2 – 45SA CRIME QUARTERLY NO. 71 • 2022

‘Bad, sad and angry’ 

Responses of the SAPS  

leadership to the dangers  

of policing  

South African

Danger is an integral part of the fabric of South African society. Yearly statistics regularly underscore 
the extent of danger experienced through reported acts of violence. As generally office bound 
executives, senior police officers rarely encounter this violence to the same extent as frontline 
officers.2 These police leaders are ultimately responsible for the strategies and operations employed 
to prevent police exposure to such dangers. Little research, however, has examined how the 
senior personnel react and respond to such danger. In this discussion, perceptions of senior South 
African Police Service (SAPS) officials to the dangers of police work are laid bare. How danger is 
conceptualised at such senior levels has relevance in initial examinations of why the SAPS may police 
in the manner in which they do. 

CRIME QUARTERLY

Gráinne Perkins1 

perkinsgrain@seattleu.edu

https://doi.org/10.17159/2413-3108/2022/vn71a12857

 No. 71 | 2022

Methodology

The murder rate in South Africa is consistently 

amongst the highest in the world.3 Although 

murder rates are high in South Africa, they 

have been declining over the last decade4 and 

so too has the number of police deaths.5 In 

the Western Cape Province, however, on-duty 

police deaths showed a slight upward trend 

between 2002 and 2014. On a national scale 

and in the Western Cape, off-duty murders 

have actually accounted for more murders than 

on-duty. Across South Africa, the SAPS identify 

mailto:perkinsgrain@seattleu.edu
https://doi.org/10.17159/2413-3108/2022/vn71a12857


INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES & UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN2 – 46

specific policing areas as ‘hot spots’ where 

more than one police member has been killed. 

Between 2014 and 2016, six police stations 

in the Western Cape Province were identified 

as being hot spots. As such, one of these hot 

spot stations in Cape Town was deemed as a 

suitable location to examine police murders. The 

research for this paper formed part of a larger 

ethnographic research project that examined 

police murders in the Western Cape during 

the period 2002–2014.6 In 2020, the SAPS 

produced a Police Safety Strategy Plan which 

aimed to accelerate efforts to address the 

attacks and unnatural deaths of police officers.7

In July 2011, police leadership convened a 

summit to examine the extent of attacks on and 

killings of SAPS members. Although the Minister 

of the Police referred to the killing of officers as 

a ‘national crisis’8 there was no reference to this 

epidemic in the SAPS Strategic Plan of 2010–

2014.9 Stemming from this police summit, a 

ten-point plan was announced to help eradicate 

the killings and attacks on officers. In a more 

recent examination of SAPS murders, Mkhize 

and Madumi suggested that the SAPS ten-point 

plan, which stemmed from the Multi-Disciplinary 

Enquiry Committee (MDC) findings, has been 

ineffective in reducing police murders.10 During 

this period, media reports, however, stated that 

the plan contained a mixture of management-

style phrases, symbolic gestures and some 

practical suggestions to boost police morale, 

but little in actual changes.11 This research 

however begat a more recent Safety Strategy 

Plan (2019) that focuses on understanding the 

issues to reduce the daily risks faced by officers 

in the line of duty.

In 2015, the frequency at which SAPS officers 

were being murdered dominated news 

headlines. Indeed, the then South African 

president told the police: ‘We urge you to 

defend yourselves with everything at your 

disposal if you are attacked, within the confines 

of the law.’12 Resultantly, the SAPS leadership 
had a vested interest in examining the issues 
surrounding police murders and invited the 
researcher to participate in the Western Cape 
Provincial Crime Combatting Forum. In South 
Africa, Crime-Combating Forums (CCFs) have 
been established at national, provincial, cluster 
and police station level to manage and monitor 
crime-combating actions at the respective 
identified levels.13 Attendance at the meeting 
was done in conjunction with over 900 hours 
of ethnographic work being undertaken by the 
author, as well as the examination of all murder 
dockets of all police officers who were killed in 
the Western Cape between 2002 and 2014.14 
What was unique about this meeting, was the 
fact that it represented the largest gathering 
of senior leaders, i.e. station commanders, 
from across the Western Cape Province. At 
this meeting, 141 out of the then 150 Station 
Commanders from the different police stations 
in the Western Cape Province were present. 

Personal details and length of service of the 
SAPS questionnaire respondents are presented 
above in Table 1. The sample drew from diverse 
ethnic backgrounds (using home language as a 
proxy): 32 respondents were Xhosa speaking, 
4 Northern Sotho, 73 Afrikaans, 4 Zulu, 22 
English, and 2 South Sotho.15 

Research Instrument: The Questionnaire

Prior to this meeting, a questionnaire, 
composed of Likert style and open-ended 
questions, was developed, which incorporated 
key variables from previous quantitative 
examinations of attacks on police and police 
murders. A literature review of police murders, 
both internationally and in South Africa, was 
accessed to help frame the questionnaire. 
The spread of the rank of the officers present 
ranged from the most senior in police 
leadership, being Major General (n= 4) to 
constable (n=5).16 A total of 141 members were 
present at the meeting and returns on 138 



2 – 47SA CRIME QUARTERLY NO. 71 • 2022

questionnaires (97.9% response rate) were 
obtained. A total of five police constables were 
invited to the meeting to ensure that concerns 
regarding other police matters could be heard 
from a non-leadership perspective.

Limitations

When individuals share an emotional 
experience, they may be influenced through 
emotional contagion.17 There are three ways 
to ‘catch’ another’s emotions. First, through 
conscious cognitive processes, individuals 
can empathise with a display of emotion. 
Second, through conditioned or unconditioned 
responses, people may feel and display 
emotion based on prior experiences. Finally, 
individuals may mimic the emotion displayed by 
another.18 As such the impact of completing a 
questionnaire amongst one’s peers should be 
factored into the interpretation of any findings.

