategy into the eu structural funds policy all employed a dual track strategy effectively (stratigaki 2005: 179). the influence of individual female politicians was further felt when commissioner anna diamantopoulou and barbara helfferich, a member of her cabinet, were successful in their fight to continue the mid-term action programmes, which had been threatened to be terminated due to arguments that gm precluded the need for other positive action measures. the framework strategy for gender equality (2001-2005) was adopted and the action programmes continued, marking an unmistakable success for gender equality issues. while these women were unable to transform dominant norms across the eu, their experience illustrated that with political will, a ‘gender’ frame could be promoted within the eu political agenda. a “dual strategy” approach is essential, as gm could otherwise be used as a justification for diluting gender expertise and eliminating specific positive action approaches altogether. maria stratigaki notes that the annual commission report, “employment in europe” contained a chapter on women’s employment from 1989 until 1993, and in 1994 it examined all chapters through a gendered lens; by 1995, both these approaches had been terminated, stating that the use of gm in the drafting of the policy meant that these measures were no longer necessary (stratigaki 2005: 176). in the field of education, budget allocations for equality projects were discontinued with the argument that gm had already been employed. the now community initiative, an important source of financing and support for women in vocational training and enterprise creation, lost its funding as the issue was mainstreamed within employment policy (woodward 2008: 76). within these areas, a ‘gender’ frame did not resonate with the dominant frame and was therefore rejected. while the fourth medium-term community action programme for equal opportunities between women and men featured mainstreaming as its most central element, this altered the shape of the projects which received funding under this programme, and small enterprises initiated by women’s organizations were set aside as larger-scale projects proposed by organizations such as the social partners received funding instead. these were significant losses for feminists and for gender equality issues. review of european and russian affairs vol. 5 issue 1/2009 © rera 2009 all rights reserved 75 equality goals continued to face difficulties under gm as it had under previous eu policy approaches, and so feminists used strategical framing practices in order to create a resonance between equality goals and other policy priorities. while strategical framing contains inherent dangers when employed with any policy goal, it is particularly dangerous when used to justify gm. in order to be an effective strategy, gm needs to retain its ability to challenge gendered policy goals and processes. strategical framing of gm increases the likelihood that it will turn into an integrationist approach, subsuming gender into existing policy frames rather than rethinking the fundamental aims of the eu from an equality perspective. this likelihood is increased even further by the fact that gm lacks specific objectives on reducing gender inequalities and is fairly vague, which allows it to be easily reshaped and relocated within other policy frames. the eu’s structural funds were the first test case for the commission’s new gm mandate. the commission created a set of draft regulations for 2000-2006, which mainstreamed gender across every area of structural operations. the proposed regulations presented ten articles containing specific requirements for effective and successful incorporation of a gendered perspective at every stage in the policy process. strategical framing was consistently used throughout the drafting and negotiation process, as gm was framed not only as a means to achieve gender equality, but also as an issue of social justice and economic growth (pollack and hafner-burton 2000: 441). this stretching of the gender equality goal placed it alongside other political goals to resonate with other policy frames. there was little resistance and the gender provisions of the new regulations were adopted by the council of ministers with very few changes, marking a success for gm (pollack and hafner-burton 2000: 442). however, one consequence of this was greater attention accorded to an ‘equal treatment’ perspective instead of a ‘gender’ perspective, and the main objective of the structural funds with regard to gender equality was stated as being increased female in the labour market (braithwaite 2000: 11). despite requirements that a gender perspective be applied to all areas of the structural funds, this has not been the case as “hard” areas (such as transport and energy) have been insulated from this and only “soft” areas (such as training and agrotourism) have been subject to a gender perspective (braithwaite 2000: 7). recent studies have shown that there are very few specific equality objectives and actions within structural fund documents, and only rarely is a ‘gender’ perspective used (ewl 2002: 1). this demonstrates a significant shift away from the initial review of european and russian affairs vol. 5 issue 1/2009 © rera 2009 all rights reserved 76 understanding of gm and the experience of gm within the structural funds has led to the conclusion that the “european commission is stronger on policy formulation than on developing accompanying arguments, procedures and instruments for translating policy into practice” (braithwaite 2000: 7). in another study, mark pollack and emilie hafner-burton examined five issue-areas of the eu and found that mainstreaming advocates employed strategical framing within all five areas. they further argued that this act of strategical framing had a direct impact in shaping the eu’s approach to gm as an integrationist strategy rather than transformative (2000: 452). the structural funds case illustrates many of the difficulties gm faces within the eu. there have been persistent criticisms that eu mainstreaming efforts have not effectively been incorporated with many of the core areas of eu policy and spending, such as transport, competition, environment, foreign policy, and agriculture (woodward 2008: 75). resistance to gm has been fairly common across departments and there has been significant variation in approaches to mainstreaming across divisions of the commission. the incorporation of gm is made more difficult by its use of predominantly “soft” policy instruments, such as benchmarking and guidelines, which are generally voluntary. the use of soft policy measures has limited the scope of gm within the ec and results have been reported to be uneven, fragile and vulnerable to setbacks or reversals (rubery 2002: 510). such tepid outcomes of gm are not accidental. various policy areas employing a policy frame which is antagonistic to equality aims have rejected a ‘gender’ perspective; while this has been mitigated by strategical framing practices, the act of strategical framing has encouraged gm to adopt an integrationist approach and relinquish its transformative potential in order to gain a place on the policy agenda. the degree to which a particular policy area has had experience dealing with gender policies, prior to the introduction of mainstreaming, has been proven to be inversely correlated to the extent of compromise required by the very tools which are intended to challenge and transform gender norms (woodward 2008: 67). a sympathetic policy frame is likely to find a resonance with gm and a ‘gender’ policy frame, whereas a frame that is unfamiliar with gender issues will require a greater degree of strategical framing. it is questionable whether the short-term successes of strategical framing are worth the constraining effects felt in the long-term, for without its potential to transform dominant norms, gm becomes a toothless policy approach which is likely to be used to legitimate economic goals rather than contribute to the pursuit of equality. review of european and russian affairs vol. 5 issue 1/2009 © rera 2009 all rights reserved 77 widespread confusion about what gm strategies involve have led to concerns about its vulnerability to being co-opted and used against feminist goals, or reduced to merely a “tick box.” in the absence of firm and understandable definitions of gender equality or mainstreaming, how can such goals be realized and strategies be operationalized? while any definition of gender equality must remain open and flexible, ambiguous references allow the definition to become a “chameleon, changing colour with every social and political context” (verloo 2005: 355). conceptualization of the goal itself, as well as an idea of how to operationalize the goal, is essential in order to realize gm’s transformative potential. ute behning and serrano pascual (2001) examined the impact of gm in national practices of employment and found that understandings of gm varied widely, from equal participation to affirmative action, or reform of government. they concluded, however, that most gm policies were simply a continuation of previous equality policies (behning and pascual 2001). twelve years after its original launch, gm has failed to radically transform policy processes within the eu. it has had limited reach in policy-areas and continues to be kept outside the debate with regard to core eu macroeconomic policies. in the areas where it has been most successful, it has been criticized as being a mere continuation of previous gender policies rather than the start of a new approach. in other areas, it has been employed as an excuse to dismantle women’s machinery and eliminate positive action programs. the resistance to gm within eu institutions demonstrates continued challenges to the adoption of a gender equality frame. strategical framing of gm has been shown to be ineffective, merely diluting the meaning of gm concepts which are absorbed into other policy frames, rather than promoting a strong gender equality frame. evidence of a declining focus on gender issues, coupled with the dismantling of equality programs and diminishing attention to promoting the equal sharing of unpaid care work between men and women, suggests that gm has done little substantively to advance gender equality. the institutionalization of gm within eu policy processes provides the transformative potential for policies to become more inclusive and sensitive to gender and diversity; however, achieving this potential will only occur through a consideration of the power relationships involved in the politics of framing. gender equality must be pursued as an essential goal in its own right within a strategy of mainstreaming; strategical framing will downplay the importance of gender equality and privilege other policy priorities, thereby relegating gm to an integrationist approach. as long as equality is seen as an instrument to achieve broader review of european and russian affairs vol. 5 issue 1/2009 © rera 2009 all rights reserved 78 employment and economic goals, gm will be unable to achieve its transformative potential in leading us to a world beyond gender. conclusion the eu has presented a favourable opportunity structure for feminist groups, allowing multiple points of access to the policy process and embedding various allies within its institutional structure. this equality machinery has been instrumental in the development of equality policies (ross 2001: 203). however, despite initial correlations with feminist understandings of equality, eu policy has eventually shifted back towards economic concerns within each time period. such shifts have been gradual and uneven, but a historical analysis reveals that the eu has maintained a liberal approach to equality and has limited meanings of equality to ‘equal treatment’ in the labour market. increasing labour market participation has simultaneously been a goal of its dominant policy frame of economic growth. despite an extensive gender regime, equality legislation has faced persistent challenges. conflicts between policy frames involve struggles over power; backed by unequal resources, advocates of equality goals have employed strategical framing in order to overcome this disadvantage. while strategical framing has been relatively successful in providing equality goals an initial place on the policy agenda, over time this opening has narrowed as equality concepts have been watered down and subsumed within the dominant frame. strategical framing can therefore be seen as a combination of enabling and constraining effects and must be employed carefully, with great attention to how power is at work within such practices. this strategy is especially dangerous when employed to create linkages between gm and other policy frames, for gm’s greatest strength is its ability to challenge dominant norms. strategical framing weakens this capacity and increases the likelihood that it will be integrated into the dominant policy frame and used to legitimate economic goals. while the enabling elements of strategical framing have been useful for equality goals, it has not yet proven to be effective at providing equality issues with a sustainable position on the policy agenda. feminists must rely upon deeper analyses of how power frames eu policies and discourse, using this knowledge to explore how to shift the review of european and russian affairs vol. 5 issue 1/2009 © rera 2009 all rights reserved 79 balance of strategical framing effects in their favour and how to sustain attention to equality goals over longer periods of time. review of european and russian affairs vol. 5 issue 1/2009 © rera 2009 all rights reserved 80 bibliography bacchi, carol lee. 1999. women, policy and politics: the construction of policy problems. london: sage publications. behning, ute and amparo serrano pascual. 2001. “rethinking the gender contract? gender mainstreaming in the european employment strategy.” in european trade union yearbook 2000, ed. emilio gabaglio and reiner hoffman. brussels: etui. beveridge, fiona and sue nott. 2002. “mainstreaming: a case for optimism and cynicism” feminist legal studies 10(3-4): 299-311. bleijenbergh, inge, jet bussemaker, jeanne 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the author(s) www.carleton.ca/rera safe country of origin list at the eu level: the bargaining process and the implications anca gurzu carleton university abstract critics have often highlighted that the 1999 tampere decision to establish a common european union (eu) asylum system has been too focused on security and not enough on human rights, leading to increased denial of protection for asylum seekers. this paper focuses on a controversial asylum policy, which is part of this debate: the safe country of origin (sco) policy. this policy revolves around having a list of countries deemed “safe,” which ensures asylum seekers from these countries are fast tracked through the system and likely denied asylum in the end, based on a general assumption that the application is unfounded. human rights groups have argued the sco policy violates the geneva convention. widely used at the national level, officials proposed the creation of a supranational sco list in the early 2000s. however, disagreements among member states over what countries to deem “safe,” as well as the need to place the european parliament in a co-decision (as opposed to consultative) position for the creation of the eu sco list have led to an impasse. this paper employs two major european integration theories, neofunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism, to explain the bargaining dynamics between member states and their failure to agree on what “safe” means. factors such as different national migratory pressures, varied procedural understandings and applications of the sco policy, a limited successful harmonization in related asylum policies, along with a reluctance to have the european parliament in a co-decision position all contributed to the non-adoption of a supranational sco list. 2 review of european and russian affairs 7 (1), 2012 introduction european union (eu) member states set themselves a new goal at the european council summit in tampere in 1999: to establish a common eu policy on immigration and asylum. the 2004 hague programme brought the initiative into a second phase, calling for deeper procedural harmonization through binding instruments with an adoption deadline of 2010 (lindstrom 2005, 600). it even speculated on the idea of joint processing of asylum applications within the eu. the stockholm programme (2010-2014) envisions a deepening of this common roadmap, calling for a functional common european asylum system by 2012. despite these initiatives, the road has not been an easy one. implementation of common eu asylum policies is a challenging endeavour. sandra lavenex (2001, 852) writes of two paradoxes in the europeanization of refugee policies: (1) the tension between state sovereignty and supranational governance, and (2) the tension between internal security and human rights issues. channe lindstrom (2005, 588) points out that current policy methods meant to harmonize member states’ asylum policies establish in fact “legitimacy for the denial of protection […] by shifting responsibility away from the european territorial core.” since the tampere summit, european union member states have had to legally abide to key eu directives and regulations that set the ground rules for several asylum-related policies.1 building on this last point, this paper will delve into a less known, but controversial, asylum policy tool, which represents an important element of the proposed harmonized eu asylum system: the safe country of origin policy (sco). according to the united nations high commissioner for refugees, the term is used in reference to countries determined to be nonrefugee producing countries (unhcr 1991). in a nutshell, this policy implies having a list—either formal or informal—of countries deemed “safe” based on various criteria often related to the democratic practices, human rights protection, and judicial independence of that country. already applied at the national level in several eu member states, this policy ensures that asylum seekers from “safe” countries are fast tracked through the system and returned to their home country based on a general assumption that the asylum claim is unfounded. refugee and human rights groups have been highly critical of the sco policy, arguing it violates basic rights outlined in the geneva convention. while these have strengthened some aspects of eu law, bruce leimsidor (2009, 9) argues the positive results have been limited. more striking is a lack of an effective enforcement mechanism and the highly politicized asylum adjudication process within the eu, which lead to inconsistencies. scholars have generally argued that attempts to harmonize immigration and refugee policies over the years have in fact allowed member states to pursue their domestic objectives by other means, such as externalizing “worst practices” (lindstrom 2005, 592) and perpetuating harmonization with the lowest common denominator (lavenex 2001, 865). overall, while the tampere conclusions left room for optimism by seeming to uphold the principle of asylum under the geneva convention, the eventual focus on security concerns “took away with one hand what it seemed to give with the other” (leimsidor 2009, 6). 1. these include the 2001 directive laying down the minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the event of mass influx of displaced persons; the 2003 directive laying down the minimum standards for the reception of asylum seekers, followed by the so-called dublin ii regulations of the same year, which aim to establish which member state is responsible for deciding an asylum claim (usually the first eu country the asylum-seeker initially arrives in); the 2003 directive on right to family reunification; the 2004 directive laying down the standards for the qualification of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees; and the 2005 directive outlining the minimum standards on procedures for granting and withdrawing refugee status, which also covers the sco principle. review of european and russian affairs 7 (1), 2012 3 as part of the ongoing process to reach a common integrated asylum system among member states, the idea of having a list of “safe” countries at the supranational level that would apply to all eu member states has already surfaced several times. however, although the sco policy is not new to representatives from member states, it has proven exceptionally difficult for them to find consensus on what “safe” means and what countries should be on the pan-eu list. the lack of consensus among eu member states and the decision by the european court of justice (to be discussed later in this paper) have put the debate about a common sco list on hold. but, while progress on the eu list has stalled, this may only be temporary. as member states gradually start implementing more and more common asylum practices, and as supranational bodies like the european asylum support office become fully operational, reviving the debate around the eulevel sco list may be only a matter of time. this is why the study of the sco refugee policy is an important endeavour. it could contribute to the still-evolving eu asylum literature, which has largely only glanced over this specific concept.2 the purpose of this paper is to theorize and explain the process of creating a common eu sco list, as well as to assess the political implications behind such a list. the two theories that will aid in this process are neofunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism. they are often used to explain european integration, but are rarely applied in specific reference to asylum policy. these theories will be used in a complementary way to explain the policy making process behind the supranational sco list, highlighting the dynamics between member states and eu institutions throughout. implicitly, the analysis will also identify the combination of factors that led to the current stalemate and how a change in these factors could reopen the debate. the argument of this paper is that member states could not agree on the pan-eu sco list because they arrived at the bargaining table with different national migratory pressures coupled with varied procedural understandings and applications of the sco policy. furthermore, the limited success in harmonization of related asylum policies and a reluctance to have the european parliament in a co-decision position both also contributed to the non-adoption of a supranational sco list. this paper will explore the bargaining process between member states regarding the definition of “safe” by appealing to the lowest common denominator argument. because of the factors highlighted above, it may be easier to eventually reach a consensus and settle everyone’s preferences by creating a longer—rather than a shorter—list of safe countries of origin. this paper is composed of four main sections. the first section will briefly outline how neofunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism explain european integration broadly, and immigration and asylum integration, more specifically. the second section will track the evolution of the sco list at the eu level. in order to understand the complexities behind setting up the eu sco list, the third section will highlight the different use of this policy at the national level of member states. the last section will then employ the two theories to sustain the main arguments of this paper, while the concluding remarks will predict the way forward. theorizing european integration despite their popularity in attempting to explain integration as a general phenomenon, there have been only few attempts to apply neofunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism to explain the drive towards a common immigration and asylum system. moreover, this is the first attempt to apply the theories to this specific asylum policy tool. 2. it is also important to underline that this paper will only focus on the principle of safe countries of origin, not on the related notion of safe third countries, which refers to a “safe” country that the asylum seeker passed though and where he or she could have asked for asylum. 4 review of european and russian affairs 7 (1), 2012 neofunctionalism the neofunctionalist concept of spillover offers a good starting point in explaining integration. according to this theory, if the project of a single market—including the free movement of people—is to be completed, certain additional policies have to be implemented in such areas as visas, asylum, immigration, and police coordination (niemann and schmitter 2009, 57). this means that integration of one sector at the regional or supranational level can only be fully successful if it is combined with the integration of another sector, since problems arising from the functional integration of the former can only be solved by integrating the latter as well (niemann and schmitter 2009, 49). neofunctionalists place rational, self-interested actors at the centre of the integration process. unlike realists, neofunctionalists do not see states as the sole relevant actors but argue that players are multiple, diverse, and changing and that they are not restricted only to the domestic realm. the actors’ interests are not constant but are likely to change during the integration process, as they learn the benefits of regional policies and gain experience in cooperative decision making (niemann and schmitter 2009, 48). moreover, as opposed to the lowest common denominator bargaining prescribed through intergovernmentalism, neofunctionalists see supranational institutions as facilitating a bargaining process that upgrades common interests. member states agree on a common standard so as not to jeopardize those areas where consensus already prevails (niemann and schmitter 2009, 50). bodies like the european commission play the role of “an institutionalized mediator” that with time gains an increasingly important role in the integration process (niemann and schmitter 2009, 50). in the case of immigration and asylum, neofunctionalists would argue that there is a strong functional interdependence between external border control and visa policy, for example. for states to waive their powers of internal control, they need to be provided with an equivalent protection by shifting control to the most external borders of the community, by creating a common visa policy and regulating admission into the eu. the schengen agreement, as well as the several carrot-and-stick approaches the eu has been pursuing with neighbouring non-eu states in the areas of migration stand as concrete examples. there is also a strong functional pressure and spillover towards the creation of a common asylum system, so that the restrictive measures of one state are not undermined by the liberal measures of another (niemann and schmitter 2009, 57). the dublin regulations clearly exemplify this rationale, and—as this paper will later show—the spillover concept is also relevant in explaining the move towards a common eu sco policy. liberal intergovernmentalism while the neofunctionalists’ spillover effect provides a reasonable perspective as to why eu member states are moving in the direction of a common immigration and asylum system, liberal intergovernmentalism adds to this understanding by focusing on the decision making process to explain specific policy initiatives. like neofunctionalists, liberal intergovernmentalists see the main actors as rational. this means that agreement to cooperate stems from a collective outcome of interdependent rational state choices and intergovernmental negotiations (moravcsik and schimmelfennig 2009, 68). rationally, a state will have an incentive to cooperate with other states when cooperation can eliminate negative externalities or create positive ones more efficiently than unilateral action could (kraft-kasack and shisheva 2008, 4). however, unlike neofunctionalists, liberal intergovernmentalists see states as the only actors involved in the european integration process. accordingly, member states are seen as actors continuing to enjoy decision making power and political legitimacy (moravcsik and schimmelfennig 2009, 68). states have national review of european and russian affairs 7 (1), 2012 5 preferences, which are issue specific and which may vary within each state and throughout time. in other words, the national preferences of different states will often conflict. hence, the outcome of intergovernmental negotiations depends on the relative bargaining power of the actors. liberal intergovernmentalists see the eu as developing incrementally, with member states likely to retain control over many major fiscal activities. yet, while member states pursue their national interests through hard bargaining, they are also likely to respond to supranational policy making in salient cases (moravcsik and schimmelfennig 2009, 84). in the case of asylum, since domestic social actors largely shape the national preferences of governments, liberal intergovernmentalism would predict that states put forward restrictionist refugee policies to reflect the interests of a mobilized set of actors in countries where ethnic and human rights groups are weak (kraft-kasack and shisheva 2008, 6). a supranational sco list? eu interior ministers made the push towards a common eu list of safe countries of origin in october 2003, three years after the meeting in tampere (euractiv 2003). since then, eu member states’ representatives continued meeting in order to reach an agreement on this pan-eu asylum policy. the call for the creation of an eu safe country of origin list was included in a draft directive in april 2004 (council of the european union 2004a). according to the annex following the draft directive, “[a] country is considered as a safe country of origin where, on the basis of the legal situation, the application of the law within a democratic system and the general political circumstances, it can be shown that there is generally and consistently no persecution” (council of the european union 2004a). in making this judgment, officials must assess how laws and regulations are applied in that country and whether the stipulations of various international documents are upheld, such as the geneva convention or the international covenant for civil and political rights (council of the european union 2004a). in september 2004, media reports made the proposed list public. the countries on it were benin, botswana, cape verde, chile, costa rica, ghana, mali, mauritius, senegal, and uruguay. reports indicated that if all members would accept this list, states would be able to add countries to their national lists but would not be able to remove any from the eu list (travis 2004). these ten countries were chosen based on a preliminary assessment of member states’ experiences in using the sco principle at the national level, the number of asylum applications lodged in the member states by nationals of those countries, and by assessing provisions laid down in several eu and international human rights conventions (council of the european union 2004). internal documents obtained by the non-profit organization statewatch in september 2004, which will be addressed again later in this paper, indicated that member states were highly divided over the proposed list. a council note from november 9 2004, concluded that member states were not able to reach agreement on the safe country of origin list (council of the european union 2004b). in september 2005, while generally supportive of the draft directive calling for the harmonization of asylum policies across the eu, the european parliament voted, nonetheless, against the idea of an eu sco list (bbc 2005). its opinion was non-binding, however. on december 1 2005, eu member states adopted the council directive setting the minimum standards on procedures for granting and refusing refugee status at the eu level. while the asylum procedures directive was not joined by a specific list of safe countries of origin, it did however make the use of the sco policy binding on member states (council directive 2005). the expectation was to draft the sco list after the adoption of the directive. however, media reports from may 2006 revealed that member states’ officials could still not reach an agreement over 6 review of european and russian affairs 7 (1), 2012 which countries should feature on this supranational list. a draft proposal by then eu justice commissioner franco frattini included the exact seven african countries as two years before but excluded the latin american countries (kubosova and küchler 2006). just a month later, frattini informed eu interior ministers that he was preparing a longer list of “safe” countries that would also include countries from central america, asia, and the west balkans (kubosova 2006). his move came reportedly in response to critiques arguing against the list’s exclusivity. developments were brought to a halt on may 6 2008, when the european court of justice ruled that the council of the european union had exceeded its powers granted by the treaty when making the future adoption of common lists of safe countries subject to mere non-binding consultations with the european parliament. the court also ruled that the adoption of any future lists would have to result from a co-decision procedure with the parliament (european court of justice 2008). the 2005 directive is currently under recast. the european commission presented the first proposal amending the asylum procedures directive in october 2009. it makes modifications to the sco principle, calling—more importantly—for the deletion of a common supranational sco list (european commission 2009). the proposal calls instead for the consolidation of the common criteria used for national designations of countries as safe, with the hopes of achieving more consistent applications of the sco policy throughout member states (european commission 2009). the european parliament adopted a first reading position on this proposal on april 6 2011 and the commission presented a modified proposal on june 1 2011, which includes the same amendments related to the deletion of the common sco list. at the time this article was being written, the proposal for the recast directive of 2005 was being negotiated in the council and the european parliament with an expected adoption date in 2012. simultaneously, the two eu institutions were also negotiating the recast of another asylum-related directive from 2003, with the final goal of bringing member states closer to the common european asylum system. due to various political sensitivities surrounding these two pieces of eu legislation, it is unclear whether the deadline will be met. at first glance, it appears that the proposed amendments for the 2005 directive—and the 2008 european court of justice ruling—have created a setback in the creation of a common eu sco list. however, a deeper analysis will show this may be only a temporary setback. for example, the commission’s amendment proposals from 2009 and 2010 also mention that the creation of a common sco list, and the elimination of the national lists, could be considered viable once the european asylum support office has the resources to sustain this new policy (european commission 2011). hence, while the common eu list does not exist yet, official discourses do not rule out the possibility of its development in the future. sco policies at the national level in order to fully understand why member states had such difficulty agreeing on what “safe” means, it is important to grasp the complex and various uses of the sco policy at the member state level, as well as some of the criticisms directed towards it. the first country to adopt the sco policy as part of the asylum law was switzerland in 1990 (costello 2005, 50). cathryn costello notes that the concept then spread not through formal harmonization, but through administrative policy sharing interactions (2005, 50). after switzerland, other countries followed suit: austria, finland, and luxembourg in 1991, germany in 1992, portugal in 1993, denmark in review of european and russian affairs 7 (1), 2012 7 1994, the netherlands in 1995, and the united kingdom (uk) and france in 1996 (costello 2005, 50). it is also interesting to note that belgium had first introduced the policy in 1991, but in 1993 a domestic court ended the practice by declaring it a violation to the right of equality (costello 2005, 51). the european commission adopted in 2010 a report evaluating the application of the 2005 asylum procedures directive, which, among others, also assesses how member states had been applying the sco provisions at the national level. by 2010, the sco notion did not exist in belgium, italy, sweden, and poland as it refers to national designations; however, these countries had transposed the sco notion as it related to the common supranational list (european commission 2010). besides the fact that not all member states employed this policy, the commission found “wide divergences” among those member states that do use the procedure (european commission 2010). for example, in cyprus, estonia, hungary, and greece the sco notion is applicable only to a part of a country, while the uk can choose to designate a country or part of a country as safe for a specified group of people (european commission 2010). the report also notes that while national laws generally provide for a list of sco, they have actually been adopted only in austria, germany, france, romania, slovakia, luxembourg, and the uk. even for these countries that use the lists, the contents vary; member states chose different countries to consider as safe and the numbers also differ significantly. furthermore, in estonia, the czech republic, finland, the netherlands, and portugal, no lists are foreseen and the notion may be applied on a case by case basis (european commission 2010). it is thus clear that when debating the creation of a common eu sco list, member states’ officials may share a similar understanding of the concept as it relates to its purpose and outcome, but they vary considerably in their procedural understandings. it may be also fair to say that the differences observed across eu member states regarding the use of the sco policy tool reflect broader differences in migration pressures over the years coupled with overall different levels of restrictive versus more liberal refugee systems. humanitarian considerations criticism over the use of the sco principle has been plenty, but some scholars have defended the concept. for example, kay hailbronner wrote in 1993 that “the basic idea is to single out at an early stage those applicants who have nothing to fear in their home country and who can therefore be presumed to have abused the asylum procedure to circumvent immigration laws” (1993, 32). while this argument is in line with the official justifications often heard at the national level, there are not only clear concerns over the national use of the sco principle, but also stronger concerns at the supranational level. sharon oakley (2007, 5) points out that the case for speedier decision making—a key characteristic of the sco concept—needs to be balanced against the requirement of member states to fulfill their obligations under international human rights and refugee law. but, in order to achieve a faster processing system, procedural safeguards are reduced. this means that applicants from a safe country of origin do not have access to the same examination procedures as applicants falling under the regular asylum system. furthermore, this implies that a fast tracked asylum seeker may not have access to free legal advice, may not have her or his case heard in a personal interview, and may not have the right to appeal (oakley 2007, 5). some scholars have even pointed towards a deterioration of the procedural use of the sco principle over the years (costello 2005, 52). for example, since 1996, france does not give asylum seekers from countries 8 review of european and russian affairs 7 (1), 2012 designated as safe the right to suspensive appeal,3 the unhcr states that it does not oppose the sco concept “as long as it is used as a procedural tool to prioritize and/or accelerate examination of an application in carefully circumscribed situations” (unhcr 2010, 65). however, it further qualifies this statement by highlighting that it is critical that each examination be examined fully on its merits; that the applicant has “an effective opportunity” to rebut the presumption of safety of the country of origin in his or her circumstances; that the burden of proof on the applicant is not increased; and that applicants have the right to appeal a negative decision (66). while the uk introduced a scheme to “super fast track” applicants from certain countries, with a time limit of two days (52). all in all, refugee and human rights groups have warned that states might be compromising their international obligations when they prioritize speed over fairness (oakley 2007, 5). in a march 2010 report, prior to the commission report mentioned above, the unhcr found “significant divergence” in the criteria used to designate a country as safe,4 specifically pointing to a lack of regulation, transparency, and accountability in the process some countries use (unhcr 2010, 69). this included an absence of clear provisions for reviewing the safety of countries over time. the unhcr also recommended that applicants “should not be afforded a lower standard of reception conditions and/or detained solely because they are nationals of a country designated as a safe country of origin” (70). the future of the eu sco list as mentioned above, the european court of justice (ecj) decided in 2008 to annul the provision calling for the creation of a supranational sco list, adding that any future lists would have to be drafted in co-decision with the european parliament. the debate on this topic has since been muted, and some observers argue it could be because member states may not be ready to see parliament play such an important role, especially in the field of asylum, tightly connected to the notion of sovereignty. the second part of this section will theorize whether bringing in an equal supranational player really causes an insurmountable deadlock for the sco list or whether the debate might be reopened. bargaining for an eu sco list the fact that member states (and the european commission) were unsuccessful a few years ago in agreeing which specific countries to include in the supranational sco list is not a secret. what is interesting, however, is to assess the level of this disagreement. documents obtained by statewatch highlight the difficulty member states had in reaching consensus over what “safe” really means. as mentioned above, member states were trying to assess safety in ten proposed countries, seven from africa and three from latin america. an analysis shows, for example, that sweden and finland opposed including four african countries, while germany opposed including three. on the other side of the spectrum, it is 3. this means that an asylum seeker whose claim was deemed unfounded, may be deported while the appeal process is ongoing. 4. the exact focus was on how member states designate safe third countries as safe countries of origin. this is slightly different than just employing the sco list (as it involves taking countries previously designated as safe to claim asylum in and designating them as safe countries of origin). this paper will not insist on this specific differentiation, and will instead just focus on the general findings of the report, since they highlight the sco principle in broad terms. review of european and russian affairs 7 (1), 2012 9 important to note that the czech republic, france, ireland, hungary, portugal, and slovakia deemed all these seven countries to be safe. the rest of the member states fell somewhere in the middle; many of them even abstained from judging the safety of a certain country (statewatch 2004). while denmark, germany, poland, and the uk fully abstained in judging the safety of the latin american countries, all the votes that did exist deemed these three countries as safe (statewatch 2004). it is also interesting to point out that many of the new member states from central and eastern europe, which are largely countries of emigration not immigration, had a higher rate of voting the proposed countries as “safe,” compared to older member states. this dynamic would be worthy of further investigation, however it is beyond the scope of this paper. as leaked council documents show, when they provided their votes, member states’ officials also had the opportunity to include comments that could justify their decision in nominating a country as safe or not. it is interesting to observe that even in cases where a country was deemed “safe,” many member states also included their concerns about the country’s various practices as they relate to human rights, the death penalty, and other issues. in short, while reservations remained, some member states nevertheless chose to nominate a country as safe. in other situations, the same reservations led other member states to declare a country not “safe” (statewatch 2004). liberal intergovernmentalism offers interesting insights when explaining the above dynamics. according to this theory, member states arrive at the negotiating table with different national preferences, which may often conflict. the theory further claims that the outcome of a negotiation is based on the bargaining power of the states involved. in the case of the sco principle, various groups have claimed that countries like the uk, france, germany, italy, and spain are putting pressure on the smaller member states to agree to the measure (statewatch 2004). since member states have different procedural understandings of the sco concept—while some states do not employ it at all—and since the above analysis shows how varied views can be regarding what is “safe,” it may be easier for member states to eventually compromise on a longer, rather than a shorter, list to meet everyone’s preferences. furthermore, in order to reach the needed compromise, liberal intergovernmentalism would predict supranational sco practices and lists to resemble those of the states who are already “well-versed” in using the refugee policy tool. this would be against the neofunctionalists’ claim that sees supranational institutions as upgrading common interests during negotiations. there are several developments that support the liberal intergovernmentalist assumption. first, not all member states use the sco policy or list at the national level. by adopting the sco list at the eu level, costello (2005) notes, member states “are required to dilute their standards of protection by a measure of ec law” (65). the eu sco list would represent the lowest common denominator, reflecting a vertical shift of the exclusionary procedural practices of member states (costello 2005, 37). a related and broader example of this liberal intergovernmentalist phenomenon is germany’s decision to participate in common asylum measures in the early 1990s. fears over a potential influx of asylum seekers after the entry into force of the schengen agreement led the german government to look for european solutions. but in order to do that, germany had to reform its fairly generous asylum system into a more restricted one (kraft-kasack and shisheva 2008, 12). in case of the sco list, it is easy to see how its development would create a similar outcome for those countries that are not as familiar with this restrictive refugee policy tool—but which they would have to employ. to further this point, it is also liberal intergovernmentalism that explains why member states that do not use sco lists, or do not even use the principle per se, chose nevertheless to join negotiations that could have led towards the creation of such a supranational list. for example, the 10 review of european and russian affairs 7 (1), 2012 documents revealed by statewatch showed that sweden and poland, which do not use the sco policy for national designations, participated in the negotiations. according to the liberal intergovernmentalist theory, states choose to cooperate with other countries when the outcomes are more efficient than those obtained through unilateral action. considering that asylum policies will continue down the path of communitarization, it may be more “economical” for these states to pursue the supranational solution. as regards the specific “safe” countries on the list, it is important to remember that member states decided to drop three latin american countries from the list because of low numbers of asylum requests coming from nationals of those countries.5 however, the second time the list was proposed, reports indicated that including only countries from africa on the sco list is not enough. the 2004 council note explaining that the decision on the sco list would be postponed also included an important line regarding this idea: “if agreement was reached on a more limited list, there is a risk that such a list would not be useful in practice” (council of the european union 2004). this statement holds considerable weight and it truly reflects the national preferences of those countries that often utilize the sco principle at the national level. it is hard to believe, for example, that countries like the uk, whose list of sco is generally long and fluid, would easily accept a common eu list that is much shorter and “safe” countries that the uk does not see as problematic. this only reinforces the point that a longer list, rather than a shorter one, would represent a satisfactory outcome of the bargaining process, according to the liberal intergovernmentalist perspective. member states could easily justify having more countries on the sco list by presenting it as an aggregate of everyone’s preferences and of domestic migration conditions. adding more countries to the supranational sco list is not in any way detrimental to the member states themselves, but only to asylum seekers arriving from the “safe” countries. these would probably enjoy fewer rights and their asylum claims would be more scrutinized. but, member states could claim to be operating under a more communitarized system as a result of a bargaining process that met everyone’s expectations. while it is fair to point to examples from previous years and underline that officials could not agree on what “safe” means and what countries should feature on the list, one could argue that future asylum policy harmonization could bring different procedural understandings closer together in time and push once more for the list’s creation. reviving the debate? despite the above analysis of the dynamics that could shape the creation of a common eu sco list, the reality is that progress has stalled. the 2008 ecj decision asking for the european parliament to be included as a co-decider in the approval of any future list of “safe countries” seems to have complicated matters. moreover, the 2005 directive that initially called for the creation of the common sco list is currently under recast; but, while member states may have difficulty accepting such an important role for the parliament in the drafting of the sco list, those dynamics might change. two general explanations support this point: (1) the future and increasing integration of asylum policies at the eu level and (2) the increasing influence the european parliament will gain overall in other areas due to expanded powers granted by the lisbon treaty. the neofunctionalist concept of spillover proves very useful in tackling the first point. as interdependence between member states will continue to increase throughout various fields, the functional spillover will also intensify and the need for increasingly harmonized asylum policies 5. these were also the only three countries that the majority of member states judged to be safe. review of european and russian affairs 7 (1), 2012 11 will become more prominent. for example, although member states are not publicly contemplating the creation of a common sco list at this point, the council and the commission have called for the consolidation of the common criteria used for national designations of countries as safe to achieve more consistent applications of the principle across the eu. this means that the push for harmonization of this principle is still active. in this respect, it is important to point out that in april 2007 member states adopted the “common eu guidelines for processing country of origin information,” while in november 2010 the european commission put forward a set of common guidelines for member states to use in setting up joint fact-finding missions to assess conditions in a country of origin (office of the commissioner general for refugees and stateless persons 2010). furthermore, the newly created european asylum office could lead to an even deeper harmonization if there was a true will to allow this body to play an important role coordinating the activities of member states in this field. hence, it is clear that deeper harmonization of the understandings underpinning concepts like “country of origin” could eventually lead to a spillover in policy areas related to them, including the “safe country of origin” asylum tool. the debate over the common sco list could be revived since future harmonization in the asylum field will eventually make the utilization of the list at the national level unsustainable. lastly, some may raise the issue of sovereignty, anticipating member states’ reluctance to give up power in sensitive areas such as asylum. however, as lavenex points out, while the sovereignty argument holds true in certain aspects of the asylum field, “the european asylum frame has affected traditional refugee regimes by […] shifting the emphasis of international co-operation in refugee policy away from the internal aspect of refugee reception towards the external and—from the point of view of sovereignty—less sensitive aspect of flight prevention in the region of origin” (2001, 855). regarding the role of the european parliament, it is important to note that liberal intergovernmentalists do not really envision supranational bodies gaining any considerable influence. thus, it is difficult for liberal intergovernmentalists to envision the parliament playing the role of co-decider in the sco list. moreover, the theory would, in general, have problems explaining the increased responsibility of the parliament under the lisbon treaty. however, neofunctionalists can fill this gap. this theory presupposes that supranational bodies like the european commission can play an important role in the european integration process, cultivating the logic of interdependence (niemann and schmitter 2009, 50). while the theory traditionally only mentions the commission, this paper applies the neofunctionalist argument to the parliament as well, especially since its increased powers are a fairly recent phenomenon. according to the neofunctionalist argument, the actors’ interests are likely to change during the integration process, as they gain experience in cooperative decision making and perceive the salience of supranational solutions to problems. while the court brought down its decision in 2008 based on the two treaties forming the eu at that time,6 6. the treaty of the european union (maastricht treaty) and the treaty on the functioning of the european union (rome treaty). the entry into force of the lisbon treaty in 2009 handed the european parliament even more co-legislative powers. this is likely to change the working dynamic of the member states (through the council) and the parliament, where cooperation and compromise will become increasingly important. it might be fair to assume then that in time, as the parliament starts exercising its new powers in areas such as trade policy, for 12 review of european and russian affairs 7 (1), 2012 example—and as new precedents for cooperation are set—member states might also envision cooperating more closely with it for the creation of a common sco list. hence, neofunctionalists’ spillover concept and the fluidity of actors’ interests indicate that reviving the debate over the common sco list might be just a matter of time. the question that follows is what impact could the european parliament have in the creation of such a list? neofunctionalists see supranational institutions such as the commission as actors who play the role of mediator, facilitating a bargaining process that upgrades common interests. it is true the commission and the parliament have different roles in the eu structure, but it is clear that the increased powers of the parliament call for a revisiting of the neofunctionalist integration theory to account for the impact of these changes. during the drafting of the 2005 asylum directive that laid down the sco provisions, the parliament’s suggested amendments were largely aimed at strengthening the guarantees for the applicants. the same is happening during the current recast of this directive (european commission 2011). similarly, it is important to remember that before the initial adoption of the directive, the parliament had been quite critical of the sco list proposal. in a non-binding move at the time, it had voted down several sections dealing with the notion of creating a list of “safe countries.” nevertheless, it is important to point out that the parliament was not against the sco principle per se. a look at some of the proposed amendments, both in 2005 and during the current recast, indicate the shaping of a debate over whether a common sco list would still require maintaining national lists or whether a sole supranational one would fulfill a better purpose (european union delegation at the united nations 2005). while it is difficult to suggest whether the parliament’s position on these matters has changed today, one might at least make a general assumption that having the parliament as a co-decider for a common sco list could indeed upgrade the actors’ interests to perhaps less restrictive policies, and—implicitly—result in more rights for asylum seekers. conversely, one might question whether the parliament’s past pragmatic stance on asylum issues was a reflection of its less powerful role within the eu framework, a way to differentiate itself in the decision making body. hence, it would be interesting to trace whether and how this position might change in the postlisbon environment. overall though, it is important to recognize that these questions require further research as they remain highly speculative at this point. conclusion this paper focused on a specific asylum policy tool, the “safe country of origin” policy, and tried to explain its evolution at the eu level through the lenses of two integration theories. the varied procedural use of the principle at the national level, or lack thereof in some countries, explains member states’ difficulty in reaching agreement over what countries should feature on the common sco list. the above sections theorized about the bargaining process behind the creation of such a list and tested liberal intergovernmentalism’s and neofunctionalism’s relevancy in explaining both past developments in this areas, as well as their capacity to point to a way forward. this paper argued that the current impasse in the creation of a common sco list could be temporary. there are several variables that could put an end to the current stalemate. first, it is important to see the final version of the 2005 directive, which is now under recast. this will provide a good indication regarding the direction supranational asylum policies are moving towards. second, while the updated version of the directive might not call for the creation of a supranational sco list, it will be interesting to observe how this policy will develop at the member state level and whether there will be room for procedural convergence. third, the review of european and russian affairs 7 (1), 2012 13 integration of other asylum policies such as the common fact-finding missions could also impact the re-opening of the sco debate. fourth, it is also important to track the changing dynamics between the member states and a much stronger european parliament. depending on their development, these factors could influence the reopening of the sco debate. lastly, some of the arguments of this paper remain speculative at this point, but deeper research—through interviews with nationals and eu officials—could shed more light on the internal perspectives of member states and eu institutions. acknowledgements the author would like to thank achim hurrelmann for his suggestions and guidance; martin geiger, whose class first inspired this paper; the three discussants who provided their feedback during the conferences this paper was presented at; and aysegül ergul for her comments and encouragement. references costello, cathryn. 2005. “the asylum procedures directive and the proliferation of safe country practices: deterrence, deflection and the dismantling of international protection?” european journal of migration and law 7: 35–69. council of the european union. 2004a. “amended proposal for a council directive on minimum standards on procedures in member states for granting and withdrawing refugee status.” interinstitutional file 2000/0238. document number 8771/04, april 30. council of the european union. 2004b. note from the presidency. interinstitutional file 2000/0238. document number 14383/04, november 9. council directive 2005/85/ec. “minimum standards on 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stefania, acting head of asylum unit at the directorate general for home affairs. letter response. december 9, 2011. statewatch. “eu divided over list of ‘safe countries of origin’ –the list should be scrapped,” september 27, 2004. http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-38-safe-countries.pdf. ———. “appendix: is the country suitable for inclusion on the minimum common list?” september 27, 2004. http://www.statewatch.org/news/2004/sep/safe-countries-appendix.pdf. travis, alan. “eu asylum list prompts human rights fears.” the guardian, september 27, 2004. http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2004/sep/27/eu.immigration. united nations high commissioner for refugees (unhcr). 1991. “background note on the safe country concept and refugee status,” july 26. http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae68ccec.html. ———. 2010. “improving asylum procedures: comparative analysis and recommendations for law and practice,” march. http://www.unhcr.org/4ba9d99d9.html. http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae68ccec.html� correct citation: gurzu, anca. 2012. “safe country of origin list at the eu level: the bargaining process and the implications.” review of european and russian affairs 7 (1): 1–14. published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada. available online at: www.carleton.ca/rera/ rera is an electronic academic peer-reviewed journal that publishes graduate, post-graduate, and young scholarly works. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is a joint project supported by the canada-europe transatlantic dialogue—a cross-canada research network supported by the social sciences and humanities research council of canada (sshrc)—along with the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies (carleton university) and its associated research unit, the centre for european studies. rera aims to provide an accessible forum for research, to promote high standards of research and scholarship, and to foster communication among young scholars. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada tel: +01 613 520-2600 ext. 1179; e-mail: rera-journal@carleton.ca creative commons license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ this working paper is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial no derivs 3.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 3.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced provided the source is acknowledged. no use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes. issn: 1718-4835 © 2012 the author(s) http://www.carleton.ca/rera/� mailto:rera-journal@carleton.ca� drawing the short straw: disproprotional effects of russian snctions on central europe and the baltic states review of european and russian affairs 10 (1), 2016 issn 1718-4835 drawing the short straw: disproportional effects of russian sanctions on central europe and the baltic states jacqueline dufalla central european university abstract in 2014, the agricultural sanctions russia imposed on the european union (eu) had a perceivable impact on the eu’s economy. yet the sanctions arguably had a disproportionate impact, which suggests they were particularly successful in exposing underlying issues within the eu. specifically, former soviet bloc countries and southern european countries were far more greatly impacted by the sanctions than the larger western eu member states. this brings to light problems of disproportionate representation of member states within decision-making processes (especially within the committee for agriculture and rural development), and the fragility of the eu's internal cohesion. by comparing typical decision-making processes of the eu with its responses during times of crisis, it becomes clear that the eu’s decision-making process and its internal cohesion with regard to economic assistance for former soviet states, are vulnerable to russia’s actions. the essay will conclude with recommendations on how to improve eu decisionmaking during times of crisis to counter this vulnerability. 2 review of european and russian affairs 10 (1), 2016 introduction in march 2014, the united states (us), the european union (eu), and other regions issued a series of sanctions against russia due to the annexation of crimea. the sanctions included freezing russian assets abroad and restricting travel. russia in turn imposed sanctions against the us and eu on agricultural products, specifically fruits, vegetables, dairy, and meat, in august 2014. agricultural exports to russia in 2013 were worth €11.8bn (bbc, “russia hits west” 2014), and the sanctions particularly affected the fruits and vegetables sector. in this sector, the sanctions affected the eu disproportionately, and specifically affected former soviet bloc countries, poland and lithuania. additionally, sanctions harmed the stability of the already fluctuating common agriculture policy (cap) while bringing to light issues of internal cohesion. therefore, the situation highlights several challenges to multiple areas of eu policy. the sanctions against the eu consequently allow for a unique opportunity to make a comparison between the eu during its normal decision-making process and during times of crisis. this essay will first show how the 2013 cap reforms were decided and implemented. it will then explore how and which actions were taken to counter the sanctions and their successes and limitations. the focus is on the representation in the european parliament1 in particular, as, after the lisbon treaty in 2009, it was given more authority in the cap. the sanctions were a reminder to the eu that russia can have a significant impact on internal eu politics. the sanctions emphasized the disproportionate vulnerability of some eu member states to russia and contributed to their disquiet. this essay will thus also explore what the eu has done to counter this feeling and proffer ideas to improve relations between eu member states. i. eu agriculture trade since the collapse of the soviet union and the accession of the former soviet bloc countries2 into the european union, russia and the eu have been strong agricultural trading partners. as of 2013, the eu has exported 10% of its agricultural goods to russia, making russia the eu’s second largest agricultural market after the us (european commission 2014a). meanwhile, 19% of russia’s agricultural exports went to the eu (bbc, “russia hits west” 2014). meanwhile, the eu was sensitive to changes in agriculture trade due to the predetermined 2013 cap reforms, further exacerbated by russian sanctions. in addition, the cap had undergone decision-making procedure revisions, particularly from the lisbon treaty, which came into full effect in december 2009. however, as greer and hind (2012) assert, it is unlikely that these changes had anything but an incremental effect. even with the european parliament taking a larger role in cap decision-making, they attest that, if anything, the treaty’s effect may reinforce the “status quo around the state-assisted paradigm…” (greer & hind 2012, 339). in other words, the general procedure of large blanket aid programs to states has not changed. this section will cover eu-russia relations before the sanctions, focusing on the 2013 cap reforms, and then will analyze the policy changes the eu has made in response to russia’s agricultural sanctions. this paper will compare how the eu functions with and without external pressure during its decision-making, as well as demonstrate the type of effect the russian sanctions had. a. 2013 cap reforms due in part to the 2004 eu expansion, the cap required adjustment as many of the former soviet bloc countries were agricultural producers, however their prices and standards were not quite at the eu level 1 the european parliament is considered the most representative eu institution, as its members are directly elected by the citizens. many of its duties are shared equally with the european council, but it also elects the commission’s president. 2 in this paper, former soviet bloc countries include bulgaria, the czech republic, estonia, hungary, latvia, lithuania, poland, romania, and slovakia. 3 review of european and russian affairs 10 (1), 2016 (ciaian & swinnen 2007, 7). before integration, approximately 4.3% of the eu-15 labor force worked in agriculture, forestry, hunting, and fishing, while about 21.5% of the population in the central and eastern european countries (ceecs) worked within these sectors (manzocchi 2003, 362). clearly the ceecs needed special attention during the 2004 integration. the lack of domestic agricultural support within the ceecs led to the eu imposing a gradual increase in direct payments to ceec agricultural producers over the first ten years of their membership to the eu (ryan 2004, 4-5). this meant that by 2013, the eu should have lifted the restrictions on subsidies to the ceecs (ibid.). the ceecs gained access to the single market, farmers received higher prices for their products, and the countries now had access to direct payments and rural development grants (ryan 2004, 4). the access to the single market also increased investment of capital in the region, which is a factor of production the ceecs have always lacked (manzocchi 2003, 321). the ceecs additionally gained access to a larger international market, especially in central asia (ciaian & swinnen 2007, 11). in short, joining the eu revitalized the agricultural sectors of the ceecs, which were especially in flux after the 1990s and the collapse of the soviet system (ciaian & swinnen 2007, 11). due to early actions by the eu, the ceecs were more or less appropriately integrating into the cap, and the eu would have almost ten years before needing to address the issue of subsidies again. 2013 was thus an important year for european agriculture, as it was the deadline for the eu to revise the cap. simultaneously, the eu had to manage agricultural sanctions imposed by russia, which will be discussed in more detail later in this paper. in addition, the eu was still recovering from the 2008 economic crisis, which especially hurt southern eu countries, including strong agricultural producers such as greece and spain. however, it should be noted that in 2013, the eu was not technically in a crisis, despite still dealing with the aftermath of the 2008 economic crisis. the revision of the cap was a previously scheduled reassessment and was not spurred on by external political pressure. the european commission, as the executive and primary legislative body of the eu, largely led the proceedings. the actual decision-making process began three years earlier with an online public debate led by dacian cioloş, commissioner for agriculture and rural development,3 from april to june 2010. it focused on four main issues: the necessity of the cap, citizen expectations, the need for reform, and the tools for the future cap (european commission 2015d). this stage seems to have incorporated one of the solutions to the eu's democratic deficit4 proffered by lucia vesnic-alujevic and rodrigo castro nacarino (2012). the eu, they argued, should include citizens in the decision-making process, specifically through the internet (ibid, 68). the eu effectively employed this strategy for the cap to its credit. the results were then discussed at a conference in july 2010. experts, think-tank representatives, ngos, representatives from the food chain process, and members of eu institutions attended the conference and participated in workshops (european commission 2015b). some panels focused on a specific sector, such as civil society, or an issue, like food security. there were several other conferences held in 2010, with many representatives from different sectors of society, similar to those who participated in the july conference. the single cmo management committee and the rural development evaluation expert committee (exco)5 then met during 2011 and 2012 to hammer out issues and propose solutions to the cap. in 2011, the commission made proposals concerning monitoring and evaluating the cap (european commission 2015c). two years later, in june 2013, the european parliament, commission, and council finally agreed on the proposals. in december 2013, the proposals were accepted by the eu council of agriculture ministers (european commission 2015a). 3 agriculture and rural development is the sector of the european commission responsible for the cap. 4 “democratic deficit” is a term often used with regard to the eu. typically, it refers to feelings citizens have that eu institutions are not held accountable because of their complex structures. it also suggests that eu legislation is so complex that an ordinary citizen could not understand it, and is thus at the mercy of legislators. 5 both are committees found in the agriculture and rural development sector of the european commission. 4 review of european and russian affairs 10 (1), 2016 while the number of proposals and adjustments are numerous and extremely detailed, there are only a few on which this essay will focus. while eu institutions6 agreed to end sugar quotas by 2017, other sectors received enhanced budgets, including the fruit scheme (eteris 2013). the “fruit scheme,” or the plan for the fruit sector, falls under the vegetables, fruits, and olives sub-group, one of five in the cap (molle 2006, 154). most importantly, the eu decided to end historically-based direct payments. this means that countries that traditionally received more payments according to their length of time in the eu will have to gradually lower their intake. those who received lower payments, primarily those who joined in 2004 and afterward, will slowly receive more payments. the idea was to promote external convergence of direct payments by 2019. former soviet bloc countries receive disproportionately low direct payments for all sectors. for example, in 2012, lithuania received €144/hectare, latvia €97, and estonia €117, while belgium received €435, the netherlands €457, and italy €404 (kydra 2012). by 2019, lithuania is expected to receive €404/hectare, which is just equal to italy’s 2012 amount (kydra 2012). thus, for the baltic states, who traditionally received the lowest payments and staged a protest demanding more equal payments in 2012 (kydra 2012), this was not necessarily good news. in 2011, poland and the baltic states were in agreement that the direct payments should be equal, rather than more equal, but when the idea of gradual convergence was introduced, poland abandoned the baltic states (willis 2011). overall, the cap reforms were not met with great enthusiasm, due to the fact that the main project, focusing on greening the cap, was hailed as too broad and not environmentally focused enough (spence 2013). however, they were praised for how well the european parliament and the other two european institutions worked together (ibid.). in short, it is evident that the 2013 cap reforms were made in the frequent style of the eu, meaning it took a great deal of time to achieve a broad series of reforms. at the end, very few states and officials were left satisfied. shortly, this essay will compare this process with how the reforms on the cap were made under the pressure from russian sanctions. b. pre-sanctions relationship with russia since the accession of a large portion of former soviet bloc countries in 2004, the eu has had to re-evaluate its approach to russian relations. after years of oppression, it comes as little surprise that many former communist countries do not regard russia favourably. poland and estonia are traditionally the most vigilant toward any signs of russian aggression. additionally, central and eastern europe are typically the most dependent on russian natural gas exports, and they attempt to maintain relationships between both russia and the eu.7 therefore, former soviet bloc countries are often in a difficult situation. most of the population recalls the former oppression, but the economic realities make russia a significant trading partner. since 2013, the eu has maintained a positive agricultural trade balance of €10.2bn with russia, making it the eu’s second largest agricultural export market after the us (european commission 2014a). for five years, russia consistently imported 10% of the eu’s total agricultural exports (european commission 2014a). specifically, russia imported mainly fruit, cheese, and pork. russia also imported approximately 46% of the eu’s total pear and apple exports (european commission 2014a). fruit accounts for 7% of the total eu agricultural output, but the sector is more important for certain countries. for southern european countries, especially greece, cyprus, malta, and portugal, fruit exports make up a third of their total agricultural exports (european commission 2014b). the main fruit exporters to russia, however, are poland, lithuania, belgium, and spain, with poland exporting 41% of its total fruits to russia (european commission 2014b). it is clear that before the sanctions, russia was an important agricultural trading partner with the eu and with some member states in particular. 6 institutions here refer to the european council, european commission, and european parliament. 7 while, proportionally speaking, germany and other western european countries import the most from russia, the former soviet bloc countries are the most vulnerable. for instance, poland, estonia, bulgaria, and lithuania’s natural gas supplies are nearly 100% russian gas (chyong & tcherneva 2015). 5 review of european and russian affairs 10 (1), 2016 c. post-sanctions: eu decision-making during the crisis russia imposed sanctions against the eu, us and several other countries in august 2014. the eu was hit hardest among the partners, as its exports comprised 73% of the total ban (juan 2014). the eu quickly took steps to counter this crisis. fortunately, the 2014-2020 cap reforms included new tools for crisis management that all of the eu institutions were able to use to legitimize their actions; this was also the first time such actions were necessary. out of the eu institutions, the commission took the first step, which set up a task force with weekly meetings to monitor the situation (ibid.). in early september, the european council8 had a meeting specifically focused on the eu’s response to the sanctions. they reported in their final press release: emergency market measures on fruit and vegetables and the milk sector have already been decided by the commission. most of the member states recognized the appropriateness of this support, while many called for the scope of the measures to be extended and the tools used to be diversified. (council of the european union 2014) the council agreed with the commission, but required more support and more diversified tools. there was also an argument as to whether or not the agreed-upon agricultural budget ceiling should be raised due to this unprecedented crisis. there was not a resolution on this issue. a day earlier, on september 4, 2014, the commission had a debate with the european parliament’s committee on agriculture and rural development about the best next steps to take. the committee primarily acts on behalf of the parliament in any agricultural or rural situations. it has the power to research best legislative options and work with the council. the committee and the council both called for more money to be given to farmers and for that money to come from budgets outside of the agricultural budget (european parliament 2014). most significantly, there was little discussion about how to combat the fact that the sanctions hit some countries harder than others, specifically the baltic states. indeed, a spanish member of the european parliament, clara eugenia aguilera garcía, complained that the mediterranean crops were not receiving enough attention, and she continued by specifying “inter alia, citrus fruits, melons, water melons and tropical fruit, and calling for measures to be more balanced” (european parliament: committee on agriculture and rural development 2014). this confirms greer and hind’s suspicions that the changes to the cap would not have a huge effect on cap decision-making, as blanket state aid was provided. this may be due to misrepresentation in the parliament’s committee on agriculture and rural development, which again verifies greer and hind’s reservations. the committee is heavily dominated by the larger member states. of the 90 members in the committee, only 17.6% of them come from former soviet bloc countries (european parliament; see graph 1). as they represent nine out of the 28 member states, the percentage should be closer to 32% for proportional representation. 8 the european council is made up of the heads of all of the member states. it typically aids in providing the general direction for the eu and becomes more involved during times of crises. 6 review of european and russian affairs 10 (1), 2016 additionally, many of the former bloc countries have high employment in agriculture, and a high portion of their total exports consist of agricultural goods (see graph 2). the baltic countries have a high number of people employed in agriculture, but latvia, for instance, has only one representative on the committee. meanwhile, countries like the united kingdom have graph 1. percentage of representatives in the european parliament’s committee on agriculture and rural development (source: author) graph 2. former soviet bloc countries representation in the parliament’s committee on agriculture and rural development versus agricultural statistics (source: author) 7 review of european and russian affairs 10 (1), 2016 10% of the representatives, with an agriculture workforce of 1.2%, and only 5.6% of total uk exports are agricultural goods (see appendix 1 for full statistics and sources). while some countries, like germany, contribute a larger portion to the total agricultural exports of the eu, most of the larger eu countries do not heavily rely on agricultural exports. chart 1 (see below) is a list of the ten countries in the eu that are most dependent on exporting agricultural goods. despite having the highest number of representatives, spain and france are only the eighth and ninth most reliant on agricultural exports, respectively. meanwhile, four of the countries are former soviet bloc countries and only have 12.2% of the representatives among them which is 5.5% less than france and spain combined. chart 1. eu countries most dependent on agricultural exports (source: author) thus, while some countries were hit harder than others by the sanctions, some members of parliament were calling for more balanced support to all farmers, rather than targeting the hardest-hit areas. in particular, this imbalance ignores the significance of the former bloc countries, including the ceecs and baltic states. this appears to be due to the fact that the parliament mainly relied on its committee for agriculture and country percentage of country’s total exports percentage of representatives 1. latvia 19.6% 1.1% 2. denmark 19.0% 2.2% 3. bulgaria 18.6% 2.2% 4. cyprus 18.2% 0.0% 5. lithuania 18.1% 2.2% 6. greece 17.8% 3.3% 7. netherlands 15.8% 4.4% 8. spain 15.0% 8.8% 9. france 13.9% 8.8% 10. poland 12.6% 5.5% 8 review of european and russian affairs 10 (1), 2016 rural development, which is dominated by countries that are not as economically reliant on agricultural exports. the commission ultimately introduced three overarching policies within a month of the russian sanctions, and after altering and debating them in parliament, they were eventually passed (juan 2014). the first was concerned with market measures and harvesting. after briefly suspending emergency measures in midseptember, by late september, the eu introduced an extra €165 million temporarily into the agricultural budget in order to protect the fruit sector specifically (ibid.). 9 secondly, the commission introduced temporary private storage for dairy products, and this quickly closed at the end of september (ibid.). the final resolution passed was the policy promotion of european agricultural products. that portion of the cap budget received an additional €60 million (ibid.). the commission was quick to introduce procedures to aid those affected by the sanctions, and the parliament and council did not delay passing these propositions. however, the eu did not take into account the disproportionate effect that the sanctions had on the ceecs and baltic states. as a result, support to the eu agricultural producers was generalized. d. successes and limitations of eu decision-making comparing eu policy implementation based on these circumstances is a beneficial way of uncovering effective methods and problem areas within eu decision-making. first, it must be said that the eu has made great strides in including the most representative institution, the european parliament, in the decisionmaking process. in both the preand post-sanction decision-making processes, parliament had a much greater say than it typically does with the cap—which is technically under commission supervision— despite the fact that parliament controls the budget. even when sanction timing was critical, parliament still contributed. that being said, during the crisis parliament was primarily represented by the committee on agriculture and rural development, which is heavily dominated by the larger member states and, as previously mentioned, is not representative of the agricultural realities of member states. when the crisis hit, the eu failed to take differences into consideration, and its institutions were not representative of the hardest hit countries. this is a serious flaw in the eu’s crisis management decisionmaking process. if the eu ignores the struggles of certain member states, already vulnerable countries may be left in a more precarious position. as previously mentioned, these countries in particular must delicately balance their actions between the eu and russia, and accordingly, their responses were not as bold as those in western europe. in recent years the eu has begun to worry about hungarian president viktor orbán’s gas dealings with russian president vladimir putin and his generally positive relationship with russia (halasz 2015). similarly, the president of the czech republic, milos zeman, had planned to attend russia’s annual victory day celebration in 2015, but after intense pressure from the eu and the us, he visited the country but skipped the parade (virostkova 2015). slovak prime minister robert fico acted similarly (grove 2015). while the baltic states and poland are very outspoken about russia’s aggression, other ceecs seem to be more wary of being so direct, exposing the vulnerability of the eu’s internal cohesion. at the same time, the baltic states wish the eu was doing more to chastise russia. they are particularly nervous after the annexation of crimea and with the current crisis in ukraine, as they, too, have large russian diasporas (adler 2015). therefore, during times of crisis, especially a crisis involving russia, the eu’s internal cohesion is tested, and ultimately, the eu must reassure the former soviet bloc states. in the future, this will be an important consideration for the eu, and perhaps require an additional task force consisting of the most affected countries in that specific crisis. there also appears to be an issue of widening versus deepening; because there are so many countries now in the european union, the eu cannot deeply explore specific problems during times of crisis. based on the comparison between the two decision-making processes, it seems as though kelemen et al. (2014) are 9 it is important to note that this was a blanket support system, i.e., countries affected the hardest were not duly compensated (european commission 2014d). 9 review of european and russian affairs 10 (1), 2016 correct when they assert that widening may hurt in the short term, but may strengthen long-term benefits, such as being able to make significant institutional changes (ibid., 647). the authors also stated that the success of deepening depends not on the number of member states, but on their attitudes, i.e., whether they prefer to maintain the status quo or are more cooperative (ibid., 651). in this case, when it was a long-term plan (e.g., cap 2020), there was more discussion with member states that are typically more cooperative, i.e., former bloc countries, who still have less of a say, but are increasingly included in the discussion. over the long term, the eu institutions were able to come to a decision about the cap with actors who typically have not been able to participate as much, specifically the european parliament and eu citizens. even though the outcome left the baltic states dissatisfied, they still gained an increase in agricultural support. it was also acknowledged that the eu member states had different agricultural needs, and should be treated accordingly. meanwhile, when it was a short-term issue, the eu institutions, primarily the commission and parliament, which depended on specific committees, could not deeply explore a problem while also dealing with the many members. this is because during the crisis, the bigger member states who typically prefer maintaining the status quo took charge, and there was very little involvement from the smaller member states. thus, the ultimate solution was a blanket aid program, rather than more targeted actions. from this perspective, it would be beneficial to have a mix of large and small countries in crisis management to ensure a comprehensive and inclusive solution. this could be a committee composed of the most affected and vulnerable countries. it is unwise for the eu to rely on countries who maintain the status quo during times of crisis because such times require a different and cooperative approach. ii. conclusion based on the two case studies of eu decision-making regarding the cap, there are several interesting patterns that emerge. first, the eu has improved the management of its democratic deficit and has even begun to utilize internet forums. the eu has also been successful in deepening the cap, notable in the cap 2020 reforms, due to its inclusion of most member states although the most vulnerable countries still had less of a say due to their size. this dynamic changes, however, during a crisis, such as the sanctions russia imposed on the eu. in this example, the eu relied more heavily on larger member states, which meant the smaller member states, who were coincidentally more affected by the sanctions, were ignored. this issue primarily occurred due to the skewed over-representation of larger countries on the main committee, who traditionally favour the status quo. while a large portion of the former soviet bloc countries have greater numbers employed in the agriculture sector and are more economically dependent, they still have a lower proportion of representatives on the committee for agriculture and rural development. this committee, which primarily handled the russian sanctions, was left to work rather independently of its governing body, the european parliament. since the committee did not contain a representative member from each country, or even a majority from those hurt most by the sanctions, its actions arguably did not accurately respond to the reality of the problems caused by the russian sanctions. had there been greater involvement from the european parliamentarians, or had they created a more balanced committee, it is likely the response would have been more appropriate. while the committee did favour the countries that were the largest agricultural producers, such as france, italy, and germany, it failed to recognize that these larger countries were not as dependent on agricultural trade for their economies, and they were thus not as vulnerable to the russian sanctions. instead, the former communist countries dealt with both stronger effects from the sanctions and less representation on the committee. 10 review of european and russian affairs 10 (1), 2016 this is a dangerous problem for the eu, and it should not be taken lightly. the sanctions brought to light issues concerning internal cohesion and the disproportionate vulnerability faced by the former soviet bloc – the ceecs and the baltic states. in the future, the eu should source solutions and aid requirements from countries most greatly affected by crises. the eu must reassure former soviet bloc countries of its support so they do not feel exposed or abandoned to perceived russian aggression. this could be rectified by establishing a committee composed only of the most affected member states. it is therefore important for the eu to address these limitations before they become serious issues in long-term or crisis decision-making. references adler, katya. 2014. “baltic nations ‘nervous about russian threat’”. bbc. march 7. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-31775358 bbc. 2014. “russia hits west with food import ban in sanctions row.” august 7. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-28687172 chyong, chi-kong and vessela tcherneva. 2015. “europe’s vulnerability on russian gas.” european council on foreign relations. march 17. http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_europes_vulnerability_on_russian_gas ciaian, pavel and johan f.m. swinnen. 2007. “distortions to agricultural incentives in central and eastern europe.” august 7. http://core.ac.uk/download/files/153/6457633.pdf council of the european union. 2014. "press release: extraordinary council meeting: agriculture and fisheries." september 5. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/agricult/144667.pdf eteris, eugene. 2013. "new union's cap reform for baltic farmers." the baltic course. october 28. http://www.baltic-course.com/eng/markets_and_companies/?doc=82678 european commission. 2014a. “agricultural trade in 2013: eu gains in commodity exports” http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/trade-analysis/map/2014-1_en.pdf —. 2014b. “analysis of the eu fruit and vegetables sector” september 26. http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/russian-import-ban/pdf/fv-production_en.pdf —. 2014c. “eu agriculture – statistical and economic information -2013.” http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/statistics/agricultural/2013/pdf/b0-1-2_en.pdf —. 2014d. "regulations" official journal of the european union. august 21. http://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/txt/pdf/?uri=celex:32014r0913&from=en http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-31775358 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-28687172 http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_europes_vulnerability_on_russian_gas http://core.ac.uk/download/files/153/6457633.pdf http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/agricult/144667.pdf http://www.baltic-course.com/eng/markets_and_companies/?doc=82678 http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/trade-analysis/map/2014-1_en.pdf http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/russian-import-ban/pdf/fv-production_en.pdf http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/statistics/agricultural/2013/pdf/b0-1-2_en.pdf http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/txt/pdf/?uri=celex:32014r0913&from=en http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/txt/pdf/?uri=celex:32014r0913&from=en 11 review of european and russian affairs 10 (1), 2016 —. from last date modified 30 january 2015a. “the common agriculture policy after 2013.” http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/cap-post-2013/ —. from last date modified 30 january 2015b. “’the cap post-2013’ conference on the public debate, brussels, july 19-20, 2010.” http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/cap-post2013/conference/19-07-2010_en.htm —. from last date modified 30 january 2015c “monitoring and evaluation for the cap post-2013.”. http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/cap-post-2013/monitoring-evaluation/index_en.htm —. from last date modified 30 january 2015d. “public debate on the cap post-2013." http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/cap-post-2013/debate/index_en.htm european parliament. 2014. "meps welcome signs of change in ukraine and urge eu to stand up to russia." september 18. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/newsroom/content/20140918ipr65201/html/meps-welcome-signs-of-hope-in-ukraine-andurge-the-eu-to-stand-up-to-russia european parliament. n.d. “european parliament committees: agriculture and rural development: members” http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/agri/members.html;jsessionid=4f7509e60f 436ed2b265678fb8b1d767.node1?action=8 european parliament: committee on agriculture and rural development. 2014. "russian ban: agriculture committee calls for more actions and money to support eu farmers." september 5. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/pdfs/news/expert/infopress/20140905ipr59401/20140905i pr59401_en.pdf greer, alan and thomas hind. 2012. “inter-institutional decision-making: the case of the common agricultural policy.” policy and society. 31: 331-341. grove, thomas. 2015. “putin puts on vast victory day parade in moscow.” the wall street journal. may 9. http://www.wsj.com/articles/putin-puts-on-vast-victory-day-parade1431167707. halasz, adam. 2015. “orban gives putin warm welcome.” euobserver. february 18. https://euobserver.com/beyond-brussels/127693 juan, ana martinez. 2014. "russian measures against european union agricultural products." european parlimentary research service. october 3. http://epthinktank.eu/2014/10/03/russian-measures-against-european-union-agriculturalproducts/ kelemen, r. daniel, anand menon and jonathan slapin. 2014. "wider and deeper? enlargement and integration in the european union." journal of european public policy. 21 (5): 647-663. http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/cap-post-2013/ http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/caphttp://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/cap-post-2013/monitoringhttp://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/cap-post-2013/debate/index_en.htm http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/content/20140918ipr65201/html/meps-welcome-signs-of-hope-in-ukraine-and-urge-the-eu-to-stand-up-to-russia http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/content/20140918ipr65201/html/meps-welcome-signs-of-hope-in-ukraine-and-urge-the-eu-to-stand-up-to-russia http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/content/20140918ipr65201/html/meps-welcome-signs-of-hope-in-ukraine-and-urge-the-eu-to-stand-up-to-russia http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/agri/members.html;jsessionid=4f7509e60f436ed2b265678fb8b1d767.node1?action=8 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/agri/members.html;jsessionid=4f7509e60f436ed2b265678fb8b1d767.node1?action=8 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/pdfs/news/expert/infopress/20140905ipr59401/20140905ipr59401_en.pdf http://www.europarl.europa.eu/pdfs/news/expert/infopress/20140905ipr59401/20140905ipr59401_en.pdf http://www.wsj.com/articles/putin-puts-on-vast-victory-day-parade-1431167707 http://www.wsj.com/articles/putin-puts-on-vast-victory-day-parade-1431167707 https://euobserver.com/beyond-brussels/127693 http://epthinktank.eu/2014/10/03/russian-measures-against-european-union-agricultural-products/ http://epthinktank.eu/2014/10/03/russian-measures-against-european-union-agricultural-products/ 12 review of european and russian affairs 10 (1), 2016 kydra, marek. 2012. “baltic countries demand fairer redistribution of cap payments." agriculture and rural conventions. july 2. http://www.arc2020.eu/front/2012/07/balticcountries-demand-fairer-redistribution-of-cap-payments/ manzocchi, stefano. 2003. the economics of enlargement. palgrave: new york. molle, wilhelm. 2006. the economics of european integration: theory, practice, policy. aldershot, england: ashgate. ryan, michael. 2005. “enlargement costs of the common agricultural policy.” bachelor’s diss., university of stanford. http://economics.stanford.edu/files/theses/theses_2005/ryan.pdf spence, timothy. 2013. "cap 2014-2020: a long road to reform." euractiv. july 4. http://www.euractiv.com/general/cap-reform-post-2013-linksdossier-508393 vesnic-alujevic, lucia and rodrigo castero nacarino. 2012. "the eu and its democratic deficit: problems and (possible) solutions." european view, (june): 63-70. virostkova, lucia. 2015. “czech and slovak leaders divided over russia’s 9 may parade.” euobserver, april 13. https://euobserver.com/beyond-brussels/128291 willis, andrew. 