Microsoft Word - Kernalegenn_Fournis_v6b_definitive.doc     Tudi  Kernalegenn  &  Yann  Fournis,  ‘The  historiography  of  an  “invisible   nation”.  Debating  Brittany’,  in:  Studies  on  National  Movements,     1  (2013)  pp.  81-­‐104.   http://snm.nise.eu   Tudi  Kernalegenn  &  Yann  Fournis   THE  HISTORIOGRAPHY  OF  AN  ‘INVISIBLE  NATION’   DEBATING  BRITTANY   Brittany  is  an  ‘invisible  nation’:  the  regionalisation  of  social  mechanisms  in   the   Breton   territory   has   never   resulted   in   a   complete   social   structure.1   This   incompleteness   as   ‘regional   nation’,   to   phrase   Michael   Keating,   is   embodied  in  its  weak  institutionalisation  as   ‘imagined  community’.2  One   symptom  of  this  failure  is  that  with  the  formation  of  the  historiography  of   Brittany   and   the   Breton   movement,   the   very   object   of   ‘Brittany’   is   the   subject  of  constant  debate  around  a  ‘usable  past’.3  A  unique  feature  of  the   region  is  indeed  the  unfinished  work  of  imposition  of  a  national  definition   of   Brittany   by   the   nationalist   movement,   involving   the   failure   of   the   foundation  of  its  own  legitimacy  as  a  representative  of  a  national  society  in   resistance  against  an  inclusive  (French)  nation-­‐building  process.4   Conflicts  linked  to  the  history  of  ‘regional  nationalism’  intend  to  establish  a   hegemonic  representation  of  Breton  society,  and  more  specifically  of  the   relationship  between  the  definition  of  society  itself  (the  nation)  and  those   who  aspire  to  be   its  representatives  (the  nationalist  movement).5  These   struggles  determine  the  legitimacy  both  of  a  society  as  a  nation  and  of  the   nationalists   as   its   historical   actors.   In   this   sense,   the   historiography   is   important  because  it  is  a  discursive  construction  of  historicity,  reflecting   the   struggles   for   the   interpretation   of   a   collective   project   as   ‘national   destiny’.6   But   far   from   being   easily   accepted   by   the   regional   elites,   the   Breton   ‘national’   historiography   is   painfully   negotiated   in   friction   and   interaction  with  the  scientific  field,  revealing  the  tensions  and  difficulties   Studies  on  National  Movements,  1  (2013)      |      ARTICLES   Tudi  Kernalegenn  &  Yann  Fournis  82   surrounding  the  insertion  of  the  nationalist  movement  in  Breton  society.7   These  difficulties  to  establish  a  nationalist  imaginary  do  not  imply,  though,   that  the  Breton  movement  is  irrelevant,  as  evidenced  by  the  presence  of   the  Breton  historiography  in  the  public  space,  both  relatively  sparse  on  the   long  term  and,  occasionally,  seized  by  severe  debates  and  controversies.   In  the  first  part  of  this  article,  we  will  show  that  the  national  approach  to   the   history   of   Brittany   in   the   nineteenth   century   emerged   during   an   intellectual  cycle  that  saw  progressively  the  differentiation  of  the  activist   and   scientific   historiographies,   leading   to   a   deadlock   for   the   Breton   national  movement  after  World  War  II.  The  second  part  is  dedicated  to  the   historiographical   cycle   leading,   from   the   1960s   onwards,   to   some   reconciliation  between  activist  and  scientific  historiographies.   The  invention  of  an  ontological  nation  (1830-­1964) A  first  historiographical  cycle  lasts  from  the  nineteenth  century  to  1964   and  is  dominated  by  a  conception  of  history  as  a  return  to  origins.  Its  first   stage  (1830-­‐1918)  corresponds  to  the  social  and  cultural  foundation  of  the   Breton   movement,   particularly   through   reactionary   cultural   networks   mobilising  the  history  of  Brittany  on  an  academic  as  well  as  an  engaged   level.  This  patriotic  historiography,  which  projects  the  essence  of  Brittany   in  the  past,  is  reactionary  in  advocating  the  preservation  of  an  ontological   nation.  Consensual,  it  also  produces  few  conflicts,  as  it  is  in  tune  with  the   social  bases  of  a  conservative  Breton  society  and  in  the  process  of  being   marginalised.   In  the  European  context  of  Romanticism  and  the   ‘spring  of  nations’,   the   1830s  are  a   turning  point   in  the  crystallisation  of  an   image  of  Brittany:   Breton  intellectuals  are  eager  to  discover  the  past  of  the  region  and  many   books  are  published  on  its  history,  literature  and  oral  traditions.  One  can   mention  Théodore  Hersart  de  la  Villemarqué,  who  collects  popular  ballads   with   a   historical   dimension   (gwerzioù);   he   edits   them   in   1839,   in   the   Barzaz   Breiz,   with   the   objective,   notably,   to   go   back   to   the   sources   of   Brittany’s  history,  then  neglected  in  France,  through  the  songs  transmitted   Studies  on  National  Movements,  1  (2013)      |      ARTICLES   Tudi  Kernalegenn  &  Yann  Fournis   83   by  folk  tradition.8  In  the  same  vein,  Pitre-­‐Chevalier  publishes  in  1844  his   very   conservative   History   of   Brittany   that   integrates   its   parts   into   an   indivisible   whole,   engaged   in   a   centuries-­‐old   opposition   to   what   would   become  France.9  Arthur  de  La  Borderie  should  also  be  mentioned,  creator   around  1850  of   the  positivist  or  scientific  history  of  Brittany,  aiming  to   write  a  patriotic  history  of  Brittany,  understood  as  a  nation.  Most  of  the   time,   this   nascent   nationalist   mobilisation   is   created   in   a   dialectical   relationship   to   the   history   of   Brittany,   that   it   endeavours   to   write   and   wherein  it  sees  its  own  justification.  However,  like  de  La  Borderie,  it  tends   to  remain  prisoner  of  its  nostalgia  for  the  past,  without  trying  to  play  the   role  of  ‘awakener’  of  the  Breton  people:  its  history  is  that  of  elites,  saints   and  military  leaders.10  These  intellectuals  have  little  to  offer  to  the  Bretons   apart   from   the   status   quo,   elaborating   a   historical   narrative   where   the   people   are   passive,   and   which   they   therefore   have   no   reason   to   acknowledge,   failing   to  claim  a   ‘right  of  State’  or   for  self-­‐determination.   This  abortive  birth  of  a  nation  is  thus  paradoxical:  unlike  other  emerging   nations,  there  is  no  transposition  in  Brittany  of  the  national  conflict  of  the   past   into   the   present   and   the   future.   Suggesting   complementarities   between   the   ‘small   motherland’   (Brittany)   and   the   ‘big   fatherland’   (France),  Brittany’s  elites  celebrate  on  the  contrary,  like  a  De  La  Borderie,   ‘the  blessed  alliance  [of  the  Bretons]  with  France,  of  which  they  have  since   been  the  most  devoted  sons,  the  most  valiant  defenders’.11  Only  with  the   creation   of   the   first   regionalist   political   parties   (Union   Régionaliste   Bretonne   in   1898   and   Fédération   Régionaliste   Bretonne   in   1911)   and   nationalist  political  parties  (Parti  National  Breton  in  1911)  do  claims  for   Breton  self-­‐government  emerge,  though  still  on  a  conservative  basis.   This   attachment   to   the   past   is   no   longer   suitable   during   the   inter-­‐war   period,   which   sees   a   new   step   (1918-­‐1964)   introduced   to   the   historiographical  cycle,  marked  by  the  emergence  of  activist  nationalism.  