Interjecting Economics into the Surface Water Dialogue


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Texas Water Journal, Volume 10, Number 1

Texas Water Resources Institute
Texas Water Journal

Volume 10, Number 1, December 17, 2019
Pages 112-127

Abstract: This paper applies the conceptual lens of economic efficiency as a criterion by which to evaluate surface water in 
Texas. We identify two major problems. First, Texas has a water allocation problem limiting the ability to substitute groundwa-
ter for surface water to move water between river basins and to facilitate transfers within a river basin. Second, surface water is 
both underpriced and unresponsive to drought conditions preventing it from being used at its highest and best use. We propose 
a variety of partial solutions, which include facilitating greater reliance on water markets as well as a water tax that would vary 
across regions and over time to encourage conservation.

Keywords: surface water regulations, surface water allocation, surface water tax

Interjecting Economics into the 
Surface Water Dialogue

1 Master of Public Service and Administration students, Bush School of Government and Public Service, Texas A&M University 
2 Faculty Advisor - Bush School of Government and Public Service, Texas A&M University 
* Corresponding author: jmgriffin@tamu.edu

Maria Vaca,1 Stefni Richards,1 Alexa Davis,1 Kylie Jackson,1 Nanag Timur,1 Fahad Manzoor,1 
Said Azam,1 Robert Feltman1 and James Griffin2*

Citation: Vaca M, Richards S, Davis A, Jackson K, Timur N, Manzoor F, Azam S, Feltman R, Griffin J. 2019. Interjecting economics into 
the surface water dialogue. Texas Water Journal. 10(1):112-127. Available from: https://doi.org/10.21423/twj.v10i1.7062.

© 2019 Vaca M, Richards S, Davis A, Jackson K, Timur N, Manzoor F, Azam S, Feltman R, Griffin J. This work is licensed under the 
Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. To view a copy of this license, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ 
or visit the TWJ website.

mailto:jmgriffin%40tamu.edu?subject=
https://doi.org/10.21423/twj.v10i1.7062
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
https://twj-ojs-tdl.tdl.org/twj/index.php/twj/about#licensing


Texas Water Journal, Volume 10, Number 1

113Interjecting Economics into the Surface Water Dialogue

Terms used in paper

Acronym Descriptive term
CFS cubic feet per second
CIF Community Involvement Fund
GDP gross domestic product
GCD(s) groundwater conservation districts
LCRA Lower Colorado River Authority
MSB marginal social benefit
MSC marginal social cost
MWD Metropolitan Water District
PVID Palo Verde Valley Irrigation District
PDSI Palmer Drought Severity Index
SWIFT State Water Implementation Fund for Texas
TCEQ Texas Commission on Environmental Quality
TWDB Texas Water Development Board
WAM Water Availability Model

INTRODUCTION

Paradoxically, while Texas is a leader in the science of model-
ling surface water flows (see Wurbs 2015), economic efficiency 
has taken a back seat to other criteria in the surface water policy 
dialogue. These other criteria can include protecting existing 
stakeholders, guaranteeing environmental flows to bays and 
estuaries, protecting water for local use, and so forth.1 Each 
criteria yields separate, and often conflicting, policy recom-
mendations around which various interest groups coalesce. 
The result is an emotion-charged political patchwork fashioned 
during severe droughts. In the past, ignoring economic criteria 
was relatively costless because Texas had an abundance of both 
surface water and groundwater. But with population growing 
from 11.2 million in 1970 to an estimated 29.1 million by 
20192 and the state’s gross domestic product (GDP) topping 
all but 10 countries,3 we can no longer afford to exempt Texas’ 

1 Other examples include protecting: touristic areas, animals and wildlife, 
other economic activities.

2 Texas State Demographer. https://uspopulation2019.com/popula-
tion-of-texas-2019.html

3 This ranking is obtained by comparing the GDP of countries from the 
World Bank Data (2018) and the Texas GDP from the Texas Comptroller 
2018 website. 

water resources from economic scrutiny. Griffin (2017) offered 
a critique of groundwater policy from an economics perspec-
tive. This sequel paper offers an economic critique of surface 
water regulation and is based on a 2017 Bush School Capstone 
report (Vaca et al. 2017) to State Comptroller Glenn Hegar. 

By adopting the conceptual lens of “economic efficiency” 
as this paper’s evaluation criterion, further justification is in 
order. Economic efficiency requires that for the last tranche 
of water consumed, the marginal social cost (MSC) of pro-
viding water just equals its marginal social benefits (MSB).4 
Note that the terms “social” costs and “social” benefits implies 
that we adopt a holistic approach looking at society as a whole 
in which environmental costs are factored in. Economic inef-
ficiency can occur either with too little (MSC>MSC) or too 
much (MSB<MSC) water consumption. Particularly, when 
water is misallocated from high-valued uses to low-valued uses, 
the welfare loss (or efficiency loss) to society as a whole would 
be measured by the difference between the two. For example, 
if surface water is diverted from an industrial user willing to 
pay $1000/acre-foot to a cotton farmer only able to pay $100/
acre-foot, then the welfare loss from this misallocation is $900/
acre-foot. Note that this calculation is value neutral between 

4 See Gruber (2013).

https://uspopulation2019.com/population-of-texas-2019.html
https://uspopulation2019.com/population-of-texas-2019.html


Texas Water Journal, Volume 10, Number 1

Interjecting Economics into the Surface Water Dialogue114

(1) the magnitude of the efficiency gains; (2) the identity and 
magnitude of the loss to the disadvantaged group; and (3) the 
feasibility of compensating the losers.

First, are the efficiency gains potentially large? Going back to 
the cotton/industrial product example, is the difference in val-
ue between the two, $900/acre-foot or only $10/acre-foot? At 
a $900/acre-foot difference, the efficiency gains are potentially 
large, particularly if there are substantial quantities of water 
being relegated to low-valued uses. 

Second, who would lose from the efficiency-enhancing poli-
cy and how much? Both the identity and the magnitude of the 
loss are relevant. Clearly, there are situations where the affected 
group deserves no consideration, such as a monopolist losing 
his monopoly profits due to antitrust prosecution. The case of 
the cotton farmer is more problematic. Is there a national secu-
rity justification for subsidizing cotton production by provid-
ing cheap water? Are there other justifications such as cotton 
farmers representing a unique culture that is worth preserving? 
And if so, how much of a subsidy is justified to maintain this 
culture? 