2011. "eu states oppose plans to end farm 'subsidy millionaires'." euobserver, march 18, https://euobserver.com/news/32014. http://www.arc2020.eu/front/2012/07/baltic-countries-demand-fairer-redistribution-of-cap-payments/ http://www.arc2020.eu/front/2012/07/baltic-countries-demand-fairer-redistribution-of-cap-payments/ http://economics.stanford.edu/files/theses/theses_2005/ryan.pdf http://www.euractiv.com/general/cap-reform-post-2013-linksdossier-508393 https://euobserver.com/beyond-brussels/128291 https://euobserver.com/news/32014 13 review of european and russian affairs 10 (1), 2016 appendix 1 country percentage of representatives10 percentage of total employment in agriculture11 percentage of country’s total exports12 total agricultural exports (billions of euros)13 austria 2.2% 4.9% 7.8% 10.3 belgium 1.1% 1.2% 9.7% 34.2 bulgaria 2.2% 6.4% 18.6% 4.1 croatia 2.2% 13.7% 11.3% 1.1 cyprus 0.0% 2.9% 18.2% 0.3 czech republic 1.1% 3.1% 5.1% 6.2 denmark 2.2% 2.6% 19.0% 15.8 estonia 0.0% 4.7% 8.8% 1.1 finland 1.1% 4.1% 4.6% 2.6 france 8.8% 2.9% 13.9% 60.8 germany 11.1% 1.5% 6.2% 68 greece 3.3% 13.0% 17.8% 4.9 hungary 2.2% 5.2% 10.0% 8.1 ireland 3.3% 4.7% 11.9% 10.3 italy 13.3% 3.7% 8.6% 33.6 latvia 1.1% 8.4% 19.6% 2.1 10 from the european parliament: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/agri/members.html;jsessionid=4f7509e60f436ed2b265678fb8b1 d767.node1?action=8 11 from european commission, agriculture and rural development: http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/statistics/agricultural/2013/pdf/c5-1-351_en.pdf 12 from european commission, agriculture and rural development: http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/statistics/factsheets/index_en.htm 13 from european commission, agriculture and rural development: http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/statistics/factsheets/index_en.htm http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/agri/members.html;jsessionid=4f7509e60f436ed2b265678fb8b1d767.node1?action=8 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/agri/members.html;jsessionid=4f7509e60f436ed2b265678fb8b1d767.node1?action=8 14 review of european and russian affairs 10 (1), 2016 lithuania 2.2% 8.8% 18.1% 4.4 luxembourg 0.0% 1.3% 7.2% 1 malta 0.0% 1.0% 4.5% 0.1 netherlands 4.4% n/a 15.8% 17.7 poland 5.5% 12.6% 12.6% 19.4 portugal 4.4% 10.5% 10.2% 4.8 romania 3.3% 29.0% 10.8% 5.3 slovakia 0.0% 3.2% 5.0% 3.3 slovenia 1.1% 8.3% 5.9% 1.5 spain 8.8% 4.4% 15.0% 35.9 sweden 4.4% 2.0% 4.0% 5.1 united kingdom 10.0% 1.2% 5.6% 22.6 (source: author) 15 review of european and russian affairs 10 (1), 2016 published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada available online at: journals.carleton.ca/rera/index.php/rera rera is an electronic academic peer-reviewed journal that publishes graduate, post-graduate, and young scholarly works. topics relate to the european union, it’s member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is a joint project supported by the canadaeurope transatlantic dialogue—a cross-canada research network supported by the social sciences and humanities research council of canada (sshrc)—along with the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies (carleton university) and its associated research unit, the centre for european studies. rera aims to provide an accessible forum for research, to promote high standards of research and scholarship, and to foster communication among young scholars. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada tel: +01 613 520-2600 ext. 3117; e-mail: rera-journal@carleton.ca creative commons license creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0 this working paper is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial no derivs 3.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 3.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, provided the source is acknowledged. no use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes. issn: 1718-4835 © 2016 the author(s) https://journals.carleton.ca/rera/index.php/rera mailto:rera-journal@carleton.ca http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ review of european and russian affairs 7 (1), 2012 issn 1718-4835 © 2012 the author(s) www.carleton.ca/rera the evolution of the european neighbourhood policy and the consistent evolvement of its inconsistencies nariné ghazaryan brunel university abstract the paper traces the evolution of the european neighbourhood policy (enp) since its origins until the present day. the enp was initiated in 2003 attracting vast institutional and scholarly interest in its various aspects. the extraordinary events of the “arab spring” revolutions in the southern neighbourhood prompted a renewed interest towards the enp despite the internal economic turmoil faced by the european union (eu) and its member states. the eu institutions undertook a substantive revision of the policy in 2011 in addition to the regional split that had taken place previously. the legal framework of the enp, comprising its objectives, methodology and instruments, is analysed to reveal the various stages of the existence of the policy and the shortcomings undermining its success. the initial stage of policy formation, the subsequent impact of the treaty of lisbon, and the most current state of affairs with a regional emphasis will be addressed in sequence. review of european and russian affairs 7 (1), 2012 issn 1718-4835 © 2012 the author(s) www.carleton.ca/rera introduction nearly a decade since the start of the european neighbourhood policy (enp), its credibility and efficiency have been questioned. initiated in 2003, the enp intended to achieve a number of simultaneous objectives, under a common umbrella of comprehensive cooperation in many areas of european union (eu or union) competences. on the surface, the enp aimed at solving the “inclusion-exclusion” dilemma faced by the eu after the 2004 enlargement by creating an alternative to the accession process (smith 2005). alongside the enlargement aspects, the enp coincided with the attempts of the eu to address global security concerns in the post 9/11 era. the neighbourhood posed threats of its own with unresolved conflicts both in the east and south, chiefly political instability emanating from autocratic states or states in transition. similarly to enlargement, the economic development pattern promoted through the enp was intended to enhance the political stability of the neighbourhood, and therefore to guarantee the union’s security. the european security strategy of 2003 stressed that “geography is still important” to the role of the eu in tackling global security threats (solana 2003). it has even been suggested that the enp is a regionalization of the european security strategy (hillion 2008). although the launch of the initial “wider europe” policy was chiefly directed at russia, ukraine, moldova and belarus, it was stretched to include the neighbours in the south (european commission 2003). russia’s unwillingness to cooperate with the eu on any platform other than that of equal partnership resulted in a separate framework of cooperation. a strategic partnership was therefore established with russia, which in its name and substance offered russia a distinct pattern of cooperation (council of the european union 2004). the ranks of the enp partner states were further revised when the three south caucasian states were recommended for inclusion by the enp strategy paper. this was due to the significance attributed to the region in the european security strategy paper, the rose revolution in georgia, as well as the position of the european parliament and the then high representative for common foreign and security policy (press release, 2004). the final number of enp addressees ultimately reached 161. ratified in 2009, the treaty of lisbon expected to simplify the legal framework for the conduct of the eu’s external relations, a process from which the enp would have benefited. the new article 8 of the treaty on european union (teu) (2010), arguably signifies a novel commitment on behalf of the eu vis-à-vis its neighbours. in parallel with the ratification of the lisbon treaty, a regional split has taken place within the enp. the union for the mediterranean (ufm) and the eastern partnership (eap) were initiated in the south and east respectively throughout 2008 and 2009. the subsequent events in the wake of the “arab spring” revolutions have renewed eu interest towards the eu foreign policy in its backyard. crucially, the eu emphasized that the developments at its doorstep are of immediate concern for the union and its member states, and therefore there should be a constructive continuous engagement with the neighbouring states. despite the internalization of eu policies in the wake of the financial crisis and the “damoclean sword” hovering above the eurozone countries afflicted by austerity, the issue of neighbourhood integration has persisted on the agenda of the eu. engagement with the neighbourhood is not an option: it is the form and the substance of this engagement that is a matter of choice and concern. in the past, the main attraction of the union for non-member states has been its successfully functioning internal market. despite its economic crisis, the eu 1ukraine, belarus, moldova, georgia, armenia, azerbaijan, egypt, tunisia, morocco, jordan, syria, lebanon, algeria, libya, israel, and occupied palestinian authorities. review of european and russian affairs 7 (1), 2012 3 is still important to its neighbours whether due to its role as a major trading partner, a source of financial aid, or as a transporter of norms. the enp has attracted vast scholarly attention focusing on a variety of aspects, including its substantive elements, regional dimensions, security issues within the neighbourhood and legal aspects of the policy (cremona and hillion 2006; kelley 2006; magen 2006; dannreuther 2006; baracani 2005; lynch 2005). a variety of issues have been identified regarding the objectives, methodology, and implementation issues of the enp in both the southern and eastern neighbourhoods. this paper aims to trace the evolution of the enp via three stages. it asks the question whether the policy has undergone a significant transformation in terms of its constituent elements. is the enp of 2012 different from the original policy? has the lisbon treaty transformed the policy in substantive terms? what is it that the enp tries to achieve in the neighbourhood currently? to answer these questions the objectives, instruments and the methodology of the policy are analysed at various stages of enp implementation. the term “stages” does not signify clear cut periods in time. rather, it refers to a distinct set of political and/or legal developments. the “stages” are at times overlapping and coexistent. the first part of the paper will address the initial stage of the enp formation. the impact of the lisbon treaty and its significance for the neighbourhood policy will then be discussed. this section will also address the suitability of these developments as a means to compensate for previously identified drawbacks of the enp. the challenges faced by the eu in its eastern and southern neighbourhood will be considered further to reveal the extent to which the current legal framework has evolved since the initiation of the policy in 2003. the paper will be summarized with brief conclusions. the initial stage of policy formation: incorporating mismatches bilateral in nature, the enp did not create a new multilateral framework for its neighbours. rather, it offered enp countries a common pattern of cooperation. the western newly independent states and the south caucasian states did not have a common framework of cooperation at that stage, and were treated with a noticeable distinction previously within the existing bilateral framework (hillion 1998; maresceau and montaguti 1995)2. alternatively the neighbours in the south had a multilateral cooperation framework with the eu under the barcelona process, which established the euro-mediterranean policy (emp) (barcelona declaration 1995). such an extensive geographic stretch meant that the same objectives were to be achieved, and the same instruments and methods used throughout the eu vicinity. it is therefore not surprising that the objectives of the policy were so broadly. the choice of the instruments and methodology also appears to be linked to the same motive, which is to enhance flexibility in terms of political manoeuvre. however, in securing such flexibility the policy suffered a syndrome of mismatches of its objectives, methodology, and legal framework. as noted in the introduction, the creation of the policy had an instrumental aim of securing a comprehensive framework for developing relations with the states surrounding the eu. however, formulating such a policy within a short period of time required relying on preexisting strategies and instruments, which happened to be the pre-accession strategy. although it excludes the possibility of eu membership, the enp offers a certain level of political and 2 the partnership and cooperation agreements [hereinafter pca], adopted between the eu and its member states on the one hand and russia, ukraine and moldova on the other, are different from the pcas adopted with the states of the south caucasus in that inter alia they provide for a prospect of free trade area. review of european and russian affairs 7 (1), 2012 4 economic integration based primarily on the pre-accession mechanisms and instruments (prodi 2002; european commission 2003; 2004; 2006). the policy suffered from ambiguity by undergoing a significant reformulation with ever changing incentives and promises. this included sharing “everything but institutions,” a “stake in the internal market,” and the possible creation of a neighbourhood common area. although, the enp strategy paper preserved the language of the “stake in the internal market,” the incentives of cooperation, in particular with the council’s involvement, were “gradually watered down” (kelley 2006; kochenov 2008). the free movement of persons as one of the pillars of the internal market has been reduced to visa facilitation prospects, thus signalling that the intentions of the eu are yet to be clearly defined. this predisposition dictated the acceptance of the conditionality mechanism as the main driving force behind the integration. as described by smith (2005), conditionality is the linking by an international organization or a state of benefits on offer to another state’s performance in meeting certain economic and/or political conditions. in the eu context, most conditionality is generally understood to describe the positive conditions that the candidate states must satisfy to become members of the union, i.e. the so called copenhagen criteria, now enshrined in article 49 of the teu (european council 1993). adopting enlargement-like conditionality was supposed to equip the enp with a similar “transformationist rationale”, which would instigate major political and economic reforms in the partner states (comelli, greco, tocci 2007). the speech made by romano prodi in 2002 signalled that conditionality would be the basis for cooperation, which was subsequently confirmed in the enp documents. (hillion 2004). however, borrowing the conditionality principle is not straightforward. first of all, the accession criteria have been replaced with “the discourse on common values,” where most of the enp policy documents have adopted the language of “shared values” (tulmets 2006; european commission 2003). nevertheless, the requirement to adhere to “shared values” already an ambiguous concept did not correspond with to the security concerns of the enp, thus revealing one of the inconsistencies embedded in the enp at the outset. an emphasis on the security of the union surfaced at the beginning of the new millennium, marked by the aftermath of the events of 9/11 and the anticipation of its most extensive enlargement, transforming the borders of the eu and bringing it closer to new neighbours (delcour 2007). the solana/patten letter which initially circulated the idea of neighbourhood integration stressed the vital link between eu security and the well-being of its neighbours, by recognizing that the action should start from outside (patten and solana 2002; lynch 2005). the importance of stability and security around the eu, and the concerns of the eu citizens regarding security, migration, and economic growth were central to the enp agenda, prompting an interpretation that the initiative is more concerned with the changes occurring in the union due to its new geographical location (ferrero-waldner 2006; european commission 2003; del sarto and schumacher 2005). thus, the prosperity of the neighbours and their socio-economic development is instrumental in achieving the security and stability of the union itself. despite the presence of security on the enp agenda, the enp has been considered “the example par excellence of civilian power in europe,” where the security element is “devoid of review of european and russian affairs 7 (1), 2012 5 military component” (khasson, vasilyan, and vos 2008, 220, 223). the instruments of the policy are clearly civilian, focused on “persuasion and negotiation”, and based on the eu’s economic power without a threat of using force (smith 2000). however, this characteristic does not nullify the rationalist presumption that stabilizing the neighbours will guarantee the security of the eu and allow it to pursue its own political interests. the prosperity and well-being of the neighbouring states is merely a means to an end of securing europe. it is this rationale that could not rest solely on the conditionality mechanism. to secure its interests and achieve the cooperation of the neighbours, conditionality was complemented by “more compromising measures,” i.e, the principles of joint ownership and differentiation (tulmets 2006). these principles are envisaged to ensure a so called “tailor-made” approach to ensure a mutual process of cooperation. incorporating these principles can be viewed positively due to the flexibility accorded to the eu in taking a notice of its neighbours’ interests. alternatively they are inconsistent with the “transformationist” rationale of the conditionality element. in combination with the security concerns of the enp, these principles are capable of trumping the eu’s normative image, embodied in the conditionality. this is especially evident in neighbours, where the power asymmetry is unmarked or insignificant. another identified weakness of the enp is that its legal framework is comprised primarily of soft law instruments. article 288 of the treaty on the functioning of the european union (tfeu) (2010) specifies the hard and soft law legal acts to be adopted by the union. while regulations, directives, and decisions are binding and create legal commitments, recommendations and opinions are specifically excluded from having a binding force. the latter constitute the so called “soft law” instruments. a commonly accepted definition of soft law refers to the absence of legally binding force, i.e. absence of legal obligations, in a certain set of rules, while at the same time these rules can have a practical or possibly even indirect legal effect (senden 2004, 112). in addition, the non-binding instruments mentioned in article 288 of the tfeu are classified as “non-legislative,” since they are adopted without recourse to the legislative procedures identified in the treaties (dougan 2008, 638). the types of soft law acts adopted by the eu institutions are not confined to those mentioned in article 288 of the tfeu. communications, strategy papers, action plans, and progress reports which shaped the instrumental basis of the enp all belong to the category of soft law instruments, and are therefore not binding on the eu, or its partners. despite this major setback, certain advantages are linked to the choice of soft law instruments. a central advantage of the eu decision making process is the avoidance of competence complications. the lack of eu legal personality and the multi-pillar structure of its constitutional order during the initiation of the enp were the obvious reasons informing this preference for soft laws. soft law instruments also offer significant flexibility and simplicity, which were important factors enabling the progressive shaping of the policy (trubek, cottrell, and nance 2006, 74). however the downside of these soft law characteristics is that they promote ambiguity in the eu’s message to its neighbours. the main policy documents, chiefly the action plans (ap), which set out the priority areas for cooperation have been adopted for the majority of the enp states. however, due to the lack of binding legal force, their implementation is left to the political will of the associate state. moreover, the aps’ generally lack a clear vision of the overall picture of the reforms that the neighbours should undertake (kochenov 2008; magen 2006). monitoring of enp country performance is annually conducted through the commission’s progress reports. review of european and russian affairs 7 (1), 2012 6 one of the few hard law instruments is the regulation on the european neighbourhood and partnership instrument (enpi), which establishes the framework for providing financial assistance to the states concerned (european parliament 2006). the importance of this document is linked to the negative conditionality element, whereby the eu can suspend its financial assistance if the partner state fails to observe the values of the eu (european parliament 2006, art. 28). another set of hard law instruments are the agreements concluded prior to the initiation of the enp. partnership and cooperation agreements (pca) were concluded with the eastern neighbours in the 1990s, with the exception of belarus. although they can be characterized as mere trade agreements (hillion 1998), the pcas also appeared to be advantageous due to the incorporation of a political dialogue previously lacking (peers 1995). in the south, association agreements were signed within the barcelona process, which allegedly offered a far-reaching cooperation. the possibility of signing new agreements with the neighbouring states, “neighbourhood agreements,” has been included in the documents initiating the enp. however, only at a later stage will this promise gain a practical significance for some neighbours. it can therefore be concluded that the initial stage of shaping and forming the enp policy was marred by significant inconsistencies. the objectives behind the enp were multifaceted and complicated, and their achievement required distinct methods of cooperation. the methods chosen did not sit well with one another. the principles of differentiation and joint ownership were capable of trumping the transformationist objectives to be achieved by the conditionality element, against the rationalist objectives of the enp. the chain of consistency was weakened by the choice of soft law instruments to formulate and implement the policy, further undermining its transformationist agenda. the lisbon treaty and its impact on the enp to a certain extent, the treaty revision was expected to resolve various concerns regarding the legal framework for conducting eu foreign policy. although article 47 of the teu recognizes for the first time the legal personality of the eu, the revised teu preserves the intergovernmental nature of the decision making in the common foreign and security policy (cfsp), one of the thorniest issues in conducting efficient foreign policy. the security rationale of the enp dictated the inclusion of cfsp related matters within its framework, which in its turn suggests that the so called “mixity” is a present feature of the enp. it will be particularly prominent during the conclusion of new agreements, where the presence of the member states alongside the eu will be necessitated. but will the lisbon treaty herald a new change in regards to the inconsistencies of the enp? the main significance of the treaty for the enp is the incorporation of the new article 8 of the teu. certain scepticism has been expressed as to the legal value of article 8 where it is viewed to be a political provision (van elsuwege and petrov 2011). although it does not specifically refer to the enp, article 8 codifies the current experience of the enp, apparent in its use of language and terminology of previous enp documents. the first paragraph of article 8 reads: the union shall develop a special relationship with neighbouring countries, aiming to establish an area of prosperity and good neighbourliness, founded on the values of the union and characterised by close and peaceful relations based on cooperation. review of european and russian affairs 7 (1), 2012 7 the argument that article 8 codifies the enp experience can be deduced from the following observations, which to a certain extent support the view of van elsuwege and petrov (2011). article 8 stands separately from the teu title v on external action of the eu and cfsp, and is included in the common provisions in title i of the teu. such separation might suggest a special significance the eu attributes to its neighbourhood: the relations with neighbours can no longer be overlooked. however, it can also be proposed that the exclusion of article 8 has other ulterior motives. providing an article expressly referring to the neighbours of the eu in the first part of the teu is aimed at accentuating the alternative character of this policy to the accession process (cremona 2003). others view this provision as potentially capable of functioning as a “pre-pre-accession” stage in a certain context (bechev and nicolaides 2010). given the current political climate such interpretation is rather credible. however, the former opinion is more in line with the present reality: providing a separate clause on neighbourhood policies, without any reference to the copenhagen criteria as in article 49 of the teu, sends a signal that the enp is a distinct and alternative policy to the enlargement. in other words, article 8 offers a margin for avoiding the application of article 49 of the teu. moreover, unlike the draft constitutional treaty (2004), where the corresponding article i56 was closely followed by the article on membership, the lisbon treaty clearly avoided similar textual approximation. perhaps, taking into account that the enp still did not manage to restrict some states in their keenness to join the eu, the lisbon treaty attempted to highlight the very distinct nature of the cooperation on offer. article 8 offers a “special relationship” with a possibility of concluding a new agreement with reciprocal rights and obligations based on the “values of the union.” although this provision does not specify the type of agreement to be concluded, the terminology of “special relationship” is linked to the association agreements as defined by the court of justice in demirel (hillion 2007; cremona 2008; van elsuwege and petrov 2011). this can be considered a confirmation of the previously existing practice with the southern neighbours, some of which had signed association agreements before the initiation of the enp. in addition, article 8 bears a general character with no reference to procedural rules unlike its counterpart in the initial version of the draft constitutional treaty, which made reference to the procedure of concluding agreements in article iii-227 (currently article 218 tfeu) (european convention 2003). however, this initial reference was excluded from the final text of the draft constitutional treaty, and did not find a place in the lisbon treaty, thereby leaving the article without much elaboration (conference 2003). regarding the value of article 8 as a legal basis, the question that inevitably arises is, can the article be used as such in its own right? according to certain commentators, there is nothing in the treaties to rule out the possibility of article 8 being used as a sole legal basis (van elsuwege and petrov 2011). however, it seems improbable the eu will rely on some type of an agreement of “a general nature” based solely on article 8, as suggested by van elsuwege and petrov (2011). the eu would prefer instead to fallback on its already tested types of agreements, such as the association agreements. in fact, all the agreements initiated in the east will take the form of an association, which i will be discuss further. therefore, an obvious choice for a legal basis will be article 217 of the tfeu on the conclusion of association agreements. however, if the eu wishes to opt out in favour of a low-key agreement as opposed to an association agreement, article 216 of the tfeu will be an appropriate channel as it provides for a competence to conclude international agreements when the treaties provide for such a possibility or when the achievement of a treaty objective so requires. thus, article 8 ultimately guarantees certain review of european and russian affairs 7 (1), 2012 8 flexibility as to the tfeu legal bases, allowing for provision-shopping, which can ultimately affect the level of cooperation a given agreement will offer. the mixed nature of the enp in terms of the delimitation of the eu and member state competences will also require a reliance on the cfsp legal grounds, in particular article 24 of the teu. for the first time, the lisbon treaty provides a uniform procedure for negotiating and concluding international agreements in article 218 of the tfeu with certain variations (tfeu 2010, arts 218(3), 218(6), 218(8); piris 2010, 88). thus, article 8 is not stricto sensu necessary for concluding an agreement with a neighbouring state, as other treaty provisions would be used in its absence. as to the methodology of the cooperation, article 8 clarifies the conditionality element of the enp by making a reference to the “values of the union” instead of enp “shared values” as the basis for the cooperation with the non-members. for the first time, the lisbon treaty defines the values of the union in article 2 of the teu to include “respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities.” thus, it can be argued, that article 8 strengthens the conditionality element by specifying its normative basis. however, despite the direct reference to the eu values, it is not clear whether the adherence to the latter will be a prerequisite for concluding a new agreement. as noted above, association agreements have been in force with certain southern neighbours despite a lack of commitment to the values of democracy and human rights. nevertheless, the recent example with the ukrainian association agreement can be interpreted as a result of non-adherence to the eu’s values as required by article 8. the ratification of the agreement has been put on hold due to the political developments in ukraine, including those related to the criminal prosecution of the former prime minister yulia timoshenko (eu observer 2012a). the policy objectives articulated in article 8 also strike us as familiar. they are focused on establishing “an area of prosperity and good neighbourliness […] characterised by close and peaceful relations based on cooperation.” in addition, article 8 should be viewed within the wider framework of the eu foreign policy objectives, defined in article 21 of the teu, which includes both strategic and normative objectives. article 21 appears to preserve the status quo, as no particular priority will be given to the promotion of the eu values in comparison with the security-oriented objectives. perhaps to ensure that none of the objectives are undermined or prioritized, article 21(3) makes it clear that consistency should be ensured between the different areas of its external action and between the external and internal policies. the enp requires multidimensional consistency. consistency between the approaches of different institutions is required, as well as vertical consistency between the union and the member states (chalmers et al 2010). consistency should also be guaranteed in relation to various elements of the policy, as well as its methodology. substantive elements of the policy can be undermined by realpolitik considerations. in this sense, consistency can be synonymous with continuity. for instance, the conditionality element of the enp loses credibility when the relations between the eu and one of the neighbouring partners progress due to the eu’s desire to a presence in its vicinity, despite the conditionality element. an example of this is the eu’s swift turn to negotiations of a visa facilitation agreement with georgia in 2008 (european council 2008). the talks were initiated immediately after the 2008 august war with russia in order to express the eu’s support to georgia. the presence of common objectives, binding all institutions and member states, will not automatically ensure a unified vision of eu’s role in the neighbourhood. it is particularly the review of european and russian affairs 7 (1), 2012 9 council and the commission, assisted by the high representative of the union for foreign affairs and security policy that shall cooperate to ensure such consistency. the permanent position of the presidency of the european council and the high representative assisted by the external action service introduced by the lisbon treaty, are key factors that will impact the conduct of eu policies abroad (european council 2010). the most recent documents on the enp have emanated jointly from the commission and the high representative demonstrating the operation of the “double-hatting” element of the eu foreign policy in this area. such positioning creates complexities for policy implementation and representation, however the discussion of these issues is beyond the scope of this paper (ghazaryan 2012). a positive result of the lisbon treaty is that it has legalized the eu’s commitment to its neighbours and clarified the element of conditionality by making a reference to the eu values in article 8 of the teu. however, it does not prioritize the element of conditionality, and does not impact the variety of the objectives pursued through the enp. it does not add any novelty in terms of the legal instruments of the policy as the conclusion of new agreements was previously on the enp agenda. east and south: what next? as noted earlier, the “arab spring” revolutions demonstrated just how important the state of affairs in the vicinity is for the eu. the economic conditions and social injustice which inter alia led to the uprisings were partly indicative of the failure of the eu policies to create prosperity in its southern neighbourhood (hollis 2012). these issues have been on the agenda of cooperation with the eu since the 1995 barcelona declaration. in fact, it was the uprisings that prompted the eu “to look afresh at the eu’s relationship” with its neighbours, and made the necessity for the review “even more compelling” (european commission 2011a). this is not the first time the eu has acknowledged a need to revise the enp, although it is doubtful whether the revisions were undertaken in order to address the inherent inconsistencies the enp to be strengthened through a revision by the commission in 2006, however no substantive changes were (european commission 2006). the unsuitability of an all-inclusive approach towards the eastern and southern neighbours led to a natural split in the policy according to its regional dimension, as predicted by missiroli (2007). the old member states, particularly france, favoured a separate approach towards their historic partners in the south. meanwhile sweden and poland championed a distinctive approach towards the eastern partners in response to their european aspirations, thus recognizing a different agenda that should be pursued at this front. consequently, the ufm and the eap emerged as the two wings of the enp in 2008 and 2009 respectively. the union for mediterranean and the southern outlook the ufm was devised as a continuation of the euro-mediterranean partnership by adding a multilateral framework of cooperation to the hitherto bilateral enp. in addition to the addressee states, it also includes turkey and the balkan states, acknowledging their shared interest in the regional cooperation. structurally, the ufm was noted to be more of “a regression” from the emp than an improvement (bechev and nicolaides 2010), due to the system of co-presidency, where an arab and a european head of state preside jointly in addition to a secretariat in spain. although the review of european and russian affairs 7 (1), 2012 10 ufm is intended to upgrade the political dialogue by ensuring high level political representation, its format led to a situation where the european leaders would side with autocratic leaders of certain southern neighbours. in fact, no summits have taken place in the last two years. as to its objectives, although the initiative intended to create more visibility and concreteness in the partnership by establishing large scale regional and sub-regional projects relevant for the population of the region, it failed to address issues including economic development and regional security (european commission 2010). instead, the ufm prioritizes a set of commercial projects to be undertaken jointly in areas such as energy, infrastructure, transport, and the environment. nonetheless, the creation of the multilateral framework does not affect the conditionality element of the enp. hollis argues that here the eu has failed to recognize that the acquis does not have the same value for the neighbours: it does not necessarily make sense beyond the eu, “especially when adopted piecemeal and selectively” (hollis 2012). noting the lack of attraction of the eu model in the south, johansson-nogues (2011) finds the reason for the complacency of the eu among autocratic regimes, as stemming from an unwillingness to accept the eu’s “preaching” model, as well as the diminishing prominence of the liberal elements in the society. indeed, little progress has been achieved in undertaking the reforms envisaged in the aps. moreover, no aps have been established with libya, algeria or syria. the southern neighbours have no illusions regarding eu membership, which would compel the adoption of the acquis. they are interested in the eu assistance to develop vital sectors of their economy, such as agriculture or small and medium enterprises. the rejection of the morocco’s eu membership bid in 1987 signified that the eu expansion to north africa was ruled out. the subsequent emp and enp confirmed this signal sent earlier. in addition, the eu appears to be in need of reinventing the same policy in different packages. in march 2011, a partnership for democracy and shared prosperity in the southern mediterranean was promised, seemingly to remind the neighbours that the eu is willing to cooperate with “pro-democratic” forces (european commission 2011b). reactionary in nature, it promises to focus on issues of concern for the partner states, such as institution building and sectoral development, including agriculture. at the same time the key concerns for the citizens of the eu, such as migration and mobility issues, will be central to the cooperation. thus, within nine years of the enp’s implementation in the south, the policy has undergone a number of transformations. these transformations are often lacking retrospective and prospective vision and are reactionary in nature. not only did the ufm not eliminate the inconsistencies of the enp, it further undermined the credibility of the policy and the eu itself. the eastern partnership and the reinforced commitments the eap nominally separates the eastern neighbours from the south promising a higher level of cooperation. it intends to reciprocate the aspirations of the eastern neighbours to be politically and economically closer to the eu. this is embedded in the prospect of signing association agreements with each of the partners aimed at establishing a deep and comprehensive free trade area (dcfta). the initial commission communication went so far as to mention the possibility of creating a neighbourhood economic area (european commission 2008). in addition to promising deeper bilateral engagement, the eap also created a multilateral framework of cooperation to promote cooperation, open dialogue, and the exchange of best practice and experiences (council of the european union 2009). a number of thematic platforms review of european and russian affairs 7 (1), 2012 11 have been established to pursue dialogue in the areas of democracy and good governance, economic integration, energy security, and contacts between people. in terms of policy objectives, one could suggest that grouping the eastern partners in a separate multilateral framework amounts to recognizing the “europeanness” of ukraine, moldova, belarus, and the states of the south caucasus as opposed to the south mediterranean and north african states. however, the official eap documents are careful to avoid such characterization. instead, the eastern partnership communication mentions that the policy is “without prejudice to individual countries aspirations for their future relationship with the eu,” further heating the debates on the perspective of membership of the eastern neighbours. nevertheless, the presence of article 8 of the teu and its separate status from article 49, serves as an assurance of the eu’s prerogative to dictate the nature of the cooperation by opting out for one of these legal bases for developing the relations with any neighbouring state. a more promising objective voiced initially by the commission was the possible creation of a network of free trade areas that would eventually evolve into a neighbourhood economic community “taking inspiration from the european economic area where appropriate” (eastern partnership communication). the subsequent council declaration and the joint declaration of the eastern partnership summit remained silent on this prospect, merely referring to the establishment of a “network of deep and comprehensive free trade areas” (council of the european union 2009). the 2011 eap summit made a cautious reference to the possibility of creating an economic area with the eu without further elaboration. such a prospect is ultimately dubious given the fact that the principles of differentiation and joint ownership are preserved in the eap methodology. these principles of cooperation will dictate variations in the level of economic cooperation among the partner states, whereas establishing a common economic area will require a common denominator in terms of economic regulation. alongside the differentiation and joint ownership, the principle of conditionality also has found continuity in the eap. it is central to the eap, at least on paper. the initial eap declaration referred to the commitment of the partners to “the principles of international law and to fundamental values, including democracy, the rule of law and the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms”, as well as to, “market economy, sustainable development and good governance” (council of the european union 2009). however, there is nothing to suggest that this document signifies a stronger commitment on behalf of any of the parties or brings any new conditions to the fore. it can be argued that eap conditionality would have been different from the original if the cooperation incentives were defined to offer significantly more benefits to the partner states. however, the eap repeated the enp in that it created uncertainty as to what is ultimately on offer. in addition, it should be noted that the conditionality principle is applied by the eu selectively and not always consistently. for instance, belarus has benefited little from the enp and the eap due to the stance of the autocratic president lukashenko. no ap has been implemented and negotiations to conclude an association agreement are non-existent. moreover, in march 2012, new sanctions were enforced against belarus in the light of the treatment of political prisoners and repressions of civil society. in addition, all eu ambassadors were withdrawn from the country in early 2012 in response to belarus’s expulsion of the eu and the polish ambassadors (eu observer 2012b). arguably as a result of this pressure, a number of opposition leaders were freed in april 2012. however, others are still imprisoned, which allows president lukashenko to retain a certain level of bargaining power. review of european and russian affairs 7 (1), 2012 12 nevertheless, in the same region the eu willingly cooperates with azerbaijan, where such power asymmetry is not present. although officially azerbaijan is beginning to adopt the values of the eu, in practice the political regime is infamous for its autocratic tendencies. however, this neighbour is too important to ignore regardless of its lack of adherence to eu values. azerbaijan is rich in natural resources and its geographic location has made it an energy corridor for a number of pipelines supplying eu member states. further, the prospect of negotiating an association agreement has been acknowledged at the latest eap summit in 2011. the possibility of concluding association agreements has been reinstated in the eap. however, since this possibility was featured previously, this has not added utility to the existing enp legal framework. instead, it merely confirmed the widely held presumption that the eap will take the form of an association agreement. in addition, the replacement of the outdated pcas did not prove to be a speedy process, as the partner states were required to undertake certain reforms prior to launching the dcfta. currently the relevant negotiations have been finalized only with ukraine, although the ratification of the agreement is barred by major political obstacles as noted earlier. negotiations with the republic of moldova were launched in 2010 with expectations of certain recommendations being adopted before any further progress. negotiations with the south caucasian republics have been delayed since july 2010. the eap has also paved the way for a number of target initiatives to offer possible sectoral arrangements including visa facilitation and readmission agreements, energy partnership or participation in eu programmes and agencies, and common aviation area agreements. in addition, the initiative has proliferated into a number of specific initiatives, including the eap small and medium enterprise facility, euronest parliamentary initiative, among others. it might seem that this multiplication of projects and tasks poses a risk to a common path of comprehensive development. however, such proliferation to a certain extent compensates for the much criticised approach the eu has taken in the past i.e., the rather centralized and top-down pre-accession practice on which the enp was built. it is thus argued that similar to the ufm, the eap failed to compensate for the inconsistencies of the enp, which have found continuity in the eastern dimension of the policy. integrating the neighbourhood: a vision for the future? so, where does the enp stand currently? taking a closer look at the recent enp documents, a number of observations should be made (european commission 2011a). facing the changes and challenges in the neighbourhood, a more enhanced outlook has been envisaged for a closer partnership to build democracy, pursue economic development and manage migration (2011a, 1). although democracy building has always been on the agenda of the enp, it is nevertheless surprising to see this commitment expressed in a language of “the new approach.” this might be viewed as an eu declaration of adherence to its own values, not only for the notice of the neighbours, but also for the sake of its credibility in view of its willingness in the past to cooperate with authoritarian regimes. a similar stance was taken by the european council in march 2012 regarding the role of the eu in “promoting and supporting the democratic transformation in its southern neighbourhood and across the wider middle east and gulf region” (european council 2012). the second objective of closer economic integration is mostly likely to be reciprocated by the neighbours. this perspective seems more realistic in the long term in the east, with the focus of the eap on the conclusion of the dcftas. although the option of establishing dcftas with the review of european and russian affairs 7 (1), 2012 13 “willing and able partners” is envisaged, such discourse is lacking in the south. here it seems the eu will respond to particular areas of concern such as industrial, agricultural, and rural development (european commission 2011a, 8, 16). the security objectives of the enp have not disappeared and are reinforced due to the presence of a number of conflicts in the neighbourhood. migration is a persistent problem stemming from the neighbourhood, which might be argued to be one of the main reasons for increasing efforts to promote economic prosperity in the concerned states. regarding methods of partnership advancement, the commission is still keenly in favour of the promotion of the eu model. however a shift in the position has taken place, as the commission now recognizes that the eu acquis will not be transposed “wholesale.” however, since no better alternative is available, the acquis will remain the main point of reference for future reforms (european commission 2010). the fact that despite the financial crisis, there has been no retraction from reforms, at least in those eastern neighbour states which have embarked on the mission of aligning their policies with those of the eu, is a minor guarantee that the eu model retains certain attraction. conclusion the start of the enp was marred by obvious inconsistencies due to the complexity and multiplicity of the objectives the union tried to achieve. to a certain extent the enp has been reactionary in nature since its foundation. the policy’s reactionary nature has been apparent in the objective of overcoming the post-2004 enlargement challenges in the external front. moreover, the policy was to address different forms of instability at the regional level and enhance the security of the eu, while simultaneously striving for the political and economic transformation of the partner states. the indecisiveness as to which members should be included, what should be on offer and other substantive issues were indicative of the ambiguity surrounding the policy. the mismatch of policy objectives, methodology, and instruments also left an impression of a hasty approach. the methods chosen did not necessarily complement each other and the central principle of conditionality was not well suited for guaranteeing the security of the eu. further, the soft law nature of the main policy instruments did not instigate the commitment required for major political and economic reforms. the enp required a structural and substantive revision to become more focused and perhaps more manageable. the structural revision came in the form of a regional split led by the member states, emphasizing the differences between the two geographical fronts of the policy. however, the newly created multilateral frameworks of cooperation did not entail significant changes in terms of substantive issues, thus it retained the original inconsistencies. although the eu’s commitment to its neighbours has become irrevocable since the inclusion of article 8 in the lisbon treaty, the latter appears to be largely a codification of the enp. in addition, the new institutional arrangements are hoped to create a united front for foreign policy implementation and representation based on common objectives and the principle of consistency. the 2011 joint communication published by the commission and the high representative, serves as a reference point for assessing the most recent development stage of the enp. although the policy was created to emphasize the eu’s commitment towards its neighbourhood and to, reinstate its normative image, its revision was a response to the uprisings in the south. the eu’s traditional tendency to make grand promises continues in this document. in the age of austerity review of european and russian affairs 7 (1), 2012 14 in europe and of the eurozone crisis, the realities and practicalities of offering what cannot be guaranteed should be taken into account. in addition, the middle eastern revolutions have offered a good lesson for the eu to once again rethink its role in international relations and to reconsider the place the enp should occupy in the view of that role. the eu’s legal commitment to the advancement of its values in the neighbourhood and globally, established in the articles 8 and 21 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(c 306). the treaty on european union (teu). march 30, 2010, o.j. (c 83) 13. review of european and russian affairs 7 (1), 2012 18 the treaty on the functioning of the european union (tfeu), march 30, 2010. 2010 o.j. (c 83) 49. treaty establishing a constitution for europe. december 16, 2004. 2004 o.j. (c 310) 47. the european convention, draft treaty establishing a constitution for europe. 2003. conv 850/03 (july 18, 2003). available at http://europeanconvention.eu.int/docs/treaty/cv00850.en03.pdf . trubek, david m., patrick cottrell, and mark nance. 2006. “‘soft law,’ ‘hard law,’ and eu integration.” in law and new governance in the eu and the us, edited by grainne de burca and joanne scott, 65-94. oxford: hart publishing. tulmets, elsa. 2006. “adapting the experience of enlargement to the neighbourhood policy: the enp as a substitute to enlargement?” in the european union and its neighbourhood: policies, problems and priorities, edited by petr kratochvil, 29-57. prague: institute of international relations. van elsuwege, peter, and roman petrov. 2011. “article 8 teu: towards a new generation of agreements with the neighbouring countries of the european union?” european law review 36: 688-703. http://european-convention.eu.int/docs/treaty/cv00850.en03.pdf http://european-convention.eu.int/docs/treaty/cv00850.en03.pdf review of european and russian affairs 7 (1), 2012 19 correct citation: nariné ghazaryan. 2012. “the evolution of the european neighbourhood policy and the consistent evolvement of its inconsistencies”. review of european and russian affairs 7 (1): 1–13. published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada. available online at: www.carleton.ca/rera/ rera is an electronic academic peer-reviewed journal that publishes graduate, post-graduate, and young scholarly works. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is a joint project supported by the canada-europe transatlantic dialogue—a cross-canada research network supported by the social sciences and humanities research council of canada (sshrc)—along with the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies (carleton university) and its associated research unit, the centre for european studies. rera aims to provide an accessible forum for research, to promote high standards of research and scholarship, and to foster communication among young scholars. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada tel: +01 613 520-2600 ext. 1179; e-mail: rera-journal@carleton.ca creative commons license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ this working paper is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial no derivs 3.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 3.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced provided the source is acknowledged. no use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes. issn: 1718-4835 © 2012 the author(s) http://www.carleton.ca/rera/ mailto:rera-journal@carleton.ca review of european and russian affairs 6 (1), 2011 issn 1718-4835 © 2011 the author(s) www.carleton.ca/rera health care crisis and grassroots social initiative in post-soviet russia elena maltseva university of toronto abstract this article analyzes the development of civil society in russia in response to the fledging post-soviet health care crisis. in recent years, russian civil society has become significantly stronger and more actively engaged in public debates on social as well as political issues. this trend suggests that the process of social capital accumulation in russia is well underway, thus instilling some hope for russia’s future. to illustrate this recent trend, i will analyze the development of two grassroots movements in st. petersburg, which help families of children diagnosed with cancer to overcome the everyday psychological, legal and financial difficulties associated with treatment, and to lobby the government to go forward with health care reform. this paper is based on the author's personal experience as a participant in one of the grassroots initiatives, published materials in russian journals and newspapers and a series of interviews with volunteers. with this article, i hope to shed new light on developments in the russian health care sector, and deepen our understanding of contemporary russian civil society. 2 review of european and russian affairs 6 (1), 2011 introduction the collapse of communism generated much interest in the concept of civil society, defined by the center for civil society at the london school of economics as “the arena of un-coerced collective action around shared interests, purposes and values” (quot. in jenei and kuti 2008, 9). civil society was regarded as an important alternative force that limited the overarching power of the state and thus prevented the state from drifting toward authoritarianism. it was argued that during democratisation civil society not only helped restrain the government, but also educated the state authorities about democracy and the rule of law (weigle 2002; taylor 2006). the interest in civil society development was accompanied by increased attention being paid to the development of russia’s non-governmental and voluntary organisations (known as the third sector), and their role in promoting and strengthening democratic civil society in the post-soviet states (mercer 2002). the third sector organisations are rightly viewed as the essential building blocks in the process of civil society development and social capital accumulation. they play an important intermediary role between the state, the market and the people, serving as vehicles for participation and social integration.i given the importance attributed to civil society and the non-governmental sector during democratisation, it was thus natural for political scientists to focus their attention on the development of russian civil society in the aftermath of communism’s disintegration. two major arguments were made. some scholars emphasized the weakness and underdevelopment of russia’s civil society as a result of the soviet legacy and attitudes held over from the communist period (howard 2002). according to this view, a tiny, but growing civil society, which existed in russia before the revolution, was wiped out when the bolsheviks came to power. with the arrival of the soviet regime, the development of an independent civil society in the country became virtually impossible. mass organisations were established; however, their functions and operations were determined by the ruling state ideology and controlled by the state. even though small pockets of opposition to the regime existed, their influence on soviet society as a whole was rather minimal. in the end, these soviet legacies and the negative memories of the russian people about enforced mass participation during the communist regime, as well as growing disappointment with postsoviet realities during the early and mid-1990s, contributed to the fact that civil society in post-soviet russia remained weak and underdeveloped (howard 2002; cook and vinogradova 2006). not only do they deliver various public services, especially in the welfare and educational domains, but they also serve as “bedrocks of social milieus and societal communities and therefore as transmitters of values and norms” (jenei and kuti 2008, 13). in other words, the third sector organisations perform various social, political, educational and integrative functions in democratising societies, offering citizens an opportunity to participate in public life, to monitor and influence the authorities, to advocate on behalf of disadvantaged groups, and to educate the people and the authorities about democracy and the rule of law (jenei and kuti 2008, 10; see also taylor 2006). other scholars, however, held a more optimistic view, stressing the progress made in the development of civil society in russia, yet also acknowledging the presence of several problems faced by russian ngos (weigle 2002; taylor 2006). according to this view, with the arrival of mikhail gorbachev and the subsequent collapse of the soviet union, a new period in civil society development began. starting in the late 80s and early 90s numerous independent political, environmental, educational, religious and social groups and movements were set up. as time passed and the initial democratic euphoria faded, these loose informal groups were replaced with formal non-governmental organisations, whose number has steadily increased. according to the international center for not-for-profit law (icnl), in 2009 there were more than 240,000 ngos operating in russia (‘non-governmental organisations and civil society’). many of these ngos promoted human rights and civil liberties, advocated on behalf of minorities and disadvantaged groups, or provided services to the most vulnerable population groups, including the disabled, chronically-ill, migrants, street children, and others (cook and vinogradova 2006). however, the biggest problem, which complicated the work of these ngos, was associated with their reliance on foreign funding (crotty 2003; cook and vinogradova 2006). as crotty points out, many review of european and russian affairs 6 (1), 2011 3 russian ngos relied on western aid, which offered them an opportunity to become important political actors (2003). at the same time, foreign aid contributed to the growing detachment of western-funded ngos operating in russia from local constituencies (crotty 2003). this undermined public support for the third sector, thus slowing the process of civil society development.ii this trend played into the hands of russian president vladimir putin, who used it as an opportunity to weaken and gain control of russia’s civil society sector. since the passage of the 2006 law on ngos, the development of russian civil society has faced significant challenges, especially western-funded international and russian ngos. the majority of outside observers and civil society activists agreed that the new law drastically limited the ability of ngos to function as independent organisations. in light of these developments, scholars and civil society activists began to speak of a hostile environment for ngos in russia and a significant regression in democratisation (bigg 2005; marinova 2008; human rights watch 2009). however, sharon tennison many russians started viewing these western-funded ngos with great skepticism, accusing them of ignorance and corruption. iii taking this debate and the recent developments in the civil society sector as the starting points for my argument, i assert that, in the last decade, russia’s civil society has grown significantly stronger and more vocal, demonstrating a great potential for social and political mobilisation in the future. dissatisfied with state policies, russian citizens started organising within genuine grassroots movements to address various social issues. the majority of participants in these movements were critical of government actions, but did not regard the state as an enemy. many of these social movements originated online, uniting people of various backgrounds and interests. they have since grown popular and influential, addressing not only social issues but also issues related to the lack of adequate political and social reforms, weak state capacity and corruption in state bureaucracy. defended the law, arguing that “russia’s not-for-profit sector is in serious need of regulation. it still hasn’t developed legal underpinnings to assure transparency of expenditures, operations or founder information all of which are crucial for societal trust and civil society development” (fisher 2006). in her view, there were still many opportunities for independent civic activism (fisher 2006). i will illustrate this broad trend by analyzing the origins and development of two volunteer movements, the ngo advita and a volunteer movement formed on the website of a local parents’ forum in saint-petersburg. the initial goal of these movements was to help the families of children diagnosed with cancer to overcome the everyday psychological, legal and financial difficulties associated with treatment. however, as these movements grew, they could no longer remain apolitical, and began promoting various issues related to health care, calling on people to get involved and demanding health care reform and the passage of effective drug and health care policies. this recent trend is important, as until recently, the role of civil society in the evolution of the russian health care system has been largely insignificant. as diane m. duffy correctly noted, in the 1990s the russian health care system lacked any home-grown voluntary organisations beyond those with international connections, such as the red cross, the cancer society and the heart association (41). according to her observations, voluntary contributions were limited to donations from governmentowned enterprises (duffy 1999, 41-2). this meant that the policy agenda was established at the center, with little involvement of civil society and few feedback mechanisms to accommodate people’s needs and concerns. in this framework, citizens passively accepted the conditions, or used their own personal resources to obtain what they needed. as duffy stated in 1999: “a successful health program needs a civil society that sees health care as valuable, a health system responsive to the public’s needs, and a political system with adequate leadership skills and motivation to develop and implement a realistic national health plan that will achieve the health outcome goals for the nation. as things currently stand in russia, all are underdeveloped” (42). in light of this, the recent mobilisation of russia’s civil society in response to the ongoing health care crisis is a socially and politically important development. it indicates that the process of social capital accumulation in russia is underway, thus instilling some hope for russia’s future. this article proceeds as follows. in the next section i will explain the overall state of the russian health care system with particular emphasis on cancer care. i will then discuss the origins and 4 review of european and russian affairs 6 (1), 2011 development of the civil society organisations working in the field of paediatric oncology in saintpetersburg and elsewhere in russia. soviet and post-soviet health care system in russia: a brief overview to understand the state of health care in contemporary russia, a brief examination of the soviet past is required. the soviet health care system was centralised, hierarchically organised and financed from general government revenues. the soviet government claimed to provide health services free of charge to the whole population, irrespective of social and economic status. in practice, however, payment for health care services and medicines was common. some citizens, including patients with communicable and chronic diseases such as tuberculosis, dysentery, diabetes, cancer, schizophrenia etc., and children under one year of age, were exempt from payment for medicine. others, such as wwii invalids and persons receiving a personal pension, were offered reductions in the cost of prescribed medicines; however, all other patients were expected to pay for medicine (winkelmann et al. 1998, 16). the organisation of the soviet health care system was developed and monitored by the ministry of health, which was responsible for the planning and control of all public health activities including assessing the state of health of the people, setting national health standards, determining population’s need of medical care, medical equipment and pharmaceuticals, and conducting medical research and training (winkelmann et al. 1998, 16). in the soviet union, the first contact for a person with symptoms was the general practitioner in a local polyclinic. if cancer was suspected, the patient was referred to the district hospital for diagnosis, where the district oncologist performed clinical diagnosis of malignant and non-malignant neoplasms, and, if needed, referred the patient to the regional oncological dispensary for specialised diagnosis and treatment (winkelmann et al. 1998, 22). the oncological dispensary was responsible for exact diagnosis and treatment of cancer. each oblast and republic had at least one oncological dispensary, which consisted of an outpatient department and an inpatient facility of some 200-300 beds (winkelmann et al. 1998, 22-3). specialised departments included radiology, chemotherapy, surgery, x-ray, and others. for diagnosis and treatment of difficult tumours, such as a tumour of an eye, patients were referred to specialised institutions at the federal level such as the institute of oncology or to clinics attached to research institutes (winkelmann et al. 1998, 22-3). after treatment, follow-up was provided by the local district hospital outpatient department. in principle, the soviet cancer care system looked quite comprehensive: the vertical system was meant to ensure that everyone, even in remote parts of the soviet union, had access to an oncologist. this, together with a great supply of hospital beds and free medicine provided to cancer patients at the state’s expense, was meant to illustrate the comprehensiveness of the soviet health care system, and cancer care system specifically. in practice, however, the picture looked gloomier. low salaries and absence of incentives, as well as the low quality of free medical services, contributed to the rise of corruption and bribery (ryan 1989, 19-35; winkelmann et al. 1998, 15). in addition, the low quality of pharmaceuticals, insufficient medical equipment and poor maintenance of health care facilities significantly undermined the quality of cancer care in the soviet union. the official cancer statistics were imprecise and never publicly revealed; however, rough estimates showed that in the soviet union the survival rate for children with leukemia or lymphomas did not exceed five to ten percent (artemenko 2006; molchanova and maschan). with the collapse of the soviet union, a period of radical economic and political reforms began. the liberalisation process saw sweeping reforms in the social security, education and health care sectors. health care reform began as early as 1991, when the yeltsin government initiated mandatory and voluntary health insurance programs and introduced a special tax to fund the mandatory component. the compulsory medical insurance covered the essential minimum medical services, while the voluntary portion covered all other expenses (tishchenko and yudin 2008). the government decentralised the health care sector and shifted a large portion of state expenditures to the regional level, including those for paramedics, medication, primary health clinics, hospitals and diagnostic centers (duffy 1999, 28). all review of european and russian affairs 6 (1), 2011 5 other functions such as control of salaries and the responsibility for health promotion and oversight were left within the jurisdiction of the federal ministry of health and social protection. these changes resulted in significant decentralisation of the russian health care system with responsibilities shared between several regional and federal institutions. the reassignment of the financing of health care programs to the regional level contributed to a dramatic decline in their quality. poor regions lacked sufficient financial resources, and were unable to provide an adequate level of health care to its residents. fiscal transfers from the federal government helped little due to their small size and irregularity. as a result, shortages of every kind of resource were dramatic. bed sheets, bandages, food, soap, medicine, and even medical equipment often had to be purchased and delivered to the hospital by the patient or his/her relatives. fundamentally, it meant that the quality of public health care and access to the public health care system were becoming increasingly unequal. the crisis also affected medical personnel. strikes and demonstrations by hungry health care providers were widespread through all of the 1990s (tishchenko and yudin 2008). those who could leave, left the state-run health care sector to set up private medical clinics. dental, gynaecological, eye, beauty and other private clinics sprang up across russia, offering those russian citizens who were in a position to pay for health care services some choice when choosing a health care provider. at the same time, the commercialisation of the russian health care sector contributed to greater stratification of russian society and, inadvertently, lowered standards of medical care in state-run polyclinics and hospitals, as many doctors left for better paid positions in the private sector. in short, the health care reform launched in the context of a deep economic crisis contributed to the worsening of the situation in the state-run health care sector and furthered the commercialisation of health care provision. all these changes had a profound impact on the russian cancer care system. cancer care in russia: institutional structure, trends and problems the collapse of communism, the economic crisis and the subsequent health care reform left a controversial imprint on russia’s cancer care system. on the positive side, closer collaboration with the west allowed russian oncologists to learn from their western colleagues. by following the more effective western chemotherapeutic protocols, russian oncologists were able to improve cancer treatment and hence raise the survival rate for cancer patients to roughly 50 per cent (molchanova and maschan). while better than under communism, these figures nonetheless did not match the effectiveness of cancer treatment for children in the west, where the survival rate usually exceeds 80 per cent (molchanova and maschan). by all other indicators, the situation in fact turned out for the worse. the health care reform launched in 1991 did not alter the old soviet system of cancer care, but added additional problems. already plagued by soviet legacies such as poorly paid medical personnel and low quality pharmaceuticals and health care services, the russian cancer care system was faced with a number of new challenges such as inadequate financing and rapidly deteriorating provision of cancer care. insufficient funding and fiscal decentralisation resulted in shortages of medicine in hospitals, outdated medical equipment, poor maintenance of health care facilities and poor sanitary conditions. regional governments found it extremely difficult to finance and maintain their hospitals and medical facilities, update their medical equipment, and provide hospitals and their populations with free medicines. even hospitals and research institutes funded from the federal budget were in need of renovation and experienced shortages of medicine and medical equipment. finally, the poor organisation of cancer care provision has significantly complicated access to treatment and essential cancer care services for ordinary russians. officially, cancer treatment was included in the compulsory insurance program, which meant that all costs of cancer treatment were to be borne by the state. the reality, however, was different. upon admission to a hospital, a patient and his/her parents usually faced a number of problems, including the catastrophic shortages of state-funded medicines. many chemotherapy medications were simply unavailable in hospitals, thus leaving the russian cancer patients – and in our case, parents of sick 6 review of european and russian affairs 6 (1), 2011 children – no choice but to seek money elsewhere. virtually no oncology center in russia was spared. regional cancer centers as well as such top oncology centers as the russian children’s clinical hospital (rdkb) in moscow, the oncological research institute and the raisa gorbacheva institute for paediatric haematology and transplantology in saint-petersburg faced shortages of required medicines (‘leading russian oncology center faces shortage of medicine’ 2008). as a result, parents and relatives of children were forced to seek funds and buy the required medicines themselves. the situation was so dramatic that in some instances, shortages of medicine or delivery delays forced doctors to appeal to the general public in search of urgent help and financial assistance (‘help us save the children’ 2005). the quality of cancer care was further compromised by the fact that the government did not cover the costs of several additional vitally important drugs such as the drugs required in the preand postchemotherapy periods, including the anti-fungal drugs ampholip, cancidas, and vifend (‘important information about the financing of paediatric medicine in russia’). these medications helped the patients cope with severe infectious complications, which often occurred as a result of low immunity of children after chemotherapy, poor sanitary conditions in many russian cancer centers, or both. of note, most of these hospital infections are fatal if not treated in time, and many of them resist treatment with ordinary drugs, which is why doctors often prescribe children advanced, last-generation antibacterial, antiviral, and especially anti-fungal medicines. these medications are very expensive, and the entire course of treatment with these drugs usually lasts several weeks or even months, forcing families of cancer stricken children to spend many thousands of dollars on these medications.iv the children, whose parents cannot buy these expensive drugs, have to be satisfied with cheaper medicines, officially supplied by the state. the problem is not only that these drugs are extremely toxic and considerably less efficient in fighting complications, but that their supply is also interrupted (‘important information about the financing of paediatric medicine in russia’). in such cases, the parents must pay for these drugs themselves, and it often turns out that they cannot raise even these smaller sums. the situation is further complicated by the fact that the government does not cover the costs of some important diagnostic and auxiliary procedures such as magnetic resonance imaging (mri) and computerised axial tomography (ct) scans, some laboratory tests, etc. necessary for the successful treatment of the disease (‘important information about the financing of paediatric medicine in russia’). the costs of these procedures are usually borne by the families. finally, due to a chronic shortage of blood in russian hospitals, relatives of patients are forced to buy blood in other hospitals and/or seek blood donors, often offering them additional payment on top of that paid by the state. in some cases, the medical staff have no alternative but to give their own blood to patients (arkus 2005). the situation of families whose children are referred to national cancer care centers in moscow or saint-petersburg because of the complexity and aggressiveness of their disease is even more alarming. in such families, mothers usually leave their jobs and relocate with their children. as for the fathers, many cannot bear the difficulties and break down, often leaving their families. even those who make a concerted effort to secure the necessary funds seldom succeed if the family comes from a poor region. quite often these families sell their apartments or houses to cover the costs of expensive drugs or treatments such as bone marrow transplantation. during the months-long stay at the hospital, these families exhaust their means to such an extent that even buying food and clothes becomes a real problem. with shortages of medicines common even in top cancer centers, these families usually require financial assistance. for many children with complex and aggressive forms of leukemia, lymphoma, etc., the only hope for survival is bone marrow transplantation (bmt). exact data on the number of patients, children in particular, requiring bone marrow transplants in russia on an annual basis are hard to obtain. estimates vary, with advita fund usa suggesting that there are about 7,500 patients in russia who need bone marrow transplantations every year (‘why do bone marrow transplant patients need your help?’). according to the russian news channel “russia today,” each year there are at least 1500 russian children who need bone marrow transplants (‘russia’s cancer children struggle for much-needed treatment’). what these numbers indicate is that, even in the most optimistic scenario, each year there are up to two thousand russian children requiring bone marrow transplants. these numbers do not include review of european and russian affairs 6 (1), 2011 7 patients from post-soviet republics, who, due to the lack of qualified doctors and medical equipment in their home countries, are forced to seek help abroad, primarily in russia. there are, however, only four major bone marrow transplantation centers located in moscow and saint-petersburg which accept patients from all of russia and abroad. together, these four centers have the capacity to perform up to 400 transplantations per year (‘why do bone marrow transplant patients need your help?’). other haematological centers exist in novosibirsk and yekaterinburg, but they offer only autologous transplantations.v the approximate total cost of each transplantation conducted in russia is $60,000-80,000, with the russian government covering only part of the sum. among the costs not covered by the russian state are for example the search and delivery of bone marrow donations to russia. problematic is that only about 20 percent of children with cancer in russia have suitable donors of bone marrow among parents or siblings, meaning that the majority of children must have transplantations from unrelated donors, usually found in a marrow donor registry according to immunological compatibility of tissues (arkus 2005). but russia has no marrow donor bank of its own, which means that the search for an unrelated donor must be performed in foreign registries, such as that of stefan morsch stiftung in germany. the cost of a donor search in such a registry is about 15,000-17,000 euro (arkus 2005). as mentioned, this money is not granted by the state and must be donated by private sponsors. lengthy waiting lists mean that it often takes months before transplantation to one or another patient can be made, but bmt must often be performed quickly and without delay if the disease is especially aggressive and there is a danger of relapse. there have been several tragic cases of russian children dying while waiting for the transplantation, even though a donor had already been found and funds, with the help of private sponsors, had been raised (‘important information about the financing of paediatric medicine in russia’). the issue has been red-flagged by civil society organisations in moscow and saint-petersburg, which have set up a number of autonomous bone marrow registries in russia (arkus 2005). however, as professor fregatova states: all these databases are not connected to each other. and thus, we cannot speak about having a viable organisation. a bone marrow register is, in the first place, an organisation operating according to specific legal rules and procedures. in russia, none of the problems associated with such transplantations has been addressed so far. donors don’t have a legal opportunity to insure their lives or be paid for their service. transportation of transplant material across the russian border is equally a grey and legally unregulated area (arkus 2005). in contrast to other countries, where all aspects of bone marrow transplantation are regulated and financed by the state, in russia the role of the state in solving these problems is minimal. some russian patients with cancer need treatment abroad, due mainly either to unique treatment procedures that are already used in foreign hospitals but not yet available in russia, or simply the shortage of hospital beds in russian cancer centers. in such situations, the only way to better a child’s chance for survival is to send him or her abroad for the transplantation, which obviously raises the cost of treatment. a bone marrow transplantation in israel, which is one of the most affordable options, costs over $100,000 for each patient (‘important information about the financing of paediatric medicine in russia’). the russian ministry of public health usually provides two-thirds of the required sum if the child falls within the so-called quota for life-saving treatment abroad, but one-third must be raised by the patient’s family. in other cases, the child’s family must raise the whole sum. without private sponsorship, it is usually impossible. in short, the provision of effective cancer treatment in russia is complicated due to several problems that have, for decades, affected the existing cancer care system. first, there is a pressing shortage of hospital beds in russia’s cancer centers, especially for transplants. as well, the majority of the existing cancer centers are in need of regular maintenance and new medical equipment. second, the legal base of the existing cancer care system does not accommodate the needs of cancer patients. in particular, there is an urgent need to update the existing list of state-funded medicines with new, vital 8 review of european and russian affairs 6 (1), 2011 medications, without which the successful treatment of cancer is virtually impossible. further, the government should increase the number of state quotas issued for treatment of cancer patients and simplify the application process for receiving a state quota. it should also raise the nominal value of such quotas to cover the expenses associated with cancer treatment, including bone marrow transplantations. likewise, the russian government should invest in creating a national register of bone marrow donors and formulate a clear legal base, which would regulate the search and transport of bone marrow transplants as well as address and protect the interests of donors and recipients. finally, there is the issue of terminally ill patients. russian law does not contain any reference to providing adequate palliative care to such patients, and the russian health care system is lacking in medical personal qualified to treat such patients: currently, russia has no stationary paediatric hospices for cancer patients. while mobile paediatric hospices exist, the range of their medical services is limited as their personnel often lacks professional training in palliative care and are unauthorised to prescribe narcotic painkillers to such patients. as a result, parents of terminally ill children are often forced to buy narcotics from illicit sources. to address these problems, many russian citizens have joined grassroots movements. in the beginning, the majority of these civic movements did not have any political influence or access to any regular funding, relying instead on individual donations from ordinary citizens. however, as these movements grew, their financial situation improved. moreover, their growing popularity has allowed them to address the problem at the national level, thus spreading public awareness and pressuring the government to respond. arguably, with the growth of the internet and other communication technologies, the popularity of such movements will only increase. in my opinion, the development of such grassroots movements is one of the key preconditions for the emergence of a strong civil society and further democratisation and liberalisation in russia. i will illustrate this trend by discussing two volunteer movements in saint-petersburg, and proceed to situate this trend within the broader russian context. accumulation of social capital and the birth of genuine civil society in russia among the first movements supporting families of children with cancer in saint-petersburg was a local movement advita, started by a software engineer who lost a friend to cancer, and a group of russian oncologists from saint-petersburg. advita was registered as a charity in 2002. advita sees its mission as assisting families affected by cancer to bear the costs of treatment, to raise funds for the procurement of medicines and medical equipment, and to provide families and patients with legal, psychological and social help during preand post-operative periods. advita’s ultimate goal is to reduce the mortality rate among russian citizens suffering from various types of cancer and blood disorders, to draw public attention to the necessity of developing a russian bone marrow registry, and to enhance the qualifications and practical experience of russian haematologists, oncologists and transplantologists (advita, http://advita.org/en/f_ustav.php). advita’s staff consists of only five permanent employees, who are responsible for running the 24/7 blood donor call center and for some basic administrative work. the majority of advita members are unpaid volunteers. currently, advita has between 100 and 150 permanent volunteers (tikhomirova 2010; elena gracheva, pers. comm.). the volunteers come from a wide variety of social backgrounds and an extensive age range. they include men and women, young and old, rich and poor, and people from different professions and of different nationalities (elena gracheva, pers. comm.). some of these volunteers are responsible for maintaining and updating the advita website, posting updates on internet-based social networks, communicating with the media, advocating for blood donations, and organising various social events aimed at raising funds and public awareness of the problems faced by cancer patients. other volunteers are assisting the families of sick children by playing with children, helping families purchase food and clothes, searching for required medications, and assisting in dealing with the bureaucracy of various health care departments. these are the people who assist families in overcoming their everyday social, bureaucratic, psychological and financial problems (tikhomirova 2010; elena gracheva, pers. comm.). http://advita.org/en/f_ustav.php� review of european and russian affairs 6 (1), 2011 9 one should also mention the thousands of donors who donate money and blood, viewing it as their civic duty. according to elena gracheva, an active advita volunteer and coordinator, the majority of donors are from poor and low middle income families – students, pensioners, women and disabled people regularly donate between 100 and 500 rubles (elena gracheva, pers. comm.). it is they who allow advita to buy medicine, food and rent housing for the patients and their families. however, gracheva also notes that during the last few years, more people from other societal groups have become interested in volunteer work and in giving donations. engineers, lawyers, journalists and businessmen contact gracheva and tell her that they want to participate (elena gracheva, pers. comm.). a particularly interesting group of people actively participating in advita’s work are russianspeaking volunteers living abroad.vi as the number of volunteers grew, advita’s popularity increased. this new popularity also led to a growth in their database of sick children. as more families from all over russia began contacting advita with their concerns, desperation among volunteers grew. a realisation was growing that only fundamental changes to the overall system of cancer care provision could alleviate this health care crisis. in response to their growing popularity, some advita volunteers switched from aid provision to advocacy-related activity. in cooperation with other volunteer movements, advita made an attempt to highlight various issues related to cancer care in newspapers, on television and in their conversations with regional and federal authorities, pushing for changes to current legislation regulating cancer care and drug policies. the work of advita and several other ngos working in this field was noticed by the government. this resulted in a series of meetings and roundtables with state authorities on issues related to cancer care in russia. these people are usually responsible for translating russian texts into english, german, and french, and maintaining the foreign versions of the main website. these volunteers assist patients and their families when they arrive for treatment in germany, israel, the us and other countries. it is these volunteers who buy medicine at lower prices abroad, arrange for its transportation to russia and donate thousands of dollars annually. in february 2009, advita, podari zhizn’ (grant life) and several other ngos met to discuss the most urgent problems and possible solutions in the field of cancer care in russia ‘v moskve obsudiat’; ‘osnovnye problemy detskoi onkologii’). also in attendance were representatives from the ministry of health and social protection of the russian federation. three main topics were addressed at the meeting. first, civil society activists discussed the existing quota system regulating the provision of cancer care in the top oncology centers. the volunteers emphasised the ineffectiveness of this system, which offered the regional health departments and the republican ministries of health relative freedom in determining and requesting the required number of quotas from the ministry of health and social protection. the result of this system was that children from dozens of regions could not receive chemotherapy and bone marrow transplantation in time, because their regions did not apply for (or receive) a sufficient number of quotas. waiting lists for receiving quotas (and hence, treatment) were frighteningly long, leaving parents no choice but to look for alternative places for treatment, usually abroad. in light of this situation, the russian ministry of health and social protection was asked to review and improve the existing system of quotas and to better equip the regional cancer centers, so as to minimise the number of patients having to travel to saint-petersburg or moscow (‘osnovnye problemy detskoi onkologii’). the second issue discussed at the meeting was the problem of what are known as orphan drugs. vii the third problem discussed at the meeting was related to the issue of palliative care. russia does not have a system of paediatric palliative care to assist children who are in the terminal stages of cancer. such children are most often discharged from cancer centers and sent home, where their parents face the as mentioned earlier, there are a number of vitally important drugs that are prescribed by oncologists, even though the drugs are not registered in russia. in the majority of cases, such drugs are taken into the country illegally with the help of volunteers, friends and relatives living abroad. abandoned by the state, people collect money, seek opportunities to buy drugs at cheaper prices, and look for people willing to smuggle these drugs into the country. ngos called on the ministry of health and social protection to pass changes to the current legislation, introducing the concept of orphan drugs and formally regulating their transportation and distribution in the russian federation (‘osnovnye problemy detskoi onkologii’). 10 review of european and russian affairs 6 (1), 2011 horrible reality of not being able to provide adequate palliative care (‘osnovnye problemy detskoi onkologii’). the russian volunteers called on the russian authorities to address this issue and to change current legislation. the dialogue between the third sector and the government looked quite promising; however, solving these problems turned out to be an extremely complicated and exhausting process. many civil society organisations are jointly lobbying the regional and federal authorities to change the legislation regulating palliative care and circulation of narcotic-containing drugs in russia.viii with regards to orphan drugs, little progress has been made. however, civic groups continue to lobby the government in the hope that changes to the recently passed legislation will be made. during preparation of the pharmaceutical market bill in 2009, several russian ngos including advita appealed to the government to make provisions for orphan drugs in terms of introducing a financing, licensing, and procurement mechanism (sesay 2010). thousands signed the petition (“pod obrachsheniem za legalizatsiiu”). nonetheless, the bill, passed on 31 march 2010, did not contain any mention of orphan drugs, even though some minor changes were made. for example, the new bill simplified the import of drugs not licensed in russia. russian patients and their relatives no longer need to secure special permission to import the drugs into russia. instead, the buyer will receive an electronic document containing a digital signature, allowing him/her to import the drug. finally, all drugs imported to russia for personal use will be cleared within five days. however, the bill failed to address major issues such as financing. civil society groups reacted by organising and drafting another petition, this time addressed to the president of the russian federation dmitrii medvedev, requesting the legalisation of orphan drugs and simplification of their registration and transportation. more than 50 ngos and grassroots movements called on the president to amend the bill (‘obrachshenie k prezidentu’; telegina and rudnitskaia 2010). the difficulty in modifying the existing system of palliative care stems from an overlap in russian legislation regulating the circulation of narcotic drugs. whereas the ministry of health and social protection allows the prescribing of narcotic-containing drugs in palliative care, a federal law regulating their use in the russian federation grants the authority to issue such prescriptions only to those hospitals and clinics which meet the prescribed security requirements (i.e. walls should be of particular thickness, windows should be grilled, etc.). in an effort to resolve this problem, the ngos proposed selecting a number of polyclinics that satisfy the prescribed security requirements imposed by the government. these polyclinics could receive the authorisation to issue prescriptions for narcotic-containing drugs to all patients from a particular region. these polyclinics would also have their own emergency ambulances (‘saint-petersburg. kruglyi stol’). a concrete example of such a polyclinic is the ongoing construction of the first children’s hospice in saint-petersburg, with advita volunteers overseeing the process and reporting on it to the broader community (‘detskii khospis. dolzhen byt’’). it is no exaggeration to state that these activities would not be possible without the help of the internet. the role of the internet in the development of russian civil society is indisputable in that it offered people the chance to find and participate in communities of interest, thus empowering the masses and strengthening the bonds of the civic community. this is evident in my next example discussing the origins and evolution of one local internet forum in saint-petersburg. the website littleone.ru was developed by one young mother from saint-petersburg in 2000. interested in communicating with other young parents, she created a website where she could meet other mothers and discuss issues related to children and family. being the first such family-oriented website in saint-petersburg, littleone.ru quickly became popular (‘vtoroi rebenok’). here the first local help forum was created, where people could volunteer and join various grassroots initiatives. as the number of topics grew, volunteers organised into groups that addressed various themes, including orphaned children, abandoned elderly citizens, oncology patients, etc. often, citizens participated in several groups, spending time with orphans in orphanages or pensioners in retirement homes. some topics on the forum list were temporary and appeared in response to some tragic events and situations, such as the 2004 beslan tragedy, after which many saint-petersburg residents invited children and their parents from north ossetia to visit saint-petersburg. other topics such as “cancer center of the 31st city hospital” became permanent, with review of european and russian affairs 6 (1), 2011 11 thousands of people contributing their time, money and energy to assist children and their families during a difficult period in their lives (‘detskoe otdelenie 31-oi gb’). in short, having started as two small grassroots movements, advita and littleone.ru have developed into powerful voices, capable of raising social issues at the regional and federal levels. they are not alone in their work. several other ngos and voluntary movements are working in the same field and collaborating with each other on various issues related to cancer care. for example, in saintpetersburg, the oldest ngo assisting cancer patients is the regional non-governmental organisation children and parents against cancer, which was created in 1998 (children and parents against cancer, http://www.capac.ru/index_e.htm). since its inception, the organisation has evolved into one of the most influential voices for the rights of sick children in russia. likewise, in moscow, volunteer movements including donors for kids, happy world, nastenka fund, they believe, podari zhizn’ and many others have emerged over the past ten years.ix to raise public awareness of the problem, many ngos and voluntary movements draw on support of russian celebrities. an example is the case of respected actress, chulpan khamatova (krasnopolska 2009). khamatova became involved in charity work several years ago when the deputy director of the top oncology center in moscow appealed to her for help, which is how podari zhizn’, a foundation to help children with cancer and other life-threatening illnesses, came into being. today podari zhizn’ is one of russia’s most successful fundraising organisations, raising nearly 7 million dollars annually, the bulk of which comes from individuals (krasnopolska 2009). soon after, a wave of civic activism swept across russian cities, from which hundreds of civic initiative groups emerged.x the majority of these grassroots initiatives were aimed at solving various social problems that the country faced, including the plight of russia’s disabled and chronically-ill people, the elderly, homeless, and orphaned and/or abandoned children. some grassroots initiatives grew into national civic movements, with multiple branches in several russian regions. one of these grassroots movements, which quickly became popular throughout russia, was the movement starost’ v radost’ [the joy of aging], founded by one young student from moscow (starost’ v radost’). having started as a tiny civic initiative to help the elderly in russia’s seniors’ homes, the movement quickly attracted many volunteers throughout russia. it now patronises more than 50 seniors’ homes in eleven russian regions (starost’ v radost’). another notable example includes the all-russian charity fund known as spravedlivaia pomochsh [just help] set up by a russian doctor elizaveta glinka or the national movement otkazniki [the abandoned], which helps russia’s orphans (‘elizaveta glinka. biograficheskaia spravka’; otkazniki.ru). with time, cooperation among ngos and volunteer movements increased. websites emerged which collected and organised information about volunteer movements and ngos working on specific issues across russia and other post-soviet republics.xi the outlook is quite promising: the work of the volunteers has inspired many ordinary people; russians continue to join volunteer movements in growing numbers. among the most recent events, which drew thousands of volunteers throughout the country, were the summer fires in central russia. most of the volunteers were young urban dwellers driven by a genuine desire to help (smirnov 2010; faustova 2010; baskakova 2010). arguably, this trend illustrates the progress in the process of civil society development and social capital accumulation in russia, which are indispensable components for successful re-democratisation and democratic consolidation. concluding remarks on the prospects of civil society development in russia the importance of civic engagement and volunteerism in a democracy has been acknowledged by a number of authors (almond and verba 1989; putnam 1993). putnam, for example, argued that successful democratic government was only possible in societies marked by the active participation of its citizens in public affairs (putnam 1993, 87). in such societies, a civic equilibrium was attainable in which “social trust, norms of reciprocity, networks of civic engagement, and successful cooperation [were] mutually reinforcing”, thus raising the quality of democratic performance altogether (putnam 1993, 180). in other words, putnam suggested that the quality of democratic performance was positively related to the quantity http://www.capac.ru/index_e.htm� 12 review of european and russian affairs 6 (1), 2011 of social capital accumulated by members of a civic community over a substantial number of years (putnam 1993). agreeing with putnam on the importance of civic engagement and voluntarism in a democracy, this article demonstrated that even though russia started its post-soviet history as a country with relatively weak civil society, it is currently showing some signs of civic revival. what is interesting is that this burst of civic activism occurred in a political environment unfavourable to the development of an independent civil society. critical of government actions, the russian people started organising in various volunteer movements to address russia’s social and health care problems. this rapidly spreading mass grassroots activity suggests that the process of social capital accumulation and civil society development in russia is underway, thus instilling some hope in russia’s future. even though the current level of civic engagement in russia is still small-scale compared to the western world, the recent trend suggests that civic activism and volunteer work are becoming more and more popular in russia, even in remote parts of russia such as the altai region. the work of these volunteers inspires others. it motivates people to join or start various grassroots initiatives in their communities. moreover, it forces the government to react to societal pressure, and collaborate with various grassroots movements in an attempt to solve russia’s urgent social problems. as of now, there are no signs that the process of civic mobilisation in russia will slow down, thus allowing me to speak positively about russia’s future. notes i claire mercer (2002) provides a succinct overview of the literature on ngos, civil society and democratisation. ii this situation is not uniquely post-soviet. according to mercer (2002), the difficulties faced by the ngos in latin american, asian or african countries were the consequence of their reliance on foreign funding and, as a result, their growing detachment from local communities. iii sharon tennison is the head of a moscow-based ngo, the centre for citizen initiatives. iv for example, an average price of one pack containing 14 capsules of vifend, a vital anti-fungal drug, is over $1000 per pack; a vial of ampholip costs more than $200; and a cost of one vial of cancidas amounts to $600. refer to the donors-for-kids group, ‘important information about the financing of pediatric medicine in russia’. v in an autologous stem cell transplant, stem cells from the patient’s own marrow are “harvested”, stored and then returned to the body (engrafted) after the patient receives high doses of chemotherapy and/or radiotherapy conditioning therapy. lymphomation.org, http://www.lymphomation.org/bmt-auto.htm vi read, for example, the stories of the volunteers at advita fund usa, ‘who we are’, http://www.advitausa.org/?page_id=345 , (last access: 13 january 2011). vii an orphan drug is a drug that is used to treat a rare disease that affects only a limited number of people. to date, the orphan drug legislation has been successfully developed in many developed countries, with russia lagging behind. viii review, for example, ‘fond advita napravila predlozheniia glavnomu onkologu’, ‘detskii khospis. dolzhen byt’’, ‘neizlechimo bol’nye deti zhdut otkrytiia khospisa i pomochshi metsenatov’, ‘saintpetersburg. kruglyi stol ‘khospisy peterburga’.’ ix there are several organisations active in the field of children oncology. to name a few, review the websites of the following organisations: donors-for-kids group, happy world, they believe, podari zhizn’, nastenka fund. x a list of selected volunteer movements and ngos can be found at vsem mirom, http://www.vsemmirom.narod.ru/together/orgki2.htm. xi see, for example, the websites of the volunteer movements blago and vse vmeste. http://www.lymphomation.org/bmt-auto.htm� http://www.advitausa.org/?page_id=345� http://www.vsem-mirom.narod.ru/together/orgki2.htm� http://www.vsem-mirom.narod.ru/together/orgki2.htm� review of european and russian affairs 6 (1), 2011 13 references advita, home page. accessed on january 10, 2011. http://www.advita.ru advita fund usa, home page. accessed on january 11, 2011. http://www.advitausa.org/ arkus, l. 2005. “esli ne my, to kto?” [if not us, then who?] seans (23/24). accessed on january 15, 2011. http://seance.ru/n/23-24/ne-o-kino/arkus-blago/ artemenko, g. 2006. “detskii rak – ne fatal’nyi prigovor. esli my vmeste budem spasat’ nashikh detei!” [pediatric cancer is not a lethal verdict. if we fight it together!] rosbalt (february 20). accessed on january 15, 2011. 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skill (april 20). accessed on january 15, 2011. http://www.zpujournal.ru/en/articles/detail.php?id=329 “v moskve obsudiat samye ostrye problemy detskoi onkologii v rossii.” [the most urgent problems in pediatric oncology will be discussed in moscow]. 2009. farmanalitik (february 9). accessed on january 15, 2011. http://fbr.info/content/view/714947/138/ vsem mirom, home page. accessed on january 15, 2011. http://www.vsem-mirom.narod.ru/together/orgki2.htm vse vmeste, home page. accessed on january 15, 2011. http://www.wse-wmeste.ru/link/ “vtoroi rebenok” [the second child]. nashi dengi [our money] saint-petersburg 27. accessed on january 16, 2011 through factiva. weigle, m.a. 2002. “on the road to the civic forum: state and civil society from yeltsin to putin.” demokratizatsiya 10 (2): 117-46. winkelmann, r.a., et al. 1998. “cancer registration techniques in the new independent states of the former soviet union.” lyon: iarc technical report 35. http://www.rosbalt.ru/2008/10/09/530446.html� http://rus.ruvr.ru/2010/09/29/22969745.html� http://starikam.ru/� http://www.rusrep.ru/2010/11/news_medicina/� http://www.theybelieve.org/� http://www.fontanka.ru/2010/05/03/015/� http://www.zpu-journal.ru/en/articles/detail.php?id=329� http://www.zpu-journal.ru/en/articles/detail.php?id=329� http://fbr.info/content/view/714947/138/� http://www.vsem-mirom.narod.ru/together/orgki2.htm� http://www.wse-wmeste.ru/link/� review of european and russian affairs 6 (1), 2011 issn 1718-4835 © 2011 the author(s) www.carleton.ca/rera cooperation and isolation: understanding eu-russia dialogue anastasia chebakova university of victoria abstract the promising agenda of eu-russia cooperation has resulted in mutual frustration manifested in continuous, paradoxical crises and isolation between the partners. this article offers a possible way to reflect on an uneasy eu-russia relationship. in this study, i make problems in eu-russia cooperation discursively visible by scrutinizing the official speech acts articulated in eu-russia political and security discourse. i demonstrate that these official speech acts create conditions for a responsive dialogue and, eventually, form a set of prevalent discursive practices that re-produce and reinforce problems in eu-russia cooperation. blending bakhtin‟s dialogic analysis and onuf‟s constructivist accounts, i strike a balance between theoretical and empirical analyses and develop a model for understanding current and possible future events in the eu-russia partnership. this model of international cooperation can be transferable beyond its borders to similar examples of relationships currently existing all over the world. review of european and russian affairs 6 (1), 2011 17 introduction * it is entirely your phrase, and not mine. your own, and not just the sequel of our conversation. “our” conversation didn’t take place at all… shatov in dostoyevsky‟s “the devils” (the possessed) (dostoyevsky and magarshack 1971, 253). in less than two decades, the relationship between the european union (eu) and russia has been transformed from exclusively bilateral relationships between individual european states and the soviet union to a new political reality: an officially declared partnership between the eu and russia – inconceivable during the cold war period. however, scholarly analysis and conference reports, official statements and public opinion polls demonstrate that eu-russia relations “are still in a state of protracted crisis” (report by the committee “rossiia v ob”edinennoi evrope” (russia in the united europe) 2005): legacies of the cold war era and mistrust between the partners endure, ambiguity of common strategic goals are resurfacing and economic asymmetry continues to exist (aleseeva 2007; arbatova 2006, 2008; debardeleben 2008; medvedev 2008; report by the committee “rossiia v ob‟edinennoi evrope” 2005). a promising agenda of cooperation has tended to result in mutual frustration manifested in continuous, paradoxical crises and isolation between the partners. this study offers one possible way of reflecting on an uneasy eu-russia relationship. i make problems in eu-russia cooperation discursively visible by looking at the eu-russia political and security dialogue and exploring the following question: what do the official standpoints articulated in the eurussia political and security dialogue demonstrate to us about cooperation between the eu and russia? official standpoints are political statements employed by both the eu and russia to indicate their strategic choices and articulate their views about cooperation. i demonstrate that these political statements, or “speech acts” (searle 1969; bakhtin 1986; onuf 1989) create conditions for a responsive dialogue and, eventually, form a set of prevalent “discursive practices” (reiss 1982, 11) that re-produce and reinforce certain modes of thinking in eu-russia political and security discourse. in this study, i seek to understand what lies behind the discourse by scrutinizing the interplay of its main components and placing them in the specific context of eu-russia cooperation. in order to do so, interpretive methodology with textual analysis of political discourse is employed in the study. first, i discuss the theoretical framework chosen in this study in order to reflect upon eu-russia dialogue in the political and security sphere. second, i examine selected speech acts and draw a picture of what is produced during the eu-russia political and security dialogue. in conclusion, i address the paradox of isolation in eu-russia cooperation and draw implications for future research. theorizing eu-russia dialogue this study employs a constructivist theoretical perspective as an analytical tool to explore the problems in eu-russia cooperation. despite the existence of a considerable body of literature (in both english and russian) on eu-russia cooperation, the scholars in the area of european and russian studies have not investigated sufficiently the connection between political dialogue and re-occurring problems in eurussia cooperation. moreover, neither western nor russian scholars make an effort to challenge the assumptions of the mainstream paradigms – “neorealism” and “neoliberalism” – and, therefore, only see eu-russia cooperation through those conceptual lenses (prozorov 2006, 2009; medvedev 2008; allison et al. 2006). therefore, given the almost non-existent constructivist agenda in the area of eu-russia * author acknowledgements: i would like to thank dr. nicholas onuf for his much-needed advices and encouragement with regard to publication. i thank dr. amy verdun for her generous support, as well as dr. clair cutler, dr. joan debardeleben and dr. franz kernic for their suggestions and comments. i owe my gratitude to dr. william doll and dr. donna trueit who contributed tremendously to the development of this study. 18 review of european and russian affairs 6 (1), 2011 studies such as agenda can enhance current academic debates by presenting a different view regarding the reasons for growing tensions between the eu and russia. this study applies the theoretical assumptions of one constructivist author, instead of trying to generate one more interpretation of “true” constructivism and to test its applicability by fitting the hypothetical reality of eu–russia relations into the supposedly constructivist accounts. it would not be fair to simplify the arguments and assertions of many constructivists and place them under one monolithic theoretical umbrella constructivism in ir. i wendt (1992), kratochwil (1989), onuf (1989), or ruggie (1998) – all played a role in the making of constructivism in the sphere of international relations. therefore, it would be more rewarding to consider their arguments in detail instead of making judgements about applicability or inapplicability, “betterness” or “worseness” of one, single constructivist perspective. in this vein, i employ the constructivist approach and the speech act theory offered by nicholas onuf (1989) ii with the goal of revealing a connection between the official speech acts and reoccurring crises in the eu-russia relationship. while conceiving of eu-russia cooperation through a constructivist lens, i simultaneously leave space for novelty in my conceptualization, which is informed but not driven by constructivism. in his understanding of social and political realities, onuf is concerned with rules that “tell us how to carry on . . . in a socially constructed world” (onuf 1989, 51). people, as well as social constructs such as states, become agents in society through rules. rules define agents in terms of structure, and structures in terms of agents (onuf 1998, 64). moreover, agents act within an institutional and social context, but at the same time they act in this context through deeds. for onuf, “constructivism begins with deeds” (onuf 1989, 36). they may consist of words or physical actions (onuf 1989, 36). deeds make the world, provide interaction between agents and contribute to the mutual constitution between agents and structure. a speech act as a deed is the “act of speaking in a form that gets someone else to act” (onuf 1998, 66). therefore, for onuf, “the point of a speech act is to have an effect on some state of affairs” (onuf 1998, 98). for onuf, language in a speech act becomes representative and performative: it can be used to perform deeds constituting a social reality and its rules (onuf 1989, 82). consequently, an agent can “make” the world not only through its physical actions but also through its speech acts. “the speaking of language is a part of an activity, or of a form of life” (wittgenstein 1968, par. 23 in onuf 1989, 44). consequently, onuf‟s speech acts (onuf 1998, 66) follow the pattern: “i (you, etc.) hereby assert (demand, promise) to anyone hearing me that some state of affairs exists or can be achieved.” onuf‟s pattern simultaneously leads in two directions: first, the message sent by the agent needs to be heard by the receiver. as a confirmation, the receiver needs to produce a response back to the agent. otherwise, any effect of a speech act is questionable. second, in order to be understood, a speech act needs to be situated in a specific context. onuf contends that observers can never step outside of the world of constructions: “we can represent the world, including our place in it, through language” (onuf 1989, 43). however, we “are always within our constructions, even as we choose to stand apart from them, condemn them, reconstruct them” (onuf 1989, 43). in the textual analysis introduced in section two, i refer to the classification of speech acts offered by onuf. according to onuf‟s classification (onuf 1989, 87) assertives are “speech acts stating a belief . . . with the intention] that the hearer accepts this belief”; directives contain an action the speaker wishes the hearer to perform (regulative intent); and commissives consist of the declaration of the speaker‟s commitment to a stated course of action. therefore, commissives produce rules for the speaker, whereas assertives and directives try to impose rules on the hearer (onuf 1989, 87–88). in essence, all three are proactive elements of a speech act. as described above, onuf emphasizes the dynamics of discourse, as well as the necessity to explain the performative and transformative impact of language in this discourse. in addition to onuf, dialogic analysis, as a unique analytical concept introduced by mikhail bakhtin (1979), offers a fruitful conceptual and methodological insight to this study. bakhtin‟s analysis (bakhtin 1979, 275) pays attention to responsiveness (“obraschennost”, “adresovannost”, “translation mine”) in a speech act: the author does not isolate one speaker from the other; instead, he looks at the responsive logic, at reactions review of european and russian affairs 6 (1), 2011 19 reflected in the speech acts within one dialogue and, in the case of eu-russia dialogue, recorded in the official texts. he emphasizes the necessity to talk with someone versus to talk to someone: “he [the main hero] talked with the world, not to the world” (bakhtin 1979, 275, “translation mine”). hence, text can be understood as part of a conversation that reflects dialogic relations (“dialogicheskie otnosheniia”, “translation mine”) (bakhtin 1979, 292, 304), in the case of eu-russia dialogue, the text of political statements reflects how the partners collaborate. therefore, bakhtin‟s dialogic analysis gives an opportunity to see the relationship that emerges in eu-russia discourse instead of analyzing the eu‟s and russia‟s speech acts as mechanical statements articulated by partners separately from each other. “utterance implies others talking” (bakhtin 1979, 250, “translation mine”): from the very beginning it is constructed in consideration of a response; it is “deeply dialogic” (bakhtin 1979, 275, “translation mine”). the sender enters into the relationship with the receiver while producing its utterance. therefore, the process of creating and sending the message is not only proactive, but also reactive in its character. the reactive feature of bakhtin‟s utterances does not automatically mean that they lose proactive characteristics described by onuf; instead, speech acts continue to proactively affect a specific situation, simultaneously having a reactive effect, as contended by bakhtin. onuf emphasizes a social action, bakhtin a social interaction in the process of communication. the defining principle of bakhtin‟s dialogism (dialogichnost”, dialogicheskaia aktivnost”) is a dialogic interaction (dialogicheskoe obscheniie, “translation mine”) (bakhtin 1979, 80) with the addressee versus the influence on the receiver of a message. thinking in both bakhtin‟s and onuf‟s terms, eu-russia discourse is a “social phenomenon” (bakhtin 1982, 259; onuf 1989, 31); each political statement in this discourse represents a complete utterance the unit of analysis in eu-russia dialogue with a specific goal in a particular sphere of communication. however, for bakhtin, “it has a meaning, which requires a responsive understanding” (bakhtin 1979, 305, “translation mine”). to continue bakhtin‟s logic, eu-russia cooperation presents “the mutual interaction” (bakhtin 1982, 4) of two voices recorded in the texts of official documents. each official document in eu-russia cooperation is not a monologue; rather, it is a part and a result of eurussia dialogue. textual analysis of these documents helps us understand dialogic relations between the eu and russia, in particular, information the partners send in their messages to each other and their view about each other and about cooperation. as a result, blending the explanatory power of onuf‟s constructivism and the methodological novelty of bakhtin‟s theory can break new ground for examining re-occurring crises in eu-russia cooperation. in order to provide an account of the effects created by eu-russia dialogue, it is necessary to address the following questions: how is eu-russia dialogue produced, and what is the relationship between the sender of a political statement and the receiver of the message? below is a schematic illustration of the way that i propose eu-russia discourse is understood in this study. an agent in the dialogue is either the eu or russia, each of which manifests its own world-views, its vision of the partner or of cooperation in the selected speech act. the preliminary structure of the relationship between the speaker (agent) and the receiver of the speaker‟s message (other) can be portrayed as follows: 20 review of european and russian affairs 6 (1), 2011 line 1 in the diagram above, “manifest speech act by agent”, indicates that the agent manifests its view on the current or desired state of affairs in its symbolic message sent to the receiver, calling its conversant into action. however, line 2, “latent message”, shows that there is some information or knowledge that is left latent in the agent’s speech act. for instance, presumptions that are implied by the agent as a self-evident truth and, therefore, not problematized in its message. the response by the receiver may or may not question the latent message sent together with the agent‟s manifest deed. the success of the agent‟s speech act depends not only on receiving a response back from the conversant, but also on the consenting or non-consenting character of this response. the agent‟s speech act is aimed at successfully indoctrinating the agent‟s view; i examine what and how much of the information within the agent‟s message the receiver questioned. i also scrutinize the success or failure of manifest deeds and indoctrinations voiced by both partners. in lines 3 and 4 of the diagram, the receiver sends its manifest speech act together with a latent message back to the agent in the response format. “present absence” in the diagram is a non-articulated position or view intentionally repressed by both the speaker and the receiver in their manifest speech acts. i examine whether the tension in cooperation occurs during the process of production of the response by “the other” and the subsequent acceptance or refusal of this response by the agent. even if the indoctrination is completed successfully, it may create the split in the receiver‟s personality: the receiver has to accept the agent‟s view and to produce a response alienated from the receiver‟s “self”. to demonstrate the way in which scrutinization of eu-russia discourse may help to understand re-occurring crisis in eu-russia cooperation, i next turn to analysis of the eu-russia political and security dialogue, leaving space for the emergence of new elements in the structure of eu-russia discourse suggested above. analyzing isolation and cooperation i examine the eu-russia interaction articulated in the official declarative statements, excluding the analysis of all other speech acts available within the framework of cooperation. the official standpoints not only provide the formal legal context of cooperation, but they also construct the political environment for the eu-russia relationship, create new structural conditions, alter or reproduce perceptions of the partners about each other and their cooperation. moreover, these key primary sources reflect the internal negotiations and “basic discourses [about things] that are considered to be viable, desirable and necessary” (hansen 2006, 51-2); they reflect official discourse between the eu and russia. review of european and russian affairs 6 (1), 2011 21 the starting point of my analysis is that “all actions by human beings involved with others in a social group are, as bakhtin (1986) claims, dialogically and responsively linked in some way, both to the previous already executed actions, and to anticipated next possible actions” (shotter 1995, 49). following this logic, the aforementioned political statements are related to each other within the framework of one conversation between the eu and russia and involve “shared intentionality” (searle 1992, 21-2). it means that they are not a matter of an individual speech act or an individual intention; rather, they are representations of a conversational, dialogic activity. this interrelatedness of political statements in eurussia dialogue, currently overshadowed by the central focus on individual interests and intentions in political and academic discourse, is very important for understanding eu-russia cooperation. in order to sharpen the analytical focus, i search for answers to the following questions that serve as a guide for analyzing the selected key texts: perception of “self” and “other”. what perceptions and representations of “self” and “other” emerge in eu-russia dialogue? is there any contradiction in partners” perceptions? indeed, the way the eu and russia perceive each other is indicative of their own worldviews and political thinking. therefore, in order to understand what partners “think” of themselves (their self-image) and of the other (their partner), i examine information that russia and the eu communicate about each other. expectations and goals. what do the eu and russia expect to happen as a result of their cooperation? what do the eu and russia aim for in their cooperation? latent message. what do the partners take to be a self-evident truth in the texts of political statements and, therefore, do not problematize in their messages to each other? absent presence. what goes unsaid in the eu‟s and russia‟s messages to each other? outcome. what do both partners mutually produce as a result of their dialogic relations? “the significant third”. do the eu and russia refer to something or somebody in their speech acts towards each other? is the relationship between the two partners influenced by a “third?” the partnership and cooperation agreement the growing speed of european integration and the establishment of the eu in 1992 with its powerful economy, wider responsibilities and growing political weight made it necessary for a resurgent russia to set up a coherent policy framework and institutionalized cooperation with its powerful western neighbour. the partnership and cooperation agreement (the agreement, pca), signed in 1994 and adopted in 1997 for the period of 10 years (the partnership and cooperation agreement (pca) 1997) forms a legal basis for eu-russia relations and creates structural-institutional conditions for cooperation. the agreement has continuing importance as the two parties are now in the process of negotiating a new one. the adoption of a pca opens up a new eu-russia dialogic space symbolizing the beginning of interaction. i understand this joint statement through the lens of bakhtin‟s concept of polyphony (bakhtin 1979, 6): two independent voices speaking simultaneously but distinct from each other in a double-voiced discourse. in order to examine the eu-russia interaction in this double-voiced joint statement, i will apply the afore-mentioned discursive interaction model. how do the eu and russia present themselves in the agreement? the text of this document is replete with articles based on principal-agent relations: the eu acts as an invisible principal whose mission is to spread its democratic and liberal economic rules across the territory of russia, whereas russia plays the role of a silent agent, which needs to follow the eu‟s directions. in the text of the agreement, russia‟s political and economic reforms become the prerequisite for eu-russia cooperation, and russia‟s one-sided transformation appears to be the only requirement for the success of eu-russia cooperation (pca 1997, preamble; article 6). as a result, the eu sets up the basis for its superiority in cooperation; transformation or change within the framework of the eu-russia partnership becomes an exclusive burden for russia, not for the eu. therefore, the superiority of the eu is not problematized in the agreement constituting the pca’s latent message. 22 review of european and russian affairs 6 (1), 2011 what is the eu‟s emergent “self”? paradoxically, the eu‟s self-representation in the agreement is itself blurry: it can be “the commitment of the community and its member states acting in the framework of the european union by the treaty on european union of 7 february 1992” (pca 1997, preamble), or the will of the member-states, or even the actions of the community alone. throughout the document, the eu does not refer to itself as the eu, which indicates the ambiguity of its own selfidentification. such an ambiguity in eu identity is understandable when placed into the historical context of the eu‟s internal development. iii this ambiguity, however, provides the eu with freedom for manoeuvre hiding the eu‟s inability to speak with “one voice” within the framework of eu-russia dialogue. as a result, problems with the eu‟s ongoing transformations and with ambiguity of its international identity remain unsaid in the pca. what are the partners‟ expectations voiced in the agreement? partners anticipate that cooperation will deepen and widen relations established between them in the past: it will lead to strengthening political and economic freedoms (pca 1997, preamble, article 1) and to increasing stability and security (pca 1997, article 6). in the text of the agreement, partners express their belief that by developing regular political dialogue and intensifying political relations (pca 1997, preamble, article 1, 6), increasing convergence on international issues (pca 1997, article 6) and developing economic cooperation (pca 1997, preamble; article 1), a gradual rapprochement between russia and europe as the main goal of cooperation can be reached (pca 1997, preamble). the partners also proclaim the basis of cooperation to be the principles of mutual advantage, mutual responsibility and mutual support (pca 1997, article 1). as an outcome of cooperation, they expect closer integration between russia and a wider area of cooperation in europe, as well as the future establishment of a free trade area between the european community and russia (pca 1997, article 1). despite the expressed claims for mutuality in cooperation, russia does not seem to articulate any views or concerns of its own in the text of the agreement. the historical context helps us to understand the silence from the russian side. while the agreement was being negotiated, russia was going through a transition period and it could not afford to miss the chance to establish a new connection with its powerful neighbour, which could potentially provide plenty of economic and technical support for russia. iv perhaps driven by the fear of disconnectedness, russia intentionally occupied a “silent” position and agreed to act as an “unequal” partner and a passive receiver of the eu‟s directions. as a result, the mutually produced agreement allowed for the eu‟s emergence of “self”, somewhat superior in relation to russia as a silent “unequal other”. at the very early stage of eu-russia cooperation, both partners laid the basis for a potential future conflict. in the text of the agreement, partners consent to “[promote] regional cooperation” (pca 1997, article 56 (3)) and commit to collaborate in the framework of the united nations, the conference on security and cooperation in europe (csce) and other fora (pca 1997, preamble). the image of the “third” the international community and the closest neighbours is non-conflictual in the text of the pca. to sum up, in onuf‟s classification, the partnership and cooperation agreement represents the type of commissives, which consist of partners‟ mutual declaration to cooperate in order to achieve further rapprochement. however, it carries some elements of assertives and directives with the intent from the eu‟s side to regulate transformation and modernization of russia. common strategy of the european union on russia in 1999, the eu adopted the second fundamental document in the eu-russia relationship the common strategy of the european union on russia (common strategy of the european union on russia 1999 (eu common strategy, common strategy)). in its common strategy, the eu gave its response to the dialogue started in the pca by sending the message to its receiver – russia; the pca and the common strategy are dialogically linked within one eu-russia conversation. moreover, the eu‟s common strategy is not only a reactive response to the pca; it is also a proactive message sent from the eu to russia in anticipation of a russian response. indeed, the eu‟s political statement exemplifies well, both the review of european and russian affairs 6 (1), 2011 23 proactive and reactive nature of speech acts. due to size limitations, this study will focus only on the official dialogue between two conversants – the eu and russia – and will not analyze the fact that the eu‟s message may indirectly be voiced for the multiplicity of listeners (i.e., other neighbouring countries). the community and its member states, through the common strategy finally, transform into one voice the eu. it is the eu that articulates the “vision…for its partnership with russia” (eu common strategy 1999, part i) in the common strategy. it is the eu that “[invites] russia to work” together on the basis of the common strategy (eu common strategy 1999, part i). it is the union‟s actions and institutions that implement provisions of the common strategy (eu common strategy 1999, instruments and means (1)). the eu’s “self” also crystallizes in the common strategy through its relation to the “other”. the eu draws a clear image of russia as a desirable partner: this image is based on what the eu “is” and what russia “is not”. in analogy to the eu‟s vision of russia articulated in part one “vision of the eu for its partnership with russia,” the union can be characterized as a “stable democracy . . . governed by the rule of law and underpinning a prosperous market economy” (eu common strategy 1999, part i “eu‟s strategic goals”). this implicit assumption by the eu about itself underlines the logic of the common strategy and plays a role of the latent message sent to russia. in its message towards russia, the eu clearly draws the image of russia that it welcomes as a friend. it is a “stable democratic and prosperous russia” (eu common strategy 1999, part i), which “rightfully” belongs to “the european family” (eu common strategy 1999, part i) and “asserts its european identity” (eu common strategy 1999, part i). paradoxically, the “paramount importance of the rule of law and respect for human rights . . . and market economy” written down earlier in the pca (pca 1997, preamble) in the common strategy becomes a pre-condition which russia must fulfill in order to finally occupy its “rightful place in the european family” (eu common strategy 1999, part i). in the common strategy, the eu crystallizes its perception of russia and strengthens its “conditional” attitude towards the partner as an “unequal other.” the language of the eu‟s political statement aims to have the effect of a prescription, a directive issued to the hearer (see onuf‟s classification). in russia‟s response, it will become obvious whether the eu‟s directive is followed, followed with amendments, or completely rejected. what goals and expectations does the eu articulate in the common strategy? the eu defines modernization of russia as its strategic interest in the framework of the eu-russia partnership (eu common strategy 1999, preamble). it expects russia to “consolidate democracy and the rule of law,” mentioned earlier in the pca, through the building of civil society and “the establishment of public institutions” (eu common strategy 1999, part 1). provided russia acquires the necessary features to become treated as a “friend,” partners have a chance to establish a strategic partnership and to cooperate on “the new european security architecture” (eu common strategy 1999, part ii). hence, the goal of the eu’s common strategy is to clarify and define the exact criteria that russia needs to meet in order to become partners with the eu and to build “a common european economic and social area” (eu common strategy 1999, principle objectives (2)). the eu aspires to build cooperation “benefiting alike all the people of russia and of the european union” (eu common strategy 1999, part i). in its message, however, the eu explicitly demonstrates that “the main responsibility for russia‟s future lies with russia itself” (eu common strategy 1999, part i), which means that any deviations in the russian course of transformation become an individual responsibility of russia. in this vein, the main agent’s (eu) message can be defined as follows: in order to be given an opportunity to cooperate with the eu, russia needs to modernize and be responsible for its own modernization itself. sending this message, the eu demonstrates an individual intention rather than mutuality in its cooperation with russia. by sending such a message to its partner, the eu hinders the interrelatedness in eu-russia dialogue, and the very spirit of mutuality and cooperation as the “operation together” is absent. when compared with the pca, the eu‟s common strategy prescribes even more importance to the “continuity, flexibility and substance” (eu common strategy 1999, part iii) of the existing political dialogue with russia. what remains “unsaid” in the eu‟s message towards russia? the eu talks about 24 review of european and russian affairs 6 (1), 2011 common interests in addressing common challenges on the european continent and common problems with money-laundering, illegal trafficking, drug trafficking, organized crime, energy resources etc (eu common strategy 1999). however, the eu does not talk about conflicting interests; it only articulates the changes that russia needs to make in order to become closer (i.e., similar) to the eu, or it opens up discourse on “commonality” between the partners as the symbol and guarantee of the future success in cooperation. as a result, differences between the partners remain “indefinable” in the eu‟s message because they are perceived by the eu as the factors that hinder the effectiveness of eu-russia cooperation; the factors that interfere with the eu‟s intentions to homogenize and “commonalize” eurussia cooperation, and, therefore, need to be absent in eu-russia dialogue. as in the pca, the eu discusses and expands on the notion of “regional cooperation”, promising to promote cooperation with russia in “the various fora for regional cooperation [e.g., barents euroarctic council, organization of the black sea economic cooperation]” and to enhance the “cross-border cooperation with neighbouring russian regions (including kaliningrad)” (eu common strategy 1999, part ii “areas of action” (c)) – all appropriated in view of the eu‟s enlargement. therefore, initially “neutral” reference to the “third” in the pca – i.e., international institutions and neighbouring countries changes into an exclusive domain of the eu‟s enlargement policy in the eu‟s common strategy. moreover, the eu is ready to enhance eu-russia cooperation in the area of preventive diplomacy by contributing to conflict management and “curbing the proliferation of wmd [weapons of mass destruction]” within the organisation for security and cooperation in europe (osce, formerly known as csce) and the united nations (un) (eu common strategy 1999, preventive diplomacy). however, the eu leaves out of its message a discussion of the role of the north atlantic treaty organization (nato) due to the fact that this organization represents an extremely conflictual “third”. indeed, the discussion about nato within the framework of eu-russia dialogue can be conceived as problematic for the eu‟s own internal development, for instance, the formation of the european security and defence policy as a security and defence component in the eu‟s architecture that is supposedly independent from nato. the discussion about nato becomes even more conflictual for the eu‟s external collaboration with russia whose interests fall far short of nato. in sum, the eu‟s common strategy, containing a set of criteria for actions that the eu wants russia to perform, provides a good example of a directive speech act (onuf, classification: section 1). the part of the eu‟s message about the importance of the rule of law, democracy and human rights carries insignificant elements of assertives (see onuf‟s classification: section 1). as a result, the eu‟s common strategy reinforces the “principal-agent” discursive practice introduced earlier in the partnership and cooperation agreement. the russian federation middle term strategy towards the european union the adoption of the russian federation middle term strategy towards the european union (2000-2010) (the russian federation middle term strategy towards the european union 1999 (the russian strategy)) affirms careful attention of russia towards cooperation with the eu and recognition of the eu‟s status as a partner (russian strategy 1999, preamble). in its strategy, russia portrays itself as a sovereign nation-state, which has a consistent foreign policy and a developed, coordinated approach towards europe that echoes its national doctrines v (russian strategy 1999, preamble). moreover, russia clearly points out that the eu-russia partnership is not aimed at “russia‟s accession to or “association” with the eu” (russian strategy 1999, part i). this statement has an important declarative meaning in russia‟s response to the eu: it is a manifesto of the russian resistance and refusal to adopt a “submissive” position in the eu-russia partnership. russia perceives the eu as a group of european nation-states (e.g., “common histories of nations,” “responsibility of european states” (russian strategy 1999, preamble)) rather than a “non-traditional,” “post-modern,” or “post-national entity” (smith 2003; ruggie 2000). to put it simply, russia perceives the eu through the lens of its own concept of the sovereign nation-state, which it attempts to build in a coherent manner. review of european and russian affairs 6 (1), 2011 25 in response to the eu‟s strategic interest in russia‟s modernization articulated in the eu‟s message, russia explicitly replies that it is not only russia, but also the eu who needs to transform or change in order for successful cooperation to occur (russian strategy 1999, preamble). moreover, russia seeks to “protect russia‟s national interests in cooperation” (russian strategy 1999, preamble) during the difficult period of russia‟s transition. in “securing the russian interests in an expanded european union” (russian strategy 1999, section 5), russia demonstrates the will to “[eliminate or set off] possible negative consequences” (russian strategy 1999, section 5) of the eu‟s expansion. as a result of eu-russia dialogue, in its response to the eu, russia acquires a voice: the voice of resistance and defence. in the text of its strategy, russia treats the eu as a source of modernization “[mobilizing] the economic potential and managerial experience of the eu” (russian strategy 1999, preamble) within the framework of the partnership. such an instrumental rhetoric about the eu as a source rather than a partner exemplifies that russia simply “responds with the same coin” to the eu‟s individualistic approach to cooperation demonstrated in the eu‟s common strategy. as a result of eu-russia dialogue, both partners gradually lose the very spirit of “operating together” in their messages to each other. they establish the relationship based on the model of one partner attempting to impose and another, to resist. moreover, the eu‟s and russia‟s self-presentations co-emerge in eu-russia dialogue according to the same model of one partner dominating and another counteracting. in section two of the document, russia accepts the eu‟s willingness to continue developing the political and security dialogue and joint foreign policy initiatives. it also recognizes and successfully accepts the necessity of institutionalization of eu-russia dialogue expressed in the eu‟s political message to russia. as well, the eu achieves a great success in the part of its message concerning the establishment of the new european security architecture (eu common strategy 1999, part ii). russia places a great emphasis on “building pan-european security” (russian strategy 1999, section 1 (5), (8)) together with the eu and establishing a pan-european economic and legal infrastructure. however, russia continues to stress the importance of “taking into consideration russia‟s concerns” in the eu russia dialogue, securing russia‟s interests and emphasizing differences existing between partners unsayable in the eu‟s message (russian strategy 1999, section 2). the russian response clearly voices what remains “unsaid” in the eu‟s message. in its strategy, russia openly reflects on the eu‟s ambiguous, flexible and unstable identity in the sphere of defence and security, and the potential this ambiguity and indefiniteness can provide in establishing, jointly with russia, the new security architecture in europe. moreover, russia openly discusses the creation of the new security architecture as a possible counter-balance to nato centrism in europe – the topic that is largely conflictual and, therefore, “absent” in the eu‟s message (russian strategy 1999). russia responds to the notion of “common” in the eu‟s message, only briefly mentioning “common histories of [european] nations…and complementarity of their economies” (russian strategy 1999, part i). in section twelve “ensuring the implementation of the strategy inside russia” (russian strategy 1999, section 12), russia temporarily abandons its “exceptionalist” and “particularist” position that is latently present in the russian response to the eu, trying to emphasize interrelatedness and interconnectedness between the partners. russia clearly states that its own modernization and the success of eu-russia cooperation depend on an “evolution within the eu,” “development of international situation” and an outside “organizational, legal and material support” for change in russia (russian strategy 1999, section 12 (1)), rather than on a one-sided transformation of russia by itself. by refusing to accept the eu‟s demands to look out for itself, russia demonstrates how its own internal change is interrelated with a number of outside factors. in its message, russia responds not only to the eu‟s common strategy, but also to the starting point of eu-russia dialogue the pca. it demonstrates a very pragmatic approach to the pca emphasizing that “the russia eu partnership should be based on the maximum use of benefits offered by the pca and the fullest possible realization of its provisions and follow-up goals” (russian strategy 1999, part 1(4)). however, the discussion of specific internal problems and the domestic situation in russia, mentioned in both the pca and the eu‟s common strategy, is absent in russia‟s response. 26 review of european and russian affairs 6 (1), 2011 apparently, keeping internal problems in silence helps russia to make its “loud response” on the eu‟s message less vulnerable to the critique from the eu. russia refers to the wider international community in the text of its response to the eu. for instance, “the protection of national production in certain sectors of economy is justified, subject to international law and experience,” or “strategic partnership with an emphasis on supremacy of international law” (russian strategy 1999, preamble). suddenly, the “third” acquires significance in building cooperation with the eu: russia refers to the abstract symbolic image of the international community, international law and international society as its last resort, the escape. the analysis of the russian strategy shows that russia, to some extent, committed to the eu‟s course of action; the eu‟s directive did succeed in encouraging russia to send the response and to voice its own view. russia‟s speech act signifies a reactive-resisting action and a proactive-assertive action with the intent to make the hearer accept russia‟s equality, views and beliefs. therefore, assertives and commissives are the two main elements of russia‟s speech act (see onuf‟s classification). an assertive action signifies russia‟s understanding of the necessity to interrelate partners‟ positions, to build some kind of mutuality and to “travel together” rather than “walk apart”. furthermore, russia‟s declaration expresses desire and commitment to future cooperation with the eu. however, the number of issues raised by the eu‟s message and questioned or even explicitly rejected by russia‟s response makes the success of the eu‟s directive questionable. as an outcome of the dialogue, russia‟s middle term strategy demonstrates that the eu did not completely succeed in trying to build eu-russia dialogue on the basis of its directives and the dominant attitude towards russia. with the exception of an insignificant attention paid by russia to the necessity of interrelatedness and sincere “operation together”, both partners tend to treat the partnership instrumentally. the eu‟s response to the russian strategy will inform whether the russian “loud message” results in weakening or strengthening the discursive practice introduced in the pca and reinforced by the eu‟s common strategy. eu’s country strategy paper contrary to the previous documents, in its country strategy (2007-2013) adopted in 2007 (country strategy paper: russian federation 2007 (country strategy paper)), vi the eu starts to recognize its internal problems speaking more openly about its own “self,”: “the eu seems a great deal weaker following its constitutional crisis (it is already clear that the kremlin considers berlin, london, paris and rome of more significance than brussels)” (country strategy paper 2007, section 3(2)). russia succeeds in its assertive action aimed at the “improvement of the image of russia in europe” (russian strategy 1999, preamble) leading the eu to change its perception about russia. for instance, the eu recognizes that russia “becomes more assertive” (country strategy paper 2007, section 3(2)) and “[has improved] financial position on the back of substantial energy export revenues, its economic standing as a member of the g8, and indeed its sheer size” (country strategy paper 2007, section 2). moreover, russia‟s proactive response in its claims for equality with the eu leads to a recognition of russia as a “key ally in eu efforts to combat new threats to security, crime terrorism” (country strategy paper 2007, section 3). the eu, however, continues to apply its own well-developed criteria for democracy to russia. although the eu claims that “it cannot take russia for granted” “as russia becomes more assertive” (country strategy paper 2007, section 3.2), latently, the eu continues to conceive of russia in terms of an “unstable”, “undemocratic”, “unlawful” country, repeatedly pointing out in the document that “russia is characterized by a powerful bureaucracy, a politically-biased legal system, powerful and repressive law enforcement agencies and a relatively weak civil society” (country strategy paper 2007, summary; section 4.1). the “political opposition remains weak and fractious” in russia (country strategy paper 2007, section 4.1), and there is a lack of independent media (country strategy paper 2007, section 3.1; 4.1). in comparison with its common strategy (1999), the eu pays noticeably more attention to russia‟s actions, goals and the trends of its development. for instance, the eu frequently says “russia review of european and russian affairs 6 (1), 2011 27 seems to be . . . ”, or “the signs are that kremlin . . . ” (country strategy paper 2007, section 3.2). however, the level of the eu‟s uncertainty of “what russia really is” is one more result of the lack of communication in eu-russia dialogue. in its country strategy paper, the eu seeks to generate “a robust and coherent approach to the eu relationship with russia” (country strategy paper 2007, section 2) based on all documents issued by the eu towards russia (e.g., pca, common strategy), or wider eu neighbourhood (e.g., eu neighbourhood policy, 2004), or the rest of the world (e.g., european security strategy 2003). apparently, the eu has an ambition to build its new self-image as an international actor that has a strong external foreign policy based on a “policy mix” (country strategy paper 2007, section 6.1). however, it remains uncertain whether the new eu international identity is accepted or rejected by russia. paradoxically, the reference to the russian strategy is absent in the eu‟s country strategy paper, which indicates that the eu treats its political statement as an individual speech act outside of the eurussia dialogue. in other words, the eu tries to distance itself and to become “internally closed” (vnutrenne zamknutym, “translation mine”) (bakhtin 1979, 81) in order to “think” about russia more neutrally, more objectively. such a trend in the eu‟s responsive action undermines the very possibility for interrelatedness in eu-russia cooperation. the eu‟s definition of cooperation in the country strategy paper sets up the requirement of commonality as a prerequisite for the success of the eu-russia partnership; it identifies the components of cooperation (interests and values) that should be in common between the two partners in order to, firstly, meet the eu‟s requirement and, secondly, to succeed in eu-russia cooperation (country strategy paper 2007, section 2). vii once introduced, the concept of commonality “naturally” starts playing a special role as the latent message in the eu‟s message to russia. conflicting interests and other differences between the partners become objectified in the eu‟s discursive practices as a self-evident obstacle to the success of cooperation. furthermore, the eu widely discusses in its country strategy paper all russia‟s conceivable problems that are absent from the text of russia‟s strategy. time and again, the eu emphasizes that russia is solely responsible for all these problems, and the eu‟s exclusive role is to provide financial assistance according to numbers carefully written down in the eu‟s country strategy paper (country strategy paper 2007, section 1, 2). however, the notion of mutual responsibility and interrelatedness is again left out of the eu‟s message, with the exception of several moments in the text when the eu is talking about “mutually-beneficial engagement with . . . the russian government” or “a spirit of . . . mutual self-interest” in cooperation (country strategy paper 2007, section 6). instead of the cooperative rhetoric in the eu‟s voice, the section “lessons learned” (country strategy paper 2007, section 5.2) demonstrates well the eu‟s talents in monitoring, evaluating and managing its instrumental financial support rendered to russia (country strategy paper 2007, section 5.2). in the eu‟s country strategy paper, relations with the “third” neighbouring countries to the south and east become an exclusive domain of the eu‟s neighbourhood policy (country strategy paper 2007, section 5.2). all other relations with the “third” are regulated under the framework of the eu common foreign and security policy, as well as the european security and defence policy. the eu aspires to appropriate its relations with the “third” outside an eu-russia dialogue. russia, for its part, has little to add as “a strategic partner” to all the spectrum of eu policies adopted and implemented without russia‟s participation and outside of the framework of eu-russia cooperation. to sum up, the eu‟s country strategy paper is an example of assertives and directives in onuf‟s classification: it asserts that russia must accept the eu‟s view of eu-russia cooperation as a strategic partnership founded on shared interests and common values. the country strategy paper also sets up several instruments for regulating the state of democracy in russia (e.g., country strategy paper 2007, section 6.4-6.7) and directing eu-russia cooperation towards the creation of common spaces (country strategy paper 2007, section 3.7). despite the fact that the eu responded and partially recognized russia‟s “equal but different” status, russia was not able to weaken the eu‟s discursive practice launched in the pca, reproduced in the eu‟s common strategy in 1998 and reinforced later in the eu‟s country strategy paper. 28 review of european and russian affairs 6 (1), 2011 concluding remarks “the body” of eu-russia cooperation is its legal and institutional framework established by both partners. in this study, i examined “the face” of the eu-russia partnership and expressions it gains in the process of dialogic interaction. the goal was not to overload the reader with new facts about the partnership but to engage closely with official texts as the carriers of eu-russia conversation. as results of textual analysis have shown, the way the eu and russia practice their speech acts is conflict-creating and crisis-prone: it produces mutual frustration and distance between the partners. however, the paradox of isolation in eu-russia cooperation disappears with a closer look at partners‟ dialogic relations: these relations continuously reproduce inequality and asymmetry, dominance and resistance, inevitably leading to re-occurring tensions in eu-russia cooperation. examination of eu-russia dialogue revealed that russia tried to strongly resist inequality and asymmetry announced at the very first stage of eu-russia cooperation (pca), whereas the eu repeatedly re-established this inequality and asymmetry with all the means at its disposal. by applying such tactics, russia did not succeed in its attempts to discursively position itself in eu-russia dialogue. the eu, for its part, did not succeed in its efforts to use the power of norms, rules and economic instruments to exercise control and homogenise the cooperative space with russia. finally, both partners did not succeed in “operating together” and creating a common space of mutuality, understanding and acceptance. instead, they succeeded in co-creating the images of an “exceptionalist” russia, claiming for a special qualitatively different status of independent sovereign state, and an “individualist” eu, prioritising an individual intention over mutuality in cooperation with russia, thereby increasing the gap between the two. by agreeing to cooperate, the eu and russia have taken a step towards introducing new practices in the world of international politics; they created the common space of cooperation. the very possibility of cooperation has been conditioned by both the eu‟s criteria imposed on russia to be considered as a friend and by russia‟s claims for equality with the eu. however, both sides are responsible for the final outcome of their dialogue. both are responsible for the improvement in communication. both partners need to make cooperation work, without declaring their differences irreconcilable, and without overemphasizing the numerous gaps that exist between them. rather, each partner needs to utilize these differences to discover a way to exist alongside a very different “other”. despite re-occurring problems in cooperation, both partners have an opportunity to view their cooperation as an open concept for re-thinking and re-definition. the scheme of analysis offered in this study may serve as a model for understanding possible events in eu-russia cooperation: whether it is a new strategy from russia‟s side or the adoption of a new partnership and cooperation agreement. this new agreement has a symbolic sense of continuation. it is not a “final say” in eu-russia dialogue; rather, it is a “new” beginning: when dialogue ends, everything ends. thus dialogue, by its very essence, cannot and must not come to an end. (bakhtin 1984, 252). notes i some authors (checkel, 2004; zehfuss 2002, 10) make an effort to define at least “three constructivisms”. for instance, checkel (2004, 3) offers a distinction among conventional, interpretative and critical (radical) variants. others (fierke 2007, 174) suggest a dichotomous division into “conventional” and “consistent” constructivism: “the former [accepts] the existence of an objective world, while the latter [emphasizes] “merely” language”. barnett (2005) and wendt (1999) attempt to integrate diverse theoretical arguments and to draw a picture of one constructivist theoretical paradigm. ii the word “constructivism” was initially introduced to ir by nicholas onuf in 1989 (fierke 2007, 172). review of european and russian affairs 6 (1), 2011 29 iii the european union was established only in 1993 with the maastricht treaty entering into force and introducing the eu as a new actor searching for its own niche, its own identity in the world of global politics. iv the eu‟s assistance is later rendered through such programs as: tacis, interreg i. ii, iii, enpi etc. according to some scholarly research, the amount of such assistance from the eu‟s side is not sufficient enough to make a difference (e.g., pashkovskaia 2007, 42-51). v several national doctrines including the foreign policy concept of the russian federation. (2000) were issued around the same period as the russian strategy during the first term of vladimir putin‟s presidency. vi the road maps of four eu-russia common spaces (2005) jointly developed with participation of both sides (e.g., st petersburg summit, 2003 and 2005, the work of the joint working group on the creation of the common economic space) acquired a different meaning for the eu and became „an expression of eu policy towards the russian federation . . . a robust and coherent approach to russia‟ (country strategy paper, 2007) i.e., the eu‟s unilateral response towards russia. the ambiguous status of this document within the framework of eu-russia partnership does not allow me to include it as a clear example of the eu‟s response to the russian political statement. vi the text of the country strategy paper itself confirms my choice of the eu‟s responsive speech act: “the road maps remain, in any event, the short and medium term instruments for the eu-russia relationship, and this is likely to be confirmed in the new agreement” (country strategy paper 2007, 7). vii the eu defines eu-russia cooperation as follows: “eu cooperation with russia is conceived in terms of, and is designed to strengthen, a strategic partnership founded on shared interests and common values” (country strategy paper 2007, section 2). references 1. secondary sources aleseeva, t. 2007. “rossiia v prostranstve globalnogo vospriiatiia.” mezhdunarodnye protsessy 5 (2/14). accessed august 25. http://www.intertrends.ru/fourteen/005.htm. allison, r., m. light, and s. white. 2006. putin's russia and the enlarged europe. wiley-blackwell. arbatova, n. 2006. “obshchee politicheskoe prostranstvo mezhdu rossiei i es: utopiia ili real‟nost.‟‟ mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia 12: 3-12. (arbatova n. 2006. “common political space between russia and the eu: utopia or reality.” world economy and international relations 12: 3-12.) arbatova, n. 2008. “obshchee prostranstvo bezopasnosti mezhdu rossiei i es: imperativy i pripiatstviia.” indeks bezopasnosti 3 (86/14): 63-76. (arbatova n. 2008. “common security space between russia and the eu: imperatives and obstacles.” security index 3 (86/14): 63-76.) bakhtin, m. 1979. estetika slovesnogo tvorchestva. moskva. (bakhtin, m. 1979. esthetics of speech art. moscow). ---. 1979. problemy poetiki dostoevskogo. moskva. (bakhtin, m. 1979. problems of dostoevsky’s poetics. moscow). ---. 1984. problems of dostoevsky’s poetics. university of minnesota press. ---. 1986. dialogical imagination. university of texas press, austin tx. barnett, m. 2005. “social constructivism.” in j. baylis, s. smith, eds., the globalization of world politics: an introduction to international relations (3 rd ed). oxford: oxford university press, 252-269. campbell, d. 2007. “poststructuralism.” in international relations theories: discipline and diversity, edited by t. dunne, m. kurki and s. smith, 166-185. new york: oxford university press. 30 review of european and russian affairs 6 (1), 2011 checkel, j. 2004. “social constructivisms in global and european politics.” review of international studies 30 (2): 229-244. debardeleben, j. 2008. “public attitudes toward eu-russian relations: knowledge, values, and interests.” in the boundaries of eu enlargement: finding a place for neighbours, edited by j. debardeleben, 70-92. new york: palgrave macmillan. dostoyevsky, f., and d. magarshack. 1971. the devils (the possessed). penguin classics. fierke, k. 2007. “constructivism.” in international relations theories: discipline and diversity, edited by t. dunne, m. kurki, and s. smith, 166-185. new york: oxford university press. hansen, l. 2006. security and practice: discourse analysis and the bosnian war. new york: routledge. komitet “rossiia v ob‟edinennoi evrope”. 2005. rossiia i evropeiskiii soiuz: ot krisiza k novomy dogovoru. moskva. (committee “russia in the united europe”. 2005. russia and the european union: from crisis to a new treaty. moskva). kratochwil, f. 1989. rules, norms and decisions: on the conditions of practical and legal reasoning in international relations and domestic affairs. cambridge: cambridge university press. ---. 2001. “constructivism as an approach to interdisciplinary study.” in constructing international relations, edited by k. fierke and k. jorgensen, 13-36. armonk, new york: sharpe. medvedev, s. 2008. “the crisis in eu-russia relations: between „sovereignty‟ and „europeanization‟.” working paper wp14/2007/02/ moscow: state universityhigher school of economics. onuf, n. 1989. world of our making: rules and rule in social theory and international relations. columbia: university of south carolina press. ---. 1998. “constructivism: a user‟s manual.” in international relations in a constructed world, edited by n. kubálková, n. onuf, and p. kowert, 58-79. usa: m.e. sharpe, inc. pashkovskaia, i. 2007. “deiatel‟nost‟ evropeiskogo soiuza v rossii po programme tacis.” mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia 8: 42-51. (pashkovskaia i. 2007. “actions of the european union in russia under the tacis program.” world economy and international relations 8: 42-51.) prozorov, s. 2006. understanding conflict between russia and the eu: the limits of integration. new york: palgrave macmillan. prozorov, s. 2009. the ethics of postcommunism: history and social praxis in russia. new york: palgrave macmillan. reiss, t. 1982. the discourse of modernism, ithaca ny: cornell university press. roach, s. ed. 2007. critical theory and international relations. new york: routledge. ruggie, j. 1998. “what makes the world hang together? neo-utilitarianism and the social constructivist challenge.” international organization 52 (4): 855-885. searle, j. 1969. speech acts. an essay in the philosophy of language. london: cambridge university press. ---. 1992. (on) searle on conversation. (compiled and introduced by h. parret & j verschueren), amsterdam and philadelphia, pa: john benjamins. shotter, j. 1995. “in conversation: joint action, shared intentionality and ethics.” theory psychology 5 (1): 49-73. wendt, a. 1999. social theory of international politics. cambridge: cambridge university press. zehfuss, m. 2002. constructivism in international relations: the politics of reality. new york: cambridge university press. 2. key primary sources agreement on partnership and cooperation (1997). (joce l 327, 27/11/1997). common strategy of the european union of 4 june 1999 on russia (l 157, 24/06/1999 p. 0001 – 0010). accessed on october 15, 2009. http://ue.eu.int/en/summ.html http://ue.eu.int/en/summ.html review of european and russian affairs 6 (1), 2011 31 eu’s country strategy paper 2007-2013: russian federation. accessed on november 12, 2009. http://ue.eu.int/en/ road maps of four eu-russia common spaces 2007. accessed on october 15, 2009. http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/russia/russia_docs/road_map_ces.pdf the russian federation middle term strategy towards the european union (2000-2010) 1999. accessed on october 15, 2009. http://www.delrus.cec.eu.int/en/p_242.htm 3. doctrines, concepts and summits europa glossary: petersburg tasks. accessed on november 15, 2009. http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/petersberg_tasks_en.htm the european commission delegation official site: eu-russia summit in khanty-mansiysk. june 2008. accessed april 22, 2010. http://www.delrus.ec.europa.eu the european commission delegation official site: tacis, interreg. accessed on april 22, 2010. http://www.delrus.ec.europa.eu the foreign policy concept of the russian federation 2000. accessed on march 15, 2009. http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/25.html http://ue.eu.int/en/ http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/russia/russia_docs/road_map_ces.pdf http://www.delrus.cec.eu.int/en/p_242.htm http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/petersberg_tasks_en.htm http://www.delrus.ec.europa.eu/ http://www.delrus.ec.europa.eu/ http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/25.html review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 issn 1718-4835 citizenship ceremonies in germany: a more universalist kulturnation maria jakob1 leipzig university abstract after 2000, a profound liberalization of naturalization criteria in germany was followed by culturalist setbacks: language requirements were tightened, a civics test, a pledge of allegiance, and citizenship ceremonies were introduced. can these developments be termed a liberal assimilationist turn in what it means to be a citizen or is this a revival of the old notion of a german cultural identity as kulturnation (cultural nation)? the qualitative study of german citizenship ceremonies presented herein, provides an in-depth analysis of the logics of “liberal assimilation” and the nexus between culture, citizenship, and national belonging. at the ceremonies, “culture” is referenced as a universally human feature that binds people together. conversely, culture is also presented as an individual folkloristic asset that can be used for profit and for contributing to the value of diversity. this twofold conceptual specification of “culture” is then discussed as an adaptation of the originally universalist kulturnation idea and as a modern solution to the problem of societal integration. 1 maria jakob holds a magister degree in political science and cultural studies. she has obtained a phd in cultural sociology with a study about naturalization ceremonies in germany in 2016 and is currently working as a research assistant at the institute for the study of culture at leipzig university. 2 review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 introduction the nexus between culture and citizenship is one of the central variables when it comes to determining the character of a country’s citizenship model or national model of belonging. in the context of citizenship regulations, “culture” is most commonly understood as the language, religion, and customs of the majority or major parts of society, to which citizenship candidates must conform. this understanding of “culture” is clearly regulated and tested in terms of language skills. however “culture” is hard to operationalize and fiercely discussed when it comes to customs or religious practices, as has become visible in the debates about the face-veil at canadian citizenship ceremonies2, and about the islamic headscarf in german public schools and administration (joppke 2007; korteweg and yurdakul 2015). german citizenship law and the country’s understanding of nationhood were long perceived as based on cultural and ethnic homogeneity. germany’s citizenship regulations have been based on an exclusive understanding of membership for the majority of 20th century, leading rogers brubaker to his characterization of the german understanding of nationhood as “ethnocultural” and “differentialist” (1992, 3). contrasting germany with the rather “state-centered” and “assimilationist” french model, brubaker updated the typology of prussian historian friedrich meinecke who in 1908 already termed germany a cultural nation (“kulturnation”) in contrast to the french political nation (“staatsnation”) (1970, 11-22). however, there has been notable immigration to germany since the 1960s. this can be treated as a latent, long-term crisis of the country’s pre-war citizenship configuration and modes of collective identity construction. this “migration-membership-dilemma” (triadafilopoulos 2012, 1) called for political as well as discursive action. consequently, there has been much discussion about citizenship and the status of germany as a “non-immigration country” since the 1990s. from 2000 on, discussions in politics and the media about a german leitkultur have risen. literally translated as “leading” or “guiding culture”, leitkultur was the heart of a debate about whether there are certain elements of “german” culture existed which immigrants adopt for successful assimilation. while conservatives advanced the view of a homogenous german volk (“people”), whose language, history, and religion should form a non-negotiable basis for future immigration and integration policies, liberal and social democrat forces viewed leitkultur as a more universal humanist principle shaped by european values and experiences (see klusmeyer 2001, manz 2004, pautz 2005). substantial reforms were also made to the citizenship law and naturalization procedures. when rogers brubaker asked about a “return of assimilation?” in 2001, naturalization in germany had just been liberalized and elements of the birthplace principle (ius soli) had been introduced into citizenship law (faist and triadafilopoulos 2006; green 2000). brubaker thus reviewed his prior assessment of german citizenship law as “ethnocultural” and described the new german policies as “politically recognizing, legally constituting, and symbolically emphasizing commonality rather than difference” (2001, 539). brubaker explicitly did not assess german citizenship policy as assimilationist in a strict sense, and at this time indeed the naturalization process did not 2 see the guardian, “canada to press for ban on islamic veil at citizenship ceremonies“, september 16, 2015; http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/16/canada-government-islamic-veil-niqab-ban-citizenship (accessed on 05-11-2017). 3 review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 contain any elements that aimed at a cultural assimilation of prospective german citizens. 3 such elements, however, were introduced only few years later. in 2007, the criteria for citizenship acquisition was amended and tightened: language requirements became stricter and more precise, a civics test and a compulsory pledge of allegiance (feierliches bekenntnis) to the constitution were included in the application procedure.4 with this last provision, citizenship ceremonies in germany proliferated even though they are not a mandatory part of the naturalization process. my aim in this article is to analyze the nexus between culture and citizenship in contemporary germany. can these recent developments be interpreted as a return to the idea of a kulturnation, or have we witnessed an assimilative turn in what it means to be a german citizen? in the following section, i will contrast some assessments of recent developments in german citizenship law with the historic ideas of kulturnation and bildungsbürgertum (“educated bourgeoisie”), that continue to frame the discourse on german citizenship. i then turn to an indepth analysis of the speeches made at german citizenship ceremonies where “culture” is simultaneously depicted as a distinct and folkloristic feature of the immigrants, while also as a universal ground for belonging as cultivated subjects and citizens. in conclusion, this twofold depiction of culture will be discussed as a specific adaptation of the idea of kulturnation, and presented as a possible solution to the challenge of diversity versus homogeneity in modern societies more broadly. german citizenship policy since 2000: liberal assimilation or return of the kulturnation? the liberalization of citizenship provisions in 2000 and ensuing introduction of language requirements, citizenship tests, the pledge of allegiance and the citizenship ceremonies, have been perceived as a moralization of citizenship by some scholars, and as a progression towards a civic conception of citizenship by others. mathias bös and veronika schmidt (2012) treat the introduction of a citizenship test in germany as a “culturalization” of citizenship. they point out that there is a shift from an attributive understanding of ethnicity towards a more open conception where being a citizen and belonging can be learned and acquired. this “culturalization”, and a parallel economization of citizenship – citizens as investments into the state’s human capital – have resulted in a “moralization” of citizenship. values and the active role of the citizens are emphasized, citizenship is not a mere status anymore. 5 in contrast, per mouritsen describes the developments as a “republican normalization” (insert citation) in germany, which approximates the country’s citizenship regulations with those of france and the netherlands. he upholds, however, that “germany still presupposes a unified community of 3 before 2007, the only criteria for naturalization in germany that could be interpreted as “cultural” was a written declaration of loyalty to the constitution and sufficient “knowledge of the language”. 4 green (2012) offers a full analysis of the reforms on german citizenship law after 2000. the development of citizenship tests in germany begins with a clearly anti-muslim “interview guide” in the state of baden-württemberg (2006) and ends with the national version of 2007 which michalowski (2011, 764) characterises as “relatively thin and procedural”. 5 similarly, willem schinkel and friso van houdt (2010) describe a western european trend to moralizing citizenship. yngve lithman (2010) agrees with this diagnosis and in addition describes this trend as “cultural essentialization”. 4 review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 culture and language, although the latter, crucially, has become transformed in a civic direction” (mouritsen 2013, 90). a peculiar combination of cultural unity and diversity seems to be at play here which has received different labels in scholarly research. triadafilopoulos (2011) calls it ‘civic integrationism’ or ‘schmittian liberalism’, tebble (2006) speaks about ‘identity liberalism’, fekete (2006) even opts for ‘enlightened fundamentalism’. perhaps most precisely, christian joppke (2008) has addressed this configuration as “the paradox of universalism”. he states a renewed emphasis on the identity aspect of citizenship while its importance concerning status and rights seems to be declining (joppke 2010b). however, because it is now impossible for western european states to refer to “national cultures”, they instead promote ideas of ‘constitutional patriotism’ or ‘political liberalism’ (joppke 2008, 536). concerned by the dilemma of a particularistic identity that is deemed necessary for integration yet that cannot be supplied by a law or policy that must remain formally non-discriminatory, contemporary states are inclined to call a certain idea of liberalism to the rescue (ibid, 543-544). in so doing, liberalism is not treated as a formalistic, procedural societal feature. instead, it is turned into an identity and connected with the idea of a shared way of life. so this is what joppke (2008) comes to call the ‘paradox of universalism’: liberalism acted out in almost illiberal ways. 6 while joppke (2008) already delivers a pointed assessment of the nexus between culture and citizenship in german naturalization law after 2000, his argument is solely based on the legal provisions for naturalization. the contents and discourses which the new components of the procedure—namely the test and the ceremonies—include, are not taken into account. furthermore, it is worth taking a step back to assess the ways in which the paradox stated by joppke (2008) unfolds and even proves functional. for starters, the diagnosis of a ‘culturalization’ of citizenship, is quite broad and open to multiple interpretations as a result. since concept of ‘culture’ can mean many different things, it follows that a culturalization of citizenship in an immigrant society can take many different shapes. there are at least two different dimensions of what ‘culture’ means. 7 first, the concept may refer to a general characteristic of a society, homogenizing differences within ‘german culture’ or it could refer to a more tightly confined ‘realm of culture’ within a society depicting, for example, the fields of music, literature, arts and education as opposed to the political or economic fields. second, “culture” may be perceived as something that shapes and even determines individual actions and values, or it could be seen as a merely superficial level of individual life such as eating habits or clothing preferences. the latter was similarly described by herbert gans (1979) as “symbolic ethnicity”. with this term gans aimed at a description of how descendants of european immigrants to the united states, while 6 similarly: triadafilopoulos (2011). in a later article, joppke (2010b) describes the paradox in slightly different terms concerning how new citizens (and citizens in general) are addressed: they are on the one hand “neoliberally” responsibilized and individualized, on the other hand they are required to assimilate into liberalism. in order to explain the contradiction between these two aims, joppke again refers to the declining formal importance of citizenship: as “citizenship light” and as mere identity politics with low impact, the citizenship discourse can mirror the ambiguities of general discourses on belonging without much consequences. 7 andreas reckwitz (2008, 19) also lists four conceptualizations of “culture”: a normative, a collectivist, and a differentialist notion as well as a very general notion that associates culture with social meaning. while the notions he describes as collectivist and differentialist can be related to the first dimension in my account, his normative and meaning-related notions apply more to scientific conceptualizations of culture than to everyday or political discourses. 5 review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 being fully integrated and assimilated structurally, still identify with or practice “ethnicity”. instead of treating this phenomenon as an ethnic revival, gans describes it as “a nostalgic allegiance to the culture of the immigrant generation (…), a love for and a pride in a tradition that can be felt without having to be incorporated in everyday behaviour” (gans 1979, 9). accordingly, a culturalization of citizenship could point to an emphasis of common values, language and religion, as indicated in the ‘moralization’ diagnosis by bös and schmidt (2012) and the ‘liberal assimilation’ thesis by joppke (2008), or to the promotion of knowledge about culture-as-arts. it could indicate a shift towards an exclusivist coupling of citizenship and culture-as-identity, or it could mean that culture-as-folklore may be actively promoted as something valuable within society. therefore it is important not to just label the developments at hand but to analyze what the ‘culturalization of citizenship’ really means and encompasses in greater detail. also, the diagnosis of a culturalization of citizenship has to be placed within the historic context of ideas about german nationhood and citizenship. the debates rely on the underlying assumption that germany has long been a kulturnation when it comes to determining the basis of its citizenship law and its national identity. there also seems to be a broad agreement that the idea of a kulturnation and its ethno-cultural determination of who can be a german citizen has been thoroughly discredited after the nazi era (levy 2002). thus, if there is or has been a renewed culturalization of german citizenship or a revival of the idea of kulturnation, this requires some explanation and a detailed analysis of what kind of culture and what kind of assimilation are at play. in order to adequately grasp the idea of kulturnation and its contemporary influences, i briefly review its distinctive elements and their development. specifically, i argue that its “ethnic” and its “cultural” elements must be considered separately. according to brubaker (1992), the german nation is fundamentally a kulturnation, a nation based on a common culture rather than on a unified state. historically, he traces the roots of this understanding to the first half of the 19th century, when germany was divided into a number of petty states and could only be imagined as a whole in terms of language and culture. brubaker here refers to the romantic movement which he presents as having laid the grounds of the “ethnocultural understanding of nationhood” (ibid, 9). brubaker omits, though, that this conceptualization was only an advancement of a more universalist idea of kulturnation which had been formulated earlier and did not yet encompass an ethnic notion of culture. as bernhard giesen (1999, 158-166) explains in his historic analysis of the “codes of collective identity” proliferated by german intellectuals, the idea of the kulturnation was indeed developed in order to establish a basis for national belonging without a unified state in the early 19th century. however the original version of kulturnation can be attributed to the bildungsbürgertum (intellectual bourgeoisie) and the context of the enlightenment. the bildungsbürgertum, which was the influential intellectual elite of the time, imagined a kulturnation that—following the ideas of goethe and schiller—was based on the value of education, on intellectual achievement, as well as on individual virtue and aesthetic pursuit of the fine arts. in contrast to france, where at the same time political revolution was the means of introducing democracy and human rights, german intellectuals were preaching cultural refinement. education should enable the people to fulfill their human potential, to become “truly free” (münkler 2009, 340-341). “culture” thus was more a general program than a mode of differentiation. only later were these universalist ideas coupled with the idea of the volk (“the people”) and a distinctive volksgeist (“spirit of the 6 review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 people”) by the romantic movement, reformulating the notion of the kulturnation from ‘culturally universalist’ to ‘ethno-culturally differentialist’ (giesen 1999, 271). against this background, the recent developments in german citizenship law with its focus on “liberal assimilation”, language acquisition, and moral conduct could be described as a revival of the old, original conceptualization of the kulturnation as a community of cultured and civilized citizens. however, the mere existence of citizenship tests and ceremonies can only indicate an overall tendency towards such a culturalization of citizenship. to analyze the link between culture and citizenship, its logics and its elements, we need to take into account how “culture” and different forms of cultural assimilation are presented and debated within the process of naturalization, the citizenship test and the ceremony. specifically i chose to analyze the citizenship ceremonies as they offer the most profound insight into the various discourses and positionings of the relation between culture and belonging as a citizen. this can be attributed to their character as decentralized, non-standardized, complex, and multi-faceted events. as the idea of kulturnation has oscillated between a universalist and an exclusivist and differentialist notion, the idea of “culture” used in the ceremonies also shows both of these aspects. in the data presented below, these two notions appear in metaphoric and narrative form. on the one hand, “culture” is presented as a feature that is possessed by every human being, in the basic ability to aesthetically perceive and perform visual or musical art. on the other hand, “culture” is de alt with as a key to understanding or integrating into a society, referring to the cognitive acquisition of knowledge about a body of literature and arts that is framed as nationally characteristic. accordingly, the new citizens are also to addressed to some extent as representatives of their “home cultures”, which are imagined in a folkloristic way. this two-fold conceptualization of “culture” as universalist but also as particular, offers an insight into the logics and mechanisms of the seemingly paradoxical claim of “liberal assimilation”, which appears here as a paradox and also as a specific solution to the problem of how to discursively reconcile cultural unity and diversity. citizenship ceremonies in germany citizenship ceremonies have been introduced in several western european and american countries as well as in australia to ritually celebrate the naturalization of new citizens. in scholarly research, the ceremonies have been evaluated as controlling and discriminatory against new citizens.8 however my goal herein is to consider the ceremonies as representative of wider societal practices and discourses, rather than focusing on their direct social function. i treat citizenship ceremonies as an indicator of how citizenship, societal identity and the new citizens are imagined and presented publicly. in this, i follow tine damsholt who has emphasized the ceremonies’ expressive nature. the citizenship rituals act as seismographic spaces, where national interest, emotions, xenophobia, and politics of belonging and integration surface and are negotiated and performed. thus, citizenship ceremonies form a kind of laboratory for articulating and materializing these new forms of belonging in all their ambiguity and heterogeneity (2009, 18). 8 see merelman (1988) for an analysis of the us ceremonies; fassin and mazouz (2009) for an analysis of france’s ceremonies; and verkaaik (2010) on the ceremonies of the netherlands. 7 review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 in germany, citizenship ceremonies can be seen as even more indicative of societal discourses and practices. since the ceremonies only began to spread in 2007—following the introduction of a pledge of allegiance into the naturalization procedure—they are ‘recently invented traditions’.9 therefore, the ceremonies have no fixed program or content and are neither imposed by federal administration nor institutionalized through tradition. the organizers and hosts of the ceremonies must come up with the ceremonial agenda and content individually, and thus will likely reflect broader societal discourses and practices of belonging and include them in the ceremonial framing. today, most of the naturalization ceremonies in germany are organized by city administrations, in addition to ceremonies held at the district or federal state (länder) levels. the ceremonies feature speeches from both administration officials – mostly city mayors – and naturalized women or men. the national anthem is sung, there is music, and some refreshments are offered. curiously the pledge, which was the very reason for the proliferation of the ceremonies in the first place, is not always included. many administrations prefer to carry out the pledge and the distribution of naturalization certificates individually, and then organize an additional common ceremony for all new citizens instead once or twice a year. the following analysis is based on a data sample that consists of approximately 95 manuscripts of speeches from citizenship ceremonies from all over germany, as well as of participant observation data from fourteen ceremonies held between 2010 and 2013. 10 a selection of the manuscripts and processes were interpreted in depth using sequential analysis adapted from ulrich oevermann’s objective hermeneutics methodology (maiwald 2005; oevermann et al. 1987). by analyzing the data line by line and even word by word, the contingency and selectivity of the statements or actions can be carved out against other possible options. this in turn allows for us to determine the underlying meaning and structure of the selections made. in my analysis i also follow rudolf schmitt’s instructive focus on the analysis of metaphors (2005). his approach of collecting, sorting, and interpreting the set of metaphoric speech contained in a text helped me identify the centrality of the metaphoric concept of ‘culture as a key’ at the ceremonies. the overall theorization of the data was achieved following grounded theory methodology (corbin and strauss 2008, strauss 1996), which also guided the theoretical sampling process of my data collection. while my sole aim here is a thorough description of the mechanics of the seemingly ‘paradoxical’ issue of liberal or cultural assimilation, citizenship ceremonies are of course a specific occasion and the discourses and practices found herein cannot be generalized to the realm of everyday life. thus, although citizenship ceremonies can be used to gain insight into politics and discourses of belonging and integration, it has yet to be determined how widespread and deeply rooted the assumptions about culture and ideas about cultural belonging found in the data presented here really are. 9 i am borrowing and adapting the concept proposed by hobsbawm and ranger (1983). 10 the data was collected as part of a larger ethnographic study on the proceedings and contexts of “doing belonging” at german citizenship ceremonies. 8 review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 the mechanisms of ‘liberal assimilation’: cultural practice and humanity, folk culture and utility what happens at the citizenship ceremonies is a certain framing of belonging and of ‘the citizen’. the new citizens are addressed individually: as subjects who are learning, who are professing their allegiance, and who are receiving some (limited) public attention as well as their certificates. altogether, four distinct themes of how citizenship and belonging are framed at the german citizenship ceremonies emerged from my analysis. first, given that the ceremonies are hosted by cities or local districts, it is not surprising that local integration and identification are central, not national belonging. this theme permeates german ceremonies and helps local officials to evade ethnic definitions of citizenship. second, the motive of individual confession is not only present in the pledge of allegiance, but also in the presentation of individual faces, biographies, and life plans. this theme aims at de-securitizing new citizens in the public eye through transparency and symbolic commitment. third, individual economic efforts are presented as a basis for social recognition and the new citizens’ economic success is narrated as a way to focus on the beneficial nature of immigration for german society. in this paper, i focus on the fourth main theme that appears at the ceremonies: ‘universal culturalization’. this does not imply that the other themes have nothing to do with or even contradict the notion of liberal assimilation. rather, all four themes are intertwined in what the new citizens are supposed to assimilate to and also what liberalism means at the ceremonies. however, the theme of ‘universal culturalization’ provides the most instructive and in-depth insight into the mechanics and shades of the propagated liberal assimilation of the new citizens. there are three main ways that the concept of culture appears in citizenship ceremonies: culture as a key to society, culture as universal human feature, and culture as folkloristic “colouring” of society. i will first present and analyze how each concept is presented at the ceremonies and then discuss how they work together in constructing a welcoming notion of liberal assimilation. culture as “the key” the first conceptualization of culture at the ceremonies is a metaphoric one. culture is dealt with as a “key”, the nation is accordingly presented as a “house” the new citizens want to inhabit and are supposed to enter. a speaker in dresden (2009), after talking about the international cultural influences on his hometown, tells his audience: furthermore, there is a valuable and actually indispensable access to this country and its people, a sort of general key, and this is its culture.11 presenting the nation as a “house” here has no constructive connotation. the speaker is not talking about a house that can be built, furnished or decorated to the wishes of the new inhabitants. he is instead pointing to the confining character of the walls of the house. to enter, one needs a key. if this key is “culture”, it means that new citizens have to somehow acquire the culture of the “house”, of the nation and its people. however, this can be achieved in different 11 darüber hinaus gibt es aber einen wertvollen und eigentlich unverzichtbaren zugang zu diesem land und seinen menschen, eine art generalschlüssel, und das ist seine kultur (guest speaker, dresden 2009; all translations by the author). 9 review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 ways. it is not made clear whether the speaker wants the new citizens to fully assimilate to “the culture” of the nation, or whether he is simply encouraging new citizens to cognitively engage with “german culture” in order to make sense of the country and its customs. at closer view, the concept of culture addressed here has two distinctive elements. it is a universal human feature that people are perceptive to “culture” – or the arts – and therefore the folkloristic colouring of a society can give them an insight into the society in question. thus, at the citizenship ceremonies, two basic instances of “culture” can be distinguished: culture as a uniting universal human feature, and culture as group property. this second notion, however, is confined to a private, leisurely realm, and as such is not a means of separation but of societal wealth and economic utilization. universal culturalism the second conceptualization of culture presented at the ceremonies can be characterized as ‘universal culturalism’. it is based on the idea that every human being is capable of participating in the perception and practice of art. thus, “culture” here refers to high-brow culture and fine arts as opposed to folk or popular culture. ‘universal culturalism’ is imagined as a common ground for citizenship and belonging that can overrule political, religious, or linguistic divisions. the musicians performing at the ceremonies are an important agent in promoting this conceptualization. often, they do not only play or sing, but also address the audience and explain the pieces in the program and their meaning: ok, a wonderful good evening, as already said, we are playing wolfgang amadeus mozart, er, you will hear why music. music is a language that is understood everywhere. you are coming here from all over – from everywhere. we are playing a divertimento. the divertimento number three in d major. divertimento means music in order to amuse oneself (berlin-charlottenburg district 2010, trio leader)12 in the musician’s view, music has a double function at the ceremony. first, it is a common ground for belonging as it “is a language that is understood everywhere”. the new citizens are not addressed as cultural “others”, but instead as fellow participants in the reception of a classical culture that is perceived as universal. the new and old citizens are thus discursively homogenized on a higher, more global level of ‘universal culture’. second, the trio leader also uses his speech as a moment to teach the audience about classical music: “divertimento means…”. this adds a second layer to the function of ‘universal cultural belonging’. the emotional understanding of the music forms its basis, but on top there is an intellectual, educational cultivation of the group members. 12 ja einen wunderschönen guten abend wie schon gesagt wir spielen wolfgang amadeus mozart, äähm, sie werden noch hören warum musik. musik ist eine sprache, die überall verstanden wird. sie kommen ja von der ganzenvon überall her. wir spielen ein divertimento. das divertimento nummer drei in d-dur. divertimento bedeutet musik, um sich zu zerstreuen (trio leader, charlottenburg 2010). 