Microsoft Word - Ther_article_v5b_definitive.docx


	
  

	
  
Philipp	
  Ther,	
  ‘Regionalism	
  and	
  border	
  studies	
  in	
  modern	
  Europe.	
  

The	
  case	
  of	
  Upper	
  Silesia	
  in	
  context’,	
  in:	
  Studies	
  on	
  National	
  Movements,	
  
1	
  (2013)	
  pp.	
  17-­‐49.	
  

http://snm.nise.eu	
  

Philipp	
  Ther	
  

REGIONALISM	
  AND	
  BORDER	
  REGIONS	
  

IN	
  MODERN	
  EUROPE	
  

THE	
  CASE	
  OF	
  UPPER	
  SILESIA	
  IN	
  CONTEXT	
  

The	
   study	
   of	
   border	
   regions	
   has	
   become	
   fashionable	
   in	
   the	
   recent	
   two	
  
decades.	
  There	
  are	
  several	
  reasons	
  for	
  this	
  widespread	
  fascination,	
  firstly	
  
the	
  rediscovery	
  of	
  multiculturality	
  and	
  distinct	
  mixtures	
  of	
  cultures	
  which	
  
was	
   lost	
   in	
  an	
   ‘age	
  of	
  extremes’.	
  Secondly,	
   the	
   long	
   lasting	
  peace	
   in	
   the	
  
postwar	
  period	
  and	
  the	
  confirmation	
  of	
  the	
  existing	
  borders	
  in	
  the	
  post-­‐
Cold	
  War	
  period	
  ended	
  the	
  destructive	
  competition	
  of	
  nation	
  states	
  over	
  
border	
   regions	
   (with	
   few	
   exceptions	
   like	
   in	
   former	
   Yugoslavia).	
   This	
  
allowed	
   a	
   much	
   wider	
   range	
   of	
   research	
   unobstructed	
   by	
   political	
  
interference	
  or	
  radical	
  nationalism.	
  Last	
  but	
  not	
  least,	
  fields	
  of	
  study	
  like	
  
comparative	
  empire	
  and	
  postcolonial	
  studies	
  provided	
  a	
  methodological	
  
impetus	
  for	
  the	
  study	
  of	
  border	
  regions.	
  They	
  can	
  also	
  be	
  termed	
  as	
  ‘lands	
  
in	
   between’	
   which	
   were	
   caught	
   in	
   between	
   by	
   competing	
   nationalisms	
  
(this	
  was	
  the	
  title	
  of	
  an	
  earlier	
  article	
  published	
  in	
  a	
  collective	
  volume	
  on	
  
borderlands	
  by	
  Indiana	
  University	
  Press).1	
  

The	
  metaphorical	
   term	
   ‘lands	
   in	
  between’	
  alludes	
   to	
   the	
   fact	
   that	
  many	
  
border	
   regions	
   in	
   modern	
   Europe,	
   and	
   in	
   particular	
   in	
   Central	
   Europe,	
  
were	
   shaped	
   by	
   a	
   distinct	
   mixture	
   of	
   cultures	
   and	
   languages.	
   Precisely	
  
because	
  of	
  this	
  blend	
  and	
  their	
  supposed	
  malleability	
  many	
  borderlands	
  
stood	
   under	
   the	
   competition	
   of	
   two	
   or	
   more	
   national	
   movements	
   and	
  



Studies	
  on	
  National	
  Movements,	
  1	
  (2013)	
  	
  	
  |	
  	
  	
  ARTICLES	
  

	
  

Philipp	
  Ther	
  18	
  

nation	
   states.	
   This	
   was	
   already	
   an	
   issue	
   in	
   the	
   age	
   of	
   empires	
   that	
  
preceded	
  World	
  War	
  I.	
  When	
  an	
  order	
  of	
  nation	
  states	
  was	
  established	
  in	
  
1918-­‐20,	
  this	
  competition	
  often	
  turned	
  into	
  a	
  bitter	
  struggle	
  over	
  disputed	
  
regions.	
   While	
   these	
   disputes	
   have	
   been	
   a	
   very	
   important	
   topic	
   of	
  
historiography,	
   a	
   discourse	
   often	
   tailored	
   to	
   legitimise	
   the	
   competing	
  
claims	
   of	
   various	
   nationalisms	
   and	
   nation	
   states,	
   the	
   issue	
   of	
   human	
  
identification	
  with	
  regions	
  has	
  for	
  a	
  long	
  time	
  been	
  relatively	
  neglected.2	
  

In	
   this	
  article	
   the	
   term	
  regionalism	
   is	
  used	
   to	
  explore	
   the	
  political	
   and	
  
social	
   dimensions	
   of	
   regional	
   identification.	
   In	
   certain	
   periods	
   regional	
  
movements	
  achieved	
  a	
  high	
  degree	
  of	
  political	
  mobilisation	
  and	
  developed	
  
their	
   own	
   political	
   programs.	
   However,	
   the	
   European	
   nation	
   states	
  
perceived	
  regional	
  movements	
  as	
  competitors	
  and	
  fought	
  against	
  political	
  
projects	
  that	
  stressed	
  the	
  autonomy	
  of	
  border	
  regions.	
  On	
  the	
  one	
  hand,	
  
this	
   was	
   an	
   issue	
   of	
   the	
   administrative	
   power	
   of	
   the	
   centres	
   over	
   the	
  
periphery,	
  in	
  particular	
  over	
  disputed	
  borderlands.	
  On	
  the	
  other	
  hand,	
  it	
  
was	
  a	
  struggle	
  over	
  ideological	
  domination.	
  The	
  centres	
  aspired	
  to	
  define	
  
the	
   national	
   codes,	
   i.e.	
   the	
   ways	
   in	
   which	
   the	
   various	
   nations	
   defined	
  
themselves.	
   There	
   was	
   little	
   toleration	
   for	
   regional	
   identifications	
   that	
  
stressed	
   the	
   particularity	
   of	
   regions	
   and	
   their	
   blends	
   of	
   cultures	
   and	
  
languages.	
  	
  

While	
  the	
  continental	
  European	
  empires	
  (Russian,	
  Habsburg,	
  German	
  and	
  
Ottoman	
   Empire)	
   at	
   least	
   acknowledged	
   the	
   existence	
   of	
   different	
  
nationalities	
   (like	
   in	
  population	
  counts)	
  and	
  of	
   regional	
  divergence,	
   the	
  
nation	
  states	
  refused	
  to	
  do	
  so.	
  In	
  modern	
  states,	
  which	
  are	
  characterised	
  
by	
   a	
   direct	
   relationship	
   between	
   rulers	
   and	
   the	
   populace,	
   people	
   were	
  
forced	
  to	
  affiliate	
  themselves	
  unambiguously.	
  It	
  was	
  only	
  possible	
  to	
  have	
  
one	
  nationality;	
  there	
  was	
  no	
  place	
  for	
  multiple	
  identities,	
  at	
  least	
  not	
  in	
  
population	
   counts	
   or	
   other	
   bureaucratic	
   procedures.	
   Recording	
  
populations	
   in	
   this	
   way	
   helped	
   to	
   put	
   a	
   seal	
   on	
   nations.	
   The	
   belief	
  
prevailed	
   that	
   individual	
   nationality	
   could	
   be	
   determined	
   by	
   objective	
  
criteria.	
   The	
   call	
   for	
   an	
   unambiguous	
   loyalty	
   affected	
   also	
   regional	
  
movements	
  and	
  regionalisms	
  and	
  was	
  imposed	
  on	
  society	
  at	
  a	
  very	
  basic	
  
level.	
  



Studies	
  on	
  National	
  Movements,	
  1	
  (2013)	
  	
  	
  |	
  	
  	
  ARTICLES	
  

	
  

Philipp	
  Ther	
   19	
  

As	
   the	
  second	
  part	
  of	
   this	
  article	
   shows	
   through	
   the	
  example	
  of	
  Upper	
  
Silesia,	
  the	
  population	
  of	
  the	
  borderlands	
  had	
  to	
  find	
  various	
  strategies	
  to	
  
cope	
   with	
   the	
   homogenising	
   pressure	
   of	
   nation	
   states	
   and	
   national	
  
movements.	
  The	
  first	
  strategy	
  (all	
  are	
  ‘ideal	
  types’	
  in	
  the	
  Weberian	
  sense)	
  
was	
  to	
  join	
  one	
  of	
  the	
  competing	
  national	
  movements,	
  the	
  second	
  one	
  to	
  
resist	
  and	
  to	
  establish	
  regional	
  movements,	
  the	
  third	
  one	
  to	
  retreat	
  into	
  
the	
   private	
   sphere	
   and	
   to	
   keep	
   a	
   distance	
   from	
   political	
   activities	
   in	
  
general,	
  including	
  the	
  competing	
  nationalisms.	
  Quite	
  often,	
  the	
  population	
  
of	
   border	
   regions	
   would	
   show	
   conformity	
   with	
   the	
   ruling	
   ideology	
   in	
  
public,	
  especially	
  when	
  confronted	
  with	
  dictatorships,	
  while	
  preserving	
  a	
  
strong	
   identification	
   with	
   the	
   region	
   in	
   the	
   private	
   sphere	
   or	
   the	
  
neighbourhood.	
  

But	
  the	
  preservation	
  of	
  regional	
  identification	
  and	
  the	
  perseverance	
  of	
  a	
  
peculiar	
  mix	
  of	
  cultures	
  and	
   languages	
  should	
  not	
  be	
  romanticised	
  as	
  a	
  
case	
   of	
   multiculturalism.	
   The	
   population	
   of	
   the	
   borderlands	
   was	
   often	
  
‘caught	
   in	
  between’,	
  and	
  was	
  discriminated	
  against,	
  persecuted,	
  or	
  even	
  
deported.	
  This	
  will	
  again	
  be	
  shown	
  specifically	
  in	
  the	
  case	
  of	
  Upper	
  Silesia	
  
(in	
  Polish	
  the	
  specification	
  ‘Upper’	
  is	
  unusual,	
  the	
  region	
  is	
  mostly	
  called	
  
Śląsk/Silesia,	
   in	
   contrast	
   to	
   Dolny	
   Śląsk/Lower	
   Silesia	
   with	
   its	
   centre	
  
Wrocław),	
  which	
  forms	
  the	
  empirical	
  core	
  of	
  this	
  article.	
  The	
  evidence	
  for	
  
other	
  European	
  border	
  regions	
  is	
  gathered	
  from	
  a	
  project	
  about	
  ‘Regional	
  
Movements	
  and	
  Regionalism’	
   that	
  was	
  carried	
  out	
   in	
  2001-­‐2003	
  at	
   the	
  
Centre	
   for	
   Comparative	
   History	
   of	
   Europe	
   in	
   Berlin	
   and	
   published	
   in	
   a	
  
collective	
  volume.3	
  

Problems	
  of	
  historiography	
  

As	
  Ron	
  Suny	
  once	
  pointedly	
  stated,	
   the	
   institutionalisation	
  of	
  history	
   is	
  
more	
  closely	
  linked	
  with	
  the	
  project	
  of	
  the	
  nation	
  than	
  that	
  of	
  any	
  other	
  
science.4	
  Although	
  historiography	
  has	
  largely	
  freed	
  itself	
  from	
  misuse	
  by	
  
various	
  nationalisms,	
  the	
  nation	
  and	
  the	
  nation	
  state	
  have	
  remained	
  the	
  
most	
   important	
   units	
   of	
   analysis	
   or	
   at	
   least	
   points	
   of	
   reference	
   for	
  
historians	
   until	
   the	
   end	
   of	
   the	
   twentieth	
   century.	
   Ernest	
   Gellner	
   once	
  



Studies	
  on	
  National	
  Movements,	
  1	
  (2013)	
  	
  	
  |	
  	
  	
  ARTICLES	
  

	
  

Philipp	
  Ther	
  20	
  

found	
   a	
   wonderful	
   metaphor	
   for	
   this	
   still	
   prevailing	
   nation-­state	
  
perspective,	
  which	
  for	
  him	
  resembles	
  a	
  modernist	
  painting.5	
  Thereby,	
  the	
  
historical	
   map	
   of	
   Europe	
   is	
   shaped	
   by	
   homogenously	
   painted	
   areas	
   of	
  
various	
  sizes	
  and	
  colours,	
  sometimes	
  bizarrely	
  shaped,	
  but	
  always	
  clearly	
  
outlined.	
  These	
  coloured	
  territories	
  demarcate	
  the	
  European	
  nations	
  that	
  
were	
   able	
   to	
   form	
   their	
   own	
   states	
   over	
   the	
   course	
   of	
   their	
   history.	
  
Shading	
  or	
  transitional	
  areas	
  between	
  the	
  individual	
  colours,	
  or	
  nations,	
  is	
  
certainly	
  not	
  provided;	
  nor	
  is	
  any	
  grading	
  of	
  colour	
  tone,	
  although	
  some	
  
national	
  categories	
  that	
  persist	
  in	
  the	
  language,	
  such	
  as	
  German	
  or	
  Polish,	
  
meant	
   something	
   quite	
   different	
   two	
   hundred	
   years	
   ago	
   than	
   they	
   do	
  
today.	
  

This	
   state-­‐national	
   or	
   modernistic	
   view	
   offers	
   little	
   possibilities	
   to	
  
integrate	
   the	
   history	
   of	
   borderlands.	
   For	
   example,	
   in	
   Upper	
   Silesia,	
   an	
  
intermediary	
  space	
  between	
  today's	
  Czech	
  Republic,	
  Poland,	
  and	
  Germany,	
  
it	
  was	
  not	
  possible	
   to	
   clearly	
  define	
   the	
  nationality	
  of	
  a	
  majority	
  of	
   its	
  
inhabitants	
   until	
   well	
   into	
   the	
   twentieth	
   century.	
   The	
   same	
   is	
   true	
   of	
  
Alsace,	
  where	
  the	
  population	
  was	
  torn	
  between	
  France	
  and	
  Germany	
  until	
  
the	
  1940s.	
  One	
  could	
  also	
  point	
  to	
  the	
  example	
  of	
  the	
  former	
  Polish	
  East	
  
(the	
   so-­‐called	
   Kresy),	
   to	
   the	
   southern	
   Balkans,	
   in	
   particular	
   to	
   greater	
  
Macedonia,	
  and	
  to	
  numerous	
  other	
  regions	
  in	
  Europe.	
  In	
  these	
   ‘lands	
  in	
  
between’,	
   national	
   standard	
   languages	
   were	
   only	
   spoken	
   to	
   a	
   limited	
  
extent.	
  The	
  population	
  communicated	
  mainly	
  in	
  mixed	
  local	
  and	
  regional	
  
dialects.	
   Social	
   distinctions	
   and	
   purposes	
   determined	
   the	
   usage	
   of	
  
language,	
  rather	
  than	
  national	
  standards.	
  This	
  was	
  not	
  only	
  true	
  for	
  rural	
  
areas	
  and	
  small	
  towns,	
  but	
  often	
  also	
  larger	
  cities.	
  One	
  should	
  add	
  that	
  in	
  
Central	
   and	
   Eastern	
   Europe,	
   such	
   multilingual	
   borderlands	
   are	
   not	
   just	
  
narrow	
  marginal	
  areas,	
  but	
  in	
  fact	
  covered	
  large	
  parts	
  of	
  the	
  entire	
  large	
  
region	
   until	
   the	
   postwar	
   period.	
   Although	
   these	
   cultural	
   and	
   social	
  
nuances	
   defined	
   people's	
   everyday	
   life	
   –	
   and	
   in	
   the	
   twentieth	
   century,	
  
even	
  influenced	
  international	
  politics	
  and	
  the	
  domestic	
  policy	
  of	
  the	
  states	
  
concerned	
   –	
   they	
   become	
   almost	
   imperceptible	
   when	
   the	
   history	
   of	
  
Europe	
   is	
   packed	
   into	
   a	
   cabinet	
   consisting	
   entirely	
   of	
   national	
  
compartments.	
  It	
  is	
  a	
  mistake	
  to	
  perceive	
  European	
  history	
  as	
  the	
  sum	
  of	
  
its	
   national	
   histories.6	
   One	
   should	
   also	
   look	
   at	
   regional	
   specifics	
   or	
  



Studies	
  on	
  National	
  Movements,	
  1	
  (2013)	
  	
  	
  |	
  	
  	
  ARTICLES	
  

	
  

Philipp	
  Ther	
   21	
  

characteristics,	
  which	
  are	
  of	
  course	
  not	
  exhausted	
  with	
  the	
  cases	
  of	
   the	
  
borderlands	
  presented	
  in	
  this	
  article.	
  

Even	
   the	
   term	
   ‘borderlands’	
   has	
   potential	
   drawbacks,	
   because	
   of	
  
prominence	
   of	
   the	
   word	
   ‘border’,	
   which	
   in	
   today's	
   perspective	
  
automatically	
   connotes	
   the	
   boundaries	
   of	
   nation	
   states.	
   The	
   ‘lands	
   in	
  
between’	
  dealt	
  with	
  in	
  this	
  article	
  do	
  not	
  necessarily	
  end	
  at	
  state	
  borders,	
  
but	
   often	
   transcend	
   them	
   and	
   encompass	
   areas	
   of	
   both	
   sides.	
   If	
   a	
   less	
  
metaphorical	
   and	
   more	
   analytical	
   term	
   is	
   preferred,	
   one	
   can	
   label	
   ‘the	
  
lands	
   in	
   between’	
   as	
   intermediary	
   spaces.	
   This	
   term	
   has	
   a	
   geographical	
  
dimension,	
  in	
  the	
  sense	
  of	
  a	
  location	
  between	
  national	
  centres	
  and	
  spaces.	
  