Third, when equity concerns are real and a severe impedi-
ment to economic efficiency, policy makers should look to find 
ways of compensating the losers so that everyone is a winner. 
As an example, in a Brady et al. (2016) analysis of groundwater, 
they proposed a mitigation fund for rural homeowners who 
might find their well dry.

 Ultimately, the political process will answer these ques-
tions and choose a trade-off between equity versus efficiency, 
but that is not the focus here. By choosing to look only at the 
economic efficiency attributes in this paper, we avoid the sub-
jective and value-laden calculus of determining when equity 
considerations trump efficiency. 

There is an important word of warning regarding the exces-
sive use of equity justifications to block efficiency-enhancing 
policies in cases where it is not feasible to compensate the 
losers. Excessive concern for equity can become a mantra for 
the status quo, which may lead to even worse problems in the 
future. In a vibrant market economy with continual techno-
logical advances, new products, and changing consumer tastes, 
some investors and some workers routinely find themselves the 
victims of these unforeseen events. Certainly, one would not 
want to stifle change in general, because when balanced over 
time, rising standards of living have made all of us better off. 
Unfortunately, in many instances the feasibility of compensat-
ing every individual for his/her bad fortune (and thereby mak-
ing everyone winners) may be impractical. 

A final attribute of using economic efficiency as a metric to 
evaluate policy options is that market prices can often provide 
valuable common sense signals. In a properly functioning mar-
ket, prices send signals of relative abundance or extreme scarci-
ty. In turn, consumers respond to high prices by reducing con-

the choice of producing cotton or producing industrial prod-
ucts. Normally in the absence of significant externalities in the 
form of environmental effects, the market value for water used 
in cotton versus industrial production will prescribe that the 
water should flow to its highest valued use.5

This papers proceeds as follows. First, it will go over the case 
for adopting economic efficiency as an evaluation criterion, 
which will set the basis to justify our later policy recommen-
dations. Second, we will explain two main problem areas for 
economic efficiency in surface water that arise from current 
regulations and policies and propose alternative solutions to 
each of these problems. 

THE CASE FOR ADOPTING ECONOMIC 
EFFICIENCY AS AN EVALUATION 
CRITERION

Opposition to adopting the economic efficiency criterion 
rests primarily on the notion that some group or groups will be 
negatively impacted. Economists have long recognized that the 
policies promoting economic efficiency will produce winners 
and losers. This is called the equity versus efficiency tradeoff.6 
Even though society as a whole is a net winner from efficien-
cy-enhancing policies, some individuals and groups may be 
worse off. Particularly, if a policy severely impacted the poorest 
segments of society, policy makers should seek ways to com-
pensate the disadvantaged group and if that was not possible, 
the efficiency-enhancing policy might be scrapped. Likewise, 
with water, emotional fears of running out of water, wheth-
er grounded in reality or imagination, can raise strong equity 
concerns. Thus, “equity” and economic efficiency can be in 
conflict. Even though the winners gain more than the losers 
lose, there may be no simple way to compensate the losers and 
equity trumps efficiency. For example, on efficiency grounds a 
universal poll tax avoids all the labor-leisure distortions result-
ing from the progressive income tax; yet, there is little support 
for such a tax because of its impact on the poor. At the other 
extreme, we have antitrust laws designed to curb the exercise of 
monopoly power. Clearly, in this case, the disadvantaged group 
from antitrust prosecution is the monopolist; yet the public 
shows little sympathy to the monopolist. Efficiency trumps 
equity.

In struggling to reconcile equity versus efficiency, economists 
look at the following three things:7

5 In the event there are significant environmental externalities that are not 
internalized in the costs of producing the cotton or the industrial products, 
the values for each would be adjusted accordingly.

6 See Gruber (2013)

7 See Pascual et al. (2010) and Martini (2007)



Texas Water Journal, Volume 10, Number 1

115Interjecting Economics into the Surface Water Dialogue

sumption while producers respond by increasing production. 
By examining water prices during periods of droughts and 
abundance, we can see if prices are sending the proper signals 
to conserve and increase supplies. The absence of the proper 
price signals forms a prima facie case for economic inefficiency. 
Because of the importance of markets sending the proper price 
signals, this report will frequently center on markets and the 
price signals being sent.

PROBLEM AREAS AND SOLUTIONS

Our study of surface water (Vaca et al. 2017) identified two 
basic sources of economic inefficiency. The first problem is that 
Texas has a water allocation problem with significant impedi-
ments to moving water from low-valued uses to high-valued 
uses. The second problem is that surface water in Texas is 
underpriced and inflexible in the face of droughts. The current 
pricing practices do not include a scarcity premium for raw 
water.8 Gold commands a scarcity premium far in excess of the 
basic cost to mine and refine the ore. Yet, Texas surface water, a 
far more essential resource, commands no such scarcity premi-
um. Especially during a drought, it is critical for prices to rise, 
encouraging conservation.

Problem area 1: Texas has a water allocation problem

The state has abundant water resources in certain locations 
where they are being relatively underutilized and relative scar-
city in other areas. If low-cost mechanisms can be found to 
move water to the areas of greater need, Texas can delay hav-
ing to implement high-cost alternatives like seawater desalina-
tion in the near term. It is useful to think of improving water 
allocation through three avenues: (1) greater conjunctive use 
of groundwater and surface water (2) reallocation of water 
resources within a river basin and (3) reallocation of surface 
water between river basins. 

Problem 1.1: Limited transfers between groundwater 
and surface water 

As there is a hydrological interconnection between surface 
water and groundwater,9 there is also an economic relation-
ship of substitutability between both of them. For instance, 
for many raw water uses, such as municipal, industrial, and 
agricultural uses, there is no major quality difference between 
surface water and groundwater. To the extent there are quali-

8 Some drought contingency plans do include a surcharge if a contract 
holder does not reduce usage when required under the plan. For example, the 
Gulf Coast Waster Authority’s plan includes the surcharge. In effect, if a user 
does not reduce its use, the cost for water is higher.

9 See Winter (1998), Sophocleous (2002).

ty differences, inexpensive treatment costs may make the two 
equivalent.10 Consequently, in the case that groundwater and 
surface water are equally available, the choice of which one to 
use should fall almost exclusively on costs.11 However, from a 
policy perspective, the independent regulation of surface water 
and groundwater often overlooks this substitutability. Specifi-
cally, even though the State owns the surface water and land-
owners own the groundwater, there is no inherent reason that 
regulatory constraints should prevent their substitution partic-
ularly during droughts.