10 review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 culture as folk culture the homogenizing function of cultural universalization can also be prominently found in another case from the sample. at a ceremony in saarbrücken (2010), an international choir is performing. the choir leader explains the group’s mission statement, and invites the ceremony guests to join their choir practice “every tuesday night”. when discussing the choir’s songs, the conductor says: our second song is “santa lucia”, we have a strong italian faction in our choir, and of course they enjoy singing their italian stuff, and of course we enjoy that very much, so we have chosen “santa lucia” which is a popular neapolitan song.13 the universal element of culture is presented here as the practice of singing together in the choir. on this basis, differences in national cultural preferences (“their italian stuff”) are not means of real separation. on the basis of a shared cultural practice and choir identity, differences can be treated as personal preferences, and do not hinder the whole choir from enjoying the italian content “ very much” – although it is not clear from the statement whether this refers to the singing of the song or the performance of the “italian faction”. this treatment of folkloristic immigrant culture as an enrichment for society is a recurring theme at the ceremonies. another speaker, a new citizen himself, connects it with a critique of assimilation policies: in my opinion, a complete integration of the immigrants would not be good – and it would be a step towards a monochrome country. germany needs a trace of exoticism. otherwise, it would be boring – and, in the long run, unhealthy.14 two metaphoric constructions are interwoven here: the society as “monochrome” versus colourful, and the society as a body that is healthy or not. by connecting “colourful” and “healthy”, the “colour” of society and its preservation through time becomes a vital issue. but also, it is associated with a superficial layer of the state of society. one is supposed to “see” whether the city or the societal body is colourful or not, healthy or not. this confines the discussion about cultural assimilation and diversity to a mere superficial level. the wording of the quote analyzed here is a problematic one: depictions of diversity as “colourfulness” and of immigrants as “exotic“ are recurrent themes in racial and othering discourses, and they also account for essentializing the “differences” that are promoted here. however, the discourse in the ceremonies treats “colour” and “exoticism” as rather superficial elements in an otherwise culturally integrated society. assimilation is criticized, but only in relation to “looking alike”. as long as “culture” is folk culture, and is not connected to real conflict or structural issues but to beneficial, healthy, interesting “diversity”, differences are encouraged. at the same time, however, a common universal “culturalization” is assumed: all citizens and all new citizens are rational, culturalized, enlightened people. by positing the different notions of “culture” on 13 das zweite, santa lucia, wir haben hier im chor eine starke italienische fraktion, und die schmettern natürlich gerne ihre italienischen sachen, und da haben wir natürlich spaß dran, und haben santa lucia gewählt, das ist ein neapolitanisches volkslied (choir leader, saarbrücken 2010). 14 eine völlige integration der immigranten wäre meiner meinung nach auch nicht gut – und ein schritt auf dem weg zu einem monochromen land. einen kleinen exotischen touch braucht deutschland. sonst wäre es langweilig – und auf dauer ungesund (new citizen, rostock 2012). 11 review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 different levels of how profoundly they shape the individual and his or her daily life activities, the “culture as a general key” metaphor can ultimately unite the three notions: if new citizens are imagined as modern actors that are perceptive towards “culture”, they can use “culture” – in the sense of the arts or of cultural consumption – as a means to cognitively or performatively align themselves with the “culture” they migrate into. the “international choir” introduced above is another significant symbolization of this relation between assimilation and diversity: the immigrant “singers” can continue to sing “their song” – under the premise and on the basis that they are “singers” in the first place. correspondingly, at the citizenship ceremonies the hosts tend to present their own culture as universal. for example, european classical music is supposedly understood and listened to everywhere and can thus be used for connecting to the new citizens. on the other hand, the culture of the “others”, the new citizens, is understood as folklore, that has its place at the rehearsal of an “international choir” or at a “middle-eastern market”, as advertised at the same ceremony in saarbrücken (2010), when the mayor said during her speech: on june 19th next week – and i hope that we will meet again then – there will be a middleeastern market arranged there [referring to a specific city quarter] for the first time, and we actually could not manage without the migrants who get involved with this. the “fc kandel” will look after the soccer tournament, the islamic congregation has used its network to recruit french marketers, the romanies’ union provides gypsy music and roasted suckling pig, the turkish students’ union invites into its tavla-café and also heaps of german marketers and institutions take part.15 in this peculiar combination of different notions of culture, that are positioned at different levels of how they impact individual and social life, and that are differently attributed to the “we” and the “other”, the program of liberal assimilation can operate. it merges an underlying cultural assimilation, that is presupposed for the new citizens, with a cultural diversity that is expected to remain on a superficial level, that is economically beneficial but not prone to conflict. in doing so, a demand of assimilation can be discursively evaded or even denied, but can still be implicitly maintained. two roots and two notions of culture while joppke (2008) speaks of a “liberal assimilation” as a programmatic idea behind the naturalization procedure at german citizenship ceremonies, liberal subjects are presupposed. new citizens are imagined as compliant with cultural practices like listening to classical music, learning about local history, singing together in a choir, and visiting an “middle-eastern market” where “cultures” are presented as folklore. at the same time, however, they are treated as representatives of some “culture” of their country of origin that is basically confined to the arts, 15 und dort findet ja auch in der nächsten woche am 19. juni, und ich hoffe, dass wir uns dort auch wiedersehen, zum ersten mal ein orientalischer markt statt, und da wären wir eigentlich aufgeschmissen ohne die migrantinnen und migranten die sich hier engagieren. der fc kandel betreut das fußballturnier, die islamische gemeinde hat ihre kontakte spielen lassen um händler aus frankreich hierher zu bringen, die roma-union steuert zigeunermusik und gegrilltes spanferkel bei, der türkische studentenbund lädt ins tavla-cafe ein und jede menge deutscher händler und instiinstitutionen machen dort mit (mayor, saarbrücken 2010). 12 review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 but also encompasses clothing or eating habits – things that can be practiced or sold at a market festival. the presentation of new citizens as culturally compatible on a deep individual level can thus be regarded as a revival of the original idea of a kulturnation, which provided an ideational resource for societal integration in spite of political, religious or language differences. however, this universalist notion of culture at the ceremonies is complemented with two rather differentialist or folkloristic notions of culture. first, the ‘culture as a key’ metaphor presents culture as the property of a society. however, culture here does not prevent newcomers from integrating but rather provides a means for cognitively approaching society and its peculiarities. second, with the folk culture idea “culture” is highlighted as a distinctive feature of the new citizens. confined to the realm of festivities, meals and hobbies, however, culture here again is not dividing feature. instead it is compatible to processes, events and structures within society as a whole. adapting the concept of ‘symbolic ethnicity’ by herbert gans (1979), we can speak of a ‘symbolic culture’ that is promoted at the ceremonies. presented in this way, culture does not determine the actions or values of its human carrier, but can be practiced pragmatically. it is confined to the realm of holidays, ceremonies, or ethnic food consumption. such “culture” is thus a readily available mode for individual distinction, but not a mode for divisively differentiating between groups or even parallel societies within society. what the speakers do at the citizenship ceremonies is adapting and combining the old ideas of kulturnation and bildungsbürgertum into a cultural model that can solve the ‘paradox of universalism’ stated by christian joppke (2008). by taking the existence of a liberal subject for granted, “culture” can become a double instrument of integration rather than separation. it is a common ground – the universal culturalization idea, first formulated with the kulturnation – and it is a means of playful diversity when it comes to consumption and cultural practice. by universalizing european cultural content and by folklorizing everything else, a “clash of cultures” is discursively averted and also the need for assimilation and for demanding it from the immigrants is prevented. we can thus conclude that the ceremonies do not stand for an assimilationist turn in german citizenship policy. but neither is germany presented as a multicultural nation. the old idea of kulturnation is being worked with, is adapted to modern affordances, is revived in its accessible and universalist form rather than in its discarded separationist form. conclusion: a modern paradox the rhetoric combination of different notions of “culture” represents a strategy whose function can be interpreted on different levels. on the level of my data, the speakers at the ceremonies have to deal with a specific problem: how to depict the new citizens as culturally similar, while still acknowledging that they are somehow different? the strategy they turn to, as i have demonstrated in the analysis of how “culture” is represented at the ceremonies, is to frame the new citizens as somehow different on a superficial level while emphasizing their overall conformity and equality. this discursive manoeuvre can also, on a more general level, be seen as a discreet introduction of the idea of diversity into public discussion and public opinion about integration in germany. by differentiating different levels of “culture”, what is imagined as “german culture” (but was never 13 review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 ultimately defined, see above) can implicitly remain the “guiding culture”. it is equated with european culture, with modernity and enlightenment, and is at the same time made invisible by equating it with universal human nature. this move of making it socially invisible is probably what makes it paradoxical. on the other hand, cultural differences can be regarded as superficial, and even beneficial, as colourful, healthy, or interesting. while one could dismiss this idealistic model of a common cultural ground as purely fictitious, it does have its equivalents in everyday life. they can be found in places where people from different backgrounds live and work together in city quarters or villages, where diversity is treated as an asset rather than a threat, and where cultural differences are perceived as normal elements of modern life. in the end, the “paradox of assimilation” of immigrants leads to the general paradox of modern societies: the paradox of culture(s) that oscillates between integration and differentiation, between conformity and individual freedom, that manifests itself in a myriad of ways – but is also dealt with in a myriad of ways. the discursive differentiation of culture and the positioning of its different elements and notions on different layers, which are also associated with different levels of significance for individual life seems to represent a rather typical way of confronting paradoxes like this. however, it is rarely made as explicit as at the citizenship ceremonies. 14 review of european and russian 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"the cachet dilemma. ritual and agency in new dutch nationalism." american ethnologist 37 (1): 69-82 17 review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada available online at: journals.carleton.ca/rera/index.php/rera rera is an electronic academic peer-reviewed journal. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is a joint project supported by the canada-europe transatlantic dialogue—a cross-canada research network supported by the social sciences and humanities research council of canada (sshrc)—along with the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies (carleton university) and its associated research unit, the centre for european studies. rera aims to provide an accessible forum for research, to promote high standards of research and scholarship, and to foster communication among young scholars. contact: 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affairs 11 (1), 2017 issn 1718-4835 cutting the ties? generational limitations in canada’s and germany’s citizenship laws martin weinmann1 abstract this paper2 compares canada’s and germany’s citizenship laws with regard to regulations that delimit the acquisition of citizenship abroad. it finds that the respective regulations are designed similarly, but differ in some details. the canadian regulation, for instance, prevents citizenship from being passed on to the second generation born abroad, whereas the german rule offers an opportunity to retain citizenship without seriously giving proof of a link to the country. from a normative point of view, there are good reasons to delimit the acquisition of citizenship abroad, but also for an opportunity to retain citizenship if people have a genuine link to the state and its political system. the regulations of each country show deficits in this respect. thus, this paper suggests introducing requirements for an entitlement to regain citizenship for second or subsequent generations born abroad which could be designed similarly to the requirements for immigrants who want to naturalize. 1 martin weinmann is a researcher at the expert council of german foundations on integration and migration (svr) 2 the author would like to thank the editors and anonymous reviewers for their very helpful comments. 2 review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 introduction in the “age of migration” (castles and miller 1993) the membership to a polity loses its dependency on fate (masing 2001). it is increasingly influenced by globalization and international mobility. thus, the importance of residence for people’s political localization is rising. this development has led to important implications for nation states and democratic systems as well as the institution of citizenship: international migration led to “significant limitations in representative democracy” (hammar 1990, 2), because the basic principle of representative government (universal suffrage in political elections) and the nation state principle (only citizens are full members and therefore can take part in political elections) came into conflict. regarding the limitations in representative democracy caused by international migration as well as the consequences for concepts of citizenship, scholars in receiving countries mostly focus on the implications for democratic processes caused by immigration. this is reasonable since they are mainly immigration countries. however, many of these countries also have to deal with emigration and have implemented policies focused on emigration and external citizens (e.g. collyer 2016; dumbrava 2014). even if there is still a “lack of comparative and normative studies on external citizenship rights” in these countries (bauböck 2006, 27), these policies have come under increasing investigation in recent years (collyer 2016). this paper aims to making a small contribution to this research by comparing the external citizenship policies of two countries, i.e. the generational limitation of external citizenship acquisition in the canadian and german citizenship acts respectively. comparisons of canada’s and germany’s immigration and citizenship policies have become of increasing interest within the last decade.3 since the late 1980s, scholars mainly emphasized the differences between the two countries (e.g. brubaker 1989; bauder 2011; 2014). however in recent years, the focus has shifted towards highlighting their similarities. this also applies to the intergenerational limitation of the transmission of canadian and german citizenship by expatriates residing abroad (e.g. svr 2015, 129–31). nonetheless, a further and deeper comparison of the respective regulations has not yet been undertaken. this paper aims to fill this gap by concentrating on german and canadian policies which delimit the transmission of citizenship by expatriates residing abroad. for the sake of clarity, other elements of citizenship policy such as citizenship acquisition, as well as rights and duties, will not be discussed herein. situated between a factual contextualization and an initial normative assessment, this paper offers a description of both countries’ policies as a starting point for future “comparative studies that aspire to higher levels of explanation” (landman 2008, 5). this approach also “provide[s] initial hunches about which topics of research may be of interest and which factors may be important to explain observed phenomena” related to the respective policies (landman 2008, 5). in the following sections, i will first assess normative arguments of why the transmission of citizenship abroad should be limited from a certain emigrant generation onwards. this is thought to be needed as a problematization and analytical framework. next, i will give an overview of the historic and legislative contexts of the respective regulations. this is necessary to assess the development of the present regulations against the background of both countries’ migration and citizenship systems. third, i will describe the core elements of the policies to delimit the 3 see for example reitz et al. 1999; geißler 2003; triadafilopoulos 2006; 2012; winter 2007; bauder 2008; 2011; bendel and kreienbrink 2008; bauder, lenard, and straehle 2014; svr 2015. 3 review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 transmission of citizenship abroad and will compare similarities and differences. against this background, i will conclude with a discussion of whether the german generational limitation and the canadian first generation limitation meet the normative requirements discussed before and provide a brief outlook on alternative possibilities where appropriate. definition of the problem: should a country delimit citizenship acquisition abroad? with regard to the limitations of representative democracy caused by international migration as well as the consequences for concepts of citizenship, implications caused by immigration as well as implications caused by emigration should be considered. an important implication caused by immigration is the fact that immigrants are usually excluded from the active and passive voting right unless they acquire the country’s citizenship. even though many receiving countries also have to deal with emigration, the limitations of representative democracy through the acquisition of citizenship abroad are frequently neglected. however, the implications on the principle of self-determination caused by immigration and emigration have more in common as one might initially expect. the freedom of self-determination (or citizen self-government) is one of the most important democratic principles. according to robert a. dahl (1989, 107–8), selfgovernment means that “[b]inding decisions are to be made only by persons who are subject to the decisions, that is, by members of the association, not by persons outside the association". further, the “criterion of inclusion” requires that the demos should include all adults subject to the binding collective decisions except transients (see dahl 1989, 120–29). this criterion is not fulfilled, if a large share of permanent residents are non-citizens and thus do not have full political rights. this can be described as under-inclusiveness, because a significant share of a country’s residents are excluded from political decisions even if they are subjected to these decisions. the criterion is not met either if a large share of citizens without genuine ties with the state is living abroad and keeps full political rights. this can be described as over-inclusiveness, because a significant share of people are included in political decisions even if they are not subject to these decisions (e.g. shachar 2003, 29). representative democracies must have an interest in delimiting the external acquisition of citizenship to reduce over-inclusiveness. thus, it has to be discussed whether the transmission of citizenship abroad by descent (ius sanguinis) should be limited from a certain emigrant generation onwards or not (see e.g. bauböck 2006). states may have an interest in retaining citizens abroad, or have a legitimate interest in granting access to citizenship as compensation to individuals who unjustly lost citizenship or have been deprived of their status in the past due to political despotism (e.g. former political enemies) (dumbrava, 2014). apart from this, trying to recover a national community by allowing former citizens or their descendants living abroad to acquire citizenship without taking up residence in the country, might seem reasonable from an ethno-nationalist point of view. however this is highly problematic on the basis of normative considerations, especially with regard to the freedom of self-determination: if a growing number of non-residents who are not equally subjected to the decisions taken as residents acquire citizenship rights, the “future of those whose fates are permanently tied to the polity” might one day be determined by outsiders (bauböck 2009, 493; see also dumbrava 2014). moreover, it is sometimes argued that the intergenerational acquisition of citizenship abroad would secure continuity of democratic community since a self-governing polity needs a stable core of citizens. 4 review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 yet this is a weak argument for ius sanguinis acquisition abroad over an infinite time period: it is not convincing that granting citizenship to grandchildren of expatriates who have never resided in the country would strengthen democratic continuity (bauböck 2009, 487; dumbrava 2014, 2353–54). a stronger argument against unlimited ius sanguinis acquisition abroad is the legitimation of democratic decisions. one could argue that citizens living abroad are also subject to binding decisions, e.g. because they own property, have business relations, invest in the country, want to return or perhaps have to pay taxes or have to serve in military service (spiro 2003). alternatively, it is hard to see why citizens living abroad should be equally subjected to the decisions taken as residents. even if they may be affected by some decisions in their country of origin (e.g. decisions concerning nationality or military service laws), they “are not directly and comprehensively affected by the decisions and policies” (rubio-marín 2006, 129) as residents (e.g. decisions concerning the education system or working conditions). furthermore, citizens who are permanently living abroad “do not share in the politically determined life of the country; they are not subject to its working conditions and practices, they do not in general pay taxes, their children are not brought up in its education system, and so on” (honohan 2011, 548). understanding citizenship as “membership, rights and participation in a polity" (bauböck 2006, 15) one could argue that first or second generation expatriates should keep citizenship, because they might be affected by the decisions taken in this country in some way or another. this is especially true as long as they have a right to return and therefore should also keep political rights (bauböck 2009, 482–85). in this understanding of citizenship (i.e. participation in a polity) the importance of residence for people’s membership in a polity is rising – especially if migration decisions solidify across generations. it is therefore questionable if there are sufficient reasons why subsequent expatriate generations should be able to pass on citizenship unrestrictedly and over an infinite time period since their births abroad solidify their parent’s or grandparent’s migration decision. however, it could also be argued that people should be able to retain citizenship as long as they have a genuine connection to the state and its political system (shachar 2003). citizenship in germany and canada: historic and legislative contexts since the late 1980s canada and germany were seen more or less as being opposites in terms of migration and citizenship policies (e.g. brubaker 1989; bauder 2011; 2014) which come from “different historic starting points and conditions” (winter 2014b, 48). germany has been described as an ethnic nation where citizenship and belonging were solely based on descent or a shared bloodline (brubaker 1990; 1992). contrary to this, canada has been identified as being the prototype of a multicultural nation (kymlicka 1995) built or shaped by immigration where “immigrants are a constituent part of the nation that citizens feel pride in” (kymlicka 2010, 9). however, in recent years scholars have noted a convergence between certain aspects of canadian and german migration policies and are increasingly focused on studying their similarities (triadafilopoulos 2012; kolb 2014; svr 2015). this also applies to citizenship policies (svr 2015, 126–31). 5 review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 german citizenship: increasing importance of territorial elements german citizenship has traditionally been based on ethnicity. for a long time “the automatic transformation of immigrants into citizens […] [was] unthinkable” (brubaker 1992, 185). the principle of descent (ius sanguinis) has been the decisive criterion for citizenship acquisition since the 1913 nationality act (reichsund staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz). although immigrants had the opportunity to acquire citizenship through naturalization on discretionary decisions (section 8 of the nationality act), they did not have any legal claim up to the early 1990s (green 2001; wiedemann 2005). only statusdeutsche, mostly refugees and displaced persons of german ethnicity (volkszugehörigkeit), were entitled to acquire german citizenship. 4 other immigrants were excluded from this right. most of them were so-called ‘guest workers’ (gastarbeiter) who had immigrated to germany mainly during the 1960s seeking opportunity. they were invited to come to germany by the german government to fill the demand for cheap labor in the country’s booming post-war economy.5 initially permanent immigration was not envisaged and ‘guest workers’ were expected to go back to their countries of origin after a limited period of stay (so called rotation model). but after the labour recruitment agreements with their countries of origin were cancelled in 1973 (anwerbestopp), readmission to germany’s and other western european countries’ labour markets had become impossible. against this background, many ‘guest workers’ decided to stay, brought over their families and became permanent residents. due to germany’s self-image of being a non-immigration country it was expected that these foreigners (ausländer) and their families would eventually return to their countries of origin. in reality, by 1990 nearly 7 % of the population (5.6 million people) did not have german citizenship (statistisches bundesamt 2014). in light of this statistical reality, germany slowly began to reform its citizenship regulations in the early 1990s. special rules for the naturalization of long-term residents and their family members were introduced by a revision of the foreigners act (ausländergesetz) in 1990: immigrants between the ages of 16 and 23, as well as immigrants of 15 or more years of residence were now entitled to be naturalized. foreigners who wanted to acquire german citizenship had to give up their foreign citizenship (sections 85, 86 of the former foreigners act). dual citizenship was only possible under certain conditions, e.g. if it was not possible to give up citizenship (section 87 of the former foreigners act). in contrast to the naturalization rules of the nationality act of 1913, which included only discretionary circumstances, the new foreigners act now included a compulsory claim to naturalization. nonetheless, children of immigrants still did not acquire german citizenship automatically even if they were born on german soil. the possibility of acquisition of german citizenship through birth on territory (ius soli) was firstly introduced within a fundamental reform in 1999 (faist and triadafilopoulos 2006; howard 2008). since then, a child of parents without german citizenship automatically acquires german citizenship if he/she is born in germany and if at least one parent had been a legal resident for a period of eight years and has held an unlimited right of residence (section 4(3) of the german citizenship act). however, until the end of 2014 these children had to decide by the age of 23 4 art. 116 abs. 1 grundgesetz [german constitution] and § 6 gesetz zur regelung von fragen der staatsangehörigkeit [law on the regulation of citizenship questions]. 5 in order to cover the rising labour demand, the federal republic of germany concluded bilateral agreements on labour recruitment (so called anwerbeabkommen) with italy (1955), spain (1960), greece (1960), turkey (1961), morocco (1963), south korea (1963), portugal (1964), tunisia (1965) and yugoslavia (1968). 6 review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 between their german citizenship or the citizenship passed down to them by their parents (section 29 of the german citizenship act, also known as optionspflicht, the ‘duty to choose’) (winter 2014b,). this requirement was widely abolished within the second reform of the german citizenship act by the end of 2014. the majority of the young people affected by the regulation are now allowed to keep both citizenships indefinitely.6 other changes of the 1999 citizenship act reform are a significant reduction of the mandatory residence period required for the acquisition of german citizenship by naturalization from 15 to 8 years as well as the acceptance of dual citizenship in some cases (e.g. if it is impossible to give up the country of origin’s citizenship). amendments in the aftermath of the 1999 citizenship reform led to a general acceptance of dual citizenship for naturalized eu citizens and a specification of the language requirement for naturalization 7 in 2007, as well as the implementation of a standardised citizenship test8 in 2008. less attention has been paid to another important change of the 1999 citizenship act: the introduction of the german generational limitation (section 4(4) of the german citizenship act). the introduction states that a foreign-born child with at least one german parent does not automatically inherit german citizenship if the parent concerned was born himself/herself abroad after 31 december 1999 and does not have his/her residence in germany. canada: traditionally mixing elements of territory and descent in contrast to germany, canadian citizenship is traditionally based on a combination of ius soli and ius sanguinis. canadian citizenship was established through the canadian citizenship act in 1947. individuals born or naturalized in canada were previously considered british subjects. with the entering into force of the act they were conferred canadian citizenship (e.g. citizenship and immigration canada 2015b). furthermore, the 1947 act established rules of acquisition and loss of citizenship. canadian citizenship now was acquired through birth on canadian territory (ius soli). children born abroad of canadian descent (ius sanguinis) acquired canadian citizenship if their father was canadian. children born abroad to a canadian mother and a foreign father acquired citizenship only if they were born out of wedlock. immigrants had the right to naturalize after five years of residence in canada. canadian citizens who acquired citizenship of another country automatically lost canadian citizenship since dual citizenship was restricted. contrary to this, immigrants who naturalized did not have to give proof that they gave up their former citizenship (galloway 2000). dual citizenship without restrictions was firstly recognized within the 1977 citizenship act which replaced the 1947 act. canadian citizenship was not lost automatically any longer if a citizen voluntarily acquired a foreign citizenship (galloway 2000). due to an increasing number 6 for a further discussion see winter, diehl, and patzelt 2015. 7 level b1 of the common european framework of reference for languages (cefr). 8 according to § 10 of the citizenship act, foreign nationals living in germany today have an entitlement to naturalization if they (1) have eight years’ legal and permanent residence in germany, (2) have an unlimited right of residence, (3) avow themselves to the “free democratic basic order” of the german constitution, (4) are able to make a living for themselves and their family without claiming social benefits, (5) give up their foreign nationality, (6) have adequate german language skills (b1), (7) have knowledge of the german legal and social order proved in a citizenship test and (8) have not been sentenced for committing an unlawful act. 7 review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 of non-british immigrants in the 1950s and 1960s the act provided equal rights and duties for naturalized and native born canadians and abolished special treatment for british subjects. a few years before in 1971, the government under prime minister pierre trudeau had adopted a policy that has often been described as multiculturalism within a bilingual framework (knowles 2000; hague 2012). 9 further, the 1977 citizenship act reduced the residence requirement for naturalization from five to three years and introduced an entitlement for naturalization for qualified applicants. additionally, children of canadian descent born abroad from then on acquired canadian citizenship automatically regardless of their parents’ gender (knowles 2000; citizenship and immigration canada 2015b; grey and gill 2015). the only provision for automatic loss of citizenship in the 1977 act concerned birth abroad. individuals who were born in a foreign country in the second or subsequent generation automatically lost canadian citizenship unless they applied for its retention by their 28th birthday (young 1998; winter 2015). with the exception of minor reforms, canadian citizenship remained unchanged until 2009 (winter 2014a). when bill c-37 came into effect on april 17, 2009, canadian citizenship legislation was extensively reformed, notably by the repatriation clause and the first generation limitation clause. the repatriation clause enables so-called lost canadians to reacquire citizenship. these individuals were never granted canadian citizenship, or ceased to be citizens due to stipulations in the country’s 1947 citizenship act which are nowadays considered discriminatory and incompatible with the canadian charter of rights and freedoms (winter 2014a; 2014b). for example, this concerns second—and subsequent—generation canadians born abroad since 1977 who failed to apply for the retention of canadian citizenship by their 28th birthday (e.g. becklumb 2014, 1–4).10 on the contrary, the first generation limitation prevents the passing on of canadian citizenship through the children of canadian emigrants. a foreignborn child of canadian parents who emigrated still acquires canadian citizenship through descent, but does not pass canadian citizenship on to his/her own children if they are also born abroad. this amendment finds expression in section 3(3) of the canadian citizenship act (becklumb 2014).11 finally, on june 19, 2014, an important amendment to the citizenship act, the strengthening canadian citizenship act (bill c-24), received royal assent.12 it contains different amendments which made it harder to become a canadian citizen and easier to lose citizenship. for example, the amendment increased the residence requirement for naturalization from three (out of the four previous) years to four (out of the six previous) years (grey and gill 2015; béchard, becklumb, 9 multiculturalism was recognized in the canadian charter of rights and freedoms in 1982. it became law through the 1988 multiculturalism act. 10 other groups concerned are: individuals who voluntarily acquired another country’s citizenship before dual citizenship was recognized in the 1977 act or individuals who did not acquire canadian citizenship because they were born abroad in wedlock by a canadian mother and a foreign father. 11 if the canadian government wants to create a new law it first introduces a bill in either the house of commons or the senate (mostly the house of commons). in order to become law the bill has to pass various stages in both chambers. if it passes these steps it is given royal assent and is given a chapter number for the statutes of canada, a compilation of all the federal laws of canada (e.g. british columbia courthouse library society 2002). clause 2(2) of bill c-37 added the new sections 3(3) to 3(5) to the citizenship act; the preexisting section 8 has been repealed by clause 6 (becklumb 2014, 10). 12 for an overview see winter (2015, 18–29). 8 review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 and elgersma 2014; citizenship and immigration canada 014a). 13 concerning the loss of citizenship, the amendment also allows the revoking of canadian citizenship based on sentences for activities like organized crime or terrorism as well as violation of human rights, war crimes or fighting against canada in an armed conflict (béchard, becklumb, and elgersma 2014). regarding the issues discussed above, the 2014 amendment extended citizenship to more lost canadians. these are, for instance, people born or naturalized in canada or british subjects residing in canada before the first canadian citizenship act took effect and who were not eligible for canadian citizenship due to this act as well as their children born abroad in the first generation (béchard, becklumb, and elgersma 2014; citizenship and immigration canada 2014b).14 furthermore, there have been some minor adjustments concerning the first generation limitation. the changes clarify to whom the rule applies and define certain groups for whom the rule does not apply. these include children born abroad to a canadian parent who was a (foreign born) adoptee (canadian bar association 2014; béchard, becklumb, and elgersma 2014). however overall, the mechanism of delimiting the intergenerational transition of citizenship abroad remained largely unaffected. comparison of the generational limitations in canada and germany there are two clauses relevant for the issues discussed in this paper related to the acquisition of citizenship abroad by ius sanguinis. for canada, it is section 3(3) added to the canadian citizenship act through bill c-37 in 2009. this amendment is the canadian equivalent to section 4(4) of the german citizenship act, which has been in force since january 2000. since april 17, 2009, section 3(3) of the canadian citizenship act prevents the passing on of canadian citizenship through the children of canadian emigrants. a foreign-born child of canadian parents who emigrated still acquires canadian citizenship through descent. however, he/she does not pass on canadian citizenship to his/her own children if they are also born abroad. said differently, every child of an emigrant born outside of canada is still a canadian citizen by descent, while his/her children born abroad are not. similarly, section 4(4) of the german citizenship act states that a foreign-born child with at least one german parent does not automatically inherit german citizenship, if the parent concerned was born abroad after december 31, 1999 and does not have his/her home (i.e. habitual place of residence) in germany. so far, the two regulations are alike: the first generation limitation as well as section 4(4) preclude canadian as well as german citizens from passing on citizenship to their children born abroad after one generation. thus, both countries combine elements of ius soli and ius sanguinis and provide an ius connexio for citizenship acquisition abroad. this additional principle 13 besides that, citizenship applicants have to prove physical presence in the country for at least 183 days per year. furthermore, time spent in canada before getting permanent resident status no longer counts toward the residence requirement. other important changes include for example stricter language rules. 14 the current liberal government is planning to repeal some of these changes (bill c-6). the proposed amendments provide for example a reduction of the residence requirement for naturalization from four out of six years to three out five years. moreover, the bill would repeal the provision that allows for the revocation of citizenship which was introduced in 2014. in june 2016 bill c-6 passed the canadian house of commons. the bill was referred to the standing senate committee on social affairs, science and technology after the second reading in the senate in december 2016 (citizenship and immigration canada 2016; parliament of canada 2016). 9 review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 “considers membership on the basis of a tangible connection between the individual and the state (as established by proof of residency, for example)” (shachar 2003, 29). preventing or limiting citizenship from being passed on however, the two regulations differ in some details. the canadian regulation no longer provides a mechanism for canadians who are the second (or subsequent) generation born abroad to retain citizenship. in contrast, the german section 4(4) allows children born in the second generation abroad to acquire citizenship. they are subsequently granted german citizenship in addition to their other citizenship(s) if their parents apply within twelve months for registering the birth in the german birth register. the application can be made at the diplomatic representation in the country of residence (oberhäuser 2016). no evidence for a serious connection to germany needs to be provided. accordingly, the berlin registry office no. i, that is responsible for the registration of the majority of foreign births, reports that not all applicants have adequate language skills in german (weinmann 2016). in summary, the german stipulations are less stringent than those employed in canada. section 4(4) of the german citizenship act merely limits the transmission of citizenship from the second to the third (or subsequent) generation(s). the first generation limitation completely prevents canadian citizenship from being passed on from the second to the third emigrant generation.15 this irrevocably cuts the ties between canada and its emigrants’ descendants (winter 2014a). before 2009 it was also possible for subsequent generations born abroad to maintain canadian citizenship. with the 2009 amendment “the preexisting mechanism for canadians who are the second or subsequent generation born abroad to register and retain citizenship by age 28 [has been] repealed” (becklumb 2014, 10; winter 2014b). there is in fact no way to retain canadian citizenship, even if these children or their parents have a genuine link to canada. current or prospective legal significance another difference between the two clauses is the current legal significance. the first generation limitation already has legal significance for children born since april 17, 2009 to a canadian parent born abroad. a child born abroad after april 17, 2009, to a canadian also born abroad would no longer acquire canadian citizenship. in contrast, the german section 4(4) only gradually becomes legally significant, because it is only relevant for children born abroad whose parents were also born abroad after december 31, 1999.16 grandchildren of german emigrants whose parents were born abroad themselves up to december 31, 1999, still acquired german citizenship automatically. but grandchildren of german emigrants whose parents are born abroad themselves since january 1, 2000 no longer acquire german citizenship automatically. 15 there are certain groups for whom the rule does not apply. these are for example children born abroad to a canadian parent working in or with canadian armed forces, federal public administration or the public service of a province or children born abroad to a canadian parent who was a (foreign born) adoptee (for exceptions see e.g. canadian bar association 2014, 28; béchard, becklumb, and elgersma 2014, 4–6; government of canada 2009). 16 against this background, section 4(4) has not yet been commented in the 2008 edition of a legal commentary on the german citizenship act (oberhäuser 2008, 1988). 10 review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 there is virtually no knowledge about the number of people who are actually or will be prospectively affected by both regulations, because statistical information on emigrants is “notoriously unreliable” (collyer 2016, 6) and children born abroad to citizens are not registered in national statistics if they do not automatically acquire citizenship. for germany, the only source of information is the berlin registry office no. i, that is responsible for the registration of the majority of foreign births. although the german regulation becomes legally relevant, just recently, the berlin registry office no. i already records an increase in the number of applications within the last years. even though the office cannot provide exact data on the increase as well as the applicants’ year of birth (born before or after 2000), it refers to the fact that 21,000 applications had been unprocessed in may 2017.17 causing statelessness or restricting an intergenerational accumulation of citizenships the absoluteness of the canadian rule – which becomes visible in completely preventing canadian citizenship from being passed on after the first generation born abroad – “will result in some offspring of canadians born abroad in the future being stateless” (becklumb 2014, 10; winter 2014b, 41). the canadian citizenship act still provides a mandatory grant of citizenship to avoid statelessness in some cases (section 5 of the canadian citizenship act). a person will be granted citizenship on application if they were born abroad after the limitation came into force, is less than 23 years of age by the time of the application, has resided in canada for at least three years (during the four years immediately before the application), has always been stateless and has not been convicted of various listed national security offences (e.g. terrorism). nevertheless, statelessness is not avoided automatically if the child born abroad does not acquire citizenship in his/her country of birth by ius soli. this situation will become more frequent in the future since “[o]nly 30 of the world’s 194 countries practice jus soli” (feere 2010, 5).18 to acquire canadian citizenship, an individual must live in canada for at least three years in canada, and must first enter canada as a stateless person – which would probably be difficult. against this background, the mandatory grant of canadian citizenship to avoid statelessness hardly seems to be an ‘emergency parachute’ for children becoming stateless due to the first generation limitation. this might be one reason why the first generation limitation is considered to be “only minimally” compliant with the united nation’s convention on the reduction of statelessness (becklumb 2014, 14). in derogation thereof, the generational limitation in the german case does not apply for children who thereby would become stateless (oberhäuser 2016). a descendant of german parents does not acquire german citizenship anymore if they as well as their parents are born abroad and has another citizenship. having another citizenship seems to be just one of the conditions, but it is actually the decisive factor. the german generational limitation is only takes effect if the child acquires another citizenship. thus, it restricts an intergenerational accumulation of multiple citizenships, but does not cause statelessness. 17 information received via e-mail from the berlin registry office no. i on 9 may 2017; in august 2016 18,000 applications had been unprocessed (weinmann 2016). 18 moreover, statelessness is not avoided automatically if the child born abroad does not acquire another citizenship by ius sanguinis. this would be the case if e.g. one parent would have dual nationality or the parents have different citizenships. 11 review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 historic and legislative context the generational limitations in canada and germany must be seen in light of the legislative context of their introduction as described above. in germany, the introduction of the generational limitation must be seen in the context of the citizenship act reform in 1999. reducing the automatic inheritance of german citizenship abroad was first demanded by the german social democratic party (spd) within the so-called asylum compromise in 1992.19 however, it was not implemented until the reform of the german citizenship act in 1999.20 thus, the legislative context of the german generational limitation is the introduction of ius soli for children of foreigners born inland (section 4(3) of the german citizenship act) as well as the substantial relief of the acquisition of citizenship through naturalisation which also lead to exceptions of the rule of rejecting dual citizenship. at first glance, section 4(4) seems to be just an appendage of this reform. yet in reality, the combination of the introduction of an element of ius soli and the limitation of ius sanguinis acquisition abroad makes the 1999 citizenship reform stringent: section 4(4) was meant to be “the counterpart to the introduction of the ius soli”,21 as stated in the official justification of the citizenship act. the introduction of the generational limitation was mainly justified with a missing link to the state’s territory.22 by combining the introduction of ius soli and the generational limitation the principle of descent was seriously questioned for the first time; it has been the decisive criterion for citizenship acquisition since 1913. accordingly, the generational limitation is seen as giving proof that the introduction of ius soli “was intended to be a real paradigm shift” (masing 2001, 7, author’s translation; renner 2002, 266). being a german citizen is not exclusively determined through fate and ethnicity anymore, but also through a spatial connection. this has led to a “decoupling of ethnicity and citizenship” in germany (joppke 2005, 234). thus, the changes of the citizenship reform of 1999 can be interpreted as de-ethnicization of german citizenship, “in the sense of grounding access to citizenship more on residence and birth on territory than on filiation” (joppke 2003, 430). the legislative context of the canadian first generation limitation is bill c-37, an amendment to the canadian citizenship act, which took effect on april 17, 2009. the bill consists of two important clauses: the first generation limitation and the repatriation clause. the first generation limitation restricts the inheritance of canadian citizenship to the first generation of children born abroad. similarly to the introduction of the generational limitation in germany, the canadian first generation limitation “limit[s] citizenship by descent” (citizenship and immigration canada 2015a) and was officially justified as “protecting the value of citizenship by ensuring that future canadians have a real connection with canada”. 23 yet in contrast to the german case, it was – even before the introduction of the first generation limitation – not possible to pass on citizenship to children born abroad unrestrictedly and over an infinite time 19 see entwurf eines gesetzes zur reform des staatsangehörigkeitsrechts, bundestagsdrucksache 14/533 vom 16. märz 1999, p. 14 [draft law on the reform of the citizenship act, bundestag printed matter from 16 march 1999]. 20 see gesetz zur reform des staatsangehörigkeitsrechts vom 15. juli 1999, bundesgesetzblatt jahrgang 1999 teil i nr. 38, ausgegeben zu bonn am 23. juli 1999, pp. 1618–1623 [law on the reform of the citizenship act from 15 july 1999, federal law gazette volume 1999 part i no. 38, published in bonn on 23 july 1999]). 21 author’s translation. 22 see entwurf eines gesetzes zur reform des staatsangehörigkeitsrechts, bundestagsdrucksache 14/533 vom 16. märz 1999, pp. 13–14 [draft law on the reform of the citizenship act, bundestag printed matter from 16 march 1999]. 23 see canada gazette part i, december 13, 2008, vol. 142, no. 50, p. 3156. 12 review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 period. individuals born outside of canada in the second or subsequent generation had to apply for the retention of their canadian citizenship by their 28th birthday. the first generation limitation replaced this regulation and made it – with few exceptions – impossible for subsequent generations born abroad to retain canadian citizenship. in contrast, the repatriation clause made it possible that individuals (born abroad to canadians) who formerly had failed to apply for the retention of canadian citizenship by their 28th birthday could retroactively (re)gain canadian citizenship (so-called lost canadians) – even if they do not “reside in, or relocate to canada” (winter 2015, 14). against this background, bill c-37 is seen as consisting of “two seemingly contradictory amendments” (winter 2014a, 47): on the one hand, descendants of canadians formerly born abroad became enabled to regain citizenship, even if they have never resided or never will reside in canada. on the other hand, descendants of canadians born abroad in the future in a similar situation are restricted to retain citizenship. while lost canadians do not need to prove a real connection to canada to (re)acquire canadian citizenship, prospective emigrants’ grandchildren do not even have an opportunity to give proof of a real connection if they would like to acquire citizenship. the possibility to retain citizenship by discretion existed under canada’s previous generational limitation. the current rule, by contrast, practices a very strict and definite cut off instead of the possibility to decide for canadian citizenship (winter 2015). discussion by comparing the two regulations, it has been demonstrated that the canadian first generation limitation is more stringent than the german section 4(4). in contrast to the german regulation, the first generation limitation completely prevents canadian citizenship from being passed from the second to the third emigrant generation. thus, the canadian rule is not only stricter than the german rule but also stricter than other generational limitations in european countries. in the european union, 14 out of 28 countries “apply the rule of ius sanguinis in a qualified manner” for citizens born abroad (dumbrava 2014, 2344), but also provide an opportunity to retain citizenship. another important difference is that the first generation limitation may cause statelessness, while the german rule does not. in the german case the generational limitation does not apply for children who would thereby become stateless. for democratic reasons it is questionable if the limited transmission of citizenship via ius sanguinis practiced by the two countries and thus the stronger linking of citizenship to the place of residence is reasonable and appropriate. as already mentioned, in the common understanding of citizenship as political membership the importance of residence for people’s membership in a polity is rising – especially if migration decisions solidify across generations. in the german case the introduction of the generational limitation as well as ius soli within the 1999 citizenship reform have to be seen as an instrument of guaranteeing a serious possibility of political participation (or influence on decisions) of those who are subjected to the decisions taken: both regulations try to trace an effective change in people’s life circumstances caused by international migration and mobility (see also renner 2002). the introduction of the generational limitation in germany’s citizenship legislation has been mainly justified with emigrant’s descendants fading connections to the state’s territory. the introduction of canada’s first generation limitation has also been justified by ensuring that future citizens have a real connection with the country. 13 review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 however, this was already guaranteed by the previous rule, which demanded a mandatory application for citizenship retention. moreover, it is not comprehensible why the repatriation clause enabled descendants of canadians formerly born abroad to regain citizenship, even if they never resided or will reside in canada while its sister clause, the first generation limitation, prevents descendants of canadians in a similar situation and born abroad in the future to retain citizenship. generational limitations always aim at preventing an unlimited acquisition of citizenship by descent to people who no longer have a connection to the country or rather to the state’s territory. thereby citizenship laws become extended through an ius connexio. this is reasonable from a normative perspective. through generational limitations political affiliation becomes related to the prospective spatial affiliation, i.e. the “expectation of future residence in a country is interpreted as a major indicator of a genuine link between individuals and the state” (dumbrava 2014, 2343). this is understandable since the “criterion of territorial contact” (masing 2001, 28, author’s translation) is also practiced in the minimum resident requirement for naturalization of immigrants. nonetheless, individuals should be able to retain citizenship if they can prove a genuine connection to the state and its political system (shachar 2003). due to the absoluteness of the canadian first generation limitation the only possibility for citizens born abroad to retain citizenship for their children is to choose canada as place of birth for their offspring. against this background the question is, which connection is missing – the expatriate’s connection to their country of origin or the country’s to its expatriates? as it stands, it is not the expatriates who fail to maintain a link to canada, but rather canada seems to be cutting the ties with its citizens abroad. the strictness of the one rule is the weakness of the other. although there is a “tight time limit” (joppke 2003, 444) of only one year for birth registration, it is comparatively easy to retain german citizenship for children born abroad. this possibility weakens the rigidity of the rule. under the condition of birth registration german citizenship could (theoretically) be passed on infinitely. for that reason meireis (2000, 70, author’s translation) assesses the german generational limitation as a “blunt sword”. yet there is also a normative problem: the preclusive period for registration of one year after birth is meant to ensure that an application is made only if there is a serious connection to the country. this seems to be legitimate because people who do not have any connection might not even know about the requirement of registering. however conversely, legal knowledge or “administrative skills” (masing 2001, 7, author’s translation) of the parents seem not to be an appropriate indicator for a serious connection. in the canadian case “place of one’s birth is being used as a proxy for one`s attachment” to the country (winter 2014b, 49). in the german case it is legal and administrative knowledge. this raises the question of what is the best criteria to determine proof of a genuine link to the country of origin? one possibility would be to introduce requirements for an entitlement to retain citizenship for second or subsequent generations born abroad. these requirements could be designed similarly to the requirements for immigrants who want to naturalize. another possibility could be the introduction of citizenship and language tests for the parents which secure a minimal knowledge of the country, its language and its political system. furthermore, the country could delimit an entitlement of retaining citizenship up to a defined generation born abroad. another option would be to apply graduated criteria for subsequent generations. for 14 review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 further research it may be of interest to examine why countries develop policies with varying degrees of stringency to pursue the same objective. the two examples, the canadian first generation limitation and the german section 4(4), show that generational limitations can be designed differently, although they may pursue similar objectives. from a normative point of view there are good reasons to delimit the acquisition of citizenship abroad, but in order to justify generational limitations within democratic theory there must be an opportunity to retain citizenship by giving proof of a genuine link to the state and its political system. 15 review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 references bauböck, rainer. 2006. “citizenship and migration concepts and controversies.” in migration and citizenship. legal status, rights and political participation, edited by rainer bauböck, 15–31. amsterdam: amsterdam university press. ———. 2009. “the rights and duties of external citizenship.” citizenship studies 13 (5): 475–99. doi:10.1080/13621020903174647. bauder, harald. 2008. “kanada: zuwanderungsmodell für deutschland?” geographische rundschau 60 (2): 48–50. ———. 2011. immigration dialectic: imagining community, economy and nation. toronto: university of toronto press. ———. 2014. “re-imagining the nation lessons from the debates of immigration in a settler society and an ethnic nation.” journal of comparative migration studies 2 (1): 9–27. 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peer-reviewed journal. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is a joint project supported by the canada-europe transatlantic dialogue—a cross-canada research network supported by the social sciences and humanities research council of canada (sshrc)—along with the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies (carleton university) and its associated research unit, the centre for european studies. rera aims to provide an accessible forum for research, to promote high standards of research and scholarship, and to foster communication among young scholars. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada tel: +01 613 520-2600 ext. 3117; e-mail: rera-journal@carleton.ca creative commons license creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0 this working paper is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial no derivs 3.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 3.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, provided the source is acknowledged. no use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes. issn: 1718-4835 © 2017 the author(s) https://journals.carleton.ca/rera/index.php/rera mailto:rera-journal@carleton.ca http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ introduction references available online at: journals.carleton.ca/rera/index.php/rera contact: carleton university tel: +01 613 520-2600 ext. 3117; e-mail: rera-journal@carleton.ca creative commons license issn: 1718-4835 microsoft word madularea_jan 10_final copy.doc review of european and russian affairs 7 (1), 2012 issn 1718-4835   © 2012 the author(s) www.carleton.ca/rera le code de la nationalite belge: a citizenship law in the making adina madularea university of ottawa abstract in april 2010, the most recent process was initiated regarding the revision of law on the acquisition of belgian nationality. a strong debate on the subject had been going on during 2010–2011. this research paper focuses on the positions held by different political parties and representatives with regard to the main issues included in numerous amendments brought to the existing belgian nationality code. looking at the way in which different aspects have been formulated and debated will provide insights about the stakes of different political actors involved and the process of political negotiation on a very sensitive territory, namely that of citizenship granting in a country with a federal government and a significant cleavage between its main ethnic groups. 2 review of european and russian affairs 7 (2), 2012 introduction in april 2010, shortly before its fall, the belgian government leterme ii had reached an agreement on the revision of law on the acquisition of belgian nationality. the code of belgian nationality was last reformed in 2000. in its current form, it contains the most flexible conditions for acquiring citizenship among the countries of the european union (eu). the code therefore, seems to contradict current european trends in citizenship law, which often promote a “thickening” of citizenship law through the introduction of language and integration requirements. for this reason, a new reform of the belgian citizenship was expected, not only in order to follow the european trends, but also because internally, critics have pointed out that easy access to citizenship brings along the risk of eroding the value of belgian citizenship. i will therefore argue that the change of citizenship law, and consequently the debate around it, is driven by three key influences: the european context, belgium nationalism, and political parties’ ideologies. i will focus on the latter two factors, using the general change in the orientation of citizenship laws in europe as a backdrop against which the belgian case will be analyzed. the debate on citizenship law in belgium has particular features given the country’s unique situation characterized by structural pluralism, which was granted to historically recognized linguistic and regional groups (the walloons and the flemish) (winter 2011). within this context, the ample discussion regarding the nationality code is demonstrated in numerous amendments (comprised in no less than 18 documents registered at the chamber of representatives). these amendments reveal the complex negotiations between the most powerful ethnic groups. one should also not forget that all the official documents bear the mark of their ideological era. in this situation, it is the ideology of their promoters (different political parties and coalitions), as well as that of the present time that are expected to guide the understanding of this official exchange of opinions. the present paper focuses on the positions held by different political parties and representatives with regard to the main issues included in the numerous amendments brought to the current belgian nationality code, the stakes of different political actors involved, and the process of political negotiation on a very sensitive territory—namely that of granting citizenship in a country with a federal government and a significant cleavage between its main ethnic groups. in the following sections, i present the context of this research, namely the political and administrative particularities of belgium. i will then present a brief overview of the two theoretical perspectives that help frame the debate on nationality law in belgium before discussing the methodological approach. finally, this paper will highlight the results of this empirical analysis and what these results mean for belgium’s nationality law on the one hand, and european trends in citizenship laws on the other. background a few contextual details are necessary with regard to the particular situation of belgium as a federal state, as well as to the current law on citizenship and main features of immigration in belgium. belgium has a “highly decentralized federal system” (seidle 2008, 6) defined by: • three regions (the flemish region, the walloon region, and the brussels-capital region); • and three language communities (dutch language within the flemish community, french language within wallonia–brussels federation, and german language within the german speaking community) review of european and russian affairs 7 (2), 2012 3 the federal government holds the decision making on the legislation of nationality, while the reception and integration of immigrants is a regional and communal matter. belgium’s complex organization also implies a complicated political scene where unilingual political parties compete against each other at the provincial level within the same linguistic group (except the officially bilingual brussels) while sharing power at the federal level.1 the actual nationality law in belgium relies on the use of the jus soli (territoriality) principle alongside the jus sanguinis (parentage/family links) principle. as opposed to the majority of eu countries, and as a consequence of the 2000 reform, belgium has a less restrictive naturalization policy—a foreign citizen can acquire belgian nationality after just three years of legal residence in the country. moreover, citizenship can also be acquired by a simple “declaration of citizenship” after seven years of legal stay. under the current citizenship law, there are no official language requirements and no official tests to assess the knowledge of participants with regard to local values, culture, or history. in terms of linguistic and civic integration, the main difference is between the flemish community and the walloon community, which also represent the main poles of dynamics in the political arena. as jacobs and rea (2006, 11) point out, the issue of integration has been considered by the flemish authorities within “a cultural vision of the nation” (ethnos) while the walloons “tend to privilege the demos (a political vision of the nation).” as a consequence, the policy of “inburgering” (the process of becoming a citizen) has been promoted within flanders territory with the purpose of facilitating immigrants’ insertion into the flemish society. according to the official “inburgering” website, immigrants residing on the flemish territory are provided with an individual “civic integration trajectory” consisting in a social orientation course, dutch language course, and support to find a job in the labour market. the walloon government has adopted no particular measures towards the linguistic integration of adult immigrants. although there are french language and literacy courses offered, as well as social, cultural, and civic information, wallonia “takes a more liberal approach, with the immigrant being responsible for his/her own integration” (seidle and fourot 2008, 3). therefore, no official enforcement with regard to integration has been put in place in wallonia as opposed to flanders where this policy is very well articulated and includes administrative fines for not complying with the civic integration requirements.2 all things considered, while the flemish community is generally characterized by an ethnocultural orientation, the french-speaking community “is conceived more in politico-civic terms” (foblets and yanasmayan 2010, 280). the approach to integration in the brussels-capital region 1. traditional parties (catholic and liberal), as well as more recent ones (socialist and green) operate on each side of the linguistic border. more precisely, the christian democrats are represented in flanders by christian democrat and flemish party (christen-democratisch en vlaams, cd&v) which is also the country’s largest party and by the democratic and humanist center (centre démocratehumaniste, cdh) in wallonia. open flemish liberals and democrats (open vlaamseliberalen en democraten, open vld) is the liberal party in flanders while mouvementréformateur (mr) is its equivalent in wallonia. among newer political parties that play a role on the political scene of flanders, there should be mentioned the right wing, conservative and nationalist movement new flemish alliance (nieuw-vlaamsealliantie, n-va), the green party groen!, and the far-right, self-proclaimed radical, nationalist, and republican party, flemish interest (vlaamsbelang, vb). in wallonia, there is the francophone ecologist party (ecolo) which made a coalition with its flemish counterpart and the social democratic party (partisocialiste, ps). 2. as mentioned in the article 25 § 2 of the decree on the flemish integration policy from 28 february 2003, in cases of failure to comply, immigrants can be fined between 50 and 5000 euros depending on the seriousness of the infringement (european commission 2003)). 4 review of european and russian affairs 7 (2), 2012 is rather “hybrid,” being influenced by the approaches of the other two regions (le texier 2006, 2). moreover, the political dynamics behind these main regions is much more complex, implying not only the opposition between the parties of one region against those of the other region, but also a significant degree of variation within parties in terms of political fights and diverse views. the present research focuses on the difference between parties’ views concerning the different amendments proposed for the citizenship law. what is more, belgium is often seen as a country of immigration and has welcomed immigrants for a variety of historical reasons (loobuyck and jacobs 2009; le texier 2006; martiniello and rea 2003). the active process of recruiting foreign workers (for coal mines at first, then for other industrial sectors) was initiated soon after the second world war through bilateral agreements with italy, spain, greece, morocco, turkey, tunisia, algeria, and yugoslavia. in addition, workers from the european community were allowed free movement to belgium for extended periods of time and were eventually granted residence permits (martiniello and rea, 2003). immigration has been, moreover, propelled by the numerous family reunification requests, by asylum seekers and refugees, and by the relaxed residence requirements for citizenship resulting in the 2000 reform of the nationality code3 (seidle 2008, 2). as a consequence, 9.11 percent (around 971 000) of the belgian population has foreign nationality out of which more than 354 000 live in the flemish region, 322 000 in wallonia, and the rest (around 295 000) in the brussel-capital region (direction générale emploi et marché du travail 2009).4it should also be added that the composition of immigrant communities differs significantly between flanders and wallonia. in flanders, most immigrants have turkish or moroccan origins, while in wallonia the majority of immigrants are from southeastern europe (foblets and yanasmayan 2010, 281). over time, immigration has been acknowledged to bring significant economic contributions. however, politically speaking, the permanent presence of immigrants has encouraged the debate with regard to citizenship and integration policies. in conclusion, belgium’s complex regional, political, and demographic histories provide an important context for which the bill on belgian citizenship law was born. literature review the debate about the belgian nationality law can be explained from two different perspectives that are equally important. first, this debate can be situated within a body of literature that examines the changes of citizenship laws and citizenship ideology at the international and european levels. the second perspective concentrates on an in-depth understanding of intergroup relations within belgium and on belgian identity and “cultural idioms”5 with regard to nationality and varying ideologies about immigrant integration. this paper will now briefly outline both perspectives. first, at the european level, “citizenship has become more communitarian and civic republican in character” as serious criteria of civic orientation and language knowledge have 3. three years of residence requirement for most immigrants (instead of five) and two years for refugees. 4. in 2007, the italians (17.39 percent of the total population with foreign origin), french (13.44 percent) and dutch (12.7 percent) were the most important communities of european origin while moroccans (8.22 percent) and turks (4.07 percent) are the main non-eu communities (http://www.emploi.belgique.be/publicationdefault.aspx?id=28778, accessed december 20, 2012) 5. the term 'cultural idiom' was used by rogers brubaker (1992) to define a dominant and historically rooted national style of thought on nationhood and citizenship in a country. review of european and russian affairs 7 (2), 2012 5 been introduced among the citizenship granting requirements (van oers et al 2010, 320). within the context of a so-called “crisis of multiculturalism,” the reaffirmation of the nation-state’s sovereignty through its old institution of citizenship was seriously called into question. as a consequence, states have made “recent efforts to upgrade and re-nationalize citizenship by ceremony, civic integration tests and more exclusive rights” (joppke 2010a, 9). zapata-barrero synthesizes the intensely discussed transformation of citizenship as follows: while the de-nationalization of citizenship has been the main trend since the early 90s, recently several old european host countries (like denmark, the netherlands, germany, france and the united kingdom) have put strong emphasis on the need to consolidate the citizenship/nationality link and even re-nationalize citizenship, by making it dependent on restrictive cultural requirements, like language and civic tests, and have introduced symbolic ceremonies. (2009, 7) however, in joppke’s vision (2010a, 29), these are rather “desperate efforts” in front of the “inevitable lightening of citizenship” illustrated by the “court-driven empowerment of eu citizenship” which is seen as “a citizenship of our time, entirely free of the baggage of nationhood and nationalism.” in other words, the innovative construct of eu citizenship indicates an inevitable dissociation between citizenship and nationhood. but until then, we can still speak about an “assimilative civic integration” which both communitarians and republicans agree upon, although for different reasons: “while the first aims at identification with shared cultural values in society (nationalism), the second aims at participation in the political community and civil society” (zapata-barrero, 2009, 12). however, it should also be noted that the changes to the citizenship acquisition process in belgium and other european countries are primarily aimed at third-country nationals and less at european union citizens, who do not really need to change citizenship. coming back to the second perspective and the literature that is concerned with belgium’s particular situation, a closer look at the history of the two communities is necessary to better understand what animates the positions held in the debate of the bill to amend the citizenship law. the idea of “cultural boundaries” needs to be employed in this analysis as belgium is often described “as the crossroads of two cultures” (gysen et al 2009, 101). more exactly, “the country is seen as the symbolic borderline between an anglo-saxon differentialistic model of multiculturalism in northern europe and a latin universalistic model of integration and the making of a multicultural society in southern europe” (101). but, in light of changes made in the 2000s to citizenship acquisition procedures in different countries across europe, the traditional frameworks for analyzing national models need to be rethought of since the “old categories of nationalism” (collectivist-ethnic, collectivist-civic and pluralist-civic models) are now “very blurred” (wright 2008, 7). this happened precisely because formerly “multicultural” or civic citizenship promoting countries (like denmark and the netherlands) have moved towards restricting their boundaries and citizenship laws, while germany (traditionally an ethnic nation/with “blood-based” citizenship) has eased its citizenship laws. jacobs and rea (2006) provide interesting insights about the particularities of the two poles of the political axis, flanders and wallonia. culture and language seem to be traditionally at the centre of the flemish community’s concerns. for the flemish “acknowledgement and recognition of ethnic identity is seen to be a legitimate endeavour” as reaction to the francophone cultural domination that lasted over a century—and despite the fact that the flemish represent the 6 review of european and russian affairs 7 (2), 2012 majority (14). on the other hand, because of its early industrialization, walloonia—once the economic bastion of the country (béland and lecours 2005, 693)—holds at present “a minority position” in the federal state, is “heavily dependent on flemish (financial) solidarity,” and faces “an assertive flanders which is pleading for more and more autonomy” and independence (jacobs and rea 2006, 14). linguistic cleavages between the two communities could also explain the disputes between the two. from one standpoint, the flemish identity “is still very much defined by the dutch language” as a consequence of the history and “the continuing linguistic tensions” (béland and lecours, 2005, 693). from another standpoint, the flemish language, although spoken by the majority in belgium, is “less prestigious and international[ly] useful than french” (woehrling 2007, 17). on a final note, consideration should also be given to what jacobs (2011) calls the “fundamentally contrasting visions” of the political representatives of two communities regarding cultural diversity and national identity—that is, that “the flemish stress the importance of linguistic and cultural assimilation, while acknowledging at the same time the importance of ethnic identity, and the francophones stress identity-blind inclusion in a political demos” (2). within the context of these two perspectives, certain questions arise, mainly how do these groups’ cultural differences, as well as the global trends in understanding citizenship, influence the debate on the recent changes to the belgian nationality law, and what influences do the parties’ ideologies have in this story? methodology the methodological approach for this paper relies on a thematic content analysis of the 18 draft law proposals and amendments debated by the belgian chamber of representatives between 2010 and 2011. this method goes beyond the observable, and allows one “to identify implicit as well as explicit themes” comprised in the data (merton 1975, 336). in thematic analysis, the coding scheme is based on categories designed to capture the dominant themes in a text (lewisbeck et al 2004, 186). therefore, the purpose is rather exploratory aiming to understand rather than to know the data. initially, the list of themes is identified deductively, starting from the most recent provisions of citizenship laws provided by the literature (e.g. naturalization procedure, legal residence, integration courses, language criteria etc.). next, the distinction between important and peripheral themes is made based on the degree of attention (in terms of number of arguments and implicitly number of pages) given to the particular themes in the proposed amendments. the analysis will then reveal details about the major categories of changes and their supporters, as well as information about the controversies with each issue. the findings will be explained by placing them within the wider context of the belgian situation and the current global debate regarding the definition of national citizenship. the approach will provide an interesting perspective on the belgian political arena, as well as its most active actors and their interests with regard to different aspects of granting citizenship to newcomers. in the undertaken approach, i first propose an overview of the key issues brought into the national citizenship debate. i will then focus on the most relevant aspects of the debate, namely the most controversial ones, and their significance within the belgian context. the reader should bear in mind that the documents under investigation are examined from a sociological point of view, i.e. attention is given to the actors and the justification of the suggested amendments; the precise legal formulation of these amendments are beyond the scope of this paper. review of european and russian affairs 7 (2), 2012 7 analysis key motivations for the new law in identifying and categorizing the major issues tackled by the citizenship law amendments, the starting point is represented by the draft law amending the belgian nationality code (dating from march 1 2000) and presented to the council of ministers in april 2010 by justice minister stefaan de clerck, who also belongs to the christian democrat and flemish party (cd&v) and is one of its former leaders.6 the key motivation for the proposed changes is to make “the acquisition of belgian nationality neutral from the immigration’s point of view” (de clerck 2010b, 2). this neutrality is explained further in terms of granting the belgian nationality only to those persons that are “lawful residents” of belgium. more concretely, it implies stricter conditions for obtaining belgian nationality, namely holding a permanent residence card at the moment of request and showing the “willingness to integrate” or “volonté d’integration”. the latter aspect is correlated to “the knowledge of one of the national languages” and “the participation in the community life” (de clerck 2010a, 2). in other words, stronger links to the belgian territory and culture, as well as the good behaviour of potential citizens are required. within this context, the word “neutral” may rather be interpreted as an expression of political correctness, as the actual requirements clearly point towards the citizenship applicant’s obligations. the first draft also calls to attention the fact that naturalized citizens can lose their citizenship if “they have been sentenced for a criminal offence showing evident hostility towards belgian society or used their belgian nationality to commit criminal offenses.” belgian citizenship may also be taken away from individuals who have acquired it through “marriage of convenience” (de clerck 2010a, 2). the same draft defines several key elements that are poorly defined in the current citizenship law and that consequently resulted in “inconsistent and incoherent implementation of code’s provisions” (de clerck 2010a, 3). first, is the notion of legal residence, which, in the minister’s opinion, needs to be clarified in terms of content for “obvious reasons of good administration and legal security” (3). legal residence refers to holding ‘principal residence’ in belgium and a permanent legal residence at the moment of submitting the application for citizenship. moreover, the process of acquiring belgian nationality can no longer be initiated or unfolded from abroad. therefore, the territorial links to belgium are primarily enforced. then, the notion of “real/authentic ties to belgium,” which, although enclosed in the law from june 28 1984, has rather been “left at the discretion of competent authorities” with no clear criteria (de clerck 2010a, 7–8). it is proposed in this respect an “exhaustive list” on what is meant by real/authentic 6. there should be also noted few contextual details: cd&v was the largest political formation in the government assembled in 2008. in april 2010, open-vld left the government due to some controversial matters left unresolved. the event implied the government dissolution and consequently accentuated the belgian political crisis characterized by tense communal relations and political instability that eventually lasted until the end of 2011. after the federal elections held on june 2010 and resulting in the new flemish alliance (n-va) winning most votes in the flemish-speaking area and the socialist party (ps) in french-speaking one, belgium had for 541 days an interim government as no agreement could be reached among the parties on a coalition to form a new government (rolf falter, “breaking up is hard to do,” crisis in belgium blog, december 10, 2011, http://crisisinbelgium.blogspot.ca /2011/12/breaking-up-is-hard-to-do.html). 8 review of european and russian affairs 7 (2), 2012 ties. there are objective criteria showing one’s “anchorage” and involvement in the host society: • knowledge of one of the official languages • duration of stay in belgium • regular contact with belgian residents • attendance at school of one of the national languages • holding property in belgium • direct connections with belgium at the social or professional level concrete details about whom the “competent authority” is and in what way these criteria are going to be evaluated seem to be missing. it is, however, mentioned that residence in belgium is mandatory in this respect and that at least two criteria need to be fulfilled. the naturalization procedure, although constitutionally considered as a “favour granted by the legislative power to a person judged as ‘particularly deserving,’” has in its current form minimal conditions of access (“currently, the procedure of naturalization is open to foreigners of eighteen years and more, having their principal residence in belgium for at least three years”) (de clerck 2010a, 8). in this context, and in line with the claimed motivation of this draft of the bill, naturalization is proposed to require five years (instead of three) of permanent residence as a prerequisite and it should also involve the knowledge of one of the official languages, along with the applicant’s willingness to participate in the life of the host community (which are not directly and concretely stated in the current citizenship law). this aspect is translated into the candidate’s “ability to cope with ordinary events that are part of his/ her daily life” and it should be evaluated in an individual manner to avoid “the exclusion of the categories of ‘vulnerable’ people” (e.g. older or less educated people) (9).to reinforce the applicant’s real connection with the belgian territory, no more citizenship submissions from abroad are accepted. in conclusion, the first draft amending the belgian nationality code suggests the profile of a person that is well integrated and connected to various parts of the host community’s life, yet no concrete criteria of evaluation are stated. in other words, the ideology of the center-right flemish party (namely the individual’s insertion in the community) is integrated as guiding principle in the proposed reform (through its author, former cd&v leader), but it is not completely depicted in operational terms. parties’ positions overall, while examining the 18 amendments proposed subsequent to the first submission of the bill by different members of parliament, it becomes clear that the initiative, and the most active role in debating the bill on citizenship, belongs to the flemish parties as they submitted approximately two thirds of the amendments. regardless of the number of amendments submitted, it is interesting to look at the parties’ declared motivations, with regard to changing the nationality law. the flemish liberal party, open vld, translated its liberal, progressive, and social ideology into the bill by emphasizing the importance of a successful integration of immigrants in the community and understanding between different ethnic groups. the integration criteria are seen as essential in this respect as they can also “maximize the likelihood of success of a model of harmonious society” (belgian h.r. 0476/001 2010, 6). although it does not clearly state what “success” looks like or how it will be measured, open vld emphasizes the importance of a clear definition of integration criteria as they seen to be essential for successful integration in the community. as a review of european and russian affairs 7 (2), 2012 9 consequence, open vld proposes that the integration criteria listed below be considered for all the procedures regarding the acquisition of citizenship: • attending an integration course (organized by the communities)–as a sign of willingness to integrate; • the knowledge of the official language of the region of main residence – perceived as essential element for integration; • and a statement agreeing to comply with the democratic rule of law and fundamental rights – as a sign of the good intentions (belgian h.r. 0476/001 2010, 7) the criteria added by the liberal flemish party with regard to immigrants’ integration approach suggests a policy of assimilation, mingled with “integration” in which the host society dictates the terms of assimilation that would imply a change in a linear progression from “foreign attributes to host citizen attributes” (ghaffar-kucher 2006, 3). unfortunately, the statements extracted from the empirical material lack concrete details about the actual implementation of these requirements. the right wing political party new flemish alliance, n-va, aims at bringing more political coherence to the belgian nationality, which currently has “the most flexible citizenship law in europe” (belgian h.r. 0574/001 2010, 3). the guiding principles suggested by them reflect their orientation towards civic nationalism with rational and liberal objectives: • neutrality from the immigration point of view which implies a sufficiently long and uninterrupted stay in belgium as eligibility criteria; • objectivity regarding the conditions for obtaining the citizenship; • social legitimacy, namely that the citizenship could be obtained only by the persons capable of proving sufficient integration in the society; • genuine engagement in the sense that serious offenders are not eligible to obtain citizenship; • and uniformity of procedures by reducing the number of measures needed to acquire belgian citizenship (3). looking at the n-va interventions in the debate of the belgian code of nationality, it appears that the above-mentioned claims of neutrality, objectivity, social legitimacy, and genuine engagement do regard exclusively the citizenship applicants and imply the necessity of assisting them to assimilate. in line with their objectives, n-va proposed the idea of implementing a process of integration (“parcours d’intégration”) (belgian h.r. 0476/003 2010, 13) as defined by the competent authority at the community level. according to the party, this parcours should be considered as a “serious condition” for the acquisition of nationality, yet no concrete details are offered in terms of who is actually the competent authority, what would comprise such a parcours or how its completion would be evaluated. nonetheless, the party’s pleading for the competence of the communities in this respect is a reminder of the flemish policy of inburgering and the party’s desire to preserve the status quo, from this point of view, as a guarantee for the possibility to impose the flemish language in flanders along with a an immigrant’s integration process enforced by the federal law. the far-right political party, flemish interest (vlaams belang, vb), translated its ideology in a proposal aimed at bringing stricter conditions “the drastic way,” implying the evaluation of the candidate’s willingness to integrate through a citizenship exam (belgian h.r. 0618/ 001 2010). its representatives also propose to replace the “nationality” (“nationalité”) term by “citizenship” (“citoyenneté”) as the two terms are, in fact, not seen as synonyms within the belgian context. therefore, citizenship would be, in their opinion, a more suitable and neutral notion. 10 review of european and russian affairs 7 (2), 2012 in line with their ideology of rejecting multiculturalism7), they argue that strong cultural differences contribute to the appearance of cultural enclaves as potential sources of conflict (belgian h.r. 0618/ 001 2010, 3)8. denouncing the multiculturalism utopia, in which the facility with which belgium grants citizenship to non-europeans plays an important role, they conclude that “granting of the citizenship cannot precede the integration, but it should rather be the culmination of successful integration” (belgian h.r. 0618/ 001 2010, 4). being the most vocal anti-immigration party, vb tries to appeal to voters through its antiimmigration and, in particular, anti-muslim sentiment. they propose, therefore, to “re-establish the right of blood” (jus sanguinis) and, besides that, make the naturalization procedure the only method of acquiring citizenship. the latter one should include more and tougher conditions in order to avoid the perception of nationality as “a means to obtain rights” (belgian h.r. 0618/ 001 2010, 4). in this respect, a citizenship test should evaluate the level of integration of the candidate, and their knowledge of the official language of their region of residence, as the primary indication of integration. tests in the united states and canada are given as examples, although they are easier than the citizenship tests implemented in different european countries. however, clear details are offered by vb on the contents of their proposed citizenship test: a written and oral citizenship test organized by each community (and held in one of the official language of the community) should evaluate the knowledge of fundamental rules of the society as well as the history and culture of the community the candidate is a part of (belgian h.r. 0618/ 001 2010, 6). the vb also propose to limit or even eliminate the plurality of citizenship by asking the candidates to give up their previous citizenship as multiple citizenships encourage “looking for the deals” and claiming the citizenship that offers the most benefits under the particular circumstances. moreover, they sustain that naturalization should be the means “par excellence” to obtain belgian citizenship motivating that if the citizenship is too easily acquired there is no motivation for integration (belgian h.r. 0618/ 001 2010, 6). therefore, in their view, there should not be an option to acquire citizenship by declaration or based on jus soli, as well as no citizenship for the third generation (grandchildren of belgium citizens who do not live in belgium and who claim belgian citizenship based on the blood ties they have with the country through their grandparents). vlaams belang’s advocacy for strict limits on immigration is obvious in this pleading, as well as the high standards imposed on the candidate: he/she should be able to pass a complicated citizenship exam, have no juridical condemnations, and have the proof of financial means and no fiscal debts. on the walloon side, the french-speaking liberal party, mouvement réformateur (mr), motivate their proposal for a more neutral citizenship law by emphasizing the necessity to reinforce the conditions of obtaining citizenship as well as imposing objective conditions with regard to the naturalization process (belgian h.r. 0601/ 001 2010). the key point of their approach is the necessity to better “control” the immigration phenomenon in which the 7. they mainly criticize multiculturalism for the threat posed by the so-called “ghettoization” 8.