There	
   is	
   also	
   a	
   political	
   dimension,	
   which	
   will	
   be	
   shown	
   below	
   in	
   the	
  
section	
  on	
  ‘regionalism’.	
  Finally,	
  there	
  is	
  an	
  important	
  cultural	
  dimension.	
  
All	
  of	
  the	
  regions	
  mentioned	
  in	
  the	
  last	
  paragraph	
  are	
  areas	
  of	
  linguistic,	
  
cultural,	
   and	
   ethnic	
   transition	
   in	
   which	
   various	
   influences	
   meet	
   and	
  
frequently	
  mingle.	
  

A	
   vivid	
   example	
   can	
   again	
   be	
   provided	
   by	
   Upper	
   Silesia,	
   where	
   Czech,	
  
Austrian,	
  Prussian,	
  German,	
  and	
  Polish	
  rule	
  not	
  only	
  shaped	
  the	
  region's	
  
history	
  but	
  also	
   its	
   language.	
  Up	
  to	
  the	
  present,	
   the	
  regional	
  dialect	
  has	
  
been	
  shaped	
  by	
  elements	
   taken	
   from	
  various	
  national	
   languages.	
   In	
   the	
  
early	
  1990s	
  the	
  sociologist	
  Danuta	
  Berlińska,	
  one	
  of	
  the	
  most	
  prominent	
  
specialists	
   on	
   the	
   region,	
   noted	
   a	
   sentence	
   spoken	
   by	
   a	
   teenager:	
  
‘Jechołech	
  na	
  kole,	
  trzasązech	
  się	
  ze	
  stromem	
  i	
  się	
  skrzywiła	
  linksztanga.’7	
  
The	
  content	
  of	
  this	
  sentence	
  is	
  quite	
  simple:	
  the	
  teenager	
  rode	
  on	
  a	
  bicycle,	
  
hit	
   a	
   tree,	
   and	
   as	
   a	
   result	
   of	
   this	
   his	
   handlebar	
   broke.	
   Linguistically	
  
speaking,	
   the	
   sentence	
   is	
   much	
   more	
   complicated	
   and	
   hardly	
  
understandable	
  for	
  an	
  outsider	
  coming	
  to	
  the	
  region.	
  If	
  one	
  looks	
  at	
  this	
  
sentence	
   from	
   the	
   viewpoint	
   of	
   standardised	
   national	
   languages,	
   the	
  
Silesian	
   boy	
   rode	
   a	
   Czech	
   bicycle	
   with	
   an	
   old	
   Polish	
   verb	
   and	
   archaic	
  
Polish	
  grammar	
  into	
  a	
  Czech	
  tree	
  and	
  then	
  the	
  German	
  handlebars	
  broke.8	
  
This	
  example	
  is	
  of	
  more	
  than	
  anecdotal	
  significance.	
  

In	
   recent	
   years	
   linguists	
   and	
   literature	
   scholars	
   have	
   proven	
   that	
  
‘continuous	
  dialects’	
  such	
  as	
  Silesian	
  were	
  not	
  only	
  an	
  everyday	
  means	
  of	
  
communication	
  but	
  also	
  served	
  to	
  differentiate	
  between	
  the	
  familiar	
  and	
  
the	
   foreign	
   –	
   they	
   were	
   points	
   of	
   identification.9	
   The	
   linguist	
   Hans-­‐



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Philipp	
  Ther	
  22	
  

Christian	
  Trepte	
  has	
  demonstrated	
  this	
  as	
  well	
  for	
  the	
  Polish-­‐Belarusian	
  
border	
  area.10	
   In	
  view	
  of	
   the	
  close	
   linguistic	
   relationship	
  of	
   the	
  various	
  
Slavic	
  languages,	
  the	
  existence	
  of	
  transitional	
  dialects	
  is	
  not	
  surprising.	
  It	
  
displays	
   similarities	
   with	
   the	
   situation	
   in	
   Teschen	
   Silesia,	
   for	
   example,	
  
where	
  areas	
  of	
  Czech	
  and	
  Polish	
  linguistic	
  influence	
  intersected	
  and	
  where	
  
until	
  recently	
  people	
  communicated	
  mainly	
  in	
  a	
  regional	
  dialect.11	
  Yet	
  even	
  
in	
  places	
  where	
  quite	
  different	
  linguistic	
  families	
  had	
  an	
  influence,	
  such	
  as	
  
in	
   the	
   Slavo-­‐Germanic	
   border	
   area,	
   mixed	
   dialects	
   and	
   modern	
   Creole	
  
languages	
   developed	
   which	
   assumed	
   elements	
   of	
   the	
   surrounding	
  
standard	
  languages.	
  If	
  one	
  approaches	
  the	
  history	
  of	
  Upper	
  Silesia,	
  Alsace,	
  
the	
  eastern	
  Polish	
  borderlands,	
  or	
  Macedonia	
  only	
  with	
  the	
  conventional	
  
nation	
  state	
  categories,	
  these	
  linguistic	
  phenomena	
  are	
  easily	
  lost,	
  along	
  
with	
  their	
  political	
  significance.	
  

But	
  if	
  there	
  was	
  any	
  awareness	
  of	
  consistent	
  dialects	
  and	
  other	
  regional	
  
traditions	
   or	
   cases	
   of	
   syncretism	
   in	
   the	
   ‘short’	
   twentieth	
   century,	
   they	
  
were	
  generally	
  regarded	
  as	
  backward	
  and	
  inferior.	
  Population	
  groups	
  that	
  
opposed	
   clear	
   national	
   classification	
   or	
   cultural	
   monopolisation	
   were	
  
considered	
   to	
   be	
   premodern.	
   In	
   an	
   ideological	
   move	
   aptly	
   criticised	
   by	
  
Celia	
   Applegate,	
   modernisation	
   was	
   frequently	
   equated	
   with	
  
nationalisation	
  so	
  that,	
  except	
  for	
  purposes	
  of	
  legitimisation,	
  the	
  study	
  of	
  
regions	
   such	
   as	
   Upper	
   Silesia,	
   Polesie,	
   Moravia,	
   Transylvania	
   or	
   the	
  
Vojvodina	
  was	
  largely	
  neglected.12	
  

It	
  is	
  characteristic	
  of	
  many	
  intermediary	
  spaces	
  that	
  their	
  cultures	
  serve	
  as	
  
a	
  point	
  of	
  departure	
   for	
  political	
  projects	
  and	
  movements.	
  Also	
   for	
   this	
  
reason,	
   intermediary	
   spaces	
   cannot	
   be	
   regarded	
   as	
   a	
   peripheral	
  
phenomenon	
  of	
  European	
  history,	
  where	
  one	
  studies	
  only	
  bizarre	
  dialects.	
  
Precisely	
   their	
   location	
   at	
   the	
   (changing)	
   borders	
   specified	
   a	
   certain	
  
centrality,	
   for	
  major	
   traffic	
  arteries	
  and	
  channels	
  of	
  communication	
  ran	
  
through	
  them.13	
  This	
  is	
  true	
  of	
  the	
  late	
  nineteenth	
  century	
  as	
  well	
  as	
  of	
  the	
  
situation	
  today.	
  From	
  a	
  European	
  perspective	
  Strasbourg	
  or	
  Katowice	
  are	
  
more	
  centrally	
  located	
  than	
  Paris	
  or	
  Warsaw.	
  In	
  her	
  programmatic	
  essay	
  
on	
  ‘A	
  Europe	
  of	
  regions’,	
  Applegate	
  describes	
  the	
  extent	
  to	
  which	
  regions	
  
have	
   shaped	
   the	
   economic	
   and	
   political	
   development	
   of	
   the	
   individual	
  
European	
   nations	
   and	
   states.	
   This	
   can	
   also	
   be	
   said	
   of	
   most	
   of	
   the	
  



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Philipp	
  Ther	
   23	
  

intermediary	
  spaces	
  treated	
  here.	
  Their	
  border	
  location	
  often	
  gave	
  rise	
  to	
  
their	
   symbolic	
   significance	
   for	
   the	
   respective	
   national	
   movements	
   and	
  
nation	
  states.	
  

The	
  study	
  of	
  nationalism	
  is,	
  for	
  reasons	
  inherent	
  to	
  the	
  subject,	
  an	
  end	
  in	
  
itself.	
   In	
   spite	
   of	
   the	
   disputes	
   between	
   constructivists,	
   ethnosymbolists,	
  
and	
   other	
   schools	
   of	
   study14,	
   the	
   telos	
   of	
   nationalism	
   studies,	
   and	
  
frequently	
  the	
  finale	
  of	
  scientific	
  narratives,	
  is	
  the	
  fully	
  developed	
  modern	
  
nation	
  and	
  the	
  nation	
  state.15	
  This	
   focus	
  on	
   the	
   ‘success’	
  of	
  nationalism	
  
entails	
   a	
   hermeneutic	
   problem.	
   This	
   is	
   particularly	
   true	
   of	
   nationalism	
  
studies	
  in	
  the	
  Federal	
  Republic	
  of	
  Germany,	
  which	
  has	
  always	
  started	
  from	
  
the	
   premise	
   that	
   the	
   German	
   nation	
   project	
   possessed	
   a	
   strong	
  
assimilating	
  power	
  and	
  that	
  the	
  population	
  was	
  nationalised	
  by	
  the	
  turn	
  of	
  
the	
   century.16	
   Christian	
   Geulen	
   recently	
   transposed	
   this	
   theory	
   to	
   the	
  
modern	
  self	
  and	
  maintained	
  that	
  ‘all	
  other	
  differences	
  and	
  identities	
  have	
  
been	
  made	
  to	
  disappear	
  by	
  the	
  national.’17	
  

Michael	
   G.	
   Müller	
   at	
   the	
   University	
   of	
   Halle,	
   a	
   specialist	
   of	
   Polish	
   and	
  
Prussian	
  history,	
  has	
  expressed	
  criticism	
  of	
  this	
  teleology.	
  In	
  their	
  recently	
  
published	
  book	
  on	
  regional	
  and	
  national	
  identities	
  in	
  Europe,	
  Müller	
  and	
  
his	
  two	
  coeditors	
  come	
  to	
  the	
  conclusion	
  that,	
  ‘it	
  is	
  no	
  longer	
  possible	
  to	
  
maintain	
   the	
   tacit	
   assumptions	
   long	
   made	
   that	
   the	
   impact	
   of	
   national	
  
propaganda	
  increases	
  with	
  its	
  intensity	
  and	
  that	
  the	
  advance	
  of	
  the	
  nation-­‐
building	
  process	
  means	
  that	
  thinking	
  in	
  national	
  categories	
  takes	
  primacy	
  
over	
   regional	
   and	
   local	
   loyalties.’18	
   One	
   possibility	
   for	
   solving	
   the	
  
hermeneutic	
  problem	
  of	
  the	
  study	
  of	
  nationalism	
  is	
  to	
  analyse	
  potentially	
  
competing	
  identification	
  options	
  on	
  the	
  political,	
  social,	
  and	
  cultural	
  levels.	
  
On	
  closer	
  examination,	
  it	
  emerges	
  that	
  religion,	
  political	
  convictions,	
  social	
  
standing,	
  a	
  dynasty,	
  or	
  a	
  monarchist	
  state	
  were	
  often	
  more	
  important	
  to	
  
people	
  than	
  national	
  beliefs	
  or	
   identities.	
  The	
  problem	
  with	
  this	
  kind	
  of	
  
relativisation,	
  however,	
   is	
  that	
   it	
  defies	
  measurement	
  and	
  does	
  not	
  take	
  
into	
  account	
  the	
  fact	
  that	
  nation	
  and	
  religion,	
  for	
  example,	
  often	
  effectively	
  
complemented	
  each	
  other.	
  

One	
  possible	
  way	
  of	
  avoiding	
  this	
  dilemma	
  is	
  to	
  first	
  examine	
  nationalism	
  
from	
  the	
  perimeters	
  of	
  its	
  range	
  of	
  influence	
  and	
  to	
  look	
  at	
  identification	
  
alternatives	
  that	
  at	
  least	
  partly	
  offered	
  competition.	
  In	
  many	
  intermediary	
  



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Philipp	
  Ther	
  24	
  

spaces,	
   regional	
   identification	
   options	
   could	
   not	
   be	
   combined	
   with	
   the	
  
ideologies	
   of	
   national	
   movements	
   and	
   nation	
   states.	
   For	
   this	
   reason,	
   it	
  
seems	
  appropriate	
  to	
  take	
  a	
  closer	
  look	
  at	
  regional	
  identities,	
  movements,	
  
and	
   programmes	
   in	
   borderlands.	
   The	
   initial	
   question	
   is,	
   then,	
   to	
   what	
  
extent	
   regional	
   identities	
   in	
   the	
   various	
   intermediary	
   spaces	
   competed	
  
with	
  national	
  identities	
  starting	
  from	
  the	
  middle	
  of	
  the	
  nineteenth	
  century,	
  
followed	
  by	
  to	
  what	
  extent	
  regional	
  movements	
  were	
  able	
  to	
  mobilise	
  the	
  
masses,	
  and	
  which	
  political	
  programmes	
  arose	
  from	
  this	
  mobilisation.19	
  

The	
  concept	
  of	
  regionalism	
  

In	
  the	
  context	
  of	
  the	
  theoretical	
  state	
  of	
  nationalism	
  studies	
  today,	
  regions	
  
are	
   constructs	
   that	
   should	
   not	
   be	
   assumed	
   as	
   units,	
   as	
   this	
   leads	
   to	
  
incorrect	
   assumptions	
   regarding	
   territorial	
   continuity	
   and	
   internal	
  
homogeneity.20	
  Following	
  Rogers	
  Brubaker's	
  approach	
  to	
  nationalism,	
  the	
  
emphasis	
  should	
  be	
  placed	
  on	
  examining	
  European	
  regions	
  as	
  a	
  cultural	
  
practice.21	
  Therefore,	
  one	
  needs	
  to	
  look	
  at	
  a	
  region	
  not	
  as	
  a	
  territory	
  with	
  
fixed	
   boundaries,	
   but	
   as	
   an	
   object	
   of	
   discourses.	
   One	
   particularly	
  
informative	
   empirical	
   example	
   is	
   the	
   above-­‐mentioned	
   region	
   of	
   Upper	
  
Silesia,	
  which	
  will	
  be	
  looked	
  at	
  more	
  closely	
  below.	
  The	
  question	
  is,	
  why	
  
this	
  and	
  other	
  regions	
  at	
  times	
  played	
  an	
  important	
  role	
  in	
  political,	
  social,	
  
and	
  cultural	
  discourses	
  or	
  were	
  even	
  considered	
  as	
  alternative	
  projects	
  to	
  
already	
   existent	
   state	
   nations	
   and	
   nation	
   states.	
   Taking	
   this	
   approach,	
  
regional	
  movements	
  are	
  viewed	
  as	
  modern	
  mass	
  movements	
  that	
  support	
  
the	
  autonomy	
  of	
  the	
  region	
  in	
  question	
  in	
  relation	
  to	
  greater	
  units	
  such	
  as	
  
empires	
  or	
  nation	
  states.	
  The	
  term	
  regionalism	
  describes	
  the	
  programmes	
  
and	
  ideologies	
  on	
  which	
  the	
  construction	
  of	
  a	
  given	
  region	
  is	
  based.	
  It	
  also	
  
contains	
  a	
  dimension	
  of	
  social	
  history,	
  for	
  without	
  knowledge	
  of	
  the	
  social	
  
extent	
   of	
   regionalism,	
   its	
   development	
   as	
   an	
   ideology	
   cannot	
   be	
  
understood.	
  

In	
   principle,	
   transitional	
   forms	
   of	
   identification	
   can	
   also	
   exist	
   between	
  
regionalism	
  and	
  nationalism.	
  The	
  difference	
  between	
  the	
  two	
  phenomena	
  
is	
  that	
  regionalism	
  does	
  not	
  strive	
  for	
  sovereignty	
  or	
  independence	
  of	
  the	
  



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Philipp	
  Ther	
   25	
  

area	
  it	
  lays	
  claim	
  to.	
  While	
  people's	
  belonging	
  to	
  a	
  nation	
  state	
  is	
  defined	
  
by	
   clearly	
   identifiable	
   criteria	
   such	
   as	
   citizenship,	
   the	
   right	
   to	
   vote	
   or	
  
military	
  service,	
   regions	
  do	
  not	
  have	
  such	
  sources	
  of	
   legitimisation	
  and	
  
institutions	
  of	
  power	
  at	
  their	
  disposal.	
  The	
  feeling	
  of	
  belonging	
  to	
  a	
  region	
  
is	
   determined	
   more	
   by	
   identification	
   elements	
   involving	
   ‘soft’	
   cultural	
  
criteria,	
  such	
  as	
  dialects,	
  customs,	
  traditions,	
  personal	
  relationships,	
  and	
  
specific	
   historical	
   experiences	
   and	
   memories.	
   People	
   evidently	
   have	
   a	
  
close	
  affinity	
  to	
  areas	
  of	
  a	
  manageable	
  size,	
  while	
  nations	
  are	
  more	
  often	
  
based	
   on	
   a	
   cognitive	
   ‘invention’	
   or	
   ‘imagination’.22	
   These	
   dissimilarities	
  
also	
  make	
  it	
  clear	
  that	
  regionalism	
  and	
  nationalism	
  should	
  not	
  be	
  regarded	
  
only	
   as	
   competing	
   concepts	
   and	
   social	
   movements.	
   Even	
   in	
   the	
   age	
   of	
  
nationalism,	
   multiple	
   identities	
   were	
   widespread,	
   with	
   beliefs	
   about	
  
belonging	
  to	
  a	
  region	
  and	
  in	
  belonging	
  to	
  a	
  nation	
  often	
  complementing	
  
and	
   augmenting	
   each	
   other.	
   Thus	
   the	
   question	
   is:	
   why	
   in	
   certain	
  
circumstances	
  does	
  a	
  situation	
  of	
  competing	
  identifications	
  arise?	
  

