ART_Puhle_v3_def     Hans-­‐Jürgen  Puhle,  ‘Trajectories  and  functions  of  Catalan  nationalism   since  the  19th  century’,  in:  Studies  on  National  Movements,  2  (2014).   http://snm.nise.eu/index.php/studies/article/view/0203a   Hans-­‐Jürgen  Puhle   TRAJECTORIES  AND  FUNCTIONS  OF  CATALAN   NATIONALISM  SINCE  THE  19TH  CENTURY   This  article  will  focus  on  the  longue  durée  trajectories  of  concepts  and  of   movements,  and  I  am  particularly   interested   in  changes  and  thresholds,   and  in  the  various  stages  of  Catalanism  and  Catalan  nationalism  through   the  last  century-­‐and-­‐a-­‐half.  In  the  limited  space  available  I  can  only  give  a   brief  summary  of  the  story  in  question,  and  I  can  only  hint  at  some  basic   lines  of  the  social  background,  the  interests,  programme  and  ideology  of   the  Catalan  nationalists,  and  look  into  their  achievements  and  limitations,   their  internal  cleavages  and  divisions,  and  their  (possible  or  impossible)   alliances  with  ‘Spanish’  political  forces,  and  with  one  another.  I  have  seven   points,   starting   with   the   initial   constellations   and   finishing   with   the   threats  and  models  for  the  21st  century.   Initial  constellations   Nationalism   requires   organisation:   you   have   to   organise   a   movement   whatever  its  shape  and  composition.  And  in  order  to  organise  a  nationalist   movement,   you   need   a   concept   of   a   nation   whatever   its   definition,   its   dimension,  and  ultimately  its  construction.  What  a  nation  is,  is  basically  a   matter  of  opinion,  even  if,  for  making  the  idea  sustainable,  some  plausible   and   tangible   characteristics   (often  called   the   ‘proto-­‐national  minimum’)   may  be  required.  Usually  they  are  found  in  language  and  culture,  and  the   Studies  on  National  Movements,  2  (2014)      |      ARTICLES   Hans-­‐Jürgen  Puhle  2   history  and  the  networks  behind  it,  less  in  voluntaristic  aspirations.1  The   Catalan   idea   of   the   nation   (the   Nationsbegriff)   has   been   a   product   of   European  romanticism  of  the  first  half  of  the  19th  century.  As  in  all  cases  of   ‘belated’  or  ‘stateless’  nations,  it  was  a  culturalist,  often  organicist  concept   driven   by   reifications,   and   drawing   more   on   Herder   than   on   Rousseau.   And   it   has   never   been   a   uniform   idea.   Since   the   1860s   two   different   connotations   could   be   distinguished:   a   more   conservative   and   a   more   liberal,  later  progressive  one.  That  corresponded  to  the  different  contexts   from  which  Catalan  nationalism  has  developed.  For   the  19th   century,  at   least   four   strands   of   movements   and   ideologies   have   to   be   mentioned.   First,   the   broad   and   rich   spectrum   of   Catalan   cultural   renaissance   (Renaixença)   since   the   1830s   and   40s,   often   linked   to   romantic   ideas;   second,  petty  bourgeois  federalism  (Pi  i  Margall  1868)  and  progressivism,   around  and  since  the  Revolution  and  the  First  Republic  in  the  late  1860s   and   the   70s;   third,   conservative   bourgeois   provincialism   which   later   became   regionalism,   and,   not   least,   fourth,   clerico-­‐reactionary   conservatism,  mostly  of  Carlist  origins.2     In   1883,   for   example,   the   federalists   and   the   Carlists   alike   asked   for   a   Catalan   state   within   an   Iberian   Federation,   and   by   the   late   1880s   provincialist   and   regionalist   organisations   demanding   institutional   recognition  of   the  public  use  of   the  Catalan   language  had  mushroomed.   The  breakthrough  of  the  Catalanist  movement  to  Miroslav  Hroch’s  phase  B   around  1880  was  due   to  a  characteristic  constellation   in  which  various   factors  came  together:  cultural  and  organisational  saturation  by  the  effects   of   the   Renaixença   (since   the   1830s),   economic   prosperity   and   modernisation   by   the   repercussions   of   full-­‐scale   industrialisation   in   relevant   parts   of   Catalonia   since   the   1860s,   on   the   one   hand,   and   a   continuation  and  intensification  of  politico-­‐institutional  dispossession  and   frustration,   on   the   other,   from   the   1830s   through   the   60s   down   to   Restauration  and  the  end  of  the  Third  Carlist  War  in  the  70s.3     Studies  on  National  Movements,  2  (2014)      |      ARTICLES   Hans-­‐Jürgen  Puhle   3   Sequences  and  types   Catalan  nationalism  has  been  part  of  what  I  call  the  fourth  wave  out  of  a   total  of  six  waves  of  contemporary  nationalist  movements,  each  defined  by   a   number   of   macro-­‐regional,   developmental   and   functional   similarities   and   often   by   a   coincidence   in   time   (see   Table   1).   These   were   the   nationalist   or   regional-­‐nationalist   movements   of   the   so-­‐called   ‘smaller’   peripheral   nations   within   the   Western   and   Southern   European   states   which  have  fought  for  autonomy  statutes  and  federalisation  of  the  state   more  often  than  for  complete  self-­‐determination  and  a  new  nation  state  of   their   own.   Among   them   we   can   find   different   intensities   and   different   types.4  For  Catalan  nationalism  we  can  date   the  Hrochian  thresholds  as   following:   AB   around   1880,5   BC   around   1900,6   and   the   autonomist   equivalent  for  statehood  (NS)   in  1932/79,  so  that  the  complete  formula   relating  the  developmental  stages  of  the  national  movement  to  the  stages   of  statewide  socio-­‐economic  and  political  development  (simplified  BR,  IR,   OW),   would   look   like   this:   BR   –   IR   –   AB   –   OW   –   BC   –   (NS).   In   my   terminology  Catalonia  hence  would  belong  to  the  cases  of  a  disintegrated   dissociation  (because  BC  comes  much  behind  BR)  of  a  relatively  developed   society  (see  Table  2).     Studies  on  National  Movements,  2  (2014)      |      ARTICLES   Hans-­‐Jürgen  Puhle  4     Table  1  |  Six  waves  of  national  movements   1. Nationalisms  of  the  established  early  Western  nation  states  (USA,  France,   Great  Britain,  Sweden,  Denmark,  Portugal,  also  Spain  despite  its  de  facto   multi-­‐national  character)   2. Nationalisms  of  the  strong  and  developed  latecomers  to  nation  stateness   (Italy,  Germany,  and  Japan  since  the  Meiji  reforms)   3. Early  nationalisms  of  stateless  nations,  mostly  East-­‐Central  and  Eastern   Europe   since   the   19th   century,   aspiring   to   break   out   of   multi-­‐national   empires  (Russia,  Ottoman,  Habsburg;  also  Finns  and  Norwegians)   4. Later   nationalist   or   regional-­‐nationalist   movements   of   ‘smaller’   nations   within   the   Western   and   Southern   European   states   (Catalans,   Basques,   Galicians;   Irish,   Scots,   Welsh;   Corsicans,   Occitans,   Bretons,   Alsatians;   Flemish,   Walloons,   Frisians,   etc.;   typologically   similar:   Canada’s   Quebeckers)   5. Anti-­‐imperialist   and   populist   nationalisms   of   the   ‘third   world’,   20th   century,   mostly   ‘national   liberation’   movements   (Latin   America,   Africa,   Asia,  Arab  and  Islamic  world)   6. Post-­‐communist   nationalisms   of   East-­‐Central   and   Eastern   Europe   and   Post-­‐Soviet  Central  Asia  after  1989-­‐90       Studies  on  National  Movements,  2  (2014)      |      ARTICLES   Hans-­‐Jürgen  Puhle   5       Table  2  |  A  tentative  typology  of  national  movements   BR   bourgeois  revolution   IR   industrial  revolution   OW   organisation  of  working-­‐class  movement     AB   transition  to  cultural  nationalism   BC   transition  to  political  nationalism   NS   'nation  state'  (or  equivalent)  (acc.  to  M.  Hroch)     1. 1.  Integration:           AB  -­‐  BC  -­‐  BR/NS  -­‐  IR  -­‐  OW     England,  France     2. 2.  Belated  integration:       AB  -­‐  IR/BC  -­‐  (BR)  -­‐  OW/NS   Germany     3. 3.  Integrated  dissociation:         Czechs           AB  -­‐  IR  -­‐  BR/BC  -­‐  OW  -­‐  NS           Norwegians,  Finns       AB  -­‐  BR/BC  -­‐IR  -­‐  NS  –  OW     4. 4.  