Lord Denning and EEC Law
A. 1. L. Campbell'*'

The purpose of this article is to make a general survey of Lord Denning's views
and decisions concerning EEC law. It will not assess particular decisions, but will
consider his contribution to the reception of and understanding of EEC law.

The impact of Lord Denning's written views in particular has been as striking as
his prose. The contribution of Lord Denning seems to have lain partly in his ability
to communicate to the profession and to the general public the importance of the
legal changes incurred by U.K. entry into the EEC. It has been said that, prior to
the entry of the U.K. into the EEC, "the learned journals, and, to some extent, the
less learned press, were full of anxiety that the English lawyer and, above, the
English judge, would not know how to compete with this new system". 1 Denning
was in a position, as Master of the Rolls, to playa central role in the development
of the English reception of EEC law. It is arguably fortunate that a judge such as
Denning with a penchant for communication and for an ability to rethink the law,
and with a temperament for accepting, not resisting, change, was in this position.
After U.K. accession to the EEC Denning was over 70, having already had a
lifetime in acquiring one legal tradition and at an age when resistance to change is
strong. It is to Denning's credit that though he may usually have come down on the
side of English law where there was an international element, towards the end of
his judicial career he faced "realistically" the "incoming tide" of EEC law. Z It can
be said that he made a deliberate effort to contribute to the understanding and
reception of EEC law. He established lasting and influential, if controversial,
guidelines on when to refer questions to the European Court, as well as attempting

'"Lecturer in Law, University of Aberdeen.
The author is grateful to his colleague Mr P. R. Beaumont and to Mr R. R. Paisley for helpful
comments on a draft of this article.

1. Mackenzie Stuart, "The United Kingdom and Community Law - The First Decade", The Third
Lord Fletcher Lecture, November 1981, The Lord Fletcher Lectures 1979-1982, Solicitors European
Group (1983) pAD. It has to be said, however, that a body of judges (Lords Diplock and Hailsham as
well as Denning) anticipated few difficulties with interpreting EEC Law: see Lasok and Bridge, Law
and 1nstilll/ions oj/he European Communities 4th ed., p.378, and Bridge, "Community Law and English
Courts and Tribunals; General Principles and Preliminary Rulings", 1 European Law Review (1975) 13,
at p.18.
2. The HonJustice Kirby, "Lord Denning: An Antipodean Appreciation", [19861DellI/iug L.J. 103,

at p.1lO.

1



THE DENNING LAW JOURNAL

to register the need to adopt different principles from those used in municipal law
for the interpretation of EEC law. In addition, he stated interesting views on EEC
supremacy. These contributions can be overstated: many of the remarks made by
Denning to be examined were in a sense obiter, and they cannot rival his
substantive contributions in other areas of the law. But they arc interesting, and it
could be said that Lord Denning's wish to make such statements beyond the
essential needs of the case even reinforces the impression of a judge anxious to
communicate the impact of EEC law in general. Denning chose the course of
exposition and guidance. Denning wrote at almost a popular level on the general
impact of EEC law in the U.K. in The Times in 1973, just after u.K. entry to the
EEC, as Master of the Rolls and Chairman of the British Institute ofInternational
and Comparative Law.3 He showed that he realised that the judiciary must
confront new problems - of the conflict between EEC law and domestic law, and
of when and how often to refer matters to the European Court of Justice, issues to
which he returned on the bench. He also showed perhaps a certain defensiveness,
in stating that this new law would be "grafted" on to the old.

An objective to communicate the importance of the change brought about by
EEC law was shown vividly in the landmark case of Bulmer v. Bollinger4 - the
"Champagne" case - in 1974, when he said in a memorably graphic, though
perhaps exaggerated, way, that:

"the treaty is like an incoming tide. It flows into the estuaries and up the
rivers. It cannot be held back."4

This was described as an "apt analogy", extra judicially, by Lord Fraser, and has
also been referred to flatteringly by Lord Scarman as "dazzling", and as a
"magificent simile", though not without qualification, by Lord Mackenzie Stuart. 5

In 1978 Lord Denning reinforced the idea:

"the flowing tide of Community law is coming in fast. It has not stopped at
high water-mark. It has broken the dykes and the banks. It has submerged the
surrounding land. So much so that we must learn to become amphibious if we
are to keep our heads above water."6

Subsequently, Denning was invited to give the first Lord Fletcher lecture, and
continued the simile thus:

3 The Times, 2 January 1973.
4 [197412 All E.R. 1226, at p.I23I; as to whether it is exaggerated see Mackenzie Stuart, supra n.I,

p.38: "If I might continue in the vein of Lord Denning, one might say, however strong may be the
currents in the estuary and forceful the incoming tide, these factors do not concern you overmuch if you
happen to run a grocery shop in central Scotland."
5 Fraser, "The Impact of Community Law on Scots Law", [19871 Joun/al ~rthe L{lm Sociery 0/

Scolland 90; Mackenzie Stuart, The European Communities (I/l{/the Rule o/Larl) (1977), I: cf Mackenzie
Stuart, supra n. I, at p.38.
6 Shields v. E. Coomes (Holdings) Lid. [19791 ] All E.R. 456, at p.462.

2



LORD DENNING AND EEe LAW

"Now in 1979 the tide is advancing. It is no use our trying to stop it, any more
than King Canute did. He got his feet wet; I expect we shall all get our feet
wet too.,,7

The analogy is perhaps to some extent intentionally humorous, but it is not
merely amusing, because it communicates to a perhaps conservative profession the
need to adjust to the change which the passing of the European Communities Act
1972 had made. This concern was also reflected in Denning's last book on law,
What Next in the Law, where he wrote "We should cease to look at [the European
Court's] work with English eyes. We should look at it with European eyes ... As I
have said before: 'The Treaty is like an incoming tide. It flows into the estuaries
and up the rivers. It cannot be held back'."s Were Lord Denning remembered
only for these rather apt similes that might well be worthwhile, since in a simple
way they communicate so effectively the inevitable impact of an important new
source of law and the extent of the change wrought by this "tide". As we shall see,
Lord Denning has more recently expanded these similes. What, however, of Lord
Denning's views in more detail? There are three convenient subdivisions of these
views: the guidance to courts as to when they should refer to the European Court
of Justice for a preliminary ruling under Article 177 of the Treaty of Rome; the
question of U.K. Sovereignty; and the interpretation of EEC law.

