ludger mees 1 | book review note on the book review published in snm 5 (2020): barbara loyer on ludger mees, the basque contention. ethnicity, politics, violence, routledge, london / new york, 2020, p. 232-240.* this is not a reply to the arguments expressed by barbara loyer in her review. though not sharing many of them, i accept them as academically legitimate points of view. however, for reasons only the author knows, the review contains some errors and statements that do not correspond to reality. in order to prevent readers who have not read the book from being misguided, here are some clarifying remarks: 1. according to loyer, on p. 4 of the book ‘mees states “i have myself been traumatized by eta’s cruelty and by the cynicism of some its defenders, and i have grown admirative of the force of a number of its opponents – some of which have become my friends”’ (p. 233). the reality is that this statement does not appear on p. 4 of the book, nor on any other of the following or previous pages. apparently, it has been invented. 2. according to loyer, mees is ‘subliminally’ setting ‘nationalism as a natural evidence that simply emerges from this territory, and not the product of a very efficient politics’ (p. 238). the reality is that, besides highlighting the crucial importance of the ‘invention and popularization of national apparatus (…) and different festivities’, the analysis of early basque nationalism concludes placing emphasis precisely on the constructive elements of nationalist politics: ‘the mobilization of basque studies on national movements 6 (2020) | book review | 2 ludger mees nationalists required their prior emotionalization, which was facilitated through the movement’s organizational design as a community of believers, the symbolic transmission of political messages and the celebration of the nation through festivities and monuments’ (p. 59). 3. according to loyer, ‘the books that bring a contradictory perspective on his implicit thesis, that the nationalist ideology is in essence democratic, are not mentioned’. besides the fact that no such generalizing statement about the ‘democratic essence’ of nationalism can be found on any of the pages of the book, a second observation must be made. juan pablo fusi and antonio rivera, listed by loyer as among the authors who have been alleged victims of such a selective and partisan bibliographical approach (p. 237), are in fact cited throughout the book on several occasions. indeed, fusi’s pioneering study on labor politics in the basque country is quoted on p. 49, endnote 44 and on p. 82, note 3. different publications by rivera are quoted on p. 26, notes 25, 26 and 28; on p. 85, note 37; on p. 141, note 6, and on p. 265, note 12 and 15. ludger mees universidad del país vasco/euskal herriko unibertsitatea * snm is a platform that facilitates open debate on scientific content linked to the history of national movements. this also might include rectifications and amendments that relate to the accuracy of authors and contributors. it is however the journal's policy to refrain from prolonged debate on such matters. kas swerts, ‘introduction’, in: studies on national movements 8 (2021) introduction volume 8 kas swerts nise/university of antwerp in american football, the last two minutes of a game hold special relevance. as the game clock hits the final two-minute mark, the match is briefly stopped, commercials are being played, and players get a quick rest as they prepare themselves for the ‘real’ game (if the score is close, at least), as this is when ‘crunch time’ starts. every decision by both teams is intensely debated, scrutinized and planned out, and can have lasting consequences for the outcome of the game. crunch time – particularly in american football – can result in dramatic finishes or results determined by a single play or error, and certain players on the field can arise as key figures that were instrumental in their team’s win or loss. one could argue that european politics experienced a similar ‘crunch time’ in the aftermath of the first world war. as europe’s map was being redrawn following the great war, politicians and activists from different regions and ends of the political spectrum engaged in intense debates on the (political) future of their respective region or nation. the articles in this volume (partly from the 2021 nise online conference) focus on this specific period, and via a wide array of cases illustrate how different political parties or actors became relevant, and how different solutions in different cases were being proposed. moreover, in conjunction with the previous volume, volumes 7 & 8 studies on national movements 8 (2021) | introduction | 2 kas swerts provide an extensive overview of national movements across europe in the aftermath of the great war and can function as clear cases for further comparative or transnational research. furthermore, nise can announce two promising projects in the nearby future. first of all, in cooperation with asen, ghent university and the university of antwerp, nise organises the upcoming nationalism and media conference in antwerp from 5-7 april 2022. further details (and registration) can be found on https://nationalismand.media. secondly, nise has started a new digital project which will be conducted in its diane-database. in cooperation with the maurits coppieters foundation, nise will expand the ‘diliname’ (digital library of national movements in europe) project and construct a database that will comprise political documents of different national movements across europe, and extensive historical overviews of the different national movements. the aim is to provide researchers a simple and quick overview of relevant political documents from different cases across europe in order to conduce comparative and transnational research of national movements. we will post regular updates on the project, so be sure to follow or subscribe to our different channels! https://nationalismand.media/ kas swerts, ‘introduction’, in: studies on national movements 7 (2021) introduction volume 7 kas swerts nise/university of antwerp as covid-restrictions are starting to ease up, discussions on what the post-covid world should entail have flared up. the pandemic laid bare fault lines in modern society, which subsequently raised questions as to how (or if) these fundamental issues should be addressed. the debates themselves appear to indicate the feeling of a ‘new normal’, a sense that the old mechanisms do not have the same efficacy as before, and new alternative approaches or methods should arise to address contemporary and future issues. one could argue that a hundred years ago, a similar feeling of a ‘new normal’ took shape following the first world war. as old empires collapsed and new maps were being drawn, debates and questions arose across the globe on how the ‘new normal’ should be shaped and moulded. in particular, sub-national and regional movements across europe took up the debates. they not only discussed the prospects of the ‘new normal’ in their own regions, but transgressed their borders, looking across europe for similar cases, finding others with whom they could discuss alternative or novel ways to give meaning to the period after wwi. the focus on sub-national and regional movements after the first world war formed the basis for the annual nise conference which took place on 28 may 2021. in cooperation with the italian journal nazioni e regioni and the consello da cultura galega, the conference (following the 2019 http://www.nazionieregioni.it/ http://consellodacultura.gal/paxina.php?id=587 studies on national movements 7 (2021) | introduction | 2 kas swerts nise warsaw conference which addressed the issue of ‘national minorities’ following wwi) focused on the way the implementation of the principles of nationality and national self-determination after the great war were fraught with inconsistency, resulting in new issues and question being raised on the regional, national, and international level. four different sessions – ‘irridentism and periphery’, ‘irridentism and minorities debated’, ‘diversity and repression’, ‘minorities and diplomacy’ – delved into various aspects of the general questions that were being raised following the first world war, and the problems following the inconsistent implementation of the principles of nationality. the articles in this volume stem from this conference and include a number of cases across europe. they not only highlight the intricate and diverse ways in which different regions and (sub)-nations dealt with the post-war context and the themes addressed in the conference, but also illustrate the transnational character of these movements: protagonists of these movements travelled across europe, finding inspiration or legitimacy from other regions, or forming friendships or alliances that could strengthen their own claims. finally, while this volume only includes a section of the articles that were being presented at the conference, all presentations during the conference were recorded, and you can find them online at http://www.nise.eu/europe-reframed-online-conference-nowavailable-online/ it does seem that online conferences (or the element of presentations being recorded online) are a tiny piece of the ‘new normal’ puzzle: henceforth nise will always strive to record its presentations (niselecture, conferences, etc…) in order to present its findings to a wide audience. http://www.nise.eu/europe-reframed-online-conference-now-available-online/ http://www.nise.eu/europe-reframed-online-conference-now-available-online/ guido franzinetti, ‘book review: sergej flere and rudi klanjšek, the rise and fall of socialist yugoslavia. elite nationalism and the collapse of a federation’, in: studies on national movements 8 (2021) book review sergej flere and rudi klanjšek, the rise and fall of socialist yugoslavia. elite nationalism and the collapse of a federation. lanham, london: rowman & littlefield, 2019. 334 pp. isbn 9781498541961 ‘why another book on yugoslavia?’, the authors rightly ask. plenty of books on the topic have been published since 1991, and even more were published after 1948. on the other hand, while in recent years there has been an upsurge of books on the collapse of the soviet union, there has not been any equivalent appearance of books on the end of yugoslavia. this simple fact should lead to some reflection. yugoslavia is no longer on the mind of european politicians, let alone potential readers. this is a highly promising book. the first author (flere) is a wellestablished sociologist, with special reference to the sociology of religion (a topic which was impossible to avoid in the yugoslav context). the second author (klanjšek) is a promising young sociologist. the division of labour between the two is not specified, but in most cases flere’s scholarly and professional experience (which included briefly working as a ‘junior political associate’ at the league of communists of yugoslavia at the end of the 1960s) is likely to have prevailed. the book is packed with interesting facts and anecdotes, which in themselves make it worth reading. it also strives to provide a studies on national movements 8 (2021) | book review | 2 guido franzinetti comprehensive overview of research on the dissolution of the second yugoslavia, but in so doing it stretches itself too thinly. many of the usual authors are mentioned and discussed, but quite a few are not. furthermore, many authors are discussed in a cursory and imprecise manner. if one really needs to refer to zbigniew brzezinski’s views on totalitarianism, one should at least check what he was saying in the 1960s, and not only in the 1950s. all too much space is devoted to punctilious critiques (often justified) and not enough to making a positive argument. as befits a book written by an author of flere’s generation, the first two chapters, covering the creation of socialist yugoslavia, are the most rewarding. they offer a detailed description of the state-building process, with a degree of attentiveness which is often lacking in many accounts of this period. the third chapter addresses the contentious issue of ‘was ‘tito’s’ yugoslavia totalitarian?’. predictably, this remains a highly controversial one in political and scholarly debates in the exyugoslav republics. the authors give a negative answer to the question, and they have been frequently attacked for this reason. but to an outsider this appear an incredibly provincial debate. in the west, from the 1960s onwards (and perhaps even earlier) nobody seriously considered tito’s yugoslavia ‘totalitarian’. but, for that matter, at the time few would have considered poland or hungary ‘totalitarian’. nor would the soviet union have been seen as ‘totalitarian’. even the neoconservative revival in the usa of such a notion proved to be a relatively short-lived affair. undoubtedly, the yugoslav system was a communist dictatorship. the real historical issue is not whether this dictatorship required a ‘totalitarian’ label but, rather, how did yugoslav citizens perceive it at the time, and, even more importantly, how do they perceive it now, in retrospect? for example, how did the son of a chetnik father perceive the system? the results of the first free elections in ‘post-communist’ exstudies on national movements 8 (2021) | book review guido franzinetti 3 | yugoslav republics give the impression that many voters did not hold ‘tito’s yugoslavia’ in such high esteem. these disillusioned yugoslavs may even have been a minority at the time, but they were sufficient to condition political developments after 1990. the subsequent two chapters focus on the 1970s and 1980s, the last two decades of the yugoslav socialist system. when it comes to factual matters, the book is always rewarding, and deserves attentive reading, regardless of whether one always shares the authors’ point of view. they essentially provide a description of what has been termed the process of ‘republicanisation’ of the elites of the yugoslav republics. the crucial role of this process in leading to the dissolution of the socialist federal republic (sfry) should be undisputable. the last three chapters are devoted to a description of the actual process of dissolution, to its theoretical explanation and to its relevance for the outside world. these chapters are less satisfactory, at least from a historian’s point of view. the theoretical analysis is overambitious in trying to provide a comprehensive and up-to-date overview of the theoretical debates on the yugoslav dissolution (as if these had not already been surveyed in other studies). a more circumscribed approach would have been more productive from any point of view. in itself, the view of the collapse of the sfry as inevitable is nowadays relatively uncontroversial. what remain controversial are the reasons for such a collapse. the authors rightly emphasize the crucial role played by the republican elites. but they also attach great importance to the role of ‘nationalism’, as if such a term provided a real explanation. one of the great achievements of ernest gellner’s theory of nationalism was its ability to properly historicize nationalism in european history, allowing it to be analysed without being demonized. unfortunately, the authors prefer to banalize gellner’s theory, and stick to a very hazy (and perhaps traditional) view of nationalism. studies on national movements 8 (2021) | book review | 4 guido franzinetti coming to the role of western europe in the final yugoslav crisis, the authors seem to have rather unrealistic expectations of what the europeans could have done to prevent it. the fact is that the key governments of the european community (and later european union) were not in the least willing to play an active role in saving the sfry. the issue was not primarily that of the possibly premature recognition of slovene and croat independence which the german federal republic pushed for. the key players were the only states which had (and have) credible military force, great britain and france. their action (and inaction) was the decisive factor. as david owen pointed out in balkan odyssey (1995), when the netherlands (on 13 july 1991) made a proposal for an international conference to promote ‘a voluntary redrawing of internal borders between the yugoslav republics’, this obtained precisely zero votes, and the key abstainers were great britain and france. in short, ‘europe’ (rather than the german-austrian-vatican axis) was simply not willing to put any real effort in preventing the yugoslav dissolution. in conclusion, this remains a stimulating book, but it is by no means a reliable summing-up of the debates on the end of yugoslavia. guido franzinetti università degli studi del piemonte orientale emmanuel dalle mulle, ‘book review: maurice pinard, maurice pinard, nationalist movements explained. comparisons from canada, belgium, spain, and switzerland.’, in: studies on national movements 6 (2020). book review maurice pinard, nationalist movements explained. comparisons from canada, belgium, spain, and switzerland. london: routledge, 2020, 202 pp, 11 illustrations. isbn 9780367271459 maurice pinard’s nationalist movements explained and the perils of comparative research for any scholar of social movements and, in particular, the quebec independence movement, maurice pinard is a venerable authority. in the 1980s, his studies broke new ground and contributed decisively to identifying the determinants of nationalist mobilisation and the electoral support for pro-independence parties. while in his previous monograph pinard condensed more than 30 years of research in a socialpsychological theory focusing on motivational factors,1 in this book, he expands his theoretical framework and tests it more systematically on a series of nationalist movements in belgium, canada and spain. he also includes switzerland as a counter-case in which cultural, linguistic and religious cleavages did not lead to the rise of strong sub-state nationalist movements (with the exception of the ephemeral campaign for the creation of the jura canton in the 1970s). there is much to commend in this study, especially in the first and third chapters, which outline comprehensively pinards’ model and offer an interesting summary of the existing literature on nationalist contentious studies on national movements 6 (2020) | book reviews | 2 emmanuel dalle mulle action. it is impossible to do justice to pinard’s framework in this short review, but, in essence, he singles out two clusters of determinants of nationalist mobilization: socio-psychological and structural. structural determinants are not only embodied by long-term processes such as modernisation, urbanisation, industrialisation, secularisation, statemaking and war, as well as cultural segmentation, but also by more volatile factors such as political opportunities. structural determinants somehow set the ground for the socio-psychological factors that explain, at the micro-level, the drive for engaging in nationalist mobilisation felt by the active members of nationalist movements. it is this set of sociopsychological factors which, according to pinard, accounts best for ‘the emergence and development of the national question’ (p. 5). pinard especially emphasises motivational factors, notably: (a) felt grievances, that is, perceived deprivation to which people attach feelings of discontent or injustice; b) collective incentives; and, often neglected, c) expectancy of success.2 to these motivational factors, pinard adds framing processes, beliefs and values. while some would criticize pinard’s theoretical insights for not being sufficiently parsimonious, they simply reflect the complexity of nationalist mobilisation, which is heavily influenced by contextual elements making the varying combinations of factors outlined by pinard a richer explanatory matrix than many other theoretical models in the current literature. in addition, pinard should also be commended for showing how some of the determinants he explores can have opposite effects on nationalist mobilisation depending on the interaction with other factors. for instance, extreme economic disparities may act as formidable sources of the discontent required to nourish felt grievances, but they can also constitute insuperable hurdles in the process of mobilisation of resources that any nationalist movement needs in order to grow and proliferate. studies on national movements 6 (2020) | book reviews emmanuel dalle mulle 3 | however, the book also has major limitations, two in particular. the first relates to the empirical evidence marshalled to support some of the claims made by the author. in chapter five, pinard argues that nationalist mobilisation in the cases analysed has followed a pattern in line with the so-called ‘cycle of protest’ perspective and, more precisely, with the evolution of levels of private materialist and post-materialist values among us college freshmen between 1966 and 2013 (figure 4.1 in the book). pinard concludes that ‘there are striking concordances between, on the one hand, the cycles of increases in personal materialism among college freshmen and of decreases in their self-fulfilment values and, on the other hand, the decline cycles of support for the nationalist parties which we have been considering’ (p. 129). more precisely, ‘the decline in support of a meaningful philosophy of life accompanied the decline in the cycle of protest movements of that period, suggesting that the first could have been a factor in the second’ (p. 116). there are three problems with this argument. first, it is highly questionable to assume that trends in private values among us freshmen can be used as a measure for value changes in other countries. second, some of the data challenge his conclusions. in the case of quebec, electoral support for the parti québecois (pq) increased consistently from 1970 to 1981 coinciding almost perfectly with declining levels of private selffulfilment values and increasing levels of private materialism. the same occurred in catalonia, between 1980 and 1984, when convergencia i unio (ciu) rose to the position of dominant party in the region. in belgium, the data roughly fit pinard’s claim, but only if one accepts the very questionable idea that the vlaams belang (vb) can be excluded from the picture simply because it is an anti-immigration party, as pinard does. this leads to the third problem. pinard tends to take into account only one (dominant) party in most of the regions under study. this is problematic because, had he considered the total sum of votes of the two major nationalist parties in flanders (volksunie and vb until 2001; nieuw-vlaamse alliantie, n-va, and vb after 2001) and catalonia (ciu studies on national movements 6 (2020) | book reviews | 4 emmanuel dalle mulle and esquerra republicana de catalunya, erc), he would have found very different electoral trends from those he reports. the second limitation of the book pertains to the comparative dimension of the study. comparative research is a thankless job. those who venture into it have to confront the extremely time-consuming task of getting acquainted with the very complex contexts of several cases, while accepting at the outset that they will never know these as well as scholars that specialise exclusively in such cases. hence, they will always expose themselves to criticism that their case studies are not accurate enough. that said, one cannot help feeling that, apart from the parts on quebec, this book could have displayed a better command of the context of each case. there are indeed a number of factual inaccuracies throughout the volume. some do not really affect the overall argument, but others are more problematic. at the end of chapter five, for example, pinard concludes that organisational tensions are likely to arise within successful ethno-regionalist parties thus causing their decline. he says ‘strong nationalist ideologies easily produce internal tensions and competition, and in particular the emergence of new parties on their left, such as quebec solidaire in quebec, the n-va in flanders, the erc and candidatura d’unitat popular in catalonia’. now, erc was founded in 1931 and is one of the oldest parties of current spanish politics. the nva is indeed a relatively new party, founded in 2001, but it stands clearly to the right of the disappeared vu. to conclude, pinard’s book will certainly be useful to whoever wants to engage with his sophisticated theoretical insights and to those who aim at getting familiarised with the existing literature on nationalist contestation. however, readers should consider with a degree of scepticism some of the conclusion he draws. emmanuel dalle mulle graduate institute of international and development studies geneva studies on national movements 6 (2020) | book reviews emmanuel dalle mulle 5 | endnotes 1 see m. pinard, motivational dimensions in social movements and contentious collective action (montreal, 2011). 2 in a 1986 article written with richard hamilton, pinard appropriately quoted leon trotsky arguing that if grievances were sufficient to explain mass protest, ‘the masses would always be in revolt’. m. pinard and r. hamilton, ‘motivational dimensions in the quebec independence movement: a test of a new model’, in: research in social movements, conflict and change, 9 (1986), 258. maría nagore-ferrer, ‘book review: sandie holguín, flamenco nation. the construction of spanish national identity’, in: studies on national movements 6 (2020). book review sandie holguín, flamenco nation. the construction of spanish national identity. madison, wisconsin: the university of wisconsin press, 2019, 361 pp, 40 illustrations. isbn 9780299321802 in may 1847, the american traveller s. teackle wallis arrived in seville in the middle of a wave of protests against the rise in the price of grain. two days after witnessing a violent riot in the tobacco factory, he attended a ‘private ballet’, in which ‘a black-eyed, gypsy-looking girl, one of the cigarreras of the riot’ featured prominently. her dance reflected some of the fury that erupted two days previously. this scene, which excellently depicts some of the topics with which spanish ‘exoticism’ is viewed by romantic travellers, is used by sandie holguín to introduce a subject as attractive as it is complex: the role of flamenco in the construction of spanish national identity. both the title of the book – flamenco nation – and the illustration on the cover are provocative. at first glance, one could assume that this is a book that provides an external view of flamenco as a symbol of an exotic spain that has attracted many travellers and tourists, but is not recognized by the spanish themselves. nothing, however, could be further from the truth. the author, a historian with a number of previous publications on spain’s contemporary history, among them the book creating spaniards: culture and national identity in republican spain studies on national movements 6 (2020) | book reviews | 2 maría nagore-ferrer (university of wisconsin press, 2002), examines with depth and accuracy this complex subject. the work stems from a question that precisely reflects the aforementioned conundrum: ‘how did flamenco, castigated as a degenerate form of song and dance associated with both the gypsies, a despised ethnic minority in spain, and andalusia, a region often derided as backward, become inexorably tied to spain's national identity? why did flamenco persist as a symbol of the nation when so many elites within spain worked feverishly for nearly a century to excise it from the country?’ (pp. 7-8). to answer these questions, holguín carries out an extensive analysis that begins in the late eighteenth century and continues through to 1975. her research is not focused on flamenco as a form of musical expression, although she does outline in chapter 1 the origin and evolution of the genre in its essential elements (toque, cante and baile), to initiate the reader who may be unfamiliar with the origins of flamenco. she instead approaches the subject from a holistic perspective, by placing ‘the evolution of this performance within the larger spanish and european historical, cultural, and political trends of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries’ (p. 8). this is one of the successful aspects of the work, which goes beyond the traditional approaches in the study of flamenco, in favour of a transnational perspective, examining both the internal and external images of spain in the construction of its national identity. in reference to the discussion on national identity, some statements by the author could be refuted, such as ‘over the course of the nineteenth century, flamenco became reified as one of two major expressions of spanish national identity – the other one being bullfighting’. however, her analysis of complex concepts such as nationalism, regionalism or national identity is exemplary. studies on national movements 6 (2020) | book reviews maría nagore-ferrer 3 | flamenco nation is composed of three parts divided into seven chapters, preceded by a documented introduction and ended with a final coda, a glossary, notes, an extensive bibliography and a useful onomastic index. after the introduction, which gives a thorough historiographical review and sets out the main bases of the study, the first part, ‘setting the stage’, is divided into two chapters. the first of which is an overview of the history of flamenco, its roots and how it evolved up until the early days of the restoration (1875). the author makes a commendable effort of synthesis, founded on a great deal of interdisciplinary literature on the subject, even if this synthesis does result in some inaccuracies when it comes to defining the particularities that set flamenco apart from other pre-flamenco and andalusian popular music forms. chapter 2, ‘the perils of flamenco in restoration spain, 1875-1923’, explores the phenomenon of antiflamenquismo during the restoration period (18751923) amongst three distinct elite groups, the catholic church and its conservative allies, left-leaning intellectuals and politicians, and the leaders of revolutionary workers' movements. this reaction coincides with the rise of flamenco as a popular spectacle, especially in the cafés cantantes of madrid, barcelona, and seville. here we see the full force of the contradiction interrogated at the outset of the book: while flamenco grew as a popular mass spectacle, the elites who considered themselves ‘guardians of the spanish national identity’ rejected it. the second part, ‘flamenco on the regional and international stage’, examines the different perceptions of flamenco, widening the lens to incorporate both an international and regionalist points of view. chapters 3 and 4 explore the cases of catalonia and andalusia respectively. the first describes the opposition by the emerging force of catalan nationalism, that tries to counteract the influence of flamenco by promoting manifestations they considered their own, such as the studies on national movements 6 (2020) | book reviews | 4 maría nagore-ferrer sardana or choral singing. chapter 4 focuses on andalusian regionalism through the figure of blas infante who is considered to be ‘the father of the andalusian nation’, and his efforts to define flamenco as a worthy art form. especially interesting is chapter 5, which moves away from spain to international exhibitions, examining how spanish elites wanted to have their nation represented and how that projected national identity failed to live up to their expectations on the world stage. the chapter also cites the strives of various avant-garde artists, such as garcía lorca, manuel de falla or debussy, to elevate the status of flamenco to that of a veritable art. the third part, ‘flamenco and the franco regime’, through the last two chapters, grapples with the franco regime’s ambivalence towards using flamenco as a principal marker of spanish identity. chapter 6 reveals that the regime, with the help of the catholic church and the leaders of the spanish falange, wanted to purify the spanish culture in accordance with the principles of national-catholicism, enhancing the patriotic spirit through the activity of regional spanish choirs and dance groups. it was a way of homogenising spanish folklore, and establishing a new kind of national identity, one of ‘unity in difference’, and of suppressing the musical supremacy of flamenco. finally, chapter 7 looks at the way the franco regime, in conjunction with a developing spanish tourist industry, changed course yet again to promote flamenco in order to bolster tourism industry in spain. this tactic once again perpetuated the same old stereotypes. holguín ends the book with a coda that guides us back to the present, where the dynamics between globalization and regional autonomy have once again transformed contemporary flamenco practices. studies on national movements 6 (2020) | book reviews maría nagore-ferrer 5 | throughout the volume, the author's ability to rigorously, clearly and attractively present the topics is evident. she combines the handling of a large number of sources and references with anecdotes and illustrations, and grabs the reader's attention with phrases like this one that opens chapter 1: ‘contrariness gave birth to flamenco’. a clear didactic vocation is also apparent in the structure of the book itself, which includes summaries and recapitulations at the beginning of each section. but beyond the formal aspects, the book provides an interesting and necessary insight into the subject of flamenco, which is increasingly present in academic literature. in short, it is essential reading in better understanding the place of flamenco in contemporary spain. maría nagore-ferrer universidad complutense de madrid jesse van amelsvoort, ‘book review: jelle krol, minority language writers in the wake of world war one: a case study of four european authors’, in: studies on national movements 7 (2021) book review jelle krol, minority language writers in the wake of world war one: a case study of four european authors. london: palgrave macmillan, 2020, xii+346pp., 8 illustrations. isbn 9783030520397 at the core of jelle krol’s book minority language writers in the wake of world war one are four writers from small or minority languages: the frisian douwe kalma, the welshman saunders lewis, the scottish hugh macdiarmid, and roparz hemon from brittany. krol’s scholarly origins are in frisian literature: in 2006, for example, he co-authored the stillauthoritative history of frisian literature, contributing the chapter on the two world wars and the interwar period. the acknowledgements to this book suggest minority language writers started out as a study on kalma, whose first publications appeared in the years 1915 and 1916, and then became a comparative analysis of four european authors. krol has not chosen his four authors randomly. all of them were born in the period 1892-1900 and thus came of age just before and during the first world war. in krol’s characterization, they are ‘typical vanguard writers’ (p. 4) who entered their language’s respective literary fields in the period 1915-1925 and who wanted change. krol convincingly captures europe’s wilsonian moment – the promise of national sovereignty offered by the american president as europe’s continental empires collapsed, burdened by the destruction of the war – and how studies on national movements 7 (2021) | book review | 2 jesse van amelsvoort these young artists pushed for more recognition of their language and their culture. perhaps national independence was not on their mind: after 1918, it quickly became clear that new nation-states were only really created in central and eastern europe, mostly out of the ashes of the austro-hungarian empire. even though most of these writers became politically active (only hemon did not), they mainly directed their energies to linguistic and literary means. krol’s approach is largely literary-sociological, in the vein of pierre bourdieu and pascale casanova. in each chapter, he describes the writers’ literary field and the genesis of their habitus as prominent individuals within those fields. time and again, krol addresses the problem how to define the literary field in case of a minority language literature. where welsh found itself in a rather strong position, paradoxically due to wales’ close connection with dominant england, for the other languages the situation was more difficult. scottish literature, by contrast, ‘generally means literature written in scotland or by scottish writers’; however, this is ‘mainly in english with a little gaelic and scots’ (p. 154). at the time of a national awakening, this situation becomes problematic. meanwhile, kalma worked to demarcate the borders of the frisian literary field from the dutch one (p. 67) and thus establish a certain literary autonomy. casanova provides a second set of methodological tools. refreshingly, krol does not draw on her work on the ‘world republic of letters’ (2004), but rather her later monograph on littératures combatives, or combative literatures. these literatures ‘became a central terrain to national existence’ (2011, 129), and thus differed from dominant, national literatures, which could separate the political and the aesthetic. in each chapter, krol describes the writers’ ‘combative’ entrance into the literary field, often in the form of polemical essays, manifestos, and other visionary texts. through these writings, the writers krol studies both carved out a space for themselves as representatives of a new sound and studies on national movements 7 (2021) | book review jesse van amelsvoort 3 | a new generation, and expressed a specific literary-political desire related to the minority language they advocated for and the cultural community formed around that language. from casanova, krol also takes four strategies that minority language writers employ while arguing for their language’s cultural autonomy. these are distancing, connecting, unifying, and mobilising. each writer attempts ‘to distance themselves from the dominating language and its influences’ (p. 304): although politically part of the netherlands, the united kingdom, and france, respectively, frisian, welsh, scots, and breton were in the minds of these authors very different, both culturally and historically. indeed, all four writers connected their present with the middle ages (p. 304), since during those times these minority languages were still widely used. another connection consisted in emphasizing links with ‘foreign’ languages (p. 305): as he distanced frisian from dutch, for example, kalma moved it closer to english, german, and the scandinavian languages. none of these writers went at it alone: they wanted to ‘unite the inhabitants of the regions in which they lived’ (p. 306), which explains their efforts in both politics and education. lastly, from this desire to unify also followed their attempts to mobilise fellow authors and speakers of their language (p. 307). the first years after the war were marked by great artistic experimentation and innovation, and the four writers krol discusses were no different. they experimented with new genres, which addressed the added literary-political goal of bestowing additional capital – in the bourdieuian sense – on their literary fields. at the same time, their desire to modernise existed next to their harking back to the past. ‘reculer pour mieux sauter’, krol calls it: taking a step back in order to make a ‘substantial leap’ forward (p. 321). the past, especially the medieval past, proves to be not only a rich imaginative source, but also a reminder of when times were better, linguistically speaking. this made the need to take a step back ‘inevitable’, in krol’s words (p. 321). grounded in a studies on national movements 7 (2021) | book review | 4 jesse van amelsvoort reimagined history, they could reposition their languages and their literatures in the world as it was changing and unfolding post-1918. krol’s book is highly readable and brings four writers who, because of the language they wrote in, have often been peripheralized, into important discussions on the complex cultural politics of the post-war moment. the discrepancy between their nationalist convictions and the lack of concrete results for minority groups in western europe at the time is made all the more glaring by krol’s work. one wishes, however, that he would have pushed his conclusions a bit further than is currently the case. here, a comparison with ireland—the only western european country that did achieve independence in the period krol attends to— and casanova’s ‘irish paradigm’ is instructive. in the world republic of letters, she discerned a pattern in which literatures go from inventing a tradition and recreating a national language to receiving autonomy. casanova based this pattern on the case of ireland. krol, however, has found no ‘straightforward imitation … in frisian, welsh, scots or breton literatures’ (p. 321) of this pattern. that is a fine observation, but one wishes that the point would have been pressed more – that it would have led to a more sustained critique of casanova’s work. what is a pattern, if it is not imitated? what does the case of ireland mean when it is not followed? is it perhaps the worldhistorical exception, rather than the rule? this feeling – that krol undersells what his book does – is felt at more moments in the concluding pages. his work shows that the national movements kalma, lewis, macdiarmid, and hemon were active in ‘coincides’ with miroslav hroch’s phase b of nationalism, and that these writers’ strategies are ‘in line’ with john hutchinson’s work on the importance of the past for nationalist movements (p. 323). this is true, but it does more than confirm and provide empirical evidence for what others have already theorized. these four case studies ultimately ask studies on national movements 7 (2021) | book review jesse van amelsvoort 5 | how work done in minority studies relates to the disciplines of european studies and world literature. that is a connection waiting to be made. jesse van amelsvoort university of groningen karl heinz, ‘archival review: the international centre for archival research (icarus), in: studies on national movements 8 (2021). archival review: the international centre for archival research (icarus) karl heinz the international centre for archival research (icarus) is a network of archives and archival institutions that aims to promote exchange among participating institutions at all levels. icarus is legally an association under austrian law with headquarters in vienna but considers itself as a supranational organization without national orientation or preference. foundation and partners icarus was founded in 2008 and can be seen as the successor organization of a loose consortium that had already been formed in 2004 in the course of the organization of the document platform monasterium (see below). the main concern from the very beginning was to convey to the participating institutions that a regular exchange and a joining of forces in achieving goals is more resource-saving and effective than going it alone. currently (fall 2021), icarus includes more than 180 members from 35 countries from europe and overseas, including studies on national movements 8 (2021) | archival review | 2 karl heinz archives of various types and sizes (state and national archives, provincial archives, municipal archives, diocesan and abbey archives), universities, research institutions and partner networks. in the meantime, very active sister organizations have been developed in various regions of europe (icarus hrvatska, icarus italia), which are increasingly taking care of the association's concerns in their catchment areas. activities one focus of the association's activities has been and continues to be the initiation and support of digitization projects in the archival field and the provision of expertise in the various related projects of the partner institutions. in this context, a mobile scanning unit has been in use throughout europe for several years to digitize document collections of smaller and larger archives. on the other hand, improving the exchange between archives and their users has been a major concern of icarus, too. a core activity of the association in recent years has always been the participation in projects funded by the european commission within different framework programs, in which icarus several times was the lead partner. examples of larger eu projects under the administration of icarus, running up to four years and already completed, were crarc crossborder archives (www.crossborderarchives.eu), enarc european network on archival cooperation (https://enarc.icar-us.eu) and co:op community as opportunity: the creative archives' and users' network (www.coop-project.eu). currently, icarus is participating in the european project ‘european digital treasures: management of centennial archives in the 21st century’ http://www.crossborderarchives.eu/ https://enarc.icar-us.eu/ http://www.coop-project.eu/ studies on national movements 8 (2021) | archival review karl heinz 3 | (www.digitaltreasures.eu) within the creative europe programme. the project aims to improve the visibility of archives as the custodians of europe's historical heritage in the perception of a wider public. the implementation of this plan will be achieved through a huge variety of activities, such as transmedia exhibitions across europe with very current topics, the development of new business models for archives, the programming of smart games to introduce the younger generation to the archives, or the involvement of the older generation and their special skills in reading old documents through crowd sourcing initiatives for the transcription of serial primary sources. http://www.digitaltreasures.eu/ studies on national movements 8 (2021) | archival review | 4 karl heinz a very forward-looking initiative is the participation in the time machine project (www.timemachine.eu), which aims at a technological revolution in the digital processing of archival material. innovations in scanning technology and the further development of machine handwriting recognition are intended to provide the prerequisites for the most comprehensive possible digital recording of initially serial resources throughout europe, and the linking and networking of local time machines created in this way all over the continent is to provide with the time answers to historical questions at the push of a button. the leading body to promote this idea and to drive the development forward is the time machine organization (tmo), which has its headquarters in vienna. as mentioned above, one of the main concerns of icarus was and still is the unbureaucratic exchange of information and experience on a collegial level and the overcoming of institutional and national hurdles and restrictions. in practice, this is carried out at biannual network meetings, the icarus conventions, which are always hosted by a different partner institution in always other parts of europe and take place in the spring and fall of each year. the icarus portals icarus itself meanwhile operates three major digital platforms. monasterium monasterium (www.monasterium.net) is the oldest platform of icarus and one of the world's largest digital resources for medieval and early modern charters, which are presented in words and images, enriched by metadata of different indexing depth. the portal started in 2004 with the http://www.timemachine.eu/ http://www.monasterium.net/ studies on national movements 8 (2021) | archival review karl heinz 5 | first 20.000 charters from the abbey archives of the province of lower austria. in the meantime, around 660.000 medieval and early modern charters from 192 archives from 15 countries are shown in the portal with all together more than 900.000 images. the data are structured according to the standard of the charters encoding initiative (cei www.cei.lmu.de), which, based upon the tei standard, was created especially for the description of the source genre ‘charter’. in addition to the classic archive holdings, monasterium also has socalled ‘collections’. in this context, this term refers to collections of documents that do not form a classic archive fond but are thematic compilations. these can be virtually merged, former archive holdings, which in reality have been widely dispersed but also digitized editions (charter books) belong to the area of collections. http://www.cei.lmu.de/ studies on national movements 8 (2021) | archival review | 6 karl heinz the system has a collaborative editing environment through which improvements and enhancements can be entered individually online and new holdings can also be uploaded. as a special feature registered users are enabled to create personal collections according to their research topics. another speciality is that the system is available in 14 different languages, mirroring the countries, contributing to the virtual archive with their holdings. currently, a new conception of the portal is under discussion, which should bring this resource up to the latest technical standard. matricula the matricula-online portal (www.matricula-online.eu) provides several million digital images of church records (baptism, marriage, and death registers) of different religious communities (catholic, protestant, jewish) from eight countries (germany, austria, slovenia, luxembourg, poland, serbia, italy and bosnia-herzegovina). by eliminating the need for lengthy and costly travel to view these sources, matricula has proven http://www.matricula-online.eu/ studies on national movements 8 (2021) | archival review karl heinz 7 | to be indispensable for the vast community of family and genealogical researchers all over the world in recent years and has recorded by far the largest number of hits in a comparison of the three portals of icarus. topotheque the third portal – the topotheque (www.topothek.at/en) – houses materials that are of great importance for local and regional lore, such as old photographs, postcards, films or other documents that illustrate the diversity of life in the community. these are mainly privately owned objects that are particularly at risk of being lost. but the aim is not only to secure and publish the material, but also to make its content accessible through dating, geo-referencing and keywording, thus making the source material, which has now grown to over one million items, searchable. in total, there are about 400 ‘topotheques’ in 15 european countries. the feed of data is decentralized via local topothecarians based in the individual municipalities, who work on a voluntary basis and receive the analogue materials from the owners, digitize them, upload them to the system and ensure that they are indexed accordingly. the great http://www.topothek.at/en studies on national movements 8 (2021) | archival review | 8 karl heinz advantage of this is that questions about content can be communicated to the entire population via the site and thus previously white spots in the tradition can be erased. a common feature of all three portals is the low-threshold and completely free access to the material (charters, church records, local history material), what can be seen as a direct contribution to bringing people closer to their own history. icarus4all according to the statutes, membership in the icarus network is only possible for institutions and corporations. nevertheless, it is primarily individuals who benefit from the work of the network and the digital offer of the described resources. in order to be able to give users a better insight into the world of archives ‘behind the scenes’ and also to perceive suggestions from the user community, the friends´ association icarus4all was founded in 2016. within the framework of this association, current developments in the archive world are regularly communicated to interested parties, excursions to domestic and foreign archives are organized, and archivists can be directly interviewed at ‘meet & greet’ events. in addition, icarus4all gives members the opportunity to directly support icarus and ensure the maintenance and further development of the portals. outlook – agenda 2023 in order to ensure that the network continues to be optimally geared to the needs of its members in the future, an internal reorganization process (agenda 2023) has been underway for some time, which is studies on national movements 8 (2021) | archival review karl heinz 9 | intended to sharpen the profile of icarus and redefine the way in which the network functions. all important areas such as community, communication, event management, project acquisition, but also the future technical-strategic orientation of the existing portals is to be evaluated and, if necessary, adapted to the changing requirements. the plan is to lead this reform process through 2023 and complete it by the fall of that year. marie-alice le corvec ‘archival review: the archival holdings of the centre de recherche bretonne et celtique’, in: studies on national movements 7 (2021). archival review: the archival holdings of the centre de recherche bretonne et celtique marie-alice le corvec the centre de recherche bretonne et celtique1 (crbc for short, kreizenn an enklaskoù breizhek ha keltiek in breton) is a research center established in brest (brittany, france) in 1969. associating scholars from various academic fields, a research library (the yves-le-gallo library) and a publishing team, the crbc specializes in the study of the celtic nations and specifically of brittany. the yves-le-gallo library (named after the first director of the research center) is a unique institution: monitoring publications in france, it aims at collecting copies of every published material related to brittany as well as the other celtic nations. its specificity also lies in the numerous private archives it preserves, which are key to understanding the history of brittany and of the breton language and culture. studies on national movements 7 (2021) | archival review | 2 marie-alice le corvec the foundation of the yves-le-gallo library and the coincidental origin of its archival holdings the centre de recherche bretonne et celtique was primarily founded as a hub for interdisciplinary research on brittany and the celtic nations. under the guidance of the université de bretagne occidentale, in which buildings the center is now located, the crbc aimed to unite academics in archeology, ethnology, history, linguistics and sociology. but, for such multidisciplinary studies to succeed, it quickly became clear that the research center also needed to provide its own documentary resources. as a result, in 1969, the crbc opened its library with its first acquisitions, the private collections of two prominent figures with a known interest for breton culture and language: daniel bernard, scholar, and francis even, notary and bard involved in the parti national breton. the acquisition of even's private library was a key moment for the center as it also offered the opportunity to preserve even’s personal papers, which became the library’s first archival fonds. in time, 69,000 books (mainly in french and breton, but also in other celtic languages) were collected. together with the various studies led in brittany by crbc’s researchers, this active gathering of documents has drawn the yves-le-gallo library into an active network of people involved in breton language and culture. [antoine borzeix©] studies on national movements 7 (2021) | archival review marie-alice le corvec 3 | consequently, owners of archival documents have found the insurance that their material will be studied and made easily accessible to both the academic community as well as the general public if preserved by the library. the library’s specialization and its location at the heart of the city of brest and inside the university’s premises are often seen as key strengths for the preservation of specific archives. and although the library was not meant to become an archive, many private donations were and are still made every year, leading to the slow but steady growth of the library's archival holdings. in 2021, there were approximately 150 archival fonds either donated, preserved for keeping, purchased or digitized by the crbc. a glimpse in the archives the aims of the crbc’s name to include both brittany and the celtic nations notwithstanding, the archival fonds preserved in the library focus mostly on the social and cultural history of brittany, although links to other celtic nations (such as ireland and wales) can also be found in the documents. through the archives of political activists, writers, scholars or journalists, researchers and the general public can access a great variety of material ranging predominantly from the nineteenth century to the beginning of the twenty-first century. studies on national movements 7 (2021) | archival review | 4 marie-alice le corvec for example, the cultural history of brittany can be explored through the archive of anatole le braz, a folklorist who published collections of traditional tales and songs in breton, taking part in the rising interest for breton language and culture in the nineteenth century. contemporary approaches to breton language and identity can be found both in the archives of writers, such as pierre-jakez hélias whose work on the social shift in brittany in the twentieth century echoed that of other french rural areas, or academics, such as donatien laurent, a sociologist in whose archive audio recordings of breton language made between the 1950s and the 1970s can be found. a more political history of brittany can be accessed in the fonds of célestin lainé, which gives a unique insight into the national breton movement and its military collaborationist actions during the second world war. some archives also concern the social and environmental movement of the 1970s, which prevented for example the implementation of nuclear power plants in brittany. the chronological span of archival fonds is not only relevant with regard to the study of breton language and identity, it also highlights the great variety of media which the yves-le-gallo library is working to preserve. while the majority of archival fonds is made of paper (textual and iconographic documents such as maps, posters or postcards), the library also holds many audiovisual archives. studies on national movements 7 (2021) | archival review marie-alice le corvec 5 | the crbc preserves photographic collections showcasing brittany and its changes throughout the twentieth century as well as audio records such as wax cylinders (early twentieth century) or magnetic tapes with recordings of breton language. in that respect, the archival holdings showcase a multitude of approaches to breton language and culture through diverse themes and ideas along with a variety of technologies and techniques.2 archives and research: the growth of digital access while physical access to the archives requires the submission of a motivated letter to the director of the crbc3, the library is actively working to share the content it preserves through digital technologies. the crbc open science project contains a variety of databases focused on promoting the library’s archival materials or the information held within. the aim is to give greater digital access to research sources while also providing in-depth and informed descriptions of them. many archival documents have thus been made accessible online via the research center’s digital library4, thanks to the library team working alongside researchers tasked with providing a thorough description and contextualisation of the digitized resources. crbc dataset5 is another iteration of the online promotion of archives. it is an open data aggregator which allows for the query of the crbc finding aids as well as of multiple databases created by the center’s researchers and built from information found in its holdings and that of partnering institutions.6 studies on national movements 7 (2021) | archival review | 6 marie-alice le corvec the projet de recherche en littérature de langue bretonne or bretonlanguage literature database (also known as prelib7) can be considered a prime example of such databases, highlighting the research opportunities enabled by the specific framework of the crbc. the project, led by two academics with the support of a database engineer, endeavors to showcase the networks of identified actors in breton literature (individuals or collectives) based on information found in either published or archival documents. through various means such as lists and graphs, the project structures for each actor a combination of sourced facts linking back the material to where the information was found. it has become a fruitful resource to explore and understand interactions inside the breton literary sphere, from its first manifestation in the middle ages up till today.8 this still ongoing project was made possible thanks to the substantial relation between researchers and information professionals within the crbc. the relevance of the collections preserved by the library and the work led by the library team in relation with researchers has been increasingly recognised on a national level. while the yves-le-gallo library has been a mixed research unit of the centre national de la recherche scientifique (cnrs) since 1983, it was recently awarded the collex – collections studies on national movements 7 (2021) | archival review marie-alice le corvec 7 | d'excellence9 label. this label acknowledges the value of the preserved heritage, both in terms of books and archival fonds. the research center has shown throughout the years the importance of its existence both as an academic hub and as a heritage institution working toward the preservation and communication of historical sources on brittany and the celtic nations. bibliography s. jean-françois (ed.), le crbc : 40 ans au service de la recherche sur la bretagne et les pays celtiques (brest, 2009). y. tranvouez, ici c'est brest ! une histoire du centre de recherche bretonne et celtique (1969-2019) (brest, to be published). endnotes 1 website: https://www.univ-brest.fr/crbc/ 2 a complete list of the archival fonds can be found here: https://www.univbrest.fr/crbc/menu/biblioth%c3%a8que+yvesle+gallo+%28ums+3554%29/fonds+d%27archives 3 for more information on access, check the website. the staff can also reply to enquiries and guide users in their search (contacts: bibliothequecrbc@univbrest.fr). 4 digital library: https://bibnumcrbc.huma-num.fr 5 crbc dataset: http://crbc-dataset.huma-num.fr/ 6 the crbc has been working with many different institutions: public libraries and archives in brittany, the bibliothèque nationale de france, the institut https://www.univ-brest.fr/crbc/ https://www.univ-brest.fr/crbc/menu/bibliothèque+yves-le+gallo+(ums+3554)/fonds+d'archives https://www.univ-brest.fr/crbc/menu/bibliothèque+yves-le+gallo+(ums+3554)/fonds+d'archives https://www.univ-brest.fr/crbc/menu/bibliothèque+yves-le+gallo+(ums+3554)/fonds+d'archives mailto:bibliothequecrbc@univ-brest.fr mailto:bibliothequecrbc@univ-brest.fr https://bibnumcrbc.huma-num.fr/ http://crbc-dataset.huma-num.fr/ studies on national movements 7 (2021) | archival review | 8 marie-alice le corvec national de l’audiovisuel or more recently the cirdoc-institut occitan de cultura. 7 projet de recherche en littérature de langue bretonne (prelib) bretonlanguage literature database: http://mshb.huma-num.fr/prelib/ 8 for a more detailed presentation: n. blanchard, j.-b. pressac & m. thomas, ‘quand l’informatique soulève des questions épistémologiques dans le domaine de la littérature de langue bretonne : l’exemple de la base de données prelib’, in: la bretagne linguistique (2017) https://doi.org/10.4000/lbl.315 n. blanchard, j.-b. pressac & m. thomas, ‘prelib: a new digital tool for apprehending breton literary networks?’, in: m. byrne & s. kidd (eds.) lìontan lìonmhor: local, national and global gaelic networks from the 18th to the 20th century, (glasgow, 2019): 213-227. 9 collex-persée, research infrastructure: https://www.collexpersee.eu/ http://mshb.huma-num.fr/prelib/ https://doi.org/10.4000/lbl.315 https://www.collexpersee.eu/ jelle krol, ‘archival review: tresoar, frisian historical and literary centre’, in: studies on national movements 6 (2020). archival review: tresoar, frisian historical and literary centre jelle krol in 1997, the land west of the river lauwers in the netherlands, formerly referred to by its dutch name ‘friesland’ was officially changed to ‘fryslân’. tresoar is fryslân’s historical and literary centre. sited on one of the three terpen, the man-made mounds on which leeuwarden, fryslân’s capital, was built, tresoar is at the foot of the oldehove, the city’s iconic leaning tower. it is housed in two late twentieth-century buildings connected by an overhead bridge. founded in 2002, it is one of the few institutes in the netherlands which is an official public body, as it has its basis in an act of law.1 it is a library, an archive, and a literary museum but, while it stimulates research, it is not a research institute. tresoar is an amalgamation of three institutes which had functioned separately up to 2002, i.e. the state archives in fryslân, fryslân’s provincial library, and the frisian literary museum and documentation centre. tresoar's logo hints at this triple amalgamation, with the e in tresoar reversed, so that it resembles a 3. the name itself means ‘treasure’ as well as ‘a chest in which treasures are kept’. the frisian poet jan cornelis pieters salverda (1783-1836) uses this uncommon word with reference to the frisian language in one of his poems: studies on national movements 6 (2020) | archival review | 2 jelle krol ja, frieslân’s teal iz ’t djoer tresoor, waems schatten, meij ondoafbre gloar, europa’s wijz’ ijnn’ eagen blierje; yes, fryslân’s language is the precious treasure, the jewels of which radiate joyfully with inextinguishable glory, in the eyes of europe’s wise men;2 these few lines epitomise the pride and glory of early nineteenthcentury frisian romantic national consciousness, which provided the basis for the emergence of the provincial (1839) and state (1886) archives and the provincial library (founded in 1844 and open to the public in 1852). the frisian literary museum and documentation centre was founded much later, in 1959, as the frisian counterpart of the dutch literary museum and documentation centre in the hague (established in 1954), which collected, documented, and exhibited manuscripts and artefacts written in dutch, but not in frisian. the awareness of frisian nationality, already reflected in the seventeenth century in the works of fryslân’s most honoured poet, gysbert japicx (1603-1666), rapidly gained ground during the nineteenth century. soon after the university of franeker, fryslân’s sole university and the second oldest of the netherlands (established 1584), had been closed by napoleon in 1811, the friesch genootschap van geschied-, oudheiden taalkunde (the frisian historical, archaeological and philological society) was founded. from its inception, in 1827, its medium was dutch rather than frisian, and its nineteenth-century balloted membership consisted mainly of learned men belonging to fryslân’s high society. studies on national movements 6 (2020) | archival review jelle krol 3 | after the state athenaeum – the watered-down version of the franeker university – also closed in franeker in 1843, a few young men from varying walks of life propagated the use of frisian and they established the selskip foar fryske tael en skriftekennisse (the society for frisian language and literature) in 1844. this society soon became popular among the frisian-speaking middle classes. both in fryslân and beyond its borders, local branches of this were founded, each having its own study group, theatrical society and/or choir. during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, organisations and institutions in the netherlands’ society as a whole were segmented according to neutral and religious principles. this was reflected in how all those who advocated the use of frisian became organised. in 1908, the protestants, who objected to frivolous frisian plays and dancing after the staging of plays in public houses, founded the kristlik frysk selskip (christian frisian departure). they perceived the diversity of languages as a gift of god. in 1917 the roman catholics followed the protestant example by creating a new organisation for themselves, the roomsk frysk boun (roman catholic league), which stimulated, among other things, the translation of missals. more radical in its ideas was the jongfryske mienskip (young frisian fellowship), established in 1915. its leader, douwe kalma (1896-1953) propagated revolutionary ideas, among them a more autonomous fryslân. the first part of the twentieth century can be seen as the heyday of these frisian movement organisations, the archives of which are kept at tresoar. they often contain several thousands of items of interest for the study of the frisian national movement. the descriptions of the bulk of the items can readily be reached by consulting tresoar’s website: studies on national movements 6 (2020) | archival review | 4 jelle krol https://www.tresoar.nl/pages/zoeken-in-de-collecties.aspx or websites in which tresoar participates, such as www.archieven.nl and www.worldcat.org. after the second world war the frisian movement organisations vied less with one another and cooperated more or less reluctantly in the ried fan de fryske beweging (the council of the frisian movement). moreover, the central government in the hague and the provincial government in leeuwarden had already made some concessions before the war. in 1937, for example, changes in the 1920 dutch primary education act permitted the teaching of ‘a regional language’ during dutch lessons and in 1938 the fryske akademy (frisian academy), a research institute dealing mainly with frisian history, language and culture, received a provincial subsidy. https://www.tresoar.nl/pages/zoeken-in-de-collecties.aspx http://www.archieven.nl/ http://www.worldcat.org/ studies on national movements 6 (2020) | archival review jelle krol 5 | attitudes towards frisian language and culture gradually changed in the post-second world war years, especially after kneppelfreed, when dutch central government and the provincial states of fryslân developed policies which promoted the use of frisian. kneppelfreed (literally ‘baton friday’, after the batons that were used by the police) took place on november 16th, 1951. on this day two journalists, one of whom was the famous frisian poet fedde schurer (1898-1968), had to appear in court in the frisian capital. both of them had written articles defending the use of frisian in court and had denounced the attitude of the officer of justice, who was unwilling to understand frisian. their denunciations were regarded as slanderous and they were both found guilty. studies on national movements 6 (2020) | archival review | 6 jelle krol after the trial, a riot broke out in the market-place in front of the hall of justice, during which the police used excessive force against the people who supported the pro-frisian points of view of the two journalists. as a result of this riot more rights were granted to frisian in the fields of justice and education during the 1950s, and frisian became known as the netherlands’ second state language. consequently, the riot is seen as a milestone in the emancipation of frisian in the netherlands. in the citation from j. c. p. salverda’s poem, quoted above, the poet refers to the eyes of europe, being directed towards the frisian language. frisian speakers, especially those interested in the language itself, have always been aware that during the middle ages frisian used to be spoken in a far wider area, broadly the north sea coastal region between the presentday danish and belgian borders. apart from the modern province of fryslân with approximately 350,000 speakers of frisian, two other frieslands can be found in germany, in ostfriesland and nordfriesland where people generally consider themselves to be frisians. however, the frisian language has survived in germany in only a few pockets of land. in saterland, an east-frisian region that used to be studies on national movements 6 (2020) | archival review jelle krol 7 | enclosed by bogs and marshes, saterland frisian is spoken by around 1,000 people. in the north-frisian coastal strip southwest of the danishgerman border, varying north -frisian dialects are being used by roughly 8,000 – 10,000 speakers. the fryske rie (frisian council), established in 1956, promotes the organisation of cross-border exchanges and meetings in the fields of economics, education, (local) government, media, and agriculture. the contacts between west, east and north frisians, stimulated by the various frisian cultural societies ever since the nineteenth century, are reflected in the archives, letters and books collected by tresoar. to house the ever-growing archives (35,000 metres) and the increasing number of books (approximately 600,000) tresoar opened a new depot and repository centre in 2016. this so-called kolleksjesintrum fryslân (collections centre fryslân) represents a unique form of cooperation in fryslân (http://www.kolleksjesintrum.nl/). it provides room for collections kept not only by tresoar, but also by four other institutes: the frysk lânboumuseum (frisian agricultural museum), the fries museum (frisian museum), natuurmuseum fryslân (museum of natural history in fryslân), and the fries scheepvaart museum (frisian maritime museum). between 2014 and 2019 four million scans were made to put the frisian archives on the digital map. tresoar coordinated the initiative, which included scans of material kept by other frisian institutes and museums. these are now readily accessible through the websites of the tresoar and the various participating institutes and museums. http://www.kolleksjesintrum.nl/ studies on national movements 6 (2020) | archival review | 8 jelle krol selected bibliography frisian in general: p. hemminga, e.a., die frieslande (bredstedt, 2006). h. munske, and n. århammar nils, handbuch des friesischen: handbook of frisian studies (tübingen, 2001). fryslân and tresoar: r. boersma, e.a., de kanon fan de skiednis fan fryslân yn 11 en 30 finsters (leeuwarden, 2011). j. krol, e.a., skatten fan tresoar: 45 topstikken = schatten van tresoar: 45 topstukken (leeuwarden, 2004). sj. van der schaaf, skiednis fan de fryske biweging (leeuwarden, 2010). ‘tresoar, frysk histoarysk en letterkundich sintrum (ljouwert)’, in: m. schroor, ph. h breuker, m. kist, and k. schroor-dijkstra, nieuwe encyclopedie van fryslân (gorredijk; 2016). g.r. zondergeld, de friese beweging in het tijdvak der beide wereldoorlogen (leeuwarden, 1978). north frisia and saterland: t. steensen, die friesische bewegung in nordfriesland im 19. und 20. jahrhundert (18791945) (neumünster, 1986). t. steensen, das große nordfriesland-buch (hamburg, 2000). studies on national movements 6 (2020) | archival review jelle krol 9 | t. steensen, h. kunz, and f. pingel, heimat nordfriesland: ein kanon friesischer kultur (bredstedt, 2013). d. stellmacher, das saterland und das saterländische (oldenburg, 1998). o. wilts, and marron c fort, north frisia and saterland: frisian between marsh and moor (brussels, 1996). endnotes 1 https://wetten.overheid.nl/bwbr0013738/2002-08-29 2 j. c. p. salverda, ‘de fries’ne teal’, ijtlijcke friesche rijmckes, snits: smallenburg, 1824, p. 43. https://wetten.overheid.nl/bwbr0013738/2002-08-29 oliver küehschelm, ‘book review: christian karner, nationalism revisited: austrian social closure from romanticism to the digital age’, in: studies on national movements 6 (2020). book review christian karner, nationalism revisited: austrian social closure from romanticism to the digital age. new york: berghahn books, 2019, 308 pp, isbn 978-1-78920-452-0 the book analyses the history of the nation and nationalism in austria since the late eighteenth century. this is at once an ambitious goal – and the author states at the beginning that this is an ambitious book – and one that might not matter much except to scholars of a small country in central europe. however, karner has digested a broad body of scholarly literature on the austrian republic and the habsburg monarchy and he needs just 220 pages for a well-structured overview that covers a long period of time. for anyone looking for reliable information on nationalising political discourse in austria this is a good deal. it potentially makes the book useful for future comparative studies. karner starts out from autobiographical reminiscences that reveal him as someone whose position enables him to speak about the austrian wegroup from the inside. they also show what makes belonging to this national we-group problematic because at the base of the austrian nation – and really any nation – are processes of selective memory, exclusions, and naturalization. following a chronological order, the book traces the crystallizations of nationalizing discourse in austria, a notion whose meaning involved shifting boundaries and geographies. chapter 1 sketches an intellectual history of romantic ideas about nationhood in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. it discusses texts from studies on national movements 6 (2020) | book reviews | 2 oliver küehschelm herder, fichte, and schlegel and asks how the concepts that formed a romantic ideoscape spread to habsburg central europe. chapter 2 turns to the intense nationalizing dynamics of the last decades of the long nineteenth century, when nationalists sought to make grammars of assimilation and apostasy relevant in the sphere of the everyday and thereby erase sites of national indifference. his account of how nationalising dynamics played out in the habsburg monarchy is attuned to a perspective that has mainly been articulated by historians from the us since the 1990s. pieter judson distilled it into an influential monograph about the habsburg empire, which was published in 2016.1 in this view nationalism does not appear as an all-pervasive force that doomed the empire, which is portrayed in a relatively benign light (maybe it should not surprise that a ‘liberal empire’ does not seem a bad idea to scholars from the us). this strand of literature reserves more scepticism for the nation-states that were founded in 1918. indeed, it is in the ensuing decades that in austria the exclusionary logic of social closure reached new heights and culminated in genocidal war and the holocaust (chapter 3). whereas in the 1920s the austrian republic failed to acquire all features of a nation state, in its second run after 1945 and under more favourable conditions it mastered the task of nation building (chapter 4). selective memory of the recent past and a selective austrian particularism played a huge role in this process. seeking to distance austria from germany and from the responsibility of nazi atrocities went together with tacit pan-german assumptions. in an increasingly wealthy and politically stable country nationalism became banal. however, on occasion it turned ‘hot’ as for example when the slovene minority in the southern province of carinthia demanded language rights and met the open hostility of ‘german-carinthians’. studies on national movements 6 (2020) | book reviews oliver küehschelm 3 | in chapters 5 to 7 the author deals with the period from the late 1980s to the present. relying on a broad corpus of sources it is here that his analysis comes into its own. taking a long view on the history of austrian social closure pays off in enabling perceptive remarks on recent phenomena. karner for instance discusses current tendencies of social protectionism as a ‘palimpsestic recycling’ of an opposition between ethnonational ‘rootedness’ and cosmopolitanism (p.197). he also points out that on the one hand the 2016 presidential elections in austria formed part of a global dynamic that pitted democratic liberalism against right-wing populism. (in the austrian case liberalism eked out a victory, but one that was soon erased by elections for the national parliament.) on the other hand the 2016 elections saw the re-emergence of a ruralurban divide that in the interwar era had pitched social democrats against the christian social political right (p.204). this of course also had its parallels in other democracies. it is worth placing karner’s work, albeit briefly, in the history of scholarship on the austrian nation. the ambition of his book clearly differs from ernst bruckmüller’s nation österreich, first published in 1984, which posited increasing identification with the small austrian republic as the happy end of a complicated history.2 contributing to the construction of this version of an austrian nation was the avowed or implicit commitment that drove works on austrian history of the long post-war era since the 1950s. it lost some of its urgency since the 1980s when an ever-larger part of the population had been born into the political, economic, and cultural context of a small wealthy nation-state. on the one hand this allowed for a critical reassessment of the role of austrians in the nazi period, while on the other hand it opened up a discursive space for a somewhat relaxed investigation into the more benign myths that had propped up the austrian nation in her post-1945form.3 it also integrated austrian society into the globalizing dynamics of studies on national movements 6 (2020) | book reviews | 4 oliver küehschelm the 1990s and early 2000s, which among many other things increased international academic mobility. karner is professor of sociology in lincoln, uk. from an austrian perspective he lives abroad. his book will also mostly have non-austrian readers. so it may be small wonder that he is not concerned with shoring up austrian national identity, even less so as his book was written at a moment when processes of right-wing-renationalization had come into full swing. although karner wants to contribute to a democratic polity – in this respect not at all different from bruckmüller in the 1980s – the academic, political, and economic context has markedly changed. this leads to a quite different stance vis-à-vis the austrian nation. not only does karner fully embrace a constructivist theory of nationalism, which has long become the dominant approach in nationalism studies, he also applies it without reserve to the underpinnings of post-1945 austria. karner brings a clearly defined theoretical and methodological focus to the task of revisiting nationalism. this greatly enhances the value of his book. at its theoretical core is the neo-weberian concept of social closure. thereby the author moves away from writing a history of the austrian nation as if it were a thing in the world that can be loved or hated but exists in the same way as the physical space that the austrian state treats as its territory. karner’s interest lies instead with showing how social boundaries were drawn on the base of a national deixis. a nation is not an essence but a form of creating communal relationships: it allows to distinguish between those who belong and those who do not. as a methodological approach karner opted for an eclectic mix of tools taken from critical discourse analysis (cda), which in ruth wodak’s brand had already been applied to the analysis of national identities in contemporary austria.4 cda claims to approach discourse as embedded in social practices. even more than that it wants to show discourse as a studies on national movements 6 (2020) | book reviews oliver küehschelm 5 | form of social practice itself. however, cda has been criticized for falling conspicuously short in this respect.5 this would also be my principal critique of an otherwise interesting book. there are many ways to overcome the limitations of cda: by systematically relating utterances to the social, economic, collective and biographical constellations against which they acquire their particular meaning; by doing a multifaceted microhistory (the author quotes jeremy king’s work on budweis/budejovice, which is an impressive example); by paying serious attention to how institutional and organizational networks interact with discursive actions. it would also pay off going beyond a focus on political discourse that is typical for the cda-lens and instead take a close look at economic aspects of nationhood. as i am myself a historian, this might be my particular déformation professionelle, but i am convinced that in order to come to full fruition the approach that karner outlines in his introduction would need a source analysis that goes considerably beyond an assemblage of published texts. this would also allow to discuss in which ways and how far nationalism entered the realm of the everyday, of associational and educational practices, of production and consumption. karner refers to ‘banal nationalism’ mostly as the opposite of ‘hot’, politically explicit and more fanatic forms of nationalism. this does not capture the complexity of nationalism as a ‘whole way of life’, to paraphrase raymond williams’s famous definition of culture. including everyday nationalism would give a fuller view of austrian social closure and it would come closer to the book’s declared goal of having nationalism ‘emerge from research, rather than being presupposed or even predetermined by it’ (p.215). in spite of this critique, it is important not to overlook the merits of karner’s work. it proposes a conceptual framework that structures a concise history of nationalism in austria. as is inevitably the case, such an account leaves open many questions, but this just calls for further studies on national movements 6 (2020) | book reviews | 6 oliver küehschelm empirical research in order to deepen our understanding of nationalism as a means of social closure. oliver küehschelm universität wien endnotes 1 p. m. judson, the habsburg empire: a new history (cambridge, ma, 2016). it does not figure in karner’s bibliography but the author has made intensive use of judson’s earlier publications. 2 there is an edition in english: e. bruckmüller, the austrian nation: cultural consciousness and socio-political processes (riverside, 2000)3. 3 karner does not much relate to this research: s. breuss, k. liebhart & a. pribersky, inszenierungen: stichwörter zu österreich (2. ed. vienna, 1995); e. brix, e. bruckmüller & h. stekl, (eds.), memoria austriae, 3 vol. (vienna, 2004– 05). 4 r. wodak, r. de cillia, m. reisigl & k. liebhart, the discursive construction of national identity (edinburgh, 1999). 5 for example r. breeze, ‘critical discourse analysis and its critics’, in: pragmatics 21/4 (2011), 493–525. rosie al-mulla and sarah bromage, ‘archival review: the scottish political archive – a contemporary collection’, in: studies on national movements 7 (2021). archival review: the scottish political archive – a contemporary collection rosie al-mulla and sarah bromage the scottish political archive (spa) was established in october 2010 as a research project in the division of history and politics (now history, heritage and politics) at the university of stirling. it was intended to create a publicly accessible archival research repository to support the division’s research relating to devolution within scotland – with emphasis on the referenda of 1979 and 1997 – and the campaign for a scottish parliament.1 when spa was established dr peter lynch, a senior lecturer in politics, was instated as the director of the archive and sarah bromage as the archivist. sarah had a previous wealth of experience in the creation of oral histories, a practise which was very much embedded into spa’s collecting from the outset. there was a scarcity of material for the period that spa wanted to collect around in other existing collections and both referenda were sufficiently far enough in the past that it was unlikely a general call out for material would yield much. oral history, therefore, was seen as a natural way to fill in the gaps by speaking to those who were there at the time and might remember all that was missing from the physical record. as with many oral history projects, sarah soon found that interviewees often owned items which they were happy to donate to the archive and so spa was able to accession physical material to accompany the interviews. http://www.scottishpoliticalarchive.org.uk/ studies on national movements 7 (2021) | archival review | 2 rosie al-mulla and sarah bromage campaign to save gartosh steel works which eventually closed in 1989 ‘how many scottish jobs must be lost before you vote for self-government?’ the first complete collection that came to spa was that of george robertson, mp for hamilton (1978 – 1999) and secretary general of nato (1999 – 2004). owing to his long career in politics, much of his professional papers cover the pre-devolution period and illuminate the road to scotland re-establishing its own parliament. spa has very much continued in this vein of collecting, creating oral history interviews for personal insights and first-hand accounts, supplementing this with ephemera, publications, speeches and photographs and taking in the professional papers of scottish politicians https://collections.stir.ac.uk/collections/getrecord/gb559_spa_gr https://collections.stir.ac.uk/collections/getrecord/gb559_spa_gr studies on national movements 7 (2021) | archival review rosie al-mulla and sarah bromage 3 | who have worked closely with issues of initial and further devolution, scottish independence and the creation of a scottish parliament. in this way spa can evidence official reasoning and actions in contemporary scottish politics as well as attest to the contextual public opinion. october 2012 was a significant period in scottish politics, particularly with respect to spa’s collecting focus – it was announced that scotland would be holding a referendum in 2014 to decide whether or not scotland would become an independent country. collecting around this event was the natural progression of the archive whose existing collections often touched on the issue of independence, so closely entwined with devolution as it is. the announcement gave spa the opportunity to consider what material it wished still existed from the referenda of ’79 and ’97 and set out to try and preserve something similar for the run up to 2014 and that referendum’s immediate aftermath. volunteers were sent out to events to take copies of pamphlets and flyers, take photographs of campaign stalls, demonstrations, billboards and posters and by creating a wide network, spa aimed to document both the grassroots yes and the no campaigns, and evidence messages from across the whole of scotland, not just the big cities. indeed, the varying of political messages from place to place across scotland had long been something spa was interested in preserving. after consulting with various institutions across scotland who also collect around scottish politics spa realised that material which evidenced regional messages was a huge gap in these collections and set out to remedy this, beginning with the 2011 scottish election. ever since, a network of volunteers and donors from across scotland send in party pamphlets, leaflets and campaign letters relating to election periods. in this way researchers can see parties’ succinct policies and evidence whether messages vary across scotland. studies on national movements 7 (2021) | archival review | 4 rosie al-mulla and sarah bromage radical independence conference leaflet, 2012 studies on national movements 7 (2021) | archival review rosie al-mulla and sarah bromage 5 | this kind of collecting practise is now called contemporary collecting and has swept the record-keeping profession particularly during the covid-19 pandemic. what began in spa as a gut instinct solution to capture ephemera which, by its nature, often ends up in the bin very quickly or billboards and public posters which are often overlooked as evidential material, has become a widespread way for archives to record the effect the pandemic has had on their communities. at the heart of doing contemporary collecting well is the task of creating strong links with a motivated community. contemporary collecting the way spa does it, asks for material time and time again, for every election, peaceful protest and rally. because of this, it is important to us to build a community of people working together to preserve and make scotland’s political history accessible. during the period of the 2014 referendum, spa took in the papers of former first minister of scotland, lord mcconnell of glenscorrodale (now the chancellor of the university of stirling). not only was he a student at the university where his political career arguably began as president of the student’s association, but he also served on the stirling district council before becoming an msp in the first scottish parliament in 1999. the archive of scotland’s first first minister donald dewar did not survive and thus lord mcconnell’s archive provides a unique insight into the establishment of the parliament and the first decade of this institution. rosie al-mulla came on board as a second part time archivist in 2019 as spa launched their holyrood graphic novel crowdfunder. the goal of this project is to create a graphic novel illustrating the road to a scottish parliament touching on the referenda of ’79 and ’97 and the processes and practices of the new parliament that spa had originally been formed to document – in a bright and striking medium, employing a glasgow based illustrator and small amounts of text from lecturers in the division of history, heritage and politics. after a period of fundraising, spa raised https://www.crowdfunder.co.uk/scottishparliamentgraphichistory studies on national movements 7 (2021) | archival review | 6 rosie al-mulla and sarah bromage enough money to begin putting this book together, to commission the illustrator and create the graphic novel in pdf form. the ultimate goal is to print physical copies and provide every school and public library in scotland with one, not only to provide an innovative and easy way to explain how scotland’s parliament was formed and what it does, but also to highlight the wonderful archive collections from whence the novel’s original source material comes. spa is still a way from its target of being able to provide all these free copies so please do support the crowdfunder if you too would like to see a printed version of our graphic novel! jack mcconnell, then president of the student’s association at the university of stirling addresses crowds on campus during the 1981 anti-cuts demonstrations. studies on national movements 7 (2021) | archival review rosie al-mulla and sarah bromage 7 | creating the holyrood graphic novel appealed greatly to the team behind spa who are always keen to provide alternative means of accessing the collections to encourage engagement not only from the researchers we have come to expect but also by people who might not be used to accessing archives at all or find politics as a subject inaccessible, difficult or boring. for those with an interest in visual evidence, a vast amount of our photo collection is available on flickr and we have an upcoming section relating photographs from spa collections have been used by illustrator jules scheele to create new and vibrant art work for the holyrood graphic novel https://www.flickr.com/photos/scottishpoliticalarchive/ studies on national movements 7 (2021) | archival review | 8 rosie al-mulla and sarah bromage to bus party material on the university of stirling’s archives and special collections’ digital collections page on jstor.2 spa proactively works with volunteers from across the university community – from politics students at every level to university alumni – and their work is integral to the cataloguing of our collections. through their work, the volunteers also gain skills which will prepare them for undertaking archivist qualifications or enhancing their research skills. as archivists at spa, we also teach on a number of courses, discussing collecting practises, exhibition skills, digital marketing and research and dissertation writing techniques. sometimes our work with students and staff collide, as is the case with our partnership with micropasts, an open-source platform co-created by staff at the university of stirling which crowdsources tasks that general members of the public are able to easily perform from their own homes such as transcribing, geo-tagging and describing cultural heritage collections to increase accessibility. this has been particularly wonderful for our volunteers during the pandemic while they were not able to come onto campus and engage in their usual tasks. following a very successful project transcribing leaflets from the 2014 independence referendum collection, we now have an ongoing project to tag photographs from the same collection. here, volunteers can learn digital heritage skills whilst also greatly improving the accessibility of our collections for a variety of users, collecting and recording additional information on items in our collection. as archivists, sarah and rosie come from quite different heritage backgrounds. because of sarah’s background working in art collections and museums, she has an eye for active outreach between the archive and the public, taking the form of exhibitions, research projects and events. rosie, coming from a purely archives professional background has, since joining spa, focused on catalogue arrangement, archive https://www.jstor.org/site/stirling/ https://crowdsourced.micropasts.org/project/leaflets2014/ https://crowdsourced.micropasts.org/project/leaflets2014/ https://crowdsourced.micropasts.org/project/spa2014tag/ studies on national movements 7 (2021) | archival review rosie al-mulla and sarah bromage 9 | policies and sharing spa with the record-keeping sector. together, they are excited for the next chapter of the scottish political archive and a continuation of our collaboration with nise. the collections of spa are available through the reading room at the university of stirling’s archives and special collections. if you have any further questions or comments, you can contact us on scottishpoliticalarchive@stir.ac.uk endnotes 1 these two referendums were key to the creation of the scottish parliament. in 1979, the referendum was held to decide whether or not there was sufficient support for a scottish assembly as was proposed in the scotland act 1978. as fewer than 40% of the scottish electorate voted ‘yes’ (51.6% voted in support of a scottish assembly but as there was only a turnout of 64%, the equivalent vote was 32.9%) the act was repealed. in the intervening years the case for a devolved parliament was strengthened and in 1997 the new labour government announced a referendum. in this referendum, a majority voted ‘yes’ in favour of a scottish parliament with devolved powers and for the parliament to have tax varying powers. the scottish parliament was subsequently established in 1999. 2 the bus party toured around scotland in 1997 to encourage political debate and a good turn out for the referendum irrespective of party preference. in 2014, the bus party toured as the listening lugs tour, travelling around 16 communities in scotland over the course of a week, encouraging discussion about communities’ hopes for a future scotland. again, the goal was not to support a particular vote or standpoint but to embrace all viewpoints and have faith in a future scotland. mailto:scottishpoliticalarchive@stir.ac.uk rob phillips, ‘archival review: the welsh political archive at the national library of wales’, in: studies on national movements 6 (2020). archival review: the welsh political archive at the national library of wales rob phillips llyfrgell genedlaethol cymru or the national library of wales (nlw) in aberystwyth was established in 1909, to collect and provide access to the documentary history of the nation. it is a legal deposit library and is therefore entitled to receive a copy of all books, magazines, newspapers etc. as well as copies of e-publications published in the united kingdom and ireland. published material is however only part of the nlw’s remit, as holdings also include archives, manuscripts, maps, visual images and audio and audio-visual material. the welsh political archive (wpa) is a dedicated programme within the nlw, established in 1983, to collect, catalogue and promote archival material which reflects the political life of wales. organising and cataloguing archives is undertaken by staff in the nlw’s archives and manuscripts section. but as the political collections include tapes of radio and television programmes, photographs, works of art, electronic files and websites, the wpa works across departments within the nlw. collections many of the political archives the nlw holds are personal collections of well-known political figures (members of parliament, lords, members of the european parliament and members of the senedd); the formal studies on national movements 6 (2020) | archival review | 2 rob phillips records of a large number of political organisations – including the main political parties, campaign groups, referendum campaigns – and business and labour groups constitute another important part. the wpa has also created certain thematic collections such as collections of ephemera related to elections, specific campaigns, and referenda. the nlw concentrates on nationally significant figures and organisations. although the nlw does hold some legacy material of a local nature, since the establishment of a network of local record offices across wales, such material can often be found in these offices.1 public records, created by government departments, agencies and the judiciary including those of the welsh government are kept at the national archives in kew. the records of the senedd (welsh parliament, formerly known as the national assembly for wales/cynulliad cenedlaethol cymru) are parliamentary records and are deposited at the nlw along with the archive of legislation passed by the senedd. the language of the nlw’s catalogue is english, though in some cases collections are catalogued in welsh or bi-lingually. the name of the organisation is usually given in its original language but in this article, i have provided an english version alongside the first instance of any organisation where the original title is not in english. in some cases, where there is no recognised english name, i have provided a close translation. studies on national movements 6 (2020) | archival review rob phillips 3 | the welsh national movement the nlw is home to the archives of the welsh conservatives, welsh liberal democrats, welsh labour and plaid cymru as well as the archives of a number of constituencies and branches. these all contain valuable material on the development of wales as a political nation, debates around political devolution to wales, national institutions and the political dimension and official attitudes to the welsh language and wider welsh culture. the plaid cymru archive is amongst the largest political archives held in the nlw. plaid cymru was established in 1925 and was initially known as plaid genedlaethol cymru (welsh national party), but later changed its name to plaid cymru (party of wales). three of its leading figures were jailed for arson after burning the royal air force (raf) bombing school at penyberth in 1936 in protest at the location of the facility in a welshspeaking community. the party won a historic by-election in carmarthen in 1966 and had elected representatives at all levels since then. the plaid cymru archive includes the papers of the national executive committee, conferences, the national council, various party sections, papers relating to referenda, elections, research and summer schools, as well as the archives of regional committees and local branches. it also contains a large amount of correspondence and campaign material. the nlw also hold the archives of the hydro group, which was established to oppose the socialist stance adopted by the party in the 1970s and those of chwith genedlaethol (national left) which campaigned for socialism within the party. in addition, the nlw also holds the papers of many prominent plaid cymru politicians including those of party leaders and presidents such as saunders lewis, gwynfor evans, dafydd elis-thomas, dafydd wigley studies on national movements 6 (2020) | archival review | 4 rob phillips and ieuan wyn jones as well as a number of its members of parliament (mps), members of the senedd (ms – formerly assembly members (ams)), and leading thinkers. these include the papers of lewis valentine, cynog dafis, elfyn llwyd, simon thomas, and phil williams. the nlw’s holdings also include papers from a number of prominent figures from other parties including secretaries of state for wales, mps, ams/mss and lords. in some cases, these are people who have campaigned for devolution to wales or, campaigned vociferously against devolution to wales and were fiercely opposed to the national movement. outside of the parliamentary parties, the nlw holds records of the 1979, 1997 and 2011 welsh devolution referenda as well as the archives of the parliament for wales campaign, the council for wales and monmouthshire, undeb cymru fydd (young wales movement) and cymru yfory (tomorrow wales). the welsh language has long been a political issue. the campaigns for the welsh language, including calls for a welsh language television service, are well represented in the nlw with collections including the archives of cymdeithas yr iaith gymraeg, urdd gobaith cymru mudiad ysgol meithrin (a voluntary group providing welsh medium nursery schools), fforwm iaith genedlaethol (national language forum), adfer (a movement which worked to strengthen welsh-speaking areas) and cefn (a civil rights groups for welsh speakers), as well as those of prominent individuals such as saunders lewis and kate roberts. the archive of ymddiriedolaeth nant gwrtheyrn, an organisation established to transform an abandoned quarry village in north west wales into a residential language centre is also held at the nlw. the control of water resources has long been at the heart of welsh politics, no more so than following the announcement of plans to flood studies on national movements 6 (2020) | archival review rob phillips 5 | the village of capel celyn to supply water to the city of liverpool. several archives, including those of plaid cymru, cymru fydd, ednyfed hudson davies and dr noelle davies contain material on this topic. there have been several instances where elements of the national movement in wales have used violence in order to further their aims. understandably there is very little in the way of official records of these organisations, but their activities feature in correspondence and other papers of politicians and political movements, as well as being recorded in the press and television programmes and in the papurau ty cenedl papers. other organisations were involved in non-violent direct action coupled with electoral activity; an example is cymru goch and the nlw holds a small archive which gives a fascinating insight into the aims and operations of this organisation. studies on national movements 6 (2020) | archival review | 6 rob phillips one of the most important collections in the nlw is the collection of electoral and other political ephemera comprising election addresses, flyers, letters etc. from 1837 to the present. although older holdings are patchy the collection since 1983 is extensive and covers european elections, general elections and by-elections to the uk parliament and the national assembly for wales/senedd cymru. as part of the work of collecting campaign ephemera, the nlw makes archival copies of the websites of the main parties, mps, ams/mss, pressure groups and candidates several times a year, and more frequently at election time including internal party elections many archives relating to the primary welsh language cultural festival, eisteddfod genedlaethol cymru (national eisteddfod of wales) are also held in the nlw. in addition to the archival collections, the development of the national movement in wales is captured in paintings, photographs, and film. the geoff charles photograph collection contains coverage of elections, the flooding of capel celyn, protests by cymdeithas yr iaith gymraeg and the activities of the parliament for wales campaign from the 1930s to the 1970s. much of this collection has been digitised and can be searched and viewed freely on the nlw’s website. the nlw’s framed works of art collection also contains portraits of leading figures in the national movement such as gwynfor evans and dafydd wigley and the nlw holds a substantial collection of cartoons by the welsh artist mal humphreys (mumph) focussing on welsh politics dating from the mid-1990s through the early years of devolution. work is underway to digitise this collection. there is a broad variety of material in the audio-visual and music collections. this ranges from folk songs with overtly nationalist messages by artists such as dafydd iwan, movies such as the 1992 antistudies on national movements 6 (2020) | archival review rob phillips 7 | war biopic hedd wyn, news, current affairs, and history programmes in both welsh and english. the nlw holds the itv wales and the bbc cymru wales archives and is running a multi-million pound project to create a national broadcast archive for wales2 which will give access to a selection of programmes over the world wide web, with full access in clip centres located in the nlw and at other locations across wales. the nlw’s off-air recordings of bbc wales, itv wales and s4c’s output are available to consult. other national movements the national movement in wales developed many connections with similar political, cultural and language movements in the other celtic nations including ireland, brittany, scotland, and cornwall. much of this material held at the nlw stems from correspondence between leading figures in the national movement in wales and the other celtic nations, co-operation between nationalist organisations and the establishment of pan-celtic organisations. the nlw holds the papers of the breton nationalist louis feutren together with two fellow nationalists’ papers he accumulated, neven henaff (célestin lainé) and alan heusaff. all three were prominent members of the breton collaborationist force bezen perrot (perrot militia) formed in december 1943. the birth of the irish free state is chronicled in the thomas jones ch papers amongst others. the plaid cymru archive contains material on breton, scottish and cornish nationalism, arranged into various subject files and the nlw holds the archives related to the celtic league and the european bureau of lesser used languages. studies on national movements 6 (2020) | archival review | 8 rob phillips public services anyone is welcome to use the material in the nlw. the original material can be consulted in the reading rooms, open from monday to saturday, while much of the digitised material is available freely on the nlw’s website. visitors can register as a reader in advance or on the day of their visit.3 information on most of the archives is available by searching the collections at the online catalogue, but the staff is happy to offer help or answer search queries. guides to the major archives by theme and party can be found at www.library.wales/welshpoliticalarchive http://www.library.wales/welshpoliticalarchive studies on national movements 6 (2020) | archival review rob phillips 9 | bibliography maniffesto; the welsh political archive newsletter (aberystwyth, 19852020). political archives at the national library of wales (aberystwyth, 2016). g. jenkins, ‘archives in wales: the past in the future’, in: trafodion anrhydeddus gymdeithas y cymmrodorion – transactions of the honourable society of cymmrodorion 1994, new series vol. 1 (1995), 94105. j.g. jones, ‘forming plaid cymru: searching for a policy, 1926-30’, in: cylchgrawn llyfrgell genedlaethol cymru – national library of wales journal, 23/2 (1983), 175-208. j.g. jones, ‘welsh politicians and their papers’, in: trafodion anrhydeddus gymdeithas y cymmrodorion – transactions of the honourable society of cymmrodorion 1997, new series vol. 4 (1998), 153-167. p. o’leary, ‘the welsh political archive’, in: llafur. the journal of the society for the study of welsh labour history, 4/2 (1985), 101-102. r. phillips, ‘liberal party archives’, in: journal of liberal history, 85 (2014). endnotes 1 contact details for local record offices in wales can be found at https://archives.wales 2 https://www.library.wales/collections/learn-more/screen-soundarchive/audio-visual-collections/national-broadcast-archive-project 3 services at the nlw have been seriously affected by the covid-19 pandemic and anyone planning to use the collections should check the nlw website at https://www.library.wales/ https://www.library.wales/collections/learn-more/screen-sound-archive/audio-visual-collections/national-broadcast-archive-project https://www.library.wales/collections/learn-more/screen-sound-archive/audio-visual-collections/national-broadcast-archive-project https://www.library.wales/ rev_mees studies  on  national  movements,  2  (2014)      |      reviews     ludger  mees   james   kennedy,   liberal   nationalisms.   empire,   state,   and   civil   society  in  scotland  and  quebec  (montreal  -­‐  kingston  -­‐  london  -­‐   ithaca:   mcgill-­‐queen's   university   press,   2013)   322   pp.,   isbn   9780773538986.   review  by  ludger  mees   inverting  the  habitual  structure  of  this  kind  of  review  essays,  i  would  like   to   initiate   this   brief   comment   on   james   kennedy's   recent   book   by   forwarding   one   of   the   conclusions   i   reached   after   having   read   his   322   pages   on   liberal   nationalisms   in   scotland   and   in   quebec.   without   any   doubt,   this   publication   is   a   major   contribution   to   the   research   on   nationalism.  this  contribution  is  important  and  interesting  for  mainly  four   reasons:  because  it  deals  with  a  complex  historical  topic  which  so  far  has   been   remarkably   under-­‐researched;   because   it   is   based   on   the   methodology   of   comparative   history,   which   helps   both   to   highlight   the   common   features   and   to   underline   the   differences   between   the   case   studies;   third,   the   structure   and   the   prose   of   the   text   are   perfectly   constructed,   fluent   and   easily   understandable   even   for   non-­‐experts   on   scottish  or  canadian  nationalisms;  and,  finally,  the  main  arguments,  which   might   even   sound   somewhat   provocative   to   the   ears   of   some   readers,   invite  to  further  debate.   to  begin  with,  kennedy's  book  is  probably  the  first  scientific  monograph   dedicated  to  the  comparison  of  early  francophone  canadian  nationalism  in   quebec  on  the  one  hand,  and  scottish  nationalism,  on  the  other.  normally,   the  references  for  both  nationalisms  are  other  cases,  the  most  important   probably  being  the  irish  one  in  the  case  of  the  scots.  however,  kennedy's   choice  to  bring  together  scotland  and  quebec  makes  sense  and  opens  new   analytical   perspectives,   since   both   territories   were   part   of   the   broader   british   empire,   both   had   been   able   to   maintain   a   certain   level   of   self-­‐ government,  and  both  developed  reacting  to  imperial  policies  aiming  at  a   studies  on  national  movements,  2  (2014)      |      reviews   ludger  mees   centralisation  of  the  empire's  rule  which  put  pressure  and  strain  on  local   governance   in   both   cases.   the   author   identifies   these   measures   of   centralisation  analysing  the  consequences  of  the  south  african  war  (boer   war,  1899),   tariff  reform,  naval  re-­‐armament  and,   in  the  canadian  case,   the   restrictions   on   education   in   french-­‐speaking   schools.   his   chronological  time  frame  comprises  the  period  between  the  boer  war  and   the  outbreak  of  world  war  i,  which  gave  rise  to  major  political  changes  in   the   history   of   scottish   and   quebec   nationalisms.   at   the   center   of   the   analysis   kennedy   places   two   organisations   and   their   respective   leadership.  in  scotland  it  is  the  young  scots'  society  (yss)  formed  in  1900,   and  in  quebec  the  ligue  nationaliste  canadienne  founded  three  years  later,   in  1903.   according   to   kennedy,   both   organisations   represented   a   liberal   type   of   nationalism.   what   does   this   mean?   the   concept   of   liberalism   and   its   different  historical  expressions  are  nearly  as  broad  and  complex  as  that  of   nationalism   and   it   might   have   been   convenient   to   dedicate   a   special   theoretical  section  of  the  book  to  this  issue.  the  introduction  and  the  first   chapter   (“liberty   and   nationality”)   place   much   more   emphasis   on   ‘nationality’   than   on   ‘liberty’.   thus,   without   going   into   details,   and   drawing  on  authors  as  john  stuart  mill,  charles  taylor  or  will  kymlicka,   kennedy  forwards  a  definition  of  liberal  nationalism  as  a  movement  made   up  by  nationalists  who  seek  a  reconciliation  of  liberalism  and  nationalism   by   1.   considering   that   a   sense   of   nationhood   is   compatible   with   democracy;   that,   2.,   moreover,   nationality   is   conductive   to   the   good   working  of  democracy,  and  that  3.  the  cultural  expression  (choice)  is  itself   a   liberal   right.   furthermore,   other   more   concrete   features   of   liberal   nationalism   are   the   defense   of   typical   liberal   claims   of   the   historical   context   (land   reform,   free   market,   women   suffrage,   etc.)   or   the   intertwining   of   nationalism   with   the   self-­‐regulating   agencies   of   civil   society  and  their  normative  commitment  to  tolerance  (church,  education,   press,  social  movements,  etc.).   kennedy   organises   his   analysis   in   seven   major   sections.   as   already   mentioned,   chapter   one   is   an   excellent   theoretical   introduction   which,   however,   might   have   deserved   some   more   attention   to   the   concept   of   liberalism.   in  chapter   two  (‘empire,  state,  and  civil  society  at   the   fin  de   studies  on  national  movements,  2  (2014)      |      reviews   ludger  mees   siècle’)   the   specific   political   and   institutional   situation   of   quebec   and   scotland  as  parts  of   the  british  empire   is  analysed.  chapter   three  deals   with   the   performance   and   the   social   background   of   the   ‘liberal   nationalists’  within   this   context.   in  both  cases  nationalists  were   ‘young,   urban,  and  professional’,  but  in  the  canadian  case,  their  nationalism  was   more  elite-­‐led  and  channeled   through  specific  newspapers,  whereas   the   scottish   was   a   more   grassroots   nationalism   spread   through   a   broad   organisational  network.  in  the  fourth  chapter  (‘empire  and  industry’)  the   nationalist  reactions  to  different  challenges  articulated  by  imperial  policy   are  scrutinised  (boer  war,  tariff  reform,  industry  and  trade).  chapters  five   and  six  deal  with  the  particular  political  aims  formulated  by  scottish  and   quebec  nationalists  (federation  and  consociation,  respectively).  finally,  in   chapter   seven   (‘liberalism   and   the   politics   of   civil   society’),   kennedy   discusses  the  relationship  between  nationalism  and  civil  society.     as   a   result,   the   author   unfolds   a   multicoloured   picture   of   a   complex   historical  reality,  in  which  similarities  appear  side  by  side  with  remarkable   differences.   kennedy's   general   conclusion   reasserts   the   existence   of   a   liberal  nationalism  in  quebec  and  in  scotland.  both  movements  arose  and   got   stronger   responding   to  political  decisions   taken  by   the  empire   that   were  understood  as  menaces  to  the  interests  of  the  quebecois  and  scottish   people.  yet  neither  of  the  two  articulated  a  demand  for  independence,  but   rather   a   desire   for   broader   autonomy   within   the   empire.   completing   michael   mann's   typology,   kennedy   calls   them   ‘state-­‐reforming   nationalisms’.  and  in  both  cases  this  liberal  nationalism,  incarnated  by  the   ligue  nationaliste  canadienne   and   the  young  scots'  society,  vanished  by   assimilation  into  other  more  radical  nationalist  organisations  opposed  to   the   classical   bi-­‐nationalism   defended   by   the   prior   organisations.   but   together   with   these   remarkable   similarities,   there   were   also   very   important,   and   even   more   numerous,   differences.   both   territories,   although   part   of   the   british   empire,   had   very   different   weights   and   statuses   within   it.   in   general,   scots,   unlike   the   francophone   canadians,   had   a   disproportionate   involvement   in   the   empire   and,   in   terms   of   economy   and   business,   scotland   was   a   beneficiary   of   the   empire.   the   dominion  of  canada,  and  especially  the  francophone  region,  suffered,  as   kennedy  puts  it,  ‘something  of  a  “core”/”periphery”  relationship’  with  the   studies  on  national  movements,  2  (2014)      |      reviews   ludger  mees   empire   (106).   conversely,   this   situation   was   reversed   in   the   political   realm.  whereas  quebec  possessed  a  legislative  assembly,  scotland  did  not.   its   recovery   became   the   core   demand   of   the   home   rule   campaign.   the   different  configuration  of  civil  society  had  far-­‐reaching  consequences.   in   quebec,   it   was   marked   by   the   enduring   and   nearly   unchallenged   predominance   of   the   catholic   church,   whereas   in   scotland   the   confessional  fragmentation  reduced  the  power  of  presbyterianism  which,   nevertheless,   was   entwined   with   the   liberal   party.   as   a   consequence,   ‘liberalism  was  more   firmly  established   in  scotland  and  more   fragile   in   quebec’   (226).   the   result   of   this   relative   strength   or   weakness   of   liberalism  for  the  nationalist  movements  was  that  ‘in  scotland  nationalism   was   often   subordinate   to   liberalism,   in   quebec   liberalism   was   often   subordinate  to  nationalism’  (ibid.).   these   are   only   some   of   the   most   intriguing   findings   forwarded   by   the   author  in  his  book  on  liberal  nationalisms.  as  i  have  already  stated  before,   the  book  is  important  since  it  allows  for  further  debate  and  also  for  some   critical  comments,  with  which  i  would  like  to  conclude  this  review  essay.   my   first   question   is   related   to   a   methodological   problem.   i   wonder   whether  a  sample  of  five  leading  personalities  of  the  ligue  nationaliste  is  a   sufficient  grounding  for  the  formulation  of  general  conclusions  concerning   liberal   nationalism   in   quebec.   of   course,   kennedy   displays   a   profound   knowledge   of   each   of   these   five   biographies,   and   not   one   single   detail   escapes  his  scrutiny.  things  become  even  more  complicated  if  the  findings   do  not  coincide  in  all  of  the  cases,  that  is,  if  in  certain  situations  some  of   these  five  leaders  think  or  act  in  one  way,  and  the  others  in  a  different  way.   the   author   seems   to   be   aware   of   these   problems,   for   instance   when   dealing   with   the   attitude   towards   the   catholic   church   defined   by   the   leaders   of   the   league.   the   empirical   data   provided   and   prove   the   ‘divisions  among  the  nationalistes’  (216),  but,  after  mixing  canadians  and   scots,   kennedy   concludes   ‘that   they   were   indeed   liberal   nationalists’   (217).   is   this   a   realistic   conclusion   if   three   among   the   five   quebec   nationalists  campaigned  for  a  ‘leading  role’  of  the  catholic  church  in      civil   society?   a  second  and  final  doubt  is  related  to  terminological  problems.  agreeing   with  kennedy's  criticism  to  gellner's  point  of  view  that  all  nationalism  is   studies  on  national  movements,  2  (2014)      |      reviews   ludger  mees   by  nature  a  state-­‐seeking  movement  and  ideology,  and  considering  valid   the   definition   of   nationalism   as   a   political   project   that   ‘seeks   an   arrangement   in   which   the   status   of   the   nation   is   politically   and/or   culturally  enhanced’  (16),  i  think  that  kennedy's  concept  of  ‘binationalists’,   which  he  introduces  and  uses  without  further  explanation,  deserves  a  little   more  epistemological  attention.  it  is  well  known  that  some  of  the  authors   who   have   studied   the   phenomenon   of   nationalism   do   not   even   label   organisations   like   the   ligue   or   the   yss   as   clearly   nationalists.   in   eric   hobsbawm's  bestseller,  nations  and  nationalism  since  1780,  for  example,   the  scottish  case  is  considered  a  ramification  of  liberalism  or  socialism.1   thus,  the  question  may  arise  as  to  what  extent  the  ligue  or  the  yss  are   (more  or  less  liberal)  nationalist  organisations  or,  to  the  contrary,  (more   or  less)  liberal  ones.  moreover,  if  both  are  ‘binationalist’,  does  that  mean   that  there  are  two  nations  that  share  the  place  on  the  top  of  the  scale  of   values  and  that  both  are  receptors  of  their  people's  loyalty?  how  does  that   work   in   reality?   what   about   possible   conflicts   within   this   binationalist   behavior?   wouldn't   it   be   more   reasonable   to   introduce   the   concept   of   regionalism   in   this   debate?   some   of   the   quotations   of   henri   bourassa   reproduced  in  the  book  seem  to  suggest  that  he,  in  reality,  was  a  supporter   of  what  might  be  considered  a  peaceful  coexistence  of  a  patria  chica  with   its  singular  cultural  particularism  within  a  broader  canadian  nation.  here   just  one  example:  ‘to  pursue  a  union  of  the  two  peoples  of  canada,  without   mutual  respect  for  their  respective  rights,  is  to  build  a  nation  on  a  fragile   basis;  it  is  to  provide  an  element  of  ruin  and  destruction  as  a  foundation   stone’   (221).   is   it  only  by  chance   that   the  quebec   leader   refers   to   ‘two   peoples’   and   one   ‘nation’?   or   was   he   simply   referring   to   the   canadian   ‘state’   when   using   the   term   ‘nation’?   might   the   concept   of   ‘patriotism’,   introduced  but  not  explained  on  page  234,  be  helpful  here?   these  doubts,  however,  do  not  curtail  the  great  value  of  kennedy's  study.   his  findings  also  open  new  analytical  perspectives  for  the  investigation  of   other   nationalisms   which   emerged   in   the   context   of   different   empires   (spanish,   turkish,   austria-­‐hungary),   whose   particular   political,   social,   economic  and  cultural  structures  proportionated  a  visible  impact  on  the   configuration   and   evolution   of   these   nationalist   movements.   if   at   the   beginning  of  this  brief  commentary  i  held  that  kennedy's  book  might  also   studies  on  national  movements,  2  (2014)      |      reviews   ludger  mees   be  perceived  by  some  readers  as  a  provocation,  i  was  referring  to  those   who  still  stick  to  simplistic  and  ahistorical,  frequently  more  normative  and   manichean   than   analytical   visions   of   nationalism.   after   reading   liberal   nationalisms,  they  will  have  learned  that  nationalism  is  not  black  or  white,   good  or  bad,  per  se.   in  the  words  of  anthony  d.  smith,  nationalism  only   ‘offers  a  broad  and  abstract  framework’  which  has  to  be  filled  out  ‘by  all   kinds   of   secondary   concepts   and   particular   notions’.   in   a   nutshell:   ‘whether  nationalism  helps  to  “fill  out”  other  ideologies,  or  is  filled  out  by   them,  is  a  secondary  matter;  it  varies  with  the  historical  context.’2     endnotes   1  ‘the  national  feelings  of  the  welsh  and  scots  in  the  united  kingdom  did  not  find   expression  through  special  nationalist  parties,  but  through  the  major  all-­‐uk   opposition  parties  -­‐first  liberals,  then  labour.’  see  e.j.  hobsbawm,  nations  and   nationalism  since  1780.  programme,  myth,  reality  (cambridge,  1990),  p.  125.   2  smith,  anthony  d.:  nationalism,  oxford:  polity,  2001,  p.  24.   raul cârstocea, ‘book review: krisztina lajosi and andreas stynen (eds.), the matica and beyond: cultural associations and nationalism in europe’, in: studies on national movements 7 (2021) book review krisztina lajosi and andreas stynen (eds.), the matica and beyond: cultural associations and nationalism in europe. leiden: brill, 2020, xvi+367 pp., isbn 978-90-04-42374-9 in the over-theorised field of nationalism studies, recent research that has paid close empirical attention to the fine grain of the historical record has been a very welcome addition. such studies have revealed the story of nationalism across the long nineteenth century as a profoundly uneven one, varying according to geographical location, existing power structures and the related political opportunities available for national mobilisation, competing political agendas, etc. drawing also on an ‘imperial turn’ that revised earlier accounts of empires, especially those in central, eastern and south-eastern europe, as increasingly obsolete entities in the nineteenth century, such research has been very helpful in complicating accounts of nationalism and nation-building that the dominant ‘modernist’ paradigm had simplified. the attention to detail has helped debunk teleological narratives that conferred a certain inevitability to nationalism and the nation-state form of statal organisation, as well as a developmental paradigm centred on the struggle for emancipation, progress, and their eventual triumph. studies on national movements 7 (2021) | book review | 2 raul cârstocea if the now extensive literature on national indifference has shown the limits of national mobilisation by looking at people who were not swayed by nationalist rhetoric and at the numerous and fluid modes of (self)identification that defied fixed notions of (national) identity, the present volume reveals the complexity of nationalism while focusing on the very people for whom the nation was all-important. it does so, as joep leerssen emphasises in the introduction, by drawing attention to the intricacies of the institutional aspects of national mobilisation, at once dependent on and having consequential ramifications into a wide array of social, cultural, and political factors. the focus of the volume on cultural associations – epitomised by the matice (‘beehives’), a prototypical type of such organisation whose scope is shown to have overlapped (more or less) with both the area of the habsburg empire and a number of nationalisms associated with various slavic groups – provides it with much-needed coherence, although this can be at times less convincing in the chapters going ‘beyond’ the matica form itself. considering the two together is however very important, and not just for expanding the (impressive) geographical range of the volume, but also for exposing significant divergences that prompt the reader to consider the complexity, or ‘vexed calibration between the translational and the situational’ (p. 8) dimensions of such transnational phenomena. in other words, if the chapters dealing with matice point at transfer and translation of a specific institutional form from the original matica srpska (serbian beehive), those exploring the ‘beyond’ are rather cases of situational parallels arising in widely different political and cultural contexts. following an excellent first chapter authored by zsuzsanna varga on the buda university press that acted as the logistical framework for several movements of national awakening, including the original matica srpska, and which provides some useful transnational context, the structure of the volume follows for the most part the title. chapters on the various studies on national movements 7 (2021) | book review raul cârstocea 3 | national matice are grouped in its first part, while the second deals with the ‘beyond’, in the shape of similar (but not quite the same) cultural institutions in western europe and the romanov empire. considering this structure, the placing of the galician-ruthenian matica (chapter 14, by iryna orlevych) in the second part of the volume appears a rather odd editorial choice, at least to this reader. as its name suggests, this constitutes a rather typical matica institution established in the habsburg province of galicia and ‘modelled on other slavic maticas’ (p. 319), and thus very much a translational case that seems stranded between two articles dealing with cultural associations in the romanov empire, a very different, and considerably more repressive political context than the habsburg one. in turn, the glaring absence of a chapter devoted to the first such cultural association and the model for the subsequent matice appears regrettable, with the matica srpska covered only briefly – although in very nuanced manner for such a short presentation – in a subsection of varga’s chapter on the buda press. as is often the case with edited volumes, the chapters vary widely in terms of foci, level of detail provided, and the degree of critical approach to the subject at hand. the very good chapter on the slovenian matica by marijan dović and the rich and insightful analysis of the interplay of regional and territorial factors with nationalising efforts and transnational entanglements in the case of the dalmatian/croatian matica by daniel baric are both critical of the self-referential tendencies in both the productions and the historiography of the matice (pp. 113114, 123). such a critical perspective appears to be completely lacking in the chapter on the czech matica by magdaléla pokorná, which, styled more as an essay, seems to unreflexively reproduce the self-aggrandising triumphalist narrative projected by the institution itself. a potentially very interesting chapter by liljana gushevska on macedonian societies in the complex setting provided by the ‘macedonian question’ falls short of the opportunity for critical engagement with the intricacies of studies on national movements 7 (2021) | book review | 4 raul cârstocea competing claims to ‘macedonia’ in the 1890s and falls back instead on essentialist tropes of national struggle (of a putative ‘macedonian nation’ whose existence is questionable during the respective period) against ‘foreign’ (bulgarian or serbian) ‘propaganda’. such simplistic narratives can be contrasted with the exquisitely nuanced and reflexive approach of miloš řezník, whose excellent chapter on the sorbian maticas in lusatia and the czech opavian matice in austrian silesia is the most compelling of the first part of the volume. the chapter shows in great detail the complexity of such institutions in cultural spaces much smaller than even the ‘small nations’ that the volume, following miroslav hroch, mostly focuses on. it also brings to the fore the ‘disunity’ engendered within the sorbian movement ‘by linguistic, traditional, and confessional differences’ (pp. 83-84), eventually leading to the creation of a separate lower sorbian matica (mašica serbska). the comparative perspective between the sorbian and the czech case, and of both with other regional (moravian) and national (czech) matice provides further nuance, drawing attention to the ‘differing forms of regionality’ (p. 82) they expressed. these were dependent on internal factors (such as the social composition of the respective movements) as well as external ones (the political opportunity structures available), while varying also according to the different influences they were exposed to. in turn, this diversity of the types of regionalisation involved is employed to draw conclusions of broader validity for the understanding of the relationship ‘between nationality (ethnicity) and territoriality (regionality) [that] can be considered as characteristic of the role of regions as a mediatory “foil” of nationality and vice versa’, and to argue that ‘it was this mediation that made the incorporation of abstract national categories into the social and cultural discourse of regional or local communities possible’ (p. 79). the insights we can draw from miloš řezník’s chapter are in many ways similar to those that can be inferred from the volume as a whole, studies on national movements 7 (2021) | book review raul cârstocea 5 | especially when factoring in the case studies that refer to other cases of cultural associations than the matica type, i.e., those of ‘small’ national/regional movements in western europe and the romanov empire. as with the matice, we encounter intersections and entanglements between multiple reference points, from sub-national through national to supra-national ones, with the importance of the – still under-researched – pan-movements coming to the fore. both the coexistence of these different reference points and the tensions between them help us complicate a too-straightforward narrative of nationalism where a particular territorial-cultural unit, ‘the nation’, is somewhat naturalised as either the exclusive or at the very least the most viable one. we are also exposed to the asymmetrical encounter and occasional confrontation of ‘small’ or ‘minority’ nationalisms, regionalisms, or otherwise cultural ‘-isms’ with better established, ‘majority’ nationbuilding projects – from the galician case analysed by xosé m. núñez seixas and alfonso iglesias amorín, through the welsh one presented in great detail by marion löffler, to the extraordinarily rich story of the ‘félibrige, or the impossible occitan nation’ offered by philippe martel. the diversity of cases covered in the second part of the volume highlight the importance of political context in shaping the nature and activities of cultural associations. these range from the favourable one in dutchspeaking regions, presented by jan rock, where the habsburg administration established an imperial academy in brussels as early as 1772; through the highly politicised context in ireland analysed by roisín higgins, where such cultural associations had to grapple not only with imperial authorities but also with salient – and partly competing – nationalist political agendas; to the repressive political regime in the romanov empire, itself played out differentially in the baltic provinces explored by jörg hackmann and the tatar cultural and educational organisations and charities examined by diliara m. usmanova. not only is there a striking chronological difference of more than a century studies on national movements 7 (2021) | book review | 6 raul cârstocea between the beginnings of such cultural mobilisation in the habsburg netherlands and the two cases in the romanov empire, but the cases show how the divergent political contexts responsible for this difference also influenced decisively the forms such associations eventually took. the stories are further complicated by internal divisions, whether they were over the nature of the activities, with cultural activists confronting those in favour of more politically militant and even violent action in ireland, based on competing nationalisms as in the baltic states, where latvian and estonian activists vied with german ones while all of them had to engage with the russification policies of the romanov empire, or between more progressive and more conservative activists in the case of tatar organisations. as with miloš řezník’s contribution in the section on the matice, philippe martel’s excellent chapter provides a sophisticated analysis covering all the intricacies associated with the activity of cultural associations that the volume focuses on, and it does so by exploring the microcosm of the félibrige, the main institution promoting the attempts at an occitan revival in nineteenth-century france. showcasing an example of failed national mobilisation, martel’s chapter is exemplary in providing an illuminating comparative context spanning national movements across europe, doubled by detailed analysis of the social composition of the félibrige and of the effects of an uneven process of urbanisation on the geographical distribution of the movement. a transnational outlook that crosses ‘national’ boundaries with the discovery of the links between occitan and catalan confers the analysis ‘spatial amplitude’ rendering it ‘no longer a provincial problem, but something far broader’ (p. 191). a keen eye for divisions along the lines of class and for patterns of social mobility whereby many of the occitan activists sought their recognition in the french capital rather than the ‘midi’ allows accounting for the paradoxes of a national movement on behalf of an occitan-speaking population that it failed to reach. the politics of the respective activists studies on national movements 7 (2021) | book review raul cârstocea 7 | are given due attention, from an initial alignment with the ancien régime (more visible though for breton or basque) to the diversity of political positions that could be encountered within its ranks at the end of the century, from the notions of direct democracy espoused by the communard louis-xavier de ricard to the reactionary and later far-right politics of charles maurras. the typical ‘ingredients’ of nation-building – ‘a proper language with a rich literary heritage, and a territory, an ancient province with long-established historical boundaries’ (p. 200) – are shown to be present in the occitan case, but not sufficient for largescale mobilisation, given the presence and strength of a not so much competing as over-arching nationalism, the majority french one, and the absence of a specific social dynamic that would have rendered the emerging middle class losers rather than winners of france’s economic modernisation. all of these insights provide richness and depth to our understanding of nationalism and its protean character, able to accommodate leftand right-wing politics, and to the importance of a confrontational context (or the absence thereof in the occitan case), itself shaped by class dynamics as much as by cultural or religious differences. throughout the volume, despite the diversity of the cases it covers, the role of religion appears all-important, just as many of the cultural activists are revealed to be men of the cloth. the inclusion of a chapter on tatar organisations is all the more useful along these lines, as it shows this pattern to not be limited to the different christian denominations, but present within islam as well. against prevailing notions of nationalism accompanying processes of secularisation and the decline of religion (pivotal for example to benedict anderson’s ‘imagined communities’), this calls for renewed attention to the importance of religion, understood as a dynamic factor fusing with national mobilisation rather than a static and increasingly obsolete contestant in terms of communities’ primary allegiance. long recognised to have studies on national movements 7 (2021) | book review | 8 raul cârstocea played a role in many national identities, religion is shown in this volume to be more than a cause for confrontation associated with confessional differences, with cases such as that of the slovak matica analysed by benjamin bossaert and dagmar kročanová exposing how ‘the initiative of forming a literary society was taken first by the catholics, then by the protestants, and sometimes they worked together’ (p. 58). such cases of inter-confessional cooperation are in need of more attention, as is the role played by clergy in the development and spread of nationalist ideas. rather than the static image of religion as a cultural resource nationalism could draw on, or as a model for nationalism as ‘political religion’, scholars of nationalism would do well to factor in the active role it played in national mobilisation in conjunction with a process of secularisation that was highly uneven – not just geographically, but also according to social class and the urban/rural divide – and quite questionable for some spaces (e.g., nineteenth-century eastern and south-eastern europe). another common feature that comes through from the cases covered in the volume is that of the two main aims of the matice and similar institutions elsewhere. scholarly pursuits related to the ‘study of history, language (including spelling), and literature’ (p. 204) were accompanied by campaigns to spread national culture among the ‘masses’ through affordable publications, as well as to improve literacy and eventually to educate new national elites, by providing stipends to students, for example. as many of the chapters in the volume reveal, these different aims were not always in tune and their co-existence could be less than harmonious, just as the actors associated primarily with one or the other could themselves be at odds. alongside the seemingly successful national eisteddfod of wales which appears to have combined both, and the many interesting hybrid institutions (literary competitions and prizes, cultural festivals), we encounter many cases where cultural activists failed to reach their intended audience, or where the dominance of scholarly pursuits hampered efforts at popularisation. in turn, this studies on national movements 7 (2021) | book review raul cârstocea 9 | hints at the ambivalence of nationalism itself, where projects of social emancipation coexisted, often uneasily, with the attempts to canonise a suitable high culture and national history. the fact that most of the chapters explicitly refer to miroslav hroch’s paradigm is salutary not only for providing an additional layer of coherence to a volume that otherwise covers a wide array of cases in very diverse settings, but also due to the attention it devotes to the social factors at play in the passage from one phase of national mobilisation to another. in a volume dealing with cultural associations, this is a useful reminder of the broader social context, acting as a (quasi)-constant corrective to ‘culturalist’ interpretations focusing almost exclusively on elites. the attention to ideas of ‘slavic reciprocity’ and the essential role of pan-slavism in engendering and bolstering different nationalisms provide another unifying factor, in this case limited to the chapters dealing with matice institutions proper. the insightful afterword by alexei miller places the matice (but not the other cultural associations covered in the volume) in yet another important context, that of imperial studies, showing how inter-imperial rivalry as much as internal transformations within empires (especially of the habsburg after the ausgleich, but also of the romanov after 1905) influenced the trajectories of ‘small’ nationalisms therein. miller answers the important question of why the matice ‘developed primarily in the habsburg empire’ (p. 357), which the respective chapters mostly eschewed, and the answer is yet another indication of how imperial policies could have unintended consequences that ended up undermining the imperial administration, serving ‘rather to trigger nationalist mobilization than to promote reconciliation’ (p. 361). it would have been interesting if the eminent imperial studies scholar that is alexei miller had brought his vast expertise to bear on the relationship of the cases of cultural mobilisation in western europe presented in the volume with their respective imperial settings. similarly, the insight of reading the matice studies on national movements 7 (2021) | book review | 10 raul cârstocea and similar cultural associations elsewhere within the framework of centre-periphery relations is an important one, holding the promise of a history of peripheral nationalisms in europe that would manage to bridge a still-persistent east/west divide. to sum up, this is an important volume, rich in detail and coherent enough despite the diversity of the case studies it covers to make a valuable contribution to nationalism studies, revealing a european dimension to the emergence of cultural associations with national agendas during the long nineteenth century. an interesting read for historians, with individual contributions highlighting the complexity of what are typically seen as the prototypical institutions promoting cultural nationalism, the many meaningful insights the volume provides might be slightly under-theorised for other scholars working on nationalism. while some of the chapters themselves emphasise the mutual influences and contacts between such institutions, as well as engaging in interesting comparisons, and while the case studies are framed by excellent introductory and concluding considerations about the transnational and inter-imperial contexts in which these associations emerged, some proper conclusions are still lacking. these could have been brought out more and rendered more relevant for nationalism studies and related fields, as i believe they are. more direct editorial intervention could have been useful here, as it would have been for providing consistency within the volume, where some chapters, for example, needed better language editing. beyond such technical considerations, the fact that both the introduction and afterword are written by guest scholars, with no general commentary offered by the two volume editors, appears as a shortcoming, despite the considerable effort that must have gone into assembling such a rich collection. the interested reader will find a lot of valuable, thoroughly researched material within the pages of this volume, as well as inspiring insights of broader validity than the respective case studies. to do so, however, she studies on national movements 7 (2021) | book review raul cârstocea 11 | will have to dig deep into the individual contributions, with little guidance from the volume editors; perhaps this review will be of some help toward that. raul cârstocea university of leicester yesim bayar, ‘state of nationalism (son): nationalism and empire’, in: studies on national movements 7 (2021). state of nationalism (son): nationalism and empire yesim bayar st. lawrence university, new york works on nations and nationalism often include an introductory chapter on empires before more substantive matters are examined. conversely, books on empires typically conclude with summary reflections on the rise of nations. this reveals a particular perspective in the larger literature where the worlds of empires and nation-states have long been clearly differentiated from each other, and have at times been treated as antithetical in nature. it has also been typical that when nationalism is studied within an imperial context the examination focuses primarily on minority nationalisms. recently more thoughtful readings of history have started to produce a rich literature that reveals the complex relationship between empires and nationalism. the present essay will seek to introduce the main contours of such rethinking. before we move on any further it is best to clarify the conceptual universe we will inhabit. empire has been a contentious and ambiguous concept whose connotations changed over time.1 for the purposes of this essay an empire will be defined as a hierarchical political entity where ‘the dominant metropole, exerts political control over the internal and external policy … of the other, the subordinate periphery’, and where peripheral societies cannot act together.2 empires have also come in different shapes and forms.3 the focus here will be on modern empires, and the discussion will include both continental land empires such as the studies on national movements 7 (2021) | state of nationalism | 2 yesim bayar ottomans, habsburgs and the russian empire, and the overseas empires of the spanish and the british kind. the conceptualization of nationalism has perhaps been even more contentious. here, i will refer to nationalism primarily as a form of political ideology, and as a basis of political legitimacy. imperial(ist) versus national(ist) universes there exists a long tradition going back to the 18th century where empires and nations have been treated as naturally incompatible. herder, for example, famously envisioned a future where empires would eventually collapse and be replaced by the ‘natural’ form of nations.4 the literature on nations and nationalism has been drawing from this tradition. while, and until recently, contemporary scholars have continued to treat the imperial and national universes differently, they no longer consider them in antithetical terms.5 there are obvious differences between empires and nation-states which deserve highlighting. while empires are characterized by hierarchical structures, nation-states are founded on the ideals of freedom and equality. empires champion universalism whereas nation-states are based on particularisms. empires are characterized by heterogeneity whereas nation-states revolve around the logic of homogeneity.6 some of the classic theoretical works in the literature similarly accentuate the differences between these two worlds. ernest gellner’s works are relevant here. in his definitive study on gellner’s thought, hall observes a ‘tension between the major analytical expectation that multinational polities are doomed and the hope that they might somehow survive’ in their more benign forms.7 in his later writings, gellner did consider austria-hungary as a morally appealing option, and studies on national movements 7 (2021) | state of nationalism yesim bayar 3 | an example of indirect rule where cultural autonomy was protected. yet, his more characteristic treatment of empires can be found in his nations and nationalism. in this work gellner considers the rise of industrial society as a watershed moment in human history. the preceding agrarian systems were small in scale and characterized by a clear separation between the majority of the population and the ruling elite. despite their size, empires were also part of this agrarian world. it was the coming of the industrial society and its requirements that shifted everything and relegated empires to history. gellner further limited his attention to secessionist nationalism famously exemplified by ruritanians in megalomania. gellner’s perspective which clearly differentiates the two universes as well as his focus on minority nationalisms are echoed in countless works in the literature. and it is on these two scores that recent works distinguish themselves. accordingly, these latter works pay attention to similarities and continuities between empires and nation-states. they also seek to understand nationalising efforts by imperial centers as opposed to primarily or exclusively focusing on minority nationalisms. as a result, a burgeoning body of works offers a more nuanced outlook on the complex dynamics of imperial rule and the role of nationalism within imperial contexts as well as the mechanisms of transformation from empires to nation-states. imperial dynamics, and explaining the transformation from empires to nation-state different from earlier works, scholars are now careful not to assume the inevitability of the transformation from empires to nation-states.8 they consequently devote considerable attention to understanding the imperial dynamics in order to explicate the mechanisms of studies on national movements 7 (2021) | state of nationalism | 4 yesim bayar transformation. one such mechanism involves war-making. here, one immediately recalls to mind tilly’s classic work where he argues that nation-states are by-products of war-making.9 other, more recent works, take this relationship seriously but treat it partly, and not exclusively, linked to the modern 19th century empires and forces of imperialism. in this vein, for example, hutchinson offers an alternative explanation where the emergence of national communities is traced back to the middle ages.10 in his account these communities shape, rather than are shaped by, state-building and war-making. modernist narratives, however, occupy a larger part in the literature. these narratives propose a variety of angles in looking at empires and nationalism. wimmer’s work has been one of the more influential additions to this literature. according to wimmer, the transition from empire to nation-state is a result of nationalist movements that emerged and strengthened inside empires. in this framework, nationalism delegitimizes imperial rule, and consequently nationalist organizations play a critical role in imperial collapse. there could be some exceptions, wimmer concedes, such as the ottoman empire where the interference by the great powers was a more decisive factor in explaining collapse. nevertheless, secessionist nationalist movements remain the core reason in the creation of nation-states where nationalism is almost inextricably tied to violence.11 while wimmer’s methodology, which combines statistical data with case studies, is a praiseworthy endeavour, his treatment of nationalism as the major cause of warfare has been rightly criticized.12 furthermore, his narrative limits nationalism exclusively to secessionism without sufficient consideration to differences in imperial dynamics. alternative explanations propose a more balanced and nuanced reading of history, reminding us that while the power of ethnic nationalism should be recognized inside imperial contexts, its significance should not studies on national movements 7 (2021) | state of nationalism yesim bayar 5 | be blown out of proportion. in fact, recent research reveals the limits of the nationalization of the masses even during the apogee of nationalism of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. judson’s brilliant research on the austrian parts of the dual monarchy, for example, examines the indifference of local populations toward nationalist ideas.13 similarly, the burgeoning historical research on central and eastern europe pays particular attention to the concept of ‘national indifference’, and reveals that ‘far from being a premodern relic, national indifference was often a response to modern mass politics’.14 admittedly, it is quite difficult, if not impossible, to measure the extent of ‘national indifference’ with great accuracy. however, it still is a useful and significant concept. further research along these lines would deepen our understanding of how nationalism operated (or failed to operate) inside empires, and how ‘national indifference’ changed forms in different imperial contexts over time. a related caution should be issued about connecting nationalist movements to imperial collapse in a causal manner. reynolds’ (2011) examination of the borderlands of the ottoman and russian empires, for instance, powerfully reveals the role of geopolitical competition, as opposed to the strength of nationalist movements, in bringing about the fall of empires.15 in the balkans local rebellions have long been interpreted as tied to nationalism and imperial collapse. yet, a revisionist look at these unrests convincingly establishes the actors involved as opportunistic local elites, and disgruntled peasantry rather than ideologically driven nationalists. identities in such ‘movements’ often lacked clear definition and articulation.16 what was observed more consistently inside the ottoman empire, for example, was an ‘indifference to nationalist categories among the sultan’s christian subjects’ which ‘reflected their sense of belonging to a community defined by religion, where linguistic differences between greek and bulgarians mattered less than their shared belief in orthodoxy’.17 studies on national movements 7 (2021) | state of nationalism | 6 yesim bayar nationalist movements did eventually develop in the balkans; but the process was much slower and uneven than sometimes presented. as well, nationalism often emerged as a result of violence and war-making rather than the other way around.18 finally, and as it is suggested by these recent works, an explanation of imperial collapse should more seriously consider the broader framework of capitalist development and the modernisation attempts by the imperial centres as well as great power interference and rivalries.19 in such imperial contexts, when national movements did emerge, they were not always secessionist. their demands typically included calls for imperial reform and autonomy as opposed to independence. 20 nationalist intellectuals and activists were often demonstrating their loyalty to their empire rather than their wish to separate. ottoman armenians, for example, sought institutional and administrative reform with a clearly articulated desire to remain within the empire. national consciousness remained relatively weak during the 19th century, and was mostly limited to intellectual circles.21 it would be the imperial policies and at times the ruling elite’s indifference which turned out to be the decisive factors in strengthening nationalist movements. in the habsburg empire too, nationalist demands which were often articulated around institutional reform in language, courts, schools etc. fundamentally sought ‘political solutions within the legal framework of the empire’.22 the situation was similar in non-contiguous imperial contexts such as the french case. in her study of the french empire, lawrence considers secessionism as only one of a number of possible outcomes.23 her analysis shows that the demands of the colonial elite were initially about political equality. nationalist secessionist mobilization eventually came about and only as a reaction to exclusion from democratic institutions. the decolonization process thus should not be exclusively understood in studies on national movements 7 (2021) | state of nationalism yesim bayar 7 | relation to anti-colonialist nationalist movements. spruyt’s study of the process of decolonization further suggests that the particular configuration of political elites in the metropolitan core mattered. ‘the more fragmented the decision-making in the core’, he argues, ‘the greater the resistance to change in territorial policy and decolonization’.24 while the french case, for example, demonstrates the difficulty of decolonization of algeria due to multiple factions (or ‘veto points’) amongst the political elite, the relatively unified position of the metropolitan elite in britain eased the final outcome. in a slightly different yet complementary vein, lieven points out that in the british case, democracy at the core severely limited the legitimation of colonies making the appeasement of the public opinion progressively more difficult.25 we should also add the financial burden of holding on to the empire as another consideration influencing the decolonization decision inside the metropole.26 nationalising empires, geopolitics and nationalism most current scholarship has recognized the need to study not only minority nationalisms in imperial contexts, but the nationalist policies of the imperial cores themselves. this perspective also parts ways with earlier works where empires and imperial policies were seen as inhibiting nationalism and nation-building.27 as lieven put it succinctly, with the exception of austria, ‘in 1900 … european empires … were sustained … by the strength of metropolitan nationalism’.28 inside the european imperial cores the political elites did not only see nationalism as a threatening force, but also as a tool to cement a sense of solidarity amongst the metropolitan populations.29 imperialism and nationalism could and did coexist inside modern empires where nationalist policies provided imperial elites with a justification for their expansionism.30 in the hands of the political elite national pride became tightly attached to studies on national movements 7 (2021) | state of nationalism | 8 yesim bayar the strength of the empire; and nationalist sentiments were preferred to the less palatable radical ideologies such as socialism. in the british case, for example, darwin’s work powerfully demonstrates how the ‘empire evoked, or was used to invoke, what … we might see as a distinctively ethnic dimension of britishness’.31 more particularly, he demonstrates how the british empire created ‘imperial ethnicities’ in an effort to garner loyalties to the empire through the creation of a common high culture. a definition of britishness which comprised an ethnic dimension was essentially linked to the imperial, and not to the local, level. the efforts to understand the actions of imperial elites add to the complexity of the relationship between nationalism and empires. it is true that sometimes national movements preceded the rise of ‘official nationalisms’.32 however, as hall powerfully demonstrates, more often than not it was the ‘actions of states [that] actually created nationalist movements where none existed before’.33 hence, the ‘general idea is that nationalism has a great deal to do with the way empires behave’.34 it is equally important to incorporate the role of geopolitics, and interimperial or interstate competition into this picture. in the ottomanrussian borderlands, reynolds argues, nationalism is ‘best understood as a form of geopolitics … [and] is better seen as a by-product of interstate competition than as the stimulus for competition’.35 more particularly, reynolds talks about how the national idea increasingly crystallized as a principle around which the competition of the great powers was shaped. in many instances, local violence was not the consequence of nationalist movements, but was contingent on great power rivalries.36 hence, the argument that nationalism is inextricably tied to violence is revised. in accounting for the outbreak of world war i, for example, a more complex picture is suggested which involves geopolitical competition, and the failure of states to act rationally as more critical variables than nationalist mobilization.37 in fact, some studies on national movements 7 (2021) | state of nationalism yesim bayar 9 | accounts highlight the war as the catalyst of such mobilization through ‘exposing both the brutality and fragility of imperial states’.38 other works remind us that oftentimes nationalist policies were implemented as a check on a possibly expansionist policy of rival entities. for instance, the promotion of latvian and estonian nationalisms by the romanovs could be understood as an effort to limit the power of baltic germans.39 it was also not uncommon inside contiguous empires to encourage nationalist feelings in different communities as a controlling device on nationalist mobilization. austrians, for example, encouraged ukrainian identity inside their empire to limit polish mobilization. similarly, the russian imperial elite supported lithuanian nationalism in order to control the polish one. 40 these and similar actions by the imperial elite affected the emergence and development of minority nationalisms in return. in the case of ukrainian subjects of the austrian empire, for example, the imperial policies led to their political mobilization. after empire the 20th century was about the ending of formal empires. yet, arguably, the imperial form could still be considered as a relevant category in a world dominated by nation-states.41 such recent works arguing for their relevance have typically focused on the soviet and post-soviet worlds as well the united states. perhaps more interesting, however, is the sustained attention in the current scholarship on similarities and continuities between empires and nation-states.42 institutional and administrative practices, it is demonstrated, underwent significant revisions and rebuilding under the nation-states. however, some imperial institutions and practices have studies on national movements 7 (2021) | state of nationalism | 10 yesim bayar continued to cast their shadow in their redefined forms. the persistence of the ottoman millet system (albeit in a transformed format) under the turkish republic is an example of such continuity. relatedly, malešević’s longue durée approach to the rise of nation-states suggests historical continuity in the areas of organization and ideology where empires ‘provided the necessary scaffolding for the nation-states’.43 after the fall of empires, the nations which were built from the imperial cores had to find ways to manage the residual heterogeneity of populations. this was not a smooth process by any means. writing about the habsburgs, judson notes that after world war i, ‘the habsburg empire was gone, but the production of politics around cultural difference as the primary way for people to make claims on their state continued with a vengeance’.44 future research along these lines promise to add to our understanding of the processes of social and political change. this review is part of the state of nationalism (son), a comprehensive guide to the study of nationalism. as such it is also published on the son website, where it is combined with an annotated bibliography and where it will be regularly updated. son is jointly supported by two institutes: nise and the university of east london (uel). dr eric taylor woods and dr robert schertzer are responsible for overall management and co-editors-in-chief. https://stateofnationalism.eu/article/nationalism-and-empire/ https://stateofnationalism.eu/article/nationalism-and-empire/ studies on national movements 7 (2021) | state of nationalism yesim bayar 11 | endnotes 1 d. lieven, empire: the russian empire and its rivals (new haven, 2000); r.g. suny, ‘ambiguous categories: states, empires and nations’, in: post-soviet affairs 11/2 (1995), 185–196; m. beissenger, ‘the persisting ambiguity of empire’, in: post-soviet affairs 11/2 (1995), 149–184. 2 m.w. doyle, empires (ithaca, 1986), 12. 3 j. breuilly, ‘modern empires and nation-states’, in: thesis eleven 139/1 (2017), 11–29. 4 a. pagden, peoples and empires: a short history of european migration, exploration, and conquest, from greece to the present (new york, 2001). 5 j.w. esherick, h. kayali & e. van young e (eds.), empire to nation: historical perspectives on the making of the modern world (lanham, md, 2006). 6 s. malesevic, nation-states and nationalisms: organization ideology and solidarity (cambridge: 2013); j. burbank & f. cooper, empires in world history: power and politics of difference (princeton, nj, 2010). 7 j. hall, ernest gellner: an intellectual biography (london, 2010), 331. 8 s. malesevic, ‘the foundations of statehood: empires and nation-states in the longue durée’, in: thesis eleven 139/1 (2017), 145–161; s. berger & a. miller (eds.), nationalizing empires (budapest, 2014); esherick, kayali & van young (eds.), empire to nation. 9 see c. tilly, coercion, capital and european states, ad 990-1990 (cambridge, ma, 1992). 10 see j. hutchinson, nationalism and war (oxford, 2017). 11 a. wimmer & b. min, ‘from empire to nation-state: explaining wars in the modern world, 1816-2001’, in: american sociological review 71/6 (2006), 867– 897; a. wimmer, waves of war: nationalism, state-formation and ethnic exclusion in the modern world (cambridge, ma, 2013); w. hiers & a. wimmer, ‘is nationalism the cause or consequence of the end of empire?’, in: j. hall & s. malesevic (eds.), nationalism and war (cambridge, 2013), 212–254; a. wimmer, studies on national movements 7 (2021) | state of nationalism | 12 yesim bayar nation building: why some countries come together while others fall apart (princeton, nj, 2018). 12 see hutchinson, nationalism and war; j. hall, the importance of being civil: the struggle for political decency (princeton, nj, 2013); j. hall, ‘taking megalomanias seriously: rough notes’, in: thesis eleven 139/1 (2017), 30–45. 13 see p. judson, guardians of the nation: activists on the language frontiers of imperial austria (cambridge, ma, 2006). 14 t. zahra, ‘imagined noncommunities: national indifference as a category of analysis’, slavic review 69/1 (2010), 98; t. zahra, kidnapped souls: national indifference and the battle for children in the bohemian lands, 1900-1948 (ithaca, ny, 2008). 15 m. reynolds, shattering empires: the clash and collapse of the ottoman and russian empires, 1908-1918 (cambridge, 2011). 16 s. malesevic, ‘obliterating heterogeneity through peace: nationalisms, states and wars in the balkans’, in: j. hall & s. malesevic (eds.), nationalism and war (cambridge, 2013), 255–276. 17 m. mazower, the balkans (london, 2000), 46. 18 a. roshwald, ethnic nationalism and the fall of empires: central europe, russia and the middle east, 1914-1923 (london, 2001); m. bergholz, violence as a generative force: identity, nationalism, and memory in a balkan community (ithaca, ny, 2016). 19 mazower, the balkans; j. darwin, after tamerlane: the rise and fall of global empires, 1400-2000 (new york, 2008); reynolds, shattering empires; o. bartov & e. weitz (eds.), shatterzone of empires: coexistence and violence in the german, habsburg, russian, and ottoman borderlands (bloomington, in, 2013). 20 roshwald, ethnic nationalism and the fall of empires; bartov & weitz (eds.), shatterzone of empires; j. kennedy, liberal nationalisms: empire, state and civil society in scotland and quebec (montreal, 2013); p. judson, the habsburg empire: a new history (cambridge, ma, 2016). 21 r.g. suny, “they can live in the desert but nowhere else”: a history of the armenian genocide (princeton, nj, 2015). 22 judson, the habsburg empire, 10. studies on national movements 7 (2021) | state of nationalism yesim bayar 13 | 23 a.k. lawrence, imperial rule and the politics of nationalism: anti-colonial protest in the french empire (cambridge, 2013). 24 h. spruyt, ending empire: contested sovereignty and territorial partition (ithaca, ny, 2005), 6. 25 lieven, empire: the russian empire and its rivals. 26 burbank & cooper, empires in world history. 27 g. hosking, russia: people and empire, 1552-1917 (london, 1997). 28 d. lieven, towards the flame: empire, war and the end of tsarist russia (london, 2015), 36. 29 lieven, empire: the russian empire and its rivals; lieven, towards the flame. 30 hall, the importance of being civil; berger & miller (eds.), nationalizing empires. 31 j. darwin, ‘empire and ethnicity’, in: j. hall & s; malesevic (eds.), nationalism and war (cambridge, 2013), 156. 32 b. anderson, imagined communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism (london, 2006). 33 hall, the importance of being civil, 230. 34 hall, ‘taking megalomanias seriously’, 30. 35 reynolds, shattering empires, 18. 36 bartov & weitz (eds.), shatterzone of empires. 37 hall, the importance of being civil; lieven, towards the flame. 38 roshwald, ethnic nationalism and the fall of empires, 33. 39 berger & miller (eds.), nationalizing empires, 15. 40 berger & miller (eds.), nationalizing empires. 41 h. münkler, empires: the logic of world domination from ancient rome to the united states (cambridge, 2007); j. go, patterns of empire: the british and american empires, 1688-present (cambridge, 2011). studies on national movements 7 (2021) | state of nationalism | 14 yesim bayar 42 see k. barkey & m. von hagen (eds.), after empire: multiethnic societies and nation-building: the soviet union and the russian, ottoman, and habsburg empires (boulder, co, 1997); roshwald, ethnic nationalism and the fall of empires; esherick, kayali & van young (eds.), empire to nation; münkler, empires: the logic of world domination; malesevic, nation-states and nationalisms; k. kumar, ‘nation-states as empires, empires as nation-states’, in: theory and society 39 (2010),119–143; go, patterns of empire. 43 malesevic, nation-states and nationalisms, 53; malesevic, ‘the foundations of statehood’. 44 judson, the habsburg empire, 449. lora knight, ‘state of nationalism (son): nationalism and gender’, in: studies on national movements 6 (2020). state of nationalism (son): nationalism and gender lora knight southern virginia university the belated application of gender analysis to nationalism studies is captured in an oft-quoted statement by anne mcclintock: nationalism [is] radically constitutive of people’s identities, through social contests that are […] always gendered. but, if the invented nature of nationalism has found wide theoretical currency, explorations of the gendering of the national imaginary have been conspicuously paltry.1 until the 1970s, nationalism studies were almost exclusively about men: male intellectuals and politicians who defined the nation for the public, and male revolutionaries or soldiers who attained and protected the nation, often claiming full political citizenship in return for their services. however, the fact of their gender and the connection between national and masculine identities was hardly acknowledged, much less interrogated until the 1980s. ironically, seeing men as men was largely the result of asking where the women were. mirroring the development of gender studies more broadly, the first steps toward an explicitly gendered understanding of nations and nationalism was an outgrowth of the interest in women’s and sexuality studies created by the sexual revolution and the women’s liberation movements of the 1960s and studies on national movements 6 (2020) | state of nationalism | 2 lora knight 1970s. since the mid-1980s a growing recognition that the complexities of nationalism cannot be understood without an analysis of gender has been accompanied by an explosion of case studies from around the world. nevertheless, much remains to be done in gendering the study of nations and in creating theoretical structures to organize new research in this area. the newness of the field, combined with the fact that most of the studies are of articleor chapter-length, makes it difficult to identify those that will have the greatest significance over the long-term. however, this review identifies a number of the most important contributions and examples of some of the newer trends emerging in this area of study. one early and of ongoing line of research has been the gendering of national belonging – analyzing the ways in which male and female citizenship has been differently defined in terms of rights and responsibilities. an early problem tackled by women’s historians was the relationship between women and the nation state, particularly in western democracies. historian linda kerber’s seminal article, for example, demonstrated that the early american republic created a role for women that deviated from the way that european enlightenment philosophes had configured female citizenship. this role, which she termed ‘republican motherhood,’ grew out of the politicizing experiences of women during the american revolution, which gave women a stake in the creation and perpetuation of the new nation. it did not include political rights in the public sphere, but it did concede to them a type of domestic moral authority and education that would allow them to raise sons and encourage husbands to virtuously exercise their masculine duties to the state.2 the concept of republican motherhood has since been extended to describe women’s relationships to other european states, especially france.3 the historical trajectory of female citizenship, however, differs in most formerly colonized democracies that granted woman suffrage at the same time as men: at the time of studies on national movements 6 (2020) | state of nationalism lora knight 3 | national independence. thus directly attached to independence movements, the interconnectedness of citizenship, nationalism and gender is perhaps even more apparent there than it is in the west.4 sexed bodies have always been important to nationalist movements – especially as soldiering male and childbearing female bodies. one early work that treated this dyad was anna davin’s imperialism and motherhood.5 in it she showed how british doctors, medical officers, politicians and middle-class reformers in the early twentieth century responded to a perceived threat that the numbers and fitness of soldiers was becoming insufficient to maintain the empire. they offered a variety of prescriptions, including pronatalist and maternalist social policies, education of working-class mothers, and eugenic proposals. karen offen, mary louise roberts, and cornelie usborne investigated similar fears of national decline attached to shrinking birthrates and twentieth-century wartime deaths in france and germany.6 this literature overlaps with another focused more specifically on eugenics, which is concerned with biologically purifying and improving nations from within as well as drawing ‘racial’ boundaries to protect them from ‘aliens’. it was no coincidence that eugenics appeared the height of late nineteenth century western nationalism. however, it was truly an international movement that spread through much of the world.7 ranging anywhere from a fringe ideology to state policy, eugenic nation building is still in evidence in many societies today.8 although producing more and ‘fitter’ soldiers and mothers may seem like an almost predictable concern for nationalist movements, george l. mosse posited a less obvious link between nationalism and sexuality – that nationalism actually absorbed late nineteenth century challenges to european social norms like homosexuality, masturbation, and bohemian, nudist and youth movements, and channeled them into ‘acceptable’ demonstrations of patriotism like the male camaraderie of the world wars and nationalistic motherhood.9 mosse’s work focused studies on national movements 6 (2020) | state of nationalism | 4 lora knight predominately on men and has been followed by an avalanche of studies showing how masculine identities are entwined with nationalist movements and wars in a wide variety of places and circumstances.10 a more contemporary co-opting of sexual pluralities by nationalist projects is the phenomenon of homonationalism – a term coined by jasbir k puar in 2007 to describe racist strains of nationalism adopted by some circles within the gay right. this, she says, followed the rise of ‘homonormativity’ which included gay communities as (unequal) citizens into the body politic as defined against islamic ‘outsiders’ to facilitate the war on terror.11 although rejected by most lgbtiq movements, the phenomenon of homonationalism persists, as evidenced by the very visible support by some members of the gay community for u.s. president donald trump’s nationalist and anti-immigrant rhetoric. recent work on sexual orientation-asylum cases and the way that regulation of homosexuality in africa and islamic countries has been treated in the western press continue to draw on puar’s influential work.12 two pioneering works on women and nationalism appeared in 1989. one was cynthia enloe’s 1989 bananas, beaches, and bases. in it she asserted that, although nationalism has ‘typically […] sprung from masculinized memory, masculinized humiliation, and masculine hope,’ nationalist movements cannot be understood apart from women’s experiences.13 enloe argued that the calculus of nationalistic aggression – military, social, and economic – often overlooks women, who are enormously impacted by it. she showed how powerful national and transnational economic and political forces have constructed ‘third world’ women’s labor ‘cheap,’ and how sexuality supports the international order through women’s roles as tourists, diplomatic wives, and sex workers around foreign military bases. the second important work on women and nationalism that appeared in 1989 was a volume of essays edited by nira yuval-davis and floya antias studies on national movements 6 (2020) | state of nationalism lora knight 5 | entitled women-nation-state containing ten essays by anthropologists, sociologists, and historians, who attempted to systematically explore how nations and nationalism have been gendered concepts.14 setting the stage for the essays that follow, the editors located five major ways in which women participate in ethnic and national processes – as biological reproducers of members of ethnic collectives, as reproducers of the boundaries of ethnic/national groups, as participants in the ideological reproduction of the collectivity and transmitters of its culture, as signifiers of ethnic/national differences, and as participants in national, economic, political and military struggles. these five categories are overlapping, and the authors did not claim that they were definitive. indeed, sylvia walby added two missing categories – the gendered division of labor, and women’s work in maintaining boundaries in social hierarchies and between different ethnic and national groups within the state.15 elaboration on these themes has since remained fertile ground for gendered studies of nationalism. rich scholarship surrounds the attempt to understand the meaning behind gendered national myths and the way that nations choose to represent themselves with symbols that are recognizably coded as either feminine or masculine. lynn hunt, for example, analyzed the familial imagery adopted by french revolutionaries constructing their nation as a brotherhood.16 such family imagery has proven both appealing and powerfully useful in nation-building projects. lauenstein has illustrated, for example, how familial language is incorporated into national anthems in ways that reinforce social hierarchies, prescribe social roles, and reify social phenomena as biologically determined.17 according to george mosse, women are most often used as the national symbol, ‘the guardian[s] of continuity and immutability of the nation, the embodiment of its respectability’ which is to be guarded by the male hero/soldier figure.18 others have demonstrated that the nation as female may be figured either as a mother or as a lover.19 but the soldierstudies on national movements 6 (2020) | state of nationalism | 6 lora knight heroes are not always male, and the gendering is not static and sometimes ambiguous.20 nationalists often use notions about ideal masculinity, femininity, and gender relations to claim their superiority over other groups, including patriarchal assertions that ‘we treat women better than they do’.21 scholars have also shown how normative western ideals of masculinity and femininity have been invoked as putative justification for denying the fitness of colonized peoples for selfgovernment as, for example, in mrinalini sinha’s colonial masculinity: the ‘manly englishman’ and the ‘effeminate bengali’ in the late nineteenth century.22 women’s role as reproducers of the boundaries of ethnic or national groups is likewise manifested in numerous ways. women’s penetrable bodies have been seen to represent the boundaries between groups. this may have a positive function as women (and, less often, men) leave their natal group to marry and thereby strengthen diplomatic relations or cement alliances between groups. however, out-marriage can also threaten the security of the group and it leaves the interloping individual vulnerable to suspicion of disloyalty by both sides when the two groups quarrel. hence, more ethnic, religious, cultural, racial groups and nations espouse endogamous marriage and sexual practices.23 sexual mores are nearly always stricter against women having relations outside the group – which may introduce ‘alien blood’ into the nation – than they are with men. this is seen, for example, by the persistence of states defining citizenship according to the husband’s nationality.24 although their meanings vary to some extent by culture, wartime rapes and other sexual tortures committed by men against women represent a literal breach of national boundaries on the bodies of the victims. they also commonly include the intent to humiliate and emasculate enemy men who are unable to protect their property, family, and ethnic bloodlines. speaking of systematic serbian war rapes in croatia and bosnia-herzegovina between 1990 and 1995, including organized rape studies on national movements 6 (2020) | state of nationalism lora knight 7 | camps where women who survived were deliberately impregnated and then held until it was too late to abort their fetuses. maria b. olujic explains: in war individual bodies become metaphoric representatives of the social body [. . .]. war rapes reinforce the cultural notions of cleanliness and dirtiness associated with sexuality and ethnic affiliation. through forced pregnancy resulting from rape, aggressors can ‘purify the blood’ of the attacked group by creating ‘ethnically cleansed’ babies belonging to the group of the invading fathers.25 rape and sexualized violence against men during war, although less common, also assaults potent cultural self-definitions of masculinity, honor, shame, and kinship. at the same time, propaganda during both war and peace often focuses on the purported ‘deviant’ sexuality of enemy or ‘other’ nations. wendy bracewell, for example, claims that a pre-existing crisis of serbian masculinity created by a stereotype of albanian rapists contributed to the outbreak of the war in yugoslavia and the sexualized violence that accompanied it.26 one of the most controversial issues in the gendered study of nationalism, first raised by scholars in the 1980s, concerns the relationship between nationalistic particularism and an international feminism that sees itself engaged in a universal struggle for women’s emancipation and liberation. if, as enloe first claimed in 1989, ‘when any nationalist movement becomes militarized […] male privilege in the community is likely to become even more entrenched’, why do many women participate, sometimes even in the most masculinist of projects as shown, for example, by claudia koonz in nazi germany?27 numerous studies have established key roles that women have played in nationalist warfare, including both sides of imperialist and revolutionary anticolonial struggles. scholars wrestle with the questions of whether some studies on national movements 6 (2020) | state of nationalism | 8 lora knight women gain from national projects, and whether, or to what extent, women’s participation in nationalist projects can be empowering. in other words, is a ‘feminist nationalism’ possible, as ranjoo herr claims it is?28 the conclusion of the authors of studies on sixteen revolutions in africa, asia, afghanistan, yugoslavia, the middle east, and latin america, for example, concur with enloe in asserting that, although women’s participation in violent national liberation and reform movements is critical, their interests are generally subordinated and their activities go unrewarded.29 another important collection of studies published in 1997 found more mixed results.30 women’s motivations and experiences as active participants in nationalist movements is an ongoing subject of debate; it provides the focus of a number of studies in the 2018 collection of articles on gender and nationalism edited by jon mulholland.31 in many countries, women’s presence in positions of political power has increased significantly, if slowly, over the last several decades. a 2005 occasional paper authored by amrita basu for the united nations research institute for social development reported on the status of women in relation to political parties and social movements in sri lanka, pakistan, bangladesh, and india. it asked what kinds of leadership roles women have played in those organizations and in elected office and what, if any, benefits have accrued to women individually or generally as a result of their participation. it noted that nationalist parties – most of which are ethnically and religiously based, were especially effective at mobilizing support through gendered appeals – especially through women’s symbolic presence.32 updates on these countries and similar studies around the globe that examine how women in public and elective office might be affecting definitions of nation and national belonging would be welcome additions to the literature. in 1995, sociologist cynthia cockburn began a research project to study how two cross-ethnic/national women’s organizations were created and maintained by watching women interact within and between the studies on national movements 6 (2020) | state of nationalism lora knight 9 | women’s support network in belfast (an array of catholic/nationalist and protestant/unionist community organizations addressing women’s needs) and the medica women’s association in zenica (a medical and psychosocial project responding to the needs of bosnian muslim, serb, and croat women raped and traumatized by the 1992-95 war in bosnia). she found that women in these groups could cooperate with each other while accepting varying attachments to nationalism in each other. however, all of the women who either did not reject nationalism outright, or actually identified themselves as nationalists, defined the term in an anti-essentialist, democratic, liberal and inclusive, way. interestingly, many of these women claimed that theirs was a distinctively feminine type of nationalism that differed from men’s.33 more recently, jill vickers has begun a project of testing theoretical hypotheses about the possible outcomes of affiliations between feminist and nationalist movements against actual case studies. she finds change over time within countries as well as differences between them and concludes that there are some instances where women’s affiliation with national projects has facilitated feminist goals, and warns of the dangers of relying on the euro-centric biases of ‘modernist (i.e. equality as opposed to difference-based) feminisms’.34 these cautions are extended and theorized by leela ferrnandes’ work on transnational feminism in the united states.35 the project of understanding the relationship between feminism and nationalism is on-going, but seems to underscore the fact that both terms are historically and geographically contingent and diverse this review is part of the state of nationalism (son), a comprehensive guide to the study of nationalism. as such it is also published on the son website, where it is combined with an annotated bibliography and where it will be regularly updated. studies on national movements 6 (2020) | state of nationalism | 10 lora knight son is jointly supported by two institutes: nise and the university of east london (uel). dr eric taylor woods and dr robert schertzer are responsible for overall management and co-editors-in-chief. https://stateofnationalism.eu/article/nationalism-and-gender/ endnotes 1 a. mcclintock, imperial leather: race, gender and sexuality in the colonial context (new york, 1995). for an argument that political science has continued this deficiency, see y. abu-laban (ed.), gendering the nation-state: canadian and comparative perspectives (vancouver, 2009). 2 l. kerber, ‘the republican mother: women and the enlightenment-an american perspective’, in: american quarterly 28/2 (1976), 187-208. 3 j.b. landes, women and the public sphere in the age of the french revolution (ithaca, ny, 1988). 4 s. walby, ‘woman and nation’, in: international journal of comparative sociology 33/1-2 (1992), 81-100; k. jayawardena, feminism and nationalism in the third world (new delhi, 1986); e. boehmer, stories of women: gender and narrative in the postcolonial nation (oxford, 2009). 5 a. davin, ‘imperialism and motherhood’, in: history workshop 5 (1978), 9-65. 6 k. offen, ‘depopulation, nationalism, and feminism in fin-de-siècle france’, in: the american historical review 89/3 (1984), 648-676; m.l. roberts, civilization without sexes: reconstructing gender in postwar france, 1917-1927 (chicago, 1994); c. usborne, ‘pregnancy is the woman's active service: pronatalism in germany during the first world war’, in: r. wall & j. winter (eds.), the upheaval of war: family, work and welfare in europe, 1914-1918 (cambridge, 1988), 389416. 7 n.l. stepan, the hour of eugenics: race, gender, and nation in latin america (new york, 1991); f. dikötter, imperfect conceptions: medical knowledge, birth https://stateofnationalism.eu/article/nationalism-and-gender/ studies on national movements 6 (2020) | state of nationalism lora knight 11 | defects and eugenics in china (new york, 1998); n. yuval-davis, gender and nation (london, 1997). 8 g. heng & j. devan, ‘state fatherhood: the politics of nationalism, sexuality, and race in singapore’, in: a. ong & m. peletz (eds.), bewitching women, pious men: gender and body politics in southeast asia (berkely, ca, 1995); j. brown & m. ferree, ‘close your eyes and think of england: pronatalism in the british print media’, in: gender and society 19/1 (2005), 5-24. 9 g. mosse, ‘nationalism and sexuality: respectability and abnormal sexuality in modern europe’, in: journal of contemporary history 17/2 (1982), 221-246; g. mosse, the image of man: the creation of modern masculinity (oxford, 1985). 10 j. valente, the myth of manliness in irish national culture, 1880-1922 (urbana, il, 2010); g. bederman, manliness and civilization: a cultural history of gender and race in the united states, 1880-1917 (chicago, 1995); j. crow, ‘from araucanian warriors to mapuche terrorists: contesting discourses of gender, race, and nation in modern chile, 1810-2010’, in: journal of iberian & latin american studies 20/1 (2014), 75-101; t.h. eriksen, ‘sex, violence and nationalism’, in: ethnic and racial studies 40/9 (2017), 1438-1449; a. mcclintock, imperial leather; j. nagel, ‘masculinity and nationalism: gender and sexuality in the making of nations’, in: ethnic and racial studies 21/2 (1998), 242-269; j. nagel, ‘the continuing significance of masculinity’, in: ethnic and racial studies 40/9 (2017), 1450-1459; j. nauright, ‘sport and the image of colonial manhood in the british mind: british physical deterioration debates and colonial sporting tours, 1878-1906’, in: canadian journal of history of sport 23/2 (1992), 54-71; o. riabov & t. riabova, ‘the remasculinization of russia? gender, nationalism, and the legitimation of power under vladimir putin’, in: problems of post-communism 61/2 (2014), 23-35. 11 j.k. puar, terrorist assemblages: homonationalism in queer times (durham, nc, 2007). 12 k. jungar & s. peltonen, ‘acts of homonationalism: mapping africa in the swedish media’, in: sexualities 20/5-6 (2017), 715-737; c. llewellyn, ‘homonationalism and sexual orientation-based asylum cases in the united states’, in: sexualities 20/5-6 (2017), 682-698; d.a.b. murray, ‘the homonational archive: sexual orientation and gendered identity refugee documentation in canada and the usa’, in: ethnos: journal of anthropology 82/3 (2017), 520-544. studies on national movements 6 (2020) | state of nationalism | 12 lora knight 13 c.h. enloe, bananas, beaches and bases: making feminist sense of international politics (berkeley, ca, 2014). 14 n. yuval-davis & f. anthias (eds.), women-nation-state (london, 1989). 15 walby, ‘woman and nation’. 16 l. hunt, the family romance of the french revolution (berkeley, ca, 1992). 17 lauenstein et al., ‘”oh motherland i pledge to thee...” a study into nationalism, gender and the representation of an imagined family within national anthems’, in: nations and nationalism 21/2 (2015), 309-329. 18 g. mosse, nationalism and sexuality: respectability and abnormal sexuality in modern europe (new york, 1985), 18. 19 a. najmabadi, ‘the erotic vatan [homeland] as beloved and mother: to love, to possess, and to protect’, in: comparative studies in society and history 39/3 (1997), 442-467. 20 see for example essays by smith-rosenberg, malečková and novikova in i. blom, k. hagemann, and c. hall (eds.), gendered nations: nationalisms and gender order in the long nineteenth century (oxford, 2000). 21 p. chatterjee, the nation and its fragments: colonial and postcolonial histories (princeton, 1993). 22 m. sinha, colonial masculinity: the “manly englishman” and the “effeminate bengali” in the late nineteenth century (new delhi, 1997). 23 a. maxwell, ‘national endogamy and double standards: sexuality and nationalism in east-central europe during the 19th century’, in: journal of social history (41/2 (2007), 413-433. 24 in the u.s., for example, see n.f. cott, ‘marriage and women's citizenship in the united states, 1830-1934’, in: the american historical review 103/5 (1998), 1440-1474. 25 m. olujic, ‘embodiment of terror: gendered violence in peacetime and wartime in croatia and bosnia-herzegovina’, in: medical anthropology quarterly 12/1 (1998), 31-50. for a reading of rape in defining a ‘hutu nation’ in rwanda’s 1994 genocide, see e.k. baines, ‘body politics and the rwandan crisis’, in: third world quarterly 24/3 (2003), 479-493; on the anglo-irish war, 1919-21, see l. ryan, ‘“drunken tans”: representations of sex and violence in the anglo-irish studies on national movements 6 (2020) | state of nationalism lora knight 13 | war, 1919-21’, in: feminist studies 66 (2000), 73-94; on world war one france, see r. harris, ‘the “child of the barbarian”: rape, race and nationalism in france during the first world war’, in: past and present 141 (1993), 170-206. 26 w. bracewell, ‘rape in kosovo: masculinity and serbian nationalism’, in: nations and nationalism 6/4 (2000), 563-590. see also a. maxwell, ‘nationalizing sexuality: sexual stereotypes in the habsburg empire’, in: journal of the history of sexuality 14/3 (2005), 266-290. 27 enloe, bananas, beaches and bases, 112; c. koonz, mothers in the fatherland: women, the family and nazi politics (new york, 1987); c. campbell, ‘building a movement, dismantling the republic: women, gender, and political extremism in the croix de feu/parti social français, 1927-1940’, in: french historical studies 35/4 (2012), 691-726. 28 r.s. herr, ‘the possibility of nationalist feminism’, in: hypatia 18/3 (2003), 135-160. see also m. sinha, ‘refashioning mother india: feminism and nationalism in late-colonial india’, in: feminist studies 16/3 (2000), 623-644. 29 m.a. tétreault (ed.), women and revolution in africa, asia, and the new world (columbia, sc, 1994). 30 l.a. west (ed.), feminist nationalism (new york, 1997). 31 j. mulholland et al., gendering nationalism: intersections of nation, gender and sexuality (london, 2018). 32 a. basu, ‘women, political parties and social movements in south asia’, in: unrisd occasional paper 5 (2005), 33. 33 c. cockburn, ‘the anti-essentialist choice: nationalism and feminism in the interaction between two women's projects’, in: nations and nationalism 6/4 (2000), 611-649. 34 j. vickers, ‘bringing nations in: some methodological and conceptual issues in connecting feminisms with nationhood and nationalisms’, in: international feminist journal of politics 8/1 (2006), 84-109. 35 l. fernandes, transnational feminism in the united states (new york, 2013). nichole fernández, ‘state of nationalism (son): nation branding’, in: studies on national movements 6 (2020). state of nationalism (son): nation branding nichole fernández university of california – san diego introduction the practice of nation branding combines public interests and resources with corporate practices and commercial aims through the creation of campaigns intended to increase foreign investment and create a competitive international image. as an industry, nation branding took off in the late 1990s, to become a fast-growing, new specialist area for consultants. practitioners in the industry believed that the branding process that had been so successfully used by corporations could also be applied to nations.1 to them this was a logical progression from the reputation management of which these nations were already engaged. nation branding goes beyond simply government propaganda or tourism promotion, but rather consists of a multitude of activities that form a comprehensive, top-down, government driven and funded initiative that appropriates corporate branding strategies to a nation. the practice of nation branding encompasses outward facing ‘cosmetic’ changes to logos, slogans, and associated tourism media, as well as investment initiatives, economic policy, and public planning. nation branding can also be directed internally, as a part of a broader effort to create a sense of nationhood among the general public. as an area of academic critique, concerns are often raised about the implications of nation branding. this literature addresses what it means to market a nation, and examines how this practice relates to studies on national movements 6 (2020) | state of nationalism | 2 nichole fernández neoliberalism. it also questions whether nation branding is merely replicating older practices of cultural imperialism, and looks at its consequences for democratic governments. more recently, academic researchers have also investigated the role of the media in the production and circulation of branded content. however, this sort of academic scholarship on nation branding is marginal to the vast literature produced by practitioners in the field. in 2011, nadia kaneva called for greater academic interest in nation branding and published a now highly-cited review article on nation branding. in that article, kaneva (2011) observed that the majority of published literature on nation branding came from marketing, business, and international relations sources that unreflectively saw nation branding as a positive and essential practice for nations in order to compete internationally.2 kaneva’s commonly cited definition of nation branding ‘as a compendium of discourses and practices aimed at reconstituting nationhood through marketing and branding paradigms’ demonstrates how the practice exists at the intersection of national identity and business.3 because nation branding is largely about marketing and branding, as well as an exercise in soft power, the literature has until very recently been dominated by praise from many practitioners in the field. for example, the leading journal of place branding and public diplomacy, which was tellingly founded by the nation branding practitioner simon anholt, tends to publish articles that are highly supportive of the industry, rather than question the wider implications of branding as an essential function of the nation. the following sections will outline a selection of the major works in sociology, anthropology, international relations, and communication, which take a more critical approach to the implications of nation branding. this article aims to provide a general overview of scholarly literature in order to enable greater understanding of the increasing commercialisation of nations. https://stateofnationalism.eu/article/nation-branding/589 studies on national movements 6 (2020) | state of nationalism nichole fernández 3 | nation branding as an extension of late-capitalism a key strand of academic research on nation branding approaches it as a part of a wider trend whereby nationalism has become increasingly commercialised. researchers in this tradition note that nation branding involves nations using corporate branding practices in order to frame their communities in terms of their economic competitiveness: to sell the nation. the nation as a brand is ‘an identity deliberately (re)defined according to the principle of competition and strategically (re)oriented toward the market’.4 in this way, nation branding is both a consequence and a perpetuator of neoliberalism and free-market competition. this has led many critics of nationalism to see nation branding as an extension of a late capitalist era where the nation ‘is thus increasingly realised as an economic function’ and ‘connected to ideological and economic changes on a global scale’.5 nation branding, from this perspective, is more than just branding, it is used to create ‘identity, status, and recognition’ in order to preserve ‘territorial sovereignty’, and to respond to ‘emergent conditions of “late modernity”’.6 wally olins, a well-known consultant and supporter of nation branding, explains how we live in a time where everything is dominated by brands, and where everything must be marketable, commercial, and profitable, even nationalism.7 while his work lacks a reflection on the wider impact of the dominance of branding, he provides a good example of how marketing nations as brands developed seamlessly within the advertising industry. branding and identity are inherently interconnected, therefore branding national identity seemed highly logical, and also necessary for nations within an increasingly globalised economic world. olins emphasises a brand’s ability to evoke strong emotions. brands ‘have immense emotional content and inspire loyalty beyond reason’.8 both brands and nations can spur similar feelings of allegiance. for olins branding nations is also a logical extension of the studies on national movements 6 (2020) | state of nationalism | 4 nichole fernández public relations and identity communication that already exists within and between nations. however, the difference between the nation building and national representation that nations engaged in previously, is that nation branding’s ultimate goal is creating a national image that is solely intended to enhance global economic competitiveness. sue curry jansen argues that ‘what distinguishes nation branding from these efforts is that the primary motivation, the raison d’être, of nation branding is commercial ambition’.9 olins goes on to argue that nation branding is the new norm, and that every nation will be seen as a brand whether or not they intend to: ‘every nation has an identity: they can either seek to manage it or it will manage them’.10 through the process of nation branding, however, practitioners argue that nations can improve their identity, making the nation more economically competitive and reducing global inequality. ‘the promoters of nation branding market it as a powerful equaliser – a way that countries without the economic, military, or political clout of superpowers can compete in the global marketplace’.11 however, against such bold claims, the reality of nation branding, as we will see in the next section, is that it reproduces inequalities. practitioners also overstate the ability of nation branding to create any significant economic change. ‘as symbolic commodities, nation brands do, in fact, yield profits for various beneficiaries – including media corporations, local and international brand consultants, and certain political and economic elites – but not necessarily for the nations they allegedly represent’.12 while nation branding does not necessarily increase economic gains, it is still a cause and consequence of a wider reframing of the nation within the neoliberal logic of economic competition. the literature on ‘commercial nationalism’ or ‘consumer nationalism’ offers a way to theorise the changing role of the nation in an era of neoliberalism and late-capitalism.13 this research has argued that traditional theories of nationalism ‘have not fully recognised the importance of markets, studies on national movements 6 (2020) | state of nationalism nichole fernández 5 | commerce, and consumption in the process of nation-building’.14 instead of becoming irrelevant with the increase of transnational institutions and supranational politics, ‘nationalism, far from being weakened by the world-wide spread of capitalist economy, became one of its indispensable building blocks’.15 in this context nationalism is characterised by a dual process whereby there is ‘simultaneous nationalisation of the commercial and commercialisation of the national’.16 in this way, nation branding acts as one of the main forces of commercial and consumer nationalism where the nation becomes more and more dependent on using commercial branding for public diplomacy, international recognition, and nation building. for academics like jansen and christopher browning, nation branding is more critically observed as part of this process of transformation, as society moves towards late-capitalism/postmodernity. in a world where ‘governments are brands and corporations make public policy’, jansen, as well as browning, see globalisation and ‘late-modernity’ as a central force in perpetuating the existence of nation branding.17 in her article on ‘designer nations’, jansen argues that nation branding has become a force of globalisation, in the sense that branding ‘explains nations to the world’.18 nation branding is also simultaneously fighting against globalisation’s post-national trend by re-establishing and branding the nation as a legitimate economic force in a modernising era.19 however, the globalised ‘late-modern’ world that created the need for a fixed nation brand also requires flexibility of identity and the capacity to cope with constant change. nation branding is ‘in danger of ignoring the reflexivity central to late modernity, which arguably makes such strategies attractive in the first place’.20 discussions of late capitalism often comment on the growing importance of the image. this focus on imagery is evident in the rise of visual branding that applies corporate branding aesthetics to national governments. while researching how former yugoslav governments studies on national movements 6 (2020) | state of nationalism | 6 nichole fernández portray themselves online, zola volcic argues the focus on appearance in branding the nation forms part of this ‘time of postmodern neoliberalism in which the “image is everything”’.21 in an article on qatar’s logo, shannon mattern argues that ‘by branding the nation, we erase it and put in its place a multinational corporation’.22 within this visual representation of the nation ‘what is branded is a simulacrum of a nation’. mattern states that this sort of nation branding is not ‘benign’ instead it acts to actively turn the nation into a fetishised ‘market-driven entity’.23 more recently, kaneva has also demonstrated how nation branding creates a simulated version of the nation that is not concerned with nation building but rather with creating an ‘imagined community’ defined in economic terms and for the economic benefit of private corporations and political elites.24 therefore the nation becomes constructed through nation branding, to quote katja valaskivi, ‘in an attempt to redefine the social imaginary of the nation with means that appear compatible with the circumstances of “global competition” and cultural capitalism’.25 nation branding and power as seen previously in the discussion of olins’s work, industry often claims that nation branding is essential for countries seeking a foothold in the global arena. ultimately its proponents argue that, in order to gain political and economic power, nations, especially small ones, must have a brand. ‘in this view, nation branding is understood as an essential strategic tool as nations compete against each other in the global marketplace for scarce resources, such as tourists, investments, qualified workers, or political goodwill’.26 nation branding has, in this way, also been approached as a tool of political diplomacy and soft power. the difference between nation branding and other forms of political diplomacy lies ‘in the means used to wield the power’.27 as a form of studies on national movements 6 (2020) | state of nationalism nichole fernández 7 | political power that utilises marketing consultants, ‘nation branding is a feature of the corporatisation of soft power’.28 therefore, research on nation branding often aims to expose the political and economic power imbalances at play in shaping the way the nation is branded. mellisa aronczyk’s book, branding the nation: the business of national identity, provides a comprehensive study of both nation branding consultants and the national governments that hire them. aronczyk shows how these brands are presented as more than a strategic means of generating capital. rather, she argues that nation branding creates ‘legitimacy and authority’ in an international political field.29 this new image of the country creates a positive global appearance that is intended not just to increase foreign investment and international trade, but also in such a way that this positive image can reverberate back to the nation forming a sense of national pride and belonging. these nation brands, though often outward-facing, do ‘influence the social imaginary of a nation’.30 however, this image is often a top-down construction where external consultants largely determine what aspects of the nation are valuable and marketable. when the nation is branded, the country simultaneously undergoes a process of differentiation and normalisation.31 the country’s image is used in order to distinguish it in a competitive field and to convince investors, corporations, and tourists to choose it above other nations. at the same time, the country is positioned as being standard, safe, and stable – thereby normalising what makes the country valuable.32 in this regard, nations will usually be branded as different but not ‘too different’, resulting in a lack of any significant variation among nation brands. thus, often ‘nations end up looking the same’.33 this homogenisation of value makes diversity problematic and creates an unsustainable image of the nation.34 however, this value is not determined by members of the nation, but is instead constructed with regards to international political influence and power. studies on national movements 6 (2020) | state of nationalism | 8 nichole fernández many economically smaller nations, and nations with a poor international image, are motivated to invest in expensive nation branding campaigns. this has largely been studied in countries of eastern europe, but there is also a growing interest in other areas, such as latin america.35 in order to redefine their nation after the fall of the soviet union, almost every central and eastern european nation has turned to nation branding experts for an international image makeover.36 despite the growth of nation branding and its seemingly vital importance to these eastern european nations, most of this research gives a fairly bleak account of nation branding. most eastern european countries tend to have a long history of a ‘top-down’ approach to politics, with the result that it is the government of the day that ultimately decides the nation’s brand.37 this brings up debates about who has the right to brand the nation and make decisions of national identity construction. nadia kaneva shows how the top-down idea of nation branding is an instrumental approach that ‘unapologetically espouses a form of “social engineering” that allows elites to manipulate national identities. it ignores relations of power and neglects the implications of nation branding for democracy’.38 additionally, many of these eastern european countries attempting to join the eu have enlisted the help of western european consultants. this opens up even more questions about whose right it is to brand the nation and the role of western european narratives on the formation of national identity. dina iordanova’s research on the branding of the romanian region of transylvania brings up additional critiques of nation branding in smaller nations.39 since the 1990s, the transylvanian government became aware of the profitability of capitalising on the dracula imagery of transylvania that was already established in the west. referring to the process as ‘selfexoticism’, iordanova shows that, while voluntary, ‘in poorer nations where the domestic consumer market is not solvent cultural studies on national movements 6 (2020) | state of nationalism nichole fernández 9 | entrepreneurship is underpinned by decisions made on the basis of perceptions of western (entertainment) market demand’.40 in the case of latin america, dunja fehimović and rebecca ogden have argued that nation branding ‘amplifies existing geopolitical inequalities’.41 nation branding builds on, commercialises, and profits off of the exotic representation of the ‘third world’, reproducing distinctions between the modernised west and an underdeveloped latin america. in his research on the colombian branding campaign colombia es pasión (colombia is passion), juan sanín shows how the campaign succeeded in redefining the nation and became a proud national symbol. however, this representation of the nation was still a creation of the elite that reproduced colombian and latino stereotypes resulting in a superficial image of colombia emptied of diversity ‘in which the only ethnic and civic principle unifying diverse people into a national community is passion’.42 instead of offering a way to place the latin american nations on an even playing field with those of the west, nation branding would create ‘new economic, political, and cultural layers to historically-shaped inequalities, cementing the unbalanced power dynamics already present in the nineteenth century’s world of nations’.43 reflecting the arguments outlined above, kaneva reiterates that in the academic research you ‘repeatedly find in each nation-branding case study the subordination of public interests to market principles and the commercialized reproduction of dominant identities within branded narratives at the expense of marginalized groups’.44 what kaneva is arguing, however, is that this is not just a case of nation branding campaigns creating incorrect representations, but rather that it is through media circulations that these representations create a simulated reality of the nation. therefore, nation branding is not about nation building for the greater good of the national community. rather it is determined by international demand, directed at an outside consumer market, and profited upon by international private organisations and studies on national movements 6 (2020) | state of nationalism | 10 nichole fernández political elites. ‘in other words the simulation nation is also “imagined”, but it is imagined primarily for the benefit of media audiences who are, by and large, located outside the nation’.45 consultants have touted nation branding as a necessary step for nations, especially for smaller and poorer ones, to survive and compete in the global arena. as a result, nation branding is now widely considered to be a key task of national governments. nations now must “sell” themselves in order to attract investment, tourism, funding, etc. but while they are advised to do this in order to gain political and economic power internationally, they are instead subject to existing global power dynamics, where larger western markets decide what is valuable. international political and economic power dynamics therefore dictate how nations should brand themselves, and which elements of the nation they must omit in order to be successful. from this perspective, the nation is imagined according to the values and the consumption of an international audience. nation branding and democratic values we have seen that nation branding replicates global power dynamics and is based on top-down campaigns that largely exclude ordinary members of the nation from branding decisions. aronczyk, however, provides an alternative vision of nation branding as an opportunity for the nation to engage in a public dialogue on who ‘we’ are and where ‘we’ want to go as a nation.46 in this view, nation branding could be approached as an exercise in democratic nation building. however, as discussed, nation branding campaigns are ultimately not created with the wider national membership in mind. even the colombia es pasión campaign, which did involve ordinary colombians and succeeded in becoming a national symbol, was originally intended to be a merely studies on national movements 6 (2020) | state of nationalism nichole fernández 11 | temporary campaign, wherein decisions on national representation were determined by external consultants with an international audience in mind.47 similarly, in the case of slovenia’s 2007 branding campaign, which ostensibly placed the general public at the core of the rebranding exercise, it has been noted that it was ‘purely promotional’, and ultimately still produced a commercialised version of the nation for economic elites.48 nation branding campaigns therefore are not an exercise in democratic discussion of nation building but instead show how ‘public national resources are transferred into private hands and governance is outsources to corporate experts’.49 these nation branding campaigns are publicly funded representations of the nation for investors, tourists, and other interested parties outside of the nation. this is one of the reasons academic critique on nation branding has questioned the relationship of nation branding and democratic values. jansen uses estonia as an example of nation branding intended to construct a more economically advantageous international image after the cold war.50 for jansen the problem of nation branding resides in the creation of a ‘monologic, hierarchical, reductive form of communication that is intended to privilege one message, require all voices of authority to speak in unison, and marginalise and silence dissenting voices. the message itself is, by design, hyper-visible, but the decision making involved in arriving at it and the multiple agendas incorporated within it are neither legible nor visible in the classic liberal sense’.51 for jansen, nation branding is inherently narrow and normalising, as it simplifies a nation, privatises national identity, and turns identity into a commodity. furthermore, the industry’s lack of transparency and open involvement makes nation brands undemocratic constructions of the elites. this argument is reflected in scotland the brand, which argues that ‘no monoculture project is possible’.52 what the authors want to point out here is the impracticality and unfeasibility of creating a representation of a nation as one cohesive unit. nations are not homogenous states and studies on national movements 6 (2020) | state of nationalism | 12 nichole fernández any effort to represent them as such will unavoidably create an unequal power dynamic. ‘all essentialist attempts to create mono-culture will inevitably build in power assumptions, and in this scheme of things gender will be skewed. the same will be true of race, religion, class or any other social dimension we examine’.53 jansen argues that the practice of branding may work for corporations that want to create a succinct, reduced message and control the product image through constant regulation, supervision, and authoritarian control. however, in a democratic system of government, creating a consistent and controllable national image should not be a ‘desirable national goal’.54 browning comes to a similar conclusion about nation branding arguing that while making national identity a commodity it presents this identity as narrow with no diversity creating ‘bland marketable homogeneity’ that is fixed. this lack of diversity and fluidity of identity comes at a ‘cost to democratic pluralism’ with ‘the potential to produce disembodied artificial caricatures of self-identity that undermine it in the long run’.55 browning argues that ‘branding promotes particular conceptions of good citizenship that can simultaneously enhance the sense of democratic deficit and elitism that often surrounds debates about national identity and purpose’.56 as previously discussed, for many scholars, nation branding is different than other ways of representing the national community because it is outward facing, predominantly externally influenced, and largely for commercial purposes.57 it is a focus on representing the nation based on economic aims that jansen believes is undemocratic, representing an overall ‘drift toward privatisation of foreign policy’.58 the nation is now being imagined differently and nation branding is proof of this: ‘if previously the nation was constructed as a collective community in relation to political legitimacy and citizenship, it is today imagined as a competitive entity in a global economy’.59 browning argues that nation branding is at odds with the ideals of ‘democratic pluralism’.60 mattern studies on national movements 6 (2020) | state of nationalism nichole fernández 13 | makes a similar claim stating that through nation branding the state ‘marginalizes differences, masks inequalities, and promotes depoliticization. what is ultimately branded is a corporation-nation seeking to appeal to a clearly defined set of stakeholders’.61 the criticisms of nation branding presented in this article, however, are highly shaped by the authors’ background in the discipline of communication and media studies. what is still largely lacking are empirical studies on nation branding from nationalism scholars that take a deeper look at how nation branding relates to the democratic role and values of nations along with questioning the impact of nation branding on nationalism. simon anholt, arguably one of the biggest names in nation brand consulting, has since removed himself from the nation branding business. in an interview with the guardian he seemed to express regret about the way nation branding has commercialised nations.62 he now focuses on the idea that for nations to have good international standing, they need to make real changes in governance and be good global actors. this means that instead of a slick corporate branding campaign, they need a government with local and global humanitarian policies, positive cultural contributions, democratic governance, etc. anholt states that ‘the upsetting thing about this lie called nation-branding, […] is that it encourages so many countries, who really can’t afford it, to blow wicked amounts of money on futile propaganda programmes, and the only people who benefit are these beastly pr agencies’.63 yet, even though anholt and others have begun to consider the negative impacts of nation branding, it is still a prominent industry with more and more nations branding and then rebranding themselves. nation branding continues to reproduce inequalities and international competition. less economically developed nations employ the practice with the aim of increasing their competitive position. larger nations continue to exploit their position by engaging in the activity without due studies on national movements 6 (2020) | state of nationalism | 14 nichole fernández consideration of the impact it can have on other nations within the international arena. in essence, any nation that engages in nation branding ‘is a nation that imagines itself as a product for consumption, rather than as a democratic community in which the government’s task is to distribute public resources to create maximal well-being for the maximal amount of people’.64 nation branding does not build a national community for the good of the nation, it builds a national community that answers to the desires of international consumers. ‘by spreading images and narratives that inspire a sense of shared identity and collective pride, nation-branding campaigns refashion benedict anderson’s “imagined community” in line with neoliberal principles, reconfiguring citizenship, identity, and the public sphere in the process’. 