The	
  case	
  of	
  Upper	
  Silesia	
  

It	
   would	
   go	
   beyond	
   the	
   scope	
   of	
   this	
   article	
   to	
   describe	
   the	
   already	
  
mentioned	
  region	
  of	
  Upper	
  Silesia	
  in	
  great	
  detail.23	
  Nevertheless,	
  a	
  brief,	
  
concise	
   outline	
   of	
   the	
   history	
   of	
   the	
   region	
   in	
   the	
   age	
   of	
   modern	
  
nationalism	
   can	
   convey	
   an	
   idea	
   of	
   why	
   regions	
   and	
   particularly	
   the	
  
intermediary	
  spaces	
  treated	
  here	
  could	
  form	
  a	
  component	
  in	
  a	
  new,	
  more	
  
variegated	
  kind	
  of	
  European	
  history.	
  

In	
   the	
   case	
   of	
   modern	
   Germany,	
   a	
   general	
   congruence	
   of	
   regional	
   and	
  
national	
  identifications	
  has	
  been	
  shown	
  in	
  various	
  studies.	
  Applegate	
  and	
  
Alon	
  Confino	
  have	
  provided	
  persuasive	
  evidence	
  of	
  this	
  in	
  central	
  areas	
  of	
  
Germany	
  with	
  an	
  exclusively	
  German-­‐speaking	
  population.24	
  In	
  Silesia,	
  and	
  
particularly	
  in	
  the	
  mainly	
  Catholic,	
  Slavic-­‐dialect-­‐speaking	
  region	
  of	
  Upper	
  
Silesia,	
  however,	
  different	
  circumstances	
  prevailed.	
  Even	
  when	
  it	
  was	
  part	
  
of	
   the	
   German	
   Empire,	
   national	
   identities	
   spread	
   relatively	
   slowly	
   in	
  
Upper	
  Silesia.	
  The	
  reasons	
  for	
  this	
  lay	
  in	
  the	
  religious	
  and	
  social	
  specifics	
  
of	
  the	
  activity	
  of	
  the	
  German	
  national	
  movement	
  in	
  the	
  eastern	
  territories	
  



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Philipp	
  Ther	
  26	
  

of	
   Prussia,	
   including	
   Upper	
   Silesia,	
   and	
   in	
   the	
   antagonistic,	
  
counterproductive	
  attempts	
  at	
  nation	
  building	
  in	
  the	
  German	
  Empire	
  and	
  
the	
  ideological	
  narrowing	
  of	
  German	
  nationalism.	
  

The	
   revolution	
   of	
   1848	
   was	
   a	
   boost	
   for	
   the	
   activities	
   of	
   the	
   German	
  
national	
  movement	
   in	
   the	
  area.	
  The	
  Polish	
  national	
  movement	
   took	
  the	
  
same	
  moment	
   to	
  hit	
  on	
   the	
  Upper	
  Silesians,	
  who	
   to	
  a	
   large	
  extent	
   still	
  
spoke	
  an	
  ancient	
  Polish	
  dialect,	
  especially	
  in	
  rural	
  areas.	
  Both	
  movements	
  
were	
  confronted	
  with	
  obstacles	
   in	
   the	
  shape	
  of	
   the	
  social	
  and	
  religious	
  
specifics	
   of	
   Upper	
   Silesia.	
   The	
   German	
   national	
   movement	
   was	
   mainly	
  
supported	
  by	
  Protestants	
  and	
  members	
  of	
  the	
  Prussian	
  administration	
  and	
  
met	
   with	
   little	
   response	
   from	
   the	
   mixed	
   population	
   of	
   these	
   mainly	
  
Catholic	
  and	
  rural	
  areas.	
  The	
  distance	
  between	
  them	
  was	
  increased	
  by	
  the	
  
struggle	
  between	
   the	
  Prussian	
  state	
  and	
   the	
  Church	
   in	
   the	
  Kulturkampf	
  
and	
   the	
   narrowing	
   definition	
   of	
   who	
   and	
   what	
   was	
   to	
   be	
   perceived	
   as	
  
German.	
  These	
  splits	
  were	
  not	
  fully	
  overcome	
  until	
  the	
  First	
  World	
  War.25	
  
Furthermore,	
   a	
   social	
   gulf	
   formed	
   between	
   the	
   elites	
   and	
   the	
   German	
  
middle	
   class,	
   on	
   the	
   one	
   hand,	
   and	
   what	
   they	
   disparagingly	
   called	
   the	
  
Schlonsaks,	
  the	
  Slavic-­‐speaking	
  workers	
  and	
  rural	
  proletariat,	
  on	
  the	
  other.	
  
The	
  relationship	
  between	
  the	
  two	
  sides	
  was	
  markedly	
  asymmetrical.	
  For	
  
this	
   reason,	
   the	
   Krakow	
   sociologist	
   Maria	
   Szmeja	
   even	
   describes	
   the	
  
Prussian-­‐German	
   rule	
   of	
   Upper	
   Silesia	
   as	
   an	
   example	
   of	
   ‘internal	
  
colonialism’.26	
  

Polish	
  nationalism	
  also	
  came	
  up	
  against	
  considerable	
  obstacles	
  despite	
  the	
  
fact	
  that	
  many	
  Poles	
  immigrated	
  to	
  Upper	
  Silesia's	
  industrial	
  district.	
  The	
  
Polish	
  national	
  movement,	
  unlike	
  the	
  German,	
  was	
  not	
  backed	
  up	
  by	
  an	
  
own	
  state,	
  so	
  it	
  had	
  organisational	
  deficits.	
  And	
  since	
  Upper	
  Silesia	
  had	
  not	
  
been	
  part	
  of	
  Poland	
  since	
  the	
  fourteenth	
  century,	
  there	
  was	
  no	
  common	
  
remembrance	
  of	
  the	
  Polish	
  state	
  that	
  had	
  existed	
  until	
  1795.	
  Furthermore,	
  
the	
   numerous	
   cultural	
   differences	
   between	
   the	
   Poles	
   and	
   the	
   Polish-­‐
speaking	
   Upper	
   Silesians	
   which	
   had	
   developed	
   over	
   the	
   centuries	
   of	
  
Austrian,	
  Prussian,	
  and	
  German	
  rule	
  all	
  played	
  a	
  part.	
  Many	
  Poles	
  could	
  
barely	
  understand	
  the	
  Upper	
  Silesian	
  dialect,	
  or	
  considered	
   it	
  a	
  strange	
  
mixture	
   with	
   German.	
   For	
   this	
   reason,	
   identification	
   with	
   the	
   more	
  
immediate	
  homeland	
  among	
  the	
  Polish-­‐speaking	
  population,	
  particularly	
  



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Philipp	
  Ther	
   27	
  

in	
   rural	
   areas,	
   continued	
   to	
   dominate	
   and	
   usually	
   prevailed	
   over	
   any	
  
secondary	
  German	
  or	
  Polish	
  national	
  consciousness.27	
  This	
  identification	
  
with	
   Silesia	
   did	
   not,	
   however,	
   manifest	
   itself	
   in	
   a	
   strong	
   political	
  
movement	
  and	
  the	
  Upper	
  Silesians	
  did	
  not	
  produce	
  a	
  secular	
  political	
  elite	
  
in	
  the	
  German	
  Empire.	
  

Poland	
  was	
  refounded	
  after	
  the	
  First	
  World	
  War	
  and	
  claimed	
  a	
  large	
  part	
  
of	
   Upper	
   Silesia	
   on	
   the	
   basis	
   of	
   ethnic	
   principles.	
   The	
   German	
   Empire,	
  
however,	
  insisted	
  on	
  keeping	
  the	
  largest	
  industrial	
  district	
  in	
  East	
  Central	
  
Europe.	
   The	
   conflict	
   between	
   both	
   states	
   caused	
   deep	
   ruptures	
   in	
   the	
  
region.	
  Violence	
  broke	
  out,	
  and	
  the	
  two	
  sides	
  fought	
  each	
  other	
  in	
  armed	
  
combat	
   in	
   the	
   three	
   Silesian	
   uprisings	
   (1919-­‐21).	
   It	
   is	
   undisputed	
   that	
  
Upper	
   Silesians	
   took	
   part	
   in	
   these	
   conflicts,	
   but	
   more	
   decisive	
   was	
   the	
  
intervention	
  and	
  mobilisation	
  from	
  abroad.	
  The	
  paramilitary	
  units	
  fighting	
  
on	
  both	
  sides	
  brought	
  in	
  Germans	
  and	
  Poles	
  who	
  had	
  little	
  connection	
  to	
  
the	
  region	
  but	
  basically	
  continued	
  the	
  war	
   in	
   the	
  name	
  of	
   the	
   ‘national	
  
interest’.	
   The	
   major	
   cause	
   of	
   the	
   violence,	
   then,	
   was	
   a	
   lack	
   of	
  
demobilisation	
  of	
   troops	
  who	
  had	
   fought	
   in	
  World	
  War	
   I	
  and	
  who	
  now	
  
formed	
  paramilitary	
  units,	
  not	
  a	
  nationalist	
  mobilisation	
  of	
  the	
  population	
  
in	
  Upper	
  Silesia.	
  

Silesian	
  insurgents	
  of	
  
1919-­1921.	
  	
  	
  |	
  	
  	
  NARODOWE	
  

ARCHIWUM	
  CYFROWE	
  –	
  
WIKIMEDIA	
  COMMONS	
  



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Philipp	
  Ther	
  28	
  

The	
   vast	
   majority	
   of	
   the	
   political	
   elites	
   in	
   Upper	
   Silesia,	
   for	
   their	
   part,	
  
called	
  for	
  unity	
  in	
  the	
  region	
  and	
  tried	
  to	
  mediate	
  in	
  the	
  dispute	
  between	
  
Germany	
   and	
   Poland.	
   After	
   World	
   War	
   I,	
   a	
   strong	
   regional	
   movement	
  
emerged,	
  the	
  Bund	
  der	
  Oberschlesier	
  (Alliance	
  of	
  Upper	
  Silesians),	
  which	
  
demanded	
  autonomy	
  and	
  at	
  times	
  even	
  Upper	
  Silesia's	
  independence.	
  In	
  
1919	
   the	
   regional	
   movement	
   had	
   around	
   300,000	
   adherents,	
   that	
   is	
   a	
  
seventh	
  of	
  the	
  population.	
  Publications	
  of	
  the	
  Bund	
  der	
  Oberschlesier	
  even	
  
tried	
  to	
  invent	
  an	
  Upper	
  Silesian	
  nation.	
  They	
  spoke	
  about	
  a	
  ‘multilingual	
  
unitary	
  nation’	
  (multilinguales	
  Einheitsvolk)	
  and	
  a	
  blend	
  of	
  Slavo-­‐Germanic	
  
blood	
   (slavo-­germanische	
   Blutmischung).28	
   The	
   regional	
   activists	
   mixed	
  
ethnic	
  elements	
  with	
  arguments	
  of	
  multiculturalism	
  in	
  order	
  to	
  construct	
  a	
  
regional	
   community	
   or	
   even	
   nation.	
   But	
   how	
   could	
   this	
   invention	
   have	
  
attracted	
  a	
  population	
  that	
  was	
  already	
  familiar	
  with	
  German	
  and	
  Polish	
  
nationalism?	
  

The	
  regional	
  movement	
  failed	
  eventually	
  due	
  to	
  its	
  inability	
  to	
  maintain	
  
neutrality	
   in	
   the	
   conflict	
   between	
   Poland	
   and	
   Germany.	
   Furthermore,	
  
neither	
  Germany,	
  Poland,	
  Czechoslovakia,	
  nor	
  the	
  Allies	
  wanted	
  another	
  
free	
  state	
   like	
  Danzig/Gdańsk.	
   In	
  March	
  1921,	
   the	
   inhabitants	
  of	
  Upper	
  
Silesia	
  were	
  called	
  on	
  to	
  align	
  themselves	
  with	
  either	
  Germany	
  or	
  Poland	
  
in	
  a	
  plebiscite.	
  Around	
  700,000	
  people	
  voted	
  to	
  stay	
  with	
  Germany	
  while	
  
480,000	
  voted	
  for	
  Poland.	
  The	
  areas	
  with	
  a	
  majority	
  in	
  favour	
  of	
  Germany	
  
were	
  mainly	
  urban	
  and	
  left	
  of	
  the	
  Oder	
  River;	
  those	
  in	
  favour	
  of	
  Poland	
  
were	
  right	
  of	
  the	
  Oder	
  and	
  small-­‐town	
  or	
  rural.29	
  It	
  would,	
  however,	
  be	
  
wrong	
   to	
   interpret	
   this	
   voting	
   behaviour	
   as	
   an	
   expression	
   of	
   a	
   deeply	
  
rooted	
   national	
   identity	
   (in	
   the	
   hardly	
   translatable	
   terms	
   of	
   the	
   time:	
  
Volkstum,	
   Deutschtum,	
   or	
   Polskośćć;	
   or	
   very	
   roughly	
   ‘local	
   culture’,	
  
‘Germanness’,	
  and	
  ‘Polishness’)	
  or	
  to	
  equate	
  the	
  number	
  of	
  votes	
  for	
  each	
  
side	
  with	
  the	
  number	
  of	
  resident	
  Germans	
  or	
  Poles.	
  At	
  local	
  elections	
  in	
  
November	
  1919,	
  Polish	
  candidates	
  still	
  had	
  gained	
  over	
  60	
  percent	
  of	
  the	
  
votes	
  –	
  this	
  roughly	
  corresponded	
  with	
  the	
  proportion	
  of	
  the	
  population	
  
that	
  was	
  Polish-­‐speaking	
  or	
  bilingual.	
  Economic	
  considerations	
  and	
  loyalty	
  
to	
  the	
  Prusso-­‐German	
  state	
  evidently	
  carried	
  more	
  weight	
  in	
  the	
  plebiscite	
  
than	
  ‘objective’	
  criteria	
  of	
  national	
  belonging	
  such	
  as	
  language.	
  

	
  	
  



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Philipp	
  Ther	
   29	
  

The	
  division	
  of	
  Upper	
  Silesia	
  left	
  large	
  minorities	
  on	
  either	
  side	
  of	
  the	
  new	
  
border.	
  A	
  total	
  of	
  226,000	
  people	
  who	
  had	
  voted	
  for	
  Germany	
  remained	
  in	
  
eastern	
   Upper	
   Silesia	
   while	
   195,000	
   people	
   who	
   had	
   voted	
   for	
   Poland	
  
became	
  residents	
  of	
  Opole	
  Silesia.	
  Under	
  the	
  Geneva	
  Convention	
  on	
  Upper	
  
Silesia	
   of	
   1922,	
   the	
   people	
   in	
   the	
   areas	
   where	
   the	
   vote	
   was	
   held	
   were	
  

Map	
  of	
  the	
  1921	
  plebiscite:	
  
(1)	
  Percival-­De	
  Marinis	
  line	
  
(2)	
  Le	
  Rond-­Korfany	
  line	
  
(3)	
  demarcation	
  line	
  as	
  
recommended	
  by	
  the	
  
Entente	
  (May	
  1921)	
  
(4)	
  area	
  with	
  majority	
  of	
  
Polish	
  votes	
  
(5)	
  German-­Polish	
  border	
  as	
  
established	
  in	
  October	
  1921	
  
(6)	
  western	
  referendum	
  
border	
  	
  	
  |	
  	
  	
  J.J.	
  TAZBIR,	
  WIELKI	
  
ATLAS	
  HISTORYCZNY	
  (2008)	
  –	
  	
  
WIKIMEDIA	
  COMMONS	
  



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Philipp	
  Ther	
  30	
  

entitled	
   to	
  adopt	
   the	
  nationality	
  of	
   the	
  respective	
  neighbouring	
  country	
  
and	
  emigrate	
  to	
  Germany	
  or	
  Poland.	
  By	
  1925,	
  about	
  100,000	
  people	
  on	
  
both	
  sides	
  had	
  taken	
  advantage	
  of	
  this	
  right	
  of	
  ‘option’.	
  The	
  plebiscite	
  and	
  
the	
  Geneva	
  Convention	
  show	
  that	
  not	
  only	
  the	
  nation	
  states,	
  but	
  also	
  the	
  
international	
  community	
  in	
  the	
  League	
  of	
  Nations	
  wanted	
  to	
  enhance	
  the	
  
homogeneity	
  of	
  the	
  nation	
  states.	
  There	
  was	
  no	
  ‘option’	
  to	
  remain	
  Polish	
  
and	
  German,	
  or	
  to	
  declare	
  an	
  allegiance	
  to	
  Silesia.	
  