The fact that groundwater is generally available with greater 
certainty,12 while surface water is intermittent and character-
ized by uncertainty, means that allowing emergency conjunc-
tive use of groundwater and surface water can bring major 
efficiency gains for consumers and the environment. Let us 
consider the case of a very severe drought that affects many sur-
face water streams and their users. Currently, there is no policy 
that incentivizes groundwater owners to react to droughts by 
increasing groundwater pumping to sources normally supplied 
by surface water. Usage-based groundwater conservation dis-
trict (GCD) regulations effectively preclude an irrigator from 
selling his groundwater to a nearby municipality or power 
plant whose surface water is facing curtailment or depletion 
(Brady et al. 2016). Yet, during this hypothetical drought, the 
economic benefits of the conjunctive use would be very large: 
surface water users would benefit from water that would not 
be available otherwise, and groundwater users would be very 
highly compensated from selling their water. In addition, add-
ed groundwater would augment stream flows stressed by the 
drought helping to alleviate environmental effects (McKinney 
2012).

Solution: Eliminate usage-based regulations by the GCDs and 
Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ).

In order for these transfers to occur, the usage-based regula-
tions by the GCDs and TCEQ should be eliminated for short-
term transfers. If groundwater is going toward a beneficial use 
as specified by the Texas Water Code13 and the transfer is speci-
fied for a short period of time as during a drought, there should 
be no further regulation on where a groundwater right holder 
can use their water.

10 For an overview of different treatment options and costs, see Bhojwani 
et al. (2019).

11 By this cost, we refer to a total cost of using surface water or groundwater 
including any treatment necessary to get a certain quality of water.  

12 The one exception is for the Edwards Aquifer, which is subject to man-
datory cutbacks during droughts.

13 Texas Water Code Chapter 11 defines “beneficial use” to include domes-
tic and municipal, agricultural and industrial, mining, hydroelectric, naviga-
tion, recreation and pleasure, public parks and game preserves.



Texas Water Journal, Volume 10, Number 1

Interjecting Economics into the Surface Water Dialogue116

Problem 1.2: Restrictions on interbasin transfers 

According to former TCEQ Commissioner and Texas Water 
Development Board (TWDB) Chairman Carlos Rubinstein, 
Texas will not be able to fix its water problems until we can 
successfully move water from “where it is, to where it is not” 
(Personal Communication in January 16, 2017 meeting). One 
way to do this is through interbasin transfers, moving water 
from abundant areas in East Texas to Central and West Texas. 
A major issue that arises when discussing interbasin transfers is 
the junior rights provision included in Senate Bill 1. When a 
transfer outside of the basin occurs, the junior rights provision 
changes the water right’s original priority date and becomes the 
most junior prior appropriation. In the current prior appropri-
ation system,14 this provision is intended to protect the basin 
of origin. However, the junior provision can reduce economic 
efficiency by degrading the value of a water right and thereby 
reducing the incentive for interbasin transfers. 

How does the junior rights provision affects economic efficiency?
The junior rights provision affects economic efficiency 

because the value of the water is greatly diminished when the 
priority date is changed. This reduction in the value of water 
rights minimizes the incentives to sell or buy water from oth-
er basins, even when there are economic gains from doing 
so.15 For instance, buyers can be reluctant to invest in a costly 
pipeline that might only be used a fraction of the year or only 
during very wet years, when junior right holders can divert. It 
is important to note that when there is plenty of water in the 
basin of origin, the junior provision becomes irrelevant and 
would not prevent any transfer from happening. However, it is 
the combination of uncertainty about drought conditions and 
a loss of priority that reduce the incentives to buy water from 
another basin under the junior rights provision. A system cre-
ated to pump water out of one river and transport it through a 
pipeline is very expensive. If the system can only be used when 
there is abundant water in the basin of origin, the system could 
sit idle for years. The cost per acre-foot of water for the project 
would become untenable. Consequently, the change in priority 
date favors the basin of origin regardless of the fact that the ben-
efits of the transfer can outweigh its costs. Even though there is 
no explicit proof that the junior rights provision has prevented 
transfers from happening, Votteler et al. (2007) show that there 
is a reduction in the number of non-exempt interbasin trans-
fers after the junior rights provision was passed in Senate Bill 1 
in 1997. Before that year, a total of 28 interbasin transfers had 
occurred over the period 1980 to 1996. After Senate Bill 1, 

14 A system with no clear compensation mechanism established for the 
basin or origin.

15 This argument is particularly applicable to run of the river rights. For 
transfers from reservoir storage, the impacts of the junior rights may be sub-
stantially diminished.

only three transfers have occurred in the period between 1997 
and 2006.16 Since 2006, we found only one interbasin transfer 
for water already owned by the City of Houston.17 These data 
strongly support the conclusion that the junior rights provision 
has definitely reduced interbasin transfers.

 Since supporters of the junior rights provision rest their sup-
port for it on equity grounds, it is important to ask the three 
questions outlined earlier regarding the case for economic effi-
ciency:

1. Are the efficiency benefits of interbasin transfers likely to be 
large?

Let us consider an example of a basin where its municipal 
users are desperately in need of more water than the basin 
can supply. A study by Cai and McCarl (2007) develops an 
integrated economic-hydrological model to examine proposed 
interbasin transfers in Texas and find that they can alleviate 
water shortages issues, especially for large cities. As additional 
water would greatly benefit all these users, their willingness to 
pay for water will be very high. For the basin of origin, let us 
assume there are some irrigators holders that would be will-
ing to sell their water at a price above its agricultural uses. For 
these sellers, they are fully compensated so that seemingly if the 
municipality is willing to pay a higher price than the irrigators’ 
reservation price, economic efficiency dictates that the transfer 
occurs. 

According to a report by R.W. Beck, Inc. for the TWDB in 
2006 (R. W. Beck 2006), interbasin transfers in Texas can have 
significant net economic benefits and that “while the economic 
impacts are more than offset by the economic benefits which 
accrue to the Basin of Origin, all competing policy objectives 
must be considered in pursuing such transfers.” So the answer 
to the first question is that the efficiency benefits of interbasin 
transfers are potentially quite large.