65 nation branding actively reimagines the nation through neoliberal logic and in doing so creates a nation distinct to that theorised by anderson and other modernist theorists of nationalism. now the question that academics must ask is not whether nation branding has any impact on the way the nation is constructed, defined, and imagined, but when ‘the nation becomes analogous with corporations’, and what sort of impact defining the nation this way has on the imagined political community.66 this review is part of the state of nationalism (son), a comprehensive guide to the study of nationalism. as such it is also published on the son website, where it is combined with an annotated bibliography and where it will be regularly updated. son is jointly supported by two institutes: nise and the university of east london (uel). dr eric taylor woods and dr robert schertzer are responsible for overall management and co-editors-in-chief. https://stateofnationalism.eu/article/nation-branding/ https://stateofnationalism.eu/article/nation-branding/ studies on national movements 6 (2020) | state of nationalism nichole fernández 15 | endnotes 1 w. olins, on brand (london, 2003). 2 n. kaneva, ‘nation branding: towards an agenda for critical research’, in: international journal of communications 5 (2011), 117-141. 3 kaneva, ‘nation branding’, 118. 4 d. fehimović & r. ogden (eds.), branding latin america: strategies, aims, resistance (lanham, md, 2018), 3-4. 5 a. graan, ‘counterfeiting the nation? skopje 2014 and the politics of nation branding in macedonia’, in: cultural anthropology 28/1 (2013), 175; p. ståhlberg & g. bolin, ‘having a soul or choosing a face? nation branding, identity and cosmopolitan imagination’, in: social identities 22/3 (2016), 275. 6 c.s. browning, ‘nation branding, national self-esteem, and the constitution of subjectivity in late modernity’, in: foreign policy analysis 11 (2015), 196. 7 olins, on brand. 8 olins, on brand, 19. 9 s.c. jansen, ‘designer nations: neo-liberal nation branding – brand estonia’, in: social identities 14/1 (2008), 122. 10 olins, on brand, 169. 11 z. volcic & m. andrejevic, ‘nation branding in the era of commercial nationalism’, international journal of communications 5 (2011), 604. 12 n. kaneva, ‘nation branding and commercial nationalism: notes for a materialist critique’, in: z. volcic & m. andrejevic (eds.), commercial nationalism: selling the nation and nationalizing the sell (basingstoke, 2017), 188. 13 z. volcic & m. andrejevic, ‘nation branding in the era of commercial nationalism’; z. volcic & m. andrejevic (eds.), commercial nationalism; e. castelló & s. mihelj, ‘selling and consuming the nation: understanding consumer nationalism’, in: journal of consumer culture 18/4 (2017), 558-576. 14 volcic & andrejevic (eds.), commercial nationalism, 3. studies on national movements 6 (2020) | state of nationalism | 16 nichole fernández 15 castelló & mihelj, ‘selling and consuming the nation’, 559. 16 ibid., 561. 17 jansen, ‘designer nations’, 137; browning, ‘nation branding, national selfesteem’. 18 jansen, ‘designer nations’, 122. 19 m. aronczyk, branding the nation: the business of national identity (oxford, 2013). 20 browning, ‘nation branding, national self-esteem’, 196. 21 z. volcic, ‘former yugoslavia on the world wide web’, in: the international communication gazette 70/5 (2008), 396. 22 s. mattern, ‘font of the nation: creating a national graphic identity for qatar’, in: public culture 20/3 (2008), 494. 23 ibid. 24 n. kaneva, ‘simulation nations: nation brands and baudrillard's theory of media’, in: european journal of cultural studies 21/5 (2018), 631-648. 25 k. valaskivi, ‘a brand new future? cool japan and the social imaginary of the branded nation’, in: japan forum 24/4 (2013), 500. 26 kaneva, ‘nation branding and commercial nationalism’, 179. 27 castelló & mihelj, ‘selling and consuming the nation’, 560. 28 p. surowiec, nation branding, public relations and soft power: corporatising poland (london, 2017), 3. 29 aronczyk, branding the nation, 16. 30 valaskivi, ‘a brand new future?’, 486. 31 aronczyk, branding the nation. 32 ibid. 33 valaskivi, ‘a brand new future?’, 500. 34 aronczyk, branding the nation. 35 fehimović & ogden (eds.), branding latin america. studies on national movements 6 (2020) | state of nationalism nichole fernández 17 | 36 n. kaneva (ed.), branding post-communist nations: marketizing national identities in the 'new' europe (london, 2012). 37 l. kulcsár & y.o. yum, ‘one nation, one brand? nation branding and identity reconstruction in post-communist hungary’, in: n. kaneva (ed.), branding postcommunist nations: marketizing national identities in the 'new' europe (london, 2012), 193-212. 38 kaneva, ‘nation branding: towards an agenda for critical research’, 121. 39 d. iordanova, ‘cashing in on dracula: eastern europe's hard sell’, in: framework 48/1 (2007), 46-63. 40 ibid., 47. 41 fehimović & ogden (eds.), branding latin america, 21. 42 j. sanín, ‘colombia was passion: commercial nationalism and the reinvention of colombianness’, in: z. volcic & m. andrejevic (eds.), commercial nationalism: selling the nation and nationalizing the sell (basingstoke, 2017), 54. 43 fehimović & ogden (eds.), branding latin america, 21. 44 kaneva, ‘simulation nations’, 638. 45 ibid., 641. 46 see aronczyk, branding the nation. 47 see sanín, ‘colombia was passion’. 48 volcic & andrejevic, ‘nation branding in the era of commercial nationalism’, 609. 49 kaneva, ‘nation branding and commercial nationalism’, 188. 50 see jansen, ‘designer nations’. 51 ibid., 134. 52 mccrone et al., scotland – the brand: the making of scottish heritage (edinburgh, 1995), 69. 53 ibid., 70. 54 jansen, ‘designer nations’, 122. studies on national movements 6 (2020) | state of nationalism | 18 nichole fernández 55 browning, ‘nation branding, national self-esteem’, 212. 56 ibid., 196. 57 see ståhlberg & bolin, ‘having a soul or choosing a face?’; castelló & mihelj, ‘selling and consuming the nation’; fehimović & ogden (eds.), branding latin america. 58 jansen, ‘designer nations’, 124. 59 ståhlberg & bolin, ‘having a soul or choosing a face?’, 275. 60 browning, ‘nation branding, national self-esteem’, 212. 61 mattern, ‘font of the nation’, 492. 62 s. subramanian,’ how to sell a country: the booming business of nation branding’, in: the guardian (7-11-2017). 63 ibid. 64 valaskivi, ‘a brand new future?’, 500. 65 fehimović & ogden (eds.), branding latin america, 8. 66 valaskivi, ‘a brand new future?’, 490. joep leerssen, ‘book review: andreas stynen, maarten van ginderachter and xosé manoel núñez seixas ed. “emotions and everyday nationalism in modern european history”, in: studies on national movements 9 (2022) book review andreas stynen, maarten van ginderachter and xosé manoel núñez seixas ed., emotions and everyday nationalism in modern european history. routledge, london and new york, 2020. 224 pp. isbn 9781032236476 the study of nationalism has of late been extending its explorations downward, from international relations and the state’s public sphere into small-scale regional communities and, lately, into the private sphere and even the intimate sphere. ‘affect theory’ – the study of unreflected emotional responses to one’s social and cultural environment – has made it mark in nationalism studies, and a good example of this trend is the volume under review here. how did people, actual individuals, actually feel about the nation? was the collective discourse in public opinion a proper reflection of what people sensed in their own heart of hearts? even to ask the question is to avert a certain scepticism on that score. the trendy approach of ‘national indifference’ forecloses that question in its very phraseology. not unlike modern political distrust of the ‘mainstream media’, historians are often moved by an ingrained tendency to second-guess the official story and to seek proof that ‘it ain’t necessarily so’. media reports of massive, fervent crowds enthusing about the declaration of war in 1914 are now suspected of being, at least in part, propagandistic ‘fake news’. and so, in the realm of the emotions, too, there may be an a priori studies on national movements 9 (2022) | book review | 160 joep leerssen tendency to explore this new source of information as a corrective to the established, collective, public frame. luckily, the present volume steers clear of such a reductive a priori. what we see here is really an ideological history from below (as the editors’ afterword phrases it), dealing with political ideas rather than material living conditions, and realizing that most private testimonies were written by ordinary people for whom politics and the nation were a matter of spontaneous, emotional response rather than professional, expert analysis. when studying the impact of the national ideologies in private ego documents we encounter unreflected rather than analytical responses, and that is where emotions need to be factored into ‘everyday nationalism’. the chapters in this collection are arranged in roughly chronological order, taking the reader from the decades around 1800 to the post-1945 period. various social groups are represented, from indigent paupers seeking financial support to soldiers. some articles gravitate towards sociology: the appeals for sustenance analysed by oddens seem to invoke charitable philanthropy rather than nationality, and wiktor marzec, in choosing to concentrate on issues as they presented themselves to workers in late-imperial russian poland, finds that these elicited class-defined and economic responses rather than nationalitydriven ones. others shed light on political ideologies like fascism. the testosterone-fuelled raging-bull fervour of italian irredentists around fiume/rijeka (arditi, indeed), well described by blanck, presents an interesting counterpart to cărstocea’s analysis of the fey cult of the fallen warrior in romanian fascism. both articles offer powerful testimony that fascism is (as goya’s drawing already realized) one of those nightmare monsters produced by the somnolence of reason: fundamentally predicated on the need to drown out rational thought and sober judgement, and replacing cerebral responses by hormonal ones. against this background, the study of lyrical, poetic material (kivimäki's studies on national movements 9 (2022) | book review joep leerssen 161 | analysis of verse written by finnish front-line soldiers) stands out as an intriguing internalization of the national affect long propagated by finnish national romanticism and now suffusing even the very capillaries of the body politic. the chicken-and-egg question that the editors ask themselves (is the nation emotionalized, or are emotions nationalized?) here comes to a fine point. my own overriding impression was how easy the two ‘click’, how very close the family relationship between chicken and egg is. one would be hard-put to find poetry by liberals expressing love and adoration of market forces. and even the literature of communism is brechtian, epic, stern, un-lyrical. how private emotions relate to the larger, public ideology – through what conduits individual affect and political agenda are communicating vessels: that comes into focus as an intriguing and complex field of research. one such conduit is that of pedagogics: sensitizing developing personalities to the allure of the nation. josephine hoegaerts studies testimonies from flemish school classrooms; martina niedhammer looks at the lyrical, communitarian appeal of mistral’s occitan dictionary a case that could be applied to other cases, e.g. dinneen’s gaelic dictionary and its widely-ramifying appeal to gaelic revivalists in ireland. such further study could fruitfully factor in how mistral and dinneen transformed an earlier, philological, bardic and troubadouroriented interest into a contemporary, rusticist, peasantry-oriented one, moving from antiquarianism to communitarianism. the overall impression i took away from this rich volume is how very successful nationalism has been in winning individual hearts and minds. evidence that in their private emotions people dissociated themselves from the public discourse of national loyalty is comparatively weak, and in many cases we can see that the collective public manifestations of national agendas could channel and collectivize, or cultivate, individually-held emotive support. nationalism, in other words, is an studies on national movements 9 (2022) | book review | 162 joep leerssen emotive ideology; something to ponder, since it may help to explain both its thin-centeredness and its powerful agency. as a historian, i particularly liked moreono almendral’s opening essay on ego-documents and the discourse of national character. but here and in this entire volume, i found one term missing which sharply focuses the historical and ideological relationship between affect and the nation. it is ‘romanticism’. as early as 1813, the prussian general neidhart von gneisenau told his king friedrich wilhelm iii that ‘the security of the throne is founded on poetry’. from the very beginning of modern nationalism, romanticism has been its powerful ambience and amplifier. glorifying the agency of subjectivity; presenting natural human affects such as filial piety, parental love and homesickness as anthropological indicators that love of the fatherland is not a civic duty but a natural human instinct; that inspiration and enthusiasm tell us higher truths than rational cogitation; that fervour and passion are the heroic mode of proper citizenship; that the nation is best expressed in its native language and in poetry. all that legacy, traced in the encyclopedia of romantic nationalism in europe, suffuses the case studies assembled here; but the concept itself is strangely overlooked. in studying how affects and emotions went public and meshed with politics, surely romanticism was the name of the game, and mentality history should not be neglected. joep leerssen university of amsterdam huub wijfjes, ‘book review: gertjan willems en bruno de wever (eds.), de verbeelding van de leeuw. een geschiedenis van media en natievorming in vlaanderen’, in: studies on national movements 8 (2021) book review gertjan willems en bruno de wever (eds.), de verbeelding van de leeuw. een geschiedenis van media en natievorming in vlaanderen. antwerpen: peristyle, 2020, 381 pp., isbn 9789492639400 the important role of media in forming and sustaining national and community identities is more and more acknowledged. in the 1980s benedict anderson coined the concept of ‘imagined communities’, referring to the capacity of media to build and convey feelings of community and belonging, even if there is no physical contact on an individual or group level. since then, the concept has often been applied in research about the relation of media and national identities. the interest in this topic has grown considerably because of the increasing interest in the broader idea that media are vital in constructing cultural identities. media are seen as crucial for cultivating a sense of belonging to a distinct culture based on a shared sexual, ethnic, or cultural identity. it is therefore not by coincidence that the content of media is high on the research agendas in history, media studies, communication sciences and minority studies. the studies brought together in de verbeelding van de leeuw [the imagination of the lion] (the lion is a symbol of flanders) are a very nice example. the book offers for the first time in the historical sciences in flanders a nice and varied collection of studies of the way studies on national movements 8 (2021) | book review | 2 huub wijfjes media shaped and gave direction to flemish identity. the obvious disadvantage of a bundle like this, is the bringing together of scattered and varied research traditions. from detailed historical source study to the more methodologically driven communication sciences, it is all there. but reading carefully, you can see that almost all studies connect to the idea of ‘imagined communities’ and a wide variety of more recent theories covering the same subject. inspiration for example was sabina mihelj’s study on media nations (2011) that stresses the ritual aspect of media and identity. in her view the most prominent role of media is to create ‘rhythm of thinking’ and a ‘collective symbolic system’. in the same line of argument is the work of billig and skey & antonsich about everyday ‘banal’ nationalism. this research looks at forms and contents that are always present in everyday life, but often remain unnoticed or unidentified. newspapers for example are writing daily with an obvious set of language tools and cultural notions. deconstructing these notions sheds light on ideas about community and identity. one of the peculiar aspects of flemish media identity is the very gradual and slow start of it. most media of the nineteenth century were published in the french language, the official language of the belgian nation since the independence of the netherlands in 1830. in the twentieth century more and more newspapers and magazines changed to flemish, a variety of dutch. as sarah van hoof shows in a contribution on language care, a battle resulted from this growing awareness of the importance of language for flemish culture. elites in literature, journalism, and broadcasting favoured the standard of ‘pure’ or ‘civilized’ dutch language. but others preferred the flemish language of common people, including phrases and words that weren’t part of standard dutch. other studies also see changes in the relation of french and flemish from the late nineteenth century. starting with a careful and modest coming out of a flemish cultural and literate elite, the cultural awareness of studies on national movements 8 (2021) | book review huub wijfjes 3 | flemish identity spread rapidly in the twentieth century. media like newspapers and broadcasting were the agents of the changes. in first instance it aimed for emancipation of the dutch language equal to the dominant french. later on, flemish nationalism politicized the press, that began to publish stories longing for a strong flanders with glorious stories from the past. with the rise of mass media like radio, film, and television, flemish identity became more and more important. after the second world war growing pressures for equal treatment of flemish culture resulted in the acknowledgment of the flemish cultural community in the 1960s and the gradual growth to a federal belgian state with greater autonomy of the french and flemish communities. in this perspective it is a pity that the emphasis in the book is on the period before the war, because big questions can be raised about the role of media like television on the federalization of culture in belgium. only two chapters cover this topic. communication sciences scholars give a very interesting analysis of the cultural policies of public service broadcasting and the way in which flemish identity was constructed in fictional programs. and political media scholars try to get a grip on one of the most intriguing topics in news reporting of the last two decades: how to report on nationalistic and populist parties that promote anti-immigration and xenophobic (some even say: racist) ideas? the study shows that public broadcasting didn’t choose for laying a ‘sanitary cordon’ around these parties. they were roughly treated the same as other parties, but the most radical party vlaams blok (flemish block) didn’t get the attention they wanted on basis of the number of voters they attracted. since then, the relation of vlaams blok with what they call ‘the mainstream leftist media’ is antagonistic, to say it carefully. growing pressures for the promotion of flemish identity have culminated in a strong position of flanders in the belgian nation. media have constructed this identity, but also strengthened it, gave the studies on national movements 8 (2021) | book review | 4 huub wijfjes emancipation for equal rights a focus and direction, created a sense of urgency, and mobilized people to adjust their norms and behaviour. the big question that follows from this is of course: are media frontrunners in the process or do they just follow what is happening in politics, culture, or society? looking at the cases presented in this book about flanders you can say that both arguments are valid. media were important agents of broader developments, as well as mobilizing factors in times of great tensions. in the interaction of media contents and cultural articulation of identities lies the secret of media power. the risk of a finalistic view on this interactive network can be felt in this book too. finalistic in the sense that a strong flemish identity always was there, only waiting to be awakened by new political ideas and media attention that reflected those. history shows that processes like these are more complex; it also shows the power of politics. in almost two centuries of development belgium has found a way to pacify the growing cultural animosity between two main identity groups (flemish and walloon). in doing so other minorities (like the german-speaking people) got considerable independence too. almost all belgian policies touching on identity nowadays are in hands of communities (education, culture, welfare, media), regions (economics, infrastructure, employment), and what is called ‘language areas’. the federation belgium therefore has become one of the most complicated nations. it still functions although there are some movements towards final separation. resisting the burden of federal belgium, the state that increasingly becomes a pragmatic political solution for a nation that was not able to form one powerful and overarching nationalistic feeling or identity. the monarchy, the army and the national football team were and still are almost the only symbols of the belgian nation. but even when covering the successful national football team, the walloon television organization rtbf focusses mostly studies on national movements 8 (2021) | book review huub wijfjes 5 | on the outstanding efforts of ‘their’ star player thibaut courtois, and the flemish vrt on ‘our red devil’ kevin de bruyne. they are in the same team, but identification with successful efforts takes place through the nationalistic cultural lenses the media use to look at reality. huub wijfjes university of groningen, department of media and journalism studies ‘visca catalunya lliure!’ – battles for catalan autonomy in the ramblas in the immediate aftermath of world war one florian grafl ludwig maximilians-universität münchen the short period from november 1918 to january 1919 marked a very distinct episode in the history of catalan nationalism and in the history of barcelona. the after-war years in the catalan metropolis became known as pistolerismo due to the bloody struggles between workers and entrepreneurs. the first months after the armistice, however, were dominated by the confrontations of catalan nationalists and the police as well as radical proponents of the spanish central state in barcelona’s main avenue, las ramblas. this article analyses these violent street protests for catalan autonomy in a microhistorical perspective aiming for a better understanding of how these struggles emerged, why they reached such a radical dimension, and under which conditions they came to a sudden end in february 1919. firstly, the socio-political developments are examined, arguing that catalanism underwent a transformation from a cultural to a political movement at the turn from the 19th to the 20th century and that despite spain’s neutrality, the raise of nationalisms caused by the first world war also affected catalonia. secondly, the importance of the ramblas as a stage of street protest in barcelona is highlighted. thirdly, the logics and the routines of these violent confrontations are analysed. finally, it is demonstrated how the canadiese strike in february 1919 immediately pushed the quest for catalan autonomy completely into the background for several years. in general, this article contributes to both the history of catalan nationalism as well as to the history of urban violence in contemporary barcelona. keywords: urban violence, catalonia, world war one, nationalism, street protest studies on national movements 7 (2021) | articles | 2 florian grafl introduction clashes between police and militant elements in a thousandstrong crowd of demonstrators transformed part of central barcelona into a battleground late on saturday as another day of pro-independence protests turned violent. projectiles were fired, at least six people were hospitalized with injuries, and barricades were set alight after officers charged ranks of demonstrators – many young and masking their faces – who had amassed outside spanish police headquarters. the violent standoff in the city’s tourist heartland offered stark evidence of the faultlines developing between hardline and conciliatory elements within the region’s independence movement. it lasted several hours before protesters dispersed through the city’s streets.1 the report illustrates the intensity of the violent street fights between radicalized supporters of catalan separatism and the police in october 2019. the protest had risen as a reaction to spain’s supreme court sentencing several catalan politicians to prison for their involvement in the independence bid two years earlier. so far, this had been the last violent climax in the struggle for catalan independence. a similar scenario located in the streets of barcelona had taken place already more than hundred years ago. the rearrangement of europe after the first world war had raised the hopes of catalan nationalists for more autonomy. but when political negotiations had finally come to a dead end, they took their demands to the streets. protesters regularly gathered to walk down the ramblas, which was already back then barcelona’s most central and most important avenue. by screaming slogans as ‘visca catalunya liure!’ (long live free catalonia) or ‘mori espanya!’ (death to spain), by singing the catalan protest song els segadors and by waving the catalan flag ‘la senyera’ they provoked a studies on national movements 7 (2021) | articles florian grafl 3 | violent reaction by the police as well as by radical supporters of the spanish central state. given the fact that both the history of catalan repression in the 20th century as well as barcelona’s history of violence in the decades preceding the spanish civil war are already well investigated, it is puzzling that the violent fights in the ramblas in the immediate afterwar years have been rather neglected. historical research on catalan repression mainly focused on primo de rivera’s and franco’s dictatorship.2 research on barcelona’s history of violence put emphasis on the anarchist terror attacks in the last decade of the 19th century, the pistolerismo, i.e. the struggles between entrepreneurs and workers from 1919 to 1923, as well as the anarchist uprisings during the second spanish republic.3 despite spain’s neutrality in both world wars, the spanish-based historian francisco romero salvadó emphasized the huge impact of the first world war on spain.4 recently, he published an article in which he focused on the immediate post-war months, arguing that they highlighted the crisis of the spanish liberal regime which came to an end after primo de rivera’s military coup in september 1923.5 while romero salvadó has convincingly analysed the political changes in spain and catalonia from a broader perspective, the objective of this article is to give a detailed micro-historical analysis of the bloody clashes in the ramblas in the same period. firstly, the socio-political developments are highlighted which led to the intensification of this conflict. secondly, it is examined why the ramblas turned into the main battleground. thirdly, a closer look on the events is taken to understand the logic and the routines of these violent confrontations. finally, the question is addressed why these fights came to a sudden end in january 1919. in general, this article, by closely examining the fights in the ramblas in the immediate post-war period, studies on national movements 7 (2021) | articles | 4 florian grafl contributes to both the history of catalan nationalism as well as the history of urban violence in barcelona. ‘triumphant catalonia will be great again!’ – the transformation of catalanism from cultural to political movement the triumphant catalonia will be rich and great again! down to those people so swanky and big-headed. good cut with the sickle, good cut with the sickle, defenders of the soil, good cut with the sickle! the time has come, reapers! the time has come to be alert! to be prepared when the next june will come, let’s sharpen our tools well! may the enemy tremble seeing our banners. as we make the golden spikes fall, we saw the chains when the time has come!6 the lyrics originate from the catalan song els segadors (the reapers). it remembers the so-called ‘reapers’ war’ which had started in 1640 as a local uprising of peasants in several regions of catalonia against the stationing of spanish troops during the franco-spanish war. in the course of the events, the generalitat, the local catalan parliament, declared independence from spain to become a part of the french kingdom. the conflict came to an end in 1651, after most parts of catalonia had been reconquered.7 at that time, catalonia had been a part of spain for almost two centuries. in 1469, ferdinand of aragon and isabel of castile married. by unifying their kingdoms, they laid the foundation of the modern spanish central state. the king and his successors hardly ever interfered in catalan’s local rights. in consequence, catalonia preserved a fair amount of autonomy and developed its own regional identity even further.8 studies on national movements 7 (2021) | articles florian grafl 5 | this came to a sudden and radical end after the spanish war of succession. catalonia supported karl of habsburg, but his rival philipp of anjou remained victorious. barcelona was conquered in 1714 by francocastilian troops. the day of defeat, 11 september, later turned into catalonia’s most important public holiday. catalonia was punished with severe repressions.9 it took nearly one and a half centuries until catalanism came to a revival. the time of renaixanca (rebirth) started with the publication of bonaventura aribau’s poem la patria (the fatherland) in 1833, in which he praised his home-country and the catalan language. during that time, however, catalanism had no political implications but the aim to raise the popularity of catalan culture.10 in this context, the text of els segadors was published for the first time by manuel milà i fontanals in 1882.11 ten years later, francesc alió included the lyrics in his song book cançons populars catalanas (catalan folk songs). he added tunes to turn the text into a song and changed the refrain into more combative lyrics.12 alió’s version had been performed at an official event in 1894 for the first time and was highly praised by the catalan press afterwards.13 at the turn of the century, both the nature of catalanism and the tone of the song changed radically. catalanism turned from a purely cultural movement to a political one. one of the main reasons was the so-called ‘disaster of 1898’.14 in that year, cuba, puerto rico, and the philippines, the last remaining non-african colonies of the former empire were lost in a war with the usa. it became obvious by then that spain’s status as one of the leading european imperial powers had gone forever. this led to a profound crisis which simultaneously caused serious doubts on the restoration monarchy. the catalan journalist and politician claudi ametlla wrote in studies on national movements 7 (2021) | articles | 6 florian grafl his memoires that many catalans became hostile to the government in madrid at the end of the 19th century.15 back then, barcelona faced the first wave of working migrants. from 1887, the year before the first world exhibition staged in barcelona, to the beginning of the new century, the number of inhabitants grew from about two hundred seventy-two thousand to five hundred thirty-three thousand.16 most of the people coming to barcelona in search for work originated from rural areas of catalonia or from other catalan-speaking regions as valencia or the balearic islands.17 their integration was facilitated not only by the catalan language but also by many local catalan traditions which found its way into barcelona’s working-class culture. the most influential habits included the building of human towers, known as ‘castells’, and a group dance called ‘sardana’. when the first wave of migrants arrived in barcelona, both traditions were forcefully popularized by the catalanists to illustrate the across-theboard character of their ideas.18 the integration of migrant workers in barcelona into the catalan culture was also facilitated by the fact that they hardly had any sympathy with the spanish central state. in comparison to other nations, compulsory military service in spain had no integrative function. on the contrary, the spanish military was very unpopular in working class circles because in their view, it only served the causes of the upper class.19 the spanish central state also failed to win the loyalty of the workers by means of social legislation. as the reports of the workplace inspectors illustrate, the compliance with labour laws was only sparsely supervised in the factories and violations were punished very mildly. labour laws were especially ineffective in catalonia as there were few state-run companies.20 studies on national movements 7 (2021) | articles florian grafl 7 | as a result, the lliga regionalista de catalunya (catalan regionalist league), a conservative right-wing party demanding more autonomy for catalonia, became the leading power in barcelona’s urban politics at the beginning of the 20th century. it aimed for the mobilisation of public opinion to establish local institutions which could represent the interests of the catalans much better than the government in madrid. their objectives should be realized peacefully via negotiations with the spanish government.21 nevertheless, supporters of the lliga regionalista became involved in violent clashes with proponents of the opposing republican party. its leader, alejandro lerroux, wanted to modernize spain by the establishment of a republican system and had polemicised in an aggressive tone against the conservatism and clericalism represented by the lliga. the republicans had chosen la marseillaise as their hymn, while their political rivals favoured els segadors. lerroux himself openly polemicised against els segadors after it had caused several clashes between his followers and catalan nationalists singing the song.22 in its original version, els segadors narrated the story of three reapers and a lady, rather evoking erotic than nationalist connotations.23 in 1897, emili guanyavents, a poet who corresponded in socialist and anarchist circles, changed the lyrics and turned it into a protest song. in the same year, the spanish government answered the wave of anarchist terror attacks in barcelona with a severe repression which also affected catalan newspapers as la reinaxenca (rebirth) and lo regionalista (the regionalist). in the resistance put up against these measures, singing els segadors became a symbolic act, accompanied with shouts as ‘visca catalunya!’ (long live catalonia) and ‘lliure!’ (free!).24 in madrid, spain’s political elite began to realize the symbolic power of the song. in the spanish parliament it was condemned as ‘a hymn of hate, rage and destruction.’25 the influential madrilenian newspaper el studies on national movements 7 (2021) | articles | 8 florian grafl heraldo de madrid (madrid’s herald) published an article on the song, calling it ‘catalanism’s most efficient medium of propaganda’. 26 in 1899, for the first time, a group walking down the ramblas singing els segadors provoked a confrontation with the police.27 this form of protest would become frequent two decades later in the post-war months from november 1918 to january 1919. in order to understand why the authorities could not tolerate this, it is necessary to elaborate on the significance of the ramblas as a stage for popular protest in contemporary barcelona. ‘to the ramblas’ – staging popular protest in contemporary barcelona a loud scream came out of their throats: “to the ramblas!”. according to the catalans, any funeral, procession and demonstration of importance needed the green and likeable stage of their via sacra, the ramblas. powerful echoes of “to the ramblas!”. they started moving. the police deployed its units. the cavalry headed against the crowd and the horns rang out. this meant that the police had orders to start firing at the people after the slightest sign of disobedience. the crowd ignored the threat. “to the ramblas!” they took the corpse as an ensign and brought it down the calle de balmes. when they arrived at the crossways to the calle de cortes, the chief of police finally gave the order to attack….and the horses of the policemen trampled over the workers, who ran away in all directions. […] whistles, throwing stones, caps that got lost during the hunt, entrance doors violently slammed to deny access to those who wanted to seek shelter in the houses nearby. and still one could hear the shouts “to the ramblas!”28 studies on national movements 7 (2021) | articles florian grafl 9 | comparable to other european cities, street protests in barcelona emerged from religious processions and festive parades dating back to early modern times. these cultural practices improved the sense of community among the lower classes as both the nobility and the upper class usually stayed away from these festivities.29 generally speaking, until the second half of the 19th century, street protest had turned into a kind of political representation as a counterpart to the official public ceremonies such as the celebrations of the birthday of a member of the royal family.30 in the following decades, popular resistance became an established form of collective action.31 as a way to express anger at the political or social conditions, mass rallies made a huge impact both on their actors as well as on the observers and posed a challenge to the authorities.32 in barcelona, the joint walk through the streets was rather a civic ritual until the last decade of the 19th century. since most people were still illiterate, it gave them a feeling of power and community. by gathering together in public, people made clear that they shared the same values.33 the transformation of this cultural practice to a form of resistance became obvious in 1890, when the first celebration of the may days took place in barcelona. around twenty-five thousand people walked from the plaça de catalunya down the ramblas to the office of the civil governor in order to demand the improvement of the working conditions. at the same time, radical anarchists also gathered in the ramblas to call for a general strike, which resulted in a clash with the police.34 the american historian temma kaplan has investigated the routes of the most important processions, parades, and demonstrations in barcelona between 1808 and 1920. in accordance with the quote above, she highlighted the importance of the ramblas as a stage of public representation and protest.35 kaplan reasoned that the ramblas, located in the centre of the city, made up a connection between many public studies on national movements 7 (2021) | articles | 10 florian grafl meeting points of importance such as the market ‘mercado de la boqueria’, where housewives collected groceries, the liceu theatre, in which the upper class gathered, and the plaça reial, where the civil governor resided.36 on both sides of the ramblas, one could find the best hotels, restaurants, cafés, and theatres in barcelona. by the beginning of the 20th century, the ramblas started to lose its exclusiveness and became a staging area of all classes of society.37 the ramblas stretch from the harbour to the plaça de catalunya. already back then, this place was the symbolic centre of the city. the routes of trams and buses converged there, and the news of the day was exchanged.38 the boulevard must have made a big impression. this is illustrated by the contemporary catalan author domènec de bellmunt. in his book les catacumbes de barcelona (barcelona’s catacombs), published in 1930, he wrote: ‘the ramblas are unique in barcelona, maybe in the entire world. this avenue has dynamics, local grace, variety of colours, and different aspects, which made it difficult for the journalist to describe it in an objective, detailed and photographic way’.39 only lerroux chose another boulevard for the manifestations of his party members and followers, namely the ‘paral∙lel’, connecting the harbour with the plaça de espanya. the boulevard was constructed in 1894 and quickly turned into barcelona’s centre of night life. with its flamenco spectacles, the ‘paral∙lel’ could be regarded as the ‘spanish’ city centre during that period.40 but in comparison to the ramblas, it lacked any tradition of popular protest. although the demonstrations led by lerroux gained a lot of attention and made him the ‘emperor of the paral∙lel’, the avenue was less significant as a stage of protest in that period.41 consequently, in the post-war months the catalan nationalists headed for the ramblas to articulate their demands for more autonomy. studies on national movements 7 (2021) | articles florian grafl 11 | ‘ara o mai’ – the radicalization of catalan nationalism after world war i as expected, last night the demonstrations on the ramblas and the plaza de cataluña continued. at 8 pm the ramblas made an impressive sight. a huge crowd of people had gathered on this central avenue and made use of its absolute legitimate right to claim the independence of catalonia. the police had already occupied the plaza de cataluña, the ramblas and the streets nearby. armed with sabres, they took action against the protesters, dissolving the demonstration. the attack of the police was as unexpected as brutal. […] nine persons were arrested. numerous injured persons were brought and cared for in the pharmacies nearby.42 during the first world war catalan nationalism had considerably grown. the rivalry between the lliga regionalista and lerroux’s radical party was decided in favour of the former.43 the wave of nationalism, which had affected all the countries who took part in the hostilities, had also spilled over to catalonia. on 14 october 1918, the catalan newspaper la veu de catalonia (the voice of catalonia) published an editorial headed ‘ara o mai’ (now or never).44 hopes for more autonomy were further nourished by the concept of the self-determination of small nations by american president woodrow wilson. in catalonia, he became very popular, and places and streets were named after him.45 the victory of the entente was celebrated with great enthusiasm on 11 november 1918.46 in the spanish parliament, an autonomy status for catalonia was seriously discussed for the first time. but in the end, the application for more autonomy was refused on 12 december 1918. neither did the allies intervene in favor for the catalans. the euphoria of studies on national movements 7 (2021) | articles | 12 florian grafl the first days after the end of the war now turned into frustration, and most of the catalan delegates withdrew from the parliament in madrid.47 after political negotiations had finally ceased, the demands for more autonomy were taken to the streets. the choreography of protests included singing els segadors and waving ‘la senyera’, the horizontally red and yellow-striped catalan flag. similar to the song els segadors, ‘la senyera’ had become a symbol of catalan nationalism in the second half of the 19th century and was turned into a form of provocation in the first decades of the 20th century.48 the first confrontation with the police had already occurred on 29 september 1918. that day was commemorated as the first anniversary of the death of enric prat de la riba, one of the most influential supporters of catalan nationalism at the beginning of the 20th century. a small group equipped with american and catalan flags walked up the passeig de gracia, a boulevard in the upper-class area of barcelona, until they were dissolved by the police.49 in the last weeks of the war, the tension grew further. one day before the armistice, a group of catalan nationalists walked down the ramblas and was stopped by the police. 50 similar incidents occurred in the following days.51 while the first protests for catalan autonomy had ended up rather peacefully, they took a much more radical turn after political negotiations in madrid for more autonomy had failed definitively. violent fights in the ramblas as the one described above became frequent in the second half of december 1918.52 generally speaking, the protests tended to follow the same pattern. they usually took place on working days, starting in the evenings when the shops were about to close. a group mainly consisting of students, workers and employees used to move through the ramblas screaming their slogans until they were confronted by the police.53 studies on national movements 7 (2021) | articles florian grafl 13 | at the beginning of 1919, the struggles took a different, even more violent turn. between 11 and 14 january, forty-two catalan nationalists were arrested.54 apart from the clashes with the police, a new rival had come up: la liga patriótica española (the league of spanish patriots), which at the beginning of 1919 claimed to count about a thousand members.55 between 11 january and 16 january, several shows of the comedy fuerzas inútiles (useless forces) were violently assaulted by catalan nationalists. the reason for their anger against those performances was that the star of the show, mary focela, was famous for her patriotic songs praising spain.56 in return, on 17 january, a group of about eighty people, most of them presumably supporters of la liga patriótica española, tried to invade a theatre in which the traditional catalan dance la sardana was performed.57 the clashes reached their climax the very next day when a young catalan nationalist was murdered by a member of la liga patriótica española. in the following days, more violent clashes took place resulting in several persons severely injured.58 the escalation of violence caused protests all over spain which put the government under pressure. on 28 january, catalan symbols were forbidden.59 ‘a battle fought in the shadows’ – the beginning of pistolerismo the city lay completely in the dark, the streets were almost fully deserted. from my flat, i passed calle de launa, plaça d’urquinaona and calle de fontanella to arrive at plaça de catalunya. i was absolutely surprised by the silence of the streets, with very few persons passing by. […] i was overwhelmed from studies on national movements 7 (2021) | articles | 14 florian grafl feelings of concern and fear at every step i took, expecting any kind of detonation as a start of a battle which was fought in the shadows. i rolled over and returned home in a hurry, pushing myself against the walls to be as least visible as possible, despite that prevailing darkness. this is how that epic strike began, which was so different than the ones before, in which the tactics of the trade union seemed like a very difficult riddle, to which no one could provide an appropriate solution.60 the seemingly apocalyptical event, to which the industrialist pedro gual villalbí referred to, was a strike in the canadiese factory, barcelona’s most important powerhouse. it brought barcelona to a total standstill for more than 40 days. the strike spread to other factories as well and in total about hundred thousand workers participated.61 many contemporaries felt that this event was the start of a new age, as the anarchist trade union cnt (confederación nacional del trabajo) demonstrated its growing power for the first time.62 only a few months after the strike, which ended in a success for the workers, the federación patronal, the most powerful catalan employers’ association, struck back by organizing a lock-out in order to smash the cnt. it affected about two hundred thousand workers.63 after these events, a peaceful solution of the labour struggles became almost unthinkable. therefore, the workers started to blackmail factory owners in order to improve their working conditions. some of the victims refused and were shot. as a response, the federación patronal saw the work of the police as completely inefficient. they started to build up a group of assassins themselves in order to take revenge. until 1923, hundreds of people died in this bloody labour war which became known as pistolerismo.64 the violent battles between entrepreneurs and workers pushed the protests for more autonomy in catalonia completely into the studies on national movements 7 (2021) | articles florian grafl 15 | background. between the beginning of the strike in the canadiese factory to the end of the pistolerismo in 1923, there were only two minor incidents without any major consequences.65 on 11 september 1923, catalan, basque and galician nationalists gathered on the plaza de cataluña, demanding an autonomy status for their home region. in the fight involving the police and spanish nationalists, about thirty persons were injured. general primo de rivera felt encouraged to bring his coup d’etat forward to the night of 12 september.66 he completely banned catalan culture from public life after he had established his dictatorship. conclusion the short period from november 1918 to january 1919 marked a very distinct episode both in the history of catalan nationalism as well as in barcelona’s history of violence. the post-war years in barcelona became known as pistolerismo due to the bloody struggles between workers and entrepreneurs. the first months after the armistice in barcelona, however, were dominated by the violent clashes in the ramblas between catalan nationalists and the police as well as radical proponents of the spanish central state. this article analysed these fights from a microhistorical perspective aiming to better understand how they emerged. furthermore, social and political conditions contributing to their escalation and their sudden ending have been investigated. catalanism had already undergone a transformation from a cultural to a political movement at the turn from the 19th to the 20th century. despite spain’s neutrality, the rise of nationalisms caused by the first world war also affected catalonia. in december 1918 it became obvious that no political solution could be found for more autonomy in catalonia. its supporters took their disappointment and agony to the streets. studies on national movements 7 (2021) | articles | 16 florian grafl relating to the contemporary newspaper article quoted above, one might argue that the manifestations turned violent mainly due to the aggressive response of the police. however, focusing on the symbols used by the catalan nationalists to support their protest visually and acoustically, it stands to reason that they were used as deliberate means of provocation. they were assured that singing els segadors as well as waving the catalan flag “la senyera” would challenge both their antagonists and the police. not only the symbols were carefully chosen by the catalan nationalists, but also the location to stage their protests. the ramblas, situated in the heart of barcelona, already had a long tradition of manifestations and demonstrations back then. it was a well-known fact that any protest heading for barcelona’s most central and most popular boulevard would receive a lot of attention and could hardly be ignored by the authorities. the manifestations for more autonomy in catalonia, however, took the politicization of this public space to another level. by closely focusing on single incidents, it became obvious that during this short period, the intensity of violence grew steadily. initiating peaceful manifestations in the beginning, the protests took a violent turn when catalan nationalists got involved in regular fights with the police in december 1918. the clashes intensified as theatres were invaded at the beginning of 1919. they reached their climax when a young catalan was murdered by a member of la liga patriótica española on 19 january. it seems surprising that the struggles fought out for months on a nearly daily basis came to a sudden end in february 1919. as many contemporaries noticed, a new era was initiated by the strike in the canadiese factory. in what became known as pistolerismo, assassinations of workers and entrepreneurs put barcelona on the verge of a civil war. the quest for catalan autonomy was completely pushed into the background, only to be taken up again more than a decade later, in the studies on national movements 7 (2021) | articles florian grafl 17 | time of the second spanish republic. the violent clashes between radical supporters of catalan separatism and the police in october 2019 illustrate that the symbolic fight for urban space and territory in barcelona still remains an important issue in the catalan struggle for independence more than a century later. endnotes 1 faust & stonestreet, ‘police, catalan separatists clash as day of protest ends in violence, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-spain-politics-cataloniaiduskbn1x5096 [accessed 30/5/2021]. 2 a. quiroga, haciendo españoles. la nacionalización de las masas en la dictadura de primo de rivera (1923-1930) (madrid, 2008); j. m. solé i sabaté (ed.), el franquisme a catalunya (1939-1977) (barcelona, 2007). 3 á. herrerín lópez, anarquía, dinamita y revolución social. violencia y represión en la españa de entre siglos (1868-1909) (madrid, 2011); c. ealham, anarchism and the city. revolution and counter-revolution in barcelona (1898-1937) (oakland, 2010); j. c. marinello bonnefoy, sindicalismo y violencia en catalunya, 1902-1919 (phd diss., university of barcelona, 2014). 4 f. romero salvadó, spain 1914-1918. between war and revolution (london, 1999). 5 f. romero salvadó, ‘between the catalan quagmire and the red spectre, spain, november 1918 – april 1919’, in: the historical journal 60/3 (2017), 795-815. 6 translation from catalan to english by the author of this article. the quotation refers to emili guanyavents’ version of the song’s lyrics later mentioned in this paper. 7 for a detailed coverage of the events of the reapers’ war and its aftermath, see: j. sanabre, la acción de francia en cataluña en la pugna por la hegemonía de europa (1640-1659) (barcelona, 1956). studies on national movements 7 (2021) | articles | 18 florian grafl 8 simon i tarrés, ‘catalunya moderna’, in: a. balcells, f. sabaté, a. simon (eds), història de catalunya (madrid, 2009), 337-355. 9 j. falkner, the war of spanish succession 1701-1714 (barnsley, 2015). 10 for a detailed examination of the development of catalan nationalism up to the end of the 19th century, see the recent study by angel smith, the origins of catalan nationalism, 1770-1898 (basingstoke, 2014). 11 milà fontanals, romancerillo catalán (barcelona, 1882), 73-76. 12 massot i muntaner, ‘”els segadors”, de canço popular a himne patriòtic’, in: j. massot i muntaner, s. pueyo, o. martorell (eds.), els segadors, himne nacional de catalunya (barcelona, 1993), 12-15. 13 la veu de catalunya, 29/4/1894. 14 smith, origins, 222. 15 smith, ‘from subordination to contestation: the rise of labour in barcelona, 1898-1918’, in: a. smith (ed.), red barcelona. social protest and labour mobilization in the 20th century, (london, 2002), 34. 16 i. julián, l’urbanisme a barcelona entre dues exposicions (1888-1929) (barcelona, 1988), 113. 17 a. caules, ‘investigación analítica sobre la evolución demográfica de cataluña’, in: cuadernos de información economica y sociologica 1 (1955), 33. 18 k.j. nagel, ‘”multikulturelle gesellschaft” und staatliche interventionspolitik in der stadt barcelona zwischen den weltausstellungen von 1888 und 1929‘, in: archiv für sozialgeschichte 32 (1992), 17. 19 d. marín, la semana trágica. barcelona en llamas, la revuelta popular y la escuela moderna (madrid, 2009), 59. 20 nagel, multikulturelle gesellschaft, 26. 21 smith, ‘the lliga regionalista, the catalan right and the making of the primo de rivera dictatorship, 1916-1923’, in: a. smith & f. romero salvadó, the agony of spanish liberalism. from revolution to dictatorship, 1913-1923 (london, 2010), 148. 22 one example of such a clash is reported in la vanguardia, 19/11/1905. studies on national movements 7 (2021) | articles florian grafl 19 | 23 j. ayats, els segadors. de cançó erótica a himne nacional (barcelona, 2011), 4849. 24 ayats, ‘segadors’, 82. 25 la vanguardia, 21/2/1900. 26 alier, ‘la societat coral‚ catalunya nova‘, in: d’art 2 (1973), 55. 27 p. anguera, els segadors. com es crea un himne (barcelona, 2010), 53. 28 this quote was translated by the author of this article from spanish to english. it is taken from a book by contemporary journalist francisco madrid. he described the assassination and the funeral of francesc layret, a lawyer who successfully had defended several union leaders at court, f. madrid, las últimas veinticuatro horas de francisco layret (buenos aires, 1942), 68-69. 29 j. amelang, ‘public ceremonies and private fetes. social segregation and aristocratic culture in barcelona, ca. 1500-1800’, in: g. mcdonogh (ed.), conflict in catalonia. images of an urban society (florida, 1986), 21-23. 30 kaschuba, ‘von der “rotte” zum “block”. zur kulturellen ikonographie der demonstration im 19. jahrhundert‘, in: b.j. warnecken (ed.), massenmedium straße. zur kulturgeschichte der demonstration (frankfurt/m., 1991), 69-70. 31 robert, ‘metamorphosen der demonstration. lyon 1848, 1890, 1912‘, in: b. j. warnecken (ed.), massenmedium straße. zur kulturgeschichte der demonstration (frankfurt/m., 1991), 49. 32 pigenet, ‘räume und rituale des ländlichen arbeiterprotestes im 19. jahrhundert. am beispiel der protestmärsche im department cher‘, in: b.j. warnecken (ed.), massenmedium straße. zur kulturgeschichte der demonstration (frankfurt/m., 1991), 39. 33 t. kaplan, red city, blue period. social movements in picassos barcelona (berkeley, 1992), 13-14. 34 t. kaplan, ‘civic rituals and patterns of resistance in barcelona, 1890-1930’, in: p. thane, g. crossick & r. floud (eds.), the power of the past. essays for eric j. hobsbawm (cambridge, 1984), 175-177. 35 kaplan, red city, 202-203. one could extend kaplan’s analysis and support her conclusion by mentioning that for example, in 1922, fc barcelona’s celebration of winning both the catalan championship as well as the copa del rey was staged studies on national movements 7 (2021) | articles | 20 florian grafl both on the ramblas as well as on plaça de catalunya. t. sala, la vida cotidiana en la barcelona de 1900 (madrid, 2005), 194. at the beginning of the second spanish republic, a demonstration during the rent strike of 1931 also headed for the ramblas, f. aisa pàmpols, la huelga de alquileres y el comité de defensa económica (barcelona, 2014), 59. 36 kaplan, red city, 2. an overview of the history of this boulevard is given by e. vila, breu història de la rambla (barcelona, 2012). 37 gabriel, ‘la barcelona obrera y proletaria’, in: a. sánchez (ed.), barcelona 1888-1929. modernidad, ambición y conflictos de una ciudad soñada (madrid, 1994), 99. 38 kaplan, red city, 3. the historical significance of this place is demonstrated by the fact that city chronicler lluís permanyer dedicated a whole ‘biography’ to it, l. permanyer, biografia de la plaça de catalunya (barcelona, 1995). 39 d. de bellmunt, les catacumbes de barcelona (barcelona, 1930), 20. 40 j. termes & t. abelló, ‘conflictivitat social i maneres de viure’, in: j. sobrequés i callicó (ed.), història de barcelona, el segle xx, i. de les annexions a la fi de la guerra civil (barcelona, 1995), 143; gabriel, ‘barcelona obrera’, 100-101. 41 j. àlvarez junco, el emperador del paralelo. lerroux y la demagogia populista (madrid 1990); j. ballerster i peris, memòries d’un noi de gràcia (barcelona, 1999), 23. 42 el diluvio, 14/12/1918. 43 àlvarez junco, el emperador, 328. 44 la veu de catalonia, 14/10/1918. 45 j.m. poblet, el moviment autonomista a catalunya dels anys 1918-1919 (barcelona, 1970), 7. 46 r. tasis i marca, barcelona. imatge i història d’una ciutat (barcelona, 1963), 457-458. 47 k.j. nagel, arbeiterschaft und nationale bewegung in katalonien zwischen 1898 und 1923 (saarbrücken, 1991), 428. studies on national movements 7 (2021) | articles florian grafl 21 | 48 for the meaning of the catalan senyera see: j. alberti, la bandera catalana. mil anys d’història (barcelona, 2010), as well as: p. anguera i nolla, les quatre barres. de bandera històrica a senyera nacional (barcelona, 2010). 49 a. balcells, e. puyol, j. sabater, la mancomunitat de catalunya i l’autonomia (barcelona 1996), 102. 50 e. ucelay da cal, estat català, the strategies of seperation and revolution of catalan radical nationalism 1919-1933 (columbia, 1979), 92. 51 such an event for example is documented in el día gráfico, 17/11/1918. 52 a similar incident was reported by el diluvio, 24/12/1918. 53 ucelay da cal, strategies, 98. 54 molas, ‘federació democrática nacionalista (1919-1923)’, in: recerques 4 (1974), 140. 55 quiroga, ‘nation and reaction’, in: f. romero salvadó & a. smith (eds.), the agony of spanish liberalism. from revolution to dictatorship, 1913-1923 (london, 2010), 207-208. 56 el noticiero universal, 13/1/1919, el diluvio, 13/1/1919, e. gonzález calleja: el máuser y el sufragio. orden público, subversión y violencia política en la crisis de la restauración 1917–1931 (madrid, 1999), 349. 57 el noticiero universal, 18/1/1919. 58 el correo catalan, 25/1/1919. 59 gonzález calleja, máuser, 351. 60 p. gual villalbí, memorias de un industrial de nuestro tiempo (barcelona, 1922), 162-163. the quote was translated from spanish to english by the author of this article. 61 a. smith, anarchism, revolution and reaction, catalan labour and the crisis of the central state, 1898-1923 (new york, 2007), 290-297. 62 p. coromines, cartes d’un visionari (barcelona, 1921), 218-219 a. baratech, los sindicatos libres de españa. su origen – su actuación – su ideario (barcelona, 1927), 51. studies on national movements 7 (2021) | articles | 22 florian grafl 63 the lock-out is extensively covered in s. bengoechea, el locaut de barcelona (1919-1920). els precedents de la dictadura de primo de rivera (barcelona 1998). 64 romero salvadó, ‘”si vis pacem para bellum”. the catalan employers’ dirty war 1919-23’, in: f. romero salvadó & a. smith (eds.), the agony of spanish liberalism. from revolution to dictatorship, 1913-1923 (london, 2010), 175-201. 65 el noticiero universal, 3/5/1920, la vanguardia, 12/9/1922. 66 quiroga, nation and reaction, 202. ther_sources_v4_definitive   philipp  ther,  ‘bibliography  of  recent  research  on  upper  silesia’,  in:   studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)  pp.  183-­‐186.   http://snm.nise.eu   philipp  ther   bibliography  of  recent  research  on  upper  silesia the   following  bibliography  contains   the  most  recent  research  on  upper   silesia.   while   in   the   post-­‐war   years   national   conflicts   and   national   movements   were   the   most   prominent   topics   –   due   to   the   long-­‐lasting   disputes   between   germany   and   poland   over   the   region   –   the   final   acknowledgement   of   the   post-­‐war   borders   in   1990,   the   granting   of   far   reaching   minority   rights,   and   the   subsequent   polish-­‐german   rapprochement  have  opened  up  new  avenues  of  research.  in  the  past  ten   years,   the   literature   on   regional   movements   and   identities   has   grown   considerably.   the   second   productive   novelty   has   been   comparative   research   on   upper   silesia,   which   has   been   compared   with   various   european   regions   such   as   alsace   or   northern   ireland.   the   third   major   change   has   been   that   anglophone   historians   and   social   scientists   have   detected  the  region  and  contributed  major  works.  moreover,  the  state  of   the  art  has  been  advanced  in  other  fields  as  well,  for  example  on  the  role  of   catholicism,   collective   memories   and   the   political   and   legal   attempts   to   recognise  a  ‘silesian  nation’.  there  also  are  a  rising  number  of  well-­‐crafted   local  studies.   studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)      |      sources   philipp  ther  184   the  history  of  regionalism  (and  nationalism  in  the  region) bjork,   james   e.,   neither   german   nor   pole.   catholicism   and   national   indifference  in  a  central  european  borderland  (ann  arbor,  2008).   budzyński,   zdzisław,   dwa   pogranicza.   galicja   wschodnia   i   górny   śląsk.   historia,  problem,  odniesienia  (rzeszów,  2003).   dziurok,  adam  &  kaczmarek,  ryszard  (eds.),  województwo  śląskie  1945-­ 1950.  zarys  dziejów  politycznych  (katowice,  2007).   haubold-­‐stolle,   juliane,   mythos   oberschlesien.   der   kampf   um   die   erinnerung  in  deutschland  und  in  polen  1919-­1956  (osnabrück,  2008).   jerczyński,   dariusz,   śląski   ruch   narodowy   pod   naciskiem   polskiego   i   niemieckiego   nacjonalizmu   na   tle   politycznej   historii   górnego   śląski   w   latach  1848-­1947  (zabrze,  2006).   kaczmarek,   ryszard,   ‘bohaterowie’   ruchu   nazistowskiego   i   komunistycznego   w   tradycji   regionu.   in   górny   śląsk   wyobrażony.   wokół   mitów,   symboli   i   bohaterów   dyskursów   narodowych   –   imaginiertes   oberschlesien.   mythen,   symbole   und   helden   in   den   nationalen   diskursen   (marburg,  2005)  248-­‐267.   kaczmarek,  ryszard,  górny  śląsk  podczas  ii  wojny  swiatowej.  między  utopą   niemieckiej   wspólnoty   narodowej   a   rzeczywistością   okupacji   na   terenach   wcielonych  do  trzeciej  rzeszy  (katowice,  2006).   kaczmarek,   ryszard,   ‘zwischen   regionalismus,   autonomismus   und   separatismus.  das  elsass  und  oberschlesien,  1871  bis  1945’,  in:  p.o.  loew,   ch.   pletzing   &   th.   serrier   (eds.),   wiedergewonnene   geschichte.   zur   aneignung   von   vergangenheit   in   den   zwischenräumen   mitteleuropas   (wiesbaden,  2006)  164-­‐186.   kaczmarek,   ryszard,   bahlcke,   joachim   &   gawrecki,   dan   (eds.),   historia   górnego   śląska.   polityka,   gospodarka   i   kultura   europejskiego   regionu   (gliwice,  2011).   studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)      |      sources   philipp  ther   185   kamusella,  tomasz,  schlonzsko.  horní  slezsko,  oberschlesien,  górny  śląsk.   esej  o  regionie  i  jego  mieszkańcach  (zabrze,  2006).   kamusella,   tomasz,   silesia   and   central   european   nationalism.   the   emergence  of  national  and  ethnic  groups   in  prussian  silesia  and  austrian   silesia,  1848-­1918  (foreword  by  professor  charles  ingrao)  (west  lafayette,   2007).   kamusella,  tomasz,  maski  i  twarze  nacjonalizmu  (zabrze,  2008).   kamusella,  tomasz,  o  schlonzsku  i  nacjonalizmie  (zabrze,  2008).   kamusella,   tomasz,   the   politics   of   language   and   nationalism   in   modern   central  europe  (foreword  by  professor  peter  burke)  (basingstoke,  2009).   kamusella,  tomasz,  the  szlonzoks  and  their  language.  between  germany,   poland   and   szlonzokian   nationalism   –   slonzocy   (ślązacy)   i   ich   język.   pomiędzy  niemcami,  polską  a  szlonzskim  (śląskim)  nacjonalizmem  (zabrze,   2009).   michalczyk,  andrzej,  heimat,  kirche  und  nation.  deutsche  und  polnische   nationalisierungsprozesse   im   geteilten   oberschlesien   (1922-­1939)   (köln,   2010).   olejnik,  leszek,  polityka  narodowościowa  polski  w  latach  1944-­1960  (łódź,   2003).   pfaff,   janusz,  tarnowskie  góry  w  okresie  polsko-­niemieckiej  rywalizacij  o   górny  śląsk  w  latach  1918-­1922.  makrostudium  mikroregionu  (tarnowskie   góry,  2006).   porte,  rémy,  haute-­silésie  1920-­1922.  laboratoire  des  ‘leçons  oubliées’  de   l’armée  française  et  perceptions  nationales  (paris,  2009).   struve,  kai,  oberschlesien   nach   dem   ersten   weltkrieg.  studien   zu  einem   nationalen  konflikt  und  seiner  erinnerung   (marburg,  2003).   wilson,  timothy,  frontiers  of  violence.  conflict  and  identity  in  ulster  and   upper  silesia  1918-­1922  (oxford,  2010).   studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)      |      sources   philipp  ther  186   present-­day  regionalism   gerlich,   marina   grzegorz,   ‘my   prawdziwi   górnoślązacy…’.   studium   ethnologiczne  (warszawa,  2010).   kossakowska-­‐jarosz,   krystyna,   śląskość.   siła   tradycji   i   współczesne   problemy  (opole,  2005).   nijakowski,  lech  m.,  nadciągają  ślązacy.  czy   istnieje  narodowość  śląska?   (warszawa,  2004).   popieliński,  paweł,  młodzież  mniejszości  niemieckiej  na  górnym  śląsku  po   1989  roku  (warszawa,  2011).   sekuła,  elżbieta  anna,  po  co  ślązakom  potrzebny  jest  naród?  niebezpieczne   związki  między  autonomią  a  nacjonalizmem  (warszawa,  2009).   smith,  david  m.,  regional   identity  and  diversity   in  europe.  experience   in   wales,  silesia  and  flanders  (london,  2007).   szmeja,  maria,  niemcy?  polacy?  ślązacy!  rodzimi  mieszkańcy  opolszczyzny   w  świetle  analiz  socjologicznych  (kraków,  2000).   tambour,  jolanta,  oberschlesien.  sprache  und  identität  (hildesheim,  2011).   wódz,  kazimiera,  dimensions  of  silesian  identity  (katowice,  2006).     final  note:  i  would  like  to  thank  mr.  johannes  kontny,  doctoral  student  at   the  university  of  vienna,  for  his  help  in  putting  together  this  bibliography.   ann mares, aragorn fuhrmann, kas swerts & sarah menu, ‘archival review: digitalising and internationalising research on nationalism in flanders: towards a third encyclopedia of the flemish movement’, in: studies on national movements 9 (2022) digitalising and internationalising research on nationalism in flanders: towards a third encyclopedia of the flemish movement ann mares, aragorn fuhrmann, kas swerts & sarah menu in the 1970s, the first edition of a reference work appeared that would serve as a general starting point for research, inquiries and other forms of acquiring knowledge about the flemish movement: the encyclopaedia of the flemish movement (1973-1975) left its mark on countless books, articles, theses, websites, lectures, reports, exhibitions, documentaries, and debates. when a second edition was published twenty-five years later, the influence of this standard work only increased. the new encyclopaedia of the flemish movement (nevb) is still an indispensable instrument in the year 2022. however, this does not alter the fact that nationalism in flanders, both within and outside party politics, as well as the general social context, has changed profoundly. now that another twenty-five years will have passed since the last edition, this rich scholarly tradition demands a new addition. studies on national movements 9 (2022) | archival review | 116 mares, fuhrmann, swerts & menu figure 1: the new encyclopaedia of the flemish movement, published in 1998 the devb-project at the end of 2018, advn | archive for national movements (antwerp, belgium) launched a broadly-supported scientific project, with a grant from the flemish government, which will ensure the further development of the encyclopaedia and will guide this standard work into the digital age. the digital encyclopaedia of the flemish movement (devb) aims to make the collected information widely accessible to a broad audience: from researchers with a scientific agenda, policy makers, journalists, to all other possibly-interested parties. even more than its predecessors, the devb has the ambition to become the starting point for all research and knowledge on the flemish movement and flemish nationalism, both in belgium and abroad. it wants to form a bridge between historical knowledge and heritage, between academic research and public outreach, and between science and education. because of its online nature, the massive amount of information the devb holds is only a mouse-click away from a broad audience and will also be regularly updated after its initial launch in 2023. studies on national movements 9 (2022) | archival review mares, fuhrmann, swerts & menu 117 | as a reflection of the state of research and novel insights in nationalism studies, this edition also tends to place various new accents on its content. one of the focal points is the international dimension of both the history of the flemish movement and research on it. after a general presentation of the devb-project by means of the two phases in the development of the encyclopaedia, we will briefly discuss this important but complex challenge. figure 2: frontage of the advn | archive for national movements, © lucid vermelden studies on national movements 9 (2022) | archival review | 118 mares, fuhrmann, swerts & menu phase 1: the start-up (2019-2020) based on the principle that scientific knowledge should be used for the benefit of society as much as possible, an 'open access' model was chosen, with free use of the encyclopaedia. the first phase of the project therefore focused on the development of an underlying digital infrastructure that meets the requirements of the different target audiences. furthermore, all the texts of the new encyclopaedia were made available digitally via www.nevb.be as 'nevb online'. both the public and research community were involved in the project from the outset by means of crowdsourcing: visitors to the website were invited to point out errors or gaps in the nevb. another focus in this first phase was the development of a widespread network and solid cooperation structures. these would guarantee a fruitful interaction between authors, editors and advisors, which is essential for this project. thus, a core editorial board was established from the authoritative academics in the field (in particular: marnix beyen (uantwerp), elke brems (kuleuven), bruno de wever (ughent), chantal kesteloot (cegesoma/rijksarchief), dave sinardet (vub), johan tollebeek (kuleuven), jeffrey tyssens (vub), maarten van ginderachter (uantwerp), kaat wils (kuleuven)) who oversee the scientific quality of the project, and an advisory board of dozens of specialists from various disciplines and bodies was put together. this working method makes it possible to furnish the devb with all the studies that have been carried out over the past twenty-five years, as well as stimulate new research on the flemish movement within the university departments. such a broad mobilisation of experts not only illustrates the current status quaestionis, but also identifies gaps in our knowledge. after a thorough preparation and documentation round, which resulted in formulating necessary working documents such as authors' studies on national movements 9 (2022) | archival review mares, fuhrmann, swerts & menu 119 | guidelines, lists of terms and a vision text, authors were appointed to update a first selection of the general introductory articles of the new encyclopaedia (literature, economy, catholic party, second world war, etc.) and to supplement them with a number of completely new texts. each revised article was read and commented on by three specialists in accordance with the principle of blind peer review. figure 3: logo of the third and digital encyclopaedia of the flemish movement, designed by adriaan tas. phase 2: the development (2020-2023) after the digital foundations of the encyclopaedia have been laid, this basis will now be further developed in a second phase covering three years (2021-2023) and culminating in the official launch in the course of 2023. this second phase will start by updating the remaining introductory articles. furthermore, all the lemmas of the nevb will be studies on national movements 9 (2022) | archival review | 120 mares, fuhrmann, swerts & menu figure 4: picture of m. hroch. with, among others, a new lemma on the czech historian miroslav hroch, the encyclopaedia wants to pay more attention to the international dimension of (research on) the flemish movement. advn. reworked and supplemented with a first set of necessary new lemmas. in addition to these content-related objectives, a new step is also being taken in the development of the digital tool: after the development of a data infrastructure for the management and research of the lemmas and the structured data that are linked to them, the construction of a userfriendly online portal is in progress. the development of an online portal is not only intended to make the devb easily searchable and to make the lemmas accessible to a wide audience in an attractive way. the portal will also function as a conduit to other information sources and thus help to unlock the rich collection of digitised heritage. to this end, the effort which started in the previous phase to provide lemmas with links to external databases will be continued and expanded on to include the advn's heritage collections and links to the collections of other archival institutions. studies on national movements 9 (2022) | archival review mares, fuhrmann, swerts & menu 121 | challenges: internationalisation of the research on the flemish movement as a renewed and innovative historical standard work, the digital encyclopaedia wants to open itself up to recent social evolutions and new scientific insights, although it must also admit its own limitations. since the devb, like most reference works, is bound to the state of research, it is not its task to fill in the gaps. it does, however, want to identify them thoroughly and draw attention to them in order to facilitate new research. one of the most important challenges for nationalism research in flanders is the international-comparative perspective and the problem of methodological nationalism: the tendency to interpret historical actors and evolutions in a one-dimensional way in the light of nations and national movements. from the point of view of methodological nationalism, many of the most critical studies on nation-building and nationalism reproduce and perpetuate the ideology of the nation by not fundamentally questioning its self-evidence as a perspective on the world. as a counter-reaction, international nationalism studies have recently developed a strong interest in transnational cross-links and overlaps. thus, researchers compare different national movements and draw attention to mutual parallels and differences that relativise and put into perspective their supposed uniqueness. others elaborate on how a national movement is not an isolated phenomenon but shows great sensitivity to international developments and even continuously interacts with other (national) cultures. by contrast, the flourishing interest in international comparisons and transfers in other regions’ historiography shows how little resonance this approach currently finds in the study of the flemish movement. with studies on national movements 9 (2022) | archival review | 122 mares, fuhrmann, swerts & menu new articles such as 'the flemish movement from an international and comparative perspective', 'cultural transfers', 'spain' (on both the basque and catalan question) and 'ireland', the devb wants to draw attention to this lacuna and offer an impetus to an international comparative study of the flemish movement. finally, this objective of internationalising the study of the flemish movement is further emphasised by the ambition to make at least part of the encyclopaedia (the introductory articles) available in english and french. the devb can thus present the study of nationalism in flanders and the flemish movement internationally, and offer a platform and point of reference for an external target audience that wants to immerse itself in flemish and belgian issues. figure 5: the flemish politician nelly maes exchanges gifts with ernest benach i pascual, former president of the catalan parliament (2003–2010), in the catalan parliament. the international dimension of the encyclopaedia is reflected in new introductory articles, among others on the catalan and basque nationalist movements. advn. studies on national movements 9 (2022) | archival review mares, fuhrmann, swerts & menu 123 | keywords: flemish movement, flemish nationalism, flemish historiography, flemish archives, encyclopaedia of the flemish movement, comparative study of national movements. microsoft word warland_v3_definitive.doc studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)      |      reviews   geneviève  warland  240   anne-­marie  thiesse  (ed.),  la  culture  des  nations.  special  issue   of   la   matière   et   l’esprit,   no.   16   (mons:   université   de   mons,   2010)  72  pp.,  ill.,  isbn  9782872828012.   review  by  geneviève  warland   the  interdisciplinary  review  la  matière  et  l’esprit,  edited  by  the  university   of  mons,  asks  a  number  of  different  specialists  to  provide  the  intellectual   contribution   for   each   edition.   in   this   edition,   anne-­‐marie   thiesse,   directeur  de  recherches  at  the  cnrs,  well  known  for  her  work  la  création   des   identités   nationales.   europe,   xviiie-­xxe   siècle   (paris,   le   seuil,   points   histoire,  2001),   invited  other  specialists  to  give  a  short  insight  from  the   perspective  of  their  main  research  topic  (around  eight  pages).  it  resulted   in  a  very  persuasive  collection  of  texts  showing  how  nationalism  was  and   still   is  constructed  in  different  european  countries.  the  sample  includes   france,  germany,  greece,  italy,  the  republic  of  macedonia  and  moldavia.   the  main  concern  relates  to  nationalism  as  a  voluntary  construction  by  a   cultural  or  political  group  coming  to  a  great  part  from  the  transfer  of  ideas,   ideologies   and   symbolic   figures,   borrowed   from   other   countries.   in   her   introduction,  thiesse  stresses   the   fact   that  all  academics  share  now  the   constructivist   view   on   nationalism,   recognising   the   fact   that   all   nation   states  are  based,  since  the  eighteenth  century,  on  political  grounds  as  well   as  on  cultural  elements.  moreover,  she   insists  on   the   impact  of  cultural   transfers  on  national  cultures  in  europe  over  the  last  two  centuries.  michel   espagne,   with   michael   werner   one   of   the   ‘fathers’   of   the   concept   of   cultural  transfer,  illustrates  the  transformations  of  cultural  goods  from  one   culture  to  another  implied  by  the  transfers  in  order  to  adjust  social  needs   (for   instance,   the   reception   of   kantian   moral   philosophy   as   a   basis   for   french  republican  pedagogy  and  instruction).  he  also  insists  on  the  fact   that  the  same  structure  is  at  odds  in  european  and  in  colonial  contexts:  the   transfers   operate   often   with   reciprocal   influences   (the   french   and   vietnamese  literatures  serve  as  an  example).     studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)      |      reviews   geneviève  warland   241   national  culture  has  to  do  with  political  identity.  the  cases  of  macedonia,   moldavia   and   also   padania   in   the   north   of   italy   best   illustrate   their   intertwinements   and   their   social   and   political   implications.   as   far   as   padania   (the   region   of   the   po   valley)   is   concerned   (article   by   martina   avanza),  the  promoters  of  this  regional  identity  are  well  aware  that  they   tend  to  construct  a  new  identity  by  manipulating  old  traditions.  they  also   know  that  adopting  purely  economic  justifications  to  sustain  the  political   demands  of  their  party,  the  lega  nord,  would  be  insufficient.  therefore,   the  cultural  reference  to  a  forgotten  nation,  which  has  to  resurge,  is  part  of   the  political  agenda.   established  in  1991  as  an  independent  republic,  macedonia  struggles  with   both   greece   and   bulgaria   on   cultural   matters   (article   by   tchavdar   marinov).   first,   its   name   is   contested   by   greece,   which   considers   it   to   belong  to  the  region  of  thessaloniki.  second,  bulgaria  sees  macedonia  as   one  of  its  provinces,  which  was  the  heart  of  bulgarian  nationalism.  third,   bulgaria  suggests  that  the  building  of  a  national  identity  in  macedonia  is   related  to  serbian  nationalists’  manipulation,  arguing  that  macedonia  is  at   the  centre  of  the  serbian  medieval  territory.  in  this  context,  the  reference   to  culture   is  a  highly  controversial  one:  on   the  one  side,  greeks  do  not   want  macedonians  seeing  themselves  as  heirs  of  philippe  ii  and  alexander   the  great;  on  the  other  side,  controversies  still  exist  between  bulgarians   and   macedonians   on   the   national   belonging   of   a   group   of   nineteenth-­‐ century   intellectuals,   having   been   either   nationalist   bulgarians   or   macedonians  striving  for  independence.     moldavia’s   case   is  no   less  difficult   (article  by  petru  negură):  under   the   soviet   regime,   the   region,   inhabited   by   several   populations   divided   in   upper  and  lower  classes,  had  to  adjust  to  communist  ideals.  it  resulted  in   the  creation  of  the  moldavian  language,  based  on  a   local  dialect  derived   from  the  romanian.  depending  on  the  political  strategies  with  regard  to   neighbouring  romania,  numerous  language  reforms  followed,  like  the  use   of  either  the  cyrillic,  either  the  latin  alphabet.  nowadays,  the  country  is   still  divided  between  the  romanian  identity  and  the  moldavian  one.  it  has   a  political  impact,  the  political  right  putting  forward  the  first  one  while  the   political  left  favours  the  second  one.   studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)      |      reviews   geneviève  warland  242   the   different   cases   briefly   sketched   here   show   that   many   cultural   references  are  shared,  translated  and  opposed  when  it  comes  to  identity   building.   they   also   illustrate   that   nationalism   is   still   alive   even   if   the   european  union  seeks  to  propose  an  alternative  political  model.  all   the   historical   contributions   in   this   edition   indicate   that   we   cannot   escape   history  if  we  wish  to  better  understand  the  present.  a  lively  and  helpful   little  book!       peuples et frontières: a europeanist journal against the europe of the treaties (1936-1939) sébastien carney centre de recherche bretonne et celtique université de bretagne occidentale from 1919 some voices were raised in brittany to claim the right of the breton people to dispose of themselves. grouped around the newspaper breiz atao, a team of young activists pretends to lead brittany to autonomy within the framework of a federal europe, even to independence, which requires a redrawing of borders. very quickly it was the europe of the treaties which was criticized, in a logic of rapprochement with other regional nationalisms, and with germany, some nationals of which stirred up local claims. this breton and european activism finds its most complete expression in two reviews: the bulletin des minorités nationales en france, created in 1936, and quickly renamed peuples et frontières (peoples and borders). why and how did a few breton activists without an audience pretend to get involved in european geopolitics? what interest did their journal defend? after being disappointed by panceltism, these breton nationalists first turned to the oppressed minorities of france, who gathered in 1927 in a committee without a future. the federalism promoted by this committee finds new life in the bulletin des minorités nationales en france, which soon spread to europe under the name peuples et frontières, in accordance with the wishes of some german activists, including gerhard von tevenar. consequently, the review defends german interests in central europe, since asking for the revision of the treaties would make it possible to defend breton interests in france. largely, this monthly was moderated by yann fouéré, whose network extended to central europe, that was considered as a laboratory. keywords: breton nationalism; federalism; central europe; collaboration; brittany. studies on national movements 7 (2021) | articles | 2 sébastien carney introduction at the end of the great war, for reasons already explained elsewhere,1 a handful of young people who had been too young to take part in the combat invested their heroism deficit in politics instead. they became convinced that brittany had lost the war and began to denounce the degeneracy of their gallicised compatriots. the groupe régionaliste breton (breton regionalist group) was founded in 1918.2 its main aim was to ‘work actively to restore the breton fatherland’.3 armed with its mouthpiece, the journal breiz atao,4 the group hoped to remedy this state of affairs by unearthing celtic warriors who had been buried under the veneer of a forced latinisation and by re-celtising brittany through contact with their so-called celtic brothers in ireland, wales and scotland.5 however, by the mid-1920s, the cross-channel contact they had made had proved disappointing and their plan for a celtic alliance had come to nothing. this failure of pan-celticism contrasted, however, with the reception that olier mordrel and morvan marchal, two leading figures in the group, were given by flemish students in belgium in february 1925 (the breton activists also saw the flemings as the victims of latinisation). the activists thus began to promote european federalism. the objective was clear. the ‘small, oppressed nationalities’6 intended to join forces to defeat the common enemy – sovereign states – and establish a new federal european order. very quickly, the europe of the treaties came in for criticism as they sought closer ties not just with other regional nationalisms but also with germany, where some nationals were stirring up local grievances. this breton and europeanist activism found its fullest expression in the bulletin des minorités nationales en france, a fortnightly journal founded in 1936 by olier mordrel and edited by yann fouéré. renamed peuples et frontières shortly after its launch, this twenty-to-thirty paged journal moved to monthly publication in 1938 before being banned in 1939 after just twenty-nine issues.7 why and how did a few breton activists without an studies on national movements 7 (2021) | articles sébastien carney 3 | audience pretend to get involved in european geopolitics? what interest did their journal defend? to answer these questions, we need to look closely at the context in which the journal emerged, which will give us an understanding of who the main protagonists were and what the content of its discourse was. federating first the french and then the european regional nationalisms the first issue of the bulletin des minorités nationales en france opened with an article written by olier mordrel. this son of a general, who had joined the breton cause seventeen years earlier while still an architecture student, was one of the key figures within the small breiz atao team. a brilliant polemicist with a divisive personality, he regularly presented contemporary political experiments that he saw as offering solutions for breton activism. indeed, he tried to merge the ideologies of the groupe régionaliste breton (1918), the parti autonomiste breton (breton autonomist party) (1927) and the parti national breton (pnb breton national party) (1931) with these successive experiments. we can see this in his shift from championing pan-celticism to promoting european federalism. on his return from flanders in 1925, he noted that ‘it is in the interests of small oppressed nationalities to stand together on their respective causes, to create an international programme from their own specific programmes, to form a european movement out of their dispersed struggles.’8 he would speak of a united states of europe. his alter-ego at the time, maurice marchal, also a former architecture student who was in the process of designing the breton flag, had taken this idea a step further, advocating the union of ‘comrades in the struggle’ who were linked by a ‘similar fate, similar hopes, similar efforts’: studies on national movements 7 (2021) | articles | 4 sébastien carney an era of closer contact seems have opened up […] from this affinity, from this friendship in some cases, that has spontaneously sprung up between parallel movements, we believe it is possible to form a closer relationship and more effective moral support […] the existence of a common organisation would allow not only exchanges of views but, where necessary, a real coordination of our efforts.9 marchal had therefore proposed a ‘comité international des minorités nationales [international committee of national minorities], to meet periodically and to comprise delegates from the national movements of western europe’. the comité central des minorités nationales de france (ccmnf (central committee of the national minorities of france)) was inaugurated in quimper on 12 september 1927 at the end of the rosporden congress, which had also seen the creation of the parti autonomiste breton. the ccmnf charter, which was signed by a small group of corsican, alsatian and breton activists, claimed to ‘align the efforts of all the member groups and, where necessary, to represent them en bloc’.10 it also provided for the establishment of statutes and the integration of the flemings. the ccmnf had a meteoric trajectory. on 4 december 1927, it met in paris to publicly protest against the banning of several newspapers,11 and the arrest of a number of alsatian autonomist leaders for conspiring against state security.12 this activity had been enough for the investigating judge in mulhouse to order searches to be carried out in corsica, flanders and brittany. at the same time, the national press believed – wrongly – that the ccmnf’s actions were being orchestrated by ‘the hand of moscow’.13 finally, in a special issue of breiz atao, which was distributed in alsace on the day the autonomists’ trial opened in colmar, the ccmnf had published an open letter to the jurors.14 this was to be its final act. due to the arrests in alsace and the lack of means studies on national movements 7 (2021) | articles sébastien carney 5 | available to all, the links between the alsatians, corsicans and bretons became more distant after this. it would be reasonable to suppose that, eight years on from colmar, the bulletin des minorités nationales en france was an old project resurrected. it was in fact a scaled-back version. the ccmnf’s aim was to compare its member organisations’ information and methods and ‘increase their influence on public opinion through joint events’.15 mordrel set out the bulletin’s objectives, which included the following: ‘regular reading […] will give european opinion, which has been misled by french propaganda, a precise idea of the importance and struggle of each distinct nationality within the french state. it would be a mistake to ascribe to each and every one of them similar situations and even aspirations’.16 the bulletin therefore intended to stick to providing information, but not just any information. the contributors to the bulletin, who were mainly breton, offered articles highlighting the historical, linguistic, literary and cultural specificities of brittany, alsace-lorraine, flanders, the basque country, corsica, catalonia and occitanie. for example, karl heller gave an ‘overview of the history of alsace until 1918’,17 while an anonymous contributor analysed the relationship that the flemish of france had with their language.18 local political movements, demonstrations and actions were also presented in the journal, as was the basque eskualerrist movement’s programme19 with details of actions undertaken in brittany to support the teaching of breton.20 there was a strong emphasis on french oppression and the hostility of successive governments towards the demands of minorities.21 information and even activist pedagogy also appeared in the form of maps – for example there was one map showing the chronology of the decline of the breton language22 – and electoral results, particularly during the legislative elections in the hautrhin and bas-rhin departments in april and may 1936.23 it is not clear whether this type of information was included predominantly because studies on national movements 7 (2021) | articles | 6 sébastien carney of a need to produce papers.24 this was perhaps the bulletin’s main problem. its editors had quickly understood the need to open it up to other countries in order, on the one hand, to have more topics to write about and, on the other, to reach a wider audience. in january 1937, the bulletin was renamed peuples et frontières with the subtitle ‘revue d’information sur les peuples opprimés d’europe occidentale’ (journal of information on the oppressed peoples of western europe).25 the editors explained the situation to their readers, assuring them they would ‘adopt exactly the same line’ as the bulletin and that the change had been prompted by the need to broaden the scope of the publication ‘if only to ensure the continuation of its material existence’. they wrote: the role of our journal will be to show that there are peoples living within these borders, and in some cases on both sides of a border, who are ignored through diplomatic arbitrariness. we will show that, standing in stark contrast to these factitious borders, these seeds of wars, these bloody conflicts, there are peoples, small populations, whose dynamism and right to live must throw off these crippling shackles.26 it was thus not just french oppression that the journal aimed to denounce now but also the europe of the treaties and any form of imperialism that ran contrary to germany’s interests. while the bulletin had only offered a few forays outside of france (ireland, italy, slovakia) and almost a third of its articles had concerned brittany, peuples et frontières was characterised by a greater emphasis on celtic countries (ireland, scotland, wales), central and eastern european countries, and the netherlands. in addition, brittany now accounted for only a fifth of the articles, and references to catalonia, corsica and occitanie were rare. there was a marked increase in the number of articles on topics related to germany’s sphere of influence, specifically flanders, which quickly studies on national movements 7 (2021) | articles sébastien carney 7 | became included in everything concerning the netherlands, alsacelorraine, and central europe, particularly czechoslovakia. these countries represented 29% of the total content in 1936 rising to almost 40% a year later. during this same period, the number of articles on brittany and the celtic countries had increased from 25% to 29% and, on the basque country, catalonia, corsica and occitanie, the number had dropped from 16% to 12%. the peoples and borders that the journal focussed on were situated in a nordic grouping that was also regularly discussed in breiz atao and stur, the doctrinal journal edited by mordrel. in the mid-1930s, all these publications were operating under the influence of a young german man named gerhard von tevenar. the promotion of an ethnic europe under germanic rule although mordrel had created the bulletin in 1936, the closure of his architect’s practice and personal problems had forced him to abandon activism for a while in order to provide for his family. yves delaporte was therefore put in charge of the journal’s editorial staff, mainly because mordrel already had to manage his own staff – at stur – and to provide papers for breiz atao. the two men were not on friendly terms, but they knew what their actions could bring to the cause. delaporte was the son of a prominent local figure from central brittany and the third child in a family of activist children. his catholic piety was matched only by his seriousness, his organisational skills, and his low-key but effective work. mordrel, on the other hand, was more prone to the grand gesture and to embarking on political experiments that he would then quickly abandon. the leader of the parti national breton, françois debauvais, was wary of mordrel’s antics and his propensity to dip into the party’s coffers and would have preferred to entrust the management of the party and breiz atao to raymond delaporte, yves’s brother. studies on national movements 7 (2021) | articles | 8 sébastien carney all was going fairly well until march 1937 and the publication of the encyclical mit brennender sorge containing pius xi’s reactions to, among other things, the adoption of racism as an official state doctrine and the anticlerical and pagan statements being made by the nazi regime’s dignitaries.27 mordrel had been expressing increasing admiration for germany since 1931 and the transformation of the parti autonomiste breton into the parti national breton. he had translated rilke into breton, tried to impose a breton adaptation of the nsdap’s programme and disseminated his racist and nordicist thinking in stur and breiz atao. while none of this had prompted any response from party members generally speaking, some catholics had taken offence after the publication of mit brennender sorge, in particular raymond delaporte, who publicly condemned mordrel’s racism.28 even though delaporte’s wealth was useful to the survival of breiz atao, debauvais decided to dispense with his services and side with mordrel. the reason for this was that behind mordrel, there was tevenar. tevenar has only recently attracted the attention of researchers, who see him as an enlightened celtic specialist, architect of the european minorities’ revolution for the benefit of germany and opponent of hitler.29 born in 1912, this son of a prussian aristocrat who had died in the trenches had come through the wehrjugendbund ‘schilljugend’, the largest nationalist youth organisation of the 1920s. he had studied law, history and geopolitics and regularly associated with the nationalsozialistischer deutscher studentenbund (national socialist student league). forced to abandon plans to join the sa-dienst due to ill health, he became a nachrichtenlieferant (intelligence provider) for admiral canaris’s amt ausland/abwehr in 1934, where he received an order to move to paris to try to establish contact with the minorities in france.30 during his first year there, he met some breton activists, including mordrel. in 1937, canaris placed him as a correspondent in holland for the berliner börsenzeitung and the münchner neueste studies on national movements 7 (2021) | articles sébastien carney 9 | nachrichten. in the meantime, tevenar had become the secretary general of a society he had co-founded with friends in berlin in january 1937 called the deutsche gesellschaft für keltische studien. headed by dr kurt georg haller, this german society for celtic studies was connected to the ahnenerbe institute,31 and the journal zeitschrift für keltische philologie. very quickly, links were forged between this journal and the abwehr ii’s subgroup no 7, led by major voss, whose mission was to intervene clandestinely with european national minorities.32 tevenar was also a follower of the unabhängige freikirche, friedrich hielscher’s pagan ‘independent free church’. hielscher was an original representative of the ‘conservative revolution’, who dreamed of becoming the priest-king of an ethnic and hierarchical reich, built on the ruins of the dismantled european states, under the aegis of germany.33 tevenar meddled in the breton affairs through these different capacities.34 for example, in exchange for information on the french maritime installations, he managed to secure a place for debauvais, who was sick at the time, in a sanatorium in the black forest. he also made a significant financial contribution to the parti national breton, which ensured the survival of breiz atao and funded more regular issues of stur as well as the bulletin des minorités nationales de france’s transformation into peuples et frontières.35 additionally, he supported a strengthened nordicist discourse in the three publications. it became clear to everyone that peuples et frontières was the international showcase of breiz atao, which worried its handful of corsican and catalan friends. in june 1937, yves delaporte wrote: some of our catalan and corsican collaborators have asked us to clarify our position with regard to the mediterranean peoples, a request they consider to be justified by what they read in the last issue of the journal stur (1 april 1937), which contained some violent attacks against the peoples of latin language and civilisation.36 studies on national movements 7 (2021) | articles | 10 sébastien carney despite delaporte’s insistence that the journal was independent of breiz atao and stur, and that mordrel was merely a guest writer from the first bulletin, both his own and the peuples et frontières’s fates were already sealed because tevenar did not like him. in fact, even though the material existence of the journal was considered to be assured, the next issue appeared a month late. a ‘profound change’ in the journal’s administration was cited.37 charles gaonac’h, who was also an administrator at the bulletin and who had just quit the secretariat of breiz atao, demonstrated his loyalty to raymond delaporte, who had been repudiated by debauvais, by giving up his position. yves delaporte was also forced to quit peuples et frontières at the end of 1937 but not before issuing a final snub to the pagan tevenar in a two-page spread comprising a photo, a short biography and extracts in breton translated into french of the sermon given by monsignor tréhiou, bishop of vannes, at the millénaire de la résurrection de la bretagne (millennium of the resurrection of brittany) mass in plougastel on 24 august 1937.38 yves delaporte was immediately replaced by fred moyse, who changed the journal’s direction: we shall make […] our modest contribution to the creation of a fairer and more humane order in that part of europe whose states and diplomacy have ignored national problems for too long. we want to collaborate in the search for the foundations of a new order, which will exclude the assimilative imperialism of the large states. we are therefore aware that we are leading a profoundly human struggle and that we are fighting, like our minority brothers in central and eastern europe, for the triumph of universal principles.39 moyse had been living in belgium since 1930, where he was employed at the permanent secretariat of the salon de l’alimentation in brussels.40 he was very involved as an activist in the pnb and had links with flemish studies on national movements 7 (2021) | articles sébastien carney 11 | autonomist circles as well as with the gaelic league and with scottish and irish nationalists. because of his job and also because he enjoyed it, he travelled a lot to the netherlands, england, germany and france. he thus acted as a linchpin between the nationalist movements of northern europe and nazi germany. this was reflected in the journal’s potential readership. there were only seventy-two names on the list of subscribers to peuples et frontières. these were mainly breton activists, a few people closely associated with the movement, such as gantois and thomasset, and twenty or so dutch, belgian and german nationals.41 in addition to these subscribers, the journal was also regularly distributed to numerous news outlets and press correspondents and to more than four hundred key figures, generally located in northern and eastern european countries. the brittany contingent obviously made up a large proportion of the journal’s distribution, comprising activists as well as some elected representatives and municipal libraries. however, the brittany contingent was outstripped by that of belgium, which counted flor grammens and joris van severen among the journal’s readership, and germany, which totalled more than sixty recipients, including otto abetz and erich mengel, a member of the vda.42 a specialist in the minorities of germanic origin in the west of the reich, mengel received twenty copies alone. excluding brittany and alsace, france accounted for around forty copies, which went mainly to libraries, foreign embassies, and some newspaper outlets, such as la flèche, esprit and temps présents. switzerland and the netherlands each received around thirty copies. after these two countries came alsace, represented by karl roos, emil pinck, hermann bickler and camille dahlet, and then scotland. there were also very small shipments sent to representatives from the league of nations in other countries, like the united states, south africa and india. clearly, the very existence and distribution of peuples et frontières contributed to germany’s european policy such as it was studies on national movements 7 (2021) | articles | 12 sébastien carney defined in the interwar period, which was to establish a europe under a germanic-rule nordic hegemony and to reshape mitteleuropa by deciding the future of the nationalities concerned with a view to restoring germanic greatness.43 central europe in fact represented the final key position for the peuples et frontières press service, with about thirty copies being sent out to bulgaria, romania, czechoslovakia, poland, yugoslavia and, above all, hungary. central europe: a laboratory central europe was one of yann fouéré’s pet causes. having joined the breton movement in the early 1930s, fouéré had access to many networks and was never one to miss an opportunity. he was involved in the push to have the breton language taught in schools through his association ar brezoneg er skol. he had also campaigned for a francogerman rapprochement as a youth representative in the union fédérale des anciens combattants (federal union of veterans) and was seen as an expert on the ideas promoted by the ‘relèves’ (the new generation of politically-minded young people) of his time, particularly those around the journal l’ordre nouveau.44 alongside abbé gantois for flanders and hermann bickler for alsace, he was one of the cornerstones of peuples et frontières in his position as editor-in-chief. although representatives from other european nationalist movements contributed from time to time, fouéré provided the bulk of the copy under multiple pseudonyms that read like a solo tour of europe, including van huffel, f. fraggiani, h. muller and j. irigoyen. in 1935, fouéré went to romania as part of a trip organised by the fédération interalliée des anciens combattants (fidac). by 1936, he had made the acquaintance of andré tamas, secretary of the office for hungarian minorities and representative of the hungarian revisionist studies on national movements 7 (2021) | articles sébastien carney 13 | league in geneva, who organised his visit to budapest in september 1937. he was also in touch with christo dimov-bogoev, the chairperson of the youth organisation’s foreign affairs department in the bulgarian union otetz païssy.45 tamas had put fouéré in contact with aldo dami, a regular contributor to the journal esprit and occasional writer for plans, who was very interested in the hungarian and bulgarian minorities. fouéré had also managed to establish a correspondence with the czechoslovakian borsody, a doctor of law, who saw in him ‘an excellent specialist in the question of central european nationalities’.46 the hungarian cause was often seen by the french ‘relèves’ as an external projection of their own situation.47 the focus of some of them on questioning the system, in particular the idea of nationhood, was echoed in the desire of others to revise the treaties, especially the treaty of trianon, which had redrawn the borders of central europe in 1920 following the dismemberment of the austro-hungarian empire. both sides aspired to a different future. for the hungarians, the revision of the treaty of trianon was a prerequisite for plans that extended far beyond the national context. they were looking to save universal culture and defend the west.48 thus, at the end of the 1920s, rené dupuis from l'ordre nouveau and philippe lamour from plans were regular contributors to the revue de hongrie, which was soon to become the nouvelle revue de hongrie. aldo dami also used the journal as a platform to speak out against the treaties and to propose solutions concerning czechoslovakia.49 in may 1936, acting on his own initiative but on behalf of the pnb, fred moyse sent an article from brussels entitled ‘la lutte pour l’indépendance des bretons’ (the struggle for breton independence) to the hungarian journal magyar hirlap. he explained his approach to the journal’s editors as follows: ‘given the great affinity that exists between the hungarian nation and the breton people, both victims of the same injustices and the imperialism of the major powers, i thought that these documents might interest you’.50 studies on national movements 7 (2021) | articles | 14 sébastien carney noting ‘the huge revision of values that characterises the modern world’,51 yann fouéré was saying similar things in peuples et frontières. fouéré tried to get andré tamas to acknowledge that the breton question had as much legitimacy as the claims of the central european minorities. fouéré planned a meeting with tamas and the senior teams at peuples et frontières and stur (which tamas could not praise highly enough).52 the idea being developed by both men was to establish an international conference for minority young people.53 fouéré promoted this idea in an article in peuples et frontières, and it was reprinted in voix des peuples, the mouthpiece of the bureau central des minorités (central office for minorities). he pointed out in this article that the congress of european nationalities, which only recognised the countries that had resulted from the treaties, did not ultimately attach any importance to minorities. in his view, this institution was more of an ‘archaeology congress than a real assembly of minority peoples’.54 he added that while peuples et frontières and voix des peuples played an important role, they did not have the impact of a body ‘that would lead the joint action of all minorities on a more general level’.55 he therefore proposed to make up for the league of nations’ shortcomings by creating ‘a central body whose task it would be to bring together initiatives, coordinate efforts and create a solid de facto link between all minorities’.56 denouncing the treaties and thus the postwar division of europe actually translated as a call for a global redefinition of borders, including within france, and an engagement in the fight for brittany. a few weeks after the anschluss, fouéré wrote in an article published in les cahiers de l'union fédérale: ‘the international policy followed by france since the end of the war has failed miserably’.57 while he noted ‘the all-consuming activity of the two totalitarian countries forming the rome/berlin axis’,58 he pointed above all to the ‘criminal recklessness’ of those who had dismembered the austro-hungarian empire and thus encouraged ‘irredentisms that are impossible to assuage’.59 he was studies on national movements 7 (2021) | articles sébastien carney 15 | aiming his comments at france and its romanian and yugoslav allies. because of the ties that united the veterans of these three countries, fouéré’s article had a certain impact. the romanians and (with the exception of two or three veterans) the czechoslovaks refused to be represented at the union fédérale (a french interwar veterans association) congress held in nice in june 1938. in a letter to andré tamas, fouéré wrote: ‘i have no doubt my name is now blacklisted in czechoslovakia and romania. they would probably be even more furious if they knew that i was also involved in “peuples et frontieres”’.60 then came munich. at the height of the crisis, fouéré claimed that the centralising jacobin ideology, which had originated in france and been applied in czechoslovakia, threatened to cause a war and bring an end to western civilisation. it was necessary to fight for peace and freedom, which were under threat from the treaties that france had imposed .61 his discourse was echoed in breiz atao and in many pacifistic right publications. fouéré therefore considered the agreements signed in munich to be realistic and even saw in them the promise of a new era: ‘one chapter in a territorial revision that is more essential than ever. this can be the starting point for a total reconstruction of europe based on new principles’.62 at the beginning of 1939, after poland and hungary had also taken their slice of the czechoslovakian cake and subcarpathian ruthenia had become autonomous, he wrote: ‘the anschluss and the rectification of czechoslovakia’s borders mark the first step towards the construction of a new european order that is more in keeping with the true rights of nationalities’.63 this new european order was in fact imposed by germany. so when hitler decided in march 1939 to violate the agreements of six months earlier by invading bohemia and moravia to establish a protectorate there and when the slovak republic was formed with his blessing, fouéré told anyone who would listen: ‘sometimes the best things can come out of the worst situations’.64 the studies on national movements 7 (2021) | articles | 16 sébastien carney ‘worst’ in this case were the postwar treaties. the ‘best’ was the so-called reich’s federalisation policy in central europe. by giving bohemia its autonomy while annexing it, germany was countering the economic, political and military interests of france and england. fouéré remained cautious with regard to hitler but believed that if he respected autonomy, his action would produce fruitful and lasting results.65 such arguments amounted to self-deception. the previous month, referring to franco’s action against the basque language, the italianisation of the french-speaking aosta valley and france’s oppression of the breton language, fouéré had contrasted the latin and nordic spirits. he had criticised the outdated jacobin ideology, which he said acted as ‘a real encouragement to violence’, and highlighted the fact that it ran contrary to what he was seeing in england, germany and the scandinavian countries.66 fouéré admired the reich’s successes. when the police questioned his concierges in 1939, they were told that he had a portrait of hitler in his home and that ‘privately, he was always championing the führer, understanding only him, seeing things only through his eyes’.67 the content of fouéré’s articles in peuples et frontières was enough to raise alarm bells with the police. in february 1939, a covert note on the journal stated: ‘this booklet, which has been published in france, is being distributed, free of charge, to the dutch press and in particular to dutch members of the pan-dutch and francophobe movement “algemeen nederlandsch verbond”. it is likely to be detrimental to french propaganda works in the netherlands’.68 the note was accompanied by an article entitled ‘décadence de la nation française’ (decadence of the french nation), which fouéré had written under the name of jean cam. in it, he described a country unable to adapt to the problems of postwar europe, as evidenced by its inability to take into account the challenges faced by its minorities. he depicted a france that had given up its ideal of liberty: ‘by remaining mute in the face of new studies on national movements 7 (2021) | articles sébastien carney 17 | problems, it remains on the sideline of the great spiritual, political and moral revolution that is in the process of transforming the lives of the peoples and the principles of their governments before our very eyes’.69 in may, the journal was subjected to a more thorough police investigation, but the person known as ‘jean cam’, author of the seditious article, was never identified.70 from then on, however, the breton nationalist press found itself in the crosshairs of the justice system, which scrutinised the columns of breiz atao, stur, and peuples et frontières, rightly seen as mouthpieces intended to ‘persuade people abroad to believe in substantial, serious separatist movements’.71. at the end of august, peuples et frontières was banned, and censorship was introduced throughout france.72 * after the second world war, mordrel set about writing a history of the breton nationalist movement. a few scattered notes survive from this endeavour, including a list of concerted actions between brittany and germany featuring mentions of peuples et frontières.73 there are two points worth noting in this regard. on the one hand, this journal was part of a strategy to tighten the noose on france that was mobilised at the end of the first world war by a handful of engaged activists and their allies at the time, both coveted allies – like the so-called celtic brothers and hitler’s germany – and more concrete allies, such as the flemish, alsatian, and corsican nationalists as well as a few german nationals. the aim of this ‘noose’ strategy was to allow the parti national breton to raise awareness of the breton cause abroad and enable germany to justify its diplomatic pretensions. on the other, this corresponded to an ideological convergence between the main leaders of the parti national breton and some figures of the german ‘conservative revolution’, who all believed in the supremacy of the celtic and germanic peoples, united under the same nordic banner. studies on national movements 7 (2021) | articles | 18 sébastien carney from this dual perspective, independence for brittany would have meant dismantling france, a move that would in turn have been linked to a reworking of the europe of the treaties, in accordance with the rights of minorities and the right of peoples to self-determination. it is therefore not surprising to learn that the two mainstays of peuples et frontières, tevenar and fouéré, had been trained as jurists and that central europe had taken on a paradigmatic significance for them. it is clear their plan failed. we may have the journal’s press service and subscribers lists, but we know nothing about its real readership or the impact that its articles had. it is likely, however, that this was almost nonexistent and that it ultimately only addressed activists who needed no convincing or diplomats who were indifferent to the breton cause. otto abetz, for example, who received copies of the journal, had no interest in helping the breton nationalists during the second world war. moreover, by 1940, it was clear to all that the german authorities in general were going to do nothing for the breton nationalists except allow their party to keep afloat just enough to disseminate their nordicist propaganda and to act as a recruitment pool for agents in the fight against the resistance. it is difficult nevertheless to believe that the peuples et frontières activists were being taken for fools, because the breton/german alliance actually only involved a small handful of outsiders, both in brittany and in germany, and all of these individuals were nurturing a dream that was essential to their own survival in a world where they did not fit in. endnotes 1 s. carney, breiz atao! mordrel, delaporte, lainé, fouéré: une mystique nationale (1901-1948), (rennes, 2015). on breton movement, see also r. dulong, la question bretonne (paris, 1975); a. deniel, le mouvement breton: 1919-1945 (paris, 1976); m. nicolas, histoire de la revendication bretonne: ou la revanche studies on national movements 7 (2021) | articles sébastien carney 19 | de la démocratie locale sur le « démocratisme » des origines jusqu’au années 1980 (spézet, 2007). 2 on the impact of the first world war on regionalisms and nationalisms in europe, see x. m. núñez seixas (ed.), the first world war and the nationality question in europe. global impact and local dynamics (leiden/boston, 2021), in particular f. zantedeschi, ‘micro-nationalisms in western europe in the wake of the first world war’, 145-169. 3 olier mordrel private collection, om7 i78. statutes of the grb, 1918-1919 (author’s highlight). unless otherwise indicated, all quotations and extracts from french sources have been translated into english. 4 breiz atao was published from 1919 to 1939. 5 for an example of a re-celticisation attempt, see s. carney, ‘l'écosse régénératrice ou la création des “cliques nationales” bretonnes, d’une sortie de guerre à l’autre’, in c. manfredy & m. byrne (eds.), bretagne-ecosse: contacts, transferts et dissonances. brittany-scotland: contacts, transfers and dissonances (brest, 2017), 167-183. 6 breiz atao [alias o. mordrel], ‘de la flandre à la cornouaille’, in: breiz atao, 3(75), 1/3/1925, 535. 7 on peuples et frontières, see also s. rojo, ‘prensa bretona y nacionalismo vasco: la revista peuples et frontières’, in: sancho el sabio 18 (2003), 89-103. 8 breiz atao [alias o. mordrel], ‘de la flandre à la cornouaille’, in: breiz atao, 3(75), 1/3/1925, 535. 9 m. marchal, ‘pour une politique internationale des minorités’, in: breiz atao, 3(75), 1/3/1925, 536-537. 10 cited in p. zind, elsass-lothringen alsace lorraine: une nation interdite (paris, 1979), 432. on corsican and alsatian movements, see f. arzalier, les perdants: la dérive fasciste des mouvements autonomistes et indépendantistes au xxe siècle (paris, 1990); y. rogé, le corsisme et l’irrédentisme 1920-1946: histoire du premier mouvement autonomiste corse et de sa compromission par l’italie fasciste (phd thesis, université paris ouest nanterre la défense, 2008); a. walh, les autonomistes en alsace, 1871-1939 (orbe, 2019). studies on national movements 7 (2021) | articles | 20 sébastien carney 11 those journals are zukunft, volksstimme, die wahrheit, banned in november 1927. in 1928 they are followed by d'r schliffstaan, d'r muehlstaan, des neue elsass. 12 unsigned, ‘protestation’, in: breiz atao 7, 18/12/1927, 1. 13 unsigned, ‘derrière les autonomistes on retrouve la main de moscou’, le matin, 12/2/1928, 3. 14 le comité central des minorités nationales de france, ‘lettre ouverte aux jurés de colmar’, in: breiz atao, special issue, 1/5/1928, 1. 15 article 8 of the statutes. ‘le comité central des minorités nationales de france’, in: breiz atao, special issue, 1/5/1928, 3. 16 o. mordrel, ‘le conflit des nationalités en france’, in: bulletin des minorités nationales en france 1, 1/6/1936, 2-5. 17 k. heller, ‘aperçu de l’histoire de l’alsace jusqu’en 1918’, in: bulletin des minorités nationales en france 1, 1/6/1936, 13-14. 18 unsigned, ‘les flamands de france et leur langue’, in: bulletin des minorités nationales en france 2, 1/8/1936, 32-34. 19 ‘le programme eskualerriste’, in: bulletin des minorités nationales en france 1, 1/6/1936, 18. 20 y. douguet [alias yves delaporte], ‘le mouvement en faveur de l’enseignement du breton’, in: bulletin des minorités nationales en france 1, 1/6/1936, 11-12 21 see for example: la rédaction, ‘la france et nous’, in: bulletin des minorités nationales en france 2, 1/8/1936, 22-23, and la rédaction, ‘que devons-nous attendre du gouvernement blum’, in: bulletin des minorités nationales en france 3, 1/10/1936, 38-39. 22 ‘les diverses étapes du recul de la langue bretonne’, in: bulletin des minorités nationales en france 3, 1/10/1936, 44-45. 23 ‘elections législatives 1936’, in: bulletin des minorités nationales en france 3, 1/10/1936, 48-49. 24 this was the case, for example, with the publication of the aforementioned basque programme, which was used because an article that had apparently been promised had not arrived in time. studies on national movements 7 (2021) | articles sébastien carney 21 | 25 from the next issue onwards, the subtitle was ‘revue d’information sur les nationalités d’europe occidentale’ (journal of information on the nationalities of western europe). 26 y. douguet, ‘notre programme’, in: peuples et frontières 1, 1/1/1937, 1-2. 27 s. carney, ‘mit brennender sorge et le mouvement nationaliste breton’, in f. bouthillon & m. levant (eds.), pie xi, un pape contre le nazisme? l’encyclique mit brennender sorge (14 mars 1937) (brest, 2016), 321-335. 28 r. furic [alias raymond delaporte], ‘la position de breiz atao reste nationale’, in: breiz atao 274, 18/4/1937, 3-4. 29 i. schmidt, der herr des feuers. friedrich hielscher und sein kreis zwischen heidentum, neuem nationalismus und widerstand gegen den nationalsozialismus (cologne, 2004), 85-93; j. lerchenmüller, keltischer sprengstoff: eine wissenschaftsgeschichtliche studie über die deutsche keltologie von 1900 bis 1945 (tübingen, 1997), 384 sq; b. schnitzler., ‘gerhard von tevenar (1912-1943). secrétaire de la deutsche gesellschaft für keltische studien’, in: l’archéologie nazie en europe de l’ouest (gollion, 2007), 289-299. 30 testimony of erika von tevenar, widow of gerhard von tevenar, conversations from 20/7/2009 and 10/1/2012. the alsatian autonomists resumed contact with the bretons at this time. 31 on ahnenerbe, see m.-h. kater, das « ahnenerbe » der ss, 1935-1945. ein beitrag zur kulturpolitik des dritten reiches (stuttgart, 1974) and h. pringle, operation ahnenerbe. comment himmler mit la pseudo-science au service de la solution finale (paris, 2007). 32 r. faligot, la harpe et l’hermine (rennes, 1994), 88. 33 on hielscher, see the indulgent biography of i. schmidt, der herr des feuers. 34 concerning the relations between nazism and breton nationalism, see l. mees, ‘the völkisch appeal: nazi germany, the basques, and the bretons’, in war, exile, justice and everyday life, 1936-1946 (reno, 2011), 251–284; j. a. r. caballero, ‘nazismo alemán y emsav bretón (1933-1945): entre la sincera alianza y el engaño recíproco’, in: historia actual online 30 (2013), 25-38 ; s. carney, ‘olier mordrel, une des voies du national-socialisme en bretagne’, in: m. grunewald, o. dard, u. puschner, confrontations au national-socialisme en europe francophone et germanophone. auseinandersetzungen mit dem studies on national movements 7 (2021) | articles | 22 sébastien carney nationasozialismus im deutsch-und französischsprachigen europa, 1919-1949, volume 4, (bruxelles, 2020), 171-185. 35 between 1935 and 1937, the pnb received more than 30,000 francs from the abwehr ii. s. carney, breiz atao, 279. 36 y. douguet, ‘les latins et nous’, in: peuples et frontières 4, 1/6/1937, 87. 37 y. douguet, ‘aux amis de la revue’, in: peuples et frontières 5, 1/8/1937, 90. 38 unsigned, ‘milvet bloaz adsavidigez breiz (millénaire de la résurrection de la bretagne)’, in: peuples et frontières 7, 1/12/1937, 154-155. 39 f. moyse, ‘notre nouvelle organisation’, in: peuples et frontières 8, 15/1/1938, 186-187. 40 archives générales du royaume belge, auguste frédéric (fred) moyse, file no 1660960 of the office des étrangers. 41 service historique de la défense [henceforth shd], 7nn 2589. renseignements sur activités du mouvement autonomiste breton. 42 volksbund für das deutschtum im ausland, the largest pan-germanic organisation in germany in the inter-war period. 43 j. elvert, ‘plans allemands d’entre les deux guerres mondiales pour la mitteleuropa’, in: e. bussière, m. dumoulin & s. schirmann (eds.), milieux économiques et intégration européenne au xxe siècle (paris, 2001-2002), 30-38. 44 on the ‘relèves’, see o. dard, le rendez-vous manqué des relèves des années trente (paris, 2002). on l’ordre nouveau, see c. roy & t. keller, alexandre marc et la jeune europe (1904-1934): l’ordre nouveau aux origines du personnalisme and le personnalisme de l'entre-deux-guerres entre l'allemagne et la france (nice, 1998). 45 institut de documentation bretonne et européenne [henceforth idbe], box ‘action bretonne et minoritaire’, letter from the bulgarian union ‘otetz païssy’ to yann fouéré, 12/10/1936. 46 idbe, box ‘action bretonne et minoritaire’, letter from dr borsody to yann fouéré, 29/5/1938. studies on national movements 7 (2021) | articles sébastien carney 23 | 47 h. de montedy, la nouvelle revue de hongrie et ses amis français (1932-44) (phd thesis, université de lyon 3, 2009); roy & keller, alexandre marc et la jeune europe, 180-181. 48 montedy, la nouvelle revue de hongrie et ses amis français (1932-44), 79 sq. 49 a. dami, ‘sur la mort des traités’, in: esprit 34, 1/7/1935, 501-549; ‘à la recherche de la tchécoslovaquie’, in: esprit 69, 1/6/1938, 363-400. 50 archives nationales [henceforth an], 20030297 art. 9, note from commissioner chenevier, 30/6/1936. 51 y. kerberio [alias yann fouéré], ‘états, nationalités, minorités’, in: peuples et frontières 9, 15/2/1938, 210-212. 52 idbe, box ‘action bretonne et minoritaire’, letter from yann fouéré to andré tamas, 27/9/1937. relations between the two men seem to have ended before the meeting could take place. 53 idbe, box ‘action bretonne et minoritaire’, letter from yann fouéré to christo dimov-bogoev, 15/9/1937. 54 y. kerberio, ‘pour une action commune des minorités’, in: peuples et frontières 11, 15/4/1938, 262-264 and g. kerberio, ‘pour une action commune des minorités’, in: voix des peuples 4, 15/5/1938, 247-251. 55 ibid. 56 ibid. 57 y. fouéré, ‘la fin des traités’, in: cahier de l'union fédérale des combattants, 142, 20/5/1938, 15. 58 ibid. 59 ibid. 60 idbe, box ‘action bretonne et minoritaire’, letter from yann fouéré to andré tamas, 6/1938 (author’s highlights). 61 y. kerberio, ‘l'évolution du problème tchécoslovaque et son influence sur le régime général des minorités’, in: peuples et frontières 16, 15/9/1938, 386-388. 62 y. kerberio, ‘l'europe sera-t-elle reconstruite’, in: peuples et frontières 17, 15/10/1938, 410-412. studies on national movements 7 (2021) | articles | 24 sébastien carney 63 g. marion [alias yann fouéré], ‘la nouvelle tchécoslovaquie’, in: peuples et frontières 21, 15/2/1939, 50-52. 64 j. cam [alias yann fouéré], ‘du pire peut parfois sortir le meilleur’, in: peuples et frontières 23, 15/4/1939, 82-85. 65 ibid. 66 j. cam, ‘de quelques folies politiques’, in: peuples et frontières 22, 15/3/1939, 58-60. 67 archives de la préfecture de police de paris, 1 w 0158, dossier no 39203, report of 21/10/1939. 68 shd, 7nn 2536. fiches de renseignements sur le mouvement autonomiste breton. note dated 16/2/1939 (author’s highlight). 69 j. cam, ‘décadence de la nation française’, in: peuples et frontières 20, 15/1/1939, 4-6. 70 shd, 7nn 2801. dossier sur les poursuites à l'encontre de guieysse marcel, autonomiste breton, pour atteinte à la sûreté extérieure de l'etat (juin 1938novembre 1939). report of may 1939. 71 an, bb/18/7007, 2 bl 91, breiz atao, parti national breton, 1939. report of 30/6/1939. 72 an, bb/18/7008, 2 bl 108, peuples et frontières, 1939. reports of 22/7/1939 and 21/8/1939. 73 private collection of olier mordrel, om8 m198, notes on the chronology of the breton movement. sub-state nationalisms in spain during the moroccan war and the rif war (1909-1927) alfonso iglesias amorín university of santiago de compostela this article analyses how the spanish colonial wars in morocco in the early 20th century influenced catalan, basque and galician nationalisms at an absolutely key moment in their development. it assesses the aftermath of the versailles settlement and the new claims of colonial peripheries, which coincided with the disaster of annual in 1921, spain’s great defeat in morocco, which served as a weapon against the state for sub-state nationalisms, and led to the appearance of the rif republic, a benchmark in the antispanish fight. the article examines how the war was used to mobilize people against prevailing spanish nationalism, the warmongering, colonialist, anti-war and anti-colonial discourses of the nationalisms in question and the positions of the main political parties and leaders. in short, it seek to measure the impact that this long and important war had on different spanish national identities during the first decades of the 20th century. keywords: nationalism, colonialism, hispano-moroccan wars, sub-state nationalisms studies on national movements 8 (2021) | articles | 2 alfonso iglesias amorín introduction although spain did not take part in the major military conflict of the first third of the twentieth century (i.e. the great war), it had to maintain a war effort for most of that period. the colonial conflict in morocco turned particularly violent from 1909 onwards, and the area of spanish influence in the north of the sultanate would be in an almost constant state of war until 1927. spanish historiography tends to treat this period as a single conflict1, often referred to as the rif war2, although outside spain, the term usually alludes solely to the war that took place between 1921 and 1926 between the spanish army and the rif kabyle people led by abdelkrim after the disaster of annual. this article will focus on this entire series of conflicts, which posed a great challenge for spain that underwent several setbacks in what was a key episode in twentiethcentury spain. for example, it was one of the triggers for miguel primo de rivera’s coup in 1923,3 contributed to the appearance of the military elite that rebelled against the second republic in 1936,4 and from 1909 onwards was one of the main arguments in the protests of a growing labour movement that used popular discontent for propaganda purposes.5 in terms of an analysis of national identities, the war was closely linked to spanish nationalism.6 patriotism was very intense amidst the military exaltation of a conflict that increased ‘nation consumption’.7 however, not everything was positive for spanish nationalism, and both the military disasters and the continuous ‘blood tax’ made the war unpopular, abating even the most bellicose patriotism. in this context, peripheral nationalisms found a favourable scenario for creating some distance by highlighting the link between the war and spanish nationalism in order to discredit it. positions ranged from moderate, which opposed the conflict by expressing an anti-war sentiment, to the most radical (especially in basque and catalan nationalism, although studies on national movements 8 (2021) | articles alfonso iglesias amorín 3 | much less in their galician counterpart). they expressed their support for the rifian cause in the sense that if the rifians were enemies of spain, then that made them allies. furthermore, there were also sectors of those nationalisms, especially in catalonia, that viewed this colonialism positively, particularly in terms of economic interests. although some publications have analysed how catalan, basque, and galician nationalism interacted concerning the spanish wars in morocco,8 the three have scarcely been assessed together, and shall therefore be the focus of this article. through available bibliography and primary sources (especially periodical archive sources), this study will examine how these sub-state nationalisms made use of the war in order to mobilize people against the predominant spanish nationalism. the warmongering, colonialist, anti-war and anti-colonial discourses of these nationalisms will be analysed, and the positions of the main political parties and leaders discussed. in short, this article seeks to measure the impact that this long and important war had on different spanish national identities in the first third of the twentieth century. morocco and nationalisms in spain during the nineteenth century, when the nation was conceived as the social unit par excellence in europe, there was a rapid process of the creation of national identities and imaginaries that enabled individuals to assert themselves as members of a differentiated community. in this creation of identities and imaginaries, wars have always been crucial, often for increasing social cohesion by consolidating communal ties, as well as to encourage self-identification in contrast to a common enemy.9 in the case of sub-state nationalism, this occurs with wars of national liberation, in which the common enemy is precisely the state from which independence is sought. on the other hand, the conflicts in which the studies on national movements 8 (2021) | articles | 4 alfonso iglesias amorín state is involved abroad, such as the colonial war that is the subject of this article, can be employed by sub-state nationalisms in order to discredit the state which they believe is subjugating them, and where they even identify with those who should have been regarded as their enemies. in the nineteenth century, there was a significant spanish conflict in morocco, the hispano-moroccan war,10 which took place in 1859-1860. the way in which this conflict affected identities in spain was very different to what would occur half a century later. at that time, national unity was the prevailing theme, and where there were alternative identities,11 these were integrated without any apparent contradiction to that of spain. they even left some references for posterity, such as the famous catalan volunteers, a military unit conceived at the local level to fight for the ‘great homeland’, and which boasted a specifically catalan discourse and symbols, such as, for example, the barretina, or traditional red catalan cap, but whose spanishness was beyond all doubt.12 they also left notable celebrations to remember, such as those that took place throughout the country after the victory at the battle of tétouan or the reception in style of the victorious troops in madrid, both in 1860. however, despite the intensity of patriotic fervour, it was quite ephemeral and had little impact, exposing the disproportion between the nationalist discourse employed by an intellectual elite and the limited capacity and willingness of the liberal state to carry out a ‘patriotic’ programme.13 the general patriotic enthusiasm surrounding the hispano-moroccan war of 1859-1860 never occurred with the moroccan war from 1909 and the rif war from 1921. in general, since the loss of cuba in 1898, which dealt a terrible moral blow to spain, belligerent patriotism decreased notably. there were some celebrations and send-offs with large crowds, but these were less frequent than in previous periods. episodes such as the occupations of tétouan (1913) or chefchaouen studies on national movements 8 (2021) | articles alfonso iglesias amorín 5 | (1920) barely caused celebration, although this was partly because they were occupied due to diplomacy rather than victory on the battlefield. the capture of gurugú or the citadel of selouane in 1909 had generated somewhat more enthusiasm, but this pales in comparison with that of half a century earlier, and the sustained duration of hostilities increased the weariness of the population. it might even have prejudiced spanish nationalism due to the disrepute that the ongoing ‘blood tax’ paid by the population entailed, but ultimately such disrepute fell primarily on the political class, and the anti-war sentiment may also be a factor that boosted nationalist sentiment.14 the terrible disaster of annual in 1921 reactivated spanish patriotism in a sense, and was in part linked to a clamour for vengeance, often with aspects of extreme nationalism. however, this was also linked to a greater concern for soldiers and more initiatives to support them. although this was almost always enveloped in a strongly pro-spanish discourse, it did not necessarily have to be linked to patriotism, and in fact the normal tendency was that the ‘patriotic’ mobilization was due to a clear desire to help soldiers with little interest in national exaltation. the conflict started in 1909 and coincided with a moment in which spanish nationalism was already fully consolidated, but its basque, catalan and galician equivalents were still in development and in search of points of reference. nationalisms often construct their idea of the fatherland by imitating other nations which act as models to be emulated, whether due to the success of their independence process or by having a common enemy.15 the emerging sub-state spanish nationalisms had above all european reference points like ireland, and some non-european cases which proved relevant, such as cuba may have been. although in morocco, and also specifically in the rif, there were struggles for independence with a common enemy such as spain, these never became one of those points of reference, although as shall be studies on national movements 8 (2021) | articles | 6 alfonso iglesias amorín seen, great attention was paid to their progress and contact would be sought when this was regarded as useful. nineteenth-century colonialism and spanish sub-state identities the nineteenth century is the most significant epoch for imperialist colonialism, a phenomenon closely linked to the nation-state and the need for international assertion through the domination of other territories. although in the spanish case this colonialism was very weak, and liberal spain had to create its project with an empire in decline following the independence of former colonies in latin america, colonial territories like cuba or morocco played an important role in spain’s national assertion, largely because of the conflicts that took place there. therefore, the hispano-moroccan war became of interest again because it reveals the state of affairs in the mid-nineteenth century and the great change that occurred in just half a century. if its reception by sub-state spanish identities (which at that time were still regionalist and provincialist, and yet to become nationalist) is examined, the aforementioned unity can be studied in depth by referring to catalan regionalism. it is clear that the war gave an impetus to cultural catalanism, and favoured the recovery of historical points of reference, such as the almogavars,16 who would subsequently enjoy a lengthy period of relevance. in 1859-60, they were both catalan and spanish reference, points, but over time would come to be exclusively catalan. the most notable catalan example was the aforementioned catalan volunteers,17 a military unit of almost 500 soldiers who fought in the final battles of the war. they were highly present in subsequent memory and history, in the same manner as general juan prim, a catalan who achieved great studies on national movements 8 (2021) | articles alfonso iglesias amorín 7 | popularity through his participation in the campaign. the return of these troops in 1860 was referred to by the sources of the time as an overwhelming event: triumphal arches, street decorations, music and choirs, theatrical functions, banquets and a long list of festive activities that went on for several days.18 the impact of the war in catalonia was such that half a century after the conflict it would once again be highly relevant, and cultural creations, such as the choral composition by anselm clavé, los nets dels almugàvers [the almogavars’ grandchildren], which was heard for years, or the paintings of mariano fortuny, such as la batalla de tetuán [the battle of tetouan], which became a visual symbol of the campaign, were still present. in the basque case, the memory of the hispano-moroccan war would also be retained, although with much less intensity than in catalonia.19 there were also the basque regiments, but they appeared later, and their impact was lesser. the integration of regional and national features was repeated in them. the love of the homeland, spain, was not at odds with the charters of local privileges (which were to be defended), and recruitment could serve to demonstrate how well the decentralized system worked. a strong sense of spanishness characterised the discourse employed in the basque case, including in historical references, and with less exclusively regional content than in the catalan case. finally, the project to create a volunteer unit did not come to fruition in the galician case; the ardently pro-spanish discourse was employed, although with particular attention to points of reference regarded as being galician, such as the kings alfonso vi and alfonso vii or the apostle, st. james. provincialism, precedent of the future galician nationalism, even depicted galicia as the most faithful member of the spanish nation.20 in short, it can be concluded that in all three cases there was a regional identity that was complementary to and interdependent of spanish identity,21 to which it was subordinated and with which it was integrated in perfect symbiosis, without contradictions. studies on national movements 8 (2021) | articles | 8 alfonso iglesias amorín changes took place towards the end of the century, and in the catalan and basque cases resulted in a transition from regionalism to nationalism, which in the galician case did not occur until well into the twentieth century. however, the presence of anti-colonialism was quite scarce. although the hegemonic current of catalan historiography has sought to characterise the political and cultural catalanism of the latter nineteenth century and the nationalism of the early twentieth century as anti-colonialist, authors such as eloy martín corrales or enric ucelay have demonstrated that this was not the case.22 the catalan bourgeoisie, closely linked to the regionalist project, had clearly supported the wars in cuba and the philippines. defeat made them return to the national market, and regionalism was an interesting route by which to seek state and social reform,23 which contributed to seeing the events of 1898 as a key moment in catalanist awareness. however, even though there was a change in approach, the lliga regionalista (regionalist league) cannot be defined as anti-colonialist, and indeed influential figures such as the politician enric prat de la riba publicly expressed imperialist positions.24 furthermore, with galician regionalism, the defence of cuba’s spanishness was a constant factor, with figures such as the writer alfredo brañas decisively supporting the war. the contrast lay in the principal tendency of latent basque nationalism, that of the pnv and its founder, sabino arana, who applauded cuban independence and regarded the africans as ‘legitimate masters’ of the territories colonized by the europeans, which gave them the right to reconquer them. in this way, the pnv would regard the spanish occupations in morocco as unjust. this anti-colonialism is a modern feature in the general traditionalism of sabino arana, although it was clearly instrumental in nature,25 and the pejorative use of terms such as moro (moor) demonstrates that it had assumed stereotypes that were common at the time.26 studies on national movements 8 (2021) | articles alfonso iglesias amorín 9 | emerging nationalisms amidst the tensions of a colonial war barely a decade after the colonial and imperialist conflict in cuba, the spanish army once again had a place to fight for prestige and medals: northern morocco, declared by the european power as an area of spanish influence in the algeciras conference of 1906. imperialist aims once again had an objective, and spanish nationalism not only aligned with the aims of other nationalist movements in the state, but the aforementioned tendency continued within catalan nationalism in spite of the contradictions this entailed, as it was aware that the only imperialism feasible for catalonia was through alignment with spain and its army: an army whose major concerns included catalanism. however, it is clear that the situation in catalonia was changing although there were important differences between the bourgeoisie, which accepted the theoretical rationality and practical reason for imperialism, and the clear popular rejection of waging a war that would lengthen over time. in catalonia, the war which began in 1909 had an impact which went beyond the sending of troops or ideological aspects, especially due to its role in the tragic week in barcelona in 1909. the origins of that violent series of strikes, disturbances, and fires, which marked catalan and spanish society over subsequent years, lay in the dispatch of troops to morocco, whose send-off led to a riot that triggered everything.27 from that point onwards, the constant state of war in morocco in the subsequent years made the unpopularity of the war a long-term issue. it is clear that the war was unpopular amongst the populace, not only due to the increase in social protest, but also due to the high rates of desertion and recruits paying in order to avoid service. in the catalan case, it was extremely common to avoid the draft by fleeing to france, especially during the period of the first world war,28 whilst in galicia it studies on national movements 8 (2021) | articles | 10 alfonso iglesias amorín was increasingly common to emigrate to latin america as an escape route. the absolute lack of enthusiasm with which many were forced to go to war can be ascertained through the soldiers’ accounts; if they identified even slightly with centripetal nationalism, it was not difficult for them to affirm such convictions. a good example is the catalan writer josep maría prous i vila, who would write in his diary about the enemy: ‘in truth, i did not wish to kill anyone, but neither would i like it if they killed me’.29 a clear anti-war spirit which was complemented with a defence of peace and the rights of peoples, and which he shared with another fine writer from the galicianist camp, xosé ramón fernándezoxea,30 who also empathized with the rifians. although none of their observations went against pro-spanishness, they reveal how the war succeeded in intensifying a sense of catalanism or galicianism, respectively, in tandem with a ‘denationalising’ of their sense of spanishness. although this effect would be negligible in the entirety of the spanish contingent, it seems relevant for centripetal nationalisms at a decisive point in their political development. the first world war had a notable impact on sub-state nationalisms. wilson’s fourteen points seemed to augur the liberation of smaller nationalities and the end of absolute monarchies and reactionary militarism. in this context, the politician francesc macià became the leader of a catalan nationalism far more radical in tendency than the lliga. after the failed campaign for the statute of autonomy in 19181919, catalanist mobilisation focused more on morocco, viewing the spanish militarism that held up the monarchy of alfonso xiii as a cheap copy of the kaiser’s prussian militarism,31 and wishing the same outcome for it. in this climate of opposition to the war, the first open expressions of solidarity with the enemy appeared. in october 1919, for example, a national catalan committee in barcelona circulated a pamphlet addressed ‘to his excellency el raisuni’ with texts in arabic and catalan studies on national movements 8 (2021) | articles alfonso iglesias amorín 11 | under the red flag of yebala and the separatist senyera with the ‘single star’. the signatories celebrated the valiant defence of the ‘moroccan homeland menaced by spain’ by raisuni, and the ‘sons of catalonia’ sent him a ‘message of support’ which served as a reminder that it was not the first time that the catalans had protested against the invasion of morocco, recalling somewhat advantageously what had occurred in 1909. they also condemned the military methods of the spanish army in morocco and wished raisuni good health and courage.32 in spite of being written in arabic and catalan, the text’s principal objective was to cause provocation, in an atmosphere of tension and confrontation that was typical in the catalan capital at the time. indeed, the appearance of organizations like the liga patriótica española [spanish patriotic league], formed above all by officials from the barcelona garrison, and regarded as the possibly first expression of fascism in spain,33 was due in some part to this tense situation. in galician nationalism, as in other aspects, matters proceeded at a slower pace, and it was harder to perceive this kind of empathy with the moroccans, whether sincere or not. antón vilar ponte, one of the founding fathers of galician nationalism, made pejorative statements in this regard in 1918: ‘throughout history, the arab race hardly had any contact with us. galicia remained untouched by the african influence’.34 he also demonstrated that he knew very little about moroccan affairs when referring to the territory as if it were entirely made up of desert and using arab and muslim as if they were synonyms. in general, there was little concern for the war amongst the leading figures of galician nationalism such as alfonso castelao or vicente risco, although their opposition to it was clear.35 both catalan and basque nationalism referred to morocco in antispanish and anti-military terms, rather than anti-imperialist. the type of sympathy such as that evoked by el raisuni was simply that of a ‘good barbarian’, which served as a contrast to the ‘barbaric methods of the studies on national movements 8 (2021) | articles | 12 alfonso iglesias amorín spanish army’.36 the defence of morocco often seems more practical than sincere. after 1921 and the disaster of annual, the moroccan who received the greatest sympathy was abdelkrim. both he and the republic of the rif that he founded began to be acclaimed frequently at events by groups such as estat català (macià’s party) or acció catalana.37 in the case of euzkadi (the basque country), the aberri-pnv party, which had split from comunión tradicionalista vasca [basque traditionalist communion], and was led by elías gallástegui ‘gudari’, stood out.38 this party defended in no uncertain terms the right of the rifians to their independence, and even the idea of a ‘quadruple alliance’ of which the republic of the rif would be a member together with euzkadi, catalonia and galicia. in the words of gallástegui: ‘a new and brilliant light shall shine on the triple alliance from the most distant southern land. over the strait of gibraltar and crossing this spain that humiliates us [...], the quadruple alliance shall be sealed’.39 this idea would also be supported in the most radical sectors of catalan nationalism. gudari was very critical of the moors who let themselves be bought by spain and defended those who fought against it, especially abdelkrim, due to his defence of moroccan independence: ‘our greeting of admiration, respect and support is sent to and for you, moorish chief!’40 although less frequent in galicia, abdelkrim was also defended by groups such as irmandade nazonalista galega [galician nationalist brotherhood], which was firmly opposed to the war.41 in spite of his vague ideas at the beginning, antón vilar ponte ended up exalting the ‘civilized’ abdelkrim and his independent and federative republic, which he regarded as having more opportunities to europeanise the rif than the ‘monstruo antediluviano del estado centralista español’ [antidiluvian monster of the centralist spanish state], and even recognised that it could be an example for the iberian peoples of how to attain freedom.42 a similar line was taken by the ourense newspaper, la zarpa, founded by the agrarian reform movement leader, basilio álvarez. many studies on national movements 8 (2021) | articles alfonso iglesias amorín 13 | figures from galician nationalism collaborated with álvarez, one of the most vehemently anti-war voices in galicia. he published the articles of xosé ramón fernández-oxea and came to express a certain anticolonialism by stating that the rifian cause was just, that abdelkrim was the sole hero of the war and that those who deserted the spanish army deserved to be praised.43 the poet manuel antonio, who defended the cause of the rifian people and their right to self-determination, is an example of decisive anti-colonialism in the galician case. he even urged his friend rafael dieste, another leading figure of galician nationalism, to support the side of abdelkrim or to desert.44 these calls to refuse to do military service or desert, more habitual in the catalan and basque cases, hardly occurred in galicia, which adds interest to the texts of manuel antonio and also make him an all too infrequent exception. in spite of being more moderate than aberri, the comunión tradicionalista vasca also displayed a certain anti-colonialism, to a greater extent than that of the lliga in catalonia, albeit nuanced. for example, manuel aranzadi, one of the leaders of the group, was highly critical of spanish imperialism, which he regarded as unjust and inhumane, and believed that morocco should be free. this colonialism was evident and not simply pacifist, as is shown by his similar evaluation of the case of guinea, for example, in the article ‘africa for the africans’, by alberto olabarría, published in euzkadi, the principal mouthpiece of comunión tradicionalista vasca.45 the moroccan war acted as a basis around which the nationalist mobilisation in catalonia and euzkadi could assemble. however, understanding of the rifian independence movement was far less, especially in the catalan case. a defeatism that focused on benefits such as the end of economic expenses and human lives in the war prevailed, especially in relation with forced conscription. gudari pointed out in aberri that the nationalists should unite to wage ‘war on the war’ and ‘impede decisively that the race and youth endure a bloodbath in this studies on national movements 8 (2021) | articles | 14 alfonso iglesias amorín fatal tragedy for catalonia, galicia and euzkadi’. also, that ‘if the spanish wish their own territory to be respected, they must start by respecting that of others. africa for the africans! spain for the spanish! and euzkadi for the basques!’46 in addition, the clamour for accountability for the disaster of annual, which had a notable repercussion in spain, was vehemently backed by many of the nationalist formations analysed. aberri harshly pointed out that ‘the thousands and thousands of spanish soldiers, and countless numbers of basques mixed in with them, who fell there in the sun, dry and blackened, are calling for redress’. it was emphasized that they should not stop holding them accountable because it was a spanish problem: ‘the same should be demanded of the basque race, which has lost thousands of victims on moroccan soil and does not wish to be spanish’, and which in addition was a territory which had not been obliged to render the ‘blood tribute’ until 1876.47 in the case of galician nationalism, the disaster of annual strengthened vague positions against the war, which now became firmer. nevertheless, there was a certain heterogeneity and even in progressive publications such as a nosa terra, positions that almost supported the war could be detected, such as that of xavier fraga: ‘we were expecting that by adopting all those means and systems that could be employed in the rif, they would impose the superiority of the civilization and organization of the spanish state, ensuring decisively and swiftly the domination of an entire area subject to spanish influence’.48 however, these ideas were not shared by other galicianists, such as jaime quintanilla or antón vilar ponte, who had to leave the el correo gallego newspaper due to his criticisms of the war in morocco. they were, however, defended in a nosa terra, which stated that they were being attacked for their nationalist and european ideas.49 studies on national movements 8 (2021) | articles alfonso iglesias amorín 15 | the dictatorship that ended the war and the road towards the republic primo de rivera’s coup d’état entailed a curbing of the growth of sub state nationalisms, upon which he waged all-out-war, as their defiance of the spanish nation had been one of the most decisive factors in mobilizing the military. in fact, the last diada (the national day of catalonia), on 11 september 1923, when the republic of the rif was cheered and a spanish flag was destroyed, was particularly symbolic.50 the majority of the madrid press reported the events generally in a shocked and indignant tone. the cries of ‘long live free catalonia! long live the republic of the rif!’51 encapsulated the two greatest concerns of a large part of the spanish political and military classes: catalan separatism and the war in morocco. these had been decisive triggers for primo de rivera’s coup d’état, which occurred just two days after these events, although its preparation had begun a long time before. morocco, which due to the war and above all the great defeat of 1921, had been a weak point in the constitutional monarchy of alfonso xiii, continued to be so during the dictatorship of primo de rivera until 1925, when the landing at alhucemas succeeded in improving the situation for spain. in the catalan case, one of the greatest changes with the dictatorship was the exile of many figures from the most belligerent ranks of nationalism, including francesc macià, its most active leader. therefore, part of the nationalists’ activities was undertaken from abroad, especially from france. amongst other things, as broad an alliance as possible was prepared against the spanish state, and the rifians, with their struggle at the decisive point in 1923, became natural allies. this is reflected in butlletí de l’estat català, published in paris, which excoriates the spanish and praises abdelkrim and his struggle: it was seen as a model for those catalans who did not display sufficient virility to rebel against the studies on national movements 8 (2021) | articles | 16 alfonso iglesias amorín occupation. they could not avoid regarding the rifians as savages, but a political agreement was sought with the republic of the rif.52 for galician nationalism, the greatest blow dealt by the dictatorship was its censorship of the press, which was the principal channel through which anti-war ideas were expressed. this was unlike the situation in euzkadi and catalonia, where such ideas had hardly featured in the repertoire of mobilization. magazines like galicia had to close, and others ignored the war in order to avoid problems. this was not the case with nationalist groups abroad, which during this period expressed their position with greater clarity than groups elsewhere in spain. for example, the federation of galician societies of buenos aires spent years regarding the withdrawal from northern africa as an important cause, equal in importance to the abolition of chartered tenancies in galician land ownership.53 during the primo de rivera dictatorship, their position became more radical: they declared their hope in a victory for the rifians in order to cause the fall of the dictator and the ushering in of a republic.54 the a fouce newspaper, in buenos aires, was one of the most decisively anti-colonialist publications, and in several articles defended the right of peoples to their independence and freedom, although in truth paid little attention to morocco.55 the only article of this publication which focussed exclusively on morocco was from july 1930. it was written by urbano hermida, a member of the sociedade nazonalista pondal [pondal nationalist society] and refers to the protectionist measures applied in spain to avoid the import of moroccan wheat: ‘poor morocco, they are still not brave enough to call you a colony and yet you have to endure the mistakes of the spanish government’. in an anticolonialist article that was highly critical of spanish conduct throughout history, the rifians are portrayed as brothers, and a sarcastic request made that spain should at least make galicia a protectorate like morocco if the galicians were not to attain independence.56 due to the ideology of its members, it is probable that a fouce would have supported the studies on national movements 8 (2021) | articles alfonso iglesias amorín 17 | rifians in the war as had the poet manuel antonio, but the magazine was launched when the campaign was in its final stage (the first issue was published in 1926). at the end of 1924, macià explored the effective alliance between the catalan resistance and the rif rebels, proposing a league of oppressed nations with catalonia, euzkadi, galicia, the philippines, ireland, the rif, egypt and india. macià shared catalanism’s admiration for the league of nations, to which he wished to give a revolutionary twist, but the project remained just a theory. more viable was the comitè de l’aliança lliure [free alliance committee], which would include estat català, pnv, cnt or pce,57 and which would try to organize an effective resistance, where the full sense of the integration of the republic of the rif would be evident, but interest vanished after the landing at alhucemas. this committee in exile attempted anti-war protests, but this also proved largely unsuccessful. the last use by the nationalists of the war was in paris in july 1926, at the great parade to which primo de rivera and the sultan of morocco were invited as guests of honour, and to which estat català contributed boos and had run ins with the police. in 1931, the second republic put a temporary end to the authoritarian measures of the previous decade and marked the beginning of a new period. although it was a much more favourable moment than the preceding ones, the anti-colonialism aimed at morocco was scarce amongst the spanish left, including sub-state nationalisms, which demonstrated that the most significant tendency had been against the war, and that with the end of the war, other concerns dissipated. for example, the pnv, which reunified in 1930 through the merger of comunión tradicionalista vasca and the aberri group, paid hardly any attention to morocco,58 and this was also the case with the leading nationalist groups in catalonia and galicia. the communist party of catalonia was one of the few during that period that regarded the selfdetermination of morocco as important, although little effort was put studies on national movements 8 (2021) | articles | 18 alfonso iglesias amorín into the matter.59 furthermore, the progress made by the republic by sub-state nationalisms in spain was the envy of moroccan nationalism, which in 1936 requested the right to have a statute of autonomy similar to that of catalonia. abdelkhalek torres, from the moroccan nationalist ranks in tetuán, visited lluis companys after his reinstatement as president of the generalitat in february 1936, and the catalan political forces supported their requests after the start of the civil war with a delegation sent to discuss the matter with the largo caballero government. however, the latter refused to grant autonomy to the spanish protectorate of morocco and continued to follow the policy of bribing local leaders. this was of little interest for torres, who had already been guaranteed this by franco and the rebels, whose power in the territory was greater. following the failure of those negotiations, catalanism could now use all the mythology of the moros against the rebels,60 who would take on numerous ‘african’ features in depictions of them produced by the republicans. conclusions the moroccan war and the rif war, which conditioned spanish domestic policy to such a large degree in the first decades of the twentieth century, also had a significant effect on sub-state nationalisms in spain. furthermore, these were at an early stage of development, unlike spanish nationalism, which was already well-established. precisely for this reason, the comparison with reactions to the hispano-moroccan war of 1859-1860 is very interesting, because it demonstrates how in just half a century there was a change in regional identities (catalan, basque and galician or others) and spanish national identity, which coexisted in perfect harmony, and the existence of new nationalisms, in this case centripetal and directly opposed to spanish nationalism. studies on national movements 8 (2021) | articles alfonso iglesias amorín 19 | the differences between the different nationalist sectors in each case have also proved revealing. an anti-war and anti-colonial approach was most present in basque nationalism, even in the more conservative sectors. on the other hand, in the catalan case, there was support for imperialism in conservative groupings, above all at the start of the twentieth century. the majority of anti-war and all anti-colonialist positions were to be found in left-wing sectors. galician nationalism, which did not even exist when the war began in 1909, was slower in all senses, although it has also been shown that there were cases of anticolonialism and the anti-war position was commonly held. the most striking positions were those of empathy and those seeking an alliance with the rifian enemy. the former could be seen in some leftwing or even liberal outlets. however, the latter tendency was practically only found in these sub-state nationalisms because they saw spain as the enemy and were prepared to fight against it. the examples of estat català and aberri, as well as its leaders francesc macià and elías gallástegui, are the best of a tendency that was shared by sectors that were very much the minority, but which were noted for their mobilisations. therefore, although these ideas had not become strongly established in spain at that time, or even in catalonia or euzkadi, they were conspicuous, and were well known among the most fervently prospanish sectors, which used them as a justification to combat what they regarded as internal enemies of the homeland. the disaster of annual in 1921, which caused the start of the rif war, was a turning point because it increased the strength of the anti-war position. it also entailed the appearance of an undisputed leader, abdelkrim, and a political project that became a point of reference for those who believed that in northern morocco an ally could be found to fight against the spanish state. the other turning point was the coup d’état in 1923: it notably slowed down the mobilisation and diffusion of ideas in spain by catalan, basque and galician nationalisms. even so, studies on national movements 8 (2021) | articles | 20 alfonso iglesias amorín they continued their fight, some from abroad, and most proposals were made during the primo de rivera dictatorship for an alliance between nationalisms that would include the rifians. however, in spite of the propagandistic use of the moroccan war, radical catalan and basque nationalism never organized jointly in an effective manner with the cause of abdelkrim. furthermore, their anticolonialism must be nuanced, as many prejudices and pejorative stereotypes continued to exist behind a rhetoric of respect and admiration. in this way, the view of the moroccans as being savages was significantly maintained, although often the spanish ‘civilisers’ were regarded as scarcely as civilised as the moroccans were. the rifian victories against the spanish army and the establishment of an independent rifian state generated fascination amongst radical nationalisms which also sought to ‘gain emancipation from the spanish protectorate’,61 and they tried to approach a point of reference that was as promising as it was short-lived. endnotes 1 for an overview of the conflict, see s. balfour, abrazo mortal: de la guerra colonial a la guerra civil en españa y marruecos (1909-1939) (barcelona, 2002); m. r. madariaga, en el barranco del lobo. las guerras de marruecos (madrid, 2005). 2 the term refers to the rif as the entire northern area of morroco and was a geographical reference common at that time. however, it does not cohere with administrative names, as the rif would be just one of the regions of the spanish protectorate established in morocco in 1912, and the war also affected others such as yebala and lucus. studies on national movements 8 (2021) | articles alfonso iglesias amorín 21 | 3 for the relationship between the conflict and the dictatorship, see s. sueiro, españa en el mediterráneo. primo de rivera y la «cuestión marroquí», 1923-1930 (madrid, 1992). 4 for spanish military interest in africa, see s. balfour & p. la porte, ‘spanish military cultures and the moroccan wars, 1909-36’, in: european history quarterly, 30 (2000), 307-332. a. iglesias amorín, ‘la cultura africanista en el ejército español (1893-1975)’, in: pasado y memoria, 15, 99-122. 5 a subject examined in the now classic study: a. bachoud. los españoles ante las campañas de marruecos (madrid, 1988). 6 see a. iglesias amorín, ‘the hispano-moroccan wars and the (de)nationalization of the spanish people’, in european history quarterly 50/2, 290-310. 7 for a definition of the concept of ‘nation consumption’ see a. quiroga, ‘la nacionalización en españa, una propuesta teórica’ in ayer 90/2013 (2), 31 and ff. 8 one of the most significant is e. ucelay, ‘els enemics dels meus enemics. les simpaties del nacionalisme català pels «moros»: 1900-1936’, in: l’avenç. dossier: el colonialisme espanyol i l’àfrica 28 (1980), 29-40; s. de pablo, ‘¡grita libertad! el nacionalismo vasco y la lucha por la independencia de las naciones africanas’, in: memoria y civilización 15 (2012); d. pereira, galegos nas guerras do rif. paisaxe bélica e imaxinario anticolonial (1860-1927) (a coruña, 2016). 9 x. m. núñez seixas, ¡fuera el invasor!: nacionalismos y movilización bélica durante la guerra civil española (1936-1939) (madrid, 2006), 11. 10 known in spain as the “african war”, a name regarded by historiography as pompous, and which demonstrated that at that time, spain showed little interest in africa beyond morocco. 11 under the form of regionalism, as nationalism did not emerge until the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century. 12 see a. garcía balañà, ‘patria, plebe y política en la españa isabelina: la guerra de áfrica en cataluña (1859-1860)’, in e. martín corrales (ed.), marruecos y el colonialismo español [1859-1912] (barcelona, 2002), 27 and ff. 13 see x. m. núñez seixas (ed.), la construcción de la identidad nacional en europa y españa (siglos xix y xx), monograph of the journal ayer, no. 64 (2006). studies on national movements 8 (2021) | articles | 22 alfonso iglesias amorín 14 see iglesias amorín, ‘the hispano-moroccan wars’. 15 x. m. núñez seixas, ‘irlanda’, in: s. de pablo, de la granja, j. l., mees, l., et al. (eds.), diccionario ilustrado de simbolos del nacionalismo vasco (madrid, 2012), 547. 16 troops of the crown of aragón, famous for their role in the medieval conquests by that kingdom in the mediterranean. 17 garcía balañà, ‘patria, plebe y política…’, 27 and ff. 18 r. olivar, el caballero prim (vida íntima, amorosa y militar) (barcelona, 1952), 221. 19 concerning this patriotism displayed, see a. cajal valaero, ‘la guerra de áfrica (1859-1860) y las expresiones patrióticas en el país vasco’, in m. esteban de vega & mª d. de calle velasco (eds.), procesos de nacionalización en la españa contemporánea (salamanca, 2010). 20 j. beramendi & s. taboada, ‘guerras y nacionalización en la galicia del siglo xix’, in: esteban & velasco, procesos de nacionalización, 226. 21 the words used to describe the basque case by f. molina aparicio, la tierra del martirio español. el país vasco y españa en el siglo del nacionalismo (madrid, 2005), 44. 22 e. martín corrales, ‘la conferencia de algeciras en la prensa catalana: entre el pragmatismo económico de la vanguardia y el imperialismo orsiano de la veu de catalunya’ in: e. martín corrales & j. a. gonzález alcantud (eds.), la conferencia de algeciras en 1906: un banquete colonial (barcelona, 2007), 220. see also e. ucelay-da cal, el imperialismo catalán. prat de la riba, cambó, d’ors y la conquista moral de españa (barcelona, 2003). 23 ucelay, ‘els enemics dels meus enemics’, 31. 24 e. prat de la riba. la nacionalitat catalana (barcelona, 1934), 103-104. 25 pablo, ‘¡grita libertad!’, 270. 26 for example, he referred to spanish immigrants in euzkadi as ‘nuestros moros’ [‘our moors’]: s. arana, ‘nuestros moros’, in bizcaitarra, 17/2/1897. 27 see j. connelly, la semana trágica (barcelona, 2009). 28 ucelay, ‘els enemics dels meus enemics’, 33. studies on national movements 8 (2021) | articles alfonso iglesias amorín 23 | 29 j. m. prous i vila, cuatro gotas de sangre (barcelona, 2011), 42. enric ucelay tells the anecdote of a group of catalan peasants sent to morocco in 1922 who agreed not to shoot anyone because the rifians were peasants just like them: ucelay, ‘els enemics dels meus enemics’, 33. 30 ben-cho-shey, crónicas de marruecos (barcelona, 2005). 31 ucelay, ‘els enemics dels meus enemics’, 36. 32 ibid. 33 x. casals i meseguer, ‘auge y declive del ‘partido militar’ de barcelona (18981936)’, in: iberic@l. revue d'études ibériques et ibéro-américaines 4 (2013), 176. 34 a. vilar ponte, ‘a visita do rei moro’, in: a nosa terra, 30/7/1918, 3. 35 a. iglesias amorín, ‘el nacionalismo gallego y la independencia de marruecos’, in: e. martín corrales & j. pich mitjana (eds.), españa frente a la independencia de marruecos (bellaterra, 2017), 305. 36 ucelay, ‘els enemics dels meus enemics’, 36. 37 madariaga. en el barranco del lobo, 200; s. g. payne. los militares y la política en la españa contemporánea (paris, 1968), 161. 38 the aberri group recovered the traditional name of partido nacionalista vasco [basque nationalist party], which had been abandoned by the mainstream (which opted for a moderate strategy seeking first political autonomy and not direct independence). the cnv also opposed the war in morocco, although with less forcefulness than the sector which in 1921 would found the partido nacionalista vasco. see a. ugalde zubiri. la acción exterior del nacionalismo vasco (1890-1939): historia, pensamiento y relaciones internacionales (bilbao, 1996), 286-287. 39 gudari, ‘triple alianza’, in: aberri, 15/7/1923, 1. 40 ugalde zubiri, la acción exterior del nacionalismo vasco, 303. the project of abdelkrim was actually not moroccan but specifically rifian, although gallástegui did not allude to this. 41 as confirmed by dionisio pereira for the branches of santiago, ourense, a coruña, viveiro or muxía: pereira, galegos nas guerras do rif, 61. 42 pereira, galegos nas guerras do rif, 63. studies on national movements 8 (2021) | articles | 24 alfonso iglesias amorín 43 see, for example, la zarpa, 28/7/1922, 1. 44 manoel antonio to rafael dieste, undated letter, october 1921. quoted in pereira, galegos nas guerras do rif, 43. 45 ugalde zubiri, la acción exterior del nacionalismo vasco, 347. 46 gudari, ‘la primera preocupación de la triple alianza’, in: aberri, 31/7/1923, 1; ‘la aventura española de marruecos va a reanudarse trágicamente’, in: aberri, 24/7/1923, p. 1. 47 gudari, ‘el proceso de berenguer. el país vasco debe exigir responsabilidades’, in: aberri, 27/6/1923, 1. 48 x. fraga, ‘o pesadelo de marrocos: hai que rectificar os procedementos’, in: a nosa terra, 1/9/1923, 1. 49 ‘um xornal que quere a escravitude da terra’, in: a nosa terra, 15/12/1921, 4. 50 j. l. vila-san juan, la vida cotidiana en españa durante la dictadura de primo de rivera (barcelona, 1984), 15. 51 as reported in many newspapers. see for example ‘banquete de separatistas’, in: la voz, 11/9/1923, 1. ‘gritos antiespañoles, cargas, heridos y detenciones’, in: el sol, 12/9/1921, 1. 52 see for example ‘al marroc ataquen. l’exemple al marroc’, in: butlletí de l’estat català, 3 (august 1924), 3; ‘com parlen els patriotes i com actúen’, in: butlletí de l’estat català, 5 (1 october 1924), 2; ‘l’abandó del marroc’, in: butlletí de l’estat català, 5 (1 october 1924), 3. 53 agrarian contracts that were medieval in origin and whose duration was lengthy and often perpetual. they were a burden for the galician peasantry until they were finally abolished in 1926. 54 x. m. núñez seixas, emigrantes, caciques e indianos (vigo, 1998), 296; 301. 55 the most numerous references alluded to irish nationalism; references to cases such as those of india, china or egypt were also habitual. 56 u. hermida, ‘irmáns do rif’, in: a fouce, 16 (1/6/1930), 4. studies on national movements 8 (2021) | articles alfonso iglesias amorín 25 | 57 cnt: conferencia nacional del trabajo [national confederation of labour], a trade union organization whose ideology was anarchist; pce: communist party of spain. 58 in 1934 the occupation of ifni was scrutinized, making the matter relevant again, but this was an exceptional case. 59 ucelay, ‘els enemics dels meus enemics’, 39 60 ibid., 40 61 ‘la triple alianza de la península’, in: aberri, 28/7/1923, 1. bossaert_cobbaert_v4r_definitive         sophie  bossaert  &  tom  cobbaert,  ‘bayernpartei  archives  at  the  advn.   inventory’,  in:  studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)  pp.  187-­‐223.   http://snm.nise.eu   sophie  bossaert  &  tom  cobbaert   bayernpartei  archives  at  the  advn   inventory   brief  history1   the  bavarian  party  (bayernpartei,  bp)  was  founded  on  28  october  1946  in   the   gasthof   straubinger   hof   in   münchen   by   ludwig   max   lallinger   and   jakob  fischbacher.  together  with   the  christian-­‐social  union  (christlich-­‐ soziale  union,  csu)  it  constituted  the  heir  to  the  bavarian  people's  party,   which  was  active  before  world  war  ii.  as  the  american  occupying  forces   refused   to   authorise   the   party,   it   was   not   until   1948   that   the   bp   was   officially  recognised  as  a  national  party.   the  party  reached  its  peak  in  the  late  1940s  and  1950s.  this  went  hand-­‐in-­‐ hand  with  an  exponential  growth  in  membership  which  rose  from  15,000   to  25,000  from  the  end  of  1948  to  october  1949.  at  the  first  elections  in   which   the   bp   took   part,   the   1948   local   elections,   153   councillors   were   elected  in  the  towns  and  309  councillors  in  the  provincial  districts.  in  the   same  year  the  bp  began  to  hold  an  annual  local  or  regional  party  meeting,   known  as   the  politischer  aschermittwoch.  until  1952  the  bavarian  party   was  the  only  party  to  organise  such  an  event,  but  later  on  this  became  a   tradition  for  all  the  big  german  parties.   in  its  party  manifesto  the  bp  promoted  the  independence  of  the  bavarian   state  within  europe.  its  leaders  wanted  to  free  the  region  from  the  central   power   of   the   bundesrepublik   (federal   republic)   and   strengthen   the   bavarian   national   identity.   in   the   founding   years   they   called   for   a   studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)        |        sources   sophie  bossaert  &  tom  cobbaert  188   transition   to   a   free   economy,   a   strengthening   and   modernisation   of   bavarian   agriculture,   the   electrification   of   industry,   train-­‐lines   and   households   and   the   development   of   a   social   security   system   for   the   working  class.   the  party  leaders  were  seen  as  the  guardians  of  the  bavarian  identity,  in   which  catholicism  plays  an   inherent  role.  the  dominance  of   the  party’s   catholic  side  was  noticeably  reduced  by  opposition  campaigns  by  the  csu.   this  party,   the  strongest  competition  to  the  bp,  presented  the  bp  as  an   enemy   of   the   catholic   church,   which   eventually   created   a   non-­‐catholic   perception.  in  reaction  to  these  campaigns,  the  liberal  fraction  within  the   bp  became  more  influential.   the  logo  of  the  bp  contains   the  coat  of  arms  and  flag  of   freistaat  bayern.   advn,  antwerp     studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)        |        sources   sophie  bossaert  &  tom  cobbaert   189   under  the  leadership  of  joseph  baumgartner  the  bp  succeeded  in  gaining   20.9%  of  the  votes  for  the  german  parliament  in  1949.  from  1949  to  1953   it  had  seventeen  members  in  the  bundestag  (federal  parliament).     in  the  first  half  of  the  1950s  the  positive  electoral  trend  continued  and  the   bp  became  the  third  most  important  party  in  bavaria,  after  the  csu  and   the   social-­‐democratic   party   (sozialdemokratische   partei   deutschlands,   spd).  in  the  1950  local  elections  the  party  won  17.9%  of  the  thirty-­‐nine   seats  in  the  bavarian  landtag.  from  1954-­‐1957  the  bp  was  represented   by   two   ministers   and   two   state   secretaries   in   the   bavarian   state   government;  party  chairman  baumgartner  was  deputy  minister-­‐president.   the  party  continued  to  focus  on  regionalism.  the  bp  accepted  the  german   state   but   accentuated   its   federal   character   and   strived   for   as   great   an   influence  as  possible  from  bavaria  on  federal  politics.   after   the   initial   success   the   results   began   to   fall.   the   eruption   of   the   spielbankenaffäre   in  1959  sparked  a  period  of  crisis.  two  bp  politicians,   baumgartner  and  august  geislhöring,  were  accused  of  bribery  by  a  casino   owner   in  exchange   for  obtaining  a   license.  although  both  of   them  were   initially  exonerated,  they  were  still  charged  in  1959.  more  than  ten  years   later,  though,  it  seemed  the  affair  had  been  set  up  by  the  head  of  the  csu,   friedrich   zimmerman,   out   of   fear   of   the   electoral   threat   that   the   csu   believed   the  bp  posed.  the  ploy  proved   to  be  a  success  as   the  bp  was   punished  electorally  after  the  affair.   on   a   federal   level   the   bp   had   already   disappeared   from   parliament   by   1953  and  after  1969  it  no  longer  took  part  in  the  national  elections.  the   1962  elections  were  the  last  ones  in  which  the  bp  could  send  members  to   the  bavarian  landtag.  at  the  time  the  bp  formed  a  coalition  government   with  the  csu.  robert  wehgartner  was  state  secretary  and  elected  as  party   chairman.  this  cooperation  ended  four  years  later  when  wehgartner  was   not  re-­‐elected  as  party  chairman  and  switched  to  the  csu.   studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)        |        sources   sophie  bossaert  &  tom  cobbaert  190   the  party  membership  followed  a  similar  trend.  in  the  beginning  the  party   experienced  rapid  growth  but  from  the  late  1950s  onwards  there  was  a   marked  decrease  in  the  number  of  members  and  it  was  not  until  the  end  of   the   1970s   that   this   trend   could   be   reversed.   in   1967   the   number   of   members  dwindled  spectacularly  due   to   the   founding  of   the  bayerische   staatspartei   (bsp),   followed   by   the   breakaway   of   the   christliche   bayerische  volkspartei  (cbv)  in  1976.   in  1978  the  party  reached  an  all-­‐time  election  low  when  it  attracted  just   0.4%   of   the   votes   in   the   regional   elections.   despite   the   disappointing   election  results,  the  party  has  continued  to  take  part  in  elections.  since  the   late  1970s  there  was  a  very  gradual  but  steady  increase  in  votes.  at  the   landtag  elections  of  1994  the  bp  achieved  1%  of  the  votes.  thanks  to  this,   the  bp  could  lay  claim  to  subsidised  party  financing  for  the  first  time  in   twenty-­‐four  years.   a  number  of  issues  appeared  repeatedly  in  the  party  manifestos.  the  bp   called  for  the  active  support  of  the  agricultural  industry,  as  well  as  small   in  1967  a  group  lead  by  helmut  kalkbrenner  and  joseph   panholzer  left  the  bp  and  founded  the  bayerische   staatspartei  (bsp).      |      advn,  antwerp   studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)        |        sources   sophie  bossaert  &  tom  cobbaert   191   and   medium-­‐sized   businesses,   and   wanted   the   civil   service   to   get   the   necessary   attention.   furthermore,   the   bp   wants   to   protect   the   environment  and,  ideally,  it  would  like  the  christian  world  vision  to  form   the  basis  of  politics.  as  expected,  regionalism  is  still  an  important  issue.   there  are  a  number  of  demands  which  reappear  frequently  including  the   wish   for   a   bavarian   president   and   a   law   which   would   outline   the   relationship  between  bavaria  and  the  federal  republic  of  germany.  on  top   of  this  the  bp  wants  to  organise  a  referendum  on  bavarian  independence.   the  bp  has  a  positive  view  towards  europe;  it  sees  the  european  union  as   a  way  to  make  the  german  state  superfluous  and  also  as  a  means  to  realise   its  dream  of  a   free  and   independent  bavaria.  the  bp   is  member  of   the   european  free  alliance  (efa),  since  the  europe  it  envisages  for  the  future   is,  as  expected,  a  europe  of  regions.     a  march  of  the  bp  at  the  annual   politischer  aschermittwoch.   advn,  antwerp   studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)        |        sources   sophie  bossaert  &  tom  cobbaert  192   archival  history   in   1979   a   part   of   the   historical   party   archives   was   transferred   to   the   bavarian  central  archives  (hauptstaatsarchiv)  in  munich  in  exchange  for  a   financial  compensation.  a  second  batch  was  moved  there  in  the  course  of   the   1990s.   both   batches   ('bayernpartei   i'   and   'bayernpartei   ii')   were   released   and   they   include   documents   from   the   1940s-­‐1990s,   including   reports  of  party  commissions  and  party  meetings,  letters,  correspondence   from  the  party  secretary,  the  landtag  fraction  and  the  chairman,  as  well  as   items  from  the  local  branches.   the   institut   für   zeitgeschichte   (institute   of   contemporary   history)   in   münchen  houses  some  archived  material  of  the  bp  from  its  early  period  of   1945-­‐1972.  these  documents  contain,  amongst  other  things,  the  personal   archives  of  professor  anton  berr,  member  of   the  bp,  and  a  copy  of   the   personal  archives  of  fischbacher,  earlier  party   leader  and   leader  of   the   kreisverband   oberbayern.   alongside   these,   there   are   also   diverse   documents  from  the  party  organisation:  statutes,  manifestos,  institutional   files,  correspondence,  financial  documents  and  meeting  reports.   on  23  november  2010  a  further  part  of  the  historical  party  archives  was   transferred,  this  time  to  the  advn  (archival,  documentation  and  research   centre  for  flemish  nationalism)  in  antwerp.  earlier  that  year  the  bp  had   contacted   nise   (national   movements   and   intermediary   structures   in   europe)  in  the  search  for  a  solution  for  its  remaining  archives,  dissatisfied   as   the   leaders   were   with   their   earlier   choice   of   the   bayerisches   hauptstaatsarchiv.   the   archives   from   the   bp   primarily   consist   of   administrative   documents   such   as   correspondence,   reports,   financial   accounts   and   electoral   files   from   the   national   level   as   well   as   the   local   branches.  alongside  these,  there  are  also  files  from  the  chairs  max  zierl,   ewald   may,   hubert   dorn   and   florian   weber.   the   archives   also   contain   various  posters,  photos  and   film  rolls.  the  majority  of   the  archives  are   dated  from  between  1970-­‐2010  but  there  are  also  items  that  date  back  to   the  origins  in  the  1940s.   studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)        |        sources   sophie  bossaert  &  tom  cobbaert   193   scope  and  content   the  archives  from  the  bavarian  party  consist  of  primarily  administrative   documents,  as  mentioned  previously.  they  portray  the  political  activities   of  the  bp  and  are  important  sources  that  chart  the  political  development  in   bavaria.   the   documents   concerning   the   elections   for   the   bundestag,   landtag,   bezirkstag   or   kreistag   offer   an   interesting   insight   into   the   electoral  history  of  the  party.     in   the   general   section   there   are   files   and   documents   concerning   the   statutes,   manifestos,   regulations,   memorial   celebrations   and   the   party's   website.   the  section  governing  bodies  contains  documents  about  the  work  of  the   party  secretary  and  the  leadership  in  the  period  1950-­‐2000.   the   archives   contain   many   finance   related   items   from   both   the   landesverband   and   the   bezirks-­,   kreis-­   and   ortsverbände   (finances   section).   in   this   section   one   will   find   mainly   financial   reports,   journals,   cashbooks,  invoices  and  proof  of  expenditures  from  the  years  1940-­‐2000.     the  extensive  membership  administration  has  been  well  preserved  for  the   years  1977-­‐2000  (member  administration  section).   the   most   extensive   section   is   that   of   the   work   done   by   the   branches   (branches  section)  which  contains  interesting  information  for  the  bezirks-­,   kreis-­  and  ortsverbände  about  the  general  business  and  the  elections.   in  the  section  publications  there  are  documents  from  1980-­‐1990   concerning  published  items  of  the  bp.   the  section  entitled  press  and  views  contains,  above  all,  press  releases   from  the  period  1950-­‐2000.   an   important   section   is   the   elections   section.   in   this   section   one   can   consult   documents   concerning   the   regional,   national   and   european   elections  between  1940-­‐2000.   finally,  there  is  the  section  entitled  external  contacts  which  contains  the   external  communication  from  bp  during  the  period  1980-­‐2000.   studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)        |        sources   sophie  bossaert  &  tom  cobbaert  194   system  of  arrangement   the  archives  were  originally  preserved  in  binders,  but  were  reorganised   and  weeded.   the  majority  of   the  titles  on  the  binders  were  too   imprecise  or  did  not   match  the  contents.  a  substantial  effort  was  made  to  respect  the  original   order  where  possible,  based  on  the  intentions  of  the  archives  creator.     the  following  sections  have  been  created  for  the  archives  according  to  the   advn  model  scheme  for  the  archives  of  organisations:   1. general   2. governing  bodies   3. finances   4. member  administration   5. branches   6. publications   7. press  and  views   8. elections   9. external  contacts   the   sections   finances   and   branches   are   split   into   subsections:   landes-­‐,   bezirks-­‐,  kreis-­‐,  ortsverband  and  jungbayernbund.   conditions  governing  access   the  bavarian  party  archives  at  the  advn  are  registered  as  be  advn  ac884   –   bayernpartei   archives.   they   are   in   a   good   condition,   so   there   are   no   specific  requirements  in  order  to  consult  them.  however,  access  is  limited   under   general   advn   regulations   and   thus   restricted   for   non-­‐published   documents   and   files   until   thirty   years   after   creation.   for   further   studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)        |        sources   sophie  bossaert  &  tom  cobbaert   195   information  regarding  access  to  the  archives,  please  refer  to  the  staff  in  the   reading  room  and  the  reading  room  rules.     endnotes   1  this  brief  history  is  based  on  m.  zierl,  mut  zur  freiheit.  50  jahre  bayernpartei,   1946-­1996.   festschrift   (munich,   1996);   c.   van   den   abeele   &   t.   cobbaert,   ‘für   bayerns  freiheit.  de  bayernpartei  (1946-­‐heden)’,  in:  advn-­mededelingen,  no.  32   (2011)   11-­‐12.   further   literature   on   the   bayernpartei:   g.   lohmeier,   joseph   baumgartner.   ein   bayerischer   patriot   (munich,   1974);   u.   kranenpohl,   ‘bayernpartei’,   in:   f.   decker   &   v.   neu   (eds.),   handbuch   der   deutschen   parteien   (wiesbaden,   2007)   165-­‐168;   a.   mintzel,   ‘die   bayernpartei’,   in:   r.   stöss   (ed.),   parteien-­handbuch  (opladen,  1986)  vol.  2,  395-­‐489;   i.  unger,  die  bayernpartei.   geschichte  und  struktur  1945-­1957  (stuttgart,  1979);  b.  taubenberger,  licht  übers   land.   die   bayerische   viererkoalition   1954-­1957   (munich,   2002);   s.a.   vogt,   the   bayernpartei.  a  minor  german  party  in  transition  (washington,  1972);  c.  walther,   jakob   fischbacher   und   die   bayernpartei   (munich,   2005);   k.   wolf,   csu   und   bayernpartei.  ein  besonderes  konkurrenzverhältnis  (cologne,  1984).   studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)        |        sources   sophie  bossaert  &  tom  cobbaert  196   be  advn  ac884  |  bayernpartei  archives   1.  general   1/1.   documents  regarding  the  foundation  of  the  party.  1946-­‐1948.   1  volume.   1/2.   documents  regarding  party  programmes,  election   programmes  and  principle  programmes.  1946-­‐1987.  1  bundle.   1/3.   documents  regarding  licenses,  regulations,  statutes  and   association  register.  1947-­‐1979.  1  bundle.   1/4.   scrapbooks  regarding  party  activities.  1958-­‐1963.  4  volumes.   1/5.   documents  regarding  policies.  1963-­‐1995.  1  bundle.   1/6.   organisation  register  for  members  and  officials.  1977-­‐1978.  1   volume.   1/7.   documents  regarding  party  programmes,  election   programmes  and  speeches.  1980-­‐2003.  1  bundle.   1/8.   documents  regarding  party  programmes,  election   programmes  and  statutes.  1981-­‐1991.  1  folder.   1/9.   documents  regarding  party  programme,  principle   programmes,  statutes  and  budgetplanning  of  the  landtag   elections,  2003.  1981-­‐2003.  1  folder.   1/10.   documents  regarding  propaganda  materials  and  kurzprogram.   1986-­‐1994.  1  folder.   1/11.   file  concerning  the  commemoration  of  joseph  baumgartner.   1987-­‐1991.  1  folder.   1/12.   file  concerning  principle  programmes,  election  programmes   and  pamphlets.  1991-­‐1996.  1  bundle.   studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)        |        sources   sophie  bossaert  &  tom  cobbaert   197   1/13.   file  concerning  the  celebration  of  50  years  bp.  1996.  1  folder.   1/14.   file  concerning  the  reform  of  the  bavarian  senate.  1997-­‐1998.   1  bundle.   1/15.   file  concerning  the  foundation  of  the  website.  1999-­‐2001.  1   folder.     1/16.   file  concerning  the  theatrical  play  es  war  kein  mayneid   (baumgartner  drama).  2003-­‐2004.  1  folder.     2.  governing  bodies     2/1.   file  concerning  de  party  committee,  landesorganisation   (president  and  party  office)  and  party  presidency.  1948-­‐1987.   1  bundle.   2/2.   file  concerning  the  financial  committee.  1966-­‐1980.  1  folder.     2/3-­‐4.   file  concerning  the  party  administration.  1977-­‐1998.  4   bundles.     2/3.   1977-­‐1981.  2  bundles.   2/4.   1988-­‐1998.  2  bundles.       2/5.   file  concerning  the  landesleitung,  landestag  and  ministries.   1980-­‐1984.  1  folder.   2/6.   invitations  to  party  administration  meetings.  1981-­‐1987.  1   bundle.   2/7.   reports  of  the  party  administration  meetings.  1981-­‐1995.  1   bundle.     2/8.   file  concerning  the  party  office.  1982-­‐1996.  1  bundle.   studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)        |        sources   sophie  bossaert  &  tom  cobbaert  198   2/9.   documents  regarding  the  meetings  of  the  party  presidency   and  the  party  committee.  1993-­‐1996.  2  items.   2/10.   file  concerning  the  landestag  2004.  2004.  1  bundle.   2/11.   file  concerning  an  expropriation  conflict  with   autobahndirektion  nord-­bayern  und  sud-­bayern.  2004-­‐2005.  1   bundle.   3.  finances   3.1.  landesverband   3.1/1-­‐21.   journals.  1948-­‐1994.  21  volumes.   3.1/1.   may  1948  -­‐  january  1949.  1  volume.   3.1/2.   january  1950  -­‐  july  1951.  1  volume.   3.1/3.   august  1951  -­‐  june  1953.  1  volume.   3.1/4.   july  1953  -­‐  december  1954.  1  volume.   3.1/5.   january  1955  -­‐  december  1957.  1  volume.   3.1/6.   january  1958  -­‐  november  1962.  1  volume.   3.1/7.   november  1962  -­‐  february  1968.  1  volume.   3.1/8.   january  1965  -­‐  october  1967.  1  volume.   3.1/9.   october  1967  -­‐  august  1969.  1  volume.   3.1/10.   february  1968  -­‐  september  1972.  1  volume.   3.1/11.   september  1969  -­‐  march  1971.  1  volume.   3.1/12.   april  1971  -­‐  march  1972.  1  volume.   3.1/13.   march  1972  -­‐  march  1973.  1  volume.   studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)        |        sources   sophie  bossaert  &  tom  cobbaert   199   3.1/14.   march  1973  -­‐  march  1974.  1  volume.   3.1/15.   april  1974  -­‐  december  1975.  1  volume.   3.1/16.   january  1979  -­‐  february  1982.  1  volume.   3.1/17.   march  1982  -­‐  may  1985.  1  volume.   3.1/18.   june  1985  -­‐  may  1987.  1  volume.   3.1/19.   june  1987  -­‐  june  1990.  1  volume.   3.1/20.   july  1990  -­‐  february  1993.  1  volume.   3.1/21.   march  1993  -­‐  august  1994.  1  volume.     3.1/22.   cashbook  regarding  fraction.  september  1949  -­‐  july  1953.  1   volume.     3.1/23-­‐33.   cashbooks.  1950-­‐1998.  11  volumes.   3.1/23.   december  1950  -­‐  june  1951.  1  volume.   3.1/24.   january  1951  -­‐  december  1953.  1  volume.   3.1/25.   november  1953  -­‐  december  1956.  1  volume.   3.1/26.   january  1954  -­‐  december  1954.  1  volume.   3.1/27.   january  1957  -­‐  april  1961.  1  volume.   3.1/28.   march  1959  -­‐  september  1959,  april  1990  -­‐  february  2000.  1   volume.   3.1/29.   september  1959  -­‐  july  1961.  1  volume.   3.1/30.   july  1961  -­‐  december  1961.  1  volume.   3.1/31.   january  1962  -­‐  december  1964.  1  volume.   3.1/32.   january  1965  -­‐  june  1967.  1  volume.   3.1/33.   december  1998.  1  volume.   studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)        |        sources   sophie  bossaert  &  tom  cobbaert  200     3.1/34.   file  concerning  financial  arrears  of  the  föderalistische  union.   1952.  1  item.   3.1/35.   file  concerning  financial  arrears  of  the  bundestag  fraction.   1953.  1  item.       3.1/36-­‐56.   files  concerning  expenses.  1953,  1976-­‐2007.  20  bundles,  4   folders  and  4  items.   3.1/36.   1953.  1  item.   3.1/37.   1976.  1  folder.   3.1/38.   1979-­‐1982.  1  bundle.     3.1/39.   1982-­‐1988.  1  bundle.   3.1/40.   1984.  1  folder.   3.1/41.   1984-­‐1985.  1  bundle.     3.1/42.   1985-­‐1986.  1  bundle.   3.1/43.   1986-­‐1987.  1  bundle.   3.1/44.   1989-­‐1990.  1  bundle.   3.1/45.   1990-­‐1991.  1  bundle.   3.1/46.   1992-­‐1993.  2  bundles.   3.1/47.   1993-­‐1995.  2  bundles  and  1  item.   3.1/48.   1996-­‐1997.  1  bundle,  1  folder  and  1  item.     3.1/49.   1997-­‐1998.  1  bundle  and  1  item.     3.1/50.   1998-­‐1999.  1  bundle.   3.1/51.   1999.  1  bundle.   3.1/52.   1999-­‐2001.  2  bundles   studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)        |        sources   sophie  bossaert  &  tom  cobbaert   201   3.1/53.   2000-­‐2002.  1  bundle.   3.1/54.   2001.  1  bundle.   3.1/55.   2001-­‐2002.  1  bundle.   3.1/56.   2004-­‐2007.  1  folder.       3.1/57-­‐70.   invoices.  1968-­‐1999.  8  bundles  and  6  folders.   3.1/57.   1968-­‐1970.  1  folder.     3.1/58.   1973-­‐1974.  1  bundle.   3.1/59.   1974-­‐1976.  1  bundle.     3.1/60.   1976-­‐1978.  1  bundle.   3.1/61.   1978-­‐1979.  1  folder.     3.1/62.   1979-­‐1982.  1  bundle.     3.1/63.   1982-­‐1984.  1  bundle.     3.1/64.   1984-­‐1985.  1  bundle.     3.1/65.   1989-­‐1991.  1  bundle.   3.1/66.   1990-­‐1994.  1  folder.     3.1/67.   1992-­‐1997.  1  folder.   3.1/68.   1996.  1  folder.   3.1/69.   1997-­‐1998.  1  bundle.   3.1/70.   1999.  1  folder.       3.1/71-­‐73.   files  concerning  evidences  of  expenditure.  1971-­‐1984.  2   bundles  and  1  folder.   3.1/71.   1971-­‐1973.  1  bundle.   3.1/72.   1973-­‐1978.  1  bundle.   studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)        |        sources   sophie  bossaert  &  tom  cobbaert  202   3.1/73.   1984.  1  folder.     3.1/74.   file  concerning  receipts  for  ads.  1972-­‐1977.  1  bundle.     3.1/75.   file  concerning  financial  operations.  1987-­‐1996.  1  bundle.     3.1/76.   file  concerning  received  donations  and  member   reimbursements.  1993-­‐1994.  1  folder.     3.1/77.   accounts  regarding  working  year  1994.  1994-­‐1995.  1  folder.     3.1/78-­‐79.   cash  documents.  1994-­‐2001.  1  folder  and  1  item.   3.1/78.   1994.  1  item.   3.1/79.   2000.  2001.  1  folder.     3.2.  bezirksverbände   3.2.1.  münchen   3.2.1/1.   accounts  regarding  working  year  1997.  1997.  1  folder.     3.2.1/2.   financial  report  regarding  working  year  2000.  2000-­‐2001.  1   folder.     3.2.2.  niederbayern   3.2.2/1.   file  concerning  expenses.  1996.  1  folder.   3.2.2/2.   invoices.  1996-­‐1997.  1  folder.   studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)        |        sources   sophie  bossaert  &  tom  cobbaert   203   3.2.3.  oberbayern   3.2.3/1.   file  concerning  financial  reporting.  1970-­‐1975.  1  folder.   3.2.3/2.   journal.  october  1972  -­‐  march  1973.  1  volume.     3.2.3/3-­‐4.   cashbooks.  1981-­‐1998.  2  volumes.     3.2.3/3.   january  1981  -­‐  december  1982.  1  volume.   3.2.3/4.   january  1983  -­‐  december  1998.  1  volume.       3.2.3/5-­‐7.   invoices.  1983-­‐1998.  2  bundles  and  1  folder.   3.2.3/5.   1983-­‐1990.  1  bundle.     3.2.3/6.   1993.  1  folder.   3.2.3/7.   1998.  1  folder.     3.2.3/8-­‐12.  file  concerning  expenses.  1986-­‐2008.  3  bundels  and  2  folders.   3.2.3/8.   1986.  1  folder.   3.2.3/9.   1989-­‐2008.  1  bundle.   3.2.3/10.   1991-­‐1995.  1  folder.   3.2.3/11.   1993-­‐1995.  1  bundle.   3.2.3/12.   2001.  1  bundle.     3.2.3/13.   file  concerning  financial  operations.  1991-­‐1993.  1  bundle.   3.2.3/14.   financial  report.  2000.  1  folder.   3.2.4.  oberfranken   studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)        |        sources   sophie  bossaert  &  tom  cobbaert  204   3.2.4/1.   capital  account.  1995.  1  item.   3.2.4/2.   file  concerning  expenses.  1997.  1  folder.     3.2.4/3-­‐4.   documents  regarding  annual  accounts.  2000-­‐2001.  2  folders.     3.2.4/3.     2000.  1  folder.     3.2.4/4.     2001.  2001-­‐2002.  1  folder.   3.2.5.  oberpfalz   3.2.5/1.   file  concerning  financial  operations.  1991-­‐1993.  3  items.   3.2.5/2.   accounts.  1994.  1  item.   3.2.5/3.   cash  documents.  1998.  1  item.     3.2.5/4-­‐5.   financial  reports.  2000-­‐2002.  2  folders.     3.2.5/4.   2000.  1  folder.     3.2.5/5.   2001.  2001-­‐2002.  1  folder.     3.2.5/6.     file  concerning  expenses.  2001-­‐2002.  1  folder.   3.2.6.  schwaben   3.2.6/1.   file  concerning  financial  operations.  1991-­‐1993.  3  items.     3.2.6/2-­‐3.   file  concerning  expenses.  1997-­‐2000.  2  folders.   3.2.6/2.   1997.  1  folder.   3.2.6/3.   2000.  1  folder.   studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)        |        sources   sophie  bossaert  &  tom  cobbaert   205   3.2.7.  unterfranken   3.2.7/1.   financial  report.  1996-­‐1999.  1  folder.   3.3.  kreisverbände   3.3.1.  altötting   3.3.1/1.   financial  report.  1993-­‐1996.  1  folder.   3.3.1/2.   invoices.  1993-­‐1998.  1  folder.   3.3.1/3.   cashbook.  march  1993  -­‐  december  1999.  1  volume.   3.3.2.  münchen   3.3.2/1.   capital  account.  1997.  1  volume.   3.3.2/2.   receipt  book.  1997-­‐1998.  2  volumes.   3.3.2/3.   spending  book.  1997-­‐1998.  2  volumes.     3.3.2/4-­‐5.   files  concerning  expenses.  1997-­‐1998.  2  folders.   3.3.2/4.   1997.  1  folder.   3.3.2/5.   1998.  1  folder.       3.3.2/6.   accounts  1997-­‐1998.  1997-­‐1999.  1  folder.   3.3.3.  rosenheim   3.3.3/1-­‐2.   cashbooks.  1979-­‐2002.  2  volumes.   studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)        |        sources   sophie  bossaert  &  tom  cobbaert  206   3.3.3/1.   1979-­‐2000.  1  volume.   3.3.3/2.   2000-­‐2002.  1  volume.       3.3.3/3-­‐4.   invoices.  1998-­‐2002.  2  folders.   3.3.3/3.   1998-­‐1999.  1  folder.   3.3.3/4.   1999-­‐2002.  1  folder.     3.3.3/5.   financial  report.  1999-­‐2000.  1  folder.   3.3.4.  starnberg   3.3.4/1.   annual  accounts.  1998-­‐2000.  1  item.   3.3.5.  traunstein   3.3.5/1.   file  concerning  expenses.  1996.  1  folder.     3.3.6.  würzburg   3.3.6/1.   financial  report.  1996-­‐1999.  1  folder.     3.4.  ortsverbände   3.4.1.  diessen   3.4.1/1.   financial  report.  2000.  1  item.   studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)        |        sources   sophie  bossaert  &  tom  cobbaert   207   3.4.2.  kaufbeuren   3.4.2/1.   file  concerning  settlement  of  party  payments.  1996.  1  folder.   3.4.3.  moorsburg   3.4.3/1-­‐2.   financial  reports.  1999-­‐2001.  1  folder  and  1  item.   3.4.3/1.   1999.  1  folder.   3.4.3/2.   2000-­‐2001.  1  item.   3.5.  jungbayernbund   3.5/1.   bank  statements.  1998-­‐2006.  1  bundle.     4.  member  administration   4/1-­‐5.   files  concerning  membership  payment.  1974-­‐1994.  6  bundles   and  4  folders.   4/1.   1974-­‐1991  (quarterly).  1  bundle  and  1  folder.   4/2.   1977-­‐1991  (monthly).  3  bundles.   4/3.   1978-­‐1990  (yearly).  2  bundles.   4/4.   1979-­‐1990  (half-­‐yearly).  1  folder.   4/5.   1982-­‐1994.  2  folders.     4/6-­‐8.   statistics  regarding  membership  lists.  1978-­‐1995.  1  bundle   and  2  folders.   4/6.   1978-­‐1993.  1  bundle.   studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)        |        sources   sophie  bossaert  &  tom  cobbaert  208   4/7.   1987-­‐1991.  1  folder.   4/8.   1991-­‐1995.  1  folder.     4/9-­‐19.   membership  lists.  1978-­‐2000.  3  bundles  and  8  folders.     4/9.   1978-­‐1984.  1  bundle.   4/10.   1985-­‐1990  (yearly).  1  folder.   4/11.   1986-­‐1990  (half-­‐yearly).  1  folder.     4/12.   1986-­‐1990  (quarterly).  1  folder.   4/13.   1987-­‐1989  (oberbayern).  1  folder.   4/14.   1990-­‐1994.  1  bundle.   4/15.   1993.  1  folder.   4/16.   1995.  1  folder.   4/17.   1996.  1  folder.   4/18.   1999.  1  folder.   4/19.   1999-­‐2000.  1  bundle.     4/20-­‐23.   financial  reports  regarding  the  member  administration.  1981-­‐ 1994.  1  bundle  and  3  folders.   4/20.   1981-­‐1994.  1  bundle.   4/21.   1982-­‐1984  (kreisverband  münchen).  1  folder.   4/22.   1985  (kreisverband  rosenheim).  1985-­‐1986.  1  folder.   4/23.   1992-­‐1993.  1  folder.     4/24-­‐26.   files  concerning  membership  changes.  1984-­‐1999.  1  bundle   and  2  folders.   studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)        |        sources   sophie  bossaert  &  tom  cobbaert   209   4/24.   1991-­‐1993.  1  folder.   4/25.   1984-­‐1994.  1  bundle.   4/26.   1998-­‐1999  (stadtverband  rosenheim).  1  folder.     4/27-­‐28.   files  concerning  membership  termination.  1990-­‐1994.  4   bundles.   4/27.   1990.  1  bundle.   4/28.   1991-­‐1994.  3  bundles.     4/29.   file  concerning  membership  fee  reminders.  1991-­‐1992.  1   bundle.     4/30-­‐31.   files  concerning  membership  application.  1991-­‐1994.  1   bundle  and  1  folder.   4/30.   1991-­‐1992.  1  bundle.   4/31.   1994.  1  folder.   5.  branches   5.1.  bezirksverbände   5.1.1.  franken   5.1.1/1-­‐5.   files  concerning  branch  operations.  1919-­‐2006.  8  bundles  and   2  folders.   studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)        |        sources   sophie  bossaert  &  tom  cobbaert  210   5.1.1/1.   1919-­‐1987  (oberfranken).  3  bundles  and  1  folder.   5.1.1/2.   1985-­‐2006.  2  bundles.   5.1.1/3.   1987-­‐1998.  2  bundles.   5.1.1/4.   1990-­‐2001.  1  bundle.   5.1.1/5.   1993-­‐1997.  1  folder.   5.1.2.  niederbayern   5.1.2/1.   file  concerning  branch  operations.  1987-­‐2007.  1  bundle.   5.1.3.  oberbayern   5.1.3/1-­‐3.   files  concerning  branch  operations.  1984-­‐1993.  1  bundle  and   2  folders.   5.1.3/1.   1984-­‐1988.  1  bundle.   5.1.3/2.   1984-­‐1990.  1  folder.   5.1.3/3.   1993.  1  folder.   5.1.4.  oberpfalz   5.1.4/1-­‐3.   files  concerning  branch  operations.  1973-­‐2003.  6  bundles.   5.1.4/1.   1973-­‐1994.  3  bundles.   5.1.4/2.   1992-­‐1997.  1  bundle.   5.1.4/3.   1997-­‐2003.  2  bundles.   5.1.5.  schwaben   5.1.5/1-­‐2.   file  concerning  branch  operations.  1982-­‐2010.  3  bundles.     studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)        |        sources   sophie  bossaert  &  tom  cobbaert   211   5.1.5/1.   1982-­‐2010.  2  bundles.   5.1.5/2.   1995-­‐2007.  1  bundle.   5.2.  kreisverbände   5.2.1.  bamberg   5.2.1/1.   file  concerning  branch  operations.  1956-­‐2005.  1  folder.   5.2.2.  bayreuth   5.2.2/1.   meeting  reports.  1951-­‐1956.  1  folder.     5.2.3.  cham   5.2.3/1.     file  concerning  branch  operations.  1996-­‐1998.  1  bundle.   5.2.4.  dachau   5.2.4/1.   report  party  committee  meetings.  1997.  1  item.   5.2.5.  hof   5.2.5/1.   file  concerning  branch  operations.  1948-­‐1960.  1  folder.     5.2.6.  kelheim   5.2.6/1.   file  concerning  branch  operations.  1979-­‐1987.  1  bundle.   studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)        |        sources   sophie  bossaert  &  tom  cobbaert  212   5.2.7.  kulmbach     5.2.7/1.   file  concerning  branch  operations.  1939-­‐1958.  1  bundle.   5.2.8.  münchen   5.2.8/1-­‐2.   file  concerning  branch  operations.  1963-­‐2008.  3  bundles  and   2  folders.   5.2.8/1.   1963.  1  folder.   5.2.8/2.   1983-­‐2008.  3  bundles  and  1  folder.     5.2.8/3.   correspondence  regarding  the  division  of  the  stadtbezirkes.   1996.  1  item.   5.2.9.  regensburg   5.2.9/1-­‐3.   files  concerning  branch  operations.  1982-­‐1997.  4  bundles  and   2  folders.   5.2.9/1.   1982-­‐1991.  1  bundle.   5.2.9/2.   1989-­‐1994.  2  bundles.     5.2.9/3.   1994-­‐1997.  1  bundle  and  2  folders.   5.2.10.  rosenheim   5.2.10/1.   file  concerning  branch  operations.  1995-­‐2000.  1  folder.   5.2.11.  schwandorf   5.2.11/1.   file  concerning  branch  operations.  1996.  1  folder.   studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)        |        sources   sophie  bossaert  &  tom  cobbaert   213   5.3.  ortsverbände   5.3.1.  arzberg   5.3.1/1.   file  concerning  branch  operations.  1949-­‐1957.  1  bundle.   5.3.2.  münchberg   5.3.2/1.   file  concerning  branch  operations.  1948-­‐1958.  1  bundle.   5.3.3.  neustadt   5.3.3/1.   file  concerning  branch  operations.  1980-­‐1984.  1  bundle.   5.3.4.  pegnitz   5.3.4/1.   file  concerning  branch  operations.  1948-­‐1959.  1  folder.   5.3.5.  wunsiedel   5.3.5/1.   file  concerning  branch  operations.  1948-­‐1960.  1  folder.   5.3.6.  würzburg   5.3.6/1-­‐2.   file  concerning  branch  operations.  1982-­‐1993.  2  bundles.   5.3.6/1.   1982-­‐1986.  1  bundle.   5.3.6/2.   1993.  1  bundle.   studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)        |        sources   sophie  bossaert  &  tom  cobbaert  214   5.4.  jungbayernbund   5.4/1.   meeting  reports.  1981-­‐1989.  1  bundle.   5.4/2.   file  concerning  branch  operations  ortsverband  jura.  1994-­‐ 1998.  1  folder.   6.  publications   6/1.   file  concerning  subscriptions,  publication  and  orders  of  weiss-­ blaue  oberpfalz  magazine.  1978-­‐1981.  1  bundle.   6/2.   correspondence  regarding  the  shipment  of  freies  bayern   magazine.  1983-­‐1989.  1  bundle.   6/3.   correspondence  regarding  the  publication  and  orders  of  freies   bayern  magazine.  1984-­‐1987.  1  bundle.   6/4.   correspondence  regarding  subscription  and  editing  of  freies   bayern  magazine.  1982-­‐2006.  1  bundle.     6/5.   file  concerning  freies  bayern  publishing  house.  