During	
   the	
   Weimar	
   Republic,	
   in	
   the	
   western	
   part	
   of	
   Upper	
   Silesia	
   that	
  
remained	
   German,	
   many	
   members	
   of	
   the	
   mixed	
   population	
   adopted	
  
Germany's	
  language	
  and	
  culture	
  for	
  pragmatic	
  reasons.	
  Not	
  only	
  was	
  this	
  a	
  
prerequisite	
   for	
  social	
  advancement,	
  but	
  even	
  school	
  children	
  distanced	
  
themselves	
  from	
  their	
  regional	
  roots	
  and	
  Slavic	
  mother	
  tongue	
  in	
  order	
  to	
  
avoid	
   teasing	
   and	
   isolation	
   from	
   the	
   German	
   majority.	
   This	
   ‘pragmatic	
  
assimilation’	
   manifested	
   itself	
   in	
   censuses	
   in	
   the	
   drop	
   in	
   numbers	
   of	
  
people	
   who	
   declared	
   themselves	
   bilingual	
   or	
   Polish-­‐speaking	
   and	
   in	
  
elections	
  in	
  the	
  decrease	
  in	
  votes	
  for	
  Polish	
  candidates.	
  This	
  tendency	
  to	
  
assimilate	
  was,	
  however,	
  disrupted	
  by	
  a	
  seizure	
  of	
  power	
  by	
  the	
  National	
  
Socialists,	
  who	
  gained	
  only	
  thirty	
  percent	
  of	
  the	
  votes	
  in	
  Upper	
  Silesia	
  in	
  
1932.	
  When	
  the	
  National	
  Socialists	
  began	
  to	
  take	
  steps	
  against	
  the	
  Catholic	
  
Church,	
   dissolved	
   the	
   Catholic	
   Centre	
   Party	
   in	
   1934,	
   and	
   finally	
   also	
  
persecuted	
   priests,	
   the	
   mixed	
   population	
   was	
   driven	
   into	
   the	
   arms	
   of	
  
Polish	
   minority	
   organisations.30	
   Nazi	
   Church	
   policy	
   provoked	
   a	
   similar	
  
reaction	
   to	
   that	
   which	
   the	
   Kulturkampf	
   had	
   elicited	
   two	
   generations	
  
earlier:	
   resistance	
   to	
   anything	
   henceforth	
   defined	
   as	
   German	
   and	
   the	
  
linking	
  of	
  the	
  struggle	
  for	
  linguistic	
  and	
  cultural	
  freedom	
  with	
  defense	
  of	
  
the	
  Church.	
  The	
  head	
  of	
   the	
  regional	
  government	
   in	
  Breslau	
  recognised	
  
this	
   problem	
   and	
   dispatched	
   a	
   report	
   in	
   1935	
   to	
   Wilhelm	
   Frick,	
   the	
  
Prussian	
  and	
  Reich	
  Minister	
  for	
  the	
  Interior,	
  stating	
  that	
  ‘the	
  unrestrained	
  
attacks	
  which	
  were	
  customary	
  in	
  the	
  past	
  and	
  went	
  way	
  beyond	
  the	
  fight	
  
against	
  political	
  Catholicism,	
  have	
  to	
  stop.	
  In	
  any	
  case,	
  the	
  state	
  and	
  the	
  
movement	
   must	
   not	
   identify	
   with	
   them.’31	
   Racial	
   prejudice	
   against	
   the	
  
Upper	
  Silesians	
  proved	
  to	
  be	
  just	
  as	
  counterproductive.	
  

In	
  the	
  eyes	
  of	
  many	
  National	
  Socialists,	
  the	
  only	
  options	
  were	
  to	
  be	
  either	
  
German	
  or	
  Polish.	
  The	
  idea	
  of	
  a	
  ‘floating	
  national	
  character’	
  (schwebendes	
  



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Philipp	
  Ther	
   31	
  

Volkstum),	
  as	
  it	
  was	
  pejoratively	
  called,	
  was	
  only	
  accepted	
  as	
  a	
  temporary	
  
phenomenon.	
   In	
   general,	
   the	
   popular	
   image	
   of	
   Upper	
   Silesia's	
   mixed	
  
population	
  transformed	
  in	
  the	
  interwar	
  years	
  from	
  that	
  of	
  a	
  nationally	
  and	
  
otherwise	
  underdeveloped	
  community	
  to	
  that	
  of	
  a	
  group	
  of	
   freeloaders.	
  
Indeed,	
  the	
  National	
  Socialists	
  noted	
  with	
  pleasure	
  how	
  they	
  were	
  able	
  to	
  
entice	
  Upper	
  Silesians	
  to	
  their	
  functions	
  with	
  free	
  tickets	
  to	
  cultural	
  events	
  
and	
   complimentary	
   cake	
   at	
   women's	
   meetings	
   but	
   in	
   other	
   reports	
  
bemoaned	
  the	
   fact	
   that	
   this	
  was	
  a	
  nationally	
  unreliable	
  and	
  corruptible	
  
ethnic	
  group.32	
  

In	
   1935,	
   the	
   National	
   Socialists	
   proceeded	
   with	
   the	
   Germanisation	
   of	
  
personal	
  and	
  place	
  names	
  and	
  extended	
  their	
  pursuit	
  of	
   the	
  population	
  
into	
  the	
  private	
  realm,	
  suspecting	
  that,	
  underneath	
  the	
  cloak	
  of	
  outward	
  
conformity,	
  anti-­‐German	
  or	
  even	
  pro-­‐Polish	
  identities	
  continued	
  to	
  exist.	
  
As	
  the	
  official	
  reports	
  from	
  Upper	
  Silesia	
  show,	
  the	
  authorities	
  were	
  not	
  
entirely	
  wrong	
  in	
  this	
  assumption.	
  One	
  sign	
  of	
  the	
  endurance	
  of	
  cultural	
  
traits	
  was	
  the	
  popularity	
  of	
  Polish	
  church	
  services.	
  In	
  1938,	
  thirty	
  percent	
  
of	
  services	
  were	
  still	
  held	
  in	
  Polish	
  according	
  to	
  the	
  nationalist	
  Association	
  
of	
  the	
  German	
  East	
  (Bund	
  Deutscher	
  Osten,	
  BDO).	
  The	
  BDO	
  estimated	
  the	
  
total	
  number	
  of	
  people	
  in	
  the	
  ‘Polish	
  minority’	
  at	
  about	
  400,000,	
  or	
  about	
  
550,000	
  with	
  the	
  ‘Germanised	
  section’	
  included.33	
  Nevertheless,	
  very	
  few	
  
people	
   openly	
   professed	
   their	
   Polishness,	
   as	
   that	
   would	
   have	
   led	
   to	
  
persecution	
  and	
  possibly	
  even	
  internment	
  in	
  a	
  concentration	
  camp.	
  As	
  is	
  
well	
   known,	
   Silesian	
   Jews	
   experienced	
   an	
   even	
   more	
   terrible	
   fate,	
  
regardless	
   of	
   their	
   national	
   allegiance.	
   Many	
   Upper	
   Silesians	
   who	
  
outwardly	
   conformed	
   or	
   even	
   spoke	
   German	
   at	
   home	
   preserved	
   close	
  
family,	
  religious,	
  and	
  cultural	
  ties	
  with	
  Polish	
  Upper	
  Silesia.	
  Paradoxically,	
  
the	
  nationalist	
  propaganda	
  against	
  the	
  so-­‐called	
  Diktat	
  von	
  Versailles	
  and	
  
the	
   revisionism	
   in	
   regard	
   to	
   the	
   border	
   established	
   in	
   1921	
   helped	
   to	
  
preserve	
  a	
  mental	
  mapping	
  that	
  encompassed	
  the	
  entire	
  region	
  of	
  Upper	
  
Silesia.	
  

Parts	
   of	
   the	
   Silesian	
   society	
   activated	
   an	
   Upper	
   Silesian	
   or	
   Polish	
  
identification,	
   whether	
   out	
   of	
   sympathy	
   for	
   Poland	
   or	
   an	
   aversion	
   to	
  
National	
  Socialism,	
  or	
  for	
  pragmatic	
  reasons.	
  The	
  further	
  tightening	
  of	
  the	
  
policy	
  on	
  nationality	
  and	
  the	
  ban	
  on	
  Polish-­‐language	
  church	
  services	
  in	
  the	
  



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Philipp	
  Ther	
  32	
  

run-­‐up	
  to	
  the	
  Second	
  World	
  War	
  increased	
  the	
  old	
  tendency	
  among	
  Upper	
  
Silesia's	
  mixed	
  population	
  toward	
  self-­‐isolationism.34	
  Not	
  until	
  Germany	
  
achieved	
   its	
   first	
  war	
  victories	
  and	
   troops	
  on	
   the	
  home	
   front	
  had	
  been	
  
mobilised	
   was	
   it	
   possible	
   to	
   win	
   over	
   a	
   section	
   of	
   the	
   population.	
  
Following	
  Germany's	
  defeats	
  on	
  the	
  eastern	
  front,	
  however,	
  personal	
  and	
  
public	
   attitudes	
   toward	
   Germany	
   changed.	
   Despite	
   the	
   Nazi	
   terror,	
   a	
  
willingness	
  to	
  show	
  symbols	
  of	
  a	
  Polish	
  or	
  Upper	
  Silesian	
  identification	
  in	
  
the	
  private	
  sphere	
  and	
  in	
  the	
  limited	
  public	
  of	
  neighbourhoods	
  increased.	
  

In	
  Polish	
  eastern	
  Upper	
  Silesia,	
  which	
  requires	
  special	
  consideration	
  in	
  the	
  
interwar	
  period,	
  national	
  and	
  regional	
   identification	
  changed	
  even	
  more	
  
than	
  in	
  the	
  German	
  part	
  of	
  Upper	
  Silesia.	
  The	
  number	
  of	
  inhabitants	
  who	
  
considered	
   themselves	
   definitely	
   German	
   had	
   dropped,	
   mainly	
   due	
   to	
  
emigration,	
   from	
   about	
   a	
   third	
   to	
   a	
   seventh	
   of	
   the	
   total	
   population	
  
between	
  1921	
  and	
  1931.35	
  But	
  many	
  Polish-­‐speaking	
  or	
  bilingual	
  Upper	
  
Silesians	
  turned	
  toward	
  German	
  political	
  parties	
  in	
  order	
  to	
  express	
  their	
  
dissatisfaction	
   with	
   economic	
   and	
   political	
   developments	
   in	
   Poland.	
   In	
  
local	
  elections	
  in	
  1926,	
  German	
  parties	
  gained	
  42	
  percent	
  of	
  the	
  votes,	
  and	
  
18.4	
  percent	
  in	
  the	
  Polish	
  parliamentary	
  elections	
  in	
  Upper	
  Silesia	
  in	
  1930,	
  
far	
   more	
   than	
   the	
   proportion	
   of	
   the	
   corresponding	
   population.	
   These	
  
results	
  were,	
  however,	
   less	
  an	
  expression	
  of	
   ‘unbroken	
  Germanness’,	
  as	
  
was	
  thought	
  in	
  the	
  Weimar	
  Republic,	
  and	
  more	
  a	
  sign	
  of	
  the	
  vitality	
  of	
  the	
  
identification	
  with	
  Upper	
  Silesia.	
  Many	
  Silesians	
  voted	
  for	
  German	
  parties	
  
in	
  protest	
  against	
  the	
  undermining	
  of	
  the	
  autonomy	
  of	
  Silesia	
  as	
  a	
  Polish	
  
province	
  (Wojewódstwo).	
  Arkadiusz	
  Bożek,	
  who	
  became	
  vice	
  president	
  of	
  
the	
  province	
  of	
  Upper	
  Silesia	
  in	
  1945,	
  summarised	
  the	
  general	
  feeling	
  of	
  
disappointment	
   with	
   the	
   Polish	
   administration	
   in	
   the	
   interwar	
   period	
  
thus:	
  ‘Only	
  the	
  men	
  in	
  charge	
  have	
  changed.	
  The	
  Berliners	
  went	
  and	
  the	
  
Warsaw-­‐Krakovians	
   came.’36	
   This	
   quote	
   indicates	
   the	
   gap	
   between	
   the	
  
regional	
  society	
  and	
  those	
  who	
  came	
  from	
  outside.	
  

At	
  the	
  end	
  of	
  the	
  twenties,	
  as	
  the	
  situation	
  in	
  Poland	
  began	
  to	
  temporarily	
  
stabilise,	
   German	
   parties	
   enjoyed	
   much	
   less	
   electoral	
   success,	
   and	
  
participation	
  in	
  German-­‐national	
  rallies	
  also	
  decreased	
  rapidly.	
  Even	
  the	
  
opponents	
  of	
  the	
  Polish	
  state	
  evidently	
  grew	
  accustomed	
  to	
  its	
  existence.37	
  
Furthermore,	
   in	
  Upper	
  Silesia,	
   social	
   and	
  economic	
  considerations	
  gave	
  



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Philipp	
  Ther	
   33	
  

rise	
   to	
   a	
   willingness	
   to	
   adapt	
   oneself	
   to	
   the	
   majority	
   nation.	
   This	
  
pragmatism	
  could,	
  however,	
  swing	
  in	
  the	
  opposite	
  direction	
  at	
  any	
  time.	
  
For	
  example,	
  parents	
  often	
  signed	
  their	
  children	
  up	
  for	
  wealthier	
  German	
  
schools	
  because	
  they	
  tended	
  to	
  provide	
  more	
  plentiful	
  school	
  meals	
  than	
  
their	
  state-­‐run	
  Polish	
  competitors.38	
  But	
  this	
  pragmatic	
  attitude	
  was	
  not	
  
tolerated	
  by	
  the	
  Polish	
  state,	
  which	
  thought	
  in	
  dialectic	
  national	
  terms	
  and	
  
was	
   afraid	
   of	
   a	
   strengthening	
   of	
   the	
   German	
   minority.	
   The	
   Polish	
  
administration	
  wanted	
   to	
  compel	
  parents	
  of	
  mixed	
  origin	
   to	
   send	
   their	
  
children	
  to	
  Polish	
  schools.	
  Eventually	
  the	
  conflict	
  about	
  these	
  children	
  was	
  
decided	
   by	
   the	
   League	
   of	
   Nations.	
   It	
   decided	
   that	
   the	
   nationality	
   of	
  
children,	
  and	
  therefore	
   their	
  choice	
  of	
  school,	
  had	
  to	
  be	
  decided	
  by	
  the	
  
state	
   bureaucracy	
   according	
   to	
   objective	
   indicators	
   (primarily	
   the	
  
language	
  spoken	
  by	
  the	
  parents),	
  and	
  not	
  by	
  the	
  parents.	
  One	
  can	
  conclude	
  
that	
   it	
  was	
  not	
  only	
  radical	
  nationalists	
  and	
   ‘nationalising	
  nation	
  states’	
  
(Brubaker)	
   who	
   thought	
   in	
   terms	
   of	
   a	
   binary	
   nationalism,	
   but	
   also	
   the	
  
international	
   community	
   of	
   states.	
   Moreover,	
   nationality	
   was	
   not	
  
perceived	
   as	
   subjective	
   and	
   changeable,	
   but	
   as	
   objective.	
   The	
   regional	
  
society	
  was	
  indeed	
  caught	
  in	
  between.	
  

A	
  person's	
  sense	
  of	
  being	
  German,	
  Polish,	
  or	
  Silesian	
  often	
  depended	
  on	
  
their	
  individual	
  social	
  and	
  professional	
  standing.	
  Some	
  cases	
  are	
  known,	
  
for	
  example,	
  of	
   the	
  wives	
  of	
  Polish	
  policemen	
  in	
  eastern	
  (Polish)	
  Upper	
  
Silesia	
  who	
  belonged	
  to	
   the	
  German	
  People's	
  Association.39	
  These	
  cases	
  
were	
  recorded	
  because	
  the	
  Supreme	
  Commander	
  of	
  the	
  Polish	
  Police	
   in	
  
the	
   województwo	
   of	
   Silesia	
   was	
   angered	
   at	
   the	
   lack	
   of	
   national	
   feeling	
  
among	
  officials	
  and	
  suspected	
  that	
  state	
  secrets	
  were	
  being	
  betrayed.	
  In	
  
Opole	
  Silesia,	
  the	
  authorities	
  also	
  reported	
  on	
  behaviour	
  that	
  could	
  not	
  be	
  
reconciled	
  with	
   their	
  view	
  of	
  a	
  proper	
  national	
  standing.	
  There	
  was	
  no	
  
understanding	
  at	
  all	
  for	
  several	
  members	
  of	
  the	
  local	
  Hitler	
  Youth	
  who	
  had	
  
joined	
   Polish	
   sports	
   clubs.40	
   As	
   the	
   reports	
   show,	
   Upper	
   Silesians	
  
sometimes	
   switched	
   languages	
   and	
   cultures	
   within	
   the	
   space	
   of	
   one	
  
evening.	
  This	
  is	
  illustrated	
  by	
  an	
  incident	
  reported	
  by	
  the	
  chief	
  of	
  police	
  in	
  
Gleiwitz/Gliwice	
  in	
  1929,	
  when	
  a	
  local	
  celebration	
  organised	
  by	
  the	
  Polish	
  
choral	
   society	
   presented	
   a	
   guest	
   choir	
   that	
   sang	
   in	
   Polish	
   first	
   before	
  
performing	
  German	
  military	
  songs.41	
  



Studies	
  on	
  National	
  Movements,	
  1	
  (2013)	
  	
  	
  |	
  	
  	
  ARTICLES	
  

	
  

Philipp	
  Ther	
  34	
  

Nevertheless,	
   one	
   should	
   be	
   wary	
   of	
   romanticising	
   this	
   multicultural	
  
mélange.	
   If	
  a	
  person	
   failed	
   to	
  opt	
   for	
  a	
  particular	
  nationality,	
  he	
  or	
  she	
  
faced	
   life	
   with	
   a	
   bad	
   reputation	
   and	
   sanctions.	
   Even	
   after	
   1945,	
   the	
  
‘struggle	
  for	
  national	
  character’	
  (Volkstumskampf)	
  –	
  which	
  today	
  would	
  be	
  
described	
  as	
  a	
  conflict	
  over	
   identities	
  –	
  was	
   fought	
  out	
  primarily	
  at	
   the	
  
expense	
  of	
  the	
  regional	
  society.	
  