A   new  generation  activates  the  national  imagination  to  renew  the  terms  of   the  Breton  question  and  its  history:   turning  their  back  on  the  academic   world,   they   perceive   historiography   as   an   instrument   for   the   transformation   of   Breton   society.   Through   the   political   work   of   Olier   Mordrel   in   journal   Breiz   Atao   and   the   cultural   and   linguistic   work   of   Roparz  Hemon  in  journal  Gwalarn,  they  ‘switch  their  perspectives  from  the   Studies  on  National  Movements,  1  (2013)      |      ARTICLES   Tudi  Kernalegenn  &  Yann  Fournis  84   regrets  of  the  past  to  the  building  of  a  future’.12  This  modernising  break  is,   however,   incomplete:   it   still   relies   on   an   ontological   conception   of   the   nation   and   is   based   on   nostalgia   for   the   ‘golden   age’   of   Breton   independence.   From   the   early   twenties,   certain   cultural,   later   political,   circles  produce  works  of  nationalist  pedagogy  or  exaltation   fostered  by   historiography   inherited   from   the   first   Emsav   [Breton   national   movement].   Some   books   become   the   pillars   of   nationalist   culture:   the   Histoire  de  notre  Bretagne  by  Jeanne  Coroller  or  the  Histoire  de  Bretagne   by   Father   Poisson   (1954).13   The   latter   takes   up   the   thread   of   the   first   Emsav,   writing   a   history   to   prove   that   the   Breton   movement,   born   in   educated  and  historical  aware  circles,  are  on  the  track  of  the  Breton  and   Celtic   tradition  of  resistance  to  the   integration   into  the  French  nation.14   Similarly,  the  Breton  National  Party  (PNB),  created  in  1931,  advocates  a   conservative  definition  of  Brittany’s  history  and  highlights  it  through  its   activism  (propaganda,  rituals)  or  early  drafts  of  an  internal  historiography,   both   hagiographic   and   radical.15   However,   the   influence   of   nationalist   historiography  in  the  public  area  is  weak.  If  the  Church  integrates  to  some   Kristian  Hamon's  2004  study  of  Breton   collaboration  during  World  War  II,  a   highly  controversial  issue.   Studies  on  National  Movements,  1  (2013)      |      ARTICLES   Tudi  Kernalegenn  &  Yann  Fournis   85   extent   the   history   and   culture   of   Brittany   in   the   normal   curriculum   of   catholic  schools,  the  regional  elites  remain  loyal  to  France  and  reinterpret   Breton  history  in  this  sense.16  The  Second  World  War,  the  collaboration   with  the  German  occupation  (to  which  a  non-­‐negligible  part  of  the  Emsav   succumbed)  and  the  subsequent  purge  only  reinforce  the  strong  distrust  of   Breton  society  towards  the  Breton  national  movement.   The  post-­‐war  years  are  difficult  for  Breton  nationalism,  which  maintains  a   conception  of  history  directly  inherited  from  pre-­‐war  years,  with  hardly   any   innovation   at   all.17   However,   historiography   is   effectively   disseminated   as   part   of   a   prosperous   cultural   revival,   consisting   of   traditional  dance  groups  (the  ‘Celtic  circles’)  and  Breton  pipe  bands  (the   bagadoù).  A  modest  evolution  resides   in  the   inclusion  of  recent  history,   notably  via  chronicles  of  Emsav’s  own  history.  A  fine  example  is  offered  by   the  very  knowledgeable  work  by  Yann  Fouéré,  an  activist  of  the  times,  and   by  Ronan  Caerléon,   the  quasi-­‐official  historian  of  Breton  nationalism.   In   the  early  sixties,  Fouéré  provides  a  synthesis,  justifying  the  collaboration   as  the  Breton  form  of  the  politics  of  presence  pursued  by  the  collaborating   French.18   Despite   its   wealth   of   information,   this   work   selects   data   to   elaborate   a   nationalist   version   of   contemporary   history   that   all   later   scholars   will   contradict.   Nonetheless,   this   reconstruction   of   history   generates  little  intellectual  conflict,  as  it  remains  completely  hidden.   The  reestablishment  (1960s  and  1970s)   A   second   historiographical   cycle   starts   in   the   1960s,   taking   a   direction   opposite  to  the  first.  A  new  generation  of  the  Breton  movement  transforms   the  approach  to  the  Breton  society,  its  history  and  the  role  it  plays.  This   new  conception  of  historical  development  (that  is  of  historicity),  centred   on  a  dynamic  vision  of   the  nation,   introduces  historiographical  analysis   highlighting,  at  every  historical  stage,   the  overlap  of  national  and  social   issues,  sometimes  raising  very  fierce  intellectual  debates.  More  visible  in   society,   the   Emsav   also   generates   –   for   the   first   time   –   a   real   interest   among  scholars  in  its  past  and  present.   Studies  on  National  Movements,  1  (2013)      |      ARTICLES   Tudi  Kernalegenn  &  Yann  Fournis  86   1964  corresponds  to  a  break  in  the  history  of  the  Breton  movement,  in  its   self-­‐representation  and  in  its  relationship  to  history.  A  new  conception  of   historicity   emerges:   the   Emsav   (both   in   its   political   and   cultural   dimensions)   gradually   breaks   with   its   cautious   apolitical   approach   developed  since  1945,  which  condemned  it  to  isolation,  and  now  claims   itself   as   a   left-­‐wing   and   socialist   actor   in   a   struggle   for   national   liberation.19   A   symbol   of   this   is   the   creation   in   1964   of   the   Breton   Democratic  Union  (UDB,  Union  Démocratique  Bretonne),   that  was   from   the  start  a  left-­‐wing  party  and  would  become  the  main  autonomist  party  in   the  region’s  history.  As  evidenced  by  its  famous  slogan  ‘Brittany  =  colony’,   this  sense  of  historicity  entails  a  new  reading  of  Brittany’s  history,  more   focused  on  class  struggle  and  decolonisation.   This   trend   is   reinforced   in   1968   by   the   student   rebellion,   which   rehabilitates  the  appeal  of  popular  culture  and  the  interest  for  the  regional   issue.20  Four  years  later,  the  wave  of  worker’s  and  peasant’s  movements  or   even   the   revival   of   the   Breton   Liberation   Front   has   a   similar   effect,   increasing  the  interest  of  the  hexagonal  left  for  Brittany.  This  results  in  a   recasting  of  the  historiography  of  the  Breton  movement  by  the  extreme   left.21   In   December   1971   and   January   1973,   the   United   Socialist   Party   (PSU),   then   main   party   of   the   alternative   left,   suggests   a   review   of   the   history   of   the   Breton   movement   (notably   Gwenc’hlan   le   Scouézec   and   Glauda  Millour).22  As  biased  as  these  articles  may  be,  focusing  on  the  most   progressive  dimensions  of  the  Breton  movement,  they  nevertheless  help   to  publicise  these  issues  and  to  take  them  out  of  the  Breton  movement.  In   1973,   Les   temps   modernes,   Jean-­‐Paul   Sartre’s   journal,   extends   this   enlargement   of   the   study   of   the   Breton   movement   in   a   special   issue   dedicated  to  the  national  minorities  in  France,  containing  several  articles   on  Brittany.  