Preliminary Rulings
Under article 177 of the Treaty of Rome national courts may, and in some cases
must, seek a preliminary ruling on a question as to the interpretation of the treaty
from the European Court of Justice. It is well known that guidelines as to when a
decision on a question of Community law is necessary and on the exercise of the
discretion to refer, accompanied by other remarks on such references, were laid
down by Denning M.R. in Bulmer v. Bollinger.9 The guidelines on when questions
should be referred to the European Court have been influential in the sense of
citation at least, even though this might to some extent be a form oflip-service, as a
run through on LEXIS shows. Though further important remarks have been
made elsewherelO these guidelines remain a commonly quoted starting point for
discussion in England, and indeed were cited by Lord Clyde in the first Scottish
civil court reference, from the Court of Session.!! Kerr LJ with the concurrence of
Gibson LJ and Russell LJ has described them, after 13 years, as "a useful list ...

7 "The Incoming Tide", The First Lord Fletcher Lecture, November 1979, The Lord Fle/cher
Lec/ures 1979-1982, Solicitors European Group (1983), p.4.
8 (1982), at p.301.
9 [1974] 2 All E.R. 1226, at p.1234.

10 See Bingham J in Commissioners of ClIstoms and Excise v. Samex [1983] 1 All E.R. 1042, at
pp.I055-56; R. v. P(ymollth Jus/ices, Ex parte Rogers [19821 2 All E.R. 175.
1I. Stephen Malcolm Brown v. Secretary of State for Scotland, unreported but available on LEXIS; if.
Prince v. Younger [1984] 1 C.M.L.R. 723, at p.727.

3



THE DENNING LAW JOURNAl.

which have stood the test of time."] 2 That is not to say that they were exempt from
criticism or revision. The guidelines were widely criticised;]3 they have also not
been formally approved by the House of Lords. The extent of detail of the
guidelines was arguably unnecessary, and Stephenson LJ in the same case
indicated that guidelines should be "few".14 But Denning's boldness in laying
down such guidelines was possibly very helpful to lower courts, and to the
profession, uncertain of European law. Some of the guidelines do have an
uncertain status, though this should not allow the general contribution to be
overshadowed.

Denning's approach might be, and has been said to be, too restrictive of national
courts' discretion to refer,]S which is a serious charge in view of the need for
uniform jurisprudence on EEC law, as overseen by the European Court itself. A
further response to those guidelines on the other hand may be, and has been, that
they are too "nationalistic",16 that is to say that too much discretion is given to
national courts to decide on EEC questions themselves. Denning was, for
example, anxious that reference to the European Court should not be made
unnecessarily, because of the time to get a ruling and the need not to overload the
European Court, factors specifically mentioned in Bulmer v. Bollinger and also in
the earlier general article in The Times. While this might be said to reflect an
unduly conservative attitude, it has practical merit, borne out by the experience of
the European Court which now takes even longer than when Denning wrote to

12. R. v. Phamlaceulical Society 0/ Creal Brilai,l, Ex parle The Association 0/ Phanllaceutical Importers
[198713 C.M.L.R. 951, at p.970.
13. See, e.g., Vaughan (ed.), Law o/the EurOpeall Communities, vol. I, 1.23,3.80; Bebr, Developmellt 0/
Judicial Control o/Ihe Europeall Communilies, p.377; Lasok and Bridge, Law and blstitutions 0/ the
European Communities 4th ed., p.378; Collins, European Community Law ill the UlIiled Killgdom 3rd ed.,
p.134; Bridge, "Community Law and English Courts and Tribunals; General Principles and
Preliminary Rulings", 1 European Law Review (1975) 13; Gormley, "The Application of Community
Law in the United Kingdom 1976-1985",23 Common Markel LalP Review (1986) 287, at p.289; Brown
and Jacobs, The Court 0/ Justice 0/ the European Comlllullities 2nd ed., at p.170, and Mitchell and
Freeman there cited; Dagtoglou, "The English Judges and European Community Law", [1978] G.L.].
76; Forman and Stevens, "The Attitude of British Courts to Community Law - The First Three
Years", 13 CommOlI Markel Law Review (1976) 388, at p.406; see also Encyclopaedia 0/ European
Community Law, vol. B II, under Article 177; Ed. Comment, 1974 ComnlOllMarket Law Review 349.
But, as Parker J. pointed out in Lord Bethel v. SABENA [1983] 3 C.M.L.R. 1, at p.4, they are only
guidelines - see also Vaughan (ibid.) and Collins, European Law ill the U.K, p.138. Brown and Jacobs
say that the guidelines have no legal authority but have had an influence in practice, "emanating from
so eminent a source".
14. [1974] 2 All E.R. 1241; Stamp L.J. wholly agreed with Stephenson's judgment.
15. See, e.g., Bebr, Development ofJudicial COllirolof the European Commllllilies, p.377; Arnull, "Article
177 and the Retreat from Van Duyn", 8 European Law Review 365, at p.368 and if. Vaughan I, 1, 23.
16. Usher, in Vaughan (ed.), Law oflhe European CommUllilies, 3.80; see also Freeman, "References to
the European Court of Justice under Article 177", [1975] G.L.P. 176; Forman and Stevens, "The
Attitude of British Courts to Community Law", at p.407; Dagtog[ou, "The English Judges and
European Community Law", at p.89.

4



LORD DENNING AND EEC LAW

hand down rulings, about fifteen months, and has to handle even more preliminary
rulings. 17

An important issue, however, is that of Aae Clair, much beloved of academics.
Denning arguably gave too much scope to this doctrine, possibly out of a general
desire not to overload the European Court, and send only cases "worthy of its
mettle",]8 but also possibly because of symptomatic over confidence as to the ease
with which the "new law" could be applied by English judges.19 Denning accepted
the principles of the "previous ruling" and of Acte Clair, the latter being
controversial:

"In some cases ... it may be found that the same point - or substantially the
same point - has already been decided by the European Court in a previous
case. In that event it is not necessary for the English Court to decide it. It can
follow the previous decision without troubling the European Court ... In
other cases the English court may consider the point is reasonably clear and
free from doubt. In that event there is no need to interpret the treaty but only
to apply it, and that is the task of the English court.,,20

These remarks have of course been overtaken by the limited approval of the
doctrine of Acte Clair in the European Court judgment in G./.L.F.I. T.. It
recognised that

"the correct application of Community law may be so obvious as to leave no
scope for any reasonable doubt as to the manner in which the question raised
is to be resolved."

But it qualified this by saying that before the court could come to such a
conclusion it

"must be convinced that the matter is equally obvious to the courts of the
other Member States and to the Court of Justice."