1986-­‐1991.  1   bundle.   6/6.   documents  regarding  the  publication  about  prof.  dr.  joseph   baumgartner.  1989.  1  volume.   6/7.   file  concerning  the  publication  of  bp  magazines.  1990-­‐1991.  1   bundle.     6/8.   correspondence  regarding  subscription  and  editing  of  freies   bayern  magazine.  1991-­‐1993.  1  folder.   6/9.   file  concerning  the  publication  of  the  festschrift  regarding  50   years  bp.  1996-­‐1998.  1  bundle.     studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)        |        sources   sophie  bossaert  &  tom  cobbaert   215   7.  press  and  views   7/1-­‐9.   files  concerning  speeches  by  party  officials.  1948-­‐1999.  10   bundles.     7/1.   1948-­‐1955.  1  bundle.   7/2.   1950-­‐1962.  1  bundle.     7/3.   1978-­‐1980.  1  bundle.     7/4.   1979-­‐1982.  1  bundle.     7/5.   1979-­‐1990.  1  bundle.     7/6.   1980-­‐1985.  1  bundle.     7/7.   1980-­‐1999.  2  bundles.     7/8.   1983-­‐1988.  1  bundle.     7/9.   1986-­‐1987.  1  bundle.       7/10-­‐24.   files  concerning  press  releases.  1952-­‐2001.  15  bundles  and  1   folder.   7/10.   1952-­‐1956.  1  folder.   7/11.   1978-­‐1979.  1  bundle.   7/12.   1984-­‐1986.  1  bundle.   7/13.   1986-­‐1987.  1  bundle.   7/14.   1988.  1  bundle.   7/15.   1988-­‐1989.  1  bundle.   7/16.   1990.  2  bundles.     7/17.   1991.  1  bundle.     7/18.   1992.  1  bundle.   7/19.   1992-­‐1994.  1  bundle.   studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)        |        sources   sophie  bossaert  &  tom  cobbaert  216   7/20.   1995.  1  bundle.   7/21.   1996.  1  bundle.   7/22.   1996-­‐1998.  1  bundle.   7/23.   1999.  1  bundle.   7/24.   2000-­‐2001.  1  bundle.     7/25.   file  concerning  press  releases  of  the  arbeitskreises  innere   sicherheit  and  sozialpolitik.  1992-­‐1993.  1  folder.     8.  elections   8.1.  general   8.1/1.   file  concerning  election  results.  1946-­‐1990.  1  bundle.   [contains:  landtag  1946,  landtag  1970,  landtag  1974,   landtag  1978,  landtag  and  bezirkstag  1978,  european   parliament  and  communal  1979,  bundestag  1980,  landtag  and   bezirkstag  1982,  landtag  and  bundestag  1983,  european   parliament  1984,  landtag  1986,  bundestag  1987,  european   parliament  1989,  landtag  and  bundestag  1990]   8.1/2.   file  concerning  the  constitutional  complaint  against  the   elections  and  investigation  of  the  reimbursement  of  election   campaigns  by  the  federal  constitutional  court.  1966-­‐1988.  1   bundle.     [contains:  bundestag  1983,  landtag  1984,  landtag  and   communal  1968]   studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)        |        sources   sophie  bossaert  &  tom  cobbaert   217   8.1/3.   file  concerning  election  results.  1966-­‐1990.  1  bundle.   [contains:  landtag,  bezirkstag  and  european  parliament  1966-­‐ 1984,  landtag  1978,  landtag  1982,  communal  1984,  landrat   1984,  kreistag  1984,  european  parliament  1984,  landtag  and   bezirkstag  1986,  communal  1987,  landtag  and  bezirkstag   1990]   8.1/4.   file  concerning  elections  programme  leaflets,  1978-­‐2004.   2005.  1  folder.   8.1/5.   file  concerning  certificates  of  election  participation.  1988-­‐ 2007.  1  folder.   8.1/6.   file  concerning  report  on  the  constitutionality  of  the  bavarian   election  rights  (wahlvorschlagsrechts).  2005.  1  folder.   8.2.  european  parliament   8.2/1.   file  concerning  the  european  elections  of  1984.  1978-­‐1984.  1   bundle.   8.2/2.   file  concerning  the  european  elections  of  1984  and  1989.   1984-­‐1989.  1  bundle.     8.2/3.   file  concerning  the  european  elections  of  1989.  1988-­‐1989.  2   bundles.   8.2/4.   file  concerning  support  petitions  for  the  european  elections  of   1989.  1988.  1  bundle.   8.2/5.   file  concerning  the  communal  and  urban  posting  of  campaign   posters  for  the  european  elections  of  1989.  1989.  1  bundle.   8.2/6.   file  concerning  the  european  elections  1989,  1999  and  2004.   1989-­‐2004.  1  bundle.   8.2/7.   file  concerning  the  communal  and  urban  posting  of  campaign   posters  for  the  european  elections  of  1994.  1994.  1  bundle.     studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)        |        sources   sophie  bossaert  &  tom  cobbaert  218   8.2/8.   file  concerning  support  petitions  for  the  european  elections  of   1994.  1994.  1  bundle  and  1  folder.   8.2/9.   file  concerning  election  propaganda,  programme  and  results   of  the  european  elections  of  1994  and  1999.  1994-­‐1999.  1   folder.   8.2/10.   file  concerning  the  european  elections  of  1999.  1999.  1   bundle.     8.3.  national     8.3/1.   file  concerning  the  bundestag  elections.  1952-­‐1987.  1  bundle.   [contains:  bundestag  1953,  bundestag  1962,  bundestag  1969,   bundestag  1976  and  bundestag  1987]     8.3/2.   file  concerning  the  bundestag  elections  of  1957.  1957.  1   bundle.   8.3/3.   file  concerning  support  petitions  for  the  elections.  1982-­‐1990.   1  folder.   [contains:  bundestag  1982,  european  parliament  1984,   bundestag  1990]   8.3/4.   file  concerning  elections.  1984-­‐1989.  1  bundle.   [contains:  bundestag  and  kreistag  1986,  landtag  1988  and   european  parliament  1989]   8.3/5.   file  concerning  bundestag  elections  of  1987.  1986-­‐1987.  1   bundle.   8.3/6.   documents  regarding  the  chair  of  the  german  bundestag  on   the  rechtenschaftsbericht  of  political  parties.  1991-­‐1994.  6   volumes.     studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)        |        sources   sophie  bossaert  &  tom  cobbaert   219   8.3/7.   file  concerning  the  bundestag  elections  of  2005.  2005-­‐2007.  1   bundle.   8.4.  regional     8.4.1.  general     8.4.1/1.   file  concerning  the  communal  and  urban  posting  of  campaign   posters  for  the  landtag  and  bezirkstag  elections  of  1990.   1990.  1  bundle.   8.4.1/2.   file  concerning  the  bundestag  and  landtag  elections  of  1990.   1990.  1  folder.     8.4.2.  mittelfranken   8.4.2/*.   file  concerning  the  bundestag,  landtag  and  bezirkstag   elections  of  1982  in  oberbayern,  oberpfalz,  niederbayern,   mittelfranken  and  unterfranken.  1980-­‐1982.  1  bundle.     [see:  8.4.6/1.]     8.4.2/*.   file  concerning  the  landtag  and  bezirkstag  elections  of  1982   and  1986  in  oberpfalz,  mittelfranken  and  unterfranken.  1982-­‐ 1986.  1  bundle.     [see:  8.4.6/2.]   8.4.3.  niederbayern   studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)        |        sources   sophie  bossaert  &  tom  cobbaert  220   8.4.3/*.   file  concerning  the  bundestag,  landtag  and  bezirkstag   elections  of  1982  in  oberbayern,  oberpfalz,  niederbayern,   mittelfranken  and  unterfranken.  1980-­‐1982.  1  bundle.     [see:  8.4.6/1.]   8.4.4.  oberbayern   8.4.4/*.   file  concerning  the  bundestag,  landtag  and  bezirkstag   elections  of  1982  in  oberbayern,  oberpfalz,  niederbayern,   mittelfranken  and  unterfranken.  1980-­‐1982.  1  bundle.     [see:  8.4.6/1.]   8.4.5.  oberfranken   8.4.5/1.   file  concerning  the  elections.  1950-­‐1986.  1  bundle.   [contains:  landtag  and  bezirkstag  1950,  landtag  and   bezirkstag  1954,  landtag  and  bezirkstag  1958,  landtag  and   bezirkstag  1962,  landtag  and  bezirkstag  1966,  landtag  and   bezirkstag  1970,  landtag  and  bezirkstag  1974,  landtag  and   bezirkstag  1978,  landtag  and  bezirkstag  1982  and  landtag   and  bezirkstag  1986]   8.4.5/2.   file  concerning  the  landtag  and  bezirkstag  elections  of  1994.   1992-­‐1997.  1  bundle.   8.4.6.  oberpfalz   8.4.6/1.   file  concerning  the  bundestag,  landtag  and  bezirkstag   elections  of  1982  in  oberbayern,  oberpfalz,  niederbayern,   mittelfranken  and  unterfranken.  1980-­‐1982.  1  bundle.   studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)        |        sources   sophie  bossaert  &  tom  cobbaert   221   8.4.6/2.   file  concerning  the  landtag  and  bezirkstag  elections  of  1982   and  1986  in  oberpfalz,  mittelfranken  and  unterfranken.  1982-­‐ 1986.  1  bundle.   8.4.6/3.   file  concerning  the  bundestag,  landtag  and  bezirkstag   elections  of  1990.  1990.  1  bundle.   8.4.6/4.   file  concerning  the  landtag  and  bezirkstag  elections  of  1994.   1994.  1  bundle.   8.4.6/5.   file  concerning  the  bundestag,  landtag  and  bezirkstag   elections  of  1998.  1998.  1  bundle.   8.4.7.  unterfranken   8.4.7/*.   file  concerning  the  bundestag,  landtag  and  bezirkstag   elections  of  1982  in  oberbayern,  oberpfalz,  niederbayern,   mittelfranken  and  unterfranken.  1980-­‐1982.  1  bundle.     [see:  8.4.6/1.]     8.4.7/*.   file  concerning  the  landtag  and  bezirkstag  elections  of  1982   and  1986  in  oberpfalz,  mittelfranken  and  unterfranken.  1982-­‐ 1986.  1  bundle.     [see:  8.4.6/2.]   8.5.  local   8.5.1.  münchen   8.5.1/1.   file  concerning  the  stadtrat  elections.  1995-­‐1996.  1  folder.     studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)        |        sources   sophie  bossaert  &  tom  cobbaert  222   8.5.2.  regensburg     8.5.2/1.   documents  regarding  the  communal  elections  of  1991.  1981-­‐ 1993.  1  bundle.   8.5.2/2.   file  concerning  the  communal  elections  of  1984.  1983-­‐1984.  1   bundle.     8.5.2/3.   file  concerning  the  communal  elections  of  1990.  1990.  1   bundle.   8.5.2/4.   file  concerning  the  communal  elections  of  2002  and  2008.   2001-­‐2008.  1  bundle.     8.5.2/5-­‐6.   file  concerning  the  electoral  campaigns  of  florian  weber.   2003-­‐2009.  2  bundles.   8.5.2/5.   2003-­‐2007.  1  bundle.   8.5.2/6.   2007-­‐2009.  1  bundle.   9.  external  contacts   9/1-­‐6.   correspondence.  1948-­‐1990.  6  folders.   9/1.   georg  bantele.  1948-­‐1961.  1  folder.   9/2.   dr.  sturm.  1951-­‐1957.  1  folder.   9/3.   otto  schreck.  1955-­‐1966.  1  folder.     9/4.   dr.  hans  weinzierl.  1979-­‐1984.  1  folder.     9/5.   hanns  siegert.  1980-­‐1982.  1  folder.     9/6.   ernst  umbach.  1980-­‐1990.  1  folder.       studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)        |        sources   sophie  bossaert  &  tom  cobbaert   223   9/7.   file  concerning  bayerische  staatspartei  (bsp)  and  the   collaboration  with  the  europäische  föderalistische  partei   (efp).  1978-­‐1986.  1  bundle.   9/8.   correspondence  with  other  german  parties.  1981-­‐2000.  1   bundle.   9/9.   file  concerning  documentation  and  information  requests   about  the  bp.  1984-­‐1994.  5  bundles  and  1  folder.   9/10.   file  concerning  collaboration  with  the  die  republikaner  party   of  franz  handlos.  1985-­‐1989.  1  folder.   9/11.   file  concerning  circular  letter  of  the  bp.  1991-­‐1992.  1  bundle.     9/12.   correspondence  with  other  regionalist  parties.  1991-­‐1994.  1   folder.     9/13.   correspondence  with  german  associations  and  other  parties.   1994.  1  bundle.   9/14.   file  concerning  incoming  and  outgoing  faxes  of  the  bp.  2000-­‐ 2003.  1  bundle.   the dilemma of dual loyalty. werner hasselblatt and the rise and failure of baltic german minority politics in the inter-war period jörg hackmann szczecin / greifswald german minority politics in the baltic states during the inter-war period has regained significant scholarly attention since the 1990s, when the estonian concept of cultural autonomy from 1925 was rediscovered as a strategy for solving post 1989 minority conflicts as well as addressing issues of multiculturality. the case of the baltic german politician werner hasselblatt, who is in the focus of this text, however, reveals a janus-faced political approach: on the one hand, he had a significant share in the implementation of the law on cultural autonomy in estonia, and he was also a major actor within the congress of european nationalities. on the other hand, from 1933 onwards hasselblatt turned into an expert of nazi resettlement and population politics, contrary to his earlier positions. here, a critical analysis of his approach towards loyalty is undertaken, in order to discuss the tilting point in his political activities. my argument is that his attitude towards loyalty was based on the assumption of an irreconcilable conflict of dual loyalty to the ‘host’ state and the ‘kin’ nation. whereas hasselblatt regarded loyalty to german volkstum not as a matter of individual choice for baltic germans and thus as not negotiable, he saw loyalty towards the estonian state as connected to the fulfilment of the german minority’s political claims. such an instrumental approach towards loyalty together with hasselblatt’s primordial understanding of nationality in contrast to citizenship may be identified as crucial issues that led his concept of constructive minority politics tilt towards the destructive notion of ‘dissimilation’. keywords: national minorities, loyalty, estonia, cultural autonomy, baltic germans studies on national movements 7 (2021) | articles | 2 jörg hackmann introduction baltic german minority politics during the inter-war period, which had been formed after estonia and latvia emerged as independent states from the russian empire in the aftermath of the first world war, was a largely forgotten issue during the cold war. it has re-gained significant scholarly attention, however, since the 1990s, when the estonian concept of cultural autonomy was rediscovered as a strategy for solving post-1989 minority conflicts as well as addressing issues of multiculturality.1 even if one leaves the question aside to what degree such a reference to the past could be used for solving contemporary political issues,2 the biography of the baltic-german journalist and politician paul schiemann (1876-1944)3 from latvia provided a positive image of liberal, non-nationalist minority politics and a counternarrative against völkisch irredentism, which finally led to the resettlement of the baltic germans in 1939-1940. studies of schiemann’s fellowmen in minority politics, ewald ammende (1893-1936) and werner hasselblatt (1890-1958) from estonia, however, have revealed indications for such a proximity to nazi politics.4 in the claim by erhard kroeger, the leading nazi representative among the german minority in latvia, that he suggested heinrich himmler the evacuation of the baltic germans in october 1939,5 one may see an evidence for the final failure of baltic-german minority politics. the resettlement of the germans from the baltic states thus raises the question of inter-connection: can baltic-german minority politics be separated from the resettlement and connected to such a counterfactual hypothesis that under different historical circumstances the estonian model of cultural autonomy could have expanded its international relevance by being adopted in other states as well?6 or should one hold an attitude of ‘emotional obstructionism instead of intelligent adaptation’7 – to refer to leo lundin’s thesis formulated under fresh impressions from the second studies on national movements 7 (2021) | articles jörg hackmann 3 | world war – among the baltic germans in estonia and latvia accountable? the concept of loyalty will be used here as an analytical tool in order to discuss these questions. loyalty here is not understood as a normative concept of describing the relations between a state and its citizens or inhabitants, but as a term that encompasses multi-level relations between social groups and institutions.8 referring to albert hirschman’s influential study,9 loyalty may be understood in the context of national minorities as one form of action besides protest and emigration. in the context of national minorities in the baltic region, here understood as the territories of the estonian and latvian state, loyalty focuses on dispositions of acceptance of the new political order and on practices of integration and participation. this paper will concentrate on the baltic german minority politician werner hasselblatt and his role in shaping minority politics in estonia in the inter-war period as well as population politics in nazi germany. however, this paper does not intend to reiterate the facts on estonian minority politics in detail, which have already been presented and discussed elsewhere.10 nor will it delve deeply into the biography of werner hasselblatt,11 but focus at the most obvious facts of his janus-faced political approach. on the one hand, he was the leading politician among the baltic german minority to implement and promote the law on cultural autonomy in estonia in 1925 and also a major actor in establishing the ‘congress of the organised national groups in the states of europe’, later known as congress of european nationalities, in the same year.12 on the other hand, he also pursued a diverging agenda of cooperation with berlin as well as german volkstum organizations in order to coordinate politics towards german minorities in eastern europe, even before he became a legal advisor to the german minorities in berlin in 1931. finally, he turned into an expert in resettlement politics who could be counted to the ‘vordenker der studies on national movements 7 (2021) | articles | 4 jörg hackmann vernichtung’, to quote the well-known term by götz aly and susanne heim.13 the main aim of this text is to identify in baltic german minority politics fault lines and tilting points between practices based on loyalty and obstructive strategies with regard to the post-1918 states. i will concentrate mainly on estonia and werner hasselblatt here, but include connections to the situation in latvia. in order to discuss these issues, i focus first on the legacy of pre-world war i politics, second on the issue of loyalty in post-war estonia, and then address constructive and deconstructive features in werner hasselblatt’s approach towards minority politics. in the conclusions it will be argued that his instrumental approach towards loyalty, focusing only on the interests of the minority, was crucial for the turn from constructive minority politics towards destructive german nationalities politics. the first point to be addressed refers to the question of path-dependency or the legacy of german minority politics going back to the pre-1914 period. some authors, partly with a baltic german background in the inter-war period, have regarded the deutsche vereine, which existed between 1905/06 and 1914, as a predecessor of german minority politics.14 there was, however, not a direct organizational connection for several reasons. first, these associations were formed under the still restrictive rules of the tsarist empire after the revolution of 1905, and they did not reappear after their forced dissolution by the tsarist authorities in august 1914, neither under german occupation of the region nor in the new states after the war.15 the reasons for this discontinuation could still receive further attention, but there are at least two tentative explanations: first, the enthusiasm of the revolutionary period that drove baltic germans into a rather spontaneous social mass movement did not replace earlier structures of sociability and diminished already before 1914, before seeing only a short revival during the war, when the german army occupied riga in september studies on national movements 7 (2021) | articles jörg hackmann 5 | 1917.16 second, a major issue of these deutsche vereine – apart from the maintaining of german-language schools – was the struggle with the politics of russification, which had lost its relevance after 1915, when the german army established the military administration of ober ost. nevertheless, one thread of continuation may be identified. as gert von pistohlkors has argued already in 1972,17 the revolution of 1905 marked the beginning of a process of the baltic germans’ transition from the leading class to a national minority. despite the fact that they undisputedly formed an ethnic or linguistic minority in quantitative terms, they were convinced to constitute not a “minor” but the culturally hegemonic group in the region. thus, the idea behind the formation of the deutsche vereine to transform the baltic germans into a coherent national group that levelled previous social distinctions, met with strong mental reservations among their elites, who were unwilling to accept this change, before and after the first world war. having noticed this mental resistance of adapting to the social and political dynamics that led to the loss of the leading social position raises the issue of loyalty as a crucial aspect. in general, loyalty to the tsar was shaped by the notion of traditional faithfulness and had not been fundamentally shattered among the baltic germans until 1917, 18 although some, in particular in courland and in riga, during the first world war saw an option to have the region incorporated into the german reich.19 at the end of the war such plans, however, quickly collapsed and another problem emerged: the threat of a bolshevist occupation of the region. in estonia, which had come under german occupation only in february 1918, during the interruption of the peace negotiations in brest-litovsk, the military situation after the collapse of the kaiserreich brought the baltic germans to a cooperation with the estonian salvation committee under konstantin päts. the agreement of 26 november 1918 about establishing a voluntary regiment – the baltenregiment – tackled with the problem of loyalty in two respects: it studies on national movements 7 (2021) | articles | 6 jörg hackmann not only signalled baltic german acceptance of the new estonian authorities they had not recognized before, but also addressed the distrust and fear among estonians of a german separatism, hence the absence of loyalty.20 different from the baltische landeswehr in latvia, which directly intervened in political struggles when unseating the latvian government of kārlis ulmanis in april 1919, the baltenregiment in estonia remained a military, non-political formation. whereas its contribution to defending the ‘heimat’ was emphatically praised in baltic german discourse, estonian attitudes instead remained ambivalent.21 the perception and the discursive use of loyalty clearly differed. whereas the german praise of the baltenregiment was meant as a proof of loyalty to the new power that should lead to political participation in the post-war order, the estonian public remained sceptical towards the reliability of the former hegemons. but even if perceptions of loyalty differed, there are indications that, even after the battle with the baltische landeswehr at cēsis in june 1919, the estonian government’s estimation of the baltenregiment’s loyalty did not change fundamentally.22 political interactions between baltic germans and estonians based on expectations and declarations of loyalty, however, reach back to the beginnings of estonian statehood. a baltic german representative, the lawyer max woldemar bock, participated in the provisional diet of the autonomous province of estonia after the february revolution (maapäev) in 1917-1919, although the ritterschaft rejected cooperation and there were still competing baltic german political projects.23 in december 1918, a german party formed first as deutsche partei in estland and then as deutsch-baltische partei led by the tallinn journalist christoph mickwitz, who had already been a leading figure in the deutsche verein in estland.24 bock and two other baltic german representatives, herrmann koch and johannes meyer, participated in the estonian constitutional assembly (asutav kogu) in 1919-1920. studies on national movements 7 (2021) | articles jörg hackmann 7 | however, the baltic-german party abstained from reaffirming estonian independence in june 1919. against the mistrust stimulated by this position, bock acknowledged the estonian republic in a speech on 29 august 1919.25 this german reluctance re-appeared in 1920, when the party also abstained from approving the constitution, although werner hasselblatt in 1929 claimed that the party must be credited for successfully bringing minority protection into the draft constitution.26 the fault line for the baltic germans had become the agrarian reform of october 1919 in estonia. it comprised more than 50% of agricultural land, which had been in the hands of about 1,200 (mostly baltic-german) noble landowners and was put first under state ownership, with c. 50% then subsequently distributed to already existing or newly created estonian farmsteads. initially, no compensation for the landowners was foreseen, and they could only apply for getting back 50 hectares of their land. only in 1926 a modest compensation law was agreed upon by the parliament.27 as a result of emigration and the social-economic change accompanying the agrarian reform, the baltic germans in estonia underwent a deep social and economic change after 1918. they turned into a more urban group, with urban professionals instead of noble landowners now beginning to dominate the political life of the baltic germans, a significant difference to the situation before 1914. however, there were also signs of political and cultural adaptation to the new situation. on a cultural level, arnold hasselblatt, a journalist from tartu and father of werner, has to be mentioned: under his presidency the learned estonian society (õpetatud eesti selts) in tartu revoked the prewar attempt to change the focus of the society from estonian language and culture to the german history of the baltic region, and the society subsequently became the predecessor of the estonian academy of sciences.28 political cooperation of the baltic germans continued in the first legislative period of the parliament (riigikogu), when four studies on national movements 7 (2021) | articles | 8 jörg hackmann representatives of the baltic-german party were elected. in the second riigikogu, the baltic-german party received three seats, with the number shrinking to two from 1926 to 1935, in later years as part of a germanswedish election group. in 1923, werner hasselblatt, who had been working as a lawyer after the war, took one of the seats of the balticgerman party and remained a member of parliament until 1932. according to the studies by raimo raag, hasselblatt became the most active non-estonian parliamentarian with more than 350 statements (of 881 altogether made by minority representatives) in estonian and german language during his tenures.29 the exact distribution of german and estonian language use in hasselblatt’s statements is not given by raag, but based on his general figures, they must have been predominantly in estonian.30 raag also indicates that the use of language among those non-estonian members of parliament, who spoke estonian, depended on which audience they were addressing.31 when turning to the implementation of cultural autonomy for the national minorities in estonia, the question was raised several times, why it took until 1925 to pass the law. given the initial declaration to guarantee national minority rights in estonia already in the declaration of independence from 24 february 1918, an argument often brought forward is that among ethnic estonians a negative attitude towards baltic germans kept prevailing,32 also after the defeat of the bolshevists and the landeswehr and the implementation of the agrarian reform in 1919. thus, anti-german voices met those arguing that the agrarian reform could only be introduced as expropriation without compensation in order to avoid revolution among the peasants.33 parliamentary negotiations about the implementation of cultural autonomy proved to be complicated due to several reasons: a lack of legal models, the internationalisation of minority issues at the level of the league of nations, the reluctance of leading estonian politicians to introduce minority protection, and the german protest against the studies on national movements 7 (2021) | articles jörg hackmann 9 | agrarian reform. a general agreement between the people’s party of jaan tõnnison and the baltic german party in 1924 paved the way towards an agreement about the core elements of the law, but it was only the attempted communist coup of december 1924 that finally changed the attitude in the riigikogu towards a quick acceptance of the law.34 the political situation since 1924 then pushed a constructive disposition towards minority protection to the foreground: preparing the law on cultural autonomy obviously was hasselblatt’s major parliamentary occupation, but according to his own account he was also active afterwards on other fields of legislation as religious communities and monuments protection.35 concerning cultural autonomy, hasselblatt credited himself with being the responsible person. this opinion was also mirrored by his german fellowmen as well as german historians, but interestingly not by estonian voices, neither before 1940 nor afterwards. karl aun in his post-war book cites hasselblatt only twice in footnotes, thus underlining the existence of a parallel estonian national discourse on cultural autonomy. the main arguments were that this was a project of the estonian parliament, not one by a single national minority, and that it addressed individuals, but not a specific group. in addition, the connection with the december coup was questioned as well.36 actually, these two threads of the debate did not merge, although hasselblatt praised the activity of estonian politicians as konstantin päts, karl einbund (later kaarel eenpalu), and eugen maddison (later maddisoo) on the official opening of the german cultural selfadministration and claimed that the baltic germans are not only focusing on their own welfare but of the whole state.37 in his publications since 1925 and also in his unpublished book manuscript, which was intended to summarize his notion of cultural autonomy,38 hasselblatt, however, left no doubt that he regarded cultural autonomy first and foremost as a german project. in addition, his point of international reference was a narrowly limited one, as he neither mentioned the austro-marxist studies on national movements 7 (2021) | articles | 10 jörg hackmann tradition of otto bauer and karl renner nor the preceding ukrainian law of 1918.39 neither did hasselblatt react to the estonian perspective, but stressed the impact of the austrian scholar rudolf laun in a short article he published in 1948.40 it should also be added that hasselblatt was far from being the only person to address and push forward the notion of cultural autonomy, even when looking at the german discussion in estonia.41 in the making of the law, hasselblatt departed from some of his basic positions: first of all, he accepted a quantitative definition of minorities as a precondition of cultural self-administration as well as the principle of individual confession, which could, however, be disputed by representatives of the ethnic group. hasselblatt had openly supported more compulsory regulations because he was convinced that belonging to a minority was not based on individual choice and hence could not be changed. in this connection, hasselblatt also addressed – although rather indirectly – the question of loyalty of the minority towards state institutions, arguing that it should be in the state’s interest to provide such conditions that would give no grounds for complaint on the part of minorities and would thereby foster positive attitudes towards the state among the minorities. in this perspective, loyalty was less seen as a legitimate demand by the state, but as a result of respecting the minorities’ interests.42 in the face of this positive image of constructive minority politics, the question arises, when did the perception start to change and when did political actions tilt. a simple explanation concerning hasselblatt would be to link the change of perspective to his new job in berlin. a major argument for such a hypothesis would be the observation that he was seemingly no longer pursuing to finish his manuscript on cultural autonomy.43 however, a closer look at this work as well as at texts published by hasselblatt since 1926 on cultural autonomy show a different picture. there, hasselblatt tried to stress that the studies on national movements 7 (2021) | articles jörg hackmann 11 | implementation of nationality rights for the germans in estonia – in contrast to the already mentioned opinions of estonian politicians – was not based on negotiations with estonian politicians, but on an autonomous decision by the german volksgruppe itself. in 1929, when reviewing the parliamentary work of the german minority in estonia, he expressed a criticism, which explicitly followed carl schirren’s notion of a mental predisposition towards ausharren44 from the 1860s: repression from the state allegedly had deprived the baltic german of the responsibility for administering the land. as the baltic germans’ commitment to stamm and heimat had been challenged, they were pushed into a position to decide between remaining in the baltic heimat on the one hand or opting for german volkstum with the consequence of emigration on the other hand.45 according to hasselblatt, attacks on the germans since 1918 came not only from the bolshevists, but also from anti-bolshevist estonians. this was to explain, why the german representatives of the asutav kogu abstained from accepting the constitution. it can also be noticed that hasselblatt’s convictions in crucial points dissented from the principles of the law on cultural autonomy. this refers not only to the rejection of the term of ‘minority’ as an application of quantitative reasoning, which hasselblatt denounced as neglecting the cultural values and historical and sociological situation of different nationalities. hasselblatt’s position was based first of all on assumptions that volkstum is not a matter of choice or individual decision, but invariably inherent to every nationality. recording nationality in a national cadastre could thus not be seen as a policy of exclusion or separation that is limiting individual decisions, but as a reflection of nonnegotiable facts. resulting from this, national minorities could not be organized as a kind of voluntary association, but only as a corporative institution, which obliges its member as well as the state. in addition, hasselblatt also criticized a crucial element of the law on cultural studies on national movements 7 (2021) | articles | 12 jörg hackmann autonomy: the limitation of the minorities’ self-administration to cultural aspects. hasselblatt’s critical stance towards the estonian state manifests itself throughout his manuscript, where he expressed a fundamental criticism of the post-war political order in central and eastern europe. nevertheless, and this underlines the janus-faced character of hasselblatt’s disposition, he still published positive assessments of the cultural autonomy around 1930.46 thus, one clearly sees an argumentation along two different lines in hasselblatt’s activities. the second, critical line appeared already as early as 1926, when the implementation of cultural autonomy in estonia opened hasselblatt access to german ministries as well as organizations taking care of deutschtum. he did not only promote cultural autonomy as best practice for the national minority groups united in the nationalities congress, but in particular as an appropriate means for the german government to protect german minorities in eastern europe and to strengthen the influence of the german reich in the region. in a paper directed to the german minister of the interior, hasselblatt argued already in june 1926 that the concept of cultural autonomy was perfect for german minorities and would thus only be of limited utility for other groups. hence, it could be used by the german government in order to strengthen the international role of germany by emphasizing the international importance of minority protection.47 in this regard, the stress on cultural autonomy as a german contribution to the solution of minority problems could be combined with a sharp criticism of the new nation states in eastern europe and of the policies of the western powers. what has to be concluded here is that hasselblatt addressed different audiences in divergent ways and put his arguments in contradictory frameworks: first, as loyal and constructive estonian citizen during his work in the riigikogu,48 second, as a loyal member of the german nation (and not only the german minority in estonia), and third as an expert in studies on national movements 7 (2021) | articles jörg hackmann 13 | international affairs. so, if one would apply hirschman’s categories,49 it becomes clear that ‘voice’ and ‘exit’ referred to the estonian state, with the option of ‘voice’ being limited by the threat of ‘exit’, whereas the notion of loyalty was used in a specific, double-faced way, shaped by bindings that were contradictory and excluding each other. the tilting point, as i would argue, was hasselblatt’s postulated dilemma between heimat and volkstum that would only allow to choose one of both,50 as it entailed the negative scenario for (german) minorities of either emigration or assimilation. according to hasselblatt, this dilemma could only be solved by a powerful leader, who could transcend state borders and be a leader to the whole nation. such an assertion clearly limited his commitment to civic loyalty and opened up – first with a focus of the sudeten german problem – the question of future border revisions related to minority issues.51 closely connected was a second crucial issue of hasselblatt’s thinking: the dichotomy between minority and nationality: in fact, hasselblatt always rejected the german term minderheit and preferred minorität, but actually nationalitiät (nationality) in the sense of a transborder community always had been dominant. hasselblatt suggested such changes of terms in various institutions, first of the organization of german minorities from the ‘ausschuss deutscher minderheiten im ausland’ to the ‘verband der deutschen volksgruppen in europa’ in 1928,52 then of the nationalities congress and also in the subtitle of the journal nation und staat, where hasselblatt replaced minoritätenproblem by nationalitätenproblem, after becoming the journal’s editor in june 1938.53 there are further aspects underlining the tilting moment in hasselblatt’s understanding of nationality. first, there is a striking germanocentrism in his attitude: he did not see any obvious connection to similar models of nationalities rights, neither in britain and switzerland nor in the studies on national movements 7 (2021) | articles | 14 jörg hackmann habsburg monarchy prior to 1918. the same is true of his comparisons with the situation of other ethnic groups and minorities, which he addressed in discussions within the european nationalities congress: these other cases for him were secondary to the fate of german minorities. second, his book manuscript reveals a fundamental criticism of the nation state and the making of new borders after 1918, which according to him dominated over categories of space, economy, and history.54 third, his understanding of ‘assimilation’ and ‘dissimilation’ has to be mentioned, which was informed by the volkstheorie of max hildebert boehm.55 whereas the turning around of concepts was still pending before hasselblatt’s relocation to berlin, he quickly became involved in the planning of nazi volkstum politics. already in march 1933, he had talks with alfred rosenberg and hitler, and some weeks later he submitted a memorandum reflecting on a possible negative impact of nazi antijewish politics on german minorities in eastern europe.56 there, hasselblatt addressed the question, whether the exclusion of jews from german civil service could provoke similar repressions against german minorities abroad. hasselblatt suggested as an argument that assimilated german jews could not be regarded as a distinct national group and therefore, categories of minority rights could not be applied here, because a minority, according to him, must be characterized by a disposition of ‘dissimilation’.57 a similar argumentation hasselblatt brought forward with regard to jewish minority representatives in the nationalities congress since 1933.58 hasselblatt, thus, clearly tried to immunize minority politics with a focus on german minorities from possible collateral damage resulting from the deprivation of rights of the german jews.59 hasselblatt, however, also went one step further, as his negative disposition towards giving priority to the individual confession of nationality and his preference for registering national groups in a cadastre provided an argument that the exclusion of jews from public life studies on national movements 7 (2021) | articles jörg hackmann 15 | in germany based on external criteria on the one hand and the support of german minorities by nazi authorities on the other hand had its origin in the notion of ‘dissimilation’.60 the character of the national cadastre thus had changed from an instrument for maintaining cohesion with the german minority in estonia to an instrument that could be used for registering such groups that should be deprived of fundamental rights. having outlined hasselblatt’s leading ideas two further aspects need to be discussed: first, the impact of estonian nationalism and second a comparison with ammende’s and schiemann’s notions of minority politics. when we saw hasselblatt already during his time in estonia operating with diverging arguments depending on his audience, a similar observation also could be made with regard to estonian approaches towards cultural autonomy. there are many hints that parts of the estonian public had a negative disposition towards the baltic germans, particular on their historical as well as their socio-economic impact on the region.61 the authoritarian period after 1934 saw no general change of the fundamental minority laws but tendencies increased that limited the use of non-estonian languages or interfered into institutions of the german minority. such a perspective of limiting the german baltic social impact on the estonian society can be connected to further social and political trends in inter-war estonia such as estonizing surnames.62 one more aspect, which was already briefly mentioned, comes from estonian publications on cultural autonomy. there, the impact of hasselblatt is seen on a totally different level compared to his self-presentation as the driving force of the law in the second riigikogu: hasselblatt is hardly mentioned, neither in contemporary estonian publications nor in postwar publications.63 concerning the relation of hasselblatt’s positions to the other prominent baltic german minority politicians, the fundamental differences to schiemann are evident64: schiemann supported the concept of an ‘anational state’, meaning that it should refrain from interference into the studies on national movements 7 (2021) | articles | 16 jörg hackmann national identity of its citizens. such a position was fully contradictory to hasselblatt’s conviction of the primacy of the nation or volk over the state. more complicated is the case of the cosmopolitan ewald ammende, who was active first in organizing the ‘verband der deutschen volksgruppen in europa’ and then as secretary of the nationalities congress. ammende – as states martyn housden – had all national minorities in europe in the focus of his activities and stressed unequivocally the necessity ‘that german minority groups should remain completely loyal to the states they inhabited’.65 according to housden the standpoints of ammende and hasselblatt in the time of the implementation of the cultural autonomy were still similar,66 but ammende’s positions were seemingly less coherent than those by his colleagues. in distinction to hasselblatt, ammende also argued for a concept of volksgemeinschaft comprising a nation state and its national minorities including the right of cross-border cooperation in the sphere of culture.67 thus, notwithstanding ammende’s anti-soviet attitude and his partial collaboration with nazi authorities, he largely kept to the basic principles of constructive minority politics. regarding their attitude towards the issue of loyalty, neither schiemann nor ammende followed hasselblatt’s postulated dilemma of heimat vs. volkstum. loyalty in schiemann’s understanding – as well as of the nationalities congress before 1933 – had to be differentiated between one oriented towards the state and one towards the nation.68 ammende still in the 1930s underlined the necessity ‘to find a mechanism permitting loyalty to both the state and their nationality’.69 conclusions three issues remain to be discussed in the concluding remarks. first: was there a common thread or a tilting moment in hasselblatt’s political notions? martyn housden and xosé núñez seixas have argued that his studies on national movements 7 (2021) | articles jörg hackmann 17 | corporatist understanding of minorities as well as his priority of volksgemeinschaft over state preformed his path to nazi politics.70 although it is obvious that hasselblatt’s support for the individual confession of belonging to a national minority was limited to the defence against assimilation, the corporatist understanding of minority also shaped the moravian compromise of 1905, and thus did not directly lead to a völkisch understanding. in addition, there are – so far – no hints of a close cooperation between hasselblatt and nazi representatives among the baltic german minorities. i would, therefore, argue that the tilting towards his völkisch understanding of nationalities and an instrumental use of minority politics appeared already as early as 1926 in hasselblatt’s contacts with berlin and under the influence of boehm’s notion of dissimilation, which – although developed already during the first world war – gained strength in the early 1930s.71 second: what were the political implications of loyalty in the case of werner hasselblatt and estonian politics towards the german minority? in distinction between public confirmations of or demands for loyalty towards the ‘host’ state on the one hand and expressions of distrust or of diverging bindings to the ‘kin’ state on the other hand, loyalty was obviously conceived and practised situationally and negotiated on both sides. if in the beginning the estonian declaration of independence as well as the constitution intended to secure the german minority’s loyalty towards the new state through political integration, this goal partly clashed with the socio-economic interest in implementing an agrarian reform in order to distribute land to the ethnic estonian population. nevertheless, securing baltic german loyalty was based on the common goal of preventing bolshevist rule in estonia. the level of bolshevist threat seemingly decided about the waves of relevance of baltic german loyalty from an estonian perspective. the issue lost political relevance after the peace treaty of tartu in 1920 but reappeared on the political agenda after the coup attempt of december 1924. it then once again lost studies on national movements 7 (2021) | articles | 18 jörg hackmann political relevance in the 1930s under the authoritarian rule, although at the same time völkisch tendencies emerged among the german minorities, which challenged previous attitudes and perceptions of loyalty. however, an unambiguous shift of loyalty towards nazi germany did not take place among the baltic german minorities. in addition, the political dimension remained limited in its scope in the baltic region, as the limitation of self-administration and autonomy to the cultural sphere was not fundamentally challenged. based on the attitudes by schiemann and ammende it also becomes clear that dual loyalty to the ‘host’ state and the ‘kin’ nation did not pose a fundamental problem, as long as the political order was respected by all sides. this notion, however, became increasingly challenged by hasselblatt, although less with open statements but with hints that loyalty might be directed to another institution, if the situation of a minority might worsen. actually, hasselblatt had no decisive impact in pursuing the ‘heim ins reich’ policy,72 but his writings leave no doubt about his support. at the same time hasselblatt had unambiguously shifted his focus from the estonian state to nazi germany. so, when we reiterate the questions asked at the beginning, it becomes clear that any positive assessment of baltic minority politics cannot be based on the suggested counterfactual narrative that separates cultural autonomy from the politics of nazi germany.73 if the fate of paul schiemann indicates his powerlessness after 1933, then the case of werner hasselblatt highlights that the momentum of an instrumental disposition towards loyalty finally destroyed the prospects of inter-war minority politics. endnotes 1 see in particular the special issue of ethnopolitics 6 (2007), no. 3, on ‘the theory and practice of cultural autonomy in central and eastern europe’; and studies on national movements 7 (2021) | articles jörg hackmann 19 | also d. j. smith & j. hiden, ethnic diversity and the nation state. national cultural autonomy revisited (new york, 2012), 43. on the restauration of inter-war minority politics in estonia see c. hasselblatt, minderheitenpolitik in estland. rechtsentwicklung und rechtswirklichkeit 1918-1995 (tallinn, 1996). further references will be given below. 2 cf. the skeptical remark by s. david, cultural autonomy in estonia. a relevant paradigm for the post-soviet era? (esrc ‘one europe or several?’ working paper, 2001), 43. 3 in particular in john hiden’s biography: j. hiden, defender of minorities. paul schiemann, 1876–1944 (london, 2004); see also j. hiden, 'a voice from latvia's past: paul schiemann and the freedom to practise one's culture', in: slavonic & east european review 77/4 (1999), 680-699. 4 m. housden, 'ambiguous activists. estonia's model of cultural autonomy as interpreted by two of its founders: werner hasselblatt and ewald ammende', in: journal of baltic studies, 35/3 (2004), 231-253; m. housden, on their own behalf: ewald ammende, europe’s national minorities and the campaign for cultural autonomy 1920-1936 (on the boundary of two worlds: identity, freedom, and moral imagination in the baltics, 37) (leiden, 2014). in these publications housden revised his former, more positive image of ammende in: m. housden, 'ewald ammende and the organization of national minorities in inter-war europe', in: german history 18/4 (2000), 439-460. the first to draw attention on hasselblatt in this connection was s. myllyniemi, die neuordnung der baltischen länder 1941-1944. zum nationalsozialistischen inhalt der deutschen besatzungspolitik (dissertationes historicae, 2) (helsinki, 1973); for further information see my publications mentioned in footnote 11. 5 see his apologetic text: e. kroeger, der auszug aus der alten heimat. die umsiedlung der baltendeutschen (veröffentlichungen des instituts für deutsche nachkriegsgeschichte, 4) (tübingen, 1967), 49-54; on the resettlement: j. v. hehn, die umsiedlung der baltischen deutschen – das letzte kapitel baltischdeutscher geschichte (marburger ostforschungen, 40) (marburg, lahn, 1984); and d. a. loeber (ed.) diktierte option. die umsiedlung der deutschbalten aus estland und lettland 1939–1941 (neumünster, 1972). 6 see the arguments listed by m. garleff, 'zwischen loyalität und verweigerung. zur autonomie der deutschbalten in estland und lettland', in: b. störtkuhl, j. stüben & t. weger (eds.), aufbruch und krise. das östliche europa und die studies on national movements 7 (2021) | articles | 20 jörg hackmann deutschen nach dem ersten weltkrieg (schriften des bundesinstituts für kultur und geschichte der deutschen im östlichen europa, 41) (munich, 2010), 301302. 7 l. lundin, 'the road from tsar to kaiser: changing loyalties of the baltic germans, 1905–1914', in: journal of central european affairs 10 (1950), 255. 8 this understanding is formed by: j. osterkamp & m. s. wessel, 'texturen von loyalität: überlegungen zu einem analytischen begriff', in: geschichte und gesellschaft 42/4 (2016), 553-573; and m. schulze wessel, '„loyalität“ als geschichtlicher grundbegriff und forschungskonzept: zur einleitung', in: m. schulze wessel (ed.), loyalitäten in der tschechoslowakischen republik. politische, nationale und kulturelle zugehörigkeiten. (veröffentlichungen des collegium carolinum, 101) (munich, 2004), 1-22; see also j. osterkamp & m. schulze wessel (eds.), exploring loyalty (veröffentlichungen des collegium carolinum, 136) (göttingen, 2017); and p. haslinger & j. v. puttkamer, 'staatsmacht, minderheit, loyalität. konzeptionelle grundlagen am beispiel ostmittel-und südosteuropas in der zwischenkriegszeit ', in: p. haslinger & j. v. puttkamer (eds.), staat, loyalität und minderheiten in ostmittelund südosteuropa 1918–1941 (buchreihe der kommission für geschichte und kultur der deutschen in südosteuropa, 39) (munich, 2007), 1-16. 9 a. o. hirschman, exit, voice and loyalty. responses to decline in firms, organizations, and states (cambridge, ma, 1970), 76-105; cf. osterkamp & wessel, 'texturen', 556. 10 apart from the literature mentioned above see k. laurits, saksa kultuuromavalitsus eesti vabariigis 1925–1940. monograafia ja allikad (ad fontes, 16) (tallinn, 2008); v. vasara, 'das estnische parlament und die deutschbalten. zu den debatten bis zur verabschiedung der kulturautonomie 1925', in: nordost-archiv n.f. 4/2 (1995), 479-500; k. alenius, 'the birth of cultural autonomy in estonia: how, why, and for whom?', in: journal of baltic studies 38/4 (2007), 445-462. 11 see my earlier publications with more detailed information: j. hackmann, 'werner hasselblatt on cultural autonomy – a forgotten manuscript', in: m. housden & d. smith (eds.), forgotten pages of baltic history. diversity and inclusion (on the boundary of two worlds: identity, freedom, and moral imagination in the baltics, 30) (amsterdam, 2011), 147-160; j. hackmann, 'concepts of german nationalities policy in eastern europe during the second studies on national movements 7 (2021) | articles jörg hackmann 21 | world war: the case of werner hasselblatt', in: d. gaunt, p. a. levine & l. palosuo (eds.), collaboration and resistance during the holocaust: belarus, estonia, latvia, lithuania (oxford et al., 2004), 95-110; j. hackmann, 'werner hasselblatt. von der estländischen kulturautonomie zur nationalsozialistischen bevölkerungspolitik', in: m. garleff (ed.), deutschbalten, weimarer republik und drittes reich (cologne, weimar, vienna, 2008), 71-107. 12 x. m. núñez seixas, 'internationale politik, minderheitenfrage und nationale autonomie: der europäische nationalitätenkongreß (1925-1938)', in: h. timmermann (ed.), nationalismus und nationalbewegung in europa 1914–1945 (dokumente und schriften der europäischen akademie otzenhausen, 85) (berlin, 1999), 39-70; x. m. núñez seixas, entre ginebra y berlín. la cuestión de las minorías nacionales y la política internacional en europa, 1914-1939 (akal universitaria, serie historia contemporánea, 216) (madrid, 2001); not always reliable is s. bamberger-stemmann, der europäische nationalitätenkongreß 1925 bis 1938. nationale minderheiten zwischen lobbyistentum und großmachtinteressen (materialien und studien zur ostmitteleuropa-forschung, 7) (marburg, 2000); see also u. v. hirschhausen, 'from minority protection to border revisionism: the european nationality congress, 1925–38', in: m. conway & k. k. patel (eds.), europeanization in the twentieth century: historical approaches (london, 2010), 87-109. 13 g. aly & s. heim, vordenker der vernichtung. auschwitz und die deutschen pläne für eine neue europäische ordnung (frankfurt/m., 1993). 14 g. kroeger, 'die deutschen vereine in liv-, estund kurland 1905/06-1914', in: jahrbuch des baltischen deutschtums 16 (1969), 39-49; g. kroeger, 'zur situation der baltischen deutschen um die jahrhundertwende', in: zeitschrift für ostforschung 17 (1968), 601-632; j. v. hehn, 'das baltische deutschtum zwischen den revolutionen von 1905 und 1917. einige bemerkungen zu forschungsaufgaben und forschungsproblemen', in: a. ezergailis & g. v. pistohlkors (eds.), die baltischen provinzen rußlands zwischen den revolutionen von 1905 und 1917 / the russian baltic provinces between the 1905/1917 revolutions (quellen und studien zur baltischen geschichte, 4) (cologne, vienna, 1982), 43-57. 15 j. hackmann, 'nachholende nationalisierung. das kurze leben der deutschen vereine in den russländischen ostseeprovinzen (1905–1914)', in: j. hackmann (ed.), vereinskultur und zivilgesellschaft in nordosteuropa. regionale spezifik und europäische zusammenhänge. associational culture and civil society in north studies on national movements 7 (2021) | articles | 22 jörg hackmann eastern europe. regional features and the european context (quellen und studien zur baltischen geschichte, 20) (vienna, cologne, weimar, 2012), 387418. 16 m. r. hatlie, 'flags and bayonets. mass celebrations in riga 1910‒1920', in: zeitschrift für ostmitteleuropa-forschung 51/4 (2002), 475‒499; m. r. hatlie, riga at war 1914–1919. war and wartime experience in a multi-ethnic metropolis (studien zur ostmitteleuropaforschung, 30) (marburg, 2014). 17 g. v. pistohlkors, 'führende schicht oder nationale minderheit? die revolution von 1905/06 und die kennzeichnung der politischen situation der deutschen balten zwischen 1840 und 1906 in der zeitgenössischen deutschbaltischen geschichtsforschung', in: zeitschrift für ostforschung 21/4 (1972), 601-618; k. brüggemann, 'von der führenden schicht zur nationalen minderheit. zur klärung der rolle der estländischen deutschen minderheit bei der begründung der republik estland 1918-1919', in: nordost-archiv n.f. 4/2 (1995), 453-478. 18 see a. henriksson, the tsar's loyal germans. the riga german community: social change and the nationality question, 1855-1905 (east european monographs, 131) (boulder, new york, 1983). 19 see the contributions by a. von taube and k-h. janßen in: j. v. hehn, h. v. rimscha & h. weiss (eds.), von den baltischen provinzen zu den baltischen staaten. beiträge zur entstehungsgeschichte der republiken estland und lettland 1917-1918 (marburg/lahn, 1971); h.-e. volkmann, die deutsche baltikumpolitik zwischen brest-litovsk und compiègne. ein beitrag zur "kriegszieldiskussion" (ostmitteleuropa in vergangenheit und gegenwart, 13) (cologne, 1970); g. v. rauch, geschichte der baltischen staaten (hannover-döhren, 1986). 20 brüggemann, 'von der führenden schicht', 462-463; e. v. dellingshausen, im dienste der heimat! erinnerungen (stuttgart, 1930), 349-350. 21 brüggemann, 'von der führenden schicht', 464. 22 brüggemann, 'von der führenden schicht', 468-471. 23 brüggemann, 'von der führenden schicht', 472; o. arens, 'the estonian maapäev during 1917', in: v. s. vardys & r. j. misiunas (eds.), the baltic states in peace and war 1917–1945 (london, 1978), 19-30, 198-201. see also: meie parlament ja aeg. fakte, sündmusi, dokumente, inimesi, ed. marge allandi, eesti studies on national movements 7 (2021) | articles jörg hackmann 23 | rahvusraamatukogu sotsiaalia ja parlamendiraamatukogu, https://meieparlamentjaaeg.nlib.ee/1917-maapaev/ [26/02/2021]. 24 mickwitz (1850-1924) was a teacher and newspaper editor as well as president of various associations; cf. p. schiemann, zwischen zwei zeitaltern. erinnerungen 1903–1919 (schriftenreihe der carl-schirren-gesellschaft, 3) (lüneburg, 1979), 26-27. 25 w. hasselblatt, 'zehn jahre deutsch-baltischer politik in estland', in: jahrbuch des baltischen deutschtums in lettland und estland (1929), 66-70; m. garleff, 'die deutschbaltische volksgruppe zwischen anpassung und widerstand bei der staatsgründung der republik estland', in: eesti teaduste akadeemia toimetised. ühiskonnateadused 40 (1991), 4-15 (7-8). 26 hasselblatt, 'zehn jahre', 68; cf. however hasselblatt, ‘minderheitenpolitik’, 35. 27 g. v. pistohlkors, 'inversion of ethnic group status in the baltic region: governments and rural ethnic conflicts in russia's baltic provinces and in the independent states of estonia and latvia, 1850-1940', in: d. w. howell, g. v. pistohlkors & e. wiegant (eds.), roots of rural ethnic mobilisation (comparative studies on governments and non-dominant ethnic groups in europe, 1850– 1940, 7) (aldershot, 1993), 169-219 (198-199); t. rosenberg, 'agrarfrage und agrarreform in estland 1919: ursachen, voraussetzungen und folgen', in: eesti teaduste akadeemia toimetised. humanitaarja sotsiaalteadused 43/3 (1994), 326-335; i. lipping, land reform legislation in estonia and the disestablishment of the baltic german rural elite, 1919–1939 (ph.d. dissertation, university of maryland) (college park, md, 1980); laurits, saksa kultuuromavalitsus, 128136. 28 for details see: j. hackmann, 'von der „gelehrten estnischen gesellschaft“ zu „õpetatud eesti selts“. verein und nation in estland', in: n. angermann, m. garleff & w. lenz (eds.), ostseeprovinzen, baltische staaten und das nationale. festschrift für gert von pistohlkors zum 70. geburtstag (schriften der baltischen historischen kommission, 14) (münster, 2005), 185-211. 29 r. raag, 'the multilingual parliament: language choice by non-estonian members of parliament in parliamentary debates in estonia 1919–1934', in: b. metuzāle-kangere (ed.), the ethnic dimension in politics and culture in the baltic countries, 1920–1945 (södertörn academic studies, 18) (södertörn, 2004), 92120; publications from that period listed in: m. garleff, 'deutschbaltische https://meieparlamentjaaeg.nlib.ee/1917-maapaev/ studies on national movements 7 (2021) | articles | 24 jörg hackmann publizisten. ewald ammende – werner hasselblatt – paul schiemann', in: berichte und forschungen 2 (1994), 189-229. 30 of the 881 statements by non-estonian members of parliament more than 500 were given in estonian, whereas the c. 300 statements by russian members were given exclusively in russian language, see raag, 'the multilingual parliament', 102, 105. 31 some of hasselblatt’s speeches were printed in german language newspaper, for details see: garleff, 'deutschbaltische publizisten'. 32 brüggemann, 'von der führenden schicht', 468. 33 brüggemann, 'von der führenden schicht', 474; j. uluots, grundzüge der agrargeschichte estlands (tartu, 1935), 180-192; rosenberg, 'agrarfrage', 330. 34 see vasara, 'parlament', for details; this connection, however, has also been disputed, see below. 35 hackmann, 'kulturautonomie', 77. 36 k. aun, der völkerrechtliche schutz nationaler minderheiten in estland von 1917 bis 1940 (hamburg, 1951); see also k. aun, 'on the spirit of the estonian minorities law', in: j. olvet-jensen (ed.), apophoreta tartuensia (stockholm, 1949), 240-245; k. aun, 'vähemusrahvuste kultuurautonoomia eestis. tagapõhjast ja teostumisest', in: eesti teaduste akadeemia toimetised. ühiskonnateadused 40/1 (1991), 61-66; o. angelus, die kulturautonomie in estland (detmold, 1951); cf. laurits, saksa kultuuromavalitsus, 57. 37 for details see hackmann, 'kulturautonomie', 77. 38 see hackmann, 'cultural autonomy'. 39 hints on the ukrainian law: m. m. laserson, 'das minoritätenrecht der baltischen staaten', in: zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches recht und völkerrecht 2 (1931), 401-429; aun, 'spirit'; aun, 'vähemusrahvuste'; laurits, saksa kultuuromavalitsus, 45. 40 w. hasselblatt, 'kulturautonomie. ein erinnerungsblatt für professor rudolf laun', in: g. c. hernmarck (ed.), festschrift zu ehren von professor dr. jur. rudolf laun, rektor der universität hamburg anlässlich der vollendung seines 65. lebensjahres am 1. januar 1947 (hamburg, 1948), 32-35. studies on national movements 7 (2021) | articles jörg hackmann 25 | 41 see ‘revaler bote’ on february 23, 1925; gesetze und verordnungen betreffend die deutsche kulturselbstverwaltung (reval, 1926); h. kraus, das recht der minderheiten. materialien zur einführung in das verständnis des modernen minoritätenproblems (stilkes rechtsbibliothek, 57) (berlin, 1927), 189-208; a. spindler, an die gegner der kulturautonomie der völkischen minderheiten in estland (reval, 1924); on the role of spindler see also smith & hiden, ethnic diversity, 36-38, 46. 42 hackmann, 'cultural autonomy', 152. 43 for more details on the fate of the text see hackmann, 'cultural autonomy', 148-149. 44 hasselblatt, 'zehn jahre', 67. 45 similar claims were made by hasselblatt several times, see hackmann, 'kulturautonomie', 79; hackmann, 'cultural autonomy', 154.. 46 w. hasselblatt, 'hat sich die kulturautonomie in estland bewährt?', in: nation und staat 4 (1930-1931), 441-448. 47 hackmann, 'kulturautonomie', 77-78; excerpts from the paper are quoted in bamberger-stemmann, nationalitätenkongreß, 51, 253. 48 following the findings by raag, 'the multilingual parliament', one might however need to analyze hasselblatt’s statements more closely. 49 hirschman, exit, see above footnote 9. 50 this antithesis appears in many of his writings, see for instance: hasselblatt, 'zehn jahre'; and w. hasselblatt, 'die nationale autonomie als ziel der europäischen nationalitätenpolitik. festvortrag zur feier des deutschpolitischen arbeitsamtes', in: zehn jahre deutschpolitisches arbeitsamt (veröffentlichungen des deutschpolitischen arbeitsamtes, 32) (prague, [1930]), 7-21; for more information see: hackmann, 'cultural autonomy', 151-154. 51 w. hasselblatt, 'überstaatliche volksgemeinschaft', in: baltische monatshefte, (1932), 1-6; w. hasselblatt, 'überstaatliche volksgemeinschaft – eine panbewegung', in: nation und staat 5 (1932-1933), 438-445. 52 hasselblatt claimed that this was his idea, see hackmann, 'kulturautonomie', 73, 95. studies on national movements 7 (2021) | articles | 26 jörg hackmann 53 see hackmann, 'kulturautonomie', 74. actually, hasselblatt already earlier opposed a first title of the journal as deutsche zeitschrift für die minderheitenfrage, see m. garleff, 'nationalitätenpolitik zwischen liberalem und völkischem anspruch. gleichklang und spannung bei paul schiemann und werner hasselblatt', in: j. v. hehn & c. j. kenéz (eds.), reval und die baltischen länder. festschrift für hellmuth weiss zum 80. geburtstag (marburg, lahn, 1980), 113-132 (118). 54 hackmann, 'kulturautonomie', 78. 55 on boehm see u. prehn, max hildebert boehm: radikales ordnungsdenken vom ersten weltkrieg bis in die bundesrepublik (hamburger beiträge zur sozialund zeitgeschichte, 51) (göttingen, 2013); u. prehn, 'metamorphosen radikalen ordnungsdenkens im "europäischen großraum". ethnopolitische und "volkstheoretische" konzepte max hildebert boehms vom ersten bis zum zweiten weltkrieg ', in: m. garleff (ed.), deutschbalten, weimarer republik und drittes reich (cologne, weimar, vienna, 2008), 1-70. 56 hackmann, 'kulturautonomie', 80, 96. 57 hackmann, 'kulturautonomie', 80. 58 núñez seixas, 'internationale politik', 55. 59 cf. here also housden, on their own behalf, 291. 60 hackmann, 'kulturautonomie', 80. 61 see the examples given by: brüggemann, 'von der führenden schicht'; hasselblatt, minderheitenpolitik; rosenberg, 'agrarfrage'. 62 for details see hasselblatt, minderheitenpolitik, 68-72. 63 see above, footnote 36. 64 they were already discussed by: garleff, 'nationalitätenpolitik'. 65 housden, 'ammende', 449. in his later texts, however, housden changed his opinion on ammende, cf. fn. 4. 66 housden, on their own behalf, 61. 67 housden, 'ammende', 449; housden, 'ambiguous activists', 241-242; housden, on their own behalf, 58. studies on national movements 7 (2021) | articles jörg hackmann 27 | 68 smith & hiden, ethnic diversity, 89. 69 housden, on their own behalf, 186. 70 housden, 'ambiguous activists', 246; x. m. núñez seixas, '¿autodeterminación o autonomía cultural? debates ideológicos en el congreso de nacionalidades europeas (1925-1939)', in: hispania 57/3 (1998), 1113-1151 (1147-1151). 71 prehn, max hildebert boehm, 273-294. 72 although his attitude to konrad henlein’s activities might receive further attention, cf. bamberger-stemmann, nationalitätenkongreß, 71; and garleff, 'loyalität'. 73 see above, footnote 6. nise-histgfie juli székely, ‘heroes after the end of the heroic. commemorating silent heroes in berlin’, in: studies on national movements, 3 (2015). http://snm.nise.eu/index.php/studies/article/view/0309a juli székely heroes after the end of the heroic commemorating silent heroes in berlin living (or) dead heroes? although meditations over the influence of key figures on the course of history have already been present since antiquity, the heroic imagination of europe considerably changed in the nineteenth century when the phenomenon of hero worship got deeply interwoven with a project of nation-states.1 as historian maria todorova describes, ‘the romantic enterprise first recovered a host of “authentic” folk heroes, and encouraged the exalted group identity located in the nation’ and then it ‘underwrote the romantic political vision of the powerful and passionate individual, the voluntaristic leader, the glorious sculptor of human destinies, the great man of history.’2 nevertheless, in the period after 1945 these great men – who traditionally functioned as historical, social and cultural models for a particular society – slowly began to appear not that great. in 1943 already sidney hook cautioned that ‘a democratic community must be eternally on guard’ against heroic leaders because in such a society political leadership ‘cannot arrogate to itself heroic power’.3 but after world war ii the question was not simply about adjusting the accents of heroism, as hook suggested, but about the future legitimacy of the concept itself. authors extensively elaborated on the crises of the hero that, from the 1970s, also entailed a http://snm.nise.eu/index.php/studies/article/view/0309a studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | a r t i c l e s juli székely 2 shift in scholarly focus towards victims and perpetrators.4 the conventional definition of the hero as the main embodiment of the nation was disputed to such an extent that in 2006 the political scientist herfried münkler announced that now we live in an era of a ‘post-heroic’ society.5 echoing various ‘endings’ in the twentieth century, such as the presumed demise of ideology, philosophy, liberalism, art, history, politics or even the author, everything seemed to indicate that the category of the hero would be done away with too. parallel to the discourse of the death of the hero, however, another tendency also emerged. various analyses appeared that, instead of revitalising the notion of the hero, tried to reinvent it in two senses. on the one hand, conceptually, scholars established a critical understanding of the hero who came to be defined as an end-product of a careful construction.6 on the other hand, phenomenologically, ‘new heroes’ also made their mass appearance.7 while the majority of these works discuss the presence of atypical heroes in previous periods, dominantly in the nineteenth century, another trend of the literature focuses on contemporary developments.8 these studies analyse the current fashion of ‘pop heroes’9, such as superheroes, stars or celebrities10, but representatives of ‘civil courage’11, such as peace activists, civil right fighters, whistleblowers, fire fighters, lifesavers or political freedom fighters are also reflected on.12 within these frameworks, heroes are not simply reborn: while they are being (re)made in specific historical, social and cultural contexts, they are more and more (re)imagined with a human face, often mediating the message that ‘you can be a hero, too’. amidst the theoretical positions of heroes dying or reviving, symbolic representations – that typically and customarily played an essential role in the process of inscribing the exemplarity of heroes into collective memory – are also affected. discussing the position of heroes in the memory politics of particular cities, berlin certainly emerges as a special case study; there is hardly another place that aimed at putting an end to the celebration of heroes so radically. in the immediate period after 1989 the debate around studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | a r t i c l e s juli székely 3 the re-functioning of the ‘neue wache’ as a central memorial to the victims of war and tyranny still signalled the presence of attempts to restore a nineteenth-century nationalist image in berlin.13 but after the historians’ quarrel advocates of the image of the german victim – and the german hero too – have been widely accused of trying to relativise the german guilt and the memory of holocaust. the traumatic memory of the shoah became the negative founding myth of the new political era emphasising a selfunderstanding built on the image of the perpetrator. yet, this shift from ‘triumphal’ to ‘traumatic’ remembrances did not mean the solidification of german memory politics, nor a definitive and irreversible farewell to concepts such as germans as victims or germans as heroes.14 as eric langenbacher, bernhard giesen, michael klundt, andreas michael, bill niven or aleida assmann emphasise, after the new millennium the topic of german victims increasingly attracted public attention.15 yet, while memories of the carpet bombing of german cities by the allies, the mass rape of german women by members of the red army and the expulsion and forced migration of germans from eastern germany and eastern europe are indeed being discussed with a growing emphasis, the gradual reappearance of heroic narratives is largely neglected. in this paper i argue that along with the german victim, a new figure of the german hero – the so-called ‘unsung’ or ‘silent’ hero – also returned in the public imagination of germany. as with the topic of german victims, the topic of ‘unsung’ or ‘silent’ heroism also had its precedents long before the 2000s.16 the term itself was introduced by journalist kurt grossmann who in 1957 published his book die unbesungenen helden (unsung heroes), in which he systematised and collected the stories of everyday men who tried to help people persecuted during wwii. as dennis riffel recalls, grossmann’s definite aim was to establish a new concept of the hero: [he gave] a more humanistic content to the concept of the hero through which he also detached it from the image of the war heroes studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | a r t i c l e s juli székely 4 that in germany was established in the nineteenth century and reached its peak during the nazi period. grossmann not only cuts off ‘his’ philanthropic hero from the war hero, but also from the politically motivated resistance fighters […].17 in this sense, grossmann’s ‘unsung heroes’ already reflected a redefined approach of heroic imagination. yet, while in the 1950s the book brought about various measures that recognised and appreciated unsung heroes, such as the establishment of the berlin jewish community’s foundation or west berlin senator for internal affairs joachim lipschitz’s initiative honouring unsung heroes, these projects were primarily carried out with the aim of wiedergutmachung (compensation), or, as lipschitz himself stated, wiederherstellung (restoration).18 after the end of lipschitz’s program in 1966 the issue of unsung heroes was largely silenced in berlin and when they found their way back to german memory narratives after the regime change, it was already a different context in which they were approached. focusing on various sites of remembrance in the berlin neighbourhood spandauer vorstadt, particularly on the house and courtyard of rosenthaler strasse 39, i demonstrate that the two, seemingly contradictory theoretical positions about the death or rebirth of heroes can be joined together, bringing about an interplay of various non-heroic and heroic imaginations in berlin. in the absence of heroes spandauer vorstadt is a ‘myth’, ‘a metaphysical place’, a ‘magic location’ ‘full of legends’.19 these attributes used by several authors in various texts refer to the fact that the area is in all probability one of the most multifaceted heritage sites in berlin. developed at the end of the seventeenth century, spandauer vorstadt belonged to the suburbs surrounding the medieval double-city of berlin-cölln, which has gradually transformed into a studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | a r t i c l e s juli székely 5 fashionable place to live in, in the middle of berlin. simultaneously, from the seventeenth century onwards, it also emerged as a centre of jewish life, later incorporating several representational institutions, most importantly the new synagogue in oranienburger strasse. therefore, the urban history of spandauer vorstadt not only functions as a document of suburban development, but it is also imbued with the traces, as well as the strong absence of the jewish community in berlin. these presences and voids constitute the primary material of the various sites of remembrance in the area. even though the deportation and mass killing of jews was sporadically commemorated after the immediate period of wwii, the first significant memorials appeared not before the 1980s. besides an increasing number of memorial plaques in spandauer vorstadt, there were three important developments in the second half of the decade: the 1985 inauguration of will lammert’s memorial of jewish victims of fascism, the 1988 establishment of the foundation new synagogue – centrum judaicum and the 1988 competition for creating a public statue in remembrance of the contributions of berlin’s jewish citizens. while the foundation’s object of reconstructing the partly destroyed building of the new synagogue explicitly sheds light on the connection between urban transformation and changing memory politics, the two public statues – and the differences between them – also illustrate the modification of practices of memorialisation. the discrepancy between the visual appearances of the two works can first of all be explained by the fact that while lammert’s statue was already finished in 1957, the 1988 winning application, karl biedermann’s the deserted room was only erected in 1996. lammert initially designed his memorial of jewish victims of fascism as a figure ensemble completing the bronze sculpture burdened woman in ravensbrück, which unambiguously connected it to the principles of an earlier aesthetic language. the ravensbrück national memorial – similar to the two other national memorials in the german democratic republic (gdr or east germany), studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | a r t i c l e s juli székely 6 buchenwald and sachsenhausen – operated along the lines of a heroic and monumental narrative. fritz cremer’s uprising of prisoners (buchenwald), the memorial obelisk (sachsenhausen) as well as lammert’s burdened woman (also labelled the pieta of ravensbrück) all fitted in this tradition. nevertheless, the fact that lammert’s fifteen figures were finally left out from the ravensbrück composition and that these same (thirteen of fifteen) figures found their place in the 1985 inaugurated public work of art in berlin also signalled a certain kind of deviation from earlier traditions. the memorial of jewish victims of fascism partly detached itself from a heroic and monumental narrative, not least because of its small scale. yet, despite its relatively late erection and its rearrangement by mark lammert, the classical genre of public statues was not yet questioned. ‘jüdische opfer des faschismus’ (will lammert) | author’s photograph studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | a r t i c l e s juli székely 7 in contrast to lammert’s rather conventional figure-ensemble, biedermann’s the deserted room already spoke another language. being the winner of the first major memorial competition held by the east berlin municipality, biedermann’s work had a highly unconventional form, especially in comparison to gdr memorials.20 even though this divergence also resulted in the municipality’s backing out of the accomplishment of the project, the united berlin took up the issue again. thanks to interventions by local organisations and individuals, the senate department for urban development realised the public work of art in the framework of its programme art in the urban space in 1996. biedermann’s the deserted room consists of a room without walls and a seemingly leather-covered table with two matching chairs on a coarse parquet floor. despite this realistic approach, the feeling of alienation is strong, and this not only due the material of bronze; the memorial gets out of balance in various senses. ‘der verlassene raum’ (karl biedermann) | author’s photograph studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | a r t i c l e s juli székely 8 both the arrangement (the second chair is set as overturned) and dimension (the size of the furniture is slightly bigger than real life) contribute to the feeling of uneasiness. the discomfort is further strengthened by the absence of any inscriptions: the only hint is offered by nelly sachs’ poem o die schornsteine (o the chimneys) framing the parquet floor. biedermann’s metaphoric representation of violence and loss, therefore, evokes the various innovative methods more commonly utilised after the 1990s. in the aftermath of the 1989 regime change two installations, christian boltanski’s the missing house (1990) and shimon attie’s writing on the wall (1991-1996), were realised within this renewed aesthetic tradition in the area of spandauer vorstadt. both were part of wider exhibition projects: while boltanski’s project participated in the exhibition the finiteness of freedom, engaging with the changing political situation in the east and west, attie’s writing on the wall formed one element in his installation series sites unseen, conducted between 1991 and 1996 in berlin, dresden, copenhagen, amsterdam, cologne and krakow. reflecting the medium of historical heritage as such, both events were planned as temporary interventions, yet boltanski’s the missing house remained at is place even after the finissage of the exhibition.21 based on the idea of rebecca horn, jannis kounellis and heiner müller, the finiteness of freedom invited several artists in order to give a unique response to the recent upheavals and to realise two related works in the eastern and western part of berlin.22 these two locations, in the case of boltanski, were set at grosse hamburger strasse 15/16 (mitte, eastern part of berlin) and at the site of the former glass palace (moabit, western part of berlin). while the latter functioned as a documentation and research ‘centre’ that boltanski called the museum, the building in mitte, more precisely the empty void of a building that was completely burnt down during wwii, served as his primary object of study. yet, boltanski did not only investigate the vanished architectural structure, his main interest lay in its inhabitants. indicating the names of former tenants, their professions studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | a r t i c l e s juli székely 9 and the time period of their residency, he placed white boards resembling street-plates on the firewall of the two adjacent houses. these plates explicitly showed that several tenants left the house between 1939 and 1943. yet, as assmann argues, ‘during this period there were no good reasons to move out from a berlin tenement. in these days, forced emigration or deportation dissolved many berlin residential communities’.23 while the inscriptions only hinted at the relationship between the origin of some of the tenants and the date of their moving out from the house, the jewish background of inhabitants and their ‘the missing house’ (christian boltanski) | author’s photograph studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | a r t i c l e s juli székely 10 dispossessions became explicitly articulated in the files exhibited in the museum. therefore, the missing house, together with museum signified a radical shift in memory politics from various perspectives. first, instead of concentrating on the great man, boltanski pulled the individual out of anonymity and placed the everyday man into the centre of attention. second, he no longer strived for the re-presentation of a historical event, his main aim was to mark, reveal and document an authentic place of absence. in this sense, boltanski’s work also fitted in the genre of the so-called ‘combimemorial’ that, by integrating the elements of a memorial, an archive and an exhibition, put the emphasis on the process of research and documentation.24 similarly to boltanski’s goal, attie wanted to show and preserve traces. writing on the wall – just like the missing house – ‘focus[ed] on the processes of disintegration, transience and loss’.25 attie’s circa twenty-six temporary interventions consisted of 1920s and 1930s photographs of berlin’s jewish inhabitants, projected upon the existing architectural structures located in the scheunenviertel area of spandauer vorstadt. as peter muir recalls, attie attempted to utilise the exact locations where the photographs were originally taken.26 writing on the wall functioned as a projection of ghost images: each of his images in the scheunenviertel is both a tomb (a house of the dead) and a monument; each is a place of exception to remind us of absence, but because of their cognitive capacity relative to their confrontational aspect, they can also be understood as radical negatives – that is, as the non-tomb and the non-monument, they are, in short, active counter-monuments.27 this interpretation of attie’s installation as a ‘counter-monument’ – which, instead of characteristics as permanence, monologicity, immobility and materiality, can be described through notions such as temporality, dialogue, mobility and immateriality – further sheds light on the paradigm shift in studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | a r t i c l e s juli székely 11 german memory politics, distancing itself from heroic as well as monumental narratives.28 parallel to these processes, one witnesses the spreading of stumbling stones in berlin from 1995 onward.29 according to my research, in spandauer vorstadt alone there are more than seventy stumbling stones installed. gunter demnig’s idea of creating stumbling stones for commemorating individual victims of nazism, by means of a brass plate with their name and life dates inscribed, very much correlates with the above-mentioned changing traditions. the stones reflect the trend of commemorating single persons within the framework of a renewed aesthetics. at the same time, stumbling stones also indicate how civilians become the main actor in memory politics and how memory politics can be connected to an entrepreneurial spirit: on the basis of their own research, citizens, neighbours, witnesses, school classes or communities can all initiate the installation of a stone with a fixed price of 120 euros (data from 2012). what is, then, the position of the house and courtyard at rosenthaler strasse 39 within this non-heroic context focusing primarily on the individual victims of holocaust? in the presence of non-heroes the history of the construction and utilisation of the building at rosenthaler strasse 39 certainly functions as a mirror of the twentieth-century history of the quarter. located between the exemplarily renovated hackeschen höfe on the right and the rosenhöfe on the left, the house was originally built in 1769 and, after a series of restructurings, obtained its present structure and form in 1907. while in the 1920s the building was home to a linen factory whose logo is still visible on the façade, in 1927 it was transferred to the ownership of dr ernst wachsner who started to run a canteen for needy jews. in 1940 the nazis confiscated the building as an act of ‘aryanisation’ and the house was sold to friedrich christian prinz zu studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | a r t i c l e s juli székely 12 schaumburg-lippe, former senior civil servant of the reich ministry for public enlightenment and propaganda. this was the period during which, from 1940 to 1947/1952, the first floor of the side-wing gave place to otto weidt’s brush and broom factory classified as ‘important for the war effort’.30 even though after the war there were several apartments available, during the time of socialism the building was primarily utilised for commercial reasons. after 1989, the house, whose condition was already bad enough by that time, was left abandoned, and only in 1995 was it occupied by the artist group dead chickens. cultivating and supporting alternative and independent art, the house at rosenthaler strasse 39 began to function as schwarzenberg house whose name, referring to stefan heym’s similarly titled novel, further underlined the aim of creating an autonomous cultural place.31 the reutilisation of an abandoned space as a space of artistic production unambiguously reflected the general guidelines of the urban redevelopment plans of spandauer vorstadt after the regime change. while the district office of mitte emphasised that a ‘wide cultural offer contributes as a positive factor to the good image and good address of a place’, suggesting that its support of cultural projects helped the renewal of the area, berlin’s former cultural senator thomas flierl even claimed that ‘the discovery, architectural renovation and revaluation of spandauer vorstadt in the 1990s was first and foremost mediated through culture’.32 the symbolic importance of culture in urban political economy, outlined most illustratively by sharon zukin, leaves no doubt that encouraging artistic production within the area was (hoped to be) a form of urban redevelopment.33 thus, the artistic occupation of schwarzenberg house – as the squatting of the house at oranienburger strasse 54-56a, later known as art house tacheles34 – not only signalled the growing presence of an alternative and independent art scene in spandauer vorstadt, but the transformation of the neighbourhood as a dynamic and chic place. at the same time, while schwarzenberg house indeed seems to be very much in line with processes happening in spandauer vorstadt, its position in its studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | a r t i c l e s juli székely 13 larger neighbourhood also appears special. as the fate of the art house tacheles illustrates, many subcultural projects within the ever more gentrified area of hackescher markt have already vanished or are endangered by disappearance. even though schwarzenberg house also faced several threats of liquidation, the building was not (yet) transmitted to the hands of an investor.35 schwarzenberger house – now incorporating the eschschloraque rümschrümp bar, an art house cinema, the neurotitan shop and gallery, various art studios, and also showcasing a flourishing street art scene along with moving metal sculptures in its courtyard – still stands. nevertheless, the reason behind the steady presence of the house is also connected to a peculiarity of rosenthaler strasse 39. the classicist building is not only occupied by alternative and independent art, but also by the memory of the so-called unsung or silent heroes who tried to rescue those persecuted during wwii. there is a strong and visible co-existence between two: the graffiti depicting anne frank corresponds exactly with the image on the poster indicating the entrance of the anne frank centre berlin that, along with otto weidt’s workshop for the blind and the silent heroes memorial centre, also operates in the building. anne frank zentrum entrance, rosenthaler strasse 39 courtyard | author’s photograph studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | a r t i c l e s juli székely 14 although in 1988 there was already a private initiative to erect a memorial plaque commemorating the historical significance of rosenthaler strasse 39, this aim got another impetus only in the new political period.36 in march 1999, museum studies students from the university of applied sciences (berlin) organised an exhibition in the back part of otto weidt’s former brush and broom factory where there were around thirty-five people employed – mainly jews, most of them blind, some even deaf. elaborating on the developments between 1941 and 1943, the exhibition blind trust opened up three rooms of weidt’s factory, which remained nearly untouched during the last decades. based on witnesses’ recollections and focusing on the biographies of former employees inge deutschkron, alice licht, hans israelowicz and the horn family, students documented the various modes of weidt’s effort to protect his workers and their families from deportation.37 the spatial presence of the three rooms (especially the hiding room at the back of the workshop) and the (hi)story behind them proved to be such a strong experience that the number of visitors exceeded all expectations; the exhibition, originally scheduled to last for four weeks, had to be extended. as with sharon macdonald, who in her paper ‘accessing audiences’ extensively examined visitor books at the documentation centre of the former nazi rally grounds in nuremberg, comments in the visitor books of the exhibition blind trust ‘provide access to aspects of visitor meaningconstruction’.38 leafing through the visitor book from 1999 suggests that the success was primarily due to the authenticity of the place. comments like ‘authenticity is impressive’ (a. m.), ‘i want to praise the organisers who discovered this authentic place’ (unknown), ‘the exhibition impressed me a lot in this historically authentic place’ (s. e.) are all returning remarks; and in fact authenticity still plays a central role in the enthusiasm around the site.39 studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | a r t i c l e s juli székely 15 as attested by the explicit claim that ‘this memorial site absolutely has to be preserved’ (a remark from 2001), visitors clearly expressed their wish to have the temporary exhibition transformed into a memorial. the idea of museum blindenwerkstatt otto weidt (under: the cupboard in front of the hiding room) | author’s photograph studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | a r t i c l e s juli székely 16 extending the run of the exhibition step by step was transformed into an idea of its long-term operation. while the organisers, being short in available resources, entrusted the anne frank centre berlin with the content-, personneland finance-wise supervision of the project until the end of 1999, the local government of the district mitte, as well as the heritage departments of the berlin senate articulated their concern about the place with a growing emphasis. while on 5 july 1999 the house was registered as a heritage site, on the initiative of district councillor thomas flier, on 19 september 1999 the exhibition became a highlighted spot during the day of contemporary history, which was organised by the senate department of science, research and culture. in the same year dr michael naumann, the german government’s commissioner for cultural and media affairs, suggested the permanent preservation of the memorial place by linking it institutionally to one of berlin’s memorials or museums. at this point, the process was irreversible. in 2000 the organisers of blind trust founded the friend’s association of blind trust with inge deutschkron as its chair, and in 2001 otto weidt’s workshop for the blind became connected to the jewish museum of berlin. the memorial place was institutionally established. its functioning now ensured, otto weidt’s workshop for the blind raised several questions. while the attempt of documenting and revealing the history of the workshop at an authentic site through the life story of individual people clearly fitted into the current trends of holocaust memorials, its focus on a ‘hero’ who actually tried to rescue those who were persecuted seemed to represent another perspective on the image of germany as a nation of perpetrators. at the same time, comments from the visitor book of the exhibition not only gave evidence of the demand on this ‘other’ side of the german history40, but also showed a growing interest in the issue of heroism.41 in this sense, blind trust can also be understood as being constitutive and representative of the widening of germany’s memory projects. studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | a r t i c l e s juli székely 17 on the level of politics, however, there was a definite aim to embed this ‘other’ side of the history into the well-established semantics of trauma narratives. this endeavour clearly manifested itself in the decision of annexing otto weidt’s workshop for the blind to the jewish museum. similarly, the site also got connected to the jewish history of spandauer vorstadt: the museum organises various tours in the area and narrates the story of the workshop through the memorials and historical buildings located in the neighbourhood and connected to the memory of holocaust. the question of how to position the memory of unsung heroes, especially in relationship to the holocaust, also appeared in the 2001 speech of federal president johannes rau. after making clear the high importance of remembering the holocaust and the unacceptable attempts of its relativisation, he argued: it seems to me that, just like earlier when we were too little occupied with the crimes of the third reich, we are still too little occupied with those who positioned themselves in opposition to these crimes. […] they were heroes, but not in the traditional sense. maybe, however, we often have a completely false image of heroes. anyone who is concerned with the heroines and heroes of the greek and roman antiquity and early christianity, whom we are especially familiar with, learns: they were not born for heroism. they had doubts and they also made mistakes. they had fear and sometimes they wanted to run away. […] but in certain situations, they have overcome all their fears and doubts; they have acted decisively, thereby risking also their own lives. […] these women and men have behaved heroically. […] commemorating ‘unsung heroes’ […] shows us that even during the nazi dictatorship women and men had a room for manoeuvring and had the possibility to make decisions. their example shows that the excuse that there was nothing one could do, is not an excuse but often just a plea.42 rau’s claim to realise an extended commemorative place for unsung heroes was met with a warm response. backed up by the aforementioned purchase of the building by the housing association berlin (wbm) in 2004, it was studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | a r t i c l e s juli székely 18 decided to expand the memorial site. additional rooms within otto weidt’s workshop for the blind, as well as an adjoining institution giving place to the silent heroes memorial centre were to be opened. instead of grossmann’s ‘unsung heroes’, the memorial site utilised the journalist and survivor deutschkron’s notion of ‘silent heroes’ that further highlighted the change of the interpretative framework of heroism.43 the position of commemorating silent heroes, however, still did not seem to be settled. in 2005, instead of the jewish museum, it was the german resistance memorial centre that was commissioned with the planning procedures. even if in the background there was some kind of misunderstanding with the jewish museum (as one of the historians of the silent heroes memorial centre, dr beate kosmala, told me on one occasion), this change in proprietors signified a change in the place of silent heroes within the memorial culture. instead of being understood as solely a ‘jewish’ issue, the notion of silent heroes was incorporated into the wider category of german resistance fighters. this process also crowned wolfgang benz’s comprehensive research project rescuing jews in nazi germany 1933-45 that interpreted solidarity and help as forms of resistance.44 this was the framework within which the memorial place of otto weidt’s workshop for the blind was reopened in 2006 with a revised rosenthaler strasse 39 courtyard, billboard of die gedenkstätte stille helden | author’s photograph studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | a r t i c l e s juli székely 19 and expanded exhibition, and within which two years later the silent heroes memorial centre was realised, as a central place of resistance.45 compared to the numerous authentic places dedicated to the crimes of germans, of course, these institutions occupy only a small place within the city. as kosmala emphasised during our meeting, there was only a limited number of helpers, so ‘we have to be modest’. at the same time, funded now by the state of berlin, by the federal government and by the european union (european regional development fund), otto weidt’s workshop for the blind and silent heroes memorial centre became rooted in german memorial culture as places of resistance to nazism. although from a slightly different perspective, this rootedness was reinforced by the 2002 moving in of the anne frank centre into the schwarzenberg house. narrating the far too short life of anne frank together with the history of national socialism not only reflects the issue of going underground, but the anne frank centre further exemplifies the process through which memories become more and more focused on individuals. schwarzenberg house, now incorporating otto weidt’s workshop for the blind, the silent heroes memorial centre and the anne frank centre, was complete. entering again the courtyard of rosenthaler strasse 39, within the cacophony of spray messages and posters we will come across glass cases attached to the walls. elegantly framed, they call our attention to the historical significance of the place and display information on the memorials located here. farther off, but still in the foreground, we find a door on the left leading up to the first floor to the silent heroes memorial centre where two levels are dedicated to the rescue attempts in germany and german-occupied territories. based on the research findings of the centre for research on antisemitism, the exhibition is centred on the various modalities of help, on individual histories of helpers and of those who were rescued, and on an accessible database for research. we pass through a seminar room, jointly utilised by otto weidt’s workshop for the blind and silent heroes memorial centre for discussions about the notion of heroism, activities like making brushes, or meetings with holocaust survivors – all studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | a r t i c l e s juli székely 20 part of the ‘educational’ programmes. leaving the seminar room on the other side, we already find ourselves in otto weidt’s workshop for the blind. here, the number of visitors is measurably greater, which is – as suggested by the comments in the visitor book – in all probability due to the fact that original appliances frame the histories of otto weidt’s successful and failed rescue attempts.46 going back to the courtyard, one continues to stroll between graffitis and explores the anne frank centre. we go upstairs, and while listening to the excerpts from anne frank’s famous diary, we unintentionally look out of the window facing the rear part of the courtyard. we start to gaze at tourists going in and out from the neurotitan alternative shop and gallery until we realise with excitement that a monstrous frog sculpture started to flutter its wings. conclusion processes of memorialisations in spandauer vorstadt, as i have argued, simultaneously showed a strong estrangement from heroic narratives, as well as its cautious reintroduction in the form of ‘silent heroes’. even though the two imaginations represented two different theoretical positions of heroes and, ultimately, two different perspectives within german history, this differentiation has been eased by several factors. on the one hand, the current conceptual and aesthetic structure of memorial sites remembering the jewish victims, as well as silent heroes appeared alike. highlighting the process of research, emphasising the everyday man, and stressing the attempt of documentation created a link between the two. on the other hand, silent heroes also became incorporated into german memory politics as resistance fighters against national socialism. in this sense, silent heroes unambiguously overtook the official role of traditional heroes as historical, social and cultural models for german society. nevertheless, visitor’s comments, such as ‘this exhibition is worthier or tells me more than the discussions about a monument’ (1999) or ‘no studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | a r t i c l e s juli székely 21 holocaust memorial can evoke the horror of the disastrous history of the nazi era as much as these rooms with their real exhibits’ (1999) suggest that the memorial place of otto weidt’s workshop for the blind, as well as the silent heroes memorial centre can still define itself differently from memorials dedicated to the holocaust. however, the two – on a basic and inescapable level – become bound together through the life of otto weidt, who in 1947, probably for the first time in germany, proposed the construction of a memorial commemorating the victims of the holocaust. the reaction to the silent heroes’ request was – at that time – silence. studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | a r t i c l e s juli székely 22 endnotes 1 l.e. grinin, ’the role of an individual in history: a reconsideration’, in: social evolution & history, 9/2 (2010) 95-136. 2 m. todorova, bones of contention (budapest new york, 1999) 487. 3 s. hook, the hero in history: a study in limitation and possibility (boston, 1965) 229. 4 see for example j.e. dimsdale, survivors, victims, and perpetrators: essays on the nazi holocaust (washington, 1980); b. giesen, triumph and trauma (boulder london, 2004); b. giesen & c. schneider, tätertrauma (konstanz, 2004); a. assmann, der lange schatten der vergangenheit. erinnerungskultur und geschichtspolitik (münchen, 2006); g. rosenthal, the holocaust in three generations: families of victims and perpetrators of the nazi regime (opladen, 2010). 5 h. münkler, der wandel des krieges. von der symmetrie zur assymetrie (göttingen, 2006). 6 see for example p. freedman, ‘cowardice, heroism and the legendary origins of catalonia’, in: past & present, 121 (1998) 3-28; k. verdery, the political lives of dead bodies: reburial and postsocialist change (new york, 1999); todorova, bones of contention; g. šmidchens, ‘national heroic narratives in the baltics as a source for nonviolent political action’, in: slavic review 66 (2007) 484-508; v. datta, heroes and legends of fin-de-siècle france. gender, politics and national identity (cambridge, 2011). 7 c. jones, new heroes in antiquity: from achilles to antinoos (cambridge, 2010). 8 see for example j. reiling & c. rohde, das 19. jahrhundert und seine helden: literarische figurationen des (post-)heroischen (bielefeld, 2011); c. macleod, heroes of invention: technology, liberalism and british identity, 1750-1914 (cambridge new york, 2007); g. reichardt, heroen der kunst. standbilder und denkmale für bildende künstler im 19. jahrhundert (köln, 2009). studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | a r t i c l e s juli székely 23 9 r. von den hoff, r.g. asch, a. aurnhammer e.a., ‘das heroische in der neueren kulturhistorischen forschung: ein kritischer bericht’, in: h-soz-kult, 28/7/2015 < http://www.hsozkult.de/searching/id/forschungsberichte-2216> [accessed 7/10/2016]. 10 see for example s. hopkins, girl heroes: the new force in popular culture (annandale, 2002); a. friedrich & a. rauscher, superhelden zwischen comic und film (münchen, 2007); b. kainz, comic. film. helden: heldenkonzepte und medienwissenschaftliche analysen (vienna, 2009); s. shimpach, television in transition: the life and afterlife of the narrative action hero (chichester malden, 2010). 11 j. lau, n. bolz, h.-t. lehmann e.a. ‘heldengedenken. über das heroische phantasma’, in: merkur, 9/10 (2009). 12 s. becker & a. eagle, ‘the heroism of women and men’, in: american psychologist, 59 (2004) 163–178; e. goren, ‘society’s use of the hero following a national trauma’, in: the american journal of psychoanalysis, 67 (2007) 37-52; s. neiman, moral clarity: a guide for grown-up idealists (orlando, 2008); p. zimbardo, ‘why the world needs heroes’, in: europe’s journal of psychology, 7 (2011) 402–407. 13 the building of neue wache was completed in 1818 and served to house the soldiers assigned to guard the king. however, while in 1931 it was re-functioned as a memorial to the dead of wwi, in 1960 it was transformed into a memorial to the victims of fascism and militarism. after the regime change, chancellor helmut kohl’s decision to redesign the memorial as a central memorial to the victims of war and tyranny was met with a loud disagreement as kohl wanted to create a single category of victims as an expression of national unity. for more details, see b. ladd, the ghosts of berlin: confronting german history in the urban landscape (chicago, 1998). 14 assmann, der lange schatten; giesen triumph; giesen & schneider, tätertrauma. 15 e. langenbacher, ‘changing memory regimes in contemporary germany?’, in: german politics and society, 21/2 (2003) 46-68; giesen & schneider, tätertrauma; m. klundt, heldenmythos und opfertaumel (köln, 2004); a. michael, ’heroes and taboos: the expansion of memory in contemporary germany’, in: war, literature and the arts: an international journal of the humanities, 17/12 (2005) 58-73; b. http://www.hsozkult.de/searching/id/forschungsberichte-2216 studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | a r t i c l e s juli székely 24 niven, germans as victims. remembering the past in contemporary germany (ann arbor, 2006); a. assmann, ‘re-framing memory. between individual and collective forms of constructing the past’, in k. tilmans, f. van vree & j. winter (eds.), performing the past. memory, history and identity in modern europe (amsterdam, 2010) 35-50. 16 as both langenbacher and niven argue, the topic of german victims was never completely abandoned. yet, after the 2000s the nature of these discourses radically changed. on the one hand, instead of promoting an absolute german victimhood, these memory narratives acknowledged german guilt, too. on the other hand, while the subject of german suffering had been largely monopolised by the right wing before, left-wing intellectuals and politicians also embraced the topic now. see langenbacher, ‘changing memory regimes’; niven, germans as victims. 17 d. riffel, unbesungene helden. die ehrungsinitiative des berliner senats 1958 bis 1966 (berlin, 2007) 40. 18 riffel, unbesungene helden, 57. 19 v. hübner & c. oehmig (eds.), spandauer vorstadt in berlin-mitte. ein kunstund denkmalführer (petersberg, 2003) 11, 234; verein stiftung scheunenviertel (ed.), das scheunenviertel. spuren eines verlorenen berlins (berlin, 1994) 7, back cover. 20 s. endlich, ’berlin. einführung’, in: s. endlich, n. goldenbogen, b. herlemann e.a. (eds.), gedenkstätten für die opfer des nationalsozialismus (bonn, 1999) vol. 2, 2835 (32). 21 t. flierl, ‘kunstgeschichte im stadtraum’, in: hübner & oehmig, spandauer vorstadt 234-240 (237). 22 w. herzogenrath, j. sartorius & c. tannert, die endlichkeit der freiheit (berlin, 1990). 23 a. assmann, erinnerungsräume. formen und wandlungen des kulturellen gedächtnisses (münchen, 2010) 377. 24 b. niven, ’from countermonument to combimemorial: developments in german memorialization’, in: journal of war & culture studies, 6/1 (2013) 75-91. studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | a r t i c l e s juli székely 25 25 p. muir, shimon attie’s writing on the wall. history, memory, aesthetics (farnham, 2010) 82. 26 muir, shimon attie, 9. 27 muir, shimon attie, 88. 28 j.e. young, at memory’s edge: after-images of the holocaust in contemporary art and architecture (new haven, 2000). 29 k. harjes, 'stumbling stones: holocaust memorials, national identity, and democratic inclusion in berlin', in: german politics & society, 74 (2005) 138-151; l. apel, 'stumbling blocks in germany', in: rethinking history, 18 (2013) 181-194. 30 after the war, weidt continued running the firm; his wife else took over after his death in 1947. in 1952 the provisioning office of east berlin city council closed down the workshop for the blind. 31 in the 1948 novel, the free republic schwarzenberg functioned as a utopian republic after the german capitulation in 1945, when for unclear reasons neither americans nor the soviet troops occupied the district schwarzenberg in the ore mountains for fourty-two days. 32 bezirksamt mitte von berlin, die sanierung der spandauer vorstadt (berlin, 2008) 31; conrad. flierl, ‘kunstgeschichte’, 234. 33 s. zukin, loft living: culture and capital in urban change (new brunswick, 1989); idem, the cultures of cities (cambridge, 1995). 34 art house tacheles was occupied in 1990 and closed in 2012. 35 while after 1989 schwarzenberg association rented the building from the wbm (housing association berlin) for symbolic sums, in 1997-2000 the building was transferred back to the jewish community who in 2003 requested the vacating of the house. following a series of campaigns supporting schwarzenberg house and several unsuccessful attempts of auctioning the building, in 2004 wbm decided to purchase the house for an amount of 2,695 million euros that got financed partly by the federal government and partly by the german lottery foundation berlin. even though wbm guaranteed to keep the present function and physical studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | a r t i c l e s juli székely 26 appearance of the building, current conditions were ensured only until 2015, when negotiations started again. 36 inge deutschkron initiated the installation of the memorial plaque. it got inaugurated in 1993 and was replaced with a bronze memorial plaque put on the ground in 1990. 37 according to wolfgang benz, weidt altogether helped fifty-six jews, from whom twenty-seven survived the war. among these, only seven of his employees (inge deutschkron, erna haney, hans israelowicz, willy latter, alice licht, herbert sommerfeld, simon weiss) survived. see w. benz (ed.), überleben im dritten reich. juden im untergrund und ihre helfer (munich, 2003). 38 s. macdonald, ‘accessing audiences: visiting visitor books’, in: museum and society, 3/3 (2005) 119-136. throughout this paper, comments are referred to with only using the visitors’ name initials. 39 ‘this is an essential exhibition on a historically authentic place. the walls, the floorboards, the furnaces, the court still mediate the feeling of narrowness and threat of that time. i have rarely experienced that the nazi period […] becomes as spontaneously present as here’ (k. f., 7/3/2001); ‘behind shabby facades noble spirit in this exhibition […]’ (unknown, 3/4/2002); ‘this place with its authenticity in the heart of the new berlin trying to obliterate the past holds the horrors of old times and makes its happenings come alive. it is very important to keep it as it is so that we can experience and learn how it really was. […]’ (i. p., 12/7/2004); ‘the grief, the whispers, the dust. the distant past lies between the bricks, the floorboards, the old walls. you have to touch them to be able to understand. the smell, the old windows. they say, who saves even one life, saves the entire world […]’ (i. f., israel, 1/1/2005); ‘beyond the great and famous and aesthetically designed museums, which are necessarily dedicated to the memory of a terrible period, these three rooms have the aura of the real and hide the history in the everyday world’ (unknown, 30/6/2005); ‘moving, authentic – there are still good people’ (n. h., h. h., israel, 11/2/2007); ‘a schindler-story. authentic, stirring, worth of being continuously told’ (t., 8/2008); ‘the authenticity of this place is mediated with sensitive and vivid means. a very good exhibition. thank you for this place’ (c., berlin, 9/2011); ‘our present time needs pause, needs memory – to recognise that people always have both: good and evil side by side. but the studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | a r t i c l e s juli székely 27 exhibition, the preserved rooms, the authenticity reinforces my conviction: the good will prevail’ (b. h., 10/3/2012). 40 ‘[…] very impressive & well done. also it is important to show that individual germans (berliner) had the determination to try and save persecuted jews’ (j. e. d., anne frank house, amsterdam, 9/7/1999); ‘it is good to see and realise that it was possible to resist and to provide assistance. i think it’s very important to show these examples as a positive signal for civil courage that i also wish for our present times’ (unknown, 9/9/2000); ‘it is astonishing that the few non-jewish people who were willing to risk their own lives to save jews, have experienced and still experience so little recognition in germany. all the more remarkable and important the issue seems to me to be’ (unknown, 11/2002); ‘it is touching, important and noteworthy to find […] such an authentic place of the history of german resistance that actually represents the “other germany”. however, as sigmund freud said, the voice of reason is quiet, and likewise, the rooms are quiet, the walls only whisper to us. in comparison, the image of berlin favouring again gigantomania appears as a bugbear. the righteous among nations, as otto weidt was one of them, really deserve no more publicity? […]’ (s. k., vienna, 15/12/2002); ‘why in germany there is still no public or governmental memorial for these brave people? why only in israel? civil courage is still worth nothing?’ (unknown, 13/2/2003); ‘for me – as a child of the perpetrator generation – it is very important that there have been people such as otto weidt in the nazi germany’ (d. k., 21/10/2004,). 41 ‘on a barren and inconspicuous place there was a heroic rescue and assistance provided. had there been only a few more like weidt, then yes, the world would look different and perhaps also the face of humanity less ugly – just human. […]’ (c. p., jerusalem, 7/7/2002); ‘a wonderful story of a brave pacifists. weidt is a human hero’ (l. and y. l., haifa, 8/2005); ‘again and again, we admire the heroism of individuals’ (two citizens of jerusalem, 13/9/2005); ‘an incredible place with the heroic story of a dear man […]’ (r. and r. k., m. t., d. and g. b., jerusalem, 6/4/2007); ‘[…] good to know that real saints existed, there is still hope for the mankind!’ (family a., haifa, israel, 30/7/2007); ‘otto weidt, you were a hero!’ (l. k., 23/11/2010); ‘the helper/rescuer were/are true heroes – models forever!’ (r. w., 8/8/2012). studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | a r t i c l e s juli székely 28 42 j. rau, rede zu inge deutschkron aus anlass der vernastaltung ‘grenzdenker’ <http://www.bundespraesident.de/shareddocs/reden/de/johannesrau/reden/2001/03/20010311_rede.html> [accessed 27/11/2013]. 43 i. deutschkron, sie blieben im schatten. ein denkmal für ‘stille helden’ (berlin, 2003). 44 the research project was led by benz and his team at the centre for research on antisemitism (technical university, berlin, 1997-2002). 45 this point was also underlined by berlin mayor klaus wowereit: ‘the federal government and berlin created a central place that remembers this form of resistance against national socialism.’ k. wowereit, rede des regierenden bürgermeisters von berlin, klaus wowereit, anlässlich des festaktes zur eröffnung der gedenkstätte ‘stille helden’ am 27. oktober 2008 im berliner rathaus <http://www.gedenkstaette-stillehelden.de/uploads/media/rede_rbm_wowereit_stille_helden.pdf> [accessed 30/11/2013]. 46 the official number of visitors of the silent heroes memorial centre went from 9000 in 2009 to 12400 in 2012. in the case of otto weidt’s workshop for the blind, this number rose from 16045 in 2001 to 66707 in 2012. http://www.bundespraesident.de/shareddocs/reden/de/johannes-rau/reden/2001/03/20010311_rede.html http://www.bundespraesident.de/shareddocs/reden/de/johannes-rau/reden/2001/03/20010311_rede.html http://www.gedenkstaette-stille-helden.de/uploads/media/rede_rbm_wowereit_stille_helden.pdf http://www.gedenkstaette-stille-helden.de/uploads/media/rede_rbm_wowereit_stille_helden.pdf protodiplomacy across the mediterranean: the catalan participation in the first congresses of byzantine studies in southeastern europe during the interwar period lucila mallart universitat pompeu fabra in the interwar period, catalan nationalists sought to participate actively in post-world war i political forums in order to inscribe catalonia in discussions on national minorities. figures like lluís nicolau d’olwer (1888-1961) or joan estelrich (1896-1958) unsuccessfully fought to have their claims heard at organisations such as the league of nations. this has been considered a form of protodiplomacy (núñez-seixas 2010). this paper will explore the ways in which catalan politicians and intellectuals, such as the abovementioned lluís nicolau d’olwer and josep puig i cadafalch (1867-1956), engaged in forms of protodiplomacy in the same period, in the context of the byzantine studies congresses that were organised in south-eastern europe in 1924 and 1927. this engagement is significant for a number of reasons. firstly, it shows that territorial entities with conflicting agendas (separatist, in the case of catalonia; agglutinating, in the case of romania) could build narratives that reciprocally reinforced each other’s nationalist objectives. secondly, it alters the conventional narrative according to which josep puig i cadafalch, former president of the catalan mancomunitat (1917-1923) retired from politics after general primo de rivera’s coup d’état, and devoted himself to merely academic practices (e.g. balcells 2013). instead, his participation in those congresses should be framed in the both implicit and explicit political character of those meetings (maufroy 2010). finally, the approach of this paper highlights the eminently transnational character of the spaces in which those nationalist narratives and claims where discussed and negotiated (alcalde 2018). keywords: protodiplomacy, transnational history, academic congresses, interwar history, catalonia studies on national movements 7 (2021) | articles | 2 lucila mallart introduction between 1924 and 1934, a series of catalan historians and art historians became regular participants in the international congresses of byzantine studies held in bucharest (1924), belgrade (1927), athens (1930) and sofia (1934).1 they spoke, in different ways, of the connections between catalan and byzantians in the middle ages. the group was led by josep puig i cadafalch (1867-1956), an architect, art historian and politician who served as president of the mancomunitat (a federation of catalan provinces) between 1917 and 1923. puig’s art historical work dealt with the evolution of romanesque style in medieval europe, and the byzantinology congresses gave him a chance to explore similarities between western romanesque and moldavian art. puig was joined by lluís nicolau d’olwer (1888-1961), a medievalist historian and politician who studied the catalan settlements in the byzantine empire during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. nicolau was student of antoni rubió i lluch (1856-1937), who also influenced the work of the romanian historians constantin marinescu (1891-1970) and nicolae iorga (1871-1940), who organised the first congress. like puig and nicolau, iorga was also politically active, and he became prime minister of romania in 1931 and 1932. this article explores the ways in which those scholarly engagements across the mediterranean may be considered a form of protodiplomacy. in the aftermath of the first world war, international academic gatherings became privileged spaces in which the aspirations of small nations and national minorities were showcased. this was especially significant in the balkans, where the disintegration of the austro-hungarian and the ottoman empires had produced several new states. in spain, the coup d’état of general primo de rivera in 1923 brought an end to puig’s presidency at the mancomunitat and blocked the road of catalonia’s autonomy. in this context, the first congresses of byzantine studies offered an arena in studies on national movements 7 (2021) | articles lucila mallart 3 | which to discuss conflicting views of the future of the balkans, and in which to present catalonia’s nationalist struggles. the existing scholarship has considered that primo’s coup was a turning a point in puig’s life (despite the fact that he initially supported the coup) and that he abandoned his political career and turned to art historical research.2 in contrast to that, the present article reads puig and nicolau’s engagement in south-eastern europe as a form of protodiplomacy, that is, a type of international engagement employed by regional or local actors that cannot use conventional channels of international diplomacy and seek the emancipation of a stateless nationality.3 this can sometimes be intertwined with para-diplomacy, that is, the use of non-explicitly political channels to reach an international audience.4 as seixas argued, culture-based diplomacy was a preferred course of action to internationalise the catalan nationalist struggle in the interwar period. joan estelrich (1896-1958), for instance, argued that political demands would better reach an international audience through the promotion of catalan language, literature, and culture abroad.5 other activists, like the abovementioned lluís nicolau d’olwer, attempted to have their voices heard at international political forums such as the league of nations.6 this article draws on previous research that has defined the first congresses of byzantine studies as diplomatic events. the attendance, behaviour, and contributions of the participants, especially those from countries who had played a prominent part in the war, such as france and germany, were closely watched.7 this article analyses the catalan participation in the first two international congresses of byzantine studies held in bucharest (1924) and belgrade (1927). it takes into account the different layers that attached political and ideological meaning to the meetings. to do so, it first discusses the significance of iorga’s concept of south-eastern europe, and it then analyses the participation of puig, nicolau, iorga and marinescu in the studies on national movements 7 (2021) | articles | 4 lucila mallart abovementioned events, and the connections that emerged from them, including iorga’s trips to spain in 1927 and 1929. the politics of nicolae iorga’s ‘south-eastern europe’ nicolae iorga has been considered one of the most influential romanian historians of the twentieth century and, according to marius turda, it was him who ‘successfully provided romanian nationalism with the essential notions of historical continuity and cultural unity’.8 between 1890 and 1894 iorga studied history in paris and in leipzig, and shortly after became a professor at the university of bucharest.9 he collaborated with the commission for historic monuments which, like elsewhere in europe, aimed at recording and protecting the country’s historical heritage. he contributed to the awakening of romanian nationalism through the magazines sămănătorul (1901-1910) and neamul românesc (1906-1940). the modern romanian state had only been created in 1878 with the independence of the united principalities of moldavia and wallachia from the ottoman empire, which had ruled the region since 1541. meanwhile, transylvania, a region historically connected to the romanian lands, remained part of the austro-hungarian empire.10 iorga was involved in the movement that sought the establishment of ‘greater romania’ through the incorporation of transylvania in the romanian crown, something that eventually happened at the end of the first world war, which entailed the disintegration of both the ottoman and the austro-hungarian empires. in 1910 he founded the conservative democratic nationalist party (pnd), and held several positions in the parliament and romanian government until he became prime minister in 1931-1932. he was murdered in 1940, allegedly by members of the iron guard – romania’s fascist party – following his criticism of the country’s fall within the nazi sphere of influence. during his lifetime, iorga’s prestige extended beyond romania: he was awarded honoris studies on national movements 7 (2021) | articles lucila mallart 5 | causa doctorates by several european universities including oxford and paris, and served as a member of different academic societies and institutes and as a corresponding member of national academies throughout europe. iorga’s ideas were notably influenced by the german historian karl lamprecht (1856-1915), with whom he studied during his years in leipzig. lamprecht has been considered ‘one of the key intellectual influences in east central european historiography in the early twentieth century overall’.11 one of the most important elements of his historiographical method was the belief that each individual nation’s history had to be studied in the context of the influences and interconnections developed with other countries and regional spheres.12 in line with lamprecht, iorga believed that supra-national territories were crucial to creating and disseminating each individual nation’s voice into the wider world. it was through broader regions that nations such as romania could contribute to the global development of humankind, and it was through the study of those regions that a nation’s true past could be unveiled.13 ‘the life of a people’, he wrote, is continuously enmeshed with the lives of other peoples, depending on and continuously influencing them. each nation is an energy with its own sources and particular circumstances, its special character and mission. but none of these energies can be absolutely isolated for study and must not be isolated in this way.14 iorga used lamprecht’s ideas to build his concept of south-eastern europe, the supra-national region that integrated the countries that emerged from the former byzantine and ottoman empires. he identified a historical continuum bonding greeks, bulgarians, serbs, romanians, albanians and turks. this common history could be traced back to the times of the thracians, was developed under byzantine and ottoman studies on national movements 7 (2021) | articles | 6 lucila mallart rule, and reached the early twentieth century with a need for political reconstruction in the aftermath of the first world war.15 in iorga’s conception of south-eastern europe, romania appeared as a natural regional leader. this was due to its central geographical location, but also because of its alleged ability to integrate both regional (southeastern) and national (romanian) values.16 in doing so, iorga confronted other scholars, like the bulgarian ethnographer ivan d. shishmanov (1862-1928) or the serb geographer jovan cvijić (1865-1927), who put forward competing versions of the ‘balkans’.17 the reconstruction of a modern ‘byzantium’ was indeed one of iorga’s most important intellectual drives throughout his life.18 he discussed it in numerous publications, such as byzance après byzance (1935).19 he also founded several organisations to that end, such as the institute for southeast european studies, created in 1913 in bucharest. he also established specialised journals such as the bulletin de l’institut pour l’étude de l’europe sud-orientale (in 1914) and the revue historique du sud-est européen (in 1924).20 in april 1924 he organised the first international congress of byzantine studies, held in bucharest. it is in the context of this intellectual project that we must understand iorga’s interest in catalonia’s history and historiography, and the participation of catalan scholars in the international congresses of byzantine studies. bucharest, 1924: political representation and brotherhood across the mediterranean when josep puig i cadafalch first visited bucharest in 1924, he was already familiar with the situation of national minorities at the borders of europe. puig participated in spanish politics during a period known as the restoration, which began with the restoration of the bourbon studies on national movements 7 (2021) | articles lucila mallart 7 | monarchy in 1874 and ended with the coup d’état of general primo de rivera in 1923. this was a time of political stability that was characterised by the rotation of the conservative and the liberal parties in the government.21 this was also the context in which catalan nationalism acquired political representation for the first time. the conservative nationalist party lliga regionalista, of which puig was a founding member, won the barcelona municipal election in 1905, and in 1907 puig was elected as a deputy to the spanish congress. the lliga also ruled the barcelona provincial government (diputació de barcelona) and the mancomunitat, a federation of catalan provinces that was established in 1914. enric prat de la riba (1870-1917) was the first president of this commonwealth between 1914 and 1917, and puig took over between 1917 and primo’s 1923 coup.22 he initially supported the coup, but eventually left catalonia and spent part of primo’s dictatorship (1923-1930) abroad.23 in a speech that he gave in 1907 at the spanish congress, puig used examples of nationalist movements in europe, from norway to the finns, the czechs, the serbs, the greeks and the turks, in order to outline catalonia’s singularity within the spanish context.24 in 1912 he participated in the ‘congrès des nationalités’, a short-lived initiative that aimed at widening the voice of sub-state nationalisms in europe.25 when he was re-elected as president of the mancomunitat in 1919, he gave a speech in which he defended the creation of an ‘institution of propaganda of catalonia’ (institució de propaganda de catalunya) to counterbalance the fact that the region was little known abroad. he complained about the fact that the spanish state rarely sent catalan representatives to foreign lands, and suggested that catalan ‘science’ had a greater chance at succeeding at international conferences than its spanish counterpart.26 during the 1920s he travelled to many of the newly created countries that had caught his attention in the previous decade. after bucharest in 1924, he attended congresses in serbia in studies on national movements 7 (2021) | articles | 8 lucila mallart 1927, in norway in 1928, and in greece – including a trip to istanbul – in 1930.27 despite the fact that puig no longer held a formal political position after 1923, his stays in those countries were never purely academic. the different facets of his life and career were always closely intertwined. in a letter that he sent to iorga on 7 november 1922, puig used stamped paper from the presidency of the mancomunitat, even though he only addressed academic matters.28 when iorga invited puig and rubió to the bucharest congress, he did it so on the grounds that ‘catalonia could be represented by a scholar of your importance and a tireless researcher of the catalan studies in greece like m. rubió i lluch’.29 in line with that, during the opening ceremony puig paid his respects to the organising country on behalf of catalonia and not spain.30 and during the closing event, he expressed his satisfaction with the attention given to catalonia during the congress.31 however, this affiliation was not always consistent: in the ‘list of members’ of the congress he and rubió appeared under the headline ‘spain’, and during the closing event he reportedly spoke as a ‘representative’ of his ‘spanish colleagues’.32 considering conference participants as ‘representatives’ of the countries they belonged to was common in the first congresses of byzantine studies. delegates participated not only as individual researchers but also as representatives of their countries, and thus their presence, attitudes and scholarly ideas could also be read as ‘diplomatic acts’.33 in line with that, no german, austrian or hungarian scholars were invited to the bucharest congress but, in belgrade, french and german delegates shared expressions of fraternity.34 studies on national movements 7 (2021) | articles lucila mallart 9 | figure 1: dimineața, 23 april 1924, front cover, uc 2542, arxiu nacional de catalunya. fons puig i cadafalch. the interview ‘de vorbă cu d. puig i cadafalc, președintele uniunei provinciale catalane’ can be seen on the top right corner. studies on national movements 7 (2021) | articles | 10 lucila mallart puig’s ‘representative’ role extended beyond the conference, as shown in an interview that he gave to the romanian newspaper dimineața during his stay in bucharest [figure 1].35 although he had been deposed as president of the mancomunitat a few months earlier, in the interview he was presented as the ‘president of the catalan provincial union’ that was ‘suspended’ at the time. there was in fact another president, alfons sala i argemí (1863-1945), appointed by primo and who would hold the position until the mancomunitat was finally dismantled in march 1925. however, puig did not seem to recognise that authority. in the interview, he also expressed his will with regards to catalonia’s autonomy: he argued that romania’s ‘national culture’ would be a model for ‘ourselves’ and argued that catalonia found itself in a ‘struggle for more autonomy’. puig made clear that he did not aspire to catalonia’s independence, but to wider recognition and strength of the region within the spanish state: ‘we understand our autonomy but still within the spanish federation. but we want a stronger affirmation of our national character [which] made us create a catalan cultural movement for encouraging and supporting patriotism’.36 it has been argued that the first two international congresses of byzantine studies contributed to the ‘affirmation of the young balkan countries in the international stage’.37 the gatherings did not only consist of academic conversations, but also included official receptions presided by heads of state, museum visits, and excursions.38 during the bucharest congress, delegates went on a one-week trip to key heritage sites that highlighted the medieval past of the modern romanian state, and reinforced the role of the principalities of moldavia and wallachia in the construction of the nation. the outline included visits to iași, former capital of the principality of moldavia; curtea de argeș, the first capital of the principality of wallachia; and the cozia monastery, the burial site of king mircea the elder of wallachia (d. 1418), renamed ‘mircea the great’ by iorga.39 the monastery of curtea de argeș had a crucial role in studies on national movements 7 (2021) | articles lucila mallart 11 | the construction of romania’s modern identity in the late nineteenth century.40 the congresses contributed to building a neo-byzantine cultural and political space in which, according to iorga, catalans also played a role. in his invitation letter, iorga stated that catalonia and romania were ‘brother’ and ‘sister’ [figure 2]. if puig and rubió, he wrote, accepted the invitation to the bucharest congress, ‘the foundations would be laid for a cultural exchange between your beautiful and brotherly catalonia and its romanian sister’.41 these were perhaps polite words, but they were also inscribed in a broader narrative that connected catalans to the medieval history of the balkans. this narrative was first developed by iorga’s student constantin marinescu (1891-1970), who was interested in the presence of the crown of aragon (to which the principality of catalonia belonged in the middle ages) in the eastern mediterranean during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.42 in a series of articles that he wrote during the early 1920s, marinescu built a narrative of fraternity between catalans and the different communities that had inhabited the balkans during the middle ages. catalans arrived in the eastern mediterranean in the early fourteenth century when the byzantine emperor andronikos ii palaiologos (12591332) hired the company of mercenaries known as companyia catalana to fight anatolian rulers. those fighters eventually settled in greece and in 1319 they established the duchy of neopatras, which was annexed to the crown and existed until 1390.43 in addition to that, the kings of aragon established numerous diplomatic contacts with the palaiologos dynasty, who ruled constantinople until 1453, and other eastern monarchs. studies on national movements 7 (2021) | articles | 12 lucila mallart figure 2: letter from nicolae iorga to josep puig i cadafalch, 20 december 1923, uc 1414, arxiu nacional de catalunya. fons puig i cadafalch. studies on national movements 7 (2021) | articles lucila mallart 13 | these exchanges were the focus of many of marinescu’s works. at the piece that he presented in the bucharest congress, he explored the diplomatic relations of the kings of aragon martin v the humane (13561410) and ferdinand i of antequera (1380-1416) with the byzantine emperor manuel ii palaiologos (1391-1425).44 in other works, he depicted the aragonese kings as supporters of different eastern communities that fought against imperial rule, such as the armenian king oshin (1282-1320) and the albanian leader skanderbeg (14051468).45 marinescu often discussed his work with catalan scholars, such as lluís nicolau d’olwer, with whom he corresponded and exchanged publications for almost a decade, between 1926 and 1934. nicolau was an internationally renowned medievalist – on one occasion, marinescu called him ‘the best connoisseur of the catalan expansion in the orient’.46 he was also a prominent politician: initially a member of the lliga regionalista, he later became a minister in the first government of the second spanish republic, in 1931.47 nicolau was a key figure in the dissemination of the catalan cause abroad during the 1920s. he lived in geneva, where he acted as president of the union académique internationale, and in 1924 he became an observer to the league of nations together with other catalan activists such as manuel massó i llorens (1876-1952).48 at the league, he unsuccessfully tried to include catalonia’s struggle for autonomy in the discussion on the protection of the national minorities that emerged after the first world war.49 nicolau’s correspondence with marinescu reinforced the abovementioned narrative of companionship between catalans and romanians. in 1926 marinescu rejoiced at the fact that nicolau had sent him some of his works on the catalan military man and writer ramon muntaner (1265-1336), a prominent figure in the medieval expansion of the crown of aragon.50 one of the works was probably l’expansió de catalunya en la mediterrània oriental, one of nicolau’s most important studies on national movements 7 (2021) | articles | 14 lucila mallart books, published earlier that year.51 l’expansió was reviewed in the 1927 spring issue of the revue historique du sud-est européen. the review, probably by iorga, highlighted that the book included ‘completely unknown information on every page’.52 in his letter, marinescu claimed that it had been his long wish that catalan scholars also contributed to the study of the eastern expansion of the crown. this, he argued, contributed to ‘highlighting the role of the catalans of the past in the history of the middle ages’.53 belgrade, 1927: conflicting views of south-eastern unity in bucharest, puig had presented a paper on the connections between late medieval moldavian churches and eleventh-century romanesque art.54 this was connected to his major research project in the 1920s, which traced the evolution of romanesque style through europe. 55 he further developed the topic three years later, during the second international congress of byzantine studies in belgrade in april 1927. 56 during the congress marinescu and nicolau presented two papers that developed the connections between ‘catalans and byzantians’, in the words of the byzantinist sévérien salaville (1881-1965). marinescu’s paper explored the relationship between the king of aragon alphonse v the magnanimous (1396-1458) and the byzantian emperor john viii (1392-1448), also from the palaiologos dynasty. in turn, nicolau recalled a catalan account of the siege of the greek island of rhodes by the mamluk sultanate in 1444.57 marinescu discussed his research with nicolau before the congress and used the latter’s work to build his research on alphonse v.58 studies on national movements 7 (2021) | articles lucila mallart 15 | figure 3. handwritten note detailing the excursions programme of the belgrade congress, uc 2543, arxiu nacional de catalunya. fons puig i cadafalch. studies on national movements 7 (2021) | articles | 16 lucila mallart in belgrade puig was warmly received by fernando alcalá galiano, count of torrijos (1883-1958), who was at the time the spanish ambassador to the then kingdom of serbs, croats and slovenes.59 alcalá galiano addressed puig as ‘president of the catalan mancomunitat’ and argued that he ‘personified and represented’ the aspirations of the region.60 in a subsequent letter, alcalá galiano corrected himself and referred to puig as ‘former president of the mancomunitat’.61 all the while, he sought puig’s help in granting a summer position in barcelona for a friend of his, a young serbian jew with spanish ancestry named bosco davitcho. alcalá galiano also shared explicit concerns about the political situation in spain and wished for ‘better times’, and conveyed that he hoped that puig could eventually return to formal politics.62 the fact that an embassy delegate sympathised with a political outcast like puig reflects, perhaps, the weaknesses of primo’s regime in the period 1925-1930. the diversity of the political families that conformed it led to instability and the eventual collapse of the dictatorship.63 puig’s political past permeated his academic participations both in romania and in serbia, and this was in line with the general ethos of the events. one of the opening speeches of the belgrade congress expressed regret that the original unity of worship of southern slavs had been broken during the middle ages, and reclaimed a ‘byzantine influence’, safeguarded by serbs, as expression of the spiritual unity of the south slavic ‘people’.64 this challenged iorga’s idea that romania was meant to have a hegemonic role in south-eastern europe. catalan delegates glimpsed that cultural unity was a concern for the organisers of the congress, and thus nicolau spoke of the ‘binders’ of the ‘yugoslav people’ in an interview that he gave to the catalan newspaper la publicitat a few weeks after the event.65 during the congress, delegates visited a collection of copies of medieval frescoes gathered by the king, alexander i, in honour of ‘the serbian kings of the middle ages’. the collection included sites in serbia, macedonia and kosovo, and participants studies on national movements 7 (2021) | articles lucila mallart 17 | received a printed copy of the collection as ‘souvenir’.66 as in romania, delegates were also taken to key heritage sites such as the ravanica monastery near belgrade; the town of kruševac, founded by the national hero lazar hrebeljanović (1329-1389), who died in the battle of kosovo; the church of staro nagoričane and the city of skopje (in macedonia); and pristina (in kosovo) [figure 3].67 the outline of the trip was in line with the policies towards serbian hegemony that shaped the yugoslavian nation-building process during the interwar period.68 it highlighted sites related to serbia’s medieval history and disregarded locations in croatia and slovenia, the other two countries that formed the kingdom of serbs, croats and slovenes, renamed kingdom of yugoslavia after 1929. the serb geographer and ethnologist jovan cvijić, who died a few months before the congress, in january 1927, was crucial in academically grounding serbia’s claims for territorial expansion. by presenting serbia’s hegemonic role in the balkans, the belgrade congress also challenged iorga’s idea that romania was the natural leader of the southeastern european region. after the congress, puig continued to be assimilated to catalonia as a nation. one of the organisers, the serbian byzantinist dragutin anastasijević (1877-1950), thanked puig for his ‘truly catalan kindness’ which, he argued, did justice to his ‘country’.69 and, when the russian alexander soloviev (1890-1971), a historian of serbia, sent puig an art historical enquiry in 1932, he began his letter congratulating him on the declaration of the statute of autonomy of catalonia which, he said, opened ‘a new era of prosperity for the proud catalan nation’.70 in the same year of the belgrade congress, iorga published two pieces on the eastern mediterranean engagement of the crown of aragon that were crucial to this articulation of south-eastern europe as a cultural space in which catalans also played a part.71 using the chronicle (13251328) of ramon muntaner as a source, he claimed that catalans had been to wallachia (one of the principalities that formed the modern romanian studies on national movements 7 (2021) | articles | 18 lucila mallart state) in the middle ages.72 he was also interested in the medieval short novel història de jacob xalabín (ca. 1404), set in the ottoman empire, which he believed was meant to be consumed by the community of catalans that settled in greece in the fourteenth century.73 thus, iorga saw catalans as one of the communities that inhabited south-eastern europe during the middle ages, and this made them part of the cultural space that he aimed to recreate (and lead) in the early twentieth century. with marinescu, iorga contributed to establish a narrative in which medieval catalans fought together with other balkan peoples against enemies that were perceived as foreign, such as the ottoman empire. such a narrative of struggle against an external, powerful enemy could be easily transported to the 1920s, a period in which national minorities in south-eastern europe were struggling to establish independent states following the collapse of the austro-hungarian and the ottoman empires, all the while catalonia’s proto-autonomous institutions disappeared under primo’s regime. epilogue: barcelona, 1927 and 1929 iorga showed sympathy for catalonia’s differentiated identity both during and after the bucharest congress, but his views on the political implications of that difference varied over time and depended largely on the audience he was addressing. this shows the utilitarian character of his interest in catalonia, and the extent to which it was entangled with his interest in the consolidation of greater romania after the first world war. this was not always easy, as romania’s and catalonia’s nationbuilding processes were almost opposed phenomena: one aiming for cultural and political centralisation, the other one seeking fragmentation. when academic exchanges between the two countries began shortly after the first world war, romania was a relatively young state – founded in 1859 – that had just incorporated the region of studies on national movements 7 (2021) | articles lucila mallart 19 | transylvania, formerly in the austro-hungarian empire and with an important presence of hungarian, germanic and roma minorities. iorga was one of the advocates of a unified and homogeneous greater romania, and a promoter of cultural and academic centralisation that prioritised the role of the capital, bucharest, vis-à-vis that of other regional centres such as cluj-napoca – formerly koloszvar – in transylvania. in contrast, the catalonia of the mancomunitat sought the redefinition of the spanish state to allow for a greater autonomy and leading role of catalonia and its capital city, barcelona. catalan nationalists, like puig, were challenging the centralisation and cultural homogeneity of the spanish state, while iorga was promoting that centralisation and cultural homogeneity in romania. iorga’s changing discourse is especially visible in the texts published after two visits to spain, in 1927 and 1929. in 1927, iorga used the history and character of spain to sustain his own nationalist agenda in romania. the spanish ‘reconquista¡ (the christian conquest of alandalus between the eighth and fifteenth centuries) were used to build a narrative of historical continuity in early-twentieth-century romania, drawing a parallel with the medieval expansion of wallachians and moldovans in transylvania.74 in this text iorga also claimed that catalonia’s landscape and built environment were not different from the rest of spain, and thus argued that the nationalist claim for autonomy was weak. ‘the land, he wrote, is the same as in the rest of the peninsula’.75 the second time, iorga took the chance to visit the 1929 barcelona international exposition, which was designed, in its initial phases, by puig.76 iorga recalled the visit in yet another book, o mică ţară latină: catalonia şi exposiţia din 1929. note de drum şi conferinţe (‘a small latin country: catalonia and the 1929 exposition. travel notes and lectures’). there, his discourse changed slightly: he argued that there was indeed a ‘catalan nationality, different to the nationality that conforms spanish studies on national movements 7 (2021) | articles | 20 lucila mallart nationality’ and that this should not ‘disturb anyone’. but he connected this specificity exclusively to the existence of a distinct catalan language and literature.77 catalonia and romania could be deemed ‘brother and sister’ in a specialised, academic environment as the 1924 bucharest congress. but, perhaps, the danger of promoting catalan separatism became apparent when reaching a wider, more popular audience, in a moment in which romania was in the process of asserting its power over the recently annexed transylvania. conclusions the congresses of byzantine studies provided catalan scholars with an excellent environment in which to showcase not only catalonia’s research, but also, and more importantly, catalonia’s quest for autonomy and national recognition within the spanish and the european contexts. puig’s participation in the conferences extended the interest on national minorities that he had shown during the years in which he was politically active. his role as president of the catalan mancomunitat was recalled both in bucharest and in belgrade, even if by 1927 the institution had already been abolished. his participation as ‘representative’ of catalonia was outlined both in the bucharest’s official programme and in iorga’s invitation letter to the congress. this echoed a general ethos that read academic engagements as diplomatic events, and which was shared by the first byzantinology congresses. at the same time, nicolau’s contribution in the conferences was parallel to his participation in political forums such as the league of nations, where he attempted, unsuccessfully, to enforce a change in the approach of primo de rivera’s government to the catalan question. catalan activists believed that the broader framework of the discussion of the political status of the national minorities that had once belonged to the empires that were dissolved at the end of the first world war could benefit the catalan studies on national movements 7 (2021) | articles lucila mallart 21 | quest for autonomy and national recognition. in line with that, the catalan participation in the byzantine congresses also contributed to create a narrative according to which catalans were part of a broader community of nations that had once inhabited the balkans. according to iorga, catalans had been part of the cultural space of southern-eastern europe through the involvement of the crown of aragon in the region in the middle ages. this thesis was developed in his own works and in those of marinescu and nicolau. however, iorga’s adhesion to the catalan autonomist project was not consistent throughout the 1920s. while he supported catalan’s differentiated identity in his protodiplomatic exchanges with puig and when he discussed catalan literature, he was reluctant to affirm the singularity of the catalan character when he addressed a broader spanish audience or the romanian public at home. this arguably reflected the differences in the challenges that the romanian and the catalan nation building processes presented in the interwar period. while the former faced the task of consolidating transylvania’s incorporation to the romanian state after the war, the later was fighting against the centralisation of primo’s regime in spain. in both cases, the participation in the international congresses of byzantine studies contributed to the building of narratives that supported claims in the sphere of politics, and which can therefore be considered a form of protodiplomacy. endnotes 1 archive research for this article was carried out in bucharest in august 2019 thanks to a travel grant from fritz thyssen stiftung. i am grateful to the staff of the academia română who helped me navigate through nicolae iorga’s correspondence. i am also indebted to the new europe college, institute of advanced study of bucharest, who facilitated my research stay. i am most thankful to ada hajdu (1978-2020), whose help in accessing archives and studies on national movements 7 (2021) | articles | 22 lucila mallart scholars in bucharest was crucial, and also to xavier montoliu, liliana iuga and rokayah navarro garcía for their help with materials, translations and references for this article. this research is also part of the project aei/feder, ue-pgc2018–098348-a-i00. 2 see, for instance, x. barral i altet, ‘puig i cadafalch: le premier art roman entre idéologie et politique’, in a. c. quintavalle (ed.), medioevo: arte llombarda. atti del convegno internazionale di studi parma 26-29 (milano, 2003), 33–41; a. pladevall i font, ‘puig i cadafalch i la difusió de la coneixença de l’art romànic a europa’, in a. balcells (ed.), puig i cadafalch i la catalunya contemporània (barcelona, 2003), 69–74. 3 n. cornago, ‘paradiplomacy and protodiplomacy’, in g. martel (ed.), the encyclopedia of diplomacy (west sussex, 2018), 1–8. 4 f. aldecoa & m. keating (eds.), paradiplomacy in action: the foreign relations of subnational governments (london, 1999). 5 x.m. núñez seixas, internacionalitzant el nacionalisme: el catalanisme polític i la qüestió de les minories nacionals a europa (1914-1936) (catarroja; valència, 2010), 82–90. 6 a. balcells, ‘catalanism and national emancipation movements in the rest of europe between 1885 and 1939’, in: catalan historical review 6 (2013), 94–95. 7 s. maufroy, ‘les premiers congrès internationaux des études byzantines: entre nationalisme scientifique et construction internationale d’une discipline’, in: revue germanique internationale 12 (2010), 232. 8 m. turda, ‘historical writing in the balkans’, in: s. macintyre, j. maiguascha & a. pók (eds.) the oxford history of historical writing: volume 4: 1800-1945 (oxford, 2011), 352; see also c. teacă, ‘in search of national traditions: art history in romania’, in: m. rampley, t. lenain & h. locher (eds.), art history and visual studies in europe: transnational discourses and national frameworks (leiden, 2012), 455. 9 the following biographical account of nicolae iorga is based on w.o. oldson, the historical and nationalistic thought of nicolae iorga (1969), 3–10. see also n.m. nagy-talavera, nicolae iorga: a biography (iași, 1998). studies on national movements 7 (2021) | articles lucila mallart 23 | 10 on the tensions between romania and hungary in the process of modern nation-building, see b. trencsényi et al. (eds.), nation-building and contested identities: romanian and hungarian case studies (budapest, 2001). 11 b. trencsényi et al., a history of modern political thought in east central europe. volume i: negotiating modernity in the ‘long nineteenth century’ (oxford, 2016), 569. 12 for an introduction to lamprecht’s historical thinking, see r. chickering, karl lamprecht: a german academic life (1856-1915) (leiden, 1993). 13 d. mishkova, ‘on the space-time constitution of southeastern europe’, in: s. rutar (ed.), beyond the balkans: towards an inclusive history of southeastern europe (münster, 2014), 61. 14 n. iorga, doua conceptii istorice (bucarest, 1911); cited in mishkova, ‘on the space-time constitution of southeastern europe’, 62. 15 mishkova, ‘on the space-time constitution of southeastern europe’, 60. 16 h.-c. maner, ‘the notion of europe from the perspective of romanian historical studies’, in: v. neumann & a. heinen (eds.), key concepts of romanian history: alternative approaches to socio-political languages (budapest, new york, 2013), 233; see also d. mishkova, ‘the politics of regionalist science: the balkans as a supranational space in late nineteenth to mid-twentieth century academic projects’, in: east central europe 39 (2012), 289–90. 17 d. mishkova, ‘the balkans as an idée-force. scholarly projections of the balkan cultural area’, in: civilisations. revue internationale d’anthropologie et de sciences humaines 60/2 (2012), 39–64. 18 maner, ‘the notion of europe from the perspective of romanian historical studies’, 236. 19 modern edition in english available as n. iorga, byzantium after byzantium (oxford, 2000). 20 mishkova, ‘on the space-time constitution of southeastern europe’, 59. 21 s. jacobson & j. moreno luzón, ‘the political system of the restoration, 18751914: political and social elites’, in: a. shubert & j. alvarez junco (eds.), spanish history since 1808 (new york, 2000), 93–109. studies on national movements 7 (2021) | articles | 24 lucila mallart 22 for an introduction to the life and works of puig, see a. balcells (ed.), puig i cadafalch i la catalunya contemporània (barcelona, 2003). 23 j.m. roig rosich, ‘la dictadura de primo de rivera i el final de la mancomunitat’, in: j. colominas ferran (ed.), josep puig i cadafalch i la mancomunitat de catalunya (barcelona, 2019), 97–117. 24 ‘respuesta del sr. diputado josep puig i cadafalch al discurso de la corona’, in: diario de las sesiones de cortes. congreso de los diputados 33 (22 june 1907): 679–85. 25 j. puig i cadafalch, ‘el congrés de les nacionalitats’, in la veu de catalunya, 16 july 1912, 3; núñez seixas, internacionalitzant el nacionalisme, 57. 26 j. puig i cadafalch, ‘als diputats de la mancomunitat de catalunya en prendre possessió de la presidència per a la qual fou novament elegit’, in: núria mañé & j. massot i muntaner (eds.), memòries (by josep puig i cadafalch) (barcelona, 2003), 227–28. 27 on puig’s engagement in the north, see l. mallart, ‘josep puig i cadafalch in the nordic countries: transferring art historiographic knowledge between north and south in the interwar period’, in: s. kallestrup & c. ashby (eds.), nordic design in translation: the circulation of objects, ideas and practices (bern, 2022). 28 letter from josep puig i cadafalch to nicolae iorga, 7 november 1922. academia română, bucharest. correspondence of nicolae iorga, volume ccxcix. 29 ‘si la catalogne pourrait être représenté par un savant de votre importance et par l’infatigable chercheur des études catalanes en grèce qui es m. rubió i lluch, […]’. letter from nicolae iorga to josep puig i cadafalch, 20 december 1923, uc 1414, arxiu nacional de catalunya. fons puig i cadafalch. it must be noted that, even though rubió accepted the invitation and appeared in the congress’ programme, he was eventually unable to travel and his paper was read by puig. see c. marinescu, compte-rendu du premier congrès international des études byzantines: bucarest, 1924 (bucharest, 1925), 66. 30 ‘mm. h. grégorie, au nom de la belgique, b. filow, au nom de la bulgarie, j. puig i cadafalch, pour la catalogne, e. peterson, pour les états unis, n. vulić, au nom de la yougoslavie, a. guarneri citati, au nom de l’italie, n. kondakov, au nom de la science russe, et m. murko, au nom de la tchécoslovaquie, apportèrent le salut studies on national movements 7 (2021) | articles lucila mallart 25 | de leurs pays à la roumanie.’ marinescu, compte-rendu du premier congrés international des études byzzantines, 15. 31 ‘[…] l’attention si souvent attirée au cours du congrès sur la catalogne’. marinescu, compte-rendu, 81. 32 ‘premier congrès international d’études byzantines. liste des universités et corps savants représentés. liste des membres’, 1924, uc 2542, arxiu nacional de catalunya. fons puig i cadafalch. 33 maufroy, ‘les premiers congrès internationaux des études byzantines’, 232. 34 maufroy, 233. 35 dimineața was a daily newspaper published between 1904 and 1937, reaching a print run of 100,000 copies in 1927, one of the highest in the country. 36 ‘ceia ce ma simi dator sa relev din observațiile mele este cu am găsit aici la dvs. [dumneavoastra] o direcție de cultură națională, pe care o urmam noi înșine. la noi se lupta inca pentru a avea o autonomie mai larga decât aceia ce s’a acordat încă de vre-o zece ani uniunei provinciale catalane, suspendata în funcționarea ei pentru un moment, și al cărei președinte am fost 7 ani în sir, fiind reales de 4 ori. autonomia noastră o înțelegem însă tot în cadrul federatiei spaniole. vrem însă o afirmare mai puternica a caracterului nostru național, ceia ca ne-a făcut sa cream o mișcare culturala catalana pentru incurajarea și susținerea patriotismului.’ ‘de vorbă cu d. puig i cadafalc, președintele uniunei provinciale catalane’, dimineața, 23 april 1924, uc 2542, arxiu nacional de catalunya. fons puig i cadafalch. 37 maufroy, ‘les premiers congrès internationaux des études byzantines’, 232. 38 maufroy, 235. 39 marinescu, compte-rendu, 85–87. 40 cosmin minea, ‘the monastery of curtea de argeş and romanian architectural heritage in the late 19th century’, in: studii de istoria și teoria arhitecturii 4 (2016), 181–201. 41 ‘[…], non seulement nos travaux en profiteraient d’une façon considérable, mais les premiers jalons seraient posés d’un échange culturel entre votre belle et frère catalogne et entre la roumanie sœur.’ letter from nicolae iorga to josep puig i cadafalch, 20 december 1923. studies on national movements 7 (2021) | articles | 26 lucila mallart 42 for an in-depth analysis of marinescu’s and iorga’s contributions on the crown of aragon, see l. mallart, ‘researching the medieval past between catalonia and romania. josep puig i cadafalch, nicolae iorga and the transnational writing of national history (1921-1935)’, in: nations and nationalism 27/1 (2021), 148–61. 43 for an introduction to the crown of aragon, see t.n. bisson, the medieval crown of aragón: a short history (oxford, 1986). 44 c. marinescu, ‘manuel ii, paléologue et les rois d’aragon: commentaire sur quatre lettres inédites en latin, expédiées par la chancellerie byzantine’, in: académie roumaine, bulletin de la section historique 11 (1924), 192–206. 45 c. marinescu, ‘alphonse v: roi d’aragon et de naples et l’albanie de scandenberg’, in: mélanges de l’ecole roumaine en france i (1923), 1–135; c. marinescu, ‘catalogne et l’arménie au temps de jacques ii (1291-1327): envoi par le roi ochine des reliques de sainte thécla à la cathédrale de tarragone’, in: mélanges de l’ecole roumaine en france ii (1923), 1–35. 46 ‘[…] du meilleur connaisseur de l'expansion catalane en orient’. letter from constantin marinescu to lluís nicolau d’olwer, 29 december 1928, arxiu de l’abadia de montserrat. arxiu lluís nicolau d’ower. 47 on the work of nicolau as a historian and philologist, see m. vilà i bayerri, lluís nicolau d’olwer, medievalista (1904-1938) (barcelona, 2009). for an approach to his political activities, see r. navarro garcía, lluís nicolau d’olwer. biografia política i d’exili d’un intel·lectual català, 1917-1961. cultura, republicanisme i democràcia (ph.d. thesis, barcelona, universitat de barcelona, 2017). 48 navarro garcía, lluís nicolau d’olwer, 48–96. 49 núñez seixas, internacionalitzant el nacionalisme, 121–29. 50 letter from constantin marinescu to lluís nicolau d’olwer, 13 september 1926, arxiu de l’abadia de montserrat. arxiu lluís nicolau d’ower. 51 lluís nicolau d’olwer, l’expansió de catalunya en la mediterrània oriental (barcelona: barcino, 1926). 52 ‘[…] on trouvera à toute page des renseignements absolument inconnus’. ‘chronique’, in: revue historique du sud-est européen iv 4–6 (april 1927), 149. studies on national movements 7 (2021) | articles lucila mallart 27 | 53 ‘[…] mise en valeur de ce que les catalans d’autrefois ont du faire dans l’histoire du moyen-âge’. letter from constantin marinescu to lluís nicolau d’olwer, 13 september 1926. arxiu lluís nicolau d’ower, arxiu de l’abadia de montserrat. 54 j. puig i cadafalch, ‘les églises de moldavie: contribution à l’étude des origines de leur forme décorative, une école parallèle pendant le xie siécle dans l’europe occidentale’, in: académie roumaine. bulletin de la section historique. congrès de byzantiologie de bucarest. mémoires 11 (1924), 76–89. 55 e. riu-barrera, ‘el primer romànic, el projecte europeu de josep puig i cadafalch en temps d’entreguerres’, in: lambard. estudis d’art medieval xxvii (2016-2018) (2019), 57–106. 56 j. puig i cadafalch, ‘les périodes successives de l’influence byzantine en occident. premier art roman. architecture mudéjar. églises de moldavie’, in: m. lhéritier (ed.), mélanges charles diehl. études sur l’histoire et sur l’art de byzance (paris, 1931), 161–69. 57 s. salaville, ‘le iie congrès international d’études byzantines à belgrade (1116 avril 1927)’, in: échos d’orient 27/149 (1928), 93. see also programme des travaux du congrés [ii congrès international des études bizantines, belgrade, 1927] (belgrade, 1927). 58 letter from constantin marinescu to lluís nicolau d’olwer, 13 september 1926. 59 on alcalá galiano, see k. budor, españa y croacia entre diplomacia y política: el diplomático español d. fernando alcalá galiano y smith, conde de torrijos (1883-1958) (ministerio de asuntos exteriores, 2004). 60 ‘presidente de la mancomunidad catalana, para mí tan estimable y estimado como la misma región de la península cuyas aspiraciones personifica y representa’. letter from fernando alcalá galiano to josep puig i cadafalch, 15 march 1927, uc 1072, arxiu nacional de catalunya. fons puig i cadafalch. 61 letter from fernando alcalá galiano to josep puig i cadafalch, 7 may 1927, uc 1072, arxiu nacional de catalunya. fons puig i cadafalch. 62 ‘[...] a una españa al fin menos inerte e inconsciente que la de ahora. sólo cabe esperar que vendrán días mejores y que v. no habrá dicho la última palabra, no sólo en cataluña, sino en españa entera’. letter from fernando alcalá galiano to studies on national movements 7 (2021) | articles | 28 lucila mallart josep puig i cadafalch, 11 june 1927, uc 1072, arxiu nacional de catalunya. fons puig i cadafalch. 63 j. lópez iñíguez, la unión patriótica y el somatén valencianos (1923-1930) (valència, 2017), 125. 64 p. gravić and d.n. anastasijévić, eds., deuxième congrès international des études byzantines, belgrade, 1927. compte-rendu (belgrade, 1929), xxiv. 65 ‘el poble iugoslau, malgrat de les seves diferències i les seves lluites polítiques incessants, té un aglutinant: la política exterior’. ‘una interviu amb en lluís nicolau d’olwer’, in: la publicitat, 21 may 1927, 1. 66 ‘souvenir de la visite à la collection de s. m. le roi (le 14 avril 1927)’, 1927, uc2543, arxiu nacional de catalunya. fons puig i cadafalch. 67 handwritten note detailing the excursions programme of the belgrade congress, uc 2543, arxiu nacional de catalunya. fons puig i cadafalch. 68 p. troch, ‘yugoslavism between the world wars: indecisive nation building’, in: nationalities papers 38/2 (2010), 227–44. 69 ‘[…] une gentillesse vraiment catalane qui de tout en tout honore votre pays’. letter from dragutin anastasijević to josep puig i cadafalch, 8 march 1927. uc 1085, arxiu nacional de catalunya. fons puig i cadafalch. 70 ‘je vous prie d’accepter mes félicitations chaleureuses à l’occasion de la proclamation de l’autonomie, qui ouvre une nouvelle ère de prospérité pour la fière nation catalane’. letter from alexander soloviev to josep puig i cadafalch, 10 october 1932. uc 1730, arxiu nacional de catalunya. fons puig i cadafalch. 71 the pieces are titled ‘ramón muntaner et l’empire byzantin’ and ‘l’histoire romantique de yakoub-tchélébi’ and they were jointly published in n. iorga, contributions catalanes à l’histoire byzantine (paris, 1927). in 1961 the first piece was published independently in a catalan translation. see n. iorga, ramon muntaner i l’imperi bizantí (barcelona, 1961). 72 l. sánchez rodrigo, ‘las relaciones literarias entre cataluña y rumanía’, revista de lenguas y literaturas catalana, gallega y vasca 19 (2014), 191. 73 j. miguel ribera llopis, ‘presencia de los balcanes en la cultura catalana’, revista de filología románica 16 (1999), 91. studies on national movements 7 (2021) | articles lucila mallart 29 | 74 for a detailed account of these comparisons, see m. anghelescu, ‘viajeros rumanos en españa, en busca de las raíces comunes’, in: revista de filología románica iv (2006), 282. 75 n. iorga, cîteva zile prin spania (bucharest, 1927), 75; translated into spanish and cited in j. josé ortega román, ‘nicolae iorga: viajero por españa’, in: revista de filología románica 20 (2003), 157. 76 for an in-depth discussion of iorga’s travels in spain, see l. mallart, ‘architectural conversations across europe’s borderlands: transnational exchanges between barcelona and bucharest in the 1920s’, in: e. gantner, h. hein-kirchner & o. hochadel (eds.), interurban knowledge exchange in southern and eastern europe, 1870-1950 (london, 2020), 219–36. 77 n. iorga, o mică ţară latină: catalonia şi exposiţia din 1929. note de drum şi conferinţe (bucharest, 1930), 51; translated into catalan and cited in x. montoliu & d. moţoc, ‘quatre apunts sobre les relacions entre la literatura romanesa i la catalana’, in: visat 15 (2013), n.p. list of figures figure 1. dimineața, 23 april 1924, front cover, uc 2542, arxiu nacional de catalunya. fons puig i cadafalch. figure 2. letter from nicolae iorga to josep puig i cadafalch, 20 december 1923, uc 1414, arxiu nacional de catalunya. fons puig i cadafalch. figure 3. handwritten note detailing the excursions programme of the belgrade congress, uc 2543, arxiu nacional de catalunya. fons puig i cadafalch. farming the nation: agrarian parties and the national question in interwar europe miguel cabo1 university of santiago de compostela agrarian parties played a key role in many european countries during the interwar period, particularly in scandinavia, central and eastern europe. though quite heterogenous in almost every respect, they had enough in common to jointly found the prague-based green international or international agrarian bureau (iab) (19211938). although their ideological foundations lacked the depth and coherence of other political families such as liberalism or socialism, circumstances obliged agrarian parties to elaborate lengthy discourses on nationalism and nation-building. the writings of leaders and thinkers in the vein of milan hodža, antonín švehla or alexandr stamboliski, as well as the bulletin of the iab, provide enough material for a discussion of their views on these matters. these debates were not merely theoretical because agrarian parties were constantly confronted with the national question, either as minority-based parties within multi-ethnic countries (for example the hss in croatia), or as mainstream parties bent on redefining the national identity of their countries in accordance with their (rural) values (for example the bulgarian agrarian union or the parti agraire et paysan français). another source of contradiction was their vision of countryfolk as the purest expression of national identity, which often made them hard to distinguish from strictly nationalist parties, together with their support of regional federations aiming at a european confederation. keywords: nationalism, agrarian parties, ruralism, pacifism, agrarian reforms. studies on national movements 8 (2021) | articles | 2 miguel cabo agrarian parties: a brief introduction the historical importance of agrarian parties is often underestimated or even completely ignored in the grand narratives of twentieth-century european history. however, they were present in most european countries, with exceptions such as the united kingdom and portugal, though their characteristics and influence varied greatly. the first parties of this political family arose with the turn-of-the-century agricultural crisis, which also led to the appearance of agrarian cooperativism across europe. even before 1900, a number of parties were created such as the danish venstre (1888), the bulgarian agrarian union (1889), the bayerischer bauernbund (bavarian peasant league, 1893), the polskie stronnictwo ludowe (polish people’s party, 1895) in austrian galicia or the česká strana agrarní (czech agrarian party, 1899) in bohemia-moravia. others would follow in the years leading up to the great war, but none would form a government prior to 1914, except in denmark. the interwar years were without doubt their golden age. agrarian parties were present at one time or another in the governments of every nordic country, the three baltic states, poland, hungary, czechoslovakia, austria, romania, bulgaria, yugoslavia and the helvetic republic, to which could be added the occasional inclusion of regional agrarian parties in coalition governments in the weimar republic.2 the proliferation of right-wing authoritarian regimes and then communist dictatorships in the soviet sphere of influence marked the end of this golden age, albeit agrarian parties still exist with marginal political weight in several countries. agrarian parties were a heterogeneous family by any standard. from an electoral point of view, they ranged from those capable of forming singleparty governments, as was the case in bulgaria and romania, to minuscule formations like those in belgium and the netherlands that had studies on national movements 8 (2021) | articles miguel cabo 3 | to fight even to gain parliamentary representation. the majority seduced somewhere between 10-15% of the electorate, which allowed them to form coalition governments in places like scandinavia and czechoslovakia. with regards to their position on the ideological spectrum, the bulgarian agrarian union fell on the extreme left, but most western european parties leaned the other way, such as the partido agrario español (1934-1936), whose raison d’être was to oppose the agricultural reforms of the second republic, or the parti agraire et paysan français (papf, 1927-1939) with its ambiguously structured criticisms of parliamentarism under the third republic. in general terms, support for agrarian parties was more precarious and their position on the ideological spectrum was more right-wing the further west one went, which has had an impact on their treatment at the hands of historians, since broad surveys of european history tend to be written by anglophone authors. despite everything, these parties had enough traits in common to be recognised as a single political family. these traits include the defence of the agricultural sector, particularly smallholders; links to agrarian associations; an identification with parliamentarism; foreign policy marked by pacifism; anticommunism etc. also relevant were the mutual links they forged with each other, such as the harbouring of bulgarian and polish agrarian refugees by the czechoslovakian agrarian party in times of repression, or the circulation and translation of books and periodicals. personal connections also played their part, as can be seen in the presence of agrarians from different countries as attendees at other parties’ congresses, or the bulgarian alexandr stamboliski’s tour of several capitals after signing the treaty of neuilly in paris, throughout which he was given what could almost be called a star’s welcome. 3 the eventual culmination of these connections was the existence between 1921 and 1938 of a coordinating body, the international agrarian bureau (iab), also known as the green international, with its studies on national movements 8 (2021) | articles | 4 miguel cabo headquarters in prague, of which twenty-one parties from across the continent were members at one time or another.4 as a prerequisite for admission into the iab, a party had to conform to a sixteen-point programme, drafted in 1929, which included pacifism, parliamentarism, cooperativism etc. taking all of this into consideration, it seems reasonable to analyse agrarian parties as a transnational phenomenon. the historical role of agrarian parties reached its apogee just as the national question was brought into focus by the collapse of multi-ethnic empires after the first world war, the drawing of new borders via peace treaties that, in theory, respected distinct nationalities, and the official acknowledgment of the existence (and rights) of national minorities by the league of nations. therefore, it is pertinent to consider the positions taken by agrarian parties in the face of the national question, multiple iterations of which weighed heavily on interwar europe. this article aims at offering a summary of the available state of knowledge through secondary literature and primary sources, as well as some hypotheses for further research on the subject. some conditioning factors unlike other political families, in the case of agrarianism there is no significant theoretical corpus that could serve as a framework for a developed system of ideas and guidelines to manage the endless complexity of human affairs. there is nothing that even comes close in scope or quality to marx’s works on socialist parties or john locke and adam smith’s writings on liberal ones, to name a few examples. the positions of agrarian parties regarding the national question must be inferred from their actions and from sources such as the bulletins published by the prague green international and its successor, the international peasant union (founded in 1947 by exiles in the usa), studies on national movements 8 (2021) | articles miguel cabo 5 | articles printed in party newspapers, and books and memoires penned by a number of agrarian leaders and theorists of note. chief among the latter are the writings of the bulgarians alexandr stamboliski and giorgi m. dimitrov, the czech antonín švehla, and the slovak milan hodža. the second of these authors had no qualms in pointing out in 1948 that ‘[...] agrarianism does not yet possess a systematic doctrine of fundamental principles or a coherent philosophical structure of values… is a practical rather than a theoretical ideology; its doctrine is being developed gradually on the basis of practical experience.’5 to this must be added a level of anti-intellectualism that did not help to attract theorists who might have been capable of articulating a true doctrine in all its complexity. schoolmasters, local intellectuals, agricultural engineers, vets etc. were all to be found in the milieu of agrarian parties, often in positions of authority within the organisation. in other words, these were people who had undergone some form of training but whose knowledge had immediate practical applications. seldom were they intellectuals in the sense of thinkers who moved in the realms of ideas and abstraction. one exception was the romanian functionalist and political scientist david mitrany (1888-1975), a romanian communist party sympathiser and author of a refutation of marxism from an agrarian perspective.6 in any case, and as has already been mentioned, agrarian parties’ production in the field of theory as well as their trajectories in a practical sense allow us to reconstruct their interactions with the national question. these were conditioned by a series of factors that are outlined below. firstly, the national question did not initially form a central part of the worldview of parties which, to use lipset and rokkan’s terminology, the cleavage of city versus countryside had brought into being.7 when the studies on national movements 8 (2021) | articles | 6 miguel cabo conditions that gave rise to specific agrarian parties are examined, it is obvious that national problems were secondary or completely negligible at the moment of their founding. some, like the czech agrarian party, splintered off pre-existing liberal formations, while others like the swedish and bulgarian ones were autonomous creations, but as a general rule the representation of the interests of an agrarian sector that felt itself to be side-lined by established parties was the clear priority. this did not stop them from having to align themselves in response to national questions, whether that was because they acted in the context of multi-ethnic states (see the croatians and czechs in the hapsburg empire) or because said questions were closely linked to agrarian concerns. this is what occurred in the case of agrarian reforms through which parties aimed to extend family ownership over smallholdings. in places where land ownership was drawn along ethnic lines, a confluence of agrarian and national questions was inevitable, for example wherever a majority of large landowners were of a different group to that of the peasantry (germans in the baltic countries and bohemia-moravia, hungarians in transylvania, poles in the mostly-ruthenian areas of austrian galicia etc.) another factor to take into account is that relations between agrarian and nationalist parties were not always easy.8 this may seem surprising given that both coincided in exalting the rural world and the peasantry, which for nationalists were the purest expression of a nation’s identity and the most stalwart guardians of its traditions. the editorial of the first number of the bulletin of the green international claimed that agriculture was the basis of civilization and thus eternal, while any other institution or social reality could change. this resulted in the peasant being ‘the main stone of the structure of human societies and the base of the idea of nation and state. therefore, the man living upon his land is and must be the creative element within the state (...) healthy and landstudies on national movements 8 (2021) | articles miguel cabo 7 | toiling men are a reservoir of national energy, necessary for curing the exhausted mankind.’9 or, as expressed immediately after the second world war while trying to reconstruct the green international in the u.s. ‘the earth is the source of life and from it spring the main human opportunities. the entire existence of a nation organised in a state depends on its ties with the earth. the weaker these ties, the sooner comes moral and physical degeneration of individuals and groups (…) the moral regeneration of the world will be achieved by peasant movements, so closely connected with the earth. their ripening into political maturity will put an end to the economic chaos and clear the stagnant atmosphere of the industrial centres. the mentality that was formed in everyday contact with the primeval laws of the earth will straighten the tortuous social thought of modern times.’10 despite all this, nationalists did not tend to approve of parties which, apart from anything else, competed with them for the support of a social group that they considered to be their natural base from which to make the leap to become a mass party. in extreme cases, an agrarian party could be so successful in the electoral arena that it could end up unseating nationalist parties from their majority position, as happened in croatia. secondly, agrarians threatened to divide the national community that nationalist parties sought to represent by leaning on the support of only one sector of the population, albeit a highly numerous one. lastly, agrarian parties’ policies could enervate the national cause by focussing on practical issues like land ownership or fair prices for agricultural products instead of national rights. furthermore, their proposals could pit different social groups against each other (large landowners against settlers, settlers against day labourers, farmers studies on national movements 8 (2021) | articles | 8 miguel cabo against merchants…), while nationalists emphasised external causes in their analysis of social and economic problems. nowhere was this clearer than in ireland, where nationalists were wary of cooperativism for the reasons stated and, by throwing in their lot with the land league, simplified the local situation into a standoff between two apparently united fronts: irish catholic peasants versus english protestant landowners. of course, beneath all this broiled conflicts of a less diaphanous nature, like that of small landowners and leaseholders against day labourers, the problem of usury or the tensions between livestock and crop farmers. for nationalists, any solution to these ‘secondary’ problems (hardly secondary to those who experienced them) would have to be put off until the primary aim of independence could be achieved. only after the creation of the free state in 1922, when blame for disillusionment with the new order of things could no longer be placed at the feet of the british, did the farmers’ party (1922-1932) appear, focussing on the interests of the more prosperous producers to the east of the country, and then clann na talmhan (1938-1965), which aimed to represent the poorer peasantry, especially in the western counties.11 the territorial implantation of these parties was another conditioning factor. some of them had a regional character, like the bavarian bayerischer bauernbund, swiss agrarian parties from german-speaking cantons, the walloon parti agraire belge or the bund der landwirte, founded by the german ethnic minority in the first czechoslovak republic. however, they were more commonly state-wide parties with enormous variations in their level of support depending on the region, with the lion’s share of their backing limited to certain strongholds, while they barely garnered any votes in other areas (which of course included urban areas). thus, in the abovementioned case of ireland, the first party to be created (the farmers’ party) championed the cause of the wealthier peasants and failed to gain support from the poorer peasantry to the studies on national movements 8 (2021) | articles miguel cabo 9 | south and west of the island. the pattern of support for clann na talmhan was the other way round, though on paper both it and the farmers’ party operated across the whole country. to a large extent this reflected the diversity of agrarian structures and, looking towards central and eastern europe, ethnic diversity as well. this was to condition parties’ positions in debates over the structure of the state, with a general tendency to favour decentralising or federal formulas and a consistent opposition to centralism. in relation to this last point, it is significant that agrarian parties were only rarely multi-ethnic constructions, or at least their ethnic makeup was not proportional to the demographic composition of their respective countries. in central and eastern europe they were usually divided along ethnic lines, in the same manner that the cooperative movement was.12 in multi-ethnic contexts, even though they were more open to dialogue than most other political groups, agrarian parties never managed to incorporate the rural populace equitably with no regards paid to linguistic or religious differences. there was a croatian, a serbian, and a slovene agrarian party in interwar yugoslavia, and though they reached occasional agreements, they never joined forces to become a unitary movement. in czechoslovakia, the pre-existing czech and slovak agrarian parties fused in 1922 to form the rszml (republikánská strana zemědělského a malorolnického lidu – republican party of farmers and peasants), which went on to become the most voted party in the first republic. nonetheless, german minority farmers were represented by their own party (bund der landwirte, 1920), as were the hungarian and ruthenian minorities, each of which had a small agrarian party that acted in their name. in the rhetoric of agrarian parties, two images that moulded their positions regarding this issue can be detected. the first is the frequent identification of the peasantry or the rural population in a broad sense with the ‘people’ as a whole, or at least with its most sound and studies on national movements 8 (2021) | articles | 10 miguel cabo representative part. the croatian hss leader vladko maček (1879-1964) could thus exalt ante radič, founder of the party along with his brother stjepan, attributing to him the ‘merit […] of having been the first to declare that the croatian people and the croatian peasantry are one and the same, which means that if a political struggle is to be successful, it must count upon the organised majority of the nation of croatia’, whereas all remaining social groups had servilely adopted the ideas and mentalities of other peoples.13 such a metonym was not infrequent, most notably wherever a strong anti-urban sentiment reared its head, like in bulgaria. absentee large landowners, the working class, and civil servants were symbolically excluded from the national community because they were contaminated by foreign influences and, on top of that, were considered parasites that fed off the true generators of wealth, i.e. the agricultural sector. this metonym could pave the way to a populist rhetoric and grand claims of speaking for the nation as a whole. as is logical, this was easier to achieve in places where the peasantry represented a majority of the population, which was still common in the twenties and thirties. an expression of this is the fact that sometimes these parties would call themselves popular parties, with no allusion to their peasant, rural or agrarian character, since it was understood that people meant countryside. so, when in 1931 three polish agrarian parties came together in a singular formation, the name chosen was stronnictwo ludowe (sl), people’s party, without it being seen as necessary to clarify who exactly constituted the ‘people’. when it came to the bǎlgarski zemedelski naroden sǎjuz, bulgarian popular agrarian union, the name even sounded reiterative. the other image is a metaphor. agrarian parties were distinct from the parties of liberal and conservative notables that had dominated the political scene as mass parties in most of europe up until the great war. this was principally due to their links with cooperatives, and additionally associations for women, agricultural technicians, students, studies on national movements 8 (2021) | articles miguel cabo 11 | sport or cultural organisations, as well as local and national press outlets. such connections with civil society gave them a solid foundation, a source of future party leaders and, in periods of repression, a place of refuge where members could await a return to normality. in the most consolidated parties, party members and voters strengthened these links through day-to-day activities like selling their products in a cooperative, reading a particular newspaper or participating in common leisure pursuits. these quotidian associations recreated benedict anderson’s ‘imagined communities’ by offering a channel through which the desired agrarian national community could be embodied.14 the local community as a metaphor for the national community, as theorised by anderson, here manifested itself in a way that was far more direct and noticeable than what can usually be observed. agrarian parties, national matters: some patterns when examining dozens of parties along the length and breadth of the continent, each with its own idiosyncrasies, and their interactions with an issue as complex as the national question, the debates around which varied from country to country, it becomes necessary to attempt some degree of classification. greater clarity is gained by doing this, though with a trade-off in the form of simplification. four conditioning factors and three state models define the system of classification. the former are: a) the percentage of the active agrarian population in a given country b) the distribution of land ownership and the dominant modes of access to landed property for farmers c) the relative strength of the agrarian party in electoral terms studies on national movements 8 (2021) | articles | 12 miguel cabo d) how far national identity is questioned or debated at the state level the three state models would be: a) countries where national identity is unquestioned, b) countries where national identity is questioned and the agrarian party aligns with an ethnic minority, and c) the same, but agrarian parties represent the interests of the majority group. in those countries where national identity is not an object of debate, agrarian parties assume said national identity as their own but work to integrate elements of their particular worldview into it. their success depends on their electoral weight and that of the local agrarian population, among other things. historically, this strategy did not exert a destabilising influence because in general nationalisms had a strong rural component to them, so agrarian revindications were no more than a question of emphasis. in countries where they represented specific areas with a differentiated regional character, they leaned towards regionalist positions, but in the sense of a ‘regional pride’ that would ultimately reinforce national identity.15 the french, danish and bulgarian cases are illustrative. the parti agraire et paysan français was founded in 1927 and was able to feed upon the malcontent caused by the great depression and the perceived disinterest of the third republic’s governments towards agrarian groups in relation to other sectors of society. it directly criticised the flaws of the regime and promoted decentralising and corporativist reform.16 its activities peaked around 1936 but soon after the death of its founder, the journalist fleurant agricola, it was split by personalisms and political alliances, particularly the clash between supporters and detractors of collaborating with henri dorgères’ more radical comités de défense paysanne.17 symbolically, the papf’s flag consisted of a green background with the tricolour to the top left; the papf touted its french patriotism but insisted on placing the contributions of the rural world in the foreground. as such, fleurant agricola revindicated 1789 as a studies on national movements 8 (2021) | articles miguel cabo 13 | peasants’ revolution, ‘which thanks to the energy of its peasants had brought ideas of liberty to the whole world’.18 in each party congress, a wreath was laid beside the monument to the fallen in the first world war as a reminder that it had been the peasantry who had made up the majority of casualties and shown the most striking loyalty to the fatherland.19 the backing of agrarian sectors that was demanded from the state was based on the idea that the most authentic expression of french identity was to be found in villages, as well as the fact that national produce would prove fundamental for national self-sufficiency in the event of another war. the danish venstre could be considered a success story in this category, with the difference that the reformulation of national identity happened before its creation but then worked to the party’s benefit. after denmark’s defeat in the second schleswig war in 1864 and the consequent shrinking of its territory, the country was forced to carry out a revision of its history and values that was underpinned by pastor n.f.s. grundtvig’s movement of religious reform.20 starting in 1888, the venstre became the political expression of popular schools, the cooperative movement, and pro-peasant historical and cultural revisionism in the wake of the failures of the bourgeoisie and traditional elites. afterwards, it managed to hold a significant level of political influence even as the active agrarian population progressively declined.21 most agrarian parties were of a small or medium size and so were never well positioned to impose the entirety of their interpretation of a dominant national identity upon the rest of the population. the most they could aspire to was for rural values to be given the level of recognition they deserved within said identity, or what the party judged to be the level they deserved. the situation would be completely distinct in a country where the peasantry still represented the majority of the population, meaning that their support would grant an agrarian party a studies on national movements 8 (2021) | articles | 14 miguel cabo parliamentary majority. moreover, this is not a hypothetical scenario because it is exactly what occurred in bulgaria between 1919 and 1923. in the chaos of humiliating defeat, territorial losses and economic disaster that followed on the heels of the great war, the charismatic alexandr stamboliski’s (1879-1923) agrarian union came into its own as an alternative to the disgraced traditional parties and monarchical power in a country where three quarters of the population lived off agriculture. in this case, the agrarian party in question did not intend to add nuances to the definition of national identity, but rather believed that its absolute majority in parliament would allow it to substantially remodel the definition and impose it on everyone else. for the duration of his ‘agrarian dictatorship’, as western diplomats were wont to call it, stamboliski clashed with multiple social and political groups over his revolutionary policies. among other measures, his government enforced periods of mandatory labour to familiarise young people with the virtues of agricultural work. with rhetoric characterised by a style of antiintellectualism not unusual among agrarian politicians, stamboliski also clashed with sofia university over his plans to reform the cyrillic alphabet to make it more accessible to the lower classes, which would facilitate his pro-literacy campaigns and indirectly increase mass participation in politics.22 whereas bulgarian identity had been built on hostility towards turks and greeks as the other, stamboliski headed a pacifistic foreign policy that meant renouncing ideas of revanchism, accepting the territorial losses enshrined in the treaty of neuilly, and making efforts to establish neighbourly relations with surrounding countries, including yugoslavia in spite of the explosive macedonian question. all of this led to the definition of national identity swinging away from ethnic elements towards civic ones, for which reason the agrarian union’s programme recognised the need to respect minorities (greeks, jews, turks…) and their right to schooling in their own languages.23 the caveat was that these civic values were founded upon an extreme pro-rural ideology, a worldview theorised by stamboliski studies on national movements 8 (2021) | articles miguel cabo 15 | himself according to which humanity was not stratified by class as marxists claimed, but split into professional or corporative groups, among whom those who worked the land were the essential and indispensable caste upon which everyone else depended. stamboliski’s attempt to remodel bulgarian society from top to bottom ended when a multi-sector coalition was formed against him by the crown. in 1923, a bloody coup put an end both to his government and his life. in those countries where national identity was contested, two possibilities were open. firstly, an agrarian party might identity with one of the minorities within that state. if such a party managed to gain a predominant position in its zone of influence, then it would become something very similar to a nationalist party, as was the case of the croatian peasants’ party (hrvatska seljačka stranka, hss), which displaced all other croatian parties. despite enjoying only minor electoral success prior to 1918, the hss was the most-voted formation from that year onwards, becoming the paladin not only of the croatian peasanty but of all croatians in the struggle against belgradian centralism, the overwhelming presence of serbs in state apparatus, fiscal aggrievements etc. it oscillated somewhat when it came to specific issues, but its acceptation of the political system always hinged upon the adoption of federal structures as a bare minimum.24 in any case, the most significant point here is that belgrade perceived stjepan radić not to be the leader of the croatian peasantry, but the supreme representative of croatians across the board. and this was true regardless of whether it entailed repression (radić endured several stretches of prison time for not obeying the constitution of 1920) or negotiation, such as when the radical party agreed to form a coalition government with him in 1925. the programmes of agrarian parties that represented the dominant group in multi-ethnic states tended to be less nationalistic in their policies than other parties. furthermore, it is worth pointing out that they proved themselves capable of reaching agreements with parties studies on national movements 8 (2021) | articles | 16 miguel cabo that represented minorities, in particular, though not exclusively, other agrarian parties with which they might share a good portion of their social and economic proposals. the most obvious example is the czechoslovakian agrarian party, with representation in all the governments of the first republic and almost constant control over the post of prime minister. it was this party, or more exactly its leader antonín švehla, that orchestrated the entry of german minority parties into the coalition government of 1926. this was a brave step towards the integration of this minority into the new state, yet the process would eventually break down with the economic crisis and the rise of the sudeten german party in the thirties.25 therefore, it is relevant that the agrarian party was the only one to oppose the expulsion of the german minority on the principle of collective guilt after czechoslovakia was reconstituted in 1945.26 likewise, in yugoslavia, the only serbian party that was open to negotiating decentralising solutions and kept amiable relations with the croatian peasants’ party was its agrarian equivalent, the zemljoradnička stranka.27 these experiences gave some credibility to milan hodža’s (agrarian slovak leader and prime minister of czechoslovakia in 1935-38) claim that in interwar central-eastern europe ‘agrarian democracy’ was the best path towards solving the minority problem”.28 just one year before the dismemberment of his country, the leader of the czechoslovakian agrarian party, rudolf beran, proclaimed in the daily organ of his party that they were ‘resolute nationalists’, but open to peaceful agreements both internationally and nationally regarding minorities. after invoking the usual chants to peasants as the most patriot class because they tilled the land, felt a personal connection to it, and fed the rest of the population, beran assured that peasants would guarantee the survival of the state. that was not to be, scarcely a year later beran was the pm of the second czechoslovakian republic studies on national movements 8 (2021) | articles miguel cabo 17 | immolated in the munich agreement, as a symbol of the limits of agrarian parties in the broad scenario of realpolitik in the 1930s.29 conclusions nationalism was not a part of what may be called the true nucleus of agrarian parties’ ideology. studying the circumstances of their creation, it can be appreciated that these parties were born either as an emanation of pre-existing associative movements or as splinter parties of already established formations whenever it became apparent to wide social sectors that their interests were not well represented by them. in fact, at many points along their trajectories, agrarian parties were accused of only servicing the practical concerns of their voters without professing any solid ideals and principles. as such, they were able to deal with parties of differing ideologies in exchange for concessions (the lowering of taxes, tariffs on imports, systems to guarantee minimum prices for agrarian produce…), all of which was the worst kind of political horsetrading in the eyes of their detractors. another interpretation is that these parties became a factor of stability in the convulsive europe of the interwar years because they facilitated the consolidation of coalition governments, although that is not the topic studied here. even if the national question was not decisively present, changes in the situation could lend it more weight later on and turn it into a priority. this happened in those regions where there was notable ethnic opposition between landowners and peasants, such as in estonia. 30 alternatively, a party’s success could lead it to monopolise the votes of a certain minority within a state and transform itself into that minority’s maximum interlocutor with the holders of power, like the previously cited croatian hss. in this sense, it seems reasonable to second alex toshkov when he writes of the ‘contingency of national expression’ for studies on national movements 8 (2021) | articles | 18 miguel cabo these parties, which was not a part of their essence but did manifest itself with greater or lesser intensity according to the context.31 in multi-ethnic societies, and few societies in europe were not multi-ethnic at least to some extent, the land question, for example, unavoidably became intertwined with the national one. in the proposals for agrarian reform that were made after the first world war, set down by agrarian parties in positions of government or supported by them from the benches of the opposition, ethnic factors counted as much as or more than economic factors, so that selected groups were favoured (generally to the detriment of hungarians and germans) in the expropriation of property and the apportioning of settlers. the justification for this lay in the avenging of ostensible historical grievances and the creation of a peasantry that identified with the new nation-states born from the ashes of fallen empires, since it was these nation-states to which they owed their access to the land.32 another important question is what constituted the idea of nation that to a greater or lesser extent these parties disseminated. making use of the ethnic/civic dichotomy, though this has been criticised, at first glance it appears that ethnic elements were clearly dominant given that the cultural expressions emanating from agrarian parties extolled folklore, traditional know-how etc.33 both the agrarian party press and writers who were sympathetic to their cause favoured a costumbrista style of literature that focussed on the countryside or on historical events in which rural folk virtues (patriotism, frugality, solidarity, ingenuity…) could be highlighted. nevertheless, the praxis of agrarian parties did introduce civic elements via their defence of parliamentarism, universal suffrage (for women and men), clean elections, the fortifying of civil society through associationism… all of which in many countries meant making the jump from liberalism to democracy. in this way they made a considerable contribution towards opening up spaces for civic studies on national movements 8 (2021) | articles miguel cabo 19 | participation and citizens’ mobilisation, thus indirectly fomenting nation-building processes. it could be argued that the aforementioned initiatives were carried out on the assumption that the weight of the rural population in the electorate as a whole would affect a country’s society, culture, and politics at all levels. stamboliski’s bulgaria was the place where this ambition came closest to being realised. through the reproduction of a national identity tailored to fit the interests of the peasantry and with which they could easily feel identified, agrarian parties (especially in central-eastern europe) helped to erode the phenomenon of ‘national indifference’ that disproportionately affected the rural masses.34 the ability of agrarian parties to pivot towards openly nationalist positions under determined circumstances was to be confirmed in the immediate aftermath of the second world war. during the brief transition between the retreat of the axis armies and the imposition of communist regimes in the soviet sphere of influence, agrarian parties adopted a new role in representing a firm obstacle to the communists’ seizure of power because they managed to attract electoral backing that went beyond their natural base of support. this was achieved precisely by agglutinating nationalist, anti-russian sentiment and the votes of many poles, hungarians, romanians or bulgarians who had little or nothing to do with the countryside and agriculture.35 a consistent trait among agrarian parties was their approach to foreign policy, based on pacificism and the building of confederal structures in preparation for a hypothetical european confederation.36 and though that could sound like mere rhetoric, there is factual evidence to demonstrate that this was not the case. agrarian parties opposed their countries’ military adventures whenever feasible, just as they did with the non-negotiated reshuffling of borders. stamboliski stands out once again as the most obvious paradigm of such convictions, although it is studies on national movements 8 (2021) | articles | 20 miguel cabo also worth mentioning some agrarian parties that worked together despite the tense relations that existed between their countries, like the cooperation between bulgarians and serbs or poles and czechoslovakians. diverse supranational schemes were managed through rural organisations, both in the interwar years and among exiles during the second world war, although the division of europe after yalta and potsdam doomed them to be little more than empty gestures. the prague green international was represented in several europeanist projects, such as coudenhove-kalergi’s paneuropean union, as well as multiple international organisations with or without ties to the league of nations (the international labour organisation, the international institute of agriculture etc.). europeanism was built on the notion, which can often be seen in contemporary speeches and publications, that peasants had a great deal in common and instinctively understood each other regardless of how many borders divided them, and as such it was necessary to reject war and xenophobia.37 from a national perspective, this is certainly one of the most constructive facets of these parties. lastly, as a general consideration, it can be recalled that agrarian parties did not promote the authoritarian nationalist regimes that proliferated in interwar europe, but rather were victims of repression under them. the balance is less favourable on other points, such as the abovementioned difficulties in reflecting states’ multi-ethnic composition within party membership and voter bases, and the persistence of an antisemitic streak which rose to the surface when jews were singled out as middlemen or, in certain periods, because of their supposed communist ties. this antisemitism reflected the general attitudes of the population and the cooperative movement in many countries, and its manifestations were less virulent that in most other parties, but it was cause for concern regardless, and even when it found no expression in the upper echelons of a party, it could still be detected studies on national movements 8 (2021) | articles miguel cabo 21 | at a grassroots level and among local party committees.38 the austrian landbund was probably the agrarian party in which antisemitism was more acute, within the context of a programme based on enmity against vienna, hostility against the socialdemocrats with a strong antisemitic tint and unification with germany.39 however, even the landbund was first and above anything else a party focused on the representation of agrarian producers and national issues, and the former was the priority for example when establishing alliances with other parties and determining its attitude towards governments. its appeal was however limited by the fact that the christian social party of engelbert dollfuss (who himself had a background as agrarian activist) managed to establish a solid link with agrarian associations. all things considered, in a historical context in which the worst excesses of nationalism led to widespread intolerance and violence, the nationalist strain that ran through agrarian parties was far from being the most toxic. it therefore appears that tom nairn’s equating of ethnic nationalism with peasant values and violent conflicts cannot be sustained.40 there may be more truth to the slovak agrarian politician milan hodža’s words when he said that if agrarians were nationalists, by all accounts theirs would be a ‘quiet nationalism’, although further research and a more systematic comparison of case-studies is required.41 ‘quiet nationalism’ seems promising as a concept and it could be applied to most of the agrarian parties but not necessarily all the time. in order to be useful as an analytical tool, it should be refined in academic terms. to sum it up, it would imply tolerance towards ethnic minorities, a pacifist approach to redefining borders and foreign policy and a combination of civic and ethnic elements when defining national identities. a sample of parties under different circumstances (in power or in opposition, governing alone or in coalition with other forces, representing minorities or ethnic majority groups and so one) would allow to test the suitability of the hypotheses proposed in this article. studies on national movements 8 (2021) | articles | 22 miguel cabo endnotes 1 university of santiago de compostela (galicia, spain), histagra research group (gi-1657). miguel.cabo@usc.es https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8099-3895. i am thankful for the suggestions of both internal and external reviewers. translated by philip webb 2 the term ‘golden age’ is taken from a. toshkov, agrarianism as modernity in 20th-century europe. the golden age of the peasantry (london, 2019). for recent works on this topic, r. bideleux, ‘the peasantries and peasant parties of interwar east central europe’, in: s.p. ramet, (ed.), interwar east central europe, 1918-1941. the failure of democracy-building. the fate of minorities (london, 2020), 281-331 and m. cabo, ‘agrarian parties in europe prior to 1945 and beyond’, in: l. van molle, l. brassart, c. marache & j. pan-montojo (eds.), making politics in the european countryside, from the 1780s to the 1930s (turnhout, 2021). the classic study is that of h. gollwitzer, (ed.), europäische bauernparteien im 20.jahrhundert (stuttgart, 1977). 3 r. daskalov & d. mishkova, entangled histories of the balkans. volume two: transfers of political ideologies and institutions (leiden, 2014), 350-352. 4 the main absences were the hungarian and nordic parties (apart from the finnish one). initially, the project had a clear pan-slavic component which was to be diluted as time went on. for works on the green international, h. haushofer, ‘die internationale organisation der bauernparteien’, in: h. gollwitzer (ed.), europäische bauernparteien im 20.jahrhundert, (stuttgart, 1977), 668-690; e. kubů & j. šouša, ‘sen o slovanské agrární spolupráci. (antonín švehla ideový a organizační tvůrce mezinárodního agrárního bureau)’, in: agrární strany ve vládních a samosprávných strukturách mezi světovými válkami (uherské hradiště, 2008), 35-41. 5 g.m. dimitrov, ‘agrarianism’, in: f. gross (ed.), european ideologies, a survey of 20th century political ideas (new york, 1948), 396. 6 d. mitrany, marx against the peasant: a study in social dogmatism (chapel hill, 1951). 7 s.m. lipset & s. rokkan (eds.), party systems and voter alignments: crossnational perspectives (new york, 1967). another issue is that in some countries mailto:miguel.cabo@usc.es https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8099-3895 studies on national movements 8 (2021) | articles miguel cabo 23 | the opposition between centre and periphery, church and state or capital and labour might overlap, but the major cleavage was between city and country. 8 l. fernández prieto & m. cabo, ‘agrarian movements, the national question, and democracy in europe, 1880-1945’, in: x.m. núñez seixas (ed.), the first world war and the nationality question in europe (leiden, 2020), 226-290. 9 ‘idée de l’agrarisme universel’, in: bulletin du bureau international agricole 1 (1923), 3-7. the same concept in švehl, who thought poles resisting the assimilation policies of prussian governments a telling example, in eduard kubu & jiri sousa (eds.) rozmluvy s antonínem svehlou a o svehlovi. vzpomínky agrárnhího diplomata karla mecíre, (prague, 2018), 83-85. 10 j. rutaj, peasant international in action (london, 1948), 7. 11 t. varley, ‘on the road to extinction: agrarian parties in twentieth-century ireland’, in: irish political studies 25/4 (2010), 581-601. 12 k. lorenz (ed.), cooperatives in ethnic conflicts: eastern europe in the 19th and early 20th century (berlin, 2006). 13 ‘ante radić le père du mouvement paysan croate’, in: bulletin union internationale paysanne 1 (1950), 7-8. 14 b. anderson, imagined communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism (london, 1987). 15 j. augusteijn & e. storm (eds.), region and state in nineteenth-century europe. nation-building, regional identities and separation (london, 2012). 16 e. lynch, ‘le parti agraire et paysan français, entre politique et manifestation’, in: histoire et sociétés rurales, 13 (2005), 54-65. 17 on dorgères, r.o. paxton, le temps des chemises vertes. révoltes paysannes et fascisme rural, 1923-1939 (paris, 1996). 18 bulletin du bureau international agraire 1928-4, 262. 19 the peasant-soldier myth was commonplace among other parties; e. lynch, ‘les usages politiques du soldat laboureur: paysannerie et nation dans la france et l’europe agrariennes 1880-1945’, in: j.l. mayaud & l. raphael (eds.), histoire de l’europe rurale contemporaine. du village à l’état (paris, 2005), 332-349. studies on national movements 8 (2021) | articles | 24 miguel cabo 20 u. østergård, ‘denmark: a big small state – the peasant roots of danish modernity’, in: j.l. campbell, j.a. hall & o.k. pedersen, national identity and the varieties of capitalism: the danish experience (ithaca, 2006), 53-98. 21 g.a. andersen & j.b. jensen, ‘the danish venstre: liberal, agrarian or centrist?’, in: d. arter (ed.). from farmyard to city square?: the electoral adaptation of the nordic agrarian parties (ann arbor, 2001), 96-131. 22 j.d. bell, peasants in power: alexander stamboliski and the bulgarian agrarian national union, 1899-1923 (princeton, 1977). toshkov, agrarianism, 65. 23 a. stamboliski, œuvres choisies (sofia, 1981), 48-50. 24 m. biondich, stjepan radic, the croat peasant party, and the politics of mass mobilization, 1904-1928 (toronto, 2000). 25 s. sobieraj, die nationale politik des bundes der landwirte in der ersten tschechoslowakischen republik: möglichkeiten und grenzen der verständigung zwischen tschechen und deutschen (1918-1929) (frankfurt am main, 2002). it is significant that the green international congress of 1929 entrusted the bund der landwirte with the presentation of a report on the national question, which concluded that pacts with agrarian parties at home and abroad were the first step towards its solution; neuer morgen 27/5/1929. 26 nevertheless, it did not have the opportunity to defend this position because it was immediately illegalised under an agreement between president edvard beneš and the communists. see for example the following editorial from the party’s newspaper in exile, in which it is maintained that tolerance had been increasing during the first republic thanks to the bridges laid by agrarian parties, ‘pomêr republikánské strany na národním menšinám’, in: agrární politika. list čs. republikánské strany v zahraničí, 1/1/1954. 27 i. avakumovic, ‘the serb peasant party, 1919-1945’, in; i. volgyes (ed.), the peasantry of eastern europe (n. york, 1979), 57-78. 28 m. hodža, články, reči, štúdie. iv cesty stredo-evropskej agrárnej demokracie 1921-1931 (prague, 1931), 276. 29 venkov (25-12-1937). 30 a-m. koll, ‘agrarianism and ethnicity’, in: h. schultz & e. kubů (eds.), history and culture of economic nationalism in east central europe (berlin, 2006), 141160; j. eellend, ‘agrarianism and modernization in inter-war eastern europe’, studies on national movements 8 (2021) | articles miguel cabo 25 | in: p. wawrzeniuk (ed.), societal change and ideological formation among the rural population of the baltic area 1880-1939 (huddinge, 2008), 35-56. 31 toshkov, agrarianism, 61. 32 a valuable and recent contribution on this point is d. müller, bodeneigentum und nation. rumänien, jugolawien und polen im europäischen vergleich 19181948, (göttingen, 2020). 33 on the uses and setbacks of said dichotomy, see among others u. özkirimli, contemporary debates on nationalism. a critical engagement (basingstoke, 2005), 15-28, or x.m. núñez seixas, ‘nations and territorial identities in europe: transnational reflections’, in: european history quarterly, 40/4 (2010), 669684. 34 m. van ginderachter & j. fox (eds.), national indifference and the history of nationalism in modern europe (new york, 2019). 35 n. swain, ‘the fate of peasant parties during socialist transformation’, in: h. schultz, a. harre, w. benecke, c. boyer, u. muller, a. nutzenadel, & p. ther (eds.), bauerngesellschaften auf dem weg in die moderne (wiesbaden, 2010), 163-176. 36 the most complete expression of this is m. hodža, federation in central europe. reflections and reminiscences (london, 1942). 