2. Who are the affected parties in the basin of origin?
Next, let us turn to the question of the identity and mag-

nitude of the loss to the disadvantaged group. In the above 
example, the party selling their water rights are voluntarily sell-
ing their rights, so they cannot claim injury. Nevertheless, as 
Gould (1988) points out, third party effects on other down-
stream users in the area of origin can be substantial. Moreover, 
they are not normally compensated. For example, with the 
irrigator’s water leaving the basin of origin, downstream users 
under the prior appropriation doctrine are deprived of runoff 
that returns to the basin of origin. At issue then is the magni-

16 Figure 1 of Votteler et al. (2007).
17 The Luce Bayou Interbasin Transfer Project that is currently under con-

struction transfers “existing surface water rights previously held by the City 
of Houston in the Trinity River to Lake Houston in the San Jacinto basin” 
(TWDB 2018). The amendments for this transfer were tied to permits and 
interbasin transfers granted before Senate Bill 1 so the Junior Provision did 
not apply in this case. 



Texas Water Journal, Volume 10, Number 1

117Interjecting Economics into the Surface Water Dialogue

right holders in the basin. The objective of this process is to 
avoid any negative effect of amending a permit to other users. 
However, in the commitment to avoiding injury and respect-
ing seniority, the bureaucratic process has become impractical 
and time consuming for potential buyers and sellers particular-
ly in responding to droughts. According to the instructions of 
the TCEQ, an application is typically processed in 300 days.18 
This amendment process is particularly troublesome during a 
drought when permit holders not using their full allocation 
would like to lease (temporarily sell) their water to another 
party at a different diversion point.19 As surface water becomes 
scarce and the demand for water expands, the inability to easily 
transfer water rights (either by short-term leases or outright 
sales of water rights) limits the market from allocating water to 
its highest value uses. 

How to increase the number of intrabasin transfers?
In order to promote intrabasin transfers, we basically need 

to facilitate the transaction process. Vaca et al. (2017) pro-
pose three alternatives in which the transaction process can 
be simplified to increase the number of intrabasin transfers. 
In this paper we will briefly discuss the first two alternatives 
and will focus on a detailed explanation of the third alterna-
tive.20 The first of these alternatives consists of changing and 
shortening some of the current procedures that are required to 
amend a water right.21 As described in Vaca et al. (2017), this 
would involve using Web 2.0 technology to inform potential-
ly impacted parties and to accelerate the process for impacted 
third parties to prove up their claim for damages. Particularly 
for short-term leases to deal with drought situations, this pro-
cess could cut through the red tape. This can incentivize more 
buyers and sellers to participate in intrabasin transfers as they 
would know that they can get the water they need by the time 
they need it. 

The second alternative outlined in Vaca et al. (2017) involved 
the implementation of watermasters in other basins. Currently, 

18 TCEQ (2017a) Instructions for Completing the Water Rights Permit-
ting Application. Note that this very long period is in part created by the 
applicants themselves who occasionally file a permit as a placeholder and 
leave it pending as leverage in a water dispute or for other reasons.

19 It is important to note that during drought emergencies, river authori-
ties have been able to amend some of their rights temporarily as part of their 
Water Management Plan (see TCEQ Emergency Order for the LCRA in 
2013). However, other users (i.e. not river authorities) that wish to sell their 
water would have to go through the normal amendment process. In addition 
to emergency amendments, Senate Bill 1430 approved in 2017 allows for 
“expedited amendments for existing water rights permits where the permit 
holder is off-setting freshwater use with desalinated seawater” (TCEQ 2018, 
SB 1430). Senate Bill 1430 intends to encourage seawater desalination. 

20 For a more detailed explanation of the other alternatives, see Vaca et al. 
(2017).

21 House Bill 1964 attempts to shorten the process, but even slight changes 
in point of diversions require WAM analysis.

tude of the return flow and the economic consequence of its 
absence on third parties.

3.  Can the losers be compensated and how?
While we support the elimination of the junior rights pro-

vision, we recognize the necessity for providing compensation 
for the area of origin. We propose that river basins and com-
munities in Texas use an arbitrator to create their own con-
text-specific mitigation funds. The first part of this mitigation 
process would consist of requiring monetary compensation for 
the basin of origin. For instance, some western states require 
compensation to be paid to the local governments within the 
basin of origin (Castleberry and Acevedo 2017). These pay-
ments can be done through mitigation funds. Mitigation funds 
can be established in different ways and can be set to compen-
sate the losers affected by the transfer including economic and 
environmental costs. Hanak et al. (2011) explains that these 
funds should consider potential employment losses, increases 
in social service costs and reductions in tax revenues.

There are several examples of successful mitigation funds 
from surface water transfers in other states. For example, in 
an interbasin water contract in California between the Metro-
politan Water District (MWD) and the Palo Verdo Valley Irri-
gation District’s (PVID), the MWD (buyer) provides a Com-
munity Involvement Fund (CIF) to address community effects 
(Hanak et al. 2011). The CIF compensates the area of origin in 
the form of training programs for community members, sup-
port for small business, and cash per acre-foot of water diverted 
(WGA 2012). In Nevada, areas of origin simply impose a $10 
fee/acre-foot on all water that is transferred out of the county 
(WGA 2012). 

Another example of how a mitigation fund could work could 
be based on the compensation fund established after the Gulf 
Coast oil spill in 2010. In 2012, Congress passed the RESTORE 
Act that dedicated 80% of all penalties from responsible par-
ties to a Gulf Coast Restoration Trust Fund (Restore the Gulf 
2018). It is clearly outlined how the resources from the fund 
can be used to restore and protect the natural resources and the 
economy of the Gulf Coast. Similar mitigation funds can be 
created for interbasin transfers, where the percentages of the 
funds are clearly established to compensate the economic and 
environmental costs of the transfers. 

Problem 1.3: Inadequate intrabasin transfers 

Transfers of water within a river basin face several regula-
tory impediments as well. The primary impediment to trans-
fers within a river basin is the complicated regulatory process 
imposed by the TCEQ in its effort to comply with legislative 
and legal constraints. The amendment process of a permit to 
change the use or diversion point requires the TCEQ to per-
form a technical review using the Water Availability Model 
(WAM) dataset to see how the amendment will affect water 



Texas Water Journal, Volume 10, Number 1

Interjecting Economics into the Surface Water Dialogue118

in addition to the highly successful Rio Grande Watermaster 
Program, there are an additional three22 watermasters covering 
various segments of river systems in the state. Watermaster sys-
tems are probably not a panacea. While popular in some areas, 
in others there is opposition because it is costly to administer. 
In essence, the administrative costs may be overshadowing the 
efficiency gains that it generates, particularly in water abundant 
river systems. The third alternative is the implementation of a 
“Watermaster Lite System” designed to reduce the administra-
tion costs. 