Belated  dissociation:       AB  -­‐  BC  -­‐  (BR)  -­‐  IR  -­‐  NS  -­‐  OW     Estonians,  Croats,  Slovaks     5. 5.  Insurgent  dissociation:       Serbs,  Bulgarians         AB  -­‐  BC  -­‐  (BR)  -­‐  NS  -­‐  IR  -­‐  OW       Irish           AB  -­‐  (BR)  -­‐  BC  -­‐  NS  -­‐  IR  –  OW     6. 6.  Disintegrated  dissociation  I  (developed):       Flemings         BR  -­‐  IR  -­‐  AB  -­‐  OW  -­‐  BC  -­‐  (NS)         Welsh           BR/IR  -­‐  AB  -­‐  OW       Catalans,  (Scots)         BR  -­‐  IR  -­‐  AB  -­‐  OW  -­‐  BC  -­‐  (NS)       Basques           BR  -­‐  IR  -­‐  OW  -­‐  AB  -­‐  BC  -­‐  (NS)       Walloons         BR  -­‐  IR  -­‐  OW  -­‐  AB  -­‐  (BC  -­‐  NS)       Alsatians         BR  -­‐  IR  -­‐  OW  -­‐  AB  -­‐  (BC)       7. 7.  Disintegrated  dissociation  II  (underdeveloped):       Britons,  Occitans,         BR  -­‐  AB  -­‐  IR  -­‐  OW  -­‐  (BC)         Gallegos,  Corsicans       BR  -­‐  AB  -­‐  IR  -­‐  OW  -­‐  BC     Studies  on  National  Movements,  2  (2014)      |      ARTICLES   Hans-­‐Jürgen  Puhle  6   What   has,   among   other   things,   to   be   explained   is   why,   of   these   West   European  cases  –  in  contrast  to  Central  and  Eastern  Europe  –  only  a  few  of   the  regionalist  or  nationalist  movements  have  reached  Hroch’s  phase  C,   the   breakthrough   of   political   nationalism   with   mass   support.   The   exceptions   are   Catalonia,   the   Basque   country   (where   autonomy   can   be   understood  as  an  equivalent  to  NS),  the  Irish,  and  rather  late  the  Scots  and   Gallegos,  to  an  extent  the  Corsicans.  If  we  want  to  find  out  why  these  few   have  made  their  way  to  full-­‐fledged  political  nationalism,  and  others  not,   like  the  Welsh  or  the  Occitans,  although  the  explicit  national  identity  of  the   latter  in  cultural  terms  cannot  be  questioned,  we  have  to  look  much  more   in   detail   into   the   peculiar   combinations   of   socio-­‐economic,   linguistic,   cultural  and  institutional  factors  like  the  following  four:   • Relative  over-­‐  or  underdevelopment  of  the  region  within  the  state   as  a  whole:  a  higher  level  of  development  usually  helps  a  region’s   national   aspirations,   although   there   are   exceptions   (Ireland,   divided  Wales);   • a   language   and   culture   of   its   own:   these   are   necessary,   but   not   sufficient  prerequisites  for  the  success  of  a  national  movement;   • (important,  but  often  overlooked)  the  existence  of  distinct  (past  or   present)  administrative  and  political  structures  and  institutions  of   the  region  (‘institutional  capital’):  these  have  helped  Catalonia,  the   Basque  Country  and  Scotland,  whereas  Galicia,  Wales  or  Brittany   have  lacked  them;   • in   cases   of   endemic   violence   (Northern   Ireland,   the   Basque   Country)  also  the  intensity  of    the  rates  of  repression  or  frustration   may  have  to  be  taken  into  account.7   The   success   of   a   nationalist   movement,   particularly   in   established   democracies  with  different   (and  differently   flexible)   sets  of   institutions,   usually  depends  on  whether  and  how  the  aspirations  and  demands  of  the   ‘small’  nationalisms  can  be  reconciled  with  the  institutional  arrangements   of   the   state.   Here,   a   federal   order   or,   alternatively,   comprehensive   and   integral   mechanisms   of   regionalisation,   devolution   or   ‘autonomisation’   Studies  on  National  Movements,  2  (2014)      |      ARTICLES   Hans-­‐Jürgen  Puhle   7   (such   as   in   Spain)   have   demonstrated   a   certain   superiority   to   mere   centralism,  but  have  been  far  from  ‘solving’  the  problems.       Divided  actors   Another  characteristic  feature  of  Catalan  nationalism  has  been  that  it  has   always  been  divided,  almost  from  its  beginnings,  often  along  class   lines,   recently  more  along   ideological   lines.   It  experienced   its   first  substantial   turnaround   at   the   turn   of   the   century   when   the   Lliga   Regionalista   was   established  in  1901,  triggered  by  the  repercussions  and  polarisations  of   the   great   Spanish   crisis   around   1898,   and   after   more   than   a   decade   of   preparation  in  which  traditional  provincial  ‘Catalanism’  had  transformed   itself   into   Catalanist   regionalism   with   explicit   demands   for   home   rule   along  autonomist  or  federalist  lines  (1886  Almirall:  Lo  Catalanisme,  1887   Lliga  de  Catalunya,   the  campaigns  of  1889,  1891  Unió  Catalanista   [UC],   1892  Bases  de  Manresa  [the  political  programme,  part.  art.  4,  16],  1897   Centre  Català,  1899  participation  in  the  Spanish  government).  Before  the   turnaround  Catalanism  had  been  dominated  by  anti-­‐centralist  and  mostly   anti-­‐modernist   notables   of   the   small   towns   of   the   hinterland.   Now   it   established  itself  as  a  relatively  ‘modern’  Barcelona-­‐centric  emancipation   movement   of   the   urban   bourgeoisie   which   had   become   regionalist   because   it  was  strong  enough   to   rule  Catalonia,  but   too  weak  either   to   dominate   Spain   or   to   declare   independence,   and   hence   embarked   on   a   tendentially  ‘imperialistic’  course  (Ucelay  da  Cal)  trying  to  follow  its  own   interests   at   home   and   to   influence   and   penetrate   Spanish   society   and   politics   (domestic   and   international)   as   much   as   possible.   The   Lliga   Regionalista  under  the  leadership  of  Prat  de  la  Riba  and  Cambó  became  a   modern  mass  party,  equally  present  in  Catalonia  and  in  Madrid  politics.  It   was   the   undisputed   hegemonic   faction   of   Catalan   nationalism   between   1901  and  the  mid-­‐1920s  and  one  of  the  dominant  forces  of  Catalan  politics   besides   the   Lerroux   Republicans   (since   1906/08   PRR);   the   party’s   mobilisation  reached  its  peak  in  1916.8     The  Lliga  dominated  wide  sectors  of  the  intense  networks  of  Catalan  civil   society,   particularly   among   the   entrepreneurial   (Foment),   agricultural   Studies  on  National  Movements,  2  (2014)      |      ARTICLES   Hans-­‐Jürgen  Puhle  8   (IACSI)  and  cultural  organisations,  but  not  all  of  them.  There  always  were   dissenters,   more   radical   minority   factions,   and   organised   interests   opposed  to  those  of  the  Lliga,  voiced  by  other  groups,  mostly  under  the   umbrella  of  the  Unió  Catalanista  (UC),  by  the  efficient  pressure  groups  of   commercial  employees  (CADCI),  and   later  of   the   tenant  winegrowers  of   the  Unió  de  Rabassaires  (UDR  1922),9  or  by  the  many  middle-­‐class  and   intellectual   initiatives   trying   to   win   over   more   republican   voters,   to   organise   more   workers,   or   to   establish   closer   alliances   with   other   working-­‐class   organisations,   like   the   anarchosyndicalist   CNT   (from   1910/11  on),  particularly  when  social  conflictivity  went  up  in  waves,  like   in  1906/07,  1909  (Setmana  Tràgica,  which  however  broke  up  Solidaritat   Catalana),   in   another   great   turnaround   in   1917/18,   and   in   1922/23.     Among  these  groups  of  the  ominous  (and  ill-­‐defined)  ‘Catalanist  Left’  we   can  find  short-­‐lived  enterprises   full  of  semi-­‐utopian   inspiration,   like  the   axis   Layret/Segui/Companys   around   1920   (all   three   of   them   were   eventually  killed),  and  many  organisational  endeavours,  often  small,  given   to  fragmentation  and  of  short  duration.10  The  most  important  ones  were   the   Centre   Nacionalista   Republicà   (CNR   1906/07),   the   Unió   Federal   Nacionalista  Republicana  (UFNR  1910),  the  Esquerra  Catalanista  (1914),   the  Bloc  Republicà  Autonomista  (BRA  1915),  the  Partit  Republicà  Català   (PRC  1917),  Macià’s  separatist  Federació  Democràtica  Nacionalista  (FDN   1919),  and  Domingo’s  populist  Esquerra  Catalana  (1921).  We  might  also   mention  the  heretic  and  explicitly  nationalist  (and  no  longer  regionalist)   youth  organisations  and  social  catholics  of  Acció  Catalana  (AC)  which  split   from  the  Lliga  in  1922,  joined  the  ‘Triple  Alianza’  of  1923  and  later  played   a  role  in  the  transition  to  the  Republic  (Bofill,  d’Olwer,  Rovira  i  Virgili).  