One of the questionnaire shortcomings was 
the failure to use the idea of ‘attempts’ at 
capturing incidents. This became obvious in 

the data analysis were officers would mark ‘no’ 

as a response but subsequently add ‘but many 

attempts’. It is often the attempts that denote 

potential danger as opposed to the occurrences 

and capturing this information would have been 

beneficial in interpretation of the findings. 

The concept of ‘voluntary’ completion of a 

form in a police setting is always questionable. 

Respondents were asked to complete the form 

before lunch and as such, could be viewed 

as a required task. Similarly the idea of the 

questionnaire being confidential is questionable. 

Even with aggregating statistics, the unique 

identifiers where respondents related to unique 

experiences, such as the pregnant officer being 

shot, makes them readily identifiable. Although 

every effort was made to redact identifiable 

information, some identifiers will be unavoidable.

These findings are not necessarily generalisable 

for all SAPS leaders across South African 

provinces. Cockcroft19 argues that police 

leadership is central to the strategic 

Table 1: The breakdown of officer rank relative to numbers of years of service 

Rank
(listed in 

descending 
seniority)

Years of service

10 years & 
<unknown

11–15 16–20 21–24 25–30 31–35 36–40

Major General 1 1 3 4

Brigadier 1 1 12 5 4

Colonel 2 3 20 11 4

Lt Colonel 1 3 6 4 2

Major

Captain 3 4 24 3 1

Warrant Officer 2 6

Sergeant 2

Constable 5

Total (138) 6 4 5 14 71 27 11



INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES & UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN2 – 48

direction given to frontline officers. As such, 
understanding how senior officers respond to 
danger directly impacts the safety policies they 
then develop for frontline officers. As such, it 
would be beneficial for a similar study to be 
conducted across the provinces to understand 
the interpretation of danger by the SAPS 
amongst its senior personnel.

Findings

Police safety: ‘Things are getting worse 
by the day’

The first two questions aimed to get an overall 
sense of security, individual safety and morale 
amongst senior personnel and SAPS members. 
The first question asked: ‘How would you 
describe morale within the South African Police 
Service today?’

A strikingly low percentage of the respondents 
(10.8%, n=15) felt that morale among the 
police is good, and that the job is ‘interesting 
and very important.’ Eighty-six percent of the 
police who took the survey felt that morale was 
problematic: 40.5% (n=56) and described it as 
‘not so good’, while 46% (n=64) described it as 
‘really low’.20 

The second question focused on past and 

current concerns about safety to ascertain 

how these attitudes have changed over 

time. Fifty-eight percent of the respondents 

(n=79) agreed with the statement that police 

are now ‘much more concerned with their 

safety. Things are getting worse by the day.’ 

Twenty-three percent (n=32) were ‘a bit more 

concerned than in the past’, while 17 percent 

(n=24) rated their levels of concern for their 

safety as ‘the same as in the past [because] 

police work is always dangerous.’

Understanding serious injuries 

To contrast officers’ safety perceptions against 

experiences of injuries while on duty we asked 

respondents whether they had suffered serious 

injuries while on duty in the last five years. 

If they had been injured, we asked them to 

describe the injuries and the incident that led 

to the injuries. 

Ninety two percent of respondents (n=127) 

did not experience any injuries while on duty. 

Only five percent (n=7), indicated that they had 

suffered an injury. Of these 7 cases, four related 

to a physical injury, namely a deep cut to the 

Figure 1: How is morale in the SAPS today?

Morale is good. 
The job is interesting 
and very important

64 (46%) 
Morale is
 really low 56 (40.5%) 

Morale is not 
so good

Figure 2: How concerned are police with  
 their safety?21

79 (58%) 
Much more 
concerned. 
Things are 

getting worse 
by the day

24 (17%)

32 (23%) 
A bit more 
concerned 
than in the 

past

The same as in the past. Police 
work is always dangerous

15 
(10.8%)



2 – 49SA CRIME QUARTERLY NO. 71 • 2022

head, a knee injury, a broken finger, and one 
responded noted that he experienced pain, 
but didn’t describe the injury. All four officers 
had been injured while attempting to arrest 
suspects. Two respondents indicated that they 
suffer from PTSD because of their experiences. 
One respondent noted that a petrol bomb was 
thrown at his house, but he did not suffer any 
injury. Another respondent noted that he had 
sustained a back injury during operational duties 
but did not provide further details. 

Four respondents provided more general 
information, falling outside of the five-year 
window. A major general with thirty-three years’ 
service stated that he had never been injured 
but “there had been many attempts”. Similarly, 
a Colonel with 35 years’ service stated that 
although he had never been injured, many of 
his members were attacked in shebeens and 
in other incidents, for example, when vehicles 
were stoned. Another Colonel, with 26 years’ 
service, highlighted an incident from 15 years 
ago where she had been shot at while driving a 
police van and she was pregnant at the time. 

Colleagues killed

Respondents were then asked whether they 

had colleagues who had been killed on or off 

during in the past five years. Figure 3 shows 

that 38 percent of respondents (n=5222) knew of 

a colleague who had been killed in the last five 

years. The most notable cause of death among 

these was by gunshot (n=42) sustained while 

the officers were on duty or during 

investigations. Three of the deaths were 

described as “accidental,” which in SAPS 

parlance generally refers to ‘friendly fire’ (where 

an officer is shot by a colleague) or where an 

officer may have accidentally shot themselves 

through the mishandling of firearms.23

Seven respondents knew officers who were 

stabbed while on duty. It is interesting to 

note that none of the respondents reported 

cases where off-duty officers were stabbed. 