After	
  the	
  Second	
  World	
  War,	
  attempts	
  to	
  nationalise	
  the	
  region	
  continued	
  
–	
   although	
   in	
   different	
   circumstances.	
   Poland	
   had	
   been	
   granted	
   all	
   of	
  
Silesia	
  in	
  1945	
  through	
  the	
  Potsdam	
  treaty.	
  Its	
  main	
  goal	
  was	
  to	
  Polonise	
  
(or	
  ‘re-­‐Polonise’,	
  as	
  the	
  propaganda	
  formulated	
  it)	
  the	
  region	
  once	
  and	
  for	
  
all.	
   For	
   reaching	
   this	
   goal	
   the	
   postwar	
   Polish	
   state	
   deployed	
   the	
   entire	
  
toolkit	
  of	
  violent,	
  totalitarian	
  nationality	
  policy.	
  The	
  ‘enemy’	
  language	
  was	
  
forbidden,	
   the	
   regional	
   culture	
   eliminated	
   by	
   all	
   possible	
   means,	
   books	
  
destroyed,	
  and	
  personal	
  as	
  well	
  as	
  place	
  names	
  changed.	
  The	
  aim	
  of	
  this	
  
policy	
  was	
  to	
  ‘de-­‐Germanise’,	
  as	
  the	
  apt	
  title	
  of	
  a	
  book	
  by	
  Bernard	
  Linek	
  
translates,	
   that	
   is	
   to	
   eliminate	
   all	
   traces	
   of	
   the	
   German	
   era.42	
   This	
   also	
  
entailed	
   the	
  expulsion	
  of	
   inhabitants	
  who	
  could	
  be	
  clearly	
   identified	
  as	
  
German.	
  In	
  comparison	
  to	
  Lower	
  Silesia,	
  where	
  almost	
  all	
  German	
  citizens	
  
were	
  removed,	
  the	
  stance	
  toward	
  the	
  Germans	
  in	
  Upper	
  Silesia	
  was	
  more	
  
tolerant.	
  In	
  the	
  areas	
  where	
  the	
  plebiscite	
  was	
  held	
  in	
  1921,	
  a	
  declaration	
  
of	
  loyalty	
  to	
  the	
  Polish	
  state	
  and	
  the	
  Polish	
  nation	
  was	
  generally	
  enough	
  to	
  
earn	
  one's	
  ‘verification’	
  or	
  ‘rehabilitation’	
  as	
  a	
  Pole	
  and	
  so	
  avoid	
  expulsion	
  
to	
  postwar	
  Germany.	
  The	
  authorities	
  upheld	
  the	
  argument	
  that	
  a	
  large	
  part	
  
of	
  the	
  population	
  of	
  Upper	
  Silesia	
  was	
  actually	
  Polish;	
  this	
  also	
  formed	
  the	
  
basis	
   for	
   territorial	
   claims	
   to	
   the	
   former	
   German	
   territories.	
   About	
  
850,000	
  ‘autochthones’	
  were	
  therefore	
  permitted	
  to	
  stay,	
  making	
  up	
  the	
  
majority	
  of	
  the	
  population	
  after	
  the	
  war	
  in	
  the	
  later	
  provinces	
  of	
  Katowice	
  
and	
  Opole.	
  

Yet	
   this	
   majority	
   section	
   of	
   the	
   population	
   was	
   regarded	
   with	
   deep	
  
mistrust	
  and	
  often	
  disapproval	
  by	
  the	
  Polish	
  government,	
  the	
  immigrant	
  
population	
  from	
  central	
  Poland,	
  and	
  expellees	
  from	
  eastern	
  Poland,	
  who	
  
equated	
  the	
  indigenous	
  Upper	
  Silesians	
  with	
  Germans	
  –	
  the	
  most	
  negative	
  
categorisation	
   possible	
   in	
   view	
   of	
   the	
   recent	
   experience	
   of	
   National	
  
Socialist	
   occupation.43	
   This	
   bipolar	
   national	
   discourse	
   had	
   existed	
   since	
  



Studies	
  on	
  National	
  Movements,	
  1	
  (2013)	
  	
  	
  |	
  	
  	
  ARTICLES	
  

	
  

Philipp	
  Ther	
   35	
  

World	
   War	
   I:	
   one	
   had	
   to	
   be	
   either	
   German	
   or	
   Polish	
   and	
   nothing	
   in	
  
between.	
  The	
  suspicion	
  persisted	
  that	
  the	
  Ślązacy	
  (the	
  Silesians)	
  were	
  in	
  
fact	
   Germans.	
   In	
   fact,	
   after	
   the	
   war,	
   many	
   Upper	
   Silesians	
   could	
   speak	
  
German	
  better	
  than	
  Polish,	
  which	
  they	
  pronounced	
  with	
  a	
  strong	
  accent	
  
anyway,	
  as	
  a	
  result	
  of	
  Nazi-­‐era	
  pressures.	
  Even	
  the	
  term	
  ‘Autochthon’	
  has	
  a	
  
derogatory	
   connotation,	
   as	
   the	
   immigrants	
   who	
   used	
   it	
   regarded	
  
themselves	
  as	
  Polish	
  missionaries	
  leading	
  the	
  formerly	
  German	
  citizens	
  of	
  
Polish	
  extraction	
  back	
   to	
   the	
  path	
  of	
   rightful	
  nationality	
  and	
  drumming	
  
Polishness	
   into	
   them,	
   by	
   force	
   if	
   necessary.	
   Furthermore,	
   deep	
   social	
  
conflicts	
   arose	
   after	
   the	
   Second	
   World	
   War,	
   particularly	
   over	
   property.	
  
Locals	
   and	
   immigrants	
   fought	
   over	
   farms,	
   apartments,	
   everyday	
  
necessities,	
  and	
  soon	
  also	
  over	
  positions	
  in	
  the	
  state	
  and	
  the	
  party.	
  

These	
  conflicts	
  and	
  the	
  frequent	
  discrimination	
  and	
  persecution	
  of	
  native	
  
inhabitants	
  led	
  to	
  the	
  latter's	
  complete	
  rejection	
  of	
  Poland	
  as	
  a	
  nation	
  and	
  
a	
  state.	
  For	
  the	
  deeply	
  Catholic	
  population,	
   the	
  rejection	
  of	
  communism	
  
was	
  also	
  connected	
  with	
  their	
  religious	
  affiliation.	
  By	
  contrast,	
  the	
  German	
  
era	
   in	
   Upper	
   Silesia	
   was	
   often	
   idealised,	
   especially	
   as	
   the	
   ‘economic	
  
miracle’	
  was	
  beginning	
   to	
   take	
  effect	
   in	
  West	
  Germany.	
   In	
  1950,	
  Bożek	
  
recorded	
  bitterly	
  that	
  ‘the	
  Germans	
  are	
  laughing	
  up	
  their	
  sleeves	
  –	
  what	
  
we	
   could	
   not	
   achieve	
   in	
   seven	
   hundred	
   years,	
   because	
   the	
   Silesians	
  
persistently	
  defended	
  their	
  faith	
  and	
  their	
  language,	
  they	
  accomplished	
  in	
  
seven	
  years:	
  the	
  complete	
  eradication	
  of	
  Polishness	
  in	
  these	
  lands,	
  down	
  
to	
  the	
  very	
  last	
  root.’44	
  This	
  statement	
  contained	
  the	
  nationalist	
  myth	
  of	
  
timeless	
  Polishness;	
  nevertheless,	
  it	
  was	
  right	
  about	
  the	
  disaffection	
  with	
  
Poland	
  and	
  Poles.	
  

The	
  change	
  in	
  orientation	
  toward	
  Germany	
  was,	
  however,	
  also	
  motivated	
  
by	
   the	
   fact	
   that	
   the	
   identification	
   with	
   the	
   region	
   of	
   Upper	
   Silesia	
   was	
  
suppressed	
   in	
   the	
   People's	
   Republic	
   of	
   Poland,	
   being	
   regarded	
   as	
   a	
  
remnant	
   of	
   the	
   interwar	
   period	
   and	
   a	
   possible	
   Trojan	
   Horse	
   of	
   the	
  
Germans.	
   Open	
   declarations	
   of	
   Germanness	
   were	
   the	
   most	
   effective	
  
method	
   for	
   gaining	
   permission	
   to	
   leave	
   the	
   country	
   and	
   so	
   escape	
  
communism.	
  Moreover,	
  the	
  Upper	
  Silesians	
  were	
  discriminated	
  against	
  as	
  
Germans.	
  



Studies	
  on	
  National	
  Movements,	
  1	
  (2013)	
  	
  	
  |	
  	
  	
  ARTICLES	
  

	
  

Philipp	
  Ther	
  36	
  

Until	
  1989,	
  the	
  situation	
  in	
  Upper	
  Silesia	
  remained	
  by	
  and	
  large	
  stable.	
  The	
  
People's	
  Republic	
  of	
  Poland	
  proceeded	
  with	
  oppression	
  –	
  the	
  ban	
  on	
  the	
  
German	
  language,	
  for	
  example,	
  remained	
  in	
  force	
  to	
  the	
  last	
  –	
  and	
  Upper	
  
Silesians	
   reacted	
   to	
   this	
   with	
   inner	
   emigration	
   or	
   actual	
   emigration	
   to	
  
Germany.	
  Thus	
  the	
  old-­‐established	
  Upper	
  Silesian	
  population	
  became	
  the	
  
minority,	
  estimated	
  at	
  250,000-­‐300,000	
  of	
  a	
   total	
  population	
  of	
  around	
  
one	
  million	
   in	
   the	
  province	
  of	
  Opole	
   in	
  1989.	
  Those	
  who	
   felt	
  drawn	
   to	
  
German	
   culture	
   or	
   simply	
   saw	
   no	
   future	
   in	
   communist	
   Poland	
   left	
   the	
  
country.	
  

When	
   the	
   communist	
   regimes	
   collapsed,	
   the	
   troubled	
   history	
   of	
   the	
  
interwar	
  period	
  threatened	
  to	
  repeat	
  itself.	
  The	
  minority,	
  which	
  as	
  a	
  result	
  
of	
   the	
   Polish	
   nationality	
   policy	
   indeed	
   had	
   become	
   a	
   German	
   minority,	
  
demanded	
   their	
   official	
   authorisation,	
   and	
   individual	
   demands	
   for	
   the	
  
borders	
  to	
  be	
  redrawn	
  were	
  also	
  made.	
  The	
  situation	
  quickly	
  eased	
  with	
  
the	
  conclusion	
  of	
  the	
  2+4	
  Treaty	
  in	
  1990,	
  in	
  which	
  Germany	
  relinquished	
  
all	
   territorial	
   claims	
   in	
   favour	
   of	
   reunification,	
   and	
   the	
   German-­‐Polish	
  
treaty	
   of	
   1990-­‐91,	
   which	
   finally	
   confirmed	
   the	
   Oder-­‐Neisse	
   border	
   and	
  
enforced	
  the	
  official	
  recognition	
  of	
  the	
  minority	
  in	
  Poland.	
  

For	
   this	
   reason,	
  among	
  others,	
  Poland	
   tolerated	
   the	
  de	
   facto	
   revisionist	
  
citizenship	
  policy	
  of	
  the	
  Federal	
  Republic	
  of	
  Germany.	
  In	
  Upper	
  Silesia,	
  all	
  
Polish	
  citizens	
  who	
  could	
  provide	
  evidence	
  of	
  their	
  German	
  ancestry	
  could	
  
apply	
  for	
  German	
  citizenship.	
  Well	
  over	
  200,000	
  German	
  passports	
  were	
  
issued	
  as	
  a	
  consequence	
  of	
  this	
  policy	
  up	
  to	
  the	
  mid	
  1990s.	
  They	
  secured	
  
the	
  holders'	
  free	
  access	
  to	
  the	
  job	
  market	
  in	
  Germany	
  and	
  the	
  EU	
  before	
  
the	
  enlargement	
  of	
   the	
  Union	
   in	
  2004,	
  which	
  was	
  a	
  great	
  advantage	
   in	
  
these	
  dire	
  years	
  of	
  early	
  transformation.	
  The	
  Germanness	
  of	
  the	
  minority	
  
in	
  Upper	
  Silesia	
  was	
  once	
  again	
  officially	
  confirmed.	
  

Freedom	
   to	
   travel	
   and	
   reunification,	
   however,	
   rapidly	
   brought	
   about	
   a	
  
change	
  in	
  the	
  popular	
  image	
  of	
  the	
  Federal	
  Republic	
  of	
  Germany	
  in	
  Upper	
  
Silesia.	
  The	
  former	
  spiritual	
  homeland	
  became	
  simply	
  a	
  neighbouring	
  state	
  
that	
  could	
  be	
  reached	
  within	
  a	
  few	
  hours.	
  Nearly	
  all	
  Upper	
  Silesians	
  took	
  
advantage	
  of	
  their	
  newly	
  established	
  right	
  to	
  travel	
  to	
  visit	
  the	
  country,	
  
especially	
   those	
   who	
   held	
   German	
   passports	
   and	
   therefore	
   also	
   work	
  
permits.	
  The	
  reality	
  of	
  Germany,	
  however,	
  was	
  often	
  surprising,	
  and	
  did	
  



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Philipp	
  Ther	
   37	
  

not	
  always	
  correspond	
  with	
  images	
  conjured	
  up	
  by	
  television,	
  brochures	
  
of	
   expellee	
   associations,	
   and	
   letters	
   from	
   relatives	
   who	
   had	
   emigrated	
  
there	
   before.	
   Especially	
   at	
   work	
   Upper	
   Silesians	
   were	
   not	
   greeted	
   as	
  
compatriots	
   but	
   rejected	
   as	
   Poles,	
   particularly	
   in	
   the	
   former	
   German	
  
Democratic	
  Republic.	
  Those	
  with	
  a	
  good	
  command	
  of	
  German	
  still	
  spoke	
  a	
  
dialect	
   that	
   sounded	
   foreign	
   to	
   people	
   west	
   of	
   the	
   Oder	
   and	
   Neisse.	
   In	
  
addition	
  to	
  this,	
  job	
  seekers	
  from	
  Silesia	
  were	
  hardly	
  regarded	
  as	
  lost	
  sons	
  
of	
  the	
  fatherland	
  but	
  frequently	
  as	
  competition.	
  Because	
  of	
  this	
  renewed	
  
experience	
   of	
   national	
   differences	
   after	
   the	
   1989	
   revolution,	
   many	
  
members	
  of	
  the	
  mixed	
  population	
  turned	
  away	
  from	
  Germany	
  and	
  German	
  
nationality.	
  

As	
  Berlińska	
  has	
  shown,	
  some	
  years	
  after	
  the	
  1989	
  revolution	
  more	
  than	
  
two	
  thirds	
  of	
  the	
  minority	
  population	
  considered	
  themselves	
  exclusively	
  
or	
  primarily	
  Silesian,	
  while	
  only	
  about	
  one	
   tenth	
  defined	
   themselves	
  as	
  
German.45	
  Less	
   is	
  known	
  about	
  changes	
  in	
  the	
  identities	
  of	
  the	
  majority	
  
population,	
   which	
   migrated	
   or	
   were	
   forced	
   to	
   migrate	
   to	
   Silesia	
   in	
   the	
  
postwar	
  period.	
  Most	
  of	
  them	
  clearly	
  and	
  sometimes	
  exclusively	
  identify	
  
with	
  Poland	
  as	
  a	
  nation	
  and	
  as	
  a	
  state.	
  The	
  changes	
  in	
  Poland	
  since	
  1989	
  
contributed	
   to	
   a	
   generally	
   stronger	
   perception	
   of	
   the	
   regional	
   or	
   local	
  
homeland	
  as	
  a	
  point	
  of	
  reference.	
  In	
  the	
  province	
  of	
  Opole,	
  the	
  minority	
  
possessed	
  a	
  concrete	
  territory	
  in	
  which	
  they	
  could	
  realise	
  their	
  political	
  
ideas.	
  Since	
  the	
  1989	
  revolution,	
  the	
  ‘socio-­‐cultural	
  society	
  of	
  Germans	
  in	
  
Poland’	
   has	
   produced	
   numerous	
   mayors,	
   chief	
   administrative	
   officers,	
  
some	
  members	
  of	
  the	
  Sejm,	
  and	
  a	
  few	
  senators	
  in	
  the	
  second	
  chamber	
  of	
  
the	
   Polish	
   parliament.	
   In	
   the	
   2003	
   census,	
   however,	
   173,000	
   people	
  
unexpectedly	
   declared	
   themselves	
   ‘Silesian’.46	
   Among	
   these	
   were	
   many	
  
former	
  members	
  of	
   the	
  German	
  minority	
   that	
  had	
  sharply	
  decreased	
   in	
  
numbers	
   to	
   become	
   the	
   second	
   largest	
   minority	
   in	
   Poland	
   after	
   the	
  
Silesians.	
  With	
  this	
  result,	
  the	
  minority	
  demonstrated	
  that	
  their	
  regional	
  
allegiance	
  was	
  stronger	
  than	
  a	
  national	
  Polish	
  or	
  German	
  one.	
  