We   better  might  put  Catalan  nationalisms  into  the  plural.         The  internal  divisions  of  the  Catalan  nationalists  were,  of  course,  a  liability   for  their  political   influence  and  weight.  The  Lliga’s  strategy  of  corporate   integration  failed,  due  to  the  limitations  of  its  bourgeois  class  politics,  its   many   pacts   with   the   Spanish   government,   and   because   its   room   for   manoeuvre  in  the  Mancomunitat  (1913-­‐24)  was  not  sufficient.  The  party   lost  votes,  split  in  1922,  and  continued  discrediting  itself  through  the  20s   and  30s.11  Political   separatism   that  emerged  after   the  First  World  War,   was   basically   tied   to   middle-­‐class   interests   from   the   hinterland   (and   Studies  on  National  Movements,  2  (2014)      |      ARTICLES   Hans-­‐Jürgen  Puhle   9   eventually   the   CADCI)   and   had   no   mass   basis   because   it   polarised   the   Catalans  by  attacking  the  Lliga  and  splitting  the  left.  The  diffuse  ‘Catalanist   Left’   consisted   of   weak,   heterogeneous   and   fragmented   groups,   mostly   artisans  and  intelligentsia  trying  to  reach  out  to  the  workers,  particularly   those  organised  by  the  CRT  and  CNT.  But  whenever  they  did  this,  they  lost   middle-­‐class  Catalanists,  and  mostly  could  not  win  over  the  workers  either   (CNR,   UFNR,   PRC,   1909,   1916/17).   Until   1917/18   they   often   became   sandwiched  between  the  Lliga  and  the  CNT  which  was  not  anti-­‐Catalanist,   but   (until   1923)   only   temporarily   and   partly   open   for   Catalanist   interests.12   This   changed   in   the   Second   Republic   when   cooperation   increased  (Trentistes  1931,  autonomy  statute,  Generalitat,  Civil  War).  On   the  whole,  the  ‘Catalanist  Left’  was  much  more  nationalist  than  socialist:   Wilson  triumphed  over  Lenin  (Ucelay  da  Cal).13  Even  the  most  promising   group   until   1923,   the   Catalan   Republican   Party   (PRC),   after   the   end   of   Layret’s   project   of   a   Catalan   republican   socialism,   became   a   more   moderate  middle-­‐class  party.   The  most  important  new  organisation  of  the  ‘Catalanist  Left’  rising  from   the   struggles   of   the   early   20s,   however,   was   (at   least   in   retrospective)   Macià’s  Estat  Català  (EC  1922).  It  started  out  separatist,  took  over  the  FDN,   fought  the  Primo  dictatorship,  moved  back  to  a  more  traditional  federalist   position,   used   populist   strategies   in   order   to   make   Catalan   nationalism   more  attractive  to  the  middle  and  working  classes,  colonised  the  PRC  and   others,  and  became  one  of  the  driving  forces    behind  the  populist  alliance   of   the   Esquerra   Republicana   de   Catalunya   (ERC)   of   1931   which   united   separatists   (Macià),   republican   Catalanists   (Companys)   and   radical   populists   (Domingo),   and   established   itself   as   the   hegemonic   actor   in   Catalanist  politics   throughout   the  1930s.   In  1931   the  Esquerra  was   the   first   to   proclaim   a   Catalan   republic   within   an   Iberian   Federation,   even   before  the  Spanish  Republic  had  been  proclaimed.  The  ‘Catalanist  Left’  had   taken  over  Catalan  nationalism,  though  at  a  price.14   Studies  on  National  Movements,  2  (2014)      |      ARTICLES   Hans-­‐Jürgen  Puhle  10   Party  politics  and  pacts   During  most  of  the  20th  century  Catalan  nationalism  has  been  dominated   by  party  politics.  The  only  exception  were  the  consolidated  years  of  the   Franco  Regime  when  Catalanist  interests  and  strategies  were  coordinated   more   by   culturalist   and   civil   society   organisations,   like   the   Òmnium   Cultural   (since   1961)   and   others.   The   objectives   of   nationalist   politics   were   usually   defined   by   the   hegemonic   parties   (or   alliances)   which   organised  and  represented  the  nationalists:  Between  1900  and  the  mid-­‐ 20s  this  was  the  Lliga,  during  the  1930s  the  ERC,  and  after  the  transition  of   the   late   1970s   for   a   longer   time   the   Pujolisme   of   Convergència   i   Unió   (CiU).   Despite   the   differences   between   these   parties   there   have   been   a   number   of   interesting   continuities   in   shared   beliefs,   programmatic   preferences,   in   the   articles   of   the   nationalist   credo,   the   use   of   the   movements’  traditions  (including  what  Enric  Ucelay  da  Cal  has  called  the   ‘Catalan  Whig  interpretation  of  history’),15  and  particularly  in  the  secular   shift   towards   populist   politics.   The   Lliga   paved   the   way,   ERC   pushed   populism   to   its   breakthrough,   and   Pujolisme   (to   the   chagrin   of   the   resurrected  Esquerra)  ratified  and  continued  it,  in  an  eclectic  way,  as  if  CiU   were  the  natural  successor  of  the  ERC  of  the  Republic.  Which  it  was,  in  a   way.   Another  crucial  element  of  the  politics  of  Catalan  nationalists  has  (at  least   until  2012)  been  a  modern  version  of  ‘pactisme’,  i.e.  a  tendency  towards   (and  often  a  need  for)  concluding  pacts  and  building  alliances  with  other,   mostly  non-­‐nationalist  political  forces,  usually  ad  hoc,  and  differently  on   different   issues   and   in   the   different   political   arenas   that   were   three   to   four:  Barcelona,   the  other  Catalan  provinces,  Catalonia  as  a   region,  and   Spanish   politics   in   Madrid.   Often   the   differences   between   nationalist   groups   have   also   been   defined   by   their   different   alliances,   be   it   with   bourgeois  or  middle-­‐class  groups,  with  populist  and  catch-­‐all  parties  of  all   kinds,  or  with  the  usual  factions  of  the  working-­‐class  movements.  Among   the  latter,  the  special  relationships  between  ‘more  Catalan’  groups  of  the   anarcho-­‐syndicalist  CNT  (Segui,  Trentistes),  the  socialists  and  communists   (USC,  PSUC,  POUM,  eventually  PSC,  less  and  less)  and  the  ‘Catalanist  Left’   are  particularly   interesting.  Here  various  additional  cleavages  interfered   Studies  on  National  Movements,  2  (2014)      |      ARTICLES   Hans-­‐Jürgen  Puhle   11   and  partly  overlapped  with  the  principal  cleavage  between  nationalist  and   non-­‐nationalist   politics   (not   to   speak   of   the   fine-­‐print   varieties   of   regionalism,   federalism,   ‘autonomism’   and   separatism).   Through   long   periods   the   most   important   ones   have   been   monarchy/republic,   Church/State,  economic,  social  and  tax  policies,  the  omnipresent  right/left   cleavage,  and  the  mere  contestation  for  the  votes.  Classical  examples  for   such   ‘mixed-­‐cleavage’   pacts   have   been   the   participation   in   the   conservative   Spanish   government   of   1899   (which   set   a   precedent   for   subsequent  cooperation   in  1909,  1917,  1919),   the  polarising  alliance  of   Solidaritat  Catalana  (1906),  the  alliances  for  the  Mancomunitat  (1913),  for   the  political  transitions  of  1931  and  the  late  1970s,  and  for  the  autonomy   statutes  of  1932,  1979  and  2006,  or  the  various  pacts  or  initiatives  with   republicans  and  anarchosyndicalists  after  1917  and  in  the  1920s  and  30s,   or  with  socialists  and  communists  since  the  Second  Republic,  in  the  Civil   War  and  in  the  opposition  against  Franco  (for  example  Coordinadora  de   Forces  Polítiques  de  Catalunya  1969,  Assemblea  de  Catalunya  1971).16                                                                                     In   Spain’s   new   democracy   both   conservative   and   socialist   governments   have  often  needed  the  votes  of  Jordi  Pujol’s  CiU  in  Madrid  (and  paid  for  it).   At  home  in  Catalonia,  Pujol,  when  he  needed  it  after  1999,  preferred  to  ally   himself  with  the  conservative  Spanish  Partido  Popular  (PP),  and  not  (like   in   the  mid-­‐80s)  with  his   ‘leftist’   fellow  nationalists  of   the  ERC.  