On duty road traffic collisions accounted 

for six cases with one further off-duty road 

traffic collision where the circumstances 

were unspecified. 

Figure 3: Cause of death among colleagues (on and off duty)

Shot – on duty/during course 
of investigation (arrest/

investigation/patrols)

Attacked – on duty (stabbed)

Road traffic collision – on duty

Suicide

Shot – accidental

Targeted as a police officer 
– off duty

Road traffic collision – off duty

Murder – suicide

Victim of crime – off duty

42

7

6

4

3

2

1

1

1

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45



INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES & UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN2 – 50

Police suicide24 remains an ongoing concern 
for SAPS members and leadership alike. 
Respondents noted four cases of suicide 
and one case of murder-suicide which an 
officer murdered their significant other prior to 
committing suicide. 

Three off-duty deaths were reported: two 
officers were described as having been targeted 
because they were SAPS members and one 
was described as ‘a victim of crime’.

Determining danger 

To measure how they identified danger, 
respondents were asked to indicate three 
reasons why police officers are attacked. 
Fourteen themes emerged among the 
reasons they provided, which were grouped 
thematically (see Figure 4), and covering 

Figure 4: Reasons for attacks on officers

issues like resources and equipment, 
training and preparation, organised crime, 
community issues, criminal justice system 
problems, corruption and complacency and 
political reasons.25 

Looking at these responses thematically, 
27 percent (n=133) attributed attacks on 
the police to the criminality of communities 
and organised crime/gangs. Explanations 
that fell under this broad theme included 
the fact that criminals target the police to 
steal their firearms and the fact that career 
criminals frequently do not fear the law. 
Respondents also noted that the pulse of 
many communities changing with respect to 
policing, arguing for example that there was 
“a breakdown of social order” and “a social 
decay of the community’s values”. 

Insufficient training

Poor police attitude

Attacked for firearms
(easy access)

Criminality of community

Police corruption

Resentment of police

Poor community relations

Lack of political will

Counter attacks by criminals

Insufficient resources

Poor fitness and health 
of police

Poor off-duty habits

Gang related

Environmental factors

67

58

44

36

34

34

32

28

26

19

11

5

5

1

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70



2 – 51SA CRIME QUARTERLY NO. 71 • 2022

A sizeable number of respondents (13 percent, 

n=62) blamed the fact that officers are being 

attacked on the fact the criminal justice system 

is “ineffective”. One respondent noted that “the 

criminal justice system is totally broken down” 

while others lamented that “punishments are 

light” and “there is no deterrence.” Respondents 

felt that other sectors of the criminal justice 

system were to blame noting that “arrest made 

by a police official sent to court, case not 

prosecuted, less sentences” and that “criminals 

are granted bail … they don’t fear the law and 

they come out to hunt for us.”

Respondents also stated that training-related 

issues were a concern in respect of attacks on 

them. One respondent noted that “police lack 

adequate equipment [such as] guns, uniforms, 

Figure 4: Reasons for attacks on officers

bullet proof vests.” The quality of bullet proof 

vests was also raised, arguing that they were 

“too heavy” to be operationally functional. 

Respondents felt that there was an over-

emphasis in allocating resources to special units 

while other police departments were neglected. 

Figure 5 shows that the issues that respondents 

raised as the reasons for attacks on the police 

largely mirrored the biggest dangers they 

identified as confronting the police today. 

Leadership speaks

Recognising and identifying how police leaders 

perceive danger is a first step to understanding 

how and why they make the decisions that they 

do in respect of policing actions. I discuss the 

key themes that were raised below.

Figure 5: Biggest dangers confronting the police26

Violence community/gangs

Resource issues: equipment/
lack of training/recruitment

Poor police discipline/attitude

Corrupt police

Lack of respect for police

Police work

Police as targets

Lawlessness

Lack of government response/
appropriate punishment

Environmental design

Firearms

28   19%

22   15.6%

18   12%

15   10.6%

15   10%

9   6%

8   5.6%

8   5.6%

7   5%

5   3.5%

0 5 10 15 20 25 30

6   4%



INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES & UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN2 – 52

Operational readiness: 
an individual problem

Operational readiness speaks to the ability 
of the officer to self-mobilise in dangerous 
circumstances, and covers both equipment 
and firearm serviceability and the officer’s 
efforts to maintain them. Officers’ individual 
ability and focus were identified as key issues. 
Respondents argued that officers were not 
operationally ready when at work. And yet, 
during fieldwork for the larger research project, 
I noticed that posters were placed throughout 
police stations by police managers as a visual 
reminder to frontline officers. These posters 
read: ‘Ensure that you are operationally ready’ 
– with a survival checklist emboldened in red 
writing splashed across the poster. 

Operational readiness also incorporates the 
idea that officers should undergo continuous 
professional development and should seek to 
improve their operational and tactical skills.27 
Respondents also noted that many officers were 
originally trained as soldiers, and transitioned 
later to become police officers: ‘There are 
soldiers who crossed to police service, they 
ignore police training yet this is a different 
environment’. Some respondents felt that these 
former soldiers underestimated or ignored 
police training, even though the operational 
environment was clearly different. They noted 
that the militaristic nature often associated with 
policing, and particularly in the South African 
context, does not necessarily translate into 
operational readiness. Respondents therefore 
appeared to interpret operational readiness in a 
much broader operational sense. 