37 b.trencsényi, m. janowski, m. baár, m. falina & m. kopeč, a history of modern political thought in east central europe (oxford, 2018), 484; p. swacha, ‘european integration in the international peasant union concepts’, in: j.rychlík, l. holec & m. pehr (eds.), agrarismus ve strední východní evrope 19. a 20. století (prague, 2015), 281-294; s. leček, ‘dream of world peace: croatian peasant party and two concepts of the community of nations’, in: j. gmitruk & a. indraszczyk (eds.), historia i tradycje ruchu ludowego, tom 1: ideologia, polityka i jej kreatorzy (warsaw, 2016), 247-263 38 k. struve, ‘die juden in der sicht der polnischen bauernparteien vom ende des 19. jahrhunderts bis 1939’, in: zeitschrift für ostmitteleuropaforschung 48 (1999), 184-225; m. fleming, communism, nationalism and ethnicity in poland, 1944-1950 (london, 2010), 62. 39 a. haas, die vergessene bauernpartei. der steirische landbund und sein einfluß auf die österreichische politik 1918–1934 (graz 2000). 40 t. nairn, faces of nationalism. janus revisited (london, 1997), 90-110. studies on national movements 8 (2021) | articles | 26 miguel cabo 41 m. hodža, články, reči, štúdie. iv cesty stredo-evropskej agrárnej demokracie 1921-1931 (prague, 1931), 277. microsoft word introduction_v3.doc     luc  boeva  &  andreas  stynen,  ‘introduction.  not  yet  another  journal  on   nationalism?’,  in:  studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)  pp.  1-­‐6.   http://snm.nise.eu   luc  boeva  &  andreas  stynen   introduction   not  yet  another  journal  on  nationalism?   over   the   last   thirty   years   studies   into   nationalism   have   considerably   grown   in   number.   the   works   of   eminent   scholars   as   ernest   gellner,   miroslav  hroch,  anthony  d.  smith  and  several  others  have  sparkled  an   interest   among   social   scientists   and   historians,   resulting   in   dozens   of   volumes   and   many   hundreds   of   articles   on   the   origins,   forms   and   meanings  of  national  movements,  their  successes  and  failures,  their  merits   and  dangers.  the  reality  of  the  early  twenty-­‐first  century,  with  the  often   joined  themes  of  nationalism  and  ethnicity  high  on  the  political  agenda,   forces   those  studying  nationalism   to   firmly  support   their   research  with   critical   reflection   and   analysis   in   order   to   prevent   or   refute   suspicions   concerning   their   true   objectives.   notwithstanding   this   caution   among   a   great   deal   of   scholars,   many   methodological   and   subsequent   research   problems  still  remain  to  be  solved.   this   is   certainly   the   case   with   the   comparative   study   of   national   movements.   though   these   movements   are   pre-­‐eminently   transnational,   both   in   inspiration   and   development,   researchers   commonly   remain   unaware  of  results  from  studies  of  other  nations.  indeed,  time  and  again   case   studies   are   carried   out   without   a   contextual   or   comparative   dimension.  moreover,  even  theory  formation  is  often  insufficiently  based   on   the   results   of   comparative   empirical   research.   comparative   studies   tend  to  be  complicated,  particularly  when  dealing  with  european  national   movements:   the   language   barrier   is   often   insurmountable,   most   studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)      |      introduction     luc  boeva  &  andreas  stynen  2   (historical)   information  resides   in  often  undisclosed  archives,   too  much   documentation   remains   unpublished   and   controlled,   systematically   presented   data   are   rarely   available.   until   recently   there   was   no   coordinated  effort  to  collect  records,  documentation  and  information  on   this  subject,   to  conserve  and  disclose   them  for  research  on  a  european   level.  at  the  same  time  a  need  for  advice  and  support  for  the  conservation   and  disclosure  of  those  sources  was  felt.   that   is   why   in   2008   an   international   research,   heuristic   and   archival   platform   of   scholars   and   institutes   was   established:   nise,   acronym   for   national   movements   and   intermediary   structures   in   europe.   its   main   objective  is  to  enable  comparative  and  transnational  studies  on  national   movements   in   general   and   their   intermediary   structures   in   particular:   political  parties,  cultural  associations  and  social  organisations,  the  people   associated   with   these   structures   (persons   in   charge,   activists,   representatives,   ideologists…),   and   the   programmes   and   goals   as   articulated  in  their  publications  and  archives.  mapping  out  personal  and   institutional   relations   between   national   movements   also   enables   researchers  to  study  political  and  cultural  transfers.  and  theoreticians  of   nationalism  are  given  the  opportunity  to  make  use  of  more  controlled  and   structured  empirical  data  than  ever  before.1   in   only   a   couple   of   years   nise   has   assembled   leading   academics   and   specialised   research   and   heritage   institutes.   geographically   its   network   ranges  from  sami  kautokeino  to  catalan  barcelona,  from  irish  maynooth   to  ukrainian  lviv.  by  means  of  services  and  advice,  data  sharing,  collective   projects  and  a  series  of  workshops,  conferences  and  other  meetings,  the   platform   has   already   proved   to   be   a   valuable   tool   for   its   members.   by   reaching   out   to   people   not   (yet)   involved,   publications   are   equally   important   in   nise’s   mission   of   stimulating   comparative   nationalism   research.   after   a   series   of   proceedings   and   monographies,   a   scientific   journal  devoted  to  nationalism  is  the  logical  next  step.   though  renowned  titles  like  nations  and  nationalism  or  national  identities   comprehensively  cover  the  subject  area,  nise  discerned  the  need  for  yet   another  english  language  journal  related  to  nationalism  studies,  so  as  to   have   a   dissemination   channel   in   accordance   with   its   remit.   this   studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)      |      introduction     luc  boeva  &  andreas  stynen   3   contributes  to  the  comparative  historiography  of  national  movements  and   subsequent   theory   formation   of   nationalism,   encouraging   transnational   and   transfer   studies   in   the   process.   the   scope   of   the   journal   includes   (european)   history,   political   sciences,   sociology,   geography,   nationalism   studies  and  cultural  studies.   the   new   journal,   studies   on   national   movements   (snm),   however   also   provides  space  for  aspects  of  nationalism  studies  that  hitherto  are  dealt   with   in   a   haphazard   way   or   are   even   being   neglected.   this   goes   in   particular   for   heuristic   and   archival   matters:   bibliographies,   catalogues,   archival  inventories  are  accompanied  by  contextual  studies,  providing  the   empirical  basis  for  research  and,  ultimately,  theory  formation.  moreover,   as  studies  on  nationalism  only  tend  to  be  noticed  when  written  in  english,   the  spotlight  will  be  directed  specifically  to  non-­‐english  theoretical  works   and   case   studies.   in   sum,   each   volume   of   snm   will   have   three   distinct   sections:  articles,  sources  and  reviews,  as  such  offering  both  a  state  of  play   of  recent  research  and  building  stones  for  future  studies.   finally,   another   operational   option   also   distinguishes   snm   from   other   subject-­‐related  journals.  in  an  era  where  the  taxpayer  finances  scientific   research  with  the  results  subsequently  all  too  often  published  in  journals   sustained  by  private  enterprise,   leading   to  university   libraries  spending   half  their  budget  on  journal  subscriptions,  nise,  subscribing  to  the  cost  of   knowledge   petition,   has   deliberately   made   snm   freely   available   on   the   internet.2  this  is  achieved  by  means  of  the  open  journals  systems  (ojs),  a   journal  management  and  publishing  system  that  allows  for  a  reliable  and   comprehensive   online   environment,   and   this   for   authors,   readers   and   editors  alike.  combining  the  benefits  of  traditional  durability  and  digital   possibilities,  ojs  was  developed  as  part  of  the  public  knowledge  project,   an  academic  partnership  aimed  at  the  promotion  of  online  infrastructure   in  the  dissemination  of  scientific  knowledge,  and  grants  an  unseen  level  of   accessibility  and  editorial  independence.3   the  free  availability  of  snm,  to  be  published  once  a  year  rather  than  as  an   ongoing   series   of   separate   articles,   does   not   detract   from   its   scientific   quality  by  any  means.  all   contributions  are  peer  reviewed,  a  refereeing   procedure  in  which  nise’s  international  advisory  board  plays  a  key  role.   studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)      |      introduction     luc  boeva  &  andreas  stynen  4   after   publication,   moreover,   the   scientific   debate   does   not   finish.   apart   from   common   citations   in   other   publications,   the   online   nature   of   the   journal  allows  for  rapid  feedback  and  even  debates  with  the  authors:  each   article  has  its  own  space  for  comments.  we  look  forward  to  the  ensuing   discussions  and  invite  all  of  our  readers  to  take  part  in  them.   considering  snm’s  objective  of  widening  the  perspective  of  historians  of   nationalism,  it  is  only  logical  that  this  first  issue  pays  ample  attention  to   historiographical  matters.  the  kickoff  is  duly  given  by  miroslav  hroch,  one   of   the   figureheads   in   the  historical  analysis  of  national  movements  and   whose  theories  were  among  the  first  to  be  adopted  by  scholars  on  both   sides   of   a,   luckily,   outdated   line   of   political   demarcation.   in   his   essay,   hroch  sharply  formulates  one  of  the  key  problems  of  our  discipline:  the   important,  and  yet  often  neglected  difference  between  officially  authorised   state   nationalism   and   the   awakening   of   national   feelings   in   minority   groups.  in  a  similar  vein,  philipp  ther  investigates  the  special  situation  of   border   regions,   with   the   inhabitants   as   the   puppet   of   two   (or   more)   competing  nationalisms.  the  case  of  upper  silesia  sheds  light  on  the  often   tragic  conditions  in  which  peoples  and  regions  were  torn  apart,  and  the   impact  on  their  identity.   four   articles   focus   on   the   historiographical   output   in/on   a   number   of   european  national  movements,  each  with  its  own  peculiarities.  bruno  de   wever  not  only  traces  the  development  of  a  critical  historiography  of  the   flemish  movement  and  the  main  debates  among  historians,  his  article  is   also  a  manual  for  researchers,  even  the  most  precise  currently  available   for  scholars  not  reading  dutch.  tudi  kernalegenn  and  yann  fournis  show   the  dynamics  between  the  nationalist  movement,  the  historical  profession   and   broad   society   in   brittany,   a   close   interplay   in   which   the   historical   debate  about   the  movement’s   involvement   in  world  war   ii  plays  a  key   role.  the  moral  implications  of  history  writing  are  also  elucidated  by  enric   ucelay-­‐da  cal,  who  dissects  the  close  and  ambiguous  relationship,  up  to   this   day,   of   historians   and   the   catalan   movement.   inevitable   as   this   blending   is,   his   article   reads   at   the   same   time   as   a   plea   for   a   higher   consciousness  among  scholars:  considering  the  (im)possibilities  of  taking   a  neutral  position,  he  explores  the  confusion  that  arises  when  historians   studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)      |      introduction     luc  boeva  &  andreas  stynen   5   are   fully   engaged   in   their   object   of   study.   that   historians   have   several   options  to  choose  from,  is  also  the  leitmotif  in  darius  staliūnas’s  article  on   lithuanian   national   historiography.   he   analyses   the   strategies   used   by   several  generations  of  historians,   first  when  confronted  with  nationalist   pressure   from   dominant   neighbours,   later   when   dealing   with   official   paradigms  determining  the  playing  field.   the  section  on   ‘sources’   in  this   first   issue  shows  the  variety  of  possible   approaches.  as  an  appendix  to  his  article  on  upper  silesia,  but  at  the  same   time  surpassing  it,  philipp  ther  presents  a  bibliography  of  recent  works  on   the  region’s  history,  including  some  with  an  outspoken  comparative  intent.   a  second  contribution,  by  sophie  bossaert  and  tom  cobbaert,  deals  with   the  archives  of  the  bayernpartei:  an  inventory  of  the  files  and  documents   belonging  to  the  international  collections  of  the  advn  in  antwerp  is  a  first   step   to  enable  research   into   this  especially  during   the  1950s  successful   bavarian   nationalist   party.   finally,   xabier   macías   and   manoel   santos   discuss   the   goals   and   development   of   diliname,   an   online   database   offering   access   to   documents   relevant   for   a   series   of   movements   advocating  the  rights  of  european  stateless  nations.  this  first  volume  of   snm   does   not   contain   an   (annotated)   source   publication,   but   that   is   something  the  journal  will  definitely  offer  in  future  issues.   the   editorial   staff   is   confident   that   studies   on   national   movements   will   receive  a  warm  welcome.  desiring  to  ensure  an  ongoing  dialogue  in  the   scholarly  historical  field,  we  invite  readers  to  share  their  comments  and   authors  to  submit  their  contributions  on  instances  of  national  thought  and   practices  anywhere   in  europe.  curious  of   the  direction  our   journal  will   venture   into,   we   are   confident   it   will   become   a   meeting   ground   for   everyone   involved   in   realising   an   innovative   history   of   national   movements.   studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)      |      introduction     luc  boeva  &  andreas  stynen  6     endnotes   1  more  on  nise  at  its  website,  http://www.nise.eu.   2  r.  monvoisin,   ‘recherche  publique,  revues  privées’,  in:  le  monde  diplomatique,   59  (december  2012)  27;  http://thecostofknowledge.com  [accessed  23/4/2013].   3   ‘public   knowledge   project.   about’   at   http://www.pkp.sfu.ca/about   [accessed   25/4/2013].   microsoft word macias_santos_v5_definitive.docx   xabier  macías  &  manoel  santos,  ‘diliname  –  digital  library  of  national   movements  in  europe.  democracy  and  sovereignty  in  all  languages’,  in:   studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)  pp.  224-­‐233.   http://snm.nise.eu   xabier  macías  &  manoel  santos   diliname  –  digital  library  of  national   movements  in  europe   democracy  and  sovereignty  in  all  languages   on   6   june   2008,   the   advn   headquarters   (archival,   documentation   and   research  centre   for  flemish  nationalism)  played  host   to   the  signing  by   foundations,   publications   and   socio-­‐cultural   entities   that   strive   for   the   right  to  self-­‐determination  and  linguistic  diversity  in  the  european  union   (eu),   of   the   constituent   agreement   of   the   centre   maurits   coppieters   (cmc).1  established  as  a  political  foundation  linked  to  the  european  free   alliance  (efa/ale)  and  with  the  support  of  the  european  parliament,  cmc   began  its  autonomous  journey  by  trying  to  provide  favourable  arguments   to   the  political  and   ideological  debate  on  democratic  reinforcement  and   the  change  to  the  institutional  architecture  of  the  eu.     the  seven  founding  organisations  expanded  to  fifteen  within  the  first  five   years  of  activity.  with  link  (flanders)  having  ceased  its  activities,  the  cmc   now  consists  of  fundació  josep  irla  (catalonia),  fundación  galiza  sempre   (galicia),  alkartasuna  fundazioa  (basque  country),  fundació  emili  darder   (balearic  islands),  fundación  aragonesista  29  de  junio  (aragón),  home  of   macedonian   culture   (macedonia,   greece),   arritti   (corsica),   welsh   nationalism  foundation  (wales),  kurdish  institute  of  brussels  (belgium),   transylvanian  monitor   (transylvania),  ciemen  (catalonia),  free  state  of   studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)      |      sources     xabier  macías  &  manoel  santos   225   rijeka   association   (rijeka)   and   istituto   camillo   bellieni   (sardinia).   le   peuple  breton  (brittany)  joined  in  2013.   this  ongoing  organisational  development  runs  parallel  to  joint  ventures.2   as  for  instance  with  diliname,  the  digital  library  on  national  movements   in  europe,  a  project  proposed  by  the  fundación  galiza  sempre   in  2009.   the   objective   is   to   ‘collect,   translate   and   host   on   the   web   programs,   manifestos  and  documents  collecting  the  background,  history  and  goals  of   socio-­‐political   movements   of   the   protectors   of   the   rights   of   european   stateless  nations’,  aiming,  initially,  at  three  kinds  of  texts:  ‘programmatic   documents   (historic   and   current);   internationalist   manifestos   and   initiatives;  and  global  justice  proposals.’  from  the  outset,  the  initiative  had   two  main  objectives:  on   the  one  hand   the   facilitation  of  access   to  basic   political   texts   and   programmes   by   the   european   nationalist,   regionalist   and   independentist   movements   promoting   exchange   and   mutual   understanding,   and   on   the   other   hand   the   provision   of   a   resource   in   support  of  educational,  fact-­‐finding  and  research  activities.     about  diliname   the   actual   development   of   this   digital   project   started   in   the   second   half   of   2010,   with   the   primary   objective   of   gathering   and   providing   relevant   documents,   historical   and   current   alike,   relating  to  the  creation,  evolution,   ideas   behind   and   contribution   by   socio-­‐ political   proposals   on   the   part   of   the   movements   of   stateless   nations   assembled   in   cmc.   diliname   is   not   directed   at   the   publication   of   extensive   essays   or   complex   texts,   but   instead   gathers   manifestos,   declarations   of   ideological   and   political   principles,  foundational  texts  of  movements  and  parties,  important  letters,   news  articles,  relevant  speeches,  and  so  on.  this   is  why  diliname  was   founded  first  of  all  as  an  outreach  project,  targeting  the  general  public  in   studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)      |      sources     xabier  macías  &  manoel  santos  226   order   to   raise   awareness   of   the   movements   and   to   disseminate   their   history  and  activities.  however,   it   is  also  aimed  at  the  academic  field  as   well   as   political   foundations   and   various   forums   assisting   with   the   comparative   study,   at   least   at   an   early   stage,   of   independentist   and   nationalist  democratic  movements  on  a  european  level.  a  third,  additional   goal  would  be  to  improve  knowledge  on  other  issues  among  the  different   stateless  nations.   an   internet   portal   (www.diliname.eu)   was   created   to   present   the   documents.   their   categorisation   was   in   the   first   place   based   on   their   nation  of  origin;  they  were  subsequently  structured  with  the  help  of  many   other  criteria  and  were  accompanied  by  a  catalogue  file  referencing  the   date,  author,  subject,  and  so  on.  the  portal,  in  short,  constitutes  a  public   area  in  which  information  resources  can  be  displayed  in  different  viewing   formats,   integrated   in   a   database   and   ranked   by   metadata   series   that   correspond  to  a  bibliographic  record,  in  this  case  a  digital  one.   in  its  internal  architecture,  the  portal  always  uses  free  and/or  open-­‐source   software,  selecting  as  main  tools  the  content  management  system  joomla!   and  the  k2  component,  which  publishes  documents  simply  in  joomla!  but   with  more  information  fields  and  other  accessories,  required  to  obtain  a   minimum  bibliographic  order  and  more  useful  cataloguing.  although  the   early  results  are  already  made  public,  as  the  library  acquires  more  content,   search  engines  will  be  implemented  that  both  allow  general  searches  (a   phrase,  a  name,  text)  or  searches  limited  to  different  criteria  (metadata)  on   which  the  library  is  structured  (title,  author,  category,  time,  date,  origin,   keywords,  description,  context,  and  so  on).   english  has  been  chosen  as  the  vehicular  language  in  order  to  facilitate  the   study  of  texts  from  varied  geographical  and  linguistic  areas.  however,  as   the   languages   originally   used   are   equally   valuable,   it   was   decided   to   publish  the  different  documents  in  three  formats:   1. online  format:  a  complete  english  translation  of  each  document  for   quick  on-­‐screen  viewing;   2. corporate  format:  a  typeset  document  in  accordance  with  the  cmc   stylebook,   downloadable   in   pdf   format.   this   format   is   available   both  in  english  and  in  the  original  language  of  the  document;   studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)      |      sources     xabier  macías  &  manoel  santos   227   3. original  digitised  format:  published  only  in  cases  in  which  there  is   a  unique  publication  that  is  considered  of  documentary  value.   in  addition,  each  document  contains  a  catalogue  file  (in  english)  containing   the  following  fields:     -­‐ id  (identification  code)   -­‐ origin  (nation  or  region)   -­‐ time  (time  scale  simple  default)   -­‐ document  title  (in  english)   -­‐ document  title  (in  original  language)   -­‐ category  (document  subject,  predefined)   -­‐ description  (brief  text  describing  content)   -­‐ language  (original)   -­‐ date  (complete,  if  applicable)   -­‐ author/s  (if  known,  whether  one  or  more  persons,  or  one  or  more   organisations)   -­‐ reference   people   (persons   relating   to   the   document   or   to   its   subject.  sometimes  these  can  be  the  same  as  the  author/s  section)   -­‐ keywords  (a  minimum  of  five  words).   in  addition,  each  complete  document  is  preceded  by  both  a  concise  text   explaining  the  historical  and  socio-­‐political  context  in  which  the  document   was  drafted,  and  a  summary  of  its  contents.  with  a  defined  minimum  and   maximum  length,  these  two  texts  provide  an  adequate  first  impression.   a  networked  library   to  obtain  the  documents,  an  integrated  network  has  been  created,  with  a   liaison   for   each   of   the   cmc   members.   this   contact   is   responsible   for   coordinating  his/her  own  team  for  the  selection  –  with  academic  advice  –   of  the  documents  and  finally  for  formatting  the  contents  to  the  said  criteria   in  order  to  be  published  by  diliname.     a  coordinator  –  supported  by  cmc  –  who  oversees  the  development  of  the   portal   and   handling   of   the   documents,   making   them   available   in   the   studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)      |      sources     xabier  macías  &  manoel  santos  228   required  format,  will  manage  the  network.  the  actual  content  contribution   is  carried  out  either  by  using  a  restricted  access  form  on  the  web,  or  by   sending  them  directly  to  the  coordinator.   the  project  is  now  in  the  early  stages  of  having  the  documents  catalogued,   both  by  origin  and  by  date  and  subject.  to  facilitate  this  and  allow  texts  to   be   available   for   comparative   study   right   from   the   start,   diliname   requests   texts   acquired   from   network   members   to   answer   to   a   basic   number  of  arrangement  criteria.  thus,  to  meet  the  library’s  first  objective   a  simple  time  criterion  was  established  (documents  from  the  nineteenth   century  or  earlier;  documents  from  the  first  half  of  the  twentieth  century;   and  documents  from  the  second  half  of  the  twentieth  century  onwards),  as   well  as  a  thematic  one  (foundation  documents;  documents  symbolising  the   ideological-­‐programmatic   developments   of   the   national   movement   in   question;  and  documents  representing  the  current  political  alternatives).   http://www.diliname.eu   studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)      |      sources     xabier  macías  &  manoel  santos   229   of   course,   all   the   documents   to   be   included   in   diliname   should   be   of   recognised  importance  and  have  a  contrasted  academic  endorsement,   in   addition  to  the  selection  criterion,  while  their  importance  should  be  nation   wide  and  not  concerning  any  limited  party  political  subject.   in  addition,  with  the  english  translations  managed  by  diliname  and  cmc,   translators  should  take  special  care  while  dealing  with  political  terms  as   well  as   terminology  related  to   identity  and  other   topics   that  may  cause   confusion   by   having   different   meanings   in   different   geographical   areas.   hence,  it  is  the  intention  to  establish  translation  standards  in  this  specific   field.   evolution  and  challenges   right  from  the  start  diliname  was  intended  as  a  collaborative  network   project,   in   which   the   involvement   and   resources   of   the   different   foundations  that  make  up  cmc  is  key,  because  these  organisations  will  be   constructing   the   library  with   their  contributions.  as  diliname  plans   to   reflect  the  historical  developments  and  extremely  diverse  issues  contained   in   the   texts   that   are   often   difficult   to   understand   outside   their   original   areas,   it   cannot   be   a   centralised   project.   this   valuable   cooperation   and   collective   endeavour,   by   its   decentralised   nature,   however   also   causes   some  delays  when  trying  at  the  same  time  to  reach  both  the  qualitative   and  quantitative  objectives  set  by  the   library.  therefore  the  project  will   sometimes   have   to   change   its   objectives   and   deadlines   to   adapt   to   the   possibilities  offered  by  each  of  the  different  sources  of  information.   in  addition,  diliname  also  faces  cataloguing  difficulties,  especially  in  the   field  of  categorising  the  types  of  documents,  the  work  to  standardise  key   words   or   the   translation   of   terms   and   concepts   that   can   bear   different   interpretations  as  a  result  of  the  diversity  among  national  movements  and   their  history.  these  are  in  fact  issues  that  will  be  rectified;  the  library  will   grow  and,  therefore,  result  in  a  broader  view  of  their  needs.   at  the  end  of  2012,  the  library  had  published  and  translated  thirty-­‐three   documents   in   full,   as   well   as   forty   corporate   documents   and   some   studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)      |      sources     xabier  macías  &  manoel  santos  230   originals.   it   also   holds   more   than   twenty   texts   on   which   work   is   in   progress,   though   for   various   reasons   they   have   not   yet   been   published   (whether  because  they  are  incomplete,  due  to  difficulties  encountered  in   their   translation,   an   insufficiently   commensurate   number   of   papers   published   from   each   nation   or   region   involved,   and   so   on).   at   present,   there  are  documents  from  aragon,  the  basque  country,  catalonia,  corsica,   galicia,  macedonia,  transylvania  and  wales,  as  well  as  a  selection  of  texts   at  a  european  and   international   level  relating   to   the  collective  rights  of   peoples.   and  yet,  a  lot  remains  to  be  added.  among  diliname’s  most  immediate   objectives   is   guaranteeing   the   presence   of   texts   from   the   national   movements  represented  within  cmc  that  are  not  yet  present  in  the  library   (this   goes   for   the   balearic   islands,   kurdistan,   flanders,   sardinia   or   brittany),   as   well   as   to   complete   a   number   of   documents   and   topics   handled  from  those  already  included.   in   the   more   distant   future,   the   publication   of   texts   from   many   other   national   movements   also   outside   cmc   could   be   carried   out,   to   make   diliname   a   reference   tool   for   the   dissemination   and   study   of   emancipatory  movements  fighting  for  the  collective  rights  of  nations  and   regions  in  europe.3     endnotes   1  maurits   coppieters   (1920-­‐2005)   was   a   prominent   flemish   and   european   politician.  he  was  one  of  the  founders  of  efa  and  mep  for  this  entity;  he  worked   most  of  his  life  as  a  teacher  and  advocate  of  the  right  to  self-­‐determination  in  the   european  union.     2  an   overview   can   be   found   on   http://www.cmc-­‐foundation.eu/   [accessed   23/4/2013].   3  for  all  information,  please  contact  info@diliname.eu.   studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)      |      sources     xabier  macías  &  manoel  santos   231   digital  library  contents  (january  2013)   aragon    aragonese  regionalist  action  manifesto  addressed  to  the  aragonese   and  those  who  live  in  aragon  (1918)    positions.  localism.  regionalism.  nationalism  (1919)    aragonese  nationalism  (1919)     basque  country    draft   proposal   by   eusko   alkartasuna   to   expedite   a   sovereign   agreement  favouring  the  independence  of  euskal  herria  (2009)     catalonia    basic  principles  of  esquerra  republicana  de  catalunya  (1931)    the  catalan  republic  (1931)    proclamation  of  the  catalan  state:  generalitat  of  catalonia  (1934)    a  question  of  names  (1962)    ideological   declaration   of   the   esquerra   republicana   of   catalonia  (1993)   corsica    partitu  di  a  nazione  corse  -­‐  autunumia  (1982)   galicia    nationalist  assembly  of  lugo  manifesto  (1918)    preliminary  plan  for  the  galician  statute  (1931)    galicianist  party.  declaration  of  principles  (1931)   studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)      |      sources     xabier  macías  &  manoel  santos  232    union  of  the  galician  people  (upg).  minimum  10  principles  (1964)    galician  socialist  party  (gsp).  declaration  of  principles  (1974)    constitutional   terms   for   the   galician   nation   to   participate   in   a   federal  agreement  and  a  provisional  galician  government  (1976)    ideological   and   political   basis   of   the   galician   labour   party   (pog)  (1977)    galician   nationalist   bloc.   political   and   organisational   programme  (1982)     europe    charter   of   cooperation   for   the   construction   of   a   europe   of   the   nations  (1979)    declaration  of  bastia  (1979)    declaration  of  the  brussels  convention  (1981)    declaration  of  brussels  on  nations  and  regions  in  the  governance   of  europe  (2000)    sovereignty,   social   justice,   subsidiarity.   towards   a   europe   of   diversity  (2004)   international    declaration  of  the  space  of  collective  rights  of  stateless  peoples  and   nations  for  the  2009  world  social  forum  belém  (2009)    global  network  for  the  collective  rights  of  peoples  (2010)   macedonia    constitution   of   the   secret   macedonian-­‐adrianople   revolutionary   organization  (1896)    circular  by  which  the  ilinden  uprising  was  proclaimed  (1903)    manifesto  issued  at  the  first  session  of  the  anti-­‐fascist  council  of   national   liberation   of   macedonia   to   the   people   of   macedonia  (1944)   studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)      |      sources     xabier  macías  &  manoel  santos   233    transylvania    a   voice   crying   out.   transylvania,   banat,   the   körös   region   and   máramaros  for  the  hungarians!  (1921)   wales    address  to  the  electors  of  the  university  of  wales  (1931)    the  end  of  britishness  (1980)    the  new  wales   gal ariely, ‘state of nationalism (son): nationalism and globalization’, in: studies on national movements 8 (2021). state of nationalism (son): nationalism and globalization gal ariely ben-gurion university of the negev. are we witnessing the fall of nationalism to globalization? in his classic nations and nationalism since 1780, eric hobsbawm argued that over the course of time nationalism would no longer be a vital political program and the world would become ‘largely supranational’.1 or do we take anthony smith’s conclusion in nation and nationalism in the global era (1995) that such predictions are too optimistic and that supranational identities will not replace national culture any time soon? hobsbawm and smith’s writings reflect the leading approach toward globalization, which was understood to be the dominant force in the post-cold war years of the 1990s. the rise of nationalism across the world since the 1990s demonstrates that the belief in the triumph of globalization (and liberalism) was probably too optimistic; an increase in globalization processes does not imply the decline of nationalism across all the spheres – the relationship between nationalism and globalization is far more complex. this relationship is a key unresolved issue in the field and this overview looks to highlight some of its central aspects. part of the challenge of addressing the relationship between nationalism and globalization is the plurality of perspectives on how to define these concepts. is globalization separate from the process of modernization?2 what is the distinction between globalization and westernization? there studies on national movements 8 (2021) | state of nationalism | 2 gal ariely is no attempt here to offer any definitive definition of globalization; rather, this overview follows the functional definition of globalization as a process of ‘increasing cross-border flows of goods, services, money, people, information, and culture’ that promotes international interconnectedness.3 according to this definition, globalization constitutes a puzzling process of contradictory effects on many aspects of politics and society due to its multifaceted nature. it should thus be understood as a process or a set of processes which do not follow linear logic or have equal impact on societies across the world. the key aspect of this definition, however, is its emphasis on the crossing of borders – these can be different kinds of social and political borders. any adopted definition of nationalism reflects its inherent tensions with globalization, as the key criteria for any such definition is the nation’s differentiation from other nations and its continuity over time. the nation is a collective identity rooted in past symbols, memories, and values, as well as a group that projects into the future. it links symbols, memories, and values to a specific territory while distinguishing itself from other nations (guibernau 2001).4 accordingly, it is clear that the nation requires some type of borders while globalization is the process challenging these borders. it is no wonder then that the dominant view in the field is that nationalism and globalization are an inherent contradiction. nationalism and globalization as contradictions the influence of globalization on nationalism is subject to dispute.5 of the two dominant interpretations – one argues that globalization undermining nationalism while the other is more sceptical, arguing that globalization might, in fact, reinforce nationalism. studies on national movements 8 (2021) | state of nationalism gal ariely 3 | globalization undermines national identity due to the fact that the crossborder flow of information makes it harder for any single national identity to retain its unique significance and distinguish itself from other national identities. in the global village, the ability to produce and maintain a homogenous national identity is challenged as people become global consumers of goods and information; in a wired world, the government no longer has the exclusive capacity to exert cultural control over its citizens and territory.6 the effects of globalization on nationalism are not only in the sphere of culture and identity but also in politics and the economy. the increased participation in international organizations and supranational bodies undermine the function of the nation state. similarly, the increased relevance of international trade and economic interdependencies challenge the functions of the nation state in allocating resources. these processes therefore reduce the nationalist orientations of citizens. although the impact of globalization has long been a subject of study in general, theorists of nationalism have only recently begun to investigate its impact.7 the customary distinction between modernist and primordial theories of nationalism is also reflected in their conflicting interpretations of the influence of globalization on national identity.8 the modernist approach posits that nationalism is the product of a specific historical period – modernity – rather than constituting a permanent feature of human society. consequently, the transformation of social, economic, and political aspects of modern society under globalization changes the meaning of nationalism as an instrument of mass identification and mobilization. hobsbawm (1992) argued that nationalism had become less important and predicted that, over the course of time, it would no longer be a vital political program. fifteen years later, he reached the same conclusion, claiming that the emergence of national movements and national claims since the 1990s had not studies on national movements 8 (2021) | state of nationalism | 4 gal ariely undermined his contention that nationalism’s role as the main force shaping politics was decreasing.9 the primordial account of nationalism, on the other hand, emphasizes that nations are neither a modern phenomenon nor social constructs created by changing circumstances, as the modernist approach argues. rather, nationalism represents the importance of identity and belonging that reaches way further back than the modern period (horowitz 2004).10 a variation of the primordial account, as develop by smith, combines the acknowledgement of modernity for national mobilization while asserting that nationalism also embodies pre-existing ethnic traditions;11 in other words, nationalism has deeper roots in human society than the modern approach would suggest. the transformation of social, economic, and political aspects of human society under globalization does not, therefore, eradicate nationalism. smith concluded nation and nationalism in the global era by rejecting the modernist approach and suggesting: it would be folly to predict an early supersession of nationalism and an imminent transcendence of the nation.…for a global culture seems unable to offer the qualities of collective faith, dignity and hope that only a ‘religious surrogate’ with its promise of a territorial cultural community across the generations can provide.12 in a later account, smith argued not only that global culture cannot replace national culture but that national identity can, in fact, withstand the force of globalization. while the existence of culturally diverse waves of immigrants has, according to smith, reshaped the meaning of national identity, this process also leads members of the nation to reflect on their national identity and reinforce its meaning and functions for the nation. he therefore maintains that, despite globalization, ‘self-reflective and studies on national movements 8 (2021) | state of nationalism gal ariely 5 | self-celebrating communities, nations and nationalism are still very much alive’.13 others view the continuation of national identity in a globalized world as a consequence of the necessity to organize public life. according to calhoun’s influential perspective, national identity organizes ordinary people’s ‘sense of belonging’ and globalization makes the sense of belonging even more important than previously.14 from the perspective of global history, nationalism is not a simple reaction to globalization nor is it independent from global connectedness. instead, nationalism has emerged in tandem with globalization. it is not an opposition to the global processes but it is ‘inherent element of certain political or social projects to manage global flows’.15 nationalism and globalization: differential effects beyond the conclusive perspectives on the contradiction between nationalism and globalization, there are also those that focus on globalization’s differential impact, i.e., the way in which it influences different segments of society in different ways. while globalization may thus push some citizens toward cosmopolitanism, other groups develop ‘resistance identities’ that reinforce national feelings.16 national identity can serve as a counterforce against the destabilization of people’s sense of security induced by globalization, functioning as a set of stories and beliefs that are particular powerful ‘because of their ability to convey a picture of security, stability, and simple answers’.17 globalization has created a new conflict between ‘winners’ and ‘losers,’ with the former enjoying the benefits created by the opening up of borders and the latter possessing less resources (such as education) to studies on national movements 8 (2021) | state of nationalism | 6 gal ariely cope with the impact of globalization on their status in the labor market and their earnings prospects.18 this distinction between the ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ from globalization can be located across economic or cultural spheres. economic ‘losers’ are those who find themselves in increasing competition in the labor market with immigrants. such competition is common among the less educated because migrants tend to search for jobs in similar sectors of the economy. where there is a lack of welfare protection, there is growing nationalism and increased voting for the far right.19 likewise, in the cultural sphere, there is evidence of competition in the face of growing globalization and immigration. this is not a competition over jobs or welfare resources; instead, it is a competition between the dominant national identity and rising diversity. this results in a sort of cultural backlash that causes the ‘losers’ from globalization to increase their support for populist leaders who promise to make their countries ‘great again’.20 the question of the extent to which economic or cultural factors are responsible for the gaps between the ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ from globalization is open to debate. nevertheless, it is clear that ‘the central psychological consequence of globalization is that it results in transformations in identity, that is, in how people think about themselves in relation to the social environment’.21 it is therefore little wonder that members of this lower social strata view globalization as a threat to their status and their national identity, which, in turn, leads to an increase in nationalistic feelings. this scenario is talked up by the far right as part of their effort to mobilize support – and intensify national sentiment – among those who attribute their (economic and cultural) losses to globalization. according to this perspective, globalization influences people in different ways depending on their status and their nationalist feelings. another take on this issue is through the concept of glocalization. glocalization is, in short, the way in which global processes are transformed according to the local context. as roudometof argued: studies on national movements 8 (2021) | state of nationalism gal ariely 7 | if globalization accounts for the cultural uniformity of the formal aspects of nationhood, glocalization is about realizing (and accounting for) the specificity and ‘uniqueness’ of each national experience. glocalization is involved in nation formation precisely because the purely formal elements of nationhood are clearly insufficient to differentiate one nation from the other.22 the local context can differ between the different segments of society which may have varying reactions toward the process of globalization due to their social status and the extent to which they view themselves as winning or losing from globalization. the theoretical arguments can thus be seen to support various views of globalization and its effect on national identity. while globalization may reduce the relevance of national identity, it may also create a nationalist backlash which affects people in different ways. any consideration of the effect of globalization on national identity must therefore consider the multidimensionality of national identity as the well as the complex psychological aspects of identity.23 nationalism and globalization: empirical findings in addition to the various theoretical views concerning the relationship between nationalism and globalization, there have been growing research efforts to assess the impact of globalization empirically. given the multidimensionality of both nationalism and globalization, it is not surprising that these studies – whether conducted in a single nation or across several – have produced mixed results. in germany, for example, a study conducted among german citizens found that people with greater exposure to globalization (in terms of experiences of border crossing and transnational social relations) are more likely to adopt studies on national movements 8 (2021) | state of nationalism | 8 gal ariely cosmopolitan attitudes toward foreigners and global governance than those with less exposure.24 in britain, the younger generation was found less attached to and less proud of their country than the older generation.25 while this may be due to greater exposure and a more positive attitude toward globalization, it may also represent a life-cycle effect; in other words, no decline in national identity has actually taken place.26 in australia, globalization has been shown to influence both people’s conceptions of their national identity and their perceptions of the indigenous population as an integral part of the nation.27 while such studies support the argument that globalization has an impact on national identity, other studies have suggested that this influence is relatively limited. for example, a longitudinal study of cosmopolitan orientations among swedish citizens found, conversely, that protectionist attitudes tended to emerge.28 although most studies have focused on single countries or on europe, some have adopted a more global research design. the availability of cross-national survey data, such as the world value survey (wvs) and the international social survey program (issp) national identity modules and the european social survey (ess) facilitates exploration of the interaction between globalization and national identity across many more countries. despite reliance on the same set of data, researchers have, nonetheless, reached inconsistent conclusions. using wvs, norris and inglehart found support for the claim that supranational identity and cosmopolitan citizenship rates are on the increase, with the additional result that living in a cosmopolitan society is strongly related to less nationalistic attitudes.29 nonetheless, jung, also using wvs, reached a completely different conclusion: ‘it is a myth to expect cosmopolitan attitudes and supranational identities to increase significantly in the current globalizing world’.30 likewise, an analysis of elite cosmopolitan orientations using the same set of data drew similar inferences.31 studies on national movements 8 (2021) | state of nationalism gal ariely 9 | by analyzing quantitative (eurobarometer) and qualitative data from western europe, antonsich found that national pride had increased, national attachment was exhibiting a stable trend, and the meanings associated with the nation remained ‘thick’.32 another study combining several cross-national surveys found that while globalization is generally associated with greater support for nationalist attitudes, some countries demonstrated a negative correlation between them. by measuring nationalism as ‘national pride,’ bekhuis, lubbers, and verkuyten indicated that globalization has virtually no effect on nationalist attitudes among the highly educated but increased nationalist attitudes among the less educated.33 such contradictions can be found in other studies. when isolating certain aspects of national identity like national pride or ethnic identity, there are indeed findings that such feelings are less common in the more globalized countries; however, when other aspects, like national chauvinism, are examined, there is no evidence of a connection with globalization.34 immigration, as a key component of globalization, has also been the topic of numerous studies that seek to inspect public attitudes toward immigrants and immigration.35 among the many factors that shape such attitudes, national identity was found to be a key component.36 these studies have indicated that although national identity is multidimensional, there is a clear distinction between nationalism and patriotism: while nationalism is directly related to xenophobic attitudes toward immigrants, this is not always the case for patriotism.37 studies on national identity and attitudes toward immigration comprise single country studies as well as cross-national studies that use data sources like the issp national identity modules38 or the ess.39 despite the several studies conducted so far, the interplay between national identity, globalization, and attitudes toward immigration seems to raise more questions than provide clear answers. studies on national movements 8 (2021) | state of nationalism | 10 gal ariely empirical findings should not be seen to resolve the historical or the sociological debate on the nature of the relationship between nationalism and globalization. there are inherent caveats, such as the use of cross-sectional studies, which cannot address questions of causal relations or issues regarding the operationalization of national identity and globalization.40 the only definite conclusions to be drawn from such empirical studies is that relations between nationalism and globalization are indeed complex. concluding remarks hobsbawm argued that nationalism is ‘past its peak. the owl of minerva which brings wisdom, said hegel, flies out at dusk. it is a good sign that it is now circling nation and nationalism’.41 however, the question remains: is the owl of minerva flying due to the wind of globalization? this overview attempted to show that the effects of globalization on national identity are widely disputed. while some regard globalization as undermining national identity and increasing cosmopolitanism, others argue that it works in the opposite direction, possibly even reinforcing national feelings in the form of a backlash, or that it impacts different segments in society differently. given the complex relationship between nationalism and globalization, this debate cannot be resolved either theoretically or empirically using current tools. perhaps adopting other approaches (e.g. complexity theory42) will enable us to better understand this debate. this review is part of the state of nationalism (son), a comprehensive guide to the study of nationalism. as such it is also published on the son website, studies on national movements 8 (2021) | state of nationalism gal ariely 11 | where it is combined with an annotated bibliography and where it will be regularly updated. son is jointly supported by two institutes: nise and the university of east london (uel). dr eric taylor woods and dr robert schertzer are responsible for overall management and co-editors-in-chief. endnotes 1 e. hobsbawm, nations and nationalism since 1780. programme, myth, reality (cambridge, 1992), 191. 2 see m. guillén, ‘is globalization civilizing, destructive or feeble? a critique of five key debates in the social science literature’, in: annual review of sociology 27/1 (2001), 242–268. 3 d. held, a. mcgrew, d. goldblatt & j. perraton, global transformations: politics, economics and culture (cambridge, 1999), 16. 4 see m. guibernau, ‘globalization and the nation-state’, in: m. guibernau & j. hutchinson (eds.), understanding nationalism (cambridge, 2001), 242–268. 5 see c. calhoun, nations matter: culture, history, and the cosmopolitan dream (london, 2007); g. delanty & k. kumar (eds.), the sage handbook of nations and nationalism (london, 2006); guibernau, ‘globalization and the nationstate’; d. halikiopoulou & s. vasilopoulou (eds.), nationalism and globalisation: conflicting or complementary? (london, 2011); r.j. holton, globalization and the nation state (new york, 2011); s. pryke, nationalism in a global world (basingstoke, 2009); v. roudometof, ‘nationalism, globalization and glocalization’, in: thesis eleven 122/1 (2014), 18–33; a. smith, ‘nationalism in decline?’, in: m. young, e. zuelow & a. strum (eds.), nationalism in a global era (new york, 2007), 17–32; s. tønnesson, ‘globalizing national states’, in: nations and nationalism 10/1-2 (2004), 179–194. studies on national movements 8 (2021) | state of nationalism | 12 gal ariely 6 see b. barber, jihad vs. mcworld: how globalism and tribalism are reshaping the world (new york, 2003); guibernau, ‘globalization and the nation-state’; calhoun, nations matter. 7 delanty & kumar (eds.), the sage handbook of nations and nationalism. 8 m. kaldor, ‘nationalism and globalization’, in: nations and nationalism 10/1-2 (2004), 161–177; tønnesson, ‘globalizing national states’. 9 e. hobsbawm, globalization, democracy and terrorism (london, 2007). 10 see d. horowitz, ‘the primoridalists’, in: d. conversi (ed.), ethnonationalism in the contemporary world (london, 2004). 11 a. smith, nations and nationalism in a global era (cambridge, 1995). 12 ibid., 160. 13 smith, ‘nationalism in decline?’, 30. 14 see calhoun, nations matter. 15 m. middell, ‘the global turn in historical writing and the history of nationalism’, in: s. berger & e. storm (eds.), writing the history of nationalism (london, 2019), 154. 16 m. castells, the information age: economy, society, and culture ii: the power of identity (london, 2011). 17 c. kinnvall, ‘globalization and religious nationalism: self, identity, and the search for ontological security’, in: political psychology 25/5 (2004), 742. 18 see h. kriesi h, et al., ‘globalization and the transformation of the national political space: six european countries compared’, in: european journal of political research 45/6 (2006), 921–956. 19 d. swank & h.g. betz, ‘globalization, the welfare state and right-wing populism in western europe’, in: socio-economic review ½ (2003), 215–245; t. vlandas & d. halikiopoulou, ‘does unemployment matter? economic insecurity, labour market policies and the far-right vote in europe’, in: european political science 18/3 (2019), 421–438. 20 p. norris & r. inglehart, cultural backlash: trump, brexit, and the rise of authoritarian populism (cambridge, 2019). studies on national movements 8 (2021) | state of nationalism gal ariely 13 | 21 j. arnett, ‘the psychology of globalization’, in: american psychologist 57/10 (2002), 777. 22 roudometof, ‘nationalism, globalization and glocalization’, 25. 23 g. reese, a. rosenmann & j.e. cameron, the psychology of globalization: identity, ideology, and action (london, 2019). 24 s. mau, j. mewes & a. zimmermann, ‘cosmopolitan attitudes through transnational practices?’, in: global networks 8/1 (2008), 1–24. 25 j. tilley & a. heath, ‘the decline of british pride’, in: british journal of sociology 58/4 (2007), 661–678. 26 see j.k. jung, ‘growing supranational identities in a globalizing world? a multilevel analysis of the world values surveys’, in: european journal of political research 47/5 (2008), 578–609. 27 a. moran, australia: nation, belonging, and globalization (new york, 2005). 28 a. olofsson & s. öhman, ‘views of risk in sweden: global fatalism and local control: an empirical investigation of ulrich beck's theory of new risks’, in: journal of risk research 10/2 (2007), 177–196. 29 p. norris & r. inglehart, cosmopolitan communications: cultural diversity in a globalized world (cambridge, 2009). 30 jung, ‘growing supranational identities in a globalizing world?’, 600. 31 r. davidson, n. poor & a. williams, ‘stratification and global elite theory: a cross-cultural and longitudinal analysis of public opinion’, in: international journal of public opinion research 21/2 (2009), 165–186. 32 m. antonsich, ‘national identities in the age of globalisation: the case of western europe’, in: national identities 11/3 (2009), 281–299. 33 h. bekhuis, m. lubbers & m. verkuyten, ‘how education moderates the relation between globalization and nationalist attitudes’, in: international journal of public opinion research 26/4 (2014), 487–500. 34 g. ariely, ‘globalisation and the decline of national identity? an exploration across sixty-three countries’, in: nations and nationalism 18/3 (2012) 461–482; g. ariely, ‘globalization, immigration and national identity: how the level of globalization affects the relations between nationalism, constructive patriotism studies on national movements 8 (2021) | state of nationalism | 14 gal ariely and attitudes toward immigrants?’, in: group processes & intergroup relations. 15/4 (2012), 539-557; g. ariely, ‘the nexus between globalization and ethnic identity: a view from below’, in: ethnicities 19/5 (2019), 763–788. 35 j. hainmueller & d.j. hopkins, ‘public attitudes toward immigration’, in: annual review of political science 17/1 (2014), 225–249. 36 see p. schmidt & m. quandt, ‘national identity, nationalism, and attitudes toward migrants in comparative perspective’, in: international journal of comparative sociology 59/5-6 (2018), 355–361. 37 r.j. de figueiredo & z. elkins, ‘are patriots bigots? an inquiry into the vices of in-group pride’, in: american journal of political science 47/1 (2003), 171–188; r. raijman, e. davidov, p. schmidt & o. hocman, ‘what does a nation owe noncitizen? national attachments, perception of threat and attitudes towards granting citizenship rights in a comparative perspective’, in: international journal of comparative sociology 49/2-3 (2008), 195–220; u. wagner, et al., ‘a longitudinal test of the relation between german nationalism, patriotism, and outgroup derogation’, in: european sociological review 28/3 (2012), 319–332. 38 schmidt & quandt, ‘national identity, nationalism, and attitudes toward migrants in comparative perspective’. 39 a. heath, et.al., ‘contested terrain: explaining divergent patterns of public opinion towards immigration within europe’, in: journal of ethnic and migration studies 46/3 (2020), 475–488. 40 b. bonikowski, ‘nationalism in settled times’, in: annual review of sociology 42 (2016), 427–449. 41 hobsbawm, nations and nationalism since 1780, 192. 42 e. kaufmann, ‘complexity and nationalism’, in: nations and nationalism 23/1 (2017), 6–25. microsoft word williams_v3_definitive.doc studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)      |      reviews   daniel  g.  williams  234   alan   sandry,   plaid   cymru.   an   ideological   analysis   (cardiff:   welsh  academic  press,  2011)  234  pp.,  isbn  9781860571169.   review  by  daniel  g.  williams   alan  sandry’s  plaid  cymru.  an  ideological  analysis  is  both  interesting  and,   at   times,   illuminating.   he   adopts   the   work   of   political   scientist   michael   freeden  as  a  basis  for  his  ‘ideological  analysis’  and  asks  two  fundamental   questions:   whether   nationalism   constitutes   a   political   ideology,   and   whether   plaid   cymru   is   primarily   a   nationalist   party.   ‘ideology’   is,   of   course,  one  of  the  most  complex  and  contested  terms  in  cultural  studies.   freeden  does  not  relate  ideology  to  the  ‘pejorative  marxist  usage’  where  it   refers   to   ‘distorted   consciousness,   reflecting   exploitative   and   alienating   power  relationships  that  can  be  overcome  in  a  socialist  society’.  rather,  he   relates   ideology   to   human   practice,   ‘as   those   actual   and   composite   thought-­‐patterns  of  individuals  and  groups  in  a  society  which  relate  to  the   way  they  comprehend  and  shape  their  political  worlds,  and  which  supply   us  with  crucial  clues  for  understanding  political  conduct  and  practices’.     sandry   deploys   freeden’s   participative   definition   of   ideology   to   good   effect  as  he  draws  on  extensive  interviews  with  some  of  the  key  politicians   and  supporters  of  plaid  cymru  to  delineate  and  define  the  dominant  ideas   and  values  that  have  informed  the  party’s  policies  and  actions.  the  book   offers  useful,  brief  overviews  of  some  of  the  key  intellectual  and  political   traditions   that   have   informed   the   party’s   thinking,   from   liberalism   to   socialism,   from   linguistic   conservationism   to   environmentalism   and   feminism.  his  goal,   in  keeping  with  freeden’s  work,  is  to  ascertain  what   constitutes   plaid   cymru’s   ‘core’   values,   and   thus   central   ideological   convictions,  and  which  ideas  constitute   ‘adjacent’  and  ‘peripheral’   forces   which  interact  and  shape  the  core  ideas  in  significant  ways.  sandry’s  key   finding  is  that  ‘if  it  is  necessary  to  classify  plaid  cymru’s  thought-­‐practices   in  terms  of  the  existing  and  standardised  political  ideologies,  then  it  would   be  far  more  accurate  to  describe  plaid  cymru’s  ideology  as  being  akin  to   studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)      |      reviews   daniel  g.  williams   235   socialist   ideology   than   it   would   be   to   match   the   party   to   a   nationalist   ideological   standpoint’.   following   freeden,   sandry   sees   nationalism   as   reliant  on  other  ‘host’  ideologies  such  as  liberalism  or  socialism  in  order  to   be  socially  and  politically  effective.  plaid  cymru,  from  this  perspective,  is  a   party  whose  nationalism  is  attached  to  a  socialist  core.   this  is  an  interesting,  if  controversial,  thesis.  but  this  is  not  all  that  sandry   has   to   say   on   the   question   of   ideology.   perhaps   equally   insightful   is   sandry’s   tracing  of  plaid  cymru’s   ideological  history.  he  argues   that  up   until  the  1950s  ‘the  promotion  of  the  welsh  language  would  be  classified   as  a  core  concept’  within   the   ideological   framework  of  plaid  cymru.  by   today,  following  the  establishment  of  cymdeithas  yr  iaith  gymraeg  (the   welsh  language  society)  in  1962  which  campaigned  specifically  on  welsh   language  issues  via  a  policy  of  civil  disobedience,  and  a  broader  range  of   positive  attitudes  towards  the  language  embraced  by  all  political  parties   since  political  devolution  in  1997,  ‘the  pressure  valve  on  plaid  cymru  has   been  discharged’  and  the  ‘welsh  language,  therefore,  can  be  viewed  as  a   peripheral,  as  opposed  to  a  core,  concept  within  plaid  cymru’s  thought-­‐ practices’.  welsh  nationalism  is   therefore  envisaged  as  a   ‘thin’   ideology,   which   turns   to   other   political   and   intellectual   traditions   to   give   it   substance.   while   sandry   discusses   the   ways   in   which   liberalism,   environmentalism  and  feminism  have  played  this  substantive  role  during   periods   of   plaid   cymru’s   history,   it   seems   that   the   dominant   historical   narrative   is   one   in   which   a   linguistic   ‘core’   becomes   ‘peripheral’,   and   ‘devolutionary   socialism’   (present   in   the   1930s   work   of   d.j.   davies   but   kept  peripheral  during   the  reign  of   the  party’s   first  president  saunders   lewis)  becomes  central.  although  he  doesn’t   explicitly   connect   the   two   processes,   it   seems   that   what   sandry   is   describing   is   a   shift   in   what   constitutes   the   key   components   of   welsh   nationalism,   from   language   rights  to  devolutionary  socialism.   in  developing  his  analysis  sandry  makes  it  clear  that  there  is  much  to  be   gained  from  freeden’s  rejection  of  the  marxist  definitions  of  ideology  as,   on  the  one  hand,  the  beliefs  characteristic  of  a  certain  class,  and  on  the   other,  the  system  of  illusory  beliefs  –  fake  ideas  and  false  consciousness  –   which  dominate  in  a  bourgeois  capitalist  society.  rather  than  conceiving  of   ideology   as   an   impersonal   force   imposed   from   above,   or   a   power   studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)      |      reviews   daniel  g.  williams  236   unconsciously  internalised  by  social  ‘subjects’,  sandry  follows  freeden  in   emphasising   the   role   of   human   agency   in   the   construction   of   political   ideologies.  the  result  of  this  approach  in  sandry’s  book  is  that  a  great  deal   of   the   analysis   is   dependent   on   knowledge   gleaned   from   interviews.   it   depends  on  our  believing  and  accepting  what  the  interviewees  are  telling   us.  in  an  age  of  cynicism  towards  politics  and  distrust  of  politicians,  this   approach  is  profoundly  refreshing.  but  it  does  have  its  limitations.  there  is   little  doubt  that  the  majority  of  plaid  cymru  activists  would  like  to  think  of   their  party  as  contributing  to  a  wave  of  devolutionary  socialist  movements   with  international  connections  with  leftist  minorities  in  western  europe   and  with  struggles   for   self-­‐determination  across   the  globe.  but   to  what   extent   is   this   self-­‐description   persuasive?   to   what   extent   might   we   be   dealing   here   with   ‘ideology’   in   its   older   marxist   sense   of   false   consciousness?     edward  said  argued  that   ‘the  starting  point  of  critical  elaboration  is  the   consciousness  of  what  one  really  is,  and  is  ‘knowing  thyself’  as  a  product  of   the  historical  process  to  date,  which  has  deposited   in  you  an   infinity  of   traces   without   leaving   an   inventory’.   much   the   same   could   be   said   of   political  movements  and  a  ‘deposit  of  traces’  will,  by  definition,  lie  beyond   the  conscious  grasp  of  the  key  participators  in  any  political  movement.  it   may   be   worth   recalling   that   freud’s   biographer,   and   the   leading   populariser   of   his   ideas,   ernest   jones,   was   an   early   member   of   plaid   cymru.  a  very  different  kind  of  ideological  analysis  might  be  seen  to  derive   from   the   fusion   of   psychoanalysis   and   marxism   characteristic   of   much   contemporary  cultural   criticism.  slavoj  žižek  makes  a  useful  distinction   between   ‘symbolic   history’   –   defined   as   ‘the   set   of   explicit   mythical   narratives   and   ideologico-­‐ethical   prescriptions   that   constitute   the   tradition   of   a   community’   –   and   its   submerged   other,   the   unacknowledgeable   ‘spectral,   fantasmic   history   that   effectively   sustains   the  explicit  symbolic  tradition,  but  has  to  remain  foreclosed  if  it  is  to  be   operative’.   in   the   shift   from   linguistic   conservation   to   devolutionary   socialism   which   sandry   describes,   the   language   issue   moves   from   the   realm   of   the   ‘symbolically   acknowledged’   to   the   ‘spectrally   unacknowledged’,  but  that  is  not  to  say  that  its  role  in  setting  limits  on  the   party’s   ideological  make  up  is  diminished.  a  comparison  of   two  periods   studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)      |      reviews   daniel  g.  williams   237   where  the  party’s  membership  and  support  increased  significantly,  1959   and  1999,  might  illustrate  this  point.     when  invited  to  speak  about  the  development  of  plaid  cymru  from  1966   at  a  commemoration  of  the  fiftieth  anniversary  of  plaid  cymru  in  1974,   phil  williams  argued  that  plaid  cymru  president  gwynfor  evans’s  victory   in   the   carmarthen   parliamentary   by-­‐election   of   1966   was   not   the   key   turning  point   in  the  party’s  history,  but  was  rather  the  culmination  of  a   series  of  transformations  that  had  begun  with  the  election  of  1959.  the   party  fought  more  than  half  of  wales’s  seats  in  1959,  and  the  total  of  votes   gained  (78,000)  was  higher  than  in  the  general  elections  of  1964  (69,000)   or   1966   (61,000).   1959   saw   ‘a   new   influx   of   members   forming   a   completely  new  element  within’  plaid  cymru,  recalled  phil,  and  ‘many  of   us   had   been   in   the   labour   party   for   years   and   were   political   to   the   fingertips:  above  all  we  understood  that  politics  was  about  power  –  that   was   the  one   lesson  the  labour  party  had  never   forgotten.’  for   the   first   time  there  was  a  large  influx  of  members  that  could  not  speak  welsh.  plaid   was  at  last  becoming  a  party  for  the  whole  of  wales.  these  were  the  years   in   which   plaid   moved   from   being   a   pressure   group   to   being   a   political   party.   but   the   strains   caused   by   rapid   growth   would   soon   show   themselves.   in   1962   lewis   delivered   his   electrifying   speech   ‘tynged   yr   iaith’   (the   fate   of   the   language)   which   called   for   the   adoption   of   revolutionary  strategies   to   secure  a   future   for   the  welsh   language.  the   speech  led  to  the  establishment  of  cymdeithas  yr  iaith  gymraeg,  but   its   intention  was  to  change  the  direction  in  which  plaid  cymru  was  travelling.   lewis’s  intention  was  to  reinforce  the  centrality  of  the  welsh  language  in   the   nationalist   party’s   thought.   in   terms   of   galvanising   a   generation   of   welsh   youth   the   speech   was   a   celebrated   success,   but   in   terms   of   its   intention  to  change  the  priorities  of   the  party  that  lewis  had   lead  until   1939,  it  was  a  failure.   a   similar  pattern  of  electoral  advance   followed  by  a   linguistic  backlash   occurred   in   1999.   in   the   first   elections   for   the   national   assembly   for   wales,  which  took  place  in  that  year,  plaid  cymru  achieved  290,572  votes,   and  a  28.4  share  of  the  vote  –  a  result  that  has  not  been  equalled  since.  as   in  1959,  new  elements  had  been  attracted  to  the  party  as  it  proceeded  to   win   seats   in   the   old   industrial   constituencies   of   llanelli,   rhondda   and   studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)      |      reviews   daniel  g.  williams  238   islwyn.  yet  by  2002  plaid  cymru  found  itself  again  at  the  centre  of  a  bitter   row  regarding  the  language.  dismayed  at  the  perceived  unwillingness  of   the   welsh   assembly   to   do   anything   about   the   ‘swamping’   of   his   welsh   speaking  community  in  north-­‐west  wales  by  english  incomers,  the  plaid   cymru  councillor  seimon  glyn  gave  vent  to  his  feelings  on  a  morning  show   on  radio  wales.  the  intemperate  nature  of  his  language  led  to  his  being   branded  a  ‘racist’,  and  the  construction  of  the  ‘nationalist  racist’  became  a   useful   tool   for   the   labour   party   to   attack   glyn   and   his   supporters   specifically,   and   the   welsh   nationalist   movement   more   broadly.   the   lukewarm  and  limited  support  given  to  glyn  by  the  plaid  cymru  leadership   exacerbated   the   sense   that   the   party   had   turned   its   back   on   its   core   supporters  in  the  welsh  speaking  areas  in  order  to  gain  electoral  advance.   the   letters   of   support   that   glyn   received   from   all   parts   of   wales   were   collected  in  a  volume  that  testified  to  the  fact  that  a  number  of  people  were   profoundly  distraught  that  plaid  cymru  had  turned  its  back  on  the  cultural   philosophy   of   its   founders   in   becoming   a   pragmatic   cog   within   an   establishmentarian  political  machine.  while  the  interventions  of  lewis  and   glyn   were   different   in   both   significance   and   effect,   the   period   from   electoral   breakthrough   to   linguistic   backlash   was   virtually   identical   in   1959   and   1999.   this   is   the   internal   tension   within   the   intellectual   and   political  thought  of  plaid  cymru.  the  transition  from  one  core  concept  to   the  other,  from  language  to  socialism,  was  never  neat  nor  complete.  there   are  no  references  to  glyn  in  sandry’s  analysis  of  plaid  cymru,  despite  the   fact  that  this  episode  revealed  in  a  particularly  stark  form  the  seemingly   incompatible  ideological  strains  that  are  woven  into  the  fabric  of  the  party.     indeed,   while   sandry   recognises   that   plaid   cymru’s   founders   placed   linguistic   continuity   above   political   autonomy   in   the   party’s   list   of   priorities,   he   seems   unable   to   read   the   myriad   welsh   language   publications   produced   by   the   party   throughout   its   history.   a   reading   knowledge  of  welsh  is  a  necessary  skill  for  anyone  writing  an  analysis  of   plaid   cymru.   at   his   worst,   sandry   is   similar   to   jack   gladney,   the   non-­‐ german-­‐speaking   director   of   ‘hitler   studies’   at   a   university   in   the   american  mid-­‐west   in  don  delillo’s  acerbic  social  satire  on  postmodern   academia,  white  noise  (1985).  where  welsh  language  words  and  concepts   are  included  in  the  discussion  they  are  misspelt.  davies’s  economic  vision   studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)      |      reviews   daniel  g.  williams   239   based  on  ‘cydweithrediad’  appears  as  the  meaningless  ‘cydweitbrediad’  in   both   the   text   and   the   index.   the   book   is   poorly   written   in   places,   and   carelessly   edited.   it   was   perry   anderson   who   once   bracingly   suggested   that  ‘it  should  be  a  matter  of  honour  for  the  left  to  write  at  least  as  well  as   its  adversaries’.  the  same  goes   for  welsh  studies.  the  welsh  academic   press  needs  to  raise  its  game  in  this  respect.   but   the   truth  of  sandry’s   suggestion   that  plaid  cymru  now  draws  on  a   socialist  core  to  give  meaning  to  its  nationalism  was  reinforced  recently  as   the  self-­‐defined  socialist  leanne  wood  was  elected   leader.  wood   is   the   party’s   first   female   leader,   the   first   with   her   roots   in   the   south   wales   valleys,  the  first  to  be  a  learner  rather  than  a  fluent  speaker  of  welsh.  she   has  the  potential  to  appeal  well  beyond  the  party’s  traditional  supporters.   if  wood   is  able   to  sustain  a  commitment   to   linguistic  development  and   expansion   while   forging   a   redistributive   economic   policy   with   a   wider   appeal,  then  plaid  cymru  may  expect  some  future  successes.  the  record   suggests  that   it   is   in  periods  of  success  that  the  party’s   ideological   fault   lines   become   apparent,   however.   it   seems   that   what   is   ‘core’   and   ‘peripheral’   is   in   fact   historically   contingent,   and   can   vary   according   to   social   circumstances.   the   internal   life   of   a   political   movement   is   more   conflicting  and  contradictory  than  the  somewhat  desiccated  world  of  the   political  theorist.   int_morgan_v5 syd morgan (with enric ucelay-da cal), ‘introduction. nationalists and the problem of overcoming invisibility: catalonia and wales’, in: studies on national movements, 2 (2014). http://snm.nise.eu/index.php/studies/article/view/0212i syd morgan (with enric ucelay-da cal) introduction nationalists and the problem of overcoming invisibility: catalonia and wales the articles in this second volume of studies on national movements form a collection of essays with its genesis in a question asked by catalan to welsh colleagues: ‘why do we know so much about scotland and so little about wales?’ they suggested exploring this perplexity at one-day seminars held in both territories. the first was organised by grens (grup de recerca en estats, nacions i sobiranies) at the universitat pompeu fabra, barcelona on 12 november 2013 under the direction of professor enric ucelay-da cal. swansea university’s european institute of identities reciprocated on 2 april 2014.1 dr da cal presented a briefing note for participants. to place the essays in the context given to their authors – and for its own value – it is published here: nationalists and the problem of overcoming invisibility: catalonia and wales2 since the rise of mature print culture in the second half of the nineteenth century, both the catalan and welsh nationalist movements have been forced over time to confront the problem of their relative invisibility. in the news media, in magazines, even in studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | introduction syd morgan (with enric ucelay-da cal) 2 books, at least for over a century, readers have been bombarded day by discussions of ‘england’ or ‘spain’, or by notions of ‘britishness’ or ‘hispanidad / hispanismo’. all such are commonly received, and just as commonly accepted without questioning, as conventional wisdom. therefore, the first objective of these two sub-state nationalist movements, like so many others in the world around them, has been to obtain the fact of perception: their possible political clientele must first realise that they incarnate ‘something else’, different as a collective to the publicly recognised government and territory, of which they allegedly form a part. the primary and oldest weapon in the sub-nation arsenal has been the writing of history specific to a historic space, which might have once been an ‘independent’ entity, but which is not so any longer. the implication is, of course, the prophetic idea of a ‘once and future’ nation, which has existed and may reappear. but many other arms have been used by sub-state nationalist movements to gain ‘awareness’, ‘raise consciousness’, and heighten sensibility among their fellow ‘nationals’. these themes – from academic racism in its heyday to ever-revived folklore and music – are a reflection of current fashions at any one time, and of change over a longer run. once a following among others of similar nationality, language or sense of selfhood is achieved, there is the need to undertake a task of ‘nation building’ outside government institutions, which are always an expression of what has been aptly termed ‘banal nationalism’, and is capable of constant pressure. also, foreign opinion must be courted and convinced, even converted, to the new cause. outside specialists, especially in literary studies, who may become adepts, can help make a movement synonymous with the territory it claims to represent, an identification which means the triumph of visibility over anonymity and blindness. both catalan and welsh nationalisms, in their different ways, express this fight against invisibility. this is the common thread that, as investigators and students of either nationalism, we can share together, in common and useful discussion or debate. studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | introduction syd morgan (with enric ucelay-da cal) 3 andrea brighenti’s hypothesis for constituting visibility as a single field in the social sciences can help us to analyse these papers. from his observation that ‘recognition’ and ‘control’ are two opposing outcomes of visibility, we can, by extension, deduce that non-recognition – in the cases of these national territories – can be a means of their control by other agencies. visibility theory allows us to ‘see’ this since it lies at the intersection of aesthetics and politics.3 it allows us to consider the particular problem of wales in a thick theoretical context. it is fitting that the papers published in this collection take an inter-disciplinary approach to the visibility of specific territories, each with their own characteristics. although the writers largely explore the territories in isolation, there are major lines of comparison, which confirm the value of this transnational approach and suggest areas for future research. looking at these thematically, the effect of imperialism on sub-state nationalities is a common motif, whether the imperial ideal absorbs the nation in question by partial accommodation of its demands (brooks) or their being part of the project (jacobson). ‘great power’ states are seen to have the particular capacity to absorb political actors from their minority nations, often but not exclusively from their bourgeoisie (brooks, farinelli, jacobson). contrary to that tendency, global anti-imperialism is a value shared between the two nations. the decline of the spanish empire (esculies, jacobson, puhle) against the contemporaneous expansion of the british empire (morgan, tudur) are seen as powerful instruments, with both territories exhibiting characteristics of internal colonialism (jacobson, tudur). valued insight can also be gained by drawing on experiences of race (williams). powerful multi-national states create dual identities and relational loyalties that vary over time (brooks, jacobson, williams). this leads to national movements having a ‘foot in both camps’: barcelona and madrid, cardiff and london (puhle). while this has been a chronic characteristic of catalan politics – originating in pactisme (puhle) – welsh nationalism did not exhibit this ‘compromise’ until post-world war ii. in western europe, imperialism and liberalism go hand in hand. in wales, individual rights triumphed over sub-state nationalisms (brooks, williams) and to some extent in catalonia (esculies, jacobson). amongst studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | introduction syd morgan (with enric ucelay-da cal) 4 other ideologies, anarcho-syndicalism existed amongst barcelona ‘blue collars’ (esculies) and welsh miners. both territories clearly exhibit the influence of the romantic cultural revival on the subsequent growth of nationalism, the renaixença (farinelli, jacobson) and cymru’n deffro (tudur) with their influence on the importance of national languages and literature. but the consequences were quite different as a result of other factors, including the respective reactions to modernism (brooks) – although ‘rural backwardness vs. industrial modernism’ is also seen as a ‘crude and misleading binary opposition’ (williams). one under-explored difference between the catalan and welsh national conditions is the cluster of territorial integrity, national boundaries and legal identities. ‘catalonia’ and the ‘catalan community’ are referenced with a certain elasticity, existing across state borders (farinelli), whereas ‘wales’ is the territory precisely determined by an english law of 1535 (morgan). this difference, perhaps, influences both nations’ approaches to diaspora, with wales being portable over distance (tudur) but catalanism much more complex and negotiated (farinelli). their different linguistic and familial connections make an instructive transnational comparison. catalonia has a historic legal identity (jacobson, farinelli), and thus greater visibility, with embedded values, whereas wales was legally – and militarily – absorbed into england (morgan), a process incrementally reinforced over centuries. challenging this formed the basis of modern welsh nationalism (tudur). history, language and religion connect catalonia with a wider, ‘normal’ europeanism (puhle) but is a characteristic of welsh nationalism primarily in opposition to overwhelming britishness (morgan, williams). the first world war, claimed by some historians to be the seminal event of the 20th century, had enormous influence on both territories, whether they were within belligerent states (wales and the british empire) or not (catalonia and spain).4 in both, new forms of nationalism emerged – though at quite different stages of development – transitioning to state building from its earlier form of home rule within existing states (jacobson, morgan). welsh nationalism, influenced by ireland, reached the latter stage a generation before catalonia, whereas the ‘new nationalism’ consequent upon wilsonian principles of self-determination had an studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | introduction syd morgan (with enric ucelay-da cal) 5 energising effect during the inter-war years in both catalonia (esculies) and wales (morgan). the changes in identity brought about by industrial and urban developments are a shared theme in these papers, but with different consequences. welsh nationalism is perceived to have rejected urbanism (tudur) which may be one cause of its underdevelopment. catalan nationalism burgeoned within the expanding city of barcelona (esculies). much of ’welsh urbanism’ took place in english cities, to some extent cutting it off from the national territory (brooks). the influences of new urban settlements within welsh coalfields, especially the vast southern linear conurbations, are only explored tangentially (morgan). migration is intimately connected to industrial urbanisation, with two principal effects: the internal migration of catalan and welsh rural dwellers into the new centres and in-migration from other national territories, principally but not exclusively from the rest of iberia and the british isles respectively (esculies, morgan, puhle) with, seemingly, different effects. the ‘long migratory process’ observed in catalonia (esculies) is not reflected upon in wales, nor is the often violent reaction of the spanish state to the emergent national movement (esculies, puhle) parallelled in wales. as a further example of its usefulness to the welsh situation, visibility theory recognises that communication systems are not neutral – despite media technology allowing that potential – so consideration of the comparative hierarchical ranking of territories may be a valid analytical tool. enhanced media exposure is not just a banal question of image but an integral part of evolutionary internal social processes. a further characteristic is that visibility asymmetries are the global norm, leading to, particularly in the case of wales, possible acceptance that it is not exceptional but ‘normally different’.5 notwithstanding that, the present, hierarchic visibility of different nations will be perceived differently by socio-political groups who regard them either as territorially endogenous or peripheral to other polities. in these cases, the latter would be london and madrid. since ‘visibility breeds identification’, the more visible these territories are, the more dangerous they are to their alternative ‘centres of loyalty’, especially as they could become a model for others.6 using that analogy, invisibility can be seen as a weapon of the status quo. studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | introduction syd morgan (with enric ucelay-da cal) 6 as an example of territories with incomplete social structures or weak institutions, the present writer has examined the political significance of media structures.7 the case study posits the existence of a ‘national paradox’ in which a sub-state government and legislature with increasing competences function within a fractured and contracting territorial media environment. it could be referenced as an apposite example of thomas jefferson’s aphorism about the relative importance – visibility – of newspapers and government.8 as a modern phenomenon, it confirms the theory that ‘shaping and managing visibility is a huge work that human beings do tirelessly’; that it is ‘never simply a technical matter [but] inherently practical and political’. beyond the ‘eye-to-eye’, brighenti says that ‘communication technologies enlarge the field of the socially visible.’9 the welsh case can be seen an example of the opposite, in that technological advances and changed ownership models have caused the contraction of earlier, specifically welsh media. its governance exists, but is so, to many of its electorate, ‘without being an object’ or is not (sufficiently) ‘articulated’, conditions which visibility theory views as politically determined. it can be represented as hardly existing in its own (territorial) public space, although technology allows it free rein within private spaces. the lack of exposure of the proceedings of the national assembly for wales may even cause its politics to ‘recede into invisibility’ in a formal sense. in the case of these two territories located within more extensive states, this lack of ‘recognition’ is also critical for relationships between minority and mainstream groups within each territory, and outside. these papers confirm the existence of ‘thresholds of visibility’ by demonstrating that, while catalonia and wales exhibit general differences in visibility, these thresholds vary across different fields and sectors of society – history, politics, languages, literatures and geographies.10 beyond the spheres dealt with in these papers, visibility studies can have other applications. for example, in our globalised, electronic world, territorial visibility – or its opposite – can be influential in sustainable socio-economic development. the emerging field of ‘economies of identity’ strongly interacts with questions of territorial visibility. globally, it can be an essential requirement for success. beyond traditional tourism, the much more complex trends of shorter vacation periods combined with studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | introduction syd morgan (with enric ucelay-da cal) 7 greater frequency; demands for higher quality levels; trends towards more physical and intellectual activities; and, especially, interest in culture, history and local environments – all of these call for bespoke territorial differentiation and the global dissemination of that knowledge in order to compete successfully in increasingly fragmented markets. this visibility (and its essential branding) is a key factor in people being able to exercise market choices in a growth sector. as touristic images are ‘representations of the political and cultural identifications and as ideological discourses of […] collective identities’, at a commercial and governmental level, applications of the concept of visibility have further potential for societal impact.11 each paper illustrates that visibility / invisibility is a nuanced and enhancing tool of analysis which can then open up new research possibilities, especially the value of comparative studies of the bilateral type attempted here. they advance earlier work on the visibility of substate nations and point the way towards the potential of comparative studies and inter-disciplinary approaches using visibility as a tool, including hierarchies of visibility, the variable impact of historical social movements and the role of academic research in enhancing visibility through public controversy. for such new research, political science using data bases assembled from surveys will help validate the work. such comparative research can be spread much wider, of course, potentially embracing other politico-cultural spaces such as sub-state nations within western europe, the realms of celtic culture and territory, and the broader atlantic world. finally, these papers lead to the conclusion that authors from wales are more overtly conscious of visibility / invisibility per se than catalan contributors because of the condition of wales compared to catalonia. that seems to be the simple answer to ucelay-da cal’s original set of questions. studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | introduction syd morgan (with enric ucelay-da cal) 8 endnotes 1 for both programmes, see <http://cataloniawalesseminar.weebly.com> [last accessed 10/2/2016]. 2 briefing note by enric ucelay da-cal (barcelona, 2013). 3 a. brighenti, ‘visibility. a category for the social sciences’, in: current sociology, 55/3 (2007) 323-342 (324). 4 g. kennan, the decline of bismarck's european order: franco-russian relations 1875-1890 (princeton, 1981) 3-10; f.l. carsten, war against war: british & german radical movements in the first world war (berkeley los angeles, 1982) 11. 5 brighenti, ‘visibility’, 325-326. 6 brighenti, ‘visibility’, 324 and 333. 7 s. morgan, questions of political communication in wales (cardiff school of education research papers, 5) (cardiff, 2009). 8 in 1787, when arguing the case for an informed citizenry, jefferson wrote: ‘were it left to me to decide whether we should have a government without newspapers or newspapers without a government, i should not hesitate a moment to prefer the latter’ (t. jefferson, the works of thomas jefferson, ed. p.l. ford (new york london, 1904) vol. 5, 253). 9 brighenti, ‘visibility’, 327. 10 brighenti, ‘visibility’, 328-329 and 331-332. 11 x. pereiro, ‘touristic images and narratives of identification between the north of portugal and galiza (spain) in the touristic promotional literature’, in: r.c. loisgonzález, x.m. santos-solla & p. taboada-de-zuñiga (eds.), new tourism in the 21st century: culture, the city, nature and spirituality (newcastle-upon-tyne, 2014) 154-176 (154). scholars and the reframing of europe: the complex relationship between language, race and nation during the great war francesca zantedeschi spin (uva) research affiliate delegates attending the paris peace conference in 1919 were given the arduous task of establishing the terms of the peace after ww1, including the criteria by which to determine the boundaries of new states emerging from the collapse of the old multinational empires. given that u.s. president woodrow wilson had laid so much emphasis on the principle of ‘selfdetermination’, language was considered by many as the best element to establish nationality in ethnically mixed territories. a legacy of the nineteenth century, the apparently straightforward identification between language and nation was nevertheless complicated by pervasive ideas about race, as the taxonomies of language and race became increasingly entangled. by presenting selected works by two scholars – leon dominian, a geographer, and antoine meillet, a linguist –, this paper analyses the main and most widespread arguments propounded in support of the identification between language and nation during the great war. it also explains why this principle turned out to be exceedingly problematic at the time of the redrawing the political map of europe, and how the ambiguous relationship between language and race persisted during the early years of twentieth century. keywords: world war 1, new states, making borders, language, race. studies on national movements 8 (2021) | articles | 2 francesca zantedeschi introduction when the delegates convened at the 1919 peace conference in paris, they were given, among others, the task of solving what would be the guiding principle by which to define and draw up the boundaries of the new states, in particular those born from the ashes of the defunct austrohungarian empire. in an article on the languages spoken in that empire by the various nationalities, published in the journal de la société statistique de paris, in 1915, the french physician and anthropologist, arthur chervin, had observed, with good reason, how language had come to serve political aims, especially with regard to the question of selfdetermination. in it, he aimed to analyse ‘with the aid of indisputable scientific documents, without bias and without passion’, the ethnic composition of austria-hungary. his objective was therefore to present the results of official administrative surveys on religion and, above all, the language spoken by its inhabitants. however, after immediately discarding religion, on the ground that it did not provide ‘such conclusive information as the spoken language’, he turned his attention to the ‘spoken mother tongue’. this, according to him, represented an important proof that the nationalities were constituted by ‘perfectly distinct linguistic units’. he argued that, ‘whatever the primitive and remote origin of the races which populate the austro-hungarian empire, the spoken language has now become the determining factor of the race which the various nationalities claim for themselves in their present habitat and the raison d’être of their political aspirations’.1 chervin’s statement identifying language as the main element by which a nation was to be defined conveys an assumption that certainly did not appear novel at that time; it was indeed a by-product of the evolving concept of nation, an ongoing process that began at the turn of the nineteenth century, according to which peoples were to be distinguished by cultural factors – above all linguistic ones. even though the studies on national movements 8 (2021) | articles francesca zantedeschi 3 | association of language to nations was by no means simple (as there are languages without nations, just as there are nations with more than one ‘national’ language), language indeed became one of the principal factors used in the identification of nations. further still, as language also conveyed a sense of ethnic (or racial) identification, given that language studies was directly correlated with the proliferation of race thinking throughout the century,2 the taxonomies of language and ‘race’ became increasingly intertwined.3 the full complexity of the tripartite nexus between language, race and nation came to the fore during the drafting of the peace treaties at the end the first world war on the question of ‘reframing’ europe based on a ‘natural and scientific solution’.4 according to the ‘nation-state principle’, in effect, there was ‘perfect congruence between political and ethno-cultural unity’.5 moreover, this principle spurred decision-making at the time of the peace treaties, which in turn led to the redrawing of the political map of europe. language, then, was therefore invoked as a ‘natural’ criterion by which to define and draw the boundaries of the new territories (nation states). in this article, i would like to focus on precisely how this close nexus between language and nation was advocated by certain scholars during the great war as the guiding principle for reframing europe once the war had ended. indeed scholars played a fundamental role in redefining the borders of central and eastern european states, since they were given the task, as the french linguist antoine meillet explained in the foreword of his book, langues dans l’europe nouvelle (1918), of not providing ‘ready-made solutions’ or ‘lead[ing]’, but ‘enlighten[ing] those who have the responsibility to act’.6 however, in order to grasp the complexity of the problem, it will be necessary to explain the awkward coexistence between ‘language’ and ‘race’ in greater detail. by the same token, throughout the century the ‘myth of race’ was intertwined with the ‘myth of nation’: in fact, both ‘provided complex social, cultural, historical, and political narratives that sought to solidify inherent similarities and studies on national movements 8 (2021) | articles | 4 francesca zantedeschi differences amongst individuals and communities’.7 the close interconnection between these three concepts, facilitated by the fluidity of ‘race’ theories, emerged to its full extent during the first world war, in particular during the peace negotiations. accordingly, in the following pages, i will try to ‘verify’ anna morpurgo davies’ assertion whereby, ‘if one disregards the personal opinions of some scholars, the development of professional linguistics in the nineteenth century [...] ends up with a clear division between language and race’.8 the fact is that the debate on the relationship between language and race (and of those of the nation), far from being limited to professional linguists, was a common concern of all those who, in one way or another, were confronted by the task of defining the characteristics (and hence, also the boundaries) of a nation. finally, the analysis of the relationship between language, race, and nation will help to clarify the deepening entrenchment of nationalist ideologies in ethnic (or cultural) principles from the end of the nineteenth century onwards, not only because the idea of the nation changed meaning in the late nineteenth century ‘under the influence of science, and specifically of evolution and race theories’,9 but also because, inevitably, nationalism was transforming european politics and scholarship.10 some recent works have indeed emphasized both the influence that human and social sciences (such as ethnology, history, physical anthropology, psychology, etc.) had on nationalism and vice versa, and the transnational dimension of the development of the national sciences, which spread in the context of international relations.11 this international frame of reference provides the context in which (cultural, physical, psychological) national differences were ‘scientifically’ elaborated and explained, and (more or less deliberately) manipulated for political purposes. however, as chris manias has explained, contrary to what happened in the earlier period, which were characterised by consolidation of scientific networks and disciplines, the decades preceding the great war testified to a growing ‘splitting and studies on national movements 8 (2021) | articles francesca zantedeschi 5 | fragmentation’. the reasons for this were many, and related to both political factors (such as the exacerbation of interand intra-national rivalries, and the repercussions of ‘new imperialism’ on ‘public consciousness, domestic politics and the human sciences’), as well as more scientific factors, for instance, the ‘challenging the idea of progress’, and the growing importance of countries previously considered ‘peripheral’ to intellectual production in the international scholarly context. this led to increasingly scientific specialism and differentiation.12 it is in this context, then, that i would like to introduce and explore a few selected works by leon dominian and antoine meillet, as they are useful in understanding the issues at stake in the negotiations that culminated with the signature of the 1919 peace treaties. leon dominian was a naturalised american armenian geographer, who made a detailed study of the political and linguistic situation in europe and near east, for the benefit of americans; antoine meillet, on the contrary, was a french linguist who had participated in the meetings of the comité d’études, held by the french government in 1917 to determine the country’s peace objectives. their works provide an opportunity to reflect on some of the major disputed questions as a result of the correlation between language and nation, such as the impossibility of using them as a reference framework for the redrawing of the map of europe, and the need to dampen exacerbated nationalisms through the search for an ‘international’ (neutral) language. nation, language, race: a tricky relationship the language/nation convergence developed significantly in the nineteenth century in the context of nationality movements and the birth of nation-states. before the coming of national languages, however, the studies on national movements 8 (2021) | articles | 6 francesca zantedeschi linguistic landscape of europe was rather jumbled: the vast majority of people were illiterate, and languages were for the most part learnt orally. moreover, different written languages existed within the single political unit, which could be accounted for by the different functions assigned to them: administrative, literary, religious and so on. by the end of the eighteenth century, national languages were deemed capable of ‘replacing a heterogeneity of linguistic modes responding to diversified uses’ and ‘representing the nation’, which therefore responded to the increasing demands of the modern state.13 in contexts where multilingualism was the norm, a single idiom was chosen as the official language of the state. the equivalence of state language and national language is therefore the result of a long evolutionary process of both linguistic and political-legal conceptions of the nation and the modern state. accordingly, the status of ‘national language’ was also attributed to written language, as it became codified, officialised, controlled and disseminated by state institutions in all domains of public life.14 the equivalence of language and nation is not only the product of a particular conjuncture, brought about by the consolidation of states into national entities during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, but it was also the product of progress in human and social sciences – in particular, the linguistic disciplines – that accompanied the creation of those states. at the end of the eighteenth century, the aesthetic and socio-historical discourse developed by german romanticism placed language, as an expression of the spirit of a people, at the heart of the legal and political definition of the nation.15 in the absence of a unifying state – as was the case for the german-speaking territories –, language ‘was thought to testify to native speakers’ shared historical descent from a common cultural origin’.16 philology was then applied with the aim of understanding historical cultures based on the analysis and interpretation of their texts. from a historical-scientific point of view, philological practice laid down the foundations of an independent discipline of studies on national movements 8 (2021) | articles francesca zantedeschi 7 | philological-historical scholarship, as well as its correlated subdisciplines, such as historical linguistics, cultural-philological interpretation and philosophical hermeneutics.17 at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the transformation of philology from an auxiliary science to an autonomous scientific discipline seemed to confirm the idea that language was ‘one of the most significant elements in understanding the development of a nation’.18 its success was also a result of the social function exercised by literature as a cultural activity that participated in the construction of collective identities. having become the main tool of medieval historical study, philology was given the task of tracing the origins of the nation. by facilitating ‘the creation of a “scientific” national history that projects both the national language and the national ideology into the distant past’, the new philology thus provided a scientific tool capable of proving the ‘antiquity’ of nations.19 at the same time, the idea of the close nexus between language and race was gaining ground. as ‘the basis of somatic features that are stable over time’, in fact, race was thought ‘to reflect – and codetermine – the specific fundamental characteristics of language and the cultural forms associated with it’.20 it was facilitated by both the inherent ambiguity of the notion of race itself, and the issues implicit in linguistic studies, as was the case of the monogenesis/polygenesis debate. this debate centred on the origins of languages, that is, whether or not they had a common origin, and the extent to which their differentiation had taken place over time (monogenetic hypothesis) or, conversely, the multiple origins of languages analysed in relation to population and geography (polygenetic hypothesis).21 another issue widely debated among linguists and others, and which was to have important repercussions in terms of ‘race’ theories, related to the question of whether european tongues descended from a single, ancestral indo-european language. at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the german writer and philosopher, friedrich von schlegel, devoted his studies on national movements 8 (2021) | articles | 8 francesca zantedeschi attention to a major study of sanskrit, über die sprache und weisheit des indier (1808), in which he argued that not only this sacred indian language was ‘the most regulated, the most efficient, the most poetic’ language and the least confused, but also that a number of other languages, including greek, latin, persian and german, owed their origins to it. he was the first to use ‘comparative grammar’ in the ‘historical-genealogical’ sense, i.e. as a means of demonstrating the common descent of several languages from a single mother tongue.22 the passage transforming a linguistic category into a racial one was short. the idea spread that this linguistic kinship originated from a people from northern europe or the caucasus who migrated during proto-history to the indian peninsula, persia and europe. in 1849, on the occasion of the prestigious volney prize, annually awarded to the best philosophical and comparative study of languages, the german comparative philologist, friedrich max müller, ‘first presented his ideas about the existence of a distinct aryan language and civilization’.23 not long after, he published comparative mythology: an essay (1856), in which he claimed that comparative philology could provide ‘insight into a period “when sanskrit was not sanskrit, greek not yet greek, but when both, together with latin, german and other aryan dialects, existed yet as one undivided language”’, and ‘would allow “the archives of the most distant antiquity of the aryan race” finally to be opened’.24 the superiority of the aryan race, defined as the ‘race of indo-european speakers’, was also claimed at that time by the french diplomat, writer, and ethnologist joseph arthur, comte de gobineau. despite not having invented the aesthetics of races,25 gobineau developed a theory of racial differences, whereby he identified the roles of the natural laws governing the social world, in his work, essai sur l’inégalité des races humaines (4 vols., 1853-1855). among his basic premises, he argued that the inequality of languages corresponded exactly to the inequality of races, and that the white race, especially the aryan one of germanic peoples, was superior to others. in that same studies on national movements 8 (2021) | articles francesca zantedeschi 9 | period, ernest renan published the essay histoire générale et système comparé des langues sémitiques (1855), whose books i and v (‘questions of origin’ and ‘conclusions’) were devoted to the construction of a genuine theory of ‘semitic peoples’, and ‘transposed a series of linguistic considerations into an ethno-cultural issue’.26 in the case of german philologists, in the nineteenth century they interpreted language as evidence of ethnic descent and created influential myths of cultural origin around the perceived starting points of their own mother tongues.27 such linguistic racial determinism was endorsed by the belgian linguist honore -joseph chave e, who transformed the language/race partnership into a linguistic principle (‘telle race, telle langue, et telle langue, telle race’), in his book les langues et les races (1862), according to which he established a kind of hierarchy of languages.28 relying on the comparison of indo-european and semitic inflections and syntactic forms, chave e argued that the two languages did not have a common origin and that, consequently, indo-europeans and semites belonged to two different primitive races.29 needless to say, the racial-linguistic affinity had also become commonplace outside linguistic circles.30 for instance, edward augustus freeman, the english historian mainly known for his history of the norman conquest (6 vols., oxford, 1867-79), asserted in 1879 that the ‘doctrine of race, in its popular form, is the direct offspring of the study of scientific philology’. this was not to say that ‘scientific philologers’ believed that language ‘was a certain test of race’, nor that men who speak the same tongue ‘are necessarily men of the same blood’; rather, it was ‘the natural instinct of mankind’ to connect race and language: it does not assume that language is an infallible test of race; but it does assume that language and race have something to do with one studies on national movements 8 (2021) | articles | 10 francesca zantedeschi another. it assumes, that though language is not an accurately scientific test of race, yet it is a rough and ready test which does for many practical purposes. to make something more of an exact definition, one might say, that though language is not a test of race, it is, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, a presumption of race; that though it is not a test of race, yet it is a test of something which, for many practical purposes, is the same as race. similarly, freeman believed that even though nationality was not grounded in philological science, language was ‘the best guide’ to group races and nations, to ‘mark them off one from the other’.31 of course, not all authors agreed on the strict determinism between language, race and nation. abel de hovelacque contributed to the heated debate regarding the defining (political or cultural) characteristics of the french nation, which had taken place following the loss of alsacelorraine because of the franco-prussian war (1870-71), and marked the beginning of the third republic. he wrote that the ‘theory of races, languages and nationalities’, was ‘specious’, for being at odds both with a number of scientific as well as political concepts it relied on, such as the right of free association, which was inherent in republican democracy.32 he explained further that this theory had been ‘officially affirmed and seemed to receive its first practical endorsement’ during the unification of italy. and yet, hovelacque continued, ‘this purported unity of the languages and races of italy was mere fiction. the italian people was one by necessity and by aspiration, it was not one [...] either in terms of its language or race’. in europe, there are no places where race coincides with language. it is even rare for language to coincide with nationality, i.e. with ‘voluntary political union’. and he therefore dismissed racial determinism: ‘it is therefore just as inadmissible to pretend to base the idea of nationality on race as to pretend to base it on language’.33 abel hovelacque, who was an anthropologist and linguist, in 1876 was studies on national movements 8 (2021) | articles francesca zantedeschi 11 | appointed professor (and from 1890 director) of the e cole d’anthropologie. in 1867 he founded, together with chave e, the revue de linguistique et de philologie comparée (1867-1916) (the journal of comparative linguistics and philology), which sought to integrate linguistics into the natural sciences, considering language as ‘a living organism and argued for the rigorous application of evolutionary transformism in linguistics’.34 in france, in that period, a generation of anthropologists-linguists (among others, hovelacque, girard de rialle, and julien vinson) devoted themselves to analysing the question of the origins of language and its evolution. following in the footsteps of the anthropologist paul broca, they admitted the distinction between langage (immutable and an integral part of man) and langues (which are transformed according to political events and social conditions). according to hovelacque, the faculty of language was acquired by man, and the ‘precursor of man’ (a being in transition between man and animal) had acquired it through different places, thus giving rise to different human races. the plurality of languages thus contributed to the original plurality of races. and yet, by the end of the century, many scholars still confounded the biological characteristics of a population with its linguistic or cultural heritage. the term ‘race’ became commonplace, as was transposed from linguistic to physical groups, and combined with ideas drawn from social darwinism to produce theories of racial inequalities and superiorities.35 the complexity of the relationship between language, race and nation, as well as the different criteria with which to define the nation (voluntary political association or ethnic-cultural group?), and the contradictions they conveyed, would fully surface at the time of the 1919 peace treaties. delegates at the paris conference attempted to identify the scientific and natural criteria with which to redraw the borders of the new states. that was the reason they called on experts (geographers, historians, linguists, economists, etc.) to redefine a geopolitical situation which, principally studies on national movements 8 (2021) | articles | 12 francesca zantedeschi due to the disintegration of the austro-hungarian and the ottoman empires, had become potentially explosive. leon dominian: language as ‘cohesive power of nationality’. in september 1917, the american president woodrow wilson authorised colonel edward m. house, a diplomat and wilson’s personal adviser, ‘to organize forces to gather and prepare for use at the peace conference the most complete information possible, from the best and latest sources, for consideration by the peace commissioners’.36 this was known as ‘the inquiry’, a group of experts directed by house himself, which had the task of collecting and analysing data on the geographical, ethnological, historical, economic, and political problems of those areas subject of the peace negotiations.37 two months later, isaiah bowman, geographer and director of the american geographical society (ags) since 1915, placed the resources of the society at the government’s disposal, thus becoming the centre of ‘the inquiry’.38 ‘the inquiry’, which was ‘entirely independent of any political hypothesis’, was composed of about 150 specialists and scholars in all fields, from political and diplomatic history to international law, from economics to geography, from physiography and cartography to education and irrigation. the ‘cartographic force’ of the ags was handed the task of drawing up maps which could ‘visualize not only all manner of territorial boundaries, but distribution of peoples, number and local densities of population, religions, economic activities, distribution of material resources, trade routes, both historic and potential strategic points’.39 all these reports, studies, and maps were to be used subsequently by the american negotiators at the paris peace conference to support the final peace negotiations. among them, leon dominian was called in february 1919 studies on national movements 8 (2021) | articles francesca zantedeschi 13 | by the commission in paris to deal with turkish and the near east related issues. of armenian origin, but born in istanbul, leon dominian (1880-1935) was not really trained in geography, since he studied geology and mining engineering in belgium; he travelled in asia minor and turkey, and lived for a time in malta. he was fluent in many languages, armenian, turkish, arabic, italian, french, english, and spanish. in 1903, he moved to the usa, becoming a naturalised citizen there ten years later; indeed, in 1912, he joined the ags. in 1918, dominian engaged in a consular career, which continued until his death. the following year, he was assigned to duty with the american commission to negotiate peace at paris. as a member of the ags, dominian published a number of reviews and articles in the bulletin of the american geographical society, namely on balkan peninsula and turkey, but also the linguistic areas of europe. dominian would further develop the arguments from his articles in the book the frontiers of language and nationality in europe (1917), in which he reviewed all the disputed areas of speech in europe, but also asia minor. as was pointed out by the american geographer, w.l.g. joerg, who wrote a short memoir dedicated to him, the book ‘supplied the desired detailed discussion of the problem of nationalities in europe and the near east and their geographical setting’.40 in a letter sent to isaiah bowman on 19 february 1915, dominian mentioned the idea of writing an article and drawing ‘a set of maps showing linguistic boundaries’ in europe, explaining that the suggestion came from madison grant, a member of the ags council, under whose direction he would later carry out the work.41 in his correspondence with the director of the ags, dominian went into detail about the nature of his intended work, also explaining which maps would be needed to complete it, including a map of europe ‘showing tendency of political boundaries to grow in accordance with linguistic frontiers’. he pointed out that the data he had collected revealed ‘splendid conformity between physical features and studies on national movements 8 (2021) | articles | 14 francesca zantedeschi linguistic distribution’ and that, even though it had no claim to originality, the work would be consisted of ‘strictly impartial statement of facts, with very detailed mention of sources’.42 confronted with bowman’s misgivings about the work, which he considered not only ‘exceedingly difficult’ but also extremely complex, partly due to the absence of any dependence of linguistic boundaries on physical features, dominian responded (citing gruber’s grundriss des romanischen philologie and the atlas linguistique de france) that ‘while this is occasionally true, it is generally possible to trace genetic connection. sometimes the sequence back is lost and it looks as if surface features had never intervened, but the deeper you delve into the subject the more you find the reverse to have happened’.43 published in the bulletin of the american geographical society (june edition, 1915), entitled ‘linguistic areas in europe: their boundaries and political significance’, dominian’s main argument was that national frontiers could best be distinguished by linguistic characteristics, and, as a general rule, boundary lines should follow the separation of languages. according to dominian, ‘linguistic lines of cleavage have twofold importance’ when they are considered as ‘political boundaries’. first of all, they are sanctioned by national aspirations, so that it is rarely possible to separate the idea of language from that of nationality. except in very rare cases (e.g., belgium and switzerland), language is the ‘cohesive power of nationality’, and it has ‘cementing qualities’, since it is ‘the medium through which shared success, achievement or struggle and sorrow are expressed’.44 second, linguistic lines of cleavage conform considerably to physical features: in fact, there is a strict correlation between language and its natural environment. since linguistic areas ‘have been largely determined by the character of the surface covered or delimited’, determination of linguistic boundaries ‘implies due recognition of selective influences attributable to surface features. but the influence of region upon expansion or confinement of language is far studies on national movements 8 (2021) | articles francesca zantedeschi 15 | from absolute. the part played by economic factors’, in fact, ‘have been of prime importance’.45 dominian then examined both some controversial linguistic boundaries – for example, the franco-flemish one, the franco-german in alsace-lorraine, the danish-german, the italo-german, the italo-slavic, a.s.o. – and main linguistic areas of europe, of which he outlined the political and economic history, to conclude that: 1. ‘zones of linguistic contact were inevitably destined by their very location to become meeting places for men speaking different languages. […] the confusion of languages on their site is in almost every instance the result of human intercourse determined by economic advantages’. that means that ‘language always followed in the wake of trade and babel-like confusion prevailed along channels wherein men and their marketable commodities flowed’.46 2. ‘the growing coincidence of linguistic and political boundaries must be regarded as a normal development’, and ‘modern reconstruction of nationalities is based on language’, as the history of europe during the nineteenth century shows (e.g., the unification of germany and italy as well as the disentanglement of balkan nationalities). in this sense, ‘the congress of vienna failed to provide europe with political stability because popular claims were ignored during the deliberations’; this is why ‘inhabitants of linguistic areas under alien rule’ were now ‘clamouring for the right to govern themselves’.47 dominian further developed his main arguments in the book he would publish a couple of years later, including parts that he had previously been forced to omit from the article, and extended his study to the turkish area because of its significance for european international affairs. quite interestingly, whereas dominian had summarily dismissed the issue of ‘race’, considering its political significance as ‘trifling’ in both the studies on national movements 8 (2021) | articles | 16 francesca zantedeschi article and the book, on the contrary, madison grant, who wrote the introduction to the book, brought it to the fore. grant was a member of the governing board of the ags from 1913 to 1935,48 besides being an american lawyer and wildlife conservationist, and later president of the new york zoological society; he was also a fervent eugenicist and advocate of scientific racism. in 1916, he published the best-selling book the passing of the great race or the racial basis of european history, in which he advocated the biological and cultural superiority of the ‘nordic race’ (teutonic and anglo-saxon groups) over all other people, and dealt with the fate of the ‘nordic type’ in the united states of america.49 in his introduction to dominian’s book, grant explained the lack of ‘race consciousness in europe’, arguing that ‘although race taken in its modem scientific meaning – the actual physical character of man – originally implied a common origin; today, it has little or nothing to do with either nationality or language, since nearly all the great nations of europe are composed, to varying degrees, of two and sometimes all three of the primary european races’. that is why language rather than race should be relied on as a basis for nationality, even though ‘lines of linguistic cleavage frequently represent lines of race distinction as well’. in his opinion, the current war could probably have been avoided if, subsequent to the franco-prussian war, the borders between the two states in alsace-lorraine had been drawn up in conformity with the linguistic reality. finally, national aspirations ‘expressed and measured’ by a common language’ ought to serve as a monitor for future peace.50 studies on national movements 8 (2021) | articles francesca zantedeschi 17 | fig. 1. l. dominian, ‘part of europe showing languages having political significance’, in: the frontiers of language and nationality on europe (1917), 334. studies on national movements 8 (2021) | articles | 18 francesca zantedeschi both the article and the book were widely criticised, and dominian was accused not only of occasionally exhibiting anti-german sentiment, but also of knowing little about germany and the history of the german language.51 moreover, the romanian-born american sociologist, max sylvius handman, reproached dominian for using mainly second-hand literature and sources, except in the case of turkey. this had not only led him to overlook ‘the deeper underlying causes of nationalistic antagonisms’, but also to present merely a one-sided stance. hence, even though the book paid ‘a great deal of attention to the subject of national characters and geographical influence, […] discussions of this subject will not be worth taking seriously until we have first developed a technique for the study of national characteristics and then found out something definite about them’.52 following the convergence of linguistics and geography, which came about as a result of the upsurgence of ethnically and linguistically-based european nationalisms by the end of the nineteenth century, philip jagessar has commented that ‘language was increasingly viewed as a mappable phenomenon that could provide a new, stable, variable for demarcating and organising space’.53 linguistic geography, which spread as a branch of dialectology from the end of the nineteenth century, dealt with the analysis of linguistic phenomena from the perspective of their geographical distribution, taking into account historical, social and geographical factors. the publication of the atlas linguistique de france (1902-1910) by the swiss linguists jules gilliéron and edmond edmont, consecrated linguistic geography as an autonomous discipline.54 moreover, ‘language areas were seen also as the geographical spaces inhabited by members of the concomitant “races” or nationalities, and this strengthened the tendency to give a political application to such ethnic-geographical groupings’.55 consequently, linguistic geography proved particularly suited to redrawing the borders of the states that had belonged to the fallen multilingual empires. this explains not only studies on national movements 8 (2021) | articles francesca zantedeschi 19 | dominian’s interest and work within the ags, but also why linguists and experts on linguistic issues were gradually integrated into the french comité d’études, which met in the ‘salle des cartes’ of the sorbonne institut de géographie from 1917 to 1919, to clarify french military ambitions and prepare for peace. the comité was set up by the deputy, charles benoist, to deliberate in particular on what to do with the dual monarchy, and what place should be given to the principle of nationalities. in particular, since the conditions for peace had to be agreed upon by the other allies, it was necessary to identify possible areas of conflict within the entente. in this sense, geographical, historical and philological knowledge made it possible to identify and clarify difficulties.56 at the outset, the comité was composed mainly of geographers and historians. in 1918, experts from other disciplines were added, namely linguists: antoine meillet, scholar of iranian and armenian studies, and slavic languages; the slavist, paul boyer, specialising in russian; émile haumont, specialising in slavistics; hubert pernot, specialising in modern greek studies, and founder (1919) and director of the institut néo-héllenique at the sorbonne; and paul verrier, specialising in scandinavian languages and literature. according to isabelle davion, the comité was the ‘laboratory of the new diplomacy’, and reflected the need to provide support to diplomatic work by offering specific expertise on extremely technical issues.57 however, the comité was never really involved in decision-making processes. it was powerless, not least because of its independence from diplomatic and governmental spheres. thus, its influence was limited to providing notes and statistics on highly specialised subjects, and consultations based on specialist status. nonetheless, some of its members were later appointed as experts to the peace conference, as it was the case of the geographer emmanuel de martonne, a specialist in the construction and comparison of ethnographical maps,58 who succeeded in obtaining the formation of ‘greater romania’.59 studies on national movements 8 (2021) | articles | 20 francesca zantedeschi antoine meillet: languages in ‘new europe’. born in moulins, france, antoine meillet (1866-1936) was one of the leading linguists of his time, particularly in the field of historicalcomparative philology of the indo-european languages. in 1891, he was appointed director of comparative indo-european studies at the école pratique des hautes-études in paris and taught armenian from 1902 until 1906, when he was appointed professor of comparative philology of the indo-european languages and of general linguistics at the collège de france. in 1921 meillet created the revue des études slaves, together with paul boyer and andré mazon. that same year, and until 1937, he was also appointed as president of the institut d’études slaves, established in 1919 by ernest denis, which ‘served as a steering instrument for the french institutes in the east, especially those in prague and warsaw’.60 antoine meillet divulgated some of his main ideas on language and nation through a number of articles published in the multilingual journal scientia, rivista internazionale di sintesi scientifica (international journal of scientific synthesis),61 as well as in his book, les langues dans l’europe nouvelle (1918; 2nd ed. 1928). these publications were all inspired by the tragic events afflicting europe at that time. his intention was to present ‘the linguistic situation of europe as it stands’, and not as the product of ‘vanity and national claims’ that had been exaggerated since the nineteenth century.62 he blamed the ‘german block’ for triggering and carrying on the war against several nations: serbia, russia, france, belgium and england. as he explained, the only allies of the germans were two groups who had survived by oppressing other nationalities: the magyars, who managed to make themselves the sole masters of a country in which they had been in a minority against the serbo-croats, the romanians, the ruthenians and the slovaks; and the turks who had dominated arabs, greeks, armenians, slavs, christians from syria, jews by force.63 meillet drew on the contrasting examples of the russian and studies on national movements 8 (2021) | articles francesca zantedeschi 21 | austro-hungarian empires to substantiate his arguments, both of which had populations belonging to mixed language groupings. he argued that, whereas non-russian speaking population occupied mainly the borders of the russian empire, those who spoke russian formed a compact and united people; the situation in austria-hungary was quite different. of the two states constituting the habsburg empire, austria had no language of its own, except czech; on the contrary, hungary had an official language, magyar, which was the idiom of the largest and most influential group in the kingdom, but the mother tongue of less than half the population. the linguistic conditions of russia and austria-hungary, he concluded, were in no way comparable: on the one hand, there was a huge number of people with the strongest possible unity speaking one of the great languages of european civilisation; on the other, groups had been brought together by chance, and rejected magyar or german as their official language and language of civilisation, aspiring to disassociate themselves. here, language was the vehicle through which peoples opposed one another.64 meillet was also critical of germany’s expansionistic ambitions, which it achieved partly by endlessly multiplying the principle of nationality, and partly, by promoting its own linguistic expansion over the small national languages. this was the case of the small states bordering on the baltic sea, whose languages of civilisation could not compete, because of their very limited influence, with the spreading of german as a ‘language of business and high culture’.65 in his book, meillet defined the situation in europe as ‘paradoxical’: while material civilisation, science and art were becoming increasingly unified, the languages that served this civilisation were extremely varied, ‘and they were becoming more numerous every day’, and each nation, no matter how small it was, wanted its own language. he therefore argued there was a link between language and nation, despite the fact that nation was not always expressed through language, ‘nor is a particularity studies on national movements 8 (2021) | articles | 22 francesca zantedeschi of language sufficient to give a national consciousness’. even though belonging to the nation was ‘a matter of feeling and will’ and the nation was not characterised by any kind of ‘material’ elements, meillet continued, and ‘the fact remains that language is the first, clearest and most effective character by which a nation is distinguished. where differences of language disappear, national differences tend to disappear as well, and where national feeling is lacking, differences of language tend to disappear’.66 meillet also devoted a chapter to the question of the relationship between language and ‘race’, the latter defined by physical traits. moreover, he rebutted the thesis of the austrian linguist and ethnologist, friedrich müller, who classified languages according to the physical character of those speaking them in his work grundriss der sprachwissenschaft (1876-1887). meillet, on the contrary, believed that there was no such inevitability between a language and the ‘race’ of those who spoke it, and the limits of race and language were revealed by the fact that they could ‘never coincide exactly’. ‘no doubt, it is possible to observe a degree of concordance between languages and ethnic types […]. but such concordance is due to the fact that the languages now used in the world appear to be almost all the result of the divergent evolution of a relatively small number of earlier languages, and that historical and geographical conditions have resulted in the distribution of languages and races which, despite not corresponding exactly, do have some common features’.67 generally speaking, by illustrating the contemporary linguistic problems of his century, meillet aimed to illustrate how languages could lose their unity and how common languages were created. an advocate of the fundamental unity of european culture, meillet feared that the entente’s victory would lead to a multiplication of national languages, which would not only be pointless – being intrinsically weak, they were destined not to go beyond the borders of the nations for which they were created –, studies on national movements 8 (2021) | articles francesca zantedeschi 23 | but also detrimental to internationalisation of civilised life. in his opinion, for europe to overcome its ‘linguistic fragmentation’ and the resilient crises that such situations engendered, a second language was needed for international relations. in light of the failure of existing languages, he pleaded for the adoption of an artificial language (such as esperanto and ido), which would provide international relations ‘the simple practical instrument they lack’. moreover, an artificial language, to be used only in international relations, had the advantage of never having, or at any rate not for a long time to come, ‘qualities that enable it to compete with national languages outside the limited and relatively humble objects for which it will be made’.68 conclusions in 1928, the second edition of meillet’s book, which was improved and enriched thanks to a comprehensive statistical analysis by lucien tesnière, a specialist in slavic languages, german and french, attempted to come to terms with the outcome of the 1919 peace treaties. while the treaties had left the geo-political situation of western europe practically unchanged (except for alsace-lorraine, returned to france), they had totally overturned the reality of eastern europe. meillet suggested that linguistic criteria had been fundamental in drawing the new frontiers: ‘linguistics did not expect to be accorded such an honour’.69 no doubt, as the linguist patrick sériot has observed, the treaty of versailles typifies the belief that the ‘distinction between languages’ matches the ‘distinction between nations’. however, even if the fundamental criterion according to which ‘where there is language, there is a nation’ appeared quite straightforward, it soon turned out to be inoperative. sériot has therefore defined the ‘boundary-makers using spontaneous linguistics’ (‘la linguistique spontanée des traceurs de studies on national movements 8 (2021) | articles | 24 francesca zantedeschi frontières’) when thinking of the discontinuous and the homogeneous; on the contrary, field linguistics reveals a complex, heterogeneous and continuously evolving situation. however, as sebastien moret has argued, this approach to linguistics was embraced not only by non linguists (as dominian’s has shown), but also by professional linguists.70 the desire to achieve a ‘scientific peace’ had led the entente governments to employ experts they considered capable of finding a solution for drawing up the boundaries of the new states, which could be both natural and scientific.71 yet, as the subsequent historiographical research on these expert committees has shown, their influence was eventually limited to furnishing notes and statistics on highly specialised subjects, and consultations based on specialist status. in fact, the us peace plan advocated by woodrow wilson, which took the form of a peace brokered on the principles laid down in the fourteen points, came up against a labyrinth of interests making its implementation very difficult. the peace treaties failed to supplant national rivalries at the root of the war, and the conditions for further conflicts remained. the harsh political, economic and military conditions that were imposed on germany soon proved unrealistic, while the dissolution of the austro-hungarian empire fuelled national tensions in many of the new states. commenting on the new european order, isaiah bowman noted indeed that ‘where there were approximately 8,000 miles of old boundary about the former states of central europe, there are now 10,000 miles, and of this total more than 3,000 miles represent newly located boundaries. every additional mile of new boundary, each new location, has increased for a time the sources of possible trouble between unlike and, in the main, unfriendly peoples.’72 studies on national movements 8 (2021) | articles francesca zantedeschi 25 | studies on national movements 8 (2021) | articles | 26 francesca zantedeschi as for the relationship between ‘language’ and ‘race’, at the dawn of the new century the two notions began to undergo a certain differentiation, and their immediate juxtaposition were not unanimously accepted. nevertheless, their relationship remained ambiguous (or at least was never clarified), and the use of racial (and ethnic) categories to define the nation emerged strongly in the first decade of the twentieth century. not surprisingly, the words of edward augustus freeman come immediately to mind: while juggling the ambiguity of those concepts, he was confident in saying that ‘community of language is, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, a presumption of the community of blood, and it is proof of something which for practical purposes is the same as community of blood’.73 endnotes 1 a. chervin, ‘les langues parlées en autriche-hongrie par les différentes nationalités d’après le dénombrement de la population de 1910’ (part i), in: journal de la société statistique de paris, 56 (1915), 105-137. arthur chervin (1850-1921) was a physician, director of the institut des bègues (institute of stutterers), from 1878. he was also president of the société d’anthropologie (1901) and société de statistiques (1904). in the article, as well in his books l’autriche et l’hongrie de demain (1915), and de prague à l’adriatique; considerations geographiques, ethniques et économiques sur le territoire (corridor) faisant communiquer les tchèques avec les yougoslaves (1919), chervin advocated the creation of a kind of ‘marche slave’, in order to guarantee european peace. accordingly, this common territory would connect northern slavs with southern slavs, where czechs and yugoslavs could live side by side. on the contrary, it would also allow austrians and hungarians to cease being neighbours, thus preventing the merging of hungary with the ‘groups of german provinces’. 2 b. ashcroft, ‘language and race’, in: social identities: journal for the study of race, nation and culture, 7/3 (2001), 311-328. studies on national movements 8 (2021) | articles francesca zantedeschi 27 | 3 j. leerssen, ‘language interest: europe. introductory survey essay’, in: j. leerssen (ed.), encyclopedia of romantic nationalism in europe (amsterdam, 2018), https://ernie.uva.nl/viewer.p/21/56/object/122-159898 4 s. moret, ‘linguistique et nouvel ordre européen autour de la grande guerre’, in: cahiers de l’ilsl, 26 (2009), 132. 5 p. alter, nationalism (london, 1989), 92. 6 a. meillet, les langues dans l’europe nouvelle (paris, 1918), 7. 7 m. turda & m.s. quine, historicizing race (london & new york, 2018), 51. 8 morpurgo davies, ‘razza e razzismo’, 56. 9 g. sluga, the nation, psychology, and international politics, 1870-1919 (basingstoke, 2006). 10 r. mcmahon (ed.), national races. transnational power struggles in the sciences and politics of human diversity, 1840-1945 (lincoln, 2019), 35. 11 to mention but a few: sluga, the nation, psychology, and international politics, 1870-1919; c. manias, race, science, and the nation (london & new york, 2013); c. reynaud paligot, de l’identité nationale: science, race et politique en europe et aux états-unis, xixe-xxe siècles (paris, 2015); r. mcmahon, the races of europe. construction of national identities in the social sciences, 1839-1939 (london, 2016); id. national races. 12 manias, race, science, and nation, chap. 7. 13 a.m. thiesse, la création des identités nationales (paris, 1999), chap. 2. 14 d. baggioni, langues et nations en europe, 12. 15 a. renaut, ‘logiques de la nation’, in: g. delannoi & p.a. taguieff (eds.), théories du nationalisme (paris, 1991), 29-47. 16 t. benes, ‘from indo-germans to aryans’, in: s. eigen & m. larrimore (eds), the german invention of race (albany, 2006), 167-181. 17 r.s. leventhal, ‘the emergence of philological discourse in the german states, 1770-1810’, in: isis, 77/2 (1986), 243-60. 18 a. morpurgo davies, la linguistica dell’ottocento (bologna, 1996), 98. 19 p.j. geary, the myth of nations (princeton and oxford 2003), 24-25 & 32. https://ernie.uva.nl/viewer.p/21/56/object/122-159898 studies on national movements 8 (2021) | articles | 28 francesca zantedeschi 20 a. burgio, l’invenzione delle razze (roma, 1998), 99. 21 as morpurgo davies explained, by the middle of the century, with the growth of linguistics and comparative-historical studies aimed at establishing linguistic kinship, the problem of language and race formed part of ‘the cultural background against which the history of linguistic thought should be considered’. m. davies, la linguistica dell’ottocento, 227. 22 s. timpanaro, sulla linguistica dell’ottocento (bologna, 2005), 44 ff. 23 turda & quine, historicizing race, 74. since indo-iranian-speaking peoples used to call themselves ‘ari’, the term ‘aryan’ was used to identify indo-european peoples who had settled in india, iran and europe thousands of years earlier. 24 j.r. davis & a. nicholls, ‘friedrich max müller: the career and intellectual trajectory of a german philologist in victorian britain’, in: publications of the english goethe society, 85/2-3 (2016), 87, doi: 10.1080/09593683.2016.1224493. 25 in george mosse’s words, gobineau ‘was not an original thinker, but a synthesiser who drew on anthropology, linguistics, and history, in order to construct a fully furnished intellectual edifice where race explained everything in the past, present, and future’; toward de final solution, 49. 26 d. paone, ‘the general history and comparative system of the semitic languages, by ernest renan. 1863’, http://heritage.bnf.fr/bibliothequesorient/en/history-semitic-languagesrenan-art 27 t. benes, in babel’s shadow. language, philology, and the nation in nineteenthcentury germany (detroit, 2008). 28 s. auroux, histoire des idées linguistiques. vol. 3: l’hégémonie du comparatisme (sprimont, 1989), 290-292; a. morpurgo davies, ‘razza e razzismo: continuità ed equivoci nella linguistica dell’ottocento’, in: p. cotticelli kurras, g. graffi (eds.), lingue, ethnos e popolazioni: evidenze linguistiche, biologiche e culturali (roma, 2009), 55. 29 although chave e’s influence was very limited outside the country, and linguistic classifications did not necessarily go hand in hand with ‘racial’ or ethnological ones, it is certain that at the time there was great confusion among http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09593683.2016.1224493 http://heritage.bnf.fr/bibliothequesorient/en/history-semitic-languages-renan-art http://heritage.bnf.fr/bibliothequesorient/en/history-semitic-languages-renan-art studies on national movements 8 (2021) | articles francesca zantedeschi 29 | linguists, fuelled, not least, by the ambiguity of the term ‘race’. m. davies, ‘razza e razzismo’, 66 ff. 30 m. davies, la linguistica dell’ottocento, 226. 31 e.a. freeman, ‘race and language’, in: historical essays, third series (london: 1879), 173-230. see also, c. hutton, ‘race and language: ties of “blood and speech”, fictive identity and empire in the writings of henry maine and edward freeman’, in: interventions, 2/1 (2000), 53-72, doi: 10.1080/136980100360797. 32 a. hovelacque, langues, races, nationalités (paris, 1875), 8. 33 hovelacque, langues, races, nationalités, 9-22. 34 p. desmet, ‘la revue de linguistique et de philologie comparée (1867-1916)’, in: orbis, 37/01 (1994), 349. 35 s.g. alter, darwinism and the linguistic image (baltimore & london, 1999). in particular, the french anthropologist georges vacher de lapouge adapted darwin’s theory of evolution to a vision of society, and attempted to organise his vision of the racist world into a coherent system. he developed the thesis of the superiority of the aryans in several works with a sociological background. after dealing with the question of the multiplicity of european ‘races’ and the mismatch between languages and ‘races’, vacher de lapouge conjectured that a native aryan people had originated among the mists of the north sea; an idea that later would serve the political ideology of the anti-democratic and racist extreme right; j.-p. demoule, mais où sont passes les indo-européens? le mythe d’origine de l’occident (paris, 214), 145-147. see also, p.-a. taguieff, ‘racisme aryaniste, socialisme et eugénisme chez georges vacher de lapouge (1854-1936)’, in: revue d’histoire de la shoah, 183 (2005), 69-134. 36 ‘inquiry of the american geographical society for the information of the peace commissioners’, in: science, 48/1250 (1918), 590-592. 37 https://www.archives.gov/research/foreign-policy/related-records/rg-256. see also l.e. gelfand, the inquiry. american preparations for peace, 1917-1919 (new haven & london, 1963). 38 in december 1918, bowman sailed for france as chief territorial specialist, but he quickly assumed an administrative role as well, gaining the ear of president woodrow wilson and his chief adviser, colonel edward house. he http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/136980100360797 https://www.archives.gov/research/foreign-policy/related-records/rg-256 studies on national movements 8 (2021) | articles | 30 francesca zantedeschi thus played a major role in determining distribution of land areas and national borders, especially in the balkans, as part of the paris peace conference. g.c. carter, ‘isaiah bowman, 1878-1950’, in: annals of the association of american geographers, 40/3 (1950), 335-350. 39 ‘inquiry’, 592. 40 w.l.g. joerg, ‘memoir of leon dominian’, in: annals of the association of american geographers, 26/4 (1936), 197. 41 ‘dominian, leon, 1913-1935’, in: ‘correspondence between isaiah bowman and leon dominian regarding matters of the american geographical society during the time dominian was on staff, through his time at the u.s. department of state and the american consular service’, american geographical society of new york records, 1723-2010, bulk 1854-2000, https://collections.lib.uwm.edu/digital/collection/agsny/id/28780 42 https://collections.lib.uwm.edu/digital/collection/agsny/id/28781 43 leon dominian’s letter to isaiah bowman, 25 february 1915, https://collections.lib.uwm.edu/digital/collection/agsny/id/28785 44 dominian, ‘linguistic areas’, 402-403. 45 dominian, ‘linguistic areas’, 402. 46 dominian, ‘linguistic areas’, 438. 47 dominian, ‘linguistic areas’, 439. 48 j.k. wright, geography in the making. the american geographical society, 1851-1951 (1952), 147. 49 c.c. alexander, ‘prophet of american racism: madison grant and the nordic myth’, in: phylon, 23/1 (1962), 73-90. 50 m. grant, ‘introduction’, in: l. dominian, the frontiers of language and nationality in europe (new york, 1917), xv-xviii. as explained by j. leerssen, the ‘applied geography’ of such authors as dominian and grant, but also william z. ripley (author of the races of europe, 1899), ‘had given intellectual support to the agenda of various diaspora nationalisms in north america’; j. leerssen, ‘ethnography and ethnicity: introductory survey essay’, in: j. leerssen, encyclopedia of romantic nationalism in europe (amsterdam, 2018), https://ernie.uva.nl/viewer.p/21/56/object/122-160535 https://collections.lib.uwm.edu/digital/collection/agsny/id/28780 https://collections.lib.uwm.edu/digital/collection/agsny/id/28781 https://collections.lib.uwm.edu/digital/collection/agsny/id/28785 https://ernie.uva.nl/viewer.p/21/56/object/122-160535 studies on national movements 8 (2021) | articles francesca zantedeschi 31 | 51 before publication, both text and maps were ‘censored by an expert committee’. among the criticisms dominian’s article received, those by professor a.h. palmer, reported here; https://collections.lib.uwm.edu/digital/collection/agsny/id/28804 52 m.s. handman, ‘the frontiers of language and nationality in europe by leon dominian’, in: journal of political economy, 27/5 (1919), 417-419. 53 p. jagessar, ‘geography and linguistics: histories, entanglements and departures’, in: geography compass, 14/11 (2020), 3-4, https://doi.org/10.1111/gec3.12540 54 however, the alf contributed above all to ‘spreading the idea that each language fact is unique, and that consequently dialects as closed, clearly circumscribed entities do not exist’; p. se riot, ‘la clôture impossible (l’espace en ge ographie linguistique: la querelle du continu et du discontinu)’, in: g. nicolas (ed.), géographie et langages(s). interface, représentation, interdisciplinarité. actes du colloque iukb-iri (unil) de sion, 1997 (sion, 1999), 227-248. 55 leerssen, ‘language interest: europe’. 56 g.-h. soutou (ed.), les experts français et les frontières d’après-guerre. les procès-verbaux du comité d’études 1917-1919, https://socgeo.com/wpcontent/uploads/2016/11/les-experts-français-et-les-frontières-daprèsguerre-mep.pdf 57 i. davion, ‘introduction’, in: g.-h. soutou (ed.), les experts français, 19. 58 g. palsky, ‘emmanuel de martonne and the ethnographical cartography of central europe’ (1917-1920), in: imago mundi, 54 (2002), 111-119. 59 see also t. ter minassian, ‘les géographes français et la délimitation des frontières balkaniques à la conférence de la paix de 1919, in: revue d’histoire moderne et contemporaine, 44/2 (1997), 252-286. 60 j.-c. chevalier, ‘les linguistes français et les pays d’europe de l’est de 1918 à 1931’, in: cahiers de l’ilsl, 8 (1996), 59. 61 in 1915, scientia inaugurated a specific section called ‘enquiry on the main present questions of an international character’, which dealt specifically with war-related issues. between 1915 and 1922, meillet published in it a number of articles dealing specifically with the issue of language and nation, namely: ‘les langues et les nationalités’ (vol. 18, 1915), ‘la situation linguistique en russie et https://collections.lib.uwm.edu/digital/collection/agsny/id/28804 https://doi.org/10.1111/gec3.12540 https://socgeo.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/les-experts-français-et-les-frontières-daprès-guerre-mep.pdf https://socgeo.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/les-experts-français-et-les-frontières-daprès-guerre-mep.pdf https://socgeo.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/les-experts-français-et-les-frontières-daprès-guerre-mep.pdf studies on national movements 8 (2021) | articles | 32 francesca zantedeschi en autriche-hongrie’ (vol. 23, 1918), ‘les langues dans le bassin de la mer baltique’ (vol. 24, 1918), ‘l’unité linguistique slave’ (vol. 27, 1920), ‘l’unité romane’ (vol. 31, 1922). 62 a. meillet, les langues dans l’europe nouvelle (paris, 1918), 7. 63 a. meillet, ‘les langues et les nationalités’, in: scientia 18 (1915), 192. 64 a. meillet, ‘la situation linguistique en russie et en autriche-hongrie’, in: scientia 23 (1918), 209-216. meillet made a distinction between ‘parler’ (language), ‘cultivated languages’ (written languages with literature), and ‘languages of civilisation’ (whose strength is assessed according to the competence acknowledged in comparison; these are all indo-european languages); p. caussat, ‘langue et nation’, in: histoire épistémologie langage, 10/2 (1988), 195-204. 65 a. meillet, ‘les langues dans le bassin de la mer baltique’, in: scientia 24 (1918), 383-392. following the treaty of brest-litovsk (3 march 1918) between the bolshevik government of russia and the central powers, russia renounced all territorial claims to finland (which it had already recognised as an independent and sovereign state), and to the future baltic republics (estonia, latvia and lithuania), belarus and ukraine. 66 meillet, les langues dans l’europe nouvelle, 93-96. 67 meillet, les langues dans l’europe nouvelle, 86, 89. 68 meillet, les langues dans l’europe nouvelle, see chapter xxv, ‘les essais de langues artificielles’, 319-330. for more information see, s. moret, ‘autour des langues dans l’europe nouvelle. une réception de meillet par les adeptes des langues artificielles’, in: histoire épistémologie langage, 41/2 (2020), 157-176. it is noteworthy that in the inter-war period, there were new developments in the pursuit of the universal language projects, which were quite different from the nineteenth-century efforts for several reasons. firstly, there was increasing mention of an ‘auxiliary language’ (it was futile to try to eliminate the diversity of mother tongues; this ‘universal language’ only claimed to be a language of communication) and an ‘international auxiliary language association’ was created (us). secondly, in contrast to the projects of the end of the previous century, the enterprise was now the domain of linguists. thirdly, the centre of studies on national movements 8 (2021) | articles francesca zantedeschi 33 | gravity crossed the atlantic, with the consequent marginalisation of european linguistics; d. baggioni, ‘préhistoire de la glottopolitique dans la linguistique européenne, de j.g. herder au cercle linguistique de prague’, in: langages, 21/83 (1986), 35-51. 69 a. meillet, les langues dans l’europe nouvelle (paris, 1928, 2nd edition), ix. 70 p. sériot, ‘la linguistique spontanée des traceurs des frontières’, in: cahiers de l’ilsl, 8 (1996), 277-304; moret, ‘linguistique et nouvel ordre européen’, 136. 71 moret, ‘linguistique et nouvel ordre européen’. 72 i. bowman, the new world. problems in political geography (yonkers-onhudson, new york, 1921), 3. 73 freeman, ‘race and language’, 224. son_culturalnationalism_v4     eric  woods,  ‘cultural  nationalism:  a  review  and  annotated  bibliography’,   in:  studies  on  national  movements,  2  (2014).   http://snm.nise.eu/index.php/studies/article/view/0202s   eric  taylor  woods   cultural  nationalism:   a  review  and  annotated  bibliography   review     cultural  nationalism  generally  refers  to  ideas  and  practices  that  relate  to   the   intended   revival   of   a   purported   national   community’s   culture.   if   political  nationalism  is  focused  on  the  achievement  of  political  autonomy,   cultural   nationalism   is   focused   on   the   cultivation   of   a   nation.   here   the   vision  of  the  nation  is  not  a  political  organisation,  but  a  moral  community.   as  such,  cultural  nationalism  sets  out  to  provide  a  vision  of  the  nation’s   identity,  history  and  destiny.  the  key  agents  of  cultural  nationalism  are   intellectuals  and  artists,  who  seek  to  convey  their  vision  of  the  nation  to   the  wider  community.  the  need  to  articulate  and  express  this  vision  tends   to   be   felt   most   acutely   during   times   of   social,   cultural   and   political   upheaval   resulting   from   an   encounter   with   modernity.   cultural   nationalism   often   occurs   in   the   early   phase   of   a   national   movement,   sometimes  before  an  explicitly  political  nationalism  has  appeared.  but  it   can  also  recur  in  long-­‐established  national  states  (see  hutchinson  2013).   the   history   of   cultural   nationalism   begins   in   late   eighteenth-­‐century   europe.  several  developments  in  the  realms  of  ideas,  culture  and  politics   converge  at   this   time,   including  the  emergence  of  historicism  and  indo-­‐ european  linguistics,  the  rise  of  romanticism  in  literature  and  the  arts  and   a  growing  commitment  to  constitutional  politics  and  the  idea  of   ‘rule  by   the  people’  (leerssen  2014,  11).  from  this  period  of  change,   ‘emerged  a   studies  on  national  movements,  2  (2014)        |        state  of  nationalism   eric  taylor  woods  2   polycentric  weltanschauung  that  presented  a  pantheistic  conception  of  the   universe,   in   which   all   natural   entities   were   animated   by   a   force   that   individualized  them  and  endowed  them  with  a  drive  for  realization.  the   nation  was  one  such  life-­‐force,  a  primordial,  cultural,  and  territorial  people   through   which   individuals   developed   their   authenticity   as   moral   and   rational  beings’  (hutchinson  2013,  76).  as  a  part  of  this  new  world-­‐view,   the  rise  of  a  belief  in  the  possibility  of  progress  was  crucial.  according  to   gregory   jusdanis   (2001)   intellectuals   in   central   and   northern   europe   became  aware  of   their   ‘backwardness’   in   the   face  of  french  dominance   and   sought   prestige   in   their   own   cultures,   while   simultaneously   also   embarking   upon   a   programme   of   progress.   from   europe,   cultural   nationalism   spread   outwards,   enjoying   a   renewed   efflorescence   in   the   decolonising   efforts   of   the   twentieth   century.   it   is   now   a   recurring   phenomenon  throughout  the  world.   johann   gottfried   herder   (1744-­‐1803)   is   often   attributed   the   greatest   individual   responsibility   for   elucidating   the   ideology   and   practice   of   cultural  nationalism.  herder  presented  the  nation  as  the  primordial  scene   from  which  the  best  of  human  endeavour  owed  its  provenance,  and  which   therefore  obliged  its  cultivation  through  the  recovery  and  celebration  of   its  history  and  culture.  interestingly,  herder  was  as  much  practitioner  as   he   was   intellectual.   in   his   search   for   the   true   character   of   the   nation   among  the  rural  peasantry  of  central  europe,  he  played  an  influential  role   in  the  development  of  several  practices  that  became  associated  with  the   cultural  nationalism  of  the  nineteenth  century,  such  as  philology,  history   and  the  collection  of  folk  songs,  myths,  and  other  practices  (see  barnard   2003).   much  ink  has  been  spilled  debating  the  character  of  cultural  nationalism   and  its  relationship  to  political  nationalism.  the  most  influential  author  in   these  debates  is  hans  kohn  (1944;  1967).  kohn  distinguishes  between  the   political   forms   of   nationalism   that   are   ostensibly   associated   with   the   united   states,   france,   britain   and   the   netherlands,   and   the   cultural   nationalisms   that  he   suggests  are   representative  of   central   and  eastern   europe,   as   well   as   the   former   european   colonies.   not   only   has   this   dichotomy   proved   incredibly   influential   in   social   research,   but   kohn’s   valuation  of  the  two  types  of  nationalism  has  also  had  great  impact.  while   studies  on  national  movements,  2  (2014)        |        state  of  nationalism   eric  taylor  woods   3   kohn   approvingly   characterises   political   nationalism   as   marked   by   rousseau’s  idea  that  political  communities  are  actively  willed  into  being,   he  takes  the  opposite  view  of  cultural  nationalism,  which  he  characterises   as   fatally   influenced   by   herder’s   obsession   with   a   nation’s   unique   character.  for  kohn,  it  is  the  latter  which  planted  the  seed  leading  to  the   growth  of  totalitarian  regimes  in  the  twentieth  century.   kohn’s   dichotomy   has   been   much   criticised   of   late.   critics   claim   that   it   should  be  abandoned  on  empirical  grounds,  on  the  basis  that  all  national   movements  tend  to  contain  both  political  and  cultural  elements  (e.g.  kuzio   2002;  shulman  2002;  yack  1996;  zimmer  2003).  others  question  kohn’s   characterisation  of  cultural  nationalism  as  an  ethnic  or  anti-­‐enlightenment   ideology,   arguing,   to   the   contrary,   that   it   is   defensible   from   a   liberal   perspective   (gans   2000).   indeed,   some   analysts   distinguish   cultural   nationalism  from  ethnic  and  civic  nationalism,  suggesting  that  a  focus  on   language  and  culture   is  distinct   from  adherence   to  citizenship  rights  as   well  as  a  belief  in  common  ancestry  (e.g.  nielsen  1996).  several  historical   sociologists  have  also  taken  issue  with  the  view  of  cultural  nationalism  as   anti-­‐modern  (e.g.  chatterjee  1993;  jusdanis  2001;  hutchinson  2013;  smith   1995).  their  suggestion  is  that  when  cultural  nationalists  turn  to  the  past,   it  is  to  find  ways  of  accommodating  their  purported  national  communities   with  modernity.   notwithstanding   these  historical  and  normative  debates,   the  concept  of   cultural   nationalism   has   proved   fruitful   among   social   researchers   who   employ   it   as   ideal   type,  while  acknowledging   that   in   reality   it   can   take   many  forms.  an  early  exemplar  of  this  approach  is  provided  by  miroslav   hroch   (1986).   hroch   embeds   cultural   nationalism   within   a   processual   model  describing  the  route  by  which  national  movements  among  several   ‘small   nations’   (stateless   nations)   of   europe   became   institutionalised.   according  to  hroch,  cultural  nationalism  typifies  the  first  phase  (phase  a)   of   the   process   of   nation-­‐formation,   when   the   ideas   and   practices   associated  with  the  national  community  are  conceived  and  disseminated   by  artists  and  intellectuals.  hroch’s  view  of  cultural  nationalism  as  a  key   element  in  the  process  leading  to  the  emergence  nations  has  provided  an   important   platform   for   subsequent   research   and   debate   on   cultural   nationalism.   studies  on  national  movements,  2  (2014)        |        state  of  nationalism   eric  taylor  woods  4   if   not   specifically   concerned   with   cultural   nationalism,   at   least   in   his   earlier  work,  anthony  smith  has  had  great  influence  on  scholarship  in  this   area.   for   smith,   all   nationalism   has   a   cultural   dimension;   hence   his   insistence  that  it  is  an  ideological  movement  rather  than  merely  a  political   movement.   across   his   long   career,   smith   (e.g.   1986;   1991;   2003)   has   sought  to  demonstrate  the  trans-­‐generational  ‘stickiness’  of  the  culture  of   nations.  according  to  smith,  this  pattern  of  myths,  symbols,  memories  and   values   often   extends   backwards   into   the   pre-­‐modern   era,   as   well   as   structuring   a   nation’s   particular   path   toward   modernisation.   however,   while  smith  stresses   the  capacity   for  cultural  patterns   to  endure   in   the   face   of   social   change,   he   also   acknowledges   they   can   undergo   rapid   change.  here  smith  attempts  to  carve  out  a  middle  ground  between  those   who  view  nationalism  as  a  herderian  expression  of  an   innate  collective   spirit  stretching  back  into  ‘time  immemorial’,  and  those  who  view  it  as  a   wholly  modern  ideology  conjured  up  by  enterprising  elites  and  imposed   upon   the   masses.   for   smith,   national   cultures   take   shape   through   a   process  of  reinterpretation  and  rediscovery  rather  than  mere   invention.   smith  has  lately  focused  more  explicitly  on  cultural  nationalism.  his  most   recent  book  seeks  to  uncover  the  significance  of  visual  art  in  the  making  of   national   identity   in   france   and   britain,   which   presents   an   original   typology  of  national  art  (smith  2013).   john  hutchinson  has  done  much  to  enrich  the  understanding  of  cultural   nationalism.   he   was   smith’s   first   phd   student   and   his   work   remains   aligned  with  his  approach.  hutchinson’s  (1987)  study  of  gaelic  revivalism   and  the  establishment  of  the  irish  national  state  greatly  extends  hroch’s   approach  to  cultural  nationalism.  while  hroch’s  model  suggests  that  the   importance   of   cultural   nationalism   will   diminish   once   the   political   movement   takes   off,   hutchinson   presents   cultural   nationalism   as   an   episodic   phenomenon,   which   can   recur   even   after   a   national   state   is   established.  to  bring  to  light  how  cultural  nationalism  is  institutionalised   and   disseminated,   the   book   distinguishes   between   the   intellectuals   and   artists   who   furnish   the   symbols   and   vision   of   the   nation,   and   the   intelligentsia,   a   vocational   and   occupational   group   including   the   professions   and   tertiary   education   instructors,   who   communicate   this   vision  to  the  ‘masses’.  in  a  subsequent  book,  hutchinson  (1994)  discusses,   studies  on  national  movements,  2  (2014)        |        state  of  nationalism   eric  taylor  woods   5   among  other  topics,  the  myths  and  symbols  that  cultural  nationalists  tend   to  draw  upon,  noting  the   importance  of  newly   ‘discovered’   folklore  and   legends  to  nationalist  poets,  writers  and  musicians.  here  he  also  discusses   the  relationship  of  cultural  nationalism  to  religion,  suggesting  that  cultural   nationalists  must  either  appropriate  religious  myths  and  symbols  or  find   alternatives.   more  recently,  hutchinson  has  focused  on  the  role  of  contestation  in  the   endurance   of   national   communities,   suggesting   that   the   often   intense   struggles   among   nationalists   over   national   identity   can   paradoxically   serve   to   reify   the   nation   (hutchinson   2005).   he   has   also   recently   disavowed   the   commonly-­‐held   view   that   cultural   nationalists   will   invariably   turn   to   organic   myths   and   symbols   of   common   descent,   suggesting  that  they  may  be  just  as  predisposed  to  characterise  the  nation   as  a  voluntary  community  grounded  in  civic  principles  (hutchinson  2013).   as  a   result  of  hutchinson’s  work,   it   is  now  possible   to  analyse  cultural   nationalism  as  an  ongoing  struggle  over  the  definition  and  character  of  the   nation,  with  the  proponents  seeking  to  convey  competing  visions  to  the   wider   community.   in   hutchinson’s   various   analyses,   this   struggle   is   expressed  as  a  series  of  binary  visions  of  the  ‘true’  character  of  the  nation.   kosaku  yoshino’s  (1992)  much  cited  study  of  cultural  nationalism  in  japan   takes   the   work   of   hutchinson   and   smith   in   a   new   direction.   yoshino   applies   the   distinction   between   intellectuals   and   intelligentsia   to   investigate  how  the  ideas  of  intellectuals  are  diffused  among  two  separate   groups   of   ‘intelligentsia’   –   businessmen   and   educators.   interestingly,   yoshino   finds   that   it   is   the   businessmen   who   are   the   more   committed   carriers  of  the  ideas  of  the  intellectuals.  more  recently,  yingjie  guo  (2004)   has  applied  hutchinson’s  approach  to  cultural  nationalism  in  a  fascinating   study   of   china,   where   he   suggests   that   a   group   of   intellectuals   have   become  increasingly  emboldened  to  assert  an  ethnic  vision  of  a  chinese   national   community   against   the   long-­‐standing   rationalist   and   marxist   representations   of   china.   both   studies   confirm   hutchinson’s   argument   that  cultural  nationalism  is  as  much  a  feature  of  long-­‐established  national   states  as  it  is  of  independence  movements.   studies  on  national  movements,  2  (2014)        |        state  of  nationalism   eric  taylor  woods  6   the  study  of  postcolonial  nationalism  in  asia  and  africa  has  contributed   much  to  our  understanding  of  cultural  nationalism.  david  kopf’s  (1969)   history  of  the  intellectual  ferment  of  the  college  of  fort  william  of  bengal   sheds   light   on   the   challenge   of   fusing   (foreign)   modernity   with   (indigenous)   culture.   this   dynamic   has   recently   taken   on   particular   importance.   homi   bhabha’s   (1990)   suggestion   that   what   emerges   is   an   unstable   ‘hybrid’   identity   that   is   neither   european   nor   indigenous   has   triggered  a  massive  outpouring  of  research.  this  even  had  an  impact  on   the  study  of  nationalism  in  the  former  metropole,  in  which  scholars  have   focused  on  the  cultural  politics  of  the  formerly  colonised  who  now  make   their  home  in  britain  (e.g.  gilroy  1987;  hall  1993).   a   central   figure   in   the   study   of   postcolonial   nationalism   is   partha   chatterjee.   in   his   first   major   study,   chatterjee   (1986)   takes   aim   at   elie   kedourie’s  assertion  that  postcolonial  nationalism  is  merely  a  derivative   discourse  imported  from  europe,  suggesting  that  it  arises  out  of  a  dialogue   between  european  and  indigenous  ideas  and  practices.  while  the  colonial   administrations  may  have  dominated  the  ‘material  realm’,  in  chatterjee’s   view,   they   never   really   fully   penetrated   the   spiritual   realm,   where   intellectuals   were   involved   in   the   elaboration   of   the   moral   community   from   the   middle   of   the   nineteenth   century   onwards.   chatterjee   (1993)   subsequently   applies   his   approach   to   a   study   of   the   emergence   of   a   national  ideology  in  bengal  through  attention  to  a  wide  variety  of  cultural   practices,   while   also   focusing   on   efforts   by   marginalised   groups   within   india   to   make   claims   for   their   inclusion   in   the   emergent   national   discourse.     the  challenge  of  constructing  novel  national  identities  also  characterises   settler   nationalism.   nationalists   in   settler   societies   face   the   peculiar   challenge   of   distinguishing   themselves   from   a   metropole   that   shares   a   similar   culture,   while   also   not   being   able   to   lay   claim   to   an   authentic   culture   rooted   in   the   territory   from   ‘time   immemorial’.   in   this   context,   bhabha’s   notion   of   ‘hybridity’   has   again   been   put   to   good   effect   (e.g.   proudfoot   &   roche   2005;   mcdonald   2013).   according   to   christopher   mcdonald,   ‘the   concept   of   hybridity   includes   not   just   bhabha’s   “third   space”  between  european  and  “native”  but  also  the  cultural  "ambivalence”   experienced  by  europeans  in  a  colonial  setting’  (2013,  174).  to  overcome   studies  on  national  movements,  2  (2014)        |        state  of  nationalism   eric  taylor  woods   7   this  ambivalence,  cultural  nationalists   in  mexico,   for  example,  sought   to   construct  a  ‘mestizo’  national  identity,  which  through  the  mixing  of  settler   and  indigenous,  can  claim  rootedness  in  the  territory  and  also  embrace  the   prestige  of  european  modernity  (doremus,  2001).   in   the   former  british   settler  societies,  cultural  nationalists  proclaim  their  national  communities   to  be  at   the  vanguard  in  the  construction  of  a  new  kind  of   ‘rainbow’  or   ‘multicultural’   community,   whose   strength   is   its   diversity   (hutchinson   1994,  chapter  6).   the  significance  of  gender   for  cultural  nationalism  has  begun   to  attract   increasing  attention.  an  earlier   intervention   in   this  area  of   research  by   george   mosse   (1985)   observes   that   the   rise   of   nationalism   in   europe   coincided  with  the  widespread  acceptance  of  the  patriarchal   family  (see   also   sluga   1998).   a   landmark   book   by   nira   yuval-­‐davis   (1997)   has   provided   a   catalyst   for   research   on   the   gendered   symbolism   of   nationalism.  davis  (1997,  43-­‐45)  observes  that  masculinity  is  associated   with  the  public  sphere  and  men  are  thereby  given  an  ‘active’  status,  as  the   defenders   of   the   national   community,   periodically   called   upon   to   the   sacrifice  themselves  for  the  ‘motherland.’  by  contrast,  the  nation’s  private   sphere,   its   ostensible   ‘inner’   essence,   tends   to   be   represented   by   femininity,   and   the   ‘active’   role   that   is   assigned   to   women   is   as   reproducers  of  the  national  community.  more  recent  research  has  focused   on  the  symbolic  importance  of  a  woman’s  body,  and  how  she  adorns  it,  to   the   national   community   (chatterjee   1989;   kandiyoti   1991;   timmerman   2000).  a  particularly  sobering  new  line  of  research  focuses  on  the  way  in   which  the  representation  of  women  as  the  ‘pure’  essence  of  the  nation  has   led  to  them  being  the  target  of  horrific  sexual  violence  in  times  of  war  and   crisis  (bracewell  2004;  harris  1993).   an   important   area   of   research   asks   questions   about   the   persistence   of   cultural  nationalism  in  an  era  characterised  by  the  increasing  globalisation   of  culture.  for  many  scholars,  globalisation  undermines  nationalism.  until   recently,   the  view  that  american  cultural  dominance  was   leading  to  the   cultural   homogenisation   of   the   world   was   widespread.   others,   such   as   anthony   giddens   (1991),   have   suggested   that   globalisation   produces   a   paradoxical  simultaneous  movement  away  from  the  nation  towards  large-­‐ scale  continental  identities  and  much  smaller,  local  identities.  pointing  to   studies  on  national  movements,  2  (2014)        |        state  of  nationalism   eric  taylor  woods  8   the  proliferation  of  new  imagined  worlds  that  do  not  readily  fit  within  a   national  schema,  arjun  appadurai  (1990)  suggests  that  global   flows  are   leading  to  new  forms  of  identification.   against   the   arguments   that   globalisation   and   nationalism   are   inimical,   smith  and  hutchinson  have  mounted  an   impressive  alternative  reading.   taking  a  long-­‐view  of  globalisation  as  a  process  that  has  been  underway   for   centuries,   hutchinson   (2001,   75)   suggests   that   ethnicity   and   nationalism  are  actually  engendered  by  globalisation.  indeed,  smith  (2010,   149)  argues  that  the  recent  global  era  should  be  considered  a  period  of   ‘internationalising   nationalism’.   according   to   smith,   nationalism   has   a   ‘demonstration   effect’,   whereby   ‘wave   after   wave   of   nationalisms   have   engulfed   successive   regions,   engendering   new   claims   and   making   equivalent  demands.’  turning   to   the  realm  of  culture,  smith   (2010,  50)   suggests   that   we   are   witnessing   an   increasing   role   for   cultural   nationalism;  if  the  criteria  for  entry  into  the  global  community  of  national   states  were  initially  political  sovereignty  and  territorial  jurisdiction,  they   now   also   include   a   demonstration   of   ‘cultural   unity   and   solidarity,   and   preferably  some  degree  of  cultural  “uniqueness”’.   arguments   over   the   impact   of   globalisation   have   been   prevalent   in   the   study  of  film  and  cinema.  in  a  highly  cited  essay,  andrew  higson  (1989)   raises   doubts   about   the   possibility   of   a   ‘national’   cinema,   when   the   production   teams   and   the   audiences   of   even   the   seemingly   most   nationalist  of  films  are  often  transnational.  yet,  the  fact  that  films  continue   to   draw   heavily   on   national   narratives   and   imagery   seems   to   suggest   nationalism’s  ongoing  grip  on  our  imaginations.  in  an  analysis  of  the  film   braveheart,   tim   edensor   (2002,   chapter   5)   shows   how   a   film   made   in   hollywood,  whose  largest  audience  was  american,  had  significant  impact   on  scottish  nationalism.  edensor’s  analysis  points  to  the  possibility  of  an   international   ‘normalisation’   of   national   myths   and   symbols   through   hollywood.  of  course,  hollywood’s  dominance  also  suggests  the  possibility   of   conflict,   as   audiences   see   themselves   refracted   through   american   stereotypes.  indeed,  in  the  case  of  braveheart,  which  depicts  the  english  in   an  unsavoury  light,  edensor  observes  that  cinema-­‐goers  in  england  largely   chose  to  stay  home.   studies  on  national  movements,  2  (2014)        |        state  of  nationalism   eric  taylor  woods   9   joep   leerssen   (2006;   2006;   2014)   has   recently   sought   to   carve   out   a   unique   approach   to   cultural   nationalism.   in   doing   so,   he   builds   in   particular  on  path-­‐breaking  work  by  anne-­‐marie  thiesse  (2001)  on  the   role  of  intellectuals  in  the  transnational  diffusion  of  nationalism.  leerssen   enjoins   his   fellow   researchers   to   move   away   from   a   concern   with   the   significance   of   cultural   nationalism   in   the   progression   of   particular   national  movements  towards  uncovering  how  the  ideas  and  practices  of   cultural   nationalists   are   shared   across   transnational   networks.   he   advocates   greater   attention   to   intellectual   and   artistic   developments,   whereby  new  practices  and  cultural  forms  emerge  and  are  disseminated   among   its   practitioners.   this   approach   sheds   light   on   the   two   sides   of   cultural  nationalism,  whereby  a  concern  for  authenticity  ensures  that  the   content   is   national,   but   the   sharing   of   ideas   and   practices   among   a   transnational  body  of  practitioners  ensures  that  the  form  is  international.   for  example,  leerssen  (2006)  details  how  sir  walter  scott’s  approach  to   the  historical  novel,  as  exemplified  by   ivanhoe,  was  adapted  by  authors   working  in  other  social  settings,  to  become  an  important  mechanism  in  the   construction   of   national   myths   and   symbols   throughout   nineteenth-­‐ century   europe.   leerssen   has   lately   become   particularly   interested   in   romantic   nationalism,   spearheading   a   large-­‐scale   research   project   that   seeks   to   shed   light   on   its   dissemination   through   time   and   space   in   nineteenth-­‐century  europe.  the  preliminary  results  of   this  project  have   been   mapped   on   to   the   project’s   interactive   website   (see   http://www.spinnet.eu).         studies  on  national  movements,  2  (2014)        |        state  of  nationalism   eric  taylor  woods  10   annotated  bibliography   appadurai,   a.,   ‘disjuncture   and   difference   in   the   global   cultural   economy’,  in:  theory,  culture  and  society,  7/2  (1990)  295-­‐310.   this   article   suggests   that   global   flows   of   ‘ethnoscapes’,   ‘mediascapes’,   ‘financescapes’   and   ‘technoscapes’   are   leading   to   new   forms   of   identification   in   the  era  of  globalisation   that  do  not   readily   fit  within  a   national  schema.     barnard,  f.m.,  ‘national  culture  and  political  legitimacy:  herder  and   rousseau’,  in:  journal  of  the  history  of  ideas,  44  (1993)  231-­‐53.   against  the  tendency  to  characterise  j.j.  rousseau  and  j.g.  von  herder  as   presenting  diametrically  opposed  visions  of   the  nation,  with   the   former   emphasising   politics   and   territory   and   the   latter   emphasising   culture,   barnard  shows  that  both  philosophers  were  concerned  with  the  cultural   and  political  aspects  of  nationhood.       barnard,  f.m.,  herder  on  nationality,  humanity  and  history  (montreal   -­‐  kingston,  2003).   this   is   widely   recognised   as   an   authoritative   text   on   j.g.   von   herder’s   philosophy  of  nationalism.  the  aim  of  the  book  is  to  resuscitate  herder’s   thought   by   demonstrating   that   his   concept   of   nation   was   defined   by   language  and  culture  rather  than  race  and  that  he  was  guided  by  a  sense  of   universal  humanity.       befu,  h.   (ed.),  cultural  nationalism  in  east  asia:  representation  and   identity  (berkeley,  ca,  1993).   a   book   by   anthropologists   dealing   with   various   aspects   of   cultural   nationalism  in  japan,  the  people’s  republic  of  china  and  the  republic  of   korea.   the   book   is   a   good   introduction   to   cultural   nationalism   in   the   region,  but  lacking  an  overall  comparative  framework.   studies  on  national  movements,  2  (2014)        |        state  of  nationalism   eric  taylor  woods   11   berger,  s.  (ed.),  writing  the  nation:  a  global  perspective  (new  york,   2007).   this   book   is   an   excellent   introduction   to   the   role   of   historiography   in   constructing   national   pasts   from   a   global   perspective.   the   essays   emphasise   broad   historical   transformations   in   the   writing   of   national   history,  as  well  as  the  ways  in  which  national  histories  are  contested.       berger,  s.  &  lorenz,  c.  (eds.),  nationalizing  of  the  past:  historians  as   nation  builders  in  modern  europe  (new  york,  2010).     this  book  focuses  on  the  relationship  of  historiography  to  nationalism  in   europe   from   a   comparative   perspective.   emphasis   is   on   developments   since  the  second  world  war.  a  highlight  of  the  book  is  the  essay  by  stefan   berger,  in  which  he  argues  that  history  writing  in  germany  and  britain  has   become  discernibly  more  nationalist  since  the  1990s.  another  interesting   essay  compares  again  the  writing  of  history  during  the  british  and  russian   empires.     berlant,  l.,  the  anatomy  of  national  fantasy:  hawthorne,  utopia,  and   everyday  life  (chicago,  1991).   this   book   provides   an   in-­‐depth   analysis   of   the   ideology   of   nathaniel   hawthorne,  and   in   the  process  produces   fascinating   insights  about  how   cultural  nationalists  creatively  combine  the  past  with  visions  of  the  future.     berlin,  i.,  three  critics  of  the  enlightenment:  vico,  hamann,  herder,  ed.   t.  hardy  (princeton,  n.j.,  2013).   this   posthumously   published   book   is   a   collection   of   essays   by   isaiah   berlin,  edited  by  thomas  hardy.  vico  and  herder  are  presented  as  being   involved   in   a   counter-­‐enlightenment   effort   that   was   anti-­‐rationalist,   relativist  and  organic.  hamann  is  presented  as  one  of  the  first  thinkers  to   argue  that  human  cognition  is  a  form  of  language.     studies  on  national  movements,  2  (2014)        |        state  of  nationalism   eric  taylor  woods  12    bhabha,  h.k.  (ed.),  nation  and  narration  (london,  2013).   a  highly  cited  intervention  in  the  study  of  national  literatures.  the  authors   focus   on   the   role   of   hybridity   and   ambivalence   in   the   construction   of   national  identity.  chapters  span  europe,  the  americas  and  australia.     bracewell,   w.,   ‘rape   in   kosovo:   masculinity   and   serbian   nationalism’,  in:  nations  and  nationalism,  6/4  (2000)  563-­‐590.   this  article  focuses  on  how  reports  of  rape  of  serbian  women  by  albanians   were  perceived  among  serbian  nationalists,  arguing  that  it  was  ultimately   read  as  an  attack  on  serbian  masculinity.     brincker,  b.,  hearn,  j.,  zimmer,  o.,  &  leerssen,  j.,  ‘seventh  nations  and   nationalism   debate:   joep   leerssen's   national   thought   in   europe:   a   cultural  history’,  in:  nations  and  nationalism,  19/3  (2013)  409-­‐433.   a  debate  over  the  significance  of  joep  leerssen’s  book,  national  thought  in   europe:  a  cultural  history  (2006).       chatterjee,   p.,   ‘colonialism,   nationalism,   and   colonialized   women:   the  contest  in  india’,  in:  american  ethnologist,  16/4  (1989)  622-­‐633.   this   article   discusses   women’s   fashion   as   a   key   site   of   struggle   in   postcolonial   india,  where  nationalists  sought  to  reform  the  treatment  of   women   in   line   with   western   expectations,   but   also   sought   to   retain   authenticity.     chatterjee,  p.,  the  nation  and  its  fragments:  colonial  and  postcolonial   histories  (princeton,  n.j.,  1993).   in  this  book,  chatterjee  takes  aim  at  the  view  that  nationalism  in  bengal   and  india  is  wholly  derivative  of  european  models,  arguing  that  it  emerged   through   dialogue   of   european   and   indigenous   culture.   central   to   this   studies  on  national  movements,  2  (2014)        |        state  of  nationalism   eric  taylor  woods   13   argument  is  the  view  that  there  existed  a  dichotomy  between  the  material   and   spiritual   realms,   and   while   the   material   realm   was   dominated   by   colonial  powers,  the  spiritual  realm  was  relatively  autonomous,  enabling   intellectuals  to  construct  the  cultural   foundation  for  the  emergence  of  a   national  movement.       delanty,   g.,   hutchinson,   j.,   kaufmann   e.a.,   ‘debate   on   john   hutchinson's   nations   as   zones   of   conflict’,   in:   nations   and   nationalism,  14/1  (2008)  1-­‐28.   a  debate  over  the  significance  of  john  hutchinson’s  book,  nations  as  zones   of   conflict   (2005).   notable   for   bringing   to   light   key   aspects   of   recent   debates  in  the  study  of  nationalism.       doremus,  a.,   ‘indigenism,  mestizaje,  and  national  identity  in  mexico   during   the   1940s   and   the   1950s’,   in:   mexican   studies,   17/2   (2001)   375-­‐402.   this   article   discusses   the   role   of   indigenism   and   mestizaje   in   struggles   over  national  identity  in  mid-­‐twentieth-­‐century  mexico.       edensor,   t.,   national   identity,   popular   culture   and   everyday   life   (oxford  -­‐  new  york,  2002).     in  this  book,  edensor  suggests  that  national  identity  should  be  studied  at   the   level   of   the   demotic   and   the   popular,   and   that   the   impact   of   globalisation   needs   further   analysis.   through   an   analysis   of   the   significance   of   national   identity   in   geography,   performance,   material   culture  and  film,  edensor  suggests  that  it  remains  a  potent  force,  even  if   the  routes  by  which  it  is  instantiated  are  undergoing  rapid  change.       studies  on  national  movements,  2  (2014)        |        state  of  nationalism   eric  taylor  woods  14   eley,   g.   &   suny,   r.g.   (eds.),   becoming   national:   a   reader   (oxford,   1996).   this  book  contains  an  excellent  collection  of  readings  that  highlights  the   role   of   culture   in   the   construction   and   contestation   of   nations,   nationalisms  and  national  identities  across  a  wide  variety  of  temporal  and   geographical   settings.   the   book   emphasises   the   possibilities   offered   by   bringing  scholars  associated  with  cultural  studies  into  closer  contact  with   nationalism  studies.       featherstone,  m.  (ed.),  global  culture:  nationalism,  globalization  and   modernity  (london,  1990).   in   this   book,   several   leading   social   scientists   explore   the   meaning   and   significance  of  the  most  recent  phase  of  the  globalisation  of  culture  and   analyse   its   impact   on   the   cultures   and   ideologies   associated   with   the   nation-­‐state.       fishman,   j.,   language   and   nationalism:   two   integrative   essays   (rowley,  ma,  1973).   this  book  traces  the  history  of  nationalism  and  examines  how  and  why   language  commonly  comes  to  be  one  of  the  key  aspects  of  nationalist  goals   and  programmes.       gans,   c.,   ‘the   liberal   foundations   of   cultural   nationalism’,   in:   canadian  journal  of  philosophy,  30/3  (2000)  441-­‐466.   this  article  examines  the  ethics  of  cultural  nationalism  and  concludes  with   the  suggestion  that  the  basic  tenets  of  cultural  nationalism  are  defensible   from  a  liberal  perspective  if  ‘the  people’  are  understood  to  derive  meaning   from  the  cultures  in  which  they  live.         studies  on  national  movements,  2  (2014)        |        state  of  nationalism   eric  taylor  woods   15   giddens,  a.,  the  consequences  of  modernity  (cambridge,  1991).   this   major   book   collects   giddens’s   writings   on   the   consequences   of   institutional   changes   associated   with   modernity,   focusing   on   the   intersections  of   trust  and  risk,  and  security  and  danger.  turning   to   the   present  era,  the  book  argues  that  we  do  not  yet  live  in  a  postmodern  age,   but  rather  in  an  age  of  high  modernity,  in  which  prior  trends  have  been   made  more  extreme.     gilroy,  p.,  ‘there  ain't  no  black  in  the  union  jack.’  the  cultural  politics   of  race  and  nation  (london,  1987).   this  classic  book  is  a  powerful  critique  of  contemporary  attitudes  to  race   in  the  uk.  gilroy  explores  the  relationships  among  race,  class,  and  nation   as   they   have   evolved   over   the   past   twenty   years,   and   highlights   racist   attitudes  that  transcend  the  left-­‐right  political  divide.  the  book  challenges   current  sociological  approaches  to  racism  as  well  as  the  ethnocentric  bias   of  british  cultural  studies.       guo,   y.,   cultural   nationalism   in   contemporary   china:   the   search   for   national  identity  under  reform  (london,  2004).   this   book   applies   the   concept   of   cultural   nationalism,   as   conceived   by   anthony  smith  and  john  hutchinson,  to  china.  guo  uncovers  the  rise  of  a   new   cultural   nationalism   which   often   finds   itself   in   opposition   to   the   official  nationalism  of  the  state.  according  to  guo,  key  elements  of  this  new   nationalism  include:  the  rehabilitation  of  zeng  guofan  of  the  qing  dynasty,   the   revival   of   confucianism,   the   renewed   emphasis   on   the   cultural   attributes  of  language  and  the  adoption  of  a  post-­‐colonial  posture  derived   from  said.           studies  on  national  movements,  2  (2014)        |        state  of  nationalism   eric  taylor  woods  16   hall,  s.,  ‘culture,  community,  nation’,  in:  cultural  studies,  7/3  (1993)   349-­‐363.   in  this  much-­‐cited  article,  which  shows  how  stuart  hall’s  vision  of  cultural   studies  differs   from  that  of  raymond  williams,  hall   theorises  about   the   ongoing   national   revival   in   the   west.   the   article   concludes   with   a   celebration  of  the  hybridity  represented  by  migrant  communities.             harris,  r.,  ‘the  “child  of  the  barbarian”:  rape,  race  and  nationalism  in   france  during  the  first  world  war’,  in:  past  and  present,  141  (1993)   170-­‐206.   this   article   discusses   how   reports   of   the   rape   of   french   women   by   german  soldiers  triggered  a  debate  over  the  potential  birth  of   ‘mongrel’   children,   and   the   ostensible   threat   that   they   could   pose   for   the   french   nation.       higson,  a.,   ‘the  concept  of  national  cinema’,  in:  screen,  30/4  (1989)   36-­‐47.   in   this   highly   cited   essay,   andrew   higson   raises   doubts   about   the   possibility  of  a  ‘national’  cinema,  observing  that  the  production  teams  and   the  audiences  of  even  the  seemingly  most  nationalist  of  films  are  usually   transnational.     hroch,   m.,   social   preconditions   of   national   revival   in   europe:   a   comparative   analysis   of   the   social   composition   of   patriotic   groups   among  the  smaller  european  nations  (new  york,  2000  [1985]).   this  important  book  seeks  to  elucidate  how  the  national  mass  movements   occur   among   the   members   of   non-­‐dominant   ethnic   groups   through   comparative   analysis   of   these   movements   in   europe.   the   book   is   well-­‐ known  for  presentation  of  a  three-­‐phase  processual  model  that  comprises   a)  a  growing  concern  with  the  culture  and  history  of   the  nation  among   intellectuals;   b)   the   formation   of   political   movement   that   attempts   to   studies  on  national  movements,  2  (2014)        |        state  of  nationalism   eric  taylor  woods   17   foment  a  national  consciousness  among  the  masses,  and  c)  the  emergence   of  a  mass  movement.     hutchinson,  j.,  the  dynamics  of  cultural  nationalism:  the  gaelic  revival   and  the  creation  of  the  irish  nation-­‐state  (london,  1987).   this  seminal  book  in  the  study  of  cultural  nationalism  is  based  on  the  case   of   ireland   and   draws   on   anthony   smith’s   approach   to   nationalism.   cultural  nationalism  is  defined  as  a  recurring  ideological  movement  that   arises  in  response  to  the  erosion  of  traditional  identities  and  status  orders   as  a  result  of  a  modernising  state.  its  key  actors  are  scholars  and  artists,   whose   activities   focus   on   the   regeneration   of   the   national   community   through  the  cultivation  of  a  unique  national  history  and  culture.  the  book   provides   a   processual   model   of   the   political   factors   leading   to   the   emergence   of   cultural   nationalism,   its   translation   into   an   ideological   movement   and   its   institutionalisation.   in   the   final   chapter,   the   book   discusses  the  conditions  under  which  cultural  nationalism  can  re-­‐emerge   after  the  formation  of  an  independent  state.     hutchinson,   j.,   ‘cultural   nationalism,   elite   mobility   and   nation-­‐ building:   communitarian   politics   in   modern   ireland’,   in:   british   journal  of  sociology,  38/3  (1987)  482-­‐501.   a   summary   of   the   argument   found   in   hutchinson’s   first   book,   the   dynamics  of  cultural  nationalism  (1987).     hutchinson,  j.,  modern  nationalism  (london,  1994).   this  book  builds  on  hutchinson’s  earlier  work  on  cultural  nationalism  in   ireland  (hutchinson,  1987).  focusing  on  its  cultural  dimension,  the  book   examines  nationalism’s  endurance  in  relation  to  religious  fundamentalism,   soviet  communism,  the  european  union,  and  the  multicultural  model.  the   book  concludes  that  nationalism  will  survive  into  the  foreseeable  future.   although   more   ambitious   than   hutchinson’s   first   book,   it   is   less   studies  on  national  movements,  2  (2014)        |        state  of  nationalism   eric  taylor  woods  18   theoretically   rigorous   and   more   closely   aligned   with   anthony   smith’s   work.  much  is  made  of  the  pre-­‐modern  ethnic  antecedents  of  nationalism   and  the  political  and  civic  aspects  of  nationalism  are  downplayed.       hutchinson,   j.,   ‘re-­‐interpreting   cultural   nationalism’,  in:   australian   journal  of  politics  and  history,  45/3  (1999)  392-­‐409.   this   article   reviews   several   leading   approaches   to   cultural   nationalism   and  outlines  an  approach  that  is  further  fleshed  out  in  hutchinson’s  later   work   on   the   integrative   role   of   internal   cultural   conflicts   over   the   definition  and  character  of  the  nation.     hutchinson,  j.,  nations  as  zones  of  conflict  (london,  2005).   criticising  a  tendency  in  the  study  of  nationalism  to  treat  the  nation  as  a   relatively  homogeneous  collectivity,  this  book  discusses  the  significance  of   long-­‐running  cultural  conflicts  over  the  myths  and  symbols  of  the  nation.   it   argues   to   the   contrary   of   post-­‐modernists   that   these   long-­‐running   disputes  actually  contribute   to   the  nation’s  endurance.  to  conclude,   the   book  suggests  that  nationalism  will  survive  until   the   foreseeable   future.   for  a  debate  on  the  book,  see  delanty  e.a.  2008.       hutchinson,  j.,   ‘cultural  nationalism’,  in:  j.  breuilly  (ed.),  the  oxford   handbook  of  the  history  of  nationalism  (oxford,  2013)  75-­‐96.   an  excellent  summary  of   john  hutchinson’s  earlier  work  on  the  history   and  sociology  of  cultural  nationalism.  a  significant  addition  is  his  rejection   of   an   earlier   claim   that   cultural   and   political   nationalists   can   be   distinguished  by  competing  organic  and  voluntarist  visions  of  the  nation,   arguing  that  in  practice  these  visions  are  usually  blended,  and  that  a  better   way   of   distinguishing   the   two   types   of   nationalism   is   whether   primary   concern   is   with   the   establishment   of   a   strong   community   or   a   strong   territorial  state,  as  the  basis  of  the  nation.       studies  on  national  movements,  2  (2014)        |        state  of  nationalism   eric  taylor  woods   19   jusdanis,   g.,   ‘beyond   national   culture?’,  in:   boundary   2:   an   international  journal  of  literature  and  culture,  22/1  (1995)  23-­‐60.   in  this  essay,  jusdanis  argues  for  the  constitutive  role  played  by  cultural   nationalism  in  the  development  of  the  nation-­‐state  and  considers  its  fate   in  relation  to  the   intensification  of  globalisation.  the  article  contains  an   excellent  discussion  of  the  meanings  of  cultural  nationalism  and  national   culture  in  relation  to  leading  theorists  of  culture.       jusdanis,  g.,  the  necessary  nation  (princeton,  n.j.,  2001).   in   this   book,   jusdanis   argues   that   nationalism   is   at   its   heart   a   cultural   phenomenon,  and  that  it  should  be  seen  as  playing  a  constitutive  role  in   the  development  of  the  nation-­‐state.  pitting  his  arguments  against  those   who   see   nationalism   as   a   baleful   influence   on   human   society,   jusdanis   suggests  that  the  history  of  nationalism  reveals  that,  much  as  it  is  guilty  of   fostering   inter-­‐group   conflict,   it   has   also   been   a   progressive   force   for   emancipation,  as  well  as  providing  emotional  and  psychological  succour  in   in  the  face  of  perennial  social  change.  to  conclude,  jusdanis  puts  forward   federalism  as  a  way  of  mitigating  nationalism’s  centrifugal  tendencies.       kandiyoti,  d.,  ‘identity  and  its  discontents:  women  and  the  nation’,  in:   millennium:  journal  of  international  studies,  20/3  (2004)  126-­‐149.   in  this  article,  kandiyoti  explores  the  implications  of  nationalist  projects  in   the  middle-­‐eastern  and  asian  post-­‐colonial  societies,  focusing  on  changing   portrayals  of  women  as  victims  of  social  backwardness,  icons  of  modernity   or  bearers  of  cultural  authenticity.  the  article  further  examines  the  extent   to   which   elements   of   national   identity   and   cultural   difference   are   articulated  as  forms  of  control  that  infringe  upon  the  rights  of  women  as   enfranchised  citizens.         studies  on  national  movements,  2  (2014)        |        state  of  nationalism   eric  taylor  woods  20   kohn,   h.,   the   idea   of   nationalism:   a   study   in   its   origins   and   background,  5th  ed.  (new  york,  1960  [1944]).   this  book  is  a  founding  text  on  nationalism  in  the  english  language.  the   tendency   in   the  scholarly   literature   to  distinguish  between   ‘western’  or   political   forms   of   nationalism   and   ‘eastern’   or   cultural   forms   of   nationalism,   and   to   view   the   former   as   the   more   benign   of   the   two,   is   largely   attributed   to   this   book.   through   an   examination   of   religious,   literary  and  philosophical  texts,  this  magisterial  book  traces  the  roots  of   nationalism  as  a  ‘state  of  mind’,  from  its  precursors  in  ancient  greek  and   jewish  civilizations  to  the  french  revolution.  key  themes  are  the  influence   of  religious  ideas,  the  interplay  of  nationalism  and  universalism  and  the   differences   between   the   nationalisms   of   western   europe   and   those   of   central  and  eastern  europe.       kohn,  h.,  prelude  to  nation-­‐states:  the  french  and  german  experience,   1789-­‐1815  (princeton,  n.j.,  1967).   this  book  is  a  highly  cited  comparison  of  the  formation  of  the  french  and   german   nation-­‐states.   it   presents   the   argument   that   the   french   experience,  which  proceeded  from  state  to  nation,  was  characterised  by  an   enlightenment-­‐inflected   political   nationalism,   whereas   the   german   experience,  which  proceeded  in  the  reverse,  was  characterised  by  a  more   reactionary  cultural  nationalism.       kopf,  d.,  british  orientalism  and  the  bengal  renaissance:  the  dynamics   of  indian  modernization  1773-­‐1835  (berkeley,  ca,  1969).   through   an   analysis   of   the   practices   of   the   college   of   fort   william   in   bengal,   which   was   established   in   1800   as   a   school   for   training   civil   servants   for   the   east   india   company,   this   book   shows   how   the   college   became  a  key  site   for   the   formation  and  dissemination  of   the   idea   that   india  could  be  modernised  through  the  regeneration  of  indian  heritage.       studies  on  national  movements,  2  (2014)        |        state  of  nationalism   eric  taylor  woods   21   leerssen,   j.,  national   thought   in   europe:   a   cultural   history   (amsterdam,  2006).   this  book  traces  the  history  of  the  cultural  and  intellectual  underpinnings   of   nationalism   in   europe   through   a   wide   variety   of   sources,   including   philosophical   writings,   literature,   architecture,   art,   dramaturgy   and   monuments.   the   book   treats   cultural   nationalism   as   a   transnational   phenomenon  that  arises  with  the  growth  of  the  public  sphere  and  whose   agents  tend  to  be  intellectuals  and  artists  who  meet  and  share  ideas  and   practices  in  urban  centres.  the  book  takes  a  critical  view  of  nationalism   and  concludes  with  support   for  habermas’s  argument   for  constitutional   patriotism.     leerssen,   j.,   ‘nationalism  and  the  cultivation  of  culture’,   in:  nations   and  nationalism,  12/4  (2006)  559-­‐578.   this   article   sets   out   leerssen’s   approach   to   the   study   of   cultural   nationalism   in   europe.   the   article   finds   that   the   study   of   cultural   nationalism   has   been   too   narrowly   focused   on   trying   to   explain   how   cultural   nationalism   becomes   institutionalised   in   particular   states,   and   argues   that   the   process   whereby   the   ideas   and   practices   of   cultural   nationalists   are   disseminated   through   transnational   networks   has   been   overlooked.  the  key  activity  of  the  cultural  nationalists  is  argued  to  be  the   cultivation   of   culture.   to   explain   the   concept,   the   article   provides   an   interesting   definition   of   culture   and   outlines   a   typology   of   the   various   activities  associated  with  its  cultivation.       leerssen,  j.,  when  was  romantic  nationalism?  the  onset,  the  long  tail,   the  banal  (antwerp,  2014).   a   concise,   well-­‐presented   history   of   romantic   nationalism   in   europe,   which  suggests  that  it  is  characterised  by  three  distinct  phases:  1)  rapid   onset  in  the  nineteenth  century,  2)  gradual  decline  in  the  first  half  of  the   twentieth  century,  3)  ongoing  banal  presence  in  the  present.       studies  on  national  movements,  2  (2014)        |        state  of  nationalism   eric  taylor  woods  22   levenson,  j.,  l’iang  ch’i  ch’ao  and  the  mind  of  modern  china  (berkeley,   ca,  1959).   this  book   is  a  classic   study  of  a   seminal   thinker  of   the  chinese  reform   movement,   who   first   seeks   to   reconstruct   confucianism   before   abandoning  it.     mosse,  g.,  nationalism  and  sexuality:  middle-­‐class  morality  and  sexual   norms  in  modern  europe  (madison,  1985).   this  book  explores  how  nationalism  became  gendered  through  a  history   of   its   rise   in   central   europe,   where   it   became   aligned   with   bourgeois   notions  of  heterosexual  morality,  and  eventually  led  to  nazism’s  obsession   with   particular   notions   of   masculinity.   mosse   observes   that   german   nationalists  tended  to  differentiate  their  community  by  reference  to  their   ostensible  masculine  disciplined  morality,  as  opposed  to  the  loose-­‐living,   sexually  degenerate  french.       nielsen,   k.,   'cultural   nationalism,   neither   ethnic   nor   civic’,   in:   the   philosophical  forum,  28/4  (1996)  2-­‐51.   this  article  suggests  that  all  nationalisms,  whether  civic  or  ethnic,  are  at   their  core  cultural,  whether  framed  as  ‘civic’  or  ‘ethnic’,  and  argues  for  a   liberal  form  of  nationalism.       nipperdey,  t.,  germany  from  napoleon  to  bismarck:  1800-­‐1866,  trans.   d.  nolan  (princeton,  n.j,  2014).   this  book,  originally  published  in  german  in  1996,   traces  the  origins  of   german  nationalism.  with  respect  to  cultural  nationalism,  there  is  much  in   here  on  the  declining  role  of  christianity  and  the  making  of  a  culturally   protestant  nationalism,  amid  the  rise  of  a  new  national  aesthetic  culture.       studies  on  national  movements,  2  (2014)        |        state  of  nationalism   eric  taylor  woods   23   peel,   j.,   religious   encounter   and   the   making   of   the   yoruba   (bloomington,  in,  1989).   in   this   book,   john   peel   focuses   on   the   impact   of   nineteenth-­‐century   christian  missionaries  and  finds  that  a  modern  yoruban  identity  emerged   out  of  a  dialogue  of  western  and  indigenous  ideas  and  practices.     proudfoot,   l.j.   &   roche,   m.m.,   (dis)placing   empire.   renegotiating   british  colonial  geographies  (london,  2010).   the   contributors   to   this   volume   discuss   how   space   and   place   were   implicated   in   the   construction   of   identity   for   settlers   and   indigenous   peoples  in  under  british  rule.       smith,  a.d.,  theories  of  nationalism  (london,  1971).   in   this   seminal   text   in   the   study   of   nationalism,   smith   evaluates   key   approaches  to  the  study  of  nationalism.  the  book’s  characterisation  of  the   field  of  study  continues  to   inform  much  of  the   literature.  the  book  also   provides   the  germ  of   the  approach   that  would  eventually  coalesce  over   subsequent   publications   as   smith’s   distinctive   contribution   known   as   ethno-­‐symbolism.  the  chapter  on  nationalism’s  response  to  the  crisis  of   dual-­‐legitimation  is  particularly  notable.     smith,  a.d.,  the  ethnic  origins  of  nations  (oxford,  1998  [1986]).   this  is  a  key  text  in  the  study  of  nations  and  nationalism,  which  challenges   the   view   that   nations   are   wholly   modern   by   tracing   their   pre-­‐modern   ethnic   origins.   smith   argues   that   their   shape   and   character   of   modern   nations   tend   to  be   in  part  derived   from  the  cultural  attributes  of  older   ethnic  groups  (referred  to  as  ethnies),  whose  dense  collection  of  myths,   symbols,   memories   and   values   provide   nations   with   their   emotional   content   and   stability.   the   book   emphasises   the   cultural   dimension   of   nationalism,  suggesting  that  it  provides  modern  communities  with  a  sense   of  rootedness  in  time  and  place  and  a  vision  of  its  future.   studies  on  national  movements,  2  (2014)        |        state  of  nationalism   eric  taylor  woods  24   smith,  a.d.,   ‘gastronomy  or  geology?  the  role  of  nationalism  in  the   reconstruction  of  nations’,  in:  nations  and  nationalism,  1/1  (1995)  3-­‐ 23.   in  this  article,  smith  sets  out  his  approach  to  nations  as  a  middle  ground  to   those  who  emphasise  its  novelty  and  mutability  and  those  who  emphasise   its  durability  and  rigidity.  stressing  the  role  of  nationalists  in  the  realm  of   culture  over  politics,  smith  argues   that   rather   than   ‘inventing’   the  past,   they  are   involved  in  a  process  of  rediscovery,  reinterpretation  and  seek   the  regeneration  of  their  communities.     smith,  a.d.,  the  nation  made  real:  art  and  national  identity  in  western   europe,  1600-­‐1850  (oxford,  2013).   in  this  book,  smith  looks  at  the  role  of  visual  art  in  representing  the  nation   and   fomenting  national   sentiment   in  western  europe,   from  1600-­‐1850.   smith   suggests   that   there   are   three   kinds   of   national   art,   i.e.   didactic,   evocative  and  commemorative.  the  artists  themselves  play  an  ambiguous   role  in  the  book:  some  are  committed  nationalists,  others  are  not.     sommer,   d.,   foundational   fictions:   the   national   romances   of   latin   america  (berkeley,  ca,  1991).   a  fascinating  discussion  of  the  important  role  played  by  romantic  novels  in   the   consolidation   of   latin   american   nation-­‐states.   the   book’s   approach   could  be  fruitfully  applied  to  other  contexts.     surak,  k.,  making  tea,  making  japan:  cultural  nationalism  in  practice   (stanford,  2012).   this   book   puts   forward   a   novel   approach   to   the   study   of   cultural   nationalism   through  an  analysis  of   the   tea  ceremony   in   japan,   showing   how  the  cultural  nationalism  of   the   intellectuals  and  the  meanings   they   attach  to  certain  practices  is  imparted  through  the  teaching  and  enactment   of  ritual  practices.   studies  on  national  movements,  2  (2014)        |        state  of  nationalism   eric  taylor  woods   25   surak,   k.,   ‘nation-­‐work:   a   praxeology   of   making   and   maintaining   nations’,  in:  european  journal  of  sociology,  53/2  (2012)  171-­‐204.   a  summary  of  surak’s  book  making  tea,  making  japan:  cultural  nationalism   in  practice  (2012).     thiesse,  a.-­‐m.,  la  création  des  identités  nationales.  europe  xviiie-­‐xxe   siècle  (paris,  2001).   in   this   book,   anne-­‐marie   thiesse   traces   the   construction   of   national   identity   in   europe   from   a   transnational   perspective,   focusing   on   the   cultural   work   of   artists   and   intellectuals.   the   book   concludes   on   an   optimistic  note,  suggesting  that  if  national  identity  was  constructed,  so  too   can  european  identity  be  constructed.     timmerman,   c.,   ‘muslim   women   and   nationalism:   the   power   of   the   image’,  in:  current  sociology,  48/4  (2000)  15-­‐27.   this  article  explores  the  symbolic  role  of  women  in  nationalist  discourses   in  muslim  countries.  it  concludes  with  a  discussion  of  the  possibilities  for   women  to  improve  their  status  within  this  framework.       yoshino,   k.,   cultural   nationalism   in   contemporary   japan:   a   sociological  enquiry  (london,  1992).   in  this  book,  kazuke  yoshino  applies  the  approach  to  cultural  nationalism   put  forward  by  john  hutchinson  and  anthony  smith  to  investigate  how  the   ideas   of   the   nihonjinron   (discussions   of   japanese   identity)   are   diffused   among  the  wider  japanese  population.  making  use  of  smith’s  distinction   between  intellectuals  (who  formulate  the  ideas  and  images  of  the  nation)   and   intelligentsia  (who  respond  to   those   ideas  and  relate   them  to   their   own  social  context),  yoshino  investigates  how  the  nihonjinron  was  taken   up  by  two  separate  groups  of  ‘intelligentsia’  –  business  men  and  educators   and  finds  that  it  has  had  greater  impact  on  the  former.     studies  on  national  movements,  2  (2014)        |        state  of  nationalism   eric  taylor  woods  26   yuval-­‐davis,  n.,  gender  and  nation  (london,  1997).   this   landmark   book   examines   key   issues   relating   to   gender   and   nationalism.   topics   include   biological   and   cultural   reproduction   of   the   nation,   citizenship,   militarism   and   warfare   and   ethnicity.   the   book   is   notable   for   applying   a   differentiated   perspective   of   women   and   the   various  symbolic  roles  that  they  play  in  various  nationalist  projects.  the   concluding   chapter   discusses   strategies   for   how   women   could   work   together  in  a  struggle  for  equality,  calling  for  a  transversal  strategy  that   highlights  dialogue  among  women  from  different  social  positions.     zimmer,  o.,  ‘boundary  mechanisms  and  symbolic  resources:  towards   a   process-­‐oriented   approach   to   national   identity’,   in:   nations   and   nationalism,  9/2  (2003)  173-­‐193.   this  article  argues  that  the  classical  distinction  between  civic  and  ethnic   forms   of   national   identity   should   be   replaced   by   approach   that   distinguishes   between,   on   the   one   hand,   the   mechanisms   which   social   actors   use   as   they   reconstruct   the   boundaries   of   national   identity   at   a   particular  point   in   time;  and,  on   the  other,   the  symbolic   resources  upon   which  they  draw  when  they  reconstruct  these  boundaries.       this  review  and  annotated  bibliography  is  part  of   the  state  of  nationalism  (son),  a  comprehensive  guide   to  the  study  of  nationalism.   as  such  it  is  also  published  on  the  son  website,   where  it  will  be  regularly  updated.   son  is  jointly  supported  by  two  institutes:   nise  and  the  university  of  east  london  (uel).   dr.  eric  taylor  woods,  author  of  the  first  contribution,   is  responsible  for  overall  management  and  editor-­‐in-­‐chief.   