Ronan  Roudaut  notably  offers  the  first  Marxist  socio-­‐history   of  the  Breton  movement,  its  ideology  and  its  sociological  basis.23   Often   selective,   based   on   a   new   ‘usable   past’,   this   historiography   is   an   instrument   facilitating   the   alignment   of   the   Breton   movement   with   the   left-­‐wing  and  popular  movements  (workers,  peasants,  environmentalists,   and  so  on).  Quite   logically   it  provokes  a  counter-­‐historiography,  equally   militant  and  denouncing   the   imposture  of   the   former,  especially  by   the   journal  La  taupe  bretonne.24  Originally,  the  group  that  publishes  La  taupe   Studies  on  National  Movements,  1  (2013)      |      ARTICLES   Tudi  Kernalegenn  &  Yann  Fournis   87   bretonne,  split  off  the  UDB,  aims  to  analyse  nationalisms,  and  in  particular   Breton   nationalism.   Quickly,   though,   it   adapts   to   state   nationalisms,   to   carry  all  its  efforts  against  minority  nationalisms,  considered  as  counter-­‐ revolutionary.25   Without   nuance   and   clearly   biased,   this   analysis   is   challenging  because  for  the  first  time  it  carries  out  a  deconstruction  of  the   discourse  of  the  Breton  movement,  based  on  a  theory  of  nationalism.  For   their  part,  Daniel  Chatelain  and  Pierre  Tafani  analyse  the  cultural  activism   and  nationalist  ideology  of  regional  movements  in  France  through  the  lens   of  class  struggle,  which  leads  them  to  de-­‐legitimise  nationalist  movements   because  of  their  social  irrelevance.26  Finally,  the  aim  of  Yannick  Guin  is  to   ‘destroy  the  nationalist  mythology  maintained  by  the  reaction  for  nearly  a   century  and  by  ordinary  leftism  in  recent  years’.27  This  analysis,  rooted  in   a   mechanistic   and   simplistic   Marxism,   concludes   that   ‘the   Breton   idea   corresponds   to   the   desperate   chimeras   of  doomed   factions’,   and   would   only  be  the  product  of  the  ‘disintegrated  agrarian  bloc’.  28   Thus,  the  inclusion  of  the  Breton  movement  within  the  social  movements   after  May  '68  disseminates  the  issues  of  the  historiography  of  the  Emsav   beyond  the  nationalist  circles,  causing  controversy  and  generating  original   ideas   among   left-­‐wing   activists.   Nevertheless,   this   remobilisation   of   history  is  not  the  prerogative  of  the  left:  the  former  generation  continues   to  take  part   in  the  contemporary  debates  of  the  Breton  society,  with  its   own   point   of   view   and   without   disavowing   its   conservative   stance,   strongly  separating  it  from  the  young  leftists.  Fouéré  continues  his  work  of   developing   a   nationalist   historiography,   reinforced   by   a   new   wave   of   militant  works  on  memorial  issues.29  Although  hidden,  these  publications   give  rise  to  great  controversies.  Many  become  obsessed  with  the  figure  of   Fouéré   himself,   tending   therefore   to   reduce   ‘the   Breton   issue’   to   the   history  of  the  Emsav  during  the  war  and  the  fascist  orientation  of  its  most   extreme  fringes.   Studies  on  National  Movements,  1  (2013)      |      ARTICLES   Tudi  Kernalegenn  &  Yann  Fournis  88   Henri  Fréville,  a  historian  at  the  Faculty  of  Arts  of  Rennes  but  also  mayor   of  that  town,  returns  to  the  Purge  in  the  media  sector  in  Brittany,  of  which   he  was  one  of   the  actors.   In  a  description  of   the  1940-­‐1946  period,  he   evokes   both   the   German   attempts   to   take   control   of   the   region’s   main   journals  and   the  reactions  of   regional  elites   to   this   strategy.  Separating   (politically)  the  wheat  from  the  chaff,  he  clearly  distinguishes  the  ruling   elite,   reluctantly   pursuing   a   politics   of   presence,   from   the   Breton   nationalists  (especially  Fouéré),  using  German  support  to  rise  at  the  head   of  influent  newspapers.30  In  a  complex  polemic,  he  relies  a  few  years  later   on   archives   to   challenge,   among   others,   many   of   the   major   points   of   nationalist   historiography.31   Condemning   the   great   figures   of   the   movement  for  collaboration,  he  relocates  their  careers  to  the  strategy  of   German  occupiers.32  Without  revolutionising  the  available  knowledge,  this   work  enlightens  little  known  events,  at  the  cost  though  of  mixing  the  roles   of  historian  of  the  post-­‐war  period  and  of  political  actor  in  this  very  same   period.   Cover  of  Yannick  Guin's    critical   History  of  Brittany  (1977).   Studies  on  National  Movements,  1  (2013)      |      ARTICLES   Tudi  Kernalegenn  &  Yann  Fournis   89   During  the  seventies,  a  new,  scientific  historiography  puts  the  importance   of   Fréville’s   work   and   the   many   controversies   into   perspective.   In   this   decade,   scholars   respond   to   social   movements   and   public   debates   by   shifting   the   perspectives   on   nationalism   in   three   different   ways.   Two   founding   texts   appear   in   1976-­‐77,   which   contradict   the   nationalist   intellectuals’   version   of   Interbellum   nationalism.   Based   on   an   extensive   knowledge   of   literature   and   archives,   Alain  Déniel   draws   a   complex   picture   of   the   Breton   movement,   emphasising   the   replacement   of   regionalism   by   an   innovative   nationalism   in   the   twenties,   before   the   economic   crisis   led   to   extremism   and   collaboration.   Besides   accurately   describing  political  nationalist  leaders  going  astray,  Déniel  also  shows  that   the  project   to   render   the  Breton  society  susceptible   to  cultural  matters   was  in  some  ways  successful.33  Michel  Denis  goes  further  by  offering  an   abrasive  summary  of  the  period,  one  by  one  dismantling  the  current  ideas   of   nationalist   historiography.   His   demonstration   follows   three   steps.   Relocating  the  nationalist  movement  to  the  political  fray,  he  stresses  that   its  collapse  following  the  'Epuration'  is  caused  less  by  the  severity  of  the   Repression  than  by  its  inherent  flaws.  He  goes  on  by  dissecting  the  internal   political   culture   of   the   nationalist   movement:   this   political   culture   accumulates   the   themes   of   fascism   (elitism,   racism,   xenophobia   and   antisemitism),  reflecting  the  contradictions  of  the  ascending  middle  class   hit  by  the  crisis  of  the  Thirties.  The  Emsav  then  locks  itself  in  an  exaltation   of  national  fetishes  (history,  language),  unable  to  expand  its  claims  beyond   the  petty  bourgeoisie.34   Some  analysts  plough  this  sociological  furrow  more  radically:  putting  into   perspective  the  historical  continuity  discourses  of  the  Breton  movement,   they  question  its  contemporary  ability  to  adapt  to  major  social  changes.   Describing   the   Breton   movement   as   resistance   to   integration   into   the   French  nation,  Michel  Nicolas  consistently  stresses   its   insertion   into   the   broader  realities,  of  both  economic  (industrial  development)  and  political   (the  encapsulating  of  the  regional  scene  by  the  French  state  and  the  local   representatives)  nature.  This  analysis  highlights  the  break  introduced  by   the  UDB  generation,  which  builds  new  political  spaces  by  developing  its   own  approach.  