Health and mental fitness

Many respondents spoke of issues surrounding 
the fitness and overall well-being of police, 
noting that officers failed to keep themselves 
fit in order to carry out their duties. This fitness 
narrative however, extended beyond the well-
worn rhetoric of the SAPS members being 

overweight.28 Respondents also spoke to the 
fact that many officers are not mentally fit as a 
result of overwork and not having appropriate 
periods of rest to recover. In this sense, the 
lack of officers available for duty was noted as 
a problem that feeds the problematic realities of 
operational readiness. Reduced staffing directly 
impacts operations in this regard. 

The lack of suitable and usable equipment was 
also considered as a factor in attacks upon 
police. Indeed, the provision of Bullet Resistant 
Vests (BRVs) can be seen as a formal response 
by the police organisation to danger. During 
fieldwork, uniform officers and detectives alike 
often did not wear the BRV or partially wore 
it – in other words, with one protective plate 
instead of the required two.29 This spoke to both 
the limited functionality and (dis)comfort levels 
involved in wearing their BRV. In the survey 
senior managers agreed with frontline officers, 
noting that the vests were ‘too heavy’ and too 
cumbersome to wear. 

These responses must be considered with 
the finding that SAPS members are often 
perceived as being indifferent to their own 
safety when working and, as a result, are not 
alert to the potential dangers around them. 
Four respondents noted the issue of the 
members using their mobile while on duty. 
One respondent explained: ‘Members are very 
relaxed, sometimes you will find the passenger 
in the van busy with cell phone instead of 
checking their surroundings’. 

Indeed, the issue of preoccupation with mobile 
phones was something which the author 
noted as an ongoing issue of concern during 
ethnographic fieldwork. This issue was not 
isolated to a specific group of officers and 
phone distraction was noted on a regular basis 
working across three different operational units 
(Visible Policing, Detectives and the Tactical 
Response Team). In one case, a SAPS front 
seat passenger was observed playing the 



2 – 53SA CRIME QUARTERLY NO. 71 • 2022

mobile phone game ‘Candy Crush’ for a full 20 
minutes, while driving through the township with 
one of the highest rates of civilian and police 
murders in South Africa. The fact that only four 
respondents identified mobile phone distractions 
as a concern, particularly when compared to the 
author’s commonplace experience in the field 
with frontline police officers, raises important 
questions about the visibility that leaders have 
with their respective teams.

Taking home firearms 

The use of firearms by the SAPS has featured 
prominently in debates, both past and present, 
particularly about the use of lethal force by 
police.30 There is a complex, if not paradoxical, 
relationship between the SAPS and firearms. 
For the senior police personnel, firearms were 
both a source of safety and of danger. One 
respondent recognised the tension between 
the issue of bringing firearms home, noting, 
‘This can be argued from both sides. Yes – for 
their protection and safety. No – depending on 
the character, personality, circumstances can 
be used as a weapon against family and/or 
themselves (suicide)’.

Dockets analysed for the larger project covered 
the 12 years between 2002 and 2014, and 
showed that only 20% of all police murders 
in the Western Cape were committed for the 
purpose of obtaining the officer’s firearm. Even 
though the officer’s firearm may have been taken 
during many of the other 80% of incidents, 
the weapon does not seem to have been the 
primary motivation for the killing. Despite these 
statistics, Figure 6 shows that 63.7% of senior 
personnel believed that officers should take their 
firearms home when off duty. The reasons given 
spanned from self-defence and the idea that 
they are police officers at all times, to reasons 
that it was not. 

The views of senior personnel differed 
significantly from front line officers who believed 
that they were targeted for their firearms. But, as 

one respondent explained, ‘Most members are 

attacked to get hold of their firearms. Members 

visit shebeens with their firearms and get drunk 

and robbed’. This narrative differs from that of 

frontline officers who failed to identify where 

these attacks actually occurred as readily. While 

most junior officers believe that they are being 

killed for their firearms at these locations, the 

reality may be somewhat different. With over 

25 000 illegal shebeens in the Cape Town 

area,32 it is more likely the type of premises and 

intoxicated behaviours that take place there 

cause these robberies, rather than the mere 

fact of having a firearm. 

Respondents that believed that police should 

not take their firearms home pointed to officers’ 

lack of operational readiness and negligence. 

One respondent explained: ‘police are not 

under siege; whilst off duty they tend to lose the 

firearms as a result of negligence’. 

The reality of having to deal with domestic 

violence cases was also a matter of concern 

for many regarding firearms. One respondent 

noted, ‘I have had too many experiences 

where the opportunity is suddenly at hand to 

solve an internal challenge. Directly involved 

Figure 6: Should police take their firearms  
 home with them?31

Undecided
9 (6.5%)

No
36 (26%)

Yes
88 (63.7%)



INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES & UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN2 – 54

in experiences in 4 suicides (3 with service 
pistols).’ Since 2015, little appears to have 
changed. In 2017/18, 11 SAPS officers were 
killed as a result of domestic violence, seven of 
them by fellow SAPS officers.33 Respondent’s 
recognised the risk of officers having firearms, 
where increases in domestic violence involving 
officers and the potential of murder/suicide 

Corruption and complacency

Fifty-seven percent (57%) of respondents 
commented on the presence of corruption as 
a contributing factor to the danger experienced 
within the SAPS. Corruption occurs amongst 
the ranks and danger is then seen as 
something which does not just manifest 
as an external threat but often stems from 
within the organisation itself. Responses were 
unanimous in the perception that, ‘the enemy 
is amidst us, some members are corrupt, 
so they organise there [criminals] attacks 
against own colleagues to be successful 
in drug activities’, ‘the police themselves, 
they [are] involve[d] in criminal activities’. 
Indeed, one respondent simply stated, ‘the 
SAPS are corrupt’. Throughout the world, 
corruption is understood as an organisationally 
pervasive and historically persistent part of 
police organisations.34 Through this lens, a 
perception of corrupt officers has now become 
a perceived state of existence in the SAPS.