“we find in our towns numerous examples of “little morocco” or “little turkey”. the security offered by this ghetto, where the ethnic solidarity prevails and where the islam sets point of reference in a “hostile” world, makes unnecessary any contact with the ‘belgians’.” [“on trouve, dans nos villes, de nombreux exemples de “petit maroc” ou de “petite turquie”. la sécurité qu’offre ce ghetto, où prime la solidarité ethnique et où l’islam sert de point de repère dans un monde “hostile”, rend superflu tout contact avec les “belges”] (belgian h.r. 0618/ 001 2010, 3). review of european and russian affairs 7 (2), 2012 11 citizenship law plays an important role. more exactly, according to this party, belgian nationality should not be chosen “to reinforce an illegal or precarious administrative status,” but rather as a personal choice shown through the candidate’s “willingness to integrate” in the country of residence (belgian h.r. 0601/ 001 2010, 4). for the mr’s representatives, “the acquisition of nationality must keep a solemn character” in the sense that it should not be just an administrative process that allows a foreigner to stay in a given area. on the contrary, it must start from the strong will of a person to join a country, to enjoy the rights it provides and also be subject to the obligations imposed upon nationals (4). their civic orientation is also brought into the discourse by emphasizing the necessity of “a deep societal reflection” on “what does belgium mean today?” (belgian h.r. 0601/ 001 2010, 7). in ideological terms, mr seems to be on the same page with the flemish parties in terms of citizenship granting as result of the integration’s success. they plead, however, for a unitary vision in terms of integration, instead of the currently fragmented field determined by the fact that integration is the community’s responsibility and the two communities have different approaches in this respect. specific elements of francophone elites’ discourse focused on socio-economic indicators with regard to immigrants’ integration, which could be noticed in the emphasis placed on “the need to give a true meaning to the process of requesting the belgian citizenship” by ensuring “decent life conditions” and asking for the “respect of the universal values of the country” (belgian h.r. 0601/ 001 2010, 15). in line with the constitutional description of the citizenship as a “favour and not a right,” mr representatives consider that citizenship should be seen as a symbol of gratitude offered by the nation to deserving foreigners. therefore, the naturalization process should be accompanied by a “real demonstration of willingness to integrate” (belgian h.r. 0601/ 001 2010, 7). in this respect, the following criteria are proposed: • seven years of residence; • knowledge of one of the official languages; • a sufficient knowledge of the universal values, institutions and history of belgium proved by any legal means; • no condemnations for criminal acts. mouvement réformateur agrees with flemish parties, in that a demonstration of a certain "attachment" to belgium, including the knowledge of one or more national languages, is required. however, they suggest considering belgium as a whole and not as distinct communities as the latter view would imply a form of “sub-nationalities against the constitution” (doc 0476/ 003 2010, 6). the allied interventions of the green parties from both regions, groen! in flanders and ecolo in wallonia, in the 2010–2011 debate on the belgian code of nationality were rather limited and concerned the addition of certain nuances to requirements regarding the permanent residence in belgium, citizenship granting to children with a belgian parent, and the limited role of the state’s official in citizenship granting (belgian h.r. 0476/ 007 2011; belgian h.r. 0476/ 008 2011). initially, the socialist party (parti socialiste, ps) did not have a distinct stance in the debate on the citizenship law. its representatives’ contributions were more concerned with clarifying certain terms or administrative situations including the notions of “main residence,” “legal stay,” or the naturalization procedure (belgian h.r. 0742/ 001 2010; belgian h.r. 0476/ 002 2010). however, in a third intervention signed by no less than eight ps members, new perspectives were introduced with respect to the procedures of obtaining belgian citizenship including 12 review of european and russian affairs 7 (2), 2012 language knowledge, proved integration in the community, and exceptional merits for belgium (belgian h.r. 0476/ 009 2011). therefore, the socialist party proposes • a short procedure of obtaining citizenship through declaration after five years of legal stay and with the condition of knowledge of one of the official languages, in order for the candidate to prove that he/ she can cope with ordinary events from their daily life (belgian h.r. 0476/ 009 2011, 13); • a long procedure after ten years of legal stay that implies the knowledge of one of the national languages correlated to applicant’s proved integration in the community of residence, and that is evaluated in terms of involvement in the life of his/her neighbourhood, having children in school, belonging to a cultural or sports association, positive feedback on behalf of the acquaintances from the neighbourhood etc. (13); • a naturalization procedure for persons older than 18 years of age, whose main residence is in belgium and who received the title of honoris causa (merits that add prestige to belgium at scientific, sport, cultural, or social level) or doloris causa (pain caused by catastrophes in belgium or persecution in the country of origin.), elements for the first time introduced in the debate. the request should be accompanied by a motivation letter sent to the chamber of representatives, the superior forum for naturalization procedure (belgian h.r. 0476/ 009 2011, 6). the main ideas introduced by the ps (“rationalized procedures of citizenship acquisition” and “exceptional merits”) along with the other intensely debated issues (language knowledge, main residence, and legal stay) are considered in a final and concerted intervention of the main flemish parties, except vb (open-vld, n-va, cd&v, sp.a) 9 aimed at bringing an integrative perspective on citizenship acquisition. they tried to harmonize different points of view expressed in previous amendments and “simplified” the modalities of acquiring belgian citizenship into five “clear and unambiguous” procedures (belgian h.r. 0476/ 010 2011, 19). • in case of citizenship acquisition by declaration, besides the requirement of legal stay in belgium (five years for the short procedure and ten years for the long one), the emphasis is on “proof of knowledge of one of the official languages,” “social integration” (translated into educational programs in belgium, namely minimum secondary studies or 400 hours of professional training or completion of a course of integration), and “economic participation” (at least two years of full employment) (belgian h.r. 0476/ 010 2011, 5–8). • citizenship through naturalization is granted in “exceptional cases” and the ps representatives’ idea of “exceptional merits” (honoris causa) that could bring a contribution to the international reputation of belgium is key in this respect (belgian h.r. 0476/ 010 2011, 11). • a fee of 150 euros (idea initially proposed by mr) for the procedure of nationality acquisition is also introduced. this fee is thought to be high enough to have a deterrent effect on persons making records without any real chance of success (belgian h.r. 0476/ 010 2011, 30). on 19 july 2012, a version of amendments for the belgian citizenship law close to the latest intervention passed with a large majority the justice committee of the belgian parliament and (wautelet, 2012) and on 25 october, it was sent to the senate for further approval (belgian h.r. 0476/ 021 2012). 9. socialistische partij anders (different socialist party) (sp.a) is the flemish counterpart of the parti socialiste. review of european and russian affairs 7 (2), 2012 13 discussion: convergent and divergent dimensions of the new citizenship law overall, there are several aspects that, in general, the belgian parties agree with; i call these the uncontroversial issues. they are in line with what most parties seem to agree with in the campaign of the 2007 federal elections, namely that more “dignity” should be given to the belgian nationality with regard to the following aspects (loobuyck and jacobs 2009). first of all, the nationality “should not be just a right of residence,” referring to the fact that belgian citizenship should be made more valuable and, for that reason, more difficult to acquire. then, it is claimed the necessity of uninterrupted and permanent legal residence in belgium as a prerequisite for any kind of application for citizenship. in the words of open vld representatives, belgium should represent “the center of the candidate’s socio-economic interests” for a number of years prior to applying for citizenship. moreover, for the flemish liberal party, open vld, legal residence “de durée indeterminée” (for an undetermined length) is an expression of applicant’s “rootedness” in the territory of the host country (belgian h.r. 0476/ 001 2010, 6). an exhaustive list describing “real/authentic ties to belgium”–accepted by many representatives from both linguistic groups in its initial form—will be considered a good change in comparison to the actual ambiguousness of the term. the objective criteria of acquiring citizenship translated in the proposal’s main provisions are: • five years of legal stay (instead of three) along with the applicant demonstrating the ability to speak one of the national languages (seen as a proof of their willingness to integrate into the host society) and evidence of economical integration (by two years of employment); • ten years of legal stay (instead of seven) accompanied by the evidence of applicant’s participation in the life of its host community as the preconditions for the so called “declaration of citizenship.” • immediate withdrawal of citizenship in the case of a naturalized citizen’s condemnation for serious crimes against belgium or making illegal use of the belgian nationality. marriages of convenience are penalized in the same manner and stricter rules have been suggested for acquiring the citizenship on the basis of marriage (a longer period of common life and even proofs on the acquisition of real/authentic ties with belgium). the most controversial issue refers to the language requirements and it is mainly a consequence of divergent visions on citizenship between flemish and walloons parties. in the debate on the linguistic requirements in relation to citizenship and integration, several aspects stand out from different amendments made by different political representatives to the draft proposal of the new belgian nationality law. on the one side, flemish parties sustain the importance of language assimilation, namely requiring that applicants for nationality demonstrate knowledge of “the national language of their place of residence” (belgian h.r. 0476/ 001 2010, 14). the arguments brought in this respect regard the fact that knowledge of the language is “a determinant element for integration” and that “a successful integration is of paramount importance for the harmonious coexistence of people with different backgrounds” (belgian h.r. 0476/ 005 2010, 3). furthermore, speaking and understanding the language of the community is crucial in this respect. the flemish parties insist 14 review of european and russian affairs 7 (2), 2012 on transferring this responsibility to the regional level. language courses, education diplomas, and citizenship tests have also been mentioned with respect to the tightening of the reform of nationality law on the other side, there are francophone parties who agree with the flemish ones regarding the knowledge of the language; yet, they believe the length of residence in belgium is also relevant. a critique against flemish parties’ proposals is that tying language knowledge to the place of residence will result in the organization of "sub-nationalities" (belgian h.r. 0476/ 003 2010, 2). instead, “the whole belgian territory should be considered as society of reference” for granting the belgian nationality (belgian h.r. 0476/ 003 2010, 3). therefore, the representatives of francophone parties consider that the language criteria should be regarded in a more flexible manner – “the requirement of language knowledge shouldn’t be a barrier to acquisition of nationality, but rather a means to facilitate integration” (3). in other words, language is an integration vector. they are also arguing for reciprocity regarding the path of integration which equals the fact that any of the three national languages of belgium should be equally accepted (“independent of the applicant’s place of residence” (3). conclusions in this contribution, i have tried to explain the debate of the bill regarding the belgian nationality law from the perspective of the undoubted influence of the european trends on citizenship law, as well as internal cultural differences, along with main political actors and their stakes. from the former point of view, it is clear that the reform of belgian nationality law follows the path of “renationalizing citizenship” through the particular attention given to civic integration. in this respect, integration courses and integration conditions for the naturalization procedure, as well as language requirements have been proposed, thus shifting the focus towards more subjective elements that regard one’s integration into the society. the new proposal follows the model of other european countries that have raised the bar for citizenship applicants. this influence could be explained from the perspective of a certain convergence in migration and integration policies observed among the european countries in the sense that “governments seem to have retracted from extreme positions on the continua (determined by the traditional and distinctive forms of nationalism–-collectivist-ethnic, collectivist-civic, and pluralist-civic) to inhabit a middle ground” (wright 2008, 5). one of the causes of this apparent convergence could be the sharing of “best practices” in the area of migration, and coordinating cooperation as “political networks become more transnational” (7). the idea of bringing the belgian citizenship law “in line” with the “new european legislations” is also sustained by the christian brotcorne, the author of the report done on behalf of the justice committee when the proposed new belgian nationality law passed in the belgian parliament’s justice committee with a large majority (dh 2012)10. on the other hand, belgium’s unique federation of three regions and three official languages, linguistic cleavages and divergent views on immigrants’ integration between main ethnic groups favours long debates, especially when an issue with such complex implications is at stake. the official positions held by different parties from the far-right vb to moderate flemish parties and the francophone liberal party reflect the ideologies they promote as well as the interests of the present. they agree on the necessity of adding value to the belgian citizenship by paying attention to the candidate’s willingness to integrate. however, some controversies are not yet 10. “par cette nouvelle loi, la belgique s'inscrit ainsi dans la ligne des nouvelles législations européennes en la matière” (dh 2012). review of european and russian affairs 7 (2), 2012 15 resolved and they refer to integration and language criteria and the extent to which they should be tied to the community. within this context, a significant role is played by the flemish elite’s interest to promote the dutch language and the francophone elite’s interest to “let the candidate choose,” which go hand in hand with their views on an immigrants’ integration (assimilation with recognizing ethnic minorities integrated in inburgering policy in flanders vs. neutral forms of individual social insertion in wallonia). both parties have big stakes, especially in the debate between “the language of the place of residence” and “one of the three official languages.” although flanders forms the majority and is more powerful from the economical point of view than wallonia, its language is more vulnerable than french (as many immigrants might consider the french language more useful or they may have already learned it in their native countries and consequently might prefer it for their integration in belgium). moreover, each of the regions has reason to use immigration as an issue that will enhance its position. and, according to jacobs (2011, 3), the big battle is in brussels capital region where there are more than 1.1 million inhabitants (representing approximately ten per cent of the population) that produces 20 percent of the belgian gross national product (with a significant number of francophone people who live in the flemish periphery of brussels and a significant number of flemish people who commute to brussels on a daily basis). therefore, “for cultural, socioeconomic, political, symbolic, and historical reasons, brussels is of high importance for all regions of belgium, and none of the linguistic communities can afford to give up the federal capital” (3). for the flemish representatives the fear is that, in the absence of pressure to learn flemish, more and more immigrants in flanders will choose the french language and consequently affect the unity of the community. on the other hand, wallonia is interested in increasing the number of the french speaking population as this is its chance to acquire (in bourdieu’s terms (1986) “social capital” for the future negotiations with economically powerful flanders. it is, therefore, interesting to see how flemish and walloon representatives will define a common ground with regard to the specificity and practicality of language and integration criteria. the new citizenship law was adopted on 25 october 2012 in the plenary session of the belgian chamber of representatives and sent to the senate for further approval (belgian h.r. 0476/021 2012). in the current form, the law requires linguistic, social, and economic integration of the applicants who must also be long term belgian residents. in what regards the controversial issue of language criteria, a compromise seems to have been reached: the requirement of “knowledge of one of the national languages” has been agreed upon, but the reciprocity of the integration process has not (belgian h.r. 0476/021 2012). more exactly, a citizenship applicant who has undertaken their integration parcours in wallonia before settling in flanders with the intention of becoming belgian will start a new path of integration in flanders. therefore, the focus could now go towards the conditions that will be created in order to achieve the required levels of integration in the particular communities and whether they will be perceived as incentive for integration or barriers to integration. acknowledgements an earlier version of this paper was presented at the ecsa-c conference in ottawa, april 2012. the author would like to thank dr. elke winter and dr. alison harell for their support and valuable suggestions. thanks go also to the members of the ecsa-c panel, as well as rera anonymous reviewers and editors for their extremely useful comments. 16 review of european and russian affairs 7 (2), 2012 references béland, daniel, and andreélecours. 2005. “the politics of territorial solidarity: nationalism and social policy reform in canada, the united kingdom, and belgium.” comparative political studies 38 (6): 676–703. belgian federal public service employment, labour and social dialogue. 2009. l’immigration en belgique: effectifs, mouvements et marche du travail. accessed december 20, 2012. http://www.emploi.belgique.be/publicationdefault.aspx?id=28778. belgian h.r. 0476/001. 2010. proposition de loi modifiant le code de 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cross-canada research network supported by the social sciences and humanities research council of canada (sshrc)—along with the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies (carleton university) and its associated research unit, the centre for european studies. rera aims to provide an accessible forum for research, to promote high standards of research and scholarship, and to foster communication among young scholars. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada tel: +01 613 520-2600 ext. 1179; e-mail: rera-journal@carleton.ca creative commons license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ this working paper is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial no derivs 3.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 3.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced provided the source is acknowledged. no use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes. issn: 1718-4835 © 2012 the author(s) review of european and russian affairs 7 (1), 2012 issn 1718-4835 © 2012 the author(s) www.carleton.ca/rera tribunes and patricians: radical fringe parties in the 21 st century harry nedelcu carleton university abstract the mid and late 2000s witnessed a proliferation of political parties in european party systems. marxist parties, libertarian, pirate, and animal parties as well as radical-right and populist parties have become part of an increasingly heterogeneous political spectrum generally dominated by the mainstream centre-left and centre-right. the question this article explores is what led to the surge of these parties during the first decade of the 21 st century. while it is tempting to look at structural arguments or the recent late-2000s financial crisis to explain this proliferation, the emergence of these parties predates the debt-crisis and cannot be described by structural shifts alone. this paper argues that the proliferation of new radical parties came about not only as a result of changes in the political space, but rather due to the very perceived presence and even strengthening of what katz and mair (1995) famously dubbed the cartelization of mainstream political parties. 2 review of european and russian affairs 7 (1), 2012 introduction the mid and late 2000s witnessed a proliferation of political parties in european party systems. marxist parties, libertarian, pirate, and animal parties, neo-fascists like jobbik and goldendawn, as well as far-right populist parties such as pvv have all become part of an increasingly heterogeneous political spectrum generally dominated by mainstream centre-left and centre-right political actors. of course, the appearance of new political contenders is by no means a rare sight. new coalitions and parties form all the time and naturally claim to take on issues that are not addressed by already existing players. the parties mentioned above are hardly new in what they are trying to do—that is, occupy a space the others have left vacant. jobbik and pvv, for instance, fall within an already existent and quite successful party family, the extreme or radicalright. these parties have taken the vacant space to the right of the statist-individualist or communitarian-libertarian debate. pirate and libertarian parties generally epitomize an opposite pole emphasizing post-modern values and personal freedom. ideologically, they could not be further apart from each other. when it comes to political strategy, however, the parties mentioned above share much in common. all point to the increasing disconnect between existing parties and society. they all attempt to portray themselves in one way or another as tribunes of “the people” or advocates of the alienated, the unheard, and the unrepresented. to this end, they often juxtapose their image against that of mainstream established and usually centrist (centre-left and centre-right) parties who are depicted—much like the patricians of ancient rome—as starting out as popular representatives, but, over time these parties emerge into an elite class of their own as they abandon their original commitments and betray those they were initially supposed to represent. while adopting completely opposite ideological positions, tribune parties rarely admit to being “radical.” the interpretation of their own position vis-à-vis the rest is that of “authentic” societal representatives versus a corrupt and disengaged general political culture that has abandoned ideology and that fails to address or even discuss “real issues.” when asked to place their party on a left-right scale, they would reject the left-right dichotomy altogether as unrepresentative of both current parties, as well as current societal cleavages. consequently, the universe of the tribune party is therefore one generally lying on the fringes of political space, located at the meeting point of anti-mainstream discourse and ideological radicalism. the rise of these new political contenders is not limited to just the handful of parties briefly mentioned above. while parties such as pvv (and possibly syriza and golden-dawn following greece’s 2012 elections) have gained most of the attention in mass media, as well as in some academic works, similar such parties have formed and entered parliaments in a large number of european union (eu) member countries. this paper has identified over 20 such parties from 13 eu member states (table 1). all are new or re-invented parties of the recent decade. while few can boast a success such as syriza’s during 2012 (when the party became greece’s main opposition), most of them have nonetheless altered their countries’ party-systems following their electoral success. therefore, fringe and ideologically radical parties that have adopted the tribune discourse have not just mushroomed in the second half of the previous decade, but have also been very successful in entering national parliaments or the european parliament (ep). this is not to say that the current and most recent proliferation is necessarily larger or greater than in other periods, but rather that it represents the latest wave of new political parties in european states. because it is quite recent, the multiplication of these parties over the review of european and russian affairs 7 (1), 2012 3 past decade is a phenomenon not yet explored. thus, the question this paper asks is what led to the proliferation of these parties within such a short period of time during the mid and late 2000s. this paper will be subsequently divided into two sections. the first will attempt to define tribune parties and will explore their proliferation during the last decade. the second section will attempt to directly answer the central research question mentioned above. the argument put forth is that these new parties emerge not only as a result of changes in the political space, but also due to the perceived presence and even strengthening of what katz and mair (1995) famously dubbed the cartelization of mainstream political parties. while one may be tempted to look at structural arguments or claim that the recent european financial crisis has been the catalyst for this proliferation, the emergence of these parties cannot be explained by structural shifts. at the same time, it predates the debt crisis. the financial crisis may certainly exacerbate the populist, radical-right or radical-left vote, however, the cause for their recent proliferation and success lies in an already existing crisis of modern representative democracy—one that the late peter mair recently referred to as a crisis of democratic legitimacy in european political systems between those political parties that govern but no longer represent, and those that claim to represent but do not govern. a comparison of twelve new parties from six eu member states (germany, greece, hungary, netherlands, romania, and sweden) will be used to illustrate the recent changes in europe’s political space. tribunes and patricians two terms are introduced, or rather re-introduced, in this paper: tribune parties and patricians. the terminology itself is not completely new, at least when speaking of “tribune parties.” as a concept, the term appeared in the 1960s and was first used by george lavau (1969) in reference to the french communist party. his intent was not to fully theorize the term nor to extend it to other parties but solely to describe the french communist party’s constant commitment to its original ideological tenets, as well as its inherent role of advocate of specific societal classes (mitchell and evans 2009, 152). since then, however, this classification has almost never been employed in respect of leftist parties or other radical parties and party-families. occasionally, it is used in the case of intransigent ethnic parties that succeed in promoting themselves as the most credible defenders of the cause. this is the case, for instance, in mitchell and evans’ (2009,152– 3) work on ethnic parties in northern ireland. aside from this, nonetheless, “tribune parties” as a concept are not often encountered in academic literature. in this paper, the universe of the tribune party—although including many populist parties such as pvv—is not exclusively one of vaguely defined populist parties. populist is the word often used to describe the wave of newly emergent parties during the 1980s, especially the extremist, xenophobic types. it is not rare in academic texts to find next to the term radical-right the disclaimer populist. populism is often hardly adequately defined, however. a generally used definition is that populism is a type of discourse that emphasizes the interests of the populus, the ordinary people. it often contrasts the ‘authentic,’ ‘real,’ ‘pure’ people with the ‘hidden’ and ‘evil’ interests of those that lead them. the elites are usually presented as corrupt, greedy, and generally not at all interested in doing what they claim to do—represent. although used prior to the rise of the radical-right and certainly not exclusively intended as a term describing radical-right parties, it is around this party family that the term populist is mostly encountered in relation to european politics. it is rarely applied in the context of left-wing parties, although many of the newer libertarian-leftist parties make use of a very similar rhetoric 4 review of european and russian affairs 7 (1), 2012 in their election manifestos and campaigns. the negative representation of major parties, mass media, or large corporations that harm the “people” is just as present among europe’s new leftlibertarians (pirate party germany 2011; pirate party 2008; politics-can-be-different 2011). the term populism is quite problematic, however. it refers to a certain discourse that juxtaposes the people against the elite, but it does not say much about what these parties say about themselves, what their position is vis-à-vis mainstream politics, or where they stand in terms of ideological commitments. several academic studies have attempted to unpack the name populism, as well as classify similar but not identical terms that are often incorrectly used interchangeably (schedler 1996; barr 2009; macdonnell and newell 2011). robert barr (2009), for instance, distinguishes between anti-establishment parties, populism, and outsiders. the nature of appeals, location visà-vis the party system, and the linkages emphasized is what reveals a party’s specific nature. outsiders could be anti-establishment but are not necessarily so. meanwhile, anti-establishment parties generally favour participatory linkages that entail a measure of citizen input and control over political decision making. on the other hand, populist parties are defined as outsiders, anti-establishment, and as advocating plebiscitarian linkages that emphasize holding decision makers accountable (barr 2009, 43–4). barr, however, seems to ignore that a large number of established politicians and parties may make use of populist rhetoric without being outsiders to the system at all. furthermore, in this conceptualization, plebiscitarian linkages and participatory linkages are presented as antithetical. they do not necessarily need to be so. a party or politician may speak of participatory linkages but, in fact, project the image of a strong leader. moreover, many parties that make use of this type of discourse do not merely state that “the people” are threatened—be it by a corrupt elite, immigrants, scheming corporate interests, or powerful governments bent on taking away individual freedom (rydgren 2006, 5). parties employing such discourse actually spell out quite clearly their own role as tribunes or “true representatives” and “saviours” of people’s interests. doing so, often times they provide very simplistic and laconic solutions to complex and intricate societal problems. the swedish democrats (sd), for example, give a 99-point answer to all of sweden’s problems from issues such as taking care of the elderly to maintaining the welfare state under current financial constraints to reducing taxes. to do this, keeping true to its extremist orientation, the sd proposes a stop to current immigration and a reversal of the multi-cultural policies of previous mainstream governments (swedish democrats 2011). the same bullet-point, one-two-three type solutions are present in other cases as well. in three steps, greece’s popular orthodox rally promises that the country’s economic problems could easily be addressed if only taxes would be cut, all immigrants sent back, and if turkey would be banned from ever joining the european union (laos 2007). similarly, romania’s new people’s party (but also ataka in neighbouring bulgaria) has a near obsession with keeping everything within twenty points. in just twenty “simple” steps, the romanian people’s party promises to deal with increasing debt by lowering taxes while at the same time vowing to increase salaries and pensions. every romanian is to receive 20,000 euros while simultaneously every corrupt politician will be placed on trial, and the hungarian ethnic minority party is to be stopped from entering parliament (ppdd 2012). for the dutch pvv, the points are trimmed down by half. its short ten-point program calls for ending voting rights for “non-nationals,” stopping immigration for five years, lowering taxes, and again, the contradictory social measure of increasing health services for the elderly (wilders review of european and russian affairs 7 (1), 2012 5 2006). similar themes can be found in jobbik’s program which argues that removing hungary’s current politicians, segregating the roma, as well as expelling multinational corporations would put the country back on track (jobbik 2010). this trivialization and tendency to combine seemingly right-of-centre economic measures with outright leftist ones for the sake of appeal is not only exercised by the radical-right; it can be seen in the new leftist-libertarian camp as well. the german pirate party, for instance, promotes free flow of information and free enterprise, but promises that once in power, it will immediately institute the minimum wage (pirate party germany 2011). similarly, the generally leftist-green party, politics-can-be-different (lmp), in hungary promotes itself as a party with “clean hands,” made up of individuals who have never been in power and argues that as representative democracy is broken, direct-democracy will be introduced in hungary upon their party’s victory (politics-can-be-different 2011). this type of downplaying the intricate dynamics of politics by offering simplified point-form solutions, which in effect constitute fundamental and complicated changes, is part of the image that these parties try to portray of themselves as tribunes of those who need these changes—if only the current disengaged political elites would endorse them. as mainstream political elites have indeed become disconnected with societal demands, the radical parties on the fringes of political space capitalize considerably by making it look like the solutions are readily available except they (the radical-right) are the only ones willing to enact them. to say that the tribune party attempts to be a party of ‘the people’ is, however, an oversimplification. the tribune party only claims to be a party of the plebs, the ordinary citizen, not the whole of society. the citizen they represent is often portrayed by such parties to be misled and thus in direct conflict with a broad class of patricians that includes political, but also economic or cultural elites. schedler (1996, 293) describes such parties as those drawing a triangular political space between a general established political class, the people, and themselves. the patrician these parties identify however is primarily but not solely comprised of the mainstream political class. this patrician can include large businesses or the rich as in the case of syriza and politics-can-be-different (syriza 2012; politics-can-be-different 2012). similarly, the patrician does not need to be internal to the state. it can be external such as foreign or multinational corporations. it can also take the form of international institutions such as the international monetary fund (imf) or the eu (golden dawn 2012; jobbik 2010; laos 2007; pvv 2012; syriza 2012). the patricians are also sometimes portrayed as a conglomerate of political, cultural, and economic interests in a conspiratorial arrangement with other identified “enemies” such as immigrants as in the case of radical-right parties (mudde 2007). in many eastern european states, the patricians are understood to include, among others, former communists. likewise, patricians may include those not yet ready to hear the transformative message of the party as in the case of the hungarian lmp, ‘traitors’ to the state as in the case of extremists like jobbik, or those that attempt at restricting private freedoms such as the government, and surveillance or law enforcement agencies as argued by pirate parties (politics-can-be-different 2011; pirate party germany 2011). in its struggle with the vast range of patricians of which the political establishment is the most evident, the tribune party—whether extremist or libertarian—will emphasize its restoration of party-societal links as well as its ability to attract those segments of society that are usually thought to be abandoned by the mainstream. lmp, for example, is quite aware, but also proud, to 6 review of european and russian affairs 7 (1), 2012 represent a constituency until recently disenchanted with its political options—budapest intellectuals. the party makes no secret of its inability to spread the libertarian-green western european message to poorer north-eastern areas of the country as the poorer north-eastern arenas are not yet prepared for it (politics-can-be-different 2011). the swedish pirate party prides itself to have managed to tap into a constituency that is often thought to remain apathetic to politics--the youth (pirate party 2012). surprisingly—and contrary to previous academic studies—the extremist swedish democrats do exactly the same. they point to the fact that in high-school mock-elections, they were among the most popular parties among students (skolval 2010). there is an emphasis on appealing to the young as a means to suggest not only that such parties are to be relevant in future elections, but also as a way to illustrate that while the mainstream parties cannot appeal to this group, they, on the other hand, can. the implication of their argument is that they are concerned with ‘real important issues’ that engage the youth, while old parties have lost touch with this important element of society. another dimension of the tribune image is the high membership and strong involvement with significant sections of society that these parties claim. almost as if to emulate the highly ideological and membership-based mass-parties of the early 20 th century, many of these new political contenders boast large memberships that often surpass the membership of longestablished parties. in this regard, jobbik has even incited a legal action against its move to create a large paramilitary wing (kushen et al 2011). the swedish pirates and the swedish democrats have attained memberships surpassing that of the leftist party or the swedish greens (swedish democrats 2012; pirate party 2011). in the absence of alternative means of receiving finances that may only be available to larger established parties, high membership does somewhat help fulfill this role. however, high membership serves another quite emblematic role as well. in essence, the message these parties try to underscore is that while the mainstream parties have abandoned ideology and moved towards the centre, turned away from society and towards the state, forsaken their need for societal links and membership, they—that is, the new political competitors—represent not the margins or fringes of political space, but rather the way the current established mainstream once used to be. as part of their claim to be radical, they have reintroduced ideology into the debates, reopened muted issues, re-linked disgruntled members of society to political representation and lastly, re-established the importance of membership in party-dynamics. ultimately, all these parties express a very critical view of their mainstream political counterparts and the deterioration of democracy under current party systems. the romanian people’s party (as well as new generation before it), jobbik, and the libertarian politics-can-bedifferent underscore the corruption of centrist parties and the failure of their neoliberal reforms (ppdd 2012; new generation party 2008; politics-can-be-different 2011; jobbik 2010). the pirates speak of an ever increasingly strong state, led by political monopolies, which has begun to infringe on individual rights and freedoms (pirate party 2008). subsequently, they all call for a reorganization of democratic order. their call is not for the elimination of democracy per se but rather for the abolition of representative democracy favouring established mainstream parties. this feature is something quite common among right-wing populist parties (rydgren 2006, 5–6). yet, many of the latest leftist-libertarians and pirates seem to make the exact same arguments. in essence, the emphasis on individual access to political decision-making, as well as direct democracy as opposed to current forms of representative democracy, is in fact present in all aforementioned parties but quite explicitly elaborated by pvv, jobbik, the pirates, politics-canreview of european and russian affairs 7 (1), 2012 7 be-different, and syriza (wilders 2006; jobbik 2010; pirate party 2008; politics-can-bedifferent 2011; syriza 2012). in their critique of representative democracy, they juxtapose the mainstream established parties (being detached from societal concerns) with the image of their party—and often their leader—which represent and champion ‘true’ popular concerns and demands. the leader is often the face of the party—the tribune personified and charismatic populist leaders are often a feature of most such parties. this is most evident in geert wilders and the pvv (vossen 2011, 179). it is also the case for jobbik and gabor vona, romania’s former new generation party and george becali, the swedish democrats and jimmie akesson, but also for the swedish pirates and rickard falkvinge. the only exception to the rule is politics-can-bedifferent as the party attempts to display a pluralist image where decision-making is never held by just one individual. however, even this party relied on the charisma of its founder, andras schiffer. ultimately, the party leader in such cases seeks to personify the ‘hero’ of their constituents, battling a series of enemies ranging from foreign financial interests to immigrants (in the case of the extremist parties) to disconnected mainstream parties who no longer represent citizen demands. ultimately, the tribune party phenomenon is not entirely new. numerous academic works have observed the same general trends among radical-right parties such as front national in france or fpo in austria ever since the 1980s (kitschelt 1989; betz 1998; kitschelt and mcgann 1995; jackman and volbert 1996; mayer 1998). however, the multiplication of newer but similar such parties over the last decade is something not yet explored and it is particularly these newer next-generation radical-right (but also radical-left and libertarian) parties which are the object of this paper. moreover, the tendency of new left-wing parties to copy some of the right-wing discourse and vice-versa is a novelty. such parties are not mere sporadic occurrences in the european political landscape. over 20 such new or re-invented parties can be identified during the last decade in europe (table 1). their proliferation is not merely manifested through their inception, but also through their ability to quickly enter the european parliament or their respective national parliaments almost immediately after formation, thus significantly altering their countries’ partysystems. what is equally novel is that their multiplication has occurred irrespective of region. such parties have generally appeared both in eastern as well as western europe. naturally, the democratization of eastern europe and the enlargement of europe’s democratic mix would result in a larger number of parties. however, had this proliferation been exclusively emblematic of democratization in the east, their presence would not have been observed in the west. yet, when considering the 20 or more identified political newcomers, these parties are equally present in western european countries as in new eu-members from eastern europe. among them, a plurality—about nine of 26 identified parties—are radical-right and occasionally extreme-right parties. another eight are populist and free-marketeering. six parties fall within a post-modern libertarian-leftist camp. finally, only three of these parties are traditional marxist parties. this is the only party-family identified that did not yet proliferate in both east and west as all three parties are present exclusively in western europe. ultimately, the argument is not that the proliferation of these parties is necessarily larger or greater than in other historical periods but that it does constitute the latest wave of new political 8 review of european and russian affairs 7 (1), 2012 parties in european states. the universe of these parties is one which combines ideological radicalism (whether on the left, right or new-left libertarianism versus authoritarianism) with a tribune discourse pitting certain sections of society—perceived to have been ignored by the mainstream parties—versus a large range of patricians of which political elites are the primary but not sole members. table 1. new fringe parties in europe: ideology and electoral results party country ideology formation first time in parliament latest national elections latest european parliament elections (2009) ataka bulgaria new radical right 2005 2005 (8.1%) 9.4% (2009) 11.96% lider bulgaria populistright 2007 3.26% (2009) 5.70% gerb ( citizens for the european development of bulgaria) bulgaria populism, liberalism 2006 2009 (39.7%) 39.7% (2009) 24.36% order, law, justice bulgaria populistright 2005 2009 (4.13%) 4.13% (2009) 4.67% public affairs party czech republic populistright 2001/20 09 2010 (10.9%) 10.9% (2010) 2.4% popular orthodox rally greece ultrareligious, populist, new radicalright 2000/20 05 2007 (3.8%) 5.63% (oct 2009) 7.15% golden dawn greece ultranationalist, neo-fascist 1993/20 07 2012 (may 6.69%) 6.97% (june 2012) n/a coalition of the radical left greece radical-left 2004 2007 (5.04%) 26.89 % (june 2012)/ 4.6% (october 2009) 4.70% liberal alliance denmark populistright 2007 2007 (2.8%) 5.00% (2011) 0.59% review of european and russian affairs 7 (1), 2012 9 fokus denmark animalrights, leftlibertarian 2010 2007 (split from people's party) die linke germany radical-left 2005 2007 (8.7%) 11.1% (2009 mostly from east germany ) 7.50% pirate party germany leftlibertarian 2006 2.0% (sep. 2009) 0.9% (june 2009) true finns finland nationalist, populist-left 1995/19 97 1999 (0.99%) 19.1% (2011) 9.8% (in electoral alliance) parti de gauche france radical-left 2008 2009 (split from sd) 6.91 in electoral alliance (2012) 6.47% (in electoral alliance as part of left front coalition) jobbik hungary new radical right 2003 2009 (ep) 16.67% (2010) 14.77% politics-can be-different hungary leftlibertarian 2009 2010 (7.48%) 7.48% (2010) 2.61% all for latvia latvia populist, new radicalright 2006 2010 (7.7%) 7.7% (in coalition 2010) 2.81% order and justice lithuania populistright 2002 2004 (11.4%) 12.7 (+1.3) (2008) 11.9 %(+5.1) party for animals netherlan ds animalrights, leftlibertarian 2002 2006 (1.8%) 1.3% (2010) 3.46% party for netherlan populist, new radical 2006 2006 15.5% 17% 10 review of european and russian affairs 7 (1), 2012 freedom ds right (5.9%) (2010) party for animals and nature portugal animalrights, greenlibertarian 2009/20 11 1.04(201 1) (present only at reg. level) new generation party romania ultrareligious, populist, new radicalright 2000/20 04 2.27% (2008) 8.65% (in electoral alliance coalition with greater romania party) people’s party romania populist, new radicalright 2011 9% (est.)* ordinary people slovakia populistright 2011 2012 (8.55%) 8.55% (2012) pirate party sweden leftlibertarian 2006 2009 (ep) 0.65% (2010) 7.10% democrats sweden new radical right 1988/19 95-2010 2010 (5.07%) 5.07% (2010) 3.30% (data obtained from nsd 2012a; nsd 2012b). 21st century tribune parties recent electoral results quite evidently illustrate that new tribune and radical political contenders in europe have been very successful with voters almost immediately after formation (see table 1). with the exception of a few that had to reinvent themselves such as the swedish democrats, these parties are not ones that lingered in the background until favourable conditions propelled them to parliament. rather, they are parties that have rather thrived on an antiestablishment message as soon as they entered political competition in the mid 2000s, suggesting that such parties have quickly capitalized on increasing voter apathy towards already exiting political choices. likewise, these parties made use of strategies circumventing the grip of mainstream parties over national elections by directing their efforts at running either at higher level (ep elections) or lower level (municipal or state elections). in 2009, new generation and the pirate party in sweden have entered the european parliament. also in 2009, the german pirates attained the review of european and russian affairs 7 (1), 2012 11 highest vote of all parties outside the bundestag and thus gained access to public funds. subsequently, they successfully entered the parliament of the state of berlin. the reinvented swedish democrats received their first breakthrough in the 2010 swedish national elections, politics-can-be-different won over seven percent in hungarian national elections almost immediately after inception, while jobbik managed excellent results in the 2009 ep elections and became hungary’s third largest party following national elections in 2010 (nsd 2012a; nsd 2012b). similarly, pvv more than tripled its share of the votes in the last dutch elections, making it an unofficial member of the governing coalition (nsd 2012b). three major explanations can be identified for the recent arrival of these new parties in the european political space. the first is structural—that is to say, societal changes are held responsible for shifts in preferences, which create a demand for such parties to form. the second, given the success of these parties around the same time as the financial crisis, argues for a strong relationship between socio-economic context and the rise of radical-right and radical-left parties. lastly, the phenomenon can be attributed to increasing voter apathy towards already exiting parties. while not completely contradicting either the first or second claims, this third explanation best accounts for the particular arrival of new parties as opposed to already existing parties capitalizing on structural changes or times of economic instability. the later have simply lost credibility among significant strata of society. structural arguments are among the most powerful in explaining transformations in political spectra. they are, however, much better at explaining changes in demand rather than supply. as a result, they may better account for changes in voters’ preferences instead of new actors capitalizing on these transformations. arguments linking new radical-left and radical-right parties to structural changes identify fundamental changes in the preferences of voters as responsible for the phenomenon. whereas party competition in the keynesian welfare state after world war ii was rather centred on economic issues, the transition to a post-industrial economy has compelled voters to shift their preferences from the traditional socialist versus capitalist axis, existent until around the mid sixties. new axes of political competition are formed which include former class-based but also new post-modern issues that deal with the role of the state, migration, identity, individual freedom, and/or the environment. the new political space is often depicted as revolving around two factors instead of one. at one extreme, there is an economically leftist (redistributive) and politically, as well as culturally, libertarian (participatory and individualistic) position. at the opposite pole, an economically rightist and freemarketeering position meets political and cultural authoritarianism (kitschelt and mcgann 1995, 13). as competition in modern capitalism between firms intensifies, employees are prevented from developing their class-consciousness and instead develop a loyalty towards workplace and an interest in the survival of their own firms. as a result, the working class favours a decrease in redistributive policies which might drain away resources from investment and consumption. moreover, as these actors work in instrumental economic environments guided by rules and orders, they identify with authoritarian versions of decision making. on the other hand, voters who are more educated, work in less exposed non-tradable domestic sectors. they socialize more due to their working environments, which will lead them to identify with a more libertarian idea of politics (kitschelt and mcgann 1995, 7–8). as a consequence, blue-collared workers, petitbourgeoisie, and residuals such as lower salaried employees or the unemployed are courted by the radical-right while white-collared employees, students, and professionals by the libertarianleft. 12 review of european and russian affairs 7 (1), 2012 such structural arguments, most extensively and coherently exposed by kitschelt (1995), have made a breakthrough in the study of the new libertarians and most importantly new far right parties. nonetheless, while they may explain the demand for these new parties very well, two fundamental problems surround these claims. first, structural arguments only tell half the story. they explain changes in demand and may map the new position of voters. what they do not do is explain how it is that new parties take advantage of these shifts. the same structural arguments could be applied if older more established parties would have taken on the same new issues. in fact, some mainstream parties have attempted just that. statements by prominent politicians, including those by angela merkel or nicolas sarkozy vis-à-vis multiculturalism or illegal immigrants, have been made in an attempt to imitate the same messages of these new parties. their efforts have not, however, been that fruitful. this suggests that although these changes did indeed occur, looking only at structure is not enough. structure does not explain why some parties, as opposed to others, form or why they become successful as a result of societal shifts. second, the right-right and left-left divide may have held true for parties during the nineties, but this is certainly not the case of the most recent arrivals of the mid-2000s. the identity chosen by the most recent political parties definitely still exposes some kind of radicalism. none take positions similar to those of larger centrist established parties. however, while libertarian parties are generally also left on economic issues, the radical-right is not that right on the economy. many extremist parties are in fact quite pro-welfare state. such is the case of the swedish democrats and jobbik but also of the pvv in the netherlands. the leftist camp neatly fits the post-modern political space model. pirates in sweden and germany spell out their commitment to citizens’ rights and free culture. they criticize the control and surveillance subjecting the modern citizen, as well as the abusive patent laws that favour privatized monopolies in their effort at hiking up prices and large hidden costs for citizens (pirate party germany 2011; pirate party 2008). similarly, politics-can-be-different (2011) in hungary advocates for environment-friendly policies, individual freedom, and more direct forms of government as well as social justice, the inclusion of minorities, and equality between citizens. the position of the extremist parties, however, is only somewhat consistent with previous understandings of shifts towards a right-right pole. nativism and authoritarian politics are present in all these parties. however, the free-market—the identifying marker which distinguishes the new right from the old right—is not equally present among pvv, the swedish democrats, jobbik, romanian people’s party, or the former new generation party. the romanian new generation party (ngp) is perhaps one of the few cases among new radical-right populist parties in europe actually fitting the right-right label. the ngp is nationalist, exclusivist, blatantly homophobic, and—much like the greek orthodox rally—ultra-religious (new generation party 2008). yet, despite the acts of charity, social programs, and disaster-relief campaigns of ngp’s populist multimillionaire party leader, the party commits itself to supporting private enterprise and a small state (bbc 2007). the swedish democrats clearly take an anti-immigration stance while favouring harsher criminal punishment, as well as an ill-defined “national action plan against islamist extremism” (swedish democrats 2011). nonetheless, despite its commitment to smaller governmental bureaucracies, the sd refrains from taking a right-wing position on economic issues. in fact, it quite clearly spells out the need for a strong swedish welfare state (swedish democrats 2011). the same issues are stressed by hungary’s jobbik. the party displays a marked hostility towards minorities and in particular the roma, an endorsement of a strong totalitarian state, harsher criminal punishment, and finally, an anti-globalization and protectionist position favouring review of european and russian affairs 7 (1), 2012 13 national industry rather than multinational corporations (jobbik 2010). like the swedish democrats, jobbik is thus much closer to a welfare chauvinist party than new radical freemarketeering as it favours some sort of state intervention in the economy for the benefit of the ethnic majority (faist 1994, 440). the romanian populists and the dutch pvv combine outright pro-market promises with welfare chauvinism. yet, they both argue for decreasing taxes while simultaneously calling for extending social and healthcare programs (ppdd 2012, wilders 2006). consequently, most cases of radical-right parties above display similar degrees of xenophobia, nationalism, authoritarianism, and rejection, rather than acceptance of the free market. effectively, therefore, these cases dispel previous understandings of the new radical-right as authoritarian, but pro-market. in fact, they only seem to confirm more recent studies which claim that despite the neo-liberalism shared by radical-right populists during the late 1980s and early 1990s, many of them have lately drifted towards a position that defends the welfare state (rydgren 2006, 11). this does not change the radical position all six aforementioned parties adopt. whether staunchly libertarian or heavily authoritarian, free-marketeering or in fact—as has been suggested—heavily critical of neo-liberalism and supportive of the welfare state, all avoid centrist positions which may overlap with the established mainstream. ultimately, what these cases do is challenge previous understandings of the demand for such parties. if postmodern changes as a result of globalization only explain the rise of the greens and radical-right in the 1980s and 1990s but not the recent wave of newcomers, then what does account for their formation? an alternative explanation for the rise of new marginal yet radical parties in europe during the mid-2000s lies in the continent’s socio-economic context. a large number of these parties have indeed become successful around the global financial crisis and most specifically during the debt-crisis in europe. jackman and volpert (1996, 502) argue that an unhealthy economy coupled with unemployment can be crucial towards the success of extremist parties. this is certainly backed by the historical rise of fascists and nazis in europe during the interwar period just as the great depression put an end to the economic boom of the 1920s. therefore, a valid hypothesis may be that as the financial crisis reached the european continent, support for radical movements, regardless of their radical-right or radical-left orientation, increased. the financial crisis of the late 2000s started in the second half of 2008; however, its impact on european economies only started to make itself felt during 2009. as table 2 and table 3 illustrate, the negative gross domestic product (gdp) growth experienced was actually during 2009 and in some cases 2010. this coincides with the latest 2009 european elections. in these elections, however, some parties did consolidate their positions, while others did not. jobbik, for example, managed its first success after failing to enter hungary’s parliament in 2006. the swedish pirates also scored their highest result yet winning two seats in the ep. the german pirates received only half the votes they did during the country’s federal elections, however (nsd 2012a; nsd 2012b). the swedish democrats failed to gain any seats, as in any other previous election, thus hardly foreshadowing their success a year later in sweden’s national elections. greece’s popular orthodox rally managed its greatest score since its inception—7.15 percent and pvv likewise got 17 percent. lmp ran for the first time in an election, and despite not passing the five percent threshold, it still managed to get a relatively good result—2.6 percent (nsd 2012a). linking these results with the financial crisis is a bit problematic, however. first, it is an already well-documented fact that european elections, by virtue of being second order elections, inflate protest-votes against mainstream parties (reif and schmitt 1980, 14 review of european and russian affairs 7 (1), 2012 9). any increase in votes from previous elections may simply be due to the fact that parties have mastered the strategy of going for mid-term elections first and using those as a stepping-stone for national elections. second, the degree of economic decline does not really correlate with the success of either radical-right or radical-left in these ep elections. romania and hungary’s negative gdp growth were similar, and yet both the radical-right and libertarian-left are more successful in the second case than the former. sweden’s negative growth would suggest that some demand exists for radical parties; yet, its radical-right did not capitalize on this demand. similarly, while the pirates did make it to the ep, their success may have had more to do with their ability to capitalize on the pirate-bay trials at the time rather than some demand actually created by the recession. finally, looking at the ep elections just months after the recession made its way to europe may be problematic simply because voters may not have started to feel the full impact of negative growth. national elections after this time may be more revealing in terms of success or failure for such parties to take advantage of the economic downturn. table 2. economic growth and radical right vote in national elections countr y gdp growth07 gdp growth08 gdp growth09 gdp growth10 nrr before 2008 nrr after 2008 diff. german y 3.394 0.809 -5.078 3.562 0.5 0.4 -0.1 greece 4.279 1.023 -2.339 -4.354 3.8 5.6 (6.92 june12) 1.8 (3.12) hungar y 0.773 0.828 -6.693 1.2 2.2 16.7 14.5 nether. 3.909 1.769 -3.529 1.634 5.9 15.5 9.6 romani a 6.317 7.349 -7.078 -1.267 15.1 5.5 -9.6 sweden 3.314 -0.613 -5.333 5.691 2.9 5.7 2.8 (data obtained from nsd 2012a; nsd 2012b; imf 2011) table 2 illustrates that the link between the radical-right vote in national elections and low/negative growth during the debt crisis does not fully explain success or failure either. the netherlands (like germany) was one of the least exposed and affected countries and by 2009 and 2010 it was already experiencing strong gdp growth. nonetheless, the radical-right there gained ten percent more votes than in the previous elections, increasing its voter share by almost 300 percent. in hungary, the voter share of the radical-right increased almost eight times, while in sweden it doubled. in greece, one of the most affected countries during the 2000s financial crisis, the radical-right increased its performance from 3.8 to 5.6 percent in 2009. therefore, among the countries where the party family increased its voter share, the greek radical-right improved the least. in subsequent post-crisis elections (may 2012 and june 2012), the radical laos (which supported the eu and imf-imposed austerity plan) did not manage to pass the electoral threshold. the space of the radical-right was however taken over by the even more radical and anti-austerity party, golden dawn, which received a slightly higher percentage (than laos in 2009) of almost seven percent. the rise of the golden dawn extremists was possible as laos’ anti-mainstream message was highly handicapped due to its own participation in the unpopular governing coalition at the time. therefore, capitalizing on laos’ discredit, golden review of european and russian affairs 7 (1), 2012 15 dawn skilfully portrayed itself as ‘a true radical right party’ that would never partake in centrist government coalitions or austerity measures. thus, as austerity forced the greek state to withdraw from its social commitments, golden dawn successfully promoted itself as the only restorer of the country’s glorious past. through its paramilitary gangs claiming to police athens’ neighbourhoods (often winding up harassing immigrants) and through soup kitchens for nativegreeks organized and funded with the help of public party subsidies, golden dawn effectively sought to challenge the ability of the state itself to perform even some of its most basic functions. in contrast to the particular case of greece, sweden—which recovered quickly from the crisis—experienced for the first time a radical-right party entering parliament despite the fact that during the early 1990s when sweden experienced similar (if not worst) economic decline, the same party was unable to pass the five percent threshold. in romania, while the country experienced the largest economic decline in 2009 and continued to decline in 2010, the radicalright fell drastically from15.1 percent to 5.5 percent. table 3. economic growth and left-libertarian vote in national elections country gdp growth07 gdp growth08 gdp growth09 gdp growth10 ll before 2008 ll after 2008 diff. germany 3.394 0.809 -5.078 3.562 2 2 greece 4.279 1.023 -2.339 -4.354 5.04 4.6 (26.89 june12) -0.4 (21.85) hungary 0.773 0.828 -6.693 1.2 7.48 7.48 nether. 3.909 1.769 -3.529 1.634 1.3 1.3 0 romania 6.317 7.349 -7.078 -1.267 0.3 0.62 0.32 sweden 3.314 -0.613 -5.333 5.691 0.63 0.65 0.02 (data obtained from nsd 2012a; nsd 2012b; imf 2011) similarly, with the exception of lmp in hungary and syriza in greece (which increased its voter-share by more than 500 percent following the 2012 elections), the left-libertarian parties have not been much more successful. their results in national elections dwarf those of the radical-right. moreover, although in most cases they do make some gains compared to elections prior to the crisis, these gains are generally too small to significantly illustrate some sort of leftlibertarian capitalization of economic decline (table 3). even syriza’s significant success in may and june 2012 has had to do as much with its position vis-à-vis the highly unpopular national coalition of mainstream parties as it did with the crisis itself. while the main issue of the elections was austerity in light of greece’s dire economic situation, syriza capitalized on its anti-establishment position by challenging both eu and imf imposed austerity measures, as well as what they perceived to be the docile compliance of most political parties who were incapable or unwilling to stand up for the interests of greeks. in the end, syriza’s success depended highly on its ability to convince the electorate that (unlike pasok who were willing to cooperate with the centre-right new democracy but unlikely to renegotiate austerity measures) it was the only ‘true’ leftist party that would not join a right-wing coalition and that was willing to undo the country’s austerity measures and drastically renegotiate greece’s commitments. this is an exception, however, rather than the rule—where a party essentially combines popular alarm about the economy with concerns over the lack of viable electoral options. thus, while in few states economic decline is followed by support for radical fringe-parties, a clear link is generally not that evident. 16 review of european and russian affairs 7 (1), 2012 a third and final hypothesis is that the current rise of radical (new-left and new-right) parties is due to an increase in the apathy of voters, as well as a decreasing faith in institutions, political parties, democratic practices, and ultimately, the democratic system in general. voters are simply disillusioned with the way they perceive and understand democracy. a lack of engagement by mainstream parties and the isolationism of the mainstream from the society it claims to represent have become quite obvious to voters who have started to be more and more aware of the deficit that current modern democracy carries. eurobarometer surveys between 2000 and 2004 illustrate a substantial increase in citizen dissatisfaction with current forms of democracy in european union member states (figure 1). when asked about satisfaction with the way democracy works in their state, the percentage of those “very satisfied” has decreased in just four years from 17 percent to 8 percent. similarly, those generally satisfied have dropped under 50 percent from a peak of 60 percent in 2000. what is most alarming, however, is that the percentage of citizens claiming that they are “not at all satisfied” has increased more than three times. while in 2000 only 4 percent declared that they were not satisfied with how democracy worked in their country, the percentage more than doubled in just one year to 9 percent while reaching 13 percent in april 2004. also, the survey shows that the number of those claiming that they are “not very satisfied” has almost doubled from 18 percent to 30 percent in the same four-year period. if taken together, the “dissatisfied” group increased from a mere 22 percent in 2000 to almost half the population in 2004. similarly, while positive views towards democracy were on solid grounds at 77 percent in 2000, they have gradually decreased to barely over 50 percent in april 2004. review of european and russian affairs 7 (1), 2012 17 at the same time, it is noticeable that the percentage of “don’t knows” has likewise increased substantially in the 2000-2004 period. this could be revealing in that respondents may have increasingly more problems in identifying how to measure democracy and what democracy actually is. it may be more difficult for them to effectively pinpoint their expectations about democracy and how democracy in their perception fares against those expectations. essentially, what this suggests is that these respondents have strongly increasing doubts about their states being well-functioning democracies but have not yet taken the significant step of explicitly identifying them as being poorly-functioning democracies. country data (figure 2) for the same period is available only for eu-15 member states. nonetheless, the picture is quite revealing of the same tendencies in the selected cases of germany, greece, sweden, and netherlands. figure 2 illustrates a significant drop in the “very satisfied” group especially in the netherlands and sweden in the year between 2000 and 2001 which does not recover by 2004. a less spectacular drop occurs in the “satisfied” group in germany and greece from 60 percent and 50 percent to 50 percent and 36 percent respectively. greek numbers in this case recover somewhat by 2004. in a similar fashion, the “not very satisfied” percentage in the netherlands and sweden more than triple in the same four year period from just under ten percent to almost 30 percent. the “not at all satisfied” likewise increase from a mere 1 to 2 percent to 6 to 7 percent in 2001 and 2004. the greek “not very satisfied” and “not at all satisfied” similarly increase substantially between june 2000 and january 2001 from 30 18 review of european and russian affairs 7 (1), 2012 percent to 36 percent and from 10 percent to 16 percent. however these spikes recede by 2004. the period analyzed above does not correspond to the beginning of a societal shift as a result of globalization. it likewise does not correspond to the financial crisis. these changes long predate the crisis. it is actually a period characterized by economic growth, relative prosperity, as well as eu integration, and in the case of many central and eastern european states, it is an era of eu accession. this period is not one of economic gloom, but rather it is one of economic promise. it is not exactly the period of katz and mair’s cartel-party thesis either. their seminal work was written about five to ten years earlier and referred to declining politicization and citizen involvement, as well as the collusive manner in which parties captured state resources in the 1970s not the 1990s. this period is nonetheless one that reveals an awareness of the cartel’s presence—or at least its suffocating effect on electoral choice. moreover, it is a period that also corresponds to the proliferation of radical libertarian and extremist parties in both western and eastern europe that capitalized on their anti-cartel rhetoric. in the case of sweden and the netherlands, this timeframe coincides with the period just preceding the formation of the pvv, the pirate party, and the renovation of the swedish democrats. in the case of greece, the spike during 2000 coincides with the formation of greece’s radical-right popular orthodox rally (laos) party. finally, in the case of germany, the volatility between satisfied and unsatisfied in this period is least evident. although the percentages of the “dissatisfied” have increased in germany as they did in all other cases, they were already high to begin with, and while in other states the spikes were proportionally significant (three times more in some cases), germany’s was not. this corresponds with the weak performance of radical parties in this country, the only notable example being the german pirates’ 2 percent federal vote. of course, it is natural to question whether these drastic spikes are illustrative of actual long term changes in citizens’ perceptions or whether they may just be an irregular and temporary disorientation on the part of voters. the implication would be that if the latter is true, more recent data should show a return to 2000 levels. this, however, is not the case. data from more recent years (2007–2010) illustrates that the shifts in the early 2000s seem to be quite permanent. more recent eurobarometers from 2007 onwards (figure 3) confirm that the 2000–2004 spike in dissatisfaction was not temporary. they indicate that the number of dissatisfied stabilized in the 2009-10 period at about the same 44–45 percent percentage recorded in 2004. this suggests that the early 2000s period was unique in the unusually high review of european and russian affairs 7 (1), 2012 19 increase of unsatisfied respondents. what this also shows is that over the entire past decade, these numbers have not receded but rather remained more or less stable following their initial spike. naturally, caution is to be exercised when making such connections. linde and ekman (2003, 393) warn against misusing the measurement of democratic satisfaction, as it may sometimes show simply a correlation between those whose party won versus those who did not. nonetheless this would not explain why in just under four years, roughly twice as many respondents saw their party as the losing party. if that were the case here, losers and winners during elections would match with respondents to the democracy question and regardless of the period, respondents should more or less stay within the same percent range. it is the argument of this paper that voter attitude toward democracy (and the way it works) heavily impacts the tribune discourse of parties. moreover, parties do consult polls and other statistical data as well and often cite it when they think it plays to their advantage. parties ultimately form, organize, and run for elections at times when they think that they have true chances to win. few parties in general want to form despite inexistent conditions of electoral success for the fear of being branded ‘minor’ or ‘insignificant’ by the electorate. political parties do not simply free-float in political space for voters to select. voters are not faced with a myriad countless parties that they could choose from in every election. the choice they have is quite limited to a number of parties which decide to form and run based on a cost-benefit analysis. therefore, voters may be faced with the same major parties, such as centre-left and centre-right as their almost certain entry in parliament outweighs the cost of running. for smaller parties, fringe parties, or what are often called niche parties, the costs of forming, organizing, and running in elections are not so obviously low. new parties rarely form and run if the possibility of victory is dim. parties that overly emphasize an anti-mainstream and anti-elitist discourse are thus much more likely to form when they themselves feel that a demand exists for such an option. although further research is needed, this paper has attempted to illustrate that the proliferation of radical (left and right) parties during the latter half of the past decade is not only due to structural shifts or economic decline, but rather due to an increasing crisis in modern democracy which primarily involves the way voters perceive already existing political options. despite the difficulty involved in measuring the true degree of cartel strength in each and every state, the positive perception of representative democracy is evidently decreasing. ultimately, although diverging in ideology, the latest arrival of niche and fringe parties can be regarded in many ways as a singular phenomenon marked not by new societal issues or cleavages but by the continuing crisis of already existent party systems. conclusion in essence, this paper has drawn attention to a plethora of new political party contenders of the late 2000s in western and eastern europe. it has sought out to outline the self-identity and position these parties adopt, as well as illustrate that their near-simultaneous arrival on the political scene of many eu member states constitutes the latest proliferation of new parties in europe. my argument is that such parties, albeit divergent in ideological position, essentially illustrate a common thrust aimed at the established centre-right and centre-left mainstream. it is in response to a perception about the corruption, disconnect, or negligence of the establishment that all these contenders wrap their political message around. 20 review of european and russian affairs 7 (1), 2012 this wave is different from previous waves in that the anti-establishment drive comes concomitantly from both left and right, libertarian and authoritarian positions in both western and eastern europe. thus the identity of the challenger is one that combines radical positions and strong ideological commitments with a clear tribune and anti-cartel party rhetoric. subsequently, in relation to already existent academic literature on the cartelization of political space, this reveals a reaction to the persistence—or possibly even the amplification—of the cartel (at least in the minds of voters) rather than its weakening. equally important, this raises two significant questions that most definitely deserve further study. first, given the rise of the tribune party phenomenon, it is worth considering whether we are still living in the cartel-party system. if not, are we indeed faced with two competing party systems—one of those that govern but do not represent, while the other claiming to represent but without governing? writing in 1966, otto kirchheimer pointed towards the transformative nature of european party systems as traditional, ideological member-based parties moved increasingly towards the centre of political space (krouwel 2003, 24). almost thirty years later, katz and mair (1995) underscored the increasingly limited terms of electoral choice that mainstream parties choose to initiate as well as the collusive manner in which they turn towards state resources. ultimately, as transformations of party systems are always presented as stages in a dialectic process, are we currently witnessing the next stage? acknowledgements the author would like to thank professor 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social sciences and humanities research council of canada (sshrc)—along with the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies (carleton university) and its associated research unit, the centre for european studies. rera aims to provide an accessible forum for research, to promote high standards of research and scholarship, and to foster communication among young scholars. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada tel: +01 613 520-2600 ext. 1179; e-mail: rera-journal@carleton.ca creative commons license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ this working paper is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial no derivs 3.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 3.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced provided the source is acknowledged. no use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes. issn: 1718-4835 © 2012 the author(s) http://www.carleton.ca/rera/ mailto:rera-journal@carleton.ca review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 issn 1718-4835 mapping of population diversity in canada and germany: different strategies, similar pragmatism caroline schultz1 abstract the aim of this paper is to compare the respective approaches of canada and germany in statistically mapping population diversity and to offer possible explanations for the differences and commonalities observed. in order to investigate this, the paper takes into account the concept of ‘politics of belonging’ as a theoretical background and considers the functions of national statistics in categorizing different groups of people. there are different strategies of mapping population diversity and, inter alia, two models can be distinguished: while some countries explicitly include questions on elusive concepts of ‘origin’ in their population data collection, others refrain from doing so and instead derive different subgroups from information on citizenship and place of birth. taking canada as an example of the first group of countries and germany of the second, and delineating recent changes within their respective strategies of measuring diversity within their populations, this paper argues that canada and germany converge towards a new pragmatism in the approaches of measuring diversity in population statistics. 1 caroline schultz is a research associate and doctoral candidate at the chair of political sociology at the university of bamberg and researcher at the expert council of german foundations on integration and migration. 2 review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 introduction states have an interest in statistically mapping their population, historically for the purpose of unifying and creating homogeneity in ongoing processes of nation building, nowadays seemingly first and foremost in order to design policies and measure their outcomes. however, even today censuses do not only ask questions on date of birth or level of income, but also include sections related to a person’s identity or ‘origin’. there are several different state strategies to identify ‘ethnic’ subgroups within the population statistically. two of the most common are 1) collecting data on concepts such as ‘race’, ‘origin’, ‘ethnicity’, or ‘ancestry’, relying on the selfidentification of the population; and 2) deriving a person’s ‘origins’ from their own and their parents’ place of birth or citizenship instead. apart from these, there are several mixed approaches and some states do not collect data on ethnic or migrant origin at all, such as france (cf. jacobs et al. 2009; valente 2010; simon 2012; see also svr 2015, 142-153). the objective of the paper is to understand why some states follow the strategy 1 and why others follow strategy 2, as well as how these strategies have evolved over time. the hypothesis being studied is that there has been a shift from ideologically driven to more pragmatic practices of statistically mapping population diversity; and that this shift can be observed even across countries employing different strategies of measuring population diversity. ideologically driven practices are understood here to be closely related to the respective idea or myth of nationhood, while pragmatic practices are defined as those that are based on considerations of what is deemed to be practical and instrumental in tracking the effects of (economic) integration measures (cf. joppke 2007) in order to detect and enable counteraction of discrimination and inequalities in modern immigration societies. it is important to emphasize that this is not meant as an ‘either-or’-comparison, but rather as a continuum. in principle, both strategies outlined above can be driven by a combination of both ideological as well as pragmatic elements. to clarify, consider the example of france which does not collect any data on ethnicity due to its republican strategy of indifference: its state philosophy is meant to be colourand culture-blind (cf. e.g. bertossi 2012; whitol de wenden, salzbrunn and weber 2013). the french approach of not collecting ethnic data is very close to the ideology end of the ideology-pragmatismcontinuum – it hazards the consequences of not being able to measure ethnic inequalities in society solely for the purpose of not moving away from its national myth of a colour-blind communauté des citoyens (schnapper 1994; cf. also svr 2015, 100). the french approach, however, is not investigated further in this paper, as its strategy to statistically map diversity is a non-strategy at best.2 rather, the paper uses the relatively unlike cases of canada and germany as two case studies for its comparative design of a ‘most different’ approach (cf. bloemraad 2013). while canada is following strategy 1 outlined above, trying to get hold of elusive concepts of ‘origin’, germany is following strategy 2, using hard facts to determine a person’s origin and assigning it from above. the paper is structured as follows: in the first section, the literature of comparative migration study research on statistical mapping of diversity in canada and germany is briefly reviewed. canada and germany are then briefly introduced as countries traditionally known in migration 2 france did take a step towards quantifying diversity in its population in 1999 with the introduction of the category ‘immigrant’ in its census. it still refrains from distinguishing between ethnic groups, however (engler 2012; jacobs et al. 2009). 3 review of european and russian affairs 7 (1), 2017 studies for adopting opposite approaches to nationhood, immigration, citizenship, and immigrant integration. in the next section, a theoretical background is provided using the concept of ‘politics of belonging’ and considering the functions of national statistics in categorizing various groups of people within society. from there, the two countries’ current approach of labelling and counting immigrants and people with a (family) history of migration is contrasted against their respective history of nation building and immigration. in conclusion, the paper sums up the main points of the discussion and outlines questions for further study.3 literature review: comparative studies on state approaches to map diversity census politics in countries of immigration have been studied only relatively recently. three recent comparative works that cover at least one of the selected case studies (canada and germany) are of particular importance for this paper: thompson (2012) compares the census politics of the united states, the united kingdom and canada, focusing on the parallel emergence of mixed race categories. she argues that a combination of internal and external factors led to the meltdown of fixed one-race categories, including “demographic trends, increasingly unsettled perceptions about discrete racial categories, and a transnational norm surrounding the primacy of racial self-identification in census-taking” and calls this process across english-speaking countries of immigration a “normative shift towards multiracial multiculturalism” (thompson 2012, 1421). stevens, ishizawa and grbic (2015) compare canada’s approach to measuring race and ethnicity in the census with those of two other big english-speaking settler-states, australia and the united states, respectively. they find “important similarities in how these three nations define and describe subgroups with immigrant origins” (stevens, ishizawa and grbic 2015, 14) and argue that these similarities are due to the similar challenges those states faced when gathering data on the ‘ethnic’ origins of their populations. these parallel problems include: first, the ambiguity and conflation of the concepts of ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’; second, the complexities that come up with intermarriage and the social trend of emphasizing ‘identity’ rather than biological features; and third, the respective behaviour of the population, i.e. the refusal to go with specific categories. both thompson (2012) and stevens, ishizawa and grbic (2015) hence focus on countries who apply strategy 1: explicitly collecting ethnic statistics. simon (2012) uses a broader sample and reviews ethnic data collection in no less than 41 european countries. he argues that much is in flow in europe as many countries that were previously reluctant to collect statistics on ‘ethnicity’ are now obliged to do so because of eu non-discrimination policies, and anticipates a “move from colour-blindness to ‘ethnic consciousness’” (simon 2012, 1367). he finds that more than half (22) of the countries observed collect ‘ethnic data’, while almost all collect country of birth and citizenship. of those 19 countries that do not collect data on ethnicity, six (mostly northern european countries) ask about the parents’ place of birth. two explanations are given for “this relative absence of statistical data on race and ethnicity in continental europe” (simon 2012, 1376). first, data protection laws in these countries define such data as ‘sensitive’ and hence prohibit collecting them; second, “these sensitive data are also perceived as inaccurate categories 3 there are obvious limitations to this brief essay. it is not based on any systematic analysis of government or media documents, but mainly draws on and consolidates the findings of previous studies on the two separate cases and develops its own argument based on these previous findings. 4 review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 for describing population and analysing social processes since they challenge the representation of ethnically homogeneous societies“ (ibid, 1376). in other words, the historically prevalent image of ‘the nation’ seems to play a role in the choice of collecting ‘ethnic data’ or only data on citizenship and place of birth. canada and germany: antipodes in mapping population diversity canada and germany have long been known for adopting opposite approaches to nationhood, immigration, citizenship, and immigrant integration. recently, however, several researchers have identified processes of convergence between the two countries in various realms of migration and integration policy.4 the respective ‘politics of belonging’ by way of the census politics in regard to measuring ethnicity or ethnic origin in canada and germany do not appear to have been studied previously in a comparative way.5 the canadian and german contexts are rather different. on one side of the atlantic, there is the settler country canada that historically values ethno-cultural difference of various population groups. accordingly, to depict its multifaceted members, collating ethnicity statistics has a century-long tradition in canada and—with minor and major changes along—is still being practiced today. on the european side, there is germany, the ‘latecomer’ in migration and integration management, its myth of the nation having been first defined by ‘culture’ (kulturnation) then by biological descent: throughout the 20th century, it was mainly blood relations that determined who ‘belonged’ to german society. parents passed on german citizenship to children, to put it simply. given the role that ethnicity statistics played in facilitating the holocaust (seltzer 1998), it is not surprising that collection of explicitly ethnic data is entirely unimaginable in post-war germany.6 nonetheless, the eventual acknowledgement that germany is a country of immigration and the related concerns of how to track social inequalities and discrimination, led to the introduction of the statistical category of ‘migration background’ in 2005. ‘migration background’ is defined by the country of birth of oneself or one’s parents. the politics of belonging and categorization in immigrant-receiving societies to understand that state strategies of mapping population diversity are embedded in wider attempts of fostering ‘national identity’ and are therefore originally ideological, it is fruitful to look into theoretical literature exploring what has been termed ‘the politics of belonging’. “we are who we are by virtue of who we are not” – this diagnosis by aristide zolberg (1999, 85) aptly pins down the processes of collective identity-making that inevitably occur in any agglomeration of people. essentially, these are processes of boundary making, of defining oneself (or one’s group) against a homogenized imagined ‘other’ (or several ‘others’). from a state-centred perspective, these processes have been termed the ‘politics of belonging’ (or 4 see for instance triadafilopoulos 2012; kolb 2014; soennecken 2014. 5 bauder (2014) contrasts canada’s and germany’s “immigration debates related to national belonging”, without taking into consideration the respective census politics. 6 however, there were and continue to be privileged entrance rules for migration based on german ethnicity (‘volkszugehörigkeit‘) (cf. for instance joppke 2005). 5 review of european and russian affairs 7 (1), 2017 sometimes ‘politics of identity’), albeit the term is mostly only vaguely defined, if at all. according to brubaker, politics of belonging are bound to exist because of an architectural flaw in the concept of the liberal nation-state, which is “conceptualized in both socio-scientific analysis and policy practice as an internally homogeneous, externally bounded political, legal, social, cultural, and (sometimes) economic space.” (2010, 63). however in practice, states do not conform to this model. an exact congruence has never existed between the frontiers of the state and those of ‘the nation’ as an “imagined community” (anderson 1991). migration is one of the most obvious reasons for this idealized concept of the homogenous nation-state to remain just that – a concept. in fact, there is room to argue that “[t]he state has historically used immigration policy as a tool in fostering a particular national identity” (adamson, triadafilopoulos and zolberg 2011, 847). tracing the politics of belonging in countries of immigration is insightful as they influence opportunities for people within a society to take part in various parts of social life (cf. crowley 1999). membership of a ‘nation’ is not only determined by formal citizenship, but is managed by “ordinary people in the course of everyday life, using tacit understandings of who belongs and who does not, of us and them” (brubaker 2010, 65). winter (2014) takes the dichotomous model of ‘us’ versus ‘them’ one step further, explaining how the existence of outsiders, ‘them’, conditions the confrontations between ‘us’ and ‘others’ in “changing sets of triangular social relations”, within a society made up of different groups that are unequal in terms of power (2014, 129). although a lot of different societal forces are at play in the politics of belonging, choosing the state as the primary level of analysis when studying these processes is a relatively straightforward approach. this is because the state is the final entity to decide upon which categories to use in bureaucracy and population statistics. obviously, it is impossible to completely disentangle other actors, precisely because the politics of membership, identity and belonging are social processes in which the public, the political and the media debate influence each other (cf. pries 2013). the politics of belonging overlap with, but are not synonymous to what has been termed “membership politics” for instance by triadafilopoulos (2012) in his comparison of canada’s and germany’s “membership regimes” throughout the 20th century. while membership politics determine who is allowed to migrate to a country (via immigration law and politics), and who is allowed to become a political member of that country (via citizenship politics) and under what conditions, it is harder to pin down the ways that politics of belonging work: the concept is arguably somewhat vague. it plays out visibly, though, in the categories and labels used for demarcating the ‘us’ from the ‘other’. some basics about the function of categories and population statistics need to be stated: first of all, it is clear that on any level of discussion, be it political, societal, or academic, there is a necessity to name the entity in question (person, group, phenomenon), which is to be studied or whose plight one seeks to discuss. categorizing is inevitable in academic research and policymaking; besides, this is how the human brain works in general: it puts things and people into imaginative boxes, i.e. categorizes in order to make sense of the world we live in. it is clear therefore that there is no alternative—for the policy-maker or for the researcher—to naming and labelling. in order for evidence-based policy-making to succeed, we need to know what works and why. however, at the same time that one acknowledges the inevitability of categories, one needs to acknowledge that it is imperative to discuss and at times question them, because “terminology is anything but irrelevant” (düvell 2008, 484). each label invokes certain 6 review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 connotations and tacitly reinforces power structures.7 one has to be aware that the labels put on people, and the boxes the state, the majority group – or themselves – stick them into, are socially constructed and by no means fixed. after all, boundary-making by the dominant group between minority groups (‘them’ and ‘others’) is clearly marked by, and a product of power relations within society (winter 2011). so what purpose does the collection of migration-related population data serve? it undoubtedly plays a vital part in re-creating and re-inventing the national identity of allegedly homogenous nation-states, and in this sense, it is inherently ideological. in other words, on the ideologypragmatism continuum introduced above, ethnic data collection leans originally very much on the ideology-side. as simon (2012, 1376, emphasis added) explains, “[c]ensuses were implemented in most western european countries as equipment for nation building during the nineteenth century, and the political objective during this process of the ‘invention of the nation’ was to create homogeneity against internal diversity by using unifying categories.” 8 it is important to bear this historical background of census politics in mind, as it points to the principal dilemma faced by decision-makers of countries of immigration today. collecting data on ‘differences’ (be they ethnic, racial, cultural or migration-related in more subtle ways) is a practical necessity in order to measure and track social inequalities and discrimination in superdiverse societies – the pragmatic element of ethnic data collection. however at the same time, precisely these categorizations might reify existing social boundaries or even create new ones. there is no way to escape the paradoxical situation that “[f]or detecting unequal opportunities or discrimination, instruments of measurement are needed, but at the moment of generating new categories, these turn out and get alive as forces of naming and blaming in public discourses and in the politics of ascription” (pries 2013, 78). therefore, a pragmatic approach to this dilemma engages in the statistical mapping of diversity with the purpose of maintaining social cohesion in diverse societies. a brief disclaimer seems to be in order at this point. this paper is less focused on what would be the normatively ‘right’ way of approaching this dilemma. instead, it seeks to understand and delineate the different paths of canada and germany in migration-paradigm or diversityparadigm statistical data collection. it finds that both experienced a shift away from an ideological towards a more pragmatic approach, while at the same time remaining fundamentally different in their respective strategies of mapping population diversity. 7 for instance, zhang (2001, 29f) highlights the role that allegedly objective and scientific censuses have played in reifying the marginalization of the ‘floating population’ in china, claiming that “a census does not simply describe existing social groups; it reflects the state’s vision for the ordering of a society.” 8 when the term ‘nation-building’ – which is often vaguely defined or used to describe a plethora of phenomena – is used in this paper, it is employed in the sense that von bogdandy et al. (2005, 586) capture in their definition: “nation-building is the most common form of a process of collective identity formation with a view to legitimizing public power within a given territory. this is an essentially indigenous process which often not only projects a meaningful future but also draws on existing traditions, institutions, and customs, redefining them as national characteristics in order to support the nation’s claim to sovereignty and uniqueness. a successful nation-building process produces a cultural projection of the nation containing a certain set of assumptions, values and beliefs which can function as the legitimizing foundation of a state structure.” 7 review of european and russian affairs 7 (1), 2017 case studies canada: mapping origins and ‘visible minorities’ in the multicultural country in a report entitled “immigration and ethnocultural diversity in canada”, statistics canada (2013, 6) explains: “canada is a multicultural society whose ethnocultural make-up has been shaped over time by immigrants and their descendants. each new wave of immigration has added to the nation's ethnic and cultural composition.” in the 2011 national household survey, more than 200 different ‘ethnic origins’ were reported, 13 of which were declared by more than one million respondents, respectively. more than six million people were classified as belonging to a ‘visible minority’, representing about 19 percent of the population – the three largest of these groups are ‘south asians’, ‘chinese’, and ‘black’. about one third of those who reported to be anything other than ‘white’ – hence being categorized as a member of a ‘visible minority’ – were born in canada (statistics canada 2013).9 to understand the vocabulary used by the statistics office, one has to take a brief look at the historical context within which canada’s politics of belonging have developed. clearly, for canada, “immigration is an integral part of national identity” (bauder 2014, 9). the settler state has been described as a “multination state”; but it has to be remembered that “[t]he original incorporation of the quebecois and aboriginal communities into the canadian political community was involuntary”, as the communitarian will kymlicka (1995, 12) states in his influential book multicultural citizenship. in fact, as kymlicka goes on to explain, “[m]any of the pivotal moments in canadian history have centred on […] attempts to renegotiate the terms of federation between english, french, and aboriginals (1995, 12-13).” 