It  also  highlights  the  limits  of  a  Breton  nationalism  which,   being   marginalised   within   the   French   political   arena,   is   forced   to   find   Studies  on  National  Movements,  1  (2013)      |      ARTICLES   Tudi  Kernalegenn  &  Yann  Fournis  90   social   intermediaries   in   the   regional   society,   even   though   its   historiography  is  quite  unsuited  for  conquering  the  masses.35  This  analysis   joins   the   epistemological   reflections   of   some   Parisian   social   science   research   calibrating   the   long-­‐term   prospects   of   the   Breton   movement   (including  its  historiographical  narratives).   A   new   tool   for   analysing   social   movements,   linked   to   Alain   Touraine,   revitalises   the   perspectives   on   regional   movements.36   In   Brittany   as   in   Occitania   they   would   be   at   the   heart   of   the   conflicts   against   the   State,   characteristic   of   modernity.   It   is   therefore   appropriate   to   question   the   historicity  of  the  Breton  movement,  that  is  to  say  its  ability  to  engage  in   conflicts   concerning   the   evolution   of   regional   society.   In   such   a   perspective,   therefore,   nationalism   is   not   transhistorical,   but   must   be   understood   in   terms  of   the  social  and  historical  course   followed  by   the   social  movement.  Less  interested  in  the  conflicts  between  regional  elites,   this   sociology   extends   the   historian’s   analysis   to   highlight,   beyond   the   fascist   diversion,   the   modernising   aspects   of   nationalism   between   the   wars  and,  above  all,  to  scrutinise  its  contemporary  expression  through  its   ability  to  enlist  with  the  new  forms  of  social  action.   Ultimately,   however,   these   studies   lead   to   disappointing   conclusions,   probably  because  of  a  too  ambitious  definition  of  the  social  movement  as   object:   despite   its   symbolic   influence,   the   Breton   movement   is   characterised   above   all   by   its   inability   to   establish   itself   as   a   force   for   social  change.  This  is  partly  explained  by  the  nationalist  reconstruction  of   history:  Breton  nationalism  is  still  based  on  a  historical  imaginary,  largely   focused  on  the  cultural  conflict  between  Brittany  and  France,  more  than  on   a  socio-­‐political  anti-­‐hegemonic  struggle  against  the  French  state,  which   impedes  action  in  true  life.37   Maryon  McDonald  draws  similar  conclusions  through  the  anthropological   method   of   participant   observation   in   the   cultural   movement.   Without   ignoring  long-­‐term  history,  she  observes  the  actualisation  of  this  historical   dimension  in  specific  and  localised  cases.  Her  conclusions  assert  the  social   and  cultural  gap  between  the   linguistic  and  educational  practices  of   the   working  classes  in  Brittany  and  those  of  the  Breton  movement  based  on  an   intellectual  and  political  culture  where  the  history  of  opposition  to  France   Studies  on  National  Movements,  1  (2013)      |      ARTICLES   Tudi  Kernalegenn  &  Yann  Fournis   91   is  omnipresent.  Dismantling  all  the  myths  of  the  nationalist  activists,  this   vitriolic  picture   finds  a  mitigated  echo   in  Brittany   in   the  context  of   the   reflux  of  activists  during  the  1980s.38  Still,  it  complements  the  analysis  of   social   movements   by   showing   how   militant   historiography   isolates   the   Breton   movement   in   the   regional   population,   which   itself   sees   no   irreversible  contradiction  between  France  and  Brittany.   Finally,  a  third  perspective  of  the  social  sciences  reconciles  the  first  two  by   broadening   the   issue   of   nationalism.   Following   the   development   of   ethnology  at  the  University  of  Rennes,  the  Centre  for  Studies  and  Research   on   Inter-­‐Ethnic   Relations   and   Minorities   (CERIEM)   reconceptualises   regional  identity  in  terms  of  ethnicity  in  the  journal  Pluriel.  Validating  on   the   one   hand   historical   work   on   the   fascistic   diversion   of   nationalism   during   the   war,   Pierre-­‐Jean   Simon   emphasises   on   the   other   hand   the   underlying  dialectic:  the  counter-­ideology  of  Breton  nationalism,  modeled   on  French  nationalism,  experienced  a  particularly  sharp  radicalisation,  due   to  the  fact  that  it  was  a  reaction  ‘directly  related’  to  the  rejection  of  the   Breton   identity   by   the   French   state.   More   broadly,   this   approach   emphasises  the  creative  and  modernising  dimension  of  nationalism  during   the   inter-­‐war  period,  which  more  than  Breton  society   itself  has  created   Breton  ethnicity.39  Finally,  this  modernity  dwells  less  on  the  past  and  its   historiographical   narratives   than   on   the   current   success   of   the   Breton   identity  to  qualify  the  phenomena  of  domination.40   Suzanne  Berger,   who   discusses   the   relationship   between   ethnicity   and   center-­‐periphery  relations  in  France,  adds  to  this  perspective.  The  specific   power  of  the  ‘ethnic  movement’  in  Brittany  and  its  evolution  to  the  left  are   explained  by  political  developments:  the  singularity  of  Brittany  is  based  on   a   symbolic   universe,   the   effectiveness   of   which   relies   less   on   ethnic   traditions  than  on  the  ability  of  these  traditions  to  reinforce  the  tensions   between   center   and   periphery.41   This   analysis   therefore   completes   and   adjusts  those  approaches  emphasising  the  Breton  movement’s  isolation  in   regional  society:  the  reinvention  of  Breton  culture  makes  it  a  medium  for   the   expression   of   Breton   nationalism   which   reaches   a   new   level   of   integration  into  contemporary  society  through  its  ability  to  disseminate  its   major  issues.42   Studies  on  National  Movements,  1  (2013)      |      ARTICLES   Tudi  Kernalegenn  &  Yann  Fournis  92   Public  debate  and  the  renewal  of  historiography  (since  the   1980s)   Between  1981  and  1995,  the  Breton  movement   is  discreet:   the  regional   issue,  officially  settled  by  the  laws  of  decentralisation  of  1982,  is  no  longer   on   the   agenda.   This   public   silence,   after   the   tumultuous   seventies,   is   accompanied   by   an   almost   complete   absence   of   studies   on   the   Breton   movement,  with   the  exception  of  delayed  publications  of  research  done   before  1981.43  A  loose  consensus  emerges:  the  Breton  nationalist  parties   remain  marginal  electorally  speaking,  while  Breton  cultural  demands  and   emanations   gather   some   passive   support.   From   the   1995   onwards,   however,   there   is   a   cultural   revival   with   the   return   of   popular   cultural   events   related   to   the   Breton   movement   like   the   festoù-­noz   and   other   festivals,  followed  by  publications  on  the  Breton  movement  designed  for   the  general  public.44   Only  from  1997-­‐1998  does  the  issue  resurface  with  a  revival  of  scientific   studies,   provoked   by   the   media   controversy   regarding   the   Breton   movement   and   the   historiography   of   Brittany.   The   discussion   partly   focuses   on   the   Breton   movement   which   uses   discrete   but   multiple   and   significant  references  to  some  of  the  leaders  of  the  second  Emsav  (1918-­‐ 1945).   For   some   leaders,   militant   historiography   composed   during   this   period  remains  valid   in   the  1990s,  by  way  of  reverence   to   the  Gwalarn   generation.  