During the funeral for a murdered officer, who 
had been robbed and stabbed on his way 
to work,35 the head of the Hawks, a senior 
officer and the deceased officer’s boss, stated 
‘we will continue rooting out corrupt officials 
and name and shame them’. However, the 
deceased was not known to be involved in 
any corrupt activities. By confessing to the 
existence of corruption in the police there is 
an acknowledgement that this issue may be 
partly responsible for officers being killed in 
the first place. Such narratives also succeed 
in indicating that danger is something that 

lurks inside the organisation itself,36 and is 
almost omnipresent, regardless of an officer’s 
rank. It is important to note that beliefs about 
corruption also feed into poor morale in the 
SAPS, and become mutually reinforcing. 

Political reasons

Explaining why police are being attacked 
and/or murdered, one respondent noted, 
‘politicians have created that environment by 
blaming police for any action they take’. This 
blame appears to be driven by suggestions 
of political rhetoric. As one respondent noted: 
‘Politics is setting the tone towards the 
police officers. Top management is attacked 
verbally at Parliament’. One of the ongoing 
issues in the appointment of senior officers 
within the SAPS is that much of the top 
leadership in the SAPS is in disarray because 
of political appointments at the expense 
of competent career police officials.37 The 
lack of an independent selection panel for 
senior police appointments adds a credibility 
concern to those personnel who then become 
appointed. Questions of transparency in the 
hiring process will remain without independent 
selection panels. 

Emotional responses

Emotions are a background to cognition and 
behaviour. Drodge and Murphy highlight how 
the role of emotions in leadership, when they 
were discussed at all, tended to be viewed 
either negatively as irrational dimensions of 
mind interfering with the rational business 
of leading or as a discrete psychological 
category subsumed within emotional 
intelligence.38 This stance is now considered 
somewhat of a police stereotype of what a 
leader is meant to do, in other words, set 
emotions aside and calmly calculate the most 
appropriate decision. 

Respondents were asked how they felt 
when a member of the police is attacked or 



2 – 55SA CRIME QUARTERLY NO. 71 • 2022

murdered (see Figure 7 below). This question 

was posed because rarely, if ever, are senior 

members asked to speak about how they 

feel. More often than not the murder of police 

officers is discussed as a quantifiable thing 

where the emotional impact of the officer is left 

unexamined. In response, one officer responded 

in a single sentence: ‘Bad, sad and angry’. This 

response captures all of the officers’ views, 

although they replied with varying levels of 

emotion. Another noted that they felt ‘gutted’ 

and added that ‘It feels like a member of my 

family was shot.’

Many responses also spoke to a sense 

of abandonment by both the state and 

Sad

Angry

Bad

Upset

Personal

Affects morale

Fear

Sense of abandonment

Traumatised

Mental impact

Desire for revenge

Frustrated

Impact on community

Pain

Helplessness

Shock

45   20%%

31   14%

28   12%

18   8%

17   7%

15   7%

15   7%

10   4%

9   4%

8   4%

7   3%

6   3%

6   3%

6   3%

4   2%

3   1%

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50

Figure 7: Feelings when a member of the police is attacked or murdered39

communities they serve. Responses looked 

at the impact of these attacks from more 

than just the organisational perspective. One 

respondent noted, ‘there is a community impact 

– community is robbed of a member keeping 

them safe’ and another noted, ‘I am concerned 

because it looks like everything is going chaotic 

and is lawlessness is taking place’. The sense of 

state abandonment could be read between the 

lines of these responses. 

Understanding the depth of emotional response 

of the SAPS leadership is important to be 

able to determine the emotional labour, which 

is often portrayed through the stereotype as 

described above. In this survey, the responses 



INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES & UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN2 – 56

highlighted how SAPS’ leaders related to these 
incidents where officers experienced danger. As 
noted by one, ‘I feel very bad because I am their 
commander. They are my sons and daughters’. 
The feeling of losing a relative was a common 
thread. One respondent noted, ‘it’s like a loss of 
a family member- like one of my own murdered. 
Gutted’. Emotional labour is understood as 
the effort required to create emotions for 
organisational goals. These responses, however, 
are not categorised as staged or feigned. If 
anything, they reflect how personally the police 
deal with such attacks. 

Solutions

Officers were asked for possible solutions that 
could prevent the killing of officers. As figure 
8 shows, many of their responses echoed 
elements of the reasons for attacks and killings 
in the first place.

Responses about the possible solutions 
to prevent killing of officers were grouped 
thematically, and were rich and varied, which 
underscores the importance of soliciting 

opinions from within the leadership personnel. 
The theme ‘Training/Operational Readiness’ and 
‘Equipment’ gained the largest response owing 
to the fact that these issues often overlap with 
each other. For example one respondent stated, 
‘Officers must be well equipped and tactically 
trained to fight back’. Such responses were then 
coded under both the training and equipment 
sub-themes. There was also a degree of overlap 
between the themes of ‘training’ and ‘awareness 
and attitude of the police’ as respondents 
believed that the attitude and awareness of 
police officers could be improved through 
‘emotional intelligence’ and ‘mindset’ training. 
One respondent suggested using motivational 
speakers to address staff could assist in 
improving the attitude and morale of members.

One of the benefits of the questionnaire 
approach is that potential solutions are often 
embedded in the respondents comments. One 
respondent noted, ‘It depends – in today’s life 
our members also face personal problems, so 
we have to do first a risk analysis in order to 
make sure members personal life is healthy and 

Figure 8: Possible solutions to prevent killing of officers40

Training/operational readiness/
Improved equipment

Improved criminal justice 
response to the murder of police

Community mobilisation 

Awareness and attitude of police

Managerial issues

Recruitment and evaluation of 
serving police officers

Socio-economic issues

Internal corruption issues

99   35%

45   16%

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

Source: Own data.