10 throughout the imagined history of canada as home to nations of settlers, however, indigenous peoples have been marginalized as ‘the other’, as they “challenge the cherished image of canada as a country of immigrants who came in search for a better future” (bauder 2014, 17). like other liberal democratic countries of immigration (joppke 2005), canada had been following an ethnic immigration policy and an assimilation-oriented integration model for the larger part of the 20th century (kymlicka 1995; triadafilopoulos 2012). criteria based on race and geographical origin was used in canadian selection procedures until 1967 (bauder 2014). in 1971, multiculturalism was adopted as an official state policy, and later put into law in 1988 (bauder 2014). 11 a lot of research has been conducted on canadian multiculturalism (for instance kymlicka 2012; winter 2015), but for the purpose of this paper it suffices to emphasize that while across western migrant-receiving countries, multiculturalism as a political approach to immigrant incorporation has come under assault in the last couple of years, it is still alive and striving in canada. however, there seems to be evidence that “even in canada multiculturalism 9 see question 19 of the 2011 national household survey, available from http://www23.statcan.gc.ca/imdbbmdi/instrument/5178_q1_v1-eng.pdf (accessed 15.12.2016) and the respective guide, available from https://www12.statcan.gc.ca/nhs-enm/2011/ref/pdf/n1_guide_short_court.pdf (accessed 15.12.2016). 10 kymlicka (1995) draws a clear distinction between national minorities (with occupied territories within the state) and immigrant groups. 11 multiculturalism as a policy was often believed to be an extension of english-french dualism: “commentators […] tended to argue that the historical compromises reached to accommodate quebec’s cultural and linguistic difference have helped to prepare the rest of canada to deal with the challenges of newer sources of ethnocultural diversity” (winter 2014, 138). however, this changed in the early 1990s, because “[i]n the years leading up to the second quebec referendum on independence in 1995, québécois nationalist separatism […] became increasingly regarded as the enfant terrible of canadian multiculturalism” (winter 2014, 138). http://www23.statcan.gc.ca/imdb-bmdi/instrument/5178_q1_v1-eng.pdf http://www23.statcan.gc.ca/imdb-bmdi/instrument/5178_q1_v1-eng.pdf https://www12.statcan.gc.ca/nhs-enm/2011/ref/pdf/n1_guide_short_court.pdf 8 review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 has lost much of its original meaning” (winter 2015, 1): while it used to refer to the recognition of group rights to maintain different cultural beliefs and traditions, in the 1990s the focus shifted to guaranteeing individual rights to difference. while census politics have predated the politics of multiculturalism by far, it is likely that politics of multiculturalism have had an impact on shifts in census politics. it is against this backdrop of the multiculturalism as a national ethos that statistical mapping of diversity in canadian censuses today has to be viewed. canada belongs to a number of ‘classic’ immigration countries that have a long tradition of mapping their population’s ‘race’ or origins. in canada, these attempts go back as far as 1767 (stevens, ishizawa and grbic 2015; cf. also thompson 2012) – while the us collected information on ‘race’ for the first time in 1790 (stevens, ishizawa and grbic 2015, 15). as in other countries all over the world, the second world war and the experience of nazi-germany’s inhuman racist ideology marked a turning point in the understanding and conception of ‘race’. in two statements in 1950 and 1951, unesco recommended the concept of ‘race’ be dropped as a scientific fallacy, which illustrates this international paradigm shift (cf. simon 2012, 1376-1377). hence, in the 1951 census, canada did not include explicit questions about ‘race’ any more, but instead took up questions about ‘origins’. 12 implicitly, however, the concept remained (and still remains today) focused on biological ancestry, with respondents being asked to indicate the “ethnic or cultural group that the person or his or her male ancestor belonged to at the time of arrival on the north american continent” (stevens, ishizawa and grbic 2015, 17).13 table 1 shows how the question on ‘origin’ in the canadian censuses evolved from 1951 to 2011. the concept of ‘origin’ was continuously modified, which according to thompson (2012, 1409) can be attributed to three key factors, namely “demographic trends, increasingly unsettled perceptions about discrete racial categories, and a transnational norm surrounding the primacy of racial self-identification in census-taking”. thompson (2012) argues for the existence of the latter as not only canada, but also the us and the uk switched from external ascription of ethnic/racial belonging to the concept of self-identification. however, note that self-identification statistics as a form of data production remain socially constructed to a considerable extent. this is shown for instance by the fact that bureaucrats subsume self-reported ethnic origins under the label of ‘visible minorities’, which is not explicitly mentioned in the nhs questionnaire (2011) itself, but in later interpretation of the data (cf. statistics canada 2013). 12 about the canadian census: “the canadian census is conducted every five years across the country since 1956. prior to 1951, it was conducted every 10 years. in 1971, with the exception of indian reserves and remote areas, selfenumeration was first introduced where census representatives were dropping off questionnaires at every private dwelling and collecting them back soon after. starting in 1991, all respondents in self-enumeration areas (over 98% of the population) were asked to return their completed census forms by mail. in the 2006 census, forms were delivered by canada post to about 70% of households. the remaining 30% received the form from a census representative as in previous censuses. in the 2011 census, 54% of canadian households completed their census form on-line” (hamel and béland 2013). 13 the social importance of the question of one’s ‘origin’ or ancestry is illustrated in the popularity of genealogy in francophone canada: leroux (2014, 720) explains that owing to efforts by scholars and tens of thousands of interested laymen, “french canadians can now trace their lineage back […] to common founding male colonists in the seventeenth century […] genealogy, then, is not simply a search for one’s ancestors; it also constructs the boundaries of the national family.” 9 review of european and russian affairs 7 (1), 2017 table 1: the question on ‘origin’ in the canadian censuses, 1951-2011 census year concept mode options / examples 1951 ‘origin’ checkbox english, french, irish, netherlands, scottish, norwegian, welsh & manx, polish, czech & slovak, russian, finnish, swedish, german, ukrainian, italian, native indian, jewish, unknown, if not listed write below 1961 ‘ethnic group’ checkbox austrian, belgian, czech, danish, english, estonian, french, german, greek, icelandic, irish, italian, jewish, lithuanian, negro, netherlands, norwegian, polish, roumanian, russian, scottish, slovak, swedish, ukrainian, welsh, yugoslavic, native indian – band member /non-band, if not listed write below 1971 ‘ethnic group’ checkbox english, french, german, irish, italian, jewish, native indian – band, native indian – non-band, netherlands, norwegian, polish, scottish, ukrainian, other – write here 1981 ‘ethnic origins’ checkbox french, english, irish, scottish, german, italian, ukrainian, dutch, polish, jewish, chinese, native peoples (inuit, status or registered indian, non-status indian, métis), other 1986 ‘ethnic group’ checkbox plus write-in (3 blank lines) french, english, irish, scottish, german, italian, ukrainian, dutch (neth.), chinese, jewish, polish, black, inuit, north amer. indian, métis, other ethnic or cultural group(s) – (3 blank lines) 1991 ‘ethnic group’ checkbox plus write-in (2 blank lines) french, english, german, scottish, italian, irish, ukrainian, chinese, dutch, jewish, polish, black, north amer. indian, métis, inuit/eskimo, other ethnic or cultural groups – specify (2 blank lines) 1996 ethnic group’ write-in (4 blank lines) french, english, german, scottish, canadian, italian, chinese, cree, micmac, metis, inuit (eskimo), ukrainian, dutch, east indian, polish, portuguese, jewish, haitian, jamaican, vietnamese, lebanese, chilean, somali, etc. 2001 ethnic group’ write-in (4 blank lines) canadian, french, english, chinese, italian, german, scottish, irish, cree, micmac, metis, inuit (eskimo), east indian, ukrainian, dutch, polish, portuguese, filipino, jewish, greek, vietnamese, lebanese, 10 review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 chilean, somali, etc. 2006 ethnic group’ write-in (4 blank lines) canadian, english, french, chinese, italian, german, scottish, east indian, irish, cree, mi’kmaq (micmac), métis, inuit (eskimo), ukrainian, dutch, filipino, polish, portuguese, jewish, greek, jamaican, vietnamese, lebanese, chilean, salvadorean, somali, etc. 2011 ‘ethnic group’ write-in (4 blank lines) canadian, english, french, chinese, east indian, italian, german, scottish, irish, cree, mi’kmaq, salish, métis, inuit, filipino, dutch, ukrainian, polish, portuguese, greek, korean, vietnamese, jamaican, jewish, lebanese, salvadorean, somali, columbian, etc. source: stevens, ishizawa and grbic 2015, own design a decade after the establishment of the census, the question of ‘origin’ was re-named as ‘ethnic group’—with the exception of the 1981 census. one of the main aspects in which this question was modified through the years was the number and type of options or examples available. response categories included mostly categories named after european nations (e.g. ‘irish’), but also religious categories (‘jewish’), at times racial ones (‘negro’ in 1961, ‘black’ in 1986), and to various degrees and levels of detail categories for indigenous peoples (e.g. ‘inuit’). while the selection of options had been arbitrary beforehand, in the 1980s it was decided that ethnic groups should be ordered according to the population counts of the previous survey year. other institutional changes made in the 1980s (i.e. after the adoption of multiculturalism as the official political approach) included “self-enumeration, the acceptance of ambilineal ancestry, […] and the acceptance – and later, the encouragement – of multiple responses“ (thompson 2012, 1420). conflation of the concepts of ‘citizenship’, ‘nationality’ and ‘ethnicity’ proved to be a serious problem for the statistics office, which tried to train its interviewers and later, when selfenumeration was used, the general public to understand its definition of ‘origins’/’ethnic group’: in 1991, it instructed respondents that “[e]thnic or cultural origin refers to the ethnic ‘roots’ or ancestral background of the population, and should not be confused with citizenship or nationality” (cited in stevens, ishizawa and grbic 2015, 19). between 1991 and 1996, the answer mode changed from checkbox format to a write-in format, where examples on what to be put were listed below the question (cf. table 1). as in the 1991 census, about 4 percent of respondents had written ‘canadian’ into the blank lines, statistics canada had to include that as one of the examples provided in the 1996 census, according to its own previously set rules. this resulted in almost 20 percent reporting to be of ‘canadian’ origin in 1996, and an additional 12 percent describing their ‘ethnic group’ as partially canadian (for instance, canadian-ukrainian). hence, in the words of stevens, ishizawa and grbic, “the decades of statistics canada imploring the general population to distinguish between nationality and ethnic origins were undone in one fellow swoop” (2015, 28). this development also prompted statistics canada to introduce a new additional question on ‘visible minority’ in 1996 (thompson 2012, 1420; stevens, ishizawa and grbic 2015, 17). this new category was 11 review of european and russian affairs 7 (1), 2017 introduced in order to still be able to measure diversity in canada, while about a third of the population now considers themselves to be ‘canadian’ by ethnicity. moreover, it shifted the responsibility for assigning an implicitly ‘racial’ category – the definition of ‘visible minority’ explicitly refers to ‘race’ – from the state to the respondents themselves (cf. thompson 2012). interestingly enough, the definition for ‘visible minority’ is included in the 1995 employment equality act, which hints at one crucial motivation for measuring diversity in the first place: antidiscrimination politics. the decision to allow more than one answer category to be marked was a pragmatic one, as thompson argues: in practical terms, because the implementation of the race question was controversial enough on its own, the state made attempts to minimize the potential criticisms that would undoubtedly arise if respondents were forced to choose only one racial affiliation while multiple responses to the ethnic question were encouraged. (2012, 1421) canadian state officials chose a pragmatic approach in managing the politics of belonging that would fit with both historical contingencies of the imagined nation-state and international norms about changed concepts of ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’. germany: ‘migration background’ as a latecomer nation’s pragmatic approach? germany, the “undeclared immigration country” (thränhardt 1992), had long been characterized simultaneously by large-scale immigration and political denial of this fact.14 only in 2005 did germany introduce a migration-specific category to its population statistics, and henceforth ‘persons with a migration background’ are being counted.15 in europe, germany is not an outlier for refraining from the usage of explicitly ethnic categories in population statistics. according to simon’s (2012, 1376) review, “19 countries out of 41 do not collect data on ethnicity and thus rely on citizenship and place of birth for defining the ethnic diversity of their population. among them, however, six countries add information on the place of birth of parents, most of them being in northern europe.” to understand how this turning point in the politics of belonging could have taken place, one needs to take into account the dynamic negotiations of identity that accompanied the federal republic throughout its existence. since the end of the second world war, different groups of ‘newcomers’ have unwillingly replaced each other in taking on the role of ‘the other’ in public and political debate, and thus constituted the reference point for the german ‘us’. often, these groups have even been spatially congregated in the same places, seeing as: there were barracks in many cities, towns and villages which were successively used by, for example, crews from the reich labour service (reichsarbeitsdienst), then during the war ‘foreign employees’ (fremdarbeiter), later dps (displaced persons [mainly former forced labourers from eastern europe]) and finally german expellees (vertriebene). they 14 the following analysis with respect to germany is primarily based on svr (2015, 144-147). 15 the federal statistical office (2014, 4) defines people with a migration background as all foreigners and naturalised former foreigners, all people who migrated to the present territory of the federal republic of germany as germans after 1949 as well as all people born as germans in germany who have at least one parent who has either migrated to germany or was born in germany as a foreign citizen. 12 review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 also not infrequently found use as ‘guest worker barracks’ (gastarbeiterlager) in the early 1960s (herbert 2003, 197, own translation). the terms that were used in the political and public debate for the various ‘others’ (subsequently or sometimes in parallel) included: ‘foreign workers’, ‘guest workers’, ‘foreigners’, ‘turks’, ‘asylanten’ (a pejorative term used to refer to asylum seekers), ‘foreign co-citizens’, ‘immigrants’, ‘to-migrants’, ‘muslims’ and – most recently – ‘poverty migrants’. the national myth of germany revolves around the community of descent, the “ethnic nation” (bauder 2014). contrasting the labels used for non-german migrants with those ascribed to conationals (ethnic german immigrants and expellees 16 ) illustrates that before the 1990s, the boundaries of german politics of belonging lay between members of the german volk (volkszugehörige) and foreigners. the federal act on refugees and expellees (bundesvertriebenengesetz) defines belonging to the german ‘volk’ as follows: “a member of the german nation according to this act is somebody who has declared his/her belonging to the german culture, provided that this declaration is confirmed by certain characteristics such as descent, language, education or culture.”17 it has been argued that with reunification, a large troublesome part of the german nation-state building process can be deemed mended. nation-building itself is an ever ongoing process which can never be fully complete. it is in the context of these new circumstances that the country could ultimately start to acknowledge the fact that it had long become a country of immigration (joppke 1998; see also hailbronner 1983). arguably this acceptance constituted a necessary prerequisite for the acknowledgement that measuring population diversity in the census was a necessary and reasonable thing to do. another factor contributing to the turning point in the politics of belonging was eu legislation. in europe, the collection of migration-related or ‘ethnic’ statistics was discussed at the start of the new millennium following the passing of two eu directives on anti-discrimination in 2000 (simon 2012). germany, which previously had only distinguished between citizens and non-citizens in its statistics, introduced the new category ‘person with a migration background’ in the 2004 microcensus act, which came into force in 2005. the aim was to statistically track the extent to which certain immigrant groups are integrating into society and continue to suffer from socioeconomic inequality (pries 2013). one of the results of this new measurement is that german co-ethnics and naturalised foreigners are thus registered alongside foreign nationals as persons with migration background in official statistics; making the dichotomy of ‘us’ versus ‘them’ that had been prevalent in the country for decades fragile and porous. however, even with the introduction of this new category, germany did not move from the second strategy of deriving (family) migration status from citizenship and place of birth (of one’s parents) to the strategy of e.g. canada of explicitly collecting ‘ethnic 16 expellees are persons with german citizenship who were forced to leave former german territory in the east during or in the immediate aftermath of the second world war or in later waves of expulsion before 1990. 17 art. 116 of the german basic law defines who is considered to be ‘german’: “(1) unless otherwise provided by a law, a german within the meaning of this basic law is a person who possesses german citizenship or who has been admitted to the territory of the german reich within the boundaries of december 31, 1937 as a refugee or expellee of german ethnic origin or as the spouse or descendant of such person. (2) former german citizens who between january 30, 1933 and may 8, 1945 were deprived of their citizenship on political, racial, or religious grounds, and their descendants, shall on application have their citizenship restored. they shall be deemed never to have been deprived of their citizenship if they have established their domicile in germany after may 8, 1945 and have not expressed a contrary intention.” 13 review of european and russian affairs 7 (1), 2017 data’. moreover, as in canada, in germany the term ‘migration background’ is applied by the authorities top-down – households that were sampled to participate in the 2011 census were visited by interviewers; the questionnaire is not being filled in by the respondents themselves. table 2: mapping (family) migration history in the german census, 1950-2011 census year concept mode 1950 ‘foreigner’ top-down, citizenship 1956 ‘foreigner’ top-down, citizenship 1961 ‘foreigner’ top-down, citizenship 1970 ‘foreigner’ top-down, citizenship 1987 ‘foreigner’ top-down, citizenship 2001 ‘foreigner’ top-down, citizenship 2011 ‘migration background’ top-down, through various questions on place of birth, citizenship, parents’ place of birth and citizenship source: own compilation and design this top-down ascription is precisely the reason why the introduction and usage of the term ‘migration background’ had been and continues to be contentious in germany. while it is indisputably an innovation compared to the previous approach of only distinguishing by citizenship, the term ascribes a heterogeneous group of people a common identity (see among others: foroutan 2013; mecheril 2013; elrick and schwartzman 2015). in contrast to canada, where the method of self-identification partially prevents complaints of this sort, this top-down labelling can come with a price.18 the term, which was intended to serve a neutral registration of migrants, has arguably taken on a meaning of its own and has lost its intended neutrality in the public and media discourse. as scarvaglieri and zech (2013) have shown in a linguistic analysis, the term has increasingly acquired a negative connotation in the public discourse, where it is frequently used to describe a group of people who present an array of different problems and allegedly lack many of the qualities necessary to find a foothold in modern-day society. similarly, as elrick and schwartzman (2015, 1) have shown in an analysis of bundestagsdocuments, state actors tend to “transform this nuanced statistical category into a homogenized social category.” 18 self-identification does, however, carry another set of problems (cf. jacobs et al. 2009). moreover, note that some level of top-down ascription is being practiced in canada (see section above). 14 review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 conclusion: statistical mapping of diversity in canada and germany – convergence towards a new pragmatism? the finding that “[t]he categories used for newcomers mainly tell us something about the society in which they arrived” (pries 2013, 55) applies to both countries. from the above comparison the conclusion can be drawn that what the two have in common – large differences notwithstanding – is a new pragmatism in the strategy to measure diversity in population statistics. canada moved away from making top-down decisions about the categories allowed to be chosen and adapted the census question on the elusive concept of ‘ethnic group’ according to the changing preferences of its population and introduced the category of ‘visible minority’ to track the success of non-discrimination policies – especially the latter measure showing a pragmatic motivation to support social cohesion. germany had long denied being a country of immigration regardless of the fact that it did host relatively large numbers of immigrants. this was arguably ideologically driven in support of its uneasy process of nation-building as a divided country. having overcome this status of an incomplete nation-state, the country now embraces the demographic fact of immigration also in the form of statistical mapping of its population. the extent to which the statistical mapping of the population in relation to ‘origin’ or ‘identity’ is ideologically driven therefore seems to have diminished in both countries. census politics constitute an important part of the politics of belonging. the primary explanatory variable for the very different paths observed in census politics seems to be the history of nationbuilding. this variable can be further broken down into a collective founding myth, the historical experiences of diversification, and politics of immigration and ethnicity. in our ‘most-extreme’ case study, there is the ‘settler state’ canada on the one side versus the ‘ethnic nation’ germany on the other side of the atlantic. to understand the canadian approach of mapping diversity in statistics, it has proved fruitful to take into account the struggles with french-canadian identityclaims on the one hand and the continuous marginalization of indigenous peoples on the other hand. the emphasis on people’s ‘roots’ in canada is in accordance with the imagined nation as a multicultural, multinational settler state. the move towards ‘racial’ self-identification through the introduction of a ‘visible minority’ question in 1996 showed the continued desire of the canadian state to distinguish various ethnic or ‘origin’ groups in its population. it also signalled a pragmatic progression from earlier more pronounced ‘top-down’ ascription activities based on the ‘origins’ question alone. it was also simply the pragmatic way to be able to track social inequalities based on phenotype and origin-based discrimination, due to the changed response behaviour on the ‘origins’ question. in post-war germany, in contrast, the impossibility of measuring ‘ethnicity’ and struggles over belonging in the ‘undeclared country of immigration’ are key variables in explaining the country’s refrain from measuring ‘ethnic’ differences and the relatively recent introduction of the intended neutral statistical category, ‘migration background’. that the introduction of this category was prompted to an extent by discussions at the eu level, following the introduction of two eu directives on anti-discrimination in 2000, points to another factor that seems to play a role in countries’ politics of belonging through census politics: shifting international norms. these seem to have had an even more pronounced effect in canada (thompson 2012). both the introduction of the ‘visible minority’ category in canada and the introduction of the ‘migration background’ in germany can be considered a pragmatic and instrumental approach to mapping diversity. the aim of this is to track the effects of (economic) integration measures (cf. 15 review of european and russian affairs 7 (1), 2017 joppke 2007) and counteract discrimination and inequalities in an ever more diverse society while complying with shifting international and national norms concerning the selfunderstanding of each country as a country of immigration. both terms are pragmatic in the sense that they were introduced with the objective of guaranteeing the same opportunities to participate in society. the traditional aim of census politics – preserving a national founding myth – took a backseat. in this limited sense, a convergence of canadian and german politics of belonging as visible in census politics can be seen, although the differences especially regarding the underlying concept of difference remain significant. future research should look into the puzzle why france can hardly be said to converge towards this new pragmatism in census politics as well. generally speaking, it can be strenuous at times that politics of belonging and the boundaries within societies marked by diversity are continuously debated or even heatedly discussed in the public realm. yet this is undoubtedly 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journals.carleton.ca/rera/index.php/rera rera is an electronic academic peer-reviewed journal. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is a joint project supported by the canada-europe transatlantic dialogue—a cross-canada research network supported by the social sciences and humanities research council of canada (sshrc)—along with the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies (carleton university) and its associated research unit, the centre for european studies. rera aims to provide an accessible forum for research, to promote high standards of research and scholarship, and to foster communication among young scholars. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada tel: +01 613 520-2600 ext. 3117; e-mail: rera-journal@carleton.ca creative commons license creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0 this working paper is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial no derivs 3.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 3.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, provided the source is acknowledged. no use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes. issn: 1718-4835 © 2017 the author(s) https://journals.carleton.ca/rera/index.php/rera mailto:rera-journal@carleton.ca http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ introduction references available online at: journals.carleton.ca/rera/index.php/rera contact: carleton university tel: +01 613 520-2600 ext. 3117; e-mail: rera-journal@carleton.ca creative commons license issn: 1718-4835 review of european and russian affairs 11(1), 2017 issn 1718-4835 neoliberalism and gender equality: canadian newspapers’ representations of the ban of face coverings at citizenship ceremonies ivana previsic1 abstract in late 2011, canada’s conservative government banned face coverings for those taking oath at citizenship ceremonies. the ban was unequivocally interpreted by the press to be targeting veilwearing muslim women. this paper analyzes newspaper coverage in the month following the announcement of the policy. it argues that most commentators conceptualized citizenship to be a neoliberal tool of rescuing veiled muslim women from their male oppressors and making them more like the equal/neoliberal “us” and/or as a reward for those who already are or will become equal/neoliberal. most non-muslim commentators constructed gender oppression as the reason for which veiled women should (not) become citizens. gender equality in canada was represented as a key national value and inequality was erased or minimized and presented as a muslim problem. in attempting to deflect these arguments, most muslim commentators silenced gender inequality among muslims by arguing that veiled muslim women choose the practice and by relegating gender oppression to western societies, thereby constructing veiled muslim women as ideal neoliberal subjects worthy of canadian citizenship. 1 ivana previsic is a phd candidate in the school of sociological and anthropological studies at the university of ottawa. 2 review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 introduction muslims have been seen as antithetical to the predominantly christian “west” ever since islam’s emergence in the 7th century (said 1979). the series of terrorist attacks committed in the name of islam in the years following 9/11 appear to have intensified this perceived divide. muslims have been represented in western public discourses as embodying values incongruent with those of the west, particularly in the areas of human rights and gender equality. gendered practices associated with muslims, namely female genital mutilation, honour killings, arranged marriages and the head and face coverings, have incited heated public debates about whether muslims can “integrate” into supposedly gender-equal western societies. while internationally regarded as more welcoming and tolerant towards immigrants and minorities than europe, canada has had its share of controversies and policy proposals which centered in particular on the niqab, which has a small opening around the eyes and covers the face completely. for instance, in january 2007, the town of herouxville, qc garnered international attention when its immigrants’ code of conduct banned the stoning of women and covering of faces (gagnon and jiwani 2012). the same year, elections canada decided to allow those who cover their faces to vote (abu-laban 2013). in 2010, quebec tabled bill 94 which proposed to ban conspicuous religious symbols in quebec’s public service. the public debate on the bill revolved almost exclusively around the practice of face covering. while in 2012 the supreme court of canada decided to leave the decision on whether to allow a witness to testify while wearing the niqab2, in 2013, an ontario judge decided that the woman must remove the garment in order to testify 3 . the same year, quebec’s governing parti québécois (pq) introduced “projet de loi 60”, known as the “quebec charter of values”, proposing to prevent state employees from wearing “conspicuous” religious symbols at work and to refuse to provide or to receive public services by those whose faces were covered (shachar 2015, 325). the socalled “niqab bill” (provost 2014) died with the pq’s defeat and the election of a liberal government in 2014. in late 2011, the conservative government of stephen harper banned face coverings for people taking oath at citizenship ceremonies. in 2014, a permanent resident from pakistan, zunera ishaq legally challenged the ban. in 2015, a federal judge ruled in her favour and two subsequent government appeals were denied.4 the ban was a major 2015 federal election campaign issue that may have contributed to the conservatives’ defeat, as well as the new democratic party’s loss of support in quebec due to the party’s opposition to the measure.5 in november 2015, the newly elected liberal government withdrew the appeal launched by the previous government. in her first act as canada’s liberal justice minister, jody wilson-raybould stated that “we will 2 judgments of the supreme court of canada, “r. v. n.s., 2012 scc 72, [2012] 3 s.c.r. 726”, december 20, 2012, accessed november 16, 2016, http://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/12779/index.do 3 canadian legal information institute, “r. v. s.(m.), 2013 oncj 209”, april 24, 2013, accessed november 16, 2016, http://www.canlii.org/en/on/oncj/doc/2013/2013oncj209/2013oncj209.html 4 federal court of canada, “2015 fc 156”, february 6, 2015, accessed november 16, 2016, http://decisions.fctcf.gc.ca/fc-cf/decisions/en/item/108049/index.do?r=aaaaaqamenvuzxjhiglzagfxaq 5tasker, john paul, “ndp dropped 20 points in 48 hours after supporting niqab, tom mulcair says”, cbc news, february 13, 2016, accessed march 21, 2016, http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/thomas-mulcair-acceptsresponsibility-1.3446241. 3 review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 ensure that we respect the values that make us canadians, those of diversity, inclusion and respect for those fundamental values”. 6 this formally ended the issue of face coverings at citizenship ceremonies. when the ban was initially announced, the citizenship and immigration canada’s operational bulletin 359 simply stated that citizenship candidates needed to be seen taking the oath of citizenship (cic 2011a)7. much less neutral was the language of then minister of citizenship and immigration jason kenney8 “to segregate one group of canadians or allow them to hide their faces, to hide their identity from us precisely when they are joining our community is contrary to canada’s commitment to openness and to social cohesion” (cic 2011b). this paper examines canada’s mainstream newspapers’ coverage of the ban in the month following the announcement. specifically, it analyzes how gender equality was employed by the commentators to argue their positions and conceptualize the meaning of canadian citizenship. it is argued that a neoliberal understanding of gender (in)equality was employed to debate the ban, whereby both muslim and non-muslim commentators negated the existence of gender inequality among “us” and ascribed it instead to “them”. canadian citizenship was represented as worthy only of those women who were considered to already be gender equal or those who were en route to becoming gender equal, by virtue of revealing their faces to others. in this paper, i first conceptualize the link between neoliberalism, citizenship and muslim “others” and then provide an overview of recent research on the state of gender equality in canada and the relations between the media and minorities. after outlining the methodological approach, i summarize and discuss the main findings. neoliberal citizenship and muslim “others” neoliberalism is an aspect of capitalism that promotes “privatisation and deregulation in order to safeguard the freedom of the individual to compete and consume without interference from a bloated state” (gupta 2012, 1). most commonly associated with the governments of margaret thatcher and ronald reagan, the doctrine emerged in the 1980s as a response to “rising unemployment, inflation, and burgeoning government deficits” (brodie 2008, 169). placing the ultimate responsibility on the individual, neoliberal politics denies the existence of systemic group inequalities (2008, 178). neoliberalism functions not only as a structuring principle of markets, but also as “an ethic in itself, capable of acting as a guide to all human action, and substituting for all previously held ethical beliefs” (harvey 2007, 3). it is this view of neoliberalism as a “way of thinking” that guides the direction of this paper. 6 mas, susana, “justin trudeau's government drops controversial niqab appeal”, cbc news, november 16, 2015, accessed march 21, 2016, http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/niqab-appeal-appeal-citizenship-ceremonies-canadajody-wilson-raybould-1.3321264. 7 the link to the bulletin was removed from the cic website when the new liberal government dropped the appeal. 8 replaced by chris alexander in 2013 4 review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 canada has been experiencing tangible effects of neoliberal restructuring since the 1980s and 1990s when governing structures diminished social programs and neglected issues such as reproductive labour, unpaid housework and childcare, as well as universal childcare (jenson 2008). during that period, canadian women’s movements lost influence to “civil society groups, such as unions, anti-poverty movements, child care advocates, and other progressive forces” who, once their allies, became “almost silent” about the state of gender equality in canada (ibid 2008, 187). today, the public sphere, purported to be genderless and motivated by self-interest, freedom and choice, remains divided from the private sphere in which domestic and caring labour remain unpaid and highly gendered (brodie 2008, 171). as a dominant system of thought and political movement, the neoliberal thinking has also redefined the image of an “ideal citizen”. she or he is rational, self-owning, self-sufficient and personally responsible for their life outcomes (abu-laban and gabriel 2002; anderson 2013; somers 2008). the ideal neoliberal citizen is one “without any sort of group-based identity” while “a non-citizen is someone who remains trapped within group-based identities” (razack 2008, 166). the neoliberal logic thus considers those who claim a group-based identity or inequality based on belonging to an identity group unworthy of citizenship benefits. this has had important implications for the ongoing struggle for gender equality in the west. the neoliberal reasoning discursively erases or minimizes the existence of gender inequality in two ways. first, any inequalities or social problems are attributed to individual failures, “missed opportunities, bad decisions, or unfortunate events”, whilst structural inequalities such as gender and race are disregarded (brodie 2008, 180). second, “our” gender-based grievances are trivialized or muted when placed in comparison to gender inequalities of minority groups, muslims in particular. as thobani (2007, 108) argues, the presence of racialized “others” coming from “traditional”, non-western communities has greatly inflated the semblance of economic and symbolic inclusion of women in the nationhood. indeed, as yeğenoğlu (1998, 105) observed, “the declaration of an emancipated status for the western woman is contingent upon the representation of the oriental woman as her devalued other”. set in opposition to the “civilized european”, “the dangerous muslim man”, as the perpetrator of gender inequality, and “the imperiled muslim woman” as the helpless victim, have been constructed as the quintessential embodiments of illiberal, gender-unequal “others” (razack 2008). far from being consequential in discourse only, the “concern” about gender relations among muslims, and particularly head and face coverings, deflects attention from debating the state of gender (in)equality in the west (jiwani 2008, 133). the ideal neoliberal citizen “without ties to community” presents “the conceptual underpinning for a number of repressive measures” including the recasting of citizenship laws, for instance, the introduction of citizenship tests and cultural codes of conduct (fekete 2004, 4). a european example includes the netherlands’ “integration exam” for foreigners looking to marry or reunite with their family. a component of the test is a film which, among other themes, presents netherlands’ gender equality as absolute and ignores, “persistent inequalities in the fields of labour, childcare, household and continuing experience of gender based harassment and violence [and] institutional sexism” (de leeuw and van wichelen 2012, 98). canadian examples include the new citizenship guide which uses the word “barbaric” to qualify “spousal abuse, ‘honour killings’, female genital mutilation, forced marriage or other gender-based violence” (canada 2011; winter and sauvageau 2014) and the ban of face coverings at citizenship ceremonies 5 review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 which has been interpreted as targeting specifically niqab-wearing muslim women (thomas 2015; park 2013). as razack argues, in order to attain full citizenship in western societies, muslims are expected to change and “just assimilate” (2008, 166). failure to do so justifies the state in “keeping muslims out or limiting their citizenship rights” (ibid, 166). the participation of muslims in citizenship thus “become[s] dependent on a willingness to transcend these dualisms by picking a side” (fernandez 2009, 270). (muslim) women in canada head and face coverings have been portrayed by western political and media discourses as an example par excellence of gender subjugation among muslims and an affront to western values of gender equality (clarke 2013; jiwani 2008; mcdonough 2003a; mcdonough and hoodfar 2005; roald 2002; zine 2012). however, research on the experiences of muslim women in the west shows that the motives behind the practice are varied and context-dependent. the reasons for wearing both the hijab (which covers only the hair) and niqab (which also covers the face except the eyes) include free choice based on religious obligation, dignity, deterring unwanted sexual attention, empowerment, confidence, self-esteem and freedom from the pressures of fashion (ahmed 2011; borghée 2012; bowen 2007; clarke 2013; hoodfar 2003; mcdonough 2003b; ruby 2006). with respect specifically to the niqab, research shows that some women indeed wear it on the insistence of their male family members, while others report having encountered family opposition to their decision to cover their faces (clarke 2013; hoodfar 2003). at the same time, gender equality in the west, including in canada, is far from being a done deed. while women have made significant gains in their struggle for gender equality in the last half-century, they have not reached parity in earnings, full-time work, political engagement or domestic work and childcare time allocation (ferrao 2010; milan et al. 2010; pay equity commission 2012; vosko 2003). gendered microaggressions in the form of overt sexism and subtle discrimination are a part of many women's daily interactions (sue 2010). women continue to be held to high beauty standards (wolf 1991; 2002) and sexual objectification occurs within everyday life as well as in canadian media representations (mcgarry and mannik 2015). with respect to gender violence and oppression, often associated with muslims, it is estimated that one in three canadian women will experience sexual assault in her adult life and more than 6 percent of women report being physically or sexually assaulted by a spousal partner (ontario women’s directorate 2013). young women aged 15 to 19 are 10 times more likely to experience dating violence compared to young men (status of women 2015). in 2004, at least 200,000 canadian women were physically assaulted and 106,000 were sexually assaulted by intimate partners (johnson and dawson 2011 in rajiva and khoday 2014, 174). another 460,000 sexual assaults were committed by non-intimate partners. in 2008, 64 women were murdered by intimate partners. approximately 100,000 women and children are admitted to emergency shelters every year (ibid). gender oppression is clearly far from being confined to muslims or other minority groups. oppression and inequality, but also choice and emancipation coexist and intersect in everyday experiences of muslim and non-muslim women alike. muslim and non-muslim women in canada have more in common in terms of experiencing gender inequality than what popular 6 review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 narratives have us believe. the following section outlines in more detail the role that the mainstream media play in the construction of these discourses. muslims in the mainstream media in addition to “agenda-setting” – determining which issues are important for the consumers to consider (mccombs and shaw 1972; weaver 2007) – the mainstream media influence how we think about matters at hand (fleras 2011). as producers and reproducers of dominant national and cultural narratives (henry and tator 2002; van dijk 1991), they play a pivotal role in shaping the citizens’ “common sense” understanding of who belongs in the nation and who does not (mahtani 2001). for researchers interested in “dominant discourses, rather than dissident or idiosyncratic voices”, newspapers continue to represent the platform of choice (mautner 2008, 32). while print readership is in decline, eight out of ten canadians read newspapers each week and 70% of them read printed editions daily.9 studies show that western mainstream media have tended to portray minorities in a negative light (fleras and kunz 2001). muslims in particular have been represented as threats to liberaldemocratic values and national security, in both europe’s10 and canada’s11 mainstream media. muslim women, often in the context of head and face coverings, have been depicted by the media predominantly as oppressed and/or dangerous “others” (antonius 2013; bullock and jaffri 2001; byng 2010; gagnon and yiwani 2012; jiwani 2006). in their analyses of media representations of the ban of face coverings at citizenship ceremonies, thomas (2015) and park (2013) found that niqab-wearing women were portrayed both as victims and threats to canadian society. park, however, focused only on online comments and did not include an analysis of the opinions of muslims, while thomas analyzed the broad themes that the media employed in its coverage. this paper focuses specifically on how one theme gender equality – was utilized by both non-muslims and muslims in order to form their arguments for or against the ban and thereby conceptualize their understandings of canadian citizenship. methodology newspaper articles were accessed using the two largest canadian newspaper databases: canadian newsstand major dailies database for english and eureka.cc for french content. the databases were searched for stories containing the words “citizenship” and “citoyenneté” which were published after december 12, 2011, when the ban was announced. 94 articles (table 1) were identified which focused specifically on the ban. most stories were published in the month following the announcement of the policy. 9 vividata, “study: print remains preferred magazine platform”, november 8, 2016, accessed november 16, 2016, https://vividata.ca/news/vivintel-reports-newsletters/ 10 e.g. bleich et al 2015; fredette 2014; geisser 2003; meer, 2006; petley and richardson 2011; poole and richardson 2006; yavari-d’hellencourt 2000 11 e.g. flatt 2012; giasson et al. 2010; karim 1996; kowalski 2013; perigoe and eid 2014 7 review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 table 1: newspaper coverage by language, ownership and circulation (newspapers canada 2014)12 newspaper number of articles language ownership average weekly circulation calgary herald 15 english postmedia 680,009 the edmonton journal 8 english postmedia 597,789 the globe and mail 6 english globe and mail inc 2,149,124 le journal of montreal 8 french quebecor 1,633,726 la presse 1 french power corp. of canada 1,633,726 montreal gazette 2 english postmedia 547,445 national post 13 english postmedia 1,097,080 ottawa citizen 7 english postmedia 626,272 the province 5 english postmedia 760,874 the vancouver sun 3 english postmedia 869,571 telegraph journal 1 english brunswick news inc. 161,742 toronto star 13 english torstar corp. 2,397,691 windsor star 3 english postmedia 325,360 winnipeg free press 3 english fp canadian newspapers limited partnership 663,431 le devoir 3 french independent 214,263 times colonist 3 english glacier media 330,301 12 “circulation report: daily newspapers”, newspapers canada, 2014, accessed march 16, 2016, http://www.newspaperscanada.ca/sites/default/files/2014_circulation_reportdaily_newspapers_in_canada_final_20150603_0.pdf 8 review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 total english 82 conservative 7,138,126 total french 12 liberal or unknown 7,550,278 total 94 total 14,688,404 most articles were published by newspapers owned by the conservative-leaning postmedia (56) and quebecor corporations (8). however, as table 1 shows, the coverage was more uniform in terms of circulation, with the conservative-leaning newspapers accounting for 48.5%, and the liberal-leaning globe and mail, toronto star, la presse and the remaining newspapers not associated with any political ideology accounting for 51.4% of the coverage. hence, while more articles were published by conservative-leaning newspapers, liberal-leaning and other newspapers reached slightly more readers. in order to analyze some “selected aspects” of the identified newspaper articles, i employed qualitative content analysis (hsieh and shannon 2005; schreier 2015). after the first phase of exploratory coding showed that the majority of commentators employed gender equality to construct their arguments, in the second phase the articles were coded for references to gender (in)equality in canada and/or among muslims and for positions towards the ban.13 in order to examine who got to speak (richardson 2007), the stories were coded for the presumed sex and religious background of the authors and cited sources.14 the coded references were counted in order to make quantifiers such as “some”, “most” and “many” more precise (maxwell 2010), as well as to give “a sense of how representative and widespread” certain portrayals were (seale 2011, 128). findings as table 2 (below) shows, the majority of newspaper articles were opinion pieces (82/94), mostly letters to the editor. over the span of a month, 49 readers expressed their opinion on the ban in 55 letters sent to canadian newspapers. the policy thus garnered significant interest among the general public. this is not surprising, given the overall attention that the question of muslim head and face coverings has been attracting in national and international contexts. the majority of authors were men (53/80), and most authors were non-muslim (66/80). what stands out is that only five of the 25 female authors were muslim women, and all were readers who wrote letters to the newspapers. two of those women identified as wearing the niqab. out of 38 people who were quoted in 94 articles, only two women who cover their faces were quoted in five articles. 13 a single news report often contained multiple and opposing arguments, either in the “on the one hand-on the other hand” form or through citing/quoting multiple sources. this applies to opinion pieces as well, which nonetheless, for the most part, expressed a final position either for or against the policy. 14 this was determined either by using authors’ and cited sources’ self-identification as being of a certain sex or religious background, or by making assumptions based on their names and the content of the article. i acknowledge the possibility of error in making these assumptions. 9 review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 table 2: newspaper coverage by the type of article, gender and religious background 15 articles authors religious background news reports 12 female 4 muslim 0 not muslim 4 male 8 muslim 0 not muslim 8 total muslim 0 total not muslim 12 total journalists 13 columns 20 female 6 muslim 0 not muslim 6 male 13 muslim 2 not muslim 11 total muslim 2 total not muslim 17 total columnists 19 editorials 7 letters 55 female 6 muslim 5 not muslim 10 male 32 muslim 6 not muslim 26 undetermined 2 muslim 1 15 two different news reports were written by the same author, hence the discrepancy between the number of news reports and the number of authors. two different columns were written by the same author which explains the difference between the number of columns and the number of authors. finally, several letters of similar, but not identical content were written by the same authors/readers, resulting in the discrepancy between the number of letters and the number of authors/readers. 10 review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 gender not muslim 1 total muslim 12 total not muslim 37 total opinion pieces 82 total gender 49 total articles 94 total female 25 total make 53 total undetermined gender 2 total muslim 14 total not muslim 66 total authors 80 male, non-muslim voices dominated the citations. as table 3 shows, the articles cited an equal number of male and female sources. however, men were cited significantly more frequently than women (274 vs. 75). next, 21 non-muslim and 17 muslim individuals were cited (table 3). in terms of the actual frequency of citations, non-muslims were cited 285 times and muslims 64 times. minister jason kenney was the most frequently named and cited source. while kenney’s announcement of the ban was the most frequent citation, it is still significant that muslim voices accounted for only 18.3% of the cited sources. table 3: coverage by the gender and religious background of cited sources number references articles female muslim 11 50 10 not muslim 8 25 12 11 review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 total 19 75 23 male muslim 6 14 8 not muslim 13 260 63 total 19 274 71 organizations 2 5 2 total 41 349 next, as table 4 shows, 54% of opinion pieces (editorials, columns, letters) expressed support for the policy 45 vs. 34, while three expressed no clear position. in terms of position by sex, out of the 70 columnists and readers, 15 out of 24, or 62.5% of articles authored by women, including muslim women, were against the ban, while 33 out of 46, or 71% of male-authored articles supported it. men were thus more likely than women to support the ban. in terms of position by religious background, more columns and letters written by nonmuslims supported the ban (37 vs. 5), while an equal number of pieces authored by muslims and non-muslims were opposed to it (15 and 15). non-muslims were thus more likely to support the ban. interestingly, the muslims who supported the ban were all men – mostly readers, while the muslims who were against the ban were all women who wrote letters to the editor. also, while overall most female-authored articles were against the ban (15/24), most articles written by nonmuslim women actually supported the policy (9/16). non-muslim men and women thus tended to support the ban. table 4: position by number of articles pro editorials 3 female muslim 0 not muslim 9 total 9 male muslim 5 not muslim 28 total 33 total pro 45 against editorials 4 female muslim 8 12 review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 not muslim 7 total 15 male not muslim 7 total 13 undetermined gender muslim 1 not muslim 1 total 2 total against 34 undetermined position muslim 0 not muslim 3 (male) total undetermined position 3 total 82 finally, most articles used gender (in)equality to argue their stance towards the ban. as table 5 shows, significantly more articles referenced gender equality than gender inequality in canada (24 vs. 8). in contrast, inequality among muslims was mentioned 33 times, while gender equality among muslims was not referred to at all. overall, gender inequality among muslims was referenced in more articles than both gender equality and inequality in canada. what follows is a qualitative analysis of some of these representations. table 5: : references to gender (in)equality by number of articles16 references to gender equality in canada references to gender inequality to canada references to gender inequality among 16 this refers to news reports which published arguments of various commentators, but expressed no overt position of their own. 13 review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 muslims position pro 10 3 17 position against 7 5 12 no overall position 7 0 4 total 24 8 33 representations of gender (in)equality in canada commentators writing in favour of the ban (predominantly non-muslim men, see table 2) largely represented gender equality in canada as a crucial national value and an accomplished fact. gender equality was given as the key reason for which face-covering women should not become accepted as members of the “canadian family”, to quote minister jason kenney, unless they uncover their faces during citizenship ceremony and thereby signal willingness to accept canadian values and (eventually) become more like the gender-equal canadian women. being canadian implied being gender equal. for instance, the national post’s editorial emphasized the importance of “the rule of law, equality between the sexes and social tolerance...if canadian citizenship is to mean anything, it cannot be given away to those who flout our values”. 17 corbella proclaimed that “[m]en and women are viewed as equal before the law in canada and will not be segregated during the ceremony. if that violates someone’s religious beliefs and we know that it does then that’s the price of citizenship”.18 “equality of the sexes” was deemed by kay to be “one of canada’s fundamental values”19, while warren went so far as to proclaim gender equality canada’s value since “pioneering” days when women in canada had “the privilege of looking men in the face and vice versa. this has nothing to do with immodesty. it goes instead to the heart of the woman’s place in the community”. 20 these commentators unequivocally championed equality between men and women, and at the same time supported the state in wanting to interfere in muslim women’s clothing practices. while most of those against the ban also presented gender equality as canada’s key value, they also argued that it should not be used as a justification to make women uncover their faces during a citizenship ceremony. breakenbridge contended that gender equality as a “definable” canadian value “should not be an excuse to intrude into the private lives of citizens”. 21 walkom referred to “a belief prized in this country, that women are equal to men and have the right to participate fully and publicly in all aspects of canadian society”; however, “using the heavy 17 “making citizenship mean something”, national post, december 13, 2011. 18 corbella lisa, “citizenship is privilege, not right”, vancouver sun, december 15, 2011. 19 kay, barbara, “facing up to canadian values”, national post, december 13, 2011. 20 warren, david, “doing the right thing”, ottawa citizen, december 14, 2011. 21 breakenbridge, rob, “burka restriction punishes victims”, calgary herald, december, 20, 2011. 14 review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 hand of the state risks transforming this relatively minor dispute over ceremony into a much more intense cultural battle”. 22.president of the islamic social services association shahina siddiqui wondered if a minister who does not comprehend the basic tenants of the women’s movement in canada where we fought long and hard to be recognized as persons under the law and struggled to gain the right to choose what we wear and how we live our lives [should] be giving lectures on the value of canadian citizenship?23 far fewer references were made to gender inequality in canada. it was mentioned by only three pro-ban opinion pieces, and only as being minimal in contrast to inequality in muslim majority countries. for instance, roy referred to a maclean’s story by anne kingston published in the month following the ban which suggested that hypersexualization of women in the west is comparable to gender oppression among muslims.24 having briefly and vaguely acknowledged that there were “imperfections”, roy rejected kingston’s argument by saying: there are civilizational features that, yes, “we” can in fact judge. those that we are familiar with, after centuries of struggles against religious or cultural madness, those that are opposed to human dignity, physical integrity, equality. let’s stop criticizing ourselves for a brief moment and realize that, on those critical points, western civilization in general and canadian in particular, without being perfect, has not done too badly 25 (author’s translation) gender inequality in canada was relegated to the past by mcinnes, for whom the practice of face covering “is associated with parts of the world where women have fewer rights than men, a proposition that we no longer accept in canada”26. in a similar vein, walkom, who spoke against the ban, first acknowledged that gender equality in canada is not a done deed, only to, a couple of paragraphs later, relegate inequality to the 1950s or attribute it to christian sects: “for the most part, canada has managed to overcome the anti-feminism of its religious history”. 27 two readers who identified as muslim men questioned the assumption that gender equality in the west is an accomplished fact. bessadook referred to makeup as a potentially comparable signifier of oppression in the west, “where female body parts became the hot centrepiece for every successful business. that is the real repression”.28 “women are victimized all over the world”, contended ahmed, “in canada women still access shelters and only recently won the battle against canada post for equal pay. these issues aren’t caused by religious dress”. 29 while the two commentators were the only ones not to silence or minimize gender inequality in canada, they also rejected the notion that oppression could be at work in some instances of the practice of face covering. they opted, instead, for religious or cultural explanations of face coverings. for 22 walkom, thomas. what’s right about jason kenney’s no veil rule, toronto star, december 14, 2011. 23 siddiqui, shahina. “lost dignity”, calgary herald, december 15, 2011. 24 kingston, anne. “veils: who are we to judge?”, maclean’s, january 17, 2012. 25 mario roy, “le voile, encore”, la presse, january, 28, 2012. 26 mcinnes, craig, “facing up to multiculturalism’s limits; tories’ policy on veils tests the of strength of tradition and what it means to be a canadian”. vancouver sun, december 14, 2011. 27 walkom, thomas. what’s right about jason kenney’s no veil rule. december 14, 2011. 28 bessadook, mohammed, “veil not a sign of repression” windsor star, january 3, 2012. 29ahmed, kashif, “veil ruling diverts attention”, toronto star, december 17, 2011. 15 review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 instance, ahmed argued that “the veil is about dignifying and protecting women, not subjugating them”.30 representations of gender inequality among muslims references to gender inequality among muslims mostly included the following presumptions regarding the reasons behind wearing a face covering: 1) muslim women are coerced into the practice by male family members, 2) multiple reasons could be at work and 3) it is a choice inspired by religion and modesty. all commentators arguing for the ban (predominantly non-muslim men) assumed that patriarchy and coercion were the reasons why some muslim women cover their faces. taking it off during citizenship ceremony would demonstrate openness to become more like the gender-equal “us”. until then, niqab-wearing women would remain not only unequal, but less human than “their” oppressive and aggressive men who would miss a valuable lesson in equality. being “human” was equated to being gender-equal and face-covering muslim women would remain sub-human until they uncovered their faces. niqabs are “not only anti-woman, they are anti-social. even anti-human. that’s because veils cover the face. and the importance of the face in human psychology cannot be overstated”, wrote gardner.31 the regulation was deemed by kay to be “a welcome first step to integrating women into their new roles as human beings who are fully equal to men, as well as sending an important message to men for whom the idea of equality between the sexes is a novel one”.32 “most likely, their brains were washed by muslim men for centuries. it’s time for muslim women to abandon the old habits and face the real world, particularly in canada and in the west”, contended das.33for klatt, “critics of the custom of veiling women almost exclusively talk about the denigration of women that motivates muslim men to cover up their chattel”.34 most commentators who were opposed to the ban argued that the policy would deepen the presumed oppression of muslim women who cover their faces. a toronto star editorial stated that while these women, “deliberately hold themselves aloof from the wider community and display beliefs that run counter to ideals about equality between men and women”. 35 the editorial goes on to say that, “full and equal” citizenship implies resisting “the impulse to punish those who are different however much we disagree with their beliefs”.36 comparing the ban with similar laws in europe, the winnipeg free press wrote that edicts like these “are counterproductive in that they prevent some from joining in the daily life of the schools, workplaces and marketplaces where immigrants naturally and quickly integrate. that isolation breeds an alienation that reinforces oppression and inequality”.37 “denying a woman in burqa the right to swear the oath of citizenship further isolates her from mainstream society”, argued 30 ibid. 31 gardner, dan, “the canvas of emotion; face veils are not like any other religious garment they are intended to smother identity, writes dan gardner”, ottawa citizen, december 14, 2011. 32 kay, barbara, “facing up to canadian values”, national post, december 13, 2011. 33 das, sanat k., “face the world”, calgary herald, december, 21, 2011. 34 klatt, heinz, “niqab a problem for both sexes”, national post, december, 20, 2011. 35 “citizenship and bigotry”, toronto star, december 13, 2011. 36 ibid 37 “remove the veil from bigoted eyes”, winnipeg free press, december 15, 2011. 16 review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 arif”.38 muslim men were presented as perpetrators of oppression by walkom: “perhaps the answer is for those who would veil womenfolk to voluntarily rethink their position”. 39 “by banning the burka, we would be targeting those who wear it. there would be no consequences for the husbands who force their wives to wear it or the imams who warn of eternal hellfire for those who shun it”, concurred breakenridge.40 some commentators arguing against the ban acknowledged the multiplicity of reasons behind the wearing of the niqab. while some muslim women wear it due to coercion or social pressure, others “don traditional dress freely, sometimes for reasons of deep personal faith, sometimes to make a political or social statement”, simons declared, adding that, regardless of how we feel about it, “why punish that minority of women who are, in fact, forced by male relatives to wear the niqab, by refusing them legal protections we freely grant to their oppressors?”41. professor felice lifshit concurred with simons: “[m]ost who do veil themselves do it voluntarily”, however, the policy “might in fact punish most harshly the very people who are most in need of citizenship rights and protections, immigrant women from extremely patriarchal cultures”.42 most muslim and some non-muslim commentators argued that the practice is a personal choice and that coercion is a non-issue. this argument came almost exclusively from women, including those few muslim women who sent letters to newspapers. both muslim and non-muslim women were portrayed as free to make choices regarding what to wear. rana, a self-identified muslim woman, argued that the niqab is a “mechanism of emancipation that liberates women from the bondage of all sorts of body-baring and self-degradation”.43 mina ella was quoted as insisting she did not cover her face because she was oppressed, but for the sake of religion and modesty. 44 head of the muslim council of montreal salam elmenyawi was also cited as saying that “a woman who chooses to cover her face is doing so because she believes it is the best way for her to live her faith”.45 fatema nakhuda, a self-identified muslim woman, argued none of the “many other muslim women who choose to wear the veil” that she personally knew would object to showing their face for citizenship purposes: “unfortunately, the ramification of this fanfare acts to pit canadians against each other, and incite animosity against canadian muslims”. 46 “though many view the veils as a sign of oppression, they actually signify the ideologies of modesty and chastity”, wrote nicole moore, a self-identified non-muslim reader. she added that “in a westernized culture, where youth admire the morally corrupt television stars like the cast of jersey shore, how can we discredit these women’s choices to cover themselves as a sign of personal dignity? i feel strongly about respecting the choices of others and encouraging cultural 38 arif, hassan, “jason kenney got it wrong”, telegraph journal, december 19, 2011. 39 walkom, thomas. what’s right about jason kenney’s no veil rule. insert publisher, december 14, 2011. 40 breakenbridge, rob, “burka restriction punishes victims”, calgary herald, december, 20, 2011. 41 simons, paula, “slight of muslim women is cynical politics; kenney’s ban on veils for citizenship targets nonproblem”, edmonton journal, december 13, 2011. 42 lifshitz, felice, “policy against veils could punish people most in need of rights”, edmonton journal, december 19, 2011. 43 rana, inaam, “defining the veil”, ottawa citizen, december 17, 2011. 44 smith, theresa, “niqab ban raises fears of a less-tolerant canada; survey shows 81 per cent agree with ban”, calgary herald, december 17, 2011. 45 harrold, max, “ottawa bans face veils at citizenship ceremonies; muslim groups fear implications; move 'necessary' to properly identify women being sworn in, kenney says”, the gazette, december 13, 2011. 46 nakhuda, fatema, “veil ruling diverts attention”, toronto star, december 17, 2011. 17 review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 and racial respect”47. choice, not oppression or gender socialization, guide women’s actions; this applies to muslim and non-muslim women alike, argued southey. if “high heels and miniskirts”48 are a personal choice, and not a sign of objectification and degradation, there is no reason why a woman cannot also choose to cover her face. “i refuse to make those assumptions and i regret any rule that enshrines them. just as i ask those assumptions not be made about me, based on my shoes. click, click, click” (ibid). discussion and conclusion this paper examined the way that gender equality was employed by canada’s mainstream newspapers to argue their positions regarding the ban of face coverings during citizenship ceremonies and asked how they conceptualized the meaning of canadian citizenship. the findings show that most commentators erased gender inequality among “us”, and ascribed it instead to “them”. both women and men, muslims and non-muslims, those in favour and those opposed to the ban employed strikingly similar logic while constructing opposing arguments. canadian citizenship was represented either as 1) an award for already being or 2) an instrument for becoming neoliberal. it was primarily men—judging by their names presumably white and of christian-background— who employed gender equality to voice their opposition to face coverings. from minister jason kenney to male readers, the central theme was their concern for and apparent need to rescue niqab-wearing women from their oppressive male family members. the women were portrayed in broad strokes as without agency: dependent, unfree to making choices and less human. this is in keeping with what spivak (1988, 296) termed “white men saving brown women from brown men”. by representing muslim (non-canadian) men as the enforcers of the non-neoliberal niqab, the white, christian-background men implicitly cast themselves as liberal, progressive and too respectful towards women to be able inflict gender-based oppression. however, the muslim male readers also cast themselves as face-covering muslim women’s saviours from the gender inequality of western societies. being placed in a position to defend their culture, the muslim commentators may have felt that acknowledging gender inequalities to any measure would have validated the assumption that gender oppression is rampant among muslims. the reproduction of “us” vs. “them” categories, however, only served to perpetuate the perceived cultural divide and bolster the discursive erasure of gender inequality at large. by appropriating the oppression vs. freedom of choice binary, both muslim and non-muslim men erased the existence of gender inequality among “their” women. they redirected the “we are not oppressive, you are” argument against each other, and thereby silenced the intersecting experiences of oppressions and choices of all women, regardless of their background or immigration status. most female commentators—also presumably white, christian-background and in the case of the columnists, educated, middle class and privileged—employed similar arguments to portray niqab-wearing women. this illustrates what abu-lughod, paraphrasing spivak, termed “white women saving brown women from brown men” (1998, 14). this logic constructs “us” (western, 47 moore, nicole, “cultural respect”, calgary herald, december 20, 2011. 48 southey, tabatha, “minister kenney, can i become a citizen in these shoes?”, globe and mail, december 17, 2011 18 review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 non-muslim women) as, “educated, modern, having control over their own bodies and sexualities, and the freedom to make their own decisions” (mohanty 1991, 56). this erases the existence of inequality among non-muslim, and more generally canadian and western women. however, muslim female commentators also, albeit using different arguments, employed similar neoliberal arguments which posited muslim women who cover their faces invariably choose to do so. they disregarded the possibility of oppression being at work in some instances of the practice and represented face coverings as an emancipation from gender oppression in the west. in an attempt to subvert prevalent assumptions about gender inequality among muslims, the muslim women represented canadian citizenship as a reward for already being neoliberal. a few of them presented the information that they were born or raised in canada as evidence that it is possible to be canadian and choose to wear a head or face covering. using the “privilege” of being canadian, muslim and/or wearing a head or face covering, they generalized their being in a position to choose to all muslim women who cover their faces. thus, solely by virtue of their being capable of and free to make choices, niqab-wearing muslim women—prospective canadians—were represented as already neoliberal and hence deserving to be accepted into the canadian family. for those in favour of the ban, regardless of their sex or religious background, displaying nonneoliberal beliefs (signified by wearing a face covering) during citizenship ceremony meant not qualifying for canadian citizenship. uncovering faces would signal willingness to eventually become liberated. for those against the ban, accepting face-covering women into citizenship meant awarding them an opportunity to eventually shed their non-neoliberal beliefs. citizenship was presented as a tool that would, in the long run, lead to face-covering muslim womens’ freedom from patriarchal oppression and assimilation with the gender-equal “us”. the difference between the commentators for the ban and most of those against it was primarily in the timing. for the former the emancipation should occur either before or, at least, be enacted during the ceremony, while for the latter group the granting of citizenship would help facilitate the eventual rescuing of niqab-wearing muslim women from oppression. not only do these representations position face-covering muslim women outside canadian citizenship and deepen the perception of unsurmountable differences between “us” and “them”, they mark the unequal and the oppressed (via their erasure) as unworthy of both media attention and citizenship. this has important implications for the struggle for gender equality in canada. as noted earlier, the mainstream media play a major role in asserting dominant narratives and prioritizing agendas. the press coverage purported to take gender equality seriously, but only insofar as the nation’s “others” are concerned. presenting gender equality as an accomplished fact and trivializing or rendering invisible instances of gender inequality outside of muslim communities has practical bearings, whether in the realm of everyday life or policymaking. the centering on the “real” gender inequalities of “others”, muslims in particular, renders “our” grievances trivial at best, nonsensical at worst. it ignores lived experiences of inequality of all women and perpetuates the silence on the state of gender equality in canada at the expense of both “us” and muslim “others”. through insisting on individualism and personal choice and through separating “us” from “them”, the media deter women from finding common cause and “makes unlikely the forging of alliances, affiliations or connections,” in local, national or international contexts (mcrobbie 2009, 2). 19 review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 references abu-laban, yasmeen and christine gabriel. 2002. selling diversity, immigration, multiculturalism, employment equity, and globalization. peterborough: 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“normalisation” de l’islam; une analyse dudiscours télévisuel en france’, in pierre brechon and jean-paul willaime (eds), médias et religions en miroir. paris: presses universitaires de france. yeğenoğlu, meyda. 1998. colonial fantasies: towards a feminist reading of orientalism. cambridge: cambridge university press. 24 review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada available online at: journals.carleton.ca/rera/index.php/rera rera is an electronic academic peer-reviewed journal. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is a joint project supported by the canada-europe transatlantic dialogue—a cross-canada research network supported by the social sciences and humanities research council of canada (sshrc)—along with the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies (carleton university) and its associated research unit, the centre for european studies. rera aims to provide an accessible forum for research, to promote high standards of research and scholarship, and to foster communication among young scholars. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada tel: +01 613 520-2600 ext. 3117; e-mail: rera-journal@carleton.ca creative commons license creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0 this working paper is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial no derivs 3.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 3.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, provided the source is acknowledged. no use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes. issn: 1718-4835 © 2017 the author(s) https://journals.carleton.ca/rera/index.php/rera mailto:rera-journal@carleton.ca http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ introduction neoliberal citizenship and muslim “others” muslims in the mainstream media methodology findings table 2: newspaper coverage by the type of article, gender and religious background table 3: coverage by the gender and religious background of cited sources table 4: position by number of articles representations of gender (in)equality in canada representations of gender inequality among muslims discussion and conclusion references seale, clive. 1999. the quality of qualitative research. london: sage publications available online at: journals.carleton.ca/rera/index.php/rera contact: carleton university tel: +01 613 520-2600 ext. 3117; e-mail: rera-journal@carleton.ca creative commons license issn: 1718-4835 review of european and russian affairs11 (1), 2017 issn 1718-4835 re-discovering the importance of citizenship through immigrants' experiences: naturalization and political integration in padua, italy eriselda shkopi1 and zana vathi2 university of padua, edge hill university abstract this paper focuses on processes of political integration for immigrants in the italian context, constituting as it does an understudied topic. it does so by looking at one specific community, albanian immigrants, who have been typically heavily stigmatized. while albanian immigration in italy has been a focus of previous research, no consideration so far has been given to naturalization and its influence on other political processes at the level of immigrants’ daily lives. through the meanings which participants of this research attribute to citizenship and their acting as political agents, the paper unpacks the relations between this "status passage" (glaser and strauss 1971) and the political integration of immigrants. the findings show a very complex picture in which multiple factors and interactions play an important role. legally speaking, italian citizenship is a pre-condition for immigrants to enjoy the right to vote in elections at all levels, which participants considered a significant indicator of their political integration. therefore, the political integration of immigrants is heavily conditioned by naturalization, which gives access to political rights, voice and representation as regulated at the state level. however, when considering the role of age and social capital in processes of political integration, there is also reason to believe that the political mobilization and participation of the youngest and most well-educated participants is not as exclusively attached to such formal recognition as a political subject. key words: political integration, citizenship, albanian immigrants, padua, italy 1eriselda shkopi is phd candidate at the university of padua, in sociology. her research concerns the naturalisation and political integration of immigrants of albanian origin in padua (italy) and london (uk). 2dr. zana vathi is reader in social sciences at edge hill university, uk and specializes in migration studies. 2 review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 introduction a significant body of research exists on immigrants3 of albanian origin, particularly in southern europe, and their identifications, socio-economic integration and stigmatization in relation to the receiving country4 (king and mai 2009; romania 2004; vathi 2015). however, naturalization 5 processes and the political integration of this collectivity have often been overlooked. based upon an explorative study of citizenship and the political integration of naturalized first-generation albanians, this paper analyzes how participants perceive and experience naturalization as italian citizens and the acquisition of associated political rights. how such naturalization intersects with other pathways of political integration within italian society is then explored. research for this paper was based on qualitative methodologies – a different approach to the study of political integration, which is often studied by means of quantitative instruments.the central questions this paper seeks to answer are: • how do naturalized albanians experience the gaining of italian citizenship? • does naturalization impact political integration and, if so, how? • what are the meanings and motivations behind electoral participation? this paper focuses on electoral participation since this is strictly linked to the status of citizenship in italy, but other forms of political participation are also analyzed. moreover, considering the role of locality and regionalism in italy in terms of integration policies and practices and strategies of immigrants and minorities (perocco 2003; vathi 2012), the paper focuses on padua, a city in the veneto region in the north east of italy, without underestimating the national political structure and its impact on the local one. the following sections provide contextual information and outline the theoretical framework used, followed by an overview of the study’s methodology. empirical sections analyze the main findings, before final considerations are turned to in the discussion and conclusion. background and context immigration, citizenship and political rights 3 the term immigrant as used in this paper refers to people born outside of italy or those who immigrated to italy after the age of 12, who may have experienced different migratory/return experiences in their lifetime, but were settled in italy at the time the interview took place. 4 as described by king and mai (2009), albanians’ portrayal in italy constitutes a unique case for its extreme stigmatization by the host society. the process of criminalization of albanians, which took place in particular after august 1991, and continued until the beginning of 2000s, saw them associated with drugs, prostitution and human trafficking and savage behavior – a process fuelled by both politicians and the media. 5in this paper, we use the term naturalization also for those who applied on the basis of jus sanguinis, since these participants first entered italy as immigrants with a permit of stay and later could apply for the italian citizenship, having italian ancestors. baubock and wallace (2010, 2) define naturalization as "any acquisition after birth of a citizenship not previously held by the person concerned that requires an application to public authorities and a decision by these". 3review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 according to the caritas/migrantes annual report, the total number of foreigners residing in italy as of december 31, 2015 was 5,026,153 or 8.3% of the overall population. the three main communities represented in this figure were romanians (22.9%), albanians (9.3%) and moroccans (8.7%). the latest statistics report that 178,035 immigrants became naturalized in italy in 2015. albanians were the largest group (35,134 naturalizations) followed by moroccans (32,448) (caritas/migrantes 2016). naturalizations have been consistently on the rise6 for a number of years, since 2010, indicating a strong tendency of immigrants toward settlement. the first large-scale influx of immigrant arrivals in italy date back to 1991 when many albanians arrived. albanians now represent the largest immigrant community in italy among non-european-union (eu) immigrants, estimated to amount to 491,240, and are also described as one of the most integrated communities (king and mai 2009). however, despite the significant demographic and socio-cultural changes as a result of immigration in the last 25 years, italy’s citizenship law has not changed since 1992. moreover, based primarily on the jus sanguinis principle, it does not favour those who apply as long-term residents who need to demonstrate 10 years of continuous residence and fulfil several economic requirements. italy’s immigrant population has reached 8.3%, which is close to the average of other immigrantreceiving eu countries such as germany, france and the uk (eurostat 2014). however, the overall situation with immigrants’ political rights in italy differs significantly from those countries (e.g. the netherlands, sweden, norway) where immigrants enjoy political rights at the local level even before naturalization.7 in italy, political rights at all levels are regulated by article 48 of the italian constitution and are granted exclusively to italian citizens, making citizenship constitute a clear boundary of the political community. governmental and political personalities until very recently berlusconi’s right-wing populist party forza italia (people of freedom) dominated the political arena in italy berlusconi led different governments in coalition with lega nord (northern league), a predominantly xenophobic party (mantovan 2013) between 1994 and 2011, with only a few interruptions. after a technically "no party" government was appointed by the president between 2011-2013, none of the political parties were able to achieve the required majority of votes for winning the elections which resulting in political instability in italy. from 2014 to 2016, the government was led by matteo renzi. at 41 years old he was the youngest leader in italian political history which was perceived as a very positive change after the berlusconi era. renzi’s political legitimization increased after the 2014 elections for the european parliament, which he won by 40%. on december 5, 2016, renzi resigned after the results of the referendum on constitutional reforms (which took place the day before). he was replaced by paolo gentiloni from the same democratic party. 6citizenship acquisitions tripled in the last 5 years: in 2010 there were 59,369 naturalizations, in 2011 56,148, in 2012 65,383, in 2013 100,712, in 2014 129,887, in 2015 as mentioned above there were 178,035 naturalizations. 7 for on overview of political rights granted to immigrants in the european context, please see the migration integration policy index (mipex): http://www.mipex.eu/political-participation accessed 27.03.2016 http://www.mipex.eu/political-participation 4 review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 however, renzi represents a controversial personality, both appreciated and hated by italians (diamanti et al. 2015). the institutional reforms of his government are not universally accepted. his political personality has been equated with the berlusconian model, which links to what calise (2010) has called the amplification of the "personalization of politics". 8 in this political and economic landscape, a new political movement, 9 known as the movimento 5 stelle (5 stars movement) emerged. created in 2005, the movement is led by the italian comedian beppe grillo, has been since grown and mobilized people mainly through online forums. padua as of 2014, padua had 211,210 inhabitants, 33,268 of whom were immigrants living in the city with a permit of stay (comune di padova settore programmazione e statistica 2014). albanians are among the largest non-eu communities, with 1,605 residents after the moldavians (4,865), chinese (2,345), nigerians (2,653), filipinas (1,941) and moroccans (2,001). furthermore, they constitute the second largest community in the last three y ears in terms of citizenship acquisitions. in padua, naturalizations at the local level converge with national-level indicators, according to which moroccans and albanians are the two largest naturalized groups. padua constitutes an interesting research context on the basis of the municipal elections that occurred in the city during may 2014, when research for this paper was conducted. at the time of these elections, the electorate in the city of padua amounted to 163,393 eligible voters, 289 of whom were albanian-origin immigrants with italian citizenship. no data exists on the voting preferences of this group either at the national or local level. the municipal elections were won by a centre-right coalition led by massimo bitonci, representative of the aforementioned xenophobic party lega nord. this was a radical change after more than 15 years of a centre-left administration in the city an interval between 1999 and 2004 aside. mayor bitonci was quick to exclude immigrant voices and political representation. by way of example, on the first meeting of the new town council (june 20, 2014), there was no seat reserved for egicenolli, the president of the commission for the representation of foreign citizens. 8 calise considers this a worldwide process, which became widespread during the 20th century when big political ideologies decreased. in the italian context, political choices are made based on the candidate’s qualities and characteristics. therefore, street politics and big ideologies have been substituted by the "politics of image". in calise’s analysis, berlusconi embodies the extreme side of the personalization of politics. calise 2010, 7-9. 9 grillo's 5 stars movement is an anti-european, anti-establishment movement. it offers a radical and popular opposition to the italian government and has similar agenda to parties such as podemos in spain and, to some extent, syriza in greece. 5review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 framing immigrants’ political integration and its links with naturalization the political integration of immigrants is a growing research topic on both sides of the atlantic. in the european context, scholars started to tackle the issue in the late 1990s (morales and giugni 2011). it is worth noting that conceptualizations and operationalizations of political integration differ significantly between continents and even within the same context. often scholars address political integration as just one dimension of integration together with social and economic integration (chaudhary 2016). other authors underline how migration researchers and scholars of political participation could both benefit from a closer dialogue relating to the political participation of immigrants (bloemraad and schönwälder 2013). with respect to the european context, martiniello offers one of the seminal definitions of political integration: in a broad sense, political integration has four dimensions. the first dimension refers to the rights granted to immigrants by the host society. one could say that the more political rights they enjoy, the better integrated they become. the second dimension is their identification with the host society. the more immigrants identify with the host society, the better their political integration. the third dimension refers to the adoption of democratic norms and values by the immigrants, which is often presented as a necessary condition for political integration. finally, immigrants’ political integration involves political participation, mobilization and representation (2005, 2). martiniello’s definition grasps the nature of political integration as a social process, located in the interaction between structure and agency, which at the same time shapes other dimensions, such as feelings of identification. moreover, it utilises political integration as an umbrella term by considering a range of activities both electoral and non-electoral in form, such as lobbying and mobilization but also representation. however as we will discuss in the empirical sections, martiniello’s definition is not without controversy, in particular concerning points two and three. in the european context, empirical research has underlined the influences of citizenship regimes on immigrants’ political integration. recognizing the role played by local policies and institutions, this approach stresses how the national political opportunity structure (pos) is more decisive than the local one. since formal citizenship is part of the countries’ philosophy concerning immigrants inclusion/integration politics, even in countries where political rights at the local level are granted, restrictive citizenship regimes may lead to "exclusionary messages" (gonzales-ferrer and morales 2013) towards immigrants and consequently to lower electorate turnouts in local elections. while there are debates about the links between political integration and citizenship and their operationalization, electoral turnouts are largely used to measure the health of the political integration of immigrants (dancygier and saunders 2006). another dimension that needs attention is the distinction among (non) conventional forms of participation. political participation has been traditionally defined as voluntary activity undertaken by ordinary people in order to influence, directly or indirectly, political outcomes at various levels of the political system (verba et al. 1995, 6 review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 38-39). while conventional forms are those activities that pertain to the electoral process (e.g. contacting a politician and participation in the electoral campaign), non-conventional electoral forms are defined as "extra-institutional" activities of direct political action such as protesting or signing a petition (de rooij 2012). the focus on electoral activities is important since they constitute the gateway to having a political voice, to being represented and to participating when important decisions are made on immigration policies (boccagni 2012). further, voting is considered as one of the most meaningful acts in which citizenship is embodied and displayed (bueker 2005), and one of the most fundamental political acts in a democracy (putnam 2000). substantial research has focused on immigrant voting in the european context. 10 in her seminal research togeby (1999) found that immigrant groups in denmark had the same shares in electoral turnouts as danish natives. she also found that differences among immigrant groups (mainly between the pakistani and turkish communities ) in the same local context were due to each group’s collective mobilization on the basis of ethnicity, as well as the role played by local political agencies in not being conducive toward immigrants’ political mobilization. more recently, de rooij (2012) and sandovici and listhaug (2010) explored the differences in patterns of political participation among immigrant-origin populations in comparison to native populations. while voter turnouts is not significantly lower among immigrants compared to natives, the differences observed within immigrant groups has depended on language command and length of residence in the receiving country. however, these differences within the same ethnic group are not explored in depth by any previous research. indeed, in migration studies there is a tendency to see immigrants as homogeneous ethnic groups and "within-group" differences are not studied in depth (glick schiller 2012, 521). this is also the case of studies of political integration, and to a large extent, also studies of voting. more helpful in this respect is research that explores the political behavior of immigrants in order to unpack the links of voting with socio-economic variables, and with "ethnic identity" or "groupbased interests". dancygier and saunders (2006) explored the political preferences of immigrants in germany and britain and found that it is not only individual characteristics that matter for elaborating voting preferences (socio-economic-status – or ses model); the receiving local context matters as well as one’s "identification with a collective group interest" (citation). further, it appears that the "impact of the immigration experience itself may be more important in socializing immigrants to the host country than the length of their stay" (dancygier and saunders 2006, 978). this goes against theories that maintain that political assimilation occurs over time (gordon 1964). this paper seeks to address some of the limitations of these approaches, seeking to integrate existing literature by looking at the processes behind the political integration of albanian immigrants in italy, particularly in padua. this topic cannot be studied without analysis of the 10togeby's (1999) study in denmark was conducted in two municipalities, copenhagen and århus, she analyzed data on electoral turn-out of foreign nationals with a permanent residence permit from at least three years, and focused mainly on turkish and lebanese immigrants. fennema's and tillie's (1999) work focused on moroccans, surinamese, antilleans and turks in amsterdam. 