Originally  crystallised  around  the  symbolic   figure  of  Hemon,   the  conflict  is  then  brought  to  the  entire  Breton  movement.45  Pushed  by   some  individuals  engaged  against  the  Breton  movement,  in  publications  as   well   as   on   the   Internet   or   in   the   press,   the   debate   crosses   Brittany’s   borders   and   quickly   raises   numerous   articles   in   the   French   press   (L’express,  19  July  1999;  Le  nouvel  observateur  7-­‐13  December  2000).46   For  the  first  time,  the  discussion  on  the  history  of  Brittany  and  the  Breton   movement   is   carried   in   the   public   arena.   The   newspaper   Ouest-­France,   with  a  circulation  of  more  than  770,000  units  and  not  under  suspicion  of   any  sympathy   for  Breton  nationalism,  serialises  Reynald  Sécher’s  comic   books  on  the  history  of  Brittany.47  Sensitive  periods  like  the  Chouannerie   (the  revolt  by  royalists  against  the  Republic   in  1793)  and  World  War  II   Studies  on  National  Movements,  1  (2013)      |      ARTICLES   Tudi  Kernalegenn  &  Yann  Fournis   93   engender   controversies   between   the   regional   press   (Ouest-­France,   Le   nouvel   Ouest)   and   the   Parisian   press   (notably   Télérama).   This   historiographical  controversy  arises  after  twenty  years  of  silence  on  the   issue  of  Brittany,  at  the  very  moment  when  the  Breton  cultural  movement   finds   a   new   dynamism   and   a   social   basis.   These   accusations,   often   the   result  of  making  a  mishmash  of  facts  and  opinions  and  despite  the  work  of   historians,  usually  end  up  evoking  the  (assumed  deleterious)  influence  of   the  Emsav  on  Breton  society.48   This  historiographical  controversy  and  its  by-­‐effects  have  only  marginally   touched   upon   the   Breton   movement   and   its   social   image   in   Brittany.49   Rather,  it  seems  to  have  been  a  strong  factor  in  a  collective  reinvestigation   of   the   Breton   movement’s   recent   history,   and   in   particular   of   the   link   between   the   pre-­‐war   period   (and   nationalism)   and   the   current   period   (and  the  Breton  identity  sensu  lato).  However,  those  links  are  less  obvious   than   ever,   even   though   some   scientific   works   stress   the   historical   continuity.50   In  fact,  regional  elites  refuse  to  see  their  efforts  to  re-­‐appropriate  Breton   history  reduced  to  a  dubious  political  crusade.  They  continue  to  invest  in   ‘Breton   identity’   –   as   does   the   influential   newspaper   Ouest-­France.   Similarly,   certain   personalities   at   the   intersection   of   academia   and   the   Breton  movement  are  engaged  in  critical  work  on  the  Emsav’s  behavior   during   World   War   II,   allowing   the   Breton   movement   to   clarify   its   own   history.  Kristian  Hamon  for  example  uses  the  historical  archives  to  draw   an   unambiguous   picture   of   the   collaboration   by   part   of   the   political   movement.51   This   research   was   not   warmly   received,   but   contributed   nevertheless  to  a   long-­‐awaited  work  of  collective  memory,  as  a   ‘right  to   inventory’.52  The  scientific  reaction  to  these  controversies  illustrates  best   the  new  relationship  between  militant  historiography  and  regional  society.   Studies  on  National  Movements,  1  (2013)      |      ARTICLES   Tudi  Kernalegenn  &  Yann  Fournis  94   Indeed,   the   controversy   provokes   a   reinvestigation   of   the   subject   by   academic   historians,   whose   work   greatly   contributes   to   the   available   knowledge   on   the   Breton   movement.   They   make   a   clear   distinction   between  the  excesses  of  the  Breton  movement  during  World  War  II  and   the  progressive  and  open  features  of  the  contemporary  Emsav.  This  public   and  historiographical  interest  for  the  Emsav  during  World  War  II  results  in   a   major   international   symposium   organised   in   Brest   by   the   Centre   de   Recherche   Bretonne   et   Celtique   (CRBC,   Centre   for   Breton   and   Celtic   Research).   Under  the  somewhat  condescending  eye  of  some  Parisian  journalists  (Le   monde  des  livres,  2  November  2001),  this  conference  aims  to  ‘meet  “strong   social  demand”  in  Brittany’,  using  ‘the  weapon  of  knowledge,  in  order  to   share  the  gains  of  historical  research  in  a  non-­‐confrontational  way’.53  To   achieve   this,   the  conference  opens  a  much  wider  debate  by  placing   the   history  of  the  Breton  movement  not  only  in  the  context  of  Breton  society,   Report  of  the  much  debated  conference  on   Brittany   in   World   War   II,   organised   in   Brest  in  November  2001.   Studies  on  National  Movements,  1  (2013)      |      ARTICLES   Tudi  Kernalegenn  &  Yann  Fournis   95   but  also  in  relation  to  other  regional  experiences  in  Europe.  The  synthesis   and  the  advancement  of  knowledge  confirm  the  earlier  scientific  work:  the   Breton  movement  has  sought  to  advance  its  own  goals  by  engaging  in  a   powerful   political   and   cultural   collaboration.54   This   has   earned   the   movement   severe  and   justifiable   retribution  at   the  Liberation,   although   individual  stories  may  be  more  complex.55  The  conference  is  also  a  great   public  success,  well  covered  by  the  regional  and  national  press.  The  two   main  newspapers  in  Brittany  (Ouest-­France  and  Le  télégramme)  announce   the   debate   and   then   report   the   content   of   the   contributions   on   a   daily   basis.  As  concluded  by  the  historian  Christian  Bougeard,  the  objective  has   been  achieved:     ‘Many   areas   have   been   investigated,   demonstrating,   from   the   perspective   of   historians   and   hopefully   of   the   media   alike,   that   there  were  no  more  “skeletons  in  the  closet”.  […]  Only  deliberate   or  lazy  ignorance  of  these  developments,  or  bad  faith,  can  further   fuel   the   controversy   or   give   a   distorted   picture   of   Breton   historical   reality.   […]  Now  well  established,   the   facts   should  no   longer   allow   the   amalgamation   of   the   entire   Emsav   with   the   collaborators.’56   Beyond   the   conference,   the   academic   study   of   the   Breton   movement   extends   to   other   periods.   The   knowledge   on   the   period   of   the   early   twentieth  century  is  renewed,  notably  with  a  conference  on  the  figure  of   Emile  Masson,  the  famous  left-­‐winger  who  first  tried  to  link  socialist  ideals   and   Breton   nationalism   or   with   the   study   of   Philippe   Le   Stum   on   the   impact   of   neo-­‐druidism.57   The   thesis   of   Francis   Le   Squer   helps   to   understand  better  the  Bleun  Brug,  a  catholic  and  regionalist  organisation   created  by  the  abbot  Yann-­‐Vari  Perrot,  which,  from  1905,  became  arguably   the   main   mass   movement   in   the   history   of   the   Emsav.58   A   successful   exhibition  dedicated  to  the  artistic  movement  Seiz  Breur,  which  imagined   in  the  1920s  and  1930s  a  Celto-­‐Breton  art  with  lasting  cultural  influences,   is  also  worth  mentioning.59  Another  new  period  of  interest  are  the  1970s,   notably   with   Tudi   Kernalegenn’s   analysis   focusing   on   the   left   and   the   Breton   national   issue,   clarifying   the   1960s   shift   to   the   left   of   both   the   Breton  movement  and  the  claims  for  devolution.60  On  the  1970s,  also  the   Studies  on  National  Movements,  1  (2013)      |      ARTICLES   Tudi  Kernalegenn  &  Yann  Fournis  96   study  of  Erwann  Chartier  and  Alain  Cabon  on  the  Breton  Liberation  Front   should   be   mentioned,   as   it   has   had   a   strong   symbolic   impact   on   the   region.61   Concerning   the   contemporary   period,   the   studies   are   also   multiplying,   with   notably   a   Dictionary   of   Breton   heritage   focusing   on   the   Breton   identity’s   constitutive   elements.62   Not   less   interesting   is   a   collective   publication  on  The  building  of   regional   identity.  