And it further pointed out difficulties involved in the interpretation of EEC law,
such as the different language versions of Community legislation, which are all
equally authentic.21

17. See H.L. 20, 1987-88, A European Court of FiTStIlIStance, p.34; this is an increase from 1984 and
1985 - see the Synopsis of the work of the Court ofJustice of the European Commlwities, Luxembourg, 1986,
p.10. In 1972 there were 40 references, in 1985, 139, and in 1987 144 requests - H.L. 20, 1987-88,
supra, at p.32; Proceedings of the Court of Justice of the European Commutlities, No. 1/88. It is true, as
Forman and Stevens point out ("The attitude of British Courts to Community Law", p.407) that it was
no longer true as Denning had stated that the Court could not be split up into divisions, but the
recomposition of the Court into Chambers came about because of the growth in the number of
references: see The Court of Justice of the European Communities (Office for Official Publications,
Luxembourg, 1975), at p.14.
18. See The Times, 2 January 1973.
19. See Lasok and Bridge, supra n.I, p.378.
20. [1974] 2 All E.R., at p.1235.
21. [1982] E.eR. 3415, at p.3430.

5



THE DENNING LAWJOURNAL

Denning's unqualified adoption of the Acte Clair doctrine also clashes with the
cautious approach of the House of Lords in Garland, though that also takes in the
"previous ruling" guideline, and indeed may be more relevant to it, where Lord
Diplock noted that there was a "question" to justifY reference to the European
Court since

"there was not ... so considerable and consistent a line of case law of the
European Court on the interpretation and direct applicability of art. 119 as
would make the answer too obvious and inevitable to be capable of giving rise
to what could properly be regarded as 'a question' within the meaning of art.
177.,,22

Lord Denning's apparent encouragement of the adoption of the Acte Clair
doctrine by national courts on a widespread basis is surely open to reasonable
criticism, in allowing the ill considered unilateral interpretation ofEEC law. Some
balance had to be created between on the one hand preventing unnecessary
reference and encouraging a belief that EEC law could be understood and was not
wholly alien, and, on the other hand, misconstruing EEC law. An impression that
Denning was "in conflict" with the House of Lords cannot be maintained on the
basis of two or three cases, especially as Lord Diplock himself described the
doctrine of Acte Clair as "common sense",23 but perhaps Denning was over
confident initially on the possibilities of misconstruction. 24 Erroneous assumptions
can easily be made, as was indeed illustrated, ironically, by Denning's views in the
well known case of Schorsch Meie~5 coupled with the House of Lords' reaction in
Miliangos.26 The Schorsch Meier case has been taken to illustrate a degree of
contentiousness in Denning's guidelines, in emphasising the role of a national
court in interpreting EEC law for itself.27 Lord Diplock was particularly
interested, on the other hand, in expressing caution on a matter being "clear",
especially where judicial minds differ, as in Henn and Darb/8 and in the Gist -
Brocades cases,29 though a disagreement as to whether the law was clear or not, and
whether a "comparatively elaborate" finding of Acte Clair was self-contradictory,

22. [198212 All E.R. 402, at p.415.
23. "The Common Market and the Common Law", 6 Law Teacher (\972), p.14.
24. A contrast on initial expectations of judges such as Denning and misconstruction is made by Lasok
and Bridge, Law alld IllSlilulions oJlhe European Comll/lmilies, pp.378-379.
25. [1975J 1 All E.R. 152, at p.157.
26. [I975J 3 All E.R. 801, at pp.810-811, 820, 838; "I entertain the strongest reservations concerning
the use made by the Court of Appeal of art. 106 in the present context ... Any other court in which
such issues may arise would be well advised to refer them to the European Court for
clarification"(Wilberforce). See Usher, European Courl Practice, 1.69; Freeman, "References to the
European Court under Article 177", 28 c.L.P. (1975) 176, at p.193; see, however, Denning, The
Discipline oj Law, p.307.
27. Vaughan (ed.), Law oJthe European Commullities, 3.80; see also Lasok and Bridge, pp.379-80; if.
Bebr, Developmetll of Judicia! COlllro!, p.378.
28. [1980J 2 All E.R. 166, at p.l97.
29. R. v. Comptroller Patenls, Ex p. Gisl Brocades [1986] 1 W.L.R. 51, at p.67.

6



LORD DENNING AND EEC LAW

became evident in the House of Lords in Re Sandhu.3o A realisation of the limits of
Aae Clair has now become evident in the Court of Appeal too. In R. v.Thomson3l
Bridge LJ expressly cited the warning of Advocate General Warner that national
courts should exercise great caution before considering that the answer to a
Community law question admits of no possible doubt. Caution on EEC law was
also stated in a way relevant to all questions of interpretation of the Treaty of
Rome by Bingham J in Customs and Excise Commissioners v. Samex:

"Sitting as a judge in a national court, asked to decide questions of
Community law, I am very conscious of the advantages enjoyed by the Court
of Justice."

He drew attention to matters such as the comparison of different texts, detailed
knowledge of the treaties and subordinate legislation made under them, and a view
of what the orderly development of the Communities requires, where the Court of
Justice is much better placed than a national court.32 He also stated in the Bulk Oil
case, a week later, that

"The cases show that, even where the English judges have been confident
that a point of Community law should be decided in one way, the Court of
Justice of the European Communities has not infrequently decided it in the
other.,,33

These remarks, in Commissioners of Customs and Excise v. Sam ex, and Bulk Oil,
were referred to and approved implicitly by the Court of Appeal in the Bulk Oil
case,34and those in Commissioners of Customs andExcisev. Samexwere described as
"of great relevance" by Kerr LJ in the context of the free movement of
pharmaceutical productS.35In the Polydor case,36moreover, according to Kerr LJ,
"Ormrod and Templeman LJJ expressed strong views in this Court about the
apparently clearly correct answer to a question of Community law which had been
raised before them. But they nevertheless referred the case to the Court ofJustice,
and we were told that the ultimate decision was in fact the other way.,,37Again,
Kerr LJ, with the concurrence of his colleagues in the Court of Appeal,

30. The Times, 10 May 1985, available on LEXIS. Lord Fraser found that Lord Templeman's
comparatively elaborate analysis indicated that it was not, as Lord Templeman suggested, ACle Clair.
Lord Fraser was supported by Lord Brandon but Lord Bridge expressly disagreed on this point.
31. [1980] 2 All E.R. 102, at p.l05.
32. [1983] 1 All E.R. 1042, at pp.1055-56.
33. Cited by Ackner LJ [1984] 1 All E.R., at p.391.
34. Bulk OiIA.G. v. Sun Inlemational Ltd. [198411 All E.R. 386, at p.391.
35. R. v. Pharmaceutical Society oj Great Britain, Ex parte The Association oj PhannaceuticalImporters
[1987] 3 C.M.L.R. 951, at p.970.
36. [1980] 2 C.M.L.R. 413.
37. Per Kerr LJ, mpra n.35, at p.971.