And   the   latter   had   no   major   problems   to   join   the   coalition   governments   of   the   ‘Tripartit’  led  by  the  Catalan  socialists  (2003-­‐2010),  the  chief  rivals  of  the   nationalists  (though  with  rising  internal  dissent  from  2006  on),  while,  at   the  same  time  (2004-­‐06),  CiU  leaders  negotiated  an  agreement  on  the  new   autonomy  statute  with  the  Spanish  socialists  (PSOE)  in  Madrid.    It  was  not   until   the   conflict   over   the   new   autonomy   statute   had   substantially   escalated   and   CiU   had   been   punished   in   the   elections   of   2012   that   the   Esquerra  came  back  to  tolerate  a  CiU  government  in  Catalonia.  In  times  of   nationalist  radicalisation  and  polarisation  the  space  for  ‘pactisme’  seems   to  have  shrunk,  for  the  first  time.  In  the  moment  it  appears  to  be  confined   to  the  nationalist  camp  only.     Studies  on  National  Movements,  2  (2014)      |      ARTICLES   Hans-­‐Jürgen  Puhle  12   From  regionalism  to  ‘autonomism’  to  separatism     If  we  reduce  the  aspirations  and  options  of  the  significant  actors  of  Catalan   nationalism  to   four  basic   types  –  regionalism,   federalism,   ‘autonomism’,   and   separatism   (or   independentism,   ‘sobiranisme’)   –   and   look   at   the   trajectories  of  the  various  movements  through  the  last  130  years  or  so,  we   can  identify  a  characteristic  trend  along  those  lines:  from  regionalism  and   federalism   via   ‘autonomism’   to   separatism   and   independentism,   not   without  overlaps,  double  standards,  nuances,  shifts,  and  many  elements  of   ‘die  Gleichzeitigkeit  des  Ungleichzeitigen’  that  might  require  some  caveats.   ‘Federalism’  for  example  has  to  be  qualified  because  the  notion  in  some   cases  might  not  refer  to  federal  systems  like  the  Swiss,  German  or  North   American,   but   more   to   loosely   coupled   confederations   like   the   ‘Iberian   Federation’   in   traditional   anarcho-­‐syndicalist   or   Catalanist   terminology   (which  could  be  combined  with  independentism,  or  with  regionalism,  as  in   the  Bases  de  Manresa  of  1892).  And  in  more  recent  times  new  notions  of   ‘asymmetric   federalism’   have   emerged.17   On   the   whole,   we   can   clearly   distinguish  four  phases.  From  the  beginnings  in  the  1880s  down  to  around   1917/18   regionalist   concepts   prevailed,   as   they   were   embodied   in   the   politics   of   the   Lliga   or   in   the   modest   institutions   of   the   Mancomunitat   (1913-­‐24),  even  if  there  were  eventual  overlaps  with  federalist  positions,   Catalonia   was   more   and   more   seen   as   a   nation,   and   some   dissenting   organisations   of   the   ‘Catalanist   Left’,   from   1906/1910   on,   increasingly   asked  for  more  institutionalised  autonomy  and  a  respective  statute  (UFNR,   some  youth  groups,  Macià,  Esquerra  Catalanista,  BRA,  PRC).  There  were,   however,  no  meaningful  separatist  demands  whatsoever.                                                                                       This  changed  significantly  in  the  second  phase,  from  1917/18  to  the  end  of   the  Spanish  Civil  War  in  1939:  It  was  characterised  by  the  disappearance   of   regionalism,   a   structural   parallelism   of   separatist   and   autonomist   demands,   in   which   the   latter   somehow   prevailed,   and   a   number   of   different  federalist  revivals  in  the  contexts  of  both.  Separatist  aspirations   were  first  voiced  by  Macià  in  November  1918  and  remained  the  credo  of   FDN  and  Estat  Català  through  1923  and  beyond,  though  it  lost  some  of  its   teeth  by  being  more  and  more  blended  with  federalism  and  populism,  and   by  a  general  upsurge  of  autonomism  (e.g.,  AC  1922,  PRC).  The  position  of   Studies  on  National  Movements,  2  (2014)      |      ARTICLES   Hans-­‐Jürgen  Puhle   13   the   ERC   in   1931   was   federalist   and   separatist,   but   it   accepted   the   autonomist   compromise   of   the   Statute   of   Nuria   of   1932,   though   not   without  a  tendency  to  relapse,  like  in  the  October  uprising  of  1934  when   Companys   proclaimed   a   Catalan   state   that   was   not   to   be.   The   ERC’s   position  was  shared  by  its  socialist  ally  of  the  Unió  Socialista  de  Catalunya   (USC)   which   in   1936   became   the   core   of   the   PSUC,   one   of   its   closest   partners   in   time  of  war.  Also   the   influential   tenant  winegrowers  of   the   Unió  de  Rabassaires  (UDR)  and  the  Bloc  Obrer   i  Camperol  (BOC)  which   was  more  socialist  and  communist  than  nationalist  (and  later  ended  in  the   POUM),  favoured  separatism  for  some  time,  before  the  final  phase  of  the   Civil  War  and  Franco’s  victory  made  further  discussions  pointless.18   The  third  phase  from  the  reinstallation  of  the  Generalitat  in  1977  and  the   Autonomy   Statute   of   Sau   (1979)   to   2005/06   was   the   heyday   of   ‘autonomism’,  and  an  almost  ‘idyllic’  phase  of  Catalan  nationalism  under   the   hegemony   of   Pujolisme,   in   a   new   structural   context:   the   Spanish   Estado  de  las  Autonomías  which  was  less  than  a  federal  system,  but  more   than  mere  regionalisation  or  devolution.  Conceived  as  ‘asymmetric’  in  the   beginning,   by   giving   the   ‘historical’   autonomous   communities   like   Catalonia   more   jurisdiction   in   some   matters   (though   in   different   ways,   compared  to  the  Basque  country  and  Navarra),  the  system  has,  however   been   increasingly   ‘resymmetrised’   by   framework   legislation   and   more   generalised   policies   of   decentralisation,   so   that   it   is   now   deemed   insufficient   by   the   Catalan   nationalists   and   government.   Pujol’s   ruling   coalition   (CiU)   of   the   liberal   CDC   and   the   Christian-­‐Democratic   UDC   (smaller  and  less  nationalistic)  represented  an  unspecific  and  streamlined   nationalism   ‘without  adjectives’.   It  paid   lip  service  to  self-­‐determination   (particularly   in   1989,   1998,   after   2005),   remained   unclear   toward   federalism,  and  behaved   loyal   to   the  Estado  de   las  Autonomías  actively   taking   advantage   of   its   mechanisms   and   opportunities,   particularly   in   educational   and   cultural   matters.   ‘Pujolisme’,   in   a   selective   way,   also   embraced   the  populist  heritage  of   the  ERC  of   the  30s,  and  many  of   the   entrepreneurial,   missionary   and   ‘imperialist’   traditions   of   the   Lliga,   defining  Catalonia  as  a  principal  agent  of  progress  and  modernisation,  for   the  Paїsos  Catalans,  for  Spain  and  for  Europe.  ‘Autonomism’  also  prevailed   by   far   in   the  surveys  on   the  preferences  of   the  Catalans  with  regard   to   Studies  on  National  Movements,  2  (2014)      |      ARTICLES   Hans-­‐Jürgen  Puhle  14   territorial  organisation.  Separatism  was  not  an  issue.  Only  the  small  and   more  radical  republican  Esquerra  (ERC),  after  a  generational  shift  of   its   leadership,   in   its  new  programme  of  1992  set  a  separatist  course  again,   much  earlier  than  others.19               This  ‘idyllic  phase’  came  to  an  end,  and  a  fourth  phase  began  when  after   2005  survey  preferences  began  to  change,  more  rapidly  from  2007  on:  in   only  five  years  (2007-­‐12)  ‘autonomism’  lost  about  half  of  its  support  and   since  then  has  ended  up  third  behind  independentism,  or  separatism,  and   federalism  (see  Table  3).       This   corresponded   to   a   decisive   new   turn   of   Catalan   nationalism,   the   reasons  for  which  have  been  many:  the  outcome  of  the  negotiations  on  the   new  Autonomy  Statute  of  Miravet  (2004-­‐06)  which  should  have  brought   Table  3  |  Evolution  of  Catalans’  territorial  political  preferences   (2005-­‐2013)       Studies  on  National  Movements,  2  (2014)      |      ARTICLES   Hans-­‐Jürgen  Puhle   15   substantial  improvements  in  status,  tax  legislation  and  transfer  of  powers   (more  along  the  lines  of  ‘asymmetrical’  federalism),  was  disappointing  for   the   Catalans.   