Examples  of  Saxony  and   Brittany,   18th-­20th   centuries   reminding   after   Catherine   Bertho   that   the   Breton  identity  is  a  social  construction  and  not  a  given.63  Thirdly  there  is   an   overview   of   the   history   of   the   Breton   movement   since   the   1980s.64   These   studies   reach   a   wide   audience,   as   demonstrated   by   a   series   of   conferences  in  2000-­‐2001  on  the  topic  Brittany  2100.  Identity  and  future.65   Within   ten   years,   the   historiography   of   the   Breton   movement   has   awakened  and  shed  light  on  many  of  its  stages  and  aspects.   Not  only  historians,  but  sociologists  as  well  have  covered  the  subject  with   several  studies  on  Breton  identity,  both  groups  insisting  on  the  intrinsic   plurality  of  Breton  identity,   in  a  constant  process  of  elaboration.66  From   this   literature   though   has   emerged   a   public   consensus   reappropriated   outside  university,  on  a  depoliticised  conception  of   the  Breton   identity.   According   to   mainstream   social   actors,   it   should   remain   cultural,   pertaining   to   the   heart,   the   emotions,   and   not   be   ‘instrumentalised’   in   order  to  ask  for  specific  Breton  institutions.  This  depoliticised  conception   of  Breton  identity,  removing  its  social  and  political  dimensions,  has  indeed   consequently  defused  the  debate  about  the  political  future  of  Brittany.   With   a   pluridisciplinary   approach,   a   group   of   young   social   scientists,   originally  gathered  around  Ronan  Le  Coadic  and  Christian  Demeuré-­‐Vallée   in  the  association  Identity  and  Democracy  –  International  Debates  (IDDI),   have  actively  contributed  to  develop  this  new  research  dynamic  around   the   Breton   issue,   with   an   international   symposium   in   Rennes   in   2002,   praised  by  the  critics,  and  two  books.67   Finally,   political   scientists   have   focused   on   the   social   construction   of   Brittany.   Political   institutionalists   have   notably   questioned   the   political   capacity  of  Brittany,  which  they  revealed  by  a  detour  through  history.68   Romain   Pasquier   shows   how   the   capacity   of   the   Bretons   to   construct   Studies  on  National  Movements,  1  (2013)      |      ARTICLES   Tudi  Kernalegenn  &  Yann  Fournis   97   territorialised  coalitions  of  interests  is  specific  in  the  French  sphere,  and   explains  to  a  certain  degree  the  ability  of  Brittany  to  act  as  a  collective  and   territorialised  social  actor,  and  therefore  shapes  its  social  reality.  Political   sociologists  have  more  focused  on  the  analysis  of  Breton  regionalism  as   the  convergence  of  territorial  mobilisations  in  various  social  areas  across   Brittany.69   An   alternative   approach   to   regionalism   is   to   see   it   as   the   expression  of  a  territorialised  social  analysis,  the  region  being  to  a  certain   extent  a  cognitive  tool  to  understand  reality  from  a  specific  point  of  view.70     The   period   since   1997   is   thus   characterised   by   a   historiographical   controversy  surrounding  the  Breton  movement,  with  the  use  of  the  past  to   attack  the  movement   in  the  present.  The  result   is  an  overinvestment   in   one  era  of  the  Breton  movement:  World  War  II.  However,  this  works  as  a   catalyst   for   the   study   of   the   entire   Breton   movement,   both   within   the   movement  itself  and  in  academic  circles.  In  some  ways,  this  revival  picks   up  the  thread  of  a  historiography  interrupted  for  almost  twenty  years,  and   contributes   to   a   beneficial   clarification   of   the   discourse   and   task   of   remembrance  of  the  Breton  movement.   Conclusion   Breton   identity   and   its   impact   on   the   Breton   society   remain   clearly   paradoxical.  On  the  one  hand,   it  cannot  be  considered  as  an   ideological   matrix   encompassing   the   whole   regional   society   in   a   single   collective   project  (in  comparison  for  example,  up  to  a  certain  point  at  least,  to  the   Catalan   or   Welsh   identities).   It   is   neither   translated   clearly   into   the   political  space,  the  regional  nationalist  parties  never  having  had  a  strong   impact  in  elections,  in  contrast  to  most  other  similar  territories  in  Western   Europe.   Brittany   is   indeed   still   an   ‘invisible   nation’…   but,   on   the   other   hand,   it   constitutes   a   strong   symbolic   frame,   contributing   to   integrate   symbols,  actions  and  strategies  within  a  real  sense  of  a  collective  identity.   Hence,   political   invisibility   does   not   necessarily   mean   weakness…   An   explanation  of  this  paradox  lies  partially  in  the  (historic)  fate  of  the  Breton   movement  itself  and  of  its  historiography.   Studies  on  National  Movements,  1  (2013)      |      ARTICLES   Tudi  Kernalegenn  &  Yann  Fournis  98   Founded   on   very   conservative   roots   and   a   fascination   for   the   past,   the   Breton  movement  has  never  been  able  to  become  a  central  actor  of  the   Breton   society   and   therefore,   notably,   has   always   had   difficulties   to   be   considered  as  a  legitimate  actor  in  the  political  definition  of  Brittany  as  a   specific   society   (in   the   cultural   realm   though,   its   influence   has   been   determinative  in  the  long  term).  Its  historiography  has  impeded  more  than   helped  the  Emsav   in  the  twentieth  century,  and  its  vision  of  history  has   remained   marginal   for   most   of   its   existence.   The   historiography   and   analysis   of   the   Breton   movement   have   even   remained   hidden   until   the   1960s.  From  the  1970s  though,  the  Emsav  has  become  a  legitimate  object   for   historians   and   social   scientists,   creating   a   new   scholarly   historiography.   This   has   not   been   without   polemics,   notably   on   the   attitude  of  the  Breton  movement  during  WWII.  Nonetheless,  scholars  have   clearly  distinguished  between  the  errors  of  the  past  and  the  contemporary   Breton   movement,   helping   it   to   turn   to   the   future   on   more   sound   foundations.   The  historiography  of  the  Breton  issue  has  been  clearly  developing  since   the  end  of  the  1990s.  Scientific  knowledge  has  grown  on  most  aspects  and   periods  of  the  history  of  the  Breton  movement.  An  important  milestone  is   the   global   synthesis   published   by   Nicolas.71   Unfortunately,   a   forceful   analysis  of  its  different  historical  periods  is  still  lacking,  most  notably  on   the  low  tide,  from  1945  to  1964.72  Other  lacunas  are  specific,  transversal   aspects,   for   example   the   movement’s   progressive   and   left-­‐wing   trend.   