37   13%

31   11%

23   8%

16   5.6%

16   5.6%

15   5%



2 – 57SA CRIME QUARTERLY NO. 71 • 2022

[assess their] domestic violence risk’. The fact 
that an officer with domestic violence issues 
is allowed to still serve in the police may be 
surprising to some, however it is a reality to 
many in South Africa where domestic violence 
is a common problem. 

Many respondents noted that improved 
relationships with communities would also 
assist in preventing the danger that officers are 
exposed to. Reponses noted that there was, 
‘a breakdown in social order’’ and that ‘high 
levels of unemployment’ and ‘social decay of the 
community’s values’ appeared to be contributory 
factors in the poor relationships between the 
SAPS and the communities they served.

Responses about the criminal justice system 
were noted across many questions posed. 
One respondent noted that ‘the criminal justice 
system is totally broken down and is ineffective 
and as such it was no deterrence’ [sic]. Another 
noted that ‘due to the justice system, arrest 
made by a police official sent to court, case 
not prosecuted, less sentences’. Again this 
feeds into the overall poor morale felt within the 
organisation. If these are the responses from 
senior personnel, it questions the overall tone 
being set within the organisation itself.

Conclusion

The stresses that police leaders experience 
should not be ignored in discussions about 
danger that the police face. While they may 
not be injured or killed at the same rate as their 
colleagues, they endure additional organisational 
stressors such as enforcing rules and regulations 
and making personnel decisions. Police work 
is continually evolving in terms of community 
orientation and the stressors in the workplace. 
This would suggest that emotional competence 
is now more than ever a requirement for 
successful policing.

In recent times the mental well-being of the 
police has come into sharp focus. Internationally 

and in South Africa, the rise in suicides has 

exceeded those injured and killed on duty. Based 

on calculations from the 2012–13 SAPS annual 

report and Statistics South Africa, the number of 

police deaths by suicide was 73.9 per 100 000 

officers. By comparison, 0.9 per 100 000 suicide 

deaths in the wider South Africans population.41 

As such, understanding the emotional impact 

on officers in senior leadership roles has value 

in further unpacking the challenges associated 

with police work particularly in a South African 

context. SAPS leadership appear in tune with 

these concerns.

The 2020 Police Safety Strategy42 addresses 

some of the concerns raised here but owing to 

the worldwide impact of Covid-19 this plan has 

yet to be truly operationalised. The plan itself, 

however, appears to be a reimagined version 

of an older police safety strategy, seen by this 

author, with issues relating to COVID 19 merely 

added to it. 

Understanding the responses of senior police 

officials to danger has important consequences 

for policing. First, it offers some insight into 

the health and managerial temperament of the 

larger overall police organisation. Secondly, as 

argued by Davis and Silvestri,43 challenging the 

traditional command-based militaristic style of 

police leadership and examining the emotive 

responses promotes a more approachable, 

supportive, and empowering workplace. Thirdly, 

it underscores the well-being of the individual 

officer, which is central to how police conduct 

the practical business of policing. Identifying the 

responses of the SAPS leadership to danger 

may also assist in understanding how police 

leaders cope with stress. The effect of stress can 

directly impact their decision making and as a 

result the leadership given to their subordinates. 

The findings of this research therefore provide 

insight into how the police perceive and respond 

to danger, and contribute to understanding why 

SAPS may police in the manner in which they do.



INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES & UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN2 – 58

To comment on this article visit 

http://www.issafrica.org/sacq.php

Notes
1 Dr Gráinne Perkins is the former Interim Director of Police 

Accountability for the Seattle Police Department in the 
 United States and is an adjunct faculty member at Seattle 

University. Her professional experience, spanning three 
continents, working within three different police agencies, is 
complemented with sustained criminological research and 
publications on occupational and organisational aspects of 
policing, including police suicide, memorialisation in policing 
and body-worn cameras. Her research was awarded the 
Homicide Studies, 2019 Richard Block Award for a PhD in 
Criminology from the University of Cape Town South Africa. 
She is currently writing a book entitled, Danger in Police 
Culture: Perspectives from South Africa, which is due to be 
published by Emerald Publishers in early 2023. Dr Perkins 
would like to thank would like to thank Mr Julius Kaka MSc, 
Research Consultant at Kings College London, who greatly 
assisted in the first thematic grouping of the data. She would 
also like to thank Professor Elrena Van Der Spuy, from the 
University Cape Town, who was instrumental in the 
development and administration of the questionnaire. 

2 The term ‘officer’ refers to a member of the police service and 
not specifically to a senior-ranking official. The term officer, 
member and police are used interchangeably throughout this 
discussion.

3 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Global 
Study on Homicide 2011: Trends, Contexts, Data (Vienna: 
UNODC, 2011), http://www.unodc.org/documents/
data-and-analysis/statistics/Homicide/Globa_study_on_
homicide_2011_web.pdf; United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime, Global Study on Homicide 2013: Trends, Contexts, 
Data. (Vienna: UNODC, 2013), https://www.unodc.org/gsh/; 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Global Study on 
Homicide 2019: Trends, Contexts, Data. (Vienna: UNDOC, 
2019), https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/
gsh/Booklet1.pdf.

4 Anine Kreigler and Mark Shaw, A Citizen's Guide to Crime 
Trends in South Africa (Cape Town: Jonathan Ball Publishers, 
2016).