http://stateofnationalism.eu   timothy berk, ‘state of nationalism (son): ethics of nationalism’, in: studies of national movements 9 (2022). state of nationalism (son): ethics of nationalism timothy berk university of toronto is nationalism morally defensible, or is it a destructive holdover from our primitive past? are certain forms of nationalism normatively preferable to others? to what extent are liberals ethically entitled to accommodate the demands and concerns of nationalists? do the claims of nationality entail a right to independence or autonomy? can the ‘politics of cultural survival’ justify the state’s protection and promotion of particular national identities? this article will provide an overview of how thinkers have dealt with such problems in the different eras of the study of nationalism. nationalism in the history of political thought compared to other modern political ideologies, such as liberalism or socialism, nationalism has a dearth of canonical works. as yack observes, theoretical works on nationalism have historically consisted of major texts by second rate thinkers, or minor texts by first rate thinkers.1 nonetheless, the most significant texts on nationalism produced in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries continue to shape the contours of many contemporary strands of nationalist thought. nationalism makes its first significant appearance in the history of political thought within the republican tradition. while machiavelli studies on national movements 9 (2022) | state of nationalism timothy berk 125 | (1469-1527) gestures towards nationalism in his call for italian unity in the closing chapter of the prince, it is rousseau (1712-1788) who makes a sustained engagement with the potential of nationalism for republican politics.2 rousseau insists that while the enlightenment’s cosmopolitan ideal of universal benevolence is indeed an admirable disposition, it is achievable perhaps by ‘a few great cosmopolitan souls’.3 sympathy or compassion, rousseau argues, diminishes the further it is extended away from the individual; a steadier political order can be built by channeling the feelings of self-interest and pre-political feelings of kinship than upon abstract obligations to humanity. rousseau thus turns towards nationalism, which, insofar as it promotes patriotism, emerges as a useful tool for binding citizens to republics. nationalism ties the citizen’s self-interest and vanity (amour-propre) to the health and prestige of the community – the citizen takes pride both in his nation’s standing in the international sphere and his own standing as a patriot within the community. rousseau adds that nationalism’s fostering of a strong collective identity contributes towards the struggles of smaller nations such as poland against foreign conquest and imperial domination. it is important to note that for both rousseau and machiavelli, the political community does not exist to further the cause of nationalism, but rather the reverse. the normative weight attributed to nationalism begins to shift as we turn to another eighteenth-century critique of the enlightenment, herder (1744-1803). herder makes a pluralistic argument in favour of nationalism that would influence twentieth-century thinkers such as isaiah berlin and charles taylor. herder argues that a people’s language opens up the world to them in a particular way – as such, different nations have their own particular ways of being that develop throughout the course of their respective histories. each nation, therefore, has its own genius and its own form of happiness that it should be free to express and pursue. while herder is critical of the cosmopolitan impulse studies on national movements 9 (2022) | state of nationalism | 126 timothy berk towards the dissolution of national differences, he nonetheless understands the plurality of nations as participating within a universal humanity, the design of which is known only to god. with herder, nationalism is therefore no longer simply a means towards promoting patriotism and republican virtue, but a shard of an infinitely diverse divine mosaic, which celebrates the particular without losing sight of the universal.4 herder’s romantic (or proto-romantic) nationalism would be taken up and radicalised by fichte (1762-1814). fichte’s influential writings on nationalism, the addresses to the german nation, were originally delivered with the intention of galvanising resistance to the napoleonic occupation of the german states.5 he attempted to forge a common german identity among its disparate cities and principalities that could form a united front against napoleonic france’s imperial ambitions. while fichte intended german national consciousness to be in the service of national liberty, the work remains controversial for its indulgence in german chauvinism. while fichte understands language to be the defining marker of the german nation, he insists that german is the only living language in europe (as opposed to the dead and derivative latin languages), and attributes a unique metaphysical destiny to the german nation as the saviour of european civilisation and heralds of a new age. the subsequent development of militant right-wing nationalism in prussia and germany would, whether fairly or not, cast a long shadow over the reception of fichte’s political thought, and nationalist thought more generally. renan (1823-1892) would reject the german tradition of identifying the nation with pre-political attributes such as language (or ethnicity) and instead inspire future civic nationalists by famously characterising the nation as a daily plebiscite.6 studies on national movements 9 (2022) | state of nationalism timothy berk 127 | mid-twentieth-century thought: the end of nationalism? by the post-war period nationalism was widely understood as having fulfilled its transitory role in the development of the modern nation state and dissolution of empires, but had outlived its purpose with devastating effects and therefore could no longer be ethically justified. the tendency is best exemplified by kohn, whose influential work anticipates the civil/ethnic nationalism binary, and foresees the end of nationalism. kohn distinguishes between western (french, british, american) and eastern (german, italian, slavic) nationalism. he writes that the former was grounded on ‘a rational and universal concept of political liberty and the rights of man, looking toward the city of the future’, while the latter is based on an irrational, mystical ‘volksgeist and its manifestations in literature and folklore, in the mother tongue, and in history’, rooted in the past and committed to the ‘diversity and selfsufficiency of nations’.7 kohn argues that nationalism is dangerous because it sets up a fraction of humanity as a whole, challenging the universalism at the heart of western civilisation. while nationalism may have initially dignified the masses and secured individual liberty and happiness, ‘now it undermines them and subjects them to the exigencies of its continued existence, which seems no longer justified. once it was a great force of life, spurring on the evolution of mankind; now it may become a dead weight upon the march of humanity’.8. in particular, fascism pushed the idea of nationalism to its limits, revealing an ethical imperative for humanity to depoliticise nationality and organise itself on a supranational basis.9 berlin, however, was more sceptical of the supposedly inevitable eclipse of nationalism. he criticised the naivete of intellectuals who had predicted that moral and technological progress would inevitably erase national borders, while morality would increasingly come to be founded upon universal rational principles. influenced by herder, berlin was studies on national movements 9 (2022) | state of nationalism | 128 timothy berk committed to a philosophical pluralism; he thought there was no one correct way of understanding the world or of finding happiness within it. he also agreed that our need to belong to a community or collective unit is a ‘basic human need or desire’, which he thought was best served by nationalism in modern mass democracies. hence, berlin could follow herder in envisioning a nationalism that embodied and respected cultural pluralism as something to be valued. nonetheless, berlin was also keenly aware of the dangers of nationalism. populist politicians, for example, often exploit or foster national grievances to serve their own ends. in such cases, the ‘bent twig’ of a pluralistic nationalism all too easily snaps. these dangers do not mean, however, that nationalism can be abandoned. berlin maintains that any political movement will be unlikely to succeed in the twentieth century if it does not ally itself to nationalist sentiment, and that we must pay much greater attention to nationalism, so as to avoid the fate of those who ‘failed to foresee’ the development of nationalism and ‘paid for it with their liberty, indeed with their lives’.10 liberal nationalism, civic nationalism, and their critics the late twentieth century saw a new wave of political theorists take up the topic of nationalism. this uptick was related to two major trends, both of which put doubt to the idea that nationalism was simply a passing phase on the road to cosmopolitanism: [i] the development of communitarian political philosophy in the 1980s and 90s, which understands individuals as members of a particular political community, whose ability to live a meaningful ethical life is dependent on their being situated within the context of a particular language and culture;11 studies on national movements 9 (2022) | state of nationalism timothy berk 129 | [ii] the rise of nationalist movements in communist and postcommunist countries, as well as national separatist movements in quebec and western europe. spurred by these two developments liberal nationalists sought to limit the dangers of the re-emergent nationalism through appeals to liberal norms and values, while also using communitarian and nationalist insights to enrich liberal thought.12 rejecting the liberal and cosmopolitan claims that nationalism is an inherently irrational force, they argue that nationality should be granted normative weight in the way we think about a wide range of political issues, including (but not limited to) the legitimate boundaries of political communities, the right to national self-determination, cultural preservation and promotion, citizenship, the rights of cultural minorities, and the scope of duties to those outside one’s own borders. they attempted to bridge the apparent divide between liberalism and nationalism by acknowledging the importance of ‘belonging, membership, and cultural affiliations, as well as the particular moral commitments that follow from them’ on the one hand, and ‘the value of personal autonomy and individual rights and freedoms’ as well as ‘a commitment for social justice both between and within nations’ on the other.13 tamir, for example, defines a liberal national entity as one that endorses liberal principles of distribution (of goods and public offices) and individual rights both within the community and between other nations, with a public space reflective of the national culture and its overlapping consensus of values (while still granting individuals a choice between cultures available within the state). in opposition, civic nationalists attempted to conceptualise a form of nationalism dependent upon political (rather than cultural) commitment towards the nation’s (liberal) institutions and principles. 14 habermas argues against communitarian theories of citizenship that claim that meaningful, active citizenship requires a strong national studies on national movements 9 (2022) | state of nationalism | 130 timothy berk identity informed by ethnic or cultural ties, confined within national borders. while the nation originally referred to a pre-political entity defined by ethnicity and culture, it has since been transformed to refer to a political nation of citizens ‘who actively exercise their civil rights’ in common.15 habermas therefore argues that political culture must be the basis of what he calls ‘constitutional patriotism’, which replaces cultural/ethnic identity as the source civic identification. liberal nationalists in canada expressed scepticism towards civic nationalist claims.16 anticipating canovan and yack’s critique that the civic nation is an ethnocentric myth obscuring the ethnic bases that continue to inform ‘western’ or ‘civic’ nationalism, these thinkers claimed that even supposedly liberal political institutions inevitably betray certain ethnic/cultural origins, whether through the adoption of official languages or historically and culturally conditioned conceptions of justice or the good.17 for liberal nationalists, this meant recognising, accepting, and accommodating the fact that elements of cultural or ethnic nationalism cannot be overcome through appeals to a purely civic nationalism or constitutional patriotism. they therefore advocated making peace with the nationalist bases of liberal states through various means, such as increased accommodation and state support of the national culture and political rights of ‘minority nations’, such as quebec, in the interest of both liberal conceptions of fairness and equality between individuals and groups, and communitarian understandings of the importance of the recognition, and even preservation, of collective identities to a member’s freedom and well-being. these strategies will be discussed further in the following section. critics of both civic and liberal nationalism, on the other hand, highlighted the difficulty of preventing the bent twig of civic or liberal nationalism from reverting to liberalism or snapping in the direction of ethnic nationalism.18 in other words, many scholars of nationalism were skeptical of the possibility of creating a normatively or morally studies on national movements 9 (2022) | state of nationalism timothy berk 131 | acceptable form of nationalism in the guise of either civic or liberal nationalism. weinstock, for example, maintains that both civic and liberal nationalism contain tensions that will cause them to collapse into either ethnic nationalism or liberal cultural neutrality.19 this is because nationalists must either dissociate a community’s values from their roots in a shared history and tradition, or narrow or ‘ethnicise’ the conditions of immigration or membership into the nation in order to preserve a national identity. the civic nationalist solution dissolves the distinctive content that animates nationalism, while the liberal nationalist solution ultimately supports a more closed and problematic form of nationalism. frost argues that the failed attempt to bifurcate civic and ethnic nationalism, or politics and culture, had caused the liberal nationalist literature to reach an impasse.20 nationalist approaches to policy while the possibility of a ‘civic’ or ‘liberal’ nationalism plays an important role in the willingness or unwillingness of theorists to turn a sympathetic eye towards the normative claims of nationalism, we must also consider the specific political claims and controversies that animate the normative literature on nationalism. most importantly, the literature asks how much normative weight should we give to nationalist claims of a right to sub-state autonomy, secession or independence? to what extent can the claims of nationality justify state promotion of particular national identities or the restriction of multicultural policy? with regard to the first set of questions, nationalists claim that the boundaries of a state should be congruent with that of the nation.21 hence, once a population begins to conceive of or imagine themselves as a nation, demands for statehood or greater autonomy often follow. liberal nationalists are sympathetic to these claims. they claim that studies on national movements 9 (2022) | state of nationalism | 132 timothy berk nations, whether fabricated or organic, civil or ethnic, are real entities that serve as the locus of its individual’s loyalty, identity and freedom, and thus deserve or require political expression and protection. the question for nationalists is therefore not whether nationality grants a right to political representation, but rather: do the claims of nationhood demand secession and independence, or can they be satisfied by increased autonomy within a multinational state? kymlicka, for example, thinks that while national identity does supply normative grounds for independence, he shares gellner’s concern that the disparity between the number of recognised ‘nations’ and ‘states’ is ultimately so great, that the recognition of each nation’s right to national sovereignty would destabilise the world order.22 here the need for peace and stable governance limits the full right to national sovereignty, which are retained as a compromise in the form rights of greater autonomy for national minorities within a multinational state. he therefore advocates increased accommodation and state support of ‘minority nations’, such as quebec, through asymmetrical federalism. not everyone agreed with kymlicka’s compromise. walzer, for instance, thinks that concerns over destabilisation are either overwrought or insufficient to delegitimise nationalist aspirations for independence or self-governance; that ‘justice… doesn’t seem to permit the kinds of coercion necessary’ to keep unwilling national groups united within a single state’.23 walzer even goes so far as to liken liberal support for the multinational state to the defence of the old multinational empires. taylor, on the other hand, promotes an asymmetrical federalism similar to kymlicka’s, but does so out of a normative commitment to the ‘deep diversity’ embodied by multinational states.24 for taylor, national independence should only be sought for when the aspiration towards the mutual recognition of members of a multinational state becomes impossible. gans also prefers sub-state autonomy to independence, claiming nationality legitimises sub-state claims to ‘self-preservation and collective self-rule’, but not studies on national movements 9 (2022) | state of nationalism timothy berk 133 | necessarily statist claims to sovereignty over a territory.25 miller, meanwhile, is critical of multinational federalism and thinks that the necessity of a singular national identity necessitates the assimilation of national minorities, who for whatever reason are unable or unwilling to seek national independence, into a broader national identity that has been transformed so that national minorities are included.26 given the normative weight liberal nationalists attribute to the nation as a source of identity, a horizon of meaning, the context of choice that make individual freedom, a rich meaningful life, and collective solidarity possible, it is perhaps unsurprising that liberal nationalists think that national majorities and national minorities have stronger claims to the public protection or promotion of national or cultural identities than non-national minorities. hence, they are willing to put limits on state policies of multiculturalism, or the policy of state neutrality towards the diverse array of ethnic communities within a nation-state. we have already seen that authors such as taylor, kymlicka, and yack think that the possibility of state neutrality towards cultures is a myth; the state always uses (and hence promotes) the language, symbols and conceptions of justice of its majority nation, hence liberal conceptions of fairness requires that the state also promote the culture of its national minorities. while this very same promotion of cultural difference can and often does extend towards multicultural groups, liberal nationalists curtail state promotion or recognition of multicultural or ‘non-national’ identities when there is a perceived need for the cultural preservation of its national communities. miller, in particular, challenges the ethical imperatives of cosmopolitanism and multiculturalism, finding them to be in tension with the preservation of national identities. he is concerned that their ‘quest for cultural diversity may turn out to be self‐defeating, because as cultures become more accessible to outsiders they also begin to lose studies on national movements 9 (2022) | state of nationalism | 134 timothy berk their depth and their distinctive character’.27 miller laments this process of national erosion as he thinks it will mean that: [a] citizens will lose their access to a ‘rich common culture’; [b] non-elites will become increasingly vulnerable to the vagaries of the world market or economy; [c] the civil solidarity necessary for the maintenance of re-distributive social program will be undermined.28 as a result, he argues that the state is justified in discriminating in favour of a shared national culture (whether it be a language, a musical tradition, a landscape, etc.) through the allocation of funds or education in a school curriculum. nonetheless, despite a willingness to prioritise, promote, and protect national cultures and identities, liberal nationalists or communitarian political theorists still insist on the need to provide limits to the promotion of nationality – they do not believe that national majorities have an unlimited right, or can to do whatever it takes to promote or protect their nationality. as taylor insists, the politics of ‘cultural survival’ cannot breach the fundamental ‘rights and immunities’ of its citizens.29 thus taylor approves of quebec’s language and sign laws, which only infringed on the ‘privileges’ of its anglophone minority, but would not approve of the breach of the basic rights of individuals. gans (2003), meanwhile, extends the right to linguistic and cultural preservation to justify policies of ‘nationality based priorities in immigration’, such as prioritising french-speaking immigrants, but only extends this right to the extent that it serves practical rather than symbolic purposes, i.e. that it ensures critical mass for the public use of a language, rather than to project and preserve power.30 lastly, even if the nation is conceived of as ‘cultural’ or ‘historical’ rather than strictly studies on national movements 9 (2022) | state of nationalism timothy berk 135 | ‘political’ (i.e. ‘civic’ or ‘constitutional’ nationalism), the identity of the nation must not be so thick that it excludes its citizens: it must be flexible enough that all citizens have an opportunity to identify themselves with it, and it must be able to be continually interpreted anew.31 responses to the resurgence of populist nationalism the normative study of nationalism took on increasing urgency following 2016. the electoral success of brexit and trump, as well as the rise in popularity of far-right parties across europe, all contributed to the perception of nationalism as a legitimate threat or alternative to liberalism. hazony’s the virtue of nationalism represents the contemporary shift within mainstream conservatism away from neoliberalism towards a populist variety of nationalism.32 the book makes a full-fledged defence of the re-emergent nationalism, celebrating it as a noble stand against cosmopolitan imperialism, or ‘globalism’. he claims that nationalism and globalism are the fault lines of contemporary politics, and that we cannot avoid choosing between the two principles: ‘either you support, in principle, the ideal of an international government or regime that imposes its will on subject nations when its officials regard this as necessary: or you believe that nations should be free to set their own course in the absence of such an international government or regime’. 33 whereas liberalism focuses too narrowly on economics and security, nationalism recognises that nations provide citizens with an organic source of loyalty from that citizens derive duties and exercise the virtues necessary for liberty and self-determination. while tamir is less enthusiastic about the normative possibilities opened by the resurgence of nationalism, she also thinks of the new studies on national movements 9 (2022) | state of nationalism | 136 timothy berk nationalism as a rational response to excesses of globalisation. in why nationalism she argues that political preferences along the ‘globalist’nationalist divide are informed by social and economic class preferences.34 thus, far from being a return of unreason, the return of nationalism is a rational and morally legitimate desire among those dispossessed by the globalisation of the economy to seek a new social contract to answer to their needs. the task then is to ‘stop the ideological pendulum half way’ between ‘neoliberal hyperglobalism’ and ‘extreme right-wing nationalism’, by nurturing a ‘committed nationalism… of mutual responsibility that places fellow nationals at the top of one’s social priorities’ and reestablishes solidarity between class lines while respecting liberal norms.35 elsewhere, tamir admits that the resurgence of nationalism can be attributed to a backlash against multiculturalism.36 she outlines five stages of nationalism: from [1] the birth of a nation, where nation building projects are necessary, to [2] banal nationalism where the benefits of the nation building project has solidified and ‘the national cultural background turns transparent’.37 this is followed by the stages of [3] multiculturalism and [4] diversity, where the national ‘majority’ accommodate and give representation to the rights and interests of nonmajority identities, culminating in the goal of superseding the nation as such. tamir thinks we are now in a fifth stage [5], ‘post-diversity’, in which the ‘majority’ nation finds diversity threatening and the ‘balance of power tilts back from diversity to homogenization’, as members becoming anxious of losing the benefits they gained in the first and second phases of nationalism. this phase is exacerbated (but cannot be entirely explained) by economic instability and austerity, and can occur in supposedly ‘civic’ nations such as the united states and the united kingdom, which ultimately ‘carry a cultural inheritance born in the period of nation building’.38 accordingly, times of homogeneity and stability will be more comfortable with diversity than periods of studies on national movements 9 (2022) | state of nationalism timothy berk 137 | diversity and instability. tamir concludes that ‘civic’ nationalism or ‘constitutional patriotism’ cannot serve as panaceas for the dangers of nationalism because ‘they offer far too thin a basis for social and political cooperation. this is why nationalism keeps coming back, pushing civic ideals aside, and making its way to centre stage. those who know how to meet the needs it presents will be the winners of the coming decades’.39 nodia agrees that modern liberal democracies should attempt to limit rather than root out nationalist populist movements.40 he reasons that populism is endogenous rather than exogenous to democracy; we cannot get rid of nationalism or populism without getting rid of democracy itself.41 democracy refers to the latin populus or greek demos, which modern democracies understand as the nation (volk). rebellions of the people against elites, he concludes, are ‘part of the ethos of democracy’.42 nodia has no specifics on how to counter this threat, but insists that ‘if we want to preserve, develop, and advance liberal democracy, we must recognize democracy for what it is. we must stop trying to free democracy from the will of the people, and from the propensity that those same people have to care more for their homelands, traditions, and beliefs than for the homeland’s traditions, and beliefs of others. efforts to ‘liberate’ democracy from the people… will only generate more ‘populist’ reactions by even more angry majorities, leading to outcomes that none of us is going to like’.43 other thinkers hope that the most recent wave of nationalism can be kept in check by supplanting ethnic narratives of national identity with civic ones. they argue that since nationalism is not natural, but instead a specifically modern understanding of collective identity, national identity itself must be malleable. mounk and braunstein, for example, seek to counter trump’s promotion of an ethnic/white conception of american national identity with a rhetoric that reframes the nation as an inclusive community.44 fukuyama, meanwhile, recommends a return to the politics of the recognition of universal dignity, based around a studies on national movements 9 (2022) | state of nationalism | 138 timothy berk unifying identity, to stem the tide of the identity politics of ‘resentment,’ which he claims now fuels both the political right and left. fukuyama argues that we can attain these more comprehensive and unifying identities by promoting ‘creedal national identities built around the foundational ideas of modern democracies’ while pursuing policies that assimilate individuals around these identities.45 more controversially, kaufmann argues that the new nationalism is driven by demographic anxieties, and maintains that rather than eradicating the centrality of ethnicity, we must make it a more open and accessible category. he claims that civic nationalism is unable to ‘address the anxieties of conservative voters’ or ‘provide deep identity in everyday life,’ while ethnic nationalism is so restrictive that it is ‘clearly a non-starter’.46 instead, kaufmann embraces what he calls ‘ethnotraditional nationhood,’ which ‘values the ethnic majority as an important component of the nation alongside other groups,’ who are welcomed into the majority ethnic group by identifying with its history and values.47 he cites the examples of how irish and italian immigrants were assimilated into a broader ‘white’ american ethnicity that maintained wasp ethnic symbols, or trump’s latino or asian supporters who value white ethnic symbols as important to their own national identity. kaufmann thus thinks a voluntary assimilationist solution can alleviate conservative anxiety by allowing them to see a future for themselves and their ethnic traditions despite inevitable demographic changes. to make this possible, he advocates slowing immigration to a level where immigrants are able to ‘voluntarily assimilate into the ethnic majority, maintaining the white ethnotradition.’ kauffmann’s compromise of reduced levels of immigration is shared by many other recent writers, including mounk, tamir, and fukuyama. this begs the ethical question as to whether the latest wave of scholarship has been too ready to compromise with the demands of studies on national movements 9 (2022) | state of nationalism timothy berk 139 | ethnic/white nationalists. will the attempt by theorists to assuage ethnonationalist anxieties ultimately end up legitimising far-right discourse? moreover, it is unclear whether questions previously raised by critics as to whether a liberal nationalism can avoid sliding into an excessively closed, chauvinistic, and discriminatory form of nationalism once set into practice have been adequately addressed. scholars should keep these questions in mind lest they inadvertently provide normative resources for the very ethno-nationalism they wish to keep in check. this review is part of the state of nationalism (son), a comprehensive guide to the study of nationalism. as such it is also published on the son website, where it is combined with an annotated bibliography and where it will be regularly updated. son is jointly supported by two institutes: nise and the university of east london (uel). dr eric taylor woods and dr robert schertzer are responsible for overall management and co-editors-in-chief. endnotes 1 b. yack, ‘the myth of the civic nation’, in: critical review 10/2 (1996), 193– 211. 2 m. machiavelli & d. wootton (ed.), selected political writings (indianapolis, 1994). studies on national movements 9 (2022) | state of nationalism | 140 timothy berk 3 j.j. rousseau & r.d. masters (ed.), the first and second discourses (boston, 1964), 160. 4 see j.g. herder & f.m. barnard (ed.), social and political writings (cambridge, 1969). 5 j. fichte & g. moore (ed.), addresses to the german nation [1808] (cambridge, 2009). 6 see e. renan, qu'est-ce qu'une nation? conférence faite en sorbonne, le 11 mars 1882 (paris, 1882). 7 h. kohn, the idea of nationalism: a study in its origins and background (5th ed. new york, 1960), 574. 8 ibid., 20. 9 see e. kedourie, nationalism (4th ed. oxford, 1993). 10 i. berlin, ‘nationalism: past neglect and present power’, in: against the current: essays in the history of ideas (princeton, 1979), 425. 11 see m. sandel, liberalism and the limits of justice (2nd ed. cambridge, 1998); c. taylor, philosophical papers, vol. 2: philosophy of the human sciences (1985); a. macintyre, after virtue (indiana, 1981); a. macintyre, is patriotism a virtue? the lindley lecture (kansas, 1984); m. walzer, spheres of justice (new york, 1983); b. anderson, imagined communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism (3rd ed. london, 2006). 12 y. tamir, liberal nationalism (princeton, 1993); d. miller, on nationality (oxford, 1995); d. miller, citizenship and national identity (malden, 2000). 13 tamir, liberal nationalism, 6. 14 j. habermas, ‘citizenship and national identity: some reflections on the future of europe’, in: praxis international 12/1 (1992), 1–19; m. ignatieff, blood and belonging: journeys into the new nationalism (london, 1993). 15 habermas, ‘citizenship and national identity’, 3. 16 w. kymlicka, multicultural citizenship (oxford, 1995); c. taylor, ‘the politics of recognition’, in: a. guttman (ed.), multiculturalism (princeton, 1994), 25–74. studies on national movements 9 (2022) | state of nationalism timothy berk 141 | 17 m. canovan, nationhood and political theory (cheltenham, 1996); yack, ‘the myth of the civic nation’; b. yack, ‘popular sovereignty and nationalism’, in: political theory 29/4 (2001), 517–536. 18 d.m. weinstock, ‘is there a moral case for nationalism?’, in: journal of applied philosophy 13/1 (1996); canovan, nationhood and political theory; yack, ‘the myth of the civic nation’; yack, ‘popular sovereignty and nationalism’; r. beiner, ‘nationalism's challenge to political philosophy’, in: theorizing nationalism (new york, 1999), 1–25; m. moore, the ethics of nationalism (oxford, 2001); c. frost, morality and nationalism (new york, 2006). 19 weinstock, ‘is there a moral case for nationalism?’, 96. 20 see frost, morality and nationalism. 21 e. gellner, nations and nationalism (oxford, 1983). 22 kymlicka, multicultural citizenship; gellner, nations and nationalism. 23 m. walzer, ‘the new tribalism: notes on a difficult problem’, in: r. beiner (ed.), theorizing nationalism (new york, 1999), 207. 24 see c. taylor, ‘the politics of recognition’, in: a. guttman (ed.), multiculturalism (princeton, 1994), 25–74. 25 c. gans, the limits of nationalism (cambridge, 2003), 4. 26 miller, on nationality. 27 ibid., 186. 28 cf. w. kymlicka, r. johnston, k. banting & s. soroka, ‘national identity and support for the welfare state’, in: canadian journal of political science 43/2 (2010), 349–377, which uses data to challenge this last assumption. weinstock also critiques miller’s argument, claiming that the liberal idea of a legal right to redistribution is a sturdier basis for redistribution than nationalist fellowfeeling or sentiment (see weinstock, ‘is there a moral case for nationalism?’). this skepticism of the need for modern states to be undergirded by national fellow-feeling or sentiment is shared by mason (1999), who thinks a sense of belonging-together can be inculcated through public recognition and accommodation of non-‘majority’ communities. see a. mason, ‘political studies on national movements 9 (2022) | state of nationalism | 142 timothy berk community, liberal-nationalism, and the ethics of assimilation’, in: ethics 109/2 (1999), 261–286. 29 see c. taylor, ‘the politics of recognition’. 30 see gans, the limits of nationalism; j. carens, culture, citizenship, and community: a contextual exploration of justice as evenhandedness (oxford, 2000), chapter 5. 31 tamir, liberal nationalism; miller, on nationality; e. kaufmann, ‘liberal ethnicity: beyond liberal nationalism and minority rights’, in: ethnic and racial studies 23/6 (2000), 1086–1119; frost, morality and nationalism; d. goodhart, progressive nationalism: citizenship and the left (london, 2006); t. modood, multiculturalism: a civic idea (2nd ed., 2013). see mason and patten 1999 for a critique of the coherence of the liberal nationalist attempt to use liberal principles to justify nationalist policies of cultural preservation. mason, ‘political community, liberal-nationalism, and the ethics of assimilation’; a. patten, ‘the autonomy argument for liberal nationalism’, in: nations and nationalism 5/1 (1999), 1–17. 32 y. hazony, the virtue of nationalism (new york, 2018). 33 ibid., 3. 34 y. tamir, why nationalism (princeton, 2019). 35 ibid., 182; 173. 36 see goodhart, progressive nationalism: citizenship and the left; c. joppke, is multiculturalism dead? crisis and persistence in the multicultural state (malden, 2017). 37 y. tamir, ‘not so civic: is there a difference between ethnic and civic nationalism?’, in: annual review of political science 22 (2019), 428. 38 ibid., 429. 39 tamir, ‘not so civic:’, 433. cf. modood’s argument that multicultural citizenship needs to be buttressed by an inclusive national identity that does not erase the thicker cultural identities of either its ‘majority’ or ‘minority’ identity groups, but rather integrates both. modood thinks that the appeal to nationalism studies on national movements 9 (2022) | state of nationalism timothy berk 143 | is necessary, in part, because of his shared scepticism of constitutional patriotism and cosmopolitanism, which he thinks are not ‘affective enough for most people, especially the relatively non-political, and especially at times of crisis. they are unlikely to hold people together and to give them the confidence and optimism to see through the present crisis of multiculturalism’. modood, multiculturalism: a civic idea, 137. for a similar argument, see goodhart, progressive nationalism. 40 g. nodia, ‘the end of the postnational illusion’, in: journal of democracy 28/5 (2017), 5–19. 41 c. taylor, ‘nationalism and modernity’, in: j. hall (ed.), the state of the nation. ernest gellner and the theory of nationalism (cambridge, 1998), 191–218; yack, ‘popular sovereignty and nationalism’. 42 nodia, ‘the end of the postnational illusion’, 15. 43 ibid., 18. 44 y. mounk, the people versus democracy: why our freedom is in danger and how to save it (cambridge, 2018); r. braunstein, ‘a (more) perfect union? religion, politics, and competing stories of america’, in: sociology of religion 79/2 (2018), 172–195. 45 f. fukuyama, identity: the demand for dignity and the politics of resentment (new york, 2018), 166. 46 e. kaufmann, whiteshift: populism, immigration and the future of white majorities (london, 2018), 10-11. 47 see kaufmann, ‘liberal ethnicity: beyond liberal nationalism and minority rights’. art_esculies_v5 joan esculies, ‘the catalan case on trial. the making of heroic leadership on a courtroom stage’, in: studies on national movements, 3 (2015). http://snm.nise.eu/index.php/studies/article/view/0305a joan esculies the catalan case on trial the making of heroic leadership on a courtroom stage in a political trial, the state (of any kind) considers itself at risk. its representatives do not pretend to prove just that the defendant is guilty, but that his ideas are immoral or inappropriate. what is judged is the threat and criticism to what until then was tacitly accepted. therefore, the basic aim is to eliminate or discredit who attacks the established order.1 it is a common mistake to assimilate political trials to show trials and to think that they only take place in authoritarian regimes. political trials are also common in democratic regimes, precisely because these legal systems tend to stabilise the status quo and to reinforce the vision and interests of the dominant group in society.2 law is not abstract, it is tied to a particular community, and thus the exercise of power through it becomes politicised. on the other hand, those groups with little power or not involved in major decisions – a sub-nationalist movement, for example – usually confront the legal system in order to try to change it.3 from these coordinates there are several classifications of political trials. the variety is huge and none is satisfactory. to understand this, just think of the cast which includes the trials of socrates (399 bc), jesus of nazareth (30-33 ad), joan of arc (1431), martin luther (1521), thomas moore (1535), galileo galilei (1616, 1633), alfred dreyfus (1894, 1899), adolf studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | articles joan esculies 2 hitler (1924), nelson mandela (1964), dr. benjamin spock and the vietnam war (1968), bobby seale and the black panthers in new haven (1969) or klaus barbie and the vichy regime (1987).4 therefore, it is more interesting to leave the categories aside and to focus on the hidden goal of political trials: the function of legitimising the regime applying them. both democracies and authoritarian regimes hardly recognise the political nature of the trial. the reason is obvious: the authority wants to maintain the status quo and insists that everyone is subject to the same established rules. to go against a political cause, the authorities can try to achieve social consensus over what makes the defendant unpopular, or to frighten the society about what the accused seeks. but the law is not just a mere enumeration of legal norms and principles. when applying it, it is necessary to discern facts from opinions: attention must be paid to how the law will be communicated and to the social perception of the sentence. the court will interpret and apply the legislation, but its implementation will be confronted with social perception and from this perspective the public opinion will or will not give legitimacy to the sentence.5 law in motion, therefore, is also a communication process, which in turn provides a framework for interpreting human actions. thus, a trial, especially if it is of political nature, must take into account how to communicate the sentence. it is easily understood that in this category of trials the communicative factor becomes more relevant than the defendant’s political motives. and in some cases, as in the famous nuremberg trials, the process can even be used to set the story, the narrative of the judged facts – the holocaust.6 political trials as plays in such trials, as in the theatre, what matters it is not the story itself, but what the actors or characters do, their behaviour and the standards of conduct and ethics derived. the competition between the stories occurring in the courtroom is more relevant than the specific reason studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | articles joan esculies 3 judged. the purpose of the trial is to create or reinforce the mindset of the audience, influencing its thinking and actions.7 an important set of our conceptual system is of metaphorical character: so the metaphor is an essential factor in making decisions. the way the dialogue, the interrogation and the discourse are part of a narrative structure is essential to motivate a particular behaviour. the goal, therefore, is to relate the values underlying certain ideas shared by each viewer and the audience. before entering analytical reasoning we think in terms of mental frames and metaphors. and therefore, when we receive information not in line with these frames, we ignore what is being said. the actors’ words in the courtroom only make sense if they mean something in the mind frame of the viewer. the key, therefore, is not to argue upon certain approaches through rationality, but in terms of emotional intelligence instead.8 a representation means that the mind is offered symbols and images, to be retained by memory. a representation is an act, a process and a product developing in time, a place and an action. a trial as a play is also a representation because, in order to find out what happened, it presents once more the offense and the facts. but in a courtroom, the truth of the facts is not present, it has to be exposed and recreated again. both the trial and the play include a text (the law and the argument of the case); actors (the judges, the prosecutor, the defence counsel, the members and officers of the court, the accused, victims, witnesses, law enforcers …, each with their assigned roles); a scenario where the dramatic conflict takes place (the stage); and the public. and overarching all this is a beginning, middle and suspended ending (the sentence). the trials, therefore, represent the state’s authority and its role of imparting justice, which is anything else than a community pointing an individual who acts against the stipulated, the agreed for this community and its leaders.9 at first glance it seems that in a democratic regime the accused has more judicial guarantees, but the process may only have a democratic appearance: the government appoints the prosecutors and judges and could well exert a certain pressure to influence the sentence. firstly, a defendant has less means than the regime to publicise his/her studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | articles joan esculies 4 motivations. but it is also true that a political trial rarely ends when the case is closed. and sometimes, despite the victory of the prosecution in the short term, success in the longer term can be for the condemned.10 when a society meets a new situation, reconsideration begins, often so from a political trial. if we assume that the essence of drama is conflict, then it is easy to understand why courts are appropriate places, animated by actors – of any kind, no matter their political agendas or interests. labour, feminist, religious, communist, anarchist and black leaders, all of them are subjected to the same processes and similar types of political trials. nationalist leaders are no exception. the trial awaiting them will not be different from one directed against, for instance, a religious leader. but as ‘the nation’ is a more transversal concept or state of mind, the trial’s impact, its consequences and profit will certainly be wider. it is obvious then to understand why nationalist movements have managed to turn political judgments into good forums to present and forge leaders or heroes. the performance is an unsurpassable platform to relate mourning, loss, hope and history – key elements of all types of nationalism.11 the relevance of the speech from the dock in 1803 robert emmet, an irish republican nationalist, led a failed coup in dublin against the british rule. he was captured and judged under the accusation of treason. by the end of the trial, already declared guilty, he was able to speak. but instead of trying to defend himself he exposed his cause in his famous speech from the dock. emmet was sentenced to death and executed as a traitor but he became, due to his speech, a hero for irish nationalism.12 a century later, the easter rising was deeply influenced by emmet’s insurrection. but, once again, padraig pearse and his colleagues failed. sir roger casement, in charge of providing weapons for the rebels, was judged for treason, as he was a british diplomat. by the end of the trial, held in london in june 1916, he was found guilty and he had also the opportunity to say a final word. following emmet’s example, casement did studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | articles joan esculies 5 not speak about the specific charges. instead, he pronounced an eloquent speech from the dock. he was executed but his words placed him in a relevant place in the irish imaginary.13 both emmet and casement understood their words would not change their fate and instead of pretending to influence the sentence they preferred transcending it and questioning the very legitimacy of the trial. they saw their trials as a play. the judge was not able, nor interested in presenting arguments on the ‘higher cause’. their death sentence had already been written before entering the trial. but the dock itself was a public space where to construct and publicise their political narrative. thus, they did not elaborate on the accusation of treason but on the relation between ireland and the british empire.14 emmet was not the first irishman to seize this option or opportunity. before him, in 1789, the father of the irish republicanism, wolfe tone, had done the same. nonetheless, emmet’s speech was very influential within irish nationalism and abroad.15 many other nationalists from around the world followed emmet’s example with their own particular speeches from the dock. just to mention a few: bal gangadhar tilak (india, 1908); mahatma gandhi (india, 1922); jomo kenyatta (kenya, 1952); fidel castro (cuba, 1953) or nelson mandela (south africa, 1962/1964). in the case of catalan nationalism four of its leading figures – enric prat de la riba, francesc macià, lluís companys and jordi pujol – also passed political trials. a schematic exhibition and analysis of each case and its consequences clearly show common patterns: the use of the trial as a political and public platform to make themselves known and to forge and expand their political leadership. enric prat de la riba, the elliptic trial enric prat de la riba (1870-1917), the catalan conservative nationalist and director of la veu de catalunya (the voice of catalonia), journal of the lliga regionalista (regionalist league), faced a court-martial in barcelona in april 1902. his newspaper had published an article copied from studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | articles joan esculies 6 l’indépendant from perpignan, capital of roussillon, the southeast catalan-speaking part of france (also known as ‘the catalonia of the north’). under the title ‘separatisme al rosselló’ (‘separatism in roussillon’) the article was in fact a letter from the wine traders to the french finance minister demanding protective measures. if not granted, they menaced him, they would promote the union of the french region with catalonia, in spain.16 at the beginning of 1902 censorship and surveillance on published texts, especially in the catalanist press, was ran by the military authority due to the political agitation in barcelona followed by a prolonged strike.17 on 2 april, prat de la riba was imprisoned. the court-martial he faced could condemn him from six up to twelve years for disturbance of public order and rebellion, as the spanish government feared the word ‘separatism’. the thirty-one year old nationalist, a lawyer himself, was astonished: ‘do i have to lie in this dirty place?’, the catholic bourgeois asked upon seeing his cell.18 prat de la riba was involved in catalan politics since 1891 and ten years later he was among the founders of the lliga, the first catalanist political party. in 1902 he was the party secretary and played an important role behind the stage, but he had not yet figured on an electoral list. therefore, prat was well known among an elite but his popularity did not go much further. relevant figures of catalan society and even members of the spanish parliament tried to free him with no success.19 prat received hundreds of visits in jail: catalanists and others, directors of rival newspapers, politicians, intellectuals and artists.20 finally, on 7 april prat was released. it is unclear why, but probably due to political pressures. a month later, thanks to the coronation of king alfonso xiii, the nationalist was pardoned.21 all in all, spanish authorities aimed to threaten la veu and its director because the daily had criticised their procedure against the strikers during the first months of 1902. thus, imprisoning prat for a week under the menace of a court-martial was considered enough to threaten him and to warn others. prat had a poor health since his youth. a few months after his stay in prison he thought he had contracted tuberculosis in jail. in march 1903 the studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | articles joan esculies 7 nationalist went to a french sanatorium in puy-de-dôme, clermontferrand, where it was clear that he had no tuberculosis. but a nodule on his neck was discovered and basedow-graves disease, an autoimmunity disorder, was diagnosed. nonetheless, by the beginning of 1904 prat returned to politics, taking on a more relevant role within the lliga. he was among the candidates in the provincial elections of march 1905 and he won the seat. the solidarity during his week in prison and his illness, perceived as a direct consequence, made him very popular. his name now transcended the elite circle and expanded to the whole of catalan society.22 in 1907 prat became president of the diputació de barcelona, the provincial government, and in april 1914 he became the first president of the mancomunitat de catalunya, the federation of the four catalan provinces under a semi-autonomous government within spain. catalans massive mourning at prat de la riba’s funeral in barcelona, 1 august 1917 | arxiu fotogràfic del centre excursionista de catalunya (afcec) studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | articles joan esculies 8 attributed his death in august 1917 to the basedow disease, supposedly contracted in jail. in fact, it was not, mainly since the disease is not contagious.23 but such was not relevant for nationalists: their greatest enemy, the spanish army, was responsible for the death of one of the founding fathers of catalanism.24 francesc macià, a trial in the odeon there is consensus among historians that the failed invasion of catalonia led by francesc macià in autumn 1926 was fundamental for his popularity. the catalan separatist leader mobilised a hundred young catalanists and italian mercenaries in the south-eastern part of france. the plan was to enter catalonia by various points along the eastern pyrenees and launch a revolt against the primo de rivera dictatorship (1923-1930). however, the french gendarmerie discovered the operation and arrested the squads and macià himself.25 francesc macià, sixty-seven years old at the time, was a former spanish colonel. by the beginning of the twentieth century he married the daughter of a rich rural landowner in lleida, in the catalan hinterland. having become a landowner himself, macià slowly developed an interest in politics. first, he joined the lliga of prat de la riba, but during the first world war period the former military tended to more social and leftistoriented ideas. from 1918 onwards he claimed autonomy within spain was not worthy for catalonia and he proposed separatism instead, defending a federal or confederal spain and a catalan state. from 1906 until 1923 he won a seat in the spanish parliament in every election.26 in september 1923 the primo de rivera dictatorship begun and macià went into exile. between 1923 and 1926, the catalan separatist met with other catalan and basque nationalists, catalan and spanish republicans, anarchists, communists – almost everyone able to cooperate with him to overthrow primo. finally, lacking significant sums of money to buy weapons and without the support of any other exiled group, macià chose to act alone. the failed invasion became known as the ‘conspiracy of pratsstudies on national movements, 3 (2015) | articles joan esculies 9 de-mollo’, after the name of the french town where macià had his headquarters.27 immediately after the arrest, the separatist leader appeared in the international press. the conspiracy was also known in catalonia. on 20 november 1926 the illustrated london news chose macià as one of the most important personalities of the week. the french government expelled the majority of the members of the squads to belgium, considering them mere troops. the former military and forty of his men (including riccioti garibaldi, nephew of the risorgimento hero), on the other hand, spent three months imprisoned in paris.28 the french executive hesitated to judge macià and garibaldi, but prime minister raymond poincaré finally chose to address the matter straight francesc macià and his lawyer, mr. henry torrès (agence meurisse, 1927) | bibliothèque nationale de france studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | articles joan esculies 10 away. consequently, the judgment of ‘the catalan conspirators’, as the trial was called, was held on 20-22 january 1927. the location was one of the largest halls of the paris conciergerie, labelled the ‘odeon’ by journalists ‘because there, as in the parisian theatre of the same name, representations less important than in the comédie française take place’.29 in the courtroom macià wore the dress uniform of his paramilitary organisation. he pleaded guilty to all charges and claimed he led an invasion to establish an independent catalan republic. during the trial his figure was opposed to garibaldi, a mussolini agent. the aim of henry torrès, a flamboyant french lawyer who defended macià, was to make clear that his client’s purpose and those of the italians were completely different.30 by the end of the trial, macià gave his speech from the dock. he argued his tiny army was willing to fight against spain, ‘an ancient enemy of france’. the separatist added his aim was to establish a ‘little belgium in the pyrenees’. macià stated he loved france and reminded that during the world war thousands of catalans had fought with the french foreign legion.31 on 22 january macià and garibaldi were sentenced with two months of prison, already accomplished, and a 100 french francs penalty. afterwards macià was expelled to belgium. from then on his organisation, estat català, used the trial for political propaganda.32 the trial made macià very popular in catalonia and among the catalan diaspora. soon he was presented as an incarnation of catalonia itself.33 he was compared to tadeusz kosciusko, george washington, simón bolívar, josé martí, eamond de valera and other freedom fighters. in 1927 macià began a long journey through america in order to obtain funds for a new invasion. it was not necessary, as in 1930 primo’s dictatorship came to an end. in february 1931 macià returned to catalonia as a hero. he founded a catch-all political party, esquerra republicana de catalunya (republican left of catalonia), won the elections and soon after became the first president of the generalitat de catalunya, the first catalan autonomous government. he died two years after and his funeral was a huge mourning event.34 studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | articles joan esculies 11 lluís companys, two different trials lluís companys was elected president of catalonia after the death of macià in christmas 1933.35 after two years of clear dominion of the leftist parties in catalonia and the rest of spain, introducing reformist policies, the conservative parties won the general elections of november 1933. this led to a period of contra-reformism. in catalonia, the lliga perceived that despite its victory, companys and macià’s esquerra republicana de catalunya still held the majority in the catalan parliament. therefore the catalan conservatives delegitimated the catalan autonomy, demanding a new electoral system and presenting companys as the president of the leftist parties but not of the catalan people as a whole.36 the situation led to an insurrection in some parts of spain by the beginning of october 1934. the socialist party and the trade unions feared that the conservatives would turn the state into a fascist dictatorship, while the catalan leftist parties feared for the region’s autonomy. on 6 october 1934, companys proclaimed the catalan state within the spanish federal republic. the proclamation was not an independentist claim but aimed to reshape the unitarian spanish republic into a federal state: companys also offered barcelona as the capital, replacing madrid. after a night of uncertainty and sporadic fighting on the morning of the 7th, the spanish army arrested the president of catalonia and the members of his government. thousands of members of trades and leftist parties were also sent to jail, local governments were changed and taken over by the conservative forces. in january 1935 the autonomy of catalonia was suspended.37 the lawyer of companys, ángel ossorio y gallardo, thought it was necessary to take profit of the situation and to turn the president of catalonia into ‘an icon’.38 ossorio y gallardo was aware that a defence over facts was impossible to win but in order to achieve political success he could not do anything else. thus the lawyer argued companys was not a separatist, rather a fervent spanish republican. this was true but it had to be shown to the judges, always suspicious of catalan nationalists.39 studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | articles joan esculies 12 while companys was in jail, ossorio arranged for the publication of a book cataluña-companys in order to help his client.40 finally the president and his government were judged at the tribunal de garanties constitucionals (court of constitutional guarantees) in madrid. the trial began on 27 may 1935, lasting for four days. companys had the opportunity to pronounce his speech from the dock. he accepted the charges against him. then, following the arguments of his lawyer, the president argued that his aim on 6 october 1934 had been the ‘defence of the democratic spanish republic’. as expected, the tribunal neglected his arguments and sentenced both companys and his government to thirty years of prison, for leading a revolt against the consitution of the spanish republic. despite this, companys appeared thereafter as someone to admire and even to venerate. his lawyer had clearly achieved his goal. in february 1936 the leftist parties won the general elections and the new government freed companys and the other political prisoners.41 companys (standing) was awaited by a fervent mass when arriving in barcelona on 1 march 1936 | buscameenelciclodelavida.com studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | articles joan esculies 13 but companys faced another trial a few years later. after the spanish civil war (1936-1939), the president of catalonia lived in exile in france. unlike many others, he did not want to escape to america, because his son resided in a parisian mental sanatorium. on 13 august 1940 the gestapo arrested companys in brittany. imprisoned he spent some days in paris and by the end of the month he was extradited to franco’s regime. later, after a month in madrid, the catalan president was moved to barcelona.42 at that time, the beginning of october, he was aware of his fate and made a will: ‘i will die for catalonia and for what it represents. it will be a beautiful death, and i will thank god for it, as it will dignify my humble person.’43 on 14 october companys, accused of military rebellion, faced a courtmartial. the defender asked for twenty years in jail, instead of death sentence. once again, the president was able to pronounce his speech from the dock. it was very brief. above all, companys argued ‘history will judge all our intentions and if you sentence me to death i will die calmly and peacefully for my ideas, with no shadow of bitterness.’44 the next day companys was shot to death. from then on his myth grew, erasing his political faults and making it difficult to judge him as a politician.45 jordi pujol, a trial to win the future in june 1959, luís de galinsoga, for twenty years the francoist director of daily newspaper la vanguardia española, went to mass in a church in a northern neighbourhood of barcelona. galinsoga, close friend of francisco franco, attended by mistake one of the two daily services in catalan – the other seven were in spanish. he got furious and loudly exclaimed that ‘all the catalans are shit!’46 the incident soon was known among the catholic catalanist cercles. twenty-nine years old jordi pujol was a member of the church where the episode occurred, witnessed by his parents. the young activist was by then a just married bourgeois, chairman of a family-run laboratory.47 studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | articles joan esculies 14 pujol considered taking advantage of galinsoga’s words. he and his colleagues waited for some months and by october, as no one else did anything, they decided to act: pujol published a propagandistic pamphlet titled tots els catalans són una merda! (all the catalans are shit!).48 the campaign against galinsoga was successful, as by the end of the year several advertisers decided to withdraw their products from la vanguardia. many readers unsubscribed and the daily sells went down. the situation led the owner, carlos de godó, to ask franco the permission to dismiss galinsoga. the director was fired in february 1960.49 a few months later, in may, franco himself visited barcelona, hoping to improve his public image in catalonia. following the successful campaign against la vanguardia, pujol printed a new pamphlet under the title us presentem el general franco (we present you the general franco). among other passages, the leaflet accused the dictator of being the ‘negation of any kind of freedom’.50 catalanist activists distributed the pamphlet during a concert in the palau de la música catalana (palace of catalan music) with the assistance of four francoist ministers. the activists also sang some anthems forbidden by the dictatorship. pujol was not present but three days later he was arrested in the middle of the night. when the police took him, he thought, as he stated many years after: ‘i am going to prison and i knew that sooner or later i had to go. if we are not capable of going to jail in the name of catalonia, what would we do then?’ 51 pujol was tortured and faced a court-martial in barcelona on 13 june 1960. the military judges let him know that, if he begged for pardon and apologised for writing the leaflet, or even if the refused to talk when the judge gave him the chance, the sentence would be short. but pujol and his wife, also an activist, decided that going to prison for three or four years was worth their case. so pujol prepared some notes for his discourse.52 by the end of the trial, as expected, pujol was given the opportunity to speak. once again, he lied as he denied being the author of the pamphlet against franco. then he pronounced his speech from the dock. ‘i belong to a generation that is coming up. a youth who grows slowly, of course, stubbornly, and moves by spiritual needs […]. i belong to a generation that will rise to honour and pride our country,’ were his most remembered studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | articles joan esculies 15 words.53 according to the audience, pujol seemed calm. many of his friends thought that was a bad option, but after his conviction – seven years – he and his wife shared the view that ‘it had been a good day, because we accomplished our goals.’ pujol’s performance was, obviously, executed according to a political plan, aiming to publicise his image.54 pujol went to a prison near zaragoza, outside the catalan region. meanwhile, a huge campaign for his freedom began. his name was painted on walls in catalan towns and villages, even in the mountain refuges. the name of pujol was equalled to catalonia, in a successful equivalence that would perdure for years. the campaign ‘pujol-catalunya’ lasted from 1960 to november 1962, when pujol was released.55 twenty years later pujol was elected president of catalonia.56 in 1982, two years after his first election, the banca catalana became bankrupt. pujol, his father and several partners had settled the bank in the late fifties in order to promote and finance catalan culture. however, the bank was misdirected and was investigated for irregular activities. in 1984, in the middle of the next catalan electoral campaign, pujol and several associates were accused of misappropriation and falsification of commercial documents. pujol stated that spanish prime minister felipe gonzález and his social-democrats were trying to send him to jail in order to avoid him being elected for the second term. once again, pujol presented his judicial process as a process against catalonia. a parallel was established between both trials, presenting pujol's criminalisation by the spanish socialist government as a continuation of his prosecution by francoism. the propaganda campaign led him to obtain an absolute majority in the catalan parliament. after winning the elections pujol claimed to his fervent voters: ‘from now on, we will talk about ethics and morality! everybody has to understand that nobody can play with catalonia and that we won’t accept tricky manners.’ finally the investigation led nowhere and pujol won his second trial. he was in office from 1980 to 2003. in 2014 the spanish treasury initiated a new investigation.57 studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | articles joan esculies 16 conclusions: leadership on a courtroom stage ‘leadership’ is one of those terms with many definitions. in general, however, it means a power relationship between leaders and followers in a context where the specific characteristics and situation of the followers are as important as the personality of the leader. ‘leadership’ also refers to a practice: the leader aims to seduce the audience, but also to organise some kind of solution (not necessarily good for everyone) to existing problems. according to this view of leadership, much of its essence lies in the ability to make decisions and to choose between viable alternatives. it goes beyond holding a position or managing a government: it has to do with the desire to implement some significant changes. though various types of leadership exist, it is often associated with ‘charisma’. this notion is no longer understood in max weber’s sense, closely related to holiness and heroism, but sweetened and seen as a kind of powerful magnetism for others.58 pujol elected president of catalonia in 1984, beginning his second term | ara.cat studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | articles joan esculies 17 as shown, enric prat de la riba, francesc macià, lluís companys and jordi pujol, four of the seven twentieth-century presidents of catalonia, gained their popularity thanks to political trials, an experience crucial for their political careers.59 in all the cases they lost the trial and were convicted, but they won on the ideas judged. they were aware that the key of the trial judgment resided not so much in the courtroom as in its public impact. for the prosecutors it had to be clear that catalonia was not judged, neither the republic nor the franco regime, but a possession of weapons, a reorganisation of the state by force and a pamphlet against the head of state. clearly, as it was at the time, prosecutors won the trials because who sat in the dock had no option to do so. but just as did emmet, casement, gandhi, mandela and so many others, the catalan nationalists succeeded in framing the representation: their speeches from the dock resonated in the mindset of those to whom they were addressed. the catalan historiography has tended to praise the roles of the macià and companys lawyers, henry torrès and ángel ossorio y gallardo. historians have presented them as individuals knowing how to create stories out of the ordinary so that their clients’ names transcended the courtroom and became symbols. sparing no merit to their work, a comparative glance at trials with other nationalists makes evident that they knew how to resolve the political trials.60 it is likely that, considering their training as lawyers, they knew the classical trials in history. the case studies shown make clear that when confronting a political trial, no matter if the regime is democratic or non-democratic, the sentence is written beforehand. in the catalan trials, the parallel with other nationalist causes is obvious. in the case of macià, for example, one of its greatest adversaries stated: ‘what did we see in macià? during the trial a sentimental atmosphere and a revolutionary spirit, which, over time, we understood, surrounded him. we saw in macià a sir [roger] casement.’61 in order to transcend the specific situation, the three catalan politicians used the resource of the famous speech from the dock. in the cases of macià and pujol, they both managed to inject an idea into their audiences: the former the concept of catalonia as a southern belgium, the latter the image of himself as a representative of a new generation of young people who studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | articles joan esculies 18 struggled to break through beyond the old franco’s regime. companys, however, failed to transcend a powerful idea in his speech. it is precisely because he was perhaps the best speaker of the three that he needed to be moving away from the static situation of the room. and it was on his return to barcelona, from the balcony of the palau de la generalitat, when in motion he cried one of his most remembered sentences: ‘we will suffer again, we will fight again and we will win again.’ all three politicians were aware that their trials were representations: companys knew macià’s identification with catalonia in his trial in paris. and he even complained in his 1935 trial that the prosecutor did not request the death penalty for him to make clear that his sacrifice was greater.62 in his first trial companys reminded how ‘our defenders talked about the judgement of history.’ in the second trial, as if trying to recall his speech from five years earlier, companys said again: ‘history will judge our intentions.’ moreover, without a soundboard that propagates the attitude of the accused in court, the speech is of little use. in the case of prat de la riba his daily newspaper contributed to it, followed by the rest of the catalan press. the french press gave a massive coverage to macià’s trial. companys even had a biography published in spanish in 1935. some admirers of pujol, including journalists, took notes of his plea to make the speech widely known. any of the above cases would have made a lower impact on the catalan imagination, or even none at all, without the respective propaganda tools. companys knew, for instance, that his speech should transcend the room. with the experience of 1935, in his 1940 trial, exhausted as he was and aware of his end, he had no instinct to prepare a great plea. he doubted if it was worth it because it could well be that his speech from the dock failed to transcend. the president knew, of course, that his execution would do so, therefore to ensure that his account of the facts would remain he stated in his will that he died ‘for catalonia’. it was the same words that he supposedly exclaimed during his execution. all in all political trials, the performance of nationalists and the processes of victimisation of themselves as persons and of their ideas contribute to the work of mourning that essentially feeds nationalism. as statues and studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | articles joan esculies 19 monuments scattered around cities and towns make the imagined community visible, the grievance for the judgement of the nation – in this case, catalonia – puts a pike on the imaginary: the figure judged becomes the representation of the nation. its presence in the courtroom stage then is the living proof of the true existence of the contested nation. endnotes 1 r.p. sokol, ‘the political trial: courtroom as stage, history as critic’, in: new literary history, 1/3 (1971) 495-516; o. kirchheimer, political justice. the use of legal procedure for political ends (princeton, 1961). 2 r. conquest, the great terror: a reassessment (oxford, 1968); t.l. belknap (ed.), american political trials (westport, 1981). 3 n. hakman, ‘political trials in the legal order: a political scientist’s perspective’, in: journal of public law, 21 (1972) 73-126; g.f. fletcher, with justice for some: victims’ rights in criminal trials, (reading, 1995) 6-10. 4 g.f. friedman, ‘political power and legal legitimacy: a short history of political trials’, in: antioch review, 30 (1970) 157-171; t.l. becker, political trials (new york, 1971); r. christenson, ‘a political theory of political trials’, in: journal of criminal law and criminology, 74/2 (1983) 574-577. 5 t. emerson, ‘political trials’, in: yale review of law and social action, 1/2 (1971) 6-10. 6 j.n. shklar, legalism, law, morals and political trials (cambridge, 1964) 170-178; m. osiel, mass atrocity, collective memory and the law (new brunswick, 1997) 123, 162. 7 l. bilsky, ‘between justice and politics: the competition of storytellers in the eichmann trial’, in: s. aschheim (ed.), hannah arendt in jerusalem (berkeley, 2001) 232-252. 8 g. lakoff, don’t think of an elephant! know your values and frame the debate: the essential guide for progressives (white river junction, 2004). studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | articles joan esculies 20 9 h. grunwald, ‘justice as performance? the historiography of legal procedure and political criminal justice in weimar germany’, in: interdisciplines, 2 (2012) 46-78; i. kershaw, hitler, 1889-1936: hubris (london, 2000); e.a. wood, ‘the trial of lenin: legitimating the revolution through political theater, 1920-23’, in: russian review, 61/2 (2000) 235-248; r. christenson (ed.), political trials in history: from antiquity to the present (new jersey, 1991) xv-xvii. 10 l. bilsky, ‘political trials’, in: n.j. smelser & p.b. baltes (eds.), international encyclopedia of the social & behavioral sciences (new york, 2001) 11712-11717. 11 d.l. eng & d. kazanjian (eds.), loss: the politics of mourning (berkeley los angeles, 2003). 12 m.p. geoghegan, robert emmet. a life (dublin, 2002); idem, ‘[which] speech from the dock?’, in: history ireland. ireland’s history magazine, 11/3 (2003); n. vance, ‘text and tradition: robert emmet’s speech from the dock’, in: studies. an irish quarterly review, 71 (1982) 185-191; t.d. sullivan e.a., speeches from the dock: or protests of irish patriotism (dublin, 1953) 60. 13 s.o. síocháin, roger casement: imperialist, rebel, revolutionary (dublin, 2008); r.r. doerries, prelude to the easter rising: sir roger casement in imperial germany (london, 2000); w.i. thompson, the imagination of an insurrection: dublin easter 1916 (london, 1972); g.h. knott, trial of sir roger casement (glasgow, 1917). 14 b. harlow, ‘speaking from the dock’, in: callaloo, 16/4 (1993) 874-890; r. christenson, political trials: gordian knots in the law (new jersey, 1999) 183-184. 15 e. butler cullingford, ‘national identities in performance: the stage englishman of boucicault’s irish drama’, in: theatre journal, 49/3 (1997) 287-300. 16 la veu de catalunya, 16/3/1902. 17 b. de riquer, lliga regionalista: la burgesia catalana i el nacionalisme, 18981904 (barcelona, 1977) 230-233; i. molas, lliga catalana: un estudi d’estasiologia (barcelona, 1972) 50-51; c.e. ehrlich, lliga regionalista, lliga catalana, 19011936 (barcelona, 2004); m. risques, l’estat a barcelona. ordre public i governadors civils (barcelona, 2012). studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | articles joan esculies 21 18 r. olivar, prat de la riba (barcelona, 1964) 63, 73, 83; m. pérez nespereira, prat de la riba. nacionalisme i formació d’un estat català (barcelona, 2007) 207209; j.m. figueres la veu de catalunya (1899-1937) (barcelona, 2014). 19 e. jardí, el doctor robert i el seu temps (barcelona, 1969) 200; la veu de catalunya, 3/4/1902. 20¡cu-cut!, 10/4/1902; la veu de catalunya, 4/4/1902. 21 f.x. santamaria balaguer, prat de la riba i la institucionalització d’un model de cultura catalana: l’obra cultural i pedagògica (phd diss., universitat ramon llull, 2010) 473. 22 j.m. figueres, procés militar a prat de la riba. les actes del consell de guerra de 1902 (barcelona, 1996). 23 j. esculies & c. zafón, ‘la fabricación historiográfica de las causas de la muerte de enric prat de la riba’, in: ayer. not published yet. 24 g.c. cattini, prat de la riba i la historiografía catalana. intel·lectuals i crisi política a la fi del segle xix (catarroja barcelona, 2008). 25 r. faura, el complot de prats de molló (barcelona, 1991); r. xuriguera, els exiliats acusen (badalona, 1930) 175; j. casals & j. arrufat, catalunya, poble dissortat (barcelona, 1933) 128. 26 f. mascarell, ‘macià, un polític sorprenent; conversa amb enric ucelay-da cal’, in: l’avenç, 66 (1983) 25-38; j.m. albaigès, el macià desconegut. militar, enginyer, polític i hisendat (lleida, 2012) 26-28, 50-51; j.m. roig rosich, francesc macià. de militar español a independentista català (1907-1923) (barcelona, 2006) 134-139. 27 j. alavedra, francesc macià. el camí cap a la presidència de la generalitat 18591926 (barcelona, 1993) 316-318. 28 g.c. cattini, el gran complot. qui va trair macià? la trama italiana (barcelona, 2009) 293; z. sardà, francesc macià en la intimitat. el president vist per la seva filla maria (lleida, 2012) 89-90; a. tona, qui va parlar? prats de molló: els fets, els homes (barcelona, 1984) 46; m. viusà, ‘francesc macià. president de catalunya’, in: som, 3 (1968) 43. 29 h. torrès, accusés hors série (paris, 1957) 48. studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | articles joan esculies 22 30 e. ucelay-da cal, estat català: the strategies of separation and revolution of catalan radical nationalism (1919-1933) (phd diss., columbia university, 1979) 331. 31 j. esculies & d. martínez fiol, 12.000! els catalans a la gran guerra (barcelona, 2014). 32 estat català, la catalunya rebel. el procés a francesc macià i als protagonistes dels fets de prats de molló (barcelona, 2003 [1927]) 61-62. 33 x. sanahuja, … i de prats de molló a la generalitat (barcelona, 1932) 12; j. carner-ribalta, francesc macià (barcelona, 1931) 48; idem, el complot de prats de molló (barcelona, 1987) 118; a. maseras, francesc macià (barcelona, s.d.) 45-49; j. fontbernat, la batalla de prats de molló (badalona, 1930) 14; j. miravitlles, gent que he conegut (barcelona, 1980) 43. 34 l. aymamí, macià. trenta anys de política catalanista (barcelona, 1933) 127139; m. cruells, francesc macià (barcelona, 1971) 84; e. jardí, francesc macià. president de catalunya (barcelona, 1981) 459. 35 a. hurtado, abans del sis d’octubre (barcelona, 2008) 12. 36 j.m. solé sabaté (ed.), lluís companys. president de catalunya. biografia humana i política (barcelona, 2006) 2 vol.; j.b. culla clarà esquerra republicana de catalunya, 1931-2012. una historia política (barcelona, 2013) 13-20. 37 e. lorente & m. simó, el sis d’octubre del president companys (lleida, 2004) 153; a. gonzàlez vilalta, m. lópez & e. ucelay-da cal (eds.), 6 d’octubre. la desfeta de la revolució catalanista de 1934 (barcelona, 2014); m. viusà, lluís compays: biografia popular (barcelona, 1977); m. lópez, els fets del 6 d’octubre de 1934 (barcelona, 2013). 38 a. gonzález vilalta & g. bou, la creació del mite companys. el 6 d’octubre i la defensa de companys per ossorio y gallardo (barcelona, 2008) 29-31, 60, 96; a. gonzález vilalta, un catalanófilo de madrid. epistolario catalán de ángel ossorio y gallardo (1924-1942) (barcelona, 2008) 120. 39 j. esculies, ‘el nacionalismo radical catalán y su visión de companys antes del mito del presidente mártir’, in e. ucelay-da cal & a. gonzález vilalta (eds.), contra companys, 1936. la frustración nacionalista ante la revolución (valència, 2012) 53-64. studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | articles joan esculies 23 40 f. gómez-hidalgo, cataluña-companys (madrid, 1935). 41 a. gonzález vilalta, lluís companys. un home de govern (barcelona, 2009) 73; j.m. lópez-picó, dietari, 1929-1959 (barcelona, 1999) 97; r. d’abadal, dietari de guerra, exili i retorn (1936-1940) (barcelona, 2001) 76; m.d. ivern, esquerra republicana de catalunya (barcelona, 1989) vol. 2, 198; j.m. poblet, vida i mort de lluís companys (barcelona, 1976) 322. 42 g. aguilera, agente 447, el hombre que detuvo a lluís companys (barcelona, 2013) 90-103. 43 j. benet, la mort del president companys (barcelona, 1998) 304-305. 44 c. güell, lluís companys inèdit. el símbol més enllà de l’home (barcelona, 2006) 45-46. 45 j.m. figueres, el consell de guerra a lluís companys. president de la generalitat de catalunya (barcelona, 1997) 131. 46 j. pujol, memòries (1930-1980) (barcelona, 2007) 144-145. 47 j. pujol, construir catalunya (barcelona, 1980); idem, el llibre roig de jordi pujol (barcelona, 2003); p.o. costa, jordi pujol. perfil humano y político (madrid, 1977); m. juan, marta ferrusola. a l’ombra del poder (barcelona, 2004). 48 r. wirth, jordi pujol. honorable corridor de fondo (barcelona, 1981) 80-86. 49 e. canals, pujol catalunya. el consell de guerra a jordi pujol (barcelona, 2013) 91-95. 50 a. manent, ‘la resistència (1939-1975)’, in: j. faulí (ed.), jordi pujol. un politic per a un poble (barcelona, 1984) 91. 51 j. crexell, els fets del palau i el consell de guerra a jordi pujol (barcelona, 1982). 52 s. baiges & j. reixach, jordi pujol. historia de una obsesion (madrid, 1991) 117. 53 j. pujol, idees i records (barcelona, 2006) 32-35. 54 j. espar, amb c de catalunya. memòries 1936-1963 (barcelona, 1994) 209-210; j.m. macip ‘moments’, in: j. manent (ed.), l’home, l’amic, el president. homenatge a jordi pujol (barcelona, 2009) 178 studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | articles joan esculies 24 55 x. polo, ‘todos los catalanes son una mierda.’ les grans gestes contra el franquisme (barcelona, 2005) 202-203; c. palomar, això és una dona. retrat no autoritzat de marta ferrusola (barcelona, 2015) 50-51; e. cirici, la generació dels fets del palau (el prat de llobregat, 2001) 123. 56 j. antich, el virrei (barcelona, 1994) 16; p. cullell, què direu de mi. jordi pujol vist pels seus contemporanis (barcelona, 2003) 105; r. miravitllas, jordi pujol (madrid, 1992) 82; j.m. novoa & j. reixach, las mil caras de jordi pujol (barcelona, 2003) 41; x. muñoz, ‘ha estat el petit napoleó de catalunya’, in: m. cuyàs, vint i jordi pujol. confessions de persones que l’han conegut (vic, 2003) 157-166. 57 f. martínez & j. oliveres, jordi pujol. en nom de catalunya (barcelona, 2005) 187-217. 58 h.-j. puhle, ‘el liderazgo en la política. una vision desde la historia’, in: l. mees & x.m. núñez seixas (eds.), nacidos para mandar. liderazgo, política y poder. perspectivas comparadas (madrid, 2012) 23-44; a. anter, max weber’s theory of the modern state. origins, structure and significance (new york, 2014) 52-67. 59 the author does not count those non-elected presidents of the mancomunitat during primo de rivera’s dictatorship (1923-1925) or during the period with suspended catalan automomy (1934-1936). the non-judged presidents were josep puig i cadafalch (1917-1923), josep irla (1940-1954) and josep tarradellas (1954-1980). 60 a. ossorio y gallardo, vida y sacrificio de companys (barcelona, 2010 [1943]) 140. 61 vibrant [d. cardona], res de nou al pirineu … (barcelona, 1933) 152-153. 62 ossorio, vida, 172; a. prats, el gobierno de la generalidad en el banquillo. barcelona, octubre 1934 – madrid, mayo 1935 (madrid, 1935) 337-383, 330-336. the agony of historic western hungary and the birth of burgenland (1914-1921) tamás székely herder institute many know that one of the most important consequences of the first world war was the collapse of the austro-hungarian monarchy. yet only few know that the two defeated allies – austria and hungary – had not only lost large territories of their own to the neighbouring successors states, but they were also engaged in serious border dispute with each other between 1918 and 1921. this desperate struggle may seem as if it came out of nowhere since the three historic counties that composed the western periphery of hungary did not really suffered from deep political or social conflicts before the war, at least not on the surface and comparing to other multi-ethnic regions of central and eastern europe. if we picture the old habsburg empire as a jigsaw puzzle then the western hungarian counties should be imagined as those oddly shaped interlocking and mosaiced pieces that geographically as well as culturally connected the two halves of the empire. although the long but narrow area along the western border of the kingdom of hungary was dominantly german-speaking for centuries, both countries were under habsburg rule under which questioning the historical borders would have been simply unreasonable. this radically changed around the turn-of-the century when modern nationalism broke through in public life and became a main driving force behind political aspirations. the disintegration of historic western hungary and birth of burgenland were a very complicated process in which regard the significance of nationalism and its radicalization in the great war cannot be underestimated. keywords: austria; hungary; habsburg; burgenland; first world war studies on national movements 6 (2020) | articles | 2 tamás székely introduction one of the most important consequences of the first world war was the collapse of the multi-ethnic conglomerate of the austro-hungarian monarchy.1 yet only few remember that the two defeated allies, austria and hungary, had not only lost large territories of their own to the neighboring successors states, but they were also engaged in a serious border dispute with each other between 1918 and 1921. this desperate post-war struggle may seem as if it came out of nowhere. the three historic counties that made up the western periphery of the kingdom of hungary, i.e. moson, sopron, and vas, did not really suffer from deep political or social conflicts before the great war, at least not on the surface and not compared to other multi-ethnic regions in central and eastern europe. recent research suggests it may have been the miseries endured during the war that destabilized society and aggravated the post-war political turmoil, escalating tensions across the otherwise peaceful western hungarian landscape. as one contemporary expert on this topic points out in her dissertation project, the agony of historic western hungary and the birth of burgenland were an extremely complicated process in which ‘the chronology, historical events and occurrences alone hint at the interplay of the international and national politics throughout the whole process’.2 since the topic in general would require a more extensive elaboration, this paper focuses primarily on the regional aspects that enable us to better understand the reasons behind this specific territorial conflict. studies on national movements 6 (2020) | articles tamás székely 3 | ‘happy years of peace’? – western hungary before 1914 ‘western hungary—such a part of the country does not exist and never did’, a moson county journalist quite rightfully claimed when despairing of the loss of his homeland to austria in 1921.3 indeed, not only does the term ‘burgenland’ sound ahistorical regarding events leading up to the early 1920s, but so to some extent does ‘western hungary’, which had at best a vague geographical meaning over the course of the centuries. this area, where the foothills of the alps meet the plains and hills of the carpathian basin, has never been a unified administrative region but was historically composed of three counties and several self-governing towns. the western borders of the three counties were also a state border with austria. however, since austria and hungary constituted a dual monarchy between 1867 and 1914, this should be considered rather a ‘weak’ state border compared to the ‘hard’ borders that usually separate two neighboring nation states.4 from an external point of view, western hungary may have appeared not to be a border region in the era before the great war but in fact it was. it is necessary to emphasize, however, that the three counties as well as the royal cities of western hungary had, for centuries, been in a frequent social, cultural and economic exchange with the neighboring austrian lands and cities: styria (steiermark), lower austria (niederösterreich) and with the imperial capital of vienna (wien).5 according to the 1910 census, the combined population of the three counties and their four cities was about 815,000 inhabitants.6 more than half of them identified themselves as native hungarian-speakers, 290,000 of them belonged to the german-speaking community and about 110,000 of them spoke a slavic language (mostly croatian or slovene) as their mother tongue. in general, the closer the border, the more multi-ethnic the western hungarian landscape was. in terms of religion, the absolute majority was roman catholic followed by a studies on national movements 6 (2020) | articles | 4 tamás székely minority of lutherans who were especially present in the germanspeaking towns. as a result of mass immigration during the nineteenth century, significant jewish communities existed across the region as well.7 despite their germanophile attitude and the anti-semitic tendencies shown occasionally by the ethnic hungarian majority, they considered themselves not as an ethnic minority but as a religious subgroup within the hungarian community. at the highest level of society were a number of wealthy hungarian aristocratic families such as the famous esterházy family who had held the hereditary office of lord lieutenant of the sopron county since the seventeenth century.8 public life was dominated by the hungarian-born middle and lower nobility, who held the important offices in the county’s administration as well.9 by far the largest social group across all three main ethnic groups was the peasantry, as the region’s economy remained dominantly agricultural. by the end of the long nineteenth century, new social groups (bourgeoisie and industrial workers) appeared on the scene as a result of the increasingly rapid industrialization and modernization that took place all over the country. consequently, the region’s society became considerably more diverse in terms of group identities, which, in the age of nationalism, sometimes led to political and social conflicts. however, it is difficult to determine whether and to what extent the side-effects of an otherwise integrative process of nation-state-building and modernization contributed to the disintegration of the society in western hungary in the decades prior to the first world war. until now, only a limited amount of research has been done at the regional and local level on the question of the security of national minorities and whether a dramatization of security issues took place in western hungary. in my view, the complicated relationship between the regional administration and local identities, interconnected with the nationality question, should be understood as a key pre-war disintegrative force. studies on national movements 6 (2020) | articles tamás székely 5 | the term ‘contested self-governance’ summarizes this phenomena very well since it refers to the controversial transformation of hungary’s historic territorial administration at the end of the nineteenth century.10 hungary had been subdivided into counties (in historic term: municipalities) since the middle ages, which served as a refuge for the hungarian nobility’s corporative positions against the habsburg administration. as the counties constituted an important arena for local political opinion-making for centuries, they played an integral role in the nobility’s local and regional identity. however, when hungary regained its sovereignty within the habsburg monarchy in 1867, the hungarian elites were able to establish their own national parliament and government, and attempted to transform a pre-modern, multi-ethnic kingdom into a modern and unified nation state.11 as a result of the reforms implemented step-by-step after 1870, the counties conceded an increasing number of legal and administrative responsibilities to the central government. in this new era, the counties were no longer really seen as self-governing and identity-forming territorial units but as integral elements of the national administration that conveyed the decisions of the government and parliament at the local level.12 simultaneously, the western-hungarian elites traditionally had patriotic and pro-habsburg sentiments, and thus supported the 1867 policies, including the centralization of the public administration. however, the transformation of the state was achieved by the old elites and they might have failed to establish a new regional identity that facilitated the integration of the non-hungarian communities into the nation state. this phenomenon is even more noticeable in the case of the so-called ‘free royal cities’. the country’s new political structure changed the conditions not only for the counties, but also for those cities that had held town privileges for centuries. they were not part of the counties but now they lost most of their privileges, including the right to directly communicate with the government. in western hungary, three of the studies on national movements 6 (2020) | articles | 6 tamás székely four towns that did have a self-governing tradition (i.e. kőszeg/güns, kismarton/eisenstadt and ruszt/rust) were incorporated into their respective counties in the 1870s. only the region’s most important city, sopron/ödenburg, was able to maintain some autonomy, though at a decreased level. as these were mostly german-speaking towns, their enforced incorporation into the counties (1876) was not just a matter of territorial administration but a question of nation-building. as károly mérey, the lord lieutenant of the four cities himself wrote in his resignation letter in 1874, he had to work under critical circumstances ‘in those four german-minded, unpatriotic and wrongly educated towns’.13 one should be aware that, according to the nationality law of 1868, the society of hungary was composed of several different nationalities (including ‘hungarian’ itself) that had equal rights and liberties and together formed one single political nation, which was also to be called hungarian.14 in reality, however, the representatives of the ethnic minorities never really shared this vision of the hungarian elites and desperately resisted the government’s so-called ‘magyarization’ efforts. in the counties of moson, sopron, and vas, similarly to the nationwide situation, the ethnic hungarians enjoyed only a relative majority over non-hungarian minorities. furthermore, moson was the only one of the 63 counties where germans enjoyed an absolute majority over other ethnic groups. the western border area was predominantly inhabited by german speakers, which caused the hungarian authorities to see a potential national security issue in pan-german nationalism and separatism. these worries were not entirely unfounded, at least not after the turn of the century. in 1908, a bohemia-born journalist of german origin, josef patry, wrote a political leaflet entitled westungarn zu deutschösterreich.15 this should be considered one of the first signs of the subsequent western hungarian crisis. the leaflet was published by studies on national movements 6 (2020) | articles tamás székely 7 | the vienna-based pan-german journal alldeutsches tageblatt and the hundreds of copies were circulated among austrian readers as well as the german-speaking inhabitants of western hungary. patry’s vision was indeed innovative as he invented ‘western hungary’ as a modern geopolitical term. according to the vision of the austrian branch of the pan-german ideology, german-austria should be established on the ruins of the austro-hungarian monarchy. the ultimate goal of this new state-formation would be the eventual unification with germany, but, prior to that, it aimed to incorporate all the german-speaking inhabitants of the habsburg lands into one single political unit.16 in terms of geography, that was obviously an impossible idea, since most of the ethnic german population in hungary and transylvania, as well as in bohemia and moravia, lived either thinly spread or very far from the core provinces of german-austria. what they could easily do without much risk, however, was to speculate about the future border between austria and hungary. patry envisioned an imminent collapse of the austrohungarian dual monarchy and advocated the complete redrawing of the political map of central and eastern europe. in exchange for western hungary, the german nationalist in austria would have offered the provinces of dalmatia and bosnia to hungary, though they demanded not only the german-speaking border area but also a far larger territory between the river rába/raab and the danube. even though patry ruled out using military means to resolve the border question, he urged the 200 german representatives of the austrian parliament to protect their compatriots in western hungary from the ‘culturally inferior hungarians’. he also invited the german-speaking intellectuals, university students and even tourists from both sides of the border to join their cause. the leaflet triggered outrage in hungary. the question of the western border was even raised in the hungarian parliament in budapest on february 26, 1908, when hugó laehne, an mp from the kőszeg/güns studies on national movements 6 (2020) | articles | 8 tamás székely district, addressed prime minister sándor wekerle.17 although laehne himself was born in sopron/ödenburg and was of german origin, he was also a member of the hungarian nationalist ‘party of independence and ’48’, and strongly demanded the immediate elimination of pan-german propaganda from hungary: ‘not at the moment when this movement is producing results, but now, when it is still in its infancy, should this [movement] be eliminated. […] we must not let citizens of foreign states stir up emotions and question the territorial integrity of our country’, laehne told his fellow members of parliament.18 in one of the biggest political dailies, a resident of western hungary reacted mockingly and furiously to the speculations about his homeland.19 according to jános breit from sopronkeresztúr/deutschkreuz, the hungarian authorities had to be aware of the pan-german danger from austria and nip the propaganda in the bud: ‘we, hungarians cannot do anything but draw the urgent conclusion that the twelfth hour has arrived.’20 he pointed out that the pan-german movement seemed to be showing anti-habsburg tendencies; therefore he urged the austrian prosecutor to carry out an investigation into josef patry’s political activities. indeed, as long as both austria and hungary were under habsburg rule by historic right, there was no room for any kind of border dispute between the two sides. furthermore, western hungary was traditionally the most royalist and pro-habsburg regions of hungary, which contributed to the difficulties regarding the incorporation of the region into the left-wing dominated republic of austria after the war. in a few years’ time the potential danger of pan-german nationalism became part of everyday administration in western hungary. just before the war, in april 1914, for instance, the ministry of interior affairs instructed the lord lieutenant of vas county to keep an eye on local peasant organizations as they might have connections with a budapestbased pan-german umbrella organization called deutscher bauernbund studies on national movements 6 (2020) | articles tamás székely 9 | aus den ländern der ungarischen krone.21 the lord lieutenant carried out a thorough investigation, receiving reports from the district administrators of németújvár/güssing and szentgotthárd/st. gotthard on the activities of an ethnic german citizen named carl wollinger. he was accused of using local savings bank branches to spread ideas of german nationalism among the border area population. according to the reports, as a result of wollinger’s activities, some villages had already started to demand the use of german language in local administration instead of the official state language. a few years later, the hungarian elites would have been happy to grant this basic right in their desperate attempt to stop western hungary’s disintegration. western hungary as hinterland of the great war (19141918) as we have seen, the austria-hungary border conflict between 1918 and 1921 did not come out of nowhere. still, it would take much more to argue that the post-war conflict was deeply rooted in the pre-war political, social, economic and cultural developments of the region. what we have witnessed is the activity of a number of political adventurers or visionaries who might have had enough intellectual capacity to become the protagonists of a cause but certainly lacked the power and political influence to make it come true. without a major turn that would radically change the political attitude of both the elites and the ordinary people, the idea of moving the austria-hungary border tens of kilometers eastwards would not have tempted a great audience. recent research on east central european political thought points out that ‘one of the most unintended consequences’ of the first world war was that it served as a ‘laboratory for testing the radical doctrines’, including social studies on national movements 6 (2020) | articles | 10 tamás székely darwinism’s vision of a zero-sum game, and of the effects of the turn of the century in real life and on real people.22 source: m. vares, the question of western hungary/burgenland 1918-1923. a territorial question in the context of national and international policy (doctoral dissertation, university of jyväskylä, 2008), 325. studies on national movements 6 (2020) | articles tamás székely 11 | was it therefore the war and its consequences that made the western hungarian people’s indifference towards nationalist appeals disappear within a short period of time? the academic concept of ‘national indifference’ suggests it probably was.23 this concept has become one of the main issues in international research on nations and nationalism in recent times; it claims that the nationalist struggle in the habsburg-ruled countries was not driven by a mass movement for the nation, but rather the opposite: indifference, ambivalence and opportunism of ‘ordinary people’ when dealing with issues of nationhood and with claims made by nationalists. the american sociologist rogers brubaker, a pioneer of the concept, argued that national identities are not the logical outcome of an already existing ethnic identity, nor is the nation a real group, but rather a practical category, an institutionalized form, and a contingent event.24 brubaker and his followers took the constructivist paradigm further to challenge anthony smith’s ethno-symbolist position as well as miroslav hroch’s phase theory of national movements and michael billig’s analysis about the relentless spread of banal nationalism in modern society. proponents of ‘national indifference’ insist there was no mass breakthrough of nationalism in the habsburg lands before the first world war but that it was the general breakdown of society because of the war that created the conditions for the ‘massification’ of national movements.25 when the heir to the imperial (austria) and royal (hungary) thrones, archduke franz ferdinand, and his wife were killed by gavrilo prinzip in sarajevo on june 28, 1914, nobody expected that a four-year-long world war would break out. obviously, the governing elites of the dual monarchy had been aware of the threatening potential of an armed conflict, but the ordinary citizens were not yet in a hurry to sacrifice themselves for ‘sacred war aims’.26 franz ferdinand was certainly not a popular figure in hungary, as his so-called ‘belvedere circle’ had been openly advocating the structural overhaul of the dual monarchy for studies on national movements 6 (2020) | articles | 12 tamás székely many years, first and foremost at the territorial expense of hungary.27 the famous proposal of the vereinigte staaten von groß-österreich (united states of greater austria), drafted by the archduke’s right hand man, the ethnic romanian lawyer aurel popovici, in 1906, would have meant a trianon-like disintegration of the lands of the holy crown. the proposal has been discussed by historians, but only limited attention has been paid to the fact that it would have granted the predominantly german-speaking parts of western hungary, including large parts of vas, the sopron counties and the entire moson county with the addition of the cities of sopron/ödenburg and pozsony/pressburg to german austria, one of the 15 different federal states of the envisioned greater austria. with franz ferdinand’s death, the proposal was taken off the agenda only to make an unexpected return in a somewhat different form four years later. since the archduke was also to inherit the hungarian throne, a period of nationwide mourning took place, with black flags hoisted on public buildings and entertainment events cancelled all over hungary. the minister of interior affairs informed the lord lieutenants of the counties about the tragic news via telegram.28 on july 1, 1914, the roman catholic bishop of szombathely celebrated a mass in honor of the late royal couple. on the very same day, the imperial defense minister informed the hungarian government about the plans for a ‘larger military exercise’ in the austria-hungary border area, which of course never took place due to the outbreak of the war.29 on july 2, the assembly of sopron county sent its condolences via telegram to the viennese court.30 in his speech to his fellow assembly members, dr istván tálas drew a comparison between the deaths of crown prince rudolf (1889) and archduke franz ferdinand and emphasized sopron county’s close attachment to the latter, who in the past had been known as the colonel of the regiment of county hussars. the assembly of moson county also expressed its condolences to the royal family.31 studies on national movements 6 (2020) | articles tamás székely 13 | the great war broke out on july 28, 1914, when austria-hungary declared war on serbia.32 soon, the dual monarchy found itself in a very difficult two-front war as the tsarist russian army easily invaded galicia and pushed in the direction of kraków as well as into the northeastern counties of hungary on the western side of the carpathian mountains. in may 1915, italy also entered the war on the side of the entente powers, opening a third front in the southwest for the control of the adriatic sea and the southern alps. the following year in august, romania joined the entente and attacked austria-hungary from the southeast in the hope of the annexation of transylvania and the bánát region. although with german assistance the austro-hungarian troops fought back and the central powers even invaded bucharest, the romanian conflict tied down significant military capacities for the rest of the war. as the initial illusion of a quickly concluded war completely shattered after a couple of months, it became increasingly obvious that those powers that produced more supplies and provided greater numbers of reinforcements in terms of manpower, weapons and food would have a better chance to win the war. in this regard, the central powers proved to be lagging behind the entente, especially after the united states entered the war in 1917.33 geographically, the region of western hungary was located quite far from all the war zones, yet it was destined to face the tragic consequences of becoming a hinterland of the war. the war posed an enormous challenge to the public administration. the local authorities—the counties as well as the towns—were forced to switch from peace to war mode as soon as possible. in the latter, there was no room for traditional forms of self-governance as everything had to be sacrificed for the sake of the war effort. unlike elsewhere, in the predominantly germanspeaking district of kismarton/eisenstadt, the district administrator was able to implement the transition more or less smoothly.34 lajos wolf, who became known as the vice-lieutenant of sopron county in the studies on national movements 6 (2020) | articles | 14 tamás székely interwar period, established the local unit of the red cross, supported the left-behind poor families and organized a military hospital, among other things. he had to deliver the unpopular tasks as well, including the introduction of war loans and the management of local military mobilizations and requisition of food and equipment. in the course of time, these practices, as well as other wartime miseries, turned the local population against the authorities. in non-hungarian regions public discontent typically took the form of anti-hungarian sentiments. the hatred increased even more when local civil servants, whose salaries drastically lost value due to wartime inflation, were involved in corruption or abuse of power.35 listing the series of wartime difficulties, it is necessary to emphasize that almost every family—regardless of their ethnic background—lost at least one or two family members, typically fathers and sons, during the war. during the first four months of 1915 alone, the austro-hungarian army lost 800,000 soldiers—either killed or captured—in the battles against russia for the east carpathian and galician territories.36 although the state censorship did the utmost to control publishing and the circulation of newspapers, bad news spread anyway.37 in the village of káld in vas county, for example, a local doctor named gyula götzl from the nearby town of jánosháza was accused of scaremongering. according to an investigation by the local district administrator, götzl just could not stop talking publicly about tragic news from the front that contradicted the official military reports. the doctor unwillingly caused such a great panic and desperation among the women of the village that local authorities felt obliged to intervene.38 the unprecedented scale of human and material losses on the one hand demoralized the society of the hinterland, whilst on the other hand undermining the agricultural and industrial production. the lack of men on the farms and in the factories, together with the increasing military requisition of food, clothes, boots and other goods and equipment, massively deteriorated the quality of life across the country.39 in spite of studies on national movements 6 (2020) | articles tamás székely 15 | contemporary and posterior marxist arguments, the elites had been very much aware of the suffering of the poor and cared for their needs, as is mirrored, for example, in a confidential message by a cabinet member to the head of vas county.40 however, the deprivation of the many was going hand in hand with the enrichment of the few. either as official or black-market suppliers of the army, some traders and landlords became so wealthy within a short period of time that it caused widespread public outrage. in many cases the villagers, angered by the magnates who lived far from their vast farmlands channeled their hate towards the local servants of the public administration. these locally evolved tensions escalated more and more into a strange combination of ethnic and class hatred, often as antisemitism and anti-magyarism. the ethnic hatred spread like an epidemic because of the refugee crisis too. in 1915-1916, tens of thousands were forced to leave their homes behind in galicia, in northeastern hungary and in transylvania during the attack of the russian and romanian troops.41 these refugees temporarily migrated to the hinterland regions, mostly to budapest and vienna but also to the countryside, including western hungary, and their arrival put an extra heavy burden on the local society.42 as most of the refugees from galicia were of either of slavic or jewish background, they faced a strange combination of generous support and ethnic discrimination from the side of the hinterland population. at the same time, similar “ethnic boxes” were created spontaneously on the front within the divisions of the otherwise heterogeneous austro-hungarian army. these processes in a previously functioning multi-ethnic society clearly foreshadowed the post-war hostilities between the different ethnic groups. since austria-hungary was at war with both serbia and russia, slavic people in general, especially south-slavs and/or those of orthodox religion, were securitized from the very beginning of the war. whether they were prisoners of war, citizens of foreign states in internment camps or even austrian/hungarian citizens, in the eyes of the authorities studies on national movements 6 (2020) | articles | 16 tamás székely they all had the potential to stir up anti-war sentiments, undermine the government and betray the dual monarchy, desert the army, and possibly join the enemy. spying on foreign agents and surveillance of suspicious figures and associations therefore became part of everyday life. in western hungary, the croatian minority, which was spread rather thinly along the border, showed no sign of ethnic-based frustration, but the slovenes formed a compact ethnic block in the southwestern corner of vas county. because of this muraköz/medžimurje micro-region, vas county was considered one of those “southern” counties of hungary that could be targeted by south-slavic aspirations. for instance, in july 1915, the ministry of interior affairs instructed the leadership of these counties to prevent the circulation of a leaflet by the “south-slavic student association”. the text of the leaflet harshly criticized germans, austrians and hungarians over the alleged oppression of slavic peoples who were now urged to join the war effort of the entente powers.43 in contrast to the pan-slavic paranoia, the question of pan-german nationalism was temporarily taken off the agenda during the war years in hungary, which can be explained through the close military alliance with the german empire. as the killing continued on the front, the miseries of war hit the big cities even more, mostly in the form of food rationing, and the lack of coal and every kind of material that is indispensable for everyday life.44 the food crisis was even worse in vienna than in budapest, which contributed to austria’s dependence on western hungary. due to the geographical distance, the farmers, craftsmen and traders of western hungary, those of german origin in particular, used to sell their products on the viennese markets long before the war. the increasing need for agricultural products in the imperial capital strengthened this economic bond even further. until the end of the war, austria and hungary formed a customs union under habsburg rule, which meant that there was no legal obstacle to western hungary’s economic gravitation towards vienna. during the studies on national movements 6 (2020) | articles tamás székely 17 | war, the legal trade was no longer able to meet the increasing demands, therefore an intensive cross-border smuggling activity evolved between western hungary and vienna, which accelerated even more in the years of the border crisis (1918-1921). the hungarian border police put a lot of effort into curbing the illegal export of food.45 the prospect of the end of the war with the potential collapse of the dual monarchy hinted at the possibility of a hard border between austria and hungary. such a future border would have not only isolated the starving city of vienna from western hungarian agriculture but would also have harmed the economic interests of the border area population profiting from either legal or illegal food trade. from the republic of heinzenland to the german autonomy of western hungary when it became obvious that the austro-hungarian monarchy was losing the war, the days of the ancient regime were already numbered in vienna as well as in budapest. although the borders of the monarchy were still intact and the still existing austro-hungary army stood on the enemy’s soil and not the opposite, the dual monarchy collapsed from the inside in the fall of 1918. a revolutionary wave swept through the habsburg lands as the so-called national councils were established all over the regions of the former empire.46 in cisleithania, charles i – as emperor of austria – issued the schönbrunn proclamation on the day of the armistice (november 11), in which he recognized the right of the austrian people to decide over the form of the state. two days later – as king charles iv of hungary – he also put his signature on a similar document known as the eckartsau proclamation, issued for the lands of the holy crown (transleithania). charles relinquished his participation in the administration of both of his realms but did not abdicate from the two studies on national movements 6 (2020) | articles | 18 tamás székely thrones, leaving the option for a future return to power open. on november 12, 1918, the austrian national council in vienna declared austria to be a democratic republic, which was to be part of the new german republic. meanwhile in budapest, the hungarian national council announced the independent hungarian people’s republic under the leadership of mihály károlyi on november 16. the ‘red count’ and his leftist circles seized power as a result of the so-called aster revolution in budapest on october 31, on the very same day that istván tisza, a symbolic figure of the old regime, was killed by unknown terrorists. in both countries, the new political elites introduced a new ideology linked with the promise of a better future after the misery of the war. consequently, the 400-year bond between austria and hungary, embodied by the habsburg dynasty, was finally broken. both republics pursued moderately left-wing and social-democrat social and economic policies on the one hand, and proentente foreign policies on the other hand, while simultaneously promoting nationalist and anti-royalist sentiments.47 in addition, both countries faced similar challenges, including a catastrophic economic situation, social turmoil, a food and coal crisis and the uncontrolled return of tens of thousands of brutalized and demoralized soldiers from the front. furthermore, over the coming weeks and months, austria as well as hungary lost enormous territories to the successor states of the habsburg monarchy. with the military intervention of the entente powers, austria yielded south tirol to italy, ceded bosnia, dalmatia, carniola and parts of carinthia to the serbcroat-slovene kingdom, relinquished galicia to poland and lost bohemia and moravia to the czechs and slovaks. at the same time, the romanian army occupied transylvania and eastern hungary, the serbs annexed southern hungary and croatia, while the czech troops marched into northern hungary to establish the new state of czechoslovakia. millions studies on national movements 6 (2020) | articles tamás székely 19 | of german and hungarian speakers became at once ethnic minority groups in their own homeland after the war. moreover, both austria and hungary lost significant industrial and agricultural capacities that would have helped to overcome their economic crises. the main difference between post-war austria and hungary was that, while the new austrian state was able to survive its internal crisis under the leadership of the social-democrat chancellor, karl renner, in hungary the károlyi administration failed to live up to the expectations, paving the road for the radicalization of politics. as a result of a wellorganized coup d'état in budapest on march 21, 1919, the extreme left rose to power and established the republic of councils in hungary. following in the footsteps of soviet russia, the hungarian communists, led by béla kun, stirred up class hatred and implemented bolshevik social and economic policies by exerting ‘red terror’ for 133 days. in order to create a corridor towards russia, the hungarian red army even launched military operations against the czech and romanian troops with much success against the former and less against the latter. one should be aware that, in this period, the domestic political situation in vienna was also critical; the chance of an austrian version of the bolshevik revolution was a distinct possibility. however, it did not happen, and, as a result, austria was able to negotiate the peace terms, at least to some extent, with the entente powers whose diplomats had been gathering in paris since january 1919 to discuss the future borders of europe. although the communist regime collapsed by the end of july, the political turmoil in hungary ended only in november 1919 after right wing, counter-revolutionist groups under the leadership of miklós horthy rose to power and took revenge on the revolutionists in the form of ‘white terror’. in western hungary, the national councils were established in late october and the early days of november 1918. they were the local branches of the hungarian national council in budapest and were ready studies on national movements 6 (2020) | articles | 20 tamás székely to take over the public administration.48 the members of these local councils came from either nationalist-independentist or left-wing, democratic backgrounds with a conventional interpretation of hungarian history that the age-old marriage with habsburg austria was a fatal failure.49 they had to realize soon that austria would not let them just walk away after the disappearance of the habsburgs. the government of german-austria (staatsrat) officially announced its claim on the german-inhabited territories of moson, sopron and vas with the addition of the city of pozsony/pressburg/bratislava on november 12, 1918. as mari vares points out, neither the formation of the republic of austria, nor the struggle for western hungary, can be interpreted without the context of pan-german nationalism in the former habsburg monarchy.50 the historic wish that all the germans of the habsburg empire had the right to form their own state and to eventually join germany also explains why the austrian government defined the question of ‘being a german’ in accordance to wilsonism and why they formally insisted on the idea that the new austrian state territory was based on the voluntary union of german people. although a delegation of ethnic german farmers from western hungary paid a visit to vienna to request the annexation, the vast majority of the society of western hungary was yet to be convinced of the cause. in order to make it happen, the austrian government established the so-called westungarische kanzlei (western hungary bureau) in vienna. this authority was responsible for the preparation of the annexation through an intensive propaganda campaign that aimed to speed up the historic region’s disintegration.51 over the course of the next weeks austrian agents and agitators showed up in the borderland villages, distributing pro-austria and anti-hungary flyers among the german-speaking population. in early november, the locals of nagymarton/mattersburg chased the hungarian public servants away and their children threw the textbooks to the floor in studies on national movements 6 (2020) | articles tamás székely 21 | school while chanting ‘we do not want to learn hungarian anymore’.52 on november 17, a joint gathering was held by the border villages of savanyúkút/bad sauerbrunn and pecsenyéd/pöttsching, where locals declared their intention to join austria.53 on december 2, austrian officers visited the village of szentmargitbánya/st. margarethen, urging the local stone miners to start civil unrest in the nearby town of ruszt/rust.54 three days later, a truck transporting 300 rifles from the lower austrian city of wiener neustadt arrived in the border village of lajtaújfalu/neufeld an der leitha, but the hungarian police arrested the crew and confiscated the shipment. on december 5, a similar shipment reached the town of nagymarton/mattersburg, where the weapons were successfully distributed among pro-austria locals who aimed to take control over the area surrounding the town.55 the next day, also in nagymarton/mattersburg, a local social democrat, hans suchard, proclaimed the republic of heinzenland, a name referring to an ethniclinguistic subgroup of western hungary germans. this artificial ministate was brought to existence with the clear purpose to cut out a piece of the territory of hungary and prepare its annexation to austria. the following day, the hungarian army deployed an armored train and a machine gun squad to the town, forcing the rebels to surrender without bloodshed. although the interrogations at the police headquarters in sopron/ödenburg suggested otherwise, the austrian government denied any role in these highly controversial events as well as any connection to the short-lived republic of heinzenland. vienna tried to avoid an open conflict with hungary even if good relations with the eastern neighbor were not considered a top priority. the post-war austrian foreign policy was much more focused on convincing the entente diplomats to support the basic interests of the republic, such as minimalizing territorial losses at its northern and southern borders, and to keep the option of a pan-german unification open.56 studies on national movements 6 (2020) | articles | 22 tamás székely meanwhile in hungary, the territory of the one-time kingdom was getting smaller day by day. the károlyi-administration either did not want to or was just not able to organize substantive military resistance against the invasion of the little entente troops, while still feeding the illusion that a fair peace treaty could be reached by the great entente powers in paris.57 oszkár jászi, the minister of nationalities, attempted but failed to keep the romanians, serbs and slovaks within the borders of hungary by offering their leaders maximum autonomy. jászi, who enjoyed a much better reputation as a scholar than a politician, even envisioned a switzerland-like danube confederation that would mirror some ideas of the above-mentioned plan of the belvedere circle on great austria (1906).58 the prospects of ethnic autonomy, however, could have delayed the change of the historic border in the west as an influential group of germans in western hungary, namely the german national council, deemed an autonomous german region within hungary a more persuasive option than annexation to austria or a continuation of the traditional hungarian rule.59 on january 28, 1919, the károlyiadministration passed the law ‘on the practice of self-government of the german people of hungary’, recognizing the right of the germanspeaking communities of hungary to create ‘autonomous self-governing zones’ in areas where they formed the majority. even though the western hungary border area constituted such a territory, the boundaries, structure, level of self-governance and its reconciliation with the existing public administration caused a series of local conflicts during the remaining two months of the ill-fated republic.60 the issue of german autonomy in western hungary was not taken off the agenda during the time of the communist dictatorship (19 march-1 august 1919) either. on the contrary, the bolshevik leaders considered western hungary a bridge towards austria, the country they hoped would become the next scene of the world revolution. the so-called gaurat für deutsch westungarn [territory council for german west studies on national movements 6 (2020) | articles tamás székely 23 | hungary] in sopron/ödenburg was first held at the end of april 1919, establishing an autonomous ethnic german territory for the first time in the region’s history. as of this time, the austria-hungary border area was seen as an autonomous body of the republic of councils in hungary administrated by the german regional council in sopron and the german western hungarian regional people’s office. however, in many multiethnic towns and villages, german autonomy was introduced in parallel with the new bolshevik system, while the remains of the traditional administration still existed. the multiple institutions once again led to a series of local conflicts, if not chaos. all in all, the communist experiment massively contributed to the disintegration of historic western hungary. it not only detached a specific area from the territories of the moson, sopron and vas counties, but, through bolshevik policies, it also deterred the dominantly catholic, conservative and rural society of western hungary from the parent state. moreover, vienna could rightfully argue in front of the entente powers that the region could only be protected from the communist terror through its annexation to austria. from saint-germain to the sopron plebiscite the fate of austria was ultimately decided when the treaty of saintgermain was signed on september 10, 1919.61 after months of multilateral negotiations, the entente powers agreed with vienna that the austro-hungarian monarchy would be dissolved; therefore, austria had to recognize the independence of the successor states, including hungary. the former cisleithanian austria lost about 60 percent of its prewar territory, most of it already occupied by the great and little entente armies. furthermore, it was strictly forbidden for austria to use the name ‘german-austria’ and join germany under any circumstances. studies on national movements 6 (2020) | articles | 24 tamás székely the treaty however awarded the western parts of the moson, sopron and vas counties, including the city of sopron/ödenburg, to austria, although this amounted to a somewhat smaller territory than expected: 4364 square kilometers with 350,000 inhabitants, including 250,000 german speakers. the treaty of saint-germain also meant the entente powers rejected prague’s surrealistic idea of establishing a ‘slavic corridor’ between czechoslovakia and the serb-croat-slovene kingdom through the territory of western hungary. the fate of hungary was ultimately decided on june 4, 1920 in the form of the treaty of trianon.62 due to the political chaos (romanian invasion in northern transdanubia, counter-revolution and ‘white terror’ elsewhere, etc.), the new hungarian regime in budapest had only been consolidated in november 1919, months after the collapse of the communist dictatorship. the kingdom was restored without the return of the habsburgs to the throne when miklós horthy, the leading figure of the counter-revolutionist movement, was elected regent on march 1, 1920. although in the following months the hungarian diplomats did their utmost to improve the peace terms, the treaty of trianon mirrored the current status quo: hungary was sentenced to lose 71 percent of its prewar territory, including the western parts awarded to austria by the treaty of saint-germain. the difference between western hungary and the other territories was that, while most of the latter were de facto already lost at the end 1918, western hungary remained under some sort of hungarian administration throughout the crisis years up until november 1921. on the one hand, hungary was reluctant to evacuate the territory in the hope of a regional plebiscite or a turn in power relations; on the other hand, austria lacked the military capacity to enforce the evacuation. furthermore, after the fall of the 133-day communist regime, the regional political forces in western hungary gravitated once again more towards counter-revolutionist hungary rather than socialist austria. studies on national movements 6 (2020) | articles tamás székely 25 | as the new hungarian regime’s rise to power began in august 1919, public administration in western hungary was reorganized through a new legal framework, the so-called government commission for western hungary. this authority was headquartered in szombathely— the largest hungarian-inhabited city of the region and the administrative center of vas county—with the aim to reorganize and coordinate the administration of four western counties: zala, vas, sopron and moson. under the leadership of the government commissioners antal sigray and józsef cziráky, the remains of the territorial german autonomy were completely abolished, and western hungary was once again managed by the traditional county administration. however, due to the border dispute and the possibility of a future plebiscite, public servants were constantly reminded to pay special attention to the needs of the germanspeaking citizens, including their right to use their mother tongue in local administration.63 on february 18, 1920, the representatives of western hungary in the national assembly sent their report to the ministry of nationalities, in which they called for an even more delicate approach to the german question in western hungary. they insisted that economic support and improved living standards would be the best way to earn the trust of the locals, instead of sending agitators from budapest.64 meanwhile the question of the croatian minority appeared on the agenda too. the catholic priest of pásztorháza/stinatz/stinjaki, péter jandresevits, who was known as the self-appointed commissioner of western hungary’s croatian community, started negotiations with both the county authorities and the central government. in exchange for the croats’ proven loyalty to hungary, he demanded the extension of minority rights in public administration and education. jandresevits also warned that the poor economic situation might speed up the region’s disintegration.65 the fate of western hungary was still hanging in the balance. over the course of 1920 and 1921, austria and hungary were engaged in studies on national movements 6 (2020) | articles | 26 tamás székely continuous negotiations and embittered diplomatic competition for the disputed territory.66 austria demanded the entente powers to force hungary to evacuate the area and also continued the underground propaganda campaign among the german-speaking border area population. at the same time, hungary took advantage of the public administration to reverse the disintegration process and demanded the revision of the austria-hungary border in the respective peace treaties, or at least the possibility of holding a plebiscite in the disputed territories. pál teleki, the hungarian prime minister, insisted on connecting the question of western hungary to the controversial issue of baranya county in south transdanubia, which, despite the provisions of the treaty of trianon, was still under serb occupation. in order to mediate between the two sides, the entente powers deployed a so-called inter-allied military mission to sopron/ödenburg. this authority was also intended to oversee the evacuation process in order to prevent further escalation of the crisis. after several proposals for sharing the disputed territory, hungary finally succeeded in reclaiming baranya county on august 27, 1921 and in exchange budapest agreed to evacuate western hungary on the very same day. according to the agreement, the hungarian authorities were to hand over the territory to the inter-allied military mission first, which would pass it over to the arriving austrian authorities.67 when a group of austrian gendarmeries, public servants and civilians crossed the historic border and headed toward sopron/ödenburg on august 28, probably both sides thought the crisis was coming to an end. however, a group of local rebels unexpectedly opened fire in the village of ágfalva/agendorf nearby sopron, forcing the austrians to retreat. this incident was the beginning of the so-called western-hungarian uprising that lasted until october 14. the few hundred rebels, who became known as the ‘scrubby guard’, engaged in months-long guerilla warfare across the region later called burgenland. they were led by pál prónai, a former studies on national movements 6 (2020) | articles tamás székely 27 | officer of the horthy army, who was infamous for his role in the ‘white terror’. among their ranks, we can find desperate locals as well as university students, former soldiers and political adventurers from other regions of the former monarchy, even a group of bosnian muslims. like one of the uprising’s prominent figures, viktor mádersprach, many of the rebels felt they had had no opportunity to defend their respective home regions but now saw an opportunity to fight for western hungary.68 the ‘scrubby guard’ not only successfully fought back the austrian gendarmeries and custom officers attempting to occupy the region in several waves, but also cleared and secured the entire disputed territory to create an artificial ministate named the banate of leitha. the capital of this highly controversial state was felsőőr/oberwart, a predominantly hungarian-speaking town in the south. they even issued their own postage stamps.69 the clear purpose of the state that de facto existed between october 4 and november 5, 1921, was to prevent the annexation of the territory to austria, even if it could not remain part of hungary. although prónai was in frequent contact with budapest and his rebels received unofficial and indirect support from hungary, the hungarian government was not able to control the uprising. in fact, many of the rebels claimed the horthy regime simply let down western hungary with the evacuation of the region. at the same time, hungary could argue vis-à-vis the entente powers that the western hungarian uprising proved that the people of the region had no intention to join austria. in order to resolve the crisis, italy volunteered to mediate between austria and hungary, inviting them to the negotiating table in venice. according to the venice protocol signed on october 13, hungary agreed to eliminate the banate of leitha, disarm the rebels, and fully evacuate the territory awarded to austria by the treaty of saint-german. in exchange, austria finally consented to hold a plebiscite in sopron/ödenburg and its surrounding villages.70 studies on national movements 6 (2020) | articles | 28 tamás székely the implementation of the venice protocol, however, suffered a delay due to an unexpected turn of events.71 charles, the former emperor of austria (under the name charles i) and the former king of hungary (as charles iv), surprisingly returned to western hungary in his second attempt to retake at least one of his former thrones, i.e. the hungarian one. while his first attempt during easter 1921 was thwarted in a peaceful manner, the second so-called ‘royal coup d'état’ in hungary led to a more serious conflict. after he received the support of the legitimist groups in western hungary, many of them involved in the uprising, charles’ airplane landed near the village of dénesfa. the king immediately visited sopron/ödenburg where he quickly established his alternative government and recruited a minor royalist army that marched on budapest. as the little entente powers threatened hungary with a military invasion in case of the restoration of the habsburg rule, horthy decided to stop charles by any means necessary. the legitimists suffered a defeat by the pro-government forces in the battle of budaörs on october 23, and charles was placed under military custody in the monastery of tihany. although he did not abdicate the throne, he was forced into exile in madeira where he passed away few months later after contracting the spanish flu. in order to avoid a little entente intervention, the hungarian parliament passed a law to dethrone the habsburg dynasty whilst formally remaining a monarchy. the former western hungarian border area (nearly 4,000 square kilometers) was officially incorporated into austria on december 5, 1921, followed by the establishment of burgenland on january 1, 1922. however, in contrast to the original plan, it was not sopron/ödenburg that became the capital city of the new austrian ‘land’ but the town of eisenstadt/kismarton, since the plebiscite in sopron and in eight nearby villages proved to be in favor of hungary. the vote was held between december 14 and 16, 1921, under the supervision of the inter-allied mission. both sides waged desperate campaigns with flyers, posters, studies on national movements 6 (2020) | articles tamás székely 29 | newspapers and demonstrations.72 according to the 1920 census, about 50,000 people lived in the district of the plebiscite, of which 55 percent was german, 39 percent hungarian, 5 percent croatian and 1 percent of other ethnic background. in the city itself, hungarians and germans both made up nearly half of the population.73 according to the plebiscite regulations, 26,879 citizens had the right to vote and 89.5 percent of them participated in the voting. after all, 15,334 voted for hungary (65%), 8,227 for austria (35%) and 502 votes were found invalid. in sopron, 72 percent of the voters were in favor of hungary, which meant that even many german-speaking citizens rejected the idea of joining austria. in five of the eight villages, however, austria won with an overwhelming majority. as a result of the plebiscite and in contrast to the peace treaties of saint-germain and trianon, hungary reclaimed 257 square kilometers of its former territory with a city of symbolic value and regional significance. although the austrian government questioned the legitimacy of the outcome and accused the hungarian side of waging an unfair campaign and causing a series of irregularities such as transporting voters to sopron, the entente powers confirmed the decision and put an end to the three-year-long border conflict between austria and hungary. the nationalist struggle, however, continued both in budapest and in vienna during the interwar period in the form of mutual accusations, irredentism, counter-irredentism and speculation about the future of burgenland. for hungarians, the historic western territory remained one of the many ‘heart-breaking and unjust’ losses of the post-war peace treaties, whereas sopron/ödenburg had long been remembered in austria as the lost heart of burgenland (‘das verlorene herz des burgenlandes’).74 studies on national movements 6 (2020) | articles | 30 tamás székely summary the disintegration of historic western hungary and the birth of burgenland were an extremely complicated historic process in which the significance of modern nationalism and its radicalization during the great war cannot be underestimated. if we picture the old empire of austria-hungary as a jigsaw puzzle, then the western hungarian counties should be imagined as those oddly shaped, interlocking and mosaiced pieces that geographically as well as culturally connected the two halves of the empire. although the long but narrow area along the western border of the kingdom of hungary was predominantly german speaking for centuries, both countries were under habsburg rule under which questioning the historical borders would have simply been unreasonable. this radically changed around the turn of the century when modern nationalism broke through in public life and became a main driving force behind political aspirations. the new nationalist elites of the nondominant ethnic groups engaged themselves in speculations on how to change the historic borders in accordance with real or imagined ethnolinguistic boundaries all over east and central europe. in the case of western hungary, these speculations took place either among the high elites (i.e. the belvedere circle) or in the nationalist groups of the middle class, but could hardly reach the ordinary people who, in the beginning at least, responded with national indifference to the claims made by the protagonists of nationalism. this reluctance by the target audience slowly but surely disappeared during the first world war and the postwar chaos when the general breakdown of society created the conditions for the ‘massification’ of national movements. the misery of war and the series of local tensions escalated more and more in a strange combination of ethnic and class hatred. at the same time, the critical economic situation also contributed to the disintegration process as studies on national movements 6 (2020) | articles tamás székely 31 | crisis-stricken vienna was in great need of the western hungarian agriculture. after the collapse of the dual monarchy at the end of 1918, politics radically shifted to the left both in budapest and vienna, but it did not lose its nationalist character. on the contrary, the new, revolutionary leaderships entered the competition for the new borders after having helplessly witnessed the successor states claiming the former territory of their respective countries. however, it was socialist-led austria and not short-lived communist hungary that was able to articulate its policies in accordance with the interests of the big powers and thus to secure the international acknowledgment of at least some of its territorial demands. indeed, the decisive moment came when the paris peace conference (1919-1920) finally agreed to move the historic border between austria and hungary somewhat eastward. however, the exact location of the new border, and thus the fate of tens of thousands of germans, hungarians, and croats, remained a matter of embittered dispute between the competing neighbors up until the end of 1921. endnotes 1 this study was written within the framework of the dfg collaborative research centre/transregio 138 subproject at the herder institute in marburg, germany, entitled discourses on the rights of minorities and majorities in east central europe in the 19th and 20th century. learn more: https://www.herderinstitut.de/projekte/laufendeprojekte/versicherheitlichung-und-diskurseueber-rechte-von-minderheitenund-mehrheiten-in-ostmitteleuropa-im-19und-r more information on the collaborative research centre: https://www.sfb138.de 2 m. vares, the question of western hungary/burgenland 1918-1923 (doctoral dissertation, university of jyväskylä, 2008), 12. https://www.herder-institut.de/projekte/laufende-projekte/versicherheitlichung-und-diskurse-ueber-rechte-von-minderheiten-und-mehrheiten-in-ostmitteleuropa-im-19-und-20-jahrhundert.html https://www.herder-institut.de/projekte/laufende-projekte/versicherheitlichung-und-diskurse-ueber-rechte-von-minderheiten-und-mehrheiten-in-ostmitteleuropa-im-19-und-20-jahrhundert.html https://www.herder-institut.de/projekte/laufende-projekte/versicherheitlichung-und-diskurse-ueber-rechte-von-minderheiten-und-mehrheiten-in-ostmitteleuropa-im-19-und-20-jahrhundert.html https://www.herder-institut.de/projekte/laufende-projekte/versicherheitlichung-und-diskurse-ueber-rechte-von-minderheiten-und-mehrheiten-in-ostmitteleuropa-im-19-und-20-jahrhundert.html https://www.herder-institut.de/projekte/laufende-projekte/versicherheitlichung-und-diskurse-ueber-rechte-von-minderheiten-und-mehrheiten-in-ostmitteleuropa-im-19-und-20-jahrhundert.html https://www.herder-institut.de/projekte/laufende-projekte/versicherheitlichung-und-diskurse-ueber-rechte-von-minderheiten-und-mehrheiten-in-ostmitteleuropa-im-19-und-20-jahrhundert.html https://www.herder-institut.de/projekte/laufende-projekte/versicherheitlichung-und-diskurse-ueber-rechte-von-minderheiten-und-mehrheiten-in-ostmitteleuropa-im-19-und-20-jahrhundert.html https://www.herder-institut.de/projekte/laufende-projekte/versicherheitlichung-und-diskurse-ueber-rechte-von-minderheiten-und-mehrheiten-in-ostmitteleuropa-im-19-und-20-jahrhundert.html 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https://www.herder-institut.de/projekte/laufende-projekte/versicherheitlichung-und-diskurse-ueber-rechte-von-minderheiten-und-mehrheiten-in-ostmitteleuropa-im-19-und-20-jahrhundert.html https://www.herder-institut.de/projekte/laufende-projekte/versicherheitlichung-und-diskurse-ueber-rechte-von-minderheiten-und-mehrheiten-in-ostmitteleuropa-im-19-und-20-jahrhundert.html https://www.herder-institut.de/projekte/laufende-projekte/versicherheitlichung-und-diskurse-ueber-rechte-von-minderheiten-und-mehrheiten-in-ostmitteleuropa-im-19-und-20-jahrhundert.html https://www.sfb138.de/ https://www.sfb138.de/ https://www.sfb138.de/ studies on national movements 6 (2020) | articles | 32 tamás székely 3 ‘a nyugati határvidék sorsa (the fate of the western border territory)’, in: mosonvármegye xix/2 (9/01/1921), 1. 4 the ecclesiastical jurisdiction over some border villages was a matter of dispute between austrian provinces and hungary even in the late nineteenth century: f. pál, ‘a szombathelyi püspök joghatóságának kérdései 1867 és 1914 között (the questions of the jurisdiction of the bishop of szombathely between 1867 and 1914)’, in: vasi szemle, lxix/3 (2015), 335-341. 5 g. horváth, bécs vonzásában. az agrárpiacosodás feltételrendszere moson vármegyében a 19. század első felében (in the attraction of vienna. the preconditions of the agricultural marketing in moson county in the first half of the 19th century) (budapest 2013). 6 a magyar korona országaiban az 1891. év elején végrehajtott népszámlálás eredményei, i. rész: általános népleírás (results of the early 1891 census in the lands of the hungarian crown. part i. general description of the people), (budapest, 1893) [hereafter: census 1891], 100-111. 7 v. heuberger, ‘zwischen wien und budapest: der einfluß der deutschen sprache und kultur auf das westungarische judentum’, in: w. kriegleder & a. seidler (eds.), deutsche sprache und kultur, literatur und presse in westungarn/burgenland (bremen, 2004), 47-60. 8 the family’s historic attachment to sopron county was mentioned several times at the inauguration ceremony of the new lord lieutenant prince pál esterházy on october 27-28, 1872. see more: mnl [national archives of hungary] győr-moson-sopron megyei levéltár, soproni levéltára, sopron vármegye törvényhatósági bizottsága közgyűlési iratai, iv/402/b/54, no. 405. 9 their political influence was ensured by the so-called virilist system. in the era of dualism, half of the seats in county assemblies were reserved for the highest taxpayers. a list of the highest taxpayers in sopron county on november 10, 1871: mnl győr-moson-sopron megyei levéltár, soproni levéltára, sopron vármegye főispánjának iratai (1867-1871), iv/251/3, no. 118. 10 a comprehensive analysis of hungary’s constitutional development in the nineteenth century: l. péter, ‘die verfassungsentwicklung in ungarn’, in: h. rumpler & p. urbanitsch (eds.), die habsburgermonarchie 1848-1918. band vii/1, verfassung ind parlamentarismus (vienna, 2000), 239-540. studies on national movements 6 (2020) | articles tamás székely 33 | 11 a more detailed summary of the attempt: t. székely, ‘a közigazgatás átalakításának programja. modernizáció és nemzetállam-építés a dualizmus korában. (the program for transforming the public administration. modernization and nation-state-building in the era of dualism)’, in: n. csibi & á. schwarczwölder (eds.): modernizáció és nemzetáll'am-építés. haza és/vagy haladás dilemmája a dualizmus kori magyarországon. kronosz kiadó (pécs, 2018), 165-179. 12 several public figures of the era argued for a powerful and centralized nation state at the expense of the “medieval” autonomies. read more: b. grünwald, közigazgatásunk és a szabadság (our public administration and the liberty) (budapest, 1876) 78; g. beksics, új korszak és politikai programja (a new era and its political program) (budapest, 1889), 16-18. 13 lord-lieutant károly mérey’s resignation letter to vilmos tóth, minister of interior affairs on 24th of january 1874: mnl országos levéltára, k148, 83. d, 1867.iii., pp.19-20. 14 l. péter, ‘law of xliv of 1868 “on the equality of nationality rights” and the language of local administration’, in: m. lojkó (ed.), hungary’s long 19th century, collected studies by lászló péter (leiden-boston, 2012), 343-354. 15 in 1918, when the author’s unrealistic vision suddenly became a distinct possibility, he republished his thoughts as a book: j. patry, westungarn zu deutschösterreich (vienna, 2018). 16 r. saage, ‘die deutsche frage. die erste republik im spannungsfeld zwischen österreichischer und deutscher identität‘, in: h. konrad & w. maderthaner eds.), das werden der wersten republik… der rest ist österreich, band i (vienna, 2008), 65-82. 17 képviselőházi napló (1906) xvi. kötet (diary of the house of representatives of the hungarian parliament called in 1906, volume 16), 128-129. 18 ibid., 129. 19 ’nyugatmagyarországot a németeknek!’ (western hungary to the germans!), in: budapesti hírlap (22/02/1908), 5-6. 20 ibid., 6. studies on national movements 6 (2020) | articles | 34 tamás székely 21 letter from the ministry of interior affairs to istván békássy, the lord lieutenant of vas county, on 29th of march 1914. mnl vas megyei levéltára, főispáni elnöki iratok 1914, iv.401/a/7, res 51. 22 b. trencsenyi, m. kopeček, l. lisjak gabrijelčič, m. falina, m. baár (eds.), a history of modern political thought in east central europe. volume 1 (oxford, 2016), 631. 23 m. van ginderachteer & j. fox (eds.), national indifference and history of nationalism in modern europe (london-new york, 2019). 24 r. brubaker, nationalism reframed. nationhood and the national question in the new europe (cambridge, 1996), 13‐22. 25 t. zahra, ’imagined noncommunities: national indifference as a category of analysis’, in: slavic review 69/1 (2010), 93-119. 26 t. hajdu, f. pollmann, a régi magyarország utolsó háborúja 1914-1918 (the last war of the old hungary 1914-1918) (budapest, 2014), 63. 27 a. popovici, die vereinigten staaten von groß-österreich. politische studien zur lösung der nationalen fragen und staatrechtlichen krisen in österreichungarn (leipzig, 1906). 28 minister of interior affairs jános sándor’s telegram to istván békássy, the lord lieutenant of vas county, on 29th of june 1914: mnl vas megyei levéltára, főispáni elnöki iratok, iv.401/a/7, res. 80. 29 minister of interior affairs jános sándor’s letter to istván békássy, the lord lieutenant of vas county, on 7th of july 1914: mnl vas megyei levéltára, főispáni elnöki iratok, iv.401/a/7, res. 86. 30 the text of the mourning telegram was recorded in the protocol of the extraordinary assembly meeting of sopron county on july 2, 1914: mnl győrmoson-sopron megyei levéltár, soproni levéltára, sopron vármegye törvényhatósági bizottsága közgyűlési iratai, iv/402/b/59, 453.bgy. 12097/914. 31 ’vármegyénk közgyűlése’ (assembly of our county), in: mosonvármegye xii/57 (12/07/1914), 1. 32 on the military history of the habsburg monarchy in the great war in general: r. jeřábek, ‘militärisches potential und kriegsverlauf 1914-1918’, in: h. rumpler studies on national movements 6 (2020) | articles tamás székely 35 | (ed.), die habsburgmonarchie 1848-1918, band xi, 1. teilband (vienna, 2016), 209-283. 33 on the breakdown of the austro-hungarian war machine: m. rauchensteiner, j.broukal, der erste weltkrieg und das ende des habsburgermonarchie in aller kürze (vienna, 2015), 191-230. 34 t. balázs, ’gévay-wolff lajos sopron vármegyei alispán (1920-1938) élete és munkássága (the life and work of lajos gévay-wolff, vice-lieutenant of sopron county (1920-1938))’, in: arrabonna 41 (2004), 191-192. 35 hajdu, pollmann, a régi magyarország, 252-257. 36 ’statistics of the first world war casualties of austria-hungary’, in: h. rumpler (ed.), die habsburgmonarchie 1848-1918, band xi, 2. teilband, weltkriegsstatistik österreich-ungarn 1914-1918 (vienna, 2014), 161-182. 37 wartime instructions by istván békássy, the lord lieutenant of vas county, to the editorial groups of local newspaper: mnl vas megyei levéltára, főispáni elnöki iratok, iv.401/a/7, res.176. 38 report on the investigation into the gyula götzl case by the local authorities to istván békássy, the lord lieutenant of vas county on 14th of september 1914: mnl vas megyei levéltára, főispáni elnöki iratok, iv.401/a/7, res. 222. 39 ’élelmiszernyomorúság’ (food misery), in: mosonvármegye xiii/33 (13/06/1915), 1; ‘drágaság (high prices)’, in: mosonvármegye xiv/22 (28/05/1916), 1. 40 minister of interior affairs jános sándor’s letter to istván békássy, the lord lieutenant of vas county, on 10th of september 1914: mnl vas megyei levéltár, főispáni elnöki iratok, iv.401/a/7, res.244. 41 ’az erdélyi menekültek’ (refugees from transylvania), in: mosonvármegye xiv/41 (8/10/1916), 1. 42 government and county plans for the relocating of refugees on the territory of vas county (9th of january 1915): mnl vas megyei levéltár, főispáni elnöki iratok, iv.401/a/7, res.379. 43 government warning to the local authorities of propaganda by the south studies on national movements 6 (2020) | articles | 36 tamás székely slavic student association that aimed to recruit a south-slavic legion in austria hungary (29 january 1915): mnl vas megyei levéltár, főispáni elnöki iratok, iv.401/a/10, res 548. 44 latest research results about the (post)war difficulties in hungary: z. bódy (ed.), háborúból békébe: a magyar társadalom 1918 után, (from war to peace. the hungarian society after 1918) (budapest, 2018). 45 letter by jános sándor, minister of interior affairs, to all county leaders on the prevention of grain smuggling on 31st of october 1915: mnl vas megyei levéltár, főispáni elnöki iratok, iv.401/a/12, res. 869. 46 w. maderthaner, ‘die eigenartige größe der beschränkung. österreichs revolution im mitteleuropäischen spannungsfeld’, in: h. konrad & w. maderthaner (eds.), das werden der wersten republik… der rest ist österreich, band i (vienna, 2008), 187-206. 47 the holy crown of st. stephen, for instance, was removed from the coat of arms of hungary. ’a magyar címer és lobogó’ (the hungarian coat-of-arms and flag), in: mosonvármegye xvii/4 (26/1/1919), 1. 48 abstract of the protocol of the extraordinary county assembly meeting in sopron county held on 18th of november 1918: mnl győr-moson-sopron megye soproni levéltára, sopron vármegye törvényhatósági bizottsága közgyűlési iratai, iv/402/b/59, nr.18043, november 27, 1918. 49 ’megalakult a vármegyei nemzeti tanács’ (the national council of the county has been established), in: sopronvármegye (19/11/1918), 1-2; mnl győrmoson-sopron megye soproni levéltára, sopron vármegye törvényhatósági bizottsága közgyűlési iratai, iv/402/b/59, nr.18043, november 27, 1918. 50 vares, the question of western hungary/burgenland, 94-96. 51 j. botlik, nyugat-magyarország sorsa 1918-1922 (vasszilvágy, 2008), 24. (english translation: j. botlik, the fate of western hungary 1918-1922 (buffalo, ny, 2012)). 52 ’osztrák ügynökök szítják nagymartonban az elszakadás gondolatát’ (austrian agents propagate separatism in nagymarton), in: sopronvármegye (19/11/1918), 3; mnl győr-moson-sopron megye soproni levéltára, sopron vármegye törvényhatósági bizottsága közgyűlési iratai, iv/402/b/59, nr.18043, november 27, 1918. studies on national movements 6 (2020) | articles tamás székely 37 | 53 ’a savanyúkúti hazaárulók’ (the traitors of savanyúkút), in: soproni napló (20/11/1918), 3; mnl győr-moson-sopron megye soproni levéltára, sopron vármegye törvényhatósági bizottsága közgyűlési iratai, iv/402/b/59, nr.18043, november 27, 1918. 54 botlik, nyugat-magyarország, 25. 55 ibid., 25-27. 56 e. hanisch, ‘im zeichen von otto bauer. deutschösterreichs außenpolitik in den jahren 1918 and 1919’ in: helmut konrad & w. maderthaner (eds.), das werden der wersten republik… der rest ist österreich, band i (vienna, 2008), 207-222. 57 on hungary’s failure to organize military resistance in late 1918-early 1919: t. révész, nem akartak katonát látni? (they did not want to see any soldiers?) (budapest, 2019). 58 o. jászi, magyarország jövője és a dunai egyesült államok (the future of hungary and the united states of the danube area) (budapest, 1918). 59 the autonomy vs. annexation dilemma of local germans was discussed by both sides: g. zsombor: westungarn. zu ungarn oder zu österreich? (sopron/ödenburg, 1919); r. von pflaunder, die zukunft der deutschen in westungarn (vienna, 1919). 60 the local journal of moson county thoroughly discussed the issues around the german autonomy: ’mosonvármegye és a német kérdés’ (moson county and the german question), in: mosonvármegye xvii/1 (5/1/1919), 1; ’a nyugatmagyarországi németség’ (the germans of western hungary), in: mosonvármegye xvii/2 (12/1/1919), 1-2.; ‘a német autonómia és a nemzeti tanács’ (the german autonomy and the national council), in: mosonvármegye xvii/8 (23/02/1919), 1; ’a német autónómia’ (the german autonomy), in: mosonvármegye xvii/11 (16/3/1919), 1. 61 l. mikoletzky, ’saint germain und karl renner. eine republik wird “diktiert”’, in: h. konrad & w. maderthaner (eds.), das werden der wersten republik… der rest ist österreich, band i (vienna, 2008), 179-186. 62 for detailed analysis see: i. romsics, a trianoni békszerződés (the peace treaty of trianon) (budapest, 2007). studies on national movements 6 (2020) | articles | 38 tamás székely 63 letter by ödön beniczky, minister of interior affairs to józsef cziráky, government commissioner for vas county, on february 29, 1920: mnl vas megyei levéltára, főispáni elnöki iratok, iv.401/a/18, res. 16. 64 opinion of the parliamentary representatives of western hungary on the internal situation in western hungary: mnl vas megyei levéltára, főispáni elnöki iratok, iv.401/a/18, 1920, 536/920. 65 letter by péter jandresevits, representative of western-hungarian croats, to józsef cziráky, lord lieutenant of vas county, on november 16, 1920: mnl vas megyei levéltára, főispáni elnöki iratok, iv.401/a/19., res. 23. 66 vares, the question of western hungary/burgenland, 208-211. 67 ibid., 222-238. 68 v. madersprach’s memoirs, published first as a series of newspaper articles in the late 1920s, were republished as a book in 2014: v. madersprach, élményeim a nyugat-magyaországi szabadságharcból (my memories of the war for freedom in western hungary) (budapest, 2014), 9-16. 69 u. brand, die zerschlagung ungarns. aus westungarn wird das österreichische burgenland (2014), 4-10. 70 vares, the question of western hungary/burgenland, 247-250. 71 botlik, nyugat-magyarország, 285-295. 72 b. rásky, ‘vom schärfen der unschärfe. die grenze zwischen österreich und ungarn 1918-1924’, in: h. konrad & w. maderthaner (eds.), das werden der wersten republik… der rest ist österreich, band i (vienna, 2008), 150-155. 73 az 1920. évi népszámlálás, i. rész: a népesség főbb demográfiai adatai (the 1920 census, part i: the main demographic data on the population) (budapest, 1923), 29. 74 see more: p. haslinger, der ungarische revisionismus und das burgenland 1922-1932 (frankfurt, 1944). art_ceulemans_v5 adelheid ceulemans, ‘the medium is the message. historical heroes in flemish lyrical dramas of the nineteenth century (1830-1914)’, in: studies on national movements, 3 (2015). http://snm.nise.eu/index.php/studies/article/view/0303a adelheid ceulemans the medium is the message historical heroes in flemish lyrical dramas of the nineteenth century (1830-1914) introduction in 1792 the théâtre du vaudeville opened its doors in paris. the fact that a separate theatre house was built for staging (only) vaudevilles, illustrates this genre’s immense popularity in france at the end of the eighteenth century. in the first decades of the nineteenth century, playwrights in the united kingdom of the netherlands slowly got acquainted with the phenomenon. from 1830-1840 onwards the genre of the ‘lyrical drama’, rooted in french vaudeville and opéra comique, flourished in flemish theatre houses.1 the staging of lyrical dramas drew full houses – it was a very popular kind of entertainment in nineteenth-century flanders. the interdisciplinary nature of lyrical dramas (at the crossroads of poetry, music and drama) renders them highly interesting subjects for research. until now, however, these genres have garnered little scholarly attention. in international research, lyrical dramas, especially french melodramas, have received attention from literary scholars, historians and musicologists in recent years.2 the lack of scholarly attention for these genres in flanders is remarkable, not least as the connection between music and literature was strikingly evident in nineteenth-century flemish studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | articles adelheid ceulemans 2 culture. the few studies into the matter corroborate this, as do the extensive correspondence between authors and composers (largely unexplored archival material) and the very existence of ‘mixed genres’ (such as lyrical dramas) on which authors and composers cooperated.3 the dearth of scholarly interest for this genre is partly due to the widespread, markedly negative image of nineteenth-century culture, which has long constrained scholars from studying nineteenth-century (flemish) music and literature in any unbiased, open-minded and effective way.4 this paper summarises the results of a literary-textual analysis of twentyfive flemish music theatre works (or lyrical dramas) of the ‘long’ nineteenth century: from belgian independence in 1830 until 1914, the outbreak of the first world war.5 all twenty-five music theatre works (cf. annex) are published in flanders and written in dutch by flemish authors. the playwrights are, among others, domien sleeckx, emmanuel van driessche, hippoliet van peene, julius hoste, karel ondereet, napoleon destanberg, prudens van duyse, emmanuel rosseels, rafael verhulst and jacob kats. the composers, not always mentioned on the title page, include karel miry, jan van den acker, florimond van duyse, emiel wambach and peter benoit. furthermore, the selected lyrical dramas have in common that they are all set in the past: the protagonists are historical heroes, both political figures (as jacob van artevelde) and artists (as anthony van dyck). the present article investigates how these lyrical dramas contributed to the discursive construction of a national, belgian identity and a subnational, flemish one through the use (or manipulation) of the past, and how historical heroes were fit into nationalising strategies. special attention will be paid to the use of stereotypes and clichés in characterising the historical protagonists, and to specific features of the lyrical dramas concerning style and content. not only does this paper focus on a genre that has been notably understudied (both in literary and music history); it also brings in a literary-textual approach into the still mainly historically oriented nationalism research of the nineteenth century (especially in flanders). the methodological approach of nationalism research has, until now, generally remained sociological and historical: social scientists have studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | articles adelheid ceulemans 3 studied the conceptualisation of nationalism; historians have analysed the rise of nation states and of nationalist ideas, thereby examining concrete manifestations of nationalism, for example in the visual arts.6 recently, some international publications have tended to integrate new perspectives in nationalism research, such as a comparative and europeinterdisciplinary point of view or music nationalism, a relatively new field in nationalism research.7 in flemish-belgian nationalism research (concerning the nineteenth century), the historical perspective is still predominant.8 literature (especially poetry) and music have received less scholarly attention than historical subdomains.9 the few studies into the matter have tended to concentrate on novels (especially those of hendrik conscience) and songs.10 all these publications adhere to a mainly historical point of view, thereby limiting themselves to historical contextual facts and interpretations. as such, these studies lack any detailed textual, musical or (as concerns visual arts) aesthetic-technical analysis.11 this paper approaches nationalism explicitly from a literary and textual point of view: it presents a discourse analysis of literary genres, including music. historical context and genre belgium in the nineteenth century the period 1830-1914 was a crucial transition period in belgian history, especially as concerns nationalism. after a period of french domination, followed by incorporation into the united kingdom of the netherlands (1815-1830) under the reign of william i, the belgian nation state was inaugurated in 1830. after more than a decade of tireless belgian patriotism, the national fervour began to ebb. from 1840 onwards, a flemish (sub)nationalism arose, spurred largely by the linguistic, cultural, social and economic divides between flemish, dutch-speaking belgians on the one hand and francophone belgians on the other hand – divides becoming increasingly apparent in public life. this cultural flemish nationalism strove for a flemish kulturnation, for recognition of the studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | articles adelheid ceulemans 4 flemish ‘imagined community’ within the belgian nation state. however, it was not until 1912 that a political flemish nationalism arose which explicitly sought an independent flemish nation state.12 the present article concerns both belgian patriotism and flemish cultural (sub)nationalism. these two different manifestations of nationalism will not be distinguished, since the focus of this paper is on the nationalising impact of the lyrical drama, on its historical protagonists and on the strategies used to produce that nationalising effect, irrespective of the type of nationalism. in the selected lyrical dramas (and in the major part of nineteenth-century flemish-belgian literature) the belgian and the flemish (sub)national identity were perfectly compatible with one another; there was no contradiction.13 in almost all of the selected music theatre works the flemish subnational identity occupies a central place, though closely linked to the belgian national identity: the pieces refer to a flemish identity as part of the belgian nation state.14 flemish lyrical dramas of the nineteenth century a lyrical drama is a hybrid kind of theatre, combining dramatic text with music; the proportion of text to music varies considerably.15 the genre is closely related to that of the opera, to the extent that sometimes the two cannot be clearly distinguished. usually a lyrical drama contains more spoken text than an opera; in the so-called zangspel, a puristic flemish term for opéra-comique or vaudeville, spoken dialogues are combined with arias, duets, ensembles and choirs, but the music is still subservient to the words. the opera can therefore be considered as a further stage in the development of a music-dramatic tradition – in flanders, the lyrical drama was the breeding ground and even the conditio sine qua non for the evolution towards a fully-fledged opera tradition (in dutch).16 the focus of this article is on flemish, dutch-language zangspelen or vaudevilles (although one grand opéra is included in the corpus: godfried van bouillon, 1895). there was also a tradition of francophone music theatre in flanders. these music theatre works were, however, mainly operas. they usually addressed a more bourgeois (francophone) audience studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | articles adelheid ceulemans 5 than dutch-language vaudevilles and were mostly staged in the official city theatres, the grand théâtres (e.g. the théâtre royal français in antwerp). francophone vaudevilles (or zangspelen) were far less staged in flemish theatre house (as the groot wafelhuys), which primarily aimed for the middle classes.17 illustrative in this regard is that van peene’s music theatre work about jacob van artevelde (1863, with music of bovery) is labelled a ‘historisch drama met koors’ (‘a historical drama with choirs’) in the subtitle, according to the abovementioned definition of the zangspel. the subtitle of the french version, jacques van artevelde (1847, also with music of bovery), is ‘grand-opéra national’. investigating nationalising strategies – and the functioning of historical heroes in those strategies – in the specific genre of the music theatre is particularly interesting because of two reasons. the first reason concerns the inherently interdisciplinary character of the lyrical drama: the integration of an oral art discipline (music) in a written (dramatic) text increases its impact.18 in the words of opera researcher krisztina lajosi: ‘people did not start a revolution after reading a poem or a novel, but some uprisings did actually begin in theatres and opera houses.’19 the second reason relates to the broad and various audiences this popular genre reached.20 illiteracy rates in nineteenth-century flanders were very high: in 1843 they amounted to 51%, in 1850 to 44%.21 it is therefore obvious that oral, dramatic art forms attracted a much larger audience than written media. nineteenth-century (flemish) lyrical dramas (especially comedies, melodramas and vaudevilles) played to full houses, according to nineteenth and twentieth-century sources (like domien sleeckx and amand de lattin) and as verified by literary and historical research.22 the genre of the lyrical drama attracted a broad, yet also quite varied audience.23 in the antwerp théâtre des variétés, for example, both aristocratic women and skippers attended the performances; in the theatre house groot wafelhuys (literally: large waffle house) there were artisans, craftsmen, clerks, lower-grade civil servants and also notaries.24 this makes the genre highly suitable as case study for nationalism research. novels, poems and other strictly textual literary media had very small readerships and circulated mainly in literary societies. thus, nationalist ideas in novels and poems affected only a small segment of the studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | articles adelheid ceulemans 6 flemish population – primarily literary or artistic colleagues of the authors, who shared the same nationalist concerns.25 historical heroes as mentioned above, the lyrical dramas that constitute the corpus of this concise study (cf. annex) all feature historical heroes. the protagonists can be divided into two ‘types’ of historical figures: political rulers and painters. they all occupy a significant place in the flemish collective memory and history (except for wolfaert, who left no traces in history).26 a brief presentation of the political rulers: wolfaert de nerviër, probably a fictive personage, belonged to the german tribe of the nerviens that stood up against roman occupation (57 bc). godfried van bouillon (1060-1100) was one of the leaders of the first crusade to jerusalem. jacob van artevelde (c. 1290-1345) was a popular medieval leader, who stood up against the french occupier by resuming the wool trade with england, which was prohibited in flanders. jan breydel (c. 1264-1328>1331) and pieter de coninck (c. 1255-1332>1333) were two prominent leaders during the legendary ‘guldensporenslag’, the battle of the golden spurs, in 1302; according to the myth, the flemish army of ordinary footmen defeated the french cavalry in a glorious battle. boudewyn vii (10931119), called ‘hapkin’ (with the axe), was count of flanders. he was popular amongst the people because he took a firm line against robber barons and villains on the rampage. nicolaas zannekin (end of the thirteenth century-1328) was the leader of the flemish peasants’ rebellion against count louis ii of nevers in the flemish coastal region. emperor charles v (1500-1558) ruled over spain, italy, the holy roman empire and also the netherlands; he was quite popular amongst the flemish and dutch common men. furthermore, there are the painters pieter paul rubens (1577-1640), david teniers (1610-1690), anthony van dyck (15991641), quinten matsys (1466-1530) and, less known, adriaen brouwer (1605/1606-1638). all political figures lived in the middle ages, except for wolfaert (roman period) and charles v (early modern period). the painters should be situated in the sixteenth and seventeenth century, mostly the baroque period, when art flourished in flanders. studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | articles adelheid ceulemans 7 it is rather remarkable that the mentioned protagonists always perform in the same type of lyrical dramas. political figures (wolfaert de nerviër, godfried van bouillon, jacob van artevelde, jan breydel and pieter de coninck, nicolaas zannekin, boudewyn hapkin) play a part in historical lyrical dramas; except for emperor charles v, who plays the leading part in comedies. painters (van dyck, teniers, brouwer) perform in comedies, except for rubens and matsys who always play a part in serious historical dramas (like van artevelde for example). textual analysis: nationalising impact morality and nationality each of these two subgenres of the lyrical drama – historical dramas on the one hand, comedies on the other hand – has a significant characteristic. in historical dramas with political figures playing the leading part, it is the discursive construction of ethnic-characteristic markers. french characters, both male and female, are all evil, lying, adriaan brouwer | advn, antwerp (vc543) studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | articles adelheid ceulemans 8 wicked and dishonest. illustrative in this regard are the stereotypical personages jacques de châtillon, the french governor of the county of flanders who died during the battle of the golden spurs; philippe le bel, king of france; his wife johanna; and the leliaerts, as the french or francophones were called during the battle of the golden spurs. flemish heroes like de coninck, breydel, van artevelde and also gwijde van dampierre (count of flanders) and his daughter philippa of flanders on the contrary are virtuous, dutiful, honourable and courageous. in the studied lyrical dramas characters are either autostereotypical (belgian or flemish) or heterostereotypical (french).27 especially the negative (heterostereotypical) literary representation of the french language and culture and of francophone, gallicised flemings is rather remarkable because, paradoxically, many lyrical dramas were inspired and influenced by french vaudevilles (especially those of eugène scribe) and opéras comiques. in the literary process of characterising and typifying, characteristics of individuals (like van artevelde or de châtillon) are linked to a national character (the flemish or the french people) – nationality (flemish or french) is associated with morality (good or bad). this is a very effective discursive strategy to appeal to the conscience and feelings of the audience. good or bad are familiar notions; via this simple moral antithesis, linked to a national identity, the audience can gradually accept and adopt a national consciousness. recognisability: humour, volkstümlichkeit and narrative templates in creating or conveying a national consciousness, the impact of comedies cannot be underestimated. though the national-political message is put less explicitly put into words, the strategy used in these genres is not less effective, on the contrary. both humour and volkstümlichkeit (folksiness), characterising features of the analysed comedies, are very functional in the process of nationalisation and moralisation. these factors enhanced the spirit of the (common) people who recognised their social environment and habits on stage; in this way, humour and folksiness ‘contributed to diminishing the gap between the stage and the audience’.28 studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | articles adelheid ceulemans 9 international research shows that authors, poets and also playwrights often used humour to communicate a political message: it is an excellent captatio benevolentiae, capturing the goodwill of the people towards the message conveyed.29 the volkstümlichkeit of the studied flemish lyrical dramas is comparable to the folksiness in the german singspiele or in the french opéras comiques: the story is set in recognisable, local or rural settings, imitating village life and reflecting the local culture of the audience.30 de keizer en de schoenlappers (the emperor and the cobblers) for example, written by domien sleeckx in 1848, is set in the workshop of a shoemaker; in other lyrical dramas about charles v, the emperor often visits a hostelry or an inn. another aspect of the volkstümlichkeit is the vernacular spoken in the studied comical lyrical dramas. (e.g.: ‘geen belet in ’t salet?’, ‘sapperloot!’ or ‘selderment! leve de vreugd en het koekelbergsche bier’ – all recognisable flemish expressions, meaning ‘can i come in?’, ‘good heavens!’, ‘well i’ll be damned! long live the joy and the beer from koekelberg’).31 furthermore, nineteenth-century lyrical dramas are characterised by stereotyped intrigues, plot lines and personages. illustrative examples are the narrative template of l’amour champêtre (‘the rural love’) and, particularly in the comedies with charles v, the topos of the disguise: the emperor often acts and clothes like a common man to mingle with ‘ordinary’ people, to have a chat or drink a beer in the pub. the wifehusband and father-son relationships are stereotypical and caricatural in the analysed comedies: the personage of lauwe is henpecked by his wife kwaebette in keizer karel by kwaebette (emperor charles meets kwaebette); in the emperor and the cobblers geert rises up against his conservative father, not wanting to succeed him as a shoemaker. like the association of morality with nationality, humour, folksiness and conventional plot lines – recognisability, in another word – are very effective discursive strategies to predispose the audience for a nationalpolitical message. studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | articles adelheid ceulemans 10 historical protagonists equally stereotypical as the plot lines are the historical protagonists of the studied lyrical dramas, both the political figures and the painters. a brief introduction into their stereotyped characters: van dyck is a womaniser and always performs in the same narrative template. on his way to italy, mecca of the arts, he falls in love with a beautiful flemish peasant girl (or in one lyrical drama even with the wife of rubens). eventually, thanks to the right mentality, his qualities as a painter and the paternal admonition of his teacher rubens, he resumes his journey to italy. teniers is a bon vivant and a welcome guest at fun fairs. brouwer is a tippler. matsys evolves from a simple blacksmith to a capable artist. contrary to van dyck, he pays court to his beloved aleide in a very honourable, gentleman way. in each of the studied lyrical dramas having painters as protagonists, the artistic hierarchy is clear: rubens is the undisputed grandmaster and also a father figure to his students. furthermore, his personage is the height of morality. the characterisation of these artistic protagonists matches with the genre in which they perform: rubens and matsys, the ‘serious’ characters, act in historical lyrical dramas, whereas the other ‘comical’ painters (van dyck, teniers, brouwer) feature in comedies. peter paul rubens, self-portrait | advn, antwerp (vc543) studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | articles adelheid ceulemans 11 the same goes for the political figures: charles v always performs in a comical lyrical drama and always with the same characteristics. he is a good and democratic sovereign, a popular emperor who stands close to the common people; he is always in for a good laugh and has a weak spot for the female kind, especially pretty peasant girls. the other historical heroes (breydel and de coninck, van artevelde), protagonists in dramatic stories, are ‘serious’ personages. they sacrifice themselves for their home country, they are the human incarnation of moral goodness and they possess the virtue of wisdom.32 all the political heroes (except for charles v) fit these criteria; they only differ from one another in small characteristic nuances. for example: boudewyn hapkin has a strong social conscience, fighting the bandits who mistreat the common people; de coninck and breydel are respectively the ‘head’ and the ‘arm’ of flanders, the thinker and the doer.33 this conventional representation is an important factor in the process of recognition and identification; identification, with figures from the past, is a proven manner to stimulate a collective consciousness of national identity. through a feeling of recognition and remembrance, the audience is aware of a common past, of a common heritage – and such is crucial to developing a national consciousness, according to ernest renan.34 the historical protagonists confront the (nineteenth-century) audience with the glorious past of the young nation state: the flemish or belgian history charles v | advn, antwerp (vc543) ) studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | articles adelheid ceulemans 12 is almost tangible in the historical heroes. national, recognisable symbols, legends and stories that frequently occur in the music theatre works (the myth of the ‘kerels’, reynard the fox, the bell of ‘roeland’, the flemish lion) reinforce this historicising effect.35 no less important is the moral and ethical function of the historical protagonists: they incarnate nineteenth-century values, virtues and standards. the protagonists of the comedies (charles v and the painters, except for matsys and rubens) are perhaps the most effective personages in that regard. because of their whims, their amorous adventures, their follies and blunders, they are more flesh-and-blood people than unapproachable heroes like van artevelde, seemingly without weaknesses or shortcomings. characters like van dyck or charles v (protagonists of comedies) are recognisable and stand close to the common people; therefore the audience will be more inclined to follow and imitate their virtuousness and patriotism. it is far less evident to follow or incorporate the unreachable virtues of for example van artevelde – who is no doubt strongly admired, but who is almost inhumanely good, close to perfection. impact of the genre a music theatre work or lyrical drama is, as mentioned above, a symbiosis of three genres. the interaction of text, music and drama reinforces the impact of each genre separately. opera as a multimedia art form enhances the dramatic effect and, more than traditional theatre, it mobilises the historical awareness because it has music and singing in its favour: ‘songs could spread ideas more effectively than pamphlets or political orations.’36 the musical element in the studied lyrical dramas consists of simple musical numbers, inserted into the spoken dialogues, with a ‘clichéd vocabulary’: songs, choruses, arias and duets.37 the tunes are well known to the audience, since they are often based on popular folk songs or recycled opera melodies, belonging to le savoir partagé.38 music supports the text and reinforces the dramatic action, for example in the expression of emotions or in the creation of atmosphere. the text in the lyrical dramas, their second characteristic, is typically dramatic: consisting of mostly short text passages, literary curiosities or stylistic firework are studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | articles adelheid ceulemans 13 very rare. there are some exceptions though: the dialogues on the first pages of the emperor and the cobblers contain very long text passages, rather unusual in drama, and rubens’ menschlievendheyd (rubens’ philanthropy) proves that literary qualities (for example figures of speech) can also be smoothly integrated in a lyrical drama (for example the use of an anaphora to emphasise or dramatise, eliciting a reaction of the audience). the characteristics of both text and music are reinforced when performed on stage. a dialogue, a rhetorical question and an aside are obviously far more effective when aurally and visually represented, when put into words and shown on stage. other typical features of the dramatic genre additionally enhance the effectiveness of text and music separately, especially the illustrative representation on stage (disguises, decors, tableaux vivants …) and the direct contact with the audience. according to george lukács the public character of drama and its direct effect on the audience was the great advantage of the historical drama over the historical novel.39 impact of the past the function of the past in lyrical dramas – and that of historical heroes in particular – is comparable to the way art was used in the process of nation formation. a long and glorious past had to legitimise the mere existence of the nation state and had to strengthen the national consciousness and identity. this is why nineteenth-century artists, historians or writers did not feel the need to confine themselves to historical facts or certainties in their cultivation of the national past.40 the more glorious, the longer and the more typical the history of a nation was, the more just, natural and evident its existence seemed to be. when filling in or even creating national history, authors often used their imagination, as is clearly shown by the studied music theatre works. the representation of historical heroes rarely corresponds to historical facts (and this also holds true for historical events, settings and locations): the lyrical dramas offer a very subjective and biased view on history, the protagonists are fit into a particular national-patriotic perspective. the sporadic references to historical sources are only pro forma: providing some authenticity and studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | articles adelheid ceulemans 14 historical credibility, they do not guarantee historical reliability.41 thus, the boundary between fact and fiction was very thin in nineteenth-century lyrical dramas.42 besides this more rational factor – a nation merely exists by the grace of its history, in this case represented by historical heroes – there is also an emotional factor: history had to impress, had to arouse enthusiasm and even love for the motherland. obviously these two factors (rational and emotional) complete one another, but there is an important difference. the first, rational function is one that is in fact attributed post factum. when watching a lyrical drama, one shall not all of a sudden realise that the nation is legitimate (‘our nation has the right to exist because it has a history’). but what one will do is admire and even stand in great awe for the heroic deeds of van artevelde or laugh with the amorous adventures of charles v. a direct consequence of this emotional impact is not so much the notion of the legitimacy of the nation state, but the consciousness of the mere existence of the nation. and thát is the most important aim of these historical lyrical dramas: the creation (or strengthening) of a national consciousness and a national identity. the content, personages and structure of the lyrical dramas and also the characterisation of the historical protagonists are all focused on that objective. the playwrights, in one way or another, wanted to emotionally affect the audience – make them laugh with comical scenes or feel sorrow with the glorious death of a historical hero – and in that way make them susceptible to the national, patriotic message transferred from the stage to the audience. in this regard also inconspicuous elements can produce a substantial effect, for example couleur locale, local (recognisable) settings, local habits and practices, the flemish vernacular or popular folksongs.43 the impact of these subtle discursive elements on the shaping and strengthening of a national consciousness is often greater than explicit slogans (‘vlaenderen den leeuw’, ‘flanders the lion’), patriotic hymns or outspoken love for the mother country. subtle hints at the national past (or a national ‘feeling’) are more frequent in comedies (with charles v, brouwer or van dyck as protagonists) than in historical dramas (with van artevelde, breydel and de coninck or rubens as protagonist). studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | articles adelheid ceulemans 15 history also refers to topical (nineteenth-century) events. several of the analysed lyrical dramas were written for specific occasions. hippoliet van peene rewrote his first version of jacob van artevelde on the occasion of the inauguration of the van artevelde statue in ghent in 1863.44 de jacob van artevelde’s statue on the vrijdagmarkt in ghent | advn, antwerp (vc543) studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | articles adelheid ceulemans 16 belgische natie (the belgian nation), written by jacob kats and composed by peter benoit, had to be performed during the celebrations for leopold i his twenty-fifth regnal day – this lyrical drama had partly a contemporary setting (that is 1856). there are also intrinsic references to current affairs in the lyrical dramas, especially in the belgian nation. the belgian motto ‘eendragt maakt magt’ (‘unity makes strength’), for example, is quoted in the belgian nation and also in wolfaert de nerviër, set in the roman period.45 wolfaert even sees a vision of leopold i, the first king of belgium and, despite the roman setting, actually represented on stage.46 furthermore, in some music theatre works the situations, events or settings are so familiar that one could forget that the story is enacted in the past. the historical setting is often only a pretext to express a message of topical interest. crucial for that matter are the protagonists that are in part the spokesmen of nineteenth-century ideas; the historical heroes and painters project a national-patriotic message and a nineteenth-century middle-class (bourgeois) moral. popular and known historical figures, like van artevelde or rubens, are very suitable to convey values and virtues to a nineteenth-century audience. the moralisation in the studied lyrical dramas consists both in explicit statements and in implicit moral references: wolfaert reminds his daughter about her ‘holy duties’; according to van artevelde envy and ingratitude poison the human heart; van dyck leaves the peasant girl klaertje to fulfil his ‘duty’ as a painter; brouwer comes to ‘reason’, thanks to rubens.47 not only for the common men did the historical heroes function as models, nineteenth-century sovereigns equally had to follow the example of their illustrious predecessors: charles v was very sympathetic towards his subjects, van artevelde was a paragon of virtue and patriotism – they hold up a mirror to nineteenth-century kings and rulers. the past is, in other words, the medium that serves a nineteenthcentury goal. studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | articles adelheid ceulemans 17 conclusion the recurrent characterisation of the historical heroes in different lyrical dramas proves that the representation and the image of these painters and political rulers were strongly anchored in nineteenth-century flemish collective memory: van dyck is portrayed in the same way in a play about teniers or rubens as in lyrical dramas carrying his name; teniers is a buffoon in teniers te grimbergen (teniers in grimbergen) and teniers, but also in rubens’ philanthropy; charles v is similarly characterised in teniers in grimbergen as in lyrical dramas about himself. the stereotyping (almost typecasting) of these figures creates a so-called interdiscourse; a set of stereotypical elements which are markedly present in different texts (in this case lyrical dramas) in a given place (flanders) at a particular time (the nineteenth century).48 the interdiscourse is in this case explicitly linked to the historical processes of nation and identity formation. the content, structure and style of the studied music theatre works are to a large extent focused on the same nationalist and nationalising goal. especially in the comedies, this objective is realised by relying on recurrent topics that are familiar and recognisable for the audience: plots draw on national history, contemporary local or rural settings are represented on stage, the language of the libretto is written in vernacular and the music incorporates folk tunes or well-known local melodies. in the ‘serious’ lyrical dramas the association of nationality and morality has to facilitate the process of national identity formation. it is clear that in the studied lyrical dramas, a pragmatic poetics, oriented towards the audience, prevailed over an autonomous poetics, in which the artwork is the focal point of attention (and not so much the audience). this is why the intrinsic literary qualities are debatable (no psychological depth, poor plot elaboration, predictable humour, melodramatic love or death scenes) and why, on the other hand, the transfer of nineteenthcentury values and norms and of a national identity to the audience is very effective.49 to conclude: the analysis of twenty-five flemish lyrical dramas of the nineteenth century clearly shows that the genre an sich was crucial for the studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | articles adelheid ceulemans 18 realisation of the nationalising goal. the whole is more than the sum of its parts in this regard: the combination of music, dramatic text and presentation on stage produced a strong effect on the audience and was therefore very suitable to convey a national-political message, even to an uneducated or illiterate audience. in other words: the medium is the message. studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | articles adelheid ceulemans 19 annex: corpus (twenty-five flemish lyrical dramas) a.v. bultynck (aut.) & p. d’acosta (comp.), godfried van bouillon. groot opera in 3 bedrijven en een naspel (antwerp, 1895). j. crets, de leeuw van vlaanderen. spel in 4 bedrijven 16 tafereelen (antwerp, 1913). n. destanberg (aut.) & e. nevejans (comp.), de dubbele jagt. blyspel met zang in een bedryf (ghent, 1862). g.h. flamen, het groot vaderlandsch mimodrama van groeninghe ofte van de gulden sporen in zeven tafereelen 1302-1902 (bruges, 1902). j. hoste (aut.) & k. miry (comp.), breidel en de coninc. drama uit de vaderlandsche geschiedenis in 6 bedrijven en 8 tafereelen met koren en liederen (ghent, 1889). j. kats (aut.) & p. benoit (comp.), de belgische natie. dramatische feesttafereelen in twee bedryven en vier tooneelveranderingen (brussels, 1856). v. lemaire, keizer karel by kwaebette. anekdotisch blyspel met zang, in één bedryf (ghent, 1847). k. ondereet (aut.) & n. destanberg (aut.), boudewyn hapkin. lyrisch drama in vier bedryven (ghent, 1855). p. putman (aut.) & a. verbrugghen (comp.), breidel en de coninck. historisch drama in 4 bedrijven en 5 tafereelen (waregem, 1892). j. roeland, antoon van dyck. blijspel met zang in twee bedrijven (waregem, 1866). e. rosseels (aut.) & j. van den acker (comp.), antoon van dijck. zangspel in één bedrijf (antwerp, 1866). e. rosseels & f. muller, adriaan brouwer. zangspel (antwerp, 1861). a. schepens, wolfaert de nerviër. vaderlandsch berymd tooneelspel, in vyf bedryven (sint-joost-ten-node, 1860). studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | articles adelheid ceulemans 20 d. sleeckx, de keizer en de schoenlappers, of de gekroonde leers. blyspel in één bedryf (brussels, 1848). d. sleeckx, zannekin. drama in vier bedrijven, met een voorspel (antwerp, 1865). m.j. van brée (pass. aut.) & e. rosseels (ed.), brouwer’s gevangenis op het kasteel van antwerpen. blyspel met zang in een bedryf (antwerp, 1849). f. van den weghe, ‘nicolaas zannekin. drama in vijf bedrijven en zes tafereelen’, in: idem, tooneelgarve van drie dramas. excelsior. studentendrama. nicolaas zannekin. maatschappelijk drama in blanke verzen (2e bijgewerkte uitgave). koloniaal. drama in vier bedrijven (antwerp, s.d.) 63-137. e. van driessche, de gek van keizer karel. tooneelspel met zang in twee bedryven (ghent, 1861). p. van duyse (aut.) & f. van duyse (comp.), teniers te grimbergen. operette in één bedryf (ghent, 1860). p. van duyse, antoon van dyck, of de reis naer italië. blyspel met zang in drie bedryven (antwerp, 1841). p. van duyse, rubens menschlievendheyd. oorspronkelyk tooneelspel met zang, in drie bedryven en zes tafereelen (antwerp, 1840). e. van even, quinten metsys, of de zegeprael der liefde, leuvensche legende van 1480. tooneelspel met zang in twee bedryven (leuven, 1861). h. van peene (aut.) & j. bovery (comp.), jacob van artevelde, of zeven jaren uit de geschiedenis van vlaanderen. historisch drama met koors in vijf bedrijven en zeven tafereelen (ghent, 1863). h. van peene, keizer karel en de berchemsche boer. blyspel met zang in twee bedryven (ghent, 1850). r. verhulst (aut.) & e. wambach (comp.), quinten massijs. zangspel in drie bedrijven (antwerp, 1899). studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | articles adelheid ceulemans 21 endnotes 1 j. dewilde, ‘tussen franse vaudeville en vlaamse opera: het zangspel getoetst aan de spelen van prudens van duyse en karel ondereet’, in: jaarboek koninklijke soevereine hoofdkamer van retorica ‘de fonteine’ te gent, lix/51 (2009) 85-115 (88). about the popularity of the opera genre in the nineteenth century, see k. lajosi, ‘shaping the voice of the people in nineteenth-century opera’, in: t. baycroft & d. hopkin (eds.), folklore and nationalism in europe during the long nineteenth century (leiden boston, 2012) 27-47 (o.a. 28, 35). 2 p. brooks, the melodramatic imagination. balzac, henry james, melodrama, and the mode of excess (new haven london, 1995); s. hibberd (ed.), melodramatic voices: understanding music drama (farnham, 2011); j. waeber, en musique dans le texte. le mélodrame, de rousseau à schoenberg (paris 2005). cf. m. murphy, ‘introduction’, in: h. white & m. murphy (eds.), musical constructions of nationalism. essays on the history and ideology of european musical culture 18001945 (cork, 2001) 1-15 (1). 3 v. bosmans, p. couttenier & j. dewilde, de zingende dichter: vlaamse en internationale liedkunst op poëzie van guido gezelle, special issue of gezelliana, kroniek van de gezellestudie, 19/1-2 (2008); a. ceulemans, verklankt verleden. vlaamse muziektheaterwerken uit de negentiende eeuw: tekst en representatie (antwerp, 2010); j. dewilde, ‘tussen franse vaudeville en vlaamse opera’. 4 cf. j. dewilde, ‘een naam als een klok, nog steeds onbekend. het eeuwfeest van peter benoit voorbij’, in: cultureel jaarboek stad antwerpen (antwerp, 2001) 149170; p. gay, schnitzler's century: the making of middle-class culture 1815-1914 (new york, 2001); w. van den berg & p. couttenier, alles is taal geworden. geschiedenis van de nederlandse literatuur 1800-1900 (amsterdam, 2009) 11. 5 a. ceulemans, verklankt verleden. a list of the twenty-five lyrical dramas (corpus) can be found in the annex. the first world war is not only a historical milestone: in the arts, modernism definitively breaks through after the first world war. studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | articles adelheid ceulemans 22 6 e.g. a. smith, the nation made real. art and national identity in western europe 1600-1850 (oxford, 2013). 7 the comparative approach is particularly strong in t. baycroft, ‘introduction’, in: baycroft & hopkin (eds.), folklore and nationalism, 1-10. for music nationalism, see: murphy, ‘introduction’. cf. lajosi, shaping the voice of the people’; b.c. thompson, ‘music and the fight against confederation in 1860s montréal’, in: studies in ethnicity and nationalism, 13/2 (2013) 218-235. 8 ceulemans, verklankt verleden, 10, 132. 9 for literature, see a.o. a. ceulemans, tussen liereman en literator: het poëtische oeuvre van theodoor van ryswyck (1811-1849) (brussels, 2015); p. couttenier, ‘nationale beelden in de vlaamse literatuur van de negentiende eeuw’, in: k. deprez & l. vos (eds.), nationalisme in belgië. identiteiten in beweging 1780-2000 (antwerp, 1999) 60-69; m. de ridder, staatsgevaarlik! de activistische tegentraditie in de vlaamse letteren, 1912-1933 (phd diss., university of antwerp, 2009). for music, see a.o. p. cordy, wij zingen vlaanderen vrij. het verhaal achter 75 jaar vlaams nationaal zangfeest (leuven, 2012); dewilde, ‘een naam als een klok’. 10 for example cordy, wij zingen vlaanderen vrij and the recent study about hendrik conscience by k. humbeeck, k. absillis & j. weijermars (eds.), de grote onleesbare. hendrik conscience herdacht (ghent, 2016). 11 exceptions are ceulemans, tussen liereman en literator; de ridder, staatsgevaarlik! (literature); dewilde, ‘tussen franse vaudeville en vlaamse opera’ (music). 12 in august 1912 several manifestations and festivities were organised in antwerp on the occasion of the hundredth birthday of the famous flemish writer hendrik conscience (known for his historical novel the lion of flanders, 1838). 200,000 spectators attended the festivities. the pursuit of an independent flemish nation state was expressed for the first time during this commemoration. this ambition was manifestly present in the activism movement during the first world war (1914-1918); see m. de ridder, ouverture 1912. literatuur en vlaamse beweging aan de vooravond van de grote oorlog (antwerp, 2008); idem, staatsgevaarlik! studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | articles adelheid ceulemans 23 13 an exception is the poem antigonus, of de volksklagten (1841) by theodore van ryswyck (ceulemans, tussen liereman en literator, 99 a.o.). 14 the most ‘belgian’ piece of the studied plays is, not surprisingly, de belgische natie (the belgian nation): the belgian patriotic feeling is the focal point of attention, but also the flemish subnationality occurs, as an indispensable part of the belgian nation state. 15 dewilde, ‘tussen franse vaudeville en vlaamse opera’, 85-86; van den berg & couttenier, alles is taal geworden, 469. 16 in 1893 the first flemish opera house opened its doors: the nederlandsch lyrisch tooneel in antwerp. 17 francophone vaudevilles were mostly performed in the southern part of belgium (now the walloon provinces) and in brussels, so it seems. an example, with historical protagonists, is rubens et van dyck à saventhem, comédievaudeville en deux actes, written by louis schoonen and published in 1845 – in brussels. until now, not much research has been done to the francophone tradition of music theatre (vaudevilles) in flanders (and belgium). useful reference books about francophone theatre in belgium (in general, not specifically about music theatre) are f. faber, documents authentiques et inédits tirés des archives générales du royaume et bibliographie concernant le théâtre français en belgique de 1830 à nos jours (brussels, 1880); idem, histoire du théâtre français en belgique depuis son origine jusqu’à nos jours (brussels paris, 1878) 5 vol.; l. renieu, histoire des théâtres de bruxelles depuis leur origine jusqu’à ce jour (paris, 1928) 2 vol. 18 choral songs and music in general could successfully convey a nationalist message because of the specific characteristics of singing: this oral art form had some advantages over written art disciplines, like literature. cf. j. dewilde, ‘the choir scene in flemish belgium in the first half of the nineteenth century: the vlaemsch-duitsch zangverbond’, in: k. lajosi & a. stynen (eds.), choral societies and nationalism in europe (leiden, 2015) 130-151. 19 lajosi ‘shaping the voice of the people’, 34. 20 cf. lajosi, ‘shaping the voice of the people’, o.a. 35. 21 a cultural and social process of democratisation (o.a. significant rise of the percentage of school-going children; abolition of the tax on newspapers) explains studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | articles adelheid ceulemans 24 the decline of the illiteracy rate in 1850. cf. o.a. m. mathijsen, het literaire leven in de negentiende eeuw (leiden, 1987); l. simons, het boek in vlaanderen sinds 1800. een cultuurgeschiedenis (tielt, 2013) 18; e. witte, ‘de 19de-eeuwse vlaamse literator en de maatschappelijk-politieke aspecten van zijn tijd’, in: a. deprez, w. gobbers & k. wauters (eds.), hoofdstukken uit de geschiedenis van de vlaamse letterkunde in de negentiende eeuw (ghent, 2003) vol. 3, 1-92 (57). 22 dewilde, ‘tussen franse vaudeville en vlaamse opera’, 85; f. peeters, ‘verstilde emotie: over enkele verdwenen antwerpse theaters 1846-1926’, in: a. remael & k. pelsmaeker (eds.), configurations of culture: essays in honour of michael windross (antwerp, 2003) 255-263 (259-260); t. verschaffel, ‘leren sterven voor het vaderland. historische drama’s in het negentiende-eeuwse belgië’, in: bijdragen en mededelingen betreffende de geschiedenis der nederlanden, 113/2 (2008) 145-176 (151). 23 cf. lajosi, ‘shaping the voice of the people’, 28 (‘what earlier had been the symbolic space of the aristocracy [opera houses, ac], in the nineteenth century became also inhabited by the “common people”.’), 35 (‘until the nineteenthcentury much of the control of musical creation and the possibility to hear certain types of music was restricted to the aristocracy, but in the course of the nineteenth century it became available to a large public.’), 47 (‘there has always been some kind of cultural exchange between the different social classes. nevertheless, the frequency, the mode and the impact of transfer was unprecedented in the nineteenth century.’). 24 peeters, ‘verstilde emotie’, 259-260. 25 cf. ceulemans, tussen liereman en literator, 667-669. 26 this is also shown by the illustrations in this article, all drawn from the advn copy of the book 100 great flemings, the glory and greatness of flanders, represented in its most famous men (english translation of the dutch title: l. elaut, r. van roosbroeck, a. vermeylen e.a. (eds.), 100 groote vlamingen. vlaanderens roem en grootheid in zijn beroemde mannen (antwerp, 1941)). 27 v. heuberger, a. suppan & e. vyslonzil (eds.), das bild vom anderen. identitäten, mentalitäten, mythen und stereotypen in multiethnischen europäischen regionen (frankfurt, 1998). 28 lajosi, ‘shaping the voice of the people’, 31. studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | articles adelheid ceulemans 25 29 l.a. vanchena, political poetry in periodicals and the shaping of german national consciousness in the nineteenth century (new york, 2000) 211. 30 lajosi, ‘shaping the voice of the people’, 32. 31 quotes respectively taken from e. rosseels & f. muller, adriaan brouwer. zangspel (antwerp, 1861) 4, 17; p. van duyse, rubens menschlievendheyd. oorspronkelyk tooneelspel met zang, in drie bedryven en zes tafereelen (antwerp, 1840) 4, 10; h. van peene, keizer karel en de berchemsche boer. blyspel met zang in twee bedryven (ghent, 1850) 3, 12. the linguistic nuances cannot be precisely translated in english. 32 cf. w.j. goode, the celebration of heroes. prestige as a social control system (berkeley los angeles london, 1978). 33 cf. j. crets, de leeuw van vlaanderen. spel in 4 bedrijven 16 tafereelen (antwerp, 1913); g.h. flamen, het groot vaderlandsch mimodrama van groeninghe ofte van de gulden sporen in zeven tafereelen 1302-1902 (bruges, 1902). 34 a. rigney, ‘epiloog’, in: r. hoozee, j. tollebeek & t. verschaffel (eds.), mise-enscène. keizer karel en de verbeelding van de negentiende eeuw (antwerp ghent, 1999) 303. 35 the myth of the courageous flemish ‘kerelsvolk’ (‘kerel’ people) gained in popularity with hendrik conscience’s historical novel de kerels van vlaanderen (the fellows of flanders, 1871) and, later on, with albrecht rodenbach’s songs. in the original medieval ‘kerelslied’ (part of the famous gruuthuse manuscript) the ‘kerels’ were boors, in contrast with the nobility. in the nineteenth century the social opposition between ‘kerels’ and nobility was interpreted as an ethnic conflict (flemish vs. french) (cf. j. leerssen, de bronnen van het vaderland. taal, literatuur en de afbakening van nederland 1806-1890 (nijmegen, 2006) 156-161). reynard the fox is the main character of the medieval beast epic van den vos reynaerde; as a libertine crook he occupies an important position in the flemish collective memory (leerssen, de bronnen van het vaderland, 79-84). the bell of roeland is a series of bells in ghent, perpetuated in a song of albrecht rodenbach. 36 lajosi, ‘shaping the voice of the people’, 47. 37 s. hibberd (ed.), melodramatic voices: understanding music drama (farnham, 2011) 1; lajosi ‘shaping the voice of the people’, 39. studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | articles adelheid ceulemans 26 38 r. amossy, l’argumentation dans le discours. discours politique, litterature d’idées, fiction (paris, 2000) 97; ceulemans, verklankt verleden, 117, 120-121; dewilde, ‘tussen franse vaudeville en vlaamse opera’, 100. 39 g. lukács, the historical novel (london, 1989) 130. also paraphrased in lajosi, ‘shaping the voice of the people’, 36. 40 see a.o. m. flacke (ed.), mythen der nationen: ein europäisches panorama (münchen, 1998); leerssen, de bronnen van het vaderland, 11-12; a. morelli, ‘het ontstaan van de “patriottische” symbolen in belgië, in de gewesten en de gemeenschappen’, in: idem (ed.), de grote mythen uit de geschiedenis van belgië, vlaanderen en wallonië (berchem, 1996) 177-187; a. rigney, ‘de stiltes van de geschiedenis. de grenzen van de historische kennis als romantisch erfdeel’, in: j. tollebeek, f. ankersmit & w. krul, romantiek en historische cultuur (groningen, 1996) 129-146; j. tollebeek & t. verschaffel (1999), ‘natie, geschiedenis en legitimatie’, in: hoozee, tollebeek & verschaffel (eds.), mise-en-scène, 17-23 (21). 41 e.g. in flamen’s ‘mimodrama’ about the battle of the gulden spurs (flamen, het groot vaderlandsch mimodrama, 136). 42 cf. the narrative theory of hayden white, o.a. h. white, metahistory: the historical imagination in nineteenth-century europe (baltimore, 1973). 43 cf. lajosi, ‘shaping the voice of the people’, 31. 44 the first edition was written in french and published in 1847: h. van peene (aut.) & j. bovery (comp.), jacques van artevelde. grand-opéra national en cinq actes et six tableaux (ghent, 1847). 45 j. kats (aut.) & p. benoit (comp.), de belgische natie. dramatische feesttafereelen in twee bedryven en vier tooneelveranderingen (brussels, 1856) 40, 67; a. schepens, wolfaert de nerviër. vaderlandsch berymd tooneelspel, in vyf bedryven (sint-joos-ten-noode, 1860) 32, 40, 94. 46 schepens, wolfaert de nerviër, 83. 47 respectively schepens, wolfaert de nerviër, 59; a.v. bultynck (aut.) & p. d’acosta (comp.), godfried van bouillon. groot opera in 3 bedrijven en een naspel (antwerp, 1895) 11; j. hoste (aut.) & k. miry (comp.), breidel en de coninc. drama uit de vaderlandsche geschiedenis in 6 bedrijven en 8 tafereelen met koren en liederen (ghent, 1889) 94; h. van peene (aut.) & j. bovery (comp.), jacob van studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | articles adelheid ceulemans 27 artevelde, of zeven jaren uit de geschiedenis van vlaanderen. historisch drama met koors in vijf bedrijven en zeven tafereelen (ghent, 1863) 57-58; p. van duyse, antoon van dyck, of de reis naer italië. blyspel met zang in drie bedryven (antwerp, 1841) 56; rosseels & muller, adriaan brouwer, 50-51. 48 amossy, l’argumentation, 93; r. amossy, ‘introduction to the study of doxa’, in: poetics today, 23/3 (2002) 369-394 (377-380); j.l. dufays, ‘received ideas and literary reception: the functions of doxa in the understanding and evaluation of texts’, in: poetics today, 23/3 (2002) 443-464 (447, 445). the notion of interdiscourse is closely linked to that of doxa: ‘common knowledge and shared opinions’ (amossy, ‘introduction to the study of doxa’, 369) or, more specifically, ‘le savoir partagé des membres d’une communauté [flanders] à une époque donnée [the ninenteenth century]’ (amossy, l’argumentation, 94). there are doxas concerning temporal contexts (e.g. middle ages), events (e.g. the belgian independence), particular motives or general themes (e.g. poverty). this paper clearly focused on doxic, stereotypical elements concerning historical figures. 