Foreword
The Rt. Hon. Lord Denning

My friends at the University of Buckingham have decided to launch a law journal.
They are fortunate in that Lord Scarman has agreed to be Chairman of the
Editorial Advisory Board. But 1 am most embarrassed that they should have called
it the Denning Law Journal. 1 cannot think why, except that my judgments have
often given rise to controversy and given the commentators something to write
about.

But 1 appreciate the compliment and would congratulate the University on its
enterprise. It is of the first importance that there should be free and open
discussion of the issues of the day. The members of this free and independent
University - self-supporting as it is - are well placed to take the lead in these
discussions. They will choose subjects of contemporary and practical importance.
They will seek contributions from those in the law schools of other universities and
also in the practising side of the legal profession. 1 trust it will be well supported.

1 have often been asked: Which was your most important judgment? 1 would put it
as Candlerv. Crane, Christmasl where 1ventured, in a dissenting opinion, to extend
the scope of negligence so as to cover economic loss caused by negligent advice.
That view was accepted and adopted 13 years later by the House of Lords in
Hedley Byrne v. Heller.2

Next, 1 would put Rex v. Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal, Ex parte
Shaw3 where we extended the remedy by prerogative writs to cover, not only
excess of jurisdiction by a tribunal, but also error of law. To which 1 would add
Barnard v. National Dock Labour Boartf where we extended the remedy by
declaration so as to make it available when a tribunal acted contrary to natural
justice or made a mistake of law. These decisions paved the way for the explosive
expansion of judicial review which culminated in 0 'Reilly v. Mackman.5 1 there
traced its history and 1 like to think that it was of help to Lord Diplock in his most
important speech in the House of Lords.

1. [1951] 2 K.B.I64.
2. [1964] A.C.465.
3. [1952] 1 K.B.338.
4. [1953] 2 QB.18.
5. [1983] 2 A.C.237.

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THE DENNING LAW JOURNAL

Then there are the cases on exception clauses. These go back to my junior days
when I induced the Court of Appeal to uphold a most unrighteous clause in
L 'Estrange v. Craucob.6 But when I was on the Bench, we managed to introduce the
doctrine of fundamental breach. It started in Karsales (Harrow) v. Wallis.7 A
company could not rely on a printed exception clause if it was itself guilty of a
breach going to the root of the contract. Although that doctrine was afterwards
repudiated by the House of Lords, we managed in due course to revive it in a new
guise. A company could not rely on a printed exception clause unless it was fair
and reasonable; That was in Ceo. Mitchell Ltd. v. Finney Lock Seeds8 which was
affirmed by the House of Lords,9 where Lord Diplock referred to my contribution
to the common law in terms which make me blush with embarrassment but which I
treasure beyond measure.

Then of course there is the Mareva injunction which I regard as my most
important contribution to commercial law. We there granted injunctions to prevent
debtors making away with their assets so as to defeat creditors. This involved our
departing from the law of the 19th Century. We did it in two interlocutory cases
straight off the reel, Nippon Yusen Kaisha v. KarageorgislO and Mareva v.
International Bulkcarriers: II but elaborated in a reserved judgment in The
Pertamina. 12 Although the House of Lords threw cold water on it in The Siskina,13
the Mareva survived and was given statutory force.

I suppose I should mention the High Trees case.14 It was not a reserved
judgment. I decided it at first instance straightaway at the end of the argument. Its
importance was in getting rid of the old notion that estoppels were confined to
representations of fact and did not extend to representations as to the future. It
brought in a new species of estoppel called promissory estoppel. Many were the
doubts cast upon it, notably by the House of Lords, but it became and is well
established.

Then there are the cases in family law, in which I sought to bring the law into
line with the social changes in the status of women. In Bendall v. McWhirterlS we
invented the deserted wife's equity - only to be reversed later by the House of
Lords - and afterwards restored by statute. In Rimmer v. Rimmerl6 we gave the
working wife a half-share in the matrimonial home: and were never reversed.

6. [1934] 2 K.B.394.
7. [1956] 1 W.L.R.936.
8. [1983] 1 QB.285.
9. [1983] 2 A.C.803.

10. [1975] 1 W.L.R.1093.
11. [1975] 2 LL.L.R.509.
12. [1978] QB.644.
13. [1979] A.C.2IO.
14. [1947] K.B.130.
15. [1952] 2 QB.466.
16. [1953] 1 QB.63.

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FOREWORD

Then there were excursions into international law. My first case in the House of
Lords was Rahimtoola v. Nizam of Hyderabad. 17 I took more pains over it than any
other case - only to be scourged by Lord Simonds and the other Law Lords. Yet in
the end we won. In the Trendtex case we did away with the absolute theory of state
immunity and replaced it by the restrictive theory.

Outside the courts, I found the Profumo Inquiry the most interesting and
important of my cases. My Reportl9 was a best-seller, but the Crown said it was
their copyright. They took all the royalties!

Since my retirement, I have spoken in the House of Lords on legal subjects: such
as abortion, diplomatic immunity, terrorism, police powers, judicial review,
telephone-tapping, kerb-crawling, test-tube babies, surrogate motherhood, and
pay rises. All these may be thought fit for discussion in the pages of this Journal.
Our legislators would welcome all the help they can get.

So I could go on. You will see why I enjoyed the Court of Appeal best. It is the
linchpin of the law of England. It is the court which lays down the law finally in
most cases. Very few go to the House of Lords.

I end with all best wishes for the success of this Journal.

•

17. [1958] A.C.379.
18. [1977] QB.529.
19. Cmnd. 2152 of 1963.

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