After	
  the	
  census	
  was	
  taken,	
  the	
  leadership	
  of	
  the	
  regional	
  movement	
  tried	
  
to	
  gain	
  recognition	
  as	
  national	
  minority.	
  This	
  was	
  first	
  denied	
  by	
  the	
  Polish	
  
government	
   and	
   courts,	
   then	
   also	
   by	
   the	
   highest	
   European	
   court	
   in	
  
Strasbourg.	
  The	
  refusal	
  in	
  Poland	
  was	
  based	
  on	
  fears	
  that	
  a	
  new	
  separatist	
  



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Philipp	
  Ther	
  38	
  

movement	
  might	
  arise.	
  Indeed,	
  the	
  widespread	
  discontent	
  in	
  Upper	
  Silesia	
  
with	
   the	
   social	
   and	
   economic	
   situation	
   of	
   the	
   region	
   might	
   feed	
   some	
  
discontent.	
  But	
  the	
  anti-­‐reaction	
  against	
  the	
  Silesian	
  movement	
  was	
  driven	
  
rather	
   by	
   historical	
   memories	
   than	
   by	
   rational	
   calculations	
   or	
   public	
  
opinion	
   polling.	
   In	
   Strasbourg,	
   the	
   underlying	
   issue	
   was	
   that	
   if	
   the	
  
Silesians	
   were	
   to	
   gain	
   recognition,	
   then	
   other	
   groups	
   might	
   organise	
  
themselves	
  as	
  national	
  minorities	
  as	
  well.	
  That	
  would	
  be	
  in	
  contrast	
  to	
  the	
  
still	
   dominant	
   vision	
   that	
   the	
   European	
   states	
   are	
   homogenous	
   nation	
  
states.	
  None	
  of	
   these	
  states	
  would	
  today	
  repeat	
   the	
  coercive	
  nationality	
  
policy	
  of	
  the	
  interwar	
  and	
  postwar	
  period.	
  But	
  it	
  still	
  seems	
  to	
  be	
  difficult	
  
to	
   accept	
   diversity	
   and	
   to	
   overcome	
   the	
   utopia	
   of	
   homogenous	
   nation	
  
states	
  if	
  divergent	
  groups	
  come	
  into	
  existence.	
  

Summary	
  

By	
   looking	
  at	
   the	
  case	
  of	
  Upper	
  Silesia,	
  one	
  can	
  show	
  the	
  endurance	
  of	
  
regions	
  as	
  objects	
  of	
  identification,	
  which	
  is	
  surprising	
  precisely	
  because	
  
of	
   the	
  wide	
  range	
  of	
   references	
   they	
  host.	
  The	
  Upper	
  Silesia	
  which	
   the	
  
Silesian	
  or	
  German	
  minority	
  refers	
  to	
  today	
  has	
  little	
  in	
  common	
  with	
  the	
  
Prussian	
  region	
  of	
  Upper	
  Silesia	
  of	
  the	
  early	
  twentieth	
  century.	
  The	
  size	
  of	
  
the	
   area,	
   its	
   social	
   and	
   demographic	
   structures,	
   and	
   its	
   state	
   affiliation	
  
changed	
  several	
  times,	
  quite	
  dramatically,	
  between	
  1900	
  and	
  2000.	
  And	
  
yet	
   today	
   a	
   significant	
   number	
   of	
   people	
   identify	
   themselves	
   primarily	
  
with	
  the	
  substratum	
  called	
  Upper	
  Silesia.	
  National	
  identities,	
  by	
  contrast,	
  
appear	
  volatile	
  and	
  context-­‐dependent.	
  Such	
  processes	
  can	
  be	
  shown	
  to	
  
have	
  taken	
  place	
  not	
  only	
  in	
  Upper	
  Silesia	
  but	
  also	
  in	
  other	
  intermediary	
  
spaces	
   such	
   as	
   Alsace.	
   With	
   these	
   intermediary	
   spaces	
   and	
   their	
  
inhabitants	
  frequently	
  crushed	
  between	
  national	
  millstones,	
  the	
  European	
  
idea	
  presented	
  itself	
  as	
  a	
  possible	
  solution.	
  It	
  is	
  no	
  coincidence	
  that	
  some	
  
prominent	
   figures	
   of	
   the	
   European	
   movement	
   or	
   a	
   European	
  
historiography,	
   such	
   as	
   with	
   Robert	
   Schuman	
   and	
   Lucien	
   Febvre,	
  
originated	
  from	
  such	
  intermediary	
  spaces.	
  



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Philipp	
  Ther	
   39	
  

Although	
  the	
  regionalism	
  in	
  Upper	
  Silesia	
  has	
  so	
  far	
  failed	
  to	
  achieve	
  its	
  
aims	
   to	
   the	
   extent	
   other	
   regional	
   movements	
   have	
   –	
   with	
   any	
  
comprehensive	
  autonomy	
  still	
  lacking	
  –	
  it	
  proves	
  the	
  limits	
  of	
  concepts	
  of	
  
nationality	
  and	
  nation	
  states.	
  The	
  relationship	
  between	
  nationalism	
  and	
  
regionalism	
  is	
  fundamentally	
  defined	
  by	
  the	
  attractiveness	
  and	
  inclusive	
  
ability	
  of	
  the	
  concept	
  in	
  question.	
  That	
  means,	
  however,	
  that	
  nation	
  and	
  
region	
  should	
  not	
  be	
  understood	
  as	
   firmly	
  established	
  quantities	
  but	
  as	
  
relational	
   options	
   employed	
   in	
   political	
   discourses	
   and	
   practices.	
  
Collective	
   identification	
   models	
   such	
   as	
   the	
   nation	
   or	
   the	
   region	
   are	
  
transitory.	
  The	
  history	
  of	
  Europe	
  is,	
  then,	
  in	
  this	
  respect	
  an	
  open	
  book.	
  It	
  
remains	
  to	
  be	
  seen	
  whether	
  it	
  will	
  continue	
  to	
  be	
  a	
  matter	
  of	
  a	
  Europe	
  of	
  
fatherlands	
  or	
  whether	
  a	
  Europe	
  of	
  regions	
  will	
  gain	
  in	
  significance.	
  This	
  is	
  
even	
   more	
   true	
   for	
   the	
   enlarged	
   European	
   Union	
   and	
   hence,	
   academic	
  
disciplines	
  studying	
  not	
  past	
  but	
  present-­‐day	
  changes,	
  making	
  it	
  just	
  one	
  
more	
   reason	
   to	
   take	
   the	
   study	
   of	
   regions	
   as	
   a	
   way	
   of	
   approaching	
  
European	
  history.	
  The	
  Schengen	
  Treaty	
  and	
  its	
  expansion	
  to	
  the	
  East	
   in	
  
2007	
  have	
  removed	
  all	
  border	
  controls	
  from	
  the	
  Bug	
  in	
  eastern	
  Poland	
  to	
  
Portugal	
   in	
   the	
   West.	
   This	
   means	
   that	
   the	
   European	
   borderlands	
   have	
  
ceased	
   to	
   be	
   located	
   at	
   state	
   borders	
   in	
   the	
   previous	
   sense.	
   Of	
   course,	
  
Schengen	
  has	
  not	
  removed	
  linguistic,	
  social,	
  and	
  political	
  borders.	
  But	
  it	
  
remains	
   to	
   be	
   seen	
   how	
   this	
   reconfiguration	
   will	
   influence	
   the	
  
intermediary	
  spaces	
  in	
  Europe.	
  

Looking	
   back	
   at	
   their	
   history	
   again,	
   one	
   can	
   distinguish	
   three	
   major	
  
periods.	
  The	
  late	
  age	
  of	
  empires	
  between	
  1848	
  and	
  1918	
  was	
  undoubtedly	
  
an	
   age	
   of	
   nationalism.	
   People's	
   identification	
   with	
   regions	
   did	
   not	
  
diminish,	
  however,	
  but	
  was	
  spread	
  in	
  various	
  borderlands	
  as	
  a	
  result	
  of	
  a	
  
generally	
   rising	
   tide	
   of	
   politicisation	
   of	
   the	
   population.	
   The	
   national	
  
movements	
  hit	
  their	
   limits	
  in	
  the	
  horizontal	
  and	
  vertical	
  mobilisation	
  of	
  
societies.	
  Because	
  of	
   their	
  mostly	
  bourgeois	
  character	
  and	
  other	
   factors	
  
such	
  as	
  religious	
  and	
  linguistic	
  differences,	
   the	
  national	
  movements	
  had	
  
problems	
   mobilising	
   the	
   urban	
   and	
   the	
   rural	
   under-­‐classes.	
   This	
   is	
  
especially	
  true	
  for	
  borderlands	
  such	
  as	
  Upper	
  Silesia	
  or	
  Alsace.	
  World	
  War	
  
I	
  was	
  a	
  catalyst	
  of	
  nationalism,	
  but	
  especially	
  in	
  countries	
  that	
  had	
  lost	
  the	
  
war,	
  regional	
  movements	
  also	
  gained	
  power.	
  However,	
  they	
  were	
  always	
  
hampered	
  by	
  the	
  lack	
  of	
  a	
  secular	
  elite.	
  So	
  even	
  when	
  nation	
  states	
  were	
  



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Philipp	
  Ther	
  40	
  

weakened,	
  such	
  as	
  Germany	
  in	
  1918-­‐19,	
  the	
  regional	
  movements	
  could	
  not	
  
achieve	
  autonomy,	
  let	
  alone	
  secession	
  or	
  independence.	
  

The	
  second	
  period	
  lasted	
  from	
  1918	
  until	
  1939,	
  in	
  which	
  the	
  old	
  and	
  new	
  
nation	
  states	
  demanded	
  an	
  unambiguous	
  identification	
  from	
  their	
  citizens.	
  
This	
  created	
  conflicts	
  with	
  national	
  minorities,	
  and	
  in	
  particular	
  with	
  and	
  
within	
  disputed	
  borderlands.	
  As	
  a	
  reaction,	
   the	
  nation	
  states	
   intensified	
  
their	
   nationalising	
   policies.	
   Regional	
   movements	
   became	
   suspicious	
   of	
  
helping	
  enemy	
  states	
  across	
  the	
  borders	
  or	
  guessed	
  that	
  minorities	
  could	
  
be	
   Trojan	
   Horses	
   within	
   the	
   body	
   of	
   an	
   organically	
   understood	
   nation.	
  
Various	
  nation	
  states	
  such	
  as	
  France	
  in	
  Alsace,	
  both	
  Germany	
  and	
  Poland	
  
in	
  Upper	
  Silesia,	
  Romania	
  in	
  Transylvania,	
  Italy	
  in	
  South	
  Tirol,	
  or	
  the	
  states	
  
which	
  had	
  carved	
  up	
  Macedonia,	
  developed	
  repressive	
  policies.	
  Instead	
  of	
  
accepting	
   at	
   least	
   a	
   minimum	
   of	
   regional	
   specifics,	
   any	
   demands	
   for	
  

Polish	
  and	
  German	
  propaganda	
  posters	
  for	
  the	
  1921	
  Silesian	
  plebiscite.	
  
WIKIMEDIA	
  COMMONS	
  –	
  MUZEM	
  HISTORII	
  KATOWIC	
  



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Philipp	
  Ther	
   41	
  

autonomy	
   were	
   interpreted	
   as	
   a	
   danger	
   for	
   the	
   nation	
   state.	
   The	
  
repressions	
  ranged	
  from	
  discrimination	
  to	
  persecution	
  and	
  deportations	
  
of	
  elites.	
  This	
  created	
  deep	
  conflicts	
  that	
  should	
  not	
  be	
  interpreted	
  in	
  the	
  
framework	
  of	
  minority	
  politics	
  only,	
  but	
  also	
  as	
  conflicts	
  between	
  centres	
  
and	
  marginalised	
  borderlands.	
  

The	
   suppression	
   of	
   regionalism	
   was	
   mostly	
   counterproductive.	
   For	
   a	
  
demonstration	
  of	
  this	
  we	
  can	
  look	
  not	
  only	
  to	
  Upper	
  Silesia,	
  but	
  also	
  to	
  
Alsace.	
  Christiane	
  Kohser-­‐Spohn	
  has	
  shown	
  how	
  the	
  French	
  policy	
  against	
  
the	
  regional	
  movement	
  in	
  the	
  1920s	
  turned	
  sour	
  an	
  Alsatian	
  society	
  which	
  
had	
  welcomed	
  French	
  troops	
   in	
  1918.	
  Similar	
  conclusions	
  can	
  be	
  made	
  
about	
   other	
   nation	
   states	
   and	
   their	
   nationality	
   policy	
   in	
   disputed	
  
borderlands.47	
  Although	
  discontent	
  was	
  widespread,	
  none	
  of	
  the	
  regional	
  
movements	
  were	
  able	
  to	
  reach	
  their	
  ideal	
  goals	
  or	
  even	
  reduce	
  the	
  degree	
  
of	
  suppression	
  by	
  nation	
  states.	
  This	
  was	
  mostly	
  due	
  to	
  their	
  weakness	
  in	
  
term	
  of	
  organisation	
  and	
  political	
  ideology,	
  and	
  their	
  late	
  start	
  compared	
  
to	
   national	
   movements.	
   Moreover,	
   the	
   nation	
   states	
   could	
   offer	
   careers	
  
that	
   were	
   of	
   course	
   pursued	
   by	
   inhabitants	
   of	
   the	
   borderlands.	
   The	
  
regional	
  movements	
  were	
  caught	
  in	
  between	
  the	
  nation	
  states.	
  Looking	
  for	
  
support	
  beyond	
  the	
  border	
  was	
  not	
  a	
  viable	
  solution	
  anymore	
  after	
  1945	
  
because	
  the	
  regional	
  movements	
  in	
  Alsace,	
  the	
  Silesians	
  in	
  Poland	
  and	
  the	
  
Schleswiger	
  in	
  Denmark	
  were	
  tainted	
  by	
  collaboration	
  with	
  the	
  National	
  
Socialists.	
  

After	
  World	
  War	
  II,	
  our	
  third	
  period,	
  Europe	
  was	
  structured	
  into	
  nation	
  
states	
  that	
  were	
  more	
  homogenised	
  than	
  ever	
  before.	
  The	
  borderlands	
  lost	
  
all	
   opportunity	
   to	
   raise	
   a	
   political	
   voice,	
   let	
   alone	
   to	
   form	
   a	
   regional	
  
movement	
   again.	
   Only	
   in	
   the	
   late	
   1960s	
   did	
   new	
   dynamics	
   emerge.	
   In	
  
Western	
   Europe	
   this	
   was	
   mostly	
   due	
   to	
   the	
   activities	
   of	
   the	
   student	
  
movement.	
  The	
  regionalist	
  component	
  of	
  1968	
  has,	
  however,	
  not	
  received	
  
much	
  attention	
  by	
  historians.	
  In	
  Alsace,	
  Bretagne,	
  and	
  parts	
  of	
  southern	
  
France	
  regional	
   initiatives	
  gathered	
  and	
  established	
   institutions.	
  Similar	
  
developments	
  can	
  be	
  observed	
  in	
  Wales	
  and	
  Scotland,	
  in	
  parts	
  of	
  Italy,	
  and	
  
in	
  Spain	
  after	
   the	
  death	
  of	
  Franco.	
  This	
   ‘new’	
  regionalism	
  was	
  partially	
  
inspired	
  by	
   the	
  political	
  Left,	
   and	
   it	
  utilised	
   the	
  vocabulary	
  of	
   the	
  anti-­‐
colonial	
  struggle.48	
  In	
  France,	
  the	
  activists	
  also	
  spoke	
  about	
  a	
  ‘renaissance’	
  



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Philipp	
  Ther	
  42	
  

of	
   the	
   region,	
   revealing	
   the	
   relevance	
  of	
   invented	
   traditions.	
  Altogether	
  
this	
  regionalism	
  was	
  very	
  different	
  from	
  the	
  interwar	
  period,	
  when	
  there	
  
still	
  was	
  a	
  strong	
  influence	
  from	
  clerics	
  and	
  right-­‐wing	
  parties,	
  and	
  is	
  ripe	
  
for	
  attention	
  as	
  a	
  distinct	
  era.	
  