49 cf. lajosi’s study of the grand opéra: lajosi, ‘shaping the voice of the people’, 31, 33. microsoft word art_brooks_publ.docx simon brooks, ‘how liberalism assimilates minorities. the failure to develop a welsh national movement in the nineteenth century’, in: studies on national movements, 2 (2014). http://snm.nise.eu/index.php/studies/article/view/0211a simon brooks how liberalism assimilates minorities the failure to develop a welsh national movement in the nineteenth century background and context: wales, an unexpected failure during the nineteenth century, the ‘age of nationalism’, no national movement worthy of the name developed in wales. the failure was severe. only in the 1880s, largely under the influence of ireland, did a nascent nationalist grouping, cymru fydd (wales will be), emerge as a ginger group within the british liberal party but it was quickly hemmed in. as a serious force, it barely lasted ten years. on a continent in which a hundred linguistic nationalisms bloomed, the welsh language movement never flowered. in the 1870s, the pioneering geographer of ethnicity, migration and language, ernst georg ravenstein, was unable to find a single ‘welsh school’ in the whole of wales.1 in every facet of official life and state activity, the celtic languages of the british isles had neither rights nor presence, a fact remarked upon in central europe where majorities like the magyars employed it as justification for the oppression of their own minorities.2 religiously, the welsh, a predominantly nonconformist people with their own welsh-language denominations, pressed for the separation of church and state but when deliverance studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles simon brooks 2 finally came in 1920, social change had made it a pyrrhic victory, indeed an anachronism. the emphasis on religion had drawn the welsh away from the fight for language, and the welsh had been transmuted in the interim into a british socialist and largely secular and english-speaking people. yet these failures draw attention to the considerable potential for following an alternative, more nationalistic path which the welsh situation had once contained. ethnically, linguistically and religiously, wales differed radically from england, the dominant nation in the british isles. in such circumstances, it might be thought that wales would be at the forefront of the development of nationalism in europe in the nineteenth century. yet this was not the case, and the distinguishing mark of nationalism in wales was its scarcity. here then is the ‘welsh question’ to be posed for those interested in comparative studies of european nationalisms. why did the welsh national movement fail? or, put more properly, why did it fail to emerge? the czech theoretician miroslav hroch describes the situation well, indeed provides the locus classicus, maintaining that wales is ‘an extreme example’ of the failure of some european ethnic groups to become ‘nations’: for wales at the end of the 19th century all the features of the ‘classical’ definition [of nationhood] were valid in their full extent: it had a compact area of settlement, an old-established and distinctive cultural unity, a modernized literary language, its territory even formed an economic whole, comparable with a national market – and despite all this we cannot speak at that time of a fully developed welsh nation.3 many theories have been offered for why this was so. none are convincing. perhaps the british empire was unique in its international reach, and its appeal to the welsh elite irresistible. but ireland too was part of the british state, and the irish forged a successful national movement for independence. could it be that the welsh were wedded to the english as common inhabitants of a protestant island, united in enmity towards studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles simon brooks 3 catholic ireland and the catholic peninsula of western europe? but the welsh rejected anglicanism, the state interpretation of the protestant faith, a serious schism. true too that the welsh faced only one dominant neighbour, england, rather than several to be played off against one another, as the baltic peoples, for example, could play off the germans and russians. but in this they were not alone – the czechs faced only one hegemonic power, the germans, although their location within the multilingual austrian (later austro-hungarian) empire was rather more fortunate. and wales was largely linguistically homogenous until at least the middle of the century, a situation very different to that in bohemia and other ‘national’ homelands. but the welsh made no use of their trump card that they were a cohesive ethnolinguistic group with one national language on one territory (for much of the century the word for the welsh and for welsh-speakers, cymry, was wholly interchangeable). it was only after a language shift in the populous south east from the 1880s onwards that the link between language and nationality came to loosen. wales was unfortunate in its geography. it lacked urban centres and prior to industrialisation was an impoverished highland area in close proximity to a much wealthier and dominant plain (rather like the territories of the scottish gaels and the slovaks).4 this maintained ethnic difference, but made it more difficult to raise the capital for expansion and nationbuilding. many of the welsh bourgeoisie congregated in english conurbations like liverpool and manchester rather than in wales. but the life of other small european peoples flourished in cities outside the national territory. vienna played such a role for some of the smaller nations of the austrian empire. in any case, cardiff, the welsh capital to be, was in the 1840s a welsh-speaking town, and for another generation a bilingual one: its complete anglicisation by 1900 suggests that it was the loss of welsh-identifying urban centres rather than the lack of urban life in wales per se which undermined the welsh national cause. nor were the welsh uniquely parochial although their location within the anglophone rather than german sphere of influence meant rather less exposure to johann gottfried von herder’s ideas of linguistic nationalism studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles simon brooks 4 than was the norm in central europe. (the small herderian movement which coalesced in wales in the 1820s and 1830s, the llanover circle, received the patronage of an anglo-german family of industrialists who promoted the welsh language; the group was not dissimilar to those german landowners in the baltic countries who developed an interest in ‘peasant’ vernaculars. however, its activities had little impact on ‘nonconformist wales’.) intellectually, the building blocks for national revival were at hand. wales had a long literary history stretching back to the post-roman period. it had a print culture and an indigenous intellectual elite. the bulk of the welsh had been literate since the eighteenth century and the bible had been translated in the sixteenth. a methodist revival had created a popular culture. the romantic age and the revolutionary-induced air of the 1790s had provided wales with visionaries like iolo morganwg who had declared wales a nation. the similarity with other romantic figures, say in the czech lands, is remarkable – yet all this failed to spawn a national movement. nor can one argue that the welsh were unaware of nationalist developments on the continent. in the mid-nineteenth century, the hungarian and italian campaigns for ‘freedom’ became causes célèbres in wales: streets were named after the first italian prime minister, count cavour, and books, of poetry and prose, were published in welsh praising the hungarian national leader, lajos kossuth.5 but these events were viewed, in political if not always in psychological terms, through the prism of a british rather than specifically welsh worldview which emphasised a sort of general emancipation for mankind rather than a national awakening. neither was wales in the period concerned an industrial backwater. indeed it was one of the very cradles of the industrial revolution. there was a proto-socialist rising in merthyr tudful, an iron-making town, in 1831: it had to be put down by the military and a man was hung; this gives something of the flavour. for the political theorist who holds that nationalism is the product of modernising and urbanising ethnic groups put under strain by the demands of international capitalism, and which studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles simon brooks 5 seek comfort in the embrace of an imagined ethnic community, wales provides something of a dilemma. by the middle of the nineteenth century, it had become an integral part of a modern, industrial, imperial economy. yet there was no national movement. then there is the argument that although wales experienced modernity, it was the wrong sort of modernity. thus some welsh historians have held that an overdependence on primary production, coal in particular, meant that while wales was undoubtedly industrialised it was not modern in the sense of having developed an indigenous, mercantile capitalism.6 hroch himself holds that because the industrial revolution in wales, which took off in a serious sense in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, preceded the heyday of nineteenth-century ethnolinguistic nationalism, any welsh national movement was bound to be fatally weakened by the competing ideology of class. he turns to flanders as an example of a sophisticated society where industrialisation occurred before the growth of nationalism, and where the movement for political autonomy subsequently failed.7 however the extent to which this thesis can be said to hold true in a welsh context is doubtful for in wales the proletariat was more patriotic than the bourgeoisie!8 liberalism, universalism, inclusivity and the civic: the assimilation of the welsh in any case, the life of nations is not lived in the dialectic between base and superstructure alone. it is best not to answer the ‘welsh question’ in the singular, as karl marx reduced history to the study of economic relations. the pace and nature of industrial development certainly plays a role, but so too does discourse, and the parameters of discourse limit the possibilities of what can and cannot be said. in the nineteenth century, when the welsh might have climbed the path to ‘national selfconsciousness’, as were most other small european peoples at the time, welsh national, linguistic and ethnic identities were subsumed by an ‘inclusive’ discourse of britishness. this was not because the british state studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles simon brooks 6 was autocratic, nor was it peculiarly oppressive. paradoxically, it was for the opposite reason, namely that the british state was democratic, for men of a certain financial means at least, and that its constitution, although it contained anachronistic elements, was broadly liberal. the franchise was limited in terms of gender and class (and prior to 1872 cast in public and thus open to abuse), but there was no direct racial or ethnic discrimination. liberal concepts of equal citizenship were at the heart of how some of the more progressive elements in england viewed cultural and linguistic difference within the british state this is significant, for the failure of welsh nationalism in nineteenth-century wales reflects some of the wider problems met by national movements in liberal-democratic societies in general. it was the supposedly unique nature of british liberalism which in the mind of many welsh intellectuals set the welsh apart from other stateless european peoples. in an important article published in 1849 in the welsh journal y traethodydd, the great radical welsh journalist gwilym hiraethog explains why, in his opinion, there had been no revolution in britain in 1848, the year when revolts had torn through the european continent. ‘our form of government,’ wrote hiraethog referring to british government (which he regarded, quite unequivocally, as his own), ‘was the broadest in base and principles of any in europe before that; and the throne and gwilym hiraethog (1802-1883), campaigning welsh liberal journalist | national library of wales studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles simon brooks 7 government of britain stood firm and steadfast when the thrones of europe were being felled and brought down on every side.’9 liberalism had its advocates in other european countries: it was an important force among the german-speaking peoples of central europe, for example. liberalism also appealed to some of the larger stateless nations – the national revolution of 1848 in hungary, and the risorgimento in italy, were cloaked in the rhetoric of a liberalism which opposed autocracy. many smaller nations, such as the czechs and others on habsburg territory, swung between their own brands of liberalism and conservatism according to the tactical needs of the day. but nowhere was liberalism as strong as it was in britain. indeed, wales is the only example of a significant national minority defining itself almost wholly in terms of adherence to the liberalism of the dominant ethnic group in the state. welsh support for the british liberal party far outgrew anything in england, and the famous english liberal mp, richard cobden, a laissezfaire promoter of free trade and very keen too that the welsh should learn english, joked that he was the mp for wales.10 this is the crucial point: the welsh did not advance liberal arguments based upon claims and privileges which pertained to their own national community. rather they embraced a liberalism which was part and parcel of english hegemony within the british isles, by which they came to be absorbed. as a leading historian of central europe, robin okey, remarks (in welsh), the welsh became liberals, while nearly every other small nation fought against liberalism, or rather against the liberal parties of the governing nations – the czechs and slovenes of austria, the poles of prussia, the flemish, the basques, the fennomans (the svecomans were liberals) and so on. […] the small nations had to side tactically with the conservative supporters of federalism or with the church in order to defend themselves from attacks by those in the big nations who claimed that they had the monopoly on universal values and on the inheritance of the enlightenment.11 this was the context for slav opposition to the german and magyar revolutions of 1848. although themselves often liberals, nationalist leaders like the czech františek palacký, rejected the creation of liberal studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles simon brooks 8 nation-states such as ‘germany’ and ‘hungary’ in favour of maintaining the ‘sovereignty and integrity’ of the imperial austrian state, which was autocratic but at least multi-ethnic and devolved.12 the tactical alliance between the so-called ‘non-historic’ peoples of the empire and the habsburg monarchy pushed friedrich engels to condemn the slavs as tribes standing on the side of ‘counter-revolution’.13 but the czech logic is difficult to fault: nothing was to be won by aping peoples like the welsh in becoming a hopelessly outnumbered minority awaiting assimilation in a liberal, unitary state. it is the assimilatory nature of liberalism and the creation of a common civic space supposedly free of ethnicity that best explains the welsh failure. in reality this so-called non-ethnicised state was full to the brim with anglo-british culture. although the umbilical cord between national politics and liberalism is not as tight in scotland as in wales, the scottish emphasis on the creation of civic space in the shadow of a composite britishness suggests this assimilatory logic was at work in scotland too. however, not every national minority in britain was supine in the face of british inquisition. the comparison with scotland suggests that assimilation to the anglo-british civic lies at the heart of the failure of the welsh nation, and that it was a factor too in the failure of scotland, but not so in the history of the irish, a catholic people who dwelt ‘beyond the pale’. the irish as an ‘uncivilised’, non-protestant people were not part of the imagined british civic in the same way as the welsh, and as a result they were in a better position to build a national movement. at its heart, liberalism is a political theory about the rights of the individual. its intellectual roots are in the enlightenment, and the argument that individuals should be free from unreasonable forms of political and religious repression. men (and supplementarily women) were to be free to compete against each other for social and economic gain, and unfair restrictions should not be imposed preventing this. many liberals have taken the view that group rights for members of national and ethnic minorities create enclosed identities which are limited and predefined, hindering individuals from acting freely in their own interest in wider society. minority nationalism is an attempt to impose an unnecessary group identity on individuals who might otherwise access studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles simon brooks 9 advantages and benefits available to all. while these arguments have been challenged recently by some liberal thinkers, such as the canadian political theorist will kymlicka, in the nineteenth century they were predominant.14 during the ‘age of nationalism’, english liberals came to the conclusion that minority languages and identities restricted rather than enhanced life opportunities, condemning the individual ‘to sulk on his own rocks, the half-savage relic of past times, revolving in his own little mental orbit, without participation or interest in the general movement of the world’ as the liberal philosopher, john stuart mill, had it.15 the 1847 ‘blue books’, a government report on the state of education in wales, which soon turned its attention to the supposed sexual immorality of the common people and their ignorance of the english language, shows how this assimilatory logic played out as an act of emancipation. in order for the welsh to take hold of their birthright as free citizens of the british empire, it was essential for the welsh and english to have a common language and thus for the welsh to learn english: ‘through no other medium than a common language can ideas become common. it is impossible to open formal sluice-gates for them from one language into another.’16 thus the demise of the welsh language was written into the dna of liberalism, for those who had most to lose if the welsh remained welsh were the welsh themselves. although some welsh liberals were willing to appeal to the welsh language as a sign of resistance to alien tory (conservative) exploitation, this was largely a rhetorical position which did not change the intellectual standpoint of mainstream british liberalism that the welsh language and culture were a barrier to free thought and trade. in a telling phrase, the liberal westminster review condemned supporters of the welsh language as ‘linguistic tories’.17 for the individual to be free he had to have access to the market. welsh nonconformists like lewis edwards, henry richard mp and the preacher brothers, samuel roberts (‘s.r.’) and john roberts (‘j.r.’), championed a radicalism which was a social extension of the principle of free trade. thus they opposed slavery because a slave could not sell his labour, and were pacifists because war was a barrier to free trade: they believed in the studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles simon brooks 10 freedom of individuals, but not in the freedom of communities. they were radical in the sense that the twentieth-century british conservative prime minister, margaret thatcher, was radical. j.r., for example, was viciously opposed to trade unions.18 the social contract implicit in trade union membership undermined the autonomy of the individual: it would be better for a man to emigrate than to join a union. the problem welsh nationalism posed for laissez-faire liberals is obvious, for nation too is a communal concept, a form of joint bargaining. furthermore, when laissez-faire principles of free trade were applied to the linguistic market, the outcome was certain. in an article whose adjectives reveal a lot about the attitude of the welsh elite towards their own people, the nonconformist minister kilsby jones argued that […] the difference in the situation of two men – one who understands english and the other who knows nothing of it is that the former is able to associate and trade unimpeded with seventy million of the wealthiest and most adventurous people in the whole world, while the latter is restricted to some seven hundred and fifty thousand welsh speakers in wales, where it is assumed, samuel roberts (1800-1885), welsh radical | national library of wales studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles simon brooks 11 for the sake of argument, that they live; and worse than that the monoglot welsh are unusually small in number, they are amongst the poorest and lowest their circumstances of any, and as a result it is disadvantageous, in every sense, that a man has to limit his influence and activities to an insignificant and unnoticed few in a wordly and marketable sense – of worthless dead – but as the vassals of others.19 linguistic change would be a sort of alchemy by which the material hopes of the welshman would be transformed. welsh, an inherently useless language, would be replaced by english, a useful language with capital. ‘welsh is dying’, reported the welsh-language newspaper, y cronicl, ‘it is dying in the financial market and in nearly every other market too.’20 the market became the key metaphor of cultural and linguistic debate in nineteenth-century wales. this laissez-faire liberalism was wrapped up in the ideology of universalism. in order to reach all corners of the marketplace, and to enable all to participate in the common good and benefit from it, great emphasis was placed on inclusivity. edwards reminded his flock in 1867 that english was a universal language of the theological market place, similar to greek in the ancient world. greek was contrasted with the narrower sphere of influence of an ‘ethnic’ language like hebrew, clearly a metaphor for nineteenth-century welsh. ‘the apostles’, he said, ‘rather than restrict themselves to hebrew, took possession of greek, the language of world trade and humanism.’21 these liberal values of universality could be reconciled with individual rights; indeed in many ways they were an extension of them. but they also required what s.r. called ‘the mixing of the nations’, namely the dissolution of minority identities into the greater whole.22 writing in civil war america, a country whose vibrant welsh-language communities enjoyed constant cultural interaction with wales, he wrote: would it be a blessing or a curse for the whole world to be of one language? there was one language at the beginning in eden. one language was in the world for nearly eighteen hundred years. […]; and there is cause to think that one of the plans of providence to studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles simon brooks 12 get the world in order once again, is to have the whole world to be of one language […] the english language, in particular, is deepening its influence, and expanding its reach every day. […] it is already far ahead on the way to becoming a ‘general language’. and the opposing argument about ‘one language’, instead of militating against the matter of the mixing of the nations, is a strong argument in its favour; because for the whole world to be of one language would be the most valuable blessing to it.23 the key phrase is ‘general’ as in ‘general language’: the whole emphasis of liberalism was on the promotion of universal values at the expense of the particular. paradoxically however, liberalism argued that these universal values would have to take the form of a specific national culture. through this sleight of hand, imperial cultures (for example, in the british, german, french, spanish and russian states) could claim to be ‘general cultures’, so that although they were undoubtedly based on the cultural attributes of one particular ethnic group, they could also claim to be universal. members of ethnic majorities had access to the individual rights enjoyed by all citizens, regardless of ethnic or linguistic background, who accepted the common culture of the state. but because the common culture was based on the culture of the ethnic group of which they happened to be members, their group rights were also protected, and their ethnic identity underlay the civic identity of the state as a whole. state nationalisms were rendered invisible by the civic; that is to say they were normalised and made part of the apparatus of social power, both real and symbolic. in comparison, the minority identities and discourses of the smaller european peoples were made visible as that which diverged from the civic. minority identities were cast as ethnic and particular and hence outside, and indeed an affront to, the values of progress and universality. but this visibility as discrete ethnic groups, frozen in time, exiled from modernity, makes these minoritised peoples invisible as well, in the sense of being cast out from centres of power. ‘what it has been, what it has done,’ said the english liberal matthew arnold of the celtic spirit, ‘let it ask us to attend to that, as a matter of science and history; not to what it will be or will do, as a matter of modern studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles simon brooks 13 politics.’24 the conflation of welsh national identity with the ‘progressive’ values of english civic liberalism proved disastrous for welsh nationalism. there could be no space in english liberalism, the dominant discourse of nineteenth-century wales, for the development of a welsh national movement. the existence of nation-states sharing a common language and culture, as mill claimed in his 1861 treatise considerations of representative government, was necessary for civic society and representative democracy to function in a proper manner.25 identifying a common language was not only a question of economic and social necessity, but also a matter of principle. any resistance to the common good was not only regarded as a form of ethnic particularism, it was almost a form of racism. remaining welsh in an english world was deeply offensive in both a moral and ethical sense, a sign of anti-englishness and perhaps of anti-welshness too. ‘antipathies of race’ would not help the welshman, said the liberal spectator in 1863 accusing the welsh of ethnic particularism, as welshmen ‘have the same laws and enjoy the same privileges as englishmen’.26 dominant ethnic groups made claims that their cultures were suitable vehicles for liberal universalism in many parts of europe – from the austro-hungarian empire to norway to the baltic countries. indeed, the same ethnic group could find itself both the benefactor and the victim of this universalist ideology. in slovenia and bohemia, the german language community perceived itself as the carrier of ‘general values’ and dismissed slovene and czech linguistic nationalism by appealing to the value of german as a weltsprache. in transylvania, however, where germanspeaking colonists had settled in the middle ages, the hegemonic magyars took upon themselves the title of liberal universalists and saw the local german-speaking population as guilty of ethnic particularism. they demanded that the ethnolinguistic institutions of the siebenbürger saxons be opened up ‘for the benefit of the whole property-owning population without discrimination on the basis of religion or language’.27 this made the saxon community vulnerable to laissez-faire interpretations of the linguistic marketplace which forced the language of the hungarian state onto the minority german-speaking community. the ideology of liberal studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles simon brooks 14 universalism, rather than the supposed bigotry of any particular ethnic group, rendered minoritised groups powerless. it is hardly surprising that the more successful national movements of the smaller nationalities of nineteenth-century europe tried to deconstruct this logic, normally by the adoption of communitarian arguments emphasising their visibility as social groups. there are examples of this happening in wales too, in the antiquarian and romantic circle of lady llanover in the first half of the nineteenth century, and later in the century in the communitarian writings of two nationalist founding figures, michael d. jones and emrys ap iwan. the communitarian emphasis of jones, the main mover behind the establishment of the welsh colony in patagonia, argentina in 1856, and emrys ap iwan, who called for official status for the welsh language in the 1880s, directly challenged the claims of liberalism. jones criticised the english roots of majoritarian civic nationalism in britain, complaining that the english condemned cultural difference as ethnic intolerance, while expecting simultaneously that their own culture be dominant. of particular interest are the arguments in an 1860 pamphlet pushing the case for his welsh colony, gwladychfa gymreig (a welsh colony). he argued that there were two categories of colonist in any colony, a ‘formative element’ and an ‘element to be assimilated’.28 the ethnic ethos of the colony was set by the ‘formative element’. in america, the english had been the formative element and the descendants of welsh immigrants to the united states were destined to give up their language and culture. only in a welsh colony could the welsh identity flourish, and only in a welsh colony could the individual welshman realise his own potential. individual autonomy was insufficient to secure justice for members of a minoritised ethnic group. the liberated individual required his social environment to reflect his cultural and linguistic needs as well. liberalism denied this and was a mask for social power and national and linguistic oppression. ‘many english liberals are if truth be told thoroughly oppressive of others’, wrote michael d. jones in 1892 following attacks by the british liberal press on the welsh language; ‘i truly detest the liberalism of those who believe in subjugation.’29 studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles simon brooks 15 the welsh national movement failed in the nineteenth century because welsh patriots chose to ally themselves with the radical and liberal politics of the dominant ethnic group in the state. the welsh internalised liberal arguments which held that the suppression of welsh national and language rights was not only inevitable, but also radical, just and equitable. welsh liberals believed it was wrong to challenge the principle of a common civic space where all men and women could engage with one another freely. it was taken for granted that the cultural and linguistic characteristics of this civic space would be english. as a result, liberal radicalism took a principled stand against cultural self-determination. endnotes 1 e.g. ravenstein, ‘on the celtic languages in the british isles. a statistical survey’, in: journal of the royal statistical society, xlii (1879) 579-636 (622). 2 l.g. von thun, die stellung der slowaken in ungarn (prague, 1843) 27-28. 3 m. hroch, social preconditions of national revival in europe. a comparative analysis of the social composition of patriotic groups among the smaller european nations (new york, 2000) 4. 4 r.j.w. evans, austria, hungary, and the habsburgs. central europe c. 1683-1867 (oxford, 2008) 260. 5 r.j. derfel, rhosyn meirion: sef, pryddest wobrwyedig ar ‘kossuth’, yn nghyd a byr ganiadau ar amrywiol destunau (rhuthun, 1853); hanes louis kossuth, llywydd hungari: yn cynnwys rhagdraith ar ei nodwedd fel dyn, gwladwr, areithiwr, &c. a hanes ei fywyd o’i febyd i’w ddymchweliad gan awstria a rwssia, ynghyd a diangfa ryfedd ei wraig a’i blant: hefyd, ei areithiau yn southampton, llundain, winchester, etc., etc. (bala, 1852). 6 r.w. jones, rhoi cymru’n gyntaf. syniadaeth plaid cymru: cyfrol 1 (cardiff, 2007) 47-49. studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles simon brooks 16 7 hroch, social preconditions, 114-115. 8 i.g. jones, ar drywydd hanes cymdeithasol yr iaith gymraeg – towards a social history of the welsh language (aberystwyth, 1994) 10. 9 [w. rees], ‘chwyldroadau y flwyddyn 1848’, in: y traethodydd, v (1849) 269286 (270). 10 s. morgan, ‘from warehouse clerk to corn law celebrity. the making of a national hero’, in: a. howe & s. morgan (eds.), rethinking nineteenth-century liberalism. richard cobden bicentenary essays (aldershot, 2006) 39-55 (46). 11 r. okey, ‘iaith ac addysg mewn cenhedloedd di-wladwriaeth yn ewrop, 18001918’, in: p. morgan (ed.), brad y llyfrau gleision: ysgrifau ar hanes cymru (llandysul, 1991) 201-222 (219). 12 r. krueger, czech, german, and noble. status and national identity in habsburg bohemia (oxford, 2009) 206. 13 f. engels, ‘der magyarische kampf’, in: neue rheinische zeitung, 13/1/1849. 14 w. kymlicka, multicultural citizenship. a liberal theory of minority rights (oxford, 1996). 15 j.s. mill, considerations of representative government (london, 1865) 122. 16 r.r.w. lingen, reports of the commissioners of inquiry into the state of education in wales […] and especially into the means afforded to the labouring classes of acquiring a knowledge of the english language. in three parts. part i. carmarthen, glamorgan and pembroke (london, 1847) 7. 17 h.t. edwards, codi’r hen wlad yn ei hôl (llandysul, 1989) 166. 18 r.t. jones, grym y gair a fflam y ffydd. ysgrifau ar hanes crefydd yng nghymru (bangor, 1998) 223. 19 k. jones, ‘y fantais a ddeillia i’r cymro o feddu gwybodaeth ymarferol o’r iaith saesonaeg’, in: v. morgan, kilsby jones (wrexham, 1890) 206-216 (206-207). 20 h.t. edwards, ‘gŵyl gwalia’. yr eisteddfod genedlaethol yn oes aur victoria (llandysul, 1980) 336. studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles simon brooks 17 21 d.d. morgan, lewis edwards (cardiff, 2009) 182. 22 d. williams, ‘hil, iaith a chaethwasanaeth. samuel roberts a “chymysgiad achau”’, in: y traethodydd, clix (2004) 92-106. 23 s. roberts, pregethau a darlithiau (utica, 1865) 220-221. 24 m. arnold, on the study of celtic literature (london, 1867) 15. 25 mill, considerations, 120-121. 26 edwards, ‘gŵyl gwalia’, 324. 27 k. gündisch, siebenbürgen und die siebenbürger sachsen (munich, 1998) 151. 28 m.d. jones, gwladychfa gymreig (liverpool, 1860) 8. 29 e.p. jones, oes a gwaith y prif athraw y parch. michael d. jones, bala (bala, 1903) 265. art_tudur_v2     dafydd  tudur,  ‘cymru’n  deffro:  michael  d.  jones  and  the  “national   awakening”’’,  in:  studies  on  national  movements,  2  (2014).   http://snm.nise.eu/index.php/studies/article/view/0204a   dafydd  tudur   cymru’n  deffro   michael  d.  jones  and  the  ‘national  awakening’   one  must  admit  that  the  blood  of  the  welsh  nation  is  warm,  that   its  heart  is  beating  consistently  and  strongly,  and  that  it  breathes   healthily   –   the   whole   life   of   the   nation   has   been   restored   in   strength  and  in  energy.   thus   wrote   one   correspondent   in   the   columns   of   the   welsh   language   weekly   periodical   y   gwyliedydd   in   october   1894.   the   welsh   nation   seemed  a  picture  of  health,  which  is  all  the  more  remarkable  when  taking   into   account   that   wales,   as   a   political   entity,   could   not   have   been   less   visible   in  british  politics   for  most  of  the  nineteenth  century.   in  the  four   centuries  that  had  elapsed  since  the  1536  act  of  union  between  england   and  wales,  only  one  act  of  parliament  had  applied  to  wales  as  separate   from  england.  as  far  as  government  was  concerned,  there  was  nothing  to   suggest  any  distinction  between  the  welsh  and  their  english  neighbours   and,  despite  differences  in  language  and  custom,  both  people  were  treated   as  a  homogeneous  british  nation.  the  situation  had  changed  significantly   by  the  1890s.  wales  was  recognised  in  political  circles  as  having  needs  and   interests   that   were   separate   from   those   of   england,   and   welsh   mps   campaigned  for  measures  that  were  specific  to  wales.  such  was  the  change   in  wales’s  political  standing,  which  was  accompanied  by  a  renaissance  in   welsh   language   and   literature,   that   some   contemporaries,   such   as   the   correspondent   in   y   gwyliedydd,   believed   that   wales   was   experiencing   nothing  less  than  a  ‘national  awakening’.   studies  on  national  movements,  2  (2014)      |      articles   dafydd  tudur  2   when   the   ‘national   awakening’   made   its   impact   on   wales,   there   were   contemporaries   who   were   also   eager   to   point   out   that   one   man   had   expressed   these  sentiments  of   ‘cymru’n  deffro’  –   ‘wales  awakes’  –   long   before  anyone  else.  one  admirer  described  him  as   the   ‘vanguard  of   the   national  awakening’,  while  another  noted  that   ‘the  historian  who  writes   the  history  of  the  welsh  awakening  must  give  detailed  consideration  to   his  vigorous  attempts  to  bring  it  about’.  the  twentieth-­‐century  welsh  poet   david  james  jones  (better  known  by  his  bardic  name  'gwenallt')  described   him   as   ‘the   greatest   welshman   of   the   nineteenth   century;   the   greatest   nationalist  after  owain  glyndŵr’,  and  gwynfor  evans  claimed  that  he  was   the  one  who  did  most  to  generate  the  hope  that  wales,  as  a  nation,  would   have  a  future.  for  evans,  he  was  ‘in  many  ways  the  spiritual  father  of  plaid   cymru’.  hailed  also  as  ‘the  founding  father  of  modern  political  nationalism   in   wales’,   that   figure,   a   nonconformist   minister   and   college   principal   named  michael  daniel   jones,  has  been  described  as   ‘the   first   in  modern   times  to  offer  the  welsh  a  rational  political  solution  to  the  question  of  how   best  to  maintain  their  identity’.   despite  this  acclaim,  studies  of  nineteenth-­‐century  welsh  political  history   suggest   that   michael   d.   jones   was   a   marginal   figure   and   his   apparent   isolation  from  mainstream  politics  has  not  passed  unnoticed.  kenneth  o.   morgan  described  jones  as  an  ‘isolated  figure’.  similarly,  ieuan  gwynedd   jones   referred   to   him   as   ‘lonely   and   enigmatic’,   while   r.   tudur   jones   branded  him  ‘a  loner’  who  ‘made  no  attempt  to  form  a  group  or  party  to   propagate   his   views’   and   did   not   ‘associate   himself   closely   with   any   particular   movement   after   1870’.   indeed,   in   the   opening   chapter   of   his   recent  study  of  the  political  thought  of  plaid  cymru,  richard  wyn  jones   draws  attention  to  the  absence  of  a  nationalist  movement  in  wales  during   the  nineteenth  century,  claiming  that   ‘it  could  be  argued  that  this   is  the   only   major   historiographical   question   raised   by   the   welsh   experience,   especially  when  there  were  few  countries  in  europe  during  the  nineteenth   century   where   there   were   better   prospects   of   a   successful   national   movement.’   when   bearing   in   mind   that   many   twentieth-­‐century   welsh   nationalists   have   regarded   jones’s   thought   as   progressive   or   even   prophetic,   it   is   surprising   that   his   understanding   of   national   identity   and   his   political   studies  on  national  movements,  2  (2014)      |      articles   dafydd  tudur   3   vision   for   wales   have   not   been   subjected   to   more   detailed   analysis   in   order   to   gain   a   better   understanding   of   their   development.   the   only   comprehensive  study  of  his  life  and  work  published  to  date  continues  to   be  the  somewhat  hagiographical  biography  written  by  his  former  student   and  friend  evan  pan  jones,  entitled  oes  a  gwaith  y  prif  athraw,  y  parch.   michael  daniel  jones,  bala  and  published  in  1903.  based  on  an  analysis  of   michael   d.   jones’s   work,   in   particular   the   letters   and   articles   that   he   published  between  1848  and  1865,   this  paper  describes  the  nature  and   formation   of   his   views   on   welsh   national   identity   and   the   subsequent   development  of  his  nationalist  aspirations  for  wales.  it  concludes  with  an   attempt  to  explain  why  jones  did  not  gain  wider  support  for  national  self-­‐ government  during  the  nineteenth  century.   background   michael  daniel  jones  was  born  near  the  village  of  llanuwchllyn  in  the  rural   county  of  meirionnydd  in  north  wales  on  2  march  1822.  he  was  the  third   of  five  children  born  to  michael  and  mary  jones.  his  father,  michael  jones,   was   an   independent   minister   who   also   kept   a   school   in   llanuwchllyn   where  children  were  taught  to  read  and  write  in  english  and  instructed  ‘in   the  principles  of  the  christian  religion’.  michael  jones  was  eager  to  see  his   children  take  advantage  of  the  educational  opportunities  that  they  were   offered   and   it   has   been   claimed   that   young   michael   had   mastered   the   rudiments  of  both  latin  and  greek  by  the  age  of  twelve.  he  completed  his   studies  at  the  age  of  fifteen,  and  spent  the  subsequent  two  years  assisting   his   father   at   the   school.   in   1839   he   was   admitted   to   the   presbyterian   college  in  the  town  of  carmarthen  in  south  west  wales.  he  went  on  from   there  in  1844  to  study  at  the  congregational  college  in  highbury,  london,   but  completed  only  three  of  the  course’s  four  years.  the  reasons  behind   his  retirement  are  unclear,  but  the  report  of  highbury  college  committee   for  1847-­‐8  stated  clearly  that  he  had  ‘proceeded  to  north  america,  where   he  has  the  prospect  of  being  useful  to  his  spiritually  destitute  countrymen,   settled   in   that   part   of   the   world’.   jones   spent   most   of   the   following   studies  on  national  movements,  2  (2014)      |      articles   dafydd  tudur  4   eighteen  months  in  the  state  of  ohio,  where  his  eldest  sister  mary  ann  had   settled  since  1837.   michael  d.  jones  was  ordained  to  the  christian  ministry  at  a  welsh  chapel   in   cincinnati   in   december   1848.   he   had   not   intended   to   settle   there   permanently   and   he   returned   to   wales   in   1849   and   was   inducted   as   minister  at  bwlchnewydd  and  gibeon,  about  five  miles  from  carmarthen.   three   years   later,   he   returned   to   meirionnydd   to   succeed   his   father   as   principal  of  bala   independent  college.  he  also  accepted  calls   to  become   the   minister   of   five   independent   churches   in   the   area.   his   increasing   workload  would  force  him  to  relinquish  his  responsibility  for  two  of  the   churches  in  1860,  but  he  retained  his  position  as  principal  of  bala  college   and  minister  of   the  remaining   three  churches  until  his   retirement   from   public  life  in  1892.  he  died  at  the  age  of  76  at  his  home,  bodiwan,  on  the   outskirts  of  bala  on  2  december  1898.   it   is  not   for   the  performance  of  his  duties  as  a  christian  minister  or  as   principal   of   a   theological   college   that   michael   d.   jones   is   largely   remembered   in   contemporary   wales.   instead,   his   name   is   usually   associated  with  the  establishment  of  a  ‘welsh’  settlement  in  patagonia,  a   sparsely  populated  region  of  south  america,  as  a  place  where  it  was  hoped   that   their   national   identity   would   be   safeguarded   from   the   assimilative   influence   of   other   cultures   and   could   flourish   unhindered.   he   was   instrumental  in  its  establishment  in  1865  and,  for  nearly  thirty  years,  he   was   the   most   vociferous   advocate   of   the   movement’s   aims   and   endeavours.  by  the  time  he  retired  from  public  life  in  1892,  the  settlement   had  become  home  to  about  two  thousand  welsh  speakers.   michael  d.  jones’s  understanding  of  welsh  national  characteristics  also  led   him  to  the  conclusion  that,  in  order  to  maintain  their  identity  and  further   their   national   interests,   the   people   of   wales   should   campaign   for   their   own   parliament.   but   alongside   his   nationalist   interests,   jones   was   also   involved   in   local   politics.   in   his   native   county   of   meirionnydd,   he   campaigned   for   the   rights   of   tenant   farmers,   whom   he   believed   to   be   oppressed   by   landowners   and   their   staff.   his   vocal   support   for   david   williams,  the  first  liberal  candidate  to  stand  for  the  parliamentary  seat  of   studies  on  national  movements,  2  (2014)      |      articles   dafydd  tudur   5   meirionnydd,  secured  for  michael  d.  jones  a  place  in  the  political  history  of   the  county.   as  principal  of  bala  independent  college,  jones  held  an  influential  position   among   the   independents,   one   of   the   three   largest   protestant   denominations  in  wales  collectively  known  as  nonconformists  (the  other   two  being  the  calvinistic  methodists  and  the  baptists).  michael  d.   jones   served   as   principal   for   almost   forty   years,   during   which   he   instructed   more   than   two   hundred   students,   most   of   whom   went   on   to   enter   the   christian  ministry.  these  denominations  had,  since  the  beginning  of  the   eighteenth   century,   seen   a   significant   increase   in   adherents   and   congregations.  for  decades,  the  nonconformists  were  at  the  forefront  in   improving   the   level   of   literacy   among   the   people   of   wales,   whom   they   provided  with  vast  amounts  of  material  published  in  the  welsh  language.   by  the  second  half  of  the  nineteenth  century,  educational  institutions  such   as  bala   independent  college  played  a  key  role   in  educating  young  men   who  would  be  held  in  high  esteem  by  congregations  throughout  wales  and   beyond,  not  only  fulfilling  pastoral  duties  but  also  shaping  public  opinion   on   a   range   of   subjects.   the   nature   and   extent   of   the   nonconformists’   influence   on   society   in   wales   during   the   nineteenth   century   deserves   further  examination;  suffice  to  say  that  this  was  the  context  within  which   michael  d.  jones  made  his  contribution  to  public  life  in  wales,  and  that  the   pulpit  and  periodical  press  were  the  means  by  which  he  propagated  his   nationalist  aspirations.   identity   it  was  during  his  visit  to  the  united  states  in  1848-­‐9  that  michael  d.  jones   first  expressed  a  concern  for  welsh  national  characteristics.  there  he  saw   assimilative   forces   within   american   society   eroding   the   national   characteristics  of  communities  of  welsh  people  who  had  migrated  there.   writing   in  1849,  he   lamented   the   immigrants’  gradual  assimilation   into   american  culture:   ‘it   is  truly  heartbreaking  to  work  with  any  institution   belonging  to  the  welsh  in  this  country,  when  all  evidence  shows  that  our   nation  will  disappear  here.’   studies  on  national  movements,  2  (2014)      |      articles   dafydd  tudur  6   jones  believed  that  by  preserving  their  cultural  characteristics,  the  welsh   could  retain  their  national  identity  in  other  parts  of  the  world,  and,  more   importantly,  pass  it  on  to  descendants  who  had  been  born  outside  wales.   similarly,  welsh  people  could  lose  or  change  their  national  identity  simply   by  abandoning  their  cultural  characteristics  and  adopting  those  of  another   nation.  for  him,  national   identity  was  subjective   in   that   its  continuance   would  ultimately  depend  on  the  will  of  those  who  belonged  to  that  specific   cultural  community.  the  connection  between  land  and  people  was  not  an   important  factor  in  this  view  of  welsh  identity,  which  explains  why  jones   saw  no  contradiction  between  his  fierce  criticism  of  the  british  imperial   endeavours  on  the  one  hand  and,  on  the  other,  his  prominent  role  in  the   establishment  of  a  welsh  settlement  in  patagonia.   the  three  characteristics  that  distinguished  the  welsh  people  from  other   peoples   and   which   were   mentioned   in   jones’s   articles   during   this   formative  period  of  his  thought  were  their  language,  customs  and  religion.   the   belief   that   the   welsh   were   an   exceptionally   religious   people   was   commonplace  among  welsh  nonconformists  at  that  time.  looking  at  their   recent  history,  they  claimed  that  god  had  shown  particular  favour  to  their   nation,   raising   it   ‘from   the   depths   of   moral   degradation,   ignorance   and   superstition,   to   the   highest   rank   amongst   the   enlightened   protestant   nations   of   the   world’.   jones   wrote   to   similar   effect   in   1849,   when   he   glorified  the  religious  character  of  the  welsh:   let   other   nations   boast   of   their   learning,   their   refinement,   and   their  civility,  and  we  will  strive  with  our  religion.  religion,  and  not   learning,   is   the  glory  of   the  world  –  christianity   is   the  glory  of   religion  –  protestantism  is  the  glory  of  christianity  –  dissent  is  the   glory  of  protestantism  –  wales  is  the  glory  of  dissent.   he  was  writing  at  a  time  when  this  rhetoric  was  intensified  by  the  welsh   nonconformists   response   to   the  comments  made   in   the  reports  on   the   state  of  education  in  wales  published  in  1847.  the  ‘blue  books’,  as  they   were  known,  contained  comments  on  the  morality  of  people  in  wales  that   were  met  with  cries  of  protest   in   the  nonconformist  press,   challenging   their  veracity  and  suggesting  that  members  of  the  anglican  church  who   studies  on  national  movements,  2  (2014)      |      articles   dafydd  tudur   7   had  been  interviewed  by  the  commissioners  had  given  false  or  misleading   evidence  in  order  to  denigrate  their  character.   during  his  ministry   in  cincinnati,  michael  d.   jones  became  aware  of  an   apparent   tendency  among  welsh   immigrants   to   lapse   in  moral   conduct   and  neglect  religious  observances.  jones  had  only  to  spend  a  few  months   in   the   united   states   to   conclude   that   there   were   ‘hundreds   who   have   become  worldly  and  irreligious’  since  their  arrival.  he  saw  a  link  between   the   loss   of   the   immigrants’   cultural   characteristics,   particularly   their   language,  and  this  deviation  from  moral  conduct.  ‘the  loss  of  our  language   will  not  only  mean  the  loss  of  a  language’,  he  wrote,  ‘but  also  the  loss  of   our   religion   and   morality   to   a   considerable   degree’.   rather   than   concluding   that   the  religiosity  of   the  welsh  people  was  merely  another   cultural  characteristic,  jones  attached  greater  value  to  the  welsh  language.   in  another  letter,  he  wrote  that  ‘the  welsh  rightfully  feel  that  morality  and   religion  are  a  nation’s  glory’,  before  adding   that   ‘it   is   the   language   that   preserves   our   nation’.   he   concluded   that   the   welsh   were   a   uniquely   religious   people   only   so   far   as   they   remained   welsh   in   language   and   custom.  his  first  expressions  of  welsh  national  identity  stemmed  from  his   belief  that  the  preservation  of  national  characteristics,  the  welsh  language   in  particular,  was  crucial  for  the  spiritual  wellbeing  of  the  welsh  people.   significantly,   michael   d.   jones   believed   that   these   observations   on   the   connection  between   language  and  religion  could  be  applied  to  wales  as   well   as   to   the   united   states.   ‘are   not   our   language,   our   customs,   our   religion   and   our   morality   worth   keeping?’   he   asked,   ‘and   does   not   the   history  of  our  nation  on  this  side  of  the  atlantic,  as  well  as  the  other,  prove   that  losing  our  language  usually  means  losing  the  other  three?’   michael   d.   jones   returned   to   wales   in   1849   with   a   deep   interest   in   national  characteristics  which,  combined  with  his  determination  to  make   his  nationality  a  pervasive  element   in  his   life,  had  the  sense  of  purpose   that   was   characteristic   of   late   eighteenth-­‐   and   nineteenth-­‐century   romanticism.  indeed,  michael  d.  jones  is  a  link  between  the  romantic  and   nonconformist  traditions  in  wales  –  two  traditions  established  during  the   same   period   but   often   seen   as   distinct   from   each   other.   when   jones   formulated  his  own  grammar  and  alphabet  for  the  welsh  language  during   the  1850s,  for  example,  it  was  based  on  ‘coelbren  y  beirdd’,  an  alphabet   studies  on  national  movements,  2  (2014)      |      articles   dafydd  tudur  8   that  was  purported  to  belong  to  welsh  bardic  circles  but  had  been   lost   since  the  middle  ages.  it  was  later  found  to  be  one  of  the  fabrications  of   antiquarian  and  bard  edward  williams,  better  known  as  iolo  morganwg,   the   person   whose   name   is   most   often   associated   with   the   romantic   movement  in  wales.  jones  also  had  connections  with  lady  llanofer,  one  of   the  foremost  patrons  of  welsh  folk  heritage  during  the  nineteenth  century   and  one  who  is  seen  as  one  of  the  heirs  of  the  romantic  tradition  in  wales.   he  is  known  to  have  stayed  at  tymawr  in  llanover  in  1877,  where  he  met   lady  llanofer  and  presented  her  with  a  fox  skin  from  patagonia.  he  also   sent  his  children  to  stay  at  llanofer,  where  they  were  taught  to  play  the   welsh  triple  harp.  jones  not  only  gave  his  children  welsh  first  names,  but   also  surnames  that  were   in  the  traditional  welsh   form  of   ‘ap  iwan’  and   ‘erch  iwan’,  meaning  ‘son’  or  ‘daughter  of  john’.  occasionally,  he  used  the   welsh  version  of  michael,  ‘mihangel’,  not  only  as  a  pseudonym  for  writing   to  the  press,  but  also  when  writing  to  friends  (and  which  he  later  gave  to   his   second   son).   and   when   in   1861   he   gave   his   newly   built   house   the   welsh  name  ‘bodiwan’  (meaning  ‘residence  of  john’  or   ‘jones’),   it  was  a   patriotic  statement,  as  it  was  considered  fashionable  to  give  english  names   to  new  homes.   nationalism   while  michael  d.  jones  asserted  the  importance  of  welsh  national  identity   during  his  visit  to  the  united  states,  it  is  clear  from  his  published  letters   that  it  had  not  yet  become  the  basis  upon  which  he  expressed  his  political   aspirations   for   the   welsh   nation.   in   1848,   he   saw   the   union   between   england   and   wales   as   based   on   mutual   consent   and   saw   no   conflict   between  the  interests  of  the  british  state  and  the  need  to  safeguard  welsh   national   characteristics.   if   the   welsh   people   made   a   concerted   call   for   better  recognition  of  the  welsh  language,  jones  believed  that  the  british   government  would  grant  it  to  them  without  much  delay.   his  opinion  of   the  british  government  was   to   change  as  a   result  of  his   observations  on  the  correlation  between   language,  which  he  saw  as  the   key  characteristic  of  welsh  national  identity,  and  political  power.  there  is   studies  on  national  movements,  2  (2014)      |      articles   dafydd  tudur   9   reason  to  believe  that  his  views  on  this  subject  had  begun  to  take  form   during   his   visit   to   the   united   states   in   1848-­‐9.   when   referring   to   the   disadvantages   that   the   welsh   faced   when   settling   in   the   same   communities   as   the   english,   scottish   and   irish   immigrants,   jones   noted   that   the  reasons   for   their  weakness  as  a  cultural  group  were,   first,   that   they   were   a   minority,   and   secondly,   that   the   legislation   is   written   in   a   different   language.   when   calling   for   the   establishment   of   a   welsh   settlement,  he  noted  that   the   law  in   the  proposed  settlement  should  be   written  and  administered  in  welsh,  though  he  gave  no  further  explanation   for  his  views  on  the  matter  at  the  time.   the  importance  that  michael  d.   jones  attached  to  the  legal  status  of  the   welsh  language  in  the  articles  which  he  published  in  the  united  states  was   an  early  suggestion  of  the  theory  that  was  outlined  a  decade  later  in  his   pamphlet,   gwladychfa   gymreig   (a   welsh   settlement).   in   the   pamphlet,   jones  explained  that  in  all  ‘settlements’  there  are  cultural  groups  that  may   be  classified  as  either   ‘formative’  or   ‘assimilative’.   in  fact,   jones’s  theory   applied  to  any  society  in  which  more  than  one  language  was  spoken,  for   when  he  discussed  the  formative  or  assimilative  status  of  cultural  groups,   he  was  actually  referring  to  the  status  of  their  languages.   for  jones,  the  dominance  of  a  cultural  group  was  reflected  by  the  status  of   its   language   in   the  spheres  of   law,   trade,  education  and  politics,  and   in   most   countries   the   dominant   cultural   group   formed   the   majority.   however,  cultural  dominance  did  not  always  reflect  the  number  of  people,   or  the  proportion  of  the  total  population,  that  belonged  to  that  group.  in   colonies,  he  noted,   the  situation  was  usually  different.   jones  referred  to   algeria   as   an   example,   where   the   formative   culture   was   french   rather   than   algerian.   similarly,   he   noted   that   the   english,   as   the   dominant   cultural  group  in  all  the  british  colonies,  ‘force  every  newcomer  to  adopt   their   language   and   customs,   which   have   given   them   [the   english]   the   advantage   of   being   foremost   in   influence,   and   an   opportunity   to   monopolize  every  position  of  comfort,  profit,  and  honour’.  other  cultural   groups  in  the  colonies  could  not  gain  access  to  positions  of  prestige  and   authority.  he  referred  to  these  as  ‘assimilative’  cultures.  some  members  of   the   assimilative   cultural   groups   adopted   the   characteristics   of   the   dominant   cultural   group   in   the   hope   of   acquiring   power   and   influence,   studies  on  national  movements,  2  (2014)      |      articles   dafydd  tudur  10   while   others   simply   ‘yielded’   by   adopting   the   formative   language   as   it   became   an   integral   part   of   everyday   life.   jones   could   see   that,   if   these   trends  persisted,  members  of  the  assimilative  cultural  groups  would  ‘melt   into  the  mould’  of  the  formative  culture  to  such  an  extent  that  no  remnants   would  be  left  of  their  original  cultural  characteristics  –  in  jones’s  words,   ‘like   men   buried   at   sea,   without   anything   to   show   that   they   had   ever   existed’.  when  establishing  a  welsh  settlement,  michael  d.   jones  argued   that,  wherever  it  was  located,  the  preservation  of  national  identity  would   depend  on  the  welsh  language  achieving  ‘formative’  status  as  the  language   of  social,  legal,  educational  and  political  institutions.   the  development  of  michael  d.  jones’s  views  on  the  interaction  between   cultural  groups  caused  a  radical  change  in  his  analysis  of  the  relationship   between  england  and  wales.  his  hope  that  the  british  government  would   acknowledge  the  rights  of  the  welsh  nation  had  been  ambitious  to  say  the   least.  in  the  mid-­‐nineteenth  century,  wales  was  not  even  recognised  by  its   own  mps  as  having  distinct  political  needs.  yet  it  was  within  this  context   that  michael  d.  jones  formulated  his  ideas  on  ‘formative’  and  ‘assimilative’   cultures  and  observed  that  parallels  could  be  drawn  between  wales  and   the  colonies  of  the  british  empire.  welsh  speakers  formed  the  majority  in   wales,  and  proportionally,  they  were  the  strongest  cultural  group,  but  it   was   english   culture   that   provided   access   to   positions   of   power   and   privilege.  welsh  culture  was  ‘assimilative’  in  wales,  because  english  was   the   language   of   government,   law,   trade   and   education.   thus,   jones   concluded  that  the  relationship  between  wales  and  england  was  colonial   rather   than   contractual.   he   placed   wales   and   ireland,   two   nations   that   were  rarely  considered  as  british  colonies,  alongside  india,  where  three   quarters  of  the  british  empire’s  population  lived  and  which  was  the  most   important  british  colony  in  terms  of  trade.  he  even  claimed  in  1856  that   ‘wales,  ireland  and  the  nations  of  india  are  slaves  of  englishmen’.   michael  d.  jones  believed  that  wales’s  colonial  status  was  reflected  in  its   economic  as  well  as  its  cultural  situation.  he  noted,  for  example,  that  the   wealth  of  natural  resources  in  wales,  such  as  water  and  minerals,  which   could  be  utilised  to  serve  the  needs  of  the  welsh  people.  he  suggested  that   the   utilisation   of   these   resources   could   provide   employment,   thereby   reducing  the  rate  of  emigration  from  wales.  rather  than  being  utilised  for   studies  on  national  movements,  2  (2014)      |      articles   dafydd  tudur   11   the  benefit  of  wales,  however,  these  resources  were  exploited  by  england.   he  wrote:   at  present,  the  welshman  sends  virtually  all  his  wool  to  england   to   be   spun.   he   pays   to   transport   the   wool,   as   well   as   fattened   animals   such   as   oxen   and   sheep   to   provide   meat   for   the   englishmen  who  do  the  spinning.  and  once  the  englishman  has   finished  the  cloth,  the  welshman  must  pay  for  its  transportation   back  to  wales,  thus  giving  the  englishman  a  good  profit  so  that  he   can  live  in  his  palace  in  england.   improvements   to   wales’s   transport   connections   with   england  over  the  previous  fifty   years   had   brought   new   industry   into   wales,   thus   creating,   in   prys   morgan’s   words,   ‘a   system   of   regional   economic   inequality,   emphasizing  for  the  welsh  that   their   economy   was   a   subservient   one,   serving   the   needs   of   mostly   english   capitalism’.   for   michael   d.   jones,   this   ‘regional   economic   inequality’   reflected   the  welsh   nation’s   colonial   status   in   relation   to   england.   jones’s   costume,   a   suit   made   of   woollen   cloth,   knee-­‐length   trousers,   combined   with   his   unusually   long  beard,  was  one   of   his   distinguishing   features   and   he   claimed   that   it   was,   above   all,   an   expression   of   patriotism.   the   woollen   cloth   michael  d.  jones  in  his  patriotic  costume,   around  1890  |  people’  collection  wales  –   wikimedia  commons   studies  on  national  movements,  2  (2014)      |      articles   dafydd  tudur  12   had  been  manufactured  in  wales,  and  it  has  been  claimed  that  he  prided   himself  on  the  fact  that  his  costume  had  been  made  entirely  in  wales,  with   the  unfortunate  exception  of  the  buttons  on  his  jacket.  ‘we  need  to  educate   our   nation   to   support   our   workshops,’   he   wrote,   before   assuring   his   readers:  ‘i  myself  always  wear  clothes  made  in  wales’.  jones  believed  that   self-­‐government  was  not  only  crucial  to  the  future  survival  of  the  welsh   nation  as  an  ethnic  group  but  also  key  to  addressing  what  he  saw  as  the   social  and  economic  injustices  of  his  time.   the  failure  to  gain  wider  support   michael  d.  jones’s  understanding  of  national  identity  and  his  observations   on  the  relationship  between  wales  and  the  british  state  had,  by  the  end  of   the  1850s,  led  him  to  the  conclusion  that  self-­‐government  was  crucial  to   the  wellbeing  and  survival  of  the  welsh  as  a  nation.  the  fact  that  he  was   active  in  public  life  for  a  further  thirty  years,  and  that  he  held  a  position  of   such   influence   within   one   of   the   largest   nonconformist   denominations   throughout   that   period,   raises   the   question   why   did   he   not   gain   more   support  for  this  political  vision  for  wales.   several  factors  may  have  played  a  part.  it  is  noteworthy  that  while  jones   had  formed  his  opinions  on  the  right  of  nations  to  govern  their  own  affairs   during  the  1850s,  he  did  not  begin  to  express  his  nationalist  aspirations  in   the   denominational   press   on   a   regular   basis,   or   at   least   apply   them   to   wales   in   relation   to   the   british   state,   until   the   mid-­‐1870s.   instead,   he   focused  his  efforts  on   local  political   campaigns   in  meirionnydd  and   the   establishment  of  the  settlement  in  patagonia.  jones  may  not  have  been  a   pacifist,   but   he   was   committed   to   constitutional   reform   rather   than   political   protest,   despite   the   patent   inequality   between   england   and   wales.   ‘we   are   a   liberal   nation,’   he   wrote   in   1863,   ‘and   yet   we   are   oppressed  and  enslaved.  we  do  not  see  any  peaceful  means  of  perfecting   our  national  character  other  than  through  national  migration.’  because  of   his  views  on  political  reform  and  the  constraints  of  the  political  system  in   wales  at  the  time,  jones  sought  to  realise  his  political  vision  for  the  welsh   nation  on  south  american  soil,  and   the  movement   to  establish  a  welsh   studies  on  national  movements,  2  (2014)      |      articles   dafydd  tudur   13   settlement  in  patagonia  could  therefore  be  seen  as  a  manifestation  of  the   energy  and  resources  that  may  otherwise  have  been  channelled  towards   self-­‐government  for  the  welsh  in  wales.   while  jones’s  demand  for  a  welsh  parliament  was  firm  and  unequivocal,   he  never  set  out   in  detail  his  views  on  the  subject.  he  believed  that  the   parliament  should  be  located  in  aberystwyth,  but  he  did  not  express  any   opinion  on  the  form  it  should  take  or  the  way  in  which  it  should  operate.   the   patagonian   settlement   was   established   under   a   constitution   that   could   be   regarded   as   one   of   the   most   democratic   constitutions   in   the   world  at  that  time,  but  although  it  may  have  been  regarded  as  a  blueprint   for  a  self-­‐governing  wales,   there   is  nothing   to  suggest   that   jones  had  a   special  role  in  its  preparation.  jones  was  equally  unclear  on  the  subject  of   how  to  achieve  the  goal  of  self-­‐government  and,  as  r.  tudur  jones  noted,   he  did  not  form  a  group  or  associate  with  any  particular  movement  with  a   view  to  furthering  his  aims.  he  published  articles  on  almost  a  fortnightly   basis   for   over   a   decade,   but   the   haphazard   manner   in   which   he   wrote   tended  to  obscure  his   intentions.  there  was  hardly  any  development  or   refinement  in  his  ideas  or  rhetoric  between  the  1860s  and  his  retirement   from   public   life   in   the   1890s.   during   the   1880s,   when   he   was   most   productive   as   a   contributor   to   the   nonconformist   press,   there   was   no   telling  what  would  be  the  subject  of  his  articles  from  one  week  to  the  next,   and  he  wrote  on  a  range  of  subjects  and  he  was  often  distracted  from  the   issue  at  hand,  especially  by  personal  grudges.   michael  d.  jones  was  also  a  controversial  and  divisive  character,  and  this   isolated  him  from  many  other  influential  nonconformist  ministers  at  the   time.  from  an  early  stage  in  his  ministry,  he  displayed  a  tendency  to  enter   into   dispute   not   only   with   landowners   and   churchmen   but   with   fellow   ministers   too.   from   the   1870s   onwards,   jones   became   surrounded   by   controversy   because   of   the   way   in   which   his   involvement   in   the   patagonian  movement,  and  the  financial  troubles  that  he  encountered  as  a   result,   had   an   impact   on   the   affairs   of   bala   independent   college.   his   behaviour  was  outspoken  and  uncompromising,  often  causing  offence  or   inciting   similarly   unreserved   responses   from   other   nonconformists.   it   would  appear  that  michael  d.  jones’s  personal  grudges  were  not  only  an   unnecessary   distraction   but   also   a   barrier   to   the   advancement   of   his   studies  on  national  movements,  2  (2014)      |      articles   dafydd  tudur  14   nationalist  project.  he  seems  to  have  been  on  better  terms  with  members   of  the  younger  generation.  the  nonconformist  ministers  among  those  who   pioneered   the   welsh   settlement   had   all   studied   under   him   at   bala   independent  college  and  when  the  movement  cymru  fydd  was  launched   by  a  group  of  welshmen  in  london  in  1886,  two  young  men  from  the  bala   area  –  thomas  edward  ellis  and  o.  m.  edwards  –  and  also  a  young  david   lloyd  george  were  among  its  prominent  members  and  were  regarded  as   political  fledglings  of  michael  d.  jones.  political  issues  were  not  mentioned   at  all  in  the  cymru  fydd  society’s  programme  in  october  1886,  and  it  has   been   claimed   that   it   was   through   ellis’s   influence   that   national   self-­‐ government  was  later  given  a  central  place  in  its  manifesto.   jones’s  views  on   industrialisation  and  urbanisation  were  also  barrier   to   gaining   support   within   areas   of   wales   where   what   he   saw   as   the   key   characteristics   of   the   welsh   nation   were   most   at   threat.   alongside   his   appreciation   of   language   and   customs,   michael   d.   jones   expressed   contempt   for   the   urban   lifestyle.   while   in   cincinnati,   he   pleaded   with   immigrants   to   avoid   what   he   saw   as   a   lifestyle   of   pride,   idleness   and   materialism,   and   to   remain   ‘as   rustic   as   their   forefathers’.   this   tension   between  rural  and  urban  lifestyles  was  also  apparent  in  letters  and  articles   that   he   published   during   his   ministry   at   bwlchnewydd   in   carmarthenshire,  and  never  receded.  he  believed  that  the  farmer’s  work   possessed  a  natural  integrity  and  regarded  urban  habits  as  conducive  to   moral  corruption.  moreover,  jones's  discussion  of  industry  in  wales  was   limited  to  the  woollen  industry;  he  hardly  mentioned  the  coal,  iron,  lead,   tin  industries,  which  did  not  seem  to  be  a  part  of  his  perception  of  wales.   rather,   his   perception   of   wales   was   modelled   on   the   social-­‐economic   landscape  of  meirionnydd,  where  he   lived  most  of  his   life.  meirionnydd   was   among   the   welsh   counties   that   experienced   the   least   social   and   economic  change  during  the  nineteenth  century  and  it  is  therefore  hardly   surprising   that   jones’s   perception   of   welsh   identity   was   quite   different   from  the  reality  that  many  experienced  in  late  nineteenth-­‐century  wales.   it  was  shaped  by   jones’s   reaction   to   the  effects  of   industrialisation  and   urbanisation.  rather  than  setting  out  a  better  future  for  a  wales  that  was   being  rapidly  industrialised,  he  presented  a  portrait  of  wales  that  ignored   those   aspects   altogether.   he   had   received   an   unusually   extensive   studies  on  national  movements,  2  (2014)      |      articles   dafydd  tudur   15   education,  he  had  travelled  to  north  and  south  america  by  the  mid-­‐1880s,   and   he   discussed   the   political   situation   in   such   remote   places   as   afghanistan,   brazil   and   burma,   and   yet   he   displayed   this   remarkable   parochialism.   while   consistently   emphasising   that   there   was   a   much   greater   world   beyond   ‘great   britain’,   michael   d.   jones   was   unable,   or   perhaps   unwilling,   to   see   the   rapidly   changing   wales   that   was   beyond   meirionnydd.   lastly,  michael  d.  jones’s  failed  to  initiate  a  nationalist  movement  because   the  prevailing  view  of  welsh  national  identity  during  the  second  half  of  the   nineteenth   century   was   fundamentally   different   from   his   views   on   the   nature   of   welsh   nationhood.   jones   saw   language   as   the   cornerstone   of   national  identity,  but  many  of  his  fellow  nonconformists  did  not  share  the   same  opinion  on   its   importance.  their  attitudes  towards   language  were   shaped  by  liberal  thought  and  in  particular  the  free  market  principles  that   had,  by  the  1840s,  become  an  integral  aspect  of  liberal  politics.  the  appeal   to  nonconformists  of  the   laissez-­‐faire  economic  philosophy  was  that  the   principle  of  non-­‐interference  seemed  to  correspond  to  their  demand  that   the  state  should  not  interfere  in  matters  of  religion.  some  nonconformists   applied   the   laissez-­‐faire   principle   to   every   aspect   of   life.   ‘competition’,   wrote  john  roberts  (j.  r.),  minister  at  conwy,  was   ‘the  order  of  heaven’   and   ‘free   market   and   competition   is   that   which   keeps   this   world   in   its   place’.  nothing,  not  even  language,  was  free  from  market  forces,  and  the   notion  that  their  religious  convictions  depended  on  the  language  that  they   spoke  was  inconceivable.   welsh   nonconformists’   somewhat   nonchalant   attitude   towards   their   native   language  was  perhaps  most  apparent   in  the   ‘english  cause’  (as   it   was   called),   a   movement   initiated   by   a   group   of   influential   welsh   ministers  who  were  concerned  for  the  spiritual  welfare  of  the  non-­‐welsh   speaking   immigrants   who   settled   in   wales.   rather   than   encourage   the   immigrants   to   learn   the   welsh   language   in   order   to   attend   the   welsh   chapel   services,   the   intention   was   to   increase   the   number   of   english-­‐ language  nonconformist  churches  in  wales  to  provide  for  the  immigrants.   for  this  movement’s  leaders,  there  was  no  reason  for  language  to  stand  in   the  way  of  religion.   studies  on  national  movements,  2  (2014)      |      articles   dafydd  tudur  16   it   is  noteworthy  that,   in  the  response  to  the  blue  books  of  1847,   it  was   mostly  the  remarks  on  the  morality  of  welsh  people  that  nonconformists   refuted  and  not  those  on  the  status  and  value  of  the  welsh  language.  there   were   anglicans   who   responded   in   defense   of   the   language,   but   the   nonconformist  denominational  press  condemned  the  established  church   for  what  it  saw  as  the  betrayal  of  the  welsh  people,  and  associated  welsh   nationhood   with   nonconformity   and   its   influence   on   the   people.   the   nonconformists   rallied   together   to   form   a   united   front   and   the   denominational  press  began  to  project  a  polarised  view  of  welsh  society  in   which  nonconformists  represented  the  interests  of  the  ‘people’  (‘gwerin’   being   the   term   often   used   in   welsh,   which   is   similar   to   the   concept   of   ‘folk’)  and,  at  the  other  end,  the  established  church  and  its  close  links  with   the   wealthy   landowner   class.   from   the   mid-­‐nineteenth   century,   the   nonconformists   claimed   that   they   not   only   represented   the   people   of   wales,  but  that  they  were  the  people  of  wales,  a  claim  that  was  made  by   the  welsh  mp  henry  richard  during  the  1860s  and,  more  notably,  prime   minister  william  gladstone  during  the  1880s.   the   nonconformists   channelled   national   consciousness   in   support   of   campaigns   that   advanced   their   own   agenda,   and,   having   responded   in   unison  to  the  blue  books,  they  looked  to  the  liberal  party  for  the  redress   of  political  grievances.   it  was  hardly  surprising  that  a  close  relationship   should  develop  between  nonconformists  and  the  liberal  party.  pledging   their   support   to   the   tories,   who   represented   the   anglican   church   and   landed   aristocracy,   was   never   a   viable   option.   the   intensity   of   nonconformist  loyalty  to  the  liberal  party,  and  particularly  to  its  leader,   william   gladstone,   was   remarkable.   it   was   crystallised   by   a   series   of   measures  introduced  by  the  gladstone’s  administration  in  the  late  1860s   and  early  1870s.  these  included  the  abolition  of  the  church  rate  in  1868,   the  disestablishment  of  the  anglican  church  in  ireland  in  1869,  and  the   opening  of  the  ancient  english  universities  to  nonconformists  in  1871.   soon   after   replacing   the   conservative   government   in   1880,   the   liberal   party  introduced  the  sunday  closing  act,  which  prohibited  the  opening  of   public   houses   on   sunday   in   wales.   it   was   a   typically   nonconformist   measure,  but  its  significance  lay  in  the  fact  that  it  was  the  first  legislation   in  over  two  centuries   to   treat  wales  as  a  separate  entity   from  england.   studies  on  national  movements,  2  (2014)      |      articles   dafydd  tudur   17   michael  d.  jones  acknowledged  that  the  act  was  an  important  recognition   of   wales’s   national   status,   but   he   also   argued   that   the   redress   of   nonconformist   grievances   would   not   solve   the   social,   economic   and   cultural  issues  that  needed  to  be  addressed  in  wales.  but  wales’s  interests   in  parliament,  however,  seemed  almost  exclusively  nonconformist.  even   when  the  ‘national  awakening’  seemed  to  have  increased  appreciation  of   welsh  cultural  identity  and  evoked  a  desire  among  welsh  mps  to  form  a   standing  committee  to  discuss  issues  specifically  relating  to  wales  (an  idea   that  was  rejected  by  parliament  in  1888),  there  was  still  a  reluctance  to   demand   full   national   self-­‐government   for   wales   and   the   campaign   for   disestablishment  remained  the  priority.  as  john  morley,  liberal  statesman   and  journalist,  asserted  in  1890,   ‘home  rule   is  not  more  essentially  the   irish  national  question  than  disestablishment  and  disendowment  are  the   welsh  national  question.’  by  the  1880s,  the  ‘national  awakening’  seemed   to  have  provided  fertile  soil  for  michael  d.  jones’s  aspirations  for  wales.   the   independent   minister   david   stephen   davies   noted   in   1892   that   michael  d.  jones  was  by  then  ‘considered  a  moderate  man  because  public   opinion  has  progressed  so  quickly   in  recent  years’.  yet   jones  would  not   have  agreed  with  the  correspondent  who  claimed  that  wales  was  a  picture   of  health;  when  he  retired  from  public  life  in  1892,  his  views  on  national   self-­‐government  were  still  considerably  more  radical  than  those  of  most   nonconformists.  wales  as  a  nation  had  by  the  1890s  become  visible  within   british   politics,   but   this   ‘revival   in   strength   and   in   energy’,   as   it   was   described  in  y  gwyliedydd,  was  underpinned  by  the  belief  that  its  interests   would   be   adequately   represented   within   and   by   the   british   state.   the   ‘awakening’   led   to   important   developments   that   validated   claims   of   nationhood,  but  another  thirty  years  would  pass  before  a  political  party  –   plaid   genedlaethol   cymru   –   would   be   formed   to   advance   michael   d.   jones’s  nationalist  aspirations  for  wales.   microsoft word kernalegenn_fournis_v6b_definitive.doc     tudi  kernalegenn  &  yann  fournis,  ‘the  historiography  of  an  “invisible   nation”.  debating  brittany’,  in:  studies  on  national  movements,     1  (2013)  pp.  81-­‐104.   http://snm.nise.eu   tudi  kernalegenn  &  yann  fournis   the  historiography  of  an  ‘invisible  nation’   debating  brittany   brittany  is  an  ‘invisible  nation’:  the  regionalisation  of  social  mechanisms  in   the   breton   territory   has   never   resulted   in   a   complete   social   structure.1   this   incompleteness   as   ‘regional   nation’,   to   phrase   michael   keating,   is   embodied  in  its  weak  institutionalisation  as   ‘imagined  community’.2  one   symptom  of  this  failure  is  that  with  the  formation  of  the  historiography  of   brittany   and   the   breton   movement,   the   very   object   of   ‘brittany’   is   the   subject  of  constant  debate  around  a  ‘usable  past’.3  a  unique  feature  of  the   region  is  indeed  the  unfinished  work  of  imposition  of  a  national  definition   of   brittany   by   the   nationalist   movement,   involving   the   failure   of   the   foundation  of  its  own  legitimacy  as  a  representative  of  a  national  society  in   resistance  against  an  inclusive  (french)  nation-­‐building  process.4   conflicts  linked  to  the  history  of  ‘regional  nationalism’  intend  to  establish  a   hegemonic  representation  of  breton  society,  and  more  specifically  of  the   relationship  between  the  definition  of  society  itself  (the  nation)  and  those   who  aspire  to  be   its  representatives  (the  nationalist  movement).5  these   struggles  determine  the  legitimacy  both  of  a  society  as  a  nation  and  of  the   nationalists   as   its   historical   actors.   in   this   sense,   the   historiography   is   important  because  it  is  a  discursive  construction  of  historicity,  reflecting   the   struggles   for   the   interpretation   of   a   collective   project   as   ‘national   destiny’.6   but   far   from   being   easily   accepted   by   the   regional   elites,   the   breton   ‘national’   historiography   is   painfully   negotiated   in   friction   and   interaction  with  the  scientific  field,  revealing  the  tensions  and  difficulties   studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)      |      articles   tudi  kernalegenn  &  yann  fournis  82   surrounding  the  insertion  of  the  nationalist  movement  in  breton  society.7   these  difficulties  to  establish  a  nationalist  imaginary  do  not  imply,  though,   that  the  breton  movement  is  irrelevant,  as  evidenced  by  the  presence  of   the  breton  historiography  in  the  public  space,  both  relatively  sparse  on  the   long  term  and,  occasionally,  seized  by  severe  debates  and  controversies.   in  the  first  part  of  this  article,  we  will  show  that  the  national  approach  to   the   history   of   brittany   in   the   nineteenth   century   emerged   during   an   intellectual  cycle  that  saw  progressively  the  differentiation  of  the  activist   and   scientific   historiographies,   leading   to   a   deadlock   for   the   breton   national  movement  after  world  war  ii.  the  second  part  is  dedicated  to  the   historiographical   cycle   leading,   from   the   1960s   onwards,   to   some   reconciliation  between  activist  and  scientific  historiographies.   the  invention  of  an  ontological  nation  (1830-­1964) a  first  historiographical  cycle  lasts  from  the  nineteenth  century  to  1964   and  is  dominated  by  a  conception  of  history  as  a  return  to  origins.  its  first   stage  (1830-­‐1918)  corresponds  to  the  social  and  cultural  foundation  of  the   breton   movement,   particularly   through   reactionary   cultural   networks   mobilising  the  history  of  brittany  on  an  academic  as  well  as  an  engaged   level.  this  patriotic  historiography,  which  projects  the  essence  of  brittany   in  the  past,  is  reactionary  in  advocating  the  preservation  of  an  ontological   nation.  consensual,  it  also  produces  few  conflicts,  as  it  is  in  tune  with  the   social  bases  of  a  conservative  breton  society  and  in  the  process  of  being   marginalised.   in  the  european  context  of  romanticism  and  the   ‘spring  of  nations’,   the   1830s  are  a   turning  point   in  the  crystallisation  of  an   image  of  brittany:   breton  intellectuals  are  eager  to  discover  the  past  of  the  region  and  many   books  are  published  on  its  history,  literature  and  oral  traditions.  one  can   mention  théodore  hersart  de  la  villemarqué,  who  collects  popular  ballads   with   a   historical   dimension   (gwerzioù);   he   edits   them   in   1839,   in   the   barzaz   breiz,   with   the   objective,   notably,   to   go   back   to   the   sources   of   brittany’s  history,  then  neglected  in  france,  through  the  songs  transmitted   studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)      |      articles   tudi  kernalegenn  &  yann  fournis   83   by  folk  tradition.8  in  the  same  vein,  pitre-­‐chevalier  publishes  in  1844  his   very   conservative   history   of   brittany   that   integrates   its   parts   into   an   indivisible   whole,   engaged   in   a   centuries-­‐old   opposition   to   what   would   become  france.9  arthur  de  la  borderie  should  also  be  mentioned,  creator   around  1850  of   the  positivist  or  scientific  history  of  brittany,  aiming  to   write  a  patriotic  history  of  brittany,  understood  as  a  nation.  most  of  the   time,   this   nascent   nationalist   mobilisation   is   created   in   a   dialectical   relationship   to   the   history   of   brittany,   that   it   endeavours   to   write   and   wherein  it  sees  its  own  justification.  however,  like  de  la  borderie,  it  tends   to  remain  prisoner  of  its  nostalgia  for  the  past,  without  trying  to  play  the   role  of  ‘awakener’  of  the  breton  people:  its  history  is  that  of  elites,  saints   and  military  leaders.10  these  intellectuals  have  little  to  offer  to  the  bretons   apart   from   the   status   quo,   elaborating   a   historical   narrative   where   the   people   are   passive,   and   which   they   therefore   have   no   reason   to   acknowledge,   failing   to  claim  a   ‘right  of  state’  or   for  self-­‐determination.   this  abortive  birth  of  a  nation  is  thus  paradoxical:  unlike  other  emerging   nations,  there  is  no  transposition  in  brittany  of  the  national  conflict  of  the   past   into   the   present   and   the   future.   suggesting   complementarities   between   the   ‘small   motherland’   (brittany)   and   the   ‘big   fatherland’   (france),  brittany’s  elites  celebrate  on  the  contrary,  like  a  de  la  borderie,   ‘the  blessed  alliance  [of  the  bretons]  with  france,  of  which  they  have  since   been  the  most  devoted  sons,  the  most  valiant  defenders’.11  only  with  the   creation   of   the   first   regionalist   political   parties   (union   régionaliste   bretonne   in   1898   and   fédération   régionaliste   bretonne   in   1911)   and   nationalist  political  parties  (parti  national  breton  in  1911)  do  claims  for   breton  self-­‐government  emerge,  though  still  on  a  conservative  basis.   this   attachment   to   the   past   is   no   longer   suitable   during   the   inter-­‐war   period,   which   sees   a   new   step   (1918-­‐1964)   introduced   to   the   historiographical  cycle,  marked  by  the  emergence  of  activist  nationalism.  a   new  generation  activates  the  national  imagination  to  renew  the  terms  of   the  breton  question  and  its  history:   turning  their  back  on  the  academic   world,   they   perceive   historiography   as   an   instrument   for   the   transformation   of   breton   society.   through   the   political   work   of   olier   mordrel   in   journal   breiz   atao   and   the   cultural   and   linguistic   work   of   roparz  hemon  in  journal  gwalarn,  they  ‘switch  their  perspectives  from  the   studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)      |      articles   tudi  kernalegenn  &  yann  fournis  84   regrets  of  the  past  to  the  building  of  a  future’.12  this  modernising  break  is,   however,   incomplete:   it   still   relies   on   an   ontological   conception   of   the   nation   and   is   based   on   nostalgia   for   the   ‘golden   age’   of   breton   independence.   from   the   early   twenties,   certain   cultural,   later   political,   circles  produce  works  of  nationalist  pedagogy  or  exaltation   fostered  by   historiography   inherited   from   the   first   emsav   [breton   national   movement].   some   books   become   the   pillars   of   nationalist   culture:   the   histoire  de  notre  bretagne  by  jeanne  coroller  or  the  histoire  de  bretagne   by   father   poisson   (1954).13   the   latter   takes   up   the   thread   of   the   first   emsav,   writing   a   history   to   prove   that   the   breton   movement,   born   in   educated  and  historical  aware  circles,  are  on  the  track  of  the  breton  and   celtic   tradition  of  resistance  to  the   integration   into  the  french  nation.14   similarly,  the  breton  national  party  (pnb),  created  in  1931,  advocates  a   conservative  definition  of  brittany’s  history  and  highlights  it  through  its   activism  (propaganda,  rituals)  or  early  drafts  of  an  internal  historiography,   both   hagiographic   and   radical.15   however,   the   influence   of   nationalist   historiography  in  the  public  area  is  weak.  if  the  church  integrates  to  some   kristian  hamon's  2004  study  of  breton   collaboration  during  world  war  ii,  a   highly  controversial  issue.   studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)      |      articles   tudi  kernalegenn  &  yann  fournis   85   extent   the   history   and   culture   of   brittany   in   the   normal   curriculum   of   catholic  schools,  the  regional  elites  remain  loyal  to  france  and  reinterpret   breton  history  in  this  sense.16  the  second  world  war,  the  collaboration   with  the  german  occupation  (to  which  a  non-­‐negligible  part  of  the  emsav   succumbed)  and  the  subsequent  purge  only  reinforce  the  strong  distrust  of   breton  society  towards  the  breton  national  movement.   the  post-­‐war  years  are  difficult  for  breton  nationalism,  which  maintains  a   conception  of  history  directly  inherited  from  pre-­‐war  years,  with  hardly   any   innovation   at   all.17   however,   historiography   is   effectively   disseminated   as   part   of   a   prosperous   cultural   revival,   consisting   of   traditional  dance  groups  (the  ‘celtic  circles’)  and  breton  pipe  bands  (the   bagadoù).  a  modest  evolution  resides   in  the   inclusion  of  recent  history,   notably  via  chronicles  of  emsav’s  own  history.  a  fine  example  is  offered  by   the  very  knowledgeable  work  by  yann  fouéré,  an  activist  of  the  times,  and   by  ronan  caerléon,   the  quasi-­‐official  historian  of  breton  nationalism.   in   the  early  sixties,  fouéré  provides  a  synthesis,  justifying  the  collaboration   as  the  breton  form  of  the  politics  of  presence  pursued  by  the  collaborating   french.18   despite   its   wealth   of   information,   this   work   selects   data   to   elaborate   a   nationalist   version   of   contemporary   history   that   all   later   scholars   will   contradict.   nonetheless,   this   reconstruction   of   history   generates  little  intellectual  conflict,  as  it  remains  completely  hidden.   the  reestablishment  (1960s  and  1970s)   a   second   historiographical   cycle   starts   in   the   1960s,   taking   a   direction   opposite  to  the  first.  a  new  generation  of  the  breton  movement  transforms   the  approach  to  the  breton  society,  its  history  and  the  role  it  plays.  this   new  conception  of  historical  development  (that  is  of  historicity),  centred   on  a  dynamic  vision  of   the  nation,   introduces  historiographical  analysis   highlighting,  at  every  historical  stage,   the  overlap  of  national  and  social   issues,  sometimes  raising  very  fierce  intellectual  debates.  more  visible  in   society,   the   emsav   also   generates   –   for   the   first   time   –   a   real   interest   among  scholars  in  its  past  and  present.   studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)      |      articles   tudi  kernalegenn  &  yann  fournis  86   1964  corresponds  to  a  break  in  the  history  of  the  breton  movement,  in  its   self-­‐representation  and  in  its  relationship  to  history.  a  new  conception  of   historicity   emerges:   the   emsav   (both   in   its   political   and   cultural   dimensions)   gradually   breaks   with   its   cautious   apolitical   approach   developed  since  1945,  which  condemned  it  to  isolation,  and  now  claims   itself   as   a   left-­‐wing   and   socialist   actor   in   a   struggle   for   national   liberation.19   a   symbol   of   this   is   the   creation   in   1964   of   the   breton   democratic  union  (udb,  union  démocratique  bretonne),   that  was   from   the  start  a  left-­‐wing  party  and  would  become  the  main  autonomist  party  in   the  region’s  history.  as  evidenced  by  its  famous  slogan  ‘brittany  =  colony’,   this  sense  of  historicity  entails  a  new  reading  of  brittany’s  history,  more   focused  on  class  struggle  and  decolonisation.   this   trend   is   reinforced   in   1968   by   the   student   rebellion,   which   rehabilitates  the  appeal  of  popular  culture  and  the  interest  for  the  regional   issue.20  four  years  later,  the  wave  of  worker’s  and  peasant’s  movements  or   even   the   revival   of   the   breton   liberation   front   has   a   similar   effect,   increasing  the  interest  of  the  hexagonal  left  for  brittany.  this  results  in  a   recasting  of  the  historiography  of  the  breton  movement  by  the  extreme   left.21   in   december   1971   and   january   1973,   the   united   socialist   party   (psu),   then   main   party   of   the   alternative   left,   suggests   a   review   of   the   history   of   the   breton   movement   (notably   gwenc’hlan   le   scouézec   and   glauda  millour).22  as  biased  as  these  articles  may  be,  focusing  on  the  most   progressive  dimensions  of  the  breton  movement,  they  nevertheless  help   to  publicise  these  issues  and  to  take  them  out  of  the  breton  movement.  in   1973,   les   temps   modernes,   jean-­‐paul   sartre’s   journal,   extends   this   enlargement   of   the   study   of   the   breton   movement   in   a   special   issue   dedicated  to  the  national  minorities  in  france,  containing  several  articles   on  brittany.  ronan  roudaut  notably  offers  the  first  marxist  socio-­‐history   of  the  breton  movement,  its  ideology  and  its  sociological  basis.23   often   selective,   based   on   a   new   ‘usable   past’,   this   historiography   is   an   instrument   facilitating   the   alignment   of   the   breton   movement   with   the   left-­‐wing  and  popular  movements  (workers,  peasants,  environmentalists,   and  so  on).  quite   logically   it  provokes  a  counter-­‐historiography,  equally   militant  and  denouncing   the   imposture  of   the   former,  especially  by   the   journal  la  taupe  bretonne.24  originally,  the  group  that  publishes  la  taupe   studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)      |      articles   tudi  kernalegenn  &  yann  fournis   87   bretonne,  split  off  the  udb,  aims  to  analyse  nationalisms,  and  in  particular   breton   nationalism.   quickly,   though,   it   adapts   to   state   nationalisms,   to   carry  all  its  efforts  against  minority  nationalisms,  considered  as  counter-­‐ revolutionary.25   without   nuance   and   clearly   biased,   this   analysis   is   challenging  because  for  the  first  time  it  carries  out  a  deconstruction  of  the   discourse  of  the  breton  movement,  based  on  a  theory  of  nationalism.  for   their  part,  daniel  chatelain  and  pierre  tafani  analyse  the  cultural  activism   and  nationalist  ideology  of  regional  movements  in  france  through  the  lens   of  class  struggle,  which  leads  them  to  de-­‐legitimise  nationalist  movements   because  of  their  social  irrelevance.26  finally,  the  aim  of  yannick  guin  is  to   ‘destroy  the  nationalist  mythology  maintained  by  the  reaction  for  nearly  a   century  and  by  ordinary  leftism  in  recent  years’.27  this  analysis,  rooted  in   a   mechanistic   and   simplistic   marxism,   concludes   that   ‘the   breton   idea   corresponds   to   the   desperate   chimeras   of  doomed   factions’,   and   would   only  be  the  product  of  the  ‘disintegrated  agrarian  bloc’.  28   thus,  the  inclusion  of  the  breton  movement  within  the  social  movements   after  may  '68  disseminates  the  issues  of  the  historiography  of  the  emsav   beyond  the  nationalist  circles,  causing  controversy  and  generating  original   ideas   among   left-­‐wing   activists.   nevertheless,   this   remobilisation   of   history  is  not  the  prerogative  of  the  left:  the  former  generation  continues   to  take  part   in  the  contemporary  debates  of  the  breton  society,  with  its   own   point   of   view   and   without   disavowing   its   conservative   stance,   strongly  separating  it  from  the  young  leftists.  fouéré  continues  his  work  of   developing   a   nationalist   historiography,   reinforced   by   a   new   wave   of   militant  works  on  memorial  issues.29  although  hidden,  these  publications   give  rise  to  great  controversies.  many  become  obsessed  with  the  figure  of   fouéré   himself,   tending   therefore   to   reduce   ‘the   breton   issue’   to   the   history  of  the  emsav  during  the  war  and  the  fascist  orientation  of  its  most   extreme  fringes.   studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)      |      articles   tudi  kernalegenn  &  yann  fournis  88   henri  fréville,  a  historian  at  the  faculty  of  arts  of  rennes  but  also  mayor   of  that  town,  returns  to  the  purge  in  the  media  sector  in  brittany,  of  which   he  was  one  of   the  actors.   in  a  description  of   the  1940-­‐1946  period,  he   evokes   both   the   german   attempts   to   take   control   of   the   region’s   main   journals  and   the  reactions  of   regional  elites   to   this   strategy.  separating   (politically)  the  wheat  from  the  chaff,  he  clearly  distinguishes  the  ruling   elite,   reluctantly   pursuing   a   politics   of   presence,   from   the   breton   nationalists  (especially  fouéré),  using  german  support  to  rise  at  the  head   of  influent  newspapers.30  in  a  complex  polemic,  he  relies  a  few  years  later   on   archives   to   challenge,   among   others,   many   of   the   major   points   of   nationalist   historiography.31   condemning   the   great   figures   of   the   movement  for  collaboration,  he  relocates  their  careers  to  the  strategy  of   german  occupiers.32  without  revolutionising  the  available  knowledge,  this   work  enlightens  little  known  events,  at  the  cost  though  of  mixing  the  roles   of  historian  of  the  post-­‐war  period  and  of  political  actor  in  this  very  same   period.   cover  of  yannick  guin's    critical   history  of  brittany  (1977).   studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)      |      articles   tudi  kernalegenn  &  yann  fournis   89   during  the  seventies,  a  new,  scientific  historiography  puts  the  importance   of   fréville’s   work   and   the   many   controversies   into   perspective.   in   this   decade,   scholars   respond   to   social   movements   and   public   debates   by   shifting   the   perspectives   on   nationalism   in   three   different   ways.   two   founding   texts   appear   in   1976-­‐77,   which   contradict   the   nationalist   intellectuals’   version   of   interbellum   nationalism.   based   on   an   extensive   knowledge   of   literature   and   archives,   alain  déniel   draws   a   complex   picture   of   the   breton   movement,   emphasising   the   replacement   of   regionalism   by   an   innovative   nationalism   in   the   twenties,   before   the   economic   crisis   led   to   extremism   and   collaboration.   besides   accurately   describing  political  nationalist  leaders  going  astray,  déniel  also  shows  that   the  project   to   render   the  breton  society  susceptible   to  cultural  matters   was  in  some  ways  successful.33  michel  denis  goes  further  by  offering  an   abrasive  summary  of  the  period,  one  by  one  dismantling  the  current  ideas   of   nationalist   historiography.   his   demonstration   follows   three   steps.   relocating  the  nationalist  movement  to  the  political  fray,  he  stresses  that   its  collapse  following  the  'epuration'  is  caused  less  by  the  severity  of  the   repression  than  by  its  inherent  flaws.  he  goes  on  by  dissecting  the  internal   political   culture   of   the   nationalist   movement:   this   political   culture   accumulates   the   themes   of   fascism   (elitism,   racism,   xenophobia   and   antisemitism),  reflecting  the  contradictions  of  the  ascending  middle  class   hit  by  the  crisis  of  the  thirties.  the  emsav  then  locks  itself  in  an  exaltation   of  national  fetishes  (history,  language),  unable  to  expand  its  claims  beyond   the  petty  bourgeoisie.34   some  analysts  plough  this  sociological  furrow  more  radically:  putting  into   perspective  the  historical  continuity  discourses  of  the  breton  movement,   they  question  its  contemporary  ability  to  adapt  to  major  social  changes.   describing   the   breton   movement   as   resistance   to   integration   into   the   french  nation,  michel  nicolas  consistently  stresses   its   insertion   into   the   broader  realities,  of  both  economic  (industrial  development)  and  political   (the  encapsulating  of  the  regional  scene  by  the  french  state  and  the  local   representatives)  nature.  this  analysis  highlights  the  break  introduced  by   the  udb  generation,  which  builds  new  political  spaces  by  developing  its   own  approach.  it  also  highlights  the  limits  of  a  breton  nationalism  which,   being   marginalised   within   the   french   political   arena,   is   forced   to   find   studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)      |      articles   tudi  kernalegenn  &  yann  fournis  90   social   intermediaries   in   the   regional   society,   even   though   its   historiography  is  quite  unsuited  for  conquering  the  masses.35  this  analysis   joins   the   epistemological   reflections   of   some   parisian   social   science   research   calibrating   the   long-­‐term   prospects   of   the   breton   movement   (including  its  historiographical  narratives).   a   new   tool   for   analysing   social   movements,   linked   to   alain   touraine,   revitalises   the   perspectives   on   regional   movements.36   in   brittany   as   in   occitania   they   would   be   at   the   heart   of   the   conflicts   against   the   state,   characteristic   of   modernity.   it   is   therefore   appropriate   to   question   the   historicity  of  the  breton  movement,  that  is  to  say  its  ability  to  engage  in   conflicts   concerning   the   evolution   of   regional   society.   in   such   a   perspective,   therefore,   nationalism   is   not   transhistorical,   but   must   be   understood   in   terms  of   the  social  and  historical  course   followed  by   the   social  movement.  less  interested  in  the  conflicts  between  regional  elites,   this   sociology   extends   the   historian’s   analysis   to   highlight,   beyond   the   fascist   diversion,   the   modernising   aspects   of   nationalism   between   the   wars  and,  above  all,  to  scrutinise  its  contemporary  expression  through  its   ability  to  enlist  with  the  new  forms  of  social  action.   ultimately,   however,   these   studies   lead   to   disappointing   conclusions,   probably  because  of  a  too  ambitious  definition  of  the  social  movement  as   object:   despite   its   symbolic   influence,   the   breton   movement   is   characterised   above   all   by   its   inability   to   establish   itself   as   a   force   for   social  change.  this  is  partly  explained  by  the  nationalist  reconstruction  of   history:  breton  nationalism  is  still  based  on  a  historical  imaginary,  largely   focused  on  the  cultural  conflict  between  brittany  and  france,  more  than  on   a  socio-­‐political  anti-­‐hegemonic  struggle  against  the  french  state,  which   impedes  action  in  true  life.37   maryon  mcdonald  draws  similar  conclusions  through  the  anthropological   method   of   participant   observation   in   the   cultural   movement.   without   ignoring  long-­‐term  history,  she  observes  the  actualisation  of  this  historical   dimension  in  specific  and  localised  cases.  her  conclusions  assert  the  social   and  cultural  gap  between  the   linguistic  and  educational  practices  of   the   working  classes  in  brittany  and  those  of  the  breton  movement  based  on  an   intellectual  and  political  culture  where  the  history  of  opposition  to  france   studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)      |      articles   tudi  kernalegenn  &  yann  fournis   91   is  omnipresent.  dismantling  all  the  myths  of  the  nationalist  activists,  this   vitriolic  picture   finds  a  mitigated  echo   in  brittany   in   the  context  of   the   reflux  of  activists  during  the  1980s.38  still,  it  complements  the  analysis  of   social   movements   by   showing   how   militant   historiography   isolates   the   breton   movement   in   the   regional   population,   which   itself   sees   no   irreversible  contradiction  between  france  and  brittany.   finally,  a  third  perspective  of  the  social  sciences  reconciles  the  first  two  by   broadening   the   issue   of   nationalism.   following   the   development   of   ethnology  at  the  university  of  rennes,  the  centre  for  studies  and  research   on   inter-­‐ethnic   relations   and   minorities   (ceriem)   reconceptualises   regional  identity  in  terms  of  ethnicity  in  the  journal  pluriel.  validating  on   the   one   hand   historical   work   on   the   fascistic   diversion   of   nationalism   during   the   war,   pierre-­‐jean   simon   emphasises   on   the   other   hand   the   underlying  dialectic:  the  counter-­ideology  of  breton  nationalism,  modeled   on  french  nationalism,  experienced  a  particularly  sharp  radicalisation,  due   to  the  fact  that  it  was  a  reaction  ‘directly  related’  to  the  rejection  of  the   breton   identity   by   the   french   state.   more   broadly,   this   approach   emphasises  the  creative  and  modernising  dimension  of  nationalism  during   the   inter-­‐war  period,  which  more  than  breton  society   itself  has  created   breton  ethnicity.39  finally,  this  modernity  dwells  less  on  the  past  and  its   historiographical   narratives   than   on   the   current   success   of   the   breton   identity  to  qualify  the  phenomena  of  domination.40   suzanne  berger,   who   discusses   the   relationship   between   ethnicity   and   center-­‐periphery  relations  in  france,  adds  to  this  perspective.  the  specific   power  of  the  ‘ethnic  movement’  in  brittany  and  its  evolution  to  the  left  are   explained  by  political  developments:  the  singularity  of  brittany  is  based  on   a   symbolic   universe,   the   effectiveness   of   which   relies   less   on   ethnic   traditions  than  on  the  ability  of  these  traditions  to  reinforce  the  tensions   between   center   and   periphery.41   this   analysis   therefore   completes   and   adjusts  those  approaches  emphasising  the  breton  movement’s  isolation  in   regional  society:  the  reinvention  of  breton  culture  makes  it  a  medium  for   the   expression   of   breton   nationalism   which   reaches   a   new   level   of   integration  into  contemporary  society  through  its  ability  to  disseminate  its   major  issues.42   studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)      |      articles   tudi  kernalegenn  &  yann  fournis  92   public  debate  and  the  renewal  of  historiography  (since  the   1980s)   between  1981  and  1995,  the  breton  movement   is  discreet:   the  regional   issue,  officially  settled  by  the  laws  of  decentralisation  of  1982,  is  no  longer   on   the   agenda.   this   public   silence,   after   the   tumultuous   seventies,   is   accompanied   by   an   almost   complete   absence   of   studies   on   the   breton   movement,  with   the  exception  of  delayed  publications  of  research  done   before  1981.43  a  loose  consensus  emerges:  the  breton  nationalist  parties   remain  marginal  electorally  speaking,  while  breton  cultural  demands  and   emanations   gather   some   passive   support.   from   the   1995   onwards,   however,   there   is   a   cultural   revival   with   the   return   of   popular   cultural   events   related   to   the   breton   movement   like   the   festoù-­noz   and   other   festivals,  followed  by  publications  on  the  breton  movement  designed  for   the  general  public.44   only  from  1997-­‐1998  does  the  issue  resurface  with  a  revival  of  scientific   studies,   provoked   by   the   media   controversy   regarding   the   breton   movement   and   the   historiography   of   brittany.   the   discussion   partly   focuses   on   the   breton   movement   which   uses   discrete   but   multiple   and   significant  references  to  some  of  the  leaders  of  the  second  emsav  (1918-­‐ 1945).   for   some   leaders,   militant   historiography   composed   during   this   period  remains  valid   in   the  1990s,  by  way  of  reverence   to   the  gwalarn   generation.  originally  crystallised  around  the  symbolic   figure  of  hemon,   the  conflict  is  then  brought  to  the  entire  breton  movement.45  pushed  by   some  individuals  engaged  against  the  breton  movement,  in  publications  as   well   as   on   the   internet   or   in   the   press,   the   debate   crosses   brittany’s   borders   and   quickly   raises   numerous   articles   in   the   french   press   (l’express,  19  july  1999;  le  nouvel  observateur  7-­‐13  december  2000).46   for  the  first  time,  the  discussion  on  the  history  of  brittany  and  the  breton   movement   is   carried   in   the   public   arena.   the   newspaper   ouest-­france,   with  a  circulation  of  more  than  770,000  units  and  not  under  suspicion  of   any  sympathy   for  breton  nationalism,  serialises  reynald  sécher’s  comic   books  on  the  history  of  brittany.47  sensitive  periods  like  the  chouannerie   (the  revolt  by  royalists  against  the  republic   in  1793)  and  world  war  ii   studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)      |      articles   tudi  kernalegenn  &  yann  fournis   93   engender   controversies   between   the   regional   press   (ouest-­france,   le   nouvel   ouest)   and   the   parisian   press   (notably   télérama).   this   historiographical  controversy  arises  after  twenty  years  of  silence  on  the   issue  of  brittany,  at  the  very  moment  when  the  breton  cultural  movement   finds   a   new   dynamism   and   a   social   basis.   these   accusations,   often   the   result  of  making  a  mishmash  of  facts  and  opinions  and  despite  the  work  of   historians,  usually  end  up  evoking  the  (assumed  deleterious)  influence  of   the  emsav  on  breton  society.48   this  historiographical  controversy  and  its  by-­‐effects  have  only  marginally   touched   upon   the   breton   movement   and   its   social   image   in   brittany.49   rather,  it  seems  to  have  been  a  strong  factor  in  a  collective  reinvestigation   of   the   breton   movement’s   recent   history,   and   in   particular   of   the   link   between   the   pre-­‐war   period   (and   nationalism)   and   the   current   period   (and  the  breton  identity  sensu  lato).  however,  those  links  are  less  obvious   than   ever,   even   though   some   scientific   works   stress   the   historical   continuity.50   in  fact,  regional  elites  refuse  to  see  their  efforts  to  re-­‐appropriate  breton   history  reduced  to  a  dubious  political  crusade.  they  continue  to  invest  in   ‘breton   identity’   –   as   does   the   influential   newspaper   ouest-­france.   similarly,   certain   personalities   at   the   intersection   of   academia   and   the   breton  movement  are  engaged  in  critical  work  on  the  emsav’s  behavior   during   world   war   ii,   allowing   the   breton   movement   to   clarify   its   own   history.  kristian  hamon  for  example  uses  the  historical  archives  to  draw   an   unambiguous   picture   of   the   collaboration   by   part   of   the   political   movement.51   this   research   was   not   warmly   received,   but   contributed   nevertheless  to  a   long-­‐awaited  work  of  collective  memory,  as  a   ‘right  to   inventory’.52  the  scientific  reaction  to  these  controversies  illustrates  best   the  new  relationship  between  militant  historiography  and  regional  society.   studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)      |      articles   tudi  kernalegenn  &  yann  fournis  94   indeed,   the   controversy   provokes   a   reinvestigation   of   the   subject   by   academic   historians,   whose   work   greatly   contributes   to   the   available   knowledge   on   the   breton   movement.   they   make   a   clear   distinction   between  the  excesses  of  the  breton  movement  during  world  war  ii  and   the  progressive  and  open  features  of  the  contemporary  emsav.  this  public   and  historiographical  interest  for  the  emsav  during  world  war  ii  results  in   a   major   international   symposium   organised   in   brest   by   the   centre   de   recherche   bretonne   et   celtique   (crbc,   centre   for   breton   and   celtic   research).   under  the  somewhat  condescending  eye  of  some  parisian  journalists  (le   monde  des  livres,  2  november  2001),  this  conference  aims  to  ‘meet  “strong   social  demand”  in  brittany’,  using  ‘the  weapon  of  knowledge,  in  order  to   share  the  gains  of  historical  research  in  a  non-­‐confrontational  way’.53  to   achieve   this,   the  conference  opens  a  much  wider  debate  by  placing   the   history  of  the  breton  movement  not  only  in  the  context  of  breton  society,   report  of  the  much  debated  conference  on   brittany   in   world   war   ii,   organised   in   brest  in  november  2001.   studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)      |      articles   tudi  kernalegenn  &  yann  fournis   95   but  also  in  relation  to  other  regional  experiences  in  europe.  the  synthesis   and  the  advancement  of  knowledge  confirm  the  earlier  scientific  work:  the   breton  movement  has  sought  to  advance  its  own  goals  by  engaging  in  a   powerful   political   and   cultural   collaboration.54   this   has   earned   the   movement   severe  and   justifiable   retribution  at   the  liberation,   although   individual  stories  may  be  more  complex.55  the  conference  is  also  a  great   public  success,  well  covered  by  the  regional  and  national  press.  the  two   main  newspapers  in  brittany  (ouest-­france  and  le  télégramme)  announce   the   debate   and   then   report   the   content   of   the   contributions   on   a   daily   basis.  as  concluded  by  the  historian  christian  bougeard,  the  objective  has   been  achieved:     ‘many   areas   have   been   investigated,   demonstrating,   from   the   perspective   of   historians   and   hopefully   of   the   media   alike,   that   there  were  no  more  “skeletons  in  the  closet”.  […]  only  deliberate   or  lazy  ignorance  of  these  developments,  or  bad  faith,  can  further   fuel   the   controversy   or   give   a   distorted   picture   of   breton   historical   reality.   […]  now  well  established,   the   facts   should  no   longer   allow   the   amalgamation   of   the   entire   emsav   with   the   collaborators.’56   beyond   the   conference,   the   academic   study   of   the   breton   movement   extends   to   other   periods.   the   knowledge   on   the   period   of   the   early   twentieth  century  is  renewed,  notably  with  a  conference  on  the  figure  of   emile  masson,  the  famous  left-­‐winger  who  first  tried  to  link  socialist  ideals   and   breton   nationalism   or   with   the   study   of   philippe   le   stum   on   the   impact   of   neo-­‐druidism.57   the   thesis   of   francis   le   squer   helps   to   understand  better  the  bleun  brug,  a  catholic  and  regionalist  organisation   created  by  the  abbot  yann-­‐vari  perrot,  which,  from  1905,  became  arguably   the   main   mass   movement   in   the   history   of   the   emsav.58   a   successful   exhibition  dedicated  to  the  artistic  movement  seiz  breur,  which  imagined   in  the  1920s  and  1930s  a  celto-­‐breton  art  with  lasting  cultural  influences,   is  also  worth  mentioning.59  another  new  period  of  interest  are  the  1970s,   notably   with   tudi   kernalegenn’s   analysis   focusing   on   the   left   and   the   breton   national   issue,   clarifying   the   1960s   shift   to   the   left   of   both   the   breton  movement  and  the  claims  for  devolution.60  on  the  1970s,  also  the   studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)      |      articles   tudi  kernalegenn  &  yann  fournis  96   study  of  erwann  chartier  and  alain  cabon  on  the  breton  liberation  front   should   be   mentioned,   as   it   has   had   a   strong   symbolic   impact   on   the   region.61   concerning   the   contemporary   period,   the   studies   are   also   multiplying,   with   notably   a   dictionary   of   breton   heritage   focusing   on   the   breton   identity’s   constitutive   elements.62   not   less   interesting   is   a   collective   publication  on  the  building  of   regional   identity.  examples  of  saxony  and   brittany,   18th-­20th   centuries   reminding   after   catherine   bertho   that   the   breton  identity  is  a  social  construction  and  not  a  given.63  thirdly  there  is   an   overview   of   the   history   of   the   breton   movement   since   the   1980s.64   these   studies   reach   a   wide   audience,   as   demonstrated   by   a   series   of   conferences  in  2000-­‐2001  on  the  topic  brittany  2100.  identity  and  future.65   within   ten   years,   the   historiography   of   the   breton   movement   has   awakened  and  shed  light  on  many  of  its  stages  and  aspects.   not  only  historians,  but  sociologists  as  well  have  covered  the  subject  with   several  studies  on  breton  identity,  both  groups  insisting  on  the  intrinsic   plurality  of  breton  identity,   in  a  constant  process  of  elaboration.66  from   this   literature   though   has   emerged   a   public   consensus   reappropriated   outside  university,  on  a  depoliticised  conception  of   the  breton   identity.   according   to   mainstream   social   actors,   it   should   remain   cultural,   pertaining   to   the   heart,   the   emotions,   and   not   be   ‘instrumentalised’   in   order  to  ask  for  specific  breton  institutions.  this  depoliticised  conception   of  breton  identity,  removing  its  social  and  political  dimensions,  has  indeed   consequently  defused  the  debate  about  the  political  future  of  brittany.   with   a   pluridisciplinary   approach,   a   group   of   young   social   scientists,   originally  gathered  around  ronan  le  coadic  and  christian  demeuré-­‐vallée   in  the  association  identity  and  democracy  –  international  debates  (iddi),   have  actively  contributed  to  develop  this  new  research  dynamic  around   the   breton   issue,   with   an   international   symposium   in   rennes   in   2002,   praised  by  the  critics,  and  two  books.67   finally,   political   scientists   have   focused   on   the   social   construction   of   brittany.   political   institutionalists   have   notably   questioned   the   political   capacity  of  brittany,  which  they  revealed  by  a  detour  through  history.68   romain   pasquier   shows   how   the   capacity   of   the   bretons   to   construct   studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)      |      articles   tudi  kernalegenn  &  yann  fournis   97   territorialised  coalitions  of  interests  is  specific  in  the  french  sphere,  and   explains  to  a  certain  degree  the  ability  of  brittany  to  act  as  a  collective  and   territorialised  social  actor,  and  therefore  shapes  its  social  reality.  political   sociologists  have  more  focused  on  the  analysis  of  breton  regionalism  as   the  convergence  of  territorial  mobilisations  in  various  social  areas  across   brittany.69   an   alternative   approach   to   regionalism   is   to   see   it   as   the   expression  of  a  territorialised  social  analysis,  the  region  being  to  a  certain   extent  a  cognitive  tool  to  understand  reality  from  a  specific  point  of  view.70     the   period   since   1997   is   thus   characterised   by   a   historiographical   controversy  surrounding  the  breton  movement,  with  the  use  of  the  past  to   attack  the  movement   in  the  present.  the  result   is  an  overinvestment   in   one  era  of  the  breton  movement:  world  war  ii.  however,  this  works  as  a   catalyst   for   the   study   of   the   entire   breton   movement,   both   within   the   movement  itself  and  in  academic  circles.  in  some  ways,  this  revival  picks   up  the  thread  of  a  historiography  interrupted  for  almost  twenty  years,  and   contributes   to   a   beneficial   clarification   of   the   discourse   and   task   of   remembrance  of  the  breton  movement.   conclusion   breton   identity   and   its   impact   on   the   breton   society   remain   clearly   paradoxical.  on  the  one  hand,   it  cannot  be  considered  as  an   ideological   matrix   encompassing   the   whole   regional   society   in   a   single   collective   project  (in  comparison  for  example,  up  to  a  certain  point  at  least,  to  the   catalan   or   welsh   identities).   it   is   neither   translated   clearly   into   the   political  space,  the  regional  nationalist  parties  never  having  had  a  strong   impact  in  elections,  in  contrast  to  most  other  similar  territories  in  western   europe.   brittany   is   indeed   still   an   ‘invisible   nation’…   but,   on   the   other   hand,   it   constitutes   a   strong   symbolic   frame,   contributing   to   integrate   symbols,  actions  and  strategies  within  a  real  sense  of  a  collective  identity.   hence,   political   invisibility   does   not   necessarily   mean   weakness…   an   explanation  of  this  paradox  lies  partially  in  the  (historic)  fate  of  the  breton   movement  itself  and  of  its  historiography.   studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)      |      articles   tudi  kernalegenn  &  yann  fournis  98   founded   on   very   conservative   roots   and   a   fascination   for   the   past,   the   breton  movement  has  never  been  able  to  become  a  central  actor  of  the   breton   society   and   therefore,   notably,   has   always   had   difficulties   to   be   considered  as  a  legitimate  actor  in  the  political  definition  of  brittany  as  a   specific   society   (in   the   cultural   realm   though,   its   influence   has   been   determinative  in  the  long  term).  its  historiography  has  impeded  more  than   helped  the  emsav   in  the  twentieth  century,  and  its  vision  of  history  has   remained   marginal   for   most   of   its   existence.   the   historiography   and   analysis   of   the   breton   movement   have   even   remained   hidden   until   the   1960s.  from  the  1970s  though,  the  emsav  has  become  a  legitimate  object   for   historians   and   social   scientists,   creating   a   new   scholarly   historiography.   this   has   not   been   without   polemics,   notably   on   the   attitude  of  the  breton  movement  during  wwii.  nonetheless,  scholars  have   clearly  distinguished  between  the  errors  of  the  past  and  the  contemporary   breton   movement,   helping   it   to   turn   to   the   future   on   more   sound   foundations.   the  historiography  of  the  breton  issue  has  been  clearly  developing  since   the  end  of  the  1990s.  scientific  knowledge  has  grown  on  most  aspects  and   periods  of  the  history  of  the  breton  movement.  an  important  milestone  is   the   global   synthesis   published   by   nicolas.71   unfortunately,   a   forceful   analysis  of  its  different  historical  periods  is  still  lacking,  most  notably  on   the  low  tide,  from  1945  to  1964.72  other  lacunas  are  specific,  transversal   aspects,   for   example   the   movement’s   progressive   and   left-­‐wing   trend.   moreover,  many  essential  actors  are  still  without  any  specific  study,  most   notably   the   union   démocratique   breton,   or   the   comité   d'étude   et   de   liaison  des  intérêts  bretons  (celib).73  new  theoretical  approaches  are  also   to  be  expected,  notably  to  better  explain  the  breton  paradox  of  a  strong   and  recognised  identity  without  any  determining  political  emanation  up  to   now.   studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)      |      articles   tudi  kernalegenn  &  yann  fournis   99     endnotes   1  a.  dieckhoff,  la  nation  dans  tous  ses  états  (paris,  2000);  s.  gemie,  brittany  1750-­ 1950.  the  invisible  nation  (cardiff,  2007).   2   b.   anderson,   l’imaginaire   national.   réflexions   sur   l’origine   et   l’essor   du   nationalisme  (paris,  1996);  m.  keating,  nations  against  the  state.  the  new  politics   of  nationalism  in  quebec,  catalonia  and  scotland  (london,  1996).   3  m.  keating,  the  new  regionalism  in  western  europe.  territorial  restructuring  and   political  change  (cheltenham,  1998);  m.  denis,  ’la  génération  des  années  1960  et   l’émancipation  bretonne.  essai  d’histoire  impertinente’,  in:  a.  croix,  f.  hubert  &  e.   le  bris  du  rest  (eds.),  monsieur  le  ‘conservateur’.  musées  et  combats  culturels  en   bretagne  au  temps  de  yann-­cheun  veillard  (rennes,  2001).  we  will  use  the  term   ‘breton  movement’  (or  emsav)  to  refer  to  the  members  of  the  political  and  cultural   organisations  that  make  up  the  nebula  of  breton  regional  nationalism  (m.  nicolas,   histoire  du  mouvement  breton  (paris,  1982)).   4  g.  noiriel,  etat,  nation  et  immigration  (paris,  2001).   5  see  l.  boltanski,  les  cadres;  la  formation  d’un  groupe  social  (paris,  1982).   6  m.  keating,  ‘how  historic  are  historic  rights?  competing  historiographies  and  the   struggle   for   political   legitimacy’,   in:   x.m.   reboredo   gonzález   (ed.),  etnicidade   e   nacionalismo.  simposio  internacional  de  antropoloxía  (abril  de  2000)  (santiago  de   compostela,  2001)  45-­‐81.   7   m.   hroch,   ‘from   national   movement   to   the   fully-­‐formed   nation’,   in:   new   left   review,   no.   198   (1993)   3-­‐20.   in   this   article   we   consider   ‘breton   national   historiography’  as   the  historiography  referring  to  brittany  taken   in   its  national   dimension,  that  is  to  say  by  and/or  on  the  breton  ‘national’  movement.   8  f.  postic  &  j.-­‐y.  veillard,  ’reconnaissance  d’une  culture  régionale.  la  bretagne   depuis  la  révolution’,  in:  ethnologie  française,  33  (2003)  381-­‐389.   9  h.  guillorel,  ‘problème  breton  et  mouvement  breton’,  in:  pouvoirs,  19  (1981)  83-­‐102.     studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)      |      articles   tudi  kernalegenn  &  yann  fournis  100     10   m.   denis,   ‘arthur   de   la   borderie   (1827-­‐1901)   ou   “l’histoire,   science   patriotique”’,  in:  n.-­‐y.  tonnerre  (ed.),  chroniqueurs  et  historiens  de  la  bretagne  du   moyen-­âge  au  milieu  du  xxe  siècle,  (rennes,  2001)  143-­‐155.   11  a.  de  la  borderie,  b.  porchnev  &  e.s.b.,  les  bonnets  rouges  (collection  10/18)   (paris,  1975)  23.     12  p.-­‐j.  simon,  la  bretonnité.  une  ethnicité  problématique  (rennes,  1999)  187.   13  j.  coroller,  histoire  de  notre  bretagne  (st.-­‐vincent-­‐sur-­‐oust,  [1922]  1997).   14  h.  poisson  &  j.-­‐p.  le  mat,  histoire  de  bretagne  (spézet,  [1954]  2000)  453.   15  notably  r.  caerléon,  gwenn  ha  du  (pleyber-­‐christ,  1938).   16   m.   lagrée,   religion   et   culture   en   bretagne   (1850-­1950)   (paris,   1992);   y.   tranvouez,  ‘les  catholiques  et  la  question  bretonne  (1940-­‐1944)’,  in:  c.  bougeard   (ed.),  bretagne  et  identités  régionales  pendant  la  seconde  guerre  mondiale  (brest,   2002)  285-­‐306.   17  m.  nicolas,  le  séparatisme  en  bretagne  (spézet,  1986).   18  y.  fouéré,  la  bretagne  écartelée  (1938-­1948)  (paris,  1962);  r.  paxton,  la  france   de  vichy  (paris,  1973).   19  m.  nicolas,  l’emsav.  politique  et  thématique  du  mouvement  breton  (phd  diss.,   université   de   rennes,   1980)   2   vol.;   nicolas,   histoire   du   mouvement   breton;   v.   porhel,  ‘usage  politique  de  l’histoire  par  le  régionalisme  breton  dans  les  conflits   sociaux   des   années   68’,   in:   m.   crivellom   p.   garcia   &   n.   offenstadt   (eds.),   concurrence  des  passés.  usages  politiques  du  passé  dans  la  france  contemporaine   (aix-­‐en-­‐provence,  2006)  131-­‐144.   20  t.  kernalegenn,  drapeau  rouge  et  gwenn-­ha-­du.  l’extrême-­gauche  et  la  bretagne   dans  les  années  de  soixante-­dix  (rennes,  2005).   21   the   reason   for   this   intellectual   interest   of   marxist   activists   for   breton   nationalism  is  the  idea  that  the  revolution  they  are  calling  for  will  emerge  from   the  union  between  class  struggles  and  national  struggles,  hence  the  need  to  better   understand  the  latter.   22  g.  le  scouézec,  ‘histoire  du  mouvement  breton’,  in:  que  faire,  8/9  (1971)  6-­‐13;   'colonialisme  intérieur  et  minorités  nationales',  in:  que  faire,  8/9  (1971)  65-­‐80;  g.   millour,  ’la  question  nationale  bretonne’,  in:  critique  socialiste,  11  (1973)  31-­‐37.     studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)      |      articles   tudi  kernalegenn  &  yann  fournis   101     23  r.  roudaut,  ‘histoire  du  mouvement  breton’,  in:  les  temps  modernes,  no.  324-­‐ 326  (1973)  170-­‐194.  in  this  special  issue  on  ‘minorités  nationales  en  france’,  see   also  the  article  by  p.  doridam,  ‘la  bretagne  et  le  socialisme’,  223-­‐233.   24  d.  chatelain  &  p.  tafani,  qu’est-­ce  qui  fait  courir  les  autonomistes  (paris,  1976);   y.  guin,  histoire  de  la  bretagne:  contribution  à  la  critique  de  l’idéologie  nationaliste   (paris,  1977).   25  see   for   instance   j.-­‐y.  guiomar,   ‘essai   sur   la  production  du  signe   idéologique   “bretagne”’,  in:  la  taupe  bretonne,  no.  3  (1972)  69-­‐94,  no.  4  (1973)  155-­‐166;  a.  le   guyader,   ‘la  bretagne  et  ses   idéologues’,   in:  la   taupe  bretonne,  no.  2-­‐5  (1971-­‐ 1973).   26  chatelain  &  tafani,  qu’est-­ce  qui  fait  courir,  306.   27  guin,  histoire,  9.   28  guin,  histoire,  317.   29   h.   le   boterf,   la   bretagne   dans   la   guerre   (paris,   1969-­‐1971)   3   vol.;   a.   youenou,  fransez  debauvais  de  breiz  atao  et  les  siens  (rennes,  1972-­‐1980)  6  vol.;   o.  mordrel,  breiz  atao.  histoire  et  actualité  du  nationalisme  breton  (paris,  1973);  r.   caerléon,  le  rêve  fou  des  soldats  de  breiz  atao  (quimper,  1975);  y.  fouéré,  histoire   résumée  du  mouvement  breton  (quimper,  1977).   30  h.  fréville,  la  presse  bretonne  dans  la  tourmente  (1940-­1946)  (paris,  1979).   31  y.  didro  &  y.  fouéré,  l’histoire  du  quotidien  ‘la  bretagne’  et  les  silences  d’henri   fréville  (les  cahiers  de  l’avenir  de  la  bretagne)  (saint-­‐brieuc,  1981).   32  h.  fréville,  archives  secrètes  de  bretagne,  1940-­1944  (rennes,  1985).   33  a.  déniel,  le  mouvement  breton,  1919-­1945  (paris,  1976).   34   m.   denis,  ’mouvement   breton   et   fascisme;   signification   de   l’échec   du   second   emsav’,  in:  c.  gras  &  g.  livet  (eds.),  régions  et  régionalismes  en  france  du  xviiie   siècle   à   nos   jours   (paris,   1977)   489-­‐506.   see   also   b.   frelaut,  les   nationalistes   bretons  de  1939  à  1945  (maulévrier,  1985).   35  nicolas,  histoire  du  mouvement  breton;  nicolas,  le  séparatisme.   36  a.  touraine  &  f.  dubet,  le  pays  contre  l’état  (paris,  1981).     studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)      |      articles   tudi  kernalegenn  &  yann  fournis  102     37   r.   dulong,  la   question   bretonne   (paris,   1975);   l.   quéré,   jeux   interdits   à   la   frontière.  essai  sur  le  régionalisme  (paris,  1978).   38   m.   mcdonald,  we   are   not   french!   langage,   culture   and   identity   in   brittany   (london,  1989)  303-­‐316.   39  simon,  la  bretonnité.   40  f.  elegoët,  ‘bilinguisme  ou  domination  linguistique?’,  in:  les  temps  modernes,  no.   324-­‐326  (1973)  213-­‐222;  simon,  la  bretonnité.   41  s.  berger,  ‘bretons  and  jacobins.  reflections  on  french  regional  ethnicity’,  in:  j.   esman  milton  (ed.),  ethnic  conflict  in  the  western  world  (ithaca  -­‐  london,  1977)   157-­‐178.   42   dulong,   la   question   bretonne;   berger,   ‘bretons   and   jacobins’;   quéré,   jeux   interdits;  mcdonald,  we  are  not  french.   43   frelaut,   les   nationalistes   bretons;   nicolas,   histoire   du   mouvement   breton;   nicolas,  le  séparatisme;  mcdonald,  we  are  not  french;  guillorel,  ‘problème  breton’,   83-­‐102;  h.  guillorel,  ‘the  social  bases  of  regionalism  in  france.  the  breton  case’,   in:  j.  coakley  (ed.),  the  social  origins  of  nationalist  movements.  the  contemporary   west  european  experience  (london,  1992)  147-­‐164.   44   m.   nicolas,  bretagne,   un   destin   européen   (rennes,   2001);   e.   chartier   &   r.   larvor,  la   question   bretonne.   enquête   sur   les   mouvements   politiques   bretons   (plougastell  -­‐  daoulaz,  2002).   45  roparz  hemon  (1900-­‐1978),  linguist,  grammarian,  writer  and  activist,  leader  of   the   gwalarn   generation   (named   after   their   journal),   is   largely   considered   the   father  of  the  breton  cultural  movement.  he  was  sentenced  to  ‘national  indignity’   in  1946,  especially  for  cultural  collaboration  with  the  occupant.  see  r.  calvez,  la   radio  en  langue  bretonne.  roparz  hemon  et  pierre-­jakez  hélias.  deux  rêves  de   la   bretagne  (rennes,  2000).  controversy  arose  when  his  name  was  given  to  the  first   diwan  college  which  was  renamed  in  may  2000.   46  a  notable  attack  on  the  movement  was  that  by  françoise  morvan,  especially  in   her  le   monde   comme   si.   nationalisme   et   dérive   identitaire   en   bretagne   (arles,   2002).   47  r.  le  honzec  &  r.  sécher,  histoire  de  bretagne  des  origines  à  nos  jours  (acigné,   2002)  10  vol.     studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)      |      articles   tudi  kernalegenn  &  yann  fournis   103     48   m.   denis,  ’le   mouvement   breton   pendant   la   guerre:   un   bilan’,   in:   bougeard,  bretagne  et  identités  régionales,  151-­‐166.   49   see   m.   bergère,   ‘les   usages   politiques   de   la   seconde   guerre   mondiale   en   bretagne:  histoire,  mémoire  et  identité  régionale’  (unpubl.  paper,  2003).   50  cf.  calvez,  la  radio.   51   k.   hamon,  les   nationalistes   bretons   sous   l’occupation   (ar   releg   -­‐   kerhuon,   2001);  k.  hamon,  le  bezen  perrot.  1944.  des  nationalistes  bretons  sous  l’uniforme   allemand  (fouesnant,  2004).   52  see  also  g.  cadiou,  l’hermine  et   la  croix  gammée.  le  mouvement  breton  et   la   collaboration  (paris,  2001).   53  bougeard,  bretagne  et  identités  régionales.   54   denis,   ‘le   mouvement   breton’;   r.   calvez,  ’1941:   le   breton,   langue   d’etat’,   in:   bougeard,  bretagne  et  identités  régionales,  207-­‐221;  l.  boissou,  ‘l’allemagne  et  le   nationalisme  breton  (1939-­‐1945)’,  in:  bougeard,  bretagne  et  identités  régionales,   321-­‐336.   55   d.   le   couédic,  ’les   étranges   destinées   de   dézarrois   et   lebesque   ou   la   complication  de   la  guerre  mise  à  nu  par  ses   intellectuels,  même’,   in:  bougeard,   bretagne  et  identités  régionales,  177-­‐206;  l.  capdevila,  ’le  mouvement  breton  face   à  l’epuration’,  in:  bougeard,  bretagne  et  identités  régionales,  337-­‐351.   56  bougeard,  bretagne  et  identités  régionales,  393-­‐399.   57  p.  le  stum,  le  néo-­druidisme  en  bretagne.  origine,  naissance  et  développement,   1890-­1914  (rennes,  1998);  j.-­‐d.  giraud  &  m.  giraud  (eds.),  émile  masson,  prophète   et  rebelle  (rennes,  2005).   58   f.   le   squer,   les   espoirs,   les   efforts   et   les   épreuves   du   mouvement   breton   catholique  de  1891  à  1945  (lille,  1997).   59   d.   le   couédic   &   j.-­‐y.   veillard   (eds.),  ar   seiz   breur   1923-­1947.   la   création   bretonne  entre  tradition  et  modernité  (rennes,  2000).   60   kernalegenn,   drapeau   rouge;   t.   kernalegenn,   une   approche   cognitive   du   régionalisme.   identités   régionales,   territoires,   mouvements   sociaux   en   bretagne,   écosse  et  galice  dans  les  années  1970  (phd  diss.,  université  de  rennes  1,  2011).     studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)      |      articles   tudi  kernalegenn  &  yann  fournis  104     61   e.   chartier   &   a.   cabon,   le   dossier   f.l.b.   plongée   chez   les   clandestins   bretons   (spézet,  2006).   62  a.  croix  &  j.-­‐y.  veillard,  le  dictionnaire  du  patrimoine  breton  (rennes,  2000).   63  c.  bertho,  ’l’invention  de  la  bretagne.  genèse  sociale  d’un  stéréotype’,  in:  actes   de   la   recherche   en   sciences   sociales,   35   (1980)   45-­‐62;   g.   nicolas   (ed.),  la   construction  de  l’identité  régionale.  les  exemples  de  la  saxe  et  de  la  bretagne,  xviiie-­ xxe  siècles  (rennes,  2001).   64  nicolas,  bretagne.   65  a.  croix  (ed.),  bretagne  2100.  identité  et  avenir  (rennes,  2001).   66  r.  le  coadic,  l’identité  bretonne  (rennes,  1998);  simon,  la  bretonnité.   67  r.  le  coadic  (ed.),  diversité  culturelle  et  mondialisation.  repenser  la  démocratie   (rennes,  2003);  n.  dugalès,  r.  le  coadic  &  f.  patez  (eds.),  et  la  bretagne?  héritage,   identité,  projets   (rennes,  2004);  n.  dugalès,  y.  fournis  &  t.  kernalegenn  (eds.),   bretagne  plurielle.  culture,  territoire  et  politique  (rennes,  2007).   68  r.  pasquier,  la  capacité  politique  des  régions.  une  comparaison  france/espagne   (rennes,  2004);  a.  cole,  beyond  devolution  and  decentralisation.  building  regional   capacity  in  wales  and  brittany  (manchester,  2006).   69   y.   fournis,   les   régionalismes   en   bretagne.   la   région   et   l’état   (1950-­2000)   (brussels,  2006).   70  kernalegenn,  une  approche  cognitive.   71  m.  nicolas,  histoire  de  la  revendication  bretonne  (spézet,  2007).   72  let  us  mention  though  the  book  of  henry  on  the  journal  l’avenir  de  la  bretagne:   l.  henry,  le  retour  du  mouvement  breton  après  1945  à  travers  le  journal  l’avenir   de   la  bretagne   (fouenant,  2003);  or  on   the  celib:   j.-­‐p.  cressard,  celib   (1950-­ 2000).  quand  la  bretagne  s’est  réveillée  (spézet,  2000).   73   a   conference   was   devoted   to   the   udb   in   april   2013,   organised   by   tudi   kernalegenn  and  romain  pasquier.  about  the  celib,  a  phd  thesis  is  now  being   prepared.   art_dgwilliams_v4_def daniel g. williams, ‘beyond invisibility. uses of comparison in welsh cultural nationalism’, in: studies on national movements, 2 (2014). http://snm.nise.eu/index.php/studies/article/view/0208a daniel g. williams beyond invisibility uses of comparison in welsh cultural nationalism the trope of invisibility has provided a resilient motif for national minorities. it is associated in particular with the african-american experience, partly due to ralph ellison’s seminal novel invisible man (1952), which re-interpreted the title of h.g. wells’s science-fiction fantasy and transformed it into a metaphor that symbolised the consequences of racial blindness and indifference.1 yet, as anne anlin cheng has noted, ‘the nature of racial blindness – and its antidote social visibility – has never been as simple as the binary terms imply.’2 visibility and invisibility can only emerge in relation to one another. english and spanish visibility relies on the normality and ubiquity of these categories, that is on their perceived invisibility. welsh and catalan invisibility acquire their shape and existence due to their potentially disturbing visibility through language and the outward symbols of nationhood. the processes by which those markers of difference are rendered inconsequential by the dominant culture are complex. the rhetoric of ‘becoming visible’, so central to minority nationalist movements, tends to ignore the tensions underpinning social visibility. ralph ellison was fully aware of these tensions, and the conceit of invisibility in invisible man embodies not the opposition between being seen and not being seen, but the mutual studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles daniel g. williams 2 projections embraced by ‘self’ and ‘other’ in structuring the relationship between dominant and subordinate cultures. the ‘invisibility to which i refer’, states the narrator of ellison’s novel, occurs because of a peculiar disposition of the eyes of those with whom i come in contact. a matter of the construction of their inner eyes, those eyes with which they look through their physical eyes upon reality. i am not complaining, nor am i protesting either. it is sometimes advantageous to be unseen, although it is most often rather wearing on the nerves. then too, you’re constantly being bumped against those of poor vision. or again, you often doubt if you really exist.3 the narrator is not literally invisible, but because of his race finds himself unacknowledged and unrepresented in american society. in beginning to make himself visible, to develop a sense of selfhood, he compares himself with others, defining himself in relation to other political actors and ideologies: victorian racial uplift, folk culture, black nationalism, communism. in this respect ellison’s celebrated work is a development of a series of stories that he wrote in the early 1940s. ellison served in the merchant marine as second cook and baker from 1943 to 1945, seeing this as a means of contributing to the war effort without serving in the segregated american army.4 his period aboard the s.s. sun yat sen in 1943 took him to the welsh ports of cardiff, barry and swansea, and it is cover of ralph ellison’s invisible man (1952) | random house inc. studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles daniel g. williams 3 the latter destination that formed a setting for the story ‘in a strange country’ which was published in 1944. it begins with the central character, parker, sitting in a welsh pub recalling events that have happened earlier that evening: coming ashore from the ship he had felt the excited expectancy of entering a strange land. moving along the road in the dark he had planned to stay ashore all night, and in the morning he would see the country with fresh eyes. […] someone had cried ‘jesus h. christ’, and he had thought, he’s from home, and grinned and apologized into the light they flashed in his eyes. he had felt the blow coming when they yelled, ‘it’s a goddamn nigger’, but it struck him anyway. he was having a time of it when some of mr catti’s countrymen stepped in and mr catti had guided him into the pub […]. at first he had included them in his blind rage. but they had seemed so genuinely and uncondescendingly polite that he was disarmed. now the anger and resentment had slowly ebbed, and he felt only a smouldering sense of self-hate and ineffectiveness. why should he blame them when they had helped him? he had been the one so glad to hear an american voice. you can’t take it out on them, they’re a different breed; even from the english.5 the passage traces a shift in parker’s perception of the welsh, from initially including them in his ‘blind rage’ to his increasing awareness of their ethnic difference. following a violent encounter with white american gis, parker has a literal black eye that functions as a suggestive metaphor in a story preoccupied with issues of sight and self-perception. upon entering the club with his welsh hosts the light strikes parker’s injured eye – ‘it was as though it were being peeled by an invisible hand’ – and the story proceeds to explore the layers of identity that constitute the africanamerican self – the black ‘i’.6 the black ‘i’ is defined comparatively, and this reflects ellison’s own experiences of defining his african-american subjectivity in wales. in a letter to a past lover, senora babb, ellison noted of the welsh that ‘i love them like my own people’, and expressed his pleasure ‘that hundreds of studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles daniel g. williams 4 negro boys are acquiring their first notions of real democracy among these people who, strangely, are culturally so similar.’7 if ellison is here evoking a somewhat romantic sense of attachment between the welsh and african americans, he is identifying and articulating a strategy of comparison adopted by all minorities in attempting to define their own identities, and in attempting to visualise themselves and to get themselves seen. in wales, where the world continues to be largely seen through the lens of a london-centric press and media, the comparative impulse is one of the defining elements within nationalist thought. from emrys ap iwan in the nineteenth century through to raymond williams in the twentieth, many of those who have tried to conceptualise and discuss welsh culture have attempted to break out of the perceptual confines of ‘britishness’ to make a wider set of comparisons, in which ‘england’ itself becomes defamiliarised. this article draws attention to some of the ways in which wales has been located, and in doing so seeks to explore the advantages and pitfalls of comparison. the analysis is inevitably highly selective and rather sweeping, but in exploring some of the ways in which those embracing various forms of welsh identity have viewed their place in the world, i am also offering particular examples of a much wider phenomenon. for, while decried as ‘provincial’ and ‘narrow-minded’ by the dominant culture, the internationalist perspectives adopted by minority nationalist movements is often striking. emrys ap iwan (1848-1906) was one of the first to describe the welsh experience in broadly colonial terms, and to identify the salient characteristics of the nation’s subjugation. he described a welsh inferiority complex that he thought manifested itself in a lack of respect for the indigenous welsh language, in the excessive respectability of welsh religious nonconformity, in the desire never to upset or criticise the english, in a political quietism and in a perpetual desire to define culture and civilisation in english terms. the best medicine to administer against this illness, suggested ap iwan, was for the welsh to see themselves reflected in the mirror of europe rather than that of england. the servile welshman would see in the european mirror, that the ‘english are a studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles daniel g. williams 5 monolingual nation – more so than any other nation in europe. they don’t wish to, and indeed they can’t, learn to speak any foreign language.’8 we have been so long in servitude and become so used to it, that most of us can’t even see that we are slaves. the dear english are so careful in administering crumbs and water to us that the wires of our cell have been rendered invisible.9 emrys ap iwan sought to break the cell’s wires by creating a plural vision of an europe in which the welsh could locate themselves, thus emancipating their hearts and minds from the dominance of the british ‘john bully’: by spending three or fours years on the continent they’ll realise that the english aren’t half as big in the eyes of other nations as they think themselves to be, and as is thought by those childish welshmen who think that the englishman’s ‘i say’ is the equivalent of the welshman’s ‘fel hyn y dywed yr arglwydd’ / ‘and thus sayeth the lord’.10 ap iwan’s vision of europe is, of course, highly selective. while he lambasts the english empire, he ignores the empires of france and germany. in adopting the pseudonym emrij van jan for some of his essays, presenting himself as a cultured and peaceful belgian, he forgets that belgium, during that very period, was creating a hell on earth in the congo. this selective vision is not unique to welsh nationalist thought of course – most of us create a europe congenial to our needs and interests. but the emphasis on locating wales within an idealised ‘europe’ has constituted a central strain within welsh nationalist thought, and a means of defining the nation against an equally imaginary ‘insular’ england. emrys ap iwan’s european vision was drawn upon by saunders lewis (1893-1985), dramatist and first president of plaid genedlaethol cymru (the national party of wales). according to lewis, the welsh could claim to have been members of the roman empire and, uniquely among the peoples of britain, could claim to have ‘sucked at the teat’ of roman europe.11 lewis argued that the roman influence had persisted in wales studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles daniel g. williams 6 even while england was enduring its dark ages, and thus the welsh were a fundamentally european people. this formed the historical basis for his 1926 pamphlet on the principles of nationalism: world economic peace can only be hoped for if british capitalists fail in their attempts at turning the british empire into an economic army that will attack europe and america. but in britain is there a european tradition? is there here a nation that was an original member of western civilization, who thinks in western terms and who understands europe and sympathises with her? the answer is: wales. the welsh are the only nation in britain who were a part of the roman empire, that sucked from the teat of the west as a baby, that has the blood of the west in her veins. wales can understand europe, because she is a member of the family.12 here lewis is formulating a creation myth, a foundational story for the welsh that bypasses britain and england in adopting europe as the backdrop of its narrative. in the late 1130s, geoffrey of monmouth produced an arthurian mythology for britain that was later forged into an effective ideology by the polymath john dee as he invented the phrase ‘british empire’ and reinforced elizabeth’s claim on north america by evoking the legend of prince madoc, the welshman who had ‘discovered’ america 300 years before columbus. while conceptions of welsh history in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were similarly contributionist in intent, emphasising wales’s role in the making of the british empire, saunders lewis’s major legacy to welsh nationalist thought was the belief that wales was an integral part of european culture – a part of europe that had been cut off from its natural home by the development of the modern, imperial, british saunders lewis in 1916 | wikimedia commons studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles daniel g. williams 7 state.13 this notion remained a key element in his celebrated works of literature and literary criticism. in the latter case, as richard wyn jones has noted, europe served both an analytic and normative function. analytic in the sense that the european context allowed for links to be traced between welsh literature and broader ‘classical’ european traditions and modes of writing and expression. normative in the sense that closeness to and awareness of that european tradition were regarded as key attributes of the works in question and the assumed foundation for welsh political and historical distinctiveness.14 what became far more controversial was lewis’s association of that europeanism with catholicism. his increasing interest in the catholic church and catholic doctrine was anathema to the largely nonconformist protestant welsh and his eventual conversion in 1931 threatened to alienate him from the majority of the members of the nationalist party. this element of his thought became more and more problematic as the 1930s progressed and the shadow of european politics grew darker. during the second half of the 1930s, lewis and his party were accused of fascist sympathies, a charge that could be made with more validity of some other minority nationalisms in europe but that gained some traction due to lewis’s conditional admiration for franco in spain, salazar in portugal and the strain of anti-semitism in his 1930s writings (which he retracted in the following decades). as richard wyn jones has noted the anti-statist and pacifist plaid cymru never embraced any overtly fascist policies, and the ‘fascist’ slur was imbued with, and informed by, a widespread anticatholic sentiment.15 while saunders lewis was the dominant influence on plaid cymru during the first period of the party’s existence, his cultural and political conservatism has made him an uneasy presence within the party’s leftist post-war trajectory. his contemporary d.j. davies (1893-1956) has been elevated in the pantheon of ‘founders’ in recent decades. davies, who had a varied and colourful life as coal miner, gold prospector, hobo and navy seaman, forged an alternative vision of europe to that espoused by lewis. the most important moment of davies’s intellectual development came during his stay at a folkeskole in denmark in 1924.16 it was here that the former socialist agitator became a welsh nationalist. on returning to studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles daniel g. williams 8 wales, davies joined the newly formed nationalist party and along with his irish wife noëlle became one of its leading economic thinkers. the scandinavian social democracies, in particular the role of the co-operative movements in those countries, were the model around which davies developed his economic vision. as richard wyn jones notes, by the postwar period the success of the scandinavian ‘small nations’ was recurrently foregrounded in plaid cymru publications. when gwynfor evans became plaid cymru’s first member of parliament in 1966 he noted in his maiden speech that ‘the welsh are beginning to take their country as seriously as the danes and swedes take their countries.’17 one way of thinking of the difference between the conceptualisations of europe in the works of lewis and davies, is to think of the former as broadly cultural and civilisationist and the latter as institutional and political. this is of course a fairly commonplace distinction in theories of nationalism, a distinction between what we might problematically describe as cultural and political conceptions of the nation. these strains of thought are usually ascribed to particular nationalisms – the wellestablished contrast between french civic nationalism and german ethnic nationalism for instance – but both strains co-exist uneasily in welsh nationalist thought and this is reflected in welsh nationalist conceptions of europe and of wales itself.18 we might address the cultural and political strains in welsh nationalist thought further by resurrecting the even older schema of historical and non-historical countries. georg wilhem friedrich hegel and friedrich engels used the distinction to discredit the smaller and more backward peoples whom they found to be a nuisance on the map of europe.19 the basic concept is however stronger than its polemical use, and indicates that in the great variety of national and regional formations there are those who have not managed to form their own modern states and others that have or did at some point in their history. the inheritance that historical statehood leaves behind in both the psychology and institutional history of peoples is important, as witnessed in the fact that it is two ‘historical nations’ in the traditional sense of having a memory of institutional independence (scotland and catalonia) that are leading the potential ‘renaissance of the peoples’ in contemporary europe.20 studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles daniel g. williams 9 as tom nairn argued back in the 1970s, wales does not neatly fit the historic or non-historic models. the non-historic features of the welsh past are very well known. to use eric hobsbawm’s characteristically dismissive description ‘a territory inhabited by an agrarian population united by […] a primitive social and economic structure and by the fact of not speaking english’.21 but wales was also a major secondary centre of the european industrial revolution. as many historians have noted, south wales became the centre of the iron, steel and coal industries and the techniques developed were copied in every developing country. according to nairn, nothing remotely comparable could be said of other european countries with forms of cultural nationalism superficially resembling that of wales. what emerges in the late nineteenth century through capitalist development and cultural nationalism is what nairn calls ‘a tracery of a nation’ where no state had existed – a movement that extended from the renewed cultural festival known as the eisteddfod, to the university colleges of wales, from the welsh national library to the national museum in cardiff.22 while the emergence of a ‘tracery’ may gesture optimistically at future developments whereby the ‘non-historic’ welsh nation seemed to be acquiring the trappings of a historic nation, welsh authors and artists in the twentieth century have often emphasised the stagnant, bifurcated, and grotesque characteristics of a wales in which two thirds of the population was packed into the industrial power-house of the south-east leaving the larger expanse of the nation’s geography in a state of underdeveloped ruralism.23 as it entered the twentieth century, wales may be said to have been suspended between the standard historic and non-historic alternatives of european neo-nationalisms. this resulted in a divided, schizophrenic form of nationhood, a feature that was registered by those attempting to describe and define the divided nature of the welsh nation. the sociologist alfred zimmern, travelling across wales in the early 1920s, famously suggested that […] the wales of today is not a unity. there is not one wales; there are three… there is welsh wales, there is industrial or as i sometimes think of it american wales, and there is upper class or studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles daniel g. williams 10 english wales. these three represent different types and different traditions. they are moving in different directions, and if they all three survive, they are not likely to re-unite.24 while a residual welsh speaking working-class culture remained within the dominant english speaking society, the communities of industrial south wales were increasingly perceived as, in the words of novelist gwyn thomas, ‘the parts of america that never managed to get the boat’.25 south wales, to quote thomas again was a ‘place where the taff and mississippi kissed’, a place of considerable ethnic and, for a period, linguistic diversity.26 for the post-war generation of anti-nationalist, english language writers and historians – gwyn thomas, duncan bush, dai smith – industrial america seemed the most appropriate comparison to industrial wales. welsh revisionist anti-nationalist history established a series of repeated mantras which were based on a crude and misleading binary opposition between what they called a ‘privileged minority’ of ‘selfblinded visionaries’ who espoused a ‘linguistically exclusive welshness’, and a ‘collectivist, universalist’ working-class who promoted ‘an intermeshing of class and community solidarities whose horizons were truly international.’27 the american melting pot was perceived to be a useful metaphor for the assimilationist narrative in which cultural differences were eradicated in the formation of what was, nevertheless, a distinctive common, anglophone, south walian society. the welsh language retained a presence in industrial south wales, however, and continued to claim a territorial heartland that extended from the island of ynys môn in the north to the town of llanelli in the south.28 there were alternative ‘americas’ to which cultural nationalists could turn to within what simon brooks has described as an ‘indigenous atlantic’.29 in the post-war era the mantle of saunders lewis was carried in the english language by the poet r.s. thomas (there were also many welsh language writers profoundly influenced by lewis’s writings). thomas attacked a contemporary wales ‘fuddled with democracy’ and lamented the loss of ‘a welsh-speaking nobility that succoured music and poetry’.30 in his poem ‘afallon’ from no truce with the furies, his imagined avalon is a place where a welsh-speaking david has ‘floor[ed]’ the goliath studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles daniel g. williams 11 of ‘a world / oscillating between dollar / and yen’.31 in his review of dee brown’s history of native americans bury my heart at wounded knee, r.s. thomas evoked the indigenous peoples of america as part of a primitivist resistance to industrialisation: here was yet another of the primitive peoples of the world who had followed a particular way of life since time immemorial; a way of life which was beautiful and in keeping with nature itself. it was confronted by the mechanised way of life, a moneygathering life based on the machine and the gun, and like every other culture, it collapsed before this soul-less leviathan.32 this romanticisation of the american indian’s ‘beautiful’ life leads thomas back to his youthful ‘dream of a different society’: when i was younger, i used to dream of a different society in wales. the population was comparatively small; there was a distinctive language; there was space. most of the country had not yet been built on; most of the inhabitants worked on the land – except for the industrial monster in the south. language is important; it partly reflects the personality of a people and it partly moulds it. would it not be possible, by means of welsh, to avoid the over industrialisation that had taken place in england, the bottomless pit into which so many western countries were rushing? the years went by. the industrialisation increased. the welsh countryside was covered in forests; the cottages and smallholdings were taken by englishmen. the dream receded. today, having read this book; having realised that the indians, with their comparatively simple ideas, were right; having begun to realise the extent of the crisis which faces england and its imitators because of over-industrialisation, its over-population, the greed of its businessmen, the wish to turn these islands into a shop in which others can buy, i see that the dream was not so unfounded after all.33 the encounter with dee brown’s sympathetic history of american indians leads thomas to reiterate the central values at the heart of his remarkably consistent, if simplistic, social philosophy. the adherence to an identity studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles daniel g. williams 12 rooted in language, the idealisation of a pre-industrial past, the dismissal of ‘the south’ as an ‘industrial monster’, are all characteristics of welsh cultural nationalism in the twentieth century, but draw on a long tradition of responses to industrialisation. thomas’s somewhat simplistic identification with native americans serves as a reminder that not all kinds of comparisons are necessarily progressive nor benevolent. there is always the danger of crass appropriation and romanticisation of margins and minorities. in seeking to establish an intellectual and poetic space for exploring his own welsh and ‘southern’ identities, and in seeking to acknowledge what he problematically describes as ‘white southern dignity’, jon dressel, a welsh-american poet from st louis, missouri, turns to a form of anti-industrialism characteristic of nationalist and ruralist thought in both wales and the american south. dressel’s father was from llanelli, and in his long poem the road to shiloh dressel describes how increasing identification with his ancestral wales in the 1970s led to his increasing identification as a southerner in the united states. shiloh was one of the major battles of the american civil war of 1861 to 1865, and his poem is a meditation on the legacy and meaning of southern defeat. his anti-industrialism is close to that of the southern agrarians; figures such as john crowe ransom and allen tate cover of jon dressel’s the road to shiloh (1994) | hyperion books studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles daniel g. williams 13 who vented their dislike of industrialism, urbanisation, immigration and the american left in their manifesto i’ll take my stand of 1930.34 for the agrarians, northern ‘industry’, rather than the abolition of slavery or federalism, had been the south’s main adversary in the civil war. more recently southern anti-industrialism has been linked to an essentially ‘celtic’ agrarianism in the writings of latter day confederates. in his cracker culture: celtic ways in the old south, the military historian and confederate sympathiser grady mcwhiney argues that ‘southerners lost the war because they were too celtic and their opponents were too english.’35 ‘viewed through this prism’, notes tony horowitz, the war of northern aggression had little to do with slavery. rather, it was a culture war in which yankees imposed their imperialist and capitalistic will on the agrarian south, just as the english had done to the irish and scots – and as america did to the indians and mexicans in the name of manifest destiny.36 the ‘celtic’ myth of the south helps to reinforce a racial, and often racist, myth of southern identity in which the true south is ‘celtic’ and therefore ‘other souths (notably african american) […] become illegitimate and inferior’.37 if there are worrying parallels between dressel’s construction of southern history and that of neo-confederates, it has to be emphasised that dressel is no white supremacist. he stresses that the african-american experience is ‘inextricably interwoven’ into the history of the south, and the power and impact of the road to shiloh derives partly from the way in which the poet’s desire to create a poetic space for ‘white southern dignity’ comes up against african-american voices and concerns in the text.38 this is the poet meditating before the inscription on a monument to confederate soldiers: the hands of a loving and grateful people: a final, eloquently humble, phrase, or so it might seem, but was it an eloquence of criminal disregard, impervious studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles daniel g. williams 14 to klan terror, to mob rule and lynching, and every other lesser, hardly speakable indignity inflicted on the black, down all the years? he did not want to think it, yet he had to, it was the price of his being moved, the sine qua non of his understanding that the words rang not untrue. that gratitude and love were real, and what was more, deserved, he could not doubt, despite the moral rightness of the south’s defeat, a rightness that resisted all of yankee cant, and guilt. yet the right of it was hard, another right had been there, the right, and need, to defend your land.39 the development of this passage reflects the broader trajectory of the sequence itself. the african-american experience is registered, klan atrocities are registered, but they cannot extinguish the suffering and willingness of confederate soldiers to defend their land. the problem is that once african americans are fully included in one’s definition of ‘the south’, then it can be questioned how many southerners actually supported the confederacy. dressel’s ‘south’ is thus ultimately a white south. african-american voices are heard in the text, but they belong to its margins. in the final poem of the sequence the american civil war is described as ‘not civil’ but for ‘southern independence’: leave the slaves for now. each one must know that too, but here we look on something else… consider dixie, wales, though it is more through than you. waterloo, sebastopol, mafeking, world war, crown your high streets, sanctify your squares. where are the hard tall figures of the men whose fight was just their own, and yours? a stone for llywelyn, a cairn for glyn dwr, studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles daniel g. williams 15 right where they are, are not enough. lee and jackson in the noon at richmond ride against the blue where thousands move. who can imagine the midday gray of cardiff under such spectacular, less vain, assault? 40 in order, ultimately, for the comparison between wales and the south to be sustained the ‘slave must be laid aside’. but to construct a south, or a history of the civil war, that marginalises the experience of slavery is surely ethically repugnant. dressel seems to be asking why there are no statues of owain glyndŵr and prince llywelyn ap gruffydd in wales equivalent to the statues of robert e. lee and jefferson davis in southern towns. given his historical fantasy that ‘parallels between robert e. lee and owain glyndŵr’ are ‘remarkable indeed’, perhaps our response to dressel’s question should be: ‘is it not time those statues to confederate leaders were torn down?’41 there are, undoubtedly, similarities between the ruralist fantasies of the southern agrarians and those of saunders lewis and others, as there are similarities between the elements of defeat and perseverance in the nationalist thought of wales and the american south, and in the experiences of rapid and uneven industrialisation.42 but to draw parallels is quite different to suggesting that we should endorse the particular forms of ethnic nationalism that inform a southern identity, or that the south should function as a model for wales to follow. if wales is to ‘consider dixie’, we should also consider african-american novelist ishmael reed’s response to those who believe that confederate monuments ‘represent a heritage’: ‘a heritage of whipping people’.43 dressel tells us that his ‘road to shiloh […] is a road that runs through wales.’44 whatever the strengths of the poetry, it is not a road to follow. in seeking an alternative path we may turn to the most insistently internationalist of contemporary writers, the welsh language female poet menna elfyn. elfyn writes in welsh, but publishes volumes with parallel facing english translations. while there are some notable precedents to the practice of publishing bilingual editions of poetry in wales (euros bowen’s poems (1974), gwyn thomas’s living a life (1982) and r. gerallt jones’s edited anthology poetry of wales 1930-1970) menna elfyn’s lauded collections proved controversial as she had been a prominent language studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles daniel g. williams 16 activist who had spent time in prison.45 in seeking an international visibility for her welsh language poetry she turned to leading anglophone poets such as r.s. thomas, gillian clarke and nigel jenkins to translate her works. wynn thomas offers a shrewd analysis of the politics informing elfyn’s cultural strategy: she realized that by identifying herself, through translation, with a women’s movement that has developed a powerful international and internationalist discourse, she was able both to overcome prejudices about the supposed ‘narrowness‘ and ‘backwardness‘ of welsh-language culture, and to render that culture potently current.46 yet, that internationalism could only be assessed by a wider audience due to the english translations, and several welsh language critics expressed their misgivings at the fact that elfyn’s increasingly ‘european‘ standing would inevitably be determined by analyses of her works in translation.47 her international ‘visibility’ was thus seen by some to render ‘invisible’ her original welsh language work. her poems indicate that elfyn is fully cognisant of this danger. ‘rice papers’, for example, is a poem that derives directly from the poet’s ‘international standing’ and her desire to explore new publics for her work. dedicated ‘i’m cyfieithydd trinh yn hanoi’, to ‘trinh, my interpreter in vietnam’, the poem recalls a meal at an expensive restaurant that the poet shared with her translator: hi oedd fy ngwestai. hi fy nhafod. hi yn ganghellor, hefyd fy morwyn. ‘mae’n rhy ddrud i mi fynd i fwytai heblaw gyda foreigner yn talu.’ studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles daniel g. williams 17 she was my host, my voice my chancellor, my maid. ‘too expensive to eat in places like this except with a foreigner paying.’48 trinh has never been to such an establishment, and is there because of the funds available to the welsh poet. the poem responds to vietnam’s contemporary poverty and its violent past, and closes with the poet noting that ‘i dined on the sight of her feasting for me.’ while the closing evokes elfyn’s pleasure in the fact that her presence enables her translator to enjoy a rare feast, the final line may also be read as a meditation on translation itself. the act of translating allows the english language to feed on the other languages that it mediates (welsh and vietnamese in this instance). the poem seems to be asking, self-reflexively, whether the english translation of a welsh language work allows a new audience to feed on the literature. does english feed on welsh in our behalf, thus allowing welsh culture to be appreciated by new international audiences? or does the feeding metaphor allude to a dominant language’s ability to devour minority languages leaving a carcass in its wake? the implications of this questions are of course intensified by an awareness that english was the language of the american culture that waged war on vietnam for more than a decade, causing the rice shortages to which trinh refers. in ‘rice papers’, elfyn is in the economically dominant position, able to enjoy the fruits of her generosity, able to assuage her western guilt, but also uneasily reversing the relationship between ‘visitor’ and ‘host’. elfyn is reliant on the international poetry circuit for this temporary wealth and visibility, and knows that it has been gained through the translations of her writings. lines of economic inequality cross uneasily with lines of linguistic and cultural inequality in a poem that can be read as an extended meditation on metaphors of poverty, power, and translation and on the benefits and dangers of comparison. in ‘dining on the sight’ of trinh feasting, elfyn foregrounds the often vexing interplay between perception and projection, identification and differentiation, visibility and invisibility, inherent in any act of comparison. studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles daniel g. williams 18 against a universalist desire to claim that ‘we are all alike’ (which can render cultural differences invisible), the minority nationalist will often seek to dramatise and foreground differences (which can over-exaggerate cultural specificities). paradoxically, as i have attempted to show, the nationalist attempt at making oneself visible will often involve making comparisons with others. elfyn’s ‘rice papers’ embodies an internal critique of our desire to identify and to compare. recognition – that is recognising ‘the other’ and being recognised by ‘an other’ – is where nationalism finds its cultural embodiment and expression. yet things are never as straightforward as the binary terms in which we tend to visualise such comparisons might imply. national visibility and invisibility can only emerge in relation to one another and are processes that inevitably become intertwined with questions of economic power and cultural capital. perhaps one of the most significant cultural agendas for any nationalist movement is to differentiate those comparative contexts that may, to paraphrase raymond williams, contain ‘the seeds of life in them’, from those ‘perhaps deep in our minds’ that harbour the ‘seeds of a general death’.49 endnotes 1 r. ellison, invisible man (new york, [1952] 1995). 2 a.a. cheng, ‘passing, natural selection, and love’s failure. ethics of survival from chang-rae lee to jaques lacan’, in: american literary history, 17/3 (2005) 553. 3 ellison, invisible man, 3-4. 4 see the chapter ‘the invisible man’s welsh routes. ralph ellison in wartime wales’, in: d.g. williams, black skin, blue books. african americans and wales (cardiff, 2012) 208-252. 5 r. ellison, ‘in a strange country’ (1944), in: flying home and other stories (london, [1996] 1998) 138-9. studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles daniel g. williams 19 6 ellison, ‘in a strange country’, 140. 7 quoted in a. rampersad, ralph ellison. a biography (new york, [2007] 2008) 171. 8 emrys ap iwan was born robert ambrose jones. original in welsh, my translations. ‘cenedl uniaith yw’r saeson yn anad un genedl yn ewrop. ni fynnant ac ni fedrant ddysgu un iaith ddiethr’. d. myrddin lloyd (ed.), detholiad o erthyglau a llythyrau emrys ap iwan, 3 vol. (aberystwyth, 1937-1940) vol. 2, xv. 9 emrys ap iwan, 168 (‘yr ydym wedi bod cyhyd mewn caethiwed, ac wedi ymddygymod cystal â fo, fel na fynn y rhan fwyaf ohonom gredu eu bod mewn caethiwed. y mae gwifrau ein cawell mor anweledig o feinion, a’r saeson annwyl yn ein porthi mor ofalus â briwsion a dwfr’). 10 emrys ap iwan, 24 (‘trwy dreulio tair neu bedair blynedd ar y cyfandir, gwelent nad yw’r saeson ddim mor fawr o lawer yng ngolwg cenhedloedd eraill ag ydynt yn eu golwg eu hunain, ac yng ngolwg y cymry plentynaidd sy’n credu bod ‘i say’ yn saesneg yr un peth â ‘fel hyn y dywed yr arglwydd’ yn y gymraeg’). my discussion of ap iwan draws on m. wynn thomas, ‘ewtopia: cyfandir dychymyg y cymry’, in: g.h. jenkins (ed.), cymry a’r cymry 2000 / wales and the welsh 2000 (aberystwyth, 2001) 99-118. 11 s. lewis, canlyn arthur (llandysul, [1938] 1985) 31. 12 lewis, canlyn arthur, 31. 13 for a lively overview of welsh national mythologies and histories, see g.a. williams, ‘when was wales’, in: idem, the welsh in their history (london, 1982) 189-201. 14 r. wyn jones, ‘from utopia to reality. plaid cymru and europe’, in: nations and nationalism, 15/1 (2009) 134. 15 d. hywel davies, the welsh nationalist party, 1925-1945 (cardiff, 1983) 113. on catholicism, see r. wyn jones, the fascist party in wales. plaid cymru, welsh nationalism and the accusation of fascism (cardiff, 2014) 14-18. 16 hywel davies, the welsh nationalist party, 87, 108. 17 wyn jones, ‘from utopia to reality’, 135. studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles daniel g. williams 20 18 a.d. smith, nationalism and modernism (london, 1998); r. brubacker, citizenship and nationhood (cambridge ma, 1992). 19 see k.b. anderson, marx at the margins. on nationalism, ethnicity and nonwestern societies (chicago, 2010) 74-5. 20 see the conversation between tom nairn and richard wyn jones, ‘ukanian discussions and homo britannicus’, in: g. hassan & r. ilett (eds.), radical scotland. arguments for self-determination (edinburgh, 2011) 267-81. 21 t. nairn, the break-up of britain. crisis and neo-nationalism (london, 1977) 197. 22 nairn, the break-up, 185-204. 23 for historical accounts of uneven development, see j. williams, was wales industrialised: essays in modern welsh history (llandysul, 1995); g.a. williams, the welsh in their history (beckenham, 1985). on the grotesque and divided manifestations of this in literature, see g. jones, the dragon has two tongues (london, 1968); a. conran, the cost of strangeness (llandysul, 1982). 24 a.e. zimmern, my impressions of wales (london, 1921), quoted in d. smith, aneurin bevan and the world of south wales (cardiff, 1993), i. 25 quoted in d. smith, wales! wales? (london, 1984) 152. 26 g. thomas, a few selected exits (bridgend, [1968] 1987) 103. 27 ch. williams, democratic rhondda (cardiff, 1996) 212. 28 j. aitchison & h. carter, a geography of the welsh language 1961-1991 (cardiff, 1994). 29 s. brooks, ‘the indigenous atlantic’, in: m. newton (ed.), the celts in the americas (cape breton, 2013) 323-334. 30 r.s. thomas, cymru or wales? (llandysul, 1992) 8. 31 r.s. thomas, no truce with the furies (newcastle, 1995) 25. 32 r.s. thomas, ‘review of “bury my heart at wounded knee”’, in: s. anstey (ed.), r.s. thomas. selected prose (bridgend, 1983) 179. studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles daniel g. williams 21 33 thomas, ‘bury my heart’, 180. 34 see w. kaufman, the civil war in american culture (edinburgh, 2006) 33-7. 35 quoted in t. horowitz, confederates in the attic. dispatches from the unfinished civil war (new york, 1999) 69. 36 horowitz, confederates, 69. 37 h. taylor, circling dixie. contemporary southern culture through a transatlantic lens (new brunswick, 2001) 16. 38 j. dressel, the road to shiloh (llandysul, 1994) xviii. 39 dressel, the road, 88-89. 40 dressel, the road, 110. 41 dressel, the road, xx. 42 in his seminal essay on saunders lewis’s politics, dafydd glyn jones noted the ubiquity of a ‘myth of the golden age’ in the 1930s, which extended from ‘dublin to dixieland’ and placed lewis’s ruralism within that context (d. glyn jones, ‘his politics’, in: a.r. jones & g. thomas (eds.), presenting saunders lewis (cardiff, 1973) 51). 43 i. reed, another day at the front. dispatches from the race war (new york, 2003) 100. 44 dressel, the road, xii. 45 see m. wynn thomas, corresponding cultures. the two literatures of wales (cardiff, 1999) 272 fn. 65. 46 thomas, corresponding cultures, 145. 47 see t. hallam, ‘when a bardd meets a poet. menna elfyn and the displacement of parallel facing texts’, in: d.g. williams (ed.), slanderous tongues. essays on welsh poetry in english 1970-2005 (bridgend, 2010) 89-111. studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles daniel g. williams 22 48 m. elfyn, merch perygl: cerddi 1976-2011 (llandysul, 2011) 46-47. the translation by nigel jenkins appears in m. elfyn & j. rowlands (eds.), the bloodaxe book of modern welsh poetry (tarset, 2003) 321-322. 49 r. williams, culture and society (london, 1958) 338. art_puhle_v3_def     hans-­‐jürgen  puhle,  ‘trajectories  and  functions  of  catalan  nationalism   since  the  19th  century’,  in:  studies  on  national  movements,  2  (2014).   http://snm.nise.eu/index.php/studies/article/view/0203a   hans-­‐jürgen  puhle   trajectories  and  functions  of  catalan   nationalism  since  the  19th  century   this  article  will  focus  on  the  longue  durée  trajectories  of  concepts  and  of   movements,  and  i  am  particularly   interested   in  changes  and  thresholds,   and  in  the  various  stages  of  catalanism  and  catalan  nationalism  through   the  last  century-­‐and-­‐a-­‐half.  in  the  limited  space  available  i  can  only  give  a   brief  summary  of  the  story  in  question,  and  i  can  only  hint  at  some  basic   lines  of  the  social  background,  the  interests,  programme  and  ideology  of   the  catalan  nationalists,  and  look  into  their  achievements  and  limitations,   their  internal  cleavages  and  divisions,  and  their  (possible  or  impossible)   alliances  with  ‘spanish’  political  forces,  and  with  one  another.  i  have  seven   points,   starting   with   the   initial   constellations   and   finishing   with   the   threats  and  models  for  the  21st  century.   initial  constellations   nationalism   requires   organisation:   you   have   to   organise   a   movement   whatever  its  shape  and  composition.  and  in  order  to  organise  a  nationalist   movement,   you   need   a   concept   of   a   nation   whatever   its   definition,   its   dimension,  and  ultimately  its  construction.  what  a  nation  is,  is  basically  a   matter  of  opinion,  even  if,  for  making  the  idea  sustainable,  some  plausible   and   tangible   characteristics   (often  called   the   ‘proto-­‐national  minimum’)   may  be  required.  usually  they  are  found  in  language  and  culture,  and  the   studies  on  national  movements,  2  (2014)      |      articles   hans-­‐jürgen  puhle  2   history  and  the  networks  behind  it,  less  in  voluntaristic  aspirations.1  the   catalan   idea   of   the   nation   (the   nationsbegriff)   has   been   a   product   of   european  romanticism  of  the  first  half  of  the  19th  century.  as  in  all  cases  of   ‘belated’  or  ‘stateless’  nations,  it  was  a  culturalist,  often  organicist  concept   driven   by   reifications,   and   drawing   more   on   herder   than   on   rousseau.   and   it   has   never   been   a   uniform   idea.   since   the   1860s   two   different   connotations   could   be   distinguished:   a   more   conservative   and   a   more   liberal,  later  progressive  one.  that  corresponded  to  the  different  contexts   from  which  catalan  nationalism  has  developed.  for   the  19th   century,  at   least   four   strands   of   movements   and   ideologies   have   to   be   mentioned.   first,   the   broad   and   rich   spectrum   of   catalan   cultural   renaissance   (renaixença)   since   the   1830s   and   40s,   often   linked   to   romantic   ideas;   second,  petty  bourgeois  federalism  (pi  i  margall  1868)  and  progressivism,   around  and  since  the  revolution  and  the  first  republic  in  the  late  1860s   and   the   70s;   third,   conservative   bourgeois   provincialism   which   later   became   regionalism,   and,   not   least,   fourth,   clerico-­‐reactionary   conservatism,  mostly  of  carlist  origins.2     in   1883,   for   example,   the   federalists   and   the   carlists   alike   asked   for   a   catalan   state   within   an   iberian   federation,   and   by   the   late   1880s   provincialist   and   regionalist   organisations   demanding   institutional   recognition  of   the  public  use  of   the  catalan   language  had  mushroomed.   the  breakthrough  of  the  catalanist  movement  to  miroslav  hroch’s  phase  b   around  1880  was  due   to  a  characteristic  constellation   in  which  various   factors  came  together:  cultural  and  organisational  saturation  by  the  effects   of   the   renaixença   (since   the   1830s),   economic   prosperity   and   modernisation   by   the   repercussions   of   full-­‐scale   industrialisation   in   relevant   parts   of   catalonia   since   the   1860s,   on   the   one   hand,   and   a   continuation  and  intensification  of  politico-­‐institutional  dispossession  and   frustration,   on   the   other,   from   the   1830s   through   the   60s   down   to   restauration  and  the  end  of  the  third  carlist  war  in  the  70s.3     studies  on  national  movements,  2  (2014)      |      articles   hans-­‐jürgen  puhle   3   sequences  and  types   catalan  nationalism  has  been  part  of  what  i  call  the  fourth  wave  out  of  a   total  of  six  waves  of  contemporary  nationalist  movements,  each  defined  by   a   number   of   macro-­‐regional,   developmental   and   functional   similarities   and   often   by   a   coincidence   in   time   (see   table   1).   these   were   the   nationalist   or   regional-­‐nationalist   movements   of   the   so-­‐called   ‘smaller’   peripheral   nations   within   the   western   and   southern   european   states   which  have  fought  for  autonomy  statutes  and  federalisation  of  the  state   more  often  than  for  complete  self-­‐determination  and  a  new  nation  state  of   their   own.   among   them   we   can   find   different   intensities   and   different   types.4  for  catalan  nationalism  we  can  date   the  hrochian  thresholds  as   following:   ab   around   1880,5   bc   around   1900,6   and   the   autonomist   equivalent  for  statehood  (ns)   in  1932/79,  so  that  the  complete  formula   relating  the  developmental  stages  of  the  national  movement  to  the  stages   of  statewide  socio-­‐economic  and  political  development  (simplified  br,  ir,   ow),   would   look   like   this:   br   –   ir   –   ab   –   ow   –   bc   –   (ns).   in   my   terminology  catalonia  hence  would  belong  to  the  cases  of  a  disintegrated   dissociation  (because  bc  comes  much  behind  br)  of  a  relatively  developed   society  (see  table  2).     studies  on  national  movements,  2  (2014)      |      articles   hans-­‐jürgen  puhle  4     table  1  |  six  waves  of  national  movements   1. nationalisms  of  the  established  early  western  nation  states  (usa,  france,   great  britain,  sweden,  denmark,  portugal,  also  spain  despite  its  de  facto   multi-­‐national  character)   2. nationalisms  of  the  strong  and  developed  latecomers  to  nation  stateness   (italy,  germany,  and  japan  since  the  meiji  reforms)   3. early  nationalisms  of  stateless  nations,  mostly  east-­‐central  and  eastern   europe   since   the   19th   century,   aspiring   to   break   out   of   multi-­‐national   empires  (russia,  ottoman,  habsburg;  also  finns  and  norwegians)   4. later   nationalist   or   regional-­‐nationalist   movements   of   ‘smaller’   nations   within   the   western   and   southern   european   states   (catalans,   basques,   galicians;   irish,   scots,   welsh;   corsicans,   occitans,   bretons,   alsatians;   flemish,   walloons,   frisians,   etc.;   typologically   similar:   canada’s   quebeckers)   5. anti-­‐imperialist   and   populist   nationalisms   of   the   ‘third   world’,   20th   century,   mostly   ‘national   liberation’   movements   (latin   america,   africa,   asia,  arab  and  islamic  world)   6. post-­‐communist   nationalisms   of   east-­‐central   and   eastern   europe   and   post-­‐soviet  central  asia  after  1989-­‐90       studies  on  national  movements,  2  (2014)      |      articles   hans-­‐jürgen  puhle   5       table  2  |  a  tentative  typology  of  national  movements   br   bourgeois  revolution   ir   industrial  revolution   ow   organisation  of  working-­‐class  movement     ab   transition  to  cultural  nationalism   bc   transition  to  political  nationalism   ns   'nation  state'  (or  equivalent)  (acc.  to  m.  hroch)     1. 1.  integration:           ab  -­‐  bc  -­‐  br/ns  -­‐  ir  -­‐  ow     england,  france     2. 2.  belated  integration:       ab  -­‐  ir/bc  -­‐  (br)  -­‐  ow/ns   germany     3. 3.  integrated  dissociation:         czechs           ab  -­‐  ir  -­‐  br/bc  -­‐  ow  -­‐  ns           norwegians,  finns       ab  -­‐  br/bc  -­‐ir  -­‐  ns  –  ow     4. 4.  belated  dissociation:       ab  -­‐  bc  -­‐  (br)  -­‐  ir  -­‐  ns  -­‐  ow     estonians,  croats,  slovaks     5. 5.  insurgent  dissociation:       serbs,  bulgarians         ab  -­‐  bc  -­‐  (br)  -­‐  ns  -­‐  ir  -­‐  ow       irish           ab  -­‐  (br)  -­‐  bc  -­‐  ns  -­‐  ir  –  ow     6. 6.  disintegrated  dissociation  i  (developed):       flemings         br  -­‐  ir  -­‐  ab  -­‐  ow  -­‐  bc  -­‐  (ns)         welsh           br/ir  -­‐  ab  -­‐  ow       catalans,  (scots)         br  -­‐  ir  -­‐  ab  -­‐  ow  -­‐  bc  -­‐  (ns)       basques           br  -­‐  ir  -­‐  ow  -­‐  ab  -­‐  bc  -­‐  (ns)       walloons         br  -­‐  ir  -­‐  ow  -­‐  ab  -­‐  (bc  -­‐  ns)       alsatians         br  -­‐  ir  -­‐  ow  -­‐  ab  -­‐  (bc)       7. 7.  disintegrated  dissociation  ii  (underdeveloped):       britons,  occitans,         br  -­‐  ab  -­‐  ir  -­‐  ow  -­‐  (bc)         gallegos,  corsicans       br  -­‐  ab  -­‐  ir  -­‐  ow  -­‐  bc     studies  on  national  movements,  2  (2014)      |      articles   hans-­‐jürgen  puhle  6   what   has,   among   other   things,   to   be   explained   is   why,   of   these   west   european  cases  –  in  contrast  to  central  and  eastern  europe  –  only  a  few  of   the  regionalist  or  nationalist  movements  have  reached  hroch’s  phase  c,   the   breakthrough   of   political   nationalism   with   mass   support.   the   exceptions   are   catalonia,   the   basque   country   (where   autonomy   can   be   understood  as  an  equivalent  to  ns),  the  irish,  and  rather  late  the  scots  and   gallegos,  to  an  extent  the  corsicans.  if  we  want  to  find  out  why  these  few   have  made  their  way  to  full-­‐fledged  political  nationalism,  and  others  not,   like  the  welsh  or  the  occitans,  although  the  explicit  national  identity  of  the   latter  in  cultural  terms  cannot  be  questioned,  we  have  to  look  much  more   in   detail   into   the   peculiar   combinations   of   socio-­‐economic,   linguistic,   cultural  and  institutional  factors  like  the  following  four:   • relative  over-­‐  or  underdevelopment  of  the  region  within  the  state   as  a  whole:  a  higher  level  of  development  usually  helps  a  region’s   national   aspirations,   although   there   are   exceptions   (ireland,   divided  wales);   • a   language   and   culture   of   its   own:   these   are   necessary,   but   not   sufficient  prerequisites  for  the  success  of  a  national  movement;   • (important,  but  often  overlooked)  the  existence  of  distinct  (past  or   present)  administrative  and  political  structures  and  institutions  of   the  region  (‘institutional  capital’):  these  have  helped  catalonia,  the   basque  country  and  scotland,  whereas  galicia,  wales  or  brittany   have  lacked  them;   • in   cases   of   endemic   violence   (northern   ireland,   the   basque   country)  also  the  intensity  of    the  rates  of  repression  or  frustration   may  have  to  be  taken  into  account.7   the   success   of   a   nationalist   movement,   particularly   in   established   democracies  with  different   (and  differently   flexible)   sets  of   institutions,   usually  depends  on  whether  and  how  the  aspirations  and  demands  of  the   ‘small’  nationalisms  can  be  reconciled  with  the  institutional  arrangements   of   the   state.   here,   a   federal   order   or,   alternatively,   comprehensive   and   integral   mechanisms   of   regionalisation,   devolution   or   ‘autonomisation’   studies  on  national  movements,  2  (2014)      |      articles   hans-­‐jürgen  puhle   7   (such   as   in   spain)   have   demonstrated   a   certain   superiority   to   mere   centralism,  but  have  been  far  from  ‘solving’  the  problems.       divided  actors   another  characteristic  feature  of  catalan  nationalism  has  been  that  it  has   always  been  divided,  almost  from  its  beginnings,  often  along  class   lines,   recently  more  along   ideological   lines.   it  experienced   its   first  substantial   turnaround   at   the   turn   of   the   century   when   the   lliga   regionalista   was   established  in  1901,  triggered  by  the  repercussions  and  polarisations  of   the   great   spanish   crisis   around   1898,   and   after   more   than   a   decade   of   preparation  in  which  traditional  provincial  ‘catalanism’  had  transformed   itself   into   catalanist   regionalism   with   explicit   demands   for   home   rule   along  autonomist  or  federalist  lines  (1886  almirall:  lo  catalanisme,  1887   lliga  de  catalunya,   the  campaigns  of  1889,  1891  unió  catalanista   [uc],   1892  bases  de  manresa  [the  political  programme,  part.  art.  4,  16],  1897   centre  català,  1899  participation  in  the  spanish  government).  before  the   turnaround  catalanism  had  been  dominated  by  anti-­‐centralist  and  mostly   anti-­‐modernist   notables   of   the   small   towns   of   the   hinterland.   now   it   established  itself  as  a  relatively  ‘modern’  barcelona-­‐centric  emancipation   movement   of   the   urban   bourgeoisie   which   had   become   regionalist   because   it  was  strong  enough   to   rule  catalonia,  but   too  weak  either   to   dominate   spain   or   to   declare   independence,   and   hence   embarked   on   a   tendentially  ‘imperialistic’  course  (ucelay  da  cal)  trying  to  follow  its  own   interests   at   home   and   to   influence   and   penetrate   spanish   society   and   politics   (domestic   and   international)   as   much   as   possible.   the   lliga   regionalista  under  the  leadership  of  prat  de  la  riba  and  cambó  became  a   modern  mass  party,  equally  present  in  catalonia  and  in  madrid  politics.  it   was   the   undisputed   hegemonic   faction   of   catalan   nationalism   between   1901  and  the  mid-­‐1920s  and  one  of  the  dominant  forces  of  catalan  politics   besides   the   lerroux   republicans   (since   1906/08   prr);   the   party’s   mobilisation  reached  its  peak  in  1916.8     the  lliga  dominated  wide  sectors  of  the  intense  networks  of  catalan  civil   society,   particularly   among   the   entrepreneurial   (foment),   agricultural   studies  on  national  movements,  2  (2014)      |      articles   hans-­‐jürgen  puhle  8   (iacsi)  and  cultural  organisations,  but  not  all  of  them.  there  always  were   dissenters,   more   radical   minority   factions,   and   organised   interests   opposed  to  those  of  the  lliga,  voiced  by  other  groups,  mostly  under  the   umbrella  of  the  unió  catalanista  (uc),  by  the  efficient  pressure  groups  of   commercial  employees  (cadci),  and   later  of   the   tenant  winegrowers  of   the  unió  de  rabassaires  (udr  1922),9  or  by  the  many  middle-­‐class  and   intellectual   initiatives   trying   to   win   over   more   republican   voters,   to   organise   more   workers,   or   to   establish   closer   alliances   with   other   working-­‐class   organisations,   like   the   anarchosyndicalist   cnt   (from   1910/11  on),  particularly  when  social  conflictivity  went  up  in  waves,  like   in  1906/07,  1909  (setmana  tràgica,  which  however  broke  up  solidaritat   catalana),   in   another   great   turnaround   in   1917/18,   and   in   1922/23.     among  these  groups  of  the  ominous  (and  ill-­‐defined)  ‘catalanist  left’  we   can  find  short-­‐lived  enterprises   full  of  semi-­‐utopian   inspiration,   like  the   axis   layret/segui/companys   around   1920   (all   three   of   them   were   eventually  killed),  and  many  organisational  endeavours,  often  small,  given   to  fragmentation  and  of  short  duration.10  the  most  important  ones  were   the   centre   nacionalista   republicà   (cnr   1906/07),   the   unió   federal   nacionalista  republicana  (ufnr  1910),  the  esquerra  catalanista  (1914),   the  bloc  republicà  autonomista  (bra  1915),  the  partit  republicà  català   (prc  1917),  macià’s  separatist  federació  democràtica  nacionalista  (fdn   1919),  and  domingo’s  populist  esquerra  catalana  (1921).  we  might  also   mention  the  heretic  and  explicitly  nationalist  (and  no  longer  regionalist)   youth  organisations  and  social  catholics  of  acció  catalana  (ac)  which  split   from  the  lliga  in  1922,  joined  the  ‘triple  alianza’  of  1923  and  later  played   a  role  in  the  transition  to  the  republic  (bofill,  d’olwer,  rovira  i  virgili).  we   better  might  put  catalan  nationalisms  into  the  plural.         the  internal  divisions  of  the  catalan  nationalists  were,  of  course,  a  liability   for  their  political   influence  and  weight.  the  lliga’s  strategy  of  corporate   integration  failed,  due  to  the  limitations  of  its  bourgeois  class  politics,  its   many   pacts   with   the   spanish   government,   and   because   its   room   for   manoeuvre  in  the  mancomunitat  (1913-­‐24)  was  not  sufficient.  the  party   lost  votes,  split  in  1922,  and  continued  discrediting  itself  through  the  20s   and  30s.11  political   separatism   that  emerged  after   the  first  world  war,   was   basically   tied   to   middle-­‐class   interests   from   the   hinterland   (and   studies  on  national  movements,  2  (2014)      |      articles   hans-­‐jürgen  puhle   9   eventually   the   cadci)   and   had   no   mass   basis   because   it   polarised   the   catalans  by  attacking  the  lliga  and  splitting  the  left.  the  diffuse  ‘catalanist   left’   consisted   of   weak,   heterogeneous   and   fragmented   groups,   mostly   artisans  and  intelligentsia  trying  to  reach  out  to  the  workers,  particularly   those  organised  by  the  crt  and  cnt.  but  whenever  they  did  this,  they  lost   middle-­‐class  catalanists,  and  mostly  could  not  win  over  the  workers  either   (cnr,   ufnr,   prc,   1909,   1916/17).   until   1917/18   they   often   became   sandwiched  between  the  lliga  and  the  cnt  which  was  not  anti-­‐catalanist,   but   (until   1923)   only   temporarily   and   partly   open   for   catalanist   interests.12   this   changed   in   the   second   republic   when   cooperation   increased  (trentistes  1931,  autonomy  statute,  generalitat,  civil  war).  on   the  whole,  the  ‘catalanist  left’  was  much  more  nationalist  than  socialist:   wilson  triumphed  over  lenin  (ucelay  da  cal).13  even  the  most  promising   group   until   1923,   the   catalan   republican   party   (prc),   after   the   end   of   layret’s   project   of   a   catalan   republican   socialism,   became   a   more   moderate  middle-­‐class  party.   the  most  important  new  organisation  of  the  ‘catalanist  left’  rising  from   the   struggles   of   the   early   20s,   however,   was   (at   least   in   retrospective)   macià’s  estat  català  (ec  1922).  it  started  out  separatist,  took  over  the  fdn,   fought  the  primo  dictatorship,  moved  back  to  a  more  traditional  federalist   position,   used   populist   strategies   in   order   to   make   catalan   nationalism   more  attractive  to  the  middle  and  working  classes,  colonised  the  prc  and   others,  and  became  one  of  the  driving  forces    behind  the  populist  alliance   of   the   esquerra   republicana   de   catalunya   (erc)   of   1931   which   united   separatists   (macià),   republican   catalanists   (companys)   and   radical   populists   (domingo),   and   established   itself   as   the   hegemonic   actor   in   catalanist  politics   throughout   the  1930s.   in  1931   the  esquerra  was   the   first   to   proclaim   a   catalan   republic   within   an   iberian   federation,   even   before  the  spanish  republic  had  been  proclaimed.  the  ‘catalanist  left’  had   taken  over  catalan  nationalism,  though  at  a  price.14   studies  on  national  movements,  2  (2014)      |      articles   hans-­‐jürgen  puhle  10   party  politics  and  pacts   during  most  of  the  20th  century  catalan  nationalism  has  been  dominated   by  party  politics.  the  only  exception  were  the  consolidated  years  of  the   franco  regime  when  catalanist  interests  and  strategies  were  coordinated   more   by   culturalist   and   civil   society   organisations,   like   the   òmnium   cultural   (since   1961)   and   others.   the   objectives   of   nationalist   politics   were   usually   defined   by   the   hegemonic   parties   (or   alliances)   which   organised  and  represented  the  nationalists:  between  1900  and  the  mid-­‐ 20s  this  was  the  lliga,  during  the  1930s  the  erc,  and  after  the  transition  of   the   late   1970s   for   a   longer   time   the   pujolisme   of   convergència   i   unió   (ciu).   despite   the   differences   between   these   parties   there   have   been   a   number   of   interesting   continuities   in   shared   beliefs,   programmatic   preferences,   in   the   articles   of   the   nationalist   credo,   the   use   of   the   movements’  traditions  (including  what  enric  ucelay  da  cal  has  called  the   ‘catalan  whig  interpretation  of  history’),15  and  particularly  in  the  secular   shift   towards   populist   politics.   the   lliga   paved   the   way,   erc   pushed   populism   to   its   breakthrough,   and   pujolisme   (to   the   chagrin   of   the   resurrected  esquerra)  ratified  and  continued  it,  in  an  eclectic  way,  as  if  ciu   were  the  natural  successor  of  the  erc  of  the  republic.  which  it  was,  in  a   way.   another  crucial  element  of  the  politics  of  catalan  nationalists  has  (at  least   until  2012)  been  a  modern  version  of  ‘pactisme’,  i.e.  a  tendency  towards   (and  often  a  need  for)  concluding  pacts  and  building  alliances  with  other,   mostly  non-­‐nationalist  political  forces,  usually  ad  hoc,  and  differently  on   different   issues   and   in   the   different   political   arenas   that   were   three   to   four:  barcelona,   the  other  catalan  provinces,  catalonia  as  a   region,  and   spanish   politics   in   madrid.   often   the   differences   between   nationalist   groups   have   also   been   defined   by   their   different   alliances,   be   it   with   bourgeois  or  middle-­‐class  groups,  with  populist  and  catch-­‐all  parties  of  all   kinds,  or  with  the  usual  factions  of  the  working-­‐class  movements.  among   the  latter,  the  special  relationships  between  ‘more  catalan’  groups  of  the   anarcho-­‐syndicalist  cnt  (segui,  trentistes),  the  socialists  and  communists   (usc,  psuc,  poum,  eventually  psc,  less  and  less)  and  the  ‘catalanist  left’   are  particularly   interesting.  here  various  additional  cleavages  interfered   studies  on  national  movements,  2  (2014)      |      articles   hans-­‐jürgen  puhle   11   and  partly  overlapped  with  the  principal  cleavage  between  nationalist  and   non-­‐nationalist   politics   (not   to   speak   of   the   fine-­‐print   varieties   of   regionalism,   federalism,   ‘autonomism’   and   separatism).   through   long   periods   the   most   important   ones   have   been   monarchy/republic,   church/state,  economic,  social  and  tax  policies,  the  omnipresent  right/left   cleavage,  and  the  mere  contestation  for  the  votes.  classical  examples  for   such   ‘mixed-­‐cleavage’   pacts   have   been   the   participation   in   the   conservative   spanish   government   of   1899   (which   set   a   precedent   for   subsequent  cooperation   in  1909,  1917,  1919),   the  polarising  alliance  of   solidaritat  catalana  (1906),  the  alliances  for  the  mancomunitat  (1913),  for   the  political  transitions  of  1931  and  the  late  1970s,  and  for  the  autonomy   statutes  of  1932,  1979  and  2006,  or  the  various  pacts  or  initiatives  with   republicans  and  anarchosyndicalists  after  1917  and  in  the  1920s  and  30s,   or  with  socialists  and  communists  since  the  second  republic,  in  the  civil   war  and  in  the  opposition  against  franco  (for  example  coordinadora  de   forces  polítiques  de  catalunya  1969,  assemblea  de  catalunya  1971).16                                                                                     in   spain’s   new   democracy   both   conservative   and   socialist   governments   have  often  needed  the  votes  of  jordi  pujol’s  ciu  in  madrid  (and  paid  for  it).   at  home  in  catalonia,  pujol,  when  he  needed  it  after  1999,  preferred  to  ally   himself  with  the  conservative  spanish  partido  popular  (pp),  and  not  (like   in   the  mid-­‐80s)  with  his   ‘leftist’   fellow  nationalists  of   the  erc.  and   the   latter   had   no   major   problems   to   join   the   coalition   governments   of   the   ‘tripartit’  led  by  the  catalan  socialists  (2003-­‐2010),  the  chief  rivals  of  the   nationalists  (though  with  rising  internal  dissent  from  2006  on),  while,  at   the  same  time  (2004-­‐06),  ciu  leaders  negotiated  an  agreement  on  the  new   autonomy  statute  with  the  spanish  socialists  (psoe)  in  madrid.    it  was  not   until   the   conflict   over   the   new   autonomy   statute   had   substantially   escalated   and   ciu   had   been   punished   in   the   elections   of   2012   that   the   esquerra  came  back  to  tolerate  a  ciu  government  in  catalonia.  in  times  of   nationalist  radicalisation  and  polarisation  the  space  for  ‘pactisme’  seems   to  have  shrunk,  for  the  first  time.  in  the  moment  it  appears  to  be  confined   to  the  nationalist  camp  only.     studies  on  national  movements,  2  (2014)      |      articles   hans-­‐jürgen  puhle  12   from  regionalism  to  ‘autonomism’  to  separatism     if  we  reduce  the  aspirations  and  options  of  the  significant  actors  of  catalan   nationalism  to   four  basic   types  –  regionalism,   federalism,   ‘autonomism’,   and   separatism   (or   independentism,   ‘sobiranisme’)   –   and   look   at   the   trajectories  of  the  various  movements  through  the  last  130  years  or  so,  we   can  identify  a  characteristic  trend  along  those  lines:  from  regionalism  and   federalism   via   ‘autonomism’   to   separatism   and   independentism,   not   without  overlaps,  double  standards,  nuances,  shifts,  and  many  elements  of   ‘die  gleichzeitigkeit  des  ungleichzeitigen’  that  might  require  some  caveats.   ‘federalism’  for  example  has  to  be  qualified  because  the  notion  in  some   cases  might  not  refer  to  federal  systems  like  the  swiss,  german  or  north   american,   but   more   to   loosely   coupled   confederations   like   the   ‘iberian   federation’   in   traditional   anarcho-­‐syndicalist   or   catalanist   terminology   (which  could  be  combined  with  independentism,  or  with  regionalism,  as  in   the  bases  de  manresa  of  1892).  and  in  more  recent  times  new  notions  of   ‘asymmetric   federalism’   have   emerged.17   on   the   whole,   we   can   clearly   distinguish  four  phases.  from  the  beginnings  in  the  1880s  down  to  around   1917/18   regionalist   concepts   prevailed,   as   they   were   embodied   in   the   politics   of   the   lliga   or   in   the   modest   institutions   of   the   mancomunitat   (1913-­‐24),  even  if  there  were  eventual  overlaps  with  federalist  positions,   catalonia   was   more   and   more   seen   as   a   nation,   and   some   dissenting   organisations   of   the   ‘catalanist   left’,   from   1906/1910   on,   increasingly   asked  for  more  institutionalised  autonomy  and  a  respective  statute  (ufnr,   some  youth  groups,  macià,  esquerra  catalanista,  bra,  prc).  there  were,   however,  no  meaningful  separatist  demands  whatsoever.                                                                                       this  changed  significantly  in  the  second  phase,  from  1917/18  to  the  end  of   the  spanish  civil  war  in  1939:  it  was  characterised  by  the  disappearance   of   regionalism,   a   structural   parallelism   of   separatist   and   autonomist   demands,   in   which   the   latter   somehow   prevailed,   and   a   number   of   different  federalist  revivals  in  the  contexts  of  both.  separatist  aspirations   were  first  voiced  by  macià  in  november  1918  and  remained  the  credo  of   fdn  and  estat  català  through  1923  and  beyond,  though  it  lost  some  of  its   teeth  by  being  more  and  more  blended  with  federalism  and  populism,  and   by  a  general  upsurge  of  autonomism  (e.g.,  ac  1922,  prc).  the  position  of   studies  on  national  movements,  2  (2014)      |      articles   hans-­‐jürgen  puhle   13   the   erc   in   1931   was   federalist   and   separatist,   but   it   accepted   the   autonomist   compromise   of   the   statute   of   nuria   of   1932,   though   not   without  a  tendency  to  relapse,  like  in  the  october  uprising  of  1934  when   companys   proclaimed   a   catalan   state   that   was   not   to   be.   the   erc’s   position  was  shared  by  its  socialist  ally  of  the  unió  socialista  de  catalunya   (usc)   which   in   1936   became   the   core   of   the   psuc,   one   of   its   closest   partners   in   time  of  war.  also   the   influential   tenant  winegrowers  of   the   unió  de  rabassaires  (udr)  and  the  bloc  obrer   i  camperol  (boc)  which   was  more  socialist  and  communist  than  nationalist  (and  later  ended  in  the   poum),  favoured  separatism  for  some  time,  before  the  final  phase  of  the   civil  war  and  franco’s  victory  made  further  discussions  pointless.18   the  third  phase  from  the  reinstallation  of  the  generalitat  in  1977  and  the   autonomy   statute   of   sau   (1979)   to   2005/06   was   the   heyday   of   ‘autonomism’,  and  an  almost  ‘idyllic’  phase  of  catalan  nationalism  under   the   hegemony   of   pujolisme,   in   a   new   structural   context:   the   spanish   estado  de  las  autonomías  which  was  less  than  a  federal  system,  but  more   than  mere  regionalisation  or  devolution.  conceived  as  ‘asymmetric’  in  the   beginning,   by   giving   the   ‘historical’   autonomous   communities   like   catalonia   more   jurisdiction   in   some   matters   (though   in   different   ways,   compared  to  the  basque  country  and  navarra),  the  system  has,  however   been   increasingly   ‘resymmetrised’   by   framework   legislation   and   more   generalised   policies   of   decentralisation,   so   that   it   is   now   deemed   insufficient   by   the   catalan   nationalists   and   government.   pujol’s   ruling   coalition   (ciu)   of   the   liberal   cdc   and   the   christian-­‐democratic   udc   (smaller  and  less  nationalistic)  represented  an  unspecific  and  streamlined   nationalism   ‘without  adjectives’.   it  paid   lip  service  to  self-­‐determination   (particularly   in   1989,   1998,   after   2005),   remained   unclear   toward   federalism,  and  behaved   loyal   to   the  estado  de   las  autonomías  actively   taking   advantage   of   its   mechanisms   and   opportunities,   particularly   in   educational   and   cultural   matters.   ‘pujolisme’,   in   a   selective   way,   also   embraced   the  populist  heritage  of   the  erc  of   the  30s,  and  many  of   the   entrepreneurial,   missionary   and   ‘imperialist’   traditions   of   the   lliga,   defining  catalonia  as  a  principal  agent  of  progress  and  modernisation,  for   the  paїsos  catalans,  for  spain  and  for  europe.  ‘autonomism’  also  prevailed   by   far   in   the  surveys  on   the  preferences  of   the  catalans  with  regard   to   studies  on  national  movements,  2  (2014)      |      articles   hans-­‐jürgen  puhle  14   territorial  organisation.  separatism  was  not  an  issue.  only  the  small  and   more  radical  republican  esquerra  (erc),  after  a  generational  shift  of   its   leadership,   in   its  new  programme  of  1992  set  a  separatist  course  again,   much  earlier  than  others.19               this  ‘idyllic  phase’  came  to  an  end,  and  a  fourth  phase  began  when  after   2005  survey  preferences  began  to  change,  more  rapidly  from  2007  on:  in   only  five  years  (2007-­‐12)  ‘autonomism’  lost  about  half  of  its  support  and   since  then  has  ended  up  third  behind  independentism,  or  separatism,  and   federalism  (see  table  3).       this   corresponded   to   a   decisive   new   turn   of   catalan   nationalism,   the   reasons  for  which  have  been  many:  the  outcome  of  the  negotiations  on  the   new  autonomy  statute  of  miravet  (2004-­‐06)  which  should  have  brought   table  3  |  evolution  of  catalans’  territorial  political  preferences   (2005-­‐2013)       studies  on  national  movements,  2  (2014)      |      articles   hans-­‐jürgen  puhle   15   substantial  improvements  in  status,  tax  legislation  and  transfer  of  powers   (more  along  the  lines  of  ‘asymmetrical’  federalism),  was  disappointing  for   the   catalans.   most   intended   reforms   were   watered   down,   first   by   the   spanish  parliament   (03/2006),   then,  after   the  statute’s   ratification  by  a   (still  impressive)  majority  in  a  referendum  (06/2006)  and  a  long  process   of   deliberation,   by   the   constitutional   court   (2010).   ‘autonomism’   and   federalism  had  not  delivered.  in  addition,  the  great  financial  and  structural   crisis   after   2008,   catalonia’s   rising   debt   and   social   problems,   and   the   intransigence  of   the  conservative  spanish  government  refusing   to  move   (from  2011  on)  have  contributed  to  rising  conflictivity.  hence  all  political   forces   of   catalonia   radicalised,   and   the   majority   nationalists   of   the   ciu   under  its  leader  artur  mas  who  took  over  the  catalan  government  in  2010,   followed  the  minority  erc  in  embarking  on  a  separatist  course  advocating   independence,  sovereignty  and  an  unclear  confederation,  however  foggy   and   protracted   the   envisaged   steps   toward   its   implementation   may   appear.   there   does   not   seem   to   be   a   way   back   to   the   estado   de   las   autonomías  as  we  knew  it.20     some  basic  thresholds     from   the   periodisation   of   these   trends   some   basic   thresholds   in   the   trajectories   of   catalan   nationalisms   should   be   clear.   the   five   most   important  ones  have  been  mentioned:                 • the  first  great  turnaround  of  the  long  1890s  (beginning  in  1886:   almirall)   which   culminated   in   the   establishment   of   the   lliga   regionalista  in  1901  as  the  hegemonic  force;   • the   second   turnaround   that   began   in   1917/18,   ended   the   hegemony   of   the   lliga   (in   the   early   1920s),   triggered   new   demands  for  autonomy  and  independence  and  a  broad  variety  of   new   organisations   and   alliances   of   the   ‘catalanist   left’   which   finally  took  over  and  crystallised  in  the  esquerra  republicana  in   1931  as  the  new  majority  faction  of  catalan  nationalism.   studies  on  national  movements,  2  (2014)      |      articles   hans-­‐jürgen  puhle  16   • the  third  and  the  fourth  threshold  are  marked  by  the  beginning  of   the  authoritarian  franco  regime  in  1939  and  its  end  in  the  second   half  of  the  1970s.  this  forty-­‐years  interlude  of  (a  partly  terroristic)   spanish   centralism   forced   catalan   nationalists   into   the   underground   or   into   exile;   many   lost   their   lives.   with   the   establishment   of   the   new   estado   de   las   autonomías   in   1979   a   longer   period   of   institutionally   consolidated,   though   contained   autonomic  rule  began,  the  scope  of  which,  for  many  reasons,  was   increasingly  considered  insufficient  in  catalonia.   • the  fifth,  and  so  far  last  threshold  can  be  seen  in  the  beginning  of   the  manifest  crisis  of  the  autonomist  model  around  2005/06.  since   then,  ‘autonomism’  and  many  institutions  of  the  spanish  state  have   lost  their  acceptance  in  catalonia,  independentism  and  separatism   have   been   on   the   rise,   and   radicalisation   and   polarisation   have   been  increased,  particularly  in  2010,  in  2012,  and  beyond.                          to   these   ‘big’   thresholds   we   may   have   to   add   some   others   with   high   significance.   first   there   are   the   changes   of   political   regimes   that   had   consequences   for   the   institutions   of   catalan   auto-­‐administration   and   territorial  organisation:  the  takeover  of  general  primo  de  rivera  in  1923   led  to   the  end  of   the  catalan  mancomunitat  one  year   later,  after  eleven   years  of  its  existence.  and  the  proclamation  of  the  spanish  (and  catalan)   republic   in   1931   triggered   the   first   autonomy   statute   for   catalonia   of   1932,  which  was  suspended  after  the  failed  uprising  of  1934,  reinstated  in   1936  and  finally  abolished  when  franco  took  over  at  the  end  of  the  civil   war.   finally   we   have   the   transition   to   democracy   of   the   late   1970s.   another   type   of   significant   turns,   changes   or   redirections   in   catalan   nationalist  politics  has  to  do  with  conflicts  and  violence,  besides  the  war   and   crisis   of   1898,   the   persistent   moroccan   crises   and   the   civil   war,   particularly   the   various   waves   of   violent   labour   unrest   and   their   repression  by   the  authorities,  endemic  after  1900,  around  1909/10/12,   between   1917   and   1923,   or   from   1934   on,   the   exodus   of   1939,   and   francoist   repression   through   its   various   stages   against   which   also   new   alliances   of   the   opposition   could   be   tried   out,   with   catholic   youth   and   student   groups   (a   particular   reservoir   of   future   leaders),   the   unions   of   comisiones   obreras,   and   the   catalan   communists   of   the   psuc.   a   third   studies  on  national  movements,  2  (2014)      |      articles   hans-­‐jürgen  puhle   17   category  of  thresholds  has  reflected  changes  of  alliances  or  coalitions,  of   the   various   nationalist   parties   and   groups   with   ‘spanish’   parties   and   groups,   or,   not   too   often,   with   one   another   (as   erc   and   ciu   have   demonstrated   through   the   last   decades),   and   differently   in   different   arenas.   these   changes   have   often   been   related   to   changes   in   policy   priorities,   particularly   with   regard   to   matters   of   (self-­‐determined)   institution   building   (and   its   symbols),   transfers   of   powers,   or   tax   legislation  (cf.  1983,  1998).     a  few  thresholds  have  also  reflected  the  repercussions  of  macro-­‐processes   of   social   change:   the   rise   of   the   lliga   around   1900   ratified   the   consequences  and  characteristics  of   industrialisation   in  catalonia.21  the   precarious  consolidation  of   the  erc   in   the  1930s  reflected   the  populist   tendencies   inherent   in  democratic  mass  politics   in  an  uprooted  society.   and  the  all-­‐encompassing  moderate  neo-­‐populist  course  of  pujol’s  catch-­‐ all  ciu  after  1980  can  only  be  understood  considering  that  catalan  society   during  the  transition  and  after  was  significantly  different  from  what  it  had   been  down  to  the  1930s  and  40s.  the  economic  opening,  rising  investment   in  industries,  services  and  infrastructure  since  the  late  1950s  and  60s  had   produced  a   rise   in   the   standard  of   living,  new  waves  of  migration,   and   triggered   comprehensive   processes   of   modernisation,   urbanisation   and   liberalisation.   anarcho-­‐syndicalism   had   practically   disappeared,   communism   was   weak,   and   the   more   fundamentalist   catholic   and   nationalist  traditions  of  the  hinterland  were  on  the  retreat.22  so  pujol  did   not  hesitate  to  dance  at  the  fiestas  of  immigrants  from  andalucía,  and  he   succeeded,  at  least  at  the  polls  for  the  catalan  parliament.  the  important   municipal  elections   in  barcelona  and  the  statewide  spanish  elections   in   catalonia  were  usually  won  by  the  catalan  socialists  (psc).   threats  and  models  for  the  21st  century       there  is  some  evidence  that  also  the  latest  ‘big’  threshold  in  the  politics  of   catalan  nationalism,  the  turn  towards  independence  and  separatism  of  the   last  decade,  may  have  to  do  with  other  macro-­‐processes  of  economic  and   social  change,  though  in  a  complicated  and  sometimes  contradictory  way.   studies  on  national  movements,  2  (2014)      |      articles   hans-­‐jürgen  puhle  18   here   i   am   particularly   referring   to   a   secular   process   of   basic   and   substantial  change  in  almost  all  dimensions  of  social  and  political  group   formation   and   interaction   that   has   occurred   in   the   decades   around   the   turn  of  the  century  (hence  ‘threshold  21’).  this  process  has  been  triggered   and  intensified  by  a  constellation  of  at  least  six  to  seven  factors:         1. the   late  repercussions  of   the   ‘stagflation  crisis’  since   the  70s   for   political  and  social  organisation  and  regulation,  deregulation  and   liberalization;   2. the   further   increase   in   ‘globalisation’,   global   exchange   of   capital   and  people,  and  the  protests  against  it;   3. the  implications  of  the  recent  financial,  economic  and  institutional   crisis  since  2008;   4. the  availability  of  the  new  electronic  media  and  it,  particularly  the   internet  and  the  social  media  which  have  given  new  momentum  to     5. a   comprehensive   mediatisation   of   politics   and   an   intensification   and  ‘deepening’  of  the  processes  of  structural  change  of  the  public   sphere   and   of   the   character   of   the   political     (about   which   habermas  first  wrote  more  than  fifty  years  ago).       6. a  sixth  process  can  be  described  as  the  breakthrough  of  ‘populist   democracy’  on  a  broad  scale,  within  a  favourable  ambience  full  of   windows  of  opportunity,  ‘populist  moments’,  and  agency.   7. for   the   european   context   we   have   to   add   a   seventh   process:   intensified  european  integration  and  institution  building  implying   more   coordination   and   interdependence,   combined   with   a   perceived  lack  of  democratic  legitimation  and  an  underdeveloped   institutional   imagination   regarding   the   future   of   the   union,   and   finally  the  crisis  of  the  euro  and  the  remedies  to  cure.23                 for   catalonia   this   implied,   among   other   things,   a   severe   economic   and   social   crisis,   an   unproportional   fiscal   deficit   and   public   debt,   increased   immigration   and   a   progressive   castilianisation   (or   ‘opening   up’,   from   a   different  view)  of  catalan  society  which  produced  new  identity  problems   and  intensified  identity  politics  in  the  nationalist  camp  which  could  take   studies  on  national  movements,  2  (2014)      |      articles   hans-­‐jürgen  puhle   19   advantage  of  the  good  conjunctures  of  populist  politics.  even  a  peacefully   and  productively  integrated  catalan  society  would  be  less  ‘catalan’  in  the   traditional   way   conceived   in   ‘ethnic’   terms   (and   hence   we   also   can   increasingly   find   more   ‘progressive’   additional   definitions   of   catalan   ‘identity’   in   more   ‘civic’   terms   of   democracy   and   welfare).   the   new   autonomy  statute  negotiated  and  ratified  in  2005/06,  beyond  its  function   to  remedy  the  shortcomings  of  the  old  one  after  25  years,  to  bring  it  up  to   date  and  develop  further  the  mechanisms  of  the  estado  de  las  autonomías,   was  also  meant  to  address  these  problems  and  give  some  relief  to  the  real   and   perceived   threats   to   catalan   identity,   symbolically,   linguistically,   institutionally   and   fiscally.   when   the   statute,   however,   was   further   watered   down   by   the   constitutional   court   after   its   ratification   and   did   neither   recognise   the   plurinationality   of   the   state   nor   make   any   improvements   in   self-­‐government   (asymmetric   federalism   or   ‘shared   sovereignty’),   transfer   of   competences   and   tax   sharing,   disenchantment   and   frustration   set   in   which   were   further   increased   by   the   subsequent   intransigence  and  immobility  of  the  spanish  parliament  and  governments   in  (not)  addressing  the  urgent  catalan  problems  and  needs.     this  was  the  constellation  into  which  a  new  generation  of  leaders  of  the   catalan  nationalists   in  both  parties,  erc  and  ciu,   (and  also  beyond   the   parties)  could  launch  a  renewed  separatist  project  demanding  the  ‘right  to   decide’,  catalan  statehood,  and   independence,  with  all   the  agitation  and   the  visible  ‘tools  for  torture’  this  implies  (like  the  controversial  ‘unilateral   referendum’  as  an   initial  step).24  when  this  began,   the  outside  observer   may   have   wondered   whether   the   campaign   for   independence   could   be   considered  as  a  calculated  ultimate  strategic  resort  in  order  to  break  the   impasse  and  get  back  into  negotiations  of  an  improved  autonomy  statute   or  a  reform  of  the  estado  de  las  autonomías  with  madrid,  albeit  with  the   risk  implied  that  the  situation  might  produce  its  own  dynamics  and  get  out   of  control.  however,  such  a  strategy,  if   it  ever  was  one,  has  not  worked.   addressing  the  catalan  discontents  and  demands  within  the  framework  of   spanish  institutions  would  have  required  that  both  sides  renounce  to  their   maximalist  positions  and  compromise  on  some  kind  of   imaginative  and   practical  models  for  territorial  organisation  as  they  have  been  debated  in   the  first  decade  of  the  21st  century,  like:  a  gradual  reform  of  the  autonomy   studies  on  national  movements,  2  (2014)      |      articles   hans-­‐jürgen  puhle  20   statutes  beyond  the  status  quo,  or  some  kind  of  federalism,  more  but  not   too  asymmetric,  an  order  that  would  exclude  hermetic  identities  and  allow   for  a  recognition  of   the  plurinationality  of   the  state  and  mechanisms  of   shared   sovereignty,   along   the   formula   of   xosé   núñez:   a   socially   plurinational,   and   institutionally   pseudo-­‐plurinational   state,   ‘ma   non   troppo’.  this  was  written  in  2006.  now  it  appears  long  ago,  indeed.25   as   the   conservative   government   in   madrid   (and   also   the   socialist   opposition)   has   not   been   ready   for   a   substantially   improved   ‘spanish   solution’   all   the   way,   and   the   catalan   nationalists,   in   their   turn,   have   become   increasingly   disenchanted,   disaffected   and   alienated   of   it,   the   project  of  independence  has  significantly  gained  momentum  everywhere   in  catalan  society.  at  the  same  time,  polarisation  has  gone  up,  and  both   sides  have  radicalised,  the  nationalists  and  the  anti-­‐nationalists,  as  it  could   be  seen  in  the  elections  of  2012  (gains  for  erc  and  ciutadans,  cf.  table  4),   and  particularly  in  more  recent  survey  results  on  perceived  identities,  on   the  preferences  of  territorial  organisation  and  on  voting  intentions.26       table  4  |  catalan  parliament:  electoral  results  (1999-­‐2012)   [percentages  (number  of  seats)]     1999   2003   2006   2010   2012   ciu   37,7  (56)   30,9  (46)   31,52  (48)   38,4  (62)   30,7  (50)   psc   37,9  (52)   31,2  (42)   26,8  (37)   18,4  (28)   14,4  (20)   pp   9,5  (12)   11,9  (15)   10,7  (14)   12,4  (18)   13  (19)   erc   8,7  (12)   16,4  (23)   14  (21)   7  (10)   13,7  (21)   icv-­‐euia   2,5  (3)   7,3  (9)   9,5  (12)   7,4  (10)   9,9  (13)   ciutadans   -­‐   -­‐   3  (3)   3,4  (3)   7,6  (9)   cup   -­‐   -­‐   -­‐   -­‐   3,5  (3)   sci   -­‐   -­‐   -­‐   3,3  (3)   1,3  (0)     studies  on  national  movements,  2  (2014)      |      articles   hans-­‐jürgen  puhle   21   the   present   procedural   quarrels   on   the   modalities   of   a   ‘unilateral   referendum’,  and  of  ‘negotiating  independence’  more  in  general,  have  also   contributed  to  further  escalation  of  the  conflict.  