7review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 elaboration of stigma11 as part of the integration process of albanians in italy. however this paper sidelines the origins of stigma or stigmatization processes per se, since a substantial literature has already examined the stigmatization of albanians in southern europe (king and mai 2009; vathi 2015). indeed, for albanians in southern europe, particularly in italy and greece, stigmatization has played a prominent role in forging assimilation processes.12 political integration of immigrants in italy in most western european countries, scholars started to address immigrants’ political subjectivities in the late 1990s (martiniello 2006; però and solomos 2010). however with the exception of a few isolated initiatives (e.g. caponio 2006), italy only began to address this issue during the last decade (boccagni 2012). following scholarship developed in western europe, scholars in italy have increasingly focused on institutional, discursive and organizational opportunity structures (pos). pos refers to both top-down openness for participation opportunities (della porta and diani 1999) and to an overture at the local level, with a focus on power relations and party systems and their role in involving immigrants (garbaye 2004). cinalli et al. (2010) compared pos in nine european cities and confirm what other scholars (de rooij 2012) have found at the eu level. they found that political participation is greater among immigrants with higher education levels, language proficiency and long-term residence, and in cities where the institutional and discursive opportunity structures are more accessible (cinalli 2010). despite the effects of personal resources disposable to immigrants, pos dominates in influencing the political participation of immigrants. in the italian context, cities and different regions are characterized by distinct local identities and often differ in terms of local politics (borket and caponio 2010). pilati (2010) studied immigrant’s political integration by looking at pos in milan, which rated as having the lowest level of immigrant political participation when compared to other cities in europe. accordingly, "the organizational integration model that regulates the political participation of immigrants is oriented toward an assimilation model, in which political integration takes place mainly through the incorporation of immigrants within forms and modalities that dominate in the host society" (pilati 2010, 275)).13 additionally, among immigrants in her sample, the delayed citizenship attainment (waiting more than 10 years) seems to influence a kind of habitus of non-participation (pilati 2010,). 11link and phelan (2001) proposed a revised definition of this concept, by maintaining that there is stigmatization when the following five interrelated "components" are all present: labelling, stereotyping, separation, status loss, discrimination. 12according to gordon (1964), assimilation is a process involving at least seven subprocesses. acculturation is likely to be the first kind of assimilation to occur and may take place also when other types do not, while structural assimilation is seen as the key point to which other kinds of assimilation naturally follow. starting from this model, king and mai (2009) found a model of a rather asymmetric assimilation of albanians in italy. while albanians nurtured a kind of italophilia towards the italian, italians cultivated a kind of albanophobia toward albanians. this severe stigmatization is viewed as having led albanians in the late 2000s to several forms of assimilation, going from radical assimilations, to encrypted or reactive albanian identity, to mimesis with italians (romania 2004). 13translated by authors. 8 review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 these studies are very important for having unlocked the discussion on this subject, however they are not exhaustive. as mollenkopf suggests in order to unpack political integration the role other actors play in the political processes and the situation on the ground need to be addressed otherwise we risk resorting to "structural functionalism" (mollenkopf 2013, 113). due to these seminal empirical works in the italian context, however, immigrants are no longer seen solely as a workforce or as passive victims—views already criticized by martiniello (2005)—but also as bearers of political subjectivity.14 methodology this paper is part of a larger study on belonging, identities, naturalization pathways and the political integration of naturalized albanians conducted by eriselda shkopi. considering that most research in the field has focused on formal activity/expression of political integration (i.e., elections), this paper focuses on another important yet unstudied aspect: motivations and meanings that derive from everyday interactions in the context of naturalization and overall political integration. in order to achieve this, qualitative methodology and precisely grounded theory15 were utilized for the purpose of data collection, coding and analysis. the sample for this paper consisted of 30 participants with two subgroups of interviewees: 20 naturalized immigrants and 10 key actors. the interviews with immigrants consisted of life stories and were conducted in padua, and followed a dialogical approach (markova 2008 16; la mendola 2009). a list of topics was prepared, in order to guide participants during the narration from general frameworks to specific episodes. the relatively small number of cases has to do with the fact that the dialogical approach and life stories are time-consuming, both in terms of conducting the fieldwork and the analysis. the sample number was also impacted by participant withdrawals in terms of recruitment, two strategies were followed: gatekeepers (intercultural mediators) and snowballing. participants of the larger subgroup (20) were expected to be first-generation immigrants; hold italian citizenship; and not be involved professionally in politics. the sample was well balanced concerning gender, class and age, as well as province or provenience of albania from which participants originated. the average participant age was 44, ranging from 32 to 63. the average time spent in italy was 18 years. in regards to education, 11 out of 20 participants had concluded university studies either in italy or albania. their current professional backgrounds varied from musician, security guard, businessman/woman, cleaning lady, tradesmen, senior centre coordinator, it technician, stay-at-home mother, retiree and 14 krause and schramm (2011, 118-119) define political subjectivity as follows: “when we talk about political subjectivities, we have two things in mind. first, we want to draw attention to the practices through which political subject-positions come into being. these entail practices of inclusion or exclusion (as they are often emphasized in citizenship debates), but also dimensions of longing and desire (as they are expressed in belonging).” 15according to flick (2009, 16), "the goal of your research then is less to test what is already known (e.g., theories already formulated in advance), but to discover and develop the new and to develop empirically grounded theories". 16 according to markova (2008, 83) "i refer to the theoretical approach that is known as dialogicality. this approach is based on the triangular relations of ego-alter-object". here ego is the interviewer; alter is the interviewee, and object is the themes on which alter is invited to narrate. 9review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 unemployed. this data was combined with 10 semi-structured interviews with key actors, mainly individuals professionally involved in politics or community activists, from different cities 17 within this subgroup, six were albanians with italian citizenship, two were albanians with only albanian citizenship, and two were native italian citizens. the narratives of key actors provided information on the situation in other localities and pos at country level, mainly concerning opportunities for immigrants to be included and recognized as political actors. interviews lasted from a hour and a half to three hours. the interviews were recorded (apart from the case of one interviewee who did not agree to this) and then entirely transcribed. all the participants of the main group are cited using pseudonyms, whereas those in the key actor group are referred to by their real name. the data was analyzed following a grounded theory approach. the first two cycles of open and focused coding were computer-assisted (atlas.ti), while the final stage of analysis was manual and based on hardcopy transcripts, in order to better contextualize categories within the narratives.18 even though this exploratory study could inform the debate on citizenship and political integration of immigrants, one limitation is that it focuses on one immigrant group. therefore the data cannot be representative either for albanians, due to the small sample size, or for other immigrant groups in italy. this is particularly important since previous research has shown (king and mai 2009; vathi 2015) that albanians have a particular integration history in italy, which demonstrates a strong tendency toward assimilation. naturalization and political integration of albanians in padua citizenship: meanings and experiences what does gaining italian citizenship mean to our participants? similar to the findings of research by colombo et al. (2009) on the second generation of immigrants in italy, for the first-generation albanian immigrants we spoke to, citizenship encapsulates multiple meanings and feelings. albert, a 38-year-old man who has been an italian citizen since 2010 and a resident in italy for 19 years, referred to himself as clandestine before gaining italian citizenship through the pathway of longterm residence. his choice, as with many others, seems to have been motivated primarily by the precarious legal status immigrants experience in the country: the day i completed the ten years for the indefinite leave to remain, i brought my application to vojsava (albanian cultural mediator in the city council) (…) when i applied, the girl at the office told me "but wait at least 24 hours, didn’t you sleep last night?”. i was looking forward to it with joy and anxiety, to finally have my right. 17the subgroup of key actors was composed of activists living in different cities in italy: 1 in padua; 1 in treviso; 3 in rome; 1 in firenze; 1 in montegrotto-padua province; 1 in milan). 18atlas.ti was employed for the general study’s sample of 75 interviews, since interviews with different groups took place in italy and the united kingdom. further analysis of the data was based on hardcopy transcripts in order to have an integrated understanding of each narration. 10 review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 being discriminated [against] when you don’t have documents (i.e. citizenship)… you cannot do this, you cannot do that, you cannot buy a car, you cannot get a mortgage… it's also true that when you have documents (i.e. the passport) you also have more… you’re legally more controlled; like everything else, it has good things and less good things, but you cannot stay a clandestine all your life! thus, citizenship emerges as an award after a long and difficult pathway. participants see it as a formalization of their relationship with the state, both in terms of rights and obligations (lister et al. 2003). nevertheless, a common pattern of participants’ narratives was a kind of naturalization without recognition by italian society, one that hampers the full realization of the second dimension of martinello’s model of political participation: identification with the host society. as skender (male, 42), who has been an italian citizen since 2004 (via jus sanguinis, as a descendant of italians) and a resident since 1992, explains below, the divide of italians and perceived “others” is still evident: in your opinion, what do you represent to italy? (silence)… a normal person like others…that maybe…when he doesn’t have a job, is a problem; when he has a job and doesn’t speak up... is more welcome. (…) the problem is that it is becoming normal that in times of crisis the foreigner becomes visible. maybe we feel it more, that we are still foreigners, not 100%, but still with that old mentality; even though many years have passed, you have it inside you, this hurts inside you, "the foreigner"… skender’s words demonstrate a deeply rooted positioning by italian society, of immigrants—even those who have been naturalized—as stranieri (strangers).19 in this profile, the detachment from the country of residence, seems bolstered by the heavy stigmatization this collectivity has endured in italy. in the same vein as skender, couple lule and marsel, residing in the country respectively for 16 and 21 years, spoke about the disempowerment caused by the stringent rules for gaining citizenship, the processes lack of transparency, and also because of the fear that they may be rejected by the institutions. anila husha, an albanian woman who holds italian citizenship and acts as the vice president of the albanian-italian association "occhio blu" in rome offered insights into how immigrants are perceived by italian society after naturalization: does anything change in the lives of the immigrants after they gain italian citizenship? …hhm, no because in the eyes of the italians you are always a foreigner; even though you say you have italian citizenship, you remain a foreigner. we know an albanian who is an italian citizen and has lived here for more than 40 years and italians still call him straniero [stranger]; it is not easy for the mentality of the italians. it is us who feel we belong and consider ourselves italians now [that we gained citizenship]. this is my impression and i work in italian institutions; i know the situation from the inside. 19 italian for foreigners. 11review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 again similar to the findings of colombo et al. (2009), citizenship to our participants means also being integrated, not feeling excluded, and being recognized as equals. for jeta and kushtim, a couple who have resided in italy since the late 1990s and who have been italian citizens since 2009 and 2012 respectively, citizenship means an emotional and important step toward integration: how did you experience receiving citizenship? kushtim (male, 63): we were waiting for it anxiously; when i got it, i was in tears; jeta was there, in the town council with me… jeta (female, 60): [i feel like] a person who decides on her choices. [with citizenship] you're integrated; when you think you will live here, it comes naturally (…) you do not feel excluded from society; even when we didn’t have it [citizenship] we felt equal to them [italians]. therefore, holding italian citizenship helps immigrants avoid possible deportation and a precarious legal status. however the formal recognition by citizenship does not seem powerful enough to counter the negative perceptions and social labelling of immigrants as foreigners by italian society. nonetheless, individual naturalized immigrants may have multiple experiences and benefits from this "status passage" (glaser and strauss 1971) based on the rights citizenship affords. for instance, the gaining of citizenship is considered by some as an investment or as an entryway to sustain the social and spatial mobility of the family in italy while othersmay perceive it as a keystone to protect and maintain emotional and affective relationships. for a 65-year-old immigrant that participated in this study, having italian citizenship meant being able to continue to stay closer to his children who live in italy, or to follow them wherever they might move in case of a re-migration. to conclude this section, holding citizenship, as jeta (female, 60) says, means also "to not feel excluded". this is fundamental in relation to conventional political rights, since these are extended only to italian citizens, at the local and national levels. the next section analyzes dimensions of inclusion/exclusion in depth, including the implications of not having citizenship status, as well as individual motivations behind voting, and resources and convictions that nurture or hamper political integration. political integration: rights, meanings, motivations a significant change in participants’ lives on gaining italian citizenship was securing the right to vote in elections at all levels. by giving the right to vote to immigrants, citizenship has the power to challenge what perocco has called "the italian apartheid", a process that strengthened in particular after the passing of the bossi-fini law (nr. 189, 2002). this law aimed to reduce immigrants and community leaders to a mere workforce, denying any human, social, cultural, or spiritual aspect to their subjectivities (perocco 2003). jeta (female, 60) clearly speaks about this sense of not having a political voice: … when there were the primary elections [of the partito democratico] you felt increasingly left out ... thinking that all those years you've spent your life here, with 12 review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 friendships and with… all the problems that life brings, you feel a little excluded. we had the pleasure to... [vote]. it’s something very exciting and how i can tell you… a pleasure and a duty at the same time. as a person who lives here… i too felt i had my rights, even if blood is what it is, the origins are those that are [albanian]... therefore, citizenship and the consequent access to conventional electoral political rights means first and foremost a "right to have rights" (arendt 1973). the situation of albanians in italy prenaturalization resonates with the notion of "frozen" political subjectivities (krause and schramm 2011). in italy, the right to vote at all levels is strictly linked to italian citizenship, while albania, the country of participants’ origin, does not allow its citizens to vote from abroad. once past this gateway, participants show a higher inclination to stay updated through television, newspapers and social networks about political life in italy. they have also taken up other forms of political participation such as attending political meetings before the elections, writing to a parliament or a local constituency member, or going on strike. having access to conventional forms of political participation bears multiple meanings. to our participants voting means "making a contribution", fulfilling a civic obligation, holding a powerful instrument for influencing a positive change in the country. moreover participants’ narratives show how acting as political actors and making a political choice—who to vote for—is informed both by mainstream political debates and individual political convictions and values: doriana (female, 55): i felt it was a duty to go and vote. i’m really concerned about how things are going in italy, and whatever my vote matters, together with others, i try to give my contribution so that the right person gets elected… grillo, no! renzi,…yes! i supported him; let’s see what he will do. for older participants in the sample group, a reduction of non-conventional forms of political participation also occasionally emerged. what these first-generation immigrants narrate, in relation to non-electoral forms of political participation, could be framed as "non-participation habitus" 20 . this is due to two main considerations. for some participants, citizenship status primarily means economic and social stabilization, regularized work and the end/reduction of exploitation by their employers which was a common experience in their first years of residence in italy. therefore, lack of availability of time, money and social networks have played an important role in discouraging political activities for this group. for other participants, holding italian citizenship means not risking deportation for behaviours considered against public security (just and anderson 2012). 20as pilati (2010, 275) found in her research in milan, the long journey to citizenship seem to bring also some of our participants to a sort of resistance toward political participation. in other terms, immigrants incorporate this not recognition as political actors and do not participate also after obtaining citizenship. 13review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 for hena(female, 51), as for other participants, the fear and the imminent threat of losing the financial security she has constructed with difficulty in italy are important motivations behind voting. a link emerges between the fear of possible status loss due to the economic crisis and new immigrants (cingolani 2012), and voting preferences that, combined with stigma management, affect participants’ orientation toward populist or left-wing parties. for instance, hena is motivated to vote for partito democratico (democratic party) as a way of contributing toward political changes she feels are needed in italy after years of berlusconism. hena (female, 51): other countries are dealing with this (migrant crisis) differently. here in italy …what’s this?! where are all these people going?! where will they eat?! my father was saying the same, "if a guest comes to your house, you will host them for 3-5 days, and then you will have to go out of your house yourself!". it is really worrying because we have tried this (migration) ourselves; but the way they keep coming here, can’t the italian state stop this through bilateral agreements with other states?! but nothing is changing, it just keeps getting worse! although not representative of all "new italians" or immigrants with double citizenship, the data here counter what quantitative studies generally maintain for italy (pilati 2010) and other european countries (gonzales-ferrer and morales 2013). having been denied the right to vote for more than 18 years (the average length of stay for participants) and living in an assimilationist and antiimmigrant region seems to stimulate, rather than weaken or void, the meaning of electoral political participation for our participants. the majority saw electoral political participation as the recognition of being heard, having political voice, and influencing the policies of the place where they contribute economically, culturally, and also politically. voting also encapsulates symbolic dimensions and emerges as an important watershed in the coconstruction21 native-immigrants of belonging and as an act that plays both a symbolic and a substantive role (zincone 2006). the act-ritual of voting itself seems to evoke feelings of being part of a political community (pizzorno 1986, 372)22 and, in a circular way, to also nurture social bonding (bueker 2005). however, even though immigrants are eager to vote and despite their participation, this does not correspond to how politicians perceive their political participation. marco paccioti, the coordinator of the immigration forum23, describes how the most progressive italian party, partito democratico, deals with the issue of political representation and involvement of immigrants in italian politics: 21on the one hand, the receiving society draws a boundary through naturalization and voting in terms of "who may/not belong to political community", and on the other, immigrants accept this boundary in italy by not challenging it through lobbing, or claiming more politically inclusive norms. 22cfr. "(..) behind both types of reasons (voting or contributing to causes) there is always the common need of securing recognition for the identity of my successive selves" (pizzorno 1986, 372). 23 immigration forum forum immigrazione is organized by the italian democratic party to discuss issues related to immigration. 14 review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 even within the party there is a difficulty in understanding a reality that is already changing but which often also in the newspapers is presented as a possibility, “if one day it will happen" while we already have 5 million immigrants. (…) thus, political agencies and their leaders have difficulties in accepting and recognizing immigrants as political subjects (bloemraad et al. 2008; però and solomos 2010). in line with previous research (cinalli et al. 2010; pilati 2010), our findings go more in depth by displaying the coconstruction processes underneath a peripheral political positioning of the albanian collectivity that in recent years is becoming increasingly visible, and claiming recognition of its members as political subjects. albanian activists anila husha and erida perarla cela, both stress that the low engagement and lack of mobilization of albanians to raise issues concerning their rights should also be attributed to albanian leaders’ lack of experience with italian parties and politics more broadly, and the fact that albanians had first to invest in addressing their stigmatized visibility. only in recent years, after reaching higher levels of socio-economic stabilization, could they allow themselves to also engage in political issues concerning both albania and italy. a last interesting nuance within our sample that should be underlined is the experience of the youngest (under 45), and well-educated participants, for whom political integration is independent of naturalization. how did you become a member of a political party? neritan (male, 40): ... i became a member before i gained italian citizenship. i was still an albanian citizen when fini24 came to padua for the first time; in 2006 i was the only albanian registered on their computer. and i have met him after i gained italian citizenship. "are you albanian?", he asked me. "yes", i said, "my family from my father’s side has been a supporter of your party, too" …[…] it’s not really that i am a crazy fan, but the day they won, after many years that we were waiting to get rid of the left, i joined the others at the piazza. it appears that political engagement and affiliation for neritan and others of different political orientations consists of values and skills through which young participants were first socialized in the country of origin and then re-socialized in the context of residence. this is also the case for the youngest albanian activists, who were involved professionally in politics despite not having italian citizenship. these profiles show how acting (or not) as political actors is both a result of interaction between structure and agency in the country of residence, but also in the country of origin prior to emigrating. both the past political socialization and the individual integration pathway play an important role. these profiles further demonstrate how citizenship status is not necessarily a sine qua non to engage and even mobilize other immigrants through (conventional or unconventional) political activity. 24the founder of the right-wing party alleanza nazionale 15review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 discussion in the italian context, naturalization as a pre-condition to enjoy political rights at all levels is discriminatory for an important part of the population and, at the same time, it does not eradicate exclusionary messages even when immigrants finally become naturalized (boccagni 2012, 93; pilati 2010). furthermore, in a country like italy, where the political rights of immigrants are strictly linked to citizenship status, political integration encounters several barriers before realization. these include a very unfavourable normative and administrative procedure of naturalization and an unwelcoming attitude toward immigrants. however, the salience of the second and third dimensions of martiniello’s model for the italian context, respectively "identification with the host society" and "adoption of democratic norms and values", are not fully supported by the findings. first, the younger and well-educated immigrants were involved professionally in politics even before holding italian citizenship. concerning the third dimension, not all immigrant collectivities move from non-democratic countries or have not been socialized with some democratic rules prior to migration. most importantly, in assessing immigrants’ democratic values against those of a host society, an important question arises: can western countries like italy still be considered democratic despite the lack of political representation for long-term immigrants? the same denial is omnipresent in the works of italian political parties today, which rely on the activism of immigrants and increasingly on their vote, but do not recognize them as equal members of the electoral body, and ultimately, of their society. indeed, italian politicians may well be missing an opportunity to mobilize this immigrant group, considering the relatively large size of the albanian community in italy and their strong tendency to integrate in italian society. conclusions what does this study tell us about immigrants’ political integration in italy? this research contributes to the political and academic debate on immigrants’ political integration in italy and also in europe (bloemraad and schönwälder 2013), and calls for further research and innovative approaches to study in order to overcome previous partial readings of the issue. future studies should opt for comparative approaches without underestimating "within-group" differences across axes of gender, age, education class, provenience (rural, urban), and religion. even though our findings are not representative of all albanians with the right to vote in italy or of all naturalized immigrants, this paper offers original findings related to the meaning immigrants attribute to naturalization and political rights. voting—taking part in the electoral process at all levels—emerges as a powerful means toward inclusion in the face of a missing political integration policy. through its symbolic and substantial attributes, voting means having a political voice, being recognized as subjects and not objects of political decision-making processes, and being part of and belonging to a political community. these findings illustrate how in a hostile and unfavourable context, citizenship matters to immigrants (bloemraad 2006) and provides both a secure legal status and the sine qua non for full and significant political integration. 16 review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 acknowledgments an early version of this work was presented at the 12th annual imiscoe conference, geneva: rights, democracy and migration – challenges and opportunities, june 2015. we are very grateful to the critical comments of the participants in the panel and to the editors of this special issue: elke winter and anke patzel. a special thank you also to the two reviewers for their stimulating comments. 17review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 references arendt, hannah. 1973. on the origins of totalitarianism. new york: harcourt, brace, jovanovich. baubock, ranier, and sara wallace. 2010. eudo citizenship policy bried no. 2, "naturalisation". http://eudo__citizenship.eu. accessed may 6, 2016. bloemraad, irene. 2006. “becoming a citizen in the united states and canada: structured mobilization and immigrant political incorporation”, social forces, 85 (2): 667-695. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4494935. accessed may 20, 2016. bloemraad, irene, annakorteweg, and gӧkçeyurdakul. 2008. “citizenship and immigration: multiculturalism, assimilation, and challenges to the nation-state”. annual review of sociology, (34): 153–179. doi: 10.1146/annurev.soc.34.040507.134608. accessed february 5, 2016. bloemraad, irene, and karen schönwälder. 2013. 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open. verba, sidney, kay lehmanschlozman, and henry e. brady. 1995. voice and equality: civic voluntarism in american politics. cambridge, ma: harvard university press. zincone, giovanna. 2006. familismo legale come (non) diventare italiani, (a cura di), editori laterza, bari. https://www.sussex.ac.uk/webteam/gateway/file.php?name=mwp88.pdf&site=252 21review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada available online at: journals.carleton.ca/rera/index.php/rera rera is an electronic academic peer-reviewed journal. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is a joint project supported by the canada-europe transatlantic dialogue—a cross-canada research network supported by the social sciences and humanities research council of canad a (sshrc)—along with the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies (carleton university) and its associated research unit, the centre for european studies. rera aims to provide an accessible forum for research, to promote high standards of research and scholarship, and to foster communication among young scholars. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada tel: +01 613 520-2600 ext. 3117; e-mail: rera-journal@carleton.ca creative commons license creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0 this working paper is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial no derivs 3.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 3.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, provided the source is acknowledged. no use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes. issn: 1718-4835 © 2017 the author(s) https://journals.carleton.ca/rera/index.php/rera mailto:rera-journal@carleton.ca http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ references available online at: journals.carleton.ca/rera/index.php/rera contact: carleton university tel: +01 613 520-2600 ext. 3117; e-mail: rera-journal@carleton.ca creative commons license issn: 1718-4835 review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 issn 1718-4835 making and authenticating the citizen: naturalisation and passport application in canada catherine frost1 & elke winter2 mcmaster university, university of ottawa abstract how do ‘we’ know our fellow citizens? this paper considers two processes where recognition occurs in the canadian context: passports and naturalisation. using document and policy analysis we argue there are two major forms of knowledge called upon to sort insiders from outsiders. mechanical knowledge involves tests and evaluations driven by document-matching, biometrics and fact-checking exercises. moral knowledge concerns the kind of lives we live among our peers and our intentions towards the political community. we note that in the canadian case tensions exist between expectation and reality around citizen recognition. the state increasingly aspires to know the citizen through procedural checks or material observation yet encounters limitations that require some form of interpersonal knowledge rooted in human-to-human relationships. drawing on these processes, in conclusion we suggest that how knowledge about citizenship is framed serves to sort outsiders from insiders, endorses specific behaviours over others, and empowers the state to redefine the meaning of citizenship. 1 catherine frost is an associate professor of political science at mcmaster university in hamilton, canada. 2 elke winter is an associate professor of sociology at the university of ottawa. 2 review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 introduction how do ‘we’ know our fellow citizens?3 changes in citizenship law and policy increasingly favour identity management techniques such as biometrics, along with requirements for specific kinds of behaviour, personal circumstances, and public performance, to merit state recognition (muller 2004). these approaches generally rely on observations in the material world, ideally using impersonal and replicable procedures. these are in contrast with an older, more personal element of citizenship. this element has been characterized in many forms over the ages, from aristotle’s civic friendship (2000) to levinas’ openness to the face of the other (1979), but is largely distinguished by activities of interpersonal engagement that, at least for these thinkers, remain prior to the state. in an increasingly securitized world, however, the reach of state authority can make such thinking seem naïve. this paper examines this assumption, and asks whether in canada efforts to know citizens at a material, technological or procedural level have crowded out this interpersonal dimension. it argues that despite significant change, a personal and moral element remains critical to the procedures of citizenship adoption and verification. attending to these elements provides a window on how citizenship is evolving in the twenty-first century. how can such a question be approached? to put it another way, how does a theoretical lens concerned with knowing fellow citizens relate to the reality of citizenship policy administration? the paper begins with the idea that applying a label like “citizen” is never a straightforward activity, and that examining this process can shed light on the meaning behind it. if language is more than just words, but also involves actions and their context, then using a name requires more than rote behaviour (wittgenstein 2008). even in a closely administered context language users must observe and interpret the world they inhabit, and draw on complex configurations of knowledge and practice to carry out tasks. examining how these processes come together is therefore part of understanding the concept at stake. this paper examines the attribution of the name ‘citizen’ in the context of canadian policy processes. bringing theory and experience together in this manner has proven fruitful in citizenship studies, with legal theorists such as ayelet shachar (2001) and eric mitnick (2004) using casework to explore questions around law, while theorists such as michael walzer (1983), will kymlikca (1995) and joseph carens (2000) used similar methods to examine membership and identity. what carens calls ‘contextualism’ begins with careful attention to a case, and draws on the unfamiliar to heighten comparison (2004). the focus for this study is on canada, and involves two areas of law and policy that are rarely considered together – passports and naturalisation.4 3 this raises the question of who ‘we’ are. the answer is found, in part, through state practices, although it is never a complete state monopoly and should be considered conceptually unsettled throughout. for more on the use of ‘we’ in the canadian context see winter, 2011. 4 naturalisation is generally understood as the ‘non-automatic acquisition of citizenship by an individual who was not a citizen of that country when he or she was born’ (liebig and von haaren 2011, 25). it exists in addition to ius sanguinis – citizenship by birth to parents who are members of the polity at stake – and ius soli – citizenship by birth on the polity’s soil. 3 review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 canada has registered significant changes in citizenship in recent years making it possible to observe its evolution. yet observing the subtle relationship between different elements of knowledge remains a challenge. one way to go about it is by finding what satisfies a test for citizenship. the seemingly mundane experience of passport application and the exceptional situation of citizenship acquisition through naturalisation share an important quality in this regard. they both involve some test or evaluation process, one that in the normal course of affairs should not be a burden to undertake. for instance, it should not be hard to get a passport, since all a citizen needs to do is prove they are who they say they are. naturalisation, on the other hand, is an unusual way to acquire citizenship (the majority acquire it by birth5). but by the time a person arrives at the final citizenship ceremony they too should have fulfilled all other expectations of naturalisation, making the ceremony itself a kind of formality. in both cases then, the test applied is based on an assumption that the candidates already are citizens or at least citizens-in-waiting. while naturalisation is an uncommon path to citizenship, and while attention to the exception has been enlightening (agamben 1998), we set out to investigate the norms involved in contemporary citizenship, and ask how someone is marked as insider rather than outsider. these patterns prove especially critical in the case of a description like membership, because of its heavy reliance on experience. this highlights the value of examining mundane or everyday elements of both citizenship (hopkins and blackwood 2011) and nationhood (fox and miller-idriss 2008). passport applications and naturalisation processes, then, are official tests for citizenship in cases where the state generally expects to find it. what satisfies these tests can therefore tell us how knowledge around citizenship is produced in these instances. neither a citizenship card nor a passport creates citizenship; citizenship must exist in order to be issued these documents, meaning the associated processes are looking for something that, once observed or verified, leads us either to recognize a fellow citizen or to rule someone out of consideration. but these processes conceal an important question: how do we know if we got it right? to put it another way, how do you calibrate the test? what confirms citizenship, and what invalidates it? and what knowledge practices are brought to the process? since these practices are taken as especially authoritative in sorting insiders from outsiders, the indicators chosen have broad ramifications. requirements for passports and naturalisation therefore reflexively define the possibilities for future membership by specifying not only what a ‘canadian’ is but also what a canadian can be in the eyes of the state. by studying both passport issuing and naturalisation as methods ‘we’ use to ‘know’ a citizen, this paper aims to grasp their meaning beyond the political and legal level, and consider how they define and re-produce identity and the social ties between ‘us.’ although we focus on canada, this is not a claim for uniqueness. passport photography is standardized worldwide, and many states use citizenship ceremonies to mark the transition in status. european countries, in particular, have copied north american traditions of citizenship tests, oaths, and 5 estimates are that 97% of the global population acquired citizenship by place of birth (shachar and hirschl 2007, 254). 4 review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 ceremonies. these similarities suggest that exploring the canadian experience may prompt questions about how other states make and authenticate their own citizens. our findings suggest that despite efforts to secure and regulate citizenship through material or performance-based criteria, some interpersonal element remains critical to the procedures of citizenship adoption and verification in canada. a focus on citizenship that only looks at the level of rules and exceptions, or claims that citizenship can be fully secured through data-driven or administrative measures therefore risks overstating the role of procedure or the influence of state mechanisms, and understating the significance of the social dimension and the role and responsibilities of co-citizens. in many ways this is a hopeful finding, showing that some personal or moral engagement remains part of canadian citizenship policy. yet it is also a vulnerability. because personal interactions always occur in the context of a prevailing social order, they remain subject to their own frailties – from insincerity to privilege or discrimination. by drawing attention to this element we hope to temper claims around the administrative closure of citizenship, while drawing attention to the ways in which interpersonal interaction within a social order impacts on the possibilities of citizenship – for good or ill. we start with a discussion of our theoretical premises followed by a brief overview of recent changes in the canadian context. second, we consider passport applications and outline the knowledge involved. third, we examine recent changes to the canadian naturalisation regime, and identify the knowledge practices they too invoke. fourth, we suggest some implications for how citizenship is known, practiced and understood. we close with reflections on citizenship practices more generally. knowing the citizen: some theoretical considerations we begin with the premise that citizenship, like any human institution, can change, and that it is currently changing in significant ways. concerns around securitization and identity management illustrate one dimension of change. we also observe through this project an increasing focus on nation-building. however, features internal to identity as a concept, and to knowledge as a practice, also factor into the process and are part of our overall assessment. with the securitisation of migration and citizenship on the rise (nyers 2009), it is astonishing how seldom studies of citizenship and passports cross-fertilise. while the former tends to engage with the literatures on nation-building (brubaker 1992), immigrant integration (bloemraad 2006) and rights (marshall 1973), the latter is often linked to topics such as border control (torpey 2000; salter 2008) and surveillance (lyon 2009). in the context of securitisation, in which security concerns are used to legitimize a ‘politics of the exception,’ it becomes more and more important to correctly ‘identify’ individuals in order to distinguish between the ‘good’ and the ‘bad,’ namely those considered as ‘normal’ and those viewed as a ‘threat’ to the polity (nyers 2009). this has given rise to yet another type of literature, namely that on digital identification technologies (ajana 2012). 5 review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 the combination of nation-building with security and surveillance raises concerns around the future trajectory of citizenship. an emphasis on certainty, safety and political closure risks making citizenship a tool of liberal administrative states for disciplining inhabitants, reducing them to “cogs in the machinery of sovereignty” (weber 2008, 132). it also raises the significance of the label ‘citizen’ and its attribution. however applying a label is especially complex where identity is concerned, because it involves two quite distinct ideas. one concerns a relationship between two or more distinct things. this is identity as “sameness with another, in a classifying objective sense.” the other idea concerns continuity or integrity within a single entity. this second aspect is identity as “the self-same, in an individualizing, subjective sense” (caplan 2001, 51). because these two aspects of identity are so divergent their means of assessment also differ. detecting a match between distinct objects requires propositional knowledge – a truth claim that is verified by testing against facts in the world. until recently the field of epistemology centred on an informational model built largely on propositional knowledge (zagzebski 2012, 366). classifying someone’s identity in this manner therefore means checking some information set (identity document, biometrics, test results, etc.) against rules or records to verify a statement as true or false. doing so establishes sameness either between the various records, or that an individual matches others already in the category. in this work, we call this mechanical knowledge because it involves a replicable comparison using discrete data drawn from the external world. in essence, it is a task that a well-programed machine can complete, although in this case it is the work of states as “sovereign machines” (weber 2008, 132). the informational model in epistemology has been eclipsed in recent years, however, as the focus shifts to practices and qualities that better underpin the knowledge exercise. knowing someone as a unique individual is a case in point. what is unique can never be affirmed through comparison, so that knowing a person entails a different kind of knowledge, one based in understanding rather than information. yet “understanding is a property of persons” not propositions (zagzebski 2012, 364). for instance, a practice like testimony reveals a deeply social dimension to knowledge, and draws on moral practices such as sincerity, reliability and trust for its truth-value (coady 1992). when identification draws on subjective understanding, delivered in the form of testimony, oaths and witnessing, we call this moral knowledge because the process requires qualities found only in moral subjects. moral knowledge is not only at stake for identity-checks in passport application but also, as we will argue below, an important dimension of the “moral” politics of naturalisation (sayad, 1982). the moral dimension raises its own concerns, since not all lives are equal subjects of concern and understanding, and epistemic trust (i.e., who we will or will not accept as sources of testimony) can be flawed, revealing engrained forms of discrimination (fricker 2012, 348). whereas propositional or mechanical knowledge is objective but narrow, social or moral knowledge is often all too human. a number of changes to canadian citizenship law and policy that took place under the mandate of stephen harper’s conservative party (2006-2015) help to reveal how knowledge is organized in this area. driven by a combination of security and patriotism, they affected critical processes where testing for citizenship is involved. for example, changes to photo and guarantor requirements were introduced, along with a new biometric ‘epassports’ to digitize bearer information and showcase “iconic” national scenes (passport canada 2014). responsibility for passports was also moved from the department of foreign affairs, trade and development to 6 review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 citizenship and immigration canada (citizenship and immigration canada 2013), bringing naturalisation and passports together under the same department. changes were even more widespread regarding naturalisation policy. the citizenship action plan, introduced in 2009-2010, outlined a set of integrated initiatives that aimed to “enhance the value and meaning of canadian citizenship” (citizenship and immigration canada 2010a) by strengthening civic memory, civic participation and sense of belonging to canada. changes included a longer mandatory residence period, tighter language requirements, a new citizenship guide and test, anti-fraud initiatives, and a modified citizenship ceremony (winter 2015). they are discussed in greater detail below. while changes were originally administrative in nature, many became law through the strengthening canadian citizenship act, which received royal assent on june 19, 2014. this act made canadian citizenship harder to obtain and easier to lose (citizenship and immigration canada 2014). the currently governing trudeau liberals (since october 2015) are easing some of these stipulations, however not in ways that would significantly alter the argument presented here.6 while aiming to be more facilitative than punitive, their overall aim for naturalisation policy is “adjustments, not full repeal” (griffith 2016),7 and they insist that citizenship must be a “real and meaningful” commitment (mccallum 2016). recent measures also tighten passport requirements for dual citizens re-entering canada (government of canada 2016), suggesting the emphasis on national identity and security may be a sustained trend. if so, it is increasingly important to understand the knowledge behind the name ‘canadian’. passports in canada we begin the analysis with passport applications. passports have evolved into highly standardised documents (torpey 2000), and the canadian document follows the recommendations of the international civil aviation organization (icao) like many states worldwide. yet its routine quality belies a complex function; the passport both confirms and unsettles identity because we “pass through a moment of disappearance and examination when citizenship (being a friend) becomes our burden to prove” (salter 2008, 337). this experience begins with asking for the papers with which to cross a border. while canada registers births it does not maintain a civil registry system of the kind found in many european states. this means citizens must prove themselves at point of application. mobility rights are guaranteed in the canadian charter of rights and freedoms, but access to travel documents is not, and rights to re-entry are not easily exercised without a canadian passport. passports are issued at the state’s discretion (canadian passport order, s. 9, 20) and in 2014 canada began refusing and revoking a passport on a number of grounds including national security (bell 2014). 6 at the time of writing, bill c-6, an act to amend the citizenship act and
 to make consequential amendments to another act has just been passed by the senate, but has not yet received royal assent. 7 to give an example: while the conservatives increased the mandatory residence period from three out of four years to four out of six years and added the requirement of physical presence to that of legal residence, the liberals are proposing to reduce the time required to three out of five years, but to maintain the physical presence stipulation. 7 review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 since the introduction of biometric passports in 2013 the document has also featured patriotic imagery that reinforces themes of security and productivity. notably, the design includes no discernable images of living women, minorities or indigenous people. in contrast there are six images of industry, six of military/police themes, and five of political figures or buildings.8 then foreign minister john baird, maintained the new design “tells the world who we are” (“newly unveiled”). given that the document is used to define national identity, and provides revocable access to constitutional rights, the means by which it is issued becomes increasingly significant. in canada, naturalized and natural born canadians undergo the same process, and adult first-time applicants living on canadian soil 9 prove themselves through two main methods. the first concerns identity documents, official records, and biometric data, meaning the lion’s share of work in processing an application is a straightforward fact checking and information-gathering exercise. however the application requires two more elements: the cooperation of the applicant in generating new identification information, and personal testimony from individuals who vouch for the applicant as long-term associates. although easily overlooked, the application also relies upon the applicant’s own testimony in signing the application (twice). while such testimony is ultimately turned into documentation, it originates in interpersonal (and intrapersonal) understanding, meaning there are two distinct forms of knowledge at work. documented identity relying on document-checking as a way of knowing a citizen provides relatively clear-cut results. yet there are limits to knowing citizens this way. results are only as reliable as the system used to look for matches within, meaning document-checking is vulnerable to large-scale failure. since some of the most populous countries around the world lack well-institutionalised identity systems, to the extent that the passport process in canada relies on records from outside the country, it is vulnerable to uncertainty (sadiq 2010, 68). the same holds true for decisions regarding naturalisation, discussed below. problems with identity are not limited to foreign documents. take for instance the passport photograph. the photograph is one of the original biometric measures, and although some european states include fingerprinting, the digitized image is the chief measure recommended by the icao, and the primary element in what makes something a biometric passport (epstein 2007). photo requirements were updated in 2003 to meet facial recognition standards that require neutral expressions and strictly specify gaze and posture. the image’s technological application tends to overshadow the way the photograph also functions as a kind of test, establishing the willingness of the subject to self-discipline before the camera. passport photography, in other words, involves a kind of performance that signals a subject is fit for consideration. the fact that the requirement is imposed on subjects whose disability, illness or sheer infancy makes it all but 8 absent canadians are represented as stone statues for women and the disabled, and a crude stone structure for indigenous peoples. the representational imbalance was pointed out early in the design process (beeby, 2012). for more on the visual dimension of the passport see frost (2017). 9 all references to the canadian passport application are to the application process for this group. the application document is available at: http://www.passport.gc.ca/form/pdfs/pptc153.pdf (passport canada 2016a). subsequent renewals use a simplified application. 8 review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 impossible to comply, suggests that identifying canadians, in this case, is oriented not around the detection of sameness, but around its production. the requirement that the bearer should always match the resulting image is equally problematic, and there is evidence that expressionless photographs undermine recognition, making them “unsuitable as proof of identity” (jenkins, white, van monfort and burton 2011, 313-4, 318, 322). beyond day-to-day variability, accidents or illness can change appearance, even alter a signature, leaving an individual at a serious disadvantage.10 in these cases a traveller would be wise to update their passport. but they are doing so precisely because they no longer match their documents. which suggests the passport process must, at some point, be drawing upon something beyond biometric comparison as a way of knowing the applicant. for some individuals the sameness stakes are even higher. by requiring applicants to identify with one of the traditional genders, the passport system effectively says an intersex or ambiguous-gender canadian is either impossible, or impermissible. notably, australia has been issuing passports with an ‘x’ (sex unspecified) gender designation since 2011 (australia. department of foreign affairs and trade n.d.) and at least seven other countries have followed suit. 11 reports appeared in 2012 suggesting that canada was looking into a similar measure (hopper 2012). yet at the time of writing no changes have been forthcoming, and no timeline is in place for a decision on the issue (canadian press 2016a). moreover, passport canada is reportedly rejecting applications that use new ontario health cards as identification, on the grounds they do not specify a gender (canadian press 2016b). in sum, there are limitations to relying on a documentary or matching process as a way of knowing citizens. it proves strikingly unreliable in some countries, it involves an unnatural image of the citizen, is fundamentally out of step with our evolving nature, and creates hardship for individuals who do not align with official requirements. given these limitations, other methods must form part of how a citizen is identified. lives lived the passport application also calls for one guarantor and two acquaintances that have known the applicant to co-sign the form. requirements that the guarantor be from a select list of professions were dropped in 2010 in favour of a guarantor being an adult canadian passport holder. while the change was an effort to liberalize requirements, the policy maintains the total number of witnesses at three, and ensures that in the case of guarantors only officially validated canadians can provide this crucial testimony (foreign affairs, trade and development 2016). this reflects an assumption about canadians: most should be able to find a passport-holder among their long-term associates. however this may not always be the case. while the national rate of passport possession reached 70% in 2013 (the last year data was made available), the 10 consider, for instance, the canadian woman who was stranded and temporarily jailed in sudan in 2009 when officials felt she did not match her passport photo (cohen 2012). 11 the x-designation has been permitted under icao rules since its use on emergency travel documents for war refugees in the 1940s. 9 review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 indigenous territory of nunavut recorded a mere 18% while in three other provinces and another territory the possession rate is 50% or below (passport canada 2013). in the event that an individual cannot locate an eligible guarantor an applicant can complete a special statutory declaration before a figure legally authorised to witness oaths (passport canada, 2016b), substituting self-testimony for those whose acquaintances do not meet the trustworthiness standard. the intersection of guarantors, trustworthiness and documentation points to an important tension. the evolution of state identity practices was driven by a desire to “substitute” the reliability of official records for the “uncertainties of witness testimonial” (caplan 2001, 56; noiriel 2001). yet the canadian passport system does not entirely dispense with the messy work of knowing an applicant as a unique individual. while mechanical forms of knowing like document checks, biometrics, and official records provide valuable information, canada still relies on some degree of moral knowledge to recognise a citizen. a similar tension between the state’s desire to know the (would-be) citizen and its capacity to know through the methods adopted exists in naturalisation. naturalisation in canada in contrast to the rational, material selection mechanisms at stake in modern liberal immigration policy, those involved in naturalisation policy have a tendency to operate at the symbolic level of social closure. this is particularly true in a country like canada where a highly functional and rationally selective immigration system is in place. according to abdelmalek sayad, naturalisation involves a “contamination of politics by [alleged] morals” (1982, 24 our translation). he explains: one does not tolerate the foreigner who lives within the nation but does not apply for naturalisation, because one suspects a condescending attitude – it must be out of contempt for the quality of [canadian culture] that one would not want to be canadian --, but one does not tolerate either to grant naturalisation to just anyone, to just anyone who requests it […] but may not deserve it (1982, 25 our translation). the paradox described by sayad is also present in the canadian naturalisation rules: on the one hand, those entering the country as immigrants are given permanent resident status and are thus citizens in waiting.12 they are entitled to stay in the country on a permanent basis even without citizenship.13 this aligns the highly exceptional situation of applying for citizenship with the more commonplace process of applying for a passport. the recent policy changes notwithstanding, access to naturalisation in canada is fairly straightforward for the majority of applicants. to be eligible for citizenship, immigrants must have permanent resident status, must have legally resided, and been physically present in the country for three of the previous five years. they must be at least 18 years of age, display an adequate ability in english or french (new documentation/testing has been required since november 2012), and have no criminal 12 recently, canada has made changes to this tradition by dramatically increasing the number of temporary migrants admitted each year (pellerin 2011). 13 although we should not forget that they may be deported if they commit criminal offences. 10 review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 convictions in the past three years. undergoing a formal citizenship test, they must understand the rights and responsibilities of citizenship and demonstrate some knowledge of canadian history, values and institutions. they are also required to take a citizenship oath. dual citizenship is allowed, thus only immigrants from countries that do not recognise dual citizenship have to renounce home country citizenship. in principle, these criteria should easily be met by many of the citizenship candidates just as passport applications must be a reasonably accessible process or risk undermining canadians’ mobility rights. on the other hand, even out of the pool of eligible permanent residents, not just anyone can become a member by association. as implied by the quote from sayad (1982, 25) above, for the polity’s “amour-propre” to be satisfied, naturalisation must not only be asked for by outsiders, there must also be the possibility for this demand to be rejected. the outsider’s application for citizenship is a flattering homage to the polity, its people and the nation’s moral character, historical grandeur, and overall beauty. the potential for rejection underlines the exclusive and exquisite character of citizenship. through naturalisation policy, the state acts as a gatekeeper and purposely demonstrates that it watches over more than the economic affairs of the nation, which tend to dominate immigration rules. when it comes to naturalisation, the state claims to protect the national character and, in this case, the quality of canadianness. in principle, fulfilling this task requires an intimate moral knowledge of citizenship candidates’ intentions towards the political community. in stark contrast, modern liberal states are increasingly invested in knowing prospective citizens mechanically. in canada, recent legal and administrative changes concern all three consecutive steps to be taken in the naturalisation process: the citizenship application, the citizenship exam, and the citizenship ceremony. we will discuss them below. citizenship application documents citizenship candidates must demonstrate that they have legally resided in the country for the appropriate amount of years, provide proof of physical presence (since 2014), and undertake a standardised language test (since 2012)14 before they can apply for citizenship. to prove physical presence in the country, a rigorous ‘residence questionnaire’ was introduced (may 2012). the detailed four-page form must be accompanied by proof such as tax returns, pay stubs, and airline tickets to document even brief absences (citizenship and immigration canada 2012b). 15 the canadian government uses both physical residence and adequate language skills as proofs of successful integration. however, both can only serve as proxies of the latter. legal residence 14 the types of documents accepted as proof of competency include “the results of a cic-approved third-party test; or the evidence of completion of secondary or post-secondary education in english or french; or the evidence of achieving the appropriate language level in certain government-funded language training programs” (citizenship and immigration canada 2012a). previously, citizenship candidates’ language skills were verified at the moment of the citizenship exam and by means of the latter, as well as through their interaction with cic representatives. bill c6 does not foresee any changes to this. 15 under the proposed bill c-6, adult applicants continue to be required to file canadian income taxes. it is, however, unclear what has become of the arduous residence questionnaire. 11 review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 alone—and even physical presence within canada—does not imply that an individual has social contacts with others and has adopted so-called ‘canadian values.’ the same holds true for the standardised language requirements. as derwing and waugh (2012, 26) remind us, “raising language requirements at the selection stage will not in itself guarantee the integration of newcomers.” rather, “sustained opportunities for learners to interact with speakers of an official language” are necessary even for immigrants with high test scores in an official language in order to acquire the soft skills and culturally based “linguistic pragmatics” that will allow them to “fit in”. in other words, here ‘cheap’ mechanical verification measures are used as substitutes for moral knowledge of ‘real’ integration.16 citizenship exam a new citizenship study guide was first introduced in november 2009. discover canada: the rights and responsibilities of citizenship is longer than its precursor. it contains much more prescriptive and normative language, insists on the importance of respecting “canadian values” and denounces “barbaric cultural practices” such as honour killings, female genital mutilation, and forced marriage (citizenship and immigration canada 2011a). it also places greater emphasis on canadian history generally, and specifically on military history and the place of the british monarchy in canada (citizenship and immigration canada 2009). consistent with the citizenship guide’s new content, the government created a new citizenship test that came into effect on march 15, 2010 (citizenship and immigration canada 2010b). as with the previous version of the test, the new exam consisted of 20 multiple-choice questions to be answered within 30 minutes. the score required to pass, however, was raised from 60% to 75% (citizenship and immigration canada 2011d). a few months after the new test’s introduction, there was a marked increase in the failure rate from between 4% to 8% for the old test to nearly 30% for the new one (presse canadienne 2010). in response, the authorities revised the test and its degree of difficulty in order to reduce the failure rate to 20% (griffith 2013; presse canadienne 2010).17 this is one of the clearest examples that the changes in canada’s naturalisation regime take place at a symbolic rather than a factual or material level: although the government wants to raise the stakes in the naturalisation process by making the citizenship study guide longer and the exam more difficult to pass, it does not intend this mechanism to serve as a dramatic form of social closure. while canada wants to be asked to grant citizenship, it is actually interested in accepting new members. the new rules are predominantly meant to instil in newcomers a patriotic love for the monarchy and the military, knowledge about canadian history, democratic values, including gender equality. 16 the question whether or not the state should be testing new citizens’ ‘good morals’ and loyalty to canada cannot be addressed here. 17 while a major revision of discover canada has not been proposed (neither in legislation nor in the liberal platform or the minister’s mandate letter), it is expected that some nuances may change; the new liberal minister has expressed concerns regarding the degree of emphasis on the war of 1812 and references to “barbaric cultural practices.” under bill c-6, the knowledge requirement (citizenship test) must also be met in english or french, not through an interpreter. 12 review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 however, here too, mechanical knowledge (a multiple choice test) is used as a substitute for a more sincere moral understanding of the newcomers’ religious and social values, their attitude towards the monarchy and their loyalty to canada more generally. citizenship ceremony two regulations changed the tone of the citizenship ceremony between 2011 and 2015. first, there was a much stronger presence of the military. at least one past or present member of the canadian forces was to be present and to be recognized by the citizenship judge or ceremony presider during every ceremony (citizenship and immigration canada 2011e). members of the order of military merit could also preside over citizenship ceremonies, a role that was usually reserved for citizenship judges (citizenship and immigration canada 2011b). second, the citizenship certificate was only awarded to those swearing allegiance with their faces uncovered. the goal of the regulation was to allow citizenship judges to confirm that the person is actually reciting the oath, insisting on the public nature of the act and the necessity that new citizens’ allegiance to their new country be clearly visible and understandable (kenney 2011). in the federal election campaign of 2015, it became clear that the targeted individuals were muslim women wearing a face veil, the niquab or burqa. the federal court of canada has since declared that bans on face veils worn for religious reasons were contrary to canadian law. the present liberal government respects that position. the issue of who attends and leads the ceremony is like the extended citizenship study guide in that it aims at the inculcation of specific values. the second example above, concerning the face veil issue, demonstrates more sharply how something that could be quintessential moral knowledge (one testifies on one’s own behalf, knowing one’s own intentions are good) is largely just an orchestrated performance. in the case of the citizenship oath the check seemed to rely more on recorded observation than on the delivery of the oath itself. although the obligation to unveil in public when swearing the citizenship oath was eliminated from the canadian political playing field for now, the widespread obsession with veiled muslim women in western liberal societies suggests that mechanical knowledge is taken or mistaken for ‘the real thing.’ at the very least, the two kinds of knowledge blur: the state wants both some deeper but difficult to observe moral qualities and a secure way of checking that actual or potential citizens do what ‘we’ require. as such, it pretends to know that naturalising muslim women are ‘emancipated’ if they do not wear a face veil, and that they are sincere if one can see how they move their lips in pronouncing the citizenship oath. while the state does not know anything about their lives, relationships and religious beliefs, it pretends that it can verify their potential to be good citizens by the mechanical check of oath recitation. yet if taken as a purely a mechanical operation, the citizenship oath is at risk of being drained of the meaning the ceremony seeks to affirm. in sum, naturalisation involves a strange identity-check: citizenship candidates having undergone the selection process in immigration, and having spent the required legal time of residence in canada without criminal convictions, ask for full inclusion in the national community. the state having granted these individuals permanent resident status has an interest in normalising their status and in naturalising them. however, the state now asks: how do we know that these persons are/have become ‘us’ over the past couple of years? how do we know that they are the deserving citizens that they claim to be? the naturalisation process is thus an institutionalised 13 review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 rite of passage (fassin and mazouz 2009), where the state—in the name of the national community—insures both the adequacy of its past decisions (to grant immigration) and the worthiness of the citizenship applicants. knowing the citizen: a multi-faceted process while the aim of naturalisation and passport-issuing is to recognise the citizen, tensions exist between knowing citizens in concrete, externally-verifiable and mechanical ways, and knowing them in social or moral ways. indeed, the tension between these two ways of knowing the citizen may help explain peculiarities in the process. for example, the readiness to substitute selftestimony for official documents or to modify citizenship test requirements that prove difficult to meet. willingness to modify the process suggests ‘we’ are, in some way, reasonably certain that we are dealing with citizens or proto-citizens. this suggests that knowing a citizen is a multifaceted process. three dynamics deserve particular attention: how insiders are distinguis hed from outsiders, how individuals are recognised as one of ‘us,’ and how these processes redefine what the attribute ‘canadian’ means. insiders/outsiders the passport application sorts insiders from outsiders primarily by means of an officially documented biography; a life lived under the gaze of the state. individuals must be willing to cooperate with these requirements, including new measures to collect and store existing information. it also requires individuals to be literate, self-aware and good record-keepers, in a sense maintaining a weberian bureaucracy in miniature. however there is also a moral dimension to the process. a canadian is known by their stable self-image, and sustained relationships with other well-documented, trustworthy canadians. yet what about when someone’s documents and guarantors check out, but security concerns result in a denial of their passport application? in this case both mechanical and moral knowledge, in a sense, fail. insofar as the state refuses to acknowledge this citizen as its own to foreign governments, their citizenship is unlike that of ‘normal’ canadians. ultimately then, a canadian is someone the state considers safe not only based on what they know from their past, but also what they expect in their future. yet note that expectation is a hallmark of uncertainty rather than knowledge. naturalisation is the process that allows outsiders to become insiders, making it a citizenship process that applies only to outsiders. it marks a stark contrast with the experience of the vast majority of citizens who are insiders by virtue of birth location (jus soli) or through parental citizenship (jus sanguinis). in both cases, as ayelet shachar (2009) reminds us, status depends upon the accident of birth. what is remarkable here is the absence of moral knowledge involved; natural-born insiders are tested for neither their morals, nor their capacity to be ‘good canadians.’ this betrays an implicit assumption that accidental, involuntary membership is somehow reliably sincere while naturalisation is an effort to emulate or substitute for this ‘natural’ moral connection. the pursuit of moral knowledge about the new citizen, explains aspects of the naturalisation process that might otherwise seem trivial or peculiar, such as the emphasis on the 14 review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 observable delivery of the oath. one of ‘us’ the passport process assumes that canadians live a socially engaged lifestyle, likely involving employment and/or social services that produce verifiable documentation. it also requires canadians to self-neutralize for the camera, and declare a gender identity that matches their medical exam. engagements based on trust, exchange, submission and gender therefore mark a citizen as one of ‘us.’ still, the state is operating with a flawed assumption – that canadians are static in certain aspects of their identity. since this does not hold true in many cases, the process is supplemented with personal testimony (including attestation through signature). personal testimony has two important advantages. first, it grasps the coherence of a person even through profound change; second, real world co-existence is harder to fake than documents. since any use of testimony necessarily calls upon sincerity and trust, this reveals a moral element at the heart of the canadian identification system. however testimony poses its own concerns. our readiness to trust some more than others tells us a great deal, as these patterns “tend to imitate relations of social power at large in the society,” (fricker 2012, 340) and “must be regarded as seriously defective both epistemically and ethically.” (ibid, 348) if so, the passport application shows how moral knowledge, when based on “systematic testimonial injustice” (ibid, 348) becomes a form of privilege. to put it another way unless you have certain kinds of associates, including people with means and motive for international travel, your standing within the canadian community will be that much less secure. stranger still, the naturalisation process aims to cultivate some degree of insecurity surrounding the grant of citizenship. to go back to sayad’s (1982) observation, naturalisation is indeed a contamination of politics by morals. while permanent residents who have been selected through the immigration process are already factual insiders—they live in canada, work in canada, pay taxes in canada—they are not yet ‘one of us.’ in order to be elevated from denizenship to citizenship, they have to undergo a second identity-check, which imposes yet other criteria than those that they were selected upon for the purpose of immigration. while having been selected for purely utilitarian purposes (in the case of skilled workers – refugees are an exception), the state wants to be assured that applicants are not equally utilitarian about their canadian citizenship. the state does not want ‘citizens of convenience’, rather it wants newcomers who demonstrate that they have become ‘one of us’ by knowing ‘our’ history the ‘right’ way, by speaking ‘our’ language, by signing up for the army and potentially defending ‘our’ country, which by then would indeed also be theirs. the switch from pragmatic considerations to moral ones points to an important shift. we may know a good candidate for immigration by their skills or financial assets, but we know a citizen by their moral intentions. this assumes, however, that the newcomers have an exceptionally positive experience in canada over their years as permanent residents, in order to form these personal bonds and moral attachments. it also assumes that the state has developed the right tools for knowing the 15 review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 truthfulness of those who apply for membership. finally, proving an applicant has become ‘one of us’ is a difficult exercise when the benchmark is not fixed. while ‘canadian values’ are often referred to in government documents and speeches, one is hard pressed to find anything more specific than “the importance of democracy, the rule of law, and fundamental human rights” (standing committee on citizenship and immigration 2013). add to this that french-english bilingualism and multiculturalism remain official parts of canadian diversity, it is difficult for the citizen-to-be to know with which segment of ‘us’ he or she is required to morally engage. redefining canadians while the passport process is focused on existing rather than future canadians, developments in the application also reflect a view of how canadian life is evolving. for instance, canadians are increasingly conceived of as fear-driven, putting security ahead of privacy or rights equality. similarly, the new epassport design attempts to re-imagine what canadians consider ‘iconic.’ according to this logic, a canadian is someone inspired by scenes that primarily feature white men in political, industrial or military settings. in the case of naturalisation, the process also reveals more about ‘us’ as insiders than about ‘them’ as outsiders. since the moral sincerity of the citizenship candidate is difficult to discern, and since the canadian government actually wants permanent residents to become citizens, it is worth asking why the state spends huge amounts of money in administering this kind of second identity check? should permanent residency transition automatically into citizenship after a set amount of time? while this would have the virtue of efficiency it would eliminate a crucial element of the naturalisation process focused on moral identity. the diverse elements of the naturalisation process showcase how the state wants canadian society to be seen. this is specifically the case with the canadian citizenship study guide— whose content has changed dramatically, from peacekeeping to military issues, from the welfare state to one’s own responsibility for one’s economic well-being, from community involvement to western democratic values (specifically gender equality, voting and obeying the law)—but also with the citizenship oath, the revamped citizenship ceremony, and physical residence rules. in sum, through naturalisation policy, the state aims to define ‘good (moral) citizenship,’ but stages and tests it in a fairly mechanical way. in cases where the capacity of the chosen (mechanical) method is in doubt, fellow citizens – often bureaucrats as in the case of oath recitation or sworn testimony – are called upon to assist with gaining moral knowledge. but here too moral knowledge is susceptible to its own problems. take for example the introduction of a tip line that invites citizens to call in and denounce their (would-be) compatriots if they suspect citizenship fraud (citizenship and immigration canada 2011c).18 in this case, the state uses ‘ordinary canadians’ to reinforce its definition of good moral character. at the same time, it instils a particular version of ‘good’ citizenship in all of those who participate. 18 at time of writing, this tip line is still operational. 16 review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 conclusion this look at citizenship practices proved to be revealing. our investigation confirms a troubling rise in fact-checking, document-matching and standardised forms of testing and authentication. in fact, it matters little whether or not some of the conservative changes to canada’s citizenship regime are currently being undone by the trudeau liberals. under both governments naturalisation and passport applications mostly involve mechanical knowledge, which is used as an unconvincing substitute for the moral knowledge that would be necessary to confirm actual and prospective citizens’ identity and canadianness. yet mechanical knowledge has little room for the nuances and varieties of life. the state’s obsession with sorting citizens into mutually exclusive categories such as safe/unsafe, deserving/undeserving, authentic/fake or trustworthy/untrustworthy produces a system that is riddled with errors and inconsistencies. here, our discussion joins with much of the recent scholarship on securitization and the rise in biometrics (lyon 2009; ajana 2012; epstein 2007). the problem with mechanical knowledge is that it faces limitations around knowing canadians as unique individuals. given the right circumstances, it is both easily deceived and easily confused, because qualities like appearance or material circumstances change all the time. the fascination with fixed biometrics, for instance, is out of step with this reality, offering only a “crude expression of the dream of perfect information” (currah and mulqueen 2011, 567). the process becomes even more absurd when the object of examination is a carefully scripted performance, such as the enforced fealty of citizenship ceremonies or the passivity of the passport photograph. when poor results of an ‘objective’ knowledge test mean the test failed rather than the candidates, we have to ask what else is informing state decision-making? the problem, it seems, is that the state is trying to detect a moral quality such as trustworthiness or sincerity by dictating mechanical, observable actions. by insisting candidates ‘sit this way,’ or ‘speak these words’ it tries to find in canadians a quality that the state can never meaningfully detect. these inadequacies point towards the importance of understanding as a form of knowledge. while less exact it is more comprehensive, and especially well-suited to knowing others in a substantive way (zagzebski 2012). relationships of understanding become the basis for testimony in passport applications, and provide the rationale behind residency and language requirements in naturalisation. canadians also testify for themselves – in signing their passport applications, and taking oaths of citizenship. both actions receive careful scrutiny of course, but as fundamentally moral actions, there is no way for propositional knowledge or mechanical checking to ever completely confirm their reliability. which is why the canadian state turns to social behaviours and relationships that take place outside the reach of state machinery to complete the process for passports and naturalisation. admittedly canada, like other states worldwide, has made efforts to shrink the political significance of a form of knowledge it can neither participate in nor directly control. concerns around the changing nature of citizenship are therefore quite real. yet if a combination of mechanical and moral ways of knowing helps form a picture of the individual that secures their recognition in the eyes of the state, then the trajectory of citizenship can only bend so far towards closure. the continued significance of social and moral dynamics to the administration of 17 review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 citizenship, even within a state that prioritizes security, reinforces the importance of attending to these dynamics. the use of the passport and naturalisation to celebrate particular values also reveals the state’s desire to not just learn from, but also shape, the moral life of canadians, making safety and productivity central values. yet insofar as some aspect of citizenship remains vested in individuals, and insofar as the state reaches out to them in order to learn more about present and potential citizens, it will not be a simple matter to attain complete closure around these values. while still critical then, this view allows for a less pessimistic view than usually informs studies of citizenship securitisation (e.g. nyers 2009). despite being a highly standardised processes, neither naturalisation nor passport issuing are conducted in a detached, mechanical way, and our analysis shows that currently, at both ends of the citizenship process, a mix of methods are involved to ensure an individual is ‘one of us.’ nothing in this analysis should be taken as suggesting that moral and social dynamics are without their dangers, however. yet as long as they are part of the system, and are likely to remain so, it’s critical to acknowledge and examine their role. the reliance on personal and moral qualities to validate citizenship adds an amorphous element to how citizenship is enacted in canada. this element can be the source of concern if it overreaches itself and sets expectations for newcomers that native-born canadians do not face, or imposes a concept of canadian life that is difficult for some to live up to because of personal circumstances. who gets trusted can become a proxy for social privilege, and there are cases, such as the citizenship tip line, where alleged moral knowledge is abused by the state in the name of advancing freedom, equality and security. equally often however, moral knowledge gained through personal testimony destabilises the ‘mechanical’ category-fixing exercise inherent to both passport and naturalisation applications. it shows that fellow citizens often know an individual better than the state apparatus can, and may serve to humanize the citizenship process in promising ways. this is an important lesson for politicians and policy makers at times when concerns about security and expediency often stand in the way of more substantial ways of knowing. 18 review of european and russian affairs 11 (1), 2017 references agamben, giorgio.1998. homo sacer: sovereign power and bare life. daniel heller-roazen (trans.). stanford, ca: stanford university press. ajana, btihaj. 2012. “biometric citizenship,” citizenship 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and humanities research council of canada (sshrc)—along with the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies (carleton university) and its associated research unit, the centre for european studies. rera aims to provide an accessible forum for research, to promote high standards of research and scholarship, and to foster communication among young scholars. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada tel: +01 613 520-2600 ext. 3117; e-mail: rera-journal@carleton.ca creative commons license creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0 this working paper is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial no derivs 3.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 3.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, provided the source is acknowledged. no use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes. issn: 1718-4835 © 2017 the author(s) https://journals.carleton.ca/rera/index.php/rera mailto:rera-journal@carleton.ca http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ introduction knowing the citizen: some theoretical considerations we begin with the premise that citizenship, like any human institution, can change, and that it is currently changing in significant ways. concerns around securitization and identity management illustrate one dimension of change. we also observe throu... with the securitisation of migration and citizenship on the rise (nyers 2009), it is astonishing how seldom studies of citizenship and passports cross-fertilise. while the former tends to engage with the literatures on nation-building (brubaker 1992),... the combination of nation-building with security and surveillance raises concerns around the future trajectory of citizenship. an emphasis on certainty, safety and political closure risks making citizenship a tool of liberal administrative states for ... because these two aspects of identity are so divergent their means of assessment also differ. detecting a match between distinct objects requires propositional knowledge – a truth claim that is verified by testing against facts in the world. until rec... the informational model in epistemology has been eclipsed in recent years, however, as the focus shifts to practices and qualities that better underpin the knowledge exercise. knowing someone as a unique individual is a case in point. what is unique c... a number of changes to canadian citizenship law and policy that took place under the mandate of stephen harper’s conservative party (2006-2015) help to reveal how knowledge is organized in this area. driven by a combination of security and patriotism,... changes were even more widespread regarding naturalisation policy. the citizenship action plan, introduced in 2009-2010, outlined a set of integrated initiatives that aimed to “enhance the value and meaning of canadian citizenship” (citizenship and im... the currently governing trudeau liberals (since october 2015) are easing some of these stipulations, however not in ways that would significantly alter the argument presented here. while aiming to be more facilitative than punitive, their overall aim... references available online at: journals.carleton.ca/rera/index.php/rera contact: carleton university tel: +01 613 520-2600 ext. 3117; e-mail: rera-journal@carleton.ca creative commons license issn: 1718-4835 why reforms fail: the role of ideas, interests and institutions review of european and russian affairs 10 (1), 2016 issn 1718-4835 the slow road to the social investment perspective in the european union shannon dinan université de montréal abstract the european union has no unilateral legislative capacity in the area of social policy. however, the european commission does play the role of guide by providing a discursive framework and targets for its 28 member states to meet. since the late 1990’s, the eu’s ideas on social policy have moved away from the traditional social protection model towards promoting social inclusion, labour activation and investing in children. these new policies represent the social investment perspective, which advocates preparing the population for a knowledge-based economy to increase economic growth and job creation and to break the intergenerational transmission of poverty. the eu began the gradual incorporation of the social investment perspective to its social dimension with the adoption of ten-year strategies. since 2000, it has continued to set goals and benchmarks as well as offer a forum for member states to coordinate their social initiatives. drawing on a series of interviews conducted during a research experience in brussels as well as official documents, this paper is a descriptive analysis of the recent modifications to the eu’s social dimension. it focuses on the changes created by the europe 2020 strategy and the social investment package. by tracing the genesis and evolution of these initiatives, the author identifies four obstacles to social investment in the european union's social dimension. 2 review of european and russian affairs 10 (1), 2016 introduction1 the european union’s (eu) social dimension is a policy area that has been subject to numerous transformations within the more general evolution of the union. a notable transition is the growing importance conferred on the social investment perspective, as exemplified by the adoption of the social investment package (sip) in 2013. this innovative social policy approach may be contrasted with earlier approaches to social policy and represents a change from the social safety net to the springboard (saintmartin 2000). broadly speaking, the social investment perspective proposes welfare state recalibration in the form of long-term investment in human capital, especially policies investing in children (jenson and saint-martin 2003; esping-andersen 2002). the social investment perspective has been promoted to the eu as well as national governments by a variety of policy experts over the past 20 years. in spite of the fact the sip represents an important affirmation of the social investment perspective, advocates of the perspective are only cautiously optimistic towards the policy. this article presents a qualitative descriptive analysis of advocates’ and other actors’ involvement with the sip. by conducting a document analysis, the article traces how policy entrepreneurs have sought to influence the social agenda though publications and participation in institutional spaces. the article then seeks to understand how the adopted policy does not meet the expectations of policy entrepreneurs, social partners, and experts by explaining critiques of the policy. to do so, this article provides an overview of the present state of social policy in the eu, and an assessment of the incorporation of the social investment perspective within the eu. the article identifies two intertwining trends. the first trend concerns the eu’s adoption of ten-year strategies which has created a discursive framework for member states. the second is the use of new governance and soft policy initiatives for social policy. these trends created a policy environment that fostered even greater exchange and learning among diverse constellations of actors, which in turn has allowed experts to promote their ideas within eu policy circles. the article argues that although experts have been able to put the social investment perspective on the policy agenda, four obstacles—outlined below—have nonetheless hindered policy innovation. these obstacles have limited the transition toward the social investment perspective within the eu, thereby generating the reticence towards their “success” expressed by key informants during the targeted interviews conducted in summer 2013. the first two obstacles are, 1) structural tension between social and economic policy in the european union, and 2) political ambivalence toward the european social model. first, while the eu has always had a social component, member states remain sovereign and the social dimension is only one part of a much larger, economically oriented organism. social policies therefore often take a backseat to other issues. the second obstacle is a perceived lack of political will in the social dialogue. the third and fourth obstacles are, 3) expert critiques of how to best promote the social investment perspective, and 4) expert criticisms of whether of the social investment package (sip) in an appropriate a policy instrument. one set of critiques voiced by social investment advocates is linked to the content of the sip. organizations such as the european anti-poverty network (eapn) and the european trade union confederation of the sip remain critical of the lack of funding for social investment and underline the need for stronger frameworks and more policy coherence; their opposition weakened the enthusiasm for the sip among decision-makers. a 1 see appendix for a list of key abbreviations. 