Watermaster Lite 

The goal of the Watermaster Lite System is to ensure that 
water can be transferred quickly by bypassing some of the reg-
ulatory burdens set forth by the TCEQ permitting process but 
does so at a much lower cost than a full-blown Watermaster 
System. In proposing this alternative, we recognize that its 
implementation would require legislative action to modify the 
prior appropriation doctrine as well devising an entire new set 
of bureaucratic procedures. We also recognize that elaborating 
and proposing solutions to these issues could easily entail a 
lengthy study in itself. In the spirit of this paper, our focus is 
to describe how such a novel system might work and what the 
economic efficiency gains it might confer. Clearly, the Water-
master Lite System should be tried on an experimental basis to 
ensure it is effective before being implemented elsewhere. The 
economic efficiency gains of this system are intended to dra-
matically shorten the TCEQ processing time, increase market 
transactions, reduce transaction costs, and require less financial 
resources to administer than the traditional Watermaster Sys-
tem requires. 

1. How to implement the Watermaster Lite?
The river will be divided into segments and each segment 

will have flow detectors installed to measure stream flow. With-
in each segment of the river basin, the basin’s water right hold-
ers will then be divided and assigned a color based upon their 
seniority and their permitted acre-feet. By grouping rights by 
seniority into color categories, the process to make an intraba-
sin transfer will be simplified and at the same time, the prior 
appropriation doctrine will still be respected by group. In addi-
tion, in case of an extreme drought, right holders can still make 
a priority call within their color categories and thus the basic 
features of the prior appropriation system are maintained. The 
Watermaster Lite System will require the TCEQ to calculate all 
of the total water permits in the basin based off their acre-feet 
withdrawal limits. For example, in the Brazos River Basin there 

22 The other three watermasters are Brazos Watermaster Program, Concho 
River Watermaster Program, and South Texas Watermaster Program. (Nuec-
es, San Antonio, and Guadalupe Rivers).

is a total of 7,932,481 acre-feet allocated to divert.23 Thereaf-
ter, water right holders would be divided into five groups. The 
most senior quintile of the 1,983,120 acre-feet would be cate-
gorized into the color “black;” the second most senior quintile 
of the 1,983,120 acre-feet would be categorized in the color 
“red;” the third set of junior diverters will be categorized into 
“orange;” the next quintile would be “yellow;” and the most 
junior 1,983,120 acre-feet would be categorized into “green.” 
Under this system, the whole river basin will be grouped by 
the acre footage and seniority of its diverters. Additionally, 
each river segment will be assigned a minimum flow rate corre-
sponding to the different color categories.

This system aims to create a spot market based off short-term 
(less than a year) changes in diversions that will be automatical-
ly granted provided three conditions are met. (1) The first con-
dition is the flow rate in their river segment and permit type is 
satisfied within a 10% margin of error. The flow rate will incor-
porate TCEQ’s adopted environmental flow standards, which 
is the flow restriction TCEQ would apply to moves of diver-
sion points under the current permitting system. (2) A sec-
ond condition is that the change in diversion will incorporate 
stream flow losses (including evaporation effects). For example, 
if the original permit called for a diversion rate of 10 acre-feet 
daily and there was a 10% evaporation and transportation loss, 
the recipient would only be entitled to divert 9 acre-feet daily. 
(3) The permit would be subject to curtailment in the event of 
a senior right call. 

This system is better stated with an example. Suppose we 
are dealing with a lower segment of the river basin where the 
stream flows are greater. Diverter A, from Figure 1, is the most 
senior water right holder in the basin and is allowed to divert 
100 acre-feet annually. Thereby, Diverter A is assigned the col-
or “Black,” which means he/she can divert water even when the 
flows are less than 936 cubic feet per second (CFS). However, 
Diverter B is a more junior water right  holder and assigned 
the color “Yellow,” which indicates that when the flow rates 
are below 2000 CFS, he/she cannot divert water. In this sce-
nario, Diverter B is no longer allowed to divert water; however 
Diverter B needs an additional 75 acre-feet for his/her crops. 
Meanwhile, Diverter A only needs 25 acre-feet. Since Diverter 
A has a senior water right and is not using all of his/her allocat-
ed share of water, under this system Diverter A could lease the 
remaining 75 acre-feet to Diverter B. Such transactions would 
be allowed to take place on a monthly basis. For example, for a 
30-day transfer, the annual rate would be prorated to the daily 
equivalent of the permit’s allocated amount. 

The Watermaster Lite System is proposed as an experi-
mental option. Its application would no doubt require addi-

23 The total number of permitted acre-feet is based on TCEQ (2017b). 
For the purpose of this exercise, we assume that all of the water rights are 
allocated for consumptive uses.



Texas Water Journal, Volume 10, Number 1

119Interjecting Economics into the Surface Water Dialogue

tional adjustments and should first be refined for a particu-
lar river basin with abundant water.24 The system would also 
need adjustments for periods of drought. To succeed during 
a drought, the Watermaster Lite System must be cheap to 
administer and have the flexibility to allow temporary changes 
in diversion points. 

The attraction of the Watermaster Lite System is that it 
retains many of the features of a watermaster system, but 
would be potentially much cheaper to administer and would 
have desirable self-policing attributes. Also, permit holders are 
likely to view it as less intrusive25 than a watermaster system.

Problem area 2: Water prices are artificially cheap and 
inflexible

A reoccurring theme within the literature and our surface 
water policy research (Vaca et al. 2017) revolves around the 

24 For example, the number of colors could vary depending on the volume 
of water rights in adjoining groups. The beauty of the system is that within a 
color group, all pumpers are treated equally, eliminating conflicts. Neverthe-
less, conflicts can exist if that pumper was assigned to a different group that 
would have gained access but was prevented by the original assignment of 
colors and stream flow limits.