Moreover,  many  essential  actors  are  still  without  any  specific  study,  most   notably   the   Union   Démocratique   Breton,   or   the   Comité   d'étude   et   de   liaison  des  intérêts  bretons  (CELIB).73  New  theoretical  approaches  are  also   to  be  expected,  notably  to  better  explain  the  Breton  paradox  of  a  strong   and  recognised  identity  without  any  determining  political  emanation  up  to   now.   Studies  on  National  Movements,  1  (2013)      |      ARTICLES   Tudi  Kernalegenn  &  Yann  Fournis   99     Endnotes   1  A.  Dieckhoff,  La  nation  dans  tous  ses  états  (Paris,  2000);  S.  Gemie,  Brittany  1750-­ 1950.  The  invisible  nation  (Cardiff,  2007).   2   B.   Anderson,   L’imaginaire   national.   Réflexions   sur   l’origine   et   l’essor   du   nationalisme  (Paris,  1996);  M.  Keating,  Nations  against  the  state.  The  new  politics   of  nationalism  in  Quebec,  Catalonia  and  Scotland  (London,  1996).   3  M.  Keating,  The  new  regionalism  in  Western  Europe.  Territorial  restructuring  and   political  change  (Cheltenham,  1998);  M.  Denis,  ’La  génération  des  années  1960  et   l’émancipation  bretonne.  Essai  d’histoire  impertinente’,  in:  A.  Croix,  F.  Hubert  &  E.   Le  Bris  du  Rest  (eds.),  Monsieur  le  ‘Conservateur’.  Musées  et  combats  culturels  en   Bretagne  au  temps  de  Yann-­Cheun  Veillard  (Rennes,  2001).  We  will  use  the  term   ‘Breton  movement’  (or  Emsav)  to  refer  to  the  members  of  the  political  and  cultural   organisations  that  make  up  the  nebula  of  Breton  regional  nationalism  (M.  Nicolas,   Histoire  du  mouvement  breton  (Paris,  1982)).   4  G.  Noiriel,  Etat,  nation  et  immigration  (Paris,  2001).   5  See  L.  Boltanski,  Les  cadres;  la  formation  d’un  groupe  social  (Paris,  1982).   6  M.  Keating,  ‘How  historic  are  historic  rights?  Competing  historiographies  and  the   struggle   for   political   legitimacy’,   in:   X.M.   Reboredo   González   (ed.),  Etnicidade   e   nacionalismo.  Simposio  internacional  de  antropoloxía  (abril  de  2000)  (Santiago  de   Compostela,  2001)  45-­‐81.   7   M.   Hroch,   ‘From   national   movement   to   the   fully-­‐formed   nation’,   in:   New   left   review,   no.   198   (1993)   3-­‐20.   In   this   article   we   consider   ‘Breton   national   historiography’  as   the  historiography  referring  to  Brittany  taken   in   its  national   dimension,  that  is  to  say  by  and/or  on  the  Breton  ‘national’  movement.   8  F.  Postic  &  J.-­‐Y.  Veillard,  ’Reconnaissance  d’une  culture  régionale.  La  Bretagne   depuis  la  Révolution’,  in:  Ethnologie  française,  33  (2003)  381-­‐389.   9  H.  Guillorel,  ‘Problème  breton  et  mouvement  breton’,  in:  Pouvoirs,  19  (1981)  83-­‐102.     Studies  on  National  Movements,  1  (2013)      |      ARTICLES   Tudi  Kernalegenn  &  Yann  Fournis  100     10   M.   Denis,   ‘Arthur   de   La   Borderie   (1827-­‐1901)   ou   “l’histoire,   science   patriotique”’,  in:  N.-­‐Y.  Tonnerre  (ed.),  Chroniqueurs  et  historiens  de  la  Bretagne  du   Moyen-­Âge  au  milieu  du  XXe  siècle,  (Rennes,  2001)  143-­‐155.   11  A.  de  La  Borderie,  B.  Porchnev  &  E.S.B.,  Les  bonnets  rouges  (Collection  10/18)   (Paris,  1975)  23.     12  P.-­‐J.  Simon,  La  bretonnité.  Une  ethnicité  problématique  (Rennes,  1999)  187.   13  J.  Coroller,  Histoire  de  notre  Bretagne  (St.-­‐Vincent-­‐sur-­‐Oust,  [1922]  1997).   14  H.  Poisson  &  J.-­‐P.  Le  Mat,  Histoire  de  Bretagne  (Spézet,  [1954]  2000)  453.   15  Notably  R.  Caerléon,  Gwenn  ha  du  (Pleyber-­‐Christ,  1938).   16   M.   Lagrée,   Religion   et   culture   en   Bretagne   (1850-­1950)   (Paris,   1992);   Y.   Tranvouez,  ‘Les  catholiques  et  la  question  bretonne  (1940-­‐1944)’,  in:  C.  Bougeard   (ed.),  Bretagne  et  identités  régionales  pendant  la  Seconde  Guerre  mondiale  (Brest,   2002)  285-­‐306.   17  M.  Nicolas,  Le  séparatisme  en  Bretagne  (Spézet,  1986).   18  Y.  Fouéré,  La  Bretagne  écartelée  (1938-­1948)  (Paris,  1962);  R.  Paxton,  La  France   de  Vichy  (Paris,  1973).   19  M.  Nicolas,  L’Emsav.  Politique  et  thématique  du  mouvement  breton  (PhD  diss.,   Université   de   Rennes,   1980)   2   vol.;   Nicolas,   Histoire   du   mouvement   breton;   V.   Porhel,  ‘Usage  politique  de  l’histoire  par  le  régionalisme  breton  dans  les  conflits   sociaux   des   années   68’,   in:   M.   Crivellom   P.   Garcia   &   N.   Offenstadt   (eds.),   Concurrence  des  passés.  Usages  politiques  du  passé  dans  la  France  contemporaine   (Aix-­‐en-­‐Provence,  2006)  131-­‐144.   20  T.  Kernalegenn,  Drapeau  rouge  et  gwenn-­ha-­du.  L’extrême-­gauche  et  la  Bretagne   dans  les  années  de  soixante-­dix  (Rennes,  2005).   21   The   reason   for   this   intellectual   interest   of   Marxist   activists   for   Breton   nationalism  is  the  idea  that  the  revolution  they  are  calling  for  will  emerge  from   the  union  between  class  struggles  and  national  struggles,  hence  the  need  to  better   understand  the  latter.   22  G.  Le  Scouézec,  ‘Histoire  du  mouvement  breton’,  in:  Que  faire,  8/9  (1971)  6-­‐13;   'Colonialisme  intérieur  et  minorités  nationales',  in:  Que  faire,  8/9  (1971)  65-­‐80;  G.   Millour,  ’La  question  nationale  bretonne’,  in:  Critique  socialiste,  11  (1973)  31-­‐37.     Studies  on  National  Movements,  1  (2013)      |      ARTICLES   Tudi  Kernalegenn  &  Yann  Fournis   101     23  R.  Roudaut,  ‘Histoire  du  mouvement  breton’,  in:  Les  temps  modernes,  no.  324-­‐ 326  (1973)  170-­‐194.  In  this  special  issue  on  ‘Minorités  nationales  en  France’,  see   also  the  article  by  P.  Doridam,  ‘La  Bretagne  et  le  socialisme’,  223-­‐233.   24  D.  Chatelain  &  P.  Tafani,  Qu’est-­ce  qui  fait  courir  les  autonomistes  (Paris,  1976);   Y.  Guin,  Histoire  de  la  Bretagne:  contribution  à  la  critique  de  l’idéologie  nationaliste   (Paris,  1977).   25  See   for   instance   J.-­‐Y.  Guiomar,   ‘Essai   sur   la  production  du  signe   idéologique   “Bretagne”’,  in:  La  taupe  bretonne,  no.  3  (1972)  69-­‐94,  no.  4  (1973)  155-­‐166;  A.  Le   Guyader,   ‘La  Bretagne  et  ses   idéologues’,   in:  La   taupe  bretonne,  no.  2-­‐5  (1971-­‐ 1973).   26  Chatelain  &  Tafani,  Qu’est-­ce  qui  fait  courir,  306.   27  Guin,  Histoire,  9.   28  Guin,  Histoire,  317.   29   H.   Le   Boterf,   La   Bretagne   dans   la   guerre   (Paris,   1969-­‐1971)   3   vol.;   A.   Youenou,  Fransez  Debauvais  de  Breiz  Atao  et  les  siens  (Rennes,  1972-­‐1980)  6  vol.;   O.  Mordrel,  Breiz  Atao.  Histoire  et  actualité  du  nationalisme  breton  (Paris,  1973);  R.   Caerléon,  Le  rêve  fou  des  soldats  de  Breiz  Atao  (Quimper,  1975);  Y.  Fouéré,  Histoire   résumée  du  mouvement  breton  (Quimper,  1977).   30  H.  Fréville,  La  presse  bretonne  dans  la  tourmente  (1940-­1946)  (Paris,  1979).   31  Y.  Didro  &  Y.  Fouéré,  L’Histoire  du  quotidien  ‘La  Bretagne’  et  les  silences  d’Henri   Fréville  (Les  Cahiers  de  l’Avenir  de  la  Bretagne)  (Saint-­‐Brieuc,  1981).   32  H.  Fréville,  Archives  secrètes  de  Bretagne,  1940-­1944  (Rennes,  1985).   33  A.  Déniel,  Le  mouvement  breton,  1919-­1945  (Paris,  1976).   34   M.   Denis,  ’Mouvement   breton   et   fascisme;   signification   de   l’échec   du   second   Emsav’,  in:  C.  Gras  &  G.  