3 review of european and russian affairs 10 (1), 2016 broader set of critiques disagrees with the sip as a policy instrument. specifically, certain social policy experts remain unconvinced that the social investment perspective is an adequate policy framework for atrisk groups, and their perspective sometimes prevailed. investigative approach the article identifies a change in the eu’s social policy that has been shaped by the ability of stakeholders' and policy experts' to place their policy ideas and proposals on the policy agenda. accordingly, the agenda setting approach is used loosely to include attention to policy entrepreneurs in the policy making process (kingdon 1984). documentation, including eu and stakeholder reports, shows that policy entrepreneurs have acted in key moments, such as during european presidencies and through policy papers, to push their ideas. to understand how experts were able to exert their influence, the article conducts a document analysis complemented by the targeted interviews with policy experts conducted by the author in 2013. the author also gained perspective on the eu’s social policies while at the european social observatory (ose), which is known as a “reference point” for information on eu integration and the social dimension (turi, 2015). the documentation includes official eu documents, position papers, and policy reports. interviews were conducted to supplement the documentation. they highlight obstacles that have hindered the adoption of the social investment perspective in the eu. the interviewees were chosen to incorporate both public and private actors, including stakeholders of the social dimension, the authors of an influential opinion paper, and technocrats in the european commission. the structure of this paper is as follows. the first section of the paper begins by providing a brief description of the social investment perspective and its origins. the second section outlines the eu’s social dimension, and presents broad trends in social policy through the adoption of ten-year strategies. the third section presents the social investment package and its adoption, before expanding on interviews that assess and critique the policy. the fourth section discusses the four obstacles holding back a more holistic approach to the social investment perspective in the eu. finally, the paper concludes with a review of the four obstacles that have impeded the adoption of the social investment perspective in the eu. the social investment perspective members of the european union face important challenges linked to economic and societal change, including changing labour relations and demographics, inequality, poverty, immigration, and the need for reforms in education, pensions, and healthcare. significant welfare state recalibration is therefore required and numerous specialists are of the opinion that the social investment perspective is one direction of change (jenson 2010a; palier 2010, 13-17; hemerijck 2010, 304, 323). although giddens coined the term “social investment state” in 1998 to refer to the new labour party’s reconfiguration of the social citizenship mix in britain, jenson and saint-martin demonstrate that the social investment perspective is much broader and inspired by both nordic europe and the third way (2003). the social investment perspective is not yet a fixed paradigm of thought. nevertheless, the perspective 4 review of european and russian affairs 10 (1), 2016 generally considers social policy initiatives to be a “productive factor” and one of its main tenants is to prepare the population for the changing economy (morel et al. 2012, 13; cantillon 2011, 440; palier 2014). the population is to be prepared through the notion of productive social policy including investment in human capital, activation policies for job training and by promoting employment and social inclusion (jenson and saint-martin 2003). the perspective also posits that to maximize employment, priority must be given to investment over the entire life cycle. in viewing policies toward human capital as long-term investments (a productive factor contributing to instead of being a cost for economic growth), this perspective uses the welfare state and markets to move away from passive policies. furthermore, the mechanism for provision in the social investment perspective is one of new governance (saint-martin 2000; rhodes 1996). whereas the post-war welfare state delivers provisions through weberian bureaucracy,2 the social investment perspective is based on the notion of provision through partnership with non-state actors (saint-martin 2000, 50; jenson 2012, 75). the social investment perspective places particular emphasis on long-term investments in human capital, and especially policies which invest in children (jenson 2012, 68; esping-andersen 2002, 19-20). these investments are meant to promote family stability, to solidify the generational contract, and to break the intergenerational transmission of poverty (esping-andersen 2002, 20-23; jenson 2010a, 64). for example, policies that promote employment for lone mothers encourage social inclusion. these investments are meant to repair deficiencies in the system caused by the changing family unit and ineffective markets. reducing the risks created by family and market deficiencies prepares the population—by providing children with stability and education—to contribute to society in the future (daly 2012, 282). consequently, the perspective introduces a dual role for the welfare state of preparing the population while also repairing structural deficiencies. through the prioritization of social investment strategies, the social investment perspective first prepares citizens to face the modern economy, which also introduces demands for civic responsibility3. then, it repairs the structural problems linked to the welfare, which protects the population from recurring social injustices (morel et al. 2012, 19; palier 2010, 377, 383). experts have diverging opinions of the level of influence the social investment perspective has in the eu. regardless, there is a general consensus that the perspective affects european social policy initiatives through the social dimension (hemerijck 2012; hemerijck et al. 2010b; jenson 2010b; kvist 2013). the gradual incorporation of the social investment perspective into the european union’s social dimension began in 1997 with the european employment strategy (hemerijck 2012, 47; hemerijck et al. 2010b, 303). since then, the eu has reaffirmed its commitment to the perspective through various policies including the lisbon strategy, the europe 2020 strategy and the sip (hemerijck 2012; jenson 2010b; kvist 2013). to understand this process, the following section explains the eu’s social dimension. 2 weberian bureaucracy refers to max weber’s rational legal ideal-type of bureaucracy. weber explains one means of legitimate state domination is through legislation. to ensure laws are implemented equally and impartially, career civil service systems are rigid hierarchies that hire civil servants based on merit as confirmed by either systematic examination or education. see, weber, max. 1971 [1922]. économie et société. tome 1. librarie pion. 320-331. 3 this perspective changes the role of the state as well as citizen’s duties and responsibilities. as jenson explains, according to the prevailing logic of the social investment perspective, “[...] young people and adults have a duty as citizens to invest in their human capital by seeking education and training” (2012, 73). 5 review of european and russian affairs 10 (1), 2016 the european union’s social dimension the eu’s social policy initiatives, commonly known as the eu’s social dimension, are intimately linked to its competences without qualifying as one itself. the eu can indirectly legislate social policy through affiliated competences, such as social protection, inclusion and cohesion. article 9 of the treaty on the functioning of the european union (tfeu) introduces a “horizontal clause” which acts as a guarantee to promote full employment, social protection, training and education, health and safety and to limit social exclusion (marlier et al. 2010). consequently, the eu has certain legislative abilities with regards to social policy. however, the coordination of social policy remains the sovereign right of member states. there has been a progressive use of innovative forms of governance for social policy (verdun and tömmel 2009). by way of example, the use of cooperative modes of governance can be observed in the adoption of ten-year strategies including the lisbon strategy, which sought to govern the eu’s “social model” through a social open method of coordination (omc), and the europe 2020 strategy. the lisbon strategy and open method of coordination the eu has adopted two consecutive ten-year strategies: the lisbon strategy in 2000 followed by the europe 2020 strategy in 2010. these strategies set an agenda and priorities for the decade to come. the lisbon strategy prioritized making the union “the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion” (armstrong 2010, 54). the strategy also set the tone for the social dimension by placing economic, employment, and social policies on a common level and highlighting the need to go beyond negative integration (barcevičius et al. 2014, 19). finally, one of the particularly notable innovations of the lisbon strategy was the open method of coordination. supposedly modeled on the european employment strategy (ees), the omc is considered a soft law that promotes voluntary member state coordination through mutual learning, defining common objectives, creating indicators, benchmarking, and monitoring between participating member states (armstrong 2010; barcevičius et al. 2014, 19-20; europa 2014). specifically, the omc was meant to be a cooperative mode of governance, based on voluntarism that allows for mutual learning (tömmel 2009, 18). known as an experimental or innovative form of governance, the omc can be contrasted with more traditional modes of governance, such as hierarchical governance, which implies a “command-compliance model” (rhodes 1996; sabel and zeitlin 2008; tömmel 2009, 29). initially, the social omc was built as three separate strands – pensions, social inclusion, and health and long-term care – for which member states provided yearly reports to promote mutual surveillance (marlier et al. 2010, 115, 225; barcevičius et al. 2014). when the lisbon strategy was restructured in 2006, these strands were streamlined and united into a single portfolio (barcevičius et al. 2014, 26). despite this, european experts have classified the social omc as both a promising form of new governance and a disappointing failure (zeitlin 2010; zeitlin et al. 2014; de la porte and pochet 2012). the europe 2020 strategy and the european semester while the lisbon strategy is known best for its governance innovations, the eu’s second ten-year strategy (europe 2020), is noticeable for its change in content, including the move towards the social investment package. europe 2020 states the general goal of strengthening growth in the eu through three “mutually reinforcing priorities”: smart, sustainable and inclusive growth (european union 2013a). the 6 review of european and russian affairs 10 (1), 2016 strategy is structured around three pillars: macroeconomic surveillance, fiscal surveillance, and thematic coordination (european union 2013a). europe 2020 also includes a number of social objectives. for instance, one can find various social objectives in europe 2020’s five targets, which pertain to employment, research and development, climate change and energy sustainability, education, the fight against poverty and the promotion of social inclusion. the strategy’s seven flagship initiatives also include social initiatives such as youth on the move, an agenda for new skills and jobs and a platform against poverty (european union, 2013a). to achieve its goals, the europe 2020 strategy revises the eu’s system of governance by implementing a new structure for the supervision and consolidation of member states, the european semester.4 in this context of soft governance, the sip was adopted. the following section explains the role expertise played in the adoption of the sip as well as its key characteristics. the social investment package (sip) expertise plays an important role in eu decision-making and experts were an important part of the elaboration of the social investment package (sip) as they consistently placed the issue of social investment on the policy agenda (hartlapp et al. 2014). in this section, documentation and interviews are used to highlight how experts promoted their policy ideas on the social investment perspective. thus we might look for the new ideas about social investment and advocacy of it by examining experts’ publications, their participation in institutional spaces (such as european presidencies) and their involvement with advocacy groups. following the portuguese presidency in 2000, which led to the lisbon strategy, the 2001 belgian presidency also furthered the eu’s social dimension by commissioning a study elaborating a “new welfare architecture for 21st century europe” (esping-andersen et al. 2001). frank vandenbroucke, representative to the belgian presidency and former member of the belgian parliament5 (socialistische partij anders, belgium), explains the study eventually led to the publication of the book, why we need a new welfare state in 2002.6 the central theme of the book, written by gøsta esping-andersen and colleagues7 is to move away from traditional welfare state provision towards more active policies targeted towards investing in the capacities of workers and children (hemerijck 2012, 47). despite the existence of three welfare regimes within the eu, the authors explain that member states can coordinate around common objectives, such as family and children, gender equality, and work life and retirement, through the social omc— without creating a universal european model (esping-andersen 2002, 19). while the study, especially its 4 for a detailed explanation of the european semester, see marlier et al. 2010 and vanhercke 2013. 5 frank vandenbroucke has held various ministerial positions within the belgian government, including deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs (1994–1995), minister of social affairs and pensions (1999–2003), and minister for employment and pensions (2003–2004). 6 interview frank vandenbroucke (representative to the belgian presidency of the eu (2001), and former minister of social insurance and health care), in conversation with author, brussels, belgium, july 17, 2013. 7 “a new welfare architecture for europe” by gøsta esping-andersen, duncan gallie, anton hemerijck and john myles. 7 review of european and russian affairs 10 (1), 2016 notions of redirecting investment to children, did not initially meet wide consensus, investment in children and human capital have been part of the eu’s general strategy since 2005 (jenson 2010b, 12, 26). ideas underscoring the need to include the social investment perspective in the eu were once more put forth with an opinion paper in 2011. bruno palier, professor at l’institut d’études politiques in paris, explains how he became a part of that opinion paper.8 palier had previously worked on understanding and appraising how european nations had used social investment as a strategy in the past with nathalie morel and joakim palme (morel et al. 2009). this work had the goal of improving the coherence of the perspective and providing a framework for welfare state reform (ibid., 9). the conclusions from that project eventually led palier to work with vandenbroucke and hemerijck to publish, “the eu needs a social investment pact” in 2011 (vandenbroucke et al.). in this paper, the authors highlight issue areas for the eu’s social dimension; many of these concerns would later be found in the european parliament’s resolution for the social investment pact. the policy paper voices concern toward the place (or lack thereof) of social policy in the new macroeconomic and fiscal surveillance provisions adopted by the eu to handle difficulties related to the global recession and the sovereign debt crisis. one of the key points of the paper is that, “consistent delivery of the social investment objectives requires that they be embedded in the macroeconomic and budgetary surveillance of the eu” (ibid., 15). accordingly, the authors also emphasize the importance of “supply side instruments” to meet new social risks including, childcare, reconciling work and family life, the integration of migrants and minimum income support (ibid., 9). the authors also explain the need to go beyond soft governance to ensure that “short term macroeconomic governance serves long-term social investment” (ibid., 18). in their view, a policy of a social investment pact is a possible solution that would encourage reciprocity between member states (ibid., 20). on november 20, 2012, the european parliament adopted a resolution highlighting the need for a social pact enabling employment activation and investing in youth (european union 2012b). this resolution specifically calls for a pact for “better governance”, “reinforced control”, and “a regular surveillance framework” (european union 2012b). three months after the parliamentary resolution, the european commission—who had also been working on a social investment initiative—adopted the social investment package (sip) (european commission 2013d). the sip, accompanied by the recommendation “investing in children” and a series of working documents, is a reaction to the eu’s long-term structural problems (european union 2013d, 3-8). it emphasizes the effects of demographic change and inequality in society, and the need for inclusive growth in the job market (ibid., 8). the sip therefore aims to enhance coordination and political efficiency with regards to: activation policies, workforce training, preschool services, education, housing, rehabilitation services, and healthcare (european union 2013d, 9). approved by both the commission and parliament in may of 2013, the package does not reflect all the demands made by the eu parliament and experts. the sip is neither integrated in the european semester through the annual growth survey (ags) or the national reform programs, nor does it stipulate precise targets or a timetable. this means the sip does not have the legal force to impose sanctions to noncooperative member states (kvist 2013, 92). this is a key difference. the governance structure advocated 8 interview bruno palier (professor at l’institut d’études politiques in paris), in telephone conversation with author, paris, france, august 28, 2013. 8 review of european and russian affairs 10 (1), 2016 by experts and the eu parliament has been changed from the proposed pact to a package. whereas a pact is a solemn agreement or treaty and would indicate reciprocity between member states, a package is a combination of propositions oriented around a general theme. the social packages adopted by the eu therefore do not have the same constraining force as pacts do. a similar phenomenon in eu terminology is the creation of platforms, a term that carries an experimental connotation and is used to indicate initiatives based on a central theme (daly 2012, 276). the european union’s apparent preference is to adopt soft packages and platforms for social initiatives as opposed to pacts, which are more commonly adopted for economic and financial measures. finally, the sip does not have a detailed budget for the rest of the europe 2020 period, from 2014-2020 (european union 2013b). for these reasons, the commission will need to create a long-term agenda for investment if it wants the sip to be an effective framework for the social dimension (ose podcast 2013). the sip does address pressing new social risks, including demographic changes, the end of the male breadwinner model, and early childhood investment. for instance, the recommendation “investing in children” links the reduction of poverty and social exclusion to childhood stability (the work-family balance), and access to education and healthcare (european union 2013e). nonetheless, the sip is also inconsistent with elements of the social investment perspective because it is not a holistic policy with precise targets. this can also be explained by the fact social investment has been grafted or added in “layers” and “conversions” to welfare states instead of being implemented as a new cohesive model (jenson 2012, 62; palier 2010, 366-369). european states therefore only gradually adapt their social systems in phases over the years. this may create similar changes to common structural problems, while maintaining nonnegligible differences between states as a whole. the adoption of activation policies offers a good illustration of this phenomenon. nordic countries use flexicurity to encourage activation, whereas liberal regimes encourage activation using workfare-type measures (palier 2014). in this case, faced with a common problem both states adopted policies based in the social investment perspective. however, each specific policy may have differing effects on their welfare models and may give way to different ideas for change. the eu’s social initiatives that use cooperative governance, including the sip, have precisely the same effect of consolidating best practices without providing a clear framework to attain common objectives. this flexibility is both a blessing and a curse for the sip. the package gives overall common objectives to social problems that clearly align with the social investment perspective, which allows for member states to invest to different degrees and not be overly constrained by the union. however, this course of action is also detrimental in that it approach creates social investment rhetoric, without creating any equalization between the member states (kvist 2013, 98). this critique has recently been confirmed by a policy report that identifies three clusters of countries according to the degree the sip has been implemented (bouget et al. 2015). the authors demonstrate that only 13 of the 28 member states can be qualified as “maintaining an (often historically) well-established social investment approach” (ibid., 8). furthermore, even between these “social investment” countries, strategies vary widely. this brings us to an uncomfortable truth with the social investment perspective: in the context of austerity, social reforms promoted in the european semester can actually take the form of indiscriminate cuts in social budgets. in this context, certain experts 9 review of european and russian affairs 10 (1), 2016 go as far as to demand radical reforms to force a paradigm change or at least promote a more holistic approach (lundvall et al. 2010, 348).9 many policy experts and social partners have weighed in on the issue of whether the policies adopted have successfully promoted employment and inclusion among the most at-risk sections of the population. the next section is an analysis of expert opinions on the sip followed by more general critiques of the social investment perspective. expert hesitation toward the sip reactions to the social investment package (sip) have been mixed, while advocates of the social investment perspective remain cautiously optimistic towards the package. the following section presents a collection of expert opinions. the european anti-poverty network (eapn), and the european trade union confederation (etuc) both provide the most global analyses of the sip. the eapn’s and the etuc’s positions overlap, but they also reflect two types of arguments that are echoed by experts. the first set of arguments, which the eapn supports, is critical of social investment without social protection and the sip’s content (or lack thereof). arguments of this nature note that social investment policies neither sufficiently redistribute nor protect citizens against exclusion and poverty. the second set of arguments, supported by the etuc among others, adheres to the concept of social investment, but critiques structural tensions apparent in the eu, and the lack of budgetary and symbolic commitment. the eapn criticizes the sip for many reasons, the most apparent of which is the flagrant contradiction between policies of economic austerity and employment activation and investment (eapn 2013, 6, 11). the welfare state is being tested during a time of austerity, which means states are asked to reduce their social budgets without being able to adopt new initiatives to replace them. this leads to irreconcilable differences between neoliberal policies for macroeconomic stability and the need for social investment in a time of crisis (hemerijck 2012, 54). the eapn also criticizes the lack of social protection in the sip, an essential compliment to investment (eapn 2013, 6). without strict guidelines to protect the population, the types of modernization policies included in the sip can actually reduce social spending while still being categorized as social investment. moreover, the sip is primarily made of working documents (which have a low legal standing), thus giving the impression that the sip is not a european priority (ibid., 6). the eapn explains the need for the sip to be integrated into european semester and to find new balance between social and economic policies (ibid.). the need for balance between policy branches is an opinion shared by the etuc, the european parliament and experts alike (etuc 2013; natali et al. 2013, 256; vandenbroucke et al. 2011, 14,18; zeitlin 2010, 262; ose podcast 2013). while the etuc is in agreement with concept of social investment, it condemns the sip's lack of sufficient budgetary resources and demands “real” investment (2013). the etuc furthermore requests that the european commission go beyond recommendations and integrate more balance between social, macroeconomic and financial governance (2013). while maintaining member states retain sovereignty over social policy, the etuc underscores the need for quality employment, as well as impact assessments and integrated strategies when promoting social investment (2013). 9 interview with cécile barbier (senior researcher at the european social observatory), in conversation with author, brussels, belgium, august 29, 2013. 10 review of european and russian affairs 10 (1), 2016 turning to individual expert reviews of the sip, lieve fransen, former director for social policy for the european commission’s directorate general for employment, social affairs and inclusion (dg empl), states she is satisfied with the package because she believes balance can be struck if modifications are made. fransen defends her opinion by arguing the sip addresses pressing needs, such as demographic change, unemployment and poverty (ose podcast 2013).10 as a key player in the implementation of this policy initiative, fransen was working with lászló andor,11 on linking the sip’s objectives to the europe 2020 strategy and the annual growth survey (ags), at the time of the interview.12 in so doing, she believed the sip’s recommendations would be incorporated into the eu’s current governance mechanisms and easily integrated to the european semester.13 fransen’s strategy for improving the sip can be likened to jonathan zeitlin’s idea of reinforcing the social dimension by tying european social objectives to the europe 2020 strategy and using indicators of reference to compare progress between member states (2010, 269). despite having a clear strategy, the task of rebalancing social investment is complex for many reasons, including the role of political power games between member states, sharp economic, social and regional divisions, the immense power given to ministers of finance and economic councils, and the need for reliable indicators to defend ideas of social investment.14 15 as fransen explains, the european commission can act as a facilitator for the adoption of policies by member states, however without partnerships and a means of influence over the member states it is an uphill battle (ose podcast 2013). she believes that even if political consensus existed, achieving the sip’s objectives is highly problematic without having reliable indicators.16 frank vandenbroucke, representative to the belgian presidency of the eu in 2001, is of the same mind and defends this perspective by drawing on his knowledge of european politics and institutional hurdles. he explains that multidimensional indicators capable of demonstrating the diverging welfare models and needs among member states are essential to creating effective social investment. 17 similarly to the eapn, vandenbroucke believes social investment and protection must be used together to promote the eu’s social dimension. however, he opines that even if the sip can only be considered a soft policy and does not represent the pact declared necessary in his opinion paper, it is a good first step because it launches a nuanced debate on the need for balance between economic and social policy within the eu.18 a final expert opinion comes from bruno palier, professor at l’institut d’études politiques in paris. using an incremental approach, palier supports the sip. in his opinion, durable political change comes in the form 10 interview with lieve fransen (former director for social policy for the european commission’s directorate general for employment, social affairs and inclusion (dg empl)), in conversation with author, brussels, belgium, july 22, 2013. 11 lászló andor is the former commissioner for employment, social affairs and inclusion from 2010 to 2014. 12 fransen, in conversation with author, july 22, 2013. 13 ibid. 14 adopting an organization composition as described by hartlapp et al. 2014., the european commission is no longer a unitary actor, but each dg can adopt either a technocratic, competence-seeking or policy-seeking approach. 15 fransen, in conversation with author, july 22nd 2013. 16 ibid. 17 vandenbroucke, in conversation with author, brussels, belgium, july 17, 2013. 18 ibid. 11 review of european and russian affairs 10 (1), 2016 of incremental steps rather than revolutionary change.19 following this logic, the sip must be improved upon to reconcile certain economic and social aspects, such as the contradiction between economic austerity and social investment (ose podcast 2013). palier cites the eu’s multiple investment programs in youth while at the same time encouraging the younger generation to accept low quality jobs as one major inconsistency in the current social investment scheme (ose podcast 2013). he also believes that there would be a better implementation of the sip if the eu’s social and economic committees’ worked together and shared competences (ose podcast 2013). finally, the lack of constraining force and precise budget allocations are severe problems for the sip. as it is not a pact, this initiative reinforces the current imbalance between economic and social policy as well as making the eu’s social dimension more complex and possibly inefficient (ose podcast 2013). the lack of budgetary planning for the sip also gives the impression that it is not a serious policy (ose podcast 2013). these critiques appropriately complement those made by the eapn and lieve fransen. in spite of the preceding critiques, not all aspects of the sip are negative. the recommendation “investing in children” receives favourable reviews from both fransen and vandenbroucke as being particularly well written.20 21 this is especially pertinent to the social investment perspective as the recommendation grounds itself in the ideas generated during the eu’s portuguese presidency in 2000 (jenson 2010b, 25). moreover, the theme of investing in and protecting children opens the door to further initiatives like minimum income, gender equity and pension reform (ibid., 24-25; esping-andersen 2002, 6-10). adding these provisions in the european dialogue by way of a recommendation supports palier’s idea that changing the eu’s social dimension is indeed an incremental process. obstacles to cohesive social investment as the previous section demonstrates, the eu has incorporated the social investment perspective into its social dimension. however, the transition remains difficult. four main obstacles can explain this: 1) the inherent structural tension between social and economic policy in the european union; 2) political ambivalence toward the european social model; 3) conflicting opinions between experts promoting the social investment perspective; and 4) experts who disagree that social investment instruments are appropriate tools to address social risks. as mentioned throughout this paper, the first obstacle to the sip is that the eu’s social policy is not a unilateral competence and social measures often confront tension with economic priorities. limited by its supranational composition, the union cannot unilaterally apply a strict welfare state model to the member states, as that would infringe on the basic right of national sovereignty (de la porte 2012, 125). furthermore, imposing a single model would be highly unfeasible due to varying national welfare regime characteristics. the eu is continually confronted by the intrinsic tension between legal, technical and political elements that has led to the social dimension having to struggle to strike a balance in a changing economic and societal landscape. according to ross, the “lack of community-level social policy prerogatives” and conflicting member state positions on what role the eu should play on social policy are major structural 19 palier, in telephone conversation with author, paris, france, august 28th 2013. 20 fransen, in conversation with author, july 22nd 2013. 21 vandenbroucke, in conversation with author, july 17, 2013. 12 review of european and russian affairs 10 (1), 2016 obstacles (2011, 44). all eu social policy initiatives will continue to be confronted by such issues until more clarity is achieved on the balance between the eu and member states on the social dimension. whether or not social policy experts are satisfied with the eu’s social dimension, many cite political ambivalence as another obstacle for the european social model and the incorporation of the social investment perspective (natali et al. 2013).22 23 this problem is exacerbated by the reoccurring theme of adopting soft measures. in this case, the adoption of a package and not a pact. while economic policies often have constraining force, social policies are not implemented in the same manner. this is often interpreted as a reticence or non-endorsement of the policies. at the root of this problem lies political acrimony. one interviewee, a member of the directorate general for employment, social affairs and inclusion (dg empl), attributes former european commission president josé manuel barroso’s “hot and cold” behaviour toward the social dimension as a limit to social initiatives and the cause of confusion between civil servants. 24 another member of dg empl indicates the commission’s—president barosso’s belligerent stance toward the european council and its former president herman van rompuy (2009 to 2014)—as another grave problem.25 this is not the first time president barosso has been perceived as holding europe’s social dimension back. in fact, he was one of the leading figures in the reorientation of the lisbon strategy in 2005 toward job creation and economic growth and away from other social aspects (lundvall et al. 2010, 337). the same civil servant explained that these conflicts reduce the flexibly for the various work committees, and render many results arbitrary to the commission’s will.26 this last point is crucial, not only to any advance in social policy, but the functioning of measures already in place. admittedly, political opposition reduces the ability of committee’s to to act in the domains they were precisely created to work within. to illustrate, the social protection committee (spc) is meant to “monitor social conditions” and “promote the discussion and coordination of policy approaches”, however it has no legal mandate to advise on pensions or social inclusion because it was not included in the europe 2020 strategy or the annual growth survey (european union 2013h).27 according to some, this mistake was intentional. evidence of a policy seeking rational and power games exist not only between the economic and social dimensions, but also among the various employment and social committees (such as emco and spc) (vanhercke 2013; hartlapp et al. 2014).28 increasing coordination among these committees would therefore be a first important improvement to make to any social policy reform. another criticism linked to political ambivalence is the european commission’s lack of transparency. 22 ibid. 23 interview with a member of personnel at the directorate general for employment, social affairs and inclusion, in conversation with author, brussels, belgium, july 27th, 2013. 24 interview with a member of personnel at the directorate general for employment, social affairs and inclusion, in conversation with author, brussels, belgium, may 24th, 2013. 25 member of personnel at the directorate general for employment, social affairs and inclusion, in conversation with author, brussels, belgium, july 27th, 2013. 26 ibid. 27 ibid. 28 ibid. 13 review of european and russian affairs 10 (1), 2016 according to all many interviewees, few documents from the various committees are made public and there is sometimes a plain refusal to give access to documents. this frequently makes analyses of the eu’s social dimension impossible. the european commission’s attitude towards this issue gives the impression that it deliberately refuses to inform the public. this last element highlights the need for dialogue to legitimize the population’s social policy needs. public debate and transparency are key to lending weight to expert opinions. the previous section highlighted the diverging opinions social investment advocates have on the sip and its contents. however, the social investment perspective is only one option for social policy recalibration and certain policy experts disagree that social investment perspective is the right course of action. to that effect, they find many caveats within the perspective. these critiques take issue with the social investment perspective’s emphasis on linking welfare to the economy, which may conceal neoliberal policies and does not adequately protect at-risk segments of the population. experts also criticize the perspective’s emphasis on the long-term. according to certain social policy experts, in the need to restructure european welfare states, the social investment perspective is used to mask neoliberal ideas.29 barbier, senior researcher at the european social observatory, observes that european social policies require in-depth reforms, however no political will to institute such reforms exists.30 unsatisfied by incremental reform, which she believes leads to fragmented policy initiatives with little or no impact, barbier points out the union’s structural problems. the eu’s founding policy architecture is economically oriented, meaning economic priorities are consistently placed above other considerations. as a consequence, the union remains ill equipped to enforce social policies. researchers have also criticized the eu’s policies of social investment for not helping the most at-risk segments of the population. béa cantillon, policy advisor to the organization of economic coordination and development (oecd) and the european commission, argues that there was no poverty reduction under the lisbon strategy and explains that asymmetries in the distribution of employment policies benefit classes disproportionately (2012, 445). during the lisbon strategy, the eu changed its passive transfer-oriented policies and services to focus on policies of activation and employment (ibid, 445). low-income families cannot take full advantage of activation policies, which tend to benefit households with two working adults, because their situation requires policies of redistribution and social protection (2012, 445; cantillon and van lancker 2013, 560). the change from passive transfers to activation presents further problems for atrisk groups because not all citizens can be a productive factor. social inclusion via employment therefore has limited results for all those unable to work (cantillon and van lancker 2013, 556). furthermore, certain iterations of the social investment perspective emphasize quantity over quality of jobs (palier 2014, 32; bonoli 2012). what is more, social investment policies emphasize the long term and can neglect pressing issues. an example is the social investment perspective’s lack of focus on gender equality. jane jenson explains that the social investment perspective emphasizes childcare and women’s productive role rather than addressing present gender inequality problems (2008, 147). the social investment perspective therefore does not necessarily provide adequate protection for all at-risk groups. this highlights the importance of the duality 29 barbier, in conversation with author, brussels, belgium, august 29, 2013. 30 ibid. 14 review of european and russian affairs 10 (1), 2016 in the social investment perspective – investment and protection. unfortunately, as social investment policies are grafted to existing social models they are rarely thoroughgoing. as a case in point, the social investment package (sip) does not to address the issue of social protection. these assessments echo many of the european anti-poverty network’s (eapn) opinions of the sip. according to specialists, the lack of coherence between policies is an inherent weakness of the social dimension (liddle et al. 2010. 86-88). for experts who remain sceptical of the sip, the absence of any real legislative power and detailed budgets serves to confirm the fragility of this policy measure. it is important to note that these arguments are not new, european social initiatives are rarely binding and often reallocate funding instead of there being a general increase in social spending. finally, the current state of economic instability must also be taken into account in this policy debate. according to some authors, the sovereign debt crisis represents a series of interrelated crises pertaining to unemployment, inequality, the north-south divide, and a political crisis of confidence (diamond et al. 2012, 287-288; natali et al. 2013, 105). consequently, economic instability has not changed the eu’s long-term social problems so much as the order in which each dilemma is addressed (diamond et al. 2012, 303). the eu must therefore choose which social services are essential during a crisis and which ones may be forgone. following this logic, the eu is reacting in a way that indicates formalizing the social dimension is important but not a priority at this time. policy experts warn against this. kvist, for example, cautions that these crises will have varying effects on the eu’s population (2013, 105). in the long-term, the absence of quality services will be a weight upon today’s youth and create important generational differences (kvist 2013, 105). experts agree that social investment must not be used to correct the perceived negative effects of policies (as is now happening) but rather to correct market failures and to avoid greater future calamity (diamond et al. 2012, 289). these debates highlight the need for the eu to take comprehensive social policy seriously. a classic disparity therefore presents itself between experts: defenders of left-wing policies cannot adhere to a half-hearted social dimension imbedded in neoliberal ideals, whereas, those who defend the social investment perspective in the eu expect change to come “more incrementally than through a social policy revolution” (palier 2010, 386). for these reasons, one cannot stress enough the importance of continued debate enough within eu institutions and between experts. conclusion the social investment perspective is perhaps a well-constructed model for the many challenges the european union and its member states face. however, 1) the eu's inherent structural tensions between social and economic policy; 2) perceived political ambivalence toward the european social model; 3) conflicting expert opinions regarding the social investment perspective; and 4) disagreement about whether social investment instruments are appropriate tools to address social risks, have plagued the social investment package. collectively, these obstacles make it difficult to transfer coherent theoretical conceptions to such a highly politicized world. economic crises also limit the eu’s ability to react to a wide array of initiatives, thus reducing the likelihood of implementing effective social investment policies in the short-term. 15 review of european and russian affairs 10 (1), 2016 european integration was first meant to be economic before eventually adding the political and social dimensions. accordingly, the eu has been based on neoliberal economic concepts since its creation and often highlights negative integration. confronted by this, the promotion of constraining social initiatives can easily be blocked and policies robbed of their beneficial effects during the negotiation process. the union has continued this trend during the economic crises by adopting coercive macroeconomic and financial measures while maintaining soft social policies. the subsequent political games generate further complexities and create irregularities between policy initiatives. it may be said that the social policies adopted depend of the political will of the day, which leads to a great measure of instability and incoherence among strategies. for these reasons, despite the clear presence of the social investment perspective in the eu’s rhetoric, experience shows this perspective is having difficulty in becoming part of the european ideology. nevertheless, efforts by partisans of the social investment perspective are not entirely in vain. authors have demonstrated that, despite difficulties, the eu is progressively adopting measures that follow this perspective (kvist 2013, 92; palier 2010, 386). from this viewpoint, the social investment package (sip) represents the most recent—if timid—of a long line of policy initiatives, starting in the 1990s and taking the form of investment in human capital during the life cycle from 2005 onwards (jenson 2008, 133-135). the europe 2020 strategy and the sip are neither the beginning nor the end of social investment in the eu, but two examples of a much more general trend. the constellation of research centers and think tanks that operate in the eu are a key tool to advancing the social dimension, and central to promoting the rights of disadvantaged groups. references armstrong, kenneth, a. 2010. governing social inclusion: europeanization through policy coordination. oxford: oxford university press. barbier, cécile. 2012. “ordolibéralisme et économie sociale de marché : la voie allemande de l’europe?”. european social observatory. opinion paper no. 10. online. http://www.ose.be/files/publication/osepaperseries/barbier_2012_opinionpaper10_o rdoliberalisme_0712.pdf (page consulted july 5th 2013). barcevičius, egidijus, j. timo weishaupt and jonathan zeitlin (eds). 2014. assessing the open method of coordination, institutional design and national influence of eu social policy coordination. united kingdom: palgrave macmillan. bonoli, giuliano. 2006. “new social risks and the politics of post-industrial social policies”. in armingeon, klaus and giuliano bonoli, (eds.), adapting post-war social policies to new social risks. new york: routledge, 3-26. _____. 2012. “active labour market policy and social investment: a changing relationship” in morel, nathalie, bruno palier and joakim palme, (eds.), 2012. towards a social investment welfare state? ideas, policies and challenges. bristol: the policy press: 153-180. http://www.ose.be/files/publication/osepaperseries/barbier_2012_opinionpaper10_ordoliberalisme_0712.pdf http://www.ose.be/files/publication/osepaperseries/barbier_2012_opinionpaper10_ordoliberalisme_0712.pdf 16 review of european and russian affairs 10 (1), 2016 bouget, denis, hugh 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social europe 2020”. in marlier, eric, david natali and rudi van dam, (eds.), europe 2020 towards a more social eu?, brussels: p.i.e. peter lang, 253-273. zeitlin, jonathan, barcevičius, egidijus, j. timo weishaupt. 2014. “institutional design and national influence of eu social policy coordination: advancing a contradictory debate.” in barcevičius, egidijus, j. timo weishaupt and jonathan zeitlin (eds), assessing the open method of coordination, institutional design and national influence of eu social policy coordination. united kingdom: palgrave macmillan. appendix list of abbreviations abbreviation institution ags annual growth survey csr country specific recommendation dg ecfin directorate general for economic and financial affairs dg empl directorate general for employment, social affairs and inclusion emco employment committee epc economic policy council epsco employment, social policy, health and consumer affairs council nrp national reform programs omc open method of coordination spc social protection committee 22 review of european and russian affairs 10 (1), 2016 published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada available online at: journals.carleton.ca/rera/index.php/rera rera is an electronic academic peer-reviewed journal. topics relate to the european union, it’s member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is a joint project supported by the canada-europe transatlantic dialogue—a cross-canada research network supported by the social sciences and humanities research council of canada (sshrc)—along with the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies (carleton university) and its associated research unit, the centre for european studies. rera aims to provide an accessible forum for research, to promote high standards of research and scholarship, and to foster communication among young scholars. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada tel: +01 613 520-2600 ext. 3117; e-mail: rera-journal@carleton.ca creative commons license creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0 this working paper is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial no derivs 3.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 3.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, provided the source is acknowledged. no use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes. issn: 1718-4835 © 2016 the author(s) https://journals.carleton.ca/rera/index.php/rera mailto:rera-journal@carleton.ca http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ assessment of the european commission initiatives on creating transnational media networks dr. elena kaliberda1 abstract the paper examines two european commission initiatives on creating transnational media networks on european affairs, the euronews television and the euranet plus radio network, and their roles in the european public sphere. an overview of euronews and euranet plus is based on the author's research, first-hand contacts with representatives of the european commission, media in belgium and france, and field work at the editorial office of euronews in lyon-ecully and at the editorial offices of euranet plus in paris and brussels. keywords: european public sphere, transnational media networks, euronews, euranet plus. 1 elena kaliberda holds a master degree in journalism and in european, russian and eurasian studies as well as a phd degree in philology. currently she is pursuing a second phd degree in communication at carleton university. she is a producer of the russian language program at chin, a multicultural radio station in ottawa, canada. review of european and russian affairs 10 (1), 2016 2 introduction2 the purpose of the study is to consider the models of audiovisual media on european affairs which are supported by the european commission and presented by euronews television and the euranet plus radio network, as well as their roles in the european public sphere. the preliminary research indicated that since 2005 the european commission encourages the creation of audiovisual media on european affairs in europe. as a result, in 2007 a new european radio network was established. several findings made during the preliminary research became stimuli to proceed with a further study. first, the literature review showed that there is a large body of scholarship on the european public sphere and there are sources on tv and radio media, but usually they are not considered from the perspective of creating media networks with a european agenda. second, radio, as a tool to help create a public sphere, is arguably understudied. for example, euranet, a european radio network that has existed for over seven years, was not mentioned within the scholarly literature. finally, although there are several works3 that consider the euronews project as an example of transnational european media, they are now dated and consider it without referring to the public sphere concept. so, this study is an attempt to collect and to summarize information on the european commission initiatives on the creation of transnational audiovisual media networks with a european agenda. it is the first attempt to subject the radio network euranet plus to a scholarly study and to compare two audiovisual media on european affairs created at the european commission initiatives. the main research question explores the purpose of euronews and euranet in relation to the european public sphere, and how the euronews experience could affect the development of euranet plus, which is yet another transnational medium of european affairs. more specifically, i address the following research questions: does euronews represent, in part, an effort to foster the development of the public sphere? what kinds of answers are given to this question by european observers and by eu institutions? was the fostering of the public sphere a motivation for the creation of euranet plus? does euranet represent, in part, an effort to foster the development of the public sphere? what kinds of answers are given to this question by european observers and by eu institutions? how did the experience with euronews affect the development of euranet? was there institutional learning? the main hypothesis of this study is that euronews and euranet plus, as audiovisual transnational media, represent an effort to foster the development of the european public sphere. another part of the hypothesis is that euronews provided institutional learning for euranet plus with the european commission as the vehicle. the theoretical framing of the issue relies on the theory of the european public sphere. the methodology relies on an analysis of primary and secondary sources. the primary sources 2 i am grateful to prof. joan debardeleben for reviewing the final version of the article and offering valuable suggestions, as well to the two anonymous experts for their helpful comments and constructive critiques. 3 for example see brüggemann 2008; garcia-blanco & cushion 2010; eriksen 2007. review of european and russian affairs 10 (1), 2016 3 include the european commission policy documents, directives and eurobarometer public opinion surveys. research interviews conducted in belgium and france with members of euronews television and euranet plus radio, european journalists and representatives of the european commission (in total there are 10 interviews) are the main empirical material of this research. the qualitative research is the main method applied within this study. the method of comparative studies is also applied to analyze the similarities, advantages and disadvantages of television and radio initiatives. theorizing the european public sphere a large number of scholarly publications discuss the european public sphere and the role of media.4 in particular, many scholars agree that the pioneer researcher of the european public sphere was habermas who “made the principal assumptions on the concept of the public sphere” (harrison & wessels 2009, 131). habermas stated in 1960 that the public sphere is “a sphere between civil society and the state” (mccarthy 1989). habermas5 also concluded that “the usage of the words 'public' and 'public sphere' betrays a multiplicity of concurrent meanings… events and occasions are public when they are open to all…” (ibid, 1). so, from this perspective it is possible to conclude that one of the mechanisms to make events open for everyone is to ensure their publicity and to provide opportunities for ordinary citizens to participate in discussions and decision-making. a review of published sources revealed a wide variety of perspectives on the development of the european public sphere, and the role of media and institutions. while there are numerous definitions of the european public sphere within the literature, a key common point is that the public sphere is defined as a communicative space that provides equal opportunities for all actors in the process of sharing public opinion. this communicative space can be “social”, “european”, and “transnational”.6 communicative spaces can be organized in the form of a network, media network, forum, public debate (eriksen 2007, 23; harrison 2009, 9), and as a discussion (heller & renyi 2007, 173). the structures of the european public sphere include: political and social clubs (eriksen 2007), think tanks, media, national and transnational ngos which organize debates, forums, discussions, public protests, letters, communiques. based on the definition of the european public sphere and the ability of media to involve a large audience of europeans in the process of sharing public opinion, the media can be considered an important element of the european public sphere. 4 the following authors discuss the european public sphere and the role of media: baisnee 2007; bentele & nothhaft, 2010; brüggemann & schulz-forberg 2008; butsch 2007; chalaby 2002; eriksen 2005 and 2007; firmstone 2008; fraser 2007; garcia-blanco & cushion 2010; gripsrud 2007; grundmann 1999; harrison & wessels 2009; heller & renyi 2007; kaitatzi-whitlock 2007; kantner 2006; lauristin 2007; lecheler 2008; machill & beller 2006; metykova & preston 2009; papathanassopoulos & negrine 2011a and 2011b; peters et al. 2005; raupp 2004; statham 2011; trenz 2007 and 2008; veltri 2012; venturelli 1993; volkmer 2008; wessler & brüggemann 2007. 5 i am referring here to the 1989 edition of his classical 1960 publication. 6 the european public sphere is described by various scholars as “a social room” (eriksen 2007, 23), “a socio-spatial extension” (wessler & brüggemann 2007, 96), “a european transnational communication space” (brüggemann & schulz-forberg 2008, 78), “a communicative space within which conversations and discussions (‘democratic deliberations’) take place” (papathanassopoulos & negrine 2011a, 128), “a truly interor transnational shared space where those holding political and bureaucratic power confront a well-informed, critical public” (gripsrud 2007, 480). review of european and russian affairs 10 (1), 2016 4 the european public sphere has been researched by scholars because it is significant for european integration. several scholars point out the role of the european public sphere in relation to the creation of a european identity, and the creation of a european “demos” to reinforce democratic legitimacy.7 an objective of the eu is the creation of a unified and strong european community. presently, the eu faces several problems that are connected with the lack of the feeling of togetherness of european citizens which is often characterized by scholars as a lack of a european identity.8 the first issue is that european citizens do not feel that they share a common sense of belonging to the european union. these results were reflected in the eurobarometer surveys eb 73-80 from may 2010 to december 2013. according to the eurobarometer-survey in may 2012, “citizens of the different member states feel very differently about the european union” (polipedia.eu 2014). the second issue is that the eu citizens’ knowledge of the eu is very basic.9 how can a european identity be achieved? there are some models that were identified in the scholarly literature. the media with a european agenda can impact the public perception of themselves as europeans.10 in the viewpoint of brüggemann and schulz-forberg (2008), the media can help in strengthening the concept of the collective identity, and some media are actively involved in this process, e.g. euronews and the european voice. citizen participation in the european project is a necessity for the functioning of the european union unity. according to eriksen (2007), democratic legitimacy can be achieved by public debates. in the point of view of kaitatzi-whitlock (2007, 696), european citizens have to be heard, to express opinions, “to fulfill their active information/‘communication rights’”. in summary, the european public sphere is important for identity, democratic legitimacy, support of the eu and european integration. finally, the european public sphere is aimed at helping promote solidarity amongst citizens by creating a supranational political community. the european media in creating the european public sphere according to harrison and wessels (2009, 131), the networked structure of the european public sphere is “composed by different actors such as civil-society organizations, relays, media infrastructures which interact with different institutions not only within the eu but also on national, regional and local levels”. although the media by itself might not necessarily be an initiator of debates, media can play a passive role as a one-way provider of information without receiving any feedback from citizens; scholars nonetheless pointed out the central role of media in the european public sphere.11 five functions can be attributed to the role of media in the european public sphere. the first function is a formation of a european identity. this point of view is supported by kantner (2006, 7 gripsrud (2007), eriksen (2005), kantner (2006), papathanassopoulos and negrine (2011b), statham (2011). 8 papathanassopoulos and negrine (2011b) and statham (2011). 9 grundmann (1999) and preston (2009). 10 papathanassopoulos and negrine (2011a), wessler and brüggemann (2007), eriksen (2007), bee (2008). 11 the following authors consider media as institutional infrastructures of the european public sphere: harrison & wessels 2009; metykova & preston 2009; nieminen 2008; trenz 2008. in point of view of raupp (2004), media is a large arena of the european public sphere. review of european and russian affairs 10 (1), 2016 5 512) who stated that “the transnational mass media agenda of common european policy issues reinforces the awareness of ‘being in the same boat’”. the second function is the formation of public opinion. according to trenz (2007), media is a generator of ideologies. papathanassopoulos and negrine believe that “the media do play a significant role in creating the context for the development of perceptions about things european” (2011a, 124). the third function of a fulfillment of democratic norms and citizens’ engagement can be implemented through the publications or participation in the television and radio programs. media facilitate a connection between eu institutions and their publics,12 and provide “the freedom to express ideas publicly” (eriksen 2007, 32). the fourth function of media in the european public sphere is ensuring transparency in the decision-making of eu-institutions’. from statham’s perspective, the main interpreter of the european content making is the fact that the “european decisionmaking has to be visible to citizens” (statcham 2011, 80). finally, the function of media in the european public sphere is informing the public on european affairs. trenz (2007, 89) stated that the media of the european public sphere could be identified as a european news cover. for purposes of european integration, transnational media are particularly important and play a significant role. while there are numerous definitions and discussions of transnational media, the key notion of this definition is media that simultaneously covers eu affairs in several member states and broadcasts in different languages.13 in contrast, “europeanized” media devotes more time and space to news on european affairs (garcia-blanco & cushion 2010 – one example of euronews), but do not necessarily broadcast or distribute their programming in more than one member state. transnational media can be national media with a transnational mission, international with a european agenda, pan-regional, or global media (brüggemann & schulzforberg 2008, 78). some of them, such as euronews and bbc, broadcast beyond the european public sphere, but remain transnational media in terms of the eu. some scholars argue that transnational media play a significant role in the european public sphere and in european integration.14 transnational audiovisual media are considered in the literature as a powerful tool to reach a large audience, to influence the public opinion, to create a common information space, to form a european identity, and to establish dialogue between eu institutions and their citizens. the european commission’s initiatives on creating transnational media . many authors15 have referenced efforts of the european union16 to create a european public sphere. the european commission produced the major european union legislative normative 12 kevin 2003; neidhardt et al. 2000; schlesinger 1999; schlesinger & kevin 2000 in firmstone 2008. 13 i formulated this definition based on descriptions of a transnational media in the european public sphere given by bee (2008), brüggemann and schulz-forberg (2008), chalaby (2002), eriksen (2007), firmstone (2010), gardoso (2008), gripsrud (2007), harrison and wessels (2009), kaitatzi-whitlock (2007), lecheler (2008), nieminen (2008), papathanassopoulos and negrine (2011a), statham (2011), thiel (2008), veltri (2012). 14 garcia-blanco & cushion (2010), firmstone (2008), grundmann (1999). 15 the following authors discuss the role of the eu institutions in the development of the european public sphere: baisnee 2007; bee 2008; brüggemann and schulz-forberg 2008; chalaby 2002; eriksen 2007; fraser 2007; garcia blanco and cushion 2010; gardoso 2008; harrison and wessels 2009; heller and renyi 2007; kohler-koch and eising 1999; lauristin 2007; metykova and preston 2009; nitoiu 2013; papathanassopoulos and negrine 2011a and 2011b; raupp 2004; statham 2011; thiel 2008; trenz 2007 and 2008; veltri 2012; venturelli 1993; volkmer 2008; wessler and brüggemann 2007. 16 here i am referring to efforts of the main eu institutions such as the council of europe, the european parliament, and the european commission. review of european and russian affairs 10 (1), 2016 6 documents that included efforts to contribute to a communicative space where citizens participate in decision-making. an analysis of treaties and european commission policy documents reveals that the european public sphere has been on the agenda of policy documents since 1992. as stated in the white paper on a european communication policy (2006), the communications gap between the eu and its citizens has been a subject of discussion in eu circles at least since the referenda that preceded the entry into force of the maastricht treaty in 1992. at that time that the eu took steps towards improving the transparency of its institutions, the collaboration of eu institutions in public information, providing more opportunities for citizens’ debates, creating a closer union of people, and the creation of a political union. by 2015 the eu achieved significant progress in these directions. the goal of the european commission to support trans-european media – such as euronews– has changed over time. in 1992, the initial the purpose was to foster the development of european digital video services, whereas since 2005 the commission's goal is to support broadcasting news with a european agenda. the plan-d (ec 2005) became the first working document that was aimed at promoting wide-range debates and provided financial opportunities for the development of transnational tv and radio networks on european affairs. the implementation of the eu communication strategies brought up the necessity of developing a new model of inter-institutional cooperation in the area of communication and transparency, and of new communication structures of the european commission and representatives of the eu in the member states. communications also became a part of the eu's regional policy. in 2005, the european public sphere became a more prioritized topic because of the decrease of trust in european institutions and the rise of euroscepticism. the creation of transnational media networks began in 2007, since the lisbon treaty. the communicating europe in partnership (2007a) is one of the most important strategic policy documents of the european commission on creating transnational audiovisual media with european agenda. the document contains a european commission decision which finds its further implementation in the ensuring documents: “the commission will contribute to greater and more sustainable coverage of eu affairs on existing audiovisual channels, and encourage european networking by broadcasters” (ec 2007a, 11). in general, this policy document brought new opportunities in sponsoring radio and tv programs on european affairs (ec 2007a). in 2008, the paper communicating europe through audiovisual media was adopted by the european commission as a follow-up to communicating europe in partnership. this paper (ec 2008a) together with the internet strategy (ec 2007b) is aimed to realize the commission decision stated in the communicating europe in partnership strategy to support networks of eu-content broadcasters. it is aimed at supporting existing networks of eu-content broadcasters and the creation of new networks. in the following sections, i will consider the institutional models of euronews and euranet plus, and their roles in the european public sphere based on my interview findings and field work. this primary research serves a broader goal, which is to compare these institutional models of transnational media with a european agenda. review of european and russian affairs 10 (1), 2016 7 euronews the euronews television channel was established by broadcasters from 10 european countries in 1992 and started broadcasting in 1993. its shareholders structure has changed during the last twenty years, and as of 2016 it is currently owned by 21 public television channels and three 3 local authorities.17 euronews has european shareholders and those that are outside of europe. as a european commission source mentioned, “euronews broadcasts [are] not only for europe but also [go] beyond the european public sphere”18, to give them global coverage. it is possible to watch euronews using satellite antennas in 155 countries around the world, including in europe, russia, asia/pacific, middle east and africa, central and south america, and north america. recently, euronews opened a bureau in washington (united states). euronews’ main headquarters is in lyon, france; but it also has bureaus and journalists working in brussels, national bureaus in kiev (ukraine), budapest (hungary) and also in athens (greece). presently, euronews broadcasts in 13 languages: arabic, english, french, german, greek, hungarian, italian, persian, polish, portuguese, russian, spanish, turkish, and ukrainian. denis loktev, a senior producer of euronews, pointed out that it is not a network but a transnational tv channel that has editorial offices. according to loktev, the role of euronews as a transnational media in creating the european public sphere is to help citizens “living in different countries to communicate with each other, because they need to know what happens in other countries than theirs”. 19 according to loktev, the lack of information on the european integration project and the fact that citizens only get news from national media leads many citizens feeling that “something is happening behind their backs. they do not really understand the european union, they do not get a clear idea of what it is and why they need to support it”. in order to change this situation, “what needs to be done is better informing people and better interaction. people need to be able to learn more about the european integration project and to participate more, to talk directly to people living in other countries, to discuss different topics of integration and to feel this is something they want and need”. loktev pointed out that “euronews was created to cover global news, primarily european news from a common european viewpoint as a counterpoint to the national viewpoint”. loktev concluded that “euronews is the only tv channel that broadcasts news about europe from the european view point in 13 languages, most european languages, it is a good example of how it can be done”.20 albina lir, a strategic planning editor of euronews, pointed out that the role of euronews is in explaining what is going on in europe. the problem that citizens face is “everything that european institutions decide is very difficult to understand because european citizens are really far from that. they have their own lives, but decisions made in brussels affect them. euronews is 17 euronews shareholders are ct (czech republic), cybc (cyprus), entv(algeria), ert (greece), ertt (tunisia), ertu (egypt), france télévisions (france), ntu (ukraine), pbs (malta), rai (italy), rtbf (belgium), rte (ireland), rtp (portugal), rtr (russia), rtvslo (slovenia), snrt (morocco), ssr (switzerland), trt (turkey), tvr (romania), tv4 (sweden), yle (finland), grand lyon, département du rhône, région rhônealpes. 18 interview with a source in the european commission, in conversation with author, brussels, belgium, 26 may 2014. 19 interview with denis loktev (a senior producer of euronews), in conversation with author, lyon, france, 30 may 2014. 20 ibid, 2014. review of european and russian affairs 10 (1), 2016 8 a kind of bridge to talk with european institutions to understand the results of what they decide and how it will impact europe and people living in europe”.21 according to her, euronews produces two types of news: one explains news events to europeans and the other tells what europe already thinks about various events. lir mentioned that “the idea of euronews is to expand broadcast languages up to 24. euronews presents many cultures, it gives an opportunity to viewers to learn about different countries and in some sense it plays an educational role”. according to her, the role of euronews is “to be objective, to try to inform europeans on what is going on not only in brussels and european institutions but in the european countries as well”.22 the deputy editor in chief of euronews stéphane parizot explained that the goal of euronews is to provide news but also to explain what europe is, to make this concept easier to understand. sometimes coverage news on european affairs can be boring. euronews tries “to translate it in european language in simple words”. 23 he also pointed out that “if we manage to explain what is the real europe, if we manage to make people understand what it is, this type of media could be considered as helpful for the european integration”. parizot pointed out that euronews changed an editorial line a few years ago to become “the first channel starting to broadcast debates of the european commission candidates”.24 in 2014, for the first time in the history of the european parliament elections, european voters could directly elect the president of the european commission. euronews held live debates broadcasted in 13 languages. augustin palokaj, the chief of the croatian newspaper jutarhji list bureau in brussels,25 also noticed that euronews recently started organizing debates to invite analysts to discuss the issues they present. the large neon-lit studio of euronews was placed at the central hallway of the european parliament in brussels on the election night on may 26, 2014. palokaj noted that euronews was the only tv channel to cover european elections from a european point of view. for example, if we turned on the bbc channel, [there would be] coverage of the european elections only reporting from the british angle: how a uk party won most of the votes, what will be the role of the uk in the future of the european union, how will these results reflect uk relations with the rest of the european union, and so on. it was the same with the german and spanish tv channels and other national television channels. euronews was the only channel to provide a broader european picture.26 palokaj concluded that this time was different because, “during the debates on the eve of the european parliament elections, euronews was pretty balanced because they had in the studio different analysts, they had interviews with the main presidential candidates representing various political parties. they also interviewed people from different parties and were even publishing 21 interview with albina lir (a strategic editor of euronews), in conversation with author, lyon, france, 30 may 2014. 22 ibid, 2014. 23 interview with stéphane parizot (the deputy editor in chief of euronews), in conversation with author, lyon, france, 30 may 2014. 24 ibid, 2014. 25 interview with augustin palokaj (the chief of croatian newspaper jutarhji list bureau in brussels), in conversation with author, brussels, belgium, 26 may 2014. 26 ibid, 2014. for the benefit of the reader, the syntax of this quote was lightly edited. review of european and russian affairs 10 (1), 2016 9 feeds27 from the viewers”.28 as was pointed out by lir, this was the first time when euronews was so well represented in brussels (a studio in the brussels office and a studio in the european parliament).29 the choice of speakers showed that euronews gave an opportunity to speak out mostly to representatives of civil society, journalists and bloggers and independent analysts. they also placed an emphasis on the coverage of the youth vote. these interviews suggest that the role of euronews in the european public sphere is to: create a supranational point of view, explain to europeans what is going on in neighbouring countries, develop a feeling among europeans that the eu is their common unity, discuss different topics about the european integration, raise discussion and ensure more transparency the euinstitutions. the euronews bureau in brussels which opened in june 2011, serves these goals. all interviewees agreed that the opening of a bureau in brussels brought many innovations to the euronews structure, which has allowed the channel to strengthen its cooperation with eu institutions and to produce more news on european affairs. as it was claimed by euronews in 2014, “euronews’ worldwide distribution has nearly doubled in the last 5 years and the channel continues its global expansion, now covering all 5 continents”. the channel is viewed within households, hotels, and on board major airlines, euronews displays in busy places, and in colleges and universities (ibid). among many public places, euronews broadcasts its latest news at: nato, eu and european commission headquarters in brussels and strasbourg; shareholders brussels train stations; the french parliament in paris, international airports in kiev, tunis, bucharest, istanbul; and within media companies like le figaro newspaper in france or the omd media agency in london (euronews, 2014). according to the q1 2014 euronews distribution report, germany holds the largest number of household viewers (30 million), followed by france (23 million), and the uk (16 million). in russia, there 17 million household viewers. on the other hand, there are 4 million household viewers in belgium, 1 million in greece and ireland, and 7 million in the netherlands and in italy respectively. over time, the target audience of euronews has thus been expanded. in an effort to prioritize youth viewership, euronews launched the euronews campus in february 2014. this program was aimed to organize live broadcasting in prestigious universities worldwide. euronews has secured partnerships with several universities in europe – belgium (vesalius college, brussels school of journalism and communications), cyprus (cyprus university of technology), france (enlyon business school) and also in egypt (future university in egypt), new zealand (university of auckland) and turkey (marmara university) with more than 130,000 students in total to ensure their awareness about european affairs. the euranet plus radio network was the next significant initiative of the european commission to create an audiovisual transnational media on european affairs. 27 feeds are brief texts (comments) received from viewers through different mobile devices. 28 ibid, 2014. 29 interview with albina lir (a strategic editor of euronews), in conversation with author, lyon, france, 30 may 2014. review of european and russian affairs 10 (1), 2016 10 euranet plus the euranet plus radio network was the next significant initiative of the european commission to create an audiovisual transnational media on european affairs. as was mentioned by several interviewees, the idea of launching a network of radio channels on european affairs came from the european commission. a source in the european commission also pointed out, “euranet did not exist before the commission call for tenders. euranet is a private contractor but it is also a part of the commission initiative”.30 according to jan simmen, management/strategy chief of euranet plus and a former member of the euranet consortium (2008 to 2012), the idea of creating a radio network was developed prior the european parliament elections of 2009. 31 the official mission of the network is to create awareness about european affairs, strengthen the understanding of european affairs, better inform citizens and to stimulate exchange of opinions and debates of european citizens on eu affairs. 32 the institutional model of the euranet radio network changed several times due to changing requirements of the european commission. euranet and euranet plus radio network are two projects that were awarded contracts by the european commission in 2008 and in 2013. euranet – from 2008 to 2012 (the european commission first tender, contract of dg communications) euranet plus – from 2013 to present (the european commission second tender, contract of dg communications) euranet connect (universities' radio) – from 2008 to 2012 (contract of dg education and culture) euranet plus connect (universities' radio) – from 2013 to present (partly supported by the grant of dg education and culture and by the euranet plus news agency) according to the warsaw declaration of pan-european cooperation and communication (polskie radio 2009), the euranet consortium33 was founded on 25 july 2007. from april 1, 2008 the euranet network began broadcasting programs on european affairs in languages of the countries belonging to the european union; this was the first time when the european commission awarded a five-year contract to the euranet consortium. at the end of 2012 the european commission decided not to renew the first service contract with euranet but to launch a new tender for a new contract. the purpose of the call for tenders was “to develop the production and broadcast of regular, specifically dedicated radio programmes in different official eu languages, 30 interview with a source in the european commission, in conversation with author, brussels, belgium, 26 may 2014. 31 interview with jan simmen (management and strategy chief of euranet plus), in conversation with author, brussels, belgium, 21 may 2014. 32 www.euranetplus-inside.eu 33 euranet is the generally used shorthand for the european radio network. review of european and russian affairs 10 (1), 2016 11 at peak listening times by each member of a network of professional eu radio broadcasters” (euroalert 2013).34 as a source in the european commission stated, it was “a tender to renew not the project but the concept of the pan-european network of radios”35. in 2013 the contract based on the tender po/2012-09/a6 “production and broadcast of radio programmes on eu affairs, on air and on digital platforms, by a network of eu radio broadcasters” was awarded to euranet plus (euroalert 2013). however the conditions of the contract were changed. according to this second call for tenders, to join the network a radio has to satisfy the criteria that are include within the technical specification of the contract: to have 300,000 listeners per day or to a 5 percent share of the national market and to broadcast news with european perspective no less than 75 minutes per week (the initial euranet had no conditions).36 the editorial line of euranet plus was also changed by the second contract with the european commission. previously there was no definition of european news. the main goal of euranet plus is now to cover stories which are related to the european agenda and european policies and to the activities of eu institutions. the main point of the euranet plus new editorial line is stated as follows: “the goal of the network is to produce together european stories directly related to european policies and the european agenda”, as explained dominique d’olne, the chief operating officer for editorial content of euranet plus.37 according to d’olne, at the beginning of the contract euranet was supposed to be used for building the european public sphere. telling the audience stories about what was happening in other eu countries was their main contribution to the development of the european public sphere.38 this mandate is expressed in the european commission document (ec 2008b): “to bring the european union and its citizens closer together”. euranet plus members do many interviews with citizens from other eu countries, not only from the country of broadcasting. d’olne explained the importance of this type of coverage: “it is important to make listeners aware that europe is not only a question of national interest of 28 partners. it is a task of journalism to show that there are some european issues that are not of national interest”.39 mareike roewekamp, a project manager of the administrative office of euranet plus, stated that the promotion of the exchange of opinions and debates is a part of the mission of euranet plus.40 in particular, each euranet plus radio station has programs that are called talk-shows which engage citizens in debates, ask for their opinions.41 an interview with people on a street is also a way of asking opinions. some members have online tools for the exchange of opinions. euranet plus also conducts a monthly debate series, citizens' corner, 34 euroalert.net is a website publishing european union grants and calls for proposals. 35 interview with a source in the european commission, in conversation with author, brussels, belgium, 26 may 2014. 36 ibid, 2014. 37 interview with dominique d’olne (chief operating officer, editorial content of euranet plus), in conversation with author, brussels, belgium, 20 may 2014. 38 ibid, 2014. 39 40 interview with mareike roewekamp (project manager, administrative office of euranet plus), in conversation with author, paris, france, 28 may 2014. 41 french bfm radio' 500 million europeans is an example of a such talk-show. review of european and russian affairs 10 (1), 2016 12 which takes place in the european parliament in brussels. its purpose is to connect decision makers with european citizens.42 today, euranet plus claims that they have 20 million listeners per day and includes 15 radio stations broadcasting in 15 countries in 14 languages.43 each of these countries is represented by only one station. there are both private and public radio stations among the euranet plus members. for example, rtbf in belgium, polskie radio in poland, and bulgarian national radio in bulgaria are public. on the other hand, there are several private member stations as well, for instance, sky radio in estonia, castilla y leon in spain, and bfm in france. in march 2013 euranet plus opened a news agency in brussels. the impression obtained from visiting the euranet plus news agency in brussels, conversations with rtbf (a partner radio station) employees, a representative of the administrative office of euranet plus in paris, is that the new agency in brussels plays the role of a central news agency through making news and providing content for the network members. yet another function of the news agency is that it represents the network at the european institutions through establishing connections and participation in events and through representation of the network online. the euranet plus news agency in brussels contributes to the development of a supranational point of view. according to jeanmichel bos, editor-in-chief of euranet plus news agency in brussels, the weekly conferences with network members are helpful in development of a common point of view and a common angle to present the european topics. 44 the youth audience is also a priority of the euranet plus radio network. since 2013, its news agency in brussels has produced materials and managed the web-page for the informal initiative of european universities radio network: euranet plus connect (which is not covered by the contract of the eu). “plus connect”, was created at the same time of euranet and helps the radio network involve students in debates on european affairs. it includes participation from european universities in denmark, estonia, finland, germany, ireland, lithuania, poland, romania, slovenia, spain and sweden. these radio stations can also provide local coverage. for example, radio moreeni in finland, which belongs to radio university, is also a local radio station. their frequency serves approximately 300.000 potential listeners in tampere, finland and the surrounding area. technically, euranet plus connect is independent from euranet plus, however as mareike roewekamp said, they “work under one brand… it is not in the frame of the contract but we provide help to this initiative”.45 according to d’olne, euranet plus still works with universities and plans to increase the presence of students in social media, for example, on behalf of euranet plus and to develop something in the academic field.46 euranet plus has some projects in developing masters programs in european journalism. in the next section, the results of the 42 interview with mareike roewekamp, in conversation with author, 2014. 43 euranet plus members: belgium – rtbf radio; bulgaria bulgarian national radio; croatia hrt – croatian radio; estonia sky radio; france bfm, germany – ams-net; greece – skai radio, hungary mtva magyar radio, italy radio24 – ilsole24ore; latvia latvijas radio; poland polskie radio; portugal renascenca; romania – romanian national radio; slovenia – radio slovenia international; spain castilla y leon. 44 interview with jean-michel bos (editor-in-chief of euranet plus news agency in brussels), in conversation with author, brussels, belgium, 21 may 2014. 45 interview with mareike roewekamp, in conversation with author, 2014. 46 interview with dominique d’olne, in conversation with author, 2014. review of european and russian affairs 10 (1), 2016 13 analysis of the institutional models of euronews and euranet plus will be applied to test the main research hypothesis that euronews provided institutional learning for euranet plus with the european commission as the vehicle. institutional learning there is no direct connection between euronews and euranet plus. they are two separate organizations. their projects and their relations with the european commission are also different, as are the philosophies.47 the main difference between the two is that euronews covers world news, including european news, from a supranational point of view. in contrast, euranet plus radio members covers mostly local european news and broadcast only 75 minutes of news with a european point of view weekly. roewekamp pointed out that both initiatives came from the european commission. according to roewekamp, “the models are different, and the media are different”.48 table 1. commonalties and differences between euronews and euranet plus commonalities differences media established by several european broadcasters the euronews model involves european and noneuropean broadcasters as shareholders. euranet plus is a network of european broadcasters working under the same brand. transnational european media euronews is a transnational television channel. euranet plus is a transnational network of national radios in 15 member states. headquarters in france euronews headquarters is located in lyon. euranet plus headquarters is located in paris. news bureau in brussels euronews opened its bureau in brussels in june 2011. euranet plus opened a bureau in brussels in march 2013 but it operates as a news agency on european affairs. broadcasting news with a european point of view is not the main stream euronews is specialized in international news seen by european journalists. the brussels bureau provides a european point of view. euranet plus radio members are national radio stations that broadcast 75 minutes of news with a european point of view weekly. creation and broadcasting of news from a european point of view euronews broadcasts the eu institutional news, more frequently since the brussels bureau was opened. euranet plus radio broadcasts european institutional news daily/weekly in various program formats. programming on european affairs: address national audiences in their own languages euronews has daily current news on european affairs and also programs on regional policy. in general, there are the same programmes in 13 languages. euranet plus radio members have a variety of 47 this argument is based on the author’s conducted interviews in 2014 with d'olne, a source in the european commission, lir, loktev, roewekamp and simmen. 48 interview with mareike roewekamp, in conversation with author, 2014. review of european and russian affairs 10 (1), 2016 14 programs on european affairs titled differently and they have a different content. existence of the internal and external editorial line euronews has an internal editorial line and there is no definition on what is a news on european affairs. euranet plus: what is a news on european affairs is stated in the contract of the european commission. if there is no direct connection between euronews and euranet plus, institutional learning still occurred, from euronews practice to euranet plus. euronews practice has been taken by the european commission as a basis for a further development of transnational media on european affairs. institutional learning became possible through the european commission policy documents for audiovisual networks on european affairs. the european commission policy documents communicating europe in partnership (ec 2007a) and communicating europe through audiovisual media (ec 2008a) had objectives to accelerate the creation of audiovisual media with a european agenda. it is very noticeable that the european commission made use of the euronews practice in these policy documents and finally came up with a new model of a european broadcaster. based on existing practice, the european commission formulated a set of proposals for audiovisual networks and in particular for a european radio network. the euronews practice has been addressed directly and indirectly in european media studies, and was included in european citizens’ surveys. euronews provided institutional learning for euranet plus with the european commission as the vehicle. the second contract of services with the european radio network started with the creation of a news agency in brussels. the euronews opened its brussels bureau in 2011 only two years before the euranet plus followed suit in 2013. potential weaknesses of the european radio project based on an analysis of the european radio project, a comparative analysis of euranet plus and euronews practices, a study of the european commission policy documents for creating audiovisual media networks, as well as interviews with practitioners, i have identified several potential weak points of the european radio network project. euranet plus is the latest and the most significant european commission' project in this area. changing several points in the second contract with the euranet plus network in 2013, the european commission was guided by the financial considerations and by the intention to clarify what is news with european agenda, a supranational news to cover. however, these changes of the contract requirements first considered as advantages, carry a risk of becoming drawbacks in the future. as it was pointed out by one of the observers, some former network members complained that at the beginning, when the euranet radio network had just been established, there were no rules. the requirement of a strict editorial line on european news can lead to an incomplete coverage of european affairs, loss of interest to european news and as a result withdrawing of citizens from media debates and a loss of trust in national media; a loss of journalistic interest to cover news on european affairs. the requirement of having an audience of 300,000 listeners per day for a radio network member can lead to a loss of radio members and a presence of network not in all eu member states. the interference of the european commission and the european parliament can lead to a loss of freedom to express independent points of view by radio members on european affairs, and also to a loss of independence from the european review of european and russian affairs 10 (1), 2016 15 institutions. in the situation when these issues are aggravated with the other challenges described by trenz (2008, 57-58), which are “the entertainment value of eu is low”, “citizens do not accept news from brussels seriously”, “cynical public requires more negative news”, the probability of the aforementioned risks can be higher and lead to more serious consequences. next steps the current contract of the european commission with euranet plus is being implemented until 2018, and it is hard to predict whether the requirements of the contract will remain the same or not. as it was concluded by a source in the european commission yet it is not clear what will be other steps on the way of development of the european public sphere and audiovisual media.49 shirin wheeler, spokesperson of the commissioner of the commission of the regions,50 said that having been in the european commission for a few years, she can say that the commission is asking right questions now, focusing on debates, rather than propaganda, but asking what people care about. wheeler believes that “media networks do play an important role in the development of a public sphere because this how people get most of their information. like the eu itself the media networks need to reflect particular interests and particular cultures of the eu”.51 conclusion in this article, i have examined two transnational audiovisual media on european affairs which are supported by the european commission. the main hypothesis of this study has been supported: euronews and euranet plus as audiovisual transnational media represent an effort to foster the development of the european public sphere. euronews and euranet plus contribute to the development of the european public sphere mostly through initiating debates on european affairs with the involvement of the civil society and the youths of the european union, developing the feeling among europeans that the eu is their common cause, discussing different topics of european integration. euronews provided institutional learning for euranet plus with the european commission as the vehicle. institutional learning became possible through the european commission policy documents for audiovisual networks on european affairs which are based on euronews practices. as can be seen, euronews has been functioning for over 20 years and it is a dynamic structure. euronews changes its priorities following new challenges, and new priorities of the european public sphere. the study highlighted the importance of further research on the role of transnational audiovisual media on european affairs in the development of the european public sphere, in particular during the elections campaign for the 2019 european parliament elections. 49 interview with a source in the european commission, in conversation with author, 2014. 50 interview with shirin wheeler (spokesperson of the commissioner of the commission of the regions), in conversation with author, brussels, belgium, 26 may 2014. 51 ibid, 2014. review of european and russian affairs 10 (1), 2016 16 references baisnee, olivier. 2007. “the european public sphere does not exist (at least it's worth wondering...).” european journal of communication 22 (4): 493-503. baisnee, olivier, & marchetti, dominique. 2000. 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"euronews, un laboratoire de la production de l'information "europeenne". culture et conflits 38-39: 2-19. http://conflits.revues.org/index283.html bee, cristiano. 2008. “the ‘institutionally constructed’ european identity: citizenship and public sphere narrated by the commission.” perspectives on european politics and society 9 (4): 431-450. bentele, gunter, & nothhaft, howard. 2010. “strategic communication and the public sphere from a european perspective.” international journal of strategic communication 4: 93-116. doi: 10.1080/15531181003701954. brüggemann, michael, & schulz-forberg, hagen. 2008. “towards a pan-european public sphere? a typology of transnational media in europe” (chpt. 5). in transnationalization of public spheres, edited by hartmut wessler, bernhard peters, & michael brüggemann, 78-94. new york, ny: palgrave macmillan. butsch, richard. 2007. media and public sphere. new york, ny: palgrave macmillan. castells, manuel. 1997. the rise of the network society. malden, ma: blackwell. cerutti, furio. 2003. “a political identity of the europeans?” thesis eleven 72 (1): 26-45. chalaby, jean k. 2002. “transnational television in europe: the role of pan-european channels.” european journal of communication 17 (2): 183-203. ____. 2005. “from internationalization to transnationalization.” global media and communication 1 (1): 28-33. eriksen, erik o. 2005. “an emerging european public sphere.” european journal of social theory 8 (3): 341-363. ____. 2007. “conceptualising european public spheres. general, segmented and strong publics” (chpt. 2). in the european union and the public sphere. a communicative space in the making?, edited by john erik fossum, & philip schlesinger, 23-43. new york, ny: routledge, firmstone, julie. 2008. “approaches of the transnational press to reporting europe.” journalism 9 (4): 423-442. doi:10.1177/1464884908091293. garcia-blanco, inaki, & cushion, stephen. 2010. “a partial europe without citizens or eu-level political institutions. how far can euronews contribute to a european public sphere?” journalism studies 11 (3): 393-411. doi: 10.1080/14616700903378653. gardoso, gustavo. 2008. “from mass to networked communication: communicational models and the informational society.” international journal of communication 2: 587-630. gripsrud, jostein. 2007. “television and the european public sphere.” european journal of communication 22 (4): 479-492. grundmann, reiner. 1999. “the european public sphere and the deficit of democracy.” the editorial board of the sociological review 48 (s1): 125-146. habermas, jurgen. 1989. the structural transformation of the public sphere. cambridge: polity press. heller, maria, & renyi, agnes. 2007. “eu enlargement, identity and the public sphere” (chpt. 9). in the european union and the public sphere. a communicative space in the making?, edited by john erik fossum, & philip schlesinger, 169-186. ny: routledge. harrison, jackie, & wessels, bridgette. 2009. mediating europe: new media, mass communications and the european public sphere. new york and oxford: berghahn books. kaitatzi-whitlock, sophia. 2007. “the missing european public sphere and the absence of imagined of imagined european citizenship.” european societies 9 (5): 685-704. kantner, cathleen. 2006. “collective identity as shared ethical self-understanding.” european journal of social theory 9 (4): 501-523. kohler-koch beate, & eising rainer. 1999. the transformation of governance in the european union. london, new-york, n.y.: routledge, 8-13. loktev, denis. 2008. organizacia raboty evropeiskogo informacionnogo kanala euronews [organization of work of the european news channel euronews]. moscow, russia: lomonosov moscow state university. studies review 11 (1): 26-38. doi: 10.1111/j.1478-9302.201.00287.x papathanassopoulos, stylianos, & negrine, ralph. 2011a. “public communication in europe: constructing europe and the european public sphere” (chpt 7) in european media: structures, policies and identity, 123-149. uk: polity press. ____. 2011b. “media and european identity”, in european media: structures, policies and identity, 150-169. uk: polity press. peters, bernhard, sifft, stefanie, & wimmel, andreas. 2005. ”7 national and transnational public spheres: the case of the eu.” european review, 13 (1): 139-160. preston, paschal. 2009. “an elusive trans-national public sphere?” journalism studies 10 (1): 114-129. doi: 10.1080/14616700802560591 thiel, michael. 2008. “european public spheres and the eu's communication strategy: from deficits to policy fit?” perspectives on european politics and society 9 (3): 342-356. doi: 10.1080/15705850802223457. available online at: journals.carleton.ca/rera/index.php/rera contact: carleton university e-mail: rera-journal@carleton.ca creative commons license issn: 1718-4835