7



THE DENNING LAW JOURNAL

emphasised that u.K. courts should "hesitate long" and exercise "great caution"
before reaching a conclusion that something is Acte Clair.38

These remarks, that national courts should be careful not to assume too readily
that they themselves should deal with the matter, must be especially true if they
refuse leave to appeal. This happened in the Magna:vision Case,39 where the
Divisional Court stated that the matter before them was clear, though it involved
the interpretation of difficult judgments of the European Court itself, and though
the Divisional Court considered that one judgment was out of line with the others
- and subsequently refused leave to appeal.40

The guidelines in Bulmer on the exercise of discretion to refer necessary
questions are relevant to courts not bound to refer such questions. Under Article
177 of the Treaty of Rome courts in general may refer questions of interpretation
to the European Court, but a court must so refer under Article 177(3) if "there is
no judicial remedy under national law" against its decisions. This obligation was
also covered by Lord Denning: "short of the House of Lords, no other English
court is bound to refer a question ... ,,4] That the issue as to which court is bound
could be argued about was indicated in the same case, however, where Stephenson
L] expressed doubt on the view that the House of Lords is the only court against
whose decisions there is no judicial remedy,42 while writers such as Collins have
opined that Denning's view was "plainly wrong",43 as did Campbell.44 There are
in fact other more recent cases which indicate that the Court of Appeal is not a
'final court', so that Denning may have been right. Pure has L], citing the Bulmer

38. Ibid., at pp.970-71; see also MacPherson] in R. v. H. M. Treasury, Ex parte Daia' Mail and Gmeral
Trost p.l.c., [19871 2 C.M.L.R. 1, cited by Kerr L], and R. v. Dearl(Jl)e;R. v. Druker, The Times, 28
January 1988.
39. S. A. Magnavision NY. v. General Optical Council (No.2) [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 262.
40. See analogously, the Bomore case [1986] 1 C.M.L.R. 228, at p.241, though it involved a decision
that the question was already covered by the European Court's jurisprudence rather than Acte Clair.
41. [1974] 2 All E.R. 1226, at p.1233; see also The Times, 2 January 1973.
42. At p.1241; Stamp L] agreed.
43. European Law in the United Kingdom 3rd ed., p.114, writing of course before Pic/mone or the
Phannaceutical Society case, referred to in the text: he also cites 8th General Report on the Activities of
the European Communities, which stated that Dcnning's view here "must be treated with reservation ";
see also Buckley LJ Hagm v. Fratelli [1980] 3 C.M.L.R. 253, at p.255 indicating that the House of
Lords and also the Court of Appea] would be bound to refer if leave to appeal were not obtainable
(which is described by Schermers Waelbroeck, Judicial Protection in the Europeau Communities 4th ed.,
(K]uwer) para.715. as the better solution, but as raising procedural difficulties by Lasok and Bridge,
supra n.l, at p.369 n.17), and S. A. Magnavision N. V. v. General Council (No.2) [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 262,
at pp.265-66, where Watkins LJ considered that if the Divisional Court refuses to certifYthat there is a
point oflaw for consideration by the House of Lords the Divisional Court may be or was "in a sense" a
court of final decision - though no reference to the European Court was made by Watkins L] and
Macpherson] because the matter was considered clear, and because no question was pending or
preliminary before the Divisional Court.
44. Common Market Law Supplement 1975, p.382: "it is respectfully submitted that his view is clearly
incorrect" .

8



LORD DENNING AND EEC LAW

guidelines, indicated in Pickstone v. Freemans plc45 that the Court of Appeal was not
a "final court" under Article 177, and Kerr LJ with the concurrence of his
colleagues said in R. v. Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain, ex parte theAssociation
of Pharmaceutical Importers that the Court of Appeal was not a court from which
there is no remedy, since there was a possibility of an appeal.4b Moreover, the
question must be asked whether the Court of Appeal is bound to refer if it has
already given judgment, and leave to appeal is refused.47 To judge by the
Magnavision case the question would no longer be "preliminary", and thus the
Court of Appeal would not be bound to refer.

Possibly if the Court of Appeal refuses leave to appeal it should be regarded as a
court from which there is no remedy; this is only consistent with justice in the
individual case, for which Denning supposedly cared especially, and with the
purpose of Article 17 and the case law of the European Court, though there are
arguments for an emphasis on 'higher' courtS.48 It is also arguable that in cases of
urgency the Court of Appeal should be regarded as the final court in England, and
the view that the House of Lords alone is bound seems inconsistent with
Denning's own consideration of the time and expense involved in getting a ruling.

Denning's view had the virtue of clarity, which was also the approach
subsequently adopted in the 1968 Convention on Jurisdiction and the
Enforcement of Judgments, and 1971 Protocol. It nominated the courts bound to
refer questions for a preliminary ruling on interpretation of the Convention and
Protocol to the ECJ, and concentrates on the House of Lords.49

The matter of the 'final court' under Article 177 is not one in any case on which
different views are not possible, and criticism of Denning may be over enthusiastic.
Sir Gordon Slynn, an Advocate General, said that it was "clearly" not true that a
court "of last resort" means the supreme court, in the U.K. the House of Lords,
and that a court from which there is no judicial remedy may be relatively low in the
hierarchy, 50 but Judge Pescatore, a judge of particular authority on the EEC,
stated that he preferred the view that a court at the top of the hierarchy is a court
from which there is no remedy and that, in any case, the question whether that

45. [1987] 3 All E.R. 756, at pp.770, 776; Oliver LJ found it unnecessary to decide if the decision
before him in the Court of Appeal was one from which there is no judicial remedy, so that a reference
would be obligatory, in British Leyland Motor Corporation v.Annstrong Patents [1984] 3 C.M.L.R. 102, at
p.l32 which implies that that decision was arguable.
46. [1987] 3 C.M.L.R. 951, at p.969; the assumption in the Bomore case, [1986] 1 C.M.L.R. 228, at
p.241, appears also to have been that the House of Lords was bound to appeal under the last paragraph
of Article 177, and the Court of Appeal a discretion to do so.
47. See Usher, European Court Practice, 1.72; Collins, European Commlll/it)' Law in the United Killgdom,
p.l13; Lasok and Bridge, Law and Institutions of the European Community, p.376.
48. See Brown and Jacobs, The Court of Justice of the European Communities, pp.16 7-68; if. Campbell
QC, Common Market Law Supplement (1975), p.383, and, on the case law of the Court of Justice,
Schermers Waelbroeck,Judicial Protection 4th ed., para. 710.
49. For Schermers Wae1broeck,Judicial Protection in the European Communities 4th ed. para. 711, the
Convention generally follows the "abstract theory", i.e. that concentrating on the highest courts.
50. "The Use of Article 177 of the EEC Treaty", the Fifth Lord Fletcher Lecture 1983, The Lord
Fletcher Lectures 1983-1984 1, at p.9.