Most   intended   reforms   were   watered   down,   first   by   the   Spanish  Parliament   (03/2006),   then,  after   the  statute’s   ratification  by  a   (still  impressive)  majority  in  a  referendum  (06/2006)  and  a  long  process   of   deliberation,   by   the   Constitutional   Court   (2010).   ‘Autonomism’   and   federalism  had  not  delivered.  In  addition,  the  great  financial  and  structural   crisis   after   2008,   Catalonia’s   rising   debt   and   social   problems,   and   the   intransigence  of   the  conservative  Spanish  government  refusing   to  move   (from  2011  on)  have  contributed  to  rising  conflictivity.  Hence  all  political   forces   of   Catalonia   radicalised,   and   the   majority   nationalists   of   the   CiU   under  its  leader  Artur  Mas  who  took  over  the  Catalan  government  in  2010,   followed  the  minority  ERC  in  embarking  on  a  separatist  course  advocating   independence,  sovereignty  and  an  unclear  confederation,  however  foggy   and   protracted   the   envisaged   steps   toward   its   implementation   may   appear.   There   does   not   seem   to   be   a   way   back   to   the   Estado   de   las   Autonomías  as  we  knew  it.20     Some  basic  thresholds     From   the   periodisation   of   these   trends   some   basic   thresholds   in   the   trajectories   of   Catalan   nationalisms   should   be   clear.   The   five   most   important  ones  have  been  mentioned:                 • the  first  great  turnaround  of  the  long  1890s  (beginning  in  1886:   Almirall)   which   culminated   in   the   establishment   of   the   Lliga   Regionalista  in  1901  as  the  hegemonic  force;   • the   second   turnaround   that   began   in   1917/18,   ended   the   hegemony   of   the   Lliga   (in   the   early   1920s),   triggered   new   demands  for  autonomy  and  independence  and  a  broad  variety  of   new   organisations   and   alliances   of   the   ‘Catalanist   Left’   which   finally  took  over  and  crystallised  in  the  Esquerra  Republicana  in   1931  as  the  new  majority  faction  of  Catalan  nationalism.   Studies  on  National  Movements,  2  (2014)      |      ARTICLES   Hans-­‐Jürgen  Puhle  16   • The  third  and  the  fourth  threshold  are  marked  by  the  beginning  of   the  authoritarian  Franco  Regime  in  1939  and  its  end  in  the  second   half  of  the  1970s.  This  forty-­‐years  interlude  of  (a  partly  terroristic)   Spanish   centralism   forced   Catalan   nationalists   into   the   underground   or   into   exile;   many   lost   their   lives.   With   the   establishment   of   the   new   Estado   de   las   Autonomías   in   1979   a   longer   period   of   institutionally   consolidated,   though   contained   autonomic  rule  began,  the  scope  of  which,  for  many  reasons,  was   increasingly  considered  insufficient  in  Catalonia.   • The  fifth,  and  so  far  last  threshold  can  be  seen  in  the  beginning  of   the  manifest  crisis  of  the  autonomist  model  around  2005/06.  Since   then,  ‘autonomism’  and  many  institutions  of  the  Spanish  state  have   lost  their  acceptance  in  Catalonia,  independentism  and  separatism   have   been   on   the   rise,   and   radicalisation   and   polarisation   have   been  increased,  particularly  in  2010,  in  2012,  and  beyond.                          To   these   ‘big’   thresholds   we   may   have   to   add   some   others   with   high   significance.   First   there   are   the   changes   of   political   regimes   that   had   consequences   for   the   institutions   of   Catalan   auto-­‐administration   and   territorial  organisation:  The  takeover  of  General  Primo  de  Rivera  in  1923   led  to   the  end  of   the  Catalan  Mancomunitat  one  year   later,  after  eleven   years  of  its  existence.  And  the  proclamation  of  the  Spanish  (and  Catalan)   Republic   in   1931   triggered   the   first   Autonomy   Statute   for   Catalonia   of   1932,  which  was  suspended  after  the  failed  uprising  of  1934,  reinstated  in   1936  and  finally  abolished  when  Franco  took  over  at  the  end  of  the  Civil   War.   Finally   we   have   the   transition   to   democracy   of   the   late   1970s.   Another   type   of   significant   turns,   changes   or   redirections   in   Catalan   nationalist  politics  has  to  do  with  conflicts  and  violence,  besides  the  war   and   crisis   of   1898,   the   persistent   Moroccan   crises   and   the   Civil   War,   particularly   the   various   waves   of   violent   labour   unrest   and   their   repression  by   the  authorities,  endemic  after  1900,  around  1909/10/12,   between   1917   and   1923,   or   from   1934   on,   the   exodus   of   1939,   and   Francoist   repression   through   its   various   stages   against   which   also   new   alliances   of   the   opposition   could   be   tried   out,   with   Catholic   youth   and   student   groups   (a   particular   reservoir   of   future   leaders),   the   unions   of   Comisiones   Obreras,   and   the   Catalan   communists   of   the   PSUC.   A   third   Studies  on  National  Movements,  2  (2014)      |      ARTICLES   Hans-­‐Jürgen  Puhle   17   category  of  thresholds  has  reflected  changes  of  alliances  or  coalitions,  of   the   various   nationalist   parties   and   groups   with   ‘Spanish’   parties   and   groups,   or,   not   too   often,   with   one   another   (as   ERC   and   CiU   have   demonstrated   through   the   last   decades),   and   differently   in   different   arenas.   These   changes   have   often   been   related   to   changes   in   policy   priorities,   particularly   with   regard   to   matters   of   (self-­‐determined)   institution   building   (and   its   symbols),   transfers   of   powers,   or   tax   legislation  (cf.  1983,  1998).     A  few  thresholds  have  also  reflected  the  repercussions  of  macro-­‐processes   of   social   change:   the   rise   of   the   Lliga   around   1900   ratified   the   consequences  and  characteristics  of   industrialisation   in  Catalonia.21  The   precarious  consolidation  of   the  ERC   in   the  1930s  reflected   the  populist   tendencies   inherent   in  democratic  mass  politics   in  an  uprooted  society.   And  the  all-­‐encompassing  moderate  neo-­‐populist  course  of  Pujol’s  catch-­‐ all  CiU  after  1980  can  only  be  understood  considering  that  Catalan  society   during  the  transition  and  after  was  significantly  different  from  what  it  had   been  down  to  the  1930s  and  40s.  The  economic  opening,  rising  investment   in  industries,  services  and  infrastructure  since  the  late  1950s  and  60s  had   produced  a   rise   in   the   standard  of   living,  new  waves  of  migration,   and   triggered   comprehensive   processes   of   modernisation,   urbanisation   and   liberalisation.   Anarcho-­‐syndicalism   had   practically   disappeared,   Communism   was   weak,   and   the   more   fundamentalist   Catholic   and   nationalist  traditions  of  the  hinterland  were  on  the  retreat.22  So  Pujol  did   not  hesitate  to  dance  at  the  fiestas  of  immigrants  from  Andalucía,  and  he   succeeded,  at  least  at  the  polls  for  the  Catalan  parliament.  The  important   municipal  elections   in  Barcelona  and  the  statewide  Spanish  elections   in   Catalonia  were  usually  won  by  the  Catalan  socialists  (PSC).   Threats  and  models  for  the  21st  century       There  is  some  evidence  that  also  the  latest  ‘big’  threshold  in  the  politics  of   Catalan  nationalism,  the  turn  towards  independence  and  separatism  of  the   last  decade,  may  have  to  do  with  other  macro-­‐processes  of  economic  and   social  change,  though  in  a  complicated  and  sometimes  contradictory  way.   Studies  on  National  Movements,  2  (2014)      |      ARTICLES   Hans-­‐Jürgen  Puhle  18   Here   I   am   particularly   referring   to   a   secular   process   of   basic   and   substantial  change  in  almost  all  dimensions  of  social  and  political  group   formation   and   interaction   that   has   occurred   in   the   decades   around   the   turn  of  the  century  (hence  ‘threshold  21’).  