25 This system can be less intrusive than a watermaster because it would 
not require the site visits and users would not be required to call in their 
diversions and get permission to divert.

underpricing of water in Texas (Griffin 2011). The current 
price scheme of surface water is not economically efficient 
because it does not reflect how much water is available to use, 
i.e. it does not include a scarcity premium and thus water pric-
es are artificially low. The main reason why there is no scarcity 
premium is related to the large amount of permitted water that 
river authorities sell to their customers at regulated rates based 
on historical costs. In many basins, river authorities typically 
control the bulk of diversion permits within a river basin.26 

Currently, the regulated nature of surface water pricing by 
river authorities leads to the underpricing of water for two rea-
sons. First, it omits altogether a scarcity premium to reflect the 
inherent scarcity of water. Second, as quasi-governmental enti-
ties, river authorities are constrained to charge rates27 that only 
recover their costs. Consequently, the market prices observed 
in transactions between river authorities and their customers 

26 A prominent exception is the Trinity River Basin where various munici-
palities already own significant appropriations. 

27 Raw water sold by river authorities or potable water provided by munic-
ipalities are based on an average of current and past infrastructure costs. This 
allows for water to remain underpriced. Neither do they include a scarcity 
premium. The presence of regulated rates for the transportation, treatment, 
and local delivery of water is a good thing by protecting consumers from the 
exercise of monopoly power by wholesale providers. Nevertheless, a byprod-
uct of this regulatory scheme is that prices are too low and inflexible. [Anoth-
er byproduct is that water is not being conserved because the incentives are 
lacking.]

Figure 1. Example of Watermaster Lite System: segments and diverters by color.



Texas Water Journal, Volume 10, Number 1

Interjecting Economics into the Surface Water Dialogue120

fail to account for true scarcity and often create a shortage of 
unmet demand at that regulated price. Figure 2 illustrates the 
problem. Assume in the example that the river authority has 
available only Q0 of water available, which it offers for sale 
to municipal users at the regulated price P0, which covers its 
operation and maintenance costs. Note that at this price there 
is unmet demand equal to Q1 – Q0. Typically, to deal with the 
shortage, the river authority will exercise curtailments across its 
customer base. 

Economic efficiency would dictate that the water goes to its 
highest valued uses. If in Figure 2, the transaction price were 
allowed to rise to P*, only users who were willing to pay this 
price or higher would receive the water. The difference between 
the regulated price P0 and P* measures in this case the true 
scarcity premium of the water as shown on Figure 2. From an 
economic efficiency viewpoint, allowing the price P* to occur 
guarantees that only the higher valued uses—between 0 and 
Q0—get the water and the lower valued uses—between Q0 
and Q1—are excluded. The alternative of curtailing all uses 
proportionally has no mechanism to filter out the lower valued 
uses. 

The key takeaways are that if observed market prices do not 
include the scarcity premium, they understate the true value 
of water. The regulated prices coupled with rationing are nei-
ther efficient nor useful as guides for policy. Price signals from 
properly functioning markets should fluctuate in response to 
droughts and furthermore should trend upward in response 
to population growth and economic activity. Figure 3 shows 
an example of how prices do not vary according scarcity. This 
figure shows the regulated rate charged by the Lower Colorado 
River Authority (LCRA) to its municipal customers over the 

period 2010 to 2016. Figure 3 also shows the Palmer Drought 
Severity Index (PDSI) drought index showing the most severe 
drought in history in 2011. Note that LCRA’s prices, which 
were based solely on operational and infrastructure costs,28 
showed no response to the drought. Paradoxically, when water 
was abundant in 2015-16, regulated rates actually increased. 

In contrast, Figure 4 shows in theory how prices should 
behave in response to economic growth and droughts. Prices 
should increase sharply during droughts while maintaining a 
relative stable but gradual trend when there are no droughts. 
Population and economic growth should increase the demand 
of water over time, which means that prices should have an 
upward trend. 

The second reason that surface water prices do not include 
a scarcity premium refers to limited opportunities to trade 
surface water rights. As explained in the water allocation sec-
tion, there are regulatory barriers that can reduce the number 
of transfers of water. Not allowing these transactions during a 
drought and relying mostly on river authorities (with regulated 
rates) prevents water to be priced at its true scarcity price (P* 
in Figure 2). 

In order to promote economically efficient pricing of surface 
water, policy makers have one of two options. The first option 
is to create the conditions that give rise to a vibrant water mar-
ket by doing the three things outlined above: (1) encouraging 
conjunctive use of groundwater and surface water (2) promot-
ing interbasin transfers, and (3) promoting intrabasin transfers. 

28 LCRA (2014) shows that its rates are calculated as the ratio of cost of 
services divided by the number of billing units. The costs of services include 
labor, operation and maintenance, and debt service. By regulation, river 
authorities such as LCRA are not allowed to charge rates that reflect water 
scarcity per se but only to recover their operational and infrastructure costs. 

Figure 2. Regulated vs. economic efficient prices.



Texas Water Journal, Volume 10, Number 1

121Interjecting Economics into the Surface Water Dialogue

With the addition of these added sources of supply, market 
prices should more likely approximate Figure 4 instead of Fig-
ure 3.

There is, however, another option that, while less preferable 
to the authors, will nevertheless promote economically efficient 
pricing. Let us now turn to the option of a water tax.

Regional water taxes: that vary with water availability 
by region. 

A water tax is designed to address the problem that water 
prices are artificially cheap and inflexible during droughts. 
First, the water tax can solve the lack of a scarcity premium 
because it would vary with water availability by region and can 
be altered by the State accordingly to address long-term water 
needs. Second, as the value of the tax will automatically vary 

Figure 3. LCRA firm water rate vs. PDSI. Source: LCRA 2015, LCRA 2017, Water Data for Texas 
2017.

Figure 4. Hypothetical price fluctuations in a well-functioning market.



Texas Water Journal, Volume 10, Number 1

Interjecting Economics into the Surface Water Dialogue122

with monthly water availability, it will increase water prices 
during droughts. Thus, a water tax will act as a water scarcity 
signal and create incentives to conserve.29 In fact, Olmstead 
et al. (2009) suggest that using price mechanisms to allocate 
scarce water supply is more cost effective than implement-
ing other programs for water conservation. It is important to 
emphasize that the water tax will not solve the water allocation 
problem because it will not directly incentivize water transac-
tions nor will it remedy existing administrative problems. Its 
sole function is to promote conservation.
1. How the tax would work

a) The tax should vary with water availability 
The most important characteristic of the tax is that it must 

vary with water availability, reflecting the true value of water 
in the short and long term. This means that the tax should 
increase when there is less water available like in the case of a 
drought.