5 South African Police Service, Annual Reports 2002–2014 
(Pretoria: South African Police Service, 2015), https://www.
saps.gov.za/about/stratframework/annualreports_arch.php. 

6 This time period was selected as the last research on the 
murder of South African police was conducted in 2000; see 
Anthony Minnaar, "The Murder of Members of The South 
African Police Service: Some Findings on Common Causes 
and Practical Preventative Steps," Acta Criminologica: African 
Journal of Criminology & Victimology 16, no. 3 (2003): 1–27, 
https://hdl.handle.net/10520/EJC28788.

7 South African Police Service, Police Safety Strategy Plan 
(Pretoria: South African Police Service, 2020).

8 Lizette Lancaster, “ Where Do Murders Occur in South 
Africa?”, ISS Today, 25 September 2013, 

 http://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/where-do-murders-occur-
in-south-africa.

9 South African Police Service, Strategic Plan 2010 to 2014 
(Pretoria: South African Police Service, 2010), 

 https://www.saps.gov.za/about/stratframework/strategic_
plan/2010_2014/strategic_plan_2010_2014.pdf

10 Mbekezeki Mkhize and Phathutshedzo Madumi, "Are 
 Police Deaths a Consequence of Flaws in the South African 

Police Service Administration? A SWOT Analysis," 
 African Security Review 25, no. 4 (2016): 323–339,   

DOI: 10.1080/10246029.2016.1225584.

11 Johan Burger, “Shooting back: The Crisis of Police Killings in 
South Africa”, ISS Today, 25 November 2015, 

 https://issafrica.org/iss-today/shooting-back-the-crisis-of-
police-killings-in-south-africa; Theresa Mallinson. “Carte 
Blanche Report: Police Killings What the Numbers Really Tell 
Us,” Daily Maverick, 16 August 2011, www.dailymaverick.
co.za/article/2011-08-16-carte-blanche-report-police-
killingswhat-the-numbers-really-tell-us/.

12 Greg Nicolson, “Police killings: Zuma Tells Cops to 
 Fight Back,” Daily Maverick, 7 September 2015, 
 https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2015-09-07-police-

killings-zuma-tells-cops-to-fight-back/. 

13 South African Police Service, Annual Report 2015/2016 
(Pretoria: South African Police Service, 2015), https://www.
saps.gov.za/about/stratframework/annualreports_arch.php.

14 The research included over 900 hours working alongside 
three police units (uniform, detectives and the Tactical 
Response Team), a review of all murder dockets of police in 
the Western Cape between 2002 and 2014, 19 semi-
structured interviews across different ranks and personnel 
and attendance at nine police funeral and memorial services. 

15 One respondent did not declare a home language.

16 Table 1 denotes the rank structure of the South African Police 
Service members who were present. 

17 Etzel Cardeña, Elaine Hatfield, John Cacioppo and Richard 
Rapson, Emotional Contagion (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997).

18 Cardeña et al., Emotional Contagion.

19 Tom Cockcroft, "Police Culture and Police Leadership," in 
Police Leadership, ed. Pauline Ramshaw, Marisa Silvestri and 
Mark Simpson (Cham, UK, Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), 

 DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-21469-2_2.

20 Three ‘Unknown’ responses were received where two 
respondents marked all boxes, and one left all blank.

21 Three officers failed to respond (1 Major, 2 Captains).

22 This figure does not suggest that 52 officers were killed as it is 
possible that two respondents separately reported the death 
of the same person.

23 The author has knowledge of such shootings that occurred 
during fieldwork.

24 The Police Safety Strategy Plan (2020) now delineates suicide 
into two categories, Individual suicide and Homicide Suicide, 
also known as ‘extended suicide’, which is noted as the killing 
of another person and subsequently taking your own life.

25 In question 5, 115 respondents provided three or more 
answers, 10 respondents gave two answers, eight 
respondents provided one answer and two respondents failed 
to respond to the question.

26 Five respondents failed to respond (1 Warrant Officer, 
 3 Captains and 1 Colonel).

27 South African Police Service, Annual Report 2015/2016 
https://www.saps.gov.za/about/stratframework/
annualreports_arch.php.

28 Chiara Carter, “Top Brass to Ambush Fat Cops”, IOL News, 
24 September 2005, https://www.iol.co.za/news/south-
africa/top-brass-set-to-ambush-fat-cops-254295; Siphokazi 
Fokazi, “SA cops are ‘fat, sick and stressed,’” IOL News, 

 12 March 2015, https://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-courts/
sa-cops-are-fat-sick-and-stressed-1830856.

29 Gráinne Perkins, “Danger and death: organisational and 
occupational responses to the murder of police in South 
Africa-a case study” (PhD Dissertation, University of Cape 
Town, 2018), http://hdl.handle.net/11427/29287.

30 David Bruce, “Lessons and Limitations of South African 
Research: Stopping Cop Killing”, South African Crime 
Quarterly 2, no. 2 (2020): 13–17; David Bruce, “Killing and the 