This  process  has  been  triggered   and  intensified  by  a  constellation  of  at  least  six  to  seven  factors:         1. the   late  repercussions  of   the   ‘stagflation  crisis’  since   the  70s   for   political  and  social  organisation  and  regulation,  deregulation  and   liberalization;   2. the   further   increase   in   ‘globalisation’,   global   exchange   of   capital   and  people,  and  the  protests  against  it;   3. the  implications  of  the  recent  financial,  economic  and  institutional   crisis  since  2008;   4. the  availability  of  the  new  electronic  media  and  IT,  particularly  the   internet  and  the  social  media  which  have  given  new  momentum  to     5. a   comprehensive   mediatisation   of   politics   and   an   intensification   and  ‘deepening’  of  the  processes  of  structural  change  of  the  public   sphere   and   of   the   character   of   the   political     (about   which   Habermas  first  wrote  more  than  fifty  years  ago).       6. A  sixth  process  can  be  described  as  the  breakthrough  of  ‘populist   democracy’  on  a  broad  scale,  within  a  favourable  ambience  full  of   windows  of  opportunity,  ‘populist  moments’,  and  agency.   7. For   the   European   context   we   have   to   add   a   seventh   process:   intensified  European  integration  and  institution  building  implying   more   coordination   and   interdependence,   combined   with   a   perceived  lack  of  democratic  legitimation  and  an  underdeveloped   institutional   imagination   regarding   the   future   of   the   Union,   and   finally  the  crisis  of  the  Euro  and  the  remedies  to  cure.23                 For   Catalonia   this   implied,   among   other   things,   a   severe   economic   and   social   crisis,   an   unproportional   fiscal   deficit   and   public   debt,   increased   immigration   and   a   progressive   Castilianisation   (or   ‘opening   up’,   from   a   different  view)  of  Catalan  society  which  produced  new  identity  problems   and  intensified  identity  politics  in  the  nationalist  camp  which  could  take   Studies  on  National  Movements,  2  (2014)      |      ARTICLES   Hans-­‐Jürgen  Puhle   19   advantage  of  the  good  conjunctures  of  populist  politics.  Even  a  peacefully   and  productively  integrated  Catalan  society  would  be  less  ‘Catalan’  in  the   traditional   way   conceived   in   ‘ethnic’   terms   (and   hence   we   also   can   increasingly   find   more   ‘progressive’   additional   definitions   of   Catalan   ‘identity’   in   more   ‘civic’   terms   of   democracy   and   welfare).   The   new   Autonomy  Statute  negotiated  and  ratified  in  2005/06,  beyond  its  function   to  remedy  the  shortcomings  of  the  old  one  after  25  years,  to  bring  it  up  to   date  and  develop  further  the  mechanisms  of  the  Estado  de  las  Autonomías,   was  also  meant  to  address  these  problems  and  give  some  relief  to  the  real   and   perceived   threats   to   Catalan   identity,   symbolically,   linguistically,   institutionally   and   fiscally.   When   the   Statute,   however,   was   further   watered   down   by   the   Constitutional   Court   after   its   ratification   and   did   neither   recognise   the   plurinationality   of   the   State   nor   make   any   improvements   in   self-­‐government   (asymmetric   federalism   or   ‘shared   sovereignty’),   transfer   of   competences   and   tax   sharing,   disenchantment   and   frustration   set   in   which   were   further   increased   by   the   subsequent   intransigence  and  immobility  of  the  Spanish  Parliament  and  governments   in  (not)  addressing  the  urgent  Catalan  problems  and  needs.     This  was  the  constellation  into  which  a  new  generation  of  leaders  of  the   Catalan  nationalists   in  both  parties,  ERC  and  CiU,   (and  also  beyond   the   parties)  could  launch  a  renewed  separatist  project  demanding  the  ‘right  to   decide’,  Catalan  statehood,  and   independence,  with  all   the  agitation  and   the  visible  ‘tools  for  torture’  this  implies  (like  the  controversial  ‘unilateral   referendum’  as  an   initial  step).24  When  this  began,   the  outside  observer   may   have   wondered   whether   the   campaign   for   independence   could   be   considered  as  a  calculated  ultimate  strategic  resort  in  order  to  break  the   impasse  and  get  back  into  negotiations  of  an  improved  Autonomy  Statute   or  a  reform  of  the  Estado  de  las  Autonomías  with  Madrid,  albeit  with  the   risk  implied  that  the  situation  might  produce  its  own  dynamics  and  get  out   of  control.  However,  such  a  strategy,  if   it  ever  was  one,  has  not  worked.   Addressing  the  Catalan  discontents  and  demands  within  the  framework  of   Spanish  institutions  would  have  required  that  both  sides  renounce  to  their   maximalist  positions  and  compromise  on  some  kind  of   imaginative  and   practical  models  for  territorial  organisation  as  they  have  been  debated  in   the  first  decade  of  the  21st  century,  like:  a  gradual  reform  of  the  autonomy   Studies  on  National  Movements,  2  (2014)      |      ARTICLES   Hans-­‐Jürgen  Puhle  20   statutes  beyond  the  status  quo,  or  some  kind  of  federalism,  more  but  not   too  asymmetric,  an  order  that  would  exclude  hermetic  identities  and  allow   for  a  recognition  of   the  plurinationality  of   the  State  and  mechanisms  of   shared   sovereignty,   along   the   formula   of   Xosé   Núñez:   a   socially   plurinational,   and   institutionally   pseudo-­‐plurinational   state,   ‘ma   non   troppo’.  This  was  written  in  2006.  Now  it  appears  long  ago,  indeed.25   As   the   conservative   government   in   Madrid   (and   also   the   socialist   opposition)   has   not   been   ready   for   a   substantially   improved   ‘Spanish   solution’   all   the   way,   and   the   Catalan   nationalists,   in   their   turn,   have   become   increasingly   disenchanted,   disaffected   and   alienated   of   it,   the   project  of  independence  has  significantly  gained  momentum  everywhere   in  Catalan  society.  At  the  same  time,  polarisation  has  gone  up,  and  both   sides  have  radicalised,  the  nationalists  and  the  anti-­‐nationalists,  as  it  could   be  seen  in  the  elections  of  2012  (gains  for  ERC  and  Ciutadans,  cf.  Table  4),   and  particularly  in  more  recent  survey  results  on  perceived  identities,  on   the  preferences  of  territorial  organisation  and  on  voting  intentions.26       Table  4  |  Catalan  Parliament:  electoral  results  (1999-­‐2012)   [Percentages  (number  of  seats)]     1999   2003   2006   2010   2012   CiU   37,7  (56)   30,9  (46)   31,52  (48)   38,4  (62)   30,7  (50)   PSC   37,9  (52)   31,2  (42)   26,8  (37)   18,4  (28)   14,4  (20)   PP   9,5  (12)   11,9  (15)   10,7  (14)   12,4  (18)   13  (19)   ERC   8,7  (12)   16,4  (23)   14  (21)   7  (10)   13,7  (21)   ICV-­‐EUiA   2,5  (3)   7,3  (9)   9,5  (12)   7,4  (10)   9,9  (13)   Ciutadans   -­‐   -­‐   3  (3)   3,4  (3)   7,6  (9)   CUP   -­‐   -­‐   -­‐   -­‐   3,5  (3)   SCI   -­‐   -­‐   -­‐   3,3  (3)   1,3  (0)     Studies  on  National  Movements,  2  (2014)      |      ARTICLES   Hans-­‐Jürgen  Puhle   21   The   present   procedural   quarrels   on   the   modalities   of   a   ‘unilateral   referendum’,  and  of  ‘negotiating  independence’  more  in  general,  have  also   contributed  to  further  escalation  of  the  conflict.  And  considering  the  actors   as   they   are,   it   has   become   clear   that,   at   a   given   point,   the   Catalan   nationalists   might   have   no   choice   but   to   commit   revolutionary   acts,   in   order  to  pursue  their  goals  (and  they  better  be  prepared  for  it,  as  long  as   they  insist  on  independence),  and  the  Spanish  nationalists  in  government   might   be   tempted   to   send   in   the   police.   Violence,   however   contained,   cannot  be  excluded.  And  it  appears  as  if,  in  this  polarised  situation,  Catalan   nationalism  has  not  only  changed  its  character  and  concept,  from  ‘positive’   to  ‘negative’,  as  Enric  Ucelay  da  Cal  has  eventually  observed  (2013),27  from   a   saturated   and   self-­‐conscious   to   an   insecure   and   complaining   nationalism,  but  also  a  number  of  other  important  features,  constellations   and  functions:   • Catalan  Nationalism  is  no  longer  law-­‐abiding  or  ‘idyllic’  as  it  was  in   the   period   of   Pujolisme,   nor   necessarily   reformist;   it   has   again   become  (at  least  potentially)  revolutionary,  in  the  sense  of  being   determined  to  break  out  of  the  existing  institutional  order.     • At   the   same   time   its   social   base   in   Catalan   society   has   been   broadened,  due  to  the  fact  that  the  politics  of  Catalan  nationalism   are  no  longer  dominated  by  the  respective  political  parties  alone   which   since   2012   have   appeared   increasingly   incapable   of   channeling  the  widespread  discontent  and  protest.  One  of  the  most   significant   new   elements   of   Catalan   nationalism,   unheard   of   for   many   decades,   has   been   the   wide   and   intense   mobilisation   and   organisation  of  civil  society,  by  a  broad  variety  of   initiatives  and   associations  (including  the  historic  Òmnium  and  the  more  recent   Assemblea   Nacional   Catalana   [ANC]   of   2012),   along   more   participatory,  inclusionary  (and  ‘loosely  coupled’)  lines  which  has   enhanced   the   dynamics   of   the   separatist   project   and   given   new   momentum   to   nationalist   politics.   ‘Independence’   also   seems   to   have   particularly   inspired   young   people   in   a   similar   way   ‘democracy’   did   in   the   1970s:   for   a   new   beginning,   a   brighter   future,  and  Catalan  ‘majoria  d’edat’.           Studies  on  National  Movements,  2  (2014)      |      ARTICLES   Hans-­‐Jürgen  Puhle  22     • Here  some  of  the  consequences  of  advanced  globalisation  and  of   the   ‘threshold  21’  come  in:  On  the  one  hand,  now  the  politics  of   Catalan  nationalism  are  framed  by  the  generalised  and  globalising   trends  toward  populist  democracy  (in  a  way  exactly  the  other  way   round   compared   to   what   happened   in   the   1930s   when   the   nationalists   had   used   populism).   On   the   other   hand   (the   ‘provincialising’  side),  the  Catalan  scene  looks  more  like  others  and   less  ‘special’,  and  Catalan  nationalism  may  appear  more  unilinear   and  less  sophisticated  than  before.                   • For  the  same  reasons  we  also  can  no   longer  analyse  the  politics   and  interactions  of  Catalan  nationalism  within  the  container  of  the   Spanish  nation  state  as  the  only  frame  of  reference,  as  it  has  been   done  for  many  years,  though  not  always  (cf.  some  federalists  and   anarchists   since   the   19th   c.).   Not   only   because   Spain,   and   hence   Catalonia   belong   to   the   European   Union   (and   many   other   alliances),  but  also  because  of  globalisation  and  all  the  ‘entangled’   and   ‘reflexive’   interdependencies   it   implies.   What   happens   in   Scotland  or  Québec,  on  the  Balkans,  in  Ukraine  or  Crimea,  and  in   Brussels,   New   York   and   elsewhere   may   have   significant   repercussions  for  Catalonia.                       The   creation   of   a   new   nation   state   in   the   age   (and   within   the   constellations)  of  its  demise  and  ‘blurring’  would  certainly  have  something   ironic  about  it.  Unless  it  would  be  a  post-­‐nation  state,  conceived  by  post-­‐ national  nationalists.       Studies  on  National  Movements,  2  (2014)      |      ARTICLES   Hans-­‐Jürgen  Puhle   23     Endnotes   1  Cf.    H.J.  Puhle,  Staaten,  Nationen  und  Regionen  in  Europa  (Wien,  1995);  H.J.  Puhle,   ‘Nation  states,  nations,  and  nationalisms  in  Western  and  Southern  Europe‘,  in:  J.G.   Beramendi,  R.  Máiz  &  X.M.  Núñez  (eds.),  Nationalism  in  Europe.  Past  and  present,   vol.  2  (Santiago    de  Compostela,  1994)  13-­‐38;  J.J.  Linz,  ‘State  building  and  nation   building’,  in:  European  Review,  1  (1993)  355-­‐369;  J.  Breuilly,  Nationalism  and  the   state  (2nd  ed.:  Manchester,  1993);  M.  Hroch,  Das  Europa  der  Nationen.  Die  moderne   Nationsbildung  im  europäischen  Vergleich  (Göttingen,  2005).     2   Cf.   E.   Ucelay-­‐Da   Cal,   ‘History,   historiography   and   the   ambiguities   of   Catalan   nationalism’,  in:  Studies  on  National  Movements,  1  (2013)  105-­‐159;  G.  Brunn,  ‘Die   Organisation  der  katalanischen  Bewegung  1859-­‐1923’,  in:  T.  Schieder  &  O.  Dann   (eds.),  Nationale  Bewegung  und  soziale  Organisation,  I  (München,  1978)  281-­‐571;   also:   J.J.  Linz,   ‘Early  state-­‐building  and   late  peripheral  nationalisms  against   the   State:  the  case  of  Spain’,  in:  S.N.  Eisenstadt  &  S.  Rokkan  (eds.),  Building  states  and   nations  (Beverly  Hills,  1973)  31-­‐116;  B.  de  Riquer  &  E.  Ucelay-­‐Da  Cal,  ‘An  analysis   of  nationalisms   in  Spain:  a  proposal   for  an   integrated  historical  model’,   in:   J.G.   Beramendi,  R.  Máiz  &  X.M.  Núñez  (eds.),  Nationalism  in  Europe.  Past  and  present,   vol.   2   (Santiago   de   Compostela,   1994)   275-­‐301;   X.M.   Núñez   Seixas,   Los   nacionalismos  en  la  España  contemporánea  (siglos  XIX  y  XX)  (Barcelona,  1999).   3  Cf.  M.  Hroch,  Die  Vorkämpfer  der  nationalen  Bewegung  bei  den  kleinen  Völkern   Europas  (Praha,  1968)  24-­‐26;  M.  Hroch,  Social  preconditions  of  national  revival  in   Europe  (Cambridge,  1985)  22-­‐30;  Puhle,  ‘Nation  states’,  28-­‐35,  and:  Pi  i  Margall’s   project   for  a   federal   constitution  and   the   ‘Projecte  de  Constitució  per  a   l’Estat   Català’   (1883),   in:   J.A.  González  Casanova,  Federalisme   i  autonomia  a  Catalunya   (1868-­‐1938).   Documents   (Barcelona,   1974)   465-­‐493;     F.   Pi   i   Margall,   Las   nacionalidades,   2   vol.   (Madrid   1972   [1877]);   V.   Almirall,   Lo   Catalanisme   (Barcelona,  1979  [1886]).       4  See  H.J.  Puhle,  ‘Neue  Nationalismen  in  Osteuropa  –  ein  sechste  Welle?‘,  in:  E.  Jahn   (ed.),   Nationalismus   im   spät-­‐   und   postkommunistischen   Europa,   vol.   1   (Baden-­‐ Baden  2008)  162-­‐181.     Studies  on  National  Movements,  2  (2014)      |      ARTICLES   Hans-­‐Jürgen  Puhle  24     5   For   example:   1879   Diari   Català,   1880   1st   Catalanist   Congress,   1882   Centre   Català,  1883  2nd  Congress  (political  program),  1886  Almirall:  Lo  Catalanisme.   6   1886   Almirall:   Lo   Catalanisme,   1891   Unió   Catalanista   (UC),   1892   Bases   de   Manresa,  1897  Centre  Català  (Almirall),  1898  Spanish  crisis  (polarisation),  1901   Lliga  Regionalista.   7  See  Puhle,  ‘Neue  Nationalismen‘,  169-­‐171;  also  Hroch,  Europa  der  Nationen,  103-­‐ 108.       8  Cf.    P.  Vilar,  La  Catalogne  dans  l’Espagne  moderne,  2  vol.  (Paris,  1962);  J.  Solé-­‐ Tura,  Catalanismo  y  revolución  burguesa  (Madrid,  1970);  Brunn,  ‘Organisation’;  E.   Ucelay  Da  Cal,  El  imperialismo  catalán.  Prat  de  la  Riba,  Cambó,  D’Ors  y  la  conquista   moral  de  España  (Barcelona,  2003);  E.  Ucelay  Da  Cal,  Nacionalisme  i  imperialisme   catalanista:  d’Almirall  a  Prat  de   la  Riba  (Barcelona,    2012);  B.  de  Riquer,  Lliga   Regionalista:   la   burgesia   catalana   i   el   nacionalisme   (1898-­‐1904)   (Barcelona,   1977);  B.  de  Riquer,  Regionalistes  i  nacionalistes  1898-­‐1931  (Barcelona,  1979);  I.   Molas,  Lliga  Catalana,  2  vol.  (Barcelona,  1972);  J.  Pla,  Cambó  (Barcelona,  1973);  E.   Prat  de  la  Riba,  La  nacionalidad  catalana  (Barcelona,  1987  [1906]);  J.B.  Culla,  El   republicanisme  lerrouxista  a  Catalunya  (1901-­‐1923)  (Barcelona,  1986).   9  Cf.  M.  Caminal  Badia,  ‘La  fundació  de  l’Institut  Agrícola  Català  de  Sant  Isidre:  els   seus  homes  i  les  seves  activitats  (1851-­‐1901)’,  in:  Recerques,  22  (1989)  117-­‐135;   M.  Lladonosa  i  Vall-­‐llebrera,  Catalanisme  i  moviment  obrer:  El  CADCI  entre  1903  i   1923   (Abadia   de   Montserrat,   1988)   [Tesi   Doctoral,   Universitat   Autònoma   de   Barcelona,  1979];  J.  Pomés,  La  Unió  de  Rabassaires  (Barcelona,  2000);  A.  Balcells,   El   problema   agrari   a   Catalunya   (1890-­‐1936).   La   qüestió   rabassaire   (Barcelona,   1968).   10  Still  the  best  and  most  comprehensive  analysis  is  K.J.  Nagel,  Arbeiterschaft  und   nationale  Frage  in  Katalonien  zwischen  1898  und  1923  (Saarbrücken,  1991);  see   also:  X.  Cuadrat,  Socialismo  y  anarquismo  en  Cataluña  (1899-­‐1911).  