and  considering  the  actors   as   they   are,   it   has   become   clear   that,   at   a   given   point,   the   catalan   nationalists   might   have   no   choice   but   to   commit   revolutionary   acts,   in   order  to  pursue  their  goals  (and  they  better  be  prepared  for  it,  as  long  as   they  insist  on  independence),  and  the  spanish  nationalists  in  government   might   be   tempted   to   send   in   the   police.   violence,   however   contained,   cannot  be  excluded.  and  it  appears  as  if,  in  this  polarised  situation,  catalan   nationalism  has  not  only  changed  its  character  and  concept,  from  ‘positive’   to  ‘negative’,  as  enric  ucelay  da  cal  has  eventually  observed  (2013),27  from   a   saturated   and   self-­‐conscious   to   an   insecure   and   complaining   nationalism,  but  also  a  number  of  other  important  features,  constellations   and  functions:   • catalan  nationalism  is  no  longer  law-­‐abiding  or  ‘idyllic’  as  it  was  in   the   period   of   pujolisme,   nor   necessarily   reformist;   it   has   again   become  (at  least  potentially)  revolutionary,  in  the  sense  of  being   determined  to  break  out  of  the  existing  institutional  order.     • at   the   same   time   its   social   base   in   catalan   society   has   been   broadened,  due  to  the  fact  that  the  politics  of  catalan  nationalism   are  no  longer  dominated  by  the  respective  political  parties  alone   which   since   2012   have   appeared   increasingly   incapable   of   channeling  the  widespread  discontent  and  protest.  one  of  the  most   significant   new   elements   of   catalan   nationalism,   unheard   of   for   many   decades,   has   been   the   wide   and   intense   mobilisation   and   organisation  of  civil  society,  by  a  broad  variety  of   initiatives  and   associations  (including  the  historic  òmnium  and  the  more  recent   assemblea   nacional   catalana   [anc]   of   2012),   along   more   participatory,  inclusionary  (and  ‘loosely  coupled’)  lines  which  has   enhanced   the   dynamics   of   the   separatist   project   and   given   new   momentum   to   nationalist   politics.   ‘independence’   also   seems   to   have   particularly   inspired   young   people   in   a   similar   way   ‘democracy’   did   in   the   1970s:   for   a   new   beginning,   a   brighter   future,  and  catalan  ‘majoria  d’edat’.           studies  on  national  movements,  2  (2014)      |      articles   hans-­‐jürgen  puhle  22     • here  some  of  the  consequences  of  advanced  globalisation  and  of   the   ‘threshold  21’  come  in:  on  the  one  hand,  now  the  politics  of   catalan  nationalism  are  framed  by  the  generalised  and  globalising   trends  toward  populist  democracy  (in  a  way  exactly  the  other  way   round   compared   to   what   happened   in   the   1930s   when   the   nationalists   had   used   populism).   on   the   other   hand   (the   ‘provincialising’  side),  the  catalan  scene  looks  more  like  others  and   less  ‘special’,  and  catalan  nationalism  may  appear  more  unilinear   and  less  sophisticated  than  before.                   • for  the  same  reasons  we  also  can  no   longer  analyse  the  politics   and  interactions  of  catalan  nationalism  within  the  container  of  the   spanish  nation  state  as  the  only  frame  of  reference,  as  it  has  been   done  for  many  years,  though  not  always  (cf.  some  federalists  and   anarchists   since   the   19th   c.).   not   only   because   spain,   and   hence   catalonia   belong   to   the   european   union   (and   many   other   alliances),  but  also  because  of  globalisation  and  all  the  ‘entangled’   and   ‘reflexive’   interdependencies   it   implies.   what   happens   in   scotland  or  québec,  on  the  balkans,  in  ukraine  or  crimea,  and  in   brussels,   new   york   and   elsewhere   may   have   significant   repercussions  for  catalonia.                       the   creation   of   a   new   nation   state   in   the   age   (and   within   the   constellations)  of  its  demise  and  ‘blurring’  would  certainly  have  something   ironic  about  it.  unless  it  would  be  a  post-­‐nation  state,  conceived  by  post-­‐ national  nationalists.       studies  on  national  movements,  2  (2014)      |      articles   hans-­‐jürgen  puhle   23     endnotes   1  cf.    h.j.  puhle,  staaten,  nationen  und  regionen  in  europa  (wien,  1995);  h.j.  puhle,   ‘nation  states,  nations,  and  nationalisms  in  western  and  southern  europe‘,  in:  j.g.   beramendi,  r.  máiz  &  x.m.  núñez  (eds.),  nationalism  in  europe.  past  and  present,   vol.  2  (santiago    de  compostela,  1994)  13-­‐38;  j.j.  linz,  ‘state  building  and  nation   building’,  in:  european  review,  1  (1993)  355-­‐369;  j.  breuilly,  nationalism  and  the   state  (2nd  ed.:  manchester,  1993);  m.  hroch,  das  europa  der  nationen.  die  moderne   nationsbildung  im  europäischen  vergleich  (göttingen,  2005).     2   cf.   e.   ucelay-­‐da   cal,   ‘history,   historiography   and   the   ambiguities   of   catalan   nationalism’,  in:  studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)  105-­‐159;  g.  brunn,  ‘die   organisation  der  katalanischen  bewegung  1859-­‐1923’,  in:  t.  schieder  &  o.  dann   (eds.),  nationale  bewegung  und  soziale  organisation,  i  (münchen,  1978)  281-­‐571;   also:   j.j.  linz,   ‘early  state-­‐building  and   late  peripheral  nationalisms  against   the   state:  the  case  of  spain’,  in:  s.n.  eisenstadt  &  s.  rokkan  (eds.),  building  states  and   nations  (beverly  hills,  1973)  31-­‐116;  b.  de  riquer  &  e.  ucelay-­‐da  cal,  ‘an  analysis   of  nationalisms   in  spain:  a  proposal   for  an   integrated  historical  model’,   in:   j.g.   beramendi,  r.  máiz  &  x.m.  núñez  (eds.),  nationalism  in  europe.  past  and  present,   vol.   2   (santiago   de   compostela,   1994)   275-­‐301;   x.m.   núñez   seixas,   los   nacionalismos  en  la  españa  contemporánea  (siglos  xix  y  xx)  (barcelona,  1999).   3  cf.  m.  hroch,  die  vorkämpfer  der  nationalen  bewegung  bei  den  kleinen  völkern   europas  (praha,  1968)  24-­‐26;  m.  hroch,  social  preconditions  of  national  revival  in   europe  (cambridge,  1985)  22-­‐30;  puhle,  ‘nation  states’,  28-­‐35,  and:  pi  i  margall’s   project   for  a   federal   constitution  and   the   ‘projecte  de  constitució  per  a   l’estat   català’   (1883),   in:   j.a.  gonzález  casanova,  federalisme   i  autonomia  a  catalunya   (1868-­‐1938).   documents   (barcelona,   1974)   465-­‐493;     f.   pi   i   margall,   las   nacionalidades,   2   vol.   (madrid   1972   [1877]);   v.   almirall,   lo   catalanisme   (barcelona,  1979  [1886]).       4  see  h.j.  puhle,  ‘neue  nationalismen  in  osteuropa  –  ein  sechste  welle?‘,  in:  e.  jahn   (ed.),   nationalismus   im   spät-­‐   und   postkommunistischen   europa,   vol.   1   (baden-­‐ baden  2008)  162-­‐181.     studies  on  national  movements,  2  (2014)      |      articles   hans-­‐jürgen  puhle  24     5   for   example:   1879   diari   català,   1880   1st   catalanist   congress,   1882   centre   català,  1883  2nd  congress  (political  program),  1886  almirall:  lo  catalanisme.   6   1886   almirall:   lo   catalanisme,   1891   unió   catalanista   (uc),   1892   bases   de   manresa,  1897  centre  català  (almirall),  1898  spanish  crisis  (polarisation),  1901   lliga  regionalista.   7  see  puhle,  ‘neue  nationalismen‘,  169-­‐171;  also  hroch,  europa  der  nationen,  103-­‐ 108.       8  cf.    p.  vilar,  la  catalogne  dans  l’espagne  moderne,  2  vol.  (paris,  1962);  j.  solé-­‐ tura,  catalanismo  y  revolución  burguesa  (madrid,  1970);  brunn,  ‘organisation’;  e.   ucelay  da  cal,  el  imperialismo  catalán.  prat  de  la  riba,  cambó,  d’ors  y  la  conquista   moral  de  españa  (barcelona,  2003);  e.  ucelay  da  cal,  nacionalisme  i  imperialisme   catalanista:  d’almirall  a  prat  de   la  riba  (barcelona,    2012);  b.  de  riquer,  lliga   regionalista:   la   burgesia   catalana   i   el   nacionalisme   (1898-­‐1904)   (barcelona,   1977);  b.  de  riquer,  regionalistes  i  nacionalistes  1898-­‐1931  (barcelona,  1979);  i.   molas,  lliga  catalana,  2  vol.  (barcelona,  1972);  j.  pla,  cambó  (barcelona,  1973);  e.   prat  de  la  riba,  la  nacionalidad  catalana  (barcelona,  1987  [1906]);  j.b.  culla,  el   republicanisme  lerrouxista  a  catalunya  (1901-­‐1923)  (barcelona,  1986).   9  cf.  m.  caminal  badia,  ‘la  fundació  de  l’institut  agrícola  català  de  sant  isidre:  els   seus  homes  i  les  seves  activitats  (1851-­‐1901)’,  in:  recerques,  22  (1989)  117-­‐135;   m.  lladonosa  i  vall-­‐llebrera,  catalanisme  i  moviment  obrer:  el  cadci  entre  1903  i   1923   (abadia   de   montserrat,   1988)   [tesi   doctoral,   universitat   autònoma   de   barcelona,  1979];  j.  pomés,  la  unió  de  rabassaires  (barcelona,  2000);  a.  balcells,   el   problema   agrari   a   catalunya   (1890-­‐1936).   la   qüestió   rabassaire   (barcelona,   1968).   10  still  the  best  and  most  comprehensive  analysis  is  k.j.  nagel,  arbeiterschaft  und   nationale  frage  in  katalonien  zwischen  1898  und  1923  (saarbrücken,  1991);  see   also:  x.  cuadrat,  socialismo  y  anarquismo  en  cataluña  (1899-­‐1911).  los  orígenes  de   la  c.n.t.  (madrid,    1976);  a.  balcells,  trabajo  industrial  y  organización  obrera  en  la   cataluña   contemporánea   (1900-­‐1936)   (barcelona,   1974);   j.   vicens   vives,   ‘el   moviment  obrerista  català  (1901-­‐1939)’,  in:  recerques,  7  (1978)  9-­‐31;  j.c.  ullman,   the  tragic  week.  a  study  of  anticlericalism  in  spain,  1875-­‐1912   (cambridge,  ma,   1968);  j.  romero  maura,  la  rosa  de  fuego.  republicanos  y  anarquistas:  la  política   de   los  obreros  barceloneses  entre  el  desastre  colonial  y   la   semana   trágica  1899-­‐   studies  on  national  movements,  2  (2014)      |      articles   hans-­‐jürgen  puhle   25     1909  (barcelona,  1975);  j.  de  camps  i  arboix,  historia  de  la  solidaritat  catalana   (barcelona,  1970).   11  see  b.  de  riquer,  alfonso  xiii  y  cambó.  la  monarquía  y  el  catalanismo  político   (barcelona,  2013);  ucelay  da  cal,  el  imperialismo.   12  cf.  nagel,  arbeiterschaft,  ch.  v,  esp.  375sq.,  406sq.,  436sq.,  450sq.   13  e.  ucelay  da  cal,  ‘wilson  i  no  lenin:  l’esquerra  catalana  i  l’any  1917’,  in:  l’avenç,   2/9  (oct.  1978)  53-­‐58.   14  see  e.  ucelay  da  cal,  la  catalunya  populista.  imatge,  cultura  i  política  en  l’etapa   republicana  (1931-­‐1939)  (barcelona,  1982);  e.  ucelay  da  cal,  francesc  macià.  una   vida   en   imatges   (barcelona,   1984);   j.b.   culla,   el   catalanisme   d’esquerra   (1828-­‐ 1936).   del   grup   de   ‘l’opinió’   al   partit   nacionalista   republicà   d’esquerra   (barcelona,   1977);   j.b.   culla   i   clarà,   esquerra   republicana   de   catalunya,   1931-­‐ 2012.  una  història  política  (barcelona,    2013).         15  ucelay  da  cal,  ‘history’,  129.   16   besides   nagel,   arbeiterschaft;   culla   i   clarà,   esquerra;   and   ucelay   da   cal,   la   catalunya  populista,  see  j.g.  beramendi  &  r.  máiz  (eds.),  los  nacionalismos  en  la   españa  de  la  ii  república  (madrid,  1991);  j.  termes,  de  la  revolució  de  setembre  a   la  fi  de  la  guerra  civil  (1868-­‐1939)  (història  de  catalunya,  vi)  (barcelona,  1987);  j.   peirats,  la  cnt  en  la  revolución  española,  3  vol.  (paris,  1971);  j.  casanova,    the   spanish  republic  and  civil  war  (cambridge,  2010);  b.  de  riquer,    la  dictadura  de   franco   (historia   de   españa,   9)   (madrid,   2010)   179-­‐245,   547-­‐607;   a.   dowling,   catalonia  since  the  spanish  civil  war.  reconstructing  the  nation  (brighton,  2013);  j.   benet,  catalunya  sota  el  règim  franquista  (paris,  1973).   17  cf.  a.o.  f.  requejo  &  k.j.  nagel  (eds.),  federalism  beyond  federations.  asymmetry   and  processes  of  resymmetrisation   in  europe  (farnham,  2011).  see  also  j.j.  linz,   democracy,   multinationalism,   and   federalism   (estudio/working   paper,   103)   (madrid,  1997).       18  besides  nagel,  arbeiterschaft,  and  culla  i  clarà,  esquerra,  see  e.  ucelay-­‐da  cal  &   a.   gonzàlez   i   vilalta   (eds.),   contra   companys,   1936.   la   frustración   nacionalista   ante   la   revolución   (valència,   2012);   pomés,   unió;   f.   bonamusa,   el   bloc   obrer   i   camperol   (1930-­‐1932)   (barcelona,   1974);   p.   pagès,   andreu   nin:   su   evolución   política  (1911-­‐1937)  (bilbao,  1975).     studies  on  national  movements,  2  (2014)      |      articles   hans-­‐jürgen  puhle  26     19   cf.   m.   guibernau,   nacionalisme   català.   franquisme,   transició   i   democracia   (barcelona,  2003);  p.  lo  cascio,  nacionalisme  i  autogovern:  catalunya,  1980-­‐2003   (barcelona,  2008);  j.  pujol,  el  caminant  davant  del  congost  (barcelona,  2013);  f.   martínez  &  j.  oliveres,  jordi  pujol.  en  nom  de  catalunya  (barcelona,  2005),  and:  o.   barberà,   unió   democràtica   de   catalunya   (1931-­‐2003).   evolució   política   i   organitzativa   (bellaterra,   2010);   o.   barberà   &   a.   barrio,   ‘convergència   i   unió:   from  stability   to  decline?’,   in:  l.  de  winter,  m.  gómez  reino,  &  p.  lynch  (eds.),   autonomist  parties  in  europe:  identity  politics  and  the  revival  of  territorial  cleavage   (barcelona,   2006)   vol.   1,   101-­‐141;   j.b.   culla   i   clarà   (ed.),   el   pal   de   paller.   convergència   democràtica   de   catalunya   (1974-­‐2000)   (barcelona,   2001);   culla   i   clarà,  esquerra.     20   see   a.o.   the   data   in   anuari   polític   de   catalunya   2012,   institut   de   ciències   politiques  i  socials  (barcelona,  2012),  and  f.  requejo  &  m.  sanjaume,  recognition   and  political  accommodation:  from  regionalism  to  secessionism.  the  catalan  case,   (grtp   political   theory   working   paper,   13)   (barcelona,   2013);   k.j.   nagel,   ‘autonomiestaat   und   krise   –   autonomiestaat   in   der   krise?‘,   in:   jahrbuch   des   föderalismus,  2012  (baden-­‐baden,  2012)  346-­‐362;  k.j.  nagel,   ‘katalonien  –  vom   autonomismus  zum  separatismus?‘,  in:  europa  ethnica,  70/1-­‐2  (2013)    32-­‐45.   21  besides  vilar,  catalogne,  and  solé  tura,  catalanismo,  see  also:  j.  nadal  oller  &  j.   maluquer  de  motes,  catalunya,   la   fábrica  d’espanya.  un  segle  d’industrialització   catalana,  1833-­‐1936  (barcelona,  1985);  a.  jutglar,  historia  crítica  de  la  burguesía   en   cataluña   (barcelona,   1984);   j.m.   fradera,   indústria   i   mercat.   les   bases   comercials  de  la  indústria  catalana  moderna  (1814-­‐1845)    (barcelona,  1987),  and   a.  balcells,  j.b.  culla  &  c.  mir,  les  eleccions  generals  a  catalunya  de  1901  a  1923   (barcelona,    1982).   22  for  a  good  synthesis  of  economic,  demographic,  social  and  attitudinal  change,   see  (besides  all  the  data  collections):  b.  de  riquer  &  j.b.  culla,  el  franquisme  i  la   transició  democràtica  (1939-­‐1988)  (història  de  catalunya,  vii)  (barcelona,  1989)   171-­‐384.   23  for  more  details  of  the  ‘threshold  21’,  see  h.j.  puhle,  ‘old  and  new  populisms  in   the  21st  century:  continuities  and  change’,  in:  a.  ostheimer  (ed.),  populism  within   europe  and  beyond  its  borders  (baden-­‐baden,  2016  forthcoming).   24   cf.   j.   muñoz   &   m.   guinjoan,   ‘accounting   for   internal   variation   in   nationalist   mobilization:  unofficial  referendums  for  independence  in  catalonia  (2009-­‐11)’,  in:     studies  on  national  movements,  2  (2014)      |      articles   hans-­‐jürgen  puhle   27     nations  and  nationalism,  19/1  (2013)  44-­‐67.  for   the  normative  backup,  see  a.   buchanan,   justice,   legitimacy   and   self-­‐determination:   moral   foundations   of   international   law   (oxford,   2007   [2003]);   a.   buchanan,   secesión:   causas   y   consecuencias   del   divorcio   político   (barcelona,   2013),   now   widely   debated   in   catalonia.     25  x.m.  núñez  seixas,  ‘el  nuevo  debate  territorial  en  la  españa  actual  (2004-­‐2006):   ¿hacia  un  estado  plurinacional?’,  in:  w.l.  bernecker  &  g.  maihold  (eds.),  españa:   del  consenso  a  la  polarización.  cambios  en  la  democracia  española  (madrid,  2007)   317-­‐335  (331).  for   the  state  of   the  debate  see  also:    l.  mees,   ‘el  debate  sobre   nación  y  estado  en  españa:  viejos  retos,  nuevas  posibilidades’,  ibidem,  297-­‐315;   d.  conversi,  ‘between  the  hammer  of  globalization  and  the  anvil  of  nationalism:  is   europe’s  complex  diversity  under   threat?’,   in:  ethnicities,  14/1  (2014)  25-­‐49  <   http://etn.sagepub.com/content/14/1/25.full.pdf+html>   [accessed   23/05/2013];   nagel,   ‘autonomiestaat’;   nagel,   ‘katalonien’,   and   more   generally   p.a.  kraus,  a  union  of  diversity.  language,   identity  and  polity-­‐building   in  europe   (cambridge,  2008).     26  see  the  data  in  anuari  polític  de  catalunya  2013,  institut  de  ciències  politiques  i   socials  (barcelona,  2013),  and:  requejo  &  sanjaume,  recognition;  l.  pérez  &  m.   sanjaume,  ‘legalizing  secession:  the  catalan  case’,  in:  journal  of  conflictology,  4/2   (2013)  3-­‐12;  k.j.  nagel,   ‘veus  pel  canvi  –  cap  a  un  nou  estat?’,   in:   j.  pigem,  a.   oliveres,  k.j.  nagel  e.a.,  veus  pel  canvi  (mataró,  2014)    59-­‐91.   27  ucelay-­‐da  cal,  ‘history’,  142-­‐147  (145).   microsoft word art_esculies_v3_def.docx joan esculies, ‘the cradle of catalan separatism: white-collars in barcelona during world war i’, in: studies on national movements, 2 (2014). http://snm.nise.eu/index.php/studies/article/view/0205a joan esculies the cradle of catalan separatism white-collars in barcelona during world war i the development, sociology and political orientation of white-collar workers have monopolised lots of historians’ attention in order to uncover, particularly, their relationship to fascism and the triumph of national socialism: scholars have researched the german case in comparison to other state cases such as the french, english, italian, the north american or even the peruvian. nowadays it is widely accepted that there is not a unique behaviour of white-collars towards fascism or any other ideology. and, instead, that their political orientation depends on the particular state society, culture and history, capitalist development, economic situation, working and living conditions, among other factors of the researched period.1 less attention has to date been paid to the relationship between white-collars and the development of sub-state nationalisms.2 yet in some particular cases, at least in catalonia (the northeastern region of spain), this group of workers played a major role in the appearance and development of the most radical tendencies within catalan nationalism (also known as catalanism): separatism. the following paper is part of a wider project on comparative history on the relevance of white-collars in sub-state nationalisms. as this is a work in progress the article is due to present the general ideas and concepts involving white-collars in catalonia, especially in barcelona, and their relationship with catalanism and specifically to their relevance in the origins of catalan separatism. studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles joan esculies 2 thus, in the first place the paper exposes the origins and social background of catalan white-collars. after that, it explains their relationship with bourgeois and blue-collar workers. next, the article presents the major pillars of the white-collars ideology. finally, it depicts the profile of the enemies of the separatist white-collars: a spanish ultranationalist group awoke in barcelona. the paper ends with some arguments explaining why catalan white-collars, or at least a part of them, tended to radicalise their catalanism and can be considered the cradle of catalan separatism. although references to previous periods are made, the article is focused on the world war i period (1914-1919) when the process mentioned above took place. white-collars in barcelona the first decades of the 20th century radically altered the social texture of barcelona, the capital of catalonia. in 1900 the city had half million inhabitants, thirty years later the population would exceed one million, becoming the largest city in spain and rivalling madrid. during this period barcelona turned into an industrial and, to some extent, a cosmopolitan centre. since the late 19th century a constant flow from the poorer rural areas of catalonia to barcelona (and to a lesser extent to other coastal towns such as badalona), had begun. this migratory process could last for long as, in some cases, the arrival of these catalan-speaking immigrants to the city saw an intermediate stage in inner towns – balaguer, tàrrega, manresa, tortosa, among others. the immigrants worked there for several years and to a large degree they achieved some professional qualification through this process. when they finally arrived in barcelona their professional skills allowed them to get a more qualified job instead of engrossing the blue-collar workers ranks.3 in this long migratory process – regarding time but not space, as the average distance between those towns and barcelona was 150km or even less – these immigrants started a family. most of the catalan-speakers arrived during the last decades of the 19th century and the first decades of the 20th studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles joan esculies 3 could escalate socially, to become members of the lower middle classes at least. during the years prior to world war i a second type of catalan-speaking immigrants arrived in barcelona. these were fifteento twenty-year-old men, second or third sons of rural families. following the catalan heritage system, the first son was the heir (l’hereu) of the farmhouse (el mas) or family business. his brothers (els fadristerns) would only receive a part of the legacy, if any, at their parents’ death. therefore, especially in harsh times, they had to pack off and try to find a professional horizon in the towns or in the city. they had great expectations of finding a job upon their arrival in barcelona. some dreamt of being proprietaries, businessmen, shopkeepers or even writers, artists or intellectuals.4 the most fortunate, with enough family funds, could enrol at professional schools or at the university, but they were just the lucky few. the bar at the centre autonomista del comerç i de la indústria, early 20th century | arxiu fotogràfic de barcelona studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles joan esculies 4 the majority of the fadristerns became members of the centre autonomista del comerç i de la indústria (cadci, industry and trade autonomist centre). there they met the sons of many of the catalanspeaking immigrants arrived to barcelona during the last decades of the 19th century and the first decades of the 20th who, despite their efforts, had not been able to afford a better education for their boys.5 nationalists of all sorts of branches of catalanism ruled the cadci. the centre, founded in 1903 in barcelona, had 3,000 members in the world war i period. its aim, according to the statutes, was to ‘group the shop men to assist them to improve their morality, their culture, their physical health and their material life in line with the autonomist and catalanist principles’.6 the cadci had its own commercial schools where, thanks to affordable fees, those fadristerns and sons of immigrants got basic education while working as shop assistants or sales clerks in the tertiary sector, becoming white-collar employees in the private sector. the white-collar category is a lower middle-class group, heterogeneous and with diffuse boundaries. it includes apprentices, servants, collectors, storehouse employees, assistants, accountants and salesmen, working in shops and offices or as clerks in banks and factories, among others. all in all these white-collars were part of those sectors that worked for others in the broad ranks of dependent labour, performing non-manual work and paid in salary, instead of wages. this group has been defined as the new middle class in opposition to the old middle class of craftsmen, shopkeepers and small businessmen – people working for their own account.7 but a much more appropriate way to define this group is according to its members’ own vision. catalan white-collars in barcelona, as in the rest of continental europe, did not think of themselves just as members of the labour force, neither workers nor proletarians, but as members of the middle class, a class of dependent labour. in their vision a clear line set them apart from bluecollars. they identified themselves as the aristocracy among the workers and they had a clear sense of corporate identity. catalan white-collars also shared common expectations: their aim was to become shop owners and proprietaries as their patrons and, thus, they tried to dress like them. their particular way of dressing was an external marker of the group, studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles joan esculies 5 clearly differentiating them from the blue-collars. they wore high-collared shirts with a tie, a wool or cotton suit, polished shoes and a hat. however, due to a lack of money their dresses and shirts had to last and this poverty could be easily seen in their darned parts.8 thus, catalan white-collars aimed to become, in a broader sense, part of the old middle class, while maintaining the distance with the blue-collar workers: a line to cross from above and a line to keep clear from below. the mental and social vision of themselves coincided with their urban distribution: catalan white-collars generally lived in the central neighbourhoods of barcelona (ciutat vella, eixample and gràcia) where they also worked. there, they were closer to the rest of the middle classes than to the lower classes: the middle and upper classes lived mainly in the central and north-western neighbourhoods of the city while blue-collar workers lived foremost in the southern parts – the ones closest to the mediterranean sea.9 the bourgeoisie and the blue-collars did not consider white-collars part of their own groups and saw them as members of the opposite group instead. for instance, the catalan bourgeois vision of white-collars was well reflected in several plays that exposed the impossible love between shop assistants and daughters of businessmen.10 typically, the wealthy family could not stand such an engagement, reminding their girl that ‘the man you have felt in love with is nothing... he is nothing but a well-dressed worker, a man of the same category as our doorman, servant or coachman’.11 on the other hand, most of the manual workers were immigrants from the south of spain – thus, non-catalan-speakers – with few professional skills, who considered the white-collars as the extension of their patrons.12 of course, considering their expectations, during the years preceding world war i catalan white-collars worried more about bourgeois thoughts and opinions than about those among blue-collar ranks; being considered ‘workers’ was even insulting, they thought. there was a strong relationship between the patron or principal and the assistant or clerk, which in some ways was patriarchal or corporatist: the employer was also relevant to the private life of his white-collar. in some cases the salesmen studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles joan esculies 6 literally dreamt at the shop or office, as many of them – especially the apprentices – slept there. but, in fact, the working conditions were even worse than those of the manual workers: just depending on the patron’s will, white-collars had to cope with very long workdays and low salaries. moreover, they had to work on sundays because the shop owners argued that the blue-collars could not buy in their shops during the rest of the week, as they were at the factories. due to their position white-collars could only express their demands through modest demonstrations and by sending delegates to visit the patrons or, as a final option, by breaking shopwindows of those owners refusing to close by eight in the evening. despite cadci’s efforts and a 1904 law fixing the (eight) working hours, white-collars never fully achieved their demands.13 when the white-collars met domènec martí i julià while young white-collars dreamt of a better future important changes took place within the catalan nationalist movement. as the spanish monarchy under king alfonso xiii deepened in its crisis, the conservative catalan nationalists of the lliga regionalista (regionalist league) saw a good opportunity to attain the concession of some sort of basic selfgovernment: the mancomunitat de catalunya. the mancomunitat, established in april 1914, was a merge of the four catalan provinces under one government and president: the lliga’s leader, lawyer enric prat de la riba. despite this autonomy being flawed, as it lacked appropriate resources and no catalan parliament existed yet, catalanists saw the mancomunitat as a first step towards the attainment of a home rule. the centre-left catalan nationalist party, the unió nacionalista republicana federal (ufnr, nationalist republican federal union) repeatedly failed in its attempts to establish an alternative political project for the lliga.14 the ufnr leaders opted for a coalition with the partit republicà radical (prr, radical republican party). the prr was very popular among blue-collar workers in barcelona and had a strong anticlerical and anti-catalanist discourse, equalling catalanism to bourgeoisie.15 in time however the party tempered its discourse and even studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles joan esculies 7 favoured the concession of the mancomunitat, resulting in an electoral decline. both republican parties thought a coalition would solve their respective problems, but the collaboration failed. in spring 1914, the ufnr collapsed. thus, while the catalan conservative nationalist area was taken over by the lliga, the left nationalist wing was vacant.16 psychiatrist domènec martí i julià, president of the unió catalanista (uc, catalanist union), seized the moment to transform this catalanist pressure group, founded in 1891, into a truly modern political party. since its foundation the uc had presented itself as an assembly of all sorts of catalanists, regardless of their political preferences as the unió did not believe in electoral politics. due to the rising hegemony of the lliga and martí i julià’s sympathies for the popular classes, and notwithstanding the desire to act as a unitary platform, unió leaders realised that the preponderance of the regionalists in catalan politics made catalanism appear as a bourgeois movement and that this image limited its growth, especially among the working class. therefore, the psychiatrist and the rest of the uc leaders had undertaken a close collaboration with the ufnr, leaving them very disappointed when the ufnr entered into a coalition with the prr anti-catalanists. domènec martí i julià (1861-1917) studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles joan esculies 8 doctor martí i julià was a popular figure at the cadci, where he often gave talks on politics, but also on diseases, health, sanitary and work conditions. he was fully convinced that ‘national freedom’ could only be achieved gaining ‘social freedom’.17 willing to abandon anti-electoral politics and in order to organise the unió catalanista as a political party, the psychiatrist initiated a total reorganisation of the platform. the loyalties of the adhering centres were put at stake during the spring and summer months of 1914.18 the end of this process established twelve centres across the ten districts of barcelona. these centres promoted activities related to catalanism, including teaching and practicing catalan dance (la sardana), performing plays and songs in catalan, organising trips and excursions to discover the rural – the so-called truly catalan – catalonia, and catalan language was taught. the centres also hosted conferences with diverse topics, ranging from the history of catalonia to issues related to sanitary conditions. men and women of all ages were allowed to take part. moreover, some of these centres organised sections for younger males, usually the propaganda sections and tutored by adults. youngsters organised leisure activities but also, and especially, political meetings where adults disseminated their doctrine towards a young audience. these sections were labelled as joventut nacionalista (nationalist youth) plus different ‘war names’ related to the myths of catalan nationalism, such as the medieval golden age of the crown of aragon or the siege of barcelona in 1714.19 despite martí i julià’s efforts, the reconversion of the unió catalanista into a political party failed.20 anti-electoral politics were so well and so deep established among the unió members that no one was prone to take part seals of catalan separatist groups | author’s collection studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles joan esculies 9 in the elections.21 as a consequence the whole process ended in a retreatment and most of the centres merged to sustain just a few of them. it was clear then that what kept the centres alive was leisure and not political discourse. the epilogue of the process took place in july 1916 when martí i julià resigned as the president of the unió, quitting politics altogether. it was not easy to replace him as no one wished to be the president, reducing the catalanist platform to merely a name and a seal.22 the unió’s conversion failed, but martí i julià’s message, spread during the last thirteen years at the cadci, constantly gained appeal among young white-collars. this was linked to the extraordinary changes in barcelona following the outbreak of world war i. due to the war situation all over europe, catalan factories exported large quantities of food and industrial products. at the same time, and this because of the drop in imports, the consumption of local products increased, favouring speculative business and a rapid enrichment. however, salaries did not rise in line with prices and export rendered some products scarce. obviously, social sectors with fewer resources were the most affected. the price of food increased by eighty per cent between 1915 and 1920. the same occurred to rental housing, domestic fuel and clothes, among others.23 as social and working conditions worsened due to the effects of wartime disruption, catalan white-collars realised that their expectations of becoming shopkeepers, businessmen or proprietors – members of the old middle class – would hardly be achieved. therefore, partially and slightly, they now thought that maybe they had more in common with the bluecollars than with the petit-bourgeoisie: middle classes appeared more distant than ever before. martí i julià’s dead in late june 1917 was followed by a turbulent summer with a deep crisis of the spanish restauration regime, after which the lliga – the patrons’ favourite political party – accepted to participate in the spanish cabinet, and this for the first time since its foundation in 1901. white-collars completely lost their confidence in the nationalist conservative party. from now on, they joined prr members in criticising regionalists. white-collars started to pay much more attention to their own social situation and to that of the blue-collars and, all in all, were prone to a soft version of socialism – the one spread by martí i julià. the psychiatrist had died but his ideas remained.24 studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles joan esculies 10 moreover, until 1910 the immigration to barcelona from the rest of catalonia predominated, but from then on the percentage changed and immigrants from valencia, aragon, murcia and andalucia doubled the catalan newcomers. while valencians and aragones maintained a stable migratory flux – some, if not most of them were catalan-speakers –, the real novelty was the arrival of murcians and andalusians, especially during the world war i period. to some extent the later groups of noncatalan newcomers from the southern parts of spain achieved a symbolic presence in barcelona, reaching 25% of the immigrant numbers. furthermore, until 1915 barcelona grew by territorial expansion, after which the city centre began to densify. ciutat vella, the living and working place for many white-collars and for some blue-collars, became a space of interaction. catalan-speakers could feel for the first time that a ‘hispanisation’ of barcelona was real: spanish language was more and more common and openly used, not only by the state administration or at the theatre and in newspapers, but also in the street. in this sense columnist, writer and philosopher eugeni d’ors, ideologist of the lliga, made a clear statement at the beginning of this turning point: ‘while our catalan language spreads everyday more and more its dominion as a literary and intellectual language, […] among the popular masses it seems always in constant withdrawal, diminishing in relative demographic extension… a friend of mine confessed to me that he had never met so many doorwomen, so many tram employees, not speaking catalan.’25 through daily contact with the ‘others’ – the non-catalan-speaking immigrants – the fadristerns and the sons of those catalan first immigration flows, both engrossing the white-collars ranks now, began to ask themselves who they were. while in their towns or villages, with no spanish immigrants, or in the catalan barcelona the necessity to define themselves had been less important, if not completely unnecessary, but now they had to deal with this issue. those just arrived knew the rural, the ‘real’ catalonia from first hand; barcelona-born sons of catalan immigrants knew it through the occasional visits to their grandparents and family but mainly from their parents’ mourning and melancholy, especially if things had not been as expected. in both cases, as àngel guimera’s popular play terra baixa (martha of the lowlands) put it in studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles joan esculies 11 more idealistic terms, they knew the virginal and truly catalan character of the upper lands (the rural catalonia) and were now confronted with a non-catalan city: a sin city. statements such as ‘catalonia for catalans’ would easily take root in their minds, especially when hispanisation was obvious and when some, not even many non-catalan-speaking immigrants became white-collars as well. the separatist route to a better future nationalist movements from eastern and central europe seized world war i to publicise their demands and to gain support from one of both sides, especially from the entente cordiale. these movements saw a splendid opportunity to make their aspirations come true when the president of the united states, woodrow wilson, proclaimed the right of nations to selfdetermination. clearly the lliga was not eager to reshape spain or to change the monarchic regime: its members were willing to defend their economical interests and to command and modernise the state. but those claiming ‘catalonia for catalans’, in line with their nationalist counterparts elsewhere in europe, recognised in selfdetermination a definitive frame to obtain a home rule for us president woodrow wilson in 1919, one year after his famous fourteen points, including self-determination for minorities | wikimedia commons studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles joan esculies 12 catalonia and, obviously, the establishment of a republican regime in spain, eventually reshaping the state into a castilian and catalan confederacy. for the very first time within catalanist circles groups of young whitecollars (and a very small number of petit-bourgeoisie intellectuals) openly defined themselves as ‘separatists’. since the appearance of catalan nationalism by the end of the 19th century ‘separatism’ had been a controversial element. ‘separatism’ is a slippery term and its political range makes an agreement on its meaning very complex. for some it means the demand of separation of a ‘national community’ from a larger group or community to establish its own state, be it independently or linked to the former by a federation, confederation or any another type of bond to be determined. precisely because the relationship is not always clear, others claim that any demand for greater autonomy of the ‘national community’ already implies a ‘separatist’ aim itself.26 those who are against any change in the political status quo usually sustain the second vision. in great measure the catalan cultural movement had turned into a political nationalist movement due to the failure of the spanish empire by 1898. already then did some catalan nationalists plead a ‘catalan state’, but with terms as nation, region or community involved it is not yet clear among historians what those catalanists exactly referred to when talking about ‘state’.27 since that very first moment until world war i the political, intellectual and economical elites in madrid rejected every demand for autonomy coming from barcelona as a separatist demand. and on the other hand, once and again, all sorts of catalans – including those supposed to be more radical, such as playwright guimerà – defended themselves arguing they were not separatists of the state but of the elites managing the state.28 this nonsense dialogue essentially rose from two competing cities, madrid and barcelona: the former with the administrative power of the state, the latter, being spain’s most populated city at the beginning of the 20th century, with its vigorous industry and bourgeoisie. madrid obviously was not willing to transfer the state control, while barcelona expected not to be studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles joan esculies 13 less and asked for more power, based on its economical strength.29 after the decline of the empire, madrid elites could not differentiate the spanish ways of being imperial from the spanish national character, still under construction. almost as if it had an atavistic component spanish nationalism was born terrified by any discussion of the shape of the state, as it immediately recalled the separation of cuba and the rest of the colonies. catalan nationalism, in all its variations, proposed a new political shape for spain but any proposal coming from barcelona was already under the suspicion of separatism due to the analogies with the lost colonies. however, catalan nationalism – especially the one coming from the lliga regionalista – could not conceive itself as a separatist movement and soon became trapped into a paradox: while it had a catalan discourse for its catalan audience, it had a catalan discourse for its spanish audience as well.30 to combine both discourses, not necessarily based on the same requirements at the same moments, was not easy. by the end of the war some catalan white-collars, with no professional horizon left, claimed to end this double discourse. they defined themselves as ‘separatists’, not only turning their back to the madrid elites but also willing to reshape spain. they proposed a powerful catalan state with a proper government and, as a result, plenty of jobs to fill far beyond the new employments established by the mancomunitat and already taken by university cadres.31 in theoretical terms the catalan separatist proposal never went far beyond la nacionalitat catalana (the catalan nationality, 1906) written by enric prat de la riba. the leader and ideologist of the lliga regionalista presented catalonia as the true nation of the catalans, and spain merely the state containing it. catalan language was central in this idea. though martí i julià published lots of articles throughout his life, he left no ideological synthesis or theory. at his death none of the psychiatrist’s lieutenants were able to offer a coherent ‘separatist’ discourse and during political meetings they often repeated statements such as the right of catalans to defend their language or the right to have a home rule or a state. these arguments were rooted in the historical past (the medieval grandeur settled in the medieval ages by the crown of aragon or the aim to recover the constitution and liberties lost after phillip v in 1714), mixed studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles joan esculies 14 with romantic myths. they also proclaimed an anti-imperialist discourse, rejecting the imperial vision of the regionalists’ catalan nationalist proposal for spain, and seizing the argument of self-determination.32 of course, the discourse was republican as there was no option of changing the status quo under the monarchy. instead of denying they were separatists, nationalists proposed a model outlining a confederal shape for spain, indistinctly making use of the terms ‘federal’ and ‘confederal’. though closely related to federal republican ideologies, this particular catalan separatism stemmed from the legacy of unió catalanista images, based on the confederacy between castile and aragon during the glorious medieval period, two equal nations within spain. the idea underpinning separatists’ thoughts was a strong catalan administration and a weak spanish central government, and not the way round. this vision could sometimes even include portugal as the third state of imagined united states of iberia.33 the fight for the urban space the end of the war brought new catalan separatist youths, many of whom were white-collars, into the scene. now they were not linked to any centre of the unió catalanista anymore.34 the armistice fuelled agitation around the self-determination in catalonia. alfonso xiii asked the leader of the lliga in madrid to find out a way to calm down the situation. consequently, francesc cambó lead a campaign to demand a home rule for catalonia but he probably overstepped the monarch’s expectations: soon he found himself with no control over the centre-left and separatist extreme demands.35 by mid-december, groups of separatist white-collars organised daily demonstrations in la rambla, the core of ciutat vella, which were repressed by the spanish army and the police. by christmas 1918 a new entity, the liga patriótica española (lpe, spanish patriotic league), came to the fore with the aim of ‘fighting against separatism and maintaining the spanish unity’, as put in its foundational manifesto ¡viva españa! studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles joan esculies 15 the liga patriótica had no political aims and was a paramilitary platform to help the army and the police in their duty against the catalan separatists.36 the movement consisted primarily of low-level officials working for the spanish administration in barcelona, plainclothes army officers, off-duty policemen, discontent members of the prr and even teachers defending the ‘right to keep teaching in spanish’.37 all in all, they were a mixture of people worried about their jobs with the arrival of a home rule and, in its wake, a new catalan administration. the reason was clear: the catalan orthographic normative (1913) had been approved parallel with the establishment of the mancomunitat.38 this normative comprehended the norms regulating a standard model for written catalan, necessary knowledge in order to obtain an employment in the first catalan administration. those not skilled in the catalan language would have no option to be recruited. the lpe established its headquarters near the beginning of la rambla, while the spiritual headquarters of the tiny group of separatist youths (altogether about 2,000 members) was the cadci at the end of la rambla. as a result, during the end of december, the whole of january and the beginning of february 1919, while the regionalists tried to obtain the home rule with a fierce opposition of both liberals and conservatives in the spanish parliament, the city centre of barcelona (la rambla and the close-by streets) became a battlefield. every evening separatist whitecollars and liga patriótica members fought with sticks and a few guns. the balance was heavy: five people were killed and many more injured. what was at stake was a professional horizon hidden beneath the obvious patriotic catalan and spanish nationalist claims: gaining the urban space was gaining visibility.39 by mid-february 1919 barcelona anarchists initiated a major strike. fearing a revolutionary period similar to the russian revolution and because their industries were at stake, the catalan bourgeoisie decided to suspend the home rule campaign, which was going nowhere, and to collaborate with the spanish government to stop the strikers. the clash between patrons and blue-collars, following now the anarcho-syndicalism instead of the prr, swallowed the in numbers less important fight between catalan separatists and spanish radical nationalists. at the studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles joan esculies 16 beginning of the strike the separatist white-collars supported the bluecollars, but after several weeks of street rallies, fights and assassinations they ended questioning if manual workers had not gone too far.40 in this mood, a catalan politician gained popularity among the separatist white-collars: francesc macià. he had begun his career as a spanish army officer but in 1905 he quit, as he was disappointed in the army itself, the government and the monarchy. macià began a career as politician, gaining a seat at the cortes. in the course of fifteen years he evolved politically from regionalism to an apparent heir of martí i julià. in march 1919 macià established with the federació democràtica nacionalista (fdn, nationalist democratic federation) his first political party. its aim was to gather the diffuse claims of catalan separatism into a coherent message and to meet the white-collar demands, but also those of the petit-bourgeoisie and the blue-collars. despite the efforts it was soon clear that even macià’s most enthusiastic followers, the white-collars, mistrusted electoral politics: the fdn project was able to gain their sympathy but not their votes. macià would gain more and more relevance in the years to come but by the end of the war catalan separatism was not powerful enough yet. it would not be for the next century, though it was established as a political option.41 conclusions as in the rest of continental europe, catalan white-collars saw their group as distinct from those above (bourgeoisie) and below (manual workers). when they were confronted with a war-related social and economical crisis their hopes of improving or even maintaining their working conditions seemed hard to achieve. patrons, the lliga voters, appeared as partially responsible for their situation. white-collars rather leaned to the left, to a soft version of socialism, while blue-collar workers in barcelona embraced, generally speaking, anarcho-syndicalism: the collar line remained clearly marked. with no professional outlook left from above and no chance of collaboration from below, some catalan white-collars imagined a new route to secure or improve their working positions: a catalan state, including self-government and public jobs. studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles joan esculies 17 catalan white-collars shared with their continental counterparts a bureaucratic concept of success and demanded a powerful public sector. the existence of catalan nationalism, the perception of being ‘true’ catalans (compared with the castilian-speaking immigrants) and their inadequate training to enrol in the mancomunitat led the white-collars to demand a strong catalan autonomous administration. the spanish administration in barcelona did not offer sufficient suitable positions for their profiles and was hence no option. spanish government delegations were perceived as something distant, due to the manners of many of the bureaucrats coming from the rest of spain, the use of castilian language and, also, because the catalan governor was the one ordering the repression against any catalanist gathering, by definition suspected as ‘separatist’.42 a wider scope, taking into account the behaviour of those young white-collars who in the 1930s achieved a position in the catalan autonomous government under the second spanish republic will confirm the arguments presented here. the sub-state nationalism in the north-eastern region of spain presents, therefore, a new element to consider in states with similar situations. further and deeper research would allow us to understand the role played by white-collars in sub-state nationalist (and separatist) demands in catalonia and all over continental europe. moreover, a comparative study between sub-state nationalism and white-collars in continental europe on the one hand and this relationship in ireland, wales and scotland on the other, as the white-collars’ characteristics in the uk were very distinct, would be most welcome.43 endnotes 1 j. kocka, white collar workers in america 1890-1940. a social-political history in international perspective (london, 1980); idem, social life, local politics and nazism. margburg, 1880-1935 (chapel hill london, 1986); d.s. parker, the idea studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles joan esculies 18 of the middle class. white-collar workers and peruvian society, 1900-1950 (pennsylvania, 1998). 2 r. koshar (ed.) splintered classes. politics and the lower middle classes in interwar europe (new york, 1990). in this highly recommendable work only the cases of germany, england, france, italy, romania, denmark and belgium are discussed. 3 j.l. oyón, la quiebra de la ciudad popular. espacio urbano, inmigración y anarquismo en la barcelona de entreguerras, 1914-1936 (barcelona, 2008) 27-28. 4 e. ucelay-da cal, ‘joventut i nacionalisme radical català 1910-1987’, in: idem (ed.) la joventut a catalunya al segle xx, vol. 1 (barcelona, 1987) 183-193; idem, ‘l’àlbum de família del nacionalisme català’, in: fonoll. revista de juneda, 133 (2004) 71-75; idem, ‘la iniciació permanent; nacionalismes radicals a catalunya des de la restauració’, in: actes del congrés internacional d’història. catalunya i la restauració, 1875-1923 (manresa, 1992) 127-134. 5 d. martínez fiol, daniel domingo montserrat (1900-1968). entre el marxisme i el nacionalisme radical (barcelona, 2001) 25-30; f. rubiralta, miquel badia. vida i mort d’un líder separatista (barcelona, 2011) 25; e. esteve, josep carner ribalta (1918-1931): entre l’activisme polític i la literatura, la formació de l’intel·lectual, treball de recerca (bellaterra, 1998) 5; m. ferrer sanxis. memòries (1920-1970). 50 anys d’acció política, social i cultural catalana, ed. m.a. velasco (barcelona, 2008) 25; j.m. roig, ‘introducció’, in: j. alavedra, francesc macià el camí cap a la presidència de la generalitat 1859-1926 (barcelona, 1933) 16-19; j. benet, domènec latorre, afusellat per catalanista (barcelona, 2003) 16-17; j. esculies, josep tarradellas (1899-1936). dels orígens a la guerra civil (barcelona, 2012); j. pons, un republicà enmig de faistes (barcelona, 2008) 30. 6 m. lladonosa, catalanisme i moviment obrer; el cadci entre 1903 i 1923 (barcelona, 1988). 7 kocka, white collar workers, 2 and 10; parker, the idea, 15. 8 m. sans, els treballadors mercantils dins del moviment obrer català (barcelona, 1975). 9 oyón, la quiebra, 115. studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles joan esculies 19 10 j. capella, la planxadora: saynete en un acte (barcelona, 1900); e. coca, gent d’ara, comèdia en dos actes (barcelona, 1908). 11 a. artís, l’eterna qüestió: pas de comèdia (barcelona, 1910). 12 oyón, la quiebra, 41, 55 and 65. 13 j. torrens, ‘cercant col·locació’, in: l’intransigent, 6/12/1918, 3; m.j. espuny, g. garcía, & o. paz, los obreros del comercio. un análisis histórico-jurídico de la dependencia mercantil catalana (madrid, 2011) 34 and 52. 14 s. izquierdo, la primera victòria del catalanisme polític (barcelona, 2002); idem, república i autonomia. el difícil arrelament del catalanisme d’esquerres 19041931 (catarroja, 2006); idem, ‘el nacionalisme republicà a catalunya (19041910)’, in: butlletí de la societat catalana d’estudis històrics, xxiii (2012) 19-63; idem, pere coromines (1970-1939) (catarroja, 2001); a. balcells, j.b. culla clarà & c. mir, les eleccions generals a catalunya de 1901 a 1923 (barcelona, 1982). 15 j.b. culla clarà, ‘ni tan jóvenes, ni tan bárbaros. las juventudes en el republicanismo lerrouxista barcelonés’, in: ayer, 59 (2005) 51-67; idem, el republicanisme lerrouxista a catalunya, 1901-1923 (barcelona, 1986); j.a. junco, el emperador del paralelo. lerroux y la demagogia populista (madrid, 1990). 16 a. balcells, la mancomunitat de catalunya i l’autonomia (barcelona, 1996); d. martí julià, per catalunya: articles (barcelona, 1913); s. vives, el dr. d. martí i julià: discurs llegit en la sessió necrològica que celebrà la societat de psiquiatria i neurologia el dia 9 de desembre de 1917 (barcelona, 1918); f. rosell, l’obra i la personalitat del doctor martí i julià (barcelona, 1918). 17 j. colomer, ‘el doctor domènec martí i julià (1861-1917). un esboç de biografia política’, in: l’avenç, 4 (1977) 10-16; idem, la unió catalanista i la formació del nacionalisme radical, 1895-1917: l'obra del doctor martí i julià (barcelona, 1984); j. coll & j. llorens, els quadres del primer catalanisme polític, 1882-1900 (barcelona, 2000). 18 between 1913 and 1923 barcelona had ten districts covering similar areas as the current ones. ‘distritos de barcelona’, in: la publicitat, 27/2/1923; r. alberch (ed.), els barris de barcelona. ciutat vella i l’eixample, vol. 1 (barcelona, 1999) 2026; j. esculies, ‘el nacionalismo radical catalán (1913-1923)’, in: spagna contemporanea, 43 (2013) 7-28. studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles joan esculies 20 19 j. esculies, ‘els néts dels almogàvers (1913-1939). història d’una joventut del separatisme català’, in: revista de catalunya, 283 (2013) 52-65. 20 j. esculies, joan solé i pla. un separatista entre macià i companys (barcelona, 2011) 112. 21 colomer, martí i julià, 191-193. 22 l. aymamí, ‘les entitats nacionalistes de barriada’, in: butlletí de l’ateneu nacionalista verdaguer, 24 (1923) 1-2. 23 j.l. martín, ‘conseqüències socials: la resposta obrera’, in: l’avenç, 69 (1984) 230-235; m. tatjer, ‘els barris obrers del centre històric de barcelona’, in: vida obrera en la barcelona de entreguerras, 1918-1936 (barcelona, 1998) 13-45. 24 j.a. lacomba, la crisis española de 1917 (madrid, 1970); a. pérez-bastardas, els republicans nacionalistes i el catalanisme polític: albert bastardas i sampere (18711944), vol. 1 (barcelona, 1987) 218-233; s. albertí, el republicanisme català i la restauració monàrquica (1875-1923) (barcelona, 1972) 361-370. 25 e. d’ors, ‘els metecs’, in: la veu de catalunya, 14/12/1909. 26 there is no reference to ‘separatism’ in the collier’s (1969), americana (1983) or britannica (1970) encyclopaedias. universalis (1989), published in paris, argues ‘separatism’ has no juridical or sociological definition, quite paradoxical as it is a common phenomenon (vol. 20, 911). gran larousse universal (1995), published in barcelona, defines it as a synonym of ‘secessionism’ and ‘independentism’ (vol. 31, 11469). enciclopèdia catalana (1996), also published in barcelona, defines it as the will of a human community to break away from the state to form a new one, independent and with full sovereignty (vol. 11). while enciclopèdia espasa (1994), published in madrid, argues it is similar to ‘secession’ and to the reshaping of a state into another political form (vol. 31). 27 t. strubell, josep roca farreras i l’origen del nacionalisme d’esquerres. a partir del material aplegat per fèlix cucurull (arenys de mar, 2000); idem, josep-narcís roca i ferreras (1834-1891) (barcelona, 2008); p. gabriel, el catalanisme i la cultura federal: història i política del republicanisme popular a catalunya el segle xix (reus, 2007); a. duarte, el republicanisme català a finals del segle xix (18901900) (bellaterra, 1987); v. almirall, bases para la constitución federal de la studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles joan esculies 21 nación española y para la del estado de cataluña: observaciones sobre el modo de plantear la confederación en españa (barcelona, 1868). 28 a. guimerà, cants a la pàtria. discursos (barcelona, s.d.); p. anguera, literatura, pàtria i societat. els intel·lectuals i la nació (vic, 1999) 129-155. 29 e. ucelay-da cal, ‘llegar a capital. rango urbano, rivalidades interurbanas y la imaginación nacionalista en españa del siglo xx’, in: papers de la fundació rafael campalans (2002) 3-60; j.a. junco, ‘historia de dos ciudades’, in: el país, 29/9/ 2013. 30 e. ucelay-da cal, el imperialismo catalán. prat de la riba, cambó, d’ors y la conquista moral de españa (barcelona, 2003) 308-327. 31 l’intransigent, 6/3/1919, 19/10/1918 and 20/12/1918. 32 fresseta, ‘a tort i a dret’, in: l’intransigent, 1/9/1918. 33 j. esculies, via fora lladres! el separatisme català i el teatre patriòtic (barcelona, 2014). 34 j.m. rodés & e. ucelay-da cal, ‘amadeu bernadó, una vida significativa’, in: l’avenç, 11 (1978) 50-53; ‘nova joventut’, in: la veu de catalunya, 7/8/1918; esculies, ‘el nacionalismo radical catalán’. 35 balcells, el projecte d’autonomia, 27-40 and 49-50. 36 el imparcial, 23/12/1918, 26/12/1918 and 5/2/1919; j. fernando mota muñoz ‘precursores de la unificación: el españa club y el voluntariado español, una experiencia unitaria de la extrema derecha barcelonesa (1935-1936)’, in: historia y política, 28 (2012) 273-303; la vanguardia, 18/1/1919. 37 ‘la liga patriótica española’, in: abc, 14/1/1919, 21; ‘campaña antiseparatista en cataluña’, in: abc, 12/1/1919, 25; j. solanare, ‘guerra als castellans’, in: l’intransigent, 28/12/1918. 38 institut d’estudis catalans, normes ortogràfiques (barcelona, 1913). 39 d. martínez fiol, estatisme i antiestatisme a catalunya (1931-1939): rivalitats polítiques i funcionarials a la generalitat (barcelona, 2008); idem, els sindicats de funcionaris de la generalitat de catalunya (1931-1939) (barcelona, 2010); j.m. francès, memorias de un cero a la izquierda (mexico df, 1962) 334; ‘el problema studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles joan esculies 22 de la autonomía. los frutos de la locura separatista. un teniente de seguridad asesinado en barcelona’, in: el imparcial, 24/12/1918. 40 c.m. winston, la clase trabajadora y la derecha en españa (1900-1936) (madrid, 1989). 41 j. esculies & d. martínez fiol, 12.000! els catalans a la primera guerra mundial (barcelona, 2014); g.c. cattini, el gran complot. qui va trair macià? la trama italiana (barcelona, 2009). 42 m. risques, l’estat a barcelona. ordre públic i governadors civils (barcelona, 2013). 43 kocka, white collar workers, 267-272; t. jeffery, ‘a place in the nation. the lower middle class in england’, in: koshar, splintered classes, 70-96. microsoft word art_morgan_v3.docx syd morgan, ‘the construction of a “new nationalism”. the welsh nationalist party to 1946’, in: studies on national movements, 2 (2014). http://snm.nise.eu/index.php/studies/article/view/0209a syd morgan the construction of a ‘new nationalism’ the welsh nationalist party to 1946 this paper reinterprets the development of a ‘new nationalism’ in wales during the period 1919 (the end of the first world war) to 1946 (the end of the second world war and the election of a majority labour uk government).1 the focus is on the building of a new political movement, the welsh nationalist party, as the instrument for the creation of a new, territorially based nationalist ideology. it identifies critical policies and actions by that party which led to its increasing visibility as the carrier of the new discourse. in particular, this analysis seeks to deal with matters of perception and politics of the defined era.2 it also examines if, to use enric ucelay-da cal’s phrase, the party’s ‘possible clientele […] realise that they incarnate “something else”‘.3 the paper argues that this particular ‘new nationalism’ was very much ‘something else’ and was, contra the accepted historical narrative, relatively successful by the end of this period. it also demonstrated some but not overwhelming success in the ‘task of “nationbuilding” outside government institutions’.4 the evidence presented here suggests that it is possible to identify seven key actions and party policies between 1919 and 1946 which characterised this new form of welsh nationalism, distinct from its predecessor variant, which was defined, both then and now, as home rule. these demonstrations of its visibility firmly position the welsh nationalist studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles syd morgan 2 party outside the uk political norm. the seven key actions are delineated here as v.1 v.7 (‘v’ for visibility) for the purpose of analysis (table 1). table 1 | the visibility of the new nationalism, 1919-46 v.1 establishing an independent party 1925 v.2 agreeing the aim of a separate state 1930 v.3 adapting to linguistic change 1932-46 v.4 anti-imperialist international and defence policies 1925-46 v.5 non-violent direct action 1935 v.6 defensive neutrality 1939 v.7 wartime policy development and campaigns 1939-46 why a ‘new nationalism’? the term new nationalism has been used variously to re-define developments in nationalist ideology for over a century. for example, in 1910, american then ex-president theodore roosevelt used it to brand his progressive political philosophy in which government would serve a more inclusive and socially just nation.5 a hundred years later, it has been used in an analysis of contemporary chinese nationalism, to legitimise the communist party of china hegemony while modifying the more rigid form of communism of the maoist era.6 in both cases, what is ‘new’ is the attempt to fuse popular nationalism with state governance in a re-worked national project. in the context of this paper, the term is (re-)used to studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles syd morgan 3 distinguish between the many and varied forms of pre-world war one decentralised governance within multi-national states, particularly empires (instituted in response to internal nineteenth-century popular national movements), and the widespread post-war phenomenon of the formation of new states focused closely, but not exclusively, around the territorial boundaries of previously sub-state nations. with different manifestations, it was a worldwide phenomenon. but original stateformation is the key determinant of the new nationalism here defined; in europe following the collapse of the austro-hungarian, german and russian empires and in the middle east with the break-up of the ottoman empire. some of the resultant new states agreed under the versailles treaty system were stillborn, e.g. armenia, kurdistan. others – although for the first time acquiring defined political borders – were not independent but colonial possessions under league of nations mandates, so their new nationalism took the form of anti-colonial struggles that ‘profoundly altered the standards of values’.7 exceptionally in the west european peninsula, the irish free state struggled into existence through a war of independence and despite the separation of ‘ulster’; mainstream irish nationalism had moved decidedly beyond its home rule phase in 1916. all national movements were given a new, moral impetus and greater legitimacy – even to their sceptics – by american president woodrow wilson’s fourteen points (1918). although he never used the term, wilson’s concept of the ‘right of national self-determination’ entered popular international discourse.8 in the field of international relations, wilsonian advocacy of self-determination further legitimised the right of each nation to have its own state, a key concept for the subject of this paper. in wales, over a decade, post-war nationalist ideology became qualitatively different from longer established ‘home rule’ movements within the united kingdom of great britain & ireland (1801-1922). it can, therefore, claim definition as the ‘new nationalism’ of its era. the crucial role of statehood per se was recognised by us secretary of state, robert lansing, in 1921: ‘rights unsupported by actual power are only moral concepts.’9 opponents also recognised this fundamental difference. writing in 1941, alfred cobban perceptively argued ‘it is necessary to take studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles syd morgan 4 the sting out of nationality by disassociating it from sovereignty.’10 ‘writing history backwards’, the new nationalism also recognised enoch powell’s later maxim about uk devolution (the re-worked home rule), ‘power devolved is power retained.’11 in the inter-war period, welsh nationalism – as exemplified by its vanguard, the welsh nationalist party after its foundation in 1925 – was decidedly wilsonian and thus both ideologically and politically different from its half-century old uk predecessor, despite sharing the same branding. (this distinction was often overlooked by contemporaries and historians.) as it developed policies and activities throughout this period, the new party’s territorially exclusive state-centric perspective was instrumental in developing notably divergent political, economic and cultural values, a fundamentally different national interest from that of the uk state. ‘welsh nationalism’ – as an ideology and a political programme – had, for over fifty years previously, been closely linked with great britain’s liberal party, which was electorally ascendant in wales from 1865. the party was so massively the traditional vehicle for this form of welsh nationalism that ‘liberalism and nationalism were fused’.12 this synchrony manifested itself in cymru fydd, a civic movement, founded in 1887, which advocated the recognition and equality of the welsh nation within the uk and a federalist form of home rule across the islands of great britain and ireland.13 this can properly be defined as old nationalism as it does not seek to undermine the integrity of the state – secessionism – nor its differently constructed ‘national interest’. however, in addition to its attachment to ‘home rule’ welsh nationalism – the welsh variant of british liberalism – was markedly non-conformist in religion, agrarian and culturally nationalist. in 1891, the uk party’s ‘newcastle programme’ set out its specific priorities for wales: the disestablishment of the church of england within wales, restrictions on the liquor trade and land reform to meet the aspirations of small farmers.14 in the pre-world war one period, it successfully implemented those parts of its electoral platform – but not the constitutional aims. nineteenth and early-twentieth-century welsh nationalism also had notable successes with the establishment of new national non-state institutions, a common development throughout europe.15 in many sub-state nations, these sometimes became buildingstudies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles syd morgan 5 blocks to later statehood. in the case of wales, a number of them were instrumental in providing the intellectual foundations for the new nationalism. simplistically, the trajectory of the rise, change and decline of liberal welsh nationalism is personified in the career of david lloyd george, member of parliament. a semi-official guide to the westminster parliament labelled him as a ‘radical and welsh nationalist’ up until 1923. following his term of office as uk prime minister and coalition government leader (december 1916 january 1920), he was re-branded as a ‘liberal’.16 at the same time as it was implementing key policies – and transforming itself from welsh nationalism within the state to a party largely at ease with british imperialism – the uk liberal party was losing electoral support in wales, most significantly to the labour party. the year before the foundation of the welsh nationalist party in 1925, the liberals had fallen to the position of second party in what was now a three-party system, and continued to decline thereafter (table 2).17 table 2 | party representation in the uk house of commons year liberal conservative labour 1885 30 4 1900 27 6 1 1906 28 6 1910 27 2 5 1924 10 9 16 the pre-war labour party had many policies in common with the liberals, evolving as it had from the ‘lib-lab’ tradition.18 apart from exceptional individuals such as kier hardie and arthur henderson, the ascendant labour party had made few pre-war commitments to uk home rule. poststudies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles syd morgan 6 war, it took some major initiatives. the 1918 uk labour party conference agreed ‘home rule all round’. a special labour party home rule conference was held in cardiff in july 1918. but ultimately, ‘industrial, economic and social issues [were] closer to the hearts of labour leaders’ as were ‘cosmopolitanism and internationalism’ and constitutional reform markedly receded as a priority.19 the failure of uk home rule: 1919-1925 in parallel with the two uk parties changing their positions on home rule, other events demonstrated that this fifty-year old political movement was coming to an end. although in 1918, welsh local authorities resolved ‘to transfer all functions of government […] not […] imperial concerns’, by 1921 draft law to create a secretary of state for wales within the uk cabinet (administrative devolution) failed, as did the more ambitious 1922 government of wales bill. a national conference to reinvigorate the constitutional momentum was ‘poorly attended’. uk party manifestoes in the 1922, 1923 and 1924 westminster elections ‘witnessed few references to [specifically] welsh issues’. these post-war failures demonstrated ‘the hopelessness of welsh nationalist aspirations as long as the british parties remained the sole channels’.20 in addition to markedly decreased momentum within great britain, welsh nationalism’s transformation from ‘old’ to ‘new’ coincides with the post-war triumph of irish nationalism. many founding members of the wnp claimed influence from ireland’s experiences.21 certainly, its political opponents believed that. however, the creation of the irish free state in 1922 weakened ‘home rule all round’ in the rest of the british isles, thus, paradoxically, allowing public space for the formulation and development of the new nationalism.22 a further factor, alongside the exemplar of irish independence and the two british parties’ abandonment of the constitutional cause, the new welsh nationalists were motivated by an intense concern for welsh language decline (table 3).23 studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles syd morgan 7 table 3 | monoglot & bilingual welsh speakers (in 1000s) 1891 898 54.4% 1901 929 49.9% minority 1911 977 43.5% 1921 929 37.2% decline 1931 909 29.0% the creation of a membership-based, independent welsh nationalist party [v.1] was a gradual process. rather than a single national event, it was implemented through the merger of local centres. this contributed, initially, to sometimes unclear and contradictory policies. universitybased cymdeithas genedlaethol cymru (national association of wales) was founded at bangor (1921). it advocated radical economic and social policies and used welsh as its official language. despite, constitutionally, only advocating home rule, opponents nevertheless accused it of ‘aping the tactics of [irish independence leader éamon] de valera’. its wider significance was in joining caernarfon-based plaid genedlaethol cymru (see below) in january 1925. the rationale for an independent welsh nationalist party was postulated by j. dyfnallt owen in april 1923. a new party was ‘necessary because of the importance which the labour party attached to class rather than the nation’.24 the second local organisation, y mudiad cymreig (the welsh movement), was formed in penarth during january 1924. its mission was ‘to save wales […] and transform it into a welsh wales’ in which the welsh language would be compulsory. despite an electoral strategy of contesting uk parliamentary elections, its successful candidates would not take their seats. this was the ‘abstentionism’ practiced by sinn féin but abandoned by fianna fáil in 1926. opponents labeled mudiad cymreig as ‘the welsh sinn féin advocates’. it was at this time that the qualitative divergence between the studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles syd morgan 8 old and new nationalisms began to be reported in the mainstream press.25 a third constituent organisation was byddin ymreolwyr cymru (wales army of home rule), later plaid genedlaethol gymreig (welsh nationalist party), founded september 1924. its aim was to ‘fight for the preservation of the language and build the future of wales on a foundation of welsh traditions and ideals’. yet again, it was reportedly only a ‘movement for welsh home rule’.26 thus, at this stage in the development of the new nationalism, the wilsonian goal of statehood [v.2] was, at best, unclear – despite the momentum towards building an independent wales-only party [v.1] as the agreed vehicle. plaid genedlaethol cymru the eventual fusion of these forces into a single nationalist party took place on 5 august 1925 at that year’s peripatetic national eisteddfod in pwllheli. the foundation of plaid genedlaethol cymru, the welsh nationalist party (wnp) is widely recognised as the founding action of modern welsh political nationalism [v.1]. the party published its own monthly welsh language political newspaper, y ddraig goch, from june 1926. the same year, saunders lewis was elected as its president. he subsequently served until august 1939, providing ‘stability, cohesion and continuity’ as well as much more.27 also in 1926, the party increased its profile further by instituting the first of its peripatetic annual summer schools. these were the crucible ‘in which the ideology of the party was moulded’.28 that october, a national office with an organiser was opened. yet despite these initial strides towards visibility in the public sphere, the new party held a number of policy positions which it needed to change to succeed in its parliamentary strategy. other designated campaigns were the implementation of its policies through elections to local government and, perhaps surprisingly, the administration of justice through sinn féintype courts.29 as shown above, it is debatable whether or not – despite what its opponents stated – the wnp advocated an independent state [v.2] at its inception. this probably accounts for contemporary and some current misunderstandings of the party’s positioning on the old studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles syd morgan 9 nationalism / new nationalism spectrum. in a seminal lecture, principles of nationalism, delivered by saunders lewis in 1926, there were unformed and unclear constitutional aims.30 lewis argued the new party should shun the english parliament (abstentionism) and join the league of nations (statehood) yet merely advocate a ‘self-government’ on the grounds that independence was unrealisable. the welsh nationalist party contested its first uk parliamentary general election on 30 may 1929, in only one of wales’ thirty-six seats. it gained 609 votes (1.6%).31 the electoral experience of 1929 caused a step-change in its westminster strategy. its 1930 conference rescinded parliamentary abstentionism. more importantly, the clear constitutional aim of ‘dominion status’ was adopted, seeking equal statehood with the countries of the british commonwealth including, of course, the neighbouring irish free state [v.2].32 this now was a clear challenge to the integrity of the uk state. further, the party faced two major structural challenges. first, the ongoing absolute and relative decline in numbers of welsh-speakers (table 3) had further changed the dynamics. in 1926, a major funder had suggested the proposed new political newspaper, y ddraig goch, ‘should be bilingual to awaken the anglicised welsh’.33 in the event, it was only published in welsh. six years later, probably in response to the 1931 census (table 3), the party decided to take its message directly to englishspeakers: the decision to publish the welsh nationalist was made because there are people in wales who do not understand the welsh language, but who are, in spite of that, part of the welsh nation.34 this fusion of a civic, inclusive ideology and realpolitik demonstrates a particular characteristic of the new nationalism being constructed by the wnp. within the wide range of new nationalisms evolving across europe in the inter-war years, it can arguably be marked out as a progressive movement. the first monthly edition of the welsh nationalist was published in january 1932 [v.3]. but this action was only the start – albeit a major one – towards the party fully recognising linguistic reality and studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles syd morgan 10 actively including non-welsh speakers within its widening discourse. as well as responding to linguistic change, the party confronted the issue of open borders, particularly with england. its ideological approach had been laid down in principles of nationalism: ‘outsiders increasingly come to wales’, and ‘by their intrusions and numbers […] welsh life is rapidly being anglicised’. but, rather than advocating immigration restrictions, it was argued that ‘we must turn the outsiders into welshmen [and] give them a welsh mind, the welsh culture and the welsh language.’35 in 1930s europe and, in particular, the rise of british fascism, this liberal counternarrative required continual reinforcement and the development of policies consistent with its principles. the welsh nationalist party repeatedly reiterated its ‘civic nationalist’ position: ‘wales for the welsh’ has never been the slogan of the nationalists. this is a wilfully misleading phase used by our opponents. our policy is: wales for every person who respects and serves our country.36 welsh nationalism means not ‘wales for the welsh’ but wales for all who have to live in wales.37 in addition to changes brought about by immigration and anglicisation, the country also suffered from an absolute decline in population. between 1921 and 1939, the net population loss due to migration totalled 450,000.38 thus, attempts to build this new nationalism must be seen against substantial population displacement and its negative effects on ‘nation-building’, especially the impact on the welsh language. the party was developing against a strong demographic tide (table 4): table 4 | population decline (in 1000s) 1921 2,656 1931 2,593 1939 2,465 studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles syd morgan 11 british nationalism and imperialism wales’ relationship to england has been described as colonial since 1282.39 a peninsula with an accessible coastline, low-lying northern and southern coastal plains and its strategic position between england and ireland exposed wales to invasion, colonisation and particular forms of socio-economic development. by an english law (1538), the welsh border was defined and the country governed almost entirely as an integral part of england. the three kingdoms of england, ireland and scotland had been united through the monarch since 1603. the parliamentary union of england and scotland (1707) created the kingdom of great britain and generated modern british nationalism. deep-seated and powerful, it preceded the popular american and french revolutions. by mid-18th century, ‘the birth of a powerfully self-confident british nationalism’ had already occurred. conceived in the era of ‘rule, britannia!’ and ‘god save the king!’, this hegemonic form of nationalism was imperialist and global: ‘the british empire […] a political community incorporating [great] britain, ireland and the [american] plantations [was] seen from the works of moral philosophers, historians, pamphleteers and poets across the whole range of private and public discourse.’40 by the inter-war era under consideration here, ‘the british empire reached its greatest territorial extent […] encompassing a quarter of the world’.41 despite the centrality of empire to uk history, it is argued here that conventional british historiography does not recognise the synchrony between the uk’s imperial and colonial policies and its foreign or international policies. against this british imperial consensus, the welsh nationalist party developed a strong ideological and policy framework – amounting to a powerful alterity – which fundamentally challenged british political orthodoxy. this merely viewed uk state actions ‘overseas’ or ‘abroad’ as synchronicity. thus, again meeting ucelay-da cal’s criteria, wnp opposition to imperialism was very much ‘something else’ contra the uk and a major element in its public discourse.42 it is further argued that the international relations policies of the inter-war welsh nationalist party – though less visible today – were certainly not so in the period under consideration. despite their importance, they are under-researched studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles syd morgan 12 both by historians of welsh nationalism and international relations specialists. this paper seeks to illuminate its importance. the party expressed strong support for the league of nations, praising the policies of small states, and welcomed their increasingly influential role on the league council. against uk norms, it urged a european focus in place of that of empire. in principles of nationalism, the initial formulation of the party’s ideology, lewis rehearsed his country’s millennia-old european connectivity until it was annexed to england in the sixteenth century. opposing insularity, he stated, ‘we who are welsh claim that we are responsible for civilisation […] in our part of europe’ [emphasis added]. lewis ambitiously challenged ‘the welsh concept [to] influence europe’.43 throughout, europe was presented as the alterity to empire and ‘great powers’ who refuse to share their sovereignty and practice imperial rivalries. more concretely, in his election address to the university of wales constituency in october 1931, lewis committed welsh nationalist parliamentarians to ‘maintain such a standard of information in international affairs and so european – in opposition to imperialist – a standpoint in matters pertaining to the organisation of peace and the cooperation of peoples’.44 the party’s pan-european perspective extended to what it considered to be exemplar nations, particularly the small european states, working as partners through the league of nations and promoting economic nationalism, especially on co-operative principles.45 there is also (as yet under-researched) evidence of powerful policy alignments with the irish free state, especially through de valera’s fianna fáil political party.46 through cultural exchanges, correspondence, personal connections and political missions, an often intense transnational transfer of policy over three decades between the two parties extended to constitutional, international, defence, economic and language issues as well as, post-war, ideas of celtic solidarity.47 this active relationship culminated in de valera’s mission to wales in october 1948 – jointly organised with plaid cymru (the new name adopted by the wnp after the war) – as part of his global anti-partition campaign after his party had lost power in february of that year to an inter-party government with john costello as taoiseach (i.e. the irish head of government).48 studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles syd morgan 13 consistent with these anti-colonialist principles, the wnp strongly opposed the raf inter-war practice of aerial bombing. this method of warfare was increasingly used in the expanded post-1918 british empire – notably iraq and palestine – as well as afghanistan and sudan. throughout this period, the party issued continuous condemnation of what was officially termed ‘air policing’ in those territories.49 against this ideological background, the party opposed uk ‘rearmament’ from the beginning of the process in 1933. this then led to specific campaigns against the increasing ‘confiscation’ of land for military purposes.50 allied with the rearmament and confiscation policies was the ‘forced’ movement of men and women out of economically depressed areas, mainly to england, under the uk government’s ‘transference through training’ schemes.51 a predominant characteristic of party policy and propaganda in the 1930s was demonstrating the connections between uk international and domestic policy [v.4]. the wnp highlighted the inconsistency between uk criticism of other great powers aggression and its own colonial activities. following the 1931 japanese invasion of manchuria, the party argued that the uk had diluted its opposition at the league of nations to safeguard the informal british empire in china.52 following the 1936 italian invasion of abyssinia, the party highlighted the inconsistency of british policy of sanctions against italy when, at the same time, the uk was conducting military operations against afghanistan’s mohmand tribes.53 it was only logical that the party supported nationalist movements in cyprus, egypt, india, malta and palestine, and was extremely critical of the actions of both conservative and labour governments at the time.54 non-violent direct action: ‘penyberth’ – a ‘perfect storm’ the international situation and its increasing impact on domestic politics led these new nationalists to ‘one of the most defining moments in modern welsh history’.55 the uk re-armament programme called for the construction of an raf airfield on the overwhelmingly welsh-speaking llyn peninsula. to be used for practicing aerial bombing, this was also opposed as having a negative impact on the notable christian history and studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles syd morgan 14 culture of llyn. combined with the affront to welsh nationality and the imposition of the facility, conditions were created for what resulted in its major political act to date.56 eighteen months before the seminal action, widespread opposition to the ‘bombing school’ had been expressed across democratic, civic society – and failed. on 8 september 1936, three leading party members burned construction huts and surrendered themselves to the police. they voluntarily admitted their crime, stressing its political nature [v.5]. it was an act of deliberate damage to property, not people. at their first trial, the local jury failed to agree a verdict. the transfer of the case to london magnified the political nature of the process. even lloyd george considered that an ‘outrage which makes my blood boil’.57 the sense of injustice was maintained when ‘the three’ were jailed for nine months in london. it was no surprise that 15,000 people greeted them at a ‘welcome home’ rally. other large public meetings were held across the country. the ‘burning of the bombing school’ had a significant political impact. welsh nationalist party membership doubled. its local branches expanded from 72 to 111. circulation of y ddraig goch increased by 2,000 per month. at county council elections the following may 1937, the party fielded nine candidates. the sensational penyberth event and london retrial had brought the new nationalism to the attention of the london and global press [v.5], if not always in sympathetic ways.58 second world war: activities and consequences standard historiography posits that the boost in publicity and support the party received over the bombing school action was dissipated by its position over the outbreak of the second world war.59 although often labelled as ‘pacifism’, its policy can be more accurately characterised as ‘defensive neutrality’, since it accepted the necessity for military defence and international alliances. placing the party’s policy in context, twentytwo european states had declared themselves neutral in september 1939.60 highly relevant to the position taken by wnp was, again, the policy of the irish free state. under the 1938 anglo-irish agreement, ukimposed military facilities on free state territory were relinquished for a studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles syd morgan 15 guarantee that eire ‘would never allow itself to be used to harm britain’s security interests’.61 its taoiseach declared that ‘ireland would fight against any country that invaded irish territory’.62 outside the uk consensus, the welsh nationalist party developed similar views, declaring ‘our country is sacred and each of us is bound to defend it by force of arms, if necessary. an obvious case where war is necessary and just is the invasion of a country by a foreign power.’63 earlier, with the threat of war against italy over abyssinia, and in conformity with its anti-imperialist position, the party’s 1934 conference decided that while ‘england will be involved in any european war: ireland will not be involved. it is for wales to decide with which she will stand.’64 as war with germany approached, the party decided that it would ‘declare wales a neutral country’ [v.6].65 with conflict imminent, the wnp hardened its position: war was seen to threaten for one reason, ‘imperialism is the main cause of modern warfare’; ‘no [party] member may join the military voluntarily or under duress’ (1936); and ‘disobey the [military conscription] law’ (1939).66 after the war, its pacifist president, gwynfor evans, stated that the party had ‘demanded the right for wales to decide for herself whether she should be belligerent or neutral’.67 party policy had evolved – reconciling its nationalist and pacifist factions – as the international situation worsened. in the event, whilst some of its members were exempt from military service on grounds of conscience, government tribunals refused to accept welsh nationalism as a valid reason. only twelve party supporters were imprisoned using this defence but, although their number was small, it was enough for evans to claim they formed the basis of a ‘small resistant movement’ of post-war significance.68 it is unlikely that this defiant political faction was ignored by state authorities and, if so, represented another level of visibility for the national movement. other members quietly joined the british armed forces, while continuing to express support for the party’s constitutional aims.69 even after the outbreak of war, the party called for the cessation of hostilities and a negotiated peace to prevent further slaughter.70 clear views were expressed against the ‘methods of this war’ – blockade and bombing.71 this conveys the vast difference between the wartime policies of the wnp and the prevailing – perhaps mythic – british narrative [v.6]. studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles syd morgan 16 this alterity contributed to the continuous construction of a radically different concept of a welsh national interest intended to ‘help make a movement synonymous with the territory it claims to represent’.72 inevitably, war itself impacted upon domestic politics. largely rural, wales received large numbers of children evacuated from english cities. in response to former president saunders lewis’ concern these would ‘submerge and destroy the welsh national tradition’, future president gwynfor evans’ solution – consistent with its civic nationalism – was to ‘befriend and welshicise them as much as possible’. in reaction to uk policies of population transfer, a committee for the defence of wales (later, undeb cymru fydd) was established in december 1939. by no means exclusively welsh nationalist, it reflected widespread concern in civic society and local communities, representing educational, cultural and religious bodies and county and district councils. the organisation also kept in touch with welsh people in the armed forces and workers from wales directed from their communities through the wartime transfer of labour scheme.73 the party confirmed throughout the war, like fianna fáil, its lack of animosity towards england. this had originally been made clear in 1935 when, in a signed editorial, the welsh nationalist declared, ‘we can guarantee peace towards england by a treaty rejecting any present or future claim to each other’s land, and preventing one country being used for war operations against the other.’74 five years later the journal emphasised how ’welsh nationalism has never espoused the cause of any foreign nation opposed to england.’75 in his 1942 new year message, saunders lewis wrote that ‘the welsh nationalist party wishes england no ill. it desires the welfare of england.’76 but having been demonstrably outside the state norm on many issues pre-war, the party’s wartime policies and activities inevitably invited more intense political attacks. in 1942, lloyd george’s former cabinet confidant, tom jones, labelled it ‘the fascist party in wales’, and ‘a nationalist party […] possessing its newspapers and conducting an active campaign, with all the devices of the old parties and with some new ones learnt from nazis and fascists.’77 linked to its alleged fascist proclivities was the additional ‘charge’ of catholicism and papal rule due to the religious choices of saunders lewis studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles syd morgan 17 and some other leading members.78 yet, in policy formulated well before the outbreak of war, the party had actively distanced itself from fascism. when fascists first organised in wales, the welsh nationalist declared that ‘welsh nationalists are its enemy’, advocating a welsh free state [sic] as ‘protection’ from english fascism.79 early on, it criticised the british union of fascists’ ‘vague and evasive attitude towards welsh nationalism’, concluding that ‘welsh nationalists cannot make any peace with fascism.’80 the same year, it praised the failure of the blueshirt movement in ireland.81 responding to ‘taunts of fascism’ by a future labour mp in 1938, lewis wrote, ‘co-operation […] is the only defence of the individual against the capitalist on one side and the state on the other. like trade unionism, it is essential to the teaching of the welsh nationalist party.’82 the ‘truly objectionable features of german fascism [are] its imperialism, militarism, racial theories, deification of the state, and antagonism to individual liberty.’83 the use of the term to attack the party continued post-war, notably in the ogmore parliamentary by-election, 1946, where labour widely distributed an eve-of-poll poster, welsh nationalism means welsh fascism, quoting from a 1934 article by saunders lewis in y ddraig goch. post-election, the party issued a lengthy rebuttal, focussing on lewis’ condemnation of state centralism and its concluding ‘the growth of fascism constitutes a menace to the peace of the world.’84 yet, these public attacks and counter attacks thrust the party further into the political limelight, and did not appear to inhibit post-war electoral growth.85 from the wnp’s inception, established politicians had predicted failure. in 1926, lloyd george stated ‘the welsh national party […] will disappear quickly.’86 yet, it ‘emerged from the second world war stronger than it had been in 1939.’87 post-war, its new president revealed: ‘it was feared that the temerity of so unpopular a stand for the rights of wales would involve the dissolution of the party.’ yet, ‘far from being destroyed […] it found itself […] in a far stronger position than at the beginning [of the war], strong enough in 1945 to fight ten seats in the [uk] parliamentary election, and in 1946 to win 80 seats on local authorities; strong enough to increase its staff threefold and to open a [second] office in cardiff.’88 this was ‘a remarkable feat in view of the hostile attitude the party had taken studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles syd morgan 18 towards the war and the consequent social, legal and political pressures inhibiting party activity.’89 this revival of fortunes came about due to the changing wartime political climate, party activities and a fortuitous electoral opportunity [v.7]. in 1942, the university of wales parliamentary constituency became vacant. although the party failed to contest three earlier wartime by-elections, it had contested this seat previously and done well. its candidate was saunders lewis. despite five candidates in the contest, the focus was the battle between lewis and the liberal candidate. unsurprisingly, ‘defeating lewis was regarded as part of the war effort’. the ‘weight of publicity in the english-language press was hostile.’90 in the january 1943 poll, lewis gained second place with 1,330 votes (22.5%).91 although defeated, ‘nationalism [was] the topic of the day’ [v.7].92 not just an isolated phenomenon, the by-election reinforced other developments enhancing wnp visibility. a southern regional organiser was appointed (1940), english was also used in official meetings (1941) – leading to an english-speaking party cell in glamorgan – and, from 1942, a bilingual internal newsletter was issued [v.3]. the party published thirtythree political tracts between september 1939 and august 1945 [v.7].93 as the perceived threat of invasion receded and with the ussr and usa as allies, the party, like others, focused on post-war reconstruction. its expanding political focus included economic viability, industrial development, trade unionism and health policies. there was also, it was claimed before the war ended, ‘a new unity […] between [returning soldiers and repatriated factory workers] and the small resistant movement which had sought to keep burning the flame of welsh freedom during the six barren years of war.’94 in this period, the party tactically softened its stance towards the uk devolutionary gradualism of other political parties. it welcomed the campaign for a secretary of state (1943) and a ‘welsh day’ at westminster (1944).95 adapting to ‘heightened interest in the party not as a vehicle for unconstitutional action but political organisation’, the wnp emphasised the role of mps working for wales in post-war planning.96 yet the party retained its fundamentalist principles [v.7], as evidenced by the provocative terminology used in its 1944 political analysis, the wages of servitude: wales’ reward for collaboration with english government. studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles syd morgan 19 additional to the increased visibility achieved in the 1943 university byelection, the scottish national party’s victory in the april 1945 motherwell by-election confirmed the changing wartime political landscape. although previously it had contested only four of the thirty-six constituencies from 1925 to 1945, the welsh nationalist party contested and polled well in two by-elections in that year, prior to the post-war uk general election (table 5). in the subsequent uk-wide general election, the party nominated candidates in seven constituencies, three in the populous southern coalfield, with the results displayed in table 6. following the election of a majority labour government in 1945, the party’s electoral performance increased dramatically in two by-elections the next year. these were, significantly, in two southern constituencies, thus posing a threat to labour hegemony, again enhancing its political profile in the post-war era (table 7). studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles syd morgan 20 table 6 | uk general election, 5 july 1945 constituency candidate votes % caernarfon county ambrose bebb 2,152 5.4 caernarfon boroughs j.e. daniel 1,560 4.5 neath wynne samuel 3,659 7.3 meirionnydd gwynfor evans 2,448 10.3 ogmore trefor morgan 2,359 5.6 university of wales gwenan jones 1,696 24.5 rhondda east kitchener davies 2,123 6.1 table 7 | the wnp and the 1946 by-elections constituency date candidate votes % ogmore 4 june 1946 trefor morgan 5,685 29.4 aberdar 5 december 1946 wynne samuel 7,090 20.0 table 5 | the wnp and the 1945 by-elections constituency date candidate votes % caernarfon boroughs 26 april 1945 j.e. daniel 6,844 24.8 neath 15 may 1945 j.w. samuel 6,290 16.2 studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles syd morgan 21 conclusion thus, at the end of this foundational period, the welsh nationalist party had not only disproved lloyd george’s 1926 prediction, it had created a marked profile for its new nationalism, both intellectually and publicly. it can be argued that its performance in parliamentary elections not only raised its visibility but also provides evidence that, post-war, its wartime policy of defensive neutrality had not made it less popular; quite the contrary, demonstrating that over time, the party and its activities were established as a ‘political factor which will remain’.97 as such, it had become ‘a real social process in itself’.98 in this period, intersecting with the political decline of the ‘old nationalism’ expressed through the liberal and labour parties, a new welsh nationalism was created. its essential vehicle, in this case, was a new political party, territorially centred in wales [v.1]. from a distinctive ideological base – the concept of the welsh nation with its own state [v.2] – it created and propagated a very different welsh nationalism from the lib-lab version. distinct from its precursor, it challenged hegemonic, imperialist british nationalism in almost every policy area. unlike the old nationalism, it did not compromise with britishness in the public sphere. it accepted only the legitimacy of england (not the uk), europe and the world. one core party principle was the protection of the welsh language. at a time of serious decline, it championed the cause whilst reaching out, gradually over time, to non-welsh speakers [v.3]. this civic nationalism included all living in the territory and was thus able to address demographic change as both a threat and an opportunity. this alterity was especially marked in the field of international politics [v.4]. at the apogee of the british empire, it espoused a fundamentalist opposition to imperialism. although this critique encompassed all empires, its substantial focus on the british empire was, naturally, to gain domestic electoral support. its repeated reference to the connectivity between international and domestic policies gave it an alternative world-view in the minds of supporters and opponents alike. the party had a particular studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles syd morgan 22 relationship with ireland and its ruling party. this affinity was controversial in view of the bruising after-effects of the irish war of independence, sensitivities around the establishment of northern ireland and inter-state trade and defence disputes [v.4]. through non-violent direct action at penyberth and the attempted use of welsh nationalism as a legal justification to refuse military conscription, the wnp demonstrated that it was not just an intellectual and electoral force but one capable of and prepared to use non-electoral but non-violent methods. these, and the state’s reaction to them, substantially enhanced its visibility to a wider world [v.5]. nor was it just another political party competing within the state, but one with an alternative world-view – and markedly different from ‘home rule’ (‘old’) welsh nationalism. using andrea brighenti’s analysis, its wartime policy increased visibility ‘at a price’, while the charges of fascism resulted in some unwanted ‘super-visibility’. finally, it ‘articulated’ a new nationalism which was ‘empowering’ and ‘recognised’, not ‘subjugated’ nor ‘unseen’.99 its actual existence, state-centric ideology and mixture of traditional and unconventional political actions enhanced its intellectual and electoral visibility. whilst it won no parliamentary victory in this period, it gained an increasing local government footprint. in the minds of the political elite – especially party political opponents and the mainstream press – it represented a challenge to the status quo. their reaction to its ‘principled fundamentalism’ served to give the new nationalism the ‘oxygen of publicity’ which, it is argued from this evidence, further advanced visibility. endnotes 1 j.g. jones, ‘forming plaid cymru’, in: national library of wales journal, 22/4 (1982) 429. jones makes a passing reference to a ‘new nationalism’ without studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles syd morgan 23 further explanation. this paper seeks to place the concept in context and use it as a useful analytical tool. 2 a. brighenti, ‘visibility: a category for the social sciences’, in: current sociology, 55/3 (2007) 324. 3 e. ucelay-da cal, nationalists and the problem of overcoming visibility: catalonia and wales (briefing note) (barcelona, 2013). 4 ucelay-da cal, nationalists. 5 campaign speech at osawatomie, kansas, 31/8/1910. 6 p. hays gries, china’s new nationalism (berkeley, 2004). 7 s. bowler, ‘ethnic nationalism: authenticity, atavism and international stability’, in: k.j. brehony & n. rassool (eds.), nationalisms old and new (basingstoke, 1990) 57. 8 bowler, ‘ethnic nationalism’, 58. 9 bowler, ‘ethnic nationalism’, 54. 10 quoted in bowler, ‘ethnic nationalism’, 59. 11 enoch powell was a uk conservative intellectual and parliamentarian (19501974) who then became an ulster unionist mp (1974-1987). quoted in the house of commons, 28/1/1998. 12 jones, ‘forming plaid cymru’, 425. 13 e.l. chappell, wake up, wales! (london, 1943) 20-30. 14 chappell, wake up, 25. 15 for example, university of wales (1893), national library (1916), church in wales (1920) and national museum (1922). 16 jones, ‘forming plaid cymru’, 429. 17 a. butt philip, the welsh question: nationalism in welsh politics 1945-1970 (cardiff, 1975) 9. studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles syd morgan 24 18 ‘lib-lab’ is shorthand for liberal-labour. in response to its shift towards social liberalism and the growth of the working class and trades unions, liberal party organisations increasingly adopted working-class candidates. while taking the liberal whip at westminster, they also caucused among themselves, especially on trade union or class issues. some later became labour-only, while others remained liberal and faced the electoral consequences. it can be argued that many in both factions retained vestiges of their lib-lab political experience. 19 jones, ‘forming plaid cymru’, 429. also see my forthcoming paper, the labour party and the uk state: 1914-1924. 20 jones, ‘forming plaid cymru’, 432. 21 jones, ‘forming plaid cymru’, 430-431. 22 j. kendle, ireland and the federal solution (kingston montréal, 1989) 234-238. 23 butt philip, welsh question, 14; chappell, wake up, 90-91. 24 jones, ‘forming plaid cymru’, 433-434. 25 jones, ‘forming plaid cymru’, 436. 26 jones, ‘forming plaid cymru’, 436 and 438. 27 jones, ‘forming plaid cymru’, 451. 28 butt philip, welsh question, 16. 29 a former sinn féin court judge, kevin o’shiel, then land commissioner in the cosgrove government, addressed the party’s first summer school in 1926. original programme in the author’s possession. 30 j.s. lewis, principles of nationalism (cardiff, 1975). 31 a.j. james & j.e. thomas, wales at westminster (llandysul, 1981) 140. 32 g. evans, ‘the twentieth century and plaid cymru’, in: a.w. wade evans, t. jones pierce, c. thomas e.a., the historical basis of welsh nationalism (cardiff, 1950) 144. 33 jones, ‘forming plaid cymru’, 445. 34 the welsh nationalist [= twn], august 1934, 6. studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles syd morgan 25 35 lewis, principles, 13-15. 36 twn, july 1933, 5. 37 twn, february 1935, 7. 38 b. thomas, the welsh economy (cardiff, 1962) 9. 39 r.r. davies, ‘colonial wales’, in: past & present, 65 (1974) 3. 40 d. armitage, the ideological origins of the british empire (cambridge, 2000) 170-172. 41 s. morewood, the british defence of egypt 1935-1940. conflict and crisis in the eastern mediterranean (abingdon, 2008) xi. 42 ucelay-da cal, nationalists. 43 lewis, principles, 3, 11 and 19. 44 s. lewis, address to the electors of the university of wales, 27/10/1931, 5. 45 the moral value of small european nations is a constant theme promoted across party publications. those nation-states include belgium, denmark, estonia, ireland, latvia, lithuania, norway, portugal and romania. 46 d. mcmahon, 'irish home rule as devolutionary paradigm, 1914-39’, in: d. tanner, c. williams, w.p. griffith & a. edwards (eds.), debating nationhood and governance in britain, 1885-1945 (manchester, 2006) 82-83. 47 considering personal connections: margaret gilcriest, later wife of the wnp president, saunders lewis, was an active irish nationalist, as was noëlle ffrench, later wife of the party’s leading researcher, dr d.j. davies. considering political missions: fianna fáil politicians regularly addressed wnp annual summer schools. the wnp organised at least one study visit to ireland in 1938. the two wnp monthly political newspapers carried regular features on ireland, mostly concerning de valera and fianna fáil. for both the personal and political exchanges, see my forthcoming doctoral thesis: s. morgan, the relationship between fianna fáil and the welsh nationalist party, 1925-1951 (swansea university). 48 morgan, the relationship. studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles syd morgan 26 49 examples can be found in twn, september 1933, 5 and september 1934, 5. 50 d.h. davies, the welsh nationalist party 1925-1945 (cardiff, 1983) 225. 51 j. field, working men's bodies: work camps in britain, 1880-1940 (manchester, 2013) 125-168. 52 twn, march 1933, 4; february 1934, 4. 53 twn, november 1935, 4-5; aeroplane, august 2011. 54 twn, may 1932; twn, december 1933; twn, december 1934; j.e. daniel, election address, 14/11/1935. 55 d. jenkins, a nation on trial: penyberth 1936 (cardiff, 1998). 56 s. lewis & l. valentine, why we burnt the bombing school (caernarfon, 1937). 57 butt philip, welsh question, 20. 58 the events were reported, inter alia, in time magazine, the irish press, the times, sunday times, new statesman, manchester guardian, daily herald and daily dispatch, even if, in the case of the london press, sometimes only in their welsh editions. 59 evans, ‘the twentieth century’, 146. 60 n. wylie (ed.), european neutrals and non-belligerents during the second world war (cambridge, 2002) 10. 61 e. o'halpin, ‘irish neutrality in the second world war’, in: wylie, european neutrals, 286. 62 b. tondra, m. kennedy, j. doyle & n. dorr (eds.), irish foreign policy (dublin, 2012) 30. 63 r.c. richards, ‘civil war: pacifism not a christian virtue but a vice’, in: twn, june 1934, 5. 64 r.c. richards, ‘war a possibility at any moment’, in: twn, october 1934, 1-2. 65 d.j. williams, ‘self government the only course’, in: twn, august 1938, 4-5. 66 davies, the wnp, 224-225. studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles syd morgan 27 67 evans, ‘the twentieth century’, 146. 68 g. evans, ‘on to 1945’, in: twn, january 1945, 1. 69 davies, the wnp, 229-231. 70 welsh nationalist party, wales and the war (caernarfon, 1940) 5-6. 71 welsh nationalist party, wales and the war, 6. 72 ucelay-da cal, nationalists. 73 davies, the wnp, 231-232. 74 twn, august 1935, 11. 75 twn, june 1940, 2. 76 twn, january 1942, 1. 77 davies, the wnp, 236; t. jones, the native never returns (london, 1946) 19. 78 twn, july 1946, 2. 79 c. huws, ‘nationalism v. fascism’, in: twn, november 1933, 1; ‘if fascism comes’, in: twn, april 1934, 6. 80 ‘english blackshirts & wales’, in: twn, july 1934, 4-5. 81 ‘preparing the way for fascist dictatorship’, in: twn, november 1934, 1-2. 82 twn, may 1938, 4 83 g. evans, ‘socialist germany’, in: twn, june 1938. 84 twn, july 1946, p.2 85 davies, the wnp, 237. 86 jones, ‘forming plaid cymru’, 443. 87 butt philip, welsh question, 73. 88 evans ‘the twentieth century’, 146-147. 89 butt philip, welsh question, 73. studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles syd morgan 28 90 davies, the wnp, 239-240. 91 james & thomas, wales at westminster, 150. 92 davies, the wnp, 241. 93 davies, the wnp, 242. 94 twn, january 1945, 1. 95 the wages of servitude (caernarfon, 1944) 3. 96 davies, the wnp, 242. 97 evans, ‘the twentieth century’, 147. 98 brighenti, ‘visibility’, 325. 99 brighenti, ‘visibility’, 235-336. microsoft word ther_article_v5b_definitive.docx     philipp  ther,  ‘regionalism  and  border  studies  in  modern  europe.   the  case  of  upper  silesia  in  context’,  in:  studies  on  national  movements,   1  (2013)  pp.  17-­‐49.   http://snm.nise.eu   philipp  ther   regionalism  and  border  regions   in  modern  europe   the  case  of  upper  silesia  in  context   the   study   of   border   regions   has   become   fashionable   in   the   recent   two   decades.  there  are  several  reasons  for  this  widespread  fascination,  firstly   the  rediscovery  of  multiculturality  and  distinct  mixtures  of  cultures  which   was   lost   in  an   ‘age  of  extremes’.  secondly,   the   long   lasting  peace   in   the   postwar  period  and  the  confirmation  of  the  existing  borders  in  the  post-­‐ cold  war  period  ended  the  destructive  competition  of  nation  states  over   border   regions   (with   few   exceptions   like   in   former   yugoslavia).   this   allowed   a   much   wider   range   of   research   unobstructed   by   political   interference  or  radical  nationalism.  last  but  not  least,  fields  of  study  like   comparative  empire  and  postcolonial  studies  provided  a  methodological   impetus  for  the  study  of  border  regions.  they  can  also  be  termed  as  ‘lands   in   between’   which   were   caught   in   between   by   competing   nationalisms   (this  was  the  title  of  an  earlier  article  published  in  a  collective  volume  on   borderlands  by  indiana  university  press).1   the  metaphorical   term   ‘lands   in  between’  alludes   to   the   fact   that  many   border   regions   in   modern   europe,   and   in   particular   in   central   europe,   were   shaped   by   a   distinct   mixture   of   cultures   and   languages.   precisely   because  of  this  blend  and  their  supposed  malleability  many  borderlands   stood   under   the   competition   of   two   or   more   national   movements   and   studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)      |      articles     philipp  ther  18   nation   states.   this   was   already   an   issue   in   the   age   of   empires   that   preceded  world  war  i.  when  an  order  of  nation  states  was  established  in   1918-­‐20,  this  competition  often  turned  into  a  bitter  struggle  over  disputed   regions.   while   these   disputes   have   been   a   very   important   topic   of   historiography,   a   discourse   often   tailored   to   legitimise   the   competing   claims   of   various   nationalisms   and   nation   states,   the   issue   of   human   identification  with  regions  has  for  a  long  time  been  relatively  neglected.2   in   this  article   the   term  regionalism   is  used   to  explore   the  political   and   social   dimensions   of   regional   identification.   in   certain   periods   regional   movements  achieved  a  high  degree  of  political  mobilisation  and  developed   their   own   political   programs.   however,   the   european   nation   states   perceived  regional  movements  as  competitors  and  fought  against  political   projects  that  stressed  the  autonomy  of  border  regions.  on  the  one  hand,   this   was   an   issue   of   the   administrative   power   of   the   centres   over   the   periphery,  in  particular  over  disputed  borderlands.  on  the  other  hand,  it   was  a  struggle  over  ideological  domination.  the  centres  aspired  to  define   the   national   codes,   i.e.   the   ways   in   which   the   various   nations   defined   themselves.   there   was   little   toleration   for   regional   identifications   that   stressed   the   particularity   of   regions   and   their   blends   of   cultures   and   languages.     while  the  continental  european  empires  (russian,  habsburg,  german  and   ottoman   empire)   at   least   acknowledged   the   existence   of   different   nationalities   (like   in  population  counts)  and  of   regional  divergence,   the   nation  states  refused  to  do  so.  in  modern  states,  which  are  characterised   by   a   direct   relationship   between   rulers   and   the   populace,   people   were   forced  to  affiliate  themselves  unambiguously.  it  was  only  possible  to  have   one  nationality;  there  was  no  place  for  multiple  identities,  at  least  not  in   population   counts   or   other   bureaucratic   procedures.   recording   populations   in   this   way   helped   to   put   a   seal   on   nations.   the   belief   prevailed   that   individual   nationality   could   be   determined   by   objective   criteria.   the   call   for   an   unambiguous   loyalty   affected   also   regional   movements  and  regionalisms  and  was  imposed  on  society  at  a  very  basic   level.   studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)      |      articles     philipp  ther   19   as   the  second  part  of   this  article   shows   through   the  example  of  upper   silesia,  the  population  of  the  borderlands  had  to  find  various  strategies  to   cope   with   the   homogenising   pressure   of   nation   states   and   national   movements.  the  first  strategy  (all  are  ‘ideal  types’  in  the  weberian  sense)   was  to  join  one  of  the  competing  national  movements,  the  second  one  to   resist  and  to  establish  regional  movements,  the  third  one  to  retreat  into   the   private   sphere   and   to   keep   a   distance   from   political   activities   in   general,  including  the  competing  nationalisms.  quite  often,  the  population   of   border   regions   would   show   conformity   with   the   ruling   ideology   in   public,  especially  when  confronted  with  dictatorships,  while  preserving  a   strong   identification   with   the   region   in   the   private   sphere   or   the   neighbourhood.   but  the  preservation  of  regional  identification  and  the  perseverance  of  a   peculiar  mix  of  cultures  and   languages  should  not  be  romanticised  as  a   case   of   multiculturalism.   the   population   of   the   borderlands   was   often   ‘caught   in  between’,  and  was  discriminated  against,  persecuted,  or  even   deported.  this  will  again  be  shown  specifically  in  the  case  of  upper  silesia   (in  polish  the  specification  ‘upper’  is  unusual,  the  region  is  mostly  called   śląsk/silesia,   in   contrast   to   dolny   śląsk/lower   silesia   with   its   centre   wrocław),  which  forms  the  empirical  core  of  this  article.  the  evidence  for   other  european  border  regions  is  gathered  from  a  project  about  ‘regional   movements  and  regionalism’   that  was  carried  out   in  2001-­‐2003  at   the   centre   for   comparative   history   of   europe   in   berlin   and   published   in   a   collective  volume.3   problems  of  historiography   as  ron  suny  once  pointedly  stated,   the   institutionalisation  of  history   is   more  closely  linked  with  the  project  of  the  nation  than  that  of  any  other   science.4  although  historiography  has  largely  freed  itself  from  misuse  by   various  nationalisms,  the  nation  and  the  nation  state  have  remained  the   most   important   units   of   analysis   or   at   least   points   of   reference   for   historians   until   the   end   of   the   twentieth   century.   ernest   gellner   once   studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)      |      articles     philipp  ther  20   found   a   wonderful   metaphor   for   this   still   prevailing   nation-­state   perspective,  which  for  him  resembles  a  modernist  painting.5  thereby,  the   historical   map   of   europe   is   shaped   by   homogenously   painted   areas   of   various  sizes  and  colours,  sometimes  bizarrely  shaped,  but  always  clearly   outlined.  these  coloured  territories  demarcate  the  european  nations  that   were   able   to   form   their   own   states   over   the   course   of   their   history.   shading  or  transitional  areas  between  the  individual  colours,  or  nations,  is   certainly  not  provided;  nor  is  any  grading  of  colour  tone,  although  some   national  categories  that  persist  in  the  language,  such  as  german  or  polish,   meant   something   quite   different   two   hundred   years   ago   than   they   do   today.   this   state-­‐national   or   modernistic   view   offers   little   possibilities   to   integrate   the   history   of   borderlands.   for   example,   in   upper   silesia,   an   intermediary  space  between  today's  czech  republic,  poland,  and  germany,   it  was  not  possible   to   clearly  define   the  nationality  of  a  majority  of   its   inhabitants   until   well   into   the   twentieth   century.   the   same   is   true   of   alsace,  where  the  population  was  torn  between  france  and  germany  until   the  1940s.  one  could  also  point  to  the  example  of  the  former  polish  east   (the   so-­‐called   kresy),   to   the   southern   balkans,   in   particular   to   greater   macedonia,  and  to  numerous  other  regions  in  europe.  in  these   ‘lands  in   between’,   national   standard   languages   were   only   spoken   to   a   limited   extent.  the  population  communicated  mainly  in  mixed  local  and  regional   dialects.   social   distinctions   and   purposes   determined   the   usage   of   language,  rather  than  national  standards.  this  was  not  only  true  for  rural   areas  and  small  towns,  but  often  also  larger  cities.  one  should  add  that  in   central   and   eastern   europe,   such   multilingual   borderlands   are   not   just   narrow  marginal  areas,  but  in  fact  covered  large  parts  of  the  entire  large   region   until   the   postwar   period.   although   these   cultural   and   social   nuances   defined   people's   everyday   life   –   and   in   the   twentieth   century,   even  influenced  international  politics  and  the  domestic  policy  of  the  states   concerned   –   they   become   almost   imperceptible   when   the   history   of   europe   is   packed   into   a   cabinet   consisting   entirely   of   national   compartments.  it  is  a  mistake  to  perceive  european  history  as  the  sum  of   its   national   histories.6   one   should   also   look   at   regional   specifics   or   studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)      |      articles     philipp  ther   21   characteristics,  which  are  of  course  not  exhausted  with  the  cases  of   the   borderlands  presented  in  this  article.   even   the   term   ‘borderlands’   has   potential   drawbacks,   because   of   prominence   of   the   word   ‘border’,   which   in   today's   perspective   automatically   connotes   the   boundaries   of   nation   states.   the   ‘lands   in   between’  dealt  with  in  this  article  do  not  necessarily  end  at  state  borders,   but   often   transcend   them   and   encompass   areas   of   both   sides.   if   a   less   metaphorical   and   more   analytical   term   is   preferred,   one   can   label   ‘the   lands   in   between’   as   intermediary   spaces.   this   term   has   a   geographical   dimension,  in  the  sense  of  a  location  between  national  centres  and  spaces.   there   is   also   a   political   dimension,   which   will   be   shown   below   in   the   section  on  ‘regionalism’.  finally,  there  is  an  important  cultural  dimension.   all  of  the  regions  mentioned  in  the  last  paragraph  are  areas  of  linguistic,   cultural,   and   ethnic   transition   in   which   various   influences   meet   and   frequently  mingle.   a   vivid   example   can   again   be   provided   by   upper   silesia,   where   czech,   austrian,  prussian,  german,  and  polish  rule  not  only  shaped  the  region's   history  but  also   its   language.  up  to  the  present,   the  regional  dialect  has   been  shaped  by  elements   taken   from  various  national   languages.   in   the   early  1990s  the  sociologist  danuta  berlińska,  one  of  the  most  prominent   specialists   on   the   region,   noted   a   sentence   spoken   by   a   teenager:   ‘jechołech  na  kole,  trzasązech  się  ze  stromem  i  się  skrzywiła  linksztanga.’7   the  content  of  this  sentence  is  quite  simple:  the  teenager  rode  on  a  bicycle,   hit   a   tree,   and   as   a   result   of   this   his   handlebar   broke.   linguistically   speaking,   the   sentence   is   much   more   complicated   and   hardly   understandable  for  an  outsider  coming  to  the  region.  if  one  looks  at  this   sentence   from   the   viewpoint   of   standardised   national   languages,   the   silesian   boy   rode   a   czech   bicycle   with   an   old   polish   verb   and   archaic   polish  grammar  into  a  czech  tree  and  then  the  german  handlebars  broke.8   this  example  is  of  more  than  anecdotal  significance.   in   recent   years   linguists   and   literature   scholars   have   proven   that   ‘continuous  dialects’  such  as  silesian  were  not  only  an  everyday  means  of   communication  but  also  served  to  differentiate  between  the  familiar  and   the   foreign   –   they   were   points   of   identification.9   the   linguist   hans-­‐ studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)      |      articles     philipp  ther  22   christian  trepte  has  demonstrated  this  as  well  for  the  polish-­‐belarusian   border  area.10   in  view  of   the  close   linguistic   relationship  of   the  various   slavic  languages,  the  existence  of  transitional  dialects  is  not  surprising.  it   displays   similarities   with   the   situation   in   teschen   silesia,   for   example,   where  areas  of  czech  and  polish  linguistic  influence  intersected  and  where   until  recently  people  communicated  mainly  in  a  regional  dialect.11  yet  even   in  places  where  quite  different  linguistic  families  had  an  influence,  such  as   in   the   slavo-­‐germanic   border   area,   mixed   dialects   and   modern   creole   languages   developed   which   assumed   elements   of   the   surrounding   standard  languages.  if  one  approaches  the  history  of  upper  silesia,  alsace,   the  eastern  polish  borderlands,  or  macedonia  only  with  the  conventional   nation  state  categories,  these  linguistic  phenomena  are  easily  lost,  along   with  their  political  significance.   but  if  there  was  any  awareness  of  consistent  dialects  and  other  regional   traditions   or   cases   of   syncretism   in   the   ‘short’   twentieth   century,   they   were  generally  regarded  as  backward  and  inferior.  population  groups  that   opposed   clear   national   classification   or   cultural   monopolisation   were   considered   to   be   premodern.   in   an   ideological   move   aptly   criticised   by   celia   applegate,   modernisation   was   frequently   equated   with   nationalisation  so  that,  except  for  purposes  of  legitimisation,  the  study  of   regions   such   as   upper   silesia,   polesie,   moravia,   transylvania   or   the   vojvodina  was  largely  neglected.12   it  is  characteristic  of  many  intermediary  spaces  that  their  cultures  serve  as   a  point  of  departure   for  political  projects  and  movements.  also   for   this   reason,   intermediary   spaces   cannot   be   regarded   as   a   peripheral   phenomenon  of  european  history,  where  one  studies  only  bizarre  dialects.   precisely   their   location   at   the   (changing)   borders   specified   a   certain   centrality,   for  major   traffic  arteries  and  channels  of  communication  ran   through  them.13  this  is  true  of  the  late  nineteenth  century  as  well  as  of  the   situation  today.  from  a  european  perspective  strasbourg  or  katowice  are   more  centrally  located  than  paris  or  warsaw.  in  her  programmatic  essay   on  ‘a  europe  of  regions’,  applegate  describes  the  extent  to  which  regions   have   shaped   the   economic   and   political   development   of   the   individual   european   nations   and   states.   this   can   also   be   said   of   most   of   the   studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)      |      articles     philipp  ther   23   intermediary  spaces  treated  here.  their  border  location  often  gave  rise  to   their   symbolic   significance   for   the   respective   national   movements   and   nation  states.   the  study  of  nationalism  is,  for  reasons  inherent  to  the  subject,  an  end  in   itself.   in   spite   of   the   disputes   between   constructivists,   ethnosymbolists,   and   other   schools   of   study14,   the   telos   of   nationalism   studies,   and   frequently  the  finale  of  scientific  narratives,  is  the  fully  developed  modern   nation  and  the  nation  state.15  this   focus  on   the   ‘success’  of  nationalism   entails   a   hermeneutic   problem.   this   is   particularly   true   of   nationalism   studies  in  the  federal  republic  of  germany,  which  has  always  started  from   the   premise   that   the   german   nation   project   possessed   a   strong   assimilating  power  and  that  the  population  was  nationalised  by  the  turn  of   the   century.16   christian   geulen   recently   transposed   this   theory   to   the   modern  self  and  maintained  that  ‘all  other  differences  and  identities  have   been  made  to  disappear  by  the  national.’17   michael   g.   müller   at   the   university   of   halle,   a   specialist   of   polish   and   prussian  history,  has  expressed  criticism  of  this  teleology.  in  their  recently   published  book  on  regional  and  national  identities  in  europe,  müller  and   his  two  coeditors  come  to  the  conclusion  that,  ‘it  is  no  longer  possible  to   maintain   the   tacit   assumptions   long   made   that   the   impact   of   national   propaganda  increases  with  its  intensity  and  that  the  advance  of  the  nation-­‐ building  process  means  that  thinking  in  national  categories  takes  primacy   over   regional   and   local   loyalties.’18   one   possibility   for   solving   the   hermeneutic  problem  of  the  study  of  nationalism  is  to  analyse  potentially   competing  identification  options  on  the  political,  social,  and  cultural  levels.   on  closer  examination,  it  emerges  that  religion,  political  convictions,  social   standing,  a  dynasty,  or  a  monarchist  state  were  often  more  important  to   people  than  national  beliefs  or   identities.  the  problem  with  this  kind  of   relativisation,  however,   is  that   it  defies  measurement  and  does  not  take   into  account  the  fact  that  nation  and  religion,  for  example,  often  effectively   complemented  each  other.   one  possible  way  of  avoiding  this  dilemma  is  to  first  examine  nationalism   from  the  perimeters  of  its  range  of  influence  and  to  look  at  identification   alternatives  that  at  least  partly  offered  competition.  in  many  intermediary   studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)      |      articles     philipp  ther  24   spaces,   regional   identification   options   could   not   be   combined   with   the   ideologies   of   national   movements   and   nation   states.   for   this   reason,   it   seems  appropriate  to  take  a  closer  look  at  regional  identities,  movements,   and   programmes   in   borderlands.   the   initial   question   is,   then,   to   what   extent   regional   identities   in   the   various   intermediary   spaces   competed   with  national  identities  starting  from  the  middle  of  the  nineteenth  century,   followed  by  to  what  extent  regional  movements  were  able  to  mobilise  the   masses,  and  which  political  programmes  arose  from  this  mobilisation.19   the  concept  of  regionalism   in  the  context  of  the  theoretical  state  of  nationalism  studies  today,  regions   are   constructs   that   should   not   be   assumed   as   units,   as   this   leads   to   incorrect   assumptions   regarding   territorial   continuity   and   internal   homogeneity.20  following  rogers  brubaker's  approach  to  nationalism,  the   emphasis  should  be  placed  on  examining  european  regions  as  a  cultural   practice.21  therefore,  one  needs  to  look  at  a  region  not  as  a  territory  with   fixed   boundaries,   but   as   an   object   of   discourses.   one   particularly   informative   empirical   example   is   the   above-­‐mentioned   region   of   upper   silesia,  which  will  be  looked  at  more  closely  below.  the  question  is,  why   this  and  other  regions  at  times  played  an  important  role  in  political,  social,   and  cultural  discourses  or  were  even  considered  as  alternative  projects  to   already   existent   state   nations   and   nation   states.   taking   this   approach,   regional  movements  are  viewed  as  modern  mass  movements  that  support   the  autonomy  of  the  region  in  question  in  relation  to  greater  units  such  as   empires  or  nation  states.  the  term  regionalism  describes  the  programmes   and  ideologies  on  which  the  construction  of  a  given  region  is  based.  it  also   contains  a  dimension  of  social  history,  for  without  knowledge  of  the  social   extent   of   regionalism,   its   development   as   an   ideology   cannot   be   understood.   in   principle,   transitional   forms   of   identification   can   also   exist   between   regionalism  and  nationalism.  the  difference  between  the  two  phenomena   is  that  regionalism  does  not  strive  for  sovereignty  or  independence  of  the   studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)      |      articles     philipp  ther   25   area  it  lays  claim  to.  while  people's  belonging  to  a  nation  state  is  defined   by   clearly   identifiable   criteria   such   as   citizenship,   the   right   to   vote   or   military  service,   regions  do  not  have  such  sources  of   legitimisation  and   institutions  of  power  at  their  disposal.  the  feeling  of  belonging  to  a  region   is   determined   more   by   identification   elements   involving   ‘soft’   cultural   criteria,  such  as  dialects,  customs,  traditions,  personal  relationships,  and   specific   historical   experiences   and   memories.   people   evidently   have   a   close  affinity  to  areas  of  a  manageable  size,  while  nations  are  more  often   based   on   a   cognitive   ‘invention’   or   ‘imagination’.22   these   dissimilarities   also  make  it  clear  that  regionalism  and  nationalism  should  not  be  regarded   only   as   competing   concepts   and   social   movements.   even   in   the   age   of   nationalism,   multiple   identities   were   widespread,   with   beliefs   about   belonging  to  a  region  and  in  belonging  to  a  nation  often  complementing   and   augmenting   each   other.   thus   the   question   is:   why   in   certain   circumstances  does  a  situation  of  competing  identifications  arise?   the  case  of  upper  silesia   it   would   go   beyond   the   scope   of   this   article   to   describe   the   already   mentioned  region  of  upper  silesia  in  great  detail.23  nevertheless,  a  brief,   concise   outline   of   the   history   of   the   region   in   the   age   of   modern   nationalism   can   convey   an   idea   of   why   regions   and   particularly   the   intermediary  spaces  treated  here  could  form  a  component  in  a  new,  more   variegated  kind  of  european  history.   in   the   case   of   modern   germany,   a   general   congruence   of   regional   and   national  identifications  has  been  shown  in  various  studies.  applegate  and   alon  confino  have  provided  persuasive  evidence  of  this  in  central  areas  of   germany  with  an  exclusively  german-­‐speaking  population.24  in  silesia,  and   particularly  in  the  mainly  catholic,  slavic-­‐dialect-­‐speaking  region  of  upper   silesia,  however,  different  circumstances  prevailed.  even  when  it  was  part   of   the   german   empire,   national   identities   spread   relatively   slowly   in   upper  silesia.  the  reasons  for  this  lay  in  the  religious  and  social  specifics   of  the  activity  of  the  german  national  movement  in  the  eastern  territories   studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)      |      articles     philipp  ther  26   of   prussia,   including   upper   silesia,   and   in   the   antagonistic,   counterproductive  attempts  at  nation  building  in  the  german  empire  and   the  ideological  narrowing  of  german  nationalism.   the   revolution   of   1848   was   a   boost   for   the   activities   of   the   german   national  movement   in   the  area.  the  polish  national  movement   took  the   same  moment   to  hit  on   the  upper  silesians,  who   to  a   large  extent   still   spoke  an  ancient  polish  dialect,  especially  in  rural  areas.  both  movements   were  confronted  with  obstacles   in   the  shape  of   the  social  and  religious   specifics   of   upper   silesia.   the   german   national   movement   was   mainly   supported  by  protestants  and  members  of  the  prussian  administration  and   met   with   little   response   from   the   mixed   population   of   these   mainly   catholic  and  rural  areas.  the  distance  between  them  was  increased  by  the   struggle  between   the  prussian  state  and   the  church   in   the  kulturkampf   and   the   narrowing   definition   of   who   and   what   was   to   be   perceived   as   german.  these  splits  were  not  fully  overcome  until  the  first  world  war.25   furthermore,   a   social   gulf   formed   between   the   elites   and   the   german   middle   class,   on   the   one   hand,   and   what   they   disparagingly   called   the   schlonsaks,  the  slavic-­‐speaking  workers  and  rural  proletariat,  on  the  other.   the  relationship  between  the  two  sides  was  markedly  asymmetrical.  for   this   reason,   the   krakow   sociologist   maria   szmeja   even   describes   the   prussian-­‐german   rule   of   upper   silesia   as   an   example   of   ‘internal   colonialism’.26   polish  nationalism  also  came  up  against  considerable  obstacles  despite  the   fact  that  many  poles  immigrated  to  upper  silesia's  industrial  district.  the   polish  national  movement,  unlike  the  german,  was  not  backed  up  by  an   own  state,  so  it  had  organisational  deficits.  and  since  upper  silesia  had  not   been  part  of  poland  since  the  fourteenth  century,  there  was  no  common   remembrance  of  the  polish  state  that  had  existed  until  1795.  furthermore,   the   numerous   cultural   differences   between   the   poles   and   the   polish-­‐ speaking   upper   silesians   which   had   developed   over   the   centuries   of   austrian,  prussian,  and  german  rule  all  played  a  part.  many  poles  could   barely  understand  the  upper  silesian  dialect,  or  considered   it  a  strange   mixture   with   german.   for   this   reason,   identification   with   the   more   immediate  homeland  among  the  polish-­‐speaking  population,  particularly   studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)      |      articles     philipp  ther   27   in   rural   areas,   continued   to   dominate   and   usually   prevailed   over   any   secondary  german  or  polish  national  consciousness.27  this  identification   with   silesia   did   not,   however,   manifest   itself   in   a   strong   political   movement  and  the  upper  silesians  did  not  produce  a  secular  political  elite   in  the  german  empire.   poland  was  refounded  after  the  first  world  war  and  claimed  a  large  part   of   upper   silesia   on   the   basis   of   ethnic   principles.   the   german   empire,   however,  insisted  on  keeping  the  largest  industrial  district  in  east  central   europe.   the   conflict   between   both   states   caused   deep   ruptures   in   the   region.  violence  broke  out,  and  the  two  sides  fought  each  other  in  armed   combat   in   the   three   silesian   uprisings   (1919-­‐21).   it   is   undisputed   that   upper   silesians   took   part   in   these   conflicts,   but   more   decisive   was   the   intervention  and  mobilisation  from  abroad.  the  paramilitary  units  fighting   on  both  sides  brought  in  germans  and  poles  who  had  little  connection  to   the  region  but  basically  continued  the  war   in   the  name  of   the   ‘national   interest’.   the   major   cause   of   the   violence,   then,   was   a   lack   of   demobilisation  of   troops  who  had   fought   in  world  war   i  and  who  now   formed  paramilitary  units,  not  a  nationalist  mobilisation  of  the  population   in  upper  silesia.   silesian  insurgents  of   1919-­1921.      |      narodowe   archiwum  cyfrowe  –   wikimedia  commons   studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)      |      articles     philipp  ther  28   the   vast   majority   of   the   political   elites   in   upper   silesia,   for   their   part,   called  for  unity  in  the  region  and  tried  to  mediate  in  the  dispute  between   germany   and   poland.   after   world   war   i,   a   strong   regional   movement   emerged,  the  bund  der  oberschlesier  (alliance  of  upper  silesians),  which   demanded  autonomy  and  at  times  even  upper  silesia's  independence.  in   1919   the   regional   movement   had   around   300,000   adherents,   that   is   a   seventh  of  the  population.  publications  of  the  bund  der  oberschlesier  even   tried  to  invent  an  upper  silesian  nation.  they  spoke  about  a  ‘multilingual   unitary  nation’  (multilinguales  einheitsvolk)  and  a  blend  of  slavo-­‐germanic   blood   (slavo-­germanische   blutmischung).28   the   regional   activists   mixed   ethnic  elements  with  arguments  of  multiculturalism  in  order  to  construct  a   regional   community   or   even   nation.   but   how   could   this   invention   have   attracted  a  population  that  was  already  familiar  with  german  and  polish   nationalism?   the  regional  movement  failed  eventually  due  to  its  inability  to  maintain   neutrality   in   the   conflict   between   poland   and   germany.   furthermore,   neither  germany,  poland,  czechoslovakia,  nor  the  allies  wanted  another   free  state   like  danzig/gdańsk.   in  march  1921,   the   inhabitants  of  upper   silesia  were  called  on  to  align  themselves  with  either  germany  or  poland   in  a  plebiscite.  around  700,000  people  voted  to  stay  with  germany  while   480,000  voted  for  poland.  the  areas  with  a  majority  in  favour  of  germany   were  mainly  urban  and  left  of  the  oder  river;  those  in  favour  of  poland   were  right  of  the  oder  and  small-­‐town  or  rural.29  it  would,  however,  be   wrong   to   interpret   this   voting   behaviour   as   an   expression   of   a   deeply   rooted   national   identity   (in   the   hardly   translatable   terms   of   the   time:   volkstum,   deutschtum,   or   polskośćć;   or   very   roughly   ‘local   culture’,   ‘germanness’,  and  ‘polishness’)  or  to  equate  the  number  of  votes  for  each   side  with  the  number  of  resident  germans  or  poles.  at  local  elections  in   november  1919,  polish  candidates  still  had  gained  over  60  percent  of  the   votes  –  this  roughly  corresponded  with  the  proportion  of  the  population   that  was  polish-­‐speaking  or  bilingual.  economic  considerations  and  loyalty   to  the  prusso-­‐german  state  evidently  carried  more  weight  in  the  plebiscite   than  ‘objective’  criteria  of  national  belonging  such  as  language.       studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)      |      articles     philipp  ther   29   the  division  of  upper  silesia  left  large  minorities  on  either  side  of  the  new   border.  a  total  of  226,000  people  who  had  voted  for  germany  remained  in   eastern   upper   silesia   while   195,000   people   who   had   voted   for   poland   became  residents  of  opole  silesia.  under  the  geneva  convention  on  upper   silesia   of   1922,   the   people   in   the   areas   where   the   vote   was   held   were   map  of  the  1921  plebiscite:   (1)  percival-­de  marinis  line   (2)  le  rond-­korfany  line   (3)  demarcation  line  as   recommended  by  the   entente  (may  1921)   (4)  area  with  majority  of   polish  votes   (5)  german-­polish  border  as   established  in  october  1921   (6)  western  referendum   border      |      j.j.  tazbir,  wielki   atlas  historyczny  (2008)  –     wikimedia  commons   studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)      |      articles     philipp  ther  30   entitled   to  adopt   the  nationality  of   the  respective  neighbouring  country   and  emigrate  to  germany  or  poland.  by  1925,  about  100,000  people  on   both  sides  had  taken  advantage  of  this  right  of  ‘option’.  the  plebiscite  and   the  geneva  convention  show  that  not  only  the  nation  states,  but  also  the   international  community  in  the  league  of  nations  wanted  to  enhance  the   homogeneity  of  the  nation  states.  there  was  no  ‘option’  to  remain  polish   and  german,  or  to  declare  an  allegiance  to  silesia.   during   the   weimar   republic,   in   the   western   part   of   upper   silesia   that   remained   german,   many   members   of   the   mixed   population   adopted   germany's  language  and  culture  for  pragmatic  reasons.  not  only  was  this  a   prerequisite   for  social  advancement,  but  even  school  children  distanced   themselves  from  their  regional  roots  and  slavic  mother  tongue  in  order  to   avoid   teasing   and   isolation   from   the   german   majority.   this   ‘pragmatic   assimilation’   manifested   itself   in   censuses   in   the   drop   in   numbers   of   people   who   declared   themselves   bilingual   or   polish-­‐speaking   and   in   elections  in  the  decrease  in  votes  for  polish  candidates.  this  tendency  to   assimilate  was,  however,  disrupted  by  a  seizure  of  power  by  the  national   socialists,  who  gained  only  thirty  percent  of  the  votes  in  upper  silesia  in   1932.  when  the  national  socialists  began  to  take  steps  against  the  catholic   church,   dissolved   the   catholic   centre   party   in   1934,   and   finally   also   persecuted   priests,   the   mixed   population   was   driven   into   the   arms   of   polish   minority   organisations.30   nazi   church   policy   provoked   a   similar   reaction   to   that   which   the   kulturkampf   had   elicited   two   generations   earlier:   resistance   to   anything   henceforth   defined   as   german   and   the   linking  of  the  struggle  for  linguistic  and  cultural  freedom  with  defense  of   the  church.  the  head  of   the  regional  government   in  breslau  recognised   this   problem   and   dispatched   a   report   in   1935   to   wilhelm   frick,   the   prussian  and  reich  minister  for  the  interior,  stating  that  ‘the  unrestrained   attacks  which  were  customary  in  the  past  and  went  way  beyond  the  fight   against  political  catholicism,  have  to  stop.  in  any  case,  the  state  and  the   movement   must   not   identify   with   them.’31   racial   prejudice   against   the   upper  silesians  proved  to  be  just  as  counterproductive.   in  the  eyes  of  many  national  socialists,  the  only  options  were  to  be  either   german  or  polish.  the  idea  of  a  ‘floating  national  character’  (schwebendes   studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)      |      articles     philipp  ther   31   volkstum),  as  it  was  pejoratively  called,  was  only  accepted  as  a  temporary   phenomenon.   in   general,   the   popular   image   of   upper   silesia's   mixed   population  transformed  in  the  interwar  years  from  that  of  a  nationally  and   otherwise  underdeveloped  community  to  that  of  a  group  of   freeloaders.   indeed,  the  national  socialists  noted  with  pleasure  how  they  were  able  to   entice  upper  silesians  to  their  functions  with  free  tickets  to  cultural  events   and   complimentary   cake   at   women's   meetings   but   in   other   reports   bemoaned  the   fact   that   this  was  a  nationally  unreliable  and  corruptible   ethnic  group.32   in   1935,   the   national   socialists   proceeded   with   the   germanisation   of   personal  and  place  names  and  extended  their  pursuit  of   the  population   into  the  private  realm,  suspecting  that,  underneath  the  cloak  of  outward   conformity,  anti-­‐german  or  even  pro-­‐polish  identities  continued  to  exist.   as  the  official  reports  from  upper  silesia  show,  the  authorities  were  not   entirely  wrong  in  this  assumption.  one  sign  of  the  endurance  of  cultural   traits  was  the  popularity  of  polish  church  services.  in  1938,  thirty  percent   of  services  were  still  held  in  polish  according  to  the  nationalist  association   of  the  german  east  (bund  deutscher  osten,  bdo).  the  bdo  estimated  the   total  number  of  people  in  the  ‘polish  minority’  at  about  400,000,  or  about   550,000  with  the  ‘germanised  section’  included.33  nevertheless,  very  few   people   openly   professed   their   polishness,   as   that   would   have   led   to   persecution  and  possibly  even  internment  in  a  concentration  camp.  as  is   well   known,   silesian   jews   experienced   an   even   more   terrible   fate,   regardless   of   their   national   allegiance.   many   upper   silesians   who   outwardly   conformed   or   even   spoke   german   at   home   preserved   close   family,  religious,  and  cultural  ties  with  polish  upper  silesia.  paradoxically,   the  nationalist  propaganda  against  the  so-­‐called  diktat  von  versailles  and   the   revisionism   in   regard   to   the   border   established   in   1921   helped   to   preserve  a  mental  mapping  that  encompassed  the  entire  region  of  upper   silesia.   parts   of   the   silesian   society   activated   an   upper   silesian   or   polish   identification,   whether   out   of   sympathy   for   poland   or   an   aversion   to   national  socialism,  or  for  pragmatic  reasons.  the  further  tightening  of  the   policy  on  nationality  and  the  ban  on  polish-­‐language  church  services  in  the   studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)      |      articles     philipp  ther  32   run-­‐up  to  the  second  world  war  increased  the  old  tendency  among  upper   silesia's  mixed  population  toward  self-­‐isolationism.34  not  until  germany   achieved   its   first  war  victories  and   troops  on   the  home   front  had  been   mobilised   was   it   possible   to   win   over   a   section   of   the   population.   following  germany's  defeats  on  the  eastern  front,  however,  personal  and   public   attitudes   toward   germany   changed.   despite   the   nazi   terror,   a   willingness  to  show  symbols  of  a  polish  or  upper  silesian  identification  in   the  private  sphere  and  in  the  limited  public  of  neighbourhoods  increased.   in  polish  eastern  upper  silesia,  which  requires  special  consideration  in  the   interwar  period,  national  and  regional   identification  changed  even  more   than  in  the  german  part  of  upper  silesia.  the  number  of  inhabitants  who   considered   themselves   definitely   german   had   dropped,   mainly   due   to   emigration,   from   about   a   third   to   a   seventh   of   the   total   population   between  1921  and  1931.35  but  many  polish-­‐speaking  or  bilingual  upper   silesians  turned  toward  german  political  parties  in  order  to  express  their   dissatisfaction   with   economic   and   political   developments   in   poland.   in   local  elections  in  1926,  german  parties  gained  42  percent  of  the  votes,  and   18.4  percent  in  the  polish  parliamentary  elections  in  upper  silesia  in  1930,   far   more   than   the   proportion   of   the   corresponding   population.   these   results  were,  however,   less  an  expression  of   ‘unbroken  germanness’,  as   was  thought  in  the  weimar  republic,  and  more  a  sign  of  the  vitality  of  the   identification  with  upper  silesia.  many  silesians  voted  for  german  parties   in  protest  against  the  undermining  of  the  autonomy  of  silesia  as  a  polish   province  (wojewódstwo).  arkadiusz  bożek,  who  became  vice  president  of   the  province  of  upper  silesia  in  1945,  summarised  the  general  feeling  of   disappointment   with   the   polish   administration   in   the   interwar   period   thus:  ‘only  the  men  in  charge  have  changed.  the  berliners  went  and  the   warsaw-­‐krakovians   came.’36   this   quote   indicates   the   gap   between   the   regional  society  and  those  who  came  from  outside.   at  the  end  of  the  twenties,  as  the  situation  in  poland  began  to  temporarily   stabilise,   german   parties   enjoyed   much   less   electoral   success,   and   participation  in  german-­‐national  rallies  also  decreased  rapidly.  even  the   opponents  of  the  polish  state  evidently  grew  accustomed  to  its  existence.37   furthermore,   in  upper  silesia,   social   and  economic  considerations  gave   studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)      |      articles     philipp  ther   33   rise   to   a   willingness   to   adapt   oneself   to   the   majority   nation.   this   pragmatism  could,  however,  swing  in  the  opposite  direction  at  any  time.   for  example,  parents  often  signed  their  children  up  for  wealthier  german   schools  because  they  tended  to  provide  more  plentiful  school  meals  than   their  state-­‐run  polish  competitors.38  but  this  pragmatic  attitude  was  not   tolerated  by  the  polish  state,  which  thought  in  dialectic  national  terms  and   was   afraid   of   a   strengthening   of   the   german   minority.   the   polish   administration  wanted   to  compel  parents  of  mixed  origin   to   send   their   children  to  polish  schools.  eventually  the  conflict  about  these  children  was   decided   by   the   league   of   nations.   it   decided   that   the   nationality   of   children,  and  therefore   their  choice  of  school,  had  to  be  decided  by  the   state   bureaucracy   according   to   objective   indicators   (primarily   the   language  spoken  by  the  parents),  and  not  by  the  parents.  one  can  conclude   that   it  was  not  only  radical  nationalists  and   ‘nationalising  nation  states’   (brubaker)   who   thought   in   terms   of   a   binary   nationalism,   but   also   the   international   community   of   states.   moreover,   nationality   was   not   perceived   as   subjective   and   changeable,   but   as   objective.   the   regional   society  was  indeed  caught  in  between.   a  person's  sense  of  being  german,  polish,  or  silesian  often  depended  on   their  individual  social  and  professional  standing.  some  cases  are  known,   for  example,  of   the  wives  of  polish  policemen  in  eastern  (polish)  upper   silesia  who  belonged  to   the  german  people's  association.39  these  cases   were  recorded  because  the  supreme  commander  of  the  polish  police   in   the   województwo   of   silesia   was   angered   at   the   lack   of   national   feeling   among  officials  and  suspected  that  state  secrets  were  being  betrayed.  in   opole  silesia,  the  authorities  also  reported  on  behaviour  that  could  not  be   reconciled  with   their  view  of  a  proper  national  standing.  there  was  no   understanding  at  all  for  several  members  of  the  local  hitler  youth  who  had   joined   polish   sports   clubs.40   as   the   reports   show,   upper   silesians   sometimes   switched   languages   and   cultures   within   the   space   of   one   evening.  this  is  illustrated  by  an  incident  reported  by  the  chief  of  police  in   gleiwitz/gliwice  in  1929,  when  a  local  celebration  organised  by  the  polish   choral   society   presented   a   guest   choir   that   sang   in   polish   first   before   performing  german  military  songs.41   studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)      |      articles     philipp  ther  34   nevertheless,   one   should   be   wary   of   romanticising   this   multicultural   mélange.   if  a  person   failed   to  opt   for  a  particular  nationality,  he  or  she   faced   life   with   a   bad   reputation   and   sanctions.   even   after   1945,   the   ‘struggle  for  national  character’  (volkstumskampf)  –  which  today  would  be   described  as  a  conflict  over   identities  –  was   fought  out  primarily  at   the   expense  of  the  regional  society.   after  the  second  world  war,  attempts  to  nationalise  the  region  continued   –   although   in   different   circumstances.   poland   had   been   granted   all   of   silesia  in  1945  through  the  potsdam  treaty.  its  main  goal  was  to  polonise   (or  ‘re-­‐polonise’,  as  the  propaganda  formulated  it)  the  region  once  and  for   all.   for   reaching   this   goal   the   postwar   polish   state   deployed   the   entire   toolkit  of  violent,  totalitarian  nationality  policy.  the  ‘enemy’  language  was   forbidden,   the   regional   culture   eliminated   by   all   possible   means,   books   destroyed,  and  personal  as  well  as  place  names  changed.  the  aim  of  this   policy  was  to  ‘de-­‐germanise’,  as  the  apt  title  of  a  book  by  bernard  linek   translates,   that   is   to   eliminate   all   traces   of   the   german   era.42   this   also   entailed   the  expulsion  of   inhabitants  who  could  be  clearly   identified  as   german.  in  comparison  to  lower  silesia,  where  almost  all  german  citizens   were  removed,  the  stance  toward  the  germans  in  upper  silesia  was  more   tolerant.  in  the  areas  where  the  plebiscite  was  held  in  1921,  a  declaration   of  loyalty  to  the  polish  state  and  the  polish  nation  was  generally  enough  to   earn  one's  ‘verification’  or  ‘rehabilitation’  as  a  pole  and  so  avoid  expulsion   to  postwar  germany.  the  authorities  upheld  the  argument  that  a  large  part   of  the  population  of  upper  silesia  was  actually  polish;  this  also  formed  the   basis   for   territorial   claims   to   the   former   german   territories.   about   850,000  ‘autochthones’  were  therefore  permitted  to  stay,  making  up  the   majority  of  the  population  after  the  war  in  the  later  provinces  of  katowice   and  opole.   yet   this   majority   section   of   the   population   was   regarded   with   deep   mistrust  and  often  disapproval  by  the  polish  government,  the  immigrant   population  from  central  poland,  and  expellees  from  eastern  poland,  who   equated  the  indigenous  upper  silesians  with  germans  –  the  most  negative   categorisation   possible   in   view   of   the   recent   experience   of   national   socialist   occupation.43   this   bipolar   national   discourse   had   existed   since   studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)      |      articles     philipp  ther   35   world   war   i:   one   had   to   be   either   german   or   polish   and   nothing   in   between.  the  suspicion  persisted  that  the  ślązacy  (the  silesians)  were  in   fact   germans.   in   fact,   after   the   war,   many   upper   silesians   could   speak   german  better  than  polish,  which  they  pronounced  with  a  strong  accent   anyway,  as  a  result  of  nazi-­‐era  pressures.  even  the  term  ‘autochthon’  has  a   derogatory   connotation,   as   the   immigrants   who   used   it   regarded   themselves  as  polish  missionaries  leading  the  formerly  german  citizens  of   polish  extraction  back   to   the  path  of   rightful  nationality  and  drumming   polishness   into   them,   by   force   if   necessary.   furthermore,   deep   social   conflicts   arose   after   the   second   world   war,   particularly   over   property.   locals   and   immigrants   fought   over   farms,   apartments,   everyday   necessities,  and  soon  also  over  positions  in  the  state  and  the  party.   these  conflicts  and  the  frequent  discrimination  and  persecution  of  native   inhabitants  led  to  the  latter's  complete  rejection  of  poland  as  a  nation  and   a  state.  for  the  deeply  catholic  population,   the  rejection  of  communism   was  also  connected  with  their  religious  affiliation.  by  contrast,  the  german   era   in   upper   silesia   was   often   idealised,   especially   as   the   ‘economic   miracle’  was  beginning   to   take  effect   in  west  germany.   in  1950,  bożek   recorded  bitterly  that  ‘the  germans  are  laughing  up  their  sleeves  –  what   we   could   not   achieve   in   seven   hundred   years,   because   the   silesians   persistently  defended  their  faith  and  their  language,  they  accomplished  in   seven  years:  the  complete  eradication  of  polishness  in  these  lands,  down   to  the  very  last  root.’44  this  statement  contained  the  nationalist  myth  of   timeless  polishness;  nevertheless,  it  was  right  about  the  disaffection  with   poland  and  poles.   the  change  in  orientation  toward  germany  was,  however,  also  motivated   by   the   fact   that   the   identification   with   the   region   of   upper   silesia   was   suppressed   in   the   people's   republic   of   poland,   being   regarded   as   a   remnant   of   the   interwar   period   and   a   possible   trojan   horse   of   the   germans.   open   declarations   of   germanness   were   the   most   effective   method   for   gaining   permission   to   leave   the   country   and   so   escape   communism.  moreover,  the  upper  silesians  were  discriminated  against  as   germans.   studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)      |      articles     philipp  ther  36   until  1989,  the  situation  in  upper  silesia  remained  by  and  large  stable.  the   people's  republic  of  poland  proceeded  with  oppression  –  the  ban  on  the   german  language,  for  example,  remained  in  force  to  the  last  –  and  upper   silesians   reacted   to   this   with   inner   emigration   or   actual   emigration   to   germany.  thus  the  old-­‐established  upper  silesian  population  became  the   minority,  estimated  at  250,000-­‐300,000  of  a   total  population  of  around   one  million   in   the  province  of  opole   in  1989.  those  who   felt  drawn   to   german   culture   or   simply   saw   no   future   in   communist   poland   left   the   country.   when   the   communist   regimes   collapsed,   the   troubled   history   of   the   interwar  period  threatened  to  repeat  itself.  the  minority,  which  as  a  result   of   the   polish   nationality   policy   indeed   had   become   a   german   minority,   demanded   their   official   authorisation,   and   individual   demands   for   the   borders  to  be  redrawn  were  also  made.  the  situation  quickly  eased  with   the  conclusion  of  the  2+4  treaty  in  1990,  in  which  germany  relinquished   all   territorial   claims   in   favour   of   reunification,   and   the   german-­‐polish   treaty   of   1990-­‐91,   which   finally   confirmed   the   oder-­‐neisse   border   and   enforced  the  official  recognition  of  the  minority  in  poland.   for   this   reason,  among  others,  poland   tolerated   the  de   facto   revisionist   citizenship  policy  of  the  federal  republic  of  germany.  in  upper  silesia,  all   polish  citizens  who  could  provide  evidence  of  their  german  ancestry  could   apply  for  german  citizenship.  well  over  200,000  german  passports  were   issued  as  a  consequence  of  this  policy  up  to  the  mid  1990s.  they  secured   the  holders'  free  access  to  the  job  market  in  germany  and  the  eu  before   the  enlargement  of   the  union   in  2004,  which  was  a  great  advantage   in   these  dire  years  of  early  transformation.  the  germanness  of  the  minority   in  upper  silesia  was  once  again  officially  confirmed.   freedom   to   travel   and   reunification,   however,   rapidly   brought   about   a   change  in  the  popular  image  of  the  federal  republic  of  germany  in  upper   silesia.  the  former  spiritual  homeland  became  simply  a  neighbouring  state   that  could  be  reached  within  a  few  hours.  nearly  all  upper  silesians  took   advantage  of  their  newly  established  right  to  travel  to  visit  the  country,   especially   those   who   held   german   passports   and   therefore   also   work   permits.  the  reality  of  germany,  however,  was  often  surprising,  and  did   studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)      |      articles     philipp  ther   37   not  always  correspond  with  images  conjured  up  by  television,  brochures   of   expellee   associations,   and   letters   from   relatives   who   had   emigrated   there   before.   especially   at   work   upper   silesians   were   not   greeted   as   compatriots   but   rejected   as   poles,   particularly   in   the   former   german   democratic  republic.  those  with  a  good  command  of  german  still  spoke  a   dialect   that   sounded   foreign   to   people   west   of   the   oder   and   neisse.   in   addition  to  this,  job  seekers  from  silesia  were  hardly  regarded  as  lost  sons   of  the  fatherland  but  frequently  as  competition.  because  of  this  renewed   experience   of   national   differences   after   the   1989   revolution,   many   members  of  the  mixed  population  turned  away  from  germany  and  german   nationality.   as  berlińska  has  shown,  some  years  after  the  1989  revolution  more  than   two  thirds  of  the  minority  population  considered  themselves  exclusively   or  primarily  silesian,  while  only  about  one   tenth  defined   themselves  as   german.45  less   is  known  about  changes  in  the  identities  of  the  majority   population,   which   migrated   or   were   forced   to   migrate   to   silesia   in   the   postwar  period.  most  of  them  clearly  and  sometimes  exclusively  identify   with  poland  as  a  nation  and  as  a  state.  the  changes  in  poland  since  1989   contributed   to   a   generally   stronger   perception   of   the   regional   or   local   homeland  as  a  point  of  reference.  in  the  province  of  opole,  the  minority   possessed  a  concrete  territory  in  which  they  could  realise  their  political   ideas.  since  the  1989  revolution,  the  ‘socio-­‐cultural  society  of  germans  in   poland’   has   produced   numerous   mayors,   chief   administrative   officers,   some  members  of  the  sejm,  and  a  few  senators  in  the  second  chamber  of   the   polish   parliament.   in   the   2003   census,   however,   173,000   people   unexpectedly   declared   themselves   ‘silesian’.46   among   these   were   many   former  members  of   the  german  minority   that  had  sharply  decreased   in   numbers   to   become   the   second   largest   minority   in   poland   after   the   silesians.  with  this  result,  the  minority  demonstrated  that  their  regional   allegiance  was  stronger  than  a  national  polish  or  german  one.   after  the  census  was  taken,  the  leadership  of  the  regional  movement  tried   to  gain  recognition  as  national  minority.  this  was  first  denied  by  the  polish   government   and   courts,   then   also   by   the   highest   european   court   in   strasbourg.  the  refusal  in  poland  was  based  on  fears  that  a  new  separatist   studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)      |      articles     philipp  ther  38   movement  might  arise.  indeed,  the  widespread  discontent  in  upper  silesia   with   the   social   and   economic   situation   of   the   region   might   feed   some   discontent.  but  the  anti-­‐reaction  against  the  silesian  movement  was  driven   rather   by   historical   memories   than   by   rational   calculations   or   public   opinion   polling.   in   strasbourg,   the   underlying   issue   was   that   if   the   silesians   were   to   gain   recognition,   then   other   groups   might   organise   themselves  as  national  minorities  as  well.  that  would  be  in  contrast  to  the   still   dominant   vision   that   the   european   states   are   homogenous   nation   states.  none  of   these  states  would  today  repeat   the  coercive  nationality   policy  of  the  interwar  and  postwar  period.  but  it  still  seems  to  be  difficult   to   accept   diversity   and   to   overcome   the   utopia   of   homogenous   nation   states  if  divergent  groups  come  into  existence.   summary   by   looking  at   the  case  of  upper  silesia,  one  can  show  the  endurance  of   regions  as  objects  of  identification,  which  is  surprising  precisely  because   of   the  wide  range  of   references   they  host.  the  upper  silesia  which   the   silesian  or  german  minority  refers  to  today  has  little  in  common  with  the   prussian  region  of  upper  silesia  of  the  early  twentieth  century.  the  size  of   the   area,   its   social   and   demographic   structures,   and   its   state   affiliation   changed  several  times,  quite  dramatically,  between  1900  and  2000.  and   yet   today   a   significant   number   of   people   identify   themselves   primarily   with  the  substratum  called  upper  silesia.  national  identities,  by  contrast,   appear  volatile  and  context-­‐dependent.  such  processes  can  be  shown  to   have  taken  place  not  only  in  upper  silesia  but  also  in  other  intermediary   spaces   such   as   alsace.   with   these   intermediary   spaces   and   their   inhabitants  frequently  crushed  between  national  millstones,  the  european   idea  presented  itself  as  a  possible  solution.  it  is  no  coincidence  that  some   prominent   figures   of   the   european   movement   or   a   european   historiography,   such   as   with   robert   schuman   and   lucien   febvre,   originated  from  such  intermediary  spaces.   studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)      |      articles     philipp  ther   39   although  the  regionalism  in  upper  silesia  has  so  far  failed  to  achieve  its   aims   to   the   extent   other   regional   movements   have   –   with   any   comprehensive  autonomy  still  lacking  –  it  proves  the  limits  of  concepts  of   nationality  and  nation  states.  the  relationship  between  nationalism  and   regionalism  is  fundamentally  defined  by  the  attractiveness  and  inclusive   ability  of  the  concept  in  question.  that  means,  however,  that  nation  and   region  should  not  be  understood  as   firmly  established  quantities  but  as   relational   options   employed   in   political   discourses   and   practices.   collective   identification   models   such   as   the   nation   or   the   region   are   transitory.  the  history  of  europe  is,  then,  in  this  respect  an  open  book.  it   remains  to  be  seen  whether  it  will  continue  to  be  a  matter  of  a  europe  of   fatherlands  or  whether  a  europe  of  regions  will  gain  in  significance.  this  is   even   more   true   for   the   enlarged   european   union   and   hence,   academic   disciplines  studying  not  past  but  present-­‐day  changes,  making  it  just  one   more   reason   to   take   the   study   of   regions   as   a   way   of   approaching   european  history.  the  schengen  treaty  and  its  expansion  to  the  east   in   2007  have  removed  all  border  controls  from  the  bug  in  eastern  poland  to   portugal   in   the   west.   this   means   that   the   european   borderlands   have   ceased   to   be   located   at   state   borders   in   the   previous   sense.   of   course,   schengen  has  not  removed  linguistic,  social,  and  political  borders.  but  it   remains   to   be   seen   how   this   reconfiguration   will   influence   the   intermediary  spaces  in  europe.   looking   back   at   their   history   again,   one   can   distinguish   three   major   periods.  the  late  age  of  empires  between  1848  and  1918  was  undoubtedly   an   age   of   nationalism.   people's   identification   with   regions   did   not   diminish,  however,  but  was  spread  in  various  borderlands  as  a  result  of  a   generally   rising   tide   of   politicisation   of   the   population.   the   national   movements  hit  their   limits  in  the  horizontal  and  vertical  mobilisation  of   societies.  because  of   their  mostly  bourgeois  character  and  other   factors   such  as  religious  and  linguistic  differences,   the  national  movements  had   problems   mobilising   the   urban   and   the   rural   under-­‐classes.   this   is   especially  true  for  borderlands  such  as  upper  silesia  or  alsace.  world  war   i  was  a  catalyst  of  nationalism,  but  especially  in  countries  that  had  lost  the   war,  regional  movements  also  gained  power.  however,  they  were  always   hampered  by  the  lack  of  a  secular  elite.  so  even  when  nation  states  were   studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)      |      articles     philipp  ther  40   weakened,  such  as  germany  in  1918-­‐19,  the  regional  movements  could  not   achieve  autonomy,  let  alone  secession  or  independence.   the  second  period  lasted  from  1918  until  1939,  in  which  the  old  and  new   nation  states  demanded  an  unambiguous  identification  from  their  citizens.   this  created  conflicts  with  national  minorities,  and  in  particular  with  and   within  disputed  borderlands.  as  a  reaction,   the  nation  states   intensified   their   nationalising   policies.   regional   movements   became   suspicious   of   helping  enemy  states  across  the  borders  or  guessed  that  minorities  could   be   trojan   horses   within   the   body   of   an   organically   understood   nation.   various  nation  states  such  as  france  in  alsace,  both  germany  and  poland   in  upper  silesia,  romania  in  transylvania,  italy  in  south  tirol,  or  the  states   which  had  carved  up  macedonia,  developed  repressive  policies.  instead  of   accepting   at   least   a   minimum   of   regional   specifics,   any   demands   for   polish  and  german  propaganda  posters  for  the  1921  silesian  plebiscite.   wikimedia  commons  –  muzem  historii  katowic   studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)      |      articles     philipp  ther   41   autonomy   were   interpreted   as   a   danger   for   the   nation   state.   the   repressions  ranged  from  discrimination  to  persecution  and  deportations   of  elites.  this  created  deep  conflicts  that  should  not  be  interpreted  in  the   framework  of  minority  politics  only,  but  also  as  conflicts  between  centres   and  marginalised  borderlands.   the   suppression   of   regionalism   was   mostly   counterproductive.   for   a   demonstration  of  this  we  can  look  not  only  to  upper  silesia,  but  also  to   alsace.  christiane  kohser-­‐spohn  has  shown  how  the  french  policy  against   the  regional  movement  in  the  1920s  turned  sour  an  alsatian  society  which   had  welcomed  french  troops   in  1918.  similar  conclusions  can  be  made   about   other   nation   states   and   their   nationality   policy   in   disputed   borderlands.47  although  discontent  was  widespread,  none  of  the  regional   movements  were  able  to  reach  their  ideal  goals  or  even  reduce  the  degree   of  suppression  by  nation  states.  this  was  mostly  due  to  their  weakness  in   term  of  organisation  and  political  ideology,  and  their  late  start  compared   to   national   movements.   moreover,   the   nation   states   could   offer   careers   that   were   of   course   pursued   by   inhabitants   of   the   borderlands.   the   regional  movements  were  caught  in  between  the  nation  states.  looking  for   support  beyond  the  border  was  not  a  viable  solution  anymore  after  1945   because  the  regional  movements  in  alsace,  the  silesians  in  poland  and  the   schleswiger  in  denmark  were  tainted  by  collaboration  with  the  national   socialists.   after  world  war  ii,  our  third  period,  europe  was  structured  into  nation   states  that  were  more  homogenised  than  ever  before.  the  borderlands  lost   all   opportunity   to   raise   a   political   voice,   let   alone   to   form   a   regional   movement   again.   only   in   the   late   1960s   did   new   dynamics   emerge.   in   western   europe   this   was   mostly   due   to   the   activities   of   the   student   movement.  the  regionalist  component  of  1968  has,  however,  not  received   much  attention  by  historians.  in  alsace,  bretagne,  and  parts  of  southern   france  regional   initiatives  gathered  and  established   institutions.  similar   developments  can  be  observed  in  wales  and  scotland,  in  parts  of  italy,  and   in  spain  after   the  death  of  franco.  this   ‘new’  regionalism  was  partially   inspired  by   the  political  left,   and   it  utilised   the  vocabulary  of   the  anti-­‐ colonial  struggle.48  in  france,  the  activists  also  spoke  about  a  ‘renaissance’   studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)      |      articles     philipp  ther  42   of   the   region,   revealing   the   relevance  of   invented   traditions.  altogether   this  regionalism  was  very  different  from  the  interwar  period,  when  there   still  was  a  strong  influence  from  clerics  and  right-­‐wing  parties,  and  is  ripe   for  attention  as  a  distinct  era.   in  the  late  1960s,  identification  directed  against  hegemonic  nation  states   also   increased   in  central  and  eastern  europe,  but  developed  a  different   dynamic.  officially   the  autonomist  slovak,  croat,  macedonian,  and  other   elites  asked  for  more  regional  autonomy,  but  the  political  discourses  soon   focused   on   national   interest   and   rights.   the   regimes   in   both   countries   responded   with   federalisation   (1969   in   czechoslovakia,   1974   in   yugoslavia),  but  this  did  not  have  the  same  results  as  in  france  or  britain,   where  regions  also  gained  power  in  the  1970s  and  80s.  in  eastern  europe,   the   devolution   of   political   power   strengthened   national   discourses   and   national  movements.  similar  conclusions  could  be  made  about  post-­‐franco   spain,   where   the   regional   movements   called   themselves   national   movements.   but   only   a   minority   of   catalans   or   galicians   called   for   independence  from  their  regions.  hence,  one  can  label  these  movements   as  predominantly  regionalist  according  to  the  definition  here  provided.  in   the  basque  country  and  in  northern  ireland,  events  took  a  different  course   because  violence  was  introduced.49   in  western  europe  the  postwar  regionalism  was  also  strengthened  by  the   european  community/union.  this  seems  to  be  paradoxical  on  first  view   because  originally  the  concept  of  the  ec  had  been  a  ‘europe  of  fatherlands’.   but   the  european  union  organised   its  various  programs   for  agriculture   and   in  particular   for   infrastructure   in  such  a  way   that   the  entities  who   could  apply   for   funds  were  not  entire  nation  states,  but  rather   the   less   developed  parts  of   them.   inequality  was  defined  on  a  regional  not  on  a   national   basis.   this   motivated   regional   interest   groups   to   become   politically  active   in  order  to  get   funding   from  brussels.  one  can  explain   this  development  through  a  comparison  with  the  united  nations.  while  it   is  necessary  on  a  global  level  to  make  political  claims  as  a  nation  because   only  nation  states  can  become  members  of  the  united  nations,  in  europe   certain   benefits,   especially   the   structural   funds,   are   distributed   at   a   regional   level.  moreover,   the  states  that  already  had  a  federal  structure,   studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)      |      articles     philipp  ther   43   such  as  germany,  pressed   for  a  general   federalisation  of   the  ec  and   its   single   member   states.   this   culminated   in   the   establishment   of   the   ‘committee  of  the  regions’  (cor)  in  the  maastricht  treaty,  which  is  better   known  for  having  laid  the  groundwork  for  the  common  currency,  the  euro.   it  is  disputed  how  much  power  the  cor  really  has.  since  the  enlargement   of   the   eu   in   2004,   this   consultative   body   has   rarely   produced   any   headlines  or  public  discourses.  but  this  institutionalisation  might  be  more   relevant  in  the  future.  it  is  an  open  question  how  the  ‘europe  of  nations’   will  develop  into  a  ‘europe  of  regions’.   independently  of  this  process,  regions  and  in  particular  borderlands  are   important   objects   of   study   for   historians.   they   make   it   possible   to   overcome   the   still   dominant   national   paradigm,   they   reveal   the   contingency   in   nation   building   and   nation   state   formation,   and   they   demonstrate   that   no   territorial   and   group   identification,   be   it   on   a   national,  regional,  or  local  level,  is  set  and  stable.     endnotes   1   see   ph.   ther,   ‘caught   in   between.   border   regions   in   modern   europe’,   in:   o.   bartov  &  e.d.  weitz  (eds.),  shatterzone  of  empires.  coexistence  and  violence  in  the   german,  habsburg,  russian,  and  ottoman  borderlands  (bloomington,  2013)  485-­‐ 502.   the   author   and   snm’s   editorial   staff   thank   the   publisher   for   allowing   to   publish  a  revised  version  of  this  article.  the  condensed  material  appears  courtesy   of  indiana  university  press;  permission  duly  granted,  gratis.   2  the  term  ‘identification’  is  preferred  in  this  article  because  it  indicates  an  active   process  which  can  be  gradual,   fluid,  or  multiple.  for  the  debate  about  the  term   identity  see  r.  brubaker  &  f.  cooper,  ‘beyond  identity’,  in:  theory  and  society,  29   (2000)   1-­‐47.   see   also   the   genealogical   treatise   in   l.   niethammer,   kollektive   identität.  heimliche  quellen  einer  unheimlichen  konjuktur  (hamburg,  2000).     studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)      |      articles     philipp  ther  44     3  this  project  is  documented  in  a  publication  by  ph.  ther  &  h.  sundhaussen  (eds.),   regionale   bewegungen   und   regionalismen   in   europäischen   zwischenräumen   seit   der  mitte  des  19.  jahrhunderts  (marburg,  2003).   4  see  r.g.  suny,  ‘history  and  the  making  of  nations’,  in:  z.  gitelman  (ed.),  cultures   and   nations   of   central   and   eastern   europe.   essays   in   honor   of   roman   szporluk   (cambridge,  2000)  569-­‐589.   5  on  the  comparison  with  modern  painting,  see  e.  gellner,  nations  and  nationalism   (ithaca,   1983)   139ff.   rogers   brubaker   used   this   in   his   essay   ‘myths   and   misconceptions   in   the   study   of   nationalism’,   in:   j.a.   hall   (ed.),  the   state   of   the   nation.  ernest  gellner  and  the  theory  of  nationalism  (cambridge,  1998)  272-­‐306   (294  ff.).   6  see  m.  fulbrook,  ‘introduction.  states,  nations,  and  the  development  of  europe’,   in:  m.  fulbrook  (ed.),  national  histories  and  european  history  (london,  1993)  1-­‐20.   7   on   the   change   of   identities   among   the   silesian   population   see   d.   berlińska,   mniejszość   niemiecka   na   śląsku   opolskim   w   poszukiwaniu   tożsamośći   (opole,   1999).   8  in  standard  polish  the  sentence  would  read  ‘jechałem  na  rowerze,  zderzyłem  się   z  drzewem  i  skrzywiła  się  kierownica.’   9  on  the  social  function  of  such  ‘consistent  dialects’,  explored  through  the  example   of   teschen   silesia,   cf.   k.   hannan,   language   and   identity   in   a   west   slavic   borderland.  the  case  of  teschen  silesia  (austin,  1994).   10   h.-­‐ch.   trepte,   '"die   hiesigen"   (tuejsi/tutejšyja).   regionales   bewusstsein   im   polnisch-­‐weissrussischem   grenzraum’,   in:   ther   &   sundhaussen,   regionale   bewegungen  und  regionalismen,  145-­‐160.   11  k.  hannan,  borders  of  language  and  identity  in  teschen  silesia  (new  york,  1996).   12  c.  applegate,   ‘a  europe  of  regions.  reflections  on  the  historiography  of  sub-­‐ national  places  in  modern  times’,  in:  american  historical  review,  104  (1999)  1157-­‐ 1182.   13   centre-­‐periphery   models   are   therefore   hardly   suited   to   analysing   the   cases   examined  here.  on  the  problematic  nature  of  such  models,  see  also  applegate,  ‘a   europe  of  regions’,  1167.     studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)      |      articles     philipp  ther   45     14  among  the  main  proponents  of  the  debate  were  and  are  gellner,  nations  and   nationalism;   b.   anderson,   imagined   communities.   reflections   on   the   origin   and   spread  of  nationalism   (london,  1983);  a.d.  smith,  nations  and  nationalism   in  a   global   era   (cambridge,   1995).   miroslav   hroch   came   up   with   a   convincing   compromise  on  this  contentious  issue  in  which  he  accepts  that  the  nation  is  to  be   regarded  as  a  project  which  is  basically  formed  by  previously  existing  economic,   political,  and  linguistic  areas  of  communication:  m.  hroch,  ‘real  and  constructed.   the  nature  of  the  nation’,  in:  hall,  the  state  of  the  nation,  91-­‐106.   15   see   as   prototypical   examples   e.   weber,   peasants   into   frenchmen.   the   modernization   of   rural   france,   1870-­1914   (stanford   1976);   a.   miller,   ‘russko-­‐ ukrainskije  otnošenija  v  19  i  načale  20  veka.  rusifikacija  i  pričiny  jejo  neudači’,  in:   ruskij  istoričeskij  žurnal,  1  (1998)  131-­‐148.   16   this   mainstream   point   of   view   of   postwar   west   german   history   writing   is   expounded  in  h.-­‐u.  wehler,  deutsche  gesellschaftsgeschichte,  3:  von  der  'deutschen   doppelrevolution’  bis  zum  beginn  des  ersten  weltkrieges  (munich,  1995)  962.  more   recent  publications  have  modified  or  revised  the  assumption  that  minorities  were   largely   assimilated;   see   h.   henning   hahn   &   p.   kunze   (eds.),   nationale   minderheiten  und  minderheitenpolitik   in  deutschland   im  19.   jahrhundert   (berlin,   1999).   on   upper   silesia   in   particular,   see   ph.   ther,   'die   grenzen   des   nationalismus.  der  wandel  von  identitäten  in  oberschlesien  von  der  mitte  des  19.   jahrhunderts   bis   1939’,   in:   u.   von   hirschhausen   &   j.   leonhard   (eds.),   nationalismen  in  europa.  west  und  osteuropa  im  vergleich  (göttingen,  2001)  322-­‐ 346.   17   ch.   geulen,   'die   metamorphose   der   identität.   zur   "langlebigkeit"   des   nationalismus’,   in:   a.   assmann   &   h.   friese   (eds.),   identitäten,   erinnerung,   geschichte,  identität  (frankfurt  am  main,  1998)  vol.  3,  346-­‐373  (359).   18   h.-­‐g.   haupt,   m.   müller   &   s.   woolf   (eds.),   regional   and   national   identities   in   europe  in  the  xixth  and  xxth  centuries  (the  hague,  1998)  4,  14;  m.g.  müller  &  r.   petri   (eds.),   zur   konstruktion   nationaler   identität   in   sprachlich   gemischten   grenzregionen  (marburg,  2002).   19  a  recently  published  volume  on  the  incorporation  of  borders  into  the  concept  of   the   nation   formulates   a   similar   question,   albeit   indirectly:   müller   &   petri,   zur   konstruktion   nationaler   identität.   the   introduction   to   this   volume   contains   a   comprehensive  bibliography  on  this  subject.     studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)      |      articles     philipp  ther  46     20  on  the  problematic  nature  of  the  tendency  to  regard  regions  and  towns  as  given   or  essential,  see   for  example,   j.  revel,   ‘la  région’,   in:  p.  nora  (ed.),  les   lieux  de   mémoire,  3:  les  france,  1:  conflicts  et  partages   (paris,  1992)  851-­‐883  (854).  a   convincing  definition  can  also  be  found  in  w.  schmale,  historische  komparatistik   und   kulturtransfer.   europageschichtliche   perspektiven   für   die   landesgeschichte   (bochum,   1998)   54.   neither   this   article   nor   the   comparative   volume   on   regionalism   published   in   2003   (cited   in   note   3)   intend   to   contribute   to   the   establishment  of  regional  identities.   21  see  the  introduction  of  r.  brubaker,  nationalism  reframed.  nationhood  and  the   national  question  in  the  new  europe  (cambridge,  1996).   22   on   the   potential   of   these   terms,   see   e.   hobsbawm   &   t.   ranger   (eds.),   the   invention  of  tradition  (cambridge,  1983);  anderson,  imagined  communities.   23  a  detailed  account  of  the  relationship  between  regional  and  national  identities   in  upper  silesia  can  be  found  in  k.  struve  &  ph.  ther  (eds.),  nationen  und  ihre   grenzen.  identitätenwandel  in  oberschlesien  in  der  neuzeit  (marburg,  2002).  most   of  the  relevant  literature  published  up  to  2001  is  listed  in  the  introduction  to  this   book.   24  a.  confino,  the  nation  as  a  local  metaphor.  württemberg,  imperial  germany  and   national   memory,   1871-­1918   (chapel   hill,   1997);   c.   applegate,   a   nation   of   provincials.  the  german  idea  of  heimat  (berkeley,  1990).  on  the  regional  basis  and   orientation  of  the  german  national  movement,  see  d.  langewiesche,  'föderativer   nationalismus   als   erbe   der   deutschen   reichsnation.   über   föderalismus   und   zentralismus   in   der   deutschen   nationalgeschichte’,   in:   d.   langewiesche   &   g.   schmidt   (eds.),  föderative  nation.  deutschlandkonzepte  von  der  reformation  bis   zum  ersten  weltkrieg  (munich,  2000).   25  on  the  struggle  between  state  and  church  in  upper  silesia,  see  j.  bahlcke,  'die   geschichte  der  schlesischen  territorien  von  den  anfängen  bis  zum  ausbruch  des   zweiten   weltkrieges’,   in:   j.   bahlcke   (ed.),   schlesien   und   die   schlesier   (munich,   1996)  14-­‐154  (103-­‐104).   26  m.  szmeja,  niemcy?  polacy?  ślązacy!  rodzimi  mieszkańcy  opolszczyzny  w  świetle   analiz  socjologicznych  (kraków,  2000)  65-­‐74.   27  for  a  complete  panorama  of  the  various  national  and  subnational  population   groups  in  upper  silesia  and  their  identification  designs,  see  t.  kamusella,  silesia     studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)      |      articles     philipp  ther   47     and  central  european  nationalism.  the  emergence  of  national  and  ethnic  groups  in   prussian  silesia  and  austrian  silesia,  1848-­1918  (west  lafayette,  2007).   28   quoted   from   materials   of   the   bund   der   oberschlesier   in   a.   schmidt-­‐rösler,   'autonomie-­‐   und   separatismusbestrebungen   in   oberschlesien   1918-­‐1922’,   in:   zeitschrift  für  ostmitteleuropaforschung,  48/1  (1999)  1-­‐49  (11).   29   it   has   become   difficult   to   navigate   the   sheer   amount   of   literature   on   the   plebiscite,  which  cannot  be  listed  here  due  to  lack  of  space.  on  upper  silesia  after   world  war  i:  k.  struve  (ed.),  oberschlesien  nach  dem  ersten  weltkrieg.  studien  zu   einem  nationalen  konflikt  und  seiner  erinnerung  (marburg,  2003).   30  w.  wrzesiński,  polski  ruch  narodowy  w  niemczech  1922-­1939  (poznań,  1970)   222-­‐232.  at  the  national  census  of  1933,  about  100,000  people  stated  that  polish   was   their  mother   tongue  and  266,375  declared  polish  and  german   to  be   their   native  languages.   31   '9.12.1935.   der   oberpräsident   in   breslau   an   den   reichs-­‐   und   preußischen   minister  des  innern.  lagebericht’,  in:  r.  jaworksi,  m.  wojciechowski,  m.  niendorf   &  p.  hauser  (eds.),  deutsche  und  polen  zwischen  den  kriegen.  minderheitenstatus   und  volkstumkampf  im  grenzgebiet  amtliche  berichterstattung  aus  beider  ländern   1920-­1939  (munich,  1997)  877-­‐881  (878).  cf.  a  report  of  march  1935  with  similar   content   by   the   president   of   the   local   government   in   opolskie   in   jaworski   e.a.,   deutsche  und  polen,  857-­‐862  (862).   32  cf.  various  reports  in  jaworski  e.a.,  deutsche  und  polen,  872,  881,  895.   33   quoted   in   j.   kokot,   'wojenne   i   powojenne   losy   byłej   ludności   niemieckiej   śląska’,  in:  ekonomia,  1  (1965)  5-­‐51  (13-­‐15).   34  wrzesiński,  polski  ruch  narodowy,  374-­‐380.  on  the  national  socialist  policy  on   nationalism  during  world  war  ii,  see  p.  madajczyk,  przyłączenie  śląska  opolskiego   do  polski  1945-­1948  (warsaw,  1996)  45,  121.   35  for  an  estimate  of   the  german  proportion  of   the  population,   see  k.  ðmigiel   (ed.),   die   statistische   erhebung   über   die   deutschen   katholiken   in   den   bistümern   polens   1928   und   1936   (marburg,   1992)   220;   m.   wanatowicz,   ‘niemcy   wobec   problemu  integracji  górnego  śląska  z  rzeczpospolitą  (1922-­‐1939)’,   in:  a.  szefer   (ed.),   niemcy   wobec   konfliktu   narodowościowego   na   górnym   śląsku   po   i   wojnie   światowej   (poznań,   1989)   141-­‐156   (154);   f.   serafin,   ‘wpływ   drugiej     studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)      |      articles     philipp  ther  48     rzeczypospolitej   na   przemiany   demograficzne   i   społeczne   w   województwie   śląskim  w  latach  1922-­‐1939’,  in:  m.w.  wanatowicz  (ed.),  rola  i  miejsce  górnego   śląska  w  drugiej  rzeczypospolitej  (bytom,  1995)  163-­‐182  (169ff.).   36  quoted  in  m.  wanatowicz,  ludność  napływowa  na  górnym  śląsku  w  latach  1922-­ 1939   (katowice,   1982)   345.   on   the   national   attitudes   of   the   population   particularly   in   eastern   upper   silesia,   see   p.   hauser,   'zur   frage   der   nationalen   identität   der   oberschlesischen   bevölkerung   in   der   zeit   zwischen   den   beiden   weltkriegen’,   in:   g.   stöber   &   r.   maier   (eds.),   grenzen   und   grenzräume   in   der   deutschen   und   polnischen   geschichte.   scheidelinie   oder   begegnungsraum?   (hannover,  2000)  205-­‐216.   37   m.   marek   drożdowski,   'górny   śląsk   czasów   drugiej   rzeczypospolitej.   rzeczywistość,  stereotypy,  mity’,   in:  wanatowicz,  rola   i  miejsce  górnego  śląska,   65-­‐83  (75ff.).   38  t.  falęcki,  niemieckie   szkolnictwo  mniejszościowe  na  górnym  śląsku  w   latach   1922-­1939  (katowice,  1970)  67.   39  jaworski  e.a.,  deutsche  und  polen,  983.   40  jaworski  e.a.,  deutsche  und  polen,  949.   41  jaworski  e.a.,  deutsche  und  polen,  933.   42  b.  linek,  ‘odniemczanie’  województwa  śląskiego  w  latach  1945-­1950  (w  świetle   materiałów  wojewódzkich)  (opole,  1997).   43  this  immigrant  population  deserves  special  attention  already  for  the  mere  fact   that  in  the  course  of  postwar  history,  it  came  to  be  a  large  majority  in  historical   upper   silesia   and   the   present-­‐day   provinces   of   opole   and   katowice.   since   the   third  postwar  generation  has  already  been  born,  it  would  seem  anachronistic  to   call  them  ‘settlers’,  and  the  silesian  society  ‘indigenous  population’,  as  they  were   labelled  in  the  1990s.  but  within  the  framework  of  this  article  i  cannot  deal   in   detail  with  the  (former)  ‘settlers’  (osiedlency)  who  came  to  silesia  after  1945.   44  a  similar  conclusion  was  drawn  by  sociologist  k.  żygulski  already  in  communist   times.   see   his   uncensored   manuscript   in   opole,   opole   instytut   śląski,   a   1454:   przyczyny  wyjazdu  ludności  rodzimej  z  woj.  opolskiego  na  zachód,  24.  the  grounds   for  bożek’s  disappointment   lay   in  the   fact   that  he,  as  one  of   the  proponents  of   polishness  among  the  upper  silesians,  strongly  overestimated  their  actual  link  to     studies  on  national  movements,  1  (2013)      |      articles     philipp  ther   49     the   polish   nation.   the   same   thing   applies   to   żygulski,   whose   essay   was   suppressed  by  the  censors.   45  d.  berlińska,  'identität  und  nationale  identifikation  der  schlesier  nach  1989’,  in:   struve  &  ther,  nationen  und  ihre  grenzen,  275-­‐308.   46  cf.  one  of  the  first  press  reactions,  a.  klich,   ‘czy  ślązacy  są  narodowości’,   in:   gazeta   wyborcza,   1/7/2003.   see   for   a   more   in   depth   study   m.g.   gerlich,   ‘my   prawdziwi  górnoślązacy…’.  studium  ethnologiczne  (warsaw,  2010).   47  on  alsace,  see  the  work  by  the  swiss  historian  k.-­‐h.  rothenberger,  die  elsaß-­ lothringische  heimat-­  und  autonomiebewegung  zwischen  den  beiden  weltkriegen   (bern,  1976);  also  a.  wahl  &  j.-­‐c.  richez,  l'alsace  entre  france  et  allemagne  1850-­ 1950  (paris,  1994).   48  traces  of  anti-­‐colonial  terms  can  also  be  found  in  academic  literature,  which   invented  the  term  of  ‘internal  colonialism’.  see  for  example  m.  hechter,  internal   colonialism.  the  celtic  fringe  in  british  national  development  1536-­1966  (berkeley,   1977);   j.  blaschke,  volk,  nation,   interner  kolonialismus.  konzepte  zur  politischen   soziologie  der  westeuropäischen  regionalbewegungen  (berlin,  1984).   49  consult   for   these  conflicts   the  comparative  research  by   the  sociologist  peter   waldmann,   who   published   widely   in   german   and   spanish.   see   in   spanish   p.   waldmann,   radicalismo   étnico.   análisis   comparado   de   las   causas   y   efectos   en   conflictos  etnicos  violentos  (madrid,  1997).   art_jacobson_v4_def stephen jacobson, ‘the origins of the ambiguity. nation and empire in catalonia from the middle ages to the 1880s’, in: studies on national movements, 2 (2014). http://snm.nise.eu/index.php/studies/article/view/0207a stephen jacobson the origins of the ambiguity nation and empire in catalonia from the middle ages to the 1880s when addressing the subject of nationhood, tracing ‘origins’ is a risky affair. after all, origins are the stuff of which nations are made. invariably, nationalists hark back to the existence of an ethnic community of descent, usually from the middle ages, but sometimes from even before, in order to infuse their political claims with the legitimacy of history and the gravity of destiny. as such, the historian has a hard time disentangling his or her studies from nationalist narratives, and is forced to perform discursive gymnastics in order to avoid misinterpretation. another difficulty is that many studies tend to be teleological. more often than not, they consist of a series of events and ideas, presented in a decontextualised though intelligible order that culminate with the birth of a nation state or a nationalist movement.1 for this reason, it is necessary to avoid projecting contemporary definitions onto the past and to strike the correct balance when evaluating the relationship between modern nationalism and earlier forms of nationhood. on one level, it was not until the late eighteenth century that important sectors of the population realised that ethnocultural identities harboured political potential and power. on another level, the contours and characteristics of modern nationalisms were conditioned, though by no means determined, by their early modern and studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles stephen jacobson 2 medieval pasts. a conservative approach would be to leave the subject to experts in each period, and to abandon master narratives to the nationalists themselves. a more risky but potentially more rewarding endeavour is to analyse the subject of nationhood over the longue durée while being aware of the methodological challenges. with respect to catalonia and indeed many places in europe, the question of origins is intriguing because catalans have long possessed multiple political identities and allegiances. throughout their history, they have belonged to different composite monarchies, imperial constellations and nation states (the crown of aragon, the kingdoms of spain, the kingdom of spain) and have shared institutions with other peoples of the iberian peninsula. dual and multi-layered identities have been a permanent feature of the political landscape, although the meanings of such identities have changed over time and not all individuals or social groups have understood them in the same way or were even always aware of their existence.2 the foundation of a modern political movement, in the latter decades of the nineteenth century, did not end or resolve such ambiguities. catalan nationalism – or ‘catalanism’ as it is often called – has included various organisations from the right and the left that have proposed diverse relationships with the spanish state. maximalist political demands have ranged from independence to home rule to federalism to the periodic defence of regional interests. catalan nationhood (the sense of belonging to a community of catalans) has been alternatively interpreted as being antagonistic to and compatible with spanish nationhood. catalan nationalism can appear as an anti-colonial movement against castilian imperialism or as an imperial movement led by catalans who consider themselves more practical, hardworking, constitutionalist and better fit to govern than castilians or other peoples in spain.3 in order to explore origins, then, it is necessary to embark on the history of a dual political identity, of being catalan and being spanish. this article ends in the 1880s when the first catalanists began to demand home rule, also known as ‘political autonomy’. initially led by a small group of lawyers and intellectuals, it was not until 1901 that a political party, the lliga regionalista, contested elections and sent deputies to the spanish congress. from the outset, catalanism was forward-looking studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles stephen jacobson 3 rather than a romantic defence of a bygone way of life. its founders argued that catalonia, the most affluent and economically developed region in spain, deserved its own government, directed by native politicians, judges and administrators, familiar with the language, customs and laws of the people and sensitive to the complex needs of an industrial society. as was the case with many nationalist movements, its ideologues harked back to the history of the medieval principality in order to legitimate political claims. in its nascent stages, few foresaw that catalanism was to become the most everlasting political force in the region. the study of ‘origins’, then, explores how the unforeseeable was possible, and how the past can help illuminate present ambiguities. origins: the idea of a catalan nation the origins of what could be termed nationhood – or better yet, the existence of an ethnic community of catalans – can be traced to the middle ages. as is obvious, the ethnic component of this phrase does not imply the existence of a genetically defined community of descent. rather, feelings of shared identity developed around the institution of the monarchy, or in the case of catalonia, the counts of barcelona, in addition to the estates in parliament (the corts) and its standing commission (the diputació). the name ‘catalans’ first appeared in pisan chronicles of the twelfth century, written in latin. at the time, the count of barcelona, ramon berenguer iii, in tandem with his pisan counterpart, was mounting a series of raids on the islamic island of mallorca.4 later in the century, the name appeared in writing in catalonia itself. as susan reynolds has argued, ‘regnal communities’ have existed since the middle ages as ‘communities of the realm’ (to borrow an expression born in thirteenthcentury england), bound together by common laws, myths of descent, histories, loyalties and rivalries, duties and liberties.5 medieval historians of catalonia have analysed the formation – or ‘invention’ if you wish – of this community by studying myths of origins, names of children, juridical ties, language and the development of feelings of solidarity among the nobility, clergy and rich men (richs hòmens, to use studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles stephen jacobson 4 the medieval catalan expression).6 the definition of such a community was of considerable political importance given that catalans belonged, since the twelfth century, to the composite monarchy of the crown of aragon. the counts of the house of barcelona reigned as the kings of aragon, and their subjects included catalans and aragonese, who spoke different languages and possessed different constitutional privileges. in the late twelfth century, shortly after the count of barcelona became the king of aragon, royal documents began using the name ‘catalonia’ to distinguish the original counties from the aragonese territories acquired by marriage. the distinction between catalans and aragonese was as commonplace then as it is today. it is present in the thirteenth-century book of deeds, the royal ‘autobiography’ of jaume i, ‘the conqueror’ (r. 1213-1276), the first of the mythical ‘four great chronicles’. for example, the autobiographer recounts the holding of corts (a parliamentary session) in the town of lleida, in which both catalans (cathalans) and aragonese (aragoneses) attended. in another passage, he refers to a military campaign in which it was necessary to separate physically the catalans from the aragonese (‘metem los aragoneses d’una part e els cathalans de l’altra’).7 the distinction is also clear in the fourteenthcentury chronicle (1325-1328) of ramon muntaner, the third of the four chronicles. in a passage often cited as evidence of precocious nationhood, the author boasts that he knows of no people who speak a single language as numerous as the catalans. in contrast, ‘castile has many provinces in which all have their own language, and they are as divided as the catalans are from the aragonese.’8 medieval ‘citizenship’ laws codified the distinction between catalans, aragonese and the other peoples of the territories of the crown of aragon, which also came to include, at one time or another, the balearic islands, valencia, occitania, sicily, sardinia, naples and other places in the western mediterranean. in the fourteenth century, the corts passed laws for the purpose of determining eligibility for royal employment in catalonia. the corts of montblanc in 1333 adopted the jus soli and considered a native anyone who was permanently domiciled in catalonia or the balearic islands. in 1422, the jus sangunis made its debut. a native was not only a permanent resident in catalonia; the category also included any person studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles stephen jacobson 5 who, domiciled elsewhere, could claim a father or grandfather who were natives.9 to use contemporary terminology, catalonia’s medieval citizenship regime exhibited both ‘ethnic’ and ‘civic’ characteristics.10 aragonese, although they formed part of the same political community and shared corts with the catalans, were excluded from royal posts in catalonia based upon blood and language. in contrast, valencians – who spoke the same language and could claim a similar line of descent – were excluded because they belonged to a different political community, the crown of valencia with its own corts. it is a subject of debate the extent to which members of the various peoples of the crown of aragon understood their place within a hierarchy of ethnicities in – or shared a sense of belonging to – a greater confederal ‘empire’.11 what is obvious, though, is that elite catalans (as well as valencians, aragonese and others) possessed identities as well as juridical forms of identification as a specific community or people, which distinguished them from others. the word ‘nation’ emerged slowly and was used sparingly until the eighteenth century. during the middle ages, the expression entered catalan through latin, from the word natio, one of the various (but not the only and certainly not the most common) biblical translation of the greek etnos.12 in the thirteenth-century book of deeds, the expression does not appear. nor did the author recur to an alternative expression, such as gens (people). in the fourteenth-century chronicle, muntaner did not employ the word nació to refer to catalans, although he used it on occasion to describe other peoples (provençals, islamic mallorcans, the french). in each instance, however, he invoked it when referring to nobles or persons from good families.13 one early reference to the catalan nobility as a natio came from the pen of the queen regent maría de luna in the early fifteenth century. she was not catalan by birth and hence used the expression to distinguish herself from the nobility with whom she was in conflict over the persistence of peasant servitude. in a message to pope benedict xiii written in latin, the good queen requested him ‘to extirpate […] this abominable, putrid, servitude […] this pestilent and reprobate servitude […] for the good of the catalan nation and to free it from ignominious opprobrium’.14 the existence of some of the most oppressive legal institutions associated with servitude (the so-called mals usos or ‘bad studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles stephen jacobson 6 customs’), long abolished in the rest of europe, gave the catalan nobility a dreadful reputation. even though the use of the terms natio (in latin) or nació (in catalan) was restricted to the nobility and elite, it was possible to invoke the existence of a broader linguistic or political community. in an attempt to include everyone and lacking a single expression, king jaume ii (r. 1291-1327) claimed authority over the ‘catalan nation, people and language’ (cathaloanorum nacio, gens et lingua).15 ramon muntaner claimed that catalans were a ‘community of the people’ (comunitat del poble) who shared a single language and flag (la senyera). by so doing, he distinguished catalonia from france, england, castile and greece where the diverse peoples of the realms spoke different languages even though they shared a flag.16 all this must be read in context. it is one thing to cite influential men who asserted the existence of an ethno-political community and quite another is to believe that all of the members of such an imagined community were conscious of its existence. the horizons of ramon muntaner and other educated men of his day were limited. in another part of the chronicle, he described catalan society as consisting of ‘nobles, rich men, counsellors, merchants, captains and mariners, crusaders and peons’.17 it would be erroneous to believe that ordinary medieval people had any clear notion of such a community, although some may have been vaguely aware by way of coinage, flags, coats-of-arms and, if they came into physical contact with it, the majesty of kingship and parliament. nor did nobles and good families believe to share ancestors with commoners despite being able to speak to them and to order them about. in catalonia, as elsewhere, the nobility and clergy propagated legendary myths of descent in which they asserted superior lineage and bluer blood. the presence of frankish or carolingian ancestry distinguished the heroic nobility from the cowardly peasants of gothic or even mixed-race origins. as such, catalan legends were similar to french ones. a thirteenth-century myth, which grew popular in the seventeenth century, distinguished the heroic nobles of frankish descent from the docile peasants of gaulish blood. in england, the idea of a ‘norman yoke’ was also based upon a similar opposition, although it was the commoners who marshalled ethnic studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles stephen jacobson 7 difference to their advantage. during the seventeenth century, revolutionaries claimed that england languished under nobles predisposed toward absolutism and papistry due to their norman descent, while the commoners were the ones with true anglo-saxon blood running through their veins.18 interestingly, in the nineteenth century, romanticist democratic historians in catalonia spun an imaginative version of the norman yoke argument. they asserted that the heroic medieval peasants were of ‘pure catalan race’ and that the oppressive nobility consisted of ‘barons of frank and germanic races’.19 the creation of the composite monarchy of ‘spain’ in the late fifteenth century did not cause elite catalans to rethink medieval conceptions of nationhood, although it did alter how they saw themselves within a hierarchy of ethnicities. on the one hand, the existence of various peoples within a single polity was hardly a novelty. it had existed previously in the crown of aragon and was the norm in all of europe.20 on the other hand, catalans were no longer a dominant, imperial group who governed and populated foreign lands and implanted, at least in some places, their law, language, feudal and political organisation and architectural styles. in contrast, they found themselves in a situation of inferiority with respect to castilians. the union of the crowns of aragon and castile, a decade following the marriage of ferdinand and isabel in 1469, created the kingdoms of spain. in theory, the union was to be one of equals. but following the discovery of the americas and the arrival of peruvian and mexican silver, castilians came to dominate royal councils and to occupy key positions in the mediterranean and atlantic empires. in the sixteenth century, cristòfor despuig assured the spanish kings that the catalans were an ‘obedient nation’ (fidelíssima nació) who should be given a greater role in imperial justice and administration. 