9



THE DENNING LAW JOURNAL

court or a court from which there is no appeal in a particular instance is one from
which there is no remedy "could give rise to endless discussion."sl That does
suggest that criticism of Denning's view on this issue can get out of proportion.
There are of course good reasons for and against both views. 52

Considering the guidelines as a whole, and the question whether the House of
Lords alone is bound to refer, it is clear that they are, or have been, open to
criticism. But it would be wrong to over-react. Lord Denning was issuing clear and
relatively short guidelines, not writing a statute, and one would ell.']Jectthem to be
qualified later. In some respects they echo the previous remarks of Lord Diplock -
in the need to have regard to time and expense, the need not to overload the
European Court, and the acceptance of Acte Clair as "common sense", despite
later qualification. 53 Lord Mackenzie Stuart, the United Kingdom judge on the
European Court since our accession and a judge of vast experience, commented:

"It is instructive to look back at some of the specific anxieties expressed at the
beginning of British membership. For example, when should a judge use his
power to refer a case to us? Should the power be exercised only at the level of
the Court of Appeal? For all the academic ink spent in comment on how Lord
Denning's guidelines in Bulmer v. Bollinger [1974] Ch. 401 should be given
effect to, I think the fears have proved groundless. The British judiciary, with
its pragmatic good sense, have referred cases to Luxembourg when they
thought it appropriate having regard to the particular problems raised by the
case before them and, perhaps more importantly, have refused to refer where
domestic law has proved a perfectly adequate solution.,,54

That comment, plus that of Kerr LJ, puts criticism of the guidelines in some
perspective. The word "pragmatic" is interesting; perhaps a balance must be
struck between freedom to refer and an academic insistence on reference
wherever EEC law is alleged to be relevant, the resolution of which balance in
particular cases will be open to criticism. As Walton J once pointed out, the
invocation of Article 177 requiring, apparently, the court not to enquire into the
validity of alleged defences under EEC law, should be treated with
circumspection. It should not have an effect even greater than the murmuring of

51. Court of Justice of the Europeall Communities: Referencesfor preliminary rulings under Article J 77 of the
EEC Treaty alld cooperation betweell the Court and na/iOlIaI courts, Office for Official Publications of the
European Communities (1986), 16.
52. See Pescatore, ibid.; Bebr, supra n.13, at p.379 el seq.; Collins, European Commlllli<v Law in the
U'li/ed Kingdom, p.112j Schermers Waelbroeck, Judicial Pro/ec/ioan in the European Communities 4th ed.,
paras. 709-710, suggesting that the obiter in the Costa case was not necessarily meant to settle this
matter, though preferring the view that the subsequent case law of the European Court confirms the
"concrete theory", which would cover more than the House of Lords.
53. "The Common Market and the Common Law", 6 Law Teacher (1972), pp.13-14. In one respect
Lord Diplock was more restrictive, in suggesting that Courts below the Court of Appeal normally
should not make references; for criticism see Bebr, Developmell/ of Judicial COIllrol, p.377.
54. "The United Kingdom and Community Law - The First Decade", pA3j see also Collins, supra
n.13, at p.140, pointing out that English Courts have not hesitated from seeking guidance from the
European Court. Lord Mackenzie Stuart has been succeeded by Sir Gordon Slynn.

10



LORD DENNING AND EEe LAW

the magic word "Basingstoke" - though unfortunately unwillingness to refer
questions to the European Court in that and other similar cases on intellectual
property has been open to criticism. 55

The sovereignty of the u.K.
Lord Denning was apparently more alive to the supremacy of EEC law than other
senior judges, at least on the basis of written judgments. Of course, before U.K.
entry to the EEC the question of sovereignty had arisen in Blackbum v.Att.-Gell ..56
Lord Denning's view there indicated that he was aware that there soon could be a
successful challenge to the dogmatic and traditional view of sovereignty of Dicey:

"We have all been brought up to believe that, in legal theory, one Parliament
cannot bind another and that no Act is irreversible. But legal theory does not
always march alongside political reality . . . Legal theory must give way to
practical politics ... What are the realities here? If ... Parliament enacts
provisions to implement [the Treaty], I do not envisage that Parliament would
afterwards go back on it ... If Parliament should do so, then I say we will
consider that event when it happens. We will then say whether Parliament can
lawfully do it or not."

As Forman and Stevens suggest, Denning did not perhaps need to address
himself to the broad question of sovereignty, as well as that of review of the
Crown's treaty making power, but it had been raised, and all three judges
considered the question; in doing so he was making one of the few general judicial
statements on the subject and was here, as Forman and Stevens also point out,
addressing one of the most entrenched doctrines in English law.57 It is both a
conservative and an open minded statement. It is conservative because, despite the
statement of a preparedness to rethink the theory of Parliamentary Sovereignty
Denning was apparently still beginning from a starting point of traditional terms,
of one Parliament not being able to bind another. That indicates that he did not yet
accept fully the views of the European Court on supremacy, by which this country
is bound, as a pro-European lawyer would do. It was open minded in being
prepared to address political realities, and to rethink theory. 58 Despite his
statement that he would consider the problem of withdrawal from the EEC when it
happened, he did address that question later, in Macarthys, to an extent that he has

55. British Leyland Motor Corporatiol/ v. T.I. Silencers Ltd. [1980] 1 e.M.L.R. 598, at p.610 and see also
Sir Robert Megarry in l.e.l. v. Berk Phanllaceutical Ltd. 1198112 e.M.L.R. 91, at p.98; see, however,
British Leyland v. T.I. Sile1lcersLtd. [1980] 2 e.M.L.R., at p.332, [19811 2 e.M.L.R. 75, and Arnull,
supra n.15, at pp. 371-77.
56. [1971] 2 All E.R. 1380, at pp.1382-83; it was cited in the House of Lords when debating the
European Communities Bill 1972 by Lords Beswick, Hailsham and Shackleton: H.L. Deb. 7 August
1972, cols. 902, 912; 8 August col. 1048; I-I.e. Deb. 7 March 1972, col. 1332.
57. Supra n.13, at p.391.
58. The other two judges also made non-committal statements on the subject; Denning's is the
statement which made an impact.

11



THE DENNING LAW JOURNAL

been said to have" escaped from the apparent shackles of orthodox theory". 59 The
contrast between traditional theory and reality was echoed later, in considering the
impact of the Single European Act. Again he contrasted traditional theory and
political reality, and although he did not in terms rethink general theory on the
basis of the new political realities, these were in his mind as he declared that
Parliamentary Sovereignty had ended.

An overview of Denning's views on Parliamentary Sovereignty and EEC
Supremacy suggests that, though there was some inconsistency, he did particularly
accept EEC supremacy, as long as there was no express statutory repudiation. This
will be considered below. A limited recognition of the supremacy of EEC law
underlay The Times article, where he was clearly prepared to say in general that if
there was a conflict between a previous Act and the treaty the treaty will
"prevail".60 This however does not raise the question of sovereignty, since he
refers to a previous Act of Parliament and might even be taken to imply that EEC
law does not prevail in the case of a later Act of Parliament.