Los  orígenes  de   la  C.N.T.  (Madrid,    1976);  A.  Balcells,  Trabajo  industrial  y  organización  obrera  en  la   Cataluña   contemporánea   (1900-­‐1936)   (Barcelona,   1974);   J.   Vicens   Vives,   ‘El   moviment  obrerista  català  (1901-­‐1939)’,  in:  Recerques,  7  (1978)  9-­‐31;  J.C.  Ullman,   The  tragic  week.  A  study  of  anticlericalism  in  Spain,  1875-­‐1912   (Cambridge,  MA,   1968);  J.  Romero  Maura,  La  rosa  de  fuego.  Republicanos  y  anarquistas:  la  política   de   los  obreros  barceloneses  entre  el  desastre  colonial  y   la   semana   trágica  1899-­‐   Studies  on  National  Movements,  2  (2014)      |      ARTICLES   Hans-­‐Jürgen  Puhle   25     1909  (Barcelona,  1975);  J.  de  Camps  i  Arboix,  Historia  de  la  Solidaritat  Catalana   (Barcelona,  1970).   11  See  B.  de  Riquer,  Alfonso  XIII  y  Cambó.  La  monarquía  y  el  catalanismo  político   (Barcelona,  2013);  Ucelay  da  Cal,  El  imperialismo.   12  Cf.  Nagel,  Arbeiterschaft,  ch.  V,  esp.  375sq.,  406sq.,  436sq.,  450sq.   13  E.  Ucelay  Da  Cal,  ‘Wilson  i  no  Lenin:  l’esquerra  catalana  i  l’any  1917’,  in:  L’Avenç,   2/9  (Oct.  1978)  53-­‐58.   14  See  E.  Ucelay  Da  Cal,  La  Catalunya  populista.  Imatge,  cultura  i  política  en  l’etapa   republicana  (1931-­‐1939)  (Barcelona,  1982);  E.  Ucelay  Da  Cal,  Francesc  Macià.  Una   vida   en   imatges   (Barcelona,   1984);   J.B.   Culla,   El   Catalanisme   d’Esquerra   (1828-­‐ 1936).   Del   grup   de   ‘L’Opinió’   al   Partit   Nacionalista   Republicà   d’Esquerra   (Barcelona,   1977);   J.B.   Culla   i   Clarà,   Esquerra   Republicana   de   Catalunya,   1931-­‐ 2012.  Una  història  política  (Barcelona,    2013).         15  Ucelay  da  Cal,  ‘History’,  129.   16   Besides   Nagel,   Arbeiterschaft;   Culla   i   Clarà,   Esquerra;   and   Ucelay   da   Cal,   La   Catalunya  populista,  see  J.G.  Beramendi  &  R.  Máiz  (eds.),  Los  nacionalismos  en  la   España  de  la  II  República  (Madrid,  1991);  J.  Termes,  De  la  revolució  de  setembre  a   la  fi  de  la  guerra  civil  (1868-­‐1939)  (Història  de  Catalunya,  VI)  (Barcelona,  1987);  J.   Peirats,  La  CNT  en  la  revolución  española,  3  vol.  (Paris,  1971);  J.  Casanova,    The   Spanish  Republic  and  Civil  War  (Cambridge,  2010);  B.  de  Riquer,    La  dictadura  de   Franco   (Historia   de   España,   9)   (Madrid,   2010)   179-­‐245,   547-­‐607;   A.   Dowling,   Catalonia  since  the  Spanish  Civil  War.  Reconstructing  the  nation  (Brighton,  2013);  J.   Benet,  Catalunya  sota  el  règim  franquista  (Paris,  1973).   17  Cf.  a.o.  F.  Requejo  &  K.J.  Nagel  (eds.),  Federalism  beyond  federations.  Asymmetry   and  processes  of  resymmetrisation   in  Europe  (Farnham,  2011).  See  also  J.J.  Linz,   Democracy,   multinationalism,   and   federalism   (Estudio/Working   Paper,   103)   (Madrid,  1997).       18  Besides  Nagel,  Arbeiterschaft,  and  Culla  i  Clarà,  Esquerra,  see  E.  Ucelay-­‐Da  Cal  &   A.   Gonzàlez   i   Vilalta   (eds.),   Contra   Companys,   1936.   La   frustración   nacionalista   ante   la   revolución   (València,   2012);   Pomés,   Unió;   F.   Bonamusa,   El   Bloc   Obrer   i   Camperol   (1930-­‐1932)   (Barcelona,   1974);   P.   Pagès,   Andreu   Nin:   su   evolución   política  (1911-­‐1937)  (Bilbao,  1975).     Studies  on  National  Movements,  2  (2014)      |      ARTICLES   Hans-­‐Jürgen  Puhle  26     19   Cf.   M.   Guibernau,   Nacionalisme   català.   Franquisme,   transició   i   democracia   (Barcelona,  2003);  P.  Lo  Cascio,  Nacionalisme  i  autogovern:  Catalunya,  1980-­‐2003   (Barcelona,  2008);  J.  Pujol,  El  caminant  davant  del  congost  (Barcelona,  2013);  F.   Martínez  &  J.  Oliveres,  Jordi  Pujol.  En  nom  de  Catalunya  (Barcelona,  2005),  and:  O.   Barberà,   Unió   Democràtica   de   Catalunya   (1931-­‐2003).   Evolució   política   i   organitzativa   (Bellaterra,   2010);   O.   Barberà   &   A.   Barrio,   ‘Convergència   i   Unió:   from  stability   to  decline?’,   in:  L.  de  Winter,  M.  Gómez  Reino,  &  P.  Lynch  (eds.),   Autonomist  parties  in  Europe:  identity  politics  and  the  revival  of  territorial  cleavage   (Barcelona,   2006)   vol.   1,   101-­‐141;   J.B.   Culla   i   Clarà   (ed.),   El   pal   de   paller.   Convergència   Democràtica   de   Catalunya   (1974-­‐2000)   (Barcelona,   2001);   Culla   i   Clarà,  Esquerra.     20   See   a.o.   the   data   in   Anuari   polític   de   Catalunya   2012,   Institut   de   Ciències   Politiques  i  Socials  (Barcelona,  2012),  and  F.  Requejo  &  M.  Sanjaume,  Recognition   and  political  accommodation:  from  regionalism  to  secessionism.  The  Catalan  case,   (GRTP   Political   Theory   Working   Paper,   13)   (Barcelona,   2013);   K.J.   Nagel,   ‘Autonomiestaat   und   Krise   –   Autonomiestaat   in   der   Krise?‘,   in:   Jahrbuch   des   Föderalismus,  2012  (Baden-­‐Baden,  2012)  346-­‐362;  K.J.  Nagel,   ‘Katalonien  –  vom   Autonomismus  zum  Separatismus?‘,  in:  Europa  ethnica,  70/1-­‐2  (2013)    32-­‐45.   21  Besides  Vilar,  Catalogne,  and  Solé  Tura,  Catalanismo,  see  also:  J.  Nadal  Oller  &  J.   Maluquer  de  Motes,  Catalunya,   la   fábrica  d’Espanya.  Un  segle  d’industrialització   catalana,  1833-­‐1936  (Barcelona,  1985);  A.  Jutglar,  Historia  crítica  de  la  burguesía   en   Cataluña   (Barcelona,   1984);   J.M.   Fradera,   Indústria   i   mercat.   Les   bases   comercials  de  la  indústria  catalana  moderna  (1814-­‐1845)    (Barcelona,  1987),  and   A.  Balcells,  J.B.  Culla  &  C.  Mir,  Les  eleccions  generals  a  Catalunya  de  1901  a  1923   (Barcelona,    1982).   22  For  a  good  synthesis  of  economic,  demographic,  social  and  attitudinal  change,   see  (besides  all  the  data  collections):  B.  de  Riquer  &  J.B.  Culla,  El  Franquisme  i  la   transició  democràtica  (1939-­‐1988)  (Història  de  Catalunya,  VII)  (Barcelona,  1989)   171-­‐384.   23  For  more  details  of  the  ‘threshold  21’,  see  H.J.  Puhle,  ‘Old  and  new  populisms  in   the  21st  century:  continuities  and  change’,  in:  A.  Ostheimer  (ed.),  Populism  within   Europe  and  beyond  its  borders  (Baden-­‐Baden,  2016  forthcoming).   24   Cf.   J.   Muñoz   &   M.   Guinjoan,   ‘Accounting   for   internal   variation   in   nationalist   mobilization:  unofficial  referendums  for  independence  in  Catalonia  (2009-­‐11)’,  in:     Studies  on  National  Movements,  2  (2014)      |      ARTICLES   Hans-­‐Jürgen  Puhle   27     Nations  and  Nationalism,  19/1  (2013)  44-­‐67.  For   the  normative  backup,  see  A.   Buchanan,   Justice,   legitimacy   and   self-­‐determination:   moral   foundations   of   international   law   (Oxford,   2007   [2003]);   A.   Buchanan,   Secesión:   causas   y   consecuencias   del   divorcio   político   (Barcelona,   2013),   now   widely   debated   in   Catalonia.     25  X.M.  Núñez  Seixas,  ‘El  nuevo  debate  territorial  en  la  España  actual  (2004-­‐2006):   ¿Hacia  un  estado  plurinacional?’,  in:  W.L.  Bernecker  &  G.  Maihold  (eds.),  España:   del  consenso  a  la  polarización.  Cambios  en  la  democracia  española  (Madrid,  2007)   317-­‐335  (331).  For   the  state  of   the  debate  see  also:    L.  Mees,   ‘El  debate  sobre   nación  y  Estado  en  España:  viejos  retos,  nuevas  posibilidades’,  ibidem,  297-­‐315;   D.  Conversi,  ‘Between  the  hammer  of  globalization  and  the  anvil  of  nationalism:  Is   Europe’s  complex  diversity  under   threat?’,   in:  Ethnicities,  14/1  (2014)  25-­‐49  <   http://etn.sagepub.com/content/14/1/25.full.pdf+html>   [accessed   23/05/2013];   Nagel,   ‘Autonomiestaat’;   Nagel,   ‘Katalonien’,   and   more   generally   P.A.  Kraus,  A  union  of  diversity.  Language,   identity  and  polity-­‐building   in  Europe   (Cambridge,  2008).     26  See  the  data  in  Anuari  polític  de  Catalunya  2013,  Institut  de  Ciències  Politiques  i   Socials  (Barcelona,  2013),  and:  Requejo  &  Sanjaume,  Recognition;  L.  Pérez  &  M.   Sanjaume,  ‘Legalizing  secession:  the  Catalan  case’,  in:  Journal  of  Conflictology,  4/2   (2013)  3-­‐12;  K.J.  Nagel,   ‘Veus  pel  canvi  –  Cap  a  un  nou  Estat?’,   in:   J.  Pigem,  A.   Oliveres,  K.J.  Nagel  e.a.,  Veus  pel  canvi  (Mataró,  2014)    59-­‐91.   27  Ucelay-­‐Da  Cal,  ‘History’,  142-­‐147  (145).