Another feature is that the tax should vary regionally to reflect 
water availability. As shown in Figure 5, a regional drought 
indicator, the PDSI can be used as a measure of water avail-

29 Note that this proposal differs fundamentally from the increasing block 
tariff schedules implemented by many cities whereby high use residential 
users pay more per thousand gallons. The increasing block tariffs typically 
do not vary with overall water availability as our tax would and instead act 
as a mechanism to spread high fixed costs onto high residential users with 
swimming pools and large lots with sprinkler systems. The latter do not vary 
over time to incentivize conservation during droughts.

ability to determine the value of the tax.30 According to Water 
Data for Texas (2017), the PDSI index is “a meteorological 
drought index based on recent precipitation and temperature 
and is used to assess the severity of dry or wet spells of weather.” 
The PDSI generally varies between -6 and +6, where negative 
values denote dry spells. In recent years, the lowest value that 
the PDSI has reached in Texas was in September 2011 in the 
Low Rolling Plains (-6.99). 

The proposed tax contemplates one major exemption.31 The 
proposed tax offers an 80% discount for agricultural users. 
Charging a lower tax for agricultural users can be justified by 
the fact that agricultural users usually face lower water rates 
(e.g. from interruptible contracts with river authorities), which 
would mean that even if they had the same price elasticity as 
that of other consumers, the price increase due to the tax will 
affect them disproportionally. 

30 Although the PDSI may not be the hydrologically perfect measure of 
water supply considering the water in reservoirs, the PDSI does track in 
advance the changes in water availability in reservoirs. For example see Fig-
ure A1 in appendix 1. As an alternative to the PDSI based on nine regions, 
one could consider computing a PDSI type index for the sixteen state water 
planning jurisdictions because it might facilitate better water planning and 
administration. Thus, the illustration here is simply designed to lay out how 
such an index could be used to determine tax rates that vary regionally.

31 In addition to an exemption to agricultural users, we propose that the 
Rio Grande Watermaster be exempt from the tax because it is a basin that 
works differently from other basins in Texas. It does have a functioning water 
market, which means that the price of water in this region already implicitly 
includes a scarcity premium. We also propose to exclude 1 acre-feet of water/
month to all permit holders. This exemption reduces the impact and admin-
istration burden on small users

Figure 5. Texas regions for PDSI. Source: Water Data for Texas – PDSI 
October 2016.



Texas Water Journal, Volume 10, Number 1

123Interjecting Economics into the Surface Water Dialogue

b) Payment options and enforcement mechanisms 
In order to facilitate payments and revenue collection, all 

water users will have access to an online account where they 
will report their monthly water consumption to the TCEQ, 
who will act as the tax collector.32 This account will show the 
tax rate for that month and the total amount owed by the user. 
To have the optimal effect on users’ behavior, monthly bills, 
rather than quarterly or annual bills, are preferable.
2. Tax formula and estimation of scenarios

The main objective of the tax is to reflect the true scarcity 
of water and thereby encourage the optimal level of conser-
vation. The proposed tax can be calculated using Equation 1. 
This equation shows that the value of the tax depends on three 

32 The funds could be used for general revenue purposes or earmarked for 
special purposes

factors: (1) the numerator (Y), (2) a fixed parameter (Z) in the 
denominator, and (3) the PDSI. After simulating with differ-
ent parameter numbers, we use a value of 7.1 for (Z), which in 
absolute values is slightly larger than the lowest PDSI (during 
the drought of 2011). In Vaca et al. (2017) we calculated three 
base scenarios with values of Y of 50, 100, and 200. For expo-
sitional purposes here, we adopt Y=100. 

                           Tax
rt
=Y/(Z+PDSI

rt 
)                                 Equation 1

In equation 1, Tax represents the water tax per acre-foot for a 
region r in a month t. The tax for agricultural users will follow 
the same equation but be only 20% of the calculated value 
generated by Equation 1. We estimate the corresponding tax 
values, water conservation, and revenue that would have been 

Figure 6. Tax values by region (2010 – Jan 2017) Y=100. Source: Capstone Team Estimations.



Texas Water Journal, Volume 10, Number 1

Interjecting Economics into the Surface Water Dialogue124

generated in the period 2010–2016 for the nine33 regions in 
Texas. 

a) Tax values
The estimation of the tax that each region would have faced 

since 2010 shows two important points. The first is that the tax 
structure allows the value to vary considerably with water avail-
ability and that the starting value of the tax has an important 
effect in the average values and level of variability of the tax. 
The variability of the tax with water availability is also showed 
graphically as the tax values dramatically increase in 2011 (the 
year of the drought) and the values decrease in wet years like 
2016 (See Figure 6).

The second important conclusion from these estimations is 
that most of the time, when water is abundant, the tax is rel-
atively low. Whereas, during drought conditions the value of 
the tax can reach very large values, which is a desirable feature 
of the tax. If water is scarce, it should cost more to encourage 
consumers to conserve. Although the tax can reach high val-
ues, these peaks rarely occur, and the majority of the regions 
would face low tax values each month since 2010. For a Y=100, 
83.3% of tax values would have been less or equal to $30/acre-
foot.34 Conversely, the tax exceeded $100/acre-foot in only 
2.2% of the cases.

b) Water Conservation 
Applying a water tax will allow users to face the real scar-

city cost of water in their region, which will result in water 
conservation.35 This means that the tax will achieve one of its 
objectives, which is to reduce water consumption, especially in 
drought conditions like 2011. Based on the values of the tax 
previously calculated, we can estimate the percentage reduction 
in water consumption for each month. Equation 2 shows that 

33 As the Rio Grande is exempted from the fee, the estimations exclude the 
Trans Pecos regions, which mean that estimations are done only for nine of 
the 10 regions. 

34 For a starting value of $50, 91% of the tax values would have been below 
$20/acre-foot and for a starting value of $200, 73.7% of the tax values would 
have below $50/acre-foot.