Livet  (eds.),  Régions  et  régionalismes  en  France  du  XVIIIe   siècle   à   nos   jours   (Paris,   1977)   489-­‐506.   See   also   B.   Frelaut,  Les   nationalistes   bretons  de  1939  à  1945  (Maulévrier,  1985).   35  Nicolas,  Histoire  du  mouvement  breton;  Nicolas,  Le  séparatisme.   36  A.  Touraine  &  F.  Dubet,  Le  pays  contre  l’État  (Paris,  1981).     Studies  on  National  Movements,  1  (2013)      |      ARTICLES   Tudi  Kernalegenn  &  Yann  Fournis  102     37   R.   Dulong,  La   question   bretonne   (Paris,   1975);   L.   Quéré,   Jeux   interdits   à   la   frontière.  Essai  sur  le  régionalisme  (Paris,  1978).   38   M.   McDonald,  We   are   not   French!   Langage,   culture   and   identity   in   Brittany   (London,  1989)  303-­‐316.   39  Simon,  La  bretonnité.   40  F.  Elegoët,  ‘Bilinguisme  ou  domination  linguistique?’,  in:  Les  temps  modernes,  no.   324-­‐326  (1973)  213-­‐222;  Simon,  La  bretonnité.   41  S.  Berger,  ‘Bretons  and  Jacobins.  Reflections  on  French  regional  ethnicity’,  in:  J.   Esman  Milton  (ed.),  Ethnic  conflict  in  the  Western  World  (Ithaca  -­‐  London,  1977)   157-­‐178.   42   Dulong,   La   question   bretonne;   Berger,   ‘Bretons   and   Jacobins’;   Quéré,   Jeux   interdits;  McDonald,  We  are  not  French.   43   Frelaut,   Les   nationalistes   bretons;   Nicolas,   Histoire   du   mouvement   breton;   Nicolas,  Le  séparatisme;  McDonald,  We  are  not  French;  Guillorel,  ‘Problème  breton’,   83-­‐102;  H.  Guillorel,  ‘The  social  bases  of  regionalism  in  France.  The  Breton  case’,   in:  J.  Coakley  (ed.),  The  social  origins  of  nationalist  movements.  The  contemporary   West  European  experience  (London,  1992)  147-­‐164.   44   M.   Nicolas,  Bretagne,   un   destin   européen   (Rennes,   2001);   E.   Chartier   &   R.   Larvor,  La   question   bretonne.   Enquête   sur   les   mouvements   politiques   bretons   (Plougastell  -­‐  Daoulaz,  2002).   45  Roparz  Hemon  (1900-­‐1978),  linguist,  grammarian,  writer  and  activist,  leader  of   the   Gwalarn   generation   (named   after   their   journal),   is   largely   considered   the   father  of  the  Breton  cultural  movement.  He  was  sentenced  to  ‘national  indignity’   in  1946,  especially  for  cultural  collaboration  with  the  occupant.  See  R.  Calvez,  La   radio  en  langue  bretonne.  Roparz  Hemon  et  Pierre-­Jakez  Hélias.  Deux  rêves  de   la   Bretagne  (Rennes,  2000).  Controversy  arose  when  his  name  was  given  to  the  first   Diwan  College  which  was  renamed  in  May  2000.   46  A  notable  attack  on  the  movement  was  that  by  Françoise  Morvan,  especially  in   her  Le   Monde   comme   si.   Nationalisme   et   dérive   identitaire   en   Bretagne   (Arles,   2002).   47  R.  Le  Honzec  &  R.  Sécher,  Histoire  de  Bretagne  des  origines  à  nos  jours  (Acigné,   2002)  10  vol.     Studies  on  National  Movements,  1  (2013)      |      ARTICLES   Tudi  Kernalegenn  &  Yann  Fournis   103     48   M.   Denis,  ’Le   mouvement   breton   pendant   la   guerre:   un   bilan’,   in:   Bougeard,  Bretagne  et  identités  régionales,  151-­‐166.   49   See   M.   Bergère,   ‘Les   usages   politiques   de   la   Seconde   Guerre   mondiale   en   Bretagne:  Histoire,  mémoire  et  identité  régionale’  (unpubl.  paper,  2003).   50  Cf.  Calvez,  La  radio.   51   K.   Hamon,  Les   nationalistes   bretons   sous   l’occupation   (Ar   Releg   -­‐   Kerhuon,   2001);  K.  Hamon,  Le  Bezen  Perrot.  1944.  Des  nationalistes  bretons  sous  l’uniforme   allemand  (Fouesnant,  2004).   52  See  also  G.  Cadiou,  L’hermine  et   la  croix  gammée.  Le  mouvement  breton  et   la   collaboration  (Paris,  2001).   53  Bougeard,  Bretagne  et  identités  régionales.   54   Denis,   ‘Le   mouvement   breton’;   R.   Calvez,  ’1941:   le   breton,   langue   d’Etat’,   in:   Bougeard,  Bretagne  et  identités  régionales,  207-­‐221;  L.  Boissou,  ‘L’Allemagne  et  le   nationalisme  breton  (1939-­‐1945)’,  in:  Bougeard,  Bretagne  et  identités  régionales,   321-­‐336.   55   D.   Le   Couédic,  ’Les   étranges   destinées   de   Dézarrois   et   Lebesque   ou   la   complication  de   la  guerre  mise  à  nu  par  ses   intellectuels,  même’,   in:  Bougeard,   Bretagne  et  identités  régionales,  177-­‐206;  L.  Capdevila,  ’Le  mouvement  breton  face   à  l’Epuration’,  in:  Bougeard,  Bretagne  et  identités  régionales,  337-­‐351.   56  Bougeard,  Bretagne  et  identités  régionales,  393-­‐399.   57  P.  Le  Stum,  Le  Néo-­druidisme  en  Bretagne.  Origine,  naissance  et  développement,   1890-­1914  (Rennes,  1998);  J.-­‐D.  Giraud  &  M.  Giraud  (eds.),  Émile  Masson,  prophète   et  rebelle  (Rennes,  2005).   58   F.   Le   Squer,   Les   espoirs,   les   efforts   et   les   épreuves   du   mouvement   breton   catholique  de  1891  à  1945  (Lille,  1997).   59   D.   Le   Couédic   &   J.-­‐Y.   Veillard   (eds.),  Ar   Seiz   Breur   1923-­1947.   La   création   bretonne  entre  tradition  et  modernité  (Rennes,  2000).   60   Kernalegenn,   Drapeau   rouge;   T.   Kernalegenn,   Une   approche   cognitive   du   régionalisme.   Identités   régionales,   territoires,   mouvements   sociaux   en   Bretagne,   Écosse  et  Galice  dans  les  années  1970  (PhD  diss.,  Université  de  Rennes  1,  2011).     Studies  on  National  Movements,  1  (2013)      |      ARTICLES   Tudi  Kernalegenn  &  Yann  Fournis  104     61   E.   Chartier   &   A.   Cabon,   Le   dossier   F.L.B.   Plongée   chez   les   clandestins   bretons   (Spézet,  2006).   62  A.  Croix  &  J.-­‐Y.  Veillard,  Le  dictionnaire  du  Patrimoine  Breton  (Rennes,  2000).   63  C.  Bertho,  ’L’invention  de  la  Bretagne.  Genèse  sociale  d’un  stéréotype’,  in:  Actes   de   la   recherche   en   sciences   sociales,   35   (1980)   45-­‐62;   G.   Nicolas   (ed.),  La   construction  de  l’identité  régionale.  Les  exemples  de  la  Saxe  et  de  la  Bretagne,  XVIIIe-­ XXe  siècles  (Rennes,  2001).   64  Nicolas,  Bretagne.   65  A.  Croix  (ed.),  Bretagne  2100.  Identité  et  avenir  (Rennes,  2001).   66  R.  Le  Coadic,  L’identité  bretonne  (Rennes,  1998);  Simon,  La  bretonnité.   67  R.  Le  Coadic  (ed.),  Diversité  culturelle  et  mondialisation.  Repenser  la  démocratie   (Rennes,  2003);  N.  Dugalès,  R.  Le  Coadic  &  F.  Patez  (eds.),  Et  la  Bretagne?  Héritage,   identité,  projets   (Rennes,  2004);  N.  Dugalès,  Y.  Fournis  &  T.  Kernalegenn  (eds.),   Bretagne  plurielle.  Culture,  territoire  et  politique  (Rennes,  2007).   68  R.  Pasquier,  La  capacité  politique  des  régions.  Une  comparaison  France/Espagne   (Rennes,  2004);  A.  Cole,  Beyond  devolution  and  decentralisation.  Building  regional   capacity  in  Wales  and  Brittany  (Manchester,  2006).   69   Y.   Fournis,   Les   régionalismes   en   Bretagne.   La   région   et   l’État   (1950-­2000)   (Brussels,  2006).   70  Kernalegenn,  Une  approche  cognitive.   71  M.  Nicolas,  Histoire  de  la  revendication  bretonne  (Spézet,  2007).   72  Let  us  mention  though  the  book  of  Henry  on  the  journal  L’Avenir  de  la  Bretagne:   L.  Henry,  Le  retour  du  mouvement  breton  après  1945  à  travers  le  journal  L’Avenir   de   la  Bretagne   (Fouenant,  2003);  or  on   the  CELIB:   J.-­‐P.  Cressard,  CELIB   (1950-­ 2000).  Quand  la  Bretagne  s’est  réveillée  (Spézet,  2000).   73   A   conference   was   devoted   to   the   UDB   in   April   2013,   organised   by   Tudi   Kernalegenn  and  Romain  Pasquier.  About  the  CELIB,  a  PhD  thesis  is  now  being   prepared.