http://www.issafrica.org/sacq.php
http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/statistics/Homicide/Globa_study_on_homicide_2011_web.pdf
http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/statistics/Homicide/Globa_study_on_homicide_2011_web.pdf
http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/statistics/Homicide/Globa_study_on_homicide_2011_web.pdf
https://www.unodc.org/gsh/
https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/gsh/Booklet1.pdf
https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/gsh/Booklet1.pdf
https://www.saps.gov.za/about/stratframework/annualreports_arch.php
https://www.saps.gov.za/about/stratframework/annualreports_arch.php
https://hdl.handle.net/10520/EJC28788
http://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/where-do-murders-occur-in-south-africa
http://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/where-do-murders-occur-in-south-africa
https://www.saps.gov.za/about/stratframework/strategic_plan/2010_2014/strategic_plan_2010_2014.pdf
https://www.saps.gov.za/about/stratframework/strategic_plan/2010_2014/strategic_plan_2010_2014.pdf
https://issafrica.org/iss-today/shooting-back-the-crisis-of-police-killings-in-south-africa
https://issafrica.org/iss-today/shooting-back-the-crisis-of-police-killings-in-south-africa
http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2011-08-16-carte-blanche-report-police-killingswhat-the-numbers-really-tell-us/
http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2011-08-16-carte-blanche-report-police-killingswhat-the-numbers-really-tell-us/
http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2011-08-16-carte-blanche-report-police-killingswhat-the-numbers-really-tell-us/
https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2015-09-07-police-killings-zuma-tells-cops-to-fight-back/
https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2015-09-07-police-killings-zuma-tells-cops-to-fight-back/
https://www.saps.gov.za/about/stratframework/annualreports_arch.php
https://www.saps.gov.za/about/stratframework/annualreports_arch.php
https://www.saps.gov.za/about/stratframework/annualreports_arch.php
https://www.saps.gov.za/about/stratframework/annualreports_arch.php
https://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/top-brass-set-to-ambush-fat-cops-254295
https://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/top-brass-set-to-ambush-fat-cops-254295
https://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-courts/sa-cops-are-fat-sick-and-stressed-1830856
https://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-courts/sa-cops-are-fat-sick-and-stressed-1830856
http://hdl.handle.net/11427/29287


2 – 59SA CRIME QUARTERLY NO. 71 • 2022

Constitution – Arrest and the Use of Lethal Force”, South 
African Journal of Human Rights 19, no. 3 (2003): 450–454; 
David Bruce, An Acceptable Price to Pay? The Use of Lethal 
Force by Police in South Africa (Pinelands, South Africa: Open 
Society Foundation For South Africa, 2011); David Bruce, 
“Beyond Section 49: Control of the Use of Lethal Force”, 
South African Crime Quarterly 36 (2011): 3–12; Anneke Osse 
and Ignacio Cano, "Police Deadly Use of Firearms: An 
International Comparison," The International Journal of 
Human Rights 21, no. 5 (2017): 629–649; Duxita Mistry, 
Anthony Minnaar, Jean Redpath and Jabu Dlamini, The Use 
of Force by Members of the SAPS: A Case Study of Seven 
Policing Areas in Gauteng (Cape Town: Institute for Human 
Rights and Criminal Justice Studies and Technikon SA, 
compiled for the Independent Complaints Directorate).

31 Five officers failed to respond (1 Lieutenant Colonel, 1 Warrant 
Officer and 3 Captains). 

32 Parliamentary Monitoring Group (PMG), “Report of the 
Portfolio Committee on Police on Oversight Visits to Police 
Stations in Nyanga and Philippi in the Western Cape 
Province”, 31 October 2014, https://pmg.org.za/tabled-
committee-report/2126/.

33 Andrew Faull, “South Africa: Police Murder-Suicide Reveals 
South Africa's Dark Underbelly”, ISS Today, 12 Dec 2018, 
https://issafrica.org/iss-today/police-murder-suicide-reveals-
south-africas-dark-underbelly

34 Andrew Faull, “Corruption and the South African Police 
Service. A Review and its Implications,” Institute for Security 
Studies Papers 150 (2007): 20, https://issafrica.org/research/
papers/corruption-and-the-south-african-police-service-a-
review-and-its-implications.

35 On the 28th of July 2015, at approximately 5 am, Warrant 
Officer Petrus Johannes Burger Holz was driving to work to 
begin his shift. On his way between Somerset West, a suburb 
of Cape Town, and Khayelitsha, a township, he was forced to 
pull to the side of the highway. His tyres had been damaged 
by objects that had been deliberately placed on the road. 
When he pulled off the road he was then subjected to a car 
hijacking and was stabbed to death at the side of the road. 
Four suspects were arrested of whom one was subsequently 
convicted of murder.

36 Perkins, “Danger and death”.

37 South African Policing Union (SAPU), https://www.sapu.org.za/.

38 Edward Drodge and Steven Murphy, "Interrogating Emotions in 
Police Leadership," Human Resource Development Review 1, 
no. 4 (2002): 420–438.

39 Five respondents failed to respond (1 Warrant Officer, 3 
Captains and 1 Colonel). Seventy-five respondents provided 
more than one answer.

40 Nine officers failed to respond (1 Major, 1 Lieutenant. Colonel, 
 1 Colonel, 3 Captains, 2 Warrant Officers and 1 constable). 

Twenty-nine respondents selected only one response.

41 Gráinne Perkins, "Shedding Light on the Hidden Epidemic of 
Police Suicide in South Africa,” Mental Health Matters 3, no. 4 
(2016): 50–52.

42 South African Police Service, Police Safety Strategy Plan. 
Pretoria: Visible Policing South African Police Service, 2020).

43  Claire Davis and Maria Silvestri, Critical Perspectives on Police 
Leadership (Bristol Policy Press, 2020).

https://pmg.org.za/tabled-committee-report/2126/
https://pmg.org.za/tabled-committee-report/2126/
https://issafrica.org/iss-today/police-murder-suicide-reveals-south-africas-dark-underbelly
https://issafrica.org/iss-today/police-murder-suicide-reveals-south-africas-dark-underbelly
https://issafrica.org/research/papers/corruption-and-the-south-african-police-service-a-review-and-its-implications
https://issafrica.org/research/papers/corruption-and-the-south-african-police-service-a-review-and-its-implications
https://issafrica.org/research/papers/corruption-and-the-south-african-police-service-a-review-and-its-implications
https://www.sapu.org.za/