The question of the extent to which EEC supremacy is given effect may arise
where a post-1972 statute is enacted in terms different from or inconsistent with
prior directly applicable EEC law, and hence inconsistently with the 1972 Act. On
standard views of parliamentary sovereignty the effect given to EEC law by the
European Communities Act 1972 may be limited by a subsequent statute; no
Parliament, including the 1972 one, can limit a subsequent Parliament. The
situation is complicated by sections 2(4) and 3 of the European Communities Act
1972. Section 2(4) of the European Communities Act 1972 says - to paraphrase it
- that present and future legislation is to be construed and have effect subject to
section 2(1), allowing EEC law which is intended to be directly enforceable to be
so; section 3 refers to judgments of the European Communities Act 1972, which
brings in the doctrine of the supremacy of EEC law stated by the European Court.
Both sections of course are themselves open to express or implied repeal. The
question is, if there is an inconsistency between EEC law and a later U.K. statute,
must the former EEC law prevail, or should the later inconsistent statute be given
effect to, or can the two be reconciled? Given the impact of section 2(4) the
question is, how far can reconciliation go? This problem was mentioned by Lord
Diplock in Carland. In that case he said that it was not then an appropriate
occasion to consider whether, in the absence of an express statement in a statute of
an intention to be in breach ofEEC law, it would be justifiable to construe a statute
inconsistently with EEC law "however wide a departure from the prima facie
meaning of the language of the provision might be needed in order to achieve

59. Allan, "Parliamentary Sovereignty: Lord Denning's Dexterous Revolution", 31 Oxford Journal of
Legal Studies (1983) 22, at p.30, considering the 'self embracing' and 'continuing' schools of theory; if.
Macarthys [1979] 3 All E.R. 325.
60. The Times, 2 January 1973.

12



LORD DENNING AND EEC LAW

consistency".61 The problem of applying section 2(4) was also clear in Pickstone,62
in the Court of Appeal, where Nicholls LJ noted, citing Garland, that there was
nothing in the Equal Pay Act 1970 "which expressly or impliedly negatives, or
purports to negative, any such Community rights." Of course, it can be argued that
there can be no implied limitation or repeal of the 1972 Act unless there is not only
an inconsistency between a later statute and EEC law but also between stated
provisions in the statute and statd provisions of the European Communities Act
1972,63 but this seems to be an unduly narrow approach which does not refer to
the general and basic question of the intention of Parliament in the later statute,64
assuming that the draftsman was aware of EEC law and the 1972 Act. 65 Since the
effect of EEC law depends on that Act, the real question must be whether
Parliament intends to limit the effect ofEEC law, and by implication, the effect of
the 1972 Act. The main question, however, is the relationship of EEC law and a
statute subsequent to it, as addressed in Garland.66

In the main Denning expressed a definite emphasis on EEC supremacy,
bringing into clear perspective the existence of that doctrine. In Shields v. E.
Coomes (Holdings) Ltd.67 he devoted a large part of his judgment to explaining the
impact of EEC law - including its supremacy. He remarked that if there were any
inconsistency between EEC law and a statute then Community law "prevails",68
and that the direct applicability and supremacy of EEC law showed that "the
flowing tide of Community law is coming in fast ... It has submerged the
surrounding land."69 Here Denning corrected the misleading impression giveri by
himself (perhaps ex tempore) in Felixstowe Dock and Railway Co and European Ferries
v. British Railways Board, where he had said that once the relevant bill became a
statute that would dispose of the argument about an abuse of a dominant position
under Article 86 of the EEC treaty: "These courts will then have to abide by the

61.[1982] 2 All E.R. 402, at p.415; see also Hood Phillips, "A Garland for their Lords", (1982) 98
L.QR. 524 and Allan, "Parliamentary Sovereignty and the EEC", [1982] Public Law 562.
62. [1987] 3 All E.R. 756, at pp.765-66, 775-76; at the time of writing the House of Lords appeal had
not been heard.
63. See Bridge, "Abstract Law and Political Reality in the Post - European - Accession British
Constitution", [1987] Dennirzg L.}., 23 at p.36, citing Ellis, "Supremacy of Parliament and European
Law", 96 L.QR. 511, at p.513; if. Usher, in Vaughan (cd.), Law oJlhe European Commllllilies, vol. I,
3.14.
64. See on implied repeal, Halsbury 4th ed. vol. 44, pp.962, 966; Bennion, Slalulory bilerprelatiorl,
section 180; Maxwell, Interpretation oj Stalutes 12th ed., (1969), p.187; Craies, Statute Law 7th ed.
(1971), p.366.
65. Diplock and Denning seemed to assume it is knowledge.
66. [1982[ 2 All E.R., at p.415.
67. [1979] 1 All E.R. 456.
68. At p.46.
69. [1979] 1 All E.R. 456, at pp.461-62; if. Macart/!ys v. Smilh [1981] 1 All E.R. 111, at p.120
("Community law is now part of our law; and whenever there is any inconsistency Community law has
priority"); and Denning in Garden COllageFoods v. M.M.B. [1982] 3 All E.R. 292, at p.294. Too much
should not be read into phrases such as "equal in force to any statute", as in Application des Ga::.v. Falks
Vcrlilas [1974] 3 All E.R. 51, at p.56 - but see Dagtoglou, supra n.l3, at p.80.

13



THE DENNING LAW JOURNAL

Statute without regard to the Treaty at all."/o Denning probably did not think
through this throwaway statement sufficiently - he later was more careful in his
remarks.