In	
  the	
  late	
  1960s,	
  identification	
  directed	
  against	
  hegemonic	
  nation	
  states	
  
also	
   increased	
   in	
  Central	
  and	
  Eastern	
  Europe,	
  but	
  developed	
  a	
  different	
  
dynamic.	
  Officially	
   the	
  autonomist	
  Slovak,	
  Croat,	
  Macedonian,	
  and	
  other	
  
elites	
  asked	
  for	
  more	
  regional	
  autonomy,	
  but	
  the	
  political	
  discourses	
  soon	
  
focused	
   on	
   national	
   interest	
   and	
   rights.	
   The	
   regimes	
   in	
   both	
   countries	
  
responded	
   with	
   federalisation	
   (1969	
   in	
   Czechoslovakia,	
   1974	
   in	
  
Yugoslavia),	
  but	
  this	
  did	
  not	
  have	
  the	
  same	
  results	
  as	
  in	
  France	
  or	
  Britain,	
  
where	
  regions	
  also	
  gained	
  power	
  in	
  the	
  1970s	
  and	
  80s.	
  In	
  Eastern	
  Europe,	
  
the	
   devolution	
   of	
   political	
   power	
   strengthened	
   national	
   discourses	
   and	
  
national	
  movements.	
  Similar	
  conclusions	
  could	
  be	
  made	
  about	
  post-­‐Franco	
  
Spain,	
   where	
   the	
   regional	
   movements	
   called	
   themselves	
   national	
  
movements.	
   But	
   only	
   a	
   minority	
   of	
   Catalans	
   or	
   Galicians	
   called	
   for	
  
independence	
  from	
  their	
  regions.	
  Hence,	
  one	
  can	
  label	
  these	
  movements	
  
as	
  predominantly	
  regionalist	
  according	
  to	
  the	
  definition	
  here	
  provided.	
  In	
  
the	
  Basque	
  Country	
  and	
  in	
  Northern	
  Ireland,	
  events	
  took	
  a	
  different	
  course	
  
because	
  violence	
  was	
  introduced.49	
  

In	
  Western	
  Europe	
  the	
  postwar	
  regionalism	
  was	
  also	
  strengthened	
  by	
  the	
  
European	
  Community/Union.	
  This	
  seems	
  to	
  be	
  paradoxical	
  on	
  first	
  view	
  
because	
  originally	
  the	
  concept	
  of	
  the	
  EC	
  had	
  been	
  a	
  ‘Europe	
  of	
  fatherlands’.	
  
But	
   the	
  European	
  Union	
  organised	
   its	
  various	
  programs	
   for	
  agriculture	
  
and	
   in	
  particular	
   for	
   infrastructure	
   in	
  such	
  a	
  way	
   that	
   the	
  entities	
  who	
  
could	
  apply	
   for	
   funds	
  were	
  not	
  entire	
  nation	
  states,	
  but	
  rather	
   the	
   less	
  
developed	
  parts	
  of	
   them.	
   Inequality	
  was	
  defined	
  on	
  a	
  regional	
  not	
  on	
  a	
  
national	
   basis.	
   This	
   motivated	
   regional	
   interest	
   groups	
   to	
   become	
  
politically	
  active	
   in	
  order	
  to	
  get	
   funding	
   from	
  Brussels.	
  One	
  can	
  explain	
  
this	
  development	
  through	
  a	
  comparison	
  with	
  the	
  United	
  Nations.	
  While	
  it	
  
is	
  necessary	
  on	
  a	
  global	
  level	
  to	
  make	
  political	
  claims	
  as	
  a	
  nation	
  because	
  
only	
  nation	
  states	
  can	
  become	
  members	
  of	
  the	
  United	
  Nations,	
  in	
  Europe	
  
certain	
   benefits,	
   especially	
   the	
   structural	
   funds,	
   are	
   distributed	
   at	
   a	
  
regional	
   level.	
  Moreover,	
   the	
  states	
  that	
  already	
  had	
  a	
  federal	
  structure,	
  



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Philipp	
  Ther	
   43	
  

such	
  as	
  Germany,	
  pressed	
   for	
  a	
  general	
   federalisation	
  of	
   the	
  EC	
  and	
   its	
  
single	
   member	
   states.	
   This	
   culminated	
   in	
   the	
   establishment	
   of	
   the	
  
‘Committee	
  of	
  the	
  Regions’	
  (CoR)	
  in	
  the	
  Maastricht	
  Treaty,	
  which	
  is	
  better	
  
known	
  for	
  having	
  laid	
  the	
  groundwork	
  for	
  the	
  common	
  currency,	
  the	
  Euro.	
  
It	
  is	
  disputed	
  how	
  much	
  power	
  the	
  CoR	
  really	
  has.	
  Since	
  the	
  enlargement	
  
of	
   the	
   EU	
   in	
   2004,	
   this	
   consultative	
   body	
   has	
   rarely	
   produced	
   any	
  
headlines	
  or	
  public	
  discourses.	
  But	
  this	
  institutionalisation	
  might	
  be	
  more	
  
relevant	
  in	
  the	
  future.	
  It	
  is	
  an	
  open	
  question	
  how	
  the	
  ‘Europe	
  of	
  nations’	
  
will	
  develop	
  into	
  a	
  ‘Europe	
  of	
  regions’.	
  

Independently	
  of	
  this	
  process,	
  regions	
  and	
  in	
  particular	
  borderlands	
  are	
  
important	
   objects	
   of	
   study	
   for	
   historians.	
   They	
   make	
   it	
   possible	
   to	
  
overcome	
   the	
   still	
   dominant	
   national	
   paradigm,	
   they	
   reveal	
   the	
  
contingency	
   in	
   nation	
   building	
   and	
   nation	
   state	
   formation,	
   and	
   they	
  
demonstrate	
   that	
   no	
   territorial	
   and	
   group	
   identification,	
   be	
   it	
   on	
   a	
  
national,	
  regional,	
  or	
  local	
  level,	
  is	
  set	
  and	
  stable.	
  

	
  

Endnotes	
  

1	
   See	
   Ph.	
   Ther,	
   ‘Caught	
   in	
   between.	
   Border	
   regions	
   in	
   modern	
   Europe’,	
   in:	
   O.	
  
Bartov	
  &	
  E.D.	
  Weitz	
  (eds.),	
  Shatterzone	
  of	
  empires.	
  Coexistence	
  and	
  violence	
  in	
  the	
  
German,	
  Habsburg,	
  Russian,	
  and	
  Ottoman	
  borderlands	
  (Bloomington,	
  2013)	
  485-­‐
502.	
   The	
   author	
   and	
   SNM’s	
   editorial	
   staff	
   thank	
   the	
   publisher	
   for	
   allowing	
   to	
  
publish	
  a	
  revised	
  version	
  of	
  this	
  article.	
  The	
  condensed	
  material	
  appears	
  Courtesy	
  
of	
  Indiana	
  University	
  Press;	
  permission	
  duly	
  granted,	
  gratis.	
  
2	
  The	
  term	
  ‘identification’	
  is	
  preferred	
  in	
  this	
  article	
  because	
  it	
  indicates	
  an	
  active	
  
process	
  which	
  can	
  be	
  gradual,	
   fluid,	
  or	
  multiple.	
  For	
  the	
  debate	
  about	
  the	
  term	
  
identity	
  see	
  R.	
  Brubaker	
  &	
  F.	
  Cooper,	
  ‘Beyond	
  identity’,	
  in:	
  Theory	
  and	
  society,	
  29	
  
(2000)	
   1-­‐47.	
   See	
   also	
   the	
   genealogical	
   treatise	
   in	
   L.	
   Niethammer,	
   Kollektive	
  
Identität.	
  Heimliche	
  Quellen	
  einer	
  unheimlichen	
  Konjuktur	
  (Hamburg,	
  2000).	
  

	
  



Studies	
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Philipp	
  Ther	
  44	
  

	
  
3	
  This	
  project	
  is	
  documented	
  in	
  a	
  publication	
  by	
  Ph.	
  Ther	
  &	
  H.	
  Sundhaussen	
  (eds.),	
  
Regionale	
   Bewegungen	
   und	
   Regionalismen	
   in	
   europäischen	
   Zwischenräumen	
   seit	
  
der	
  Mitte	
  des	
  19.	
  Jahrhunderts	
  (Marburg,	
  2003).	
  
4	
  See	
  R.G.	
  Suny,	
  ‘History	
  and	
  the	
  making	
  of	
  nations’,	
  in:	
  Z.	
  Gitelman	
  (ed.),	
  Cultures	
  
and	
   nations	
   of	
   Central	
   and	
   Eastern	
   Europe.	
   Essays	
   in	
   honor	
   of	
   Roman	
   Szporluk	
  
(Cambridge,	
  2000)	
  569-­‐589.	
  
5	
  On	
  the	
  comparison	
  with	
  modern	
  painting,	
  see	
  E.	
  Gellner,	
  Nations	
  and	
  nationalism	
  
(Ithaca,	
   1983)	
   139ff.	
   Rogers	
   Brubaker	
   used	
   this	
   in	
   his	
   essay	
   ‘Myths	
   and	
  
misconceptions	
   in	
   the	
   study	
   of	
   nationalism’,	
   in:	
   J.A.	
   Hall	
   (ed.),	
  The	
   state	
   of	
   the	
  
nation.	
  Ernest	
  Gellner	
  and	
  the	
  theory	
  of	
  nationalism	
  (Cambridge,	
  1998)	
  272-­‐306	
  
(294	
  ff.).	
  
6	
  See	
  M.	
  Fulbrook,	
  ‘Introduction.	
  States,	
  nations,	
  and	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  Europe’,	
  
in:	
  M.	
  Fulbrook	
  (ed.),	
  National	
  histories	
  and	
  European	
  history	
  (London,	
  1993)	
  1-­‐20.	
  
7	
   On	
   the	
   change	
   of	
   identities	
   among	
   the	
   Silesian	
   population	
   see	
   D.	
   Berlińska,	
  
Mniejszość	
   niemiecka	
   na	
   Śląsku	
   Opolskim	
   w	
   poszukiwaniu	
   tożsamośći	
   (Opole,	
  
1999).	
  
8	
  In	
  standard	
  Polish	
  the	
  sentence	
  would	
  read	
  ‘Jechałem	
  na	
  rowerze,	
  zderzyłem	
  się	
  
z	
  drzewem	
  i	
  skrzywiła	
  się	
  kierownica.’	
  
9	
  On	
  the	
  social	
  function	
  of	
  such	
  ‘consistent	
  dialects’,	
  explored	
  through	
  the	
  example	
  
of	
   Teschen	
   Silesia,	
   cf.	
   K.	
   Hannan,	
   Language	
   and	
   identity	
   in	
   a	
   West	
   Slavic	
  
borderland.	
  The	
  case	
  of	
  Teschen	
  Silesia	
  (Austin,	
  1994).	
  
10	
   H.-­‐Ch.	
   Trepte,	
   '"Die	
   Hiesigen"	
   (Tuejsi/Tutejšyja).	
   Regionales	
   Bewusstsein	
   im	
  
polnisch-­‐weissrussischem	
   Grenzraum’,	
   in:	
   Ther	
   &	
   Sundhaussen,	
   Regionale	
  
Bewegungen	
  und	
  Regionalismen,	
  145-­‐160.	
  
11	
  K.	
  Hannan,	
  Borders	
  of	
  language	
  and	
  identity	
  in	
  Teschen	
  Silesia	
  (New	
  York,	
  1996).	
  
12	
  C.	
  Applegate,	
   ‘A	
  Europe	
  of	
  regions.	
  Reflections	
  on	
  the	
  historiography	
  of	
  sub-­‐
national	
  places	
  in	
  modern	
  times’,	
  in:	
  American	
  historical	
  review,	
  104	
  (1999)	
  1157-­‐
1182.	
  
13	
   Centre-­‐periphery	
   models	
   are	
   therefore	
   hardly	
   suited	
   to	
   analysing	
   the	
   cases	
  
examined	
  here.	
  On	
  the	
  problematic	
  nature	
  of	
  such	
  models,	
  see	
  also	
  Applegate,	
  ‘A	
  
Europe	
  of	
  regions’,	
  1167.	
  

	
  



Studies	
  on	
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  1	
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  ARTICLES	
  

	
  

Philipp	
  Ther	
   45	
  

	
  
14	
  Among	
  the	
  main	
  proponents	
  of	
  the	
  debate	
  were	
  and	
  are	
  Gellner,	
  Nations	
  and	
  
nationalism;	
   B.	
   Anderson,	
   Imagined	
   communities.	
   Reflections	
   on	
   the	
   origin	
   and	
  
spread	
  of	
  nationalism	
   (London,	
  1983);	
  A.D.	
  Smith,	
  Nations	
  and	
  nationalism	
   in	
  a	
  
global	
   era	
   (Cambridge,	
   1995).	
   Miroslav	
   Hroch	
   came	
   up	
   with	
   a	
   convincing	
  
compromise	
  on	
  this	
  contentious	
  issue	
  in	
  which	
  he	
  accepts	
  that	
  the	
  nation	
  is	
  to	
  be	
  
regarded	
  as	
  a	
  project	
  which	
  is	
  basically	
  formed	
  by	
  previously	
  existing	
  economic,	
  
political,	
  and	
  linguistic	
  areas	
  of	
  communication:	
  M.	
  Hroch,	
  ‘Real	
  and	
  constructed.	
  
The	
  nature	
  of	
  the	
  nation’,	
  in:	
  Hall,	
  The	
  state	
  of	
  the	
  nation,	
  91-­‐106.	
  
15	
   See	
   as	
   prototypical	
   examples	
   E.	
   Weber,	
   Peasants	
   into	
   Frenchmen.	
   The	
  
modernization	
   of	
   rural	
   France,	
   1870-­1914	
   (Stanford	
   1976);	
   A.	
   Miller,	
   ‘Russko-­‐
ukrainskije	
  otnošenija	
  v	
  19	
  i	
  načale	
  20	
  veka.	
  Rusifikacija	
  i	
  pričiny	
  jejo	
  neudači’,	
  in:	
  
Ruskij	
  istoričeskij	
  žurnal,	
  1	
  (1998)	
  131-­‐148.	
  
16	
   This	
   mainstream	
   point	
   of	
   view	
   of	
   postwar	
   West	
   German	
   history	
   writing	
   is	
  
expounded	
  in	
  H.-­‐U.	
  Wehler,	
  Deutsche	
  Gesellschaftsgeschichte,	
  3:	
  Von	
  der	
  'Deutschen	
  
Doppelrevolution’	
  bis	
  zum	
  Beginn	
  des	
  Ersten	
  Weltkrieges	
  (Munich,	
  1995)	
  962.	
  More	
  
recent	
  publications	
  have	
  modified	
  or	
  revised	
  the	
  assumption	
  that	
  minorities	
  were	
  
largely	
   assimilated;	
   see	
   H.	
   Henning	
   Hahn	
   &	
   P.	
   Kunze	
   (eds.),	
   Nationale	
  
Minderheiten	
  und	
  Minderheitenpolitik	
   in	
  Deutschland	
   im	
  19.	
   Jahrhundert	
   (Berlin,	
  
1999).	
   On	
   Upper	
   Silesia	
   in	
   particular,	
   see	
   Ph.	
   Ther,	
   'Die	
   Grenzen	
   des	
  
Nationalismus.	
  Der	
  Wandel	
  von	
  Identitäten	
  in	
  Oberschlesien	
  von	
  der	
  Mitte	
  des	
  19.	
  
Jahrhunderts	
   bis	
   1939’,	
   in:	
   U.	
   von	
   Hirschhausen	
   &	
   J.	
   Leonhard	
   (eds.),	
  
Nationalismen	
  in	
  Europa.	
  West	
  und	
  Osteuropa	
  im	
  Vergleich	
  (Göttingen,	
  2001)	
  322-­‐
346.	
  
17	
   Ch.	
   Geulen,	
   'Die	
   Metamorphose	
   der	
   Identität.	
   Zur	
   "Langlebigkeit"	
   des	
  
Nationalismus’,	
   in:	
   A.	
   Assmann	
   &	
   H.	
   Friese	
   (eds.),	
   Identitäten,	
   Erinnerung,	
  
Geschichte,	
  Identität	
  (Frankfurt	
  am	
  Main,	
  1998)	
  vol.	
  3,	
  346-­‐373	
  (359).	
  
18	
   H.-­‐G.	
   Haupt,	
   M.	
   Müller	
   &	
   S.	
   Woolf	
   (eds.),	
   Regional	
   and	
   national	
   identities	
   in	
  
Europe	
  in	
  the	
  XIXth	
  and	
  XXth	
  centuries	
  (The	
  Hague,	
  1998)	
  4,	
  14;	
  M.G.	
  Müller	
  &	
  R.	
  
Petri	
   (eds.),	
   Zur	
   Konstruktion	
   nationaler	
   Identität	
   in	
   sprachlich	
   gemischten	
  
Grenzregionen	
  (Marburg,	
  2002).	
  
19	
  A	
  recently	
  published	
  volume	
  on	
  the	
  incorporation	
  of	
  borders	
  into	
  the	
  concept	
  of	
  
the	
   nation	
   formulates	
   a	
   similar	
   question,	
   albeit	
   indirectly:	
   Müller	
   &	
   Petri,	
   Zur	
  
Konstruktion	
   nationaler	
   Identität.	
   The	
   introduction	
   to	
   this	
   volume	
   contains	
   a	
  
comprehensive	
  bibliography	
  on	
  this	
  subject.	
  

	
  



Studies	
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  Movements,	
  1	
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  |	
  	
  	
  ARTICLES	
  

	
  

Philipp	
  Ther	
  46	
  

	
  
20	
  On	
  the	
  problematic	
  nature	
  of	
  the	
  tendency	
  to	
  regard	
  regions	
  and	
  towns	
  as	
  given	
  
or	
  essential,	
  see	
   for	
  example,	
   J.	
  Revel,	
   ‘La	
  région’,	
   in:	
  P.	
  Nora	
  (ed.),	
  Les	
   lieux	
  de	
  
mémoire,	
  3:	
  Les	
  France,	
  1:	
  Conflicts	
  et	
  partages	
   (Paris,	
  1992)	
  851-­‐883	
  (854).	
  A	
  
convincing	
  definition	
  can	
  also	
  be	
  found	
  in	
  W.	
  Schmale,	
  Historische	
  Komparatistik	
  
und	
   Kulturtransfer.	
   Europageschichtliche	
   Perspektiven	
   für	
   die	
   Landesgeschichte	
  
(Bochum,	
   1998)	
   54.	
   Neither	
   this	
   article	
   nor	
   the	
   comparative	
   volume	
   on	
  
regionalism	
   published	
   in	
   2003	
   (cited	
   in	
   note	
   3)	
   intend	
   to	
   contribute	
   to	
   the	
  
establishment	
  of	
  regional	
  identities.	
  