35 There are other policy alternatives that can result in conservation, such as 
mandatory rationing. As rationing can achieve a precise percentage of conser-
vation, the fact that everyone had to conserve the same proportion makes it 
economically inefficient. For example, let’s consider the mandatory effect of 
rationing for two users. The first user is an environmentally concerned citizen 
and has already reduced her water consumption to a minimum. The second 
user is not so concerned with environment: has inefficient irrigation practices 
for his yard and sometimes even leaves the faucet running because he forgot. 
Rationing would force equally both users to conserve an x%, which would be 
nearly impossible for user 1 while user 2 could conserve more than that %. 
The tax solves this problem by making water more expensive and thus leading 
water to its highest and best use automatically. 

water conservation depends on the price elasticity of demand 
for water, the value of the tax and the original water price.36 

Conservation (%) = elasticity × (Tax/(Water Price) × 100% 

Equation 2

For this estimation, the short run water price elasticity37 used 
is 0.38. 

Water conservation resulting from the tax can be equivalent 
to increasing water supply by a certain percentage as it decreas-
es the water deficit. For instance, in 2011 a tax with a Y=100 
would have been equivalent to an increase in supply of surface 
water by 13.7% for non-agricultural uses and 11.9% for agri-
cultural users. The average water savings for non-agricultural 
users based on the estimations of the period 2010 to 2017 is 
4.4%.

Clearly, Figure 6 shows that a state water tax that varies 
regionally and monthly could solve the problem that water pric-
es are artificially underpriced and inflexible during droughts. 
The resulting conservation (Figure 7) during droughts will go 
a long way toward forcing society to use water more efficiently. 

c) Tax revenue collection
As any other tax, the water tax will generate revenue for the 

state of Texas. As the primary purpose of the tax is to reflect 
water scarcity and promote conservation during droughts, how  
revenues of the tax are spent is not the main priority and what 
agency collects the tax does not have an impact on whether 
the tax is an economically efficient tool or not. However, we 
propose that the tax be collected by TCEQ as it is the primary 
regulatory agency for surface water. In addition, as the revenue 
comes from water users, it would be good to use these resourc-
es for water purposes. One alternative would be for the tax 
revenues to be put in a fund to cover operational expenses for 
agencies like TCEQ and TWDB. Another alternative would be 
to place all revenues of the tax in a fund like State Water Imple-
mentation Fund for Texas (SWIFT) that is used for financing 
water infrastructure projects. 

CONCLUSIONS

The intention of the Vaca et al. (2017) report, Surface Water 
Regulation in Texas: Problems and Solutions, was to stimu-
late discussion on the pressing policy issues of surface water 
management in Texas. For purposes of policy analysis, we have 
adopted the conceptual lens of economic efficiency. We rec-
ognize that the inability to fully compensate the losers may 
cause policy makers to choose equity over economic efficien-
cy. It is, nevertheless, a useful exercise to apply the conceptual 

36 For this estimation we use an approximation of wholesale water rates 
for residential users ($3/1000 gallons) and for other users we use the LCRA 
rates.

37 See Espey et al. (1997).



Texas Water Journal, Volume 10, Number 1

125Interjecting Economics into the Surface Water Dialogue

lens of economic efficiency to surface water policy to look at 
the benefits foregone to protect various interest groups. This 
paper focuses on how we can use existing water supplies more 
efficiently by improving water allocation and water pricing. 
To improve water allocation and to move water from lower 
valued uses to higher valued uses, we identified the following 
three mechanisms: (1) encouraging conjunctive water use, (2) 
removing roadblocks to interbasin transfers and (3) facilitating 
intrabasin transfers. The latter proposed a Watermaster Lite 
System. 

To correct the current water pricing system that underval-
ues water and is inflexible to droughts, we present two alter-
natives—a water tax and an active water market. In contrast 
to the current artificially low and inflexible pricing system, 
water taxes that vary regionally in response to drought con-
ditions could be a powerful force for conservation. The other 
alternative, creating an active water market, is perhaps an even 
more daunting task since it will require reforming legal and 
administrative procedures to facilitate trading of water. Never-
theless, we believe that a vibrant water market is superior to a 
tax because it will solve both the issues of water pricing as well 
as the water allocation problem.

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do): U.S. Geological Survey. 79 p. U.S. Geological Survey 
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Texas Water Journal, Volume 10, Number 1

127Interjecting Economics into the Surface Water Dialogue

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editor/Water_transfers_in_the_West_December_2012.
pdf.

APPENDIX 1

Although the PDSI may not be the hydrologically perfect 
measure of water supply considering the water in reservoirs, the 
PDSI does track in advance the changes in water availability 
in reservoirs. Figure A.1 shows how that the PDSI moves in 
the same direction as the Reservoir Storage. The correlation 
coefficient between these two variables is 0.73 and is statisti-

Figure A.1 PDSI and Reservoir Storage. Source: Date from Water Data for Texas 2017.

Table A.1. Regression Analysis of PDSI and Reservoir Storage.

cally significant at the 1% level. In addition, Table A.1 shows 
the results of two simple regressions between these variables. 
The first line shows the results for the regression of the PDSI 
on Reservoir Storage with an R2 of .542. The second line also 
includes the lag of the PDSI (1 month before) on Reservoir 
Storage and the R2 increases to .64, which means that PDSI 
has power to predict the next month of Reservoir Storage. 

Regression R2
Percentage Storage on PDSI .542
Percentage Storage on PDSI and One Month 
Lagged PDSI .640

https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?name_desc=true
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?name_desc=true
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http://westgov.org/images/editor/Water_transfers_in_the_West_December_2012.pdf

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	Page 113, Vaca et al. 2017
	Page 113, 2017
	Page 113, 2018
	Page 113 2013
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	Page 114 2013
	Page 114 2010
	Page 114 2007
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	Bhojwani et al. (2019)
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	(Brady et al. 2016)
	 Votteler et al. (2007) 
	Cai and McCarl (2007) 
	(R. W. Beck 2006),
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	Votteler et al. (2007).
	(TWDB 2018)
	(Castleberry and Acevedo 2017).
	Hanak et al. (2011)
	(Hanak et al. 2011).
	(WGA 2012)
	(WGA 2012).
	(Restore the Gulf 2018)
	Vaca et al. (2017)
	Vaca et al. (2017)
	Vaca et al. (2017)
	TCEQ (2017a) 
	TCEQ 2018
	Vaca et al. (2017)
	TCEQ (2017b).
	(Vaca et al. 2017)
	(Griffin 2011)
	LCRA (2014) 
	LCRA 2015
	LCRA 2017
	Water Data for Texas 2017
	Olmstead et al. (2009)
	Water Data for Texas (2017)
	Vaca et al. (2017)
	Vaca et al. (2017) 
	Espey et al. (1997)