Where there is an express repudiation of EEC law Denning's attitude was
different. In Macarthys v. Smith he returned to the issue of supremacy:

"I have assumed that Parliament, whenever it passes legislation, intends to
fulfil its obligations under the Treaty. If the time should come when our
Parliament deliberately passes an Act with the intention of repudiating the
Treaty or any provision in it or intentionally of acting inconsistently with it
and says so in express terms then I should have thought that it would be the
duty of our courts to follow the statute ... Unless there is such an intentional
and express repudiation of the Treaty, it is our duty to give priority to the
Treaty.,,7\

Thus, when Parliament expressly says that it repudiates, by statute, EEC law, or
expressly says that it intends to act inconsistently with it, effect must be given to
that repudiation, but that unless that happens we must go by EEC law. The phrase
"says so in express terms" is not entirely clear; it may mean that the terms of the
statute evince such a deliberate intention 72 or, more probably, that an express or
formal statement is made as to intention. 73

Either interpretation may to some extent be supported by reference to the First
Lord Fletcher Lecture 1979,74where Denning stated that he had said in a recent
case (A1.acarthys) that "our own Parliament in the last resort, if it so intends, can
over-ride Community law. It can, for instance, say that our courts are not to follow
Community law on any particular topics. It could in the last resort withdraw."
Saying in a statute that our courts are not to follow Community law on a topic
would seem sufficiently, in Denning's terms in Macarthys, to "say so" in express
terms. If Denning simply meant that a deliberate intention be clear, that the
statement mentioned is a "for instance" and the question is if Parliament "so

70. [19761 2 C.M.LR. 655, at pp. 664-65.
71. [1979] 3 All E.R. 325, at p.329.
72. See Collins, European Community Law in the United Kingdom, p.29; if. Bridge, op.cit. supra n.63,
1987 Denning L.J. 23, at pp.35-36; Lasok and Bridge, Law and Institutions of the European Commllllities
4th ed., p.375.
73. See Allan, 31 OxfordJournal of Legal 5111dies(1983) 22, at pp.25-27, who takes it that Denning's
requirement of express words mirrors section 2 of the Canadian Bill of Rights 1960. "Every law of
Canada shall, unless it is expressly declared by an Act of the Parliament of Canada that it shall operate
notwithstanding the Canadian Bill of Rights, be so construed and applied as not to abrogate, abridge or
infringe, or to authorize the abrogation, abridgement or infringement of any of the rights or freedoms
herein recognized and declared", and (p.31) that it requires that Parliament state expressly that
Community law is not to prevail; Wade and Phillips, CottStitutional and Administrative Law, p.138, use
the words "expressly declare that it prevailed". Lord Fraser, "The Impact ofComnlUnity Law on Scots
Law", [1987] Journal of the Law Society of Scotland, p.91, cites Macarthys in connection with an Act
"clearly stating that it superseded some provision of Community legislation"; if. Bridge, Lasok and
Bridge, supra n.72.
74. At p.8.

14



LORD DENNING AND EEC LAW

intends", he would be, it is submitted, in conformity with general philosophy on
implied repeal.75 However in the Lord Fletcher lecture he seems to envisage a
specific reference to Community law,76 not just a repugnancy, where EEC law and
the statute cannot stand together. The significance of Denning's statement in
Macarthys, according to Allan, is that section 2(4) of the 1972 Act has been to some
extent entrenched, that a requirement of form (of express wording) has been
placed on any statute designed to override Community law, and the court has
departed from the ordinary rule on implied repeal. 77

As it stands, Denning's statement places more emphasis on express terms than
did Lord Diplock in Garland. Lord Diplock anticipated when debating the
European Communities Bill that conflicts between statutes and EEC law would
not be deliberate, but might arise by accident or oversight, that there were a great
many cases where statutes were ambiguous; but that if Parliament decided
(unambiguously) to amend or repeal directly applicable EEC law then the courts
would be bound to give effect to the subsequent statute; he seems to have
contemplated express repeal or amendment, rather than the academic possibility
of implied repeal as such.78 But he also suggested extra judicially, before the
enactment of section 2(4), that, generally, the courts would give effect to a statute
where there was a conflict between a subsequent statute and EEC law.79 The
Diplock statement in Garland, and that of Nicholls LJ in Pickstone do also leave
open the possibility of implied repeal of EEC law without an express statement.80

Of course in Macarthys Denning may simply have been taking the clear case,
particularly because he was concerned with the extreme possibility of withdrawal
from the U.K., even ifhe meant that an express statement be made,8] and it seems
clear from the Lord Fletcher lecture that he was focussing on the clear, extreme,
cases of 'the last resort'.

The apparent requirement of an express statement appears to echo clause 3 of
Lord Wade's Bill of 1977 (not long before Macartky's), a Bill to give effect to the
European Convention on Human Rights, which stated that in the case of a conflict
between a subsequent statute and the European Convention, the Convention
should prevail unless the statute "explicitly" said otherwise.82 It also echoes the
75. For rules on implied repeal see n.M supra.
76. Cf Allan, ~upra n.73, who interpreted Macar/~ys in this way.
77. Ibid., at pp.2S, 32. As Bridge puts it, SlIpra n.72, at p.24, "the eponym who graces this Joumal has
been credited with accomplishing a 'dexterous revolution!'"
7M. H.L. Deb, 8 August 1972, cols.l028-1029, and if. Lord Hailsham at col. lOS I; here Diplock made
the interesting statement that "it is difficult to think of any section in an Act of Parliament in which one
cannot say there is one meaning or another." Presumably he thought such an approach would normally
provide the solution to conflicts. Diplock's statement that "the only problem so long as the Community
survives" would in practice arise where there is an oversight or accident was echoed by Denning in
Macar/hys [1979] 3 All E.R. 325, at p.329.
79. "The Common Market and the Common Law", The Lam Teacher (1972), p.8.
80. See also Bridge, op.ci/. SlIpra n.63, p.38.
81. See also the Lord Fletcher Lecture, and Wha/ Nex/ ill /he Lalv, at p.300.
82. See H.L. 176, 1977-78, Report of the Select Committee on a Bill of Rights, Annex.; ~rAllan,
SlIpra n.73. The Committee (p.36) wished to amend it to read as regards later Acts "unless it provides
otherwise or does not admit of any construction compatible with this Act", which is wider.

15



THE DENNING LAW JOURNAL

statement of Sir Geoffrey Howe, who spoke for the government as Solicitor-
General in the Second Reading Debates on the 1972 Act, that he did not go so far
as Lord Diplock's statement (extra-judicially) that any later statutes plainly in
conflict with our obligations under the treaties would be given effect to, but
endorsed the proposition "that a subsequent United Kingdom statute - even if not
designed to pull us out of the Communities - which began with the phrase
'notwithstanding the provisions of Clause 2 ... of the European Communities Bill,
black shall be white' would mean that the courts of this country would give
effect to that limited proposition, certainly as the matter now stands"; of course he
seems to be taking the clear case.83 It is again consistent with suggestions that
statutes of constitutional importance are not necessarily subject to implied repeal
to the same extent as ordinary statutes.84 Any emphasis on the need for an express
statement is practical because it becomes relatively clear when EEC law is not to
be given effect to, i.e. when there is an express, stated intention so to do within the
statute.85 Denning was later to complain that section 2(4) is obscure and
unintelligible.86

Denning's was in any case an early and clear statement of the position where
there is a conflict between EEC law and a statute, indicating that he was alive to
that problem. It is interesting that the word "priority" is used by Denning - a word
reflecting the question of supremacy which is implicit in section 3 of the 1972 Act,
rather than the straightforward one of construction as under the terms of section
2(4) of the 1972 Act.