21	
  See	
  the	
  introduction	
  of	
  R.	
  Brubaker,	
  Nationalism	
  reframed.	
  Nationhood	
  and	
  the	
  
national	
  question	
  in	
  the	
  new	
  Europe	
  (Cambridge,	
  1996).	
  
22	
   On	
   the	
   potential	
   of	
   these	
   terms,	
   see	
   E.	
   Hobsbawm	
   &	
   T.	
   Ranger	
   (eds.),	
   The	
  
invention	
  of	
  tradition	
  (Cambridge,	
  1983);	
  Anderson,	
  Imagined	
  communities.	
  
23	
  A	
  detailed	
  account	
  of	
  the	
  relationship	
  between	
  regional	
  and	
  national	
  identities	
  
in	
  Upper	
  Silesia	
  can	
  be	
  found	
  in	
  K.	
  Struve	
  &	
  Ph.	
  Ther	
  (eds.),	
  Nationen	
  und	
  ihre	
  
Grenzen.	
  Identitätenwandel	
  in	
  Oberschlesien	
  in	
  der	
  Neuzeit	
  (Marburg,	
  2002).	
  Most	
  
of	
  the	
  relevant	
  literature	
  published	
  up	
  to	
  2001	
  is	
  listed	
  in	
  the	
  introduction	
  to	
  this	
  
book.	
  
24	
  A.	
  Confino,	
  The	
  nation	
  as	
  a	
  local	
  metaphor.	
  Württemberg,	
  imperial	
  Germany	
  and	
  
national	
   memory,	
   1871-­1918	
   (Chapel	
   Hill,	
   1997);	
   C.	
   Applegate,	
   A	
   nation	
   of	
  
provincials.	
  The	
  German	
  idea	
  of	
  Heimat	
  (Berkeley,	
  1990).	
  On	
  the	
  regional	
  basis	
  and	
  
orientation	
  of	
  the	
  German	
  national	
  movement,	
  see	
  D.	
  Langewiesche,	
  'Föderativer	
  
Nationalismus	
   als	
   Erbe	
   der	
   deutschen	
   Reichsnation.	
   Über	
   Föderalismus	
   und	
  
Zentralismus	
   in	
   der	
   deutschen	
   Nationalgeschichte’,	
   in:	
   D.	
   Langewiesche	
   &	
   G.	
  
Schmidt	
   (eds.),	
  Föderative	
  Nation.	
  Deutschlandkonzepte	
  von	
  der	
  Reformation	
  bis	
  
zum	
  Ersten	
  Weltkrieg	
  (Munich,	
  2000).	
  
25	
  On	
  the	
  struggle	
  between	
  state	
  and	
  Church	
  in	
  Upper	
  Silesia,	
  see	
  J.	
  Bahlcke,	
  'Die	
  
Geschichte	
  der	
  schlesischen	
  Territorien	
  von	
  den	
  Anfängen	
  bis	
  zum	
  Ausbruch	
  des	
  
Zweiten	
   Weltkrieges’,	
   in:	
   J.	
   Bahlcke	
   (ed.),	
   Schlesien	
   und	
   die	
   Schlesier	
   (Munich,	
  
1996)	
  14-­‐154	
  (103-­‐104).	
  
26	
  M.	
  Szmeja,	
  Niemcy?	
  Polacy?	
  Ślązacy!	
  Rodzimi	
  mieszkańcy	
  Opolszczyzny	
  w	
  świetle	
  
analiz	
  socjologicznych	
  (Kraków,	
  2000)	
  65-­‐74.	
  
27	
  For	
  a	
  complete	
  panorama	
  of	
  the	
  various	
  national	
  and	
  subnational	
  population	
  
groups	
  in	
  Upper	
  Silesia	
  and	
  their	
  identification	
  designs,	
  see	
  T.	
  Kamusella,	
  Silesia	
  
	
  



Studies	
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  ARTICLES	
  

	
  

Philipp	
  Ther	
   47	
  

	
  
and	
  Central	
  European	
  nationalism.	
  The	
  emergence	
  of	
  national	
  and	
  ethnic	
  groups	
  in	
  
Prussian	
  Silesia	
  and	
  Austrian	
  Silesia,	
  1848-­1918	
  (West	
  Lafayette,	
  2007).	
  
28	
   Quoted	
   from	
   materials	
   of	
   the	
   Bund	
   der	
   Oberschlesier	
   in	
   A.	
   Schmidt-­‐Rösler,	
  
'Autonomie-­‐	
   und	
   Separatismusbestrebungen	
   in	
   Oberschlesien	
   1918-­‐1922’,	
   in:	
  
Zeitschrift	
  für	
  Ostmitteleuropaforschung,	
  48/1	
  (1999)	
  1-­‐49	
  (11).	
  
29	
   It	
   has	
   become	
   difficult	
   to	
   navigate	
   the	
   sheer	
   amount	
   of	
   literature	
   on	
   the	
  
plebiscite,	
  which	
  cannot	
  be	
  listed	
  here	
  due	
  to	
  lack	
  of	
  space.	
  On	
  Upper	
  Silesia	
  after	
  
World	
  War	
  I:	
  K.	
  Struve	
  (ed.),	
  Oberschlesien	
  nach	
  dem	
  Ersten	
  Weltkrieg.	
  Studien	
  zu	
  
einem	
  nationalen	
  Konflikt	
  und	
  seiner	
  Erinnerung	
  (Marburg,	
  2003).	
  
30	
  W.	
  Wrzesiński,	
  Polski	
  Ruch	
  Narodowy	
  w	
  Niemczech	
  1922-­1939	
  (Poznań,	
  1970)	
  
222-­‐232.	
  At	
  the	
  national	
  census	
  of	
  1933,	
  about	
  100,000	
  people	
  stated	
  that	
  Polish	
  
was	
   their	
  mother	
   tongue	
  and	
  266,375	
  declared	
  Polish	
  and	
  German	
   to	
  be	
   their	
  
native	
  languages.	
  
31	
   '9.12.1935.	
   Der	
   Oberpräsident	
   in	
   Breslau	
   an	
   den	
   Reichs-­‐	
   und	
   Preußischen	
  
Minister	
  des	
  Innern.	
  Lagebericht’,	
  in:	
  R.	
  Jaworksi,	
  M.	
  Wojciechowski,	
  M.	
  Niendorf	
  
&	
  P.	
  Hauser	
  (eds.),	
  Deutsche	
  und	
  Polen	
  zwischen	
  den	
  Kriegen.	
  Minderheitenstatus	
  
und	
  Volkstumkampf	
  im	
  Grenzgebiet	
  amtliche	
  Berichterstattung	
  aus	
  beider	
  Ländern	
  
1920-­1939	
  (Munich,	
  1997)	
  877-­‐881	
  (878).	
  Cf.	
  a	
  report	
  of	
  March	
  1935	
  with	
  similar	
  
content	
   by	
   the	
   president	
   of	
   the	
   local	
   government	
   in	
   Opolskie	
   in	
   Jaworski	
   e.a.,	
  
Deutsche	
  und	
  Polen,	
  857-­‐862	
  (862).	
  
32	
  Cf.	
  various	
  reports	
  in	
  Jaworski	
  e.a.,	
  Deutsche	
  und	
  Polen,	
  872,	
  881,	
  895.	
  
33	
   Quoted	
   in	
   J.	
   Kokot,	
   'Wojenne	
   i	
   powojenne	
   losy	
   byłej	
   ludności	
   niemieckiej	
  
Śląska’,	
  in:	
  Ekonomia,	
  1	
  (1965)	
  5-­‐51	
  (13-­‐15).	
  
34	
  Wrzesiński,	
  Polski	
  Ruch	
  Narodowy,	
  374-­‐380.	
  On	
  the	
  National	
  Socialist	
  policy	
  on	
  
nationalism	
  during	
  World	
  War	
  II,	
  see	
  P.	
  Madajczyk,	
  Przyłączenie	
  Śląska	
  Opolskiego	
  
do	
  Polski	
  1945-­1948	
  (Warsaw,	
  1996)	
  45,	
  121.	
  
35	
  For	
  an	
  estimate	
  of	
   the	
  German	
  proportion	
  of	
   the	
  population,	
   see	
  K.	
  Ðmigiel	
  
(ed.),	
   Die	
   statistische	
   Erhebung	
   über	
   die	
   deutschen	
   Katholiken	
   in	
   den	
   Bistümern	
  
Polens	
   1928	
   und	
   1936	
   (Marburg,	
   1992)	
   220;	
   M.	
   Wanatowicz,	
   ‘Niemcy	
   wobec	
  
problemu	
  integracji	
  Górnego	
  Śląska	
  z	
  Rzeczpospolitą	
  (1922-­‐1939)’,	
   in:	
  A.	
  Szefer	
  
(ed.),	
   Niemcy	
   wobec	
   konfliktu	
   narodowościowego	
   na	
   Górnym	
   Śląsku	
   po	
   I	
   wojnie	
  
światowej	
   (Poznań,	
   1989)	
   141-­‐156	
   (154);	
   F.	
   Serafin,	
   ‘Wpływ	
   Drugiej	
  
	
  



Studies	
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  ARTICLES	
  

	
  

Philipp	
  Ther	
  48	
  

	
  
Rzeczypospolitej	
   na	
   przemiany	
   demograficzne	
   i	
   społeczne	
   w	
   województwie	
  
Śląskim	
  w	
  latach	
  1922-­‐1939’,	
  in:	
  M.W.	
  Wanatowicz	
  (ed.),	
  Rola	
  i	
  miejsce	
  Górnego	
  
Śląska	
  w	
  Drugiej	
  Rzeczypospolitej	
  (Bytom,	
  1995)	
  163-­‐182	
  (169ff.).	
  
36	
  Quoted	
  in	
  M.	
  Wanatowicz,	
  Ludność	
  napływowa	
  na	
  Górnym	
  Śląsku	
  w	
  latach	
  1922-­
1939	
   (Katowice,	
   1982)	
   345.	
   On	
   the	
   national	
   attitudes	
   of	
   the	
   population	
  
particularly	
   in	
   eastern	
   Upper	
   Silesia,	
   see	
   P.	
   Hauser,	
   'Zur	
   Frage	
   der	
   nationalen	
  
Identität	
   der	
   oberschlesischen	
   Bevölkerung	
   in	
   der	
   Zeit	
   zwischen	
   den	
   beiden	
  
Weltkriegen’,	
   in:	
   G.	
   Stöber	
   &	
   R.	
   Maier	
   (eds.),	
   Grenzen	
   und	
   Grenzräume	
   in	
   der	
  
deutschen	
   und	
   polnischen	
   Geschichte.	
   Scheidelinie	
   oder	
   Begegnungsraum?	
  
(Hannover,	
  2000)	
  205-­‐216.	
  
37	
   M.	
   Marek	
   Drożdowski,	
   'Górny	
   Śląsk	
   czasów	
   Drugiej	
   Rzeczypospolitej.	
  
Rzeczywistość,	
  stereotypy,	
  mity’,	
   in:	
  Wanatowicz,	
  Rola	
   i	
  miejsce	
  Górnego	
  Śląska,	
  
65-­‐83	
  (75ff.).	
  
38	
  T.	
  Falęcki,	
  Niemieckie	
   szkolnictwo	
  mniejszościowe	
  na	
  Górnym	
  Śląsku	
  w	
   latach	
  
1922-­1939	
  (Katowice,	
  1970)	
  67.	
  
39	
  Jaworski	
  e.a.,	
  Deutsche	
  und	
  Polen,	
  983.	
  
40	
  Jaworski	
  e.a.,	
  Deutsche	
  und	
  Polen,	
  949.	
  
41	
  Jaworski	
  e.a.,	
  Deutsche	
  und	
  Polen,	
  933.	
  
42	
  B.	
  Linek,	
  ‘Odniemczanie’	
  województwa	
  Śląskiego	
  w	
  latach	
  1945-­1950	
  (w	
  świetle	
  
materiałów	
  wojewódzkich)	
  (Opole,	
  1997).	
  
43	
  This	
  immigrant	
  population	
  deserves	
  special	
  attention	
  already	
  for	
  the	
  mere	
  fact	
  
that	
  in	
  the	
  course	
  of	
  postwar	
  history,	
  it	
  came	
  to	
  be	
  a	
  large	
  majority	
  in	
  historical	
  
Upper	
   Silesia	
   and	
   the	
   present-­‐day	
   provinces	
   of	
   Opole	
   and	
   Katowice.	
   Since	
   the	
  
third	
  postwar	
  generation	
  has	
  already	
  been	
  born,	
  it	
  would	
  seem	
  anachronistic	
  to	
  
call	
  them	
  ‘settlers’,	
  and	
  the	
  Silesian	
  society	
  ‘indigenous	
  population’,	
  as	
  they	
  were	
  
labelled	
  in	
  the	
  1990s.	
  But	
  within	
  the	
  framework	
  of	
  this	
  article	
  I	
  cannot	
  deal	
   in	
  
detail	
  with	
  the	
  (former)	
  ‘settlers’	
  (osiedlency)	
  who	
  came	
  to	
  Silesia	
  after	
  1945.	
  
44	
  A	
  similar	
  conclusion	
  was	
  drawn	
  by	
  sociologist	
  K.	
  Żygulski	
  already	
  in	
  communist	
  
times.	
   See	
   his	
   uncensored	
   manuscript	
   in	
   Opole,	
   Opole	
   Instytut	
   Śląski,	
   A	
   1454:	
  
Przyczyny	
  wyjazdu	
  ludności	
  rodzimej	
  z	
  woj.	
  opolskiego	
  na	
  Zachód,	
  24.	
  The	
  grounds	
  
for	
  Bożek’s	
  disappointment	
   lay	
   in	
  the	
   fact	
   that	
  he,	
  as	
  one	
  of	
   the	
  proponents	
  of	
  
Polishness	
  among	
  the	
  Upper	
  Silesians,	
  strongly	
  overestimated	
  their	
  actual	
  link	
  to	
  
	
  



Studies	
  on	
  National	
  Movements,	
  1	
  (2013)	
  	
  	
  |	
  	
  	
  ARTICLES	
  

	
  

Philipp	
  Ther	
   49	
  

	
  
the	
   Polish	
   nation.	
   The	
   same	
   thing	
   applies	
   to	
   Żygulski,	
   whose	
   essay	
   was	
  
suppressed	
  by	
  the	
  censors.	
  
45	
  D.	
  Berlińska,	
  'Identität	
  und	
  nationale	
  Identifikation	
  der	
  Schlesier	
  nach	
  1989’,	
  in:	
  
Struve	
  &	
  Ther,	
  Nationen	
  und	
  ihre	
  Grenzen,	
  275-­‐308.	
  
46	
  Cf.	
  one	
  of	
  the	
  first	
  press	
  reactions,	
  A.	
  Klich,	
   ‘Czy	
  Ślązacy	
  są	
  narodowości’,	
   in:	
  
Gazeta	
   Wyborcza,	
   1/7/2003.	
   See	
   for	
   a	
   more	
   in	
   depth	
   study	
   M.G.	
   Gerlich,	
   ‘My	
  
prawdziwi	
  Górnoślązacy…’.	
  Studium	
  ethnologiczne	
  (Warsaw,	
  2010).	
  
47	
  On	
  Alsace,	
  see	
  the	
  work	
  by	
  the	
  Swiss	
  historian	
  K.-­‐H.	
  Rothenberger,	
  Die	
  elsaß-­
lothringische	
  Heimat-­	
  und	
  Autonomiebewegung	
  zwischen	
  den	
  beiden	
  Weltkriegen	
  
(Bern,	
  1976);	
  also	
  A.	
  Wahl	
  &	
  J.-­‐C.	
  Richez,	
  L'Alsace	
  entre	
  France	
  et	
  Allemagne	
  1850-­
1950	
  (Paris,	
  1994).	
  
48	
  Traces	
  of	
  anti-­‐colonial	
  terms	
  can	
  also	
  be	
  found	
  in	
  academic	
  literature,	
  which	
  
invented	
  the	
  term	
  of	
  ‘internal	
  colonialism’.	
  See	
  for	
  example	
  M.	
  Hechter,	
  Internal	
  
colonialism.	
  The	
  Celtic	
  fringe	
  in	
  British	
  national	
  development	
  1536-­1966	
  (Berkeley,	
  
1977);	
   J.	
  Blaschke,	
  Volk,	
  Nation,	
   interner	
  Kolonialismus.	
  Konzepte	
  zur	
  politischen	
  
Soziologie	
  der	
  westeuropäischen	
  Regionalbewegungen	
  (Berlin,	
  1984).	
  
49	
  Consult	
   for	
   these	
  conflicts	
   the	
  comparative	
  research	
  by	
   the	
  sociologist	
  Peter	
  
Waldmann,	
   who	
   published	
   widely	
   in	
   German	
   and	
   Spanish.	
   See	
   in	
   Spanish	
   P.	
  
Waldmann,	
   Radicalismo	
   étnico.	
   Análisis	
   comparado	
   de	
   las	
   causas	
   y	
   efectos	
   en	
  
conflictos	
  etnicos	
  violentos	
  (Madrid,	
  1997).