21 in the early modern period, writers and speakers used various expressions and ideas to convey a shared sense of belonging to a political community, which more closely resembled modern conceptions of civic nationalism and sovereignty than the word ‘nation’ did at the time. when the catalan corts entered constitutional conflicts with the habsburg monarchy over fiscal and military obligations during the seventeenth century, deputies and jurists marshalled the terms terra and patria to studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles stephen jacobson 8 refer to the land and the liberties of catalonia as expressed in parliament.22 the nobleman and jurist francisco gilabert, in his discourses on the quality of the principality of catalonia, the temperament of its inhabitants and its government (1616), invoked both the ‘catalan nation’ and the patria in his defence of parliamentary institutions. echoing aristotle and predating montesquieu by more than a century, gilabert argued that the political traditions of catalonia sprung from the distinct temperament of the people, which derived from its peculiar geography and climate.23 throughout the seventeenth century, gilabert and others defended the catalan tradition of pactisme (shared sovereignty between king and parliament) against the march of royal absolutism. although it is possible to interpret gilabert as a precursor to modern constitutionalist thought originating with john locke, most have portrayed his work a defence of aristocratic privilege, the feudal law, corporate structures and even an apology for banditry. whatever the case, pactisme came to serve as a watchword for catalan political identity, often counter-posed to a splenetic castilian penchant for hierarchy and authority. although avoided by jurists embroiled in constitutional conflicts and used infrequently by others, the word ‘nation’ could serve propagandistic ends, hence foreshadowing later developments.24 by the seventeenth century, it had ceased being reserved for the nobility and families of superior lineage, and referred to a ‘community of the people’ who shared language, humours and customs. an anonymous document, the date of which is unclear, referred to the first castilian-speaking king of the trastámara dynasty to sit on the throne of the crown of aragon (an occurrence that had taken place in the fifteenth century), as ‘a foreign man, from a foreign nation, who was not of our language and our custom’.25 on the eve of the reapers’ war (1640-1652), in which the corts rebelled from the spanish monarchy by declaring allegiance to the french king louis xiii, one commentator described the coming of royal troops: ‘his majesty the king and our lord has just sent a great power to plough through us with fire and blood with the purpose of transforming the people of the catalan nation into another nation.’26 such incendiary quotations must be tempered with the observation that the ‘nation’ was by no means a monolithic concept. more often than not, it was a banal expression, used to describe the studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles stephen jacobson 9 catalans as well as smaller cultural groups within catalonia or from other places from china to africa. for the most part, exalted expressions of catalan patriotism defended the rights and liberties of the patria, represented by the estates in parliament, threatened by the onslaught of political absolutism. patriotic rallying cries were widespread during the two international wars in which the catalan corts allied with the european enemies of the monarchy in madrid: the reapers’ war (1640-1652) and the war of spanish succession (17011714). such patriotism was not only expressed by the nobility, rich men and upper clergy, who defended traditional privileges and liberties, but it was also felt, albeit less passionately, among middling groups of society. literate guildsmen and tradesmen, peasants with high incidences of ownership, lower clergy and other conservative men of town and country were comfortable in the corporate structure of the society in which they lived and were weary of creeping royal authority, synonymous with onerous fiscal obligations.27 what the great majority of the population – illiterate and living precarious existences – thought about the patria or the nation (or about anything else for that matter) remains a mystery in catalonia as elsewhere. it is likely that most thought very little about the nation until the era of the french revolution, remaining faithful to traditional, meaningful and visible bonds of solidarity, such as family, town, church and confraternity.28 when writers referred to ‘nations’ or ‘nationalities’ of spain, they juxtaposed catalans with castilians and other peoples, each with its own humours, virtues and vices. in contrast, the term ‘spaniard’ was an allinclusive identity, more imperial than national, consisting of various ethnic groups. as one french observer wrote in the first decade of the seventeenth century: among themselves the spaniards are at daggers drawn, each extolling his own province over that of his companions out of an exaggerated desire for singularity creating far greater differences between their nationalities than we have in france. the aragonese, the valencians, the catalans, the basques, the galicians, the portuguese bait each other, throwing in each others’ studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles stephen jacobson 10 faces the vices and failings of their provinces; but should a castilian appear among them, then see how at one they are in launching themselves upon him all together, as bulldogs upon a wolf.29 although one can imagine someone uttering similar words today, the relationship between catalan and spanish identity in catalonia was to change over time. over the course of centuries, catalans steadily came to feel increasingly ‘spanish’. what is more, ‘spanishness’ would become transformed from an imperial to a national identity. it is here where the ambiguities set in. the ambiguity: spanish identity in catalonia in the first history of spain, the historia general de españa, initially published in latin in 1592, the aragonese jesuit juan de mariana employed the word natio to describe spaniards, claiming that all shared a similar ancestry. according to legend, spaniards descended from tubal, the son of noah who migrated to iberia following the destruction of the tower of babel.30 it does not appear that catalan writers adopted this biblical genealogy, then commonplace among many such peoples in europe at the time.31 in this respect, catalans were quite different from basques, who were regarded as the most authentic of all spaniards, the speakers of the original iberian language and the repositories of pure noaic blood. for this reason and others, basques enjoyed the privilege of universal nobility (hidalguía universal) and – in contrast to catalans – were over-represented at the royal court in madrid and within imperial administration.32 catalan writers, for their part, remained faithful to the legendary origins as expressed in medieval sources. jeroni pujades’s universal chronicle of the principality of catalonia (1609) and narcís feliu de la penya’s the annals of catalonia with a brief epilogue on the catalan nation (1709) reworked noble and royal legends, disabusing them of their medieval attributes. they blended them into coherent historical narrative that proclaimed frankish origins of the original conquerors and counts as a means to differentiate catalans from castilians and others in spain. to studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles stephen jacobson 11 early modern catalans, to be spanish was not an ethnic description. nonetheless, it was a crucial form of imperial identification, especially to the elite. the idea of spain had been present in learned circles for centuries before the union of the crowns. in the middle ages, ‘spain’ had been an intellectual concept present in catalonia and other places. like ‘britain’ or ‘france’, it was a classical ideal, which covered the territories of various iberian monarchies of the middle ages, the old roman hispania. but it was also an ideological (rather than merely a geographical) construct that distinguished the christian realms from the islamic ones and expressed a simultaneous desire, a manifest destiny for christian, and perhaps regnal or imperial, unity of iberia.33 once such regnal unity had been achieved, catalans embraced this imperial ideal, although they increasingly complained that castilians usurped royal positions and conflated ‘spain’ with ‘castile’. as early as 1557, cristòfer despuig complained that ‘castilians enjoy saying publicly that our province is not spain.’34 in the seventeenth century, the jurist francesc ferrer expressed his annoyance that the laws of the kingdom of castile were called ‘spanish laws’ while those of catalonia were deemed exceptional. ‘they are not the only spaniards’, he wrote, ‘we are also spaniards, and it could be that we deserve the title more. moreover, we do not live under their laws, nor does the great majority of spain. despite this, they always use the expression “spanish laws”, something i cannot stand.’35 ‘spanishness’ was an overarching imperial identity in catalonia rather than one that could be considered ‘national’. included were the neighbours (vecinos) of the municipalities who were natives (naturales) of the crownlands in iberia and the americas. to state the obvious, catalans, castilians, basques, andalucians, navarese and aragonese were all spanish, as were the peninsular and creole inhabitants of new spain, new granada and peru. on one level, it was an ‘inclusive’ identity, given that newcomers naturalised and assimilated comparatively easily, providing they were catholic and got along with their neighbours who did not suspect or accuse them of having any traces of muslim, jewish, protestant, african or indian blood.36 however, it was also exclusive. as is well known, early modern spain and its empire developed a diffuse but precocious studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles stephen jacobson 12 citizenship regime based on statutes of ‘purity of the blood’ (limpieza de sangre). to be a true or ‘good spaniard’ – and hence qualify for various religious, royal and municipal posts and privileges on the peninsula or in the americas – one had to pass a test, called a probanza, proving uninterrupted ancestry from old christians rather than from converts. one of the enduring images of seventeenth-century ‘golden age’ literature (a frequent source used by historians to chronicle emerging spanish patriotic sentiment) was a country obsessed with racial purity and genealogy.37 although the probanzas stopped along with the last inquisitorial persecutions of heresy in the early eighteenth century, ‘purity of the blood’ remained part of the political lexicon well into the modern era, especially among the political right. as late as 1823, a person seeking to prove that he was a ‘good spaniard’ (buen español), in catalonia as elsewhere, could call neighbours and witnesses to testify that his family had a reputation for being ‘good christians, roman catholic and apostolic, of clean blood, without any mix of moor, jew, lutheran or any other reprobate sect of the holy mother of our church’.38 the arrival of the bourbons to the spanish throne and the defeat of catalonia in the war of spanish succession (1702-1714) represented a key point of inflection with respect to political institutions. catalonia arguably became a quasi-colonial possession. the new foundation (nueva planta) of 1716 abolished catalan parliamentary and municipal institutions and all public law, obviating the original union agreement, contained in the marriage contract between ferdinand and isabel. throughout the eighteenth century, residents of the crown of aragon contributed to the treasury per capita more than others on the peninsula. all the while, the monarchy maintained between 25,000 to 30,000 royal troops in catalonia, and filled civilian posts with military officials. until 1770, the number of royal troops in catalonia was greater than the total of those stationed in spanish america. what is more, royal laws forbade catalans (the nobility inclusive) and other residents of the crown of aragon from carrying arms due to their supposed rebellious character, a prohibition that did not exist in other iberian crowns. the contrast with spanish america is telling. following the temporary loss of havana and manila to great britain in the seven years’ war (1756-1763), the monarchy of charles iii undertook a studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles stephen jacobson 13 reform in which the defence of the american empire rested upon local armed militias, something that was never permitted in catalonia until the french revolution.39 all the same, institutional centralisation and militarisation did not cause catalans to lose faith in spain or to cast off their identities as spaniards (as latin american creoles would do a century later). on the contrary, the most visible opposition to the bourbons were known as austriacistes, because they supported a return of the habsburg monarchy to the spanish throne. austriacistes in catalonia and in exile published pamphlets in a desperate attempt to convince european powers, particularly britain, to intervene in spain to address the inequities of the treaty of utrecht (1714) and the peace of vienna (1725) and to restore the catalanaragonese corts and the habsburg monarchy.40 with the coming of the enlightenment, however, austricisme faded away. when charles iii (17591788) ended the monopoly of cádiz on trade with cuba in 1765 and all of the americas in 1778, commercial sectors in catalonia warmed to the bourbons. in the meanwhile, intellectual and juridical elite gained influence in madrid. one of the most enlightened men in barcelona was francesc romà i rosell, one of the authors of the representation to charles iii (1759). submitted to the king shortly after his coronation, this petition echoed the often-heard complaint that the monarchy discriminated against residents from the crown of aragon with respect to juridical, administrative and clerical posts within the territory.41 however, romà loved spain. his signs of happiness in spain and the way to make them more efficient (1768) was an influential work of political economy, which, like many such treatises, measured the happiness of the people by the growth of the population. it was filled with praise for the spanish patria (the land) and the ‘nation’, which referred to the ‘people’ or the ‘estates’.42 catalans and others would continue to invoke the nation and the patria when referring to spain throughout the nineteenth century, albeit the nation could also refer to smaller nationalities and the patria to smaller lands and their ancient liberties, such as provinces, counties and towns. such ‘national’ patriotism – or nationalism – was widespread when napoleonic troops crossed the pyrenees in 1808, inaugurating what was known at the time as the ‘war against the french’ in catalonia, although it studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles stephen jacobson 14 was to be later patriotically rebaptised as the ‘war of independence’. in this war, the great majority of politicised catalans, enlightened and traditionalist alike, sided with the spanish resistance. contrary to previous international wars, in which the catalan corts had joined the enemies of castile, the junta de cataluña supported the claims of the deposed monarchy, preferring the bourbons to the bonapartes. in the war of spanish succession (1702-1714), the catalan corts had sided with occupying british armies; however, during the napoleonic war, politicised catalans, for the most part, resisted or at least resented the presence of french and italian troops on iberian soil. the war inaugurated a period in which liberal catalans participated in the construction of the spanish constitutional state, forgetting previous habsburg or austriaciste claims to recover ancient institutions and privileges. it is revealing – though at the time not surprising – that the most zealous expression of spanish nationalism during the war came from the pen of the catalan courtier antoni de capmany. his pamphlet centinel against the french (1808) was a call to arms similar to johann gottlieb fichte’s message to the german nation, delivered the same year. the title echoed the famous diatribe, centinel against the jews (1674). the pamphlet bristled with a dizzying array of linguistic, cultural and even culinary markers, celebrating the daily habits and customs of the people (as opposed to the monarchy). his many references included ‘castilian language’, ‘the bullfight’, ‘songs and dances from our ancient traditions’, ‘spaniards who profess the catholic faith since the times of the apostles’ and ‘breakfast with hot chocolate and fried eggs’. indeed, by the outset of the nineteenth century, even the reference to castilian language was not divisive. castilian language (or ‘spanish’ as it later became known) was well on its way into being converted into the language of reading, writing, international commerce and public speaking in catalonia among the educated classes even though they generally continued to use catalan for daily conversation.43 one of the most famous phrases of the pamphlet proclaimed spain a ‘nation of nations’: what would become of the spaniards if there were no aragonese, valencians, murcians, andalucians, gallicians, extramadurans, studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles stephen jacobson 15 catalans, castilians, etc... each one of these names burns bright and long. these small nations comprise the mass of the great nation.44 this patriotic spirit imbued the work of early liberal constitutionalists. in may 1809, the organising commission for spain’s first constitutional convention sent out a request to notables from all over the country to send proposals. the responses from catalonia consisted of a mixture of moderately enlightened, ‘montesquieuan’ ideas and well-worn old regime ancient constitutionalist formulae.45 some proposals came from individuals whose families had been loosely associated with austriacisme decades earlier. however, by the outset of the nineteenth century, such sectors of the population no longer proposed that catalonia should recover its ancient liberties embodied in parliamentary and municipal institutions. rather, the goal was to use the catalan-aragonese political tradition as a baseline for a new charter that would include all spaniards on the peninsula and, as the constitution of 1812 later stated, on ‘both sides of the atlantic’. for example, the deputy francesc de papiol, a pious catholic and moderately enlightened property owner, took advantage of a family library replete with works of austriacisme, to propose a constitutional monarchy based on the catalan tradition of pactisme. the centrepiece of his proposal was a ‘counsel of the nation’, which would function like the historic catalan diputació (the standing commission of the corts) except that it would exist on a ‘national’ (meaning spanish) level.46 in a like manner, josep battle i jover submitted a draft constitution. the first article was based upon a famous oath lifted directly out of catalan-aragonese ceremonial asserting the sovereignty of parliament: ‘we the spanish nation are more than you the king of spain’ (‘nos la nació espanyola que somos más que vos el rey de españa’).47 in the end, these proposals, and others like them, made little impact. spain’s constitution of 1812 drew inspiration from french precedent. deputies ignored proposals to frame a constitution on older iberian, british or swiss traditions. unlike that which occurred in mexico and many parts of south and north america, centralising tendencies in spain prevailed over federalising ones. in catalonia, however, ancient studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles stephen jacobson 16 constitutionalism remained an influential intellectual doctrine. in the 1860s and 1870s, antoni bofarull and víctor balaguer published multivolume histories of catalonia from ancient times to contemporary ones. in these histories, the arrival of constitutionalism in spain signified the reassertion of catalan-aragonese parliamentary traditions that had been previously abolished upon the imposition of bourbon absolutism.48 in a like manner, intellectuals and antiquarians of the catalan revivalist movement, later called renaixensa, resurrected poetry, drama and other religious, artistic and literary traditions as a means of celebrating catalonia’s deep cultural and linguistic heritage. although many persons later associated with renaixensa went on to become future ideologues of nascent catalan nationalism, the founders had no such intentions. they combined catalan and spanish patriotic ideas, and wrote in both languages, as a matter of course. to take an illustrative but by no means unique example, manuel angelón wrote the first full-length modern drama in catalan in 1856, the virgin of mercy, celebrating the conquests of jaume the conqueror. in 1860, he also penned a biography of queen isabel ii, proclaiming the controversial queen the embodiment of liberal spain. a year later, he published repel the foreign invader, a historical novel set during the war of independence.49 until the 1880s, romanticist and catalan ‘medievalist’ revivalism evolved in harmony with spanish liberal constitutionalism.50 the traditionalist right also joined the chorus, even if many catholics were initially hesitant to invoke the ‘nation’ because of its revolutionary link to popular sovereignty and the mythical spanish pueblo.51 at first, catholics had trouble finding their way. enlightened and liberal thinkers had debunked many of their most puissant paradigms, equating them with superstition and obscurantism. by the mid-nineteenth century, the discourse of ‘purity of the blood’, loosely based on the medieval science of spermogenesis, had been thoroughly discredited in exchange for the newer (and equally false) science of race initiated by arthur de gobineau. noaic genealogies also came to be regarded as fabulous in all of europe. in response, catholics embraced the emerging and equally powerful discipline of history. the intellectual who first reconciled religious discourse with that of the nation was, in fact, the catalan cleric jaume studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles stephen jacobson 17 balmes. he equated catholic unity with the laws and customs of all of spain, forging a single and convincing historical narrative that would form a baseline for generations of patriotic traditionalists later associated with national catholicism. the defeat of the moors at covadonga, the conquest of the americas, and the defeat of the turks at lepanto, formed the vertebrate of a foundational history of monarchical and catholic triumphalism embodied in the spanish nation. to balmes, catholicism would regenerate the spanish nation torn apart by the liberal and constitutional revolutionary movements of foreign, french extraction. balmes believed in a ‘religious and monarchical’ spain, ‘the spain of traditions, of tranquil habits, of simple customs, of few necessities, of a peculiar character that distinguishes it from the other nations of europe’.52 to be sure, for most of the nineteenth century, catalan regional or national identity strengthened the cultural fabric of the spanish nation in much the way that the heimat movement fortified a united germany, or french and italian regionalism contributed to the textured elaboration of national identity.53 of course, it would be an exaggeration to claim that representatives of regional interests were always satisfied with how things played out in madrid. conflicts and disagreements frequently flared up in the parliament and the press. catalan liberal-conservatives resisted centralising measures coming from madrid whose politicians were inspired on bonapartist juridical and administrative models. throughout the century, the barcelona chamber of commerce clamoured for high tariff walls to protect catalan industry. many considered the catalans a selfish and insular group, who zealously defended their moral and material interests to the detriment of others whilst many catalans gazed at the rest of spain with a mixture of bewilderment, frustration, condescension and even racial prejudice. all the same, all this was part of the country’s political life, in which centralist and regionalist, agrarian and industrial interests, were constantly at odds with one another.54 fiscal inequalities disappeared with the consolidation of the liberal-constitutionalist state, and, following the end of the revolutionary era in the early 1840s, the presence of the spanish army in catalonia was greatly reduced. in 1848 – that ‘crazy year’ in which europe was rocked by liberal and republican nationalist movements – the revolutionary wave did not cross studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles stephen jacobson 18 the pyrenees. spain remained quiet. nor were nationalist tensions around the corner or even perceptible. from 1859-1860, spain began to expand its interests in the north african territory of the rif region of morocco, successful in what was bombastically labelled the war of africa. during the war, enthusiastic crowds in barcelona exhibited characteristic dual patriotism, sending off and receiving troops with parades waving catalan and spanish flags.55 the hero of the war, general joan prim, hailed from the catalan city of reus, later orchestrated the democratic and bloodless ‘glorious revolution’ of 1868. in barcelona, prim oversaw the tearing down of the citadel, the fortress constructed in the wake of the war of spanish succession and thus a symbol of repression and absolutism. though less spectacular, this act emulated the symbolic importance of the destruction of the bastille in france. the revolutionary municipality converted the lands into a public park, and in 1888 barcelona hosted an international exhibition on the grounds. the queen regent, maría cristina, and the boy king, alfonso xii, arrived for opening ceremonies where they were greeted by crowds of barcelonese in a series of processions, balls, banquets, inaugurations and ‘spontaneous’ acts of charity. the organisers portrayed barcelona as the industrial vanguard of a regenerated country. the queen regent, the prime minister and the mayors of barcelona and genoa unveiled the statue of columbus, the most recognisable hero of spain to the world. the tallest statute to date, it was a few meters higher than the statue of nelson in trafalgar square. the city sponsored a columbus day parade, which later became the national holiday of spain. politicians of different ideological stripes travelled to the exhibition and applauded the patriotism of the barcelonese. they lauded that the catalans had put their personal interests and periodic grievances aside and had sponsored a world event of which all spaniards could be proud.56 in 1882, spain’s most prominent politician of the time, antonio cánovas de castillo delivered a famous speech, discourse on the spanish nation at the atheneum of madrid. like many such speeches echoing throughout europe at the time, it was a reply to ernest renan’s que’est-ce que la nació, delivered at the sorbonne a few months earlier. cánovas rebutted renan’s voluntaristic concept of the nation as a daily plebiscite; instead, he reiterated that the nation of spain was founded (as balmes and other studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles stephen jacobson 19 conservatives had argued before him) upon catholic and monarchical unity. what is notable, however, is that, unlike renan, who was preoccupied with the problem of alsace-lorraine, cánovas did not make any reference to the existence of a single nationalist problem in spain, save the british presence in gibraltar. this was simply because it never occurred to him to mention any. in 1882, like in 1848, spain was assumed to be a unified country that did not suffer from ‘nationalist questions’ present in austria-hungary (with its multiple nationalities of revolutionary proclivities), britain (plagued by the irish problem), or france and germany (caught up in conflicts over alsace-loraine). this is not to say that spain had a reputation for political peace. the nineteenthcentury version of the black legend depicted spaniards as a ‘cainistic’ people with a penchant toward civil war (the last had ended in 1875); like all latins, they were thought to be predisposed toward revolution. engels once claimed that the barricades had been raised in barcelona with more frequency than any other city in europe. however, in the 1880s, no one associated spain with nationalist questions. conclusion in many respects, the history of nationhood in catalonia leads to the most unteleological of conclusions. the birth of catalan nationalism in the latter decades of the nineteenth century appears to be an anomaly since it arose after a lengthy period in which catalans had embraced spanish national identity. in the nineteenth century, catalans increasingly used spanish in writing, reading and formal oratory, while maintaining catalan for everyday conversation with family, friends and associates. the existence of two languages and two patriotic affiliations was not a source of tension, especially in a catalonia plagued by industrial conflict in the cities and civil war in the country. multi-layered regional identities contributed to the forging of the liberal constitutional nation-state. the recovery of medieval history, poetry and culture served as a spiritual tonic for the industrial age. the fact that catalan nationalism came late – and blindsided many at the time – has led many historians to explain its appearance as a studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles stephen jacobson 20 consequence of underlying political and socio-economic causes rather than of the persistence of age-old conflicts. to marxists, catalan nationalism was the work of an industrial bourgeoisie in search of its own political structure, destined to come into conflict with a state dominated by agrarian interests.57 to sociologically oriented modernisation theorists, a perennially weak spanish state lacked the ability to promote uniform language, civil laws, national holidays, built environments and even culinary and hygienic practices.58 this opened up space for regionalists and nationalists to infuse ethnic identities, on the rise in the late nineteenth century, with political meaning.59 exploring these socio-economic and political-administrative causes of catalan nationalism is an intriguing subject, although it is beyond the scope of this article. for present purposes, it must be emphasised that such explanations, be they valid or debatable, must coexist with the study of origins. analysing the causes of nationalism should not convert the study of the history of nationhood as a mere exercise in describing the raw material out of which modern nationalists moulded their creations or in correcting the historical record for the sake of accuracy. it is true that the study of medieval and early modern nationhood does not explain why a modern movement emerged or did not emerge. as has often been repeated by ‘modernist’ theorists, many medieval or early modern nations never gave rise to nationalist movements or nation states in the nineteenth century.60 if spanish history had turned out differently and statesmen had organised the country around federal, regional or lesscentralised administrative and political structures (as had occurred in germany), then it is quite possible that catalan nationalism might never have taken shape.61 if this had been the case, then the ‘origins’ of nationhood in catalonia would not be regarded as being that different than those of burgundy, to take one example of a place where the existence of a strong sense of nationhood in the middle ages never became politically relevant in the modern period. all the same, understanding origins is crucial in explaining the characteristics, contours and ambiguities of those movements that did emerge. although not ‘path dependent’, they were not free of historic constraints. studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles stephen jacobson 21 despite the existence of invented traditions, catalan nationalism maintained durable continuities with the past. for example, part of nationalist lore was that catalans possessed a differential character, known as the fet català. its component traits consisted of myths and ideas from the past, such as pactisme or the franco-germanic racial heritage, in addition to modern ones, such as industriousness, sense of enterprise and practicality. perhaps more importantly, such continuities were not always the ones that today’s nationalists might expect or find useful for furthering their political agendas. the historian enric ucelay-da cal has convincingly argued that early twentieth-century catalan nationalism remained faithful to dual patriotism, albeit with a twist. catalan nationalists asserted that an autonomous catalan nation – economically, intellectually and racially superior – should constitute the morally regenerative force, the dominant ethnic and racial group of an otherwise decadent country.62 in many ways, this was a response to similar ethno-racial ideas that had been articulated by spain’s ‘generation of 1898’, following the loss of spain’s last colonies (cuba, puerto rico and the philippines). many followed the basque socialist miguel de unamuno, who in his about casticismo (1894-95) had argued that the salvation of a decadent spain lay in the mystical soul and steppe of castile. to unamuno, the ‘eternal’ and ‘intrahistorical’ castizo tradition was destined to lead spain into the twentieth century. to catalan nationalists, the call to resurrect the castilian spirit, when castile represented the epitome of decadence, was too mystical if not utterly incomprehensible, especially from the perspective of practical men in an industrial city. to them, catalans should take the lead in constructing a new state and empire, hence joining the ranks of expansionist britain, france and germany. the question was who was to be the dominant nationality destined to implement the new imperial imperative of the modern nation state. the ‘imperial’ version of catalan nationalism, though dominant in the early twentieth century, coexisted with another version. many nationalists remained faithful to the measured goals of the original founder, valentí almirall. in the 1880s, he argued that political autonomy was a practical solution to catalonia’s problems, given that the spanish political system was irretrievably riddled with bombast, oligarchy and corruption, studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles stephen jacobson 22 indicative of an empire in decay. what must be underlined is that neither version of nationalism – the imperial version of the right or the antiimperial one of the left – called into question the idea of spain. rather, catalanists, regionalists and federalists criticised the political and administrative organisation of a centralised constitutional monarchy founded on bourbon and bonapartist models, dominated by castile and castilians. in this respect, ethnic rivalry echoed or resurrected similar rivalries and conflicts present since the unification of the crowns of aragon and castile. it is important not to stretch continuities too far. the coming of nationalism represented a significant break with established political practices and embraced mass politics. nationalists showed a tremendous capacity to recuperate and rework ideas concerning racial and political differences that had been dormant in the constitutional era. they invented traditions, erected monuments, reconstructed sacred spaces out of medieval ruins, commemorated and romanticised the past, and launched political parties. they mobilised professional and middle classes around the recovery of catalan language, the protection of industry, the preservation of the civil law and the conservation of tradition and family. 63 all the same, catalan nationalism retained the dual patriotic spirit, which had long characterised relations and rivalries between nationalities on the peninsula. it is worth ending with one observation with respect to contemporary developments. in the twentieth century, a new version of catalan nationalism appeared. some persons who identified themselves as ‘catalans’ rejected (or found repugnant) their ascribed identity as ‘spaniards’. this idea came into vogue around the time of the first world war, gathered steam during the second republic (1931-1936) and became commonplace during the francoist dictatorship (1939-1975). separatism gained purchase in the wake of the decolonisation of the british, french and austro-hungarian empires and with the renewed power of the doctrine of national self-determination. the hundreds of thousand noncatalan-speaking migrants who settled in barcelona and its environs generated (and became victims of) anti-spanish sentiment. the francoist appropriation of ‘spain’ caused the term to be conflated with dictatorship, and today some associate it with corruption, waste and inefficiency. studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles stephen jacobson 23 however, separatism has never been a majority opinion in catalonia, at least never for an extended length of time. over the past decades, pollsters have traced the extent to which residents of catalonia feel more or less spanish. today, catalans feel less spanish than ever. still, it is revealing that many more feel ‘equally spanish and catalan’ than ‘solely catalan’.64 to be sure, the rise of anti-spanish (as opposed to anti-castilian sentiment) is a twentieth and twenty-first-century phenomenon that appeared decades after the foundation of a nationalist movement. it is a subject of vital importance, especially today, worthy of scholarly attention. it is not, however, a relevant factor in exploring the origins of nationhood in catalonia, which, as we have seen, is a story of dual and layered identities. endnotes 1 for catalonia, see a. balcells, catalan nationalism. past and present, trans. j. hall & g.j. walker (basingstoke, 1996). 2 j. m. fradera first coined the idea of ‘dual patriotism’ (j.m. fradera, ‘el proyecto liberal catalán y los imperativos del doble patriotismo’, in: a.m. garcía rovira (ed.), españa ¿nación de naciones? (madrid, 2002) 87-99). 3 e. ucelay-da cal, ‘history, historiography and the ambiguities of catalan nationalism’, in: studies on national movements, 1 (2013) 105-159 (109). 4 for the name catalonia and similar questions concerning medieval origins, see t. bisson, ‘the rise of catalonia. identity, power, and ideology in a twelfth-century society’, in: medieval france and her pyrenean neighbours. studies in early institutional history (london, 1989) 125-152; j. m. salrach, ‘catalunya i catalans des de quan?’, in: revista de catalunya, 15 (1988) 35-50; a.m. alcover (ed.), diccionari català-valencià-balear (palma de mallorca, 1964-1969) vol. 3, 46-48. 5 s. reynolds, kingdoms and communities in western europe, 900-1300 (2nd ed.: oxford, 1997) 250-331. in this work, reynolds rebuts the thesis of benedict studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles stephen jacobson 24 anderson and ernest gellner who depicted the ‘imagined community’ as a modern phenomenon and drew sharp dividing lines between a preindustrial world defined by vertical hierarchies and an industrial world characterised by horizontal forms of national identity. reynolds convincingly argues that communities were also imagined in the middle ages. i find her approach to medieval nationhood more helpful than that of azar gat and alexander yakobson, who focus on the durability of kinship ties and tribal communities over time, and over-emphasise their political importance and influence in earlier periods (a. gat & a. yakobson, nations. the long history and deep roots of political ethnicity and nationalism (cambridge, 2013)). 6 t.n. bisson, power, crisis, and humanity in rural catalonia, 1140-1200 (cambridge ma, 1998) 28-67; j.m. salrach, el procés de formació nacional de catalunya (segles, xiii-ix), 2 vol. (barcelona, 1978). 7 j. brugura (ed.), llibre dels fets del rei en jaume (barcelona, 1991) vol. 2, 15, 79. 8 cited in j.-p. rubiés, ‘the idea of empire in the catalan tradition from ramon muntaner to enric prat de la riba’, in: journal of historical review, 4 (1999) 229262 (243). 9 e. roca i trias, ‘"unde cathalunus quasi in cathalonia stans". la condición de catalán en el derecho histórico’, in: revista jurídica de cataluña, 67/1 (1978) 7-44. 10 for this terminology, see r. brubaker, citizenship and nationhood in france and germany (cambridge ma, 1992). 11 for this debate, see rubiés, ‘the idea of empire’; j.n. hilgarth, the problem of a catalan mediterranean empire (london, 1975), supplement to no. 8 of the english historical review. 12 for this etymology, see a. hastings, the construction of nationhood. ethnicity, religion and nationalism (cambridge, 1997) 12-13. 13 i have found only three uses of the term in the first five of the nine volumes. in the first case, ramon muntaner uses the word ‘nació’ to refer to a group of provençals who are also described as ‘bones gents’ led by an honoured citizen of marseilles (vol. 2, pp. 42-43). in the second case, the term refers to the pope who is said to be from the ‘nació’ of charles, king of france (vol. 3, p. 21). in the third studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles stephen jacobson 25 case, it refers to the defeated ‘moixerif’ (almojarife) of menorca and twenty kinsmen and their wives and families (vol. 5, p. 42) (r. muntaner, crònica (barcelona, 1927) ch. 81, 102, 172). 14 p.h. freedman, the origins of peasant servitude in medieval catalonia (cambridge, 1991) 206; he cites f. monsalvatje y fossas, colección diplomática del condado de besalú (olot, 1906) vol. 8, 169-171. 15 j.-p. rubiés, ‘rhetoric and ideology in the book of ramon muntaner’, in: mediterranean historical review, 26/1 (june 2011) 1-29 (26); he cites a. mas i forners, esclaus i catalans. esclavitud i segregació a mallorca durant els segles xiv i xv (palma, 2005) 115-116. 16 this link between political and ethnic community has lead some historians to describe catalonia as the ‘first modern nation state in europe’ or to ask ‘whether all this was so different than the idea of a nation-state’. for the first citation, see j. fontana, la formació d’una identitat. una història de catalunya (vic, 2014) 35; for the second, see p. villar, ‘reflexions sobre el fonament del fet català’, in: els valencians davant la qüestió nacional (valencia, 1983) 67-75. for a more nuanced and less anachronistic interpretation, see rubiés, ‘rhetoric and ideology’, 17 (for the above citation). 17 cited in fontana, la formació d’una identitat, 33. 18 for catalan legends, see p.h. freedman, ‘cowardice, heroism, and the legendary origins of catalonia’, in: past and present, 121 (1988) 3-28. for the legendary differences between the ‘frankish’ nobility and the ‘gaulish’ peasantry, he cites s. reynolds, ‘medieval origines gentium and the community of the realm’, in: history, 68 (1983) 375-390 and c. beaune, naissance de la nation france (paris, 1985) 3840. for the norman yoke thesis, he cites c. hill, ‘the norman yoke’, in: puritanism and revolution. studies in interpretation of the english revolution of the 17th century (london, 1958) 50-122. 19 l. cutchet, cataluña vindicada (barcelona, 1858) 176. 20 the classic work on this subject is j.h. elliott, ‘the cultural and political construction of europe. a europe of composite monarchies’, in: past and present, 137/1 (1992) 48-71. studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles stephen jacobson 26 21 c. despuig, los colloquis de la insigne ciutat de tortosa, ed. eulàlia duran (barcelona, 1981) 200. 22 for the meanings and usages of the terms terra, patria, nació and provincia, see x. torres sans, naciones sin nacionalismos. cataluña en la monarquía hispánica (siglos xvi-xvii) (valencia, 2008) 79-122. 23 for gilabert and the defence of pactisme, see j.-p. rubiés, ‘reason of state and constitutional thought in the crown of aragon, 1850-1640’, in: the historical journal, 38/1 (1995) 1-28. 24 j.-l. palos, els juristes i la defensa de les constituciones. joan pere fontanella (1575-1649) (vic, 1997). 25 cited in x. torres sans, ‘un patriotisme sense nació. què va ser l’amoneada guerra dels segadors (1640-52/1659)’, in: j.m. fradera & e. ucelay-da cal (eds.), notícia nova de catalunya (barcelona, 2005) 61-96 (89). 26 cited in a. simon i tarrés, construccions polítiques i identitats nacionals. catalunya i els orígens de l’estat modern espanyol (barcelona, 2005) 203. 27 for middling or ‘popular’ sectors and such patriotism, see torres sans, naciones sin nacionalismo, 257-344; ‘reis, pagesos i llibertats. la fi de les constitucions catalanes segons els memorialistes de pagès’, in: j. albareda & j.m. torras i ribé (eds.), del patriotisme al catalanisme (vic, 2001) 197-220. 28 in this respect, i follow j. breuilly, ‘changes in the political uses of the nation. continuity or discontinuity’, in: l. scales & o. zimmer (eds.), power and the nation in european history (cambridge, 2005) 67-102. 29 i.a.a. thompson, ‘castile, spain and the monarchy. the political community from patria natural to patria nacional’, in: r.l. kagan & g. parker (eds.), spain, europe and the atlantic world. essays in honour of john h. elliott (cambridge, 1995) 125-159 (133). he cites b. joly, viajes de extranjeros por españa y portugal, ed. j. garcía mercadal (madrid, 1959) vol. 2, 125. 30 j. álvarez junco, ‘españa. el debate sobre la nación’, in: n. townson (ed.), ¿es españa diferente? una mirada comparativa (siglos xix y xx) (madrid, 2010) 29-64 (34). studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles stephen jacobson 27 31 c. kidd, british identities before nationalism. ethnicity and nationhood in the atlantic world (cambridge, 2006). 32 f. molina aparicio, la tierra del martirio español. el país vasco y españa en el siglo del nacionalismo (madrid, 2005) 110-190; i. bazán e.a., de túbal a aitor. historia de vasconia (madrid, 2002) 320-321; j. aranzadi, ‘raza, linaje, familia y casa-solar en el país vasco’, in: hispania, lxi/3, no. 209 (2001) 879-906. 33 for the meaning of spain in medieval catalonia, see s. claramunt, ‘la formación de cataluña y su inserción en la edad media española’, in: v. palacio atard (ed.), de hispania a españa. el nombre y el concepto a través de los siglos (madrid, 2005) 85-102. 34 cited in e. duran, ‘patriotisme i historiografia humanística. manuscrits’, in: revista d’història moderna, 19 (2001) 43-58 (35). 35 cited in j. capdeferro i pla, ‘joan pere fontanella (1575-1649?). el dret al servei de la pàtria’, in: albareda & torras i ribé, del patriotisme al catalanisme, 51-70 (58). 36 for this discussion, see t. herzog, immigrants and citizens in early modern spain and spanish america (new haven, 2003). 37 m.e. martínez, genealogical fictions. limpieza de sangre, religion, and gender in colonial mexico (stanford, 2008) 61-87. despite the title, the first third of this book addresses spain. 38 see, for example: barcelona, arxiu corona d’aragò, real audiencia: expedientes (1829), caja 94, no. 17 (tomás martí de riudons); expedientes (1832), caja 131, no. 648 (ignacio oms y torrents); expedientes (1832), caja 140, no. 703 (francisco bofill y portell); expedientes (1833), caja 139, no. 624 (jayme riu). 39 j.m. delgado ribas, ‘eclipse and collapse of the spanish empire, 1650-1898’, in: a.w. mccoy, j.m. fradera, & s. jacobson (eds.), endless empire. spain’s retreat, europe’s eclipse, america’s decline (madison, 2012) 43-54 (50, 53); j.m. delgado, ‘construir el estado, destruir la nación. las reformas fiscales de los primeros borbones. el colapso del sistema de equilibrios en el imperio español (17141796)’, in: illes i imperis, 13 (2010) 63-85; l. roura i aulinas, ‘subjecció i studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles stephen jacobson 28 militarització a la catalunya del segle xviii’, in: del patriotisme al catalanisme, 289-316 (296-298). 40 for austriacisme, see j. albareda, ‘cataluña en la españa del siglo xviii. represión, acomodación y disidencia’, in: j. arrieta & j. astigarraga (eds.), conciliar la diversidad pasado y presente de la vertebración de españa (bilbao, 2009) 55-75; r.m. albarús, felip v i l’opinió dels catalans (lleida, 2001) 355-340; e. lluch, ‘el austriacismo persistente y purificado, 1734-1741’, in: las españas vencidas del siglo xviii. claroscuros de la ilustración (barcelona, 1999) 62-92. 41 this differed from earlier grievances, such as those of despuig, who complained that catalans were being shut out of royal and imperial posts outside of the crown of aragon. by the eighteenth century, catalans, like elite from latin america, complained that royal posts within catalonia were being co-opted by castilians. i have discussed this petition in s. jacobson, catalonia’s advocates. lawyers, society, and politics in barcelona, 1759-1900 (chapel hill, 2009) 33-34. 42 to take one of many examples, romà writes, ‘the body in which love of the patria is deposited in france and england is the parlament, and in spain is the council of castile […] it is important for all spaniards to understand that the council of castile […] is the highest embodiment of the nation’ (f. romà y rosell, las señales de la felicidad de españa, y medios de hacerlas eficaces (madrid, 1768) 153-154). 43 j.-l. marfany, la llengua maltractada. el castellà i el català a catalunya del segle xvi i el segle xix (barcelona, 2001). 44 a. capmany, centinela contra franceses (madrid, 2008) 82, 121, 131, 134-135, 151. 45 for these responses, see m. ramisa verdaguer, polítics i militars a la guerra del francès (1808-1814) (lleida, 2008) 37-60; ll. ferran toledano gonzàlez, ‘el projecte català per a espanya. la classe dirigent catalana i el procés constitucional de cadis (1808-1814)’, in: afers, 68 (2011) 71-96. 46 papiol’s proposal is analysed in depth in j. roca vernet, tradició constitucional i història nacional (1808-1823). llegat i projecció política d’una nissaga catalana, els papiol (lleida, 2011). studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles stephen jacobson 29 47 for this observation, see roca vernet, tradició constitucional, 136. 48 v. balaguer, historia de cataluña y la corona de aragón, 5 vol. (barcelona, 186163); a. bofarull y brocá, historia crítica (civil y eclesiástica) de cataluña, 9 vol. (barcelona, 1876). 49 m. angelon, la verge de las mersés. drama histórico-sacro-cabareresc en cinco actos (barcelona, 1856); idem, isabel ii. historia de la reina de españa (madrid, 1860); idem, ¡atrás el estranjero! novela histórica del tiempo de la guerra de la independencia (barcelona, 1861). 50 for the renaixensa in its historical context, see j.-l. marfany, ‘"minority" languages and literary revivals’, in: past and present, 184/1 (2004) 137-167; idem, ‘renaixença literària i decadència lingüistica’, barcelona. quaderns d’història, 6 (2002) 139-52; j.m. fradera, cultura nacional en una societat dividida. patriotisme i cultura a catalunya (1838-1868) (barcelona, 1992). 51 for the difficulties of the spanish right in accepting the idea of the ‘nation’ during the early nineteenth century, see j. álvarez junco, ‘la difícil nacionalización de la derecha española en la primera mitad del siglo xix’, in: hispania, 61/209 (2001) 831-858. 52 cited in j. álvarez junco, mater dolorosa. la idea de españa en el siglo xix (madrid, 2001) 407. for balmes and national catholicism, see s. julia, historias de las dos españas (madrid, 2004) 46-57; j. varela, la novela de españa. los intelectuales y el problema español (madrid, 1999) 40-42. 53 the bibliography on this subject is immense. see, for example, s. cavazza, ‘el culto de la pequeña patria en italia, entre centralización y nacionalismo. de la época liberal al fascismo’, in: ayer, 64/4 (2006) 33-64; a.-m. thiesse, ‘centralismo estatal y nacionalismo regionalizado. la paradojas del caso francés’, in: ayer, 64/4 (2006) 95-119; c. ford, creating the nation in provincial france. religion and political identity in brittany (princeton, 1993); c. applegate, a nation of provincials. the german idea of heimat (berkeley, 1990). for other regions in spain, see x.-m. núnez, ‘the region as essence of the fatherland. regionalist variants of spanish nationalism (1840-1936)’, in: european history quarterly, 31/4 (2001) 483-518; f. archilés & m. martí, ‘ethnicity, region and nation. valencian studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles stephen jacobson 30 identity and the spanish ethnic state’, in: ethnic and racial studies, 24/5 (2001) 779-797. 54 for these conflicts, see b. de riquer, identitats contemporànies. catalunya i espanya (vic, 2000) 87-110; s. jacobson, catalonia’s advocates, 198-238. 55 for such dual patriotism during the war of africa, see a. garcia balañà, ‘patria, plebe y política en la españa isabelina. la guerra de áfrica en cataluña (18591860)’, in: e. martín corrales (ed.), marruecos y el colonialismo español (18591912). de la guerra de áfrica a la ‘penetración pacífica’ (barcelona, 2002) 13-78. 56 incidentally, the world’s fair of 1888 provides an interesting point of inflection. on the one hand, catalans continued to demonstrate such ‘dual patriotism’ during official and even improvised and spontaneous celebrations. nonetheless, emergent ‘catalanist’ groups, unhappy with such bombast, were very critical. i have addressed this subject in s. jacobson, ‘interpreting municipal celebrations of nation and empire. the barcelona universal exhibition of 1888’, in: w. whyte & o. zimmer (eds.), nationalism and the reshaping of urban communities in europe, 1848-1914 (basingstoke, 2011) 74-109. 57 j. solé tura, catalanismo y revolución burguesa (madrid, 1970); b. de riquer, lliga regionalista. burgesia catalana i el nacionalisme (1890-1904) (barcelona, 1977). 58 j.-j. linz, ‘early state building and later peripheral nationalism against the state. the case of spain’, in: s.n. eisenstadt & s. rokkan (eds.), building states and nations (beverly hills, 1973) vol. 2, 32-116; b. de riquer, ‘reflexions entorn de la dèbil nacionalització espanyola del segle xix’, in: l’avenç, 170 (1993) 8-15; j. álvarez junco, ‘el nacionalismo español. la insuficiencias en la acción estatal’, in: historia social, 40 (2001) 29-51. i have criticised the ‘weak nationalisation thesis’ in: s. jacobson, ‘identidad nacional en españa, el imperio y cataluña. una perspectiva comparativa’, in: j. moreno luzón & f. del rey (eds.), pueblo y nación. homenaje a josé álvarez junco (madrid, 2013) 263-282 (272-281). 59 s. jacobson, ‘spain. the iberian mosaic,’ in: t. baycroft & m. hewitson (eds.), what is a nation? europe, 1789-1914 (oxford, 2006) 210-227. 60 a. smith, nationalism and modernism. a critical survey of recent theories of nations and nationalism (london, 1999). studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles stephen jacobson 31 61 this is the central thesis of the most detailed and informative account of the nineteenth-century origins of nationalism: a. smith, the origins of catalan nationalism, 1770-1898 (basingstoke, 2014) 218. 62 e. ucelay-da cal, el imperialismo catalán. prat de la riba, cambó, d’ors y la conquista moral de españa (madrid, 2003). 63 for the invention of tradition thesis as applied to catalonia, see j.-m. marfany, la cultura del catalanisme (barcelona, 1995). 64 in 2008, opinion poles reveal that 55 per cent of the population believed that catalonia should remain ‘an autonomous community within spain’, which was far and away the most popular response. in the same survey, 45,6 per cent felt ‘equally spanish as catalan’ while only 14 per cent felt ‘solely catalan’. in 2014, in contrast, 42 per cent of the population believed that catalonia should be ‘independent’ while only 25 per cent remained satisfied with the status of ‘an autonomous community in spain’. still, 45 per cent of the population felt ‘equally spanish as catalan’ while 22 per cent described themselves as ‘only catalan’. institut de ciències polítiques i socials, sondeig d’opinió 2008 (barcelona, 2008) 22, 34; avançament de resultats del sondeig d’opinió 2014 (barcelona, 2014) 7, 9. microsoft word art_farinelli_v5_def.docx marcel a. farinelli, ‘the invisible motherland? the catalan-speaking minority in sardinia and catalan nationalism’, in: studies on national movements, 2 (2014). http://snm.nise.eu/index.php/studies/article/view/0206a marcel a. farinelli the invisible motherland? the catalan-speaking minority in sardinia and catalan nationalism the town of alghero, in north-western sardinia, is today one of the most popular tourist sites of all the island, and it is one of the few coastal towns dating back to the middle ages. sardinia has always had a troubled relationship with the sea, and most of its inhabitants traditionally preferred to live high up, in the mountains. the full reasons for this are still uncertain, but two factors can be pointed out: the dangers inherent in marshlands, notably malaria, and the threat of invasions.1 given this native choice only a small number of port cities have been founded, since approximately from 1000 bce, though generally not by the islanders but by outsiders. alghero was one of these colonies, and today remains home to the only catalan-speaking minority living in italy. in terms of the overall catalan language situation in europe outside spanish borders, the city represents its most peripheral part, separated by the mediterranean, and much further away than perpignan and french catalonia, just across the pyrenees. as an exclave, the catalan-speaking community of sardinia had a complex relationship with catalan nationalists, but there are important differences with the context of south france. the geographical distance between sardinia and catalonia, the lack of familiar ties or any economic studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles marcel a. farinelli 2 relationship during the last three centuries and, finally, the difference in number of inhabitants (alghero: 43.534; french catalonia: 457.238), created quite a unique situation.2 as a result, its circumstances have not been well studied and scant attention has been granted to the writers, poets or activists from alghero who, over the years, have identified themselves with catalan nationalism, and to the role played by the small island city in this movement. this article tries to present this specific case and to raise some more general questions.3 alghero: a mediterranean coastal town the gulf of alghero is one of the few natural harbours of sardinia, and one of the best in the western mediterranean. but the role played by this site is related to the location of the entire island. sardinia, along with corsica, the town of alghero | snipview.com studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles marcel a. farinelli 3 occupies the centre of the western mediterranean basin. this archipelago forms a platform between africa and europe. as british painter and traveller thomas forester indicated in the foreword to the second edition of his travel book about sardinia and corsica in 1861 (the same year when the kingdom of italy was established), these two islands – along with sicily – are indispensable stepping stones on the route from provence to tunisia, but also from the iberian to the italian peninsulas.4 given such a strategic location, sardinia has been a much-disputed island. maritime powers fighting for control of sea-lanes battled for access, not so much to control the entire territory but rather to establish suitable and well-protected ports along its coasts. little is known about the most ancient inhabitants of sardinia, or about the seven thousand stone towers (nuraghe) that still exist on the island, since modern archaeologists have preferred to study, quite systematically, the coastal settlements of the phoenicians, greeks, carthaginians and romans.5 after the fall of the western roman empire, in the fifth century, everything changed. the old, fortified port cities were sacked by vandals and muslims, and thereafter abandoned. sardinia’s upland inhabitants had poor maritime skills, so they were ineffective against muslim raiders, who could establish transitory beachheads. medieval sardinia was governed by four ʻkingdomsʼ, called giuigados (from a byzantine administrative term, literally ʻjudgeshipsʼ), a jurisdiction abandoned as arab pressure increased.6 for a time, sardinia became a base from which mediterranean pirates – notably from the coasts of islamic al-andalus – could launch their attacks on provence, liguria, tuscany and latium. the rise of the christian merchant republics in north italy, such as pisa and genoa, increased trade across the mediterranean after the tenth and eleventh centuries. the role of the italian mercantile city-states renewed the geostrategic role played by sardinia and corsica: first as an indispensable barrier to muslim raids, then as a platform from which to better control trade routes from europe to africa and the levant. as could be expected, local sardinian kings began to establish close links with powerful genoese and pisan families. these great houses or clans obtained lands and, more importantly, the right to build a few ports to handle their trade and to assure defence against piracy. therefore during the twelfth and the thirteenth centuries, mastery studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles marcel a. farinelli 4 of sardinia was disputed between pisa and genoa. in this context, alghero was probably founded in midto late-thirteenth century, as the personal dominion of one of the most powerful genoese families: the doria.7 the settlement’s first name was la lighera, a ligurian word used to indicate algae, or the place where such maritime vegetation, moved by the waves, washes the coastline. given their rivalry with both pisa and genoa, the catalans and the crown of aragon also took part in this struggle. nobles from catalonia and the giuigado de arborea – the last of the sardinian ‘kingdoms’ to resist pisa and genoa – had close matrimonial ties, and the crown of aragon was involved in sardinian affairs from at least the mid-thirteenth century. the island, like sicily and mainland tuscany, was regarded as a papal fief, and for this reason it played a role in the dispute between the pope and the emperor and their respective partisans, the guelphs and the ghibellines, which divided the many republics, city-states and dynastic entities that crowded the italian peninsula.8 at the end of the thirteenth century, the crown of aragon and the french house of anjou, rulers of sicily, were at war for the control of this island and sardinia, so in 1297 pope urban viii, in an attempt to solve this conflict, invested james ii of aragon with the title of rex sardiniae et corsicae. such a grant was a typical feudal fiction: the two islands were still in the hands of pisa and genoa. so the catalans entered in this competition ostensibly acting as ʻliberatorsʼ of the native sardinians, just as they had done in sicily after the sicilian vespers and in the long war that followed (1282-1302).9 the catalans and the aragonese arrived in sardinia in 1323, but the conquest was expensive, difficult and required a century and a half to be ‘solved’.10 in this new sardinian war, alghero played a central role. the town was conquered in 1353 for the house of the counts of barcelona, but just a few months later the inhabitants drove the catalans out, an event that set off a revolt against the new masters throughout the whole island. so the catalans organised another expedition in 1354 and, after a long siege, peter iii of aragon finally entered the city and decided to expel all the inhabitants. during the following years, king peter crafted a settlement programme for the city and its countryside to assure that this part of his island was populated strictly by faithful subjects of his crown and the studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles marcel a. farinelli 5 original homelands. the decision to bring loyal colonisers was likewise followed in cagliari, sassari and iglesias, where they were interspersed with the locals but, in the exceptional case of alghero, the town was completely colonised with immigrants from catalonia or aragon, as well as from the quite recently acquired and resettled valencia.11 in this way, l'alguer was born, now with a catalan name and new townspeople. the settlement was located on a hostile island populated by enemies. for many decades, until the early fifteenth century, the kingdom of sardinia existed only inside the walls of cagliari and iglesias in the south and those of alghero in the north. the expression ‘beyond the pale’, normally applied to the medieval norman english kingdom of ireland, works perfectly in the sardinian instance. catalan and aragonese aristocratic families became the legal landlords of the whole island, but this control was ineffective. just outside the walls of alghero, all the villages and farms remained abandoned due to the constant state of war, and the colonisers of the town had serious problems in feeding themselves. therefore during the first decades, the only means of survival for settlers was the sea. accordingly, l'alguer became a centre of piracy, trade and, above all, the only port in all western sardinia where coral fishermen could legally operate. when the island was part of the hispanic empire, from the fifteenth to the turn of the eighteenth centuries, the port city became the hub in northern sardinia for all imports and exports, mostly grain, salt, cheese and leather. those were indispensable commodities for maintaining the populace of barcelona, or even supplying the royal armies.12 the linguistic minority all these relationships, mercantile or otherwise, changed with the war of spanish succession.13 at the beginning of the eighteenth century, the mediterranean spanish empire came to an end and, after some adjustments with the viennese habsburgs, sardinia became part of the dynastic dominions of the house of savoy. studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles marcel a. farinelli 6 although the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries were a time of decadence on the island, sardinia and its aristocracy had strengthened ties with the spanish court and many sardinian nobles played important roles in the extended administration of the spanish habsburgs. the more able leaders in madrid tended to contrast and balance the catalans, continuously asking for more self-government, against the sardinian aristocracy, which played a role in the repression of the catalan revolt (1640-1652). moreover, during the thirty years’ war supplies from sardinia were vital for sustaining spanish military efforts. throughout the seventeenth century the island was completely integrated in the hispanic monarchy, to the degree that finally noblemen from sardinia were considered of the same status as those from the mainland.14 without elaborating on the spanish war of succession here, it is important to remember how sardinia, between linguistic map of sardinia | wikimedia commons studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles marcel a. farinelli 7 1708 and 1720, played a key role in the mediterranean war. sardinia passed from bourbons to habsburgs in 1708, then returned to bourbons in 1717 and was finally put into the hands of the house of savoy in 1720.15 this transfer gave the savoy the right to call themselves kings, but for the island the shift of dynasties did not entail any changes: for the next fifty years not much seemed to testify the presence of the new royal rulers from turin. not before 1760 was the italian language (that is, literary tuscan) made obligatory in administration and education, and only seven years later did the dynastic symbol of aragon disappear from the coats of arms of cities and towns, to be replaced by the savoyard cross.16 from this point onwards, l'alguer began to be alghero. such a slow and soft italianisation, at a time when italy did not exist as a single state, gradually altered the ‘iberian character’ or style of sardinian society, but it was ineffective in adapting all aspects of island life to ‘continental’ norms (islanders still today call people from the italian peninsula ‘continentals’). it should be stressed how slowly the imagination of the islanders adapted, even after the unification of italy between 1859 and 1870. an anecdote from the middle of the nineteenth century is very revealing. while quarrelling with a piedmontese army officer, the mayor of a small village exploded with rage and said fiercely: ʻi will send an official protest to the capital, madrid!ʼ17 but an unhurried rhythm of life in a backwater territory is not sufficient to explain why in alghero people continued not only to speak catalan, but, at the end of the nineteenth century, produced writers who tried to participate in the literary and nationalist movement of catalonia. the unification of italy nevertheless created a completely new context in which to interpret the evolution of the algherese community: that of the italian nation-building process.18 the construction of an italian identification, and the consolidation of a new state, did not have great consequences for the former catalan stronghold. the town had a very peripheral position: it was the first port where one arrived in sardinia sailing from barcelona, but, for a ship travelling from anywhere in italy, this is a most unusual site at which to stop. olbia, cagliari or porto torres all are suitable ports for a link between sardinia and italy, not those on the west coast of the island. furthermore, new techniques in navigation studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles marcel a. farinelli 8 undermined the economic usefulness of the harbour, until then a natural haven for smaller sailing ships. so alghero lost its key role. in the last decade of the nineteenth century, when the rivalry between france and italy for predominance in the western mediterranean burst into a bitter tariff war, the result was harsh, as it diminished even the export of local products such as olive oil or spiny lobster, traditionally aimed at the market in marseille.19 after italian unification, furthermore, the social composition of the town changed. a city like alghero, in a monarchy that now included the entire italian peninsula, along with densely populated sicily, had only a secondary military relevance. after 1867 it was no longer considered a fortress city and urbanisation could grow beyond the medieval walls. the potential for urban growth brought many people from the villages around the city to relocate more comfortably there. but, perhaps surprisingly considering its depressed outlook, alghero, was attractive to those yet poorer, notably many immigrants from the inland areas of sardinia or even from southern italy. the newcomers were drawn to the town by the opportunity to work as fishermen or seamen, to labour in some of the factories alongside the port, or even by jobs as rural hands in the agricultural holdings around the city. for them, catalan was a means to integrate into town life and they tended to learn to speak in that language.20 for instance, fishermen used it to clearly identify themselves as algueresos (ʻalghereseʼ in english) and so to detect strangers poaching in their fishing areas. rivalry on the water could explain also help to why – and how – the language survived. in this new context, also surprisingly, catalans returned, as intellectuals fascinated by their former sway over sardinia. during the second half of the nineteenth century, cultural life in barcelona was dominated by the socalled renaixença, largely a literary movement (and premise to nationalism) whose principal goal was the ʻrebirthʼ of catalan national culture – the very sense of the term.21 writers or travellers from catalonia came to alghero in search of documents, literature or other traces of an artistic and cultural heritage. they were convinced that sardinia – and especially l’alguer – could prove the golden age of the catalan nation. these intellectuals saw sardinia (and its catalan-speaking corner) as a studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles marcel a. farinelli 9 magic casket in which elements of their national essence might have survived the effects of modernisation and nationalisation that had taken place in a quickly-growing metropolitan context such as that of barcelona. languages and traditions had resisted in a mediterranean island that had been ‘lost’ almost two centuries before. this sentimental nostalgia made a significant impact in the more cultivated sectors of catalan society, far beyond its practical transcendence. the person most responsible was a spanish vice-consul in cagliari, eduard toda i güell.22 a good friend of such writers of the ‘catalan rebirth’ as victor balaguer, the well-to-do toda visited alghero often between 1887 and 1890, in search of medieval documents. he obtained some successes, including materials from the town archive he found and even stole or illegally bought. today, some of those documents are still located in the spanish archives.23 toda also published several works about this peculiar catalan spot in sardinia. his masterpiece was a monograph about alghero, described of course as l’alguer, an entire and quite ‘uncorrupted’ catalan town.24 but there was also blowback. the presence of toda in alghero between 1887 and 1890 and the publicity he gave the city, had an important impact on local society. in addition, toda lived to be 86 years old, until his death in 1941 forever the amateur antiquarian and a faithful correspondent. his campaign meant a dramatic upheaval of local customs: intellectuals from alghero, since the end of the eighteenth century, used italian, not catalan. such had been the case with the most important of them: historian giuseppe manno. he is considered the founder of the modern school of sardinian history and in his masterpiece he outlined the history of a people resisting many invasions.25 the last, and worst according to manno, was the arrival of catalans in the fourteenth century. manno’s work serves as a key element to better understand just how invisible the linguistic homeland had become to alghero’s inhabitants. manno, it should be stressed, was a very successful sardinian, who became not only president of the senate of the kingdom of piedmont, but afterwards that of united italy as well. so he reflected an official savoy dynastic viewpoint and although born in alghero, for manno the local language was a ‘foreign’ dialect best forgotten. but by the end of the nineteenth century, after studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles marcel a. farinelli 10 manno’s death in 1868 and with toda quite alive, some algherese intellectuals began to use catalan again.26 they wrote mostly poems, but also some essays. these writings obtained an important audience in the catalan-speaking community of spain. the connection with barcelona was no longer sustained by sea trade and economic links, but by cultural ties. toda also tried to politicise the local intellectuals, quite unsuccessfully. he was not able to convince them to organise a catalan nationalist movement as was rising in catalonia. the situation of alghero was that of a provincial town, where the elite had an important dependency on public administration. almost all of the persons toda dealt with were teachers, archivists or liberal professionals with a leading role in the municipal council. they had nothing to gain by taking part in a movement to reclaim the town council of alghero | www.alguer.info studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles marcel a. farinelli 11 l’alguer, the non-italian identification of alghero. such was even more the case in a politically sensitive state as italy that existed as a unified entity for twenty years only and that aspired to become a major power. for italian nationalists the past was shameful, with the nation, since the fifteenth century, first subject to cruel hispanic rule and then to tyrannical austrian occupation. on sardinia, where such foreign oppression had begun with the arrival of the catalans, any connection was taboo, enough to classify any catalan inheritance as more than politically incorrect. on the island, ʻthe catalansʼ represented the main villain of what, in spanish historiography, has been termed the black legend, the idea of unique spanish evil; ʻthe catalansʼ (coined ʻthe aragoneseʼ in mainland italy) kept that reputation both for italian nationalism and later for sardinian nationalism as well.27 even if they were a minority, between the end of the nineteenth century and the first decade of the twentieth a few intellectuals continued to use catalan, maintaining links with literary figures in catalonia. but only two among them expressed any sympathy with catalan nationalism: joan pais and antoni ciuffo, the latter better known with his pseudonym of ‘ramon clavellet’. unlike most of their colleagues they were not of upper-class birth (which might show off catalan or spanish surnames) but came from middle strata, and their origins were far from catalonia. the former, joan pais, had a surname that suggests he descended from a sardinian family of rural origins, while the latter, antoni ciuffo, had neapolitan ancestors and was born in sassari, the capital of the north region of the island. both were products of the immigration to alghero that had followed the unification of italy and as such they clearly embodied disillusionment with the results of italian nation-building. pais and ciuffo were the only intellectuals from alghero who visited barcelona in turbulent 1902, witnessing abundant street demonstrations and strikes. social protest led to the prohibition of the jocs florals, a catalan literary competition to which both had been invited. during their trip they entered into close contact with catalan nationalists and experienced the harshness of spanish governmental repression against the labour movement, as well as against republicans and even bourgeois nationalists in barcelona. studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles marcel a. farinelli 12 after this experience in the catalan capital, the two had proven their solidarity with the nationalist movement in catalonia and, from 1906 on, ciuffo or ʻramon clavelletʼ, even played an active role in it. clavellet became well known for his patriotic poems, in which he referred to catalonia as ʻour motherʼ or ʻmotherlandʼ, especially after his starring participation in the first international congress of the catalan language. he thereupon moved permanently to catalonia.28 in barcelona, he collaborated with the catalan press, for example in the journal catalonia, where he was in charge of a section dedicated to sardinia: la sardenya catalana. he also gave lectures about l’alguer to highly-motivated audiences, under the auspices of catalan nationalist organisations like the lliga de catalunya or the white-collar workers’ centre (known by its acronym cadci). in 1909, clavellet moved to reus, a middle-sized town near tarragona, where he was active in local publications linked to the nationalist republican federalists, an umbrella group for the left. clavellet was even the director of several of the most important and politicised extreme nationalist periodicals: la kabila, lo campaneret and foment.29 but his political activities were criticised or ignored in alghero, where his colleagues did not want to make political declarations. for them the catalan language was merely a cultural interest, a curiosity but not a political matter, and moreover they did not want problems with the italian authorities. yet the participation of ciuffo with another militant alguerès, joan palomba (he too had neapolitans ancestors) at the language congress of 1906 raised suspicions in alghero, and even some criticism appeared in local newspapers. why was it so difficult, seen from alghero, to understand the catalan nationalist movement? the answer is simple: ʻpan-catalanismʼ, then being born as the ideal of uniting all the catalan-speaking territories (what today would be termed the catalan countries), lacked all substance, beyond asserting the fact of linguistic kinship. nobody in alghero had any kind of substantial connection with catalonia. in fact, the people from alghero were cut off from the social, cultural and political life of the rest of the greater catalan-speaking community and just a very small minority had a chance to read a few books or newspapers in catalan in the local library. but these individuals, all part of the local elite, had no interest whatsoever studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles marcel a. farinelli 13 in following the path of the catalan nationalists and preferred remaining faithful to the italian state, which granted them their social status and employment. common people, even if the majority spoke the local version of catalan, were completely illiterate: they had no hopes of reading news from catalonia and therefore could not ‘imagine’ a future outside italy, except personally, as emigrants.30 map of the catalan countries, including alghero | imgarcade.com studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles marcel a. farinelli 14 the enclave between nationalisms: italian and sardinian, plus catalan in sum, there was a structural misunderstanding between ʻour mother cataloniaʼ – as clavellet wrote – and the former colony. the inhabitants of alghero were passive, while visitors from barcelona spoke exaltedly of the catalan roots of the sardinian city. the former completely ignored the catalan nationalist movement, so its implications, however remote, remained absolutely invisible. but from the moment when catalan nationalists began to show an interest in the city, alghero was transformed into a minority enclave, and its ancient name l'alguer was once again used. all this happened at a time when, between the early years of the twentieth century and the first world war, another nationalist movement with markedly different claims was taking shape in sardinia. this current – sardinian nationalism, linked to the island and its own distinct language – would develop more fully in the postwar period.31 as happened with other islands of the mediterranean with an italian cultural link of some kind, like corsica (a part of france) or malta (a british colony), intellectuals and politicians in sardinia were rethinking their connection with the mainland. after the end of the great war in 1918, returning veterans started to organise a political movement that dealt with this issue of insular specificity. quickly, they formed the first mass party in the history of the island, the partito sardo d'azione (psa, sardinian action party).32 basically the psa called for some degree of autonomy from rome. the core ideas of the new party were republicanism (elimination of the monarchy), federalism (no more bureaucratic centralism from rome) and some kind of peasant socialism (not marxism), while only a minority wanted outright independence. the party won strongly in local and national elections in 1919 and 1921 and therefore offered a striking presence: it was the first autonomist party in all of italy, the very first to publicly criticise the centripetal nature of the italian state, even questioning the process of unification, the hitherto inviolable theme of the risorgimento. studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles marcel a. farinelli 15 catalans, as one of the many invaders of the island, had not been particularly welcomed during the risorgimento, but now, as one of the many european peoples that were claiming more self-government, they began to be better regarded in the political imagination of sardinian nationalists. members of the psa admitted the possibility of a mediterranean federation between sardinia, corsica, catalonia, the balearic islands and even sicily.33 but a fluid relationship between sardinian and catalan nationalists was still pending. the idea of the catalan kings fighting treacherously against ʻthe sardinian joan of arcʼ, queen eleonora d'arborea, remained somehow alive. the psa was the most powerful force on the island when benito mussolini began to build his dictatorship after the 1922 march on rome. after a period of hostilities, sardinian veterans and fascists reached an agreement: the local fascist party would be formed and controlled by the ex-members of the psa. in this way mussolini obtained control of the island's society, while the autonomists could continue to improve their politics in culture and economy (on the condition of not criticising the process of consolidation of the fascist dictatorship). this alliance was called in italian sardofascismo (ʻsardinian fascismʼ) and immediately had its heyday.34 but finally, even if some of the policies of the psa were acted on during the first decade of the fascist regime, the strong italian nationalism inherent to fascism brought this particular cohabitation with sardinian nationalism to an end. in fact, one of the principal preoccupations of the mussolini regime was to complete the nominal italianisation of the entire country, a process initiated with the creation of the kingdom of italy in 1861. for instance, during the 1930s numerous toponyms considered especially egregious were changed from sardinian into italian. this began to move into the terrain of literature and folklore: even some traditional poetry contests in sardinian were forbidden.35 and yet, up to the very last days of the dictatorship there was a sort of modus vivendi or understanding between sardinian nationalism and italian fascism, as long as the first was not overtly antifascist. but for the catalans from alghero this was not a very easy game to play: catalans, unlike sardinians or sicilians, could not be considered ʻitaliciʼ (literally ʻitalicsʼ), that is ethnically (or even racially) an ‘italian people’. fascism tried to studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles marcel a. farinelli 16 erase the catalan past, through education and a programme of implicit population control, building a new town beside the old one, forbidden to sardinians: fertilia.36 though the initiative failed, it started a process that progressively reduced the use of catalan, mostly after the end of the second world war. by 1946 italy was transformed into a republic, with an advanced democratic constitution (approved in 1948) that granted the status of autonomy to certain regions, including sardinia. this was a victory for the psa, reborn as a democratic organisation, which now could work on improving the island’s economy. after the devastation of world war ii, all of italy was so impoverished – being largely poor to start with – that language and culture were not considered as priorities. at that time the italianisation of sardinian society was so weak that it did not represent a threat to the traditional sardinian way of life. during the late 1950s and through to the 1970s an ambitious economic plan for the island was first discussed and then put into practice, with agricultural reforms, public works and the creation of industrial plants, especially in the petrochemical industry. this ‘rebirth plan’ was meant to put an end to some of sardinia’s chronic problems: unemployment, crime and massive emigration.37 meanwhile, in catalonia, the franco dictatorship interpreted the public use of catalan as a menace or a declaration of hostility to the regime. again, as in the late nineteenth century, some intellectuals – and even some elderly radical nationalists – from catalonia published books about l’alguer.38 poets and intellectuals from catalonia, valencia and majorca visited alghero, participating in public lectures, conferences and poetry contests. the most important of such activities was the so-called ʻrediscovery cruiseʼ of 1960, when about 150 ʻtouristsʼ more or less occupied the city for some days.39 here they could freely speak in catalan, rather difficult to do in urban catalonia, and sing their nationalist songs, in doing so protesting against franco. these activities were supported in alghero by a group of citizens devoted to the local version of catalan, organised in various cultural associations. but these algueresos had no desire to enter politics, to the degree that there was coordination of these activities with the spanish embassy in italy, in order to avoid any possible problems.40 moreover, the most prominent figures in alghero who kept in studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles marcel a. farinelli 17 touch with the other catalan-speaking areas in the fifties and sixties were involved in fascism during mussolini's regime (but they were not ʻsardofascistiʼ). this fact indicates just how distant the cultural activists in alghero were from the mainstream of catalan nationalism. the town could not be a genuine paradise for catalan nationalist opponents to franco, because there was no political solidarity for the catalan nationalist struggle. from alghero, it was impossible to see or to feel real empathy for the protests against franco in spain. simply put, why should they be in favour of a catalan state? while alghero served to demonstrate the vitality of a persecuted language and to offer international visibility to catalan nationalists, little of this really mattered to the inhabitants of the city. they did not read any newspaper, nor watch television, nor hear radio from barcelona, so no information arrived. what could arrive was subject to the franco regime’s censorship. this complete ignorance was an insurmountable barrier. therefore the mix of catalan, sardinian and italian spoken in alghero was about to disappear, due to the immigration, the lack of legal protection for the minority language and the weight of the powerful italian-speaking media. in the 1970s this regression was so evident that for the first time a civic movement (called ‘alguer 80’) was organised to demand the use of catalan in municipal administration and at school. catalan speakers in alghero, as well as sardinians and others elsewhere in italy, were not considered linguistic minorities. when the process of italianisation was finally about to convert italy into an effectively united country in linguistic terms, worries arose about the loss of cultural peculiarity and diversity. this matter was not considered important during earlier decades, when sardinian and catalan (at least in alghero) were the most popular languages on the island, italian only being spoken by the middle and high classes in urban areas. in order to avoid the cultural changes, in the 1970s sardinian nationalists adopted a more radical view of the relationship with italy, openly talking about independence, while a radical left-wing separatist movement arose.41 in line with then fashionable third world rhetoric elsewhere, the latter group group began to identify sardinia as a ‘colony’ of italy. from this experience the first independentist party was born. studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles marcel a. farinelli 18 some residents of alghero were involved in these activities. the outstanding figure was rafael caria, a lawyer who had studied in catalonia just at the end of the sixties and who started defending the catalan identification of alghero from a political point of view. he was the first to set up a civic and political movement about this question and to use catalan at assemblies of the town council, provoking fierce reactions from the communist party (of which he was officially a representative) and from the neo-fascists. for some years, the group led by caria talked of sardinia as an ‘italian colony’, presenting the improvement of the catalan language spoken in alghero as an initial stepping stone to future liberation. finally, in 1980 caria organised a radical left-wing independentist party, a first in sardinian politics, which in name seemed to draw inspiration from basque eta (acronym for euskadi ta askatasuna, or ‘basque country and freedom’): the new organisation was sardenya i llibertat, or ‘sardinia and freedom’. the subliminal message was strictly related to the sardinian left, but also to radical left-wing catalan nationalism. this meant that, between the end of the seventies and the beginning of the eighties, catalan nationalism was actually visible for the first time from l'alguer, even if it was just for few devoted persons. many factors assured this visibility: first of all the evolution in communications technology, and the presence, both in sardinia and catalonia, of separatist and nationalist movements. moreover, during the seventies italian left-wing student movements, to which caria and others sardinian nationalists were linked, demonstrated public sympathy with anti-franco protesters of different ideologies, from anarchists to nationalists. in this new context, the town council of alghero, following a proposal of the group led by caria, showed solidarity with the struggle in spain against franco, and that in northern ireland for secession from the united kingdom and integration in the republic of ireland. first in 1975, when two members of eta and three of the frap (a spanish armed left-wing organisation) were executed, and then in 1981, after bobby sands died as a consequence of a long hunger strike, civic authorities of alghero sent formal protests to the spanish and british embassies in rome. studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles marcel a. farinelli 19 final considerations the context of l'alguer/alghero can be compared to that of french catalonia. here catalan nationalists tried to establish permanent links with catalan-speaking intellectuals, and this since the late eighteenth century. these intents were not as unsuccessful as those in alghero. northern catalonia, as the nationalists called it, had not played a secondary role in the development of catalan culture, with important figures as joan amade or charles bauby. but, in spite of the existence of a minor regionalist political movement based on catalan language, catalan nationalism failed to establish itself as a major political force. catalan activists, in general, avoided the political arena, remaining on a cultural terrain. pan-catalanism, or irredentism, was embraced by some intellectuals or some politicians, but it was, since our days, a minor option. scholars attribute this situation to the double patriotism of the northern catalans: proud of their catalan heritage, but at the same time faithful to france.42 moreover, catalans living in spain, mostly during the spanish civil war and the franco dictatorship, had a bad reputation among french catalans, a factor that could explain a certain rejection of an imagined common nation. in many aspects, the context of the catalan speakers in sardinia is similar to that in france, the main differences related to the physical distance, the number of inhabitants and the existence on the island of a sardinian nationalism. and, moreover, french catalonia differs from alghero for the presence of political parties directly linked to catalan nationalist parties: forces as esquerra republicana de catalunya (leftist and republican nationalists) or convergència democratica de catalunya (centre-right nationalists) have a delegation in french catalonia or a direct link with a local party. the two exclaves, in conclusion, had both tried to maintain a link with the ‘motherland’, but there was a misunderstanding between the pan-catalanist position of many nationalists in catalonia and the more cultural approach of the sardinian and the french catalan communities. this lack of a common political position, in the two cases, was almost overcome in the mid-seventies, after the fall of the franco regime. but many misunderstandings or unsolved problems remained and, in sardinia as in french catalonia, the use of catalan language studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles marcel a. farinelli 20 diminished, catalan nationalist parties remained irrelevant, while catalan identity was in part folklorised and presented as one of the main attraction for tourists. with the democratisation of the spanish society, catalonia regained an autonomous government in 1977, as sardinia had after the end of world war ii. but, in spite of this autonomy, sardinian was not regarded as a minority language by the italian state. only in 1997 did the regional assembly pass a law granting legal protection to this language on the island. two years later italy finally recognised most of the linguistic minorities within its borders, including catalans and sardinians. all these factors created a framework through which institutions of different kinds were able to operate to avoid the disappearance of the catalan language in alghero. but this was not easy, and even close collaboration between the catalan government (called generalitat) and the municipal authorities of alghero has not solved the problem. catalan, certainly by the seventies, had lost its predominance to italian: it was not taught in school, except for some hours, and only one private school used it as its vehicular idiom, and even there only as part of its kindergarten service. the successes of the group led by caria were temporary and during the eighties these activists were so divided that a shared cultural and linguistic policy was impossible to plan. personal affairs aside, the main problem were the relationships with associations and political parties based in catalonia and moreover with the generalitat. roughly speaking, while some activists from alghero saw these links positively, others preferred to maintain a more distant position. such a disagreement helped to make catalan nationalism even more irrelevant, and therefore heightened perceptions that questioned the real utility of maintaining the catalan language in alghero. the fact is clear: there is no way to sustain the cultural vitality of the spoken catalan without a strong relationship with catalonia. without an institutional connection or a trade link catalan in alghero seemed useless. and in a society that increasingly uses a common and standardised language – here i mean italian – speaking in ʻdialectʼ has no practical purpose. inhabitants born at the end of the seventies, like myself, have for the most part not learned catalan from their parents, nor at school. there was a time, mostly during the nineties, when catalan studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles marcel a. farinelli 21 speakers in alghero were convinced that the language would be lost after their lifetimes. nevertheless, there was an unexpected surprise. at the beginning of the twenty-first century, some people, again like myself, began to study catalan, and to use it. why? it may sound a bit banal, but the former settlement and its distant capital are now no longer united by sea-lanes; instead they are connected by a ryanair boeing 737. a cheap airplane connection attracts tourists, especially from barcelona, searching for sea and sun, but also for a taste of the particular mix of catalan, sardinian and italian culture. in alghero they can spend a good holiday in a lost part of the disappeared crown of aragon, hearing an odd version of their national language. thanks to this situation and to the many occasions of contact between catalonia and alghero that current technology offers, it is now easy to follow events in barcelona, as well as the advent of a new style of catalan nationalism – all in real time, online. the 11th of september of 2013, the emblematic catalan national holiday, a peculiar event took place, the so-called via catalana. in alghero a delegation of the local associations of catalan-speakers, with those of all sardinian nationalist parties, linked themselves in a symbolic human chain in solidarity with the one made by catalan nationalists in catalonia. does this mean that catalonia is now conceived as a motherland, and that some ʻpatriotsʼ are actually pan-catalanists? it is not likely. the nebulous question whether the linguistic minority should form part of an eventual catalan nation-state has never been seriously tackled. all writers, poets or activists from alghero cited in this paper have glossed over the question. only joan pais and ramon clavellet talked of catalonia as their patria, but did so in a naive way, without any serious reflection. while rafael caria used to say that barcelona was the capital, he did not specify whether he saw this in a cultural or a political sense. sometimes the answer to this question was cryptic. one can cite antoni simon mossa, an outstanding figure both for sardinian nationalism and pro-catalan activism in alghero (he was leader of both in the late sixties). mossa asserted that ʻsardinans and people from alghero are the sameʼ, a sentence open to various interpretations.43 this is a key point, still unresolved, and probably the contradiction that could explain the divisions inside activism in alghero. it is also the sign of a certain misunderstanding with mainland catalan studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles marcel a. farinelli 22 nationalists. for instance, when algherese show support for whatever might seem pertinent in barcelona, catalan nationalists perceive a fullscale participation, trying to involve the activists in some campaigns that, seen from a sardinian perspective, are hard to understand. in other words, it is the very complexity of the context that creates this difficulty. the presence in alghero of three different and opposed national options – sardinian, catalan and italian – makes the full identification of pro-catalan activists from alghero with their catalan ʻmotherlandʼ and the acceptance of a pan-catalanist perspective problematic. in contrast, many catalan nationalists assert that this sardinian city should be part of a hypothetical common nation-state for all the catalan speakers. in certain cases they even consider that the simple fact of speaking catalan in via catalana in alghero, 11 september 2013 | finestro.wordpress.com studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles marcel a. farinelli 23 alghero means accepting such a political posture. but the recently increased number of persons interested in learning catalan in the sardinian town is not a consequence of a complete identification with the struggle of catalan nationalists; perhaps it depends more on job or study opportunities that the knowledge of this language offered in the years before the 2007 crisis. the confusion between professional profiling and ideological adherence is an indication of how difficult it is to see catalan nationalism clearly and in all its aspects and implications in a context as complex as that of alghero. at the same time, it also proves how difficult it is for catalans to perceive sardinian nationalism, and its implications for the development of the only catalan minority inside italy. endnotes 1 for the geography of the island, see m. le lannou, pâtres et paysans de la sardaigne (tours, 1941). for malaria and its impact in the development of sardinian history, see e. tognotti, per una storia della malaria in italia. il caso della sardegna (milan, 2008). 2 for the case of the catalan-speaking community in south france, also called northern catalonia or rosselló (in french: pyrénées-orientales), see n. berjoan, l'identité du roussilon: penser un pays catalane à l'âge des nations, 1780-2000 (perpignan, 2011); f. zantedeschi, il malinteso rousillonese-catalano. un aproccio comparativo allo studio del catalanismo in roussillon (1880-1920) (ba thesis, università cà foscari, venice 2002/2003). 3 the contents of this article are the result of my research; unless otherwise specified in endnotes, i refer to my phd dissertation: m.a. farinelli, un arxipèlag invisible. la relació impossible de sardenya i còrsega sota nacionalismes: segles xviii-xx (phd diss., universitat pompeu fabra, 2013) 492-669. as a brief résumé, see m.a. farinelli, història de l'alguer (barcelona, 2014). 4 t. forester, rambles in the islands of corsica and sardinia (london, 1861) v-vii. studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles marcel a. farinelli 24 5 about sardinian ancient history, see g. lilliu, la civilità dei sardi. dal paleolitico all'età dei nuraghi (turin, 1988); a. mastino, storia della sardegna antica (cagliari, 2005). 6 see a. boscolo, la sardegna dei giudicati (cagliari, 1979); idem, la sardegna bizantina e alto-giudicale (sassari, 1978); g. milia, ʻla civiltà giudicaleʼ, in: m. guidetti (ed.), storia dei sardi e della sardegna (milan, 1988) vol. 2, 193-229; s. petrucci, ʻstoria politica e istituzionale della sardegna medioevaleʼ, in: guidetti (ed.), storia dei sardi, 97-156. 7 about the involvement of those maritime powers in sardinia, see f. aritzu, la sardegna pisana e genovese (sassari, 1985); g. meloni, ʻla sardegna nel quadro della politica mediterranea di pisa, genova, aragonaʼ, in: guidetti (ed.), storia dei sardi, 49-96; j. heers, ʻpisani e genovesi nella sardegna medioevale: vita politica e sociale (x-xv secolo)ʼ, in: guidetti (ed.), storia dei sardi, 231-250. for corsica, see p. antonetti, histoire de la corse (paris, 1990) 121-144; s.p.p. scalfati (ed.), la corse médiévale (ajaccio, 1994). 8 as an introduction to that question, see j.c. moore, ʻpope innocent iii, sardinia and the papal stateʼ, in: speculum, 62/1 (1987), 81-101. 9 for the rivalry between the crown of aragon and genoa: f. giunta, aragoneses y catalanes en el mediterráneo (barcelona, 1989; first italian edition: palermo, 1953); g. meloni, genova e aragona al tempo di pietro il cerimonioso, 3 vol. (padova, 1971-1982). for the history of the ligurian city: s. epstein, genoa & the genoese 958-1528 (chapel hill, nc, 1996). for the sicilian vespers: s. runciman, the sicilian vespers. a history of the mediterranean world in the later thirteenth century (cambridge, 1992). 10 for the catalan expansion in the mediterranean and the establishment of the kingdom of sardinia, see a. arribas palau, la conquista de cerdeña por jaume ii de aragón (barcelona, 1952); idem, la conquista de sardenya (barcelona, 1961); b. anatra, ʻdall'unificazione aragonese ai savoiaʼ, in: g. galasso (ed.), storia d'italia (turin, 1984) vol. 10, 191-663 (191-364); t. bisson, the medieval crown of aragon. a short history (oxford, 1986) 86-103; r. conde y delgado de molina, ʻla sardegna aragoneseʼ, in: guidetti (ed.), storia dei sardi, 251-278; m. del treppo, ʻthe crown of aragon and the mediterraneanʼ, in: journal of european economic history, 2/1 (1973) 161-185. studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles marcel a. farinelli 25 11 bisson, the medieval crown, 109-111; r. conde y delgado de molina, ʻil ripopolamento catalano di algheroʼ, in: a. mattone & p. sanna (eds.), alghero, la catalogna, il mediterraneo (sassari, 1995) 75-103. 12 on the role played by sardinia and alghero: vv.aa., xiv congresso di storia della corona d'aragona. la corona d'aragona in italia: il regnum sardiniae et corsicae nell'espansione mediterranea della corona d'aragona (sassari, 1995) vol. 2; m. tangheroni, ʻla sardegna e alghero nel sistema dell'economia catalanaʼ, in: mattone & sanna (eds.), alghero, 179-189. 13 vv.aa., l'aposta catalana a la guerra de successió. 1705-1707 (barcelona, 2007); j. albareda, la guerra de successión de españa. 1700-1714 (barcelona, 2010); idem, catalunya en un conflicte europeu. felip v i la pèrdua de les llibertats catalanes (barcelona, 2001); a.d. francis, the first peninsular war. 1702-1713 (london, 1975); l. frey, a question of empire. leopold i and the war of spanish succession 1701-1705 (new york, 1983); h. kamen, the war of succession in spain. 1700-1715 (london, 1969). 14 these issues are widely discussed in a. mattone, cerdeña, un reino de la corona de aragón bajo los austrias (valencia, 2010) 303-427. 15 g. symcox, victor amadeus ii. absolutism in the savoyard state, 1675-1730 (berkeley los angeles, 1983) 171-189. on the terms of this transfer between bourbons and savoy, see a. mattone, ‘la cessione de regno di sardegna dal trattato di utrecht alla presa di possesso sabauda’, in: rivista storica italiana, civ (1992) 5-89. 16 for the policy of the house of savoy in sardinia during the 17th century, see m. lepori, dalla spagna ai savoia. ceti e corona della sardegna del settecento (rome, 2003). 17 a. ferrero della marmora, itinéraire de l'ile de sardaigne (turin, 1860) vol. 2, 147. 18 on this point the bibliography is wide; for an indication in english, see a.m. banti, il risorgimento italiano (rome, 2011); d. beales, the risorgimento and the unification of italy (london, 1971); c.m. lovett, the democratic movement in italy, 1830-1876 (cambridge, 1982); d. mack smith, victor emanuel, cavour and the risorgimento (london, 1971); g. sabbatucci, v. vidotto (eds.), l'unificazione italiana (roma, 2011); l. riall, the italian risorgimento. state, society and national studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles marcel a. farinelli 26 unification (london, 1994); s.j. woolf, the italian risorgimento (london, 1969). for the sardinian context, see f. atzeni, a. mattone (eds.), la sardegna nel risorgimento (rome, 2014). 19 on the so called ‘trade warʼ between france and italy, see a. billot, la france et l'italie. histoire des années troubles, 1881-1899 (paris, 1905); c. duggan, francesco crispi. from nation to nationalism (new york, 2002) 518-523. for its consequences in sardinia: m.l. coda, la sardegna nella crisi di fine secolo. aspetti dell'economia e della società sarda nell'ultimo ventennio dell'ottocento (sassari, 1977). 20 f. ballone, an acoustic study of sardinian and algherese catalan vowels (phd diss., universitat autonoma de barcelona, 2013) 33-42; e. chessa, another case of language death? the intergenerational transmission of catalan in alghero (phd diss., queen mary-university of london, 2011) 51-52. i suggest these dissertations for further bibliographical information, due to the lack of english language works about the catalan minority of alghero. of course, catalan publications about this argument abound. 21 few works on catalan nationalism are written in english, so consult the following books for further bibliographical sources on the reinaxença: a. balcells, catalan nationalism. past and present (london, 1996) 25-27; d. conversi, the basques, the catalans and spain (london, 1997) 11-17; k. mcroberts, catalonia. nation-building without a state (toronto, 2001) 16-20. 22 there is no complete biography on toda i güell; for some information, see m. ginés blasi, ʻeduard toda i güell: from vice-consul of spain in china to the reinaxença in barcelona (1871-1884)ʼ, in: entremons. upf journal of world history, 5 (2013); e. fort i cogull, eduard toda tal i com l'he conegut (barcelona, 1975); j. massó carballido, eduard toda i güell: de reus a sardenya (cagliari, 2010). 23 part of the toda's working papers about his researches have been recently published: e. toda i güell, cortes españolas de cerdeña (cagliari, 2009); idem, memoria de los archivos de cerdeña (cagliari, 2009). 24 e. toda i güell, l'alguer, un poble català d'itàlia (barcelona, 1888). the same author published others works about sardinia and alghero, such as bibliografia española de cerdeña (madrid, 1890); la poesia catalana a sardenya (barcelona, 1888); recorts catalans de sardenya (barcelona, 1903). studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles marcel a. farinelli 27 25 vv.aa., giornata di studi su giuseppe manno. politico, storico e letterato (quartu sant'elena, 1989); a. mattone, giuseppe manno magistrato, storico, letterato tra piemonte della restaurazione e italia liberale (naples rome, 2009). 26 r. caria, ʻels retrobaments a l'alguer els segles xix i xxʼ, in: j. carbonell & f. manconi, i catalani in sardegna (cagliari, 1984) 183-186 (183-185); a. mattone & p. sanna ʻper una storia economica e civile della città di algheroʼ, in: mattone & sanna (eds.), alghero, 737-836 (816-819). 27 see how the history of sardinia between 1297 and 1720 is judged in g. manno, storia di sardegna (milan, 1835; original edition: turin, 1825-1827) 2 vol., 3-350. on the interpretation of the hispanic past in the italian and sardinian historiography, see a. musi (ed.), alle origini di una nazione. antispagnolismo e identità italiana (milan, 2003). 28 for a short biography, see a. nughes, ramon clavellet. pàgines de literatura algueresa (alghero, 1991). 29 on catalan republican nationalism, see a. duarte, història del republicanisme a catalunya (lleida vic, 2004); s. izquierdo ballester, el republicanisme nacional a catalunya. la gestació de la unió federal nacionalista republicana (barcelona, 2010). 30 on the relationship between a common printed literature and nationalism, see b. anderson, imagined communities. reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism (london new york, 1991) 67-82. 31 m. clark, ʻsardinia: cheese and modernizationʼ, in: c. levy, italian regionalism. history, identity and politics (oxford washington, 1996) 81-106 (85-87); c. roux, ʻthe partito sardo d'azione: regionalist mobilization in southern italyʼ, in: l. de winter, m. gómez-reino et al., autonomist parties in europe: identity politics and the revival of the territorial cleavage (barcelona, 2006) 189-218 (191-194). 32 on this party and for further bibliographical sources, see m. brigalia, ʻla sardegna dall'età giolittiana al fascismoʼ, in: l. berlinguer & a. mattone (eds.), storia d'italia. le regioni dall'unità ad oggi: la sardegna (turin, 1998) 575-629; clark, ʻsardiniaʼ, 87-89; c. roux, ʻfrom great war to democracy. former combatants and sardinian autonomy movementʼ, in: n. duclos, war veterans in post-war situations. chechnya, serbia, turkey, peru and cote d'ivoire (london, 2012) 201-218. for the recent history of psa, and a more political analysis: e. studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles marcel a. farinelli 28 hepburn, ʻexplaining failure: the high and low of sardinian nationalismʼ, in: regional & federal studies, 19/4-5 (2009) 595-618; idem, ʻthe polarisation and de-polarisation of sardinian nationalismʼ (paper presented in edinburgh, 2007); roux, ʻthe partito sardo d'azioneʼ, 194-215. for a comparative perspective that includes corsica and the balearic islands, see a. fazi, ʻthe western mediterranean islands and the many faces of independentismʼ, in: commonwealth and comparative politics, 50/4 (2012) 474-493. 33 g. contu, il federalismo nella storia del sardismo (cagliari, 1994) 15; idem, l'idea federalista nell'evoluzione storica del sardismo, in: a. contu (ed.), il pensiero federalista in sardegna (cagliari, 1996) vol. 2, 91-109 (97-99). 34 bibliography about this issue is scarce: s. cubeddu, il sardo-fascismo tra politica, cultura ed economia (cagliari, 1993); f. manconi & g. melis, ʻsardofascmo e cooperazione. il caso della fedlacʼ, in: archivio sardo del movimento operaio, contadino e autonomistico, 8-10 (1977) 204-234; l. marroccu, ʻil ventennio fascista (1923-1943)ʼ, in: berlinguer & mattone (eds.), storia d'italia, 633-713 (633-652); l. ortu, ʻil sardofascimo nelle carte di paolo pili. contributo per una storia della questione sardaʼ, in: archivio storico sardo, 24 (1990) 294-337. 35 for any further bibliographical indication about this period, see marroccu, ʻil ventennio fascistaʼ. 36 m.a. farinelli, el feixisme a l'alguer (barcelona, 2010) 73-114. on the new town fertilia: idem, ʻcittà nuove, colonizzazione e impero. il caso di fertiliaʼ, in: passato & presente, 88 (2013) 57-82. 37 a. accardo, ʻpolitica, economia e cultura nella sardegna autonomistica (19481998)ʼ, in: a. accardo (ed.), l'isola della rinascita. cinquant'anni di autonomia della regione sardegna (rome bari, 1998) 5-135 (35-121); f. soddu, ʻil piano di rinascita della sardegna: gli strumenti istituzionali e il dibattito politicoʼ, in: berlinguer & mattone (eds.), la sardegna, 995-1034. 38 the most important were p. català i roca, invitació a l'alguer actual (palma, 1957); m. pagès i mercader, crònica descriptiva de l'alguer (girona, 1957). 39 the cruise and the days the passengers spent in alghero were described in a special issue of a catalan review published in perpignan (france): tramontane (1961). studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles marcel a. farinelli 29 40 m.a. farinelli, ʻbenvinguts amics catalans. catalunya i l'alguer entre el "viatge del retrobament" i els jocs florals de 1961ʼ, in: recerques, 69 (2014) 217-244. 41 clark, ʻsardiniaʼ, 97-99; hepburn, ʻexplaining failureʼ, 570-571. 42 berjoan, l'identité du roussilon. 43 a. simon mossa, ʻl'ensenyança del passatʼ, in: renaixença nova, 25/1/1961. microsoft word rti_hirschi_v5.docx studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | roundtables & interviews ‘continuities and shifting paradigms. a debate on caspar hirschi’s the origins of nationalism’, in: studies on national movements, 2 (2014). http://snm.nise.eu/index.php/studies/article/view/0210ri steven grosby / joep leerssen / caspar hirschi continuities and shifting paradigms a debate on caspar hirschi's the origins of nationalism caspar hirschi, the origins of nationalism. an alternative history from ancient rome to early modern germany (cambridge new york: cambridge university press, 2012) xiv + 241 pp., isbn 9780521764117. 1. introduction (p. 2) 2. steven grosby, nationality and constructivism (pp. 2-13) 3. joep leerssen, the baton and the frame: or, tradition and recollection (pp. 13-23) 4. caspar hirschi, duck or quack? on the lack of scholarly soundness and decorum in joep leerssen’s review (pp. 24-35) 5. joep leerssen, response to caspar hirschi (pp. 35-48) studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | roundtables & interviews steven grosby / joep leerssen / caspar hirschi 2 1. introduction during the nise annual gathering in 2013, at the herder-institut in marburg, one of the debates focused on a publication by swiss historian caspar hirschi looking for proof in cultural history for the pre-modernity of nations and nationalism. that discussion, following a presentation by the writer himself, has now spawned this roundtable review. the review by joep leerssen (university of amsterdam, netherlands) and the subsequent riposte by caspar hirschi (university of st. gallen, switzerland), as well as the response to that by leerssen, together boil down to the fundamental question whether the texts, ideas etc. presented here, are evidence of a nationalist mindset before modernity or are retrospectively instrumentalised into a nationalist frame in modern times. you will find here also a review published earlier by steven grosby on the reviews in history website from the institute of historical research (university of london, united kingdom). 2. nationality and constructivism (steven grosby)1 the study of nationality (a term used to designate historically and constitutively diverse nations) poses a number of acute methodological, historical, and philosophical problems. one problem, that of moral philosophy, is how to come to terms with the complexity of our existence, specifically, the ethical consequences of acknowledging both the individual qua individual as moral agent and the accepted obligations and 1 this review was originally published on the reviews in history website of the institute of historical research (university of london). nise would like to thank the journal and its editorial board for granting permission to reprint this text. see http://www.history.ac.uk/reviews/review/1281 [last accessed in january 2016]. studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | roundtables & interviews steven grosby / joep leerssen / caspar hirschi 3 preferences of the individual as a member of a nation. although this ethical problem – long recognised by different analysts, ranging, for example, from adam smith in part iv, chapter ii, of the theory of moral sentiments (see his discussion of approbation which ‘involves in it a sense of propriety quite distinct from the principle of utility’) to otto von gierke’s lecture of 1902, das wesen der menschlichen verbände – is of pressing importance, it will not be addressed here as it is not taken up at any length in caspar hirschi’s book under review. a second problem is methodological, the principle of methodological individualism. even though we rightly accept – to use hans freyer’s felicitous characterisation from theorie des objektiven geistes: eine einleitung in der kulturphilosophie – a ‘natural liberalism’ of the social situation, that is, action is self-dependent or self-centered, such that there is a natural sovereignty of the individual and not a ‘group mind’, we also recognise that human action is often influenced by ideas that are by no means unique to the individual. the recognition of this problem is also not new. it is the problem of how, given the principle of methodological individualism, to understand the ‘sharing’ of ideas between individuals; it is the problem of culture for the historical and social sciences; and it has often been formulated as the problem of national culture. i remain convinced that the problem of understanding national culture is legitimate. thus, the works of herder and wilhelm von humboldt ought not to be subjected to facile criticism, as is too often the fashion; rather, their works deserve not only, of course, a critical but also a generous engagement, as the objects of their concern are also our own. how to understand a national culture, given the principle of methodological individualism, is a problem that confronts every work on nationality. a third problem has to do with temporal depth as a factor in the constitution of certain social relations. the nation necessarily contains meaningful references to the past and yet it is constituted in the present, that is, ‘under [specific] political and cultural conditions’ such that ‘it becomes possible to conceive and create [nations]’ (p. 24). this, if you will, domination of the present, characterised by hirschi throughout this book as ‘constructivism’, should not be lost sight of, as that temporal depth is not a mechanical reception of the past into the present; it is not the lifeless studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | roundtables & interviews steven grosby / joep leerssen / caspar hirschi 4 hand of the past on the present. on the contrary, all traditions are, in varying degrees, subject to modification in their reception over time, for example, the continual changes in roman law in, among others, the works of johann apel (1486-1536) as a significant factor in the formation of a territorially uniform law of the land that, as such, undermined the previous bodies of ‘special law’ – a process underway before the reformation. the change of tradition in its reception – both its adaptation to, and contribution to the formation of, the present – has been observed often enough, both in the philosophy of history, for example, by michael oakeshott, and in works on tradition, for example, by t.s. eliot and edward shils. the change, usually contested, can be radical, even when there is a premium placed on preserving tradition, as in religion; for example, the strikingly odd metaphor of the ‘circumcision of the foreskin of the heart’ (deuteronomy 10:16, 30:6, jeremiah 4:4) which, because of its oddness must be a critical, expansive commentary on the commandment to circumcise the foreskin of the penis; paul’s wildly and self-admittedly allegorical interpretation of the two covenants (galatians 4: 24-25); and the conception of the ‘new jerusalem’ (revelation 3:12,21:2), let alone, as is well known, the various chosen peoples of their respectively ‘new israels’ in the late medieval and early modern history of europe and america.2 and, in this regard, we ought to remember luther’s desire to excise the epistle of james from the bible. one should not view the hermeneutic principle of sola scriptura of luther and especially calvin, whose interpretations of the bible earned him the opprobrium of being a ‘judaizer’, as biblical literalism. nevertheless, however opportunistic and transformative the reception of tradition might be and often is, it presupposes already existing attachments and conceptions. these latter 2 for recent discussions of the latter, see a.d. smith, ‘nation and covenant: the contribution of ancient israel to modern nationalism’, in: proceedings of the british academy, 151 (2007) 213-55, and s. grosby, ‘hebraism: the third culture’, in: j.a. jacobs (ed.), judaic sources and western thought. jerusalem’s enduring presence, (oxford, 2011) 73-96. studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | roundtables & interviews steven grosby / joep leerssen / caspar hirschi 5 two problems of the ‘sharing’ such that a culture exists and tradition and its reception bring us to the book under review. caspar hirschi’s the origins of nationalism. an alternative history from ancient rome to early modern germany is a worthy contribution to the scholarly literature on nationalism as its analysis of the constitution of the nation of germany during the medieval and early modern period properly and productively complicates our understanding of what hirschi asserts is ‘the protean nature of the nation’ (p. 13). the protean nature of nationality, recognised explicitly as such by herder in his youthful auch eine philosophie der geschichte zur bildung der menschheit, raises a predictable paradox of difficulties for the historian. on the one hand, what frederic maitland said in his sidgwick lecture of 1903, ‘moral personality and legal personality’ about english history, ‘we are not logical enough to be elementary’, may rightly be expanded beyond his defense of the tradition of common law against the roman law doctrine of corporations to apply to the historian’s investigation into the specific, idiosyncratic processes of most social relations. one consequence of this recognition is hirschi’s justified skepticism of ‘the macro-sociologist approach of most modernist theories’ of nationality (p. 13); and his criticism of ernest gellner’s (and for that matter benedict anderson’s) so very logical, functionalist, and materialist analysis of nationalism in chapter two, ‘the modernist paradigm: strengths and weaknesses’, is a tour de force. the manifest weaknesses of the modernist theories of nationality have been observed often enough, for example, by john a. armstrong, anthony smith, aviel roshwald, and others, so that their criticisms and those by hirschi need not be repeated in any detail here. suffice it to say that the modernist theories suffer from a theoretically antiquated, unequivocal historical distinction between gemeinschaft and gesellschaft, as hirschi also rightly observes (pp. 26-27). however, on the other hand, in dealing with myriad facts specific to a particular context implied by the use of the description ‘protean’, the historian cannot avoid employing analytical categories of generalisation. herein lies the paradox; and so, despite hirschi’s misgivings about ‘using “objective” criteria, such as language, customs, etc.’ that ‘have never been studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | roundtables & interviews steven grosby / joep leerssen / caspar hirschi 6 specific enough’ in formulating a definition of the nation (p. 35), he understandably can not avoid, in his own definition, as developed in chapter 3, ‘foundations of a new nationalism theory’, and subsequently, reference to such categories, the nation can be understood as an abstract community formed by a multipolar and equal relationship to other communities of the same category (i.e. other nations), from which it separates itself by claiming singular qualities, a distinct territory, political and cultural independence and an exclusive honor (p. 47). natio came to mean a political, cultural and linguistic community, inhabiting a territory of its own and sharing an exclusive honor among its members (p. 88). even though, as anthony smith and others have repeatedly observed, there is no such thing as ‘the’ nation because there is only ‘a’ nation among others, the character of these ‘singular qualities’, for example, often a common language (even with wide variation in dialects) and, in particular, a distinct territory are of significance if the definition of the nation is to have heuristic merit. it seems to me that however much hirschi understandably and rightly wishes to concentrate on the particulars of any historical formation, thus how nations are the historically specific ‘products and producers of a competitive culture and engage in endless contests about material and symbolic values’ (p. 47), about which he is surely correct, we are still compelled to distinguish between nation, citykingdom or city-state (or in the context of the holy roman empire, the free city) and empire. in fact, hirschi employs these categorial distinctions when he rightly and repeatedly observes throughout this engaging book that the imperialist political culture of the holy roman empire co-existed with a fragmented territorial structure (the same may be said, mutatis mutandis, of the roman catholic church). in making this observation, i am simply noting that in any analysis of nationality, these fragmented territories cannot be taken for granted for the very category of ‘distinct territory’ or ‘defined territory’ (p. 14) must be clarified. the existence of a distinct, defined studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | roundtables & interviews steven grosby / joep leerssen / caspar hirschi 7 territory implies a great deal, for example, established boundaries, the jurisdiction of a law code, and a relatively stable self-conception of the collectivity. (the stability of that self-conception can only be relative, for the reasons mentioned above having to do with the reception of tradition.) it is of course the case that a territory, in contrast to an area of land, is a cultural and historical artifact (in hirschi’s parlance, ‘constructed’); nonetheless, it is also the sine qua non for the category of nation. and it is here where one finds hirschi seemingly sidestepping an important complication in his otherwise rich and welcomed contribution by not considering explicitly this question: in what ways was there and wasn’t there a german nation during the early modern period? i have no doubt whatsoever that one finds significant adumbrations of german nationality during this period; and if any one does have a doubt, this book will or should convincingly dispel it. (my use of ‘adumbrations’ is because the complicated processes involved in the constitution of any nation, as expressed in the shared, layered self-conception of numerous individuals, are obscured – no, more, ignored – through a misguided attention to one particular date to indicate the existence of a nation.) however, when one turns one’s attention to the ‘german nation’ of the holy roman empire of the german nation, as the empire was called at the beginning of the 16th century, it is not the relation of the german nation to the french or the italian that is need of careful explication, but rather: 1) the problematic eastern border (territorial and symbolic) with poland; 2) the relation of prussia to the german nation; and 3) the latter’s relation to austria. these three considerations call into question the ‘distinctness’ of the ‘defined’ territory, and all that is implied by that distinctness. in taking up these complicated (and, to be sure, contested) processes of the formation and development of german nationality during this period, the analyst might reasonably turn to friedrich meinecke’s category of kulturnation as laid out in weltbürgertum and nationalstaat (english translation, cosmopolitanism and the national state, 1970). all that we ask of such an analyst is that he or she does so self-consciously. the particularly noteworthy and worthwhile aspect of hirschi’s definition of the nation is its focus on the multipolarity of nationality in contrast to the bi-polarity of empire, that is, the very category of nation assumes an studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | roundtables & interviews steven grosby / joep leerssen / caspar hirschi 8 ascendant ‘conception of space [that] can be described as multicentric. nations are formed by their relations to other nations’ (p. 39). this national, multicentric relation of equality of existential existence is in contrast to the imperial distinction between civilised and barbarian, ‘based on the ancient ideal that the centre of political power had to coincide with the centre of civilization and education’ (p. 43). it seems to me that there is merit to this line of argument; thus, the roman empire’s inability to transcend this conception of bi-polarity is likely a part of the answer to the problem posed by arnaldo momigliano in ‘the disadvantages of monotheism for a universal state’ (reprinted in on pagans, jews, and christians) as to why the empire never turned to some kind of federal structure. according to hirschi, the decisive developments of this new discourse of the multipolarity of nationality that ‘gave rise to europe’s unique inner dynamic, both politically and culturally’ (p. 44) were the consolidation of the previously fragmented territorial legacy of the roman empire into competing, multipolar territorial structures beginning with the aftermath of charlemagne’s reign, subsequently abetted by the reception of roman law as a vehicle for patriotism (here, hirschi, in chapter 4, ‘killing and dying for love: the common fatherland’, rightly draws upon kantorowicz’s analysis of the development of the conception of pro patria mori); the realisation or simulation of that patriotism at the council of constance (1414-18) such that one finds ‘a national competition or honour’ (p. 15, 81-88), as presented by hirschi in chapter 5, ‘competing for honour; the making of nations in medieval europe’; and the further extension and deepening of that discourse by the humanist nationalism during the 15th through 17th centuries, one example of which was the discovery in the mid-1450s and subsequent exploitation of tacitus’ germania (pp. 168-71). there is much to commend in this analysis of the emergence of a multicentric discourse of nationality, not least of which is its drawing attention to factors long before what is too often and too simply viewed to be the decisive moment in the creation of nations, the peace of westphalia (1648). nonetheless, one already finds repeatedly in genesis 10 (verses 5, 20, 31) a classificatory distinction revolving explicitly around language, territory, and descent; and surely a multicentric equality is implied in the studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | roundtables & interviews steven grosby / joep leerssen / caspar hirschi 9 septuagint’s deuteronomy 32:8, ‘when the most high divided the nations (έθνή), when he separated humankind, he fixed the boundaries of the peoples according to the number of the gods’ (literally, ‘according to the angels of god’). furthermore, although the vulgate’s translation of deuteronomy 32:8 does not follow the septuagint, it still implies the same, ‘when the most high divided the nations (gentes), when he separated humankind, he fixed the boundaries of the peoples according to the number of the sons of israel.’ thus, while israel in the vulgate is usually referred to as a gens, it is not quite right to state unequivocally that ‘jerome’s latin translation of the bible in the late fourth century led the way to [an imperial bi-polarity by] calling all peoples outside the judaeochristian world nationes’ (p. 79); for, in both deuteronomy 17:14 and 1 samuel 8:5, israel pleads to become a natio among nationes. of course, israelite self-conception, as conveyed in the old testament, can not be put on the same plane as competing with a dominant, imperial discourse; but an analysis of nationality outside the context of early modern german history would note an apparent, to be sure tamed and partial, multipolarity of the imperial persian ‘cyrus cylinder’: the rebuilding of other people’s temples, the implied recognition that the worship of the gods of those other peoples was legitimate, and the return of exiles to their respective lands. certainly the jews understood cyrus’ edict that way (ezra 1:1-4, isaiah 44:28). the relevance of the reference to ancient israel here is because, as many have observed, the reception of its image, as a designation for both a particular people and its bounded land, from the bible has been one factor in the early formation of european nations. and hirschi notes how the image of ancient israel contributed to the self-understanding of, among others, the french, czechs, and swiss (pp. 66-68, 212-214). although i applaud hirschi’s insistence on distinguishing nationalism from religion and he is surely correct that the relation between nationalism and religion requires a nuanced analysis (p. 213), the cultural significance of the retrieval of the image of ancient israel deserves to be pondered. doing so is surely a difficult matter; but it seems to me that understanding further the significance of the ‘turn’ to the old testament is a pressing task for analysts of occidental nationality; for within a monotheistic civilisation studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | roundtables & interviews steven grosby / joep leerssen / caspar hirschi 10 that emphasises, at least doctrinally, the universal brotherhood of the individual, as the new testament does, the image of ancient israel has been the vehicle that conveys, however tension-ridden, a symbolic intertwining of the particular and the universal. in contrast, the tradition of rome, analysed well by hirschi, can not avoid being burdened by three problems: i) polytheism; ii) imperial ambition (consider, for example, plutarch’s description of cato’s ‘bi-polar’, if you will, hatred for all things greek and his demand that carthage be utterly destroyed), and iii) the roman church’s dogmatic rejection of this world. no doubt, recognition of this burden accounts in large measure for the turn to the old testament as a way to legitimate, within monotheism, territorial fragmentation, including that of the church that long predates the conciliarism of the council of constance. the careful and often subtle analysis of this book indicates that hirschi is capable of taking on this task of elucidating the significance of this turn; the earlier de facto territorial divisions within the church; and the conceptual groundwork laid for both the conciliar movement of the council of constance and the consolidation of national states as exemplified by the previous controversies, bearing within them the problem of clarifying the ‘self’ of self-government, over the lex regia of the corpus iuris (for example, whether or not the translatio was only a concessio) and the early 14th century work of individuals such as john of paris (tractatus de regia potestate et papali), not surprisingly concurrent with the outcome of the conflict between the ‘royal religion’ of philip the fair and boniface viii: the formulation of the rex glorie (1311) that ‘like the people of israel . . . the kingdom of france, as a peculiar people chosen by god to carry out divine mandates, is distinguished by marks of special honor and grace.’3 taking on this task will require a more expansive survey of the humanist intellectuals than what appears in what i take to be the most important chapter and contribution of this book, the lengthy chapter 7, ‘humanist nationalism’ (pp. 119-179). hirschi is spot on to emphasise the humanists’ retrieval of earlier texts, their subsequent editing, and the humanists’ 3 see j. strayer, the reign of philip the fair (princeton, 1980). studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | roundtables & interviews steven grosby / joep leerssen / caspar hirschi 11 philological investigations for nationality (pp. 158-159), that is, the elevation of the importance of history to understand – or, as formulated by hirschi, ‘construct’ – the present, for example, not only the discovery and editing of tacitus’ germania but also the exploitation of its various accounts such as that of arminius to assert a temporal continuity of the past with the present, another example of which is beatus rhenanus’ three books on german history of 1531 (pp. 207-209). the rich evidence of this excellent chapter serves to substantiate hirschi’s argument for the crucial role played by the humanists in formulating a national discourse that, in turn, contributed decisively to the formation of nationality. although outside the purview of the book, his argument can rightly be extended to encompass other areas, for example, the establishment and defense of the english common law by coke, selden, and hale, hence the arguments over the continuity of the ‘good old law’, all of which presuppose the temporal depth of the historical outlook (and which – note well – would not have been possible without the earlier bracton and that peculiar institution of english legal education, the inns of court). however, deserving of attention are those numerous humanists – for example, carlo sigonio, joseph scaliger, isaac casaubon, petrus cunaeus, johannes althusius, of course hugo grotius and john selden, and many more – who, in the investigation of the past, looked past rome to ancient israel. our problem is to ascertain the significance of why they did. when pursuing this problem we will not be content with an explanation that limits itself to the influence of the reformation; for doing so begs the questions that are important in the investigation of occidental nationality. hirschi’s admirable focus on the humanists and events of the 15th through 17th centuries clearly supports his argument that nationality is not exclusively modern. he is right. this focus also supports his argument for the decisive role intellectuals played in formulating a discourse necessary for nationality to emerge; and this is why he describes his analysis of nationality as ‘constructivist’. there is merit here, too, especially in his attention to the multipolarity of that discourse; but there is a danger to this ‘constructivist’ analysis because of the capriciousness or arbitrariness and an often unwarranted intentionality implied by the term. it is the case that all social relations, including face-to-face, involve ‘acts of the studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | roundtables & interviews steven grosby / joep leerssen / caspar hirschi 12 imagination’, that is, some symbolic referent perceived by each of the members of the relation to be adhering or inhering in each of them. hirschi is right to observe that this perception can not be taken for granted; it has its own historical development. however, the recognition of this symbolic or imaginative factor, for example, such that a territory exists or that language achieves significance as a classificatory criterion of the self and others, does not mean that it is ‘imaginary’, as if the social relation were a unicorn. take, for example, speaking a common language. now, first, there is the standardisation of language; in the context of this book, the influence of luther’s translation of the bible (p. 105). too many analysts begin their investigation with nationality at this point, often because of their misguided insistence that the decisive factor for the existence of the nation can only be state-directed policies. of course, the bearing of these policies or the work of intellectuals on the standardisation of language is not to be denied; but, as hirschi properly notes, there is a great deal of evidence from as early as the 11th century and increasingly thereafter for germans being distinguished from others by the language they spoke (pp. 104-108). behind this distinction is the fact of (needless to say) an uneven linguistic differentiation from one area of land to another. however, for language to be a self-differentiating referent of a nation, crucial is the attribution of significance to that distinction; and hirschi is, once again, correct to draw our attention to numerous intellectual and historical factors that contributed to that attribution. but also crucial is that the ‘construction’ or ‘invention’ of language as a symbolic boundary of a nation was possible because of the underlying anthropological fact of the spontaneous order of its areal differentiation. here, i am simply exploiting hume’s observation in a treatise of human nature that while many of our relations are artificial, in the sense that they are the result of the intervention of our thought or reflection, they are not arbitrary, hence, my earlier distinction between ‘the acts of the imagination’ and ‘the imaginary’. the reference to hume’s distinction and my adaptation of it as between ‘the acts of the imagination’ and ‘the imaginary’ returns us again to the two problems confronting an analysis of nationality: the temporal depth of the reception of tradition and the sharing such that a culture exists; but they studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | roundtables & interviews steven grosby / joep leerssen / caspar hirschi 13 do so now with a set of different concerns that, it seems to me, unavoidably nag historical investigations and the human sciences in general. not all conceptual creations become traditions, and not all traditions persist, albeit with dramatic changes, over time. furthermore, not all traditions become objects of what is important to hirschi’s analysis of nationality, honour; and not all are widely shared such that a culture exists. we would like to know why is it that some conceptual creations persist as (contested) traditions, are (unevenly) shared, and become objects of honour? these are, after all, reasonable questions to raise, if we do not loose sight of just why we are so interested in the phenomenon of nationality such that it is the subject of so many historical investigations. i think that key to addressing those problems is the recognition that the nation is one among several collectivities of existential significance. hirschi implies as much when he refers to the ‘bigger family’ in his discussion of the goal of patriotism as convincing citizens or subjects ‘that there is a bigger family which they belong to and which deserves an even stronger dedication than [to] their own [family]’ (p. 51), earlier examples of which are found in herodotus’ history (8.144), plato’s republic (v.470 cd), and especially the platonic dialogue menexenus (237-244). to recognise this significance is not to gainsay the necessity of careful historical analysis of the particular processes involved in the formation of those collectivities, an analysis that ought to include their categorial differentiation from one another. if we conclude with the philological investigations of hirschi’s humanists, then to postulate the likelihood of this existential significance is by no means an audacious claim; for all that need be done is to consider the etymology of natio. 3. the baton and the frame: or, tradition and recollection (joep leerssen) the 17th-century german language purist schottelius rhetorically asked his fellow-germans: ‘should you not, o german, honour the language that, studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | roundtables & interviews steven grosby / joep leerssen / caspar hirschi 14 together with your mother’s milk, you sucked in with her sweet murmurings?’ – thereby linking the native tongue, as an instrument of social communication and collective identity, to that most intimate of transgenerational bonds. the sentiment was to be quoted two hundred years later by jacob grimm, both in an indictment of danish policy in schleswig-holstein (1812) and again half century later in his german dictionary. caspar hirschi does not refer to this particular instance, but he refers to a good many similar ones, and for him they all point to one undeniable home truth: german nationalism has roots that go all the way back. german humanists and intellectuals of the late-medieval and earlymodern period (he mentions schottelius, and hütten, and beatus rhenanus, and the ever-fascinating conrad celtis, and a great many others) make statements that sound like nationalism, look like nationalism, feel like nationalism. if it walks like a duck, and quacks like a duck, it’s probably a duck. all the interesting and important issues raised in the origins of nationalism are put into the service of that ‘it’s a duck’ argument; and that is a pity. hirschi puts his historical erudition and acumen in the service of a mere methodological skirmish against the modernists in nationalism studies; and that mars what could have been a very good book indeed. * let me begin by praising the breadth and erudition of the origins of nationalism, which follows on from hirschi’s wettkampf der nationen, slimmed down from its 2005 format and broadened with several forays into other historical periods and themes. from courtly prestige-jostles to humanist cultural reflections and the afterlife of roman antiquity, mainly in the area of the holy roman empire just north of the alps, the book marshals an impressive amount of fascinating historical material, circling around what is surely one of the formative events at the close of the middle ages: the council of constance. hirschi is right to zoom in on that crucial event. those who look up the term ‘nationalism’ in the old, ultramontanist but always-interesting catholic encyclopedia of 1909 will note that that work dates the ideology back to, precisely, the council of studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | roundtables & interviews steven grosby / joep leerssen / caspar hirschi 15 constance and its decision to have bishops vote in ‘block votes’, by church province (‘nation’), rather than as a single collective. this issue appears in hirschi’s book, too; i will return to it. for the wealth of historical detail from a period and corpus of documentation not easily accessible to most english-language scholars, hirschi’s book is a gem; and that praise ought to stand unqualified by any bones i intend to pick further on. so i repeat: hats off, read this book, it brings into our purview important and intriguing personalities and authors, and for its grasp of the period it commands our respect. * that being said, i am deeply at odds with the mast that hirschi nails his colours to: his insistence that nationalism is a long-term presence in european affairs, and that we see its manifestations in this late-medieval, early-modern context as clearly and unmistakably as we do in nineteenth or twentieth-century sources. it is at this point that i take exception. not because i am a card-carrying member of that modernist interpretation of nationalism which hirschi sets out to controvert. i have some familiarity with the early-modern period from my own work, on the reception history of tacitus and on the impact of neo-aristotelianism on national stereotypes; and i have spent much time studying documentation from this same period in a different part of europe, ireland. that work was done at a time (the early 1980s) when the scholarly community habitually read gaelic sources from the period 1540-1690 with the eyes of contemporary irish nationalism. from experience, i know distortive anachronism and retroprojection when i see it; and it has made me a stickler for trying to situate and understand the record in its own, proper epistemic frame and rhetorical setting. as paul veyne put it, ‘l’historiographie est une lutte incessante contre notre tendance au contre-sens anachronique.’ * if schottelius was a nationalist, why not ramses ii? was assurbanipal a totalitarian dictator, or attila the hun a homophobic misogynist? such qualifications are ‘not even wrong’. they apply contemporary categories to uncongenial subjects outside their proper frame of reference, and they studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | roundtables & interviews steven grosby / joep leerssen / caspar hirschi 16 misleadingly claim the power to identify and qualify subjects whom we can discern and apprehend only very imperfectly from a great distance. what from afar appears to waddle and quack like a duck, may actually be a goose. resemblances across such enormous cultural distances are not in themselves convincing – and even without going to the ad absurdum lengths of ramses and assurbanipal, it should give us pause for thought that those middle ages which are here so confidently identified in modernday terms ended more than half a millennium ago. hirschi makes his case largely by means of mere, iterative assertion – the application of the epithet ‘national’ or ‘nationalist’ wherever it suits his purpose. the title, resounding and apodictic as it is, already bespeaks, if we ponder it more fully, a very questionable finalism – almost as if a history of renaissance italy or france should be carry the title the origins of the pizza, or the roots of bistro culture. not every 16th-century marquis quaffing a goblet of burgundy is a forerunner of sartre at les deux magots. time and again the word ’nationalism’ is applied to remote centuries with cheerful insouciance as if that were wholly unproblematic, seasoning the presentation of the facts a priori and pre-empting their interpretation. an example picked at random: french humanists were ‘engaged in the nationalist re-evaluation of their mother tongue’ (p. 111); their german counterparts dislike foreign loanwords as if these are ‘illegal immigrants’ and a certain linguistic activist is positioned amidst his ‘fellow nationalists’ (p. 113). thus loading the dice, hirschi attempts to foreclose the case and to assume what he actually needs to demonstrate. hirschi is remarkably cavalier with the historical minutiae of how words have different meanings and even different ontologies at different periods. he stretches terms like ‘nationalism’ and ‘nation’ at will to suit his purpose: any sense of pride in one’s own ‘nation’ and its honour, any sense of placing it competitively vis-à-vis other nations, is seen as ‘nationalism’ by hirschi. but in that very wide sense, the word refers to a mere affect, not an ideology, and the instances of that affect in the late middle ages cannot be the ‘origins’, as the title claims, of the modern political doctrine, any more than a sense of social grievance among dispossessed peasants constitute the ‘origins’ of communism. studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | roundtables & interviews steven grosby / joep leerssen / caspar hirschi 17 david lowenthal, harvard history professor, told me a few years ago about being interviewed by a journalist; one of the questions was about ‘bussing’ – the hotly contentious policy to achieve an ethnic mix in innercity schools by bringing in children from other neighbourhoods by schoolbus. what, the journalist wondered, would abraham lincoln have said about bussing? lowenthal’s reply: ‘lincoln would have said: “what is a bus?”’ those who apply the word nationalism to periods antedating its actual usage, as if it were no different from ‘apple’ or ‘shoe’, should ponder that. and even when it comes to words like ‘nation’ and (more interestingly) ‘honour’, we should exercise caution. hirschi does not. his definition of the ‘nation’ on p. 47 is all-embracing (‘an abstract community formed by a multipolar and equal relationship to other communities of the same category (i.e other nations) from which it separates itself by claiming singular qualities, a distinct territory, political and cultural independence and an exclusive honour’). in fairness, the notion of multipolarity is a sound one, and hirschi makes an important point in seeing this as a distinguishing feature from imperial self-aggrandisement or tribal antagonisms; but even so, this definition could apply to any almost territorially-based multi-neighboured human aggregate, like a city or a football team; and in the context, it amounts to little more than a definition of the state. accordingly, any development toward state-formation, be it ancient rome, or be it feudal or monarchical, can be interpreted by hirschi as ‘nationalism’. yet at the same time the matter of the block-votes at the council of constance is equally grist to his mill, although the usage of the word ‘nation’ there is much less amenable to his definition. those block votes (hirschi himself describes it well) were meant to break up the episcopal power base of the infamous pope john xxii, largely concentrated in the italian church province. the block votes were a canny gerrymander to water down that majority, and the ‘nations’ argument, though extremely intriguing for many reasons, reflects if anything [a] the fascination that humanists had with the tribal antecedents of northern europe, taken from classical authors like caesar, tacitus and jordanes; and [b] the nomenclature of the divisions of the student bodies at universities like the sorbonne or prague – mere landsmannschaften, more like the studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | roundtables & interviews steven grosby / joep leerssen / caspar hirschi 18 division of hogwart’s into houses like griffindor and slytherin than like the modern use of the term. the apparent superficiality of words and patterns can be misleading; but although hirschi himself admits in a concessive clause that ‘the nationes of medieval universities had not much in common with later nations’, he cannot suppress his urge to conclude that ‘they marked an important step towards them’; and in order to demonstrate that we move on to the next instance or case-example where similarities and resemblances are invoked and highlighted so as to overrule dissimilarities, discrepancies, anachronisms. but this is where the next step led: at the follow-up to constance, the council of basel (1436), bishop alfonso of burgos claimed seniority in his ‘nation’ on the basis that he represented a most ancient, visigothically-founded monarchy. in so doing, he was at odds with a similar claim by bishop nils ragvaldsson of uppsala, who claimed precedence on the basis of sweden being the aboriginal homeland of the goths.4 goths in sweden, goths in spain – it is hard to see these erudite tribalisms as steps towards modern nationalism. if they were, they led along a path so tortuous and forking, so riddled with dead-end turns, labyrinthine diversions and twisted signposts, that it is downright wrong to present this as a straightforward linear trajectory. at its worst, such a mode of reasoning could be used to show that the starving french, centuries before marie-antoinette told them to ‘eat cake’, were already in the habit of doing so, merely because we can trace the presence of an egg here, some milk and even butter over there, and sugar or flour in yet another instance. in a not too dissimilar procedure hirschi demonstrates, over a wide area and time period, the dispersed ingredients of nationalism (state formation, centralised power, tribal appellations, dynastic rivalry and ethnocentrism) and, mixing them together, claims to have demonstrated the existence of nationalism. 4 o. mörke, ‘bataver, eidgenossen und goten: gründungs und begründungsmythen in den niederlanden, der schweiz, und schweden in der frühen neuzeit’, in: mythos und nation. studien zur entwicklung des kollektiven bewußtseins in der neuzeit, 3, ed. h. berding (frankfurt, 1996) 104-132. studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | roundtables & interviews steven grosby / joep leerssen / caspar hirschi 19 hirschi himself feels that the coalescence of these ingredients is a historical fact, not a matter of his own dispositio, and he makes an interesting case to support it: it revolves around the element of honour as the decisive factor in binding the ingredients of nationalism into a coherent ideology. i fully agree with hirschi on the great importance of the idea of rivalry and of the repoussoir of an otherness outside the ‘we’group; and in highlighting the ethos of honour he makes an important historical point. the realisation that one’s own nation stands in need of support as it faces a wider agonistic-competitive framework: this is an essential prerequisite for the articulation of national feeling. but that sense of honour, itself, is an ingredient in the historical mix, one among all the other other ingredients, not a bonding agency at the meta-level; it, too, was subject to enormous historical fluctuations in meaning and applicability. it was ‘honour’ that challenged, for the longest time, the modern state’s increasing monopoly on legitimate violence – witness the tenacious cult of the duel. indeed, of all operative political grundbegriffe, terms like ‘honour’ and ‘nation’ have probably gone through the most fundamental changes between 1500 and 1900. their semantic vicissitudes faithfully trace the intervening historical and ideological paradigm shifts: the rising notion of democratic republicanism, of popular sovereignty, of the enlightenment and of counter-enlightenment historicism and vernacular particularism; and we can see both words, ‘nation’ and ‘honour’, playing problematic, dynamically shifting key roles in the turmoil of the american and french revolutions and the napoleonic conquests. that turmoil is brilliantly addressed in lucien febvre’s classic lecture course at the collège de france in 1945-1946, entitled honneur et patrie (invoking, of course, the motto of the légion d’honneur). hirschi does not go into any of this, and that is the weakness of his ‘quacking duck’ case. there is no serious attempt, despite the wellestablished methodology of begriffsgeschichte, to trace the changing meanings and functions of ideas like ‘nation’ and ‘honour’. i have myself, inspired partly by febvre, tried to make the case that the rise of nationalism in the proper sense of the word (i.e. the sense in which the word ‘nationalism’ came to be used itself by its adherents and opponents, studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | roundtables & interviews steven grosby / joep leerssen / caspar hirschi 20 from the mid-19th-century onwards) was made possible precisely by the conceptual shifts around 1800, between johann georg zimmermann’s von dem nationalstolze and fichte’s reden an die deutsche nation, when ‘honour’ was rejected as the depraved, selfish arrogance of the nobility, and amor patriae became a matter of civic, anti-aristocratic ‘virtue’ instead; when the slogans vive le roi and vive la patrie were used by bitterly opposed, aristocratic and democratic, factions. hirschi will recognise and appreciate the ciceronian echoes in that classical republicanism – he is laudably aware of the long-standing importance of cicero’s nachleben in european political philosophy; but by the same token he must admit, i think, that the aristocratic-chivalric code of honour and the classic-republican code of civic virtue and responsible engagement in the body politic cannot be simply lumped together as two related manifestations of proto-nationalism; as if eggs resemble flour, since both are used in baking cakes. ‘honour’ and the ‘nation’ as invoked by feudal heralds-at-arms, by church prelates and by humanist scholars, over a long and turbulent period, mean, quite simply, totally different things from case to case. (much as a word like ‘character’ can mean totally different things when used by a book-printer, a playwright or a psychologist.) as i think i have shown in national thought in europe, intense concept-historical realignments over six or seven decades (1740-1815) were fundamental catalysts in the emergence of that political rhetoric and doctrine called nationalism, and set it off against its longer, older source-traditions of national feeling; how then can hirschi justify seeing stable ideological and rhetorical continuities over almost as many centuries? historical lines of continuity and discontinuity cannot be demonstrated by mere cherry picking, highlighting what suits your case, blindsiding what does not. * having said that, i must make sure not to overbalance into the opposite error and fetishise those discontinuities that hirschi so cavalierly shrugged off. schottelius was called, after all, the ‘17th-century grimm’; grimm did place himself under schottelius’s auspices, and it would be foolish to deny that such continuities were operative over the centuries. if hirschi has a point in criticising modernists, it is that they are heedless of these diachronic affiliations, and that their fixation on post-1780 events studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | roundtables & interviews steven grosby / joep leerssen / caspar hirschi 21 and infrastructural processes tends to turn their gaze away from one important fact: the actors concerned were all of them sentient intellectuals with a highly developed historical consciousness. on their trajectory towards the future they were not mere ballistic projectiles, but careful drivers who regularly checked their historical rear-view mirror. that this stands in need of being pointed out seems to me to be, not so much a conflict between a modernist and a perennialist view of nationalism, as, rather, a cleavage between sociopolitical and cultural historians; and i feel myself very much at one with hirschi in the latter camp. cultural processes are different from mechanical, statistical or systematic ones (such as the workings of supply and demand, or productivity and market forces, or demographic and climatological fluctuations, or how a strukturwandel here triggers reactions over there). the core of that difference lies in the fact that the actors of cultural history are people exercising their power of self-reflection, remembering the past and from that remembrance making judgements, and extrapolating and anticipating scenarios for the future. that essential hermeneutic quality (we can follow ricœur in this) centrally involves a diachronic, historical consciousness; at every step of their deeds and actions that consciousness informed what they tried to achieve, what they tried to avoid, what they were thinking they were doing. those reflections, that culture, must be factored into our analysis of what happened in the past and why it developed as it did. but at the same time we should realise that culture, too, went through a modernisation process. that, i put to caspar hirschi, is the vexed quandary in nationalism studies: modernists think that culture does not matter, perennialists think that the modernisation process does not matter. in this symmetrical, complementary one-sidedness, each party misses the other’s point. i would have probably concurred heartily with every fact and argument in hirschi’s book if he had narrated it the other way around: not how schottelius ‘anticipated’ grimm, but how grimm recycled schottelius; not how the use of ‘nations’ at constance marked a step in the development towards nationalism, but how nationalism, once it developed, could avail studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | roundtables & interviews steven grosby / joep leerssen / caspar hirschi 22 itself of this conceptual repertoire. the distinction may seem nit-picking, but it is fundamental. it reflects valéry’s dictum that ‘we march into the future backwards’ – ‘nous entrons dans l’avenir à reculons’, blind to where we are going, with our eyes fixed on the path already travelled. that means that it makes perfect sense to see how the past informs later periods, and it makes no sense to say that the past prepares it or provides its ‘origins’. in 1517, luther burned a papal bull excommunicating him. that gesture was picked up three hundred years later by students who, in a commemorative feast on the wartburg, burned books critical of the new german patriotism. and the students’ book-burning gesture was picked up in the 1930s by josef goebbels. now, here is a continuity leapfrogging across the centuries. but while goebbels was mindful of the 1817 students, and they were mindful of luther, it makes no possible sense to claim that luther ‘foreshadowed’ or ‘anticipated’ 1817, or (pace daniel goldhagen) that either he or the wartburg students are part of a german run-up towards national socialism. historical continuity often works intractably in a counter-chronological direction. many continuities of history are, if they are in any way meaningful, retrospective in nature. they reside in the way in which the present instrumentalises the past, draws upon the past, knows the past the way that past could never know its future. what successive periods pass on to each other looks at first sight like the baton in a relay race: words, ideas, gestures, institutions, agendas. that notion of handing on the baton is deeply ingrained in our way of viewing historical continuity; hence the notion of tradition, which means precisely that: ‘handing on’, the way we bequeath property, or names, or scientific innovations. and in some cases, it may actually work like that – in very strong institutions such as a monarchy, or a church, or family property, or an academy. but hirschi’s book convinces me that this is only half the story, and that many relay races are run à reculons, facing backwards. beside that historical continuity which reaches out from the past and which is called ‘tradition’, there is another, altogether different one which reaches into the past and which we may call recollection, basing one’s studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | roundtables & interviews steven grosby / joep leerssen / caspar hirschi 23 actions on something recalled, received, recycled, assimilated, appropriated. what the past leaves to its successors is information; and how that heirloom shapes and in-forms the heirs is up to them. much as historians know that one should never monocausally explain important events from a single root cause, so too the present is not formed or in-formed by any specific single lump inherited from the past. the past is a shopping mall, a lucky dip, and offers us whatever we find chimes with our current concerns (allowing us to ignore other, more inconvenient elements in our inheritance). what we take from the past is very often not a baton but a frame – a way of schematising and cognitively arranging things. what goebbels took from the wartburg, and what the wartburg students took from luther, was not a relay baton, but, indeed, a frame, something to give historical meaning to their contemporary actions. that is what grimm recollected from schottelius. if hirschi had written his book in that retrospective mode, in the mode of frames of recollection rather than batons of tradition, – how romans, heralds, humanists and prelates in their words and deeds left behind frames which could be picked up, appropriated and instrumentalised, and adapted to inform the agendas of later ages – it would all have made perfect, perfect sense. and that would raise the immensely challenging and intriguing research perspective, what role is played by ecological contingency in that process (as in the christian parable of superabundant supply and partial survival: the sower sowing his seeds, randomly scattering them here and there, with only a small portion taking root and ripening) – and what role is played by volition, conscious anticipation and that family resemblance which makes some things in the past appear more familiar than others. those are, for me, the hugely engrossing reflections and questions that hirschi’s flawed, fine book leaves me with, and i would love to hear his reflections, as a fellow cultural-historian, on them. studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | roundtables & interviews steven grosby / joep leerssen / caspar hirschi 24 4. duck or quack? on the lack of scholarly soundness and decorum in joep leerssen’s review (caspar hirschi) ‘keep quiet and trust your readers!’ was the answer of an experienced scholar ten years ago when i had just published my first book and expressed my bewilderment about a reviewer who seemed to have misunderstood my argument deliberately. i will always be grateful for his advice because it has taught me an important lesson in scholarly decorum and it has also spared me many unnecessary disputes. after all, it does not make much sense to write books if you cannot trust your readers. so why reply now to a review of another book of mine? when i was approached by studies on national movements in the summer of 2013, the idea presented to me was a round table review with three contributors starting the discussion and me commenting on their critiques. i accepted with pleasure. it appeared to me that this was a good opportunity to discuss key arguments of the book from various angles without running the risk of a tit for tat with a single reviewer. the situation now is a bit different. instead of three reviews there are only two, one of which, written by steven grosby, was published in july 2012, and has been openly accessible ever since. when it first appeared in reviews in history i declined the offer by the editor to comment because i saw no reason to break the proven rule of silence, particularly as grosby’s piece looked interesting enough by itself. it would thus be inconsistent and slightly unfair to the first publisher if i did so now. so there remains the review by joep leerssen, which prompts all sorts of questions, though not many that would allow for a productive debate about my arguments. still, some of these questions have relevance beyond the book, and this is why i decided that, despite the change of circumstance, i would keep my word and write a response. * the first issue i would like to address has little to do with the content of leerssen’s text, but rather its pre-publication history. in early 2015 i was invited to give a keynote at a conference on ‘national identity formation in early modern europe’ at the university of nijmegen. when i arrived the studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | roundtables & interviews steven grosby / joep leerssen / caspar hirschi 25 organiser of the conference told me that she had received an email with an alarming review of my book attached. it was sent by leerssen and interpreted by the organiser as a sign of disapproval at my invitation. at the time, the editors of this journal had already sent me leerssen’s text, but i was still waiting for the other reviews. it was thus a bit odd to realise that before the planned roundtable review had even taken shape, its first and only contribution so far had already started to take on a life of its own in the nationalism research community. a few months later, amazement turned to astonishment when i attended a conference on ‘nationhood before modernity’ in oxford and was greeted by a well-known english modernist with the question: ‘what do you say about leerssen’s review?’ when i told him that it was not published yet, he mentioned that leerssen had sent it to him, too. apparently, leerssen preferred to have the debate decided by networking his way through digital back channels before other reviewers, let alone the author himself, had anything to say. the simulation of an open debate serves the purpose of driving an unwelcome perspective on the history of nationalism out of the field before it can actually be discussed. as far as the review itself is concerned, leerssen accuses me of committing three cardinal sins of historiography: using ‘distortive anachronism’, presenting history as ‘a straightforward linear trajectory’ and explaining important events ‘monocausally’. i will start with the motif that runs through the review in multiple variations, anachronism. lorraine daston once said that historians, despite all their differences, were united, among other things, by ‘a huge fear of anachronism’. leerssen plays on this fear by portraying me as a serial sinner. according to him, my book contains a ‘wealth of historical detail’, all presented, however, in a misleading way. the sources i quote – contracts, missives, legal opinions, chronicles, commentaries, letters, speeches, broadsheets etc. – may look as if they have something to do with nations and nationalism, but actually they have not. this is a heavy charge, and one would expect it to be supported by evidence based on a critical re-examination of at least some of my key sources. however, leerssen does not offer a single misinterpreted document to corroborate his accusation. instead, he refers to famous men such as ramses ii and assurbanipal, alfonso of burgos and nils studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | roundtables & interviews steven grosby / joep leerssen / caspar hirschi 26 ragvaldsson of uppsala, attila the hun and sartre, goebbels and goldhagen. these men do not share many characteristics, but they have one thing in common: they do not figure in my book. even schottelius, who is given most prominence in leerssen’s review, is only mentioned once in my book and, by the way, not labelled a nationalist. so what are all these names dropped for? they serve to entertain through ridicule (ramses, attila etcetera), guilt by association (goldhagen), or mock counterwitnessing (two bishops at the council of basle indulging in ‘erudite tribalism’ – whatever that may mean – allegedly disprove my argument about the long-term significance of the council of constance for the construction of nations). equally entertaining are the forays into ornithology, gastronomy and motorised mobility. however, what might work as polemic does not necessarily work as proof. * let’s have a closer look at leerssen’s own version of the famous animal proverb. he says that something may look like a duck, walk like a duck and quack like a duck, but be in fact a goose. what should this signify exactly? is it that something appears to be a duck at first sight, but on closer inspection turns into a goose and thus also looks, walks and quacks like a goose? or is it that something seems to be a duck and continues to look like a duck, yet cannot be a duck because ducks have never been sighted in these areas? as leerssen sees no need to expand, he must understand his version in the latter sense. he is absolutely certain that nationalism is a uniquely modern phenomenon, so when confronted with an abundance of sources from pre-modern periods that point to the contrary he must conclude that the content cannot be what it appears to be. in the end, this attitude deems the study of sources irrelevant in the quest for new historical knowledge and, at the same time, it reduces the possibility of adding new historical knowledge to existing conceptual frameworks. this is exactly what leerssen’s accusation of anachronism amounts to: it is not about the interpretation of my sources, but about my use of the word ‘nationalism’. leerssen sticks to an old argument that is still used by many historians, although it is more suited to time-travel daydreams than historiographical research. he complains that i apply ‘the word studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | roundtables & interviews steven grosby / joep leerssen / caspar hirschi 27 nationalism to periods antedating its actual usage’ and, even worse, that i do it ‘with cheerful insouciance’. of course, the idea here is that serious historians explain the past in the language of that past and not in the language of the present. as consistent as this may sound, it is neither practically possible nor theoretically desirable. leerssen’s own language is a case in point. it would be easy to argue that leerssen’s accusation is hypocritical because he is guilty of the same sin. in his book on national thought in europe he speaks – shall we say, with cheerful insouciance – of ‘humanism in the early fifteenth century’ or of ‘tacitus’s democratic primitivism’. evidently, the word ‘humanism’ was not in ‘actual usage’ during the early fifteenth century and neither were the romans of tacitus’ time familiar with the term ‘primitivism’. but why take examples from leerssen’s book when his review contains similarly frivolous anachronisms? surely the most ironical of them is the phrase which leerssen – not once, but twice – sets against my concept of pre-modern nationalism. this is ‘national feeling’, an expression that is, be it in english, german or french, alien to medieval and early modern sources and for an obvious reason: it belongs to the language of romanticism, which leerssen studies in his book and, similar to romantic authors, re-projects on premodern periods. it is not my goal, though, to welcome leerssen to the club of historiographical cardinal sinners. my point is that his inconsistent reference to anachronism is the symptom of a bigger conceptual flaw not unusual in nationalism studies. he falls victim to the essentialist fallacy. when leerssen demands that historians should only use vocabulary available to the people they study he fails to acknowledge that even if we wrote about tacitus in the language of the annals or about goebbels in the jargon of german nazis, we would not cut through to the essence of history, but, by the simple process of selection and composition, build new constructions out of old constructions – just without admitting it as such. when he argues that speaking about nationalism in the middle ages is the same as assuming that there were buses in lincoln’s days, he regards ‘nationalism’ as a thing in the world, not a perspective on the world. equally, when he speaks about ‘primitivism’ in antiquity, ‘humanism’ in studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | roundtables & interviews steven grosby / joep leerssen / caspar hirschi 28 the renaissance and ‘republicanism’ in the early modern period he does so as if they were things in the past and not projections on the past. why is leerssen able to accept certain ‘isms’ as historically sound, while rejecting others as ‘distortive anachronisms’? why does he even condemn a phrase such as ‘illegal immigrants’ for the seventeenth century, when official travel documents had been in use for several centuries and when cities and principalities had policies in place to detect and expel strangers who had entered their territories without permission (a practice german authors alluded to when trying to expel ‘foreign’ words from the german language)? the answer, i think, is simple and can be derived from what i said above his misapprehension of conceptual frameworks: leerssen confounds linguistic conventions within history writing with historical truths per se, and thus treats conventions as if they were sacred. speaking of ancient primitivism, renaissance humanism or early modern republicanism has been an established convention for a long time, whereas speaking of pre-modern nationalism has not. conventionally, historians relate nationalism to modernity. conventions, however, are products of routines rather than of rationality, and while some have heuristic value, others do not make much sense when being scrutinised. this is exactly the point i make about nationalism in my book. * conventionally, terminological distinctions between modern and premodern forms of nation formation are derived from nationalist language itself. a popular distinction, even accepted by a die-hard modernist such as ernest gellner, is the one between nationalism and patriotism. it enables various binary oppositions with both epistemic and normative dimensions: modern-pre-modern; artificial-natural; extreme-moderate; aggressive-defensive; territorial-local; western-eastern; totalitariandemocratic etc. most of these oppositions echo the uses of the two words in everyday speech, where ‘nationalism’ is often treated as an aberration of ‘patriotism’, resulting in many self-declared ‘patriots’, but hardly any ‘nationalists’. i do not see how this normative dichotomy could be adequate to differentiate pre-modern and modern nation formation, all the more as ‘patriotism’ would ascribe a degree of stability and studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | roundtables & interviews steven grosby / joep leerssen / caspar hirschi 29 homogeneity to pre-modern political culture that does no justice to the transformations of national discourses in the late medieval and early modern period. as i argue in my book, ‘patriotism’, as an analytical term, only makes sense when being attributed to ‘fatherlands’ that are not constructed as national communities of honour, as are, for instance, ancient cities, medieval kingdoms or early modern principalities. without this clear separation, a relapse into moral tales about good old patriotism turning into bad new nationalism is hard to avoid. this, i am afraid, is what happens to leerssen when he contrasts ‘enlightenment patriotism’ (understood as ‘republican’ and ‘democratic’) with ‘the nascent ideology of nationalism’ (understood as ‘authoritarian’ and ‘anti-democratic’) in his book. such judgmental language is better suited to a moral philosopher than a historian, and indeed, leerssen’s own moral tale is inspired by jürgen habermas’ ideal of ‘constitutional patriotism’, according to which it is both desirable and feasible to create, in leerssen’s words, ‘a sense of solidarity between taxpaying citizens’ without any ‘sense of cultural identity involved’. here, again, we are in the realm of study-room daydreams. more problematic still is the terminology used by leerssen to reject my argument in his review. as already mentioned above, the assumption of a historical development from ‘national feeling’ to ‘national thought’ to ‘nationalism’ inevitably invokes the romantic teleology of a rising consciousness of national belonging from ancient to modern times. if you want to find an exemplary linear trajectory, here it is – a historical upward movement from the guts to the brain. ‘national feeling’ proved to be a handy term to project nationalist notions on to heroes of the distant past even if they had never expressed any such notions themselves. after all, if they were just ‘feeling’ their sense of national belonging, the logic went, they could not yet speak about it. leerssen, though, does not seem to be guided by this shaky logic, as he attributes the term ‘source-traditions of national feeling’ to pre-modern authors who clearly wrote about nations. so what does he mean with traditions of feeling – if this wording makes any sense at all? did these authors only feel, but not think when they were writing about nations? as leerssen distinguishes them from later studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | roundtables & interviews steven grosby / joep leerssen / caspar hirschi 30 proponents of ‘national thought’, we would have to come to such an absurd conclusion. again, writing a history of nation formation that evolves from pre-modern ‘feeling’ to modern ‘ideology’ only makes sense when sticking to an essentialist attitude, according to which nations emerged as something genuine but later turned into something false. similar problems arise with terms such as ‘national identity’ or ‘nationhood’ as pre-modern antecedents to modern ‘nationalism’. apart from essentialist undertones, these terms rather impede an understanding of nations as ‘contested terrains’, with different groups seeking to enforce their respective constructions of the nation’s ‘true character’. * so if the conventional language to distinguish pre-modern from modern forms of nation formation is of little heuristic value, what better alternatives are available? the answer given in my book is not, as leerssen insinuates, that we should treat anything and everything as nationalism. first, i argue for a strictly constructivist approach that analyses nations first and foremost as products of specific forms of speech, which are in return understood as products of specific political and cultural circumstances. secondly, i introduce ‘national discourse’ as an umbrella term that covers ‘all forms of speaking about nations’ including, for instance, anti-nationalist cosmopolitanism or academic nationalism studies; the reason why it is important to consider these forms, too, is that they also play a role in the construction of nations. thirdly, i treat nationalism as a form of national discourse ‘that creates and preserves the nation as an autonomous value, ‘autonomous’ meaning not subordinate (but neither necessarily superior) to any other community’ (p. 47). this definition is directed against two widespread misconceptions of nationalism: a) that it claims the highest rank within a ‘hierarchy of loyalties’ and b) that it forms a ‘doctrine’ similar to the dogmas of a codified religion or even an ‘ideology’ such as communism. my point is that nationalism is best understood as less fixed and more malleable than doctrines or ideologies. so when leerssen writes that i see nationalism bound to a ‘coherent ideology’ following the council of constance and then studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | roundtables & interviews steven grosby / joep leerssen / caspar hirschi 31 criticises me for seeing ‘stable ideological continuities’ over many centuries, he imposes his own misconception of nationalism on my book and then blames me for prolonging it into the pre-modern past. it is a perfect straw man. equally, if he had read my definition of nationalism closely, there would have been no need to ask why ramses ii is not to be considered a nationalist. the only definition in my book that leerssen discusses is that of the ‘nation’. he even cites it to demonstrate how ‘all-embracing’ and thus useless it is. in order to make his case he gives two examples of ‘human aggregate’ that would also be covered by my definition: a city and a football team. really? let’s re-read the definition. it starts with the term ‘abstract community’, which, for the sake of careless readers, is even specified in the same paragraph as ‘with most of its members not knowing and never seeing each other’. does a football team fall under this category? it would, to put it mildly, be interesting to imagine a game of football between two teams whose players ‘never see’ most of their teammates. how about cities? are they ‘formed by a multipolar and equal relationship to other communities of the same category’ (i.e. other cities)? you would only need to take a look at a modern or medieval map to see the nonsense of such a proposition. towns and cities are – historically, legally, geographically etc. – set against the countryside. in other words, they form a bipolar and unequal relationship to the world surrounding them. although some cities were stuck in long-lasting competitions with other cities, it would be odd to argue that the city, as a specific type of abstract community, was formed by such competitions. based on the definitions of nation, nationalism and national discourse, my book contains three main lines of argument as to why it is historically justified and analytically useful to speak of nationalism before modernity. first, it presents a great variety of sources – textual and visual, political and legal, scholarly and popular – whose language and content correspond to what is defined as nationalism in the book, and to what, i guess, most readers would regard as expressions of nationalist attitudes (thus leerssen’s refuge in a parody of the duck dictum). furthermore, it develops a long-term perspective to demonstrate that modern nationalism ‘could only become such a mobilising force because of its presence in studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | roundtables & interviews steven grosby / joep leerssen / caspar hirschi 32 politics, scholarship and art of long ago’. this perspective is based on the idea that nationalism is not to be understood as a modern ‘invention’, but as a pre-modern product of ‘bricolage’ – assembled by ‘pulling existing bits and pieces out of diverse contexts and putting them together in a form unknown before’. nationalism is thus described as a discourse which could easily be rebuilt and thereby adapted to changing circumstances. in other words, my long-term perspective is quite the contrary of what leerssen calls – in yet another display of a straw man – a ‘baton of tradition’ handed down through the centuries. the third line of argument is that the concept of modern nationalism needs to be recalibrated, too, in consequence of my re-evaluation of pre-modern nationalism as a discourse dominated by scholarly elites. to quote from the book again: most modernist theories understand nationalism as a mass phenomenon and are principally devoted to the question of how it could have become widespread. as legitimate as this is, i do not think the criterion of nationalism’s mass appeal is particularly helpful to understand the historical development of nations. it might be more instructive to use nationalists’ proximity to power as a leading benchmark. my point is that nationalists always spoke and acted in the name of the people but often did not need popular support to reach their goals. even those nationalist movements which led to the foundation of nation states both in europe and on other continents were predominantly carried out by elite minorities, who sometimes comprised a very small number of people. (pp. 15-16) so while mass appeal can be a useful criterion to distinguish modern from pre-modern nationalism, it may be more important still to emphasise that while pre-modern nationalists had limited access to power and only rare opportunities to influence politics according to their desires, modern nationalists managed – often after long and fierce battles – to establish themselves in the centres of power permanently. * having discussed the issue of anachronism at great length, the two other cardinal sins i am allegedly guilty of can be dealt with more swiftly. as to studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | roundtables & interviews steven grosby / joep leerssen / caspar hirschi 33 the ‘straightforward linear trajectory’, leerssen is satisfied with a single sentence from my book to make his point: even if the nationes at medieval universities had not much in common with later nations, they marked an important step towards them. (pp. 80) this sentence is indeed typical of a book such as mine, but for other reasons than leerssen claims. if a book covers a time span of more than 1500 years, it needs an overarching narrative to hold the historical analysis of different periods and places together. in my case this narrative is concerned with the long-term process that made the nation possible. so when treating a particular moment of historical change within this process one always has to do two things: analyse the particular reasons for this change and integrate the results into the bigger picture. otherwise, the book could not be more than the sum of its parts. this is the purpose of the sentence quoted by leerssen. if he still thinks that speaking of ‘an important step towards’ something is proof enough of a ‘straightforward linear trajectory’ then he should be reminded that one can always take a step back or to the side or detour completely. in fact, my book contains several such non-linear movements, and even a glance at a chapter title such as ‘from earth to heaven and back: the middle ages’ would suffice to recognize this. to give another example from the conclusion, this time with reference to the early modern period: in the previous chapter, i described the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as a time largely dominated by religious fundamentalism. my argument was that after renaissance humanists had introduced the concept of autonomous nations engaged in a multipolar competition between equals, the reformation quickly re-established a bipolar and unequal system, which separated believers from infidels, saved from damned. (p. 213) given such passages, leerssen’s accusation of a ‘straightforward linear trajectory’ looks like an attempt to throw mud at the wall in the hope that some of it will stick. studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | roundtables & interviews steven grosby / joep leerssen / caspar hirschi 34 the same can be said about his accusation that i explain important events ‘monocausally’. here, it is not even clear what he is referring to. i suspect it stems from my analysis of the council of constance, which leerssen treats as the centrepiece of my book, even though it represents just one important transformation among many. the leading argument about the council is that during its power struggles we can observe how ‘nationes’ turned from ‘concrete corporations’ into ‘abstract communities’ of honour for the first time. this is not exactly a causal, let alone a monocausal argument. i never suggest that the council was the cause of nations as we know them, and neither do i claim that the new understanding of ‘natio’ replaced or even eradicated older ones. the question guiding my argument is, if you will, a kantian one: what was the condition allowing for the possibility of nations as abstract communities of honour? the question actually helps to avoid simple cause-and-effect arguments, and the answers given are formulated accordingly: this match of words [i.e. ‘natio inclita’ or ‘honor nationum’] only became possible through the medieval labelling of certain corporations as nationes. and with the new understanding of nationes as representative bodies and the subsequent blend of nationes principales and particulares at constance, the collective honour of a corporation was able to flow into an abstract community that transcended the barriers of the medieval society of orders. (p. 87) you need a lot of imagination to read a monocausal explanation into this. expressions such as ‘became possible’ and ‘was able to’ are clearly not made for statements of cause and effect. * looking at leerssen’s review in total, i cannot help but deplore a missed opportunity for a good debate. at the same time, i think it was important to respond to his sweeping charges and his pre-print, back-channel propaganda. it is one thing accepting criticism, but it is a different matter when serious academic debate is undermined to preclude unwelcome competition. the purpose of my refutation is to encourage all those studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | roundtables & interviews steven grosby / joep leerssen / caspar hirschi 35 nationalism scholars who are not yet familiar with my book to read it and form an opinion of their own. the book clearly wants to provoke, but i believe it merits a higher level of debate than the one launched by leerssen. it seems particularly ironic to me that leerssen fashions his criticism as a defence of serious historical scholarship but violates basic scholarly standards in several regards. he makes heavy accusations without producing solid proof, is guilty of charges he raises against me, speaks at length about men who do not appear in my book, while failing to spell one of its prominent figures, hutten, correctly, and he misreads a simple definition just to score a cheap point. in the end, the duck-dictum rebounds on joep leerssen, but in a more solid and sophisticated version than the one he invents. a few years ago, the historian of science steven shapin ended a review about a book on pseudo-science with the following observation: ‘a rule of thumb for sound inference has always been that if it looks like a duck, swims like a duck and quacks like a duck, then it probably is a duck. but there’s a corollary: if it struts around the barnyard loudly protesting that it’s a duck, that it possesses the very essence of duckness, that it’s more authentically a duck than all those other orange-billed, web-footed, swimming fowl, then you’ve got a right to be suspicious: this duck may be a quack.’ nobody doubts that joep leerssen is a serious historian, given his impressive publication record. if we had just this one review, though, we could not be so sure. 5. response to caspar hirschi (joep leerssen) my review seems to have annoyed caspar hirschi for a great many reasons – the indiscretions of third-party-readers (apparently engineered by me as ‘back-channel propaganda’, no less); clumsy metaphors and flippant analogies; and a fundamental failure to properly appreciate or understand his book, either as a result of wilful prejudice or of plain obtuseness on my studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | roundtables & interviews steven grosby / joep leerssen / caspar hirschi 36 part. in his wrath he seems to have overlooked or dismissed the sincerelyfelt appreciation that was also expressed, repeatedly, in that review – indeed, if i had found his book as disagreeable as he appears to think i do, i would not have bothered reviewing it. while i cannot be expected to apologise for anything and everything that happens to annoy hirschi – most of all the fact that he fails to convince me –, let me at the outset unreservedly state my regret at any phraseology that may have galled him. my analogies and metaphors were meant to identify, with short-hand brevity and while avoiding ponderous abstractions, a general and abstract problematic; not to mock his book or snipe at it. i would be grateful if we could enter into a measured debate on the substance, rather than a heated polemic on the style, of our disagreement. i am sure that he will, by and by, of his own accord, come to regret his vehemence. that being said, i find that my main objections to his book still stand as i put them in my review, notwithstanding hirschi’s response, which was mainly in the mode of angry counter-accusation. so let me recapitulate and explain myself. i will avoid metaphors or analogies this time, since that appears to provoke hirschi’s temper. * caspar hirschi makes his anti-modernist case, throughout the book, by dint of insistent, anachronistic labeling. ticking me off for not being so perfect myself in avoiding anachronistic terminology does not make that go away; at least i do not rear entire 1500-year surveys on the principle. (if i apply the idea of democratic primitivism to the discourse of the tacitus reception, i do so with anything but the cheerful insouciance that i had accused hirschi of, and which he now seeks to turn back on me.5) 5 for the record, i relied for my use of those concepts on the classic study by a.o. lovejoy and franz boas, primitivism and related ideas in antiquity (which i can heartily recommend to hirschi) and had argued its applicability to the earlymodern context in a 1995 article in the journal of the history of ideas (‘wildness, wilderness and ireland: patterns in the early-modern demarcation of civility’). studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | roundtables & interviews steven grosby / joep leerssen / caspar hirschi 37 true, the author concedes (to give an example) that ‘there were no nationalists walking the streets of rome’ (p. 50), but in the thirteen pages that follow (on ancient rome and cicero), the words ‘patriot’, ‘patriotic’ and ‘patriotism’ (all of them of late-medieval or later vintage) are flung around with reckless abandon – no less than sixty-eight times (i may have missed one or two). his own terminological definition of that term and its attendant discourse is elastic; at times patriotism seems to mean no more than the high-minded integrity of patriarchically-minded state officials (in which case it might be applied as much to confucius as to cicero); at other times it is linked to an attachment to the patria – which, instead of explaining his use of the word ‘patriot’, leads us from one semantic quagmire into another: patria shifts from the polity into which one is born to a cosy heimatgefühl. all that is collapsed into the latter-day ‘patriotic’ lexeme, used insistently so as to inure the reader to its inappropriateness, and applied to ‘something’ for which the romans themselves used a wide variety of quite different words. to be sure, hirschi is perfectly right in arguing that the ciceronian virtue of self-abnegating devotion to civic duties was, in early-modern and enlightenment times, an honourable ideal for ‘classical republicans’ and commonwealthmen. indeed, it was as part of the early-modern ciceronian revival (and no earlier) that post-roman terms like ‘patriot’ and its derivatives gained their political meaning. zera fink made the case in a 1962 classic book, as did (for the 18th century) caroline robbins, franco venturi and maurizio viroli.6 to identify this republican, enlightenment usage was a necessary historical enterprise, not just a modernist ploy to play off ‘good’ patriotism against ‘bad’ nationalism, as dr hirschi suspects; it was a necessary historical enterprise because that is what historians do: describing how, and 6 i have addressed the issue at greater length in my two books on irish history (mere irish and fíor-ghael and remembrance and imagination), where the transition from patriotism to nationalism is historically analysed with reference to fink, robbins, viroli, venturi and others, and a large corpus of irish and british sources in english and gaelic. the reader will find that, contrary to what hirschi sees fit to impute, the distinction between the two ideologies is by no means made for merely moralistic reasons. studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | roundtables & interviews steven grosby / joep leerssen / caspar hirschi 38 analysing why, periods differ from one century to another. for the same reason, the entire historiography on the history of patriotism and enlightenment republicanism (which was carried and brought to fruition by historians miles removed from the entire modernism debate) started from the fundamental caveat that the meaning of the word changed drastically between its classical references, its historical deployment and its current usage nowadays. indeed, the entire specialism of begriffsgeschichte arose from such concerns, and begriffsgeschichte was first and foremost applied to the history of political concepts like freedom, citizen and fatherland. no lexical homophony could link the ethos of the roman pater patriae to that of george w. bush’s ‘patriot act’. yet dr hirschi displays utter insouciance for such pitfalls, and indeed actively courts anachronism. witness a statement like this: ‘fashioning themselves as defending patriots, the romans conquered the whole mediterranean area and most of western europe, and, to give just the most recent example, the americas and british have invaded iraq’ (p. 61). as with roman ‘patriotism’, so too with late-medieval and early-modern ‘nationalism’, or ‘humanist nationalism’ (as the entire chapter 7 is called). let us get this straight: our starting point in the understanding of nationalism must be what that word meant, and means, to those who have actually used it; and it was not used by anyone before 1800, let alone before 1600. in its own, proper usage, which is part and parcel of how the word has reached all of us and has made itself available to us, it is predicated on a combination of three things (which i here allow myself to summarise in latter-day analytical terms, without anachronism, because nationalism, the word and the thing, is still with us). they are: 1) popular sovereignty, 2) the modular territorialisation of culture (meaning that nation-states are mutually demarcated by the geographical faultlines of cultural differentiation, and internally bonded by a single shared culture), and 3) the historicism that traces the nation-state’s citizenry from a shared descent, held together transgenerationally by a shared culture. let dr hirschi take note that nothing in this definition is contentious, or inspired by moralistic disapproval of an alleged modernist. indeed, this is also how dr hirschi himself uses the word. he does not apply it randomly, but to a very specific set of discourses exhibiting some resemblance to studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | roundtables & interviews steven grosby / joep leerssen / caspar hirschi 39 these intrinsic characteristics, as listed above, of the 19th-century ideology that provided the name. even so, dr hirschi claims the right to use the word nationalism (like patriotism) loosely and a-historically, and is somewhat impatient with those of us who prefer to keep our terminology specific (for all that we may occasionally stumble in the attempt). what he calls ‘nationalism’ is in fact ‘whatever happens to remind him of nationalism’. the word, thus hijacked from its original context and emptied of its concrete signification, is used as a lens for a variable bandwidth of political assumptions and discourses, what he calls an ongoing ‘bricolage’ of bits and pieces which were assembled and reassembled in successive periods. indeed i like the idea of the ongoing process, and of the bricolage; dr hirschi and i are not so far removed from each other in that view. but presenting that bricolage a priori by the specific name of the political doctrine that it morphed into after 1800, is not just anachronistic. more than that, it is finalistic (studying history only in terms of what it gave rise to). more than that, it is a massive petitio principii, an exercise in circular reasoning. dr hirschi reduces the real thing, the 19th-century political doctrine which is actually, properly called nationalism, sensu stricto, to a mere continuation of the bricolage enterprise lato senso. thus, under the header proclaiming ‘the limited originality of romantic nationalism’ leibniz, herder, fichte and grimm are all name-checked as mere variations on an ongoing theme in just two pages (116-117); on p. 159, we leapfrog within a dozen lines from einhard, hrotsvitha, conrad celtis and trithemius to görres and friedrich schlegel. so 19th-century nationalism, minus its ideological substance, furnishes its mere name as an floating signifier to whatever happened to resemble it centuries earlier, and this is then supposed to offer ‘a new understanding of the historical origins of nationalism’ (as the opening sentence proclaims). time and again, this procedure is applied. a fair number of admittedly intriguing examples is presented, which are asserted to be characteristic of the ‘nationalistically’-minded discourse of an entire century or country; and then some analogous latter-day examples are sketchily invoked to prove the operative persistence of that mind-set beyond 1800. but one cannot but help wondering if the original examples were not selected because of their amenable resemblance to studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | roundtables & interviews steven grosby / joep leerssen / caspar hirschi 40 later, nationalistic analogies. confirmation bias is not something that seems to worry dr hirschi; and he is not averse to foreclosing his own argument by presenting his older historical materials from the outset in phraseological constructions such as ‘humanist nationalism’. dr hirschi concedes (p. 119) that the combination humanism/nationalism may strike some of us as an oxymoron, as indeed it does. not because of the moral connotations of humanism which he then pursues, irrelevantly, but because it juxtaposes currents anchored in widely different centuries. i warrant that even dr hirschi would not dream of calling 19th-century figures like fichte or treitschke ‘humanists’; why then is he so eager to commit the anachronism in the opposite direction? to claim that humanists were nationalists bespeaks a belief (stated explicitly in dr hirschi’s rebuttal) that the nationalist ideology pre-existed the moment of its articulation, and is therefore exempt from the risk of anachronism; which means that, rather than viewing the ideology historically, one has bought into the ideology’s own view of history. nationalism itself, centrally anchored as it is in historicism and the transgenerational persistence of the nation, by definition believes the nation to be categorical and ontologically autonomous; not a by-product of history, but a transhistorical informing presence. refusing to admit the possibility that such a belief is in itself a historically generated phenomenon is what i mean by ‘buying into the ideology’s view of history’. and that is not just a rigid adherence to ‘linguistic conventions within history writing’ on my part, but a serious shortcoming of dr hirschi’s scholarship, and for two reasons. (quite apart from the fact that it tends to make us heedless of the contradictions that the past consists of, within a given period as well as between periods.) to begin with, the argument of occasional resemblance is specious. the ideology identified, and self-identifying, as nationalism was more than just the co-presence of the characteristic elements summed up above (popular sovereignty, territorialisation of culture, ethnocultural historicism) – indeed, any of those elements could by itself also form part of widely different ideologies, such as communism or racism. what identifies nationalism as such is the structural combination of those elements into a system of thought. that is what makes nationalism more than just an studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | roundtables & interviews steven grosby / joep leerssen / caspar hirschi 41 attitude, makes it an ideology (an explanation of the world, a value-system, and a mobilising programme for political action). the historical presence or even co-presence of the separate elements before 1800 is not tantamount to proving the fact that they were already meshed into that ideological combination. in the bricolage, the same materials are recycled over and over again. but we cannot call that entire process by the name of the assemblage into which the materials happened to get constructed in the 19th century. you cannot be finalistic about bricolage. the other shortcoming is that buying into the ideology we study makes us partial, and partisan. how that partiality colours dr hirschi’s historical argument, i will indicate further down; for now let me point out that it seduces him into a failure to engage properly with the work of anyone whom he happens to disagree with. i am flattered to see my own name, ‘quack’ though i apparently am, lumped together with other victims of dr hirschi’s irate dismissal: ernest gellner and jürgen habermas. i, and they, and ‘modernists’ in general, seem (so he imputes) to be driven exclusively by a moralistic disapproval of nationalism, arguing their case with ‘judgmental language’ (amusing, that, coming from him), and delivering, in the end, ‘moral tales’ from ‘study-room daydreams’. ‘why should a history of nations and nationalism written by a nationalist be a more partisan enterprise than one by an internationalist?’, dr hirschi asks in his introduction to his book (p. 17); as well he might. i can think of a reason or two. identifying with the ideology one studies might seduce one into mistaking agreement for truth, disagreement for falsity, temporal phenomena for timeless conditions. it might even render one shorttempered with dissenting opinions. be that as it may, dr hirschi’s antagonism opens up an intriguing perspective beyond his polemic: the ingrained opposition between primordialists and modernists probably correlates strongly with those sympathetic to nationalism or critical of it. anti-nationalists may be predisposed to argue the modernist case from a need to debunk the ideology, while the primordialist case may be more congenial to those who feel the attractive power of nationalism’s invocation of the nation’s long-standing traditions and ethnic continuities. where, so dr hirschi challenges me, can i demonstrate that his analysis of the sources is actually vitiated by what i denounce as an anachronistic studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | roundtables & interviews steven grosby / joep leerssen / caspar hirschi 42 framing of them? i have already mentioned the phraseological loading of the dice, and the fact that he conflates the ideological system with its constituent ingredients. but the question stands, and deserves a serious response. i wish to state at the outset that i have no quarrel with the various data and documents which dr hirschi presents. it is the framing of the sources, not the sources themselves, that is the problem: not the dots, but the way he chooses to connect them. within the historical survey, there is a problematic conflation of stateformation, nation-formation and the growth of nationalism as processes that all happened conjointly. (‘this book offers a new understanding of the historical origins of nationalism, combined with an explanation of the initial formation of european nations’, p. 1). i can go along with an explanation of state formation from the late-medieval ‘[chronic failure of] would-be empires stuck in a battle to keep each other at bay’ (p. 2); but folded into that agenda is a claim that the discourses involved in state formation in the same process also formed nations, and that is much, much more problematic – not just for lexical reasons. many ‘national’ selfdefinitions were not formed until well after 1600 or even 1800 (most recently: bulgarian, estonian, latvian, belgian, walloon), and many of the ‘nations’ that were formed between 1400 and 1600 were historical deadends, later subsumed into larger states and/or wholly different selfdefining national entities. yes, language was used as an argument in interstate rivalry and the denunciation of wicked foreigners; but we hear nothing from dr hirschi about the accommodation of linguistic differences in bior multilingual regimes (wales under the tudors; the basque fueros; hungary; burgundy7). bricolage or no bricolage: things that do not fit dr 7 each of these is the subject of a respectable body of historical analysis. as regards the case of the burgundian duchy of brabant, i mention my own ‘medieval heteronomy, modern nationalism: language assertion between liège and maastricht, 14th-20th century’, in: revue belge d’histoire contemporaine, 34 (2004) 581–593. hirschi had access to it: it is recapitulated as an appendix in national thought in europe, the book which in his response he chides for endorsing something as feeble-minded as civic patriotism. studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | roundtables & interviews steven grosby / joep leerssen / caspar hirschi 43 hirschi’s case do not make it into his book; as he presents them, stateformation and nation-formation are both straightforward, concurrent and interlinked processes. historians who have argued differently are, after a wholesale denunciation of ‘the modernists’ in the introduction, simply ignored. the book is back-handed in suggesting, yet not providing, a cutoff date: the subtitle leads us to early modern germany, but the stated aim to disprove the modernists means that time and again shortcuts are indicated to later centuries. shifting meanings of key concepts like ‘nation’, ‘honour’ and ‘freedom’ are registered only in passing, if at all. the turbulences of post-1600 history hardly seem to matter: social shifts from an aristocratic to a bourgeois ethos and the rise of a public sphere and print media; intellectual shifts such as the decline of the biblical explanation of the antiquity of nations, the rise of historicism, a new philosophy of language, the ‘vernacular turn’ in the human sciences and the state-organised overhaul of cultural institutions. none of this is allowed to have seriously affected the post-medieval, convergent developmental trajectory towards that nationalism-in-general whose ‘historical origins’ are being presented. history between 1600 and 1800 simply does not matter. just more bricolage. but it cannot be my role to explain the importance of entire bodies of relevant historiography (arno borst, patrick geary, walter pohl, ian wood, the koselleck of the geschichtliche grundbegriffe and the sattelzeit) to dr hirschi at this point, much as his work might profit from actually engaging with it.8 i merely needed to restate these strictures because dr hirschi’s rebuttal did not address them. that being done, let me now try and reboot the discussion. i want first to point out where i believe dr hirschi and i share common ground. * 8 hirschi is certainly aware of the work of these prominent experts; but they are all omitted from his bibliography, which by his own admission selects only ‘titles upon which i based an argument, relied on for information or commented on explicitly’ (xii). a non-mention does therefore not indicate ignorance, but it does indicate a lack of engagement. studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | roundtables & interviews steven grosby / joep leerssen / caspar hirschi 44 dr hirschi and i both would wish to see the history of nationalism liberated from the constraints of a modernist approach which discountenances any development antedating the democratic revolutions and the invention of the steam engine. chronologically, such modernism is an artificial truncation of our historical field of vision; thematically, it tends to reduce the rise of nationalism to a mere ideological by-product of socio-economic changes, writing intellectual and cultural traditions out of the analysis. like dr hirschi, i believe that nationalism cannot be understood without taking into account the tradition of intellectual and discursive reflection which informed it. early-modern anti-absolutism and enlightenment patriotism cannot be understood without the abiding influence of ciceronian thought; the belief in nations’ characterological individualities cannot be understood without a long, medievally-rooted tradition of self/other-stereotyping; the german invocation of arminius, or the dutch one of civilis, or even the british one of caractacus and boudicca, cannot be understood without the 15th-century rediscovery of tacitus. i argued as much in my book national thought in europe, which indeed dr hirschi seems to have picked some cherries from (though his source references are inconclusive and he misspells my name in the bibliography). moreover, city cultures and the aristocratic honour code both provide remarkable anticipations of what later would become nationalism; i have no hesitation in endorsing dr hirschi’s analysis on that score. as regards the former: the city cults of homines illustri, the tendency for cities to adopt an ‘spqr’ ideal of civic governance, can be traced back to the late middle ages, indeed to humanism; cities also cherished an ‘institutional memory’ and a historical self-cultivation (e.g. in the form of city academies, or festivals from the siennese palio to the floral games of toulouse) which would provide models for the nineteenth-century nation-state. as regards the latter: the dedication to maintaining one’s status amidst others equally intent on maintaining their status provides a powerful linkage between the ideals of independence and honour. in state formation, the emergence of a monarch claiming a violence-monopoly amidst his feudal nobles (and cities) is an important element in state formation and the consolidation of agreed frontiers. the restored monarchies of post-napoleonic europe studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | roundtables & interviews steven grosby / joep leerssen / caspar hirschi 45 would fall back on this heritage in the form of an intense dynastic historicism. (disaffected ethnic minorities would, conversely, fall back on the democratic message of 1789; while in ‘reduced former realms’ such as catalonia, scotland, poland, bohemia and hungary, both elements could be combined: romantic/chivalric historicism and modern popular sovereignty.) nationalism studies has much to learn from work like dr hirschi’s, mapping the pre-1800 source traditions which nationalism would later fall back on. but in thus presenting the common ground which i believe to be shared by him and myself (the ground covered by hirschi in his excellent wettkampf der nationen, now so pitifully pressed into the service of antimodernism), i have, as the reader may have noted, avoided presenting the older cultural traditions as the ‘origin’ of their later nationalist instrumentalisation. the continuity is there, and needs to be factored in; but not, i believe, in the way that dr hirschi is prone to. here, i think, lies the core of our disagreement, such as it is. on the basis of the common ground outlined above, i would hope that a sustained debate on that point may yet inspire new insights; it may also (if we manage to keep our temper) bring us beyond the entrenchment of the anti/modernism debate. we shall probably never agree on the terminus a quo of something we can meaningfully call nationalism. but i look forward to dr hirschi’s response to what follows. * what my review was trying to get at is a principle which underlies and informs dr hirschi’s book – and indeed a great deal of historiography: the default assumption that traditions and causal continuities move downstream on the river of time, from the past towards the present, rather than upstream. causes explain effects, not the other way around; right? thus, when we wonder what ‘caused’ important historical phenomena or events, we construe those from the outset as an ‘effect’, and outcome of some run-up or other, which we can explain by retracing that run-up: its causal antecedents. rerum cognoscere causas. studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | roundtables & interviews steven grosby / joep leerssen / caspar hirschi 46 but that single straightforward line of from then (causa) towards later (res), is by no means the whole story. many other lines of development fanned out from the 14-16th century; many other lines converged from different parts of the past to create modern nationalism and to make that ideology popular. much as historians ought never to be monocausal in their explanation of events, so too they ought never to be ‘mono-effectual’, to trace the afterlives of a given phenomenon in one preconceived direction only. singling out the simple then-to-later analogy reduces the intervening changes, contradictions, dead-ends and happenstance emergences of history into the blithe, anthropological assertion ‘that’s just how it has always been’, from carthage to iraq. let me give a neutral, non-hirschi example. dutch nationalism intensely identifies with the early-modern revolt against spanish rule, under william ‘the silent’ of orange, pater patriae. rebel songs of late-16thcentury vintage denouncing the foreign tyrant and asserting the readiness of the netherlands to defend their liberty in arms were sung in the 19th and 20th centuries with a sense of unreserved identification; they were even sung as a sign of resistance against the nazi occupation (and, dr hirschi, i am prouder of that than you would allow me to be). but the historian ought to take a longer, harder look than the patriot. what such a patriotic re-singing of dutch songs like o nederland, let op uw saeck marginalises is the overwhelming rhetorical prominence of religious argument: these are protestant songs, about protestant liberties, as much as they are songs in the dutch language about political liberties in the low countries. also, such political fellow-feeling as the song expresses is not necessarily a national one in the sense that the term has nowadays: political liberties at the time were primarily vested in cities and provinces – for which the term ‘nederland’ in the parlance of those times was a mere container term. the low countries which are vindicated against a foreign tyranny were an open-boundaried agglomeration of cities and provinces resisting taxations and the inquisition imposed by the spanish monarch. some of these were successful in their religious-cum-fiscal resistance, others (like antwerp, breda, brussels and gent) not. the successful ones became, ultimately and after many constitutional and territorial vicissitudes, the kingdom of the netherlands, where, after napoleon and studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | roundtables & interviews steven grosby / joep leerssen / caspar hirschi 47 the onset of modernity, a state-driven nation-building process was implemented, among a population consisting for 40% of roman catholics. in other words, the line from the 16th-century song to modern dutch nationalism, from its anti-inquisition to its anti-nazi functionality, is there, but it is wobbly, hatched and crisscrossed by other lines and (dis)continuities. and it strikes me that the wobbles, the vicissitudes and shifts in meaning and function, should be the historian’s proper challenge; something that is ill served by blanket statements to the effect that ‘it was ever thus’. to be content with highlighting the analogies and similarities between the then and the now means to block the complexities of history from our view; to trace ‘the’ origins of dutch nationalism to the 16th century low countries would prevent us from registering the impact of herder, rousseau, napoleon, romanticism and german nationalism. what does this amount to? it is not to disprove the idea of pre-1800 origins of nationalism once and for all; that would be to prove a negative anyway. what it does mean is that, as i see it, dr hirschi could do either of two things. one is to face a much heavier burden of proof than he has admitted so far, showing that the intellectual similarities and discursive self-perpetuations of the period 1500-1850 indeed add up to a continuity and outweigh the massive discontinuities of those centuries. he would also have to convince readers like me that the early presence of the later ideology’s elements was not singulatim but already in a structural and ideological linkage, and related to the country rather than to a city or a class. alternatively (and this is where i said before that the book would make perfect sense to all readers, including me) dr hirschi could reconsider the terms in which he presents historical causality, and take seriously his notion of bricolage – as a truly open-ended, not a teleological process. merely asserting that there are typological similarities between earlymodern and post-1800 types of discourse is not enough to prove the case that the former generated the latter. would we not be on much firmer ground if we argued that the earlier discourses provided later nationalist bricoleurs with a repertoire? i do not suggest this as a mere reiteration of the tired and unjustly dismissive ‘invention of tradition’ formula, but rather with paul valéry’s dictum in mind that ‘we walk into the future studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | roundtables & interviews steven grosby / joep leerssen / caspar hirschi 48 backwards’, moving to an unseen future with our eyes on the past. would it not make much more sense to trace retrospective continuities – humanists and classical republicans making use of cicero and tacitus, romantics making use of that earlier usage and of the middle ages? that would indeed address the open-ended process of bricolage which dr hirschi claims to be his concern. i am unconvinced that the ‘origins’ surveyed by dr hirschi generated ‘nationalism’. but we may profit enormously from his book it were offered to the reader, not as a case against modernism, but as an analysis of the cumulative memoryrepertoire of nationalists.