Lawton L] in the same case, preferred to emphasise the operation of the 1972
Act, remarking, after citing sections 2(1) and 2(4) of that Act, that there was
nothing in the statute concerned - the Equal Pay Act 1970 as amended by the Sex
Discrimination Act 1975 - to indicate an intention to amend or to limit the
application of the European Communities Act 1972, "indicate" being less formal,
apparently, than Denning's words "says so in express terms".87

83. "The European Communities Act 1972", 49 II/lernatiollal Affairs (1973) I, at p.9, citing 838 H.C.
Deb. 13June 1972, col. 1320, where he said that "most people" agreed that a statute with a phrase as in
the text would be given effect to; a proposed requirement that section 2(4) provide for Parliament
saying "notwithstanding our obligations the following shall take effect", or "unless the contrary
appears", was rejected by Howe as providing in advance for the breach of treaty obligations; see also
Viscount Colville of Culross, H.L. Debates 8 August 1972, col. 1024. Sir Geoffrey Howe considered
the possibility also of an inadvertent conflict, when the courts would "try" to construe the statute in
accordance with our international conventions: ibid., at col. 1321. Viscount Colville stated that the
advice that had been given was that if there were unavoidable conflict the courts would have to give
effect to the statute: H.L. Deb. 8 August 1972, cols. 1024, 1027,
84. See Halsbury 44, at p.966 (citing Lord Wilberforce in Petitio" of Earl of A,I/rim [1967] 1 A.C., at
p.724, but also Karapier v. Wy'eshilla [1968] A.C. 717), and Hailsham's evidence to the Select
Committee on a Bill of Rights, H.L. 81, 1977-78, p.16, but see H.L. 176, 1977-78, p.22, n.1.
85. Cf Halsbury 44, at p.962, Bennion, section 180 on implied repeal generally.
86. The Salisbury Review, April 1987, p.ll; see also H.L. Deb. vol. 480, 1986, col. 1090.
87. [1979] 3 All E.R., at p.334. Cf Usher in Vaugh~n, I, 3,14.

16



LORD DENNING AND EEC LAW

Certainly Denning's broad view was partially upheld in the judgment of Lord
Diplock in Garland.88 The implication from that judgment is at least that an
express statement would justifY construction inconsistently with EEC law. Lord
Denning's view has also received support, extra judicially, from Lord Fraser, who
stated, citing Macarthys and Garland, that an express positive statement in a statute
of an intention to overrule or depart from a piece of Community legislation would
be given effect to.89

Denning's attitude to the passing of the European Communities (Amendment)
Bill, giving effect to the Single European Act, indicates a more traditional personal
desire to defend the Sovereignty of Parliament, but also a realistic and perhaps
radical recognition of the supremacy of EEC law, which in the views of some may
have been an over-reaction. In the House of Lords he vigorously opposed the
passing of the Bill, declaring that it would "seriously erode" the sovereignty of the
Queen in Parliament,90 ranging himself on the side of the "traditional
constitutionalists" to ensure the supremacy ofPariiament.91 Here he was rebuffed.
As he himself remarked, The Times' headline was "Denning crushed on
sovereignty".92 But he returned to the attack at the Committee stage, putting down
amendments so as to prevent a repeal or amendment of a statute by an EEC
directive, or by a decision of the European Court, so that it would be public.93 He
further went into print, in The Salisbury Review, and in The Times. In The Salisbury
Review94 he recognised initially the traditional sovereignty of the Queen in
Parliament,95 but continued:

"For nearly 300 years our constitutional law has been based on the
fundamental principle that Parliament was the supreme legislative authority
in and for the United Kingdom. It alone could make or unmake our laws,
amend or alter them. That sovereignty has now been ended. Its overthrow
will be completed by Parliament itself when it passes the European
Communities (Amendment) Bill ... So we have to reckon with a new
constitutional principle. Community law, as declared by the European Court
of Justice, is superior over any Act of our Parliament which is inconsistent
with it.,,96

88. [1982] 2 All E.R. 402, at p.415; see also Hood Phillips, "A Garland for their Lords", 98 L.QR ..
(1982) 524, and Allen, "Parliamentary Sovcreignty and the EEC", [1982] PlIblic Lan> 562.
89. "The Impact of Community Law on Scots Law", [I987]Jollmal of/he Lam Socie()' ofSco/lalld 90, at
pp.91-92.
90. H.L. Deb. 1986, vol. 479, col. 1056. See also his account in nle SalislJlII)' Reviem, April 1987,8 at
p.l2, and H.L. Deb. vol. 480, cols. 1089-90.
91. See The Salisbury ReviClv, April 1987, p.12.
92. Ibid., at p.12.
93. H.L. Deb, 1986, vol. 480, col. 1090; if. The Salisb1l1J'Review, April 1987, p.12.
94. "The Single European Act", ibid., p.8.
95. Ibid., at p.l1.
96. Ibid., at pp.1l-12.

17



THE DENNING LAW JOURNAL

Equally his article in The Times, headed with the dramatic by-line "Farewell to our
Sovereignty)! stressed in the same way that Parliamentary Sovereignty had
ended.97

It must be said that Denning's views seem to be dictated by his reaction to the
Single European Act. That Act made changes to the Treaty of Rome and was
given effect to in the U.K. by the European Communities (Amendment) Act,
which he mentions: in his view the Bill was not confined to economic matters but
covered legal and political matters as well. His views were also influenced by
considerations as to the role of the European Court, which has declared the
supremacy of Community law.98 His reaction to the single European Act itself was
controversial. Indeed attempts to reopen the question of sovereignty on the Single
European Act were, generally, dismissed by Bridge as misconceived.99

Denning did accept and support the changes made once the European
Communities (Amendment) Bill became an Act. I Thus he wrote in his usual
graphic style:

"Let us give the Single European Act our wholehearted support. Long ago,
when we entered the Common Market, I drew this picture:

'The Treaty is like an incoming tide ... '
Now I continue the imagery:

Look, there is a ship coming in with the tide. She is called European Union.
But she is in difficulty ... Send out a good boat to help her. Here is one. It is
called the United Kingdom. Put good men aboard the European Union.)!2

However, Denning's later reaction to the EEC commission's suit against the
United Kingdom on failure to implement an EEC directive on V.A.T. contrast
with those views on the loss of sovereignty. This suit concerned the zero-rating of
items, which it was alleged was not proper under the Directive. In an article in The
Times Denning argued that:

"The zero-rating case is of immense constitutional significance ... I am quite
sure that, when we ~ntered the European Community, no one ever thought
that we were giving the European Court of Justice power to declare invalid
our Acts of Parliament, especially those dealing with taxation, on which we
have always felt most strongly ... the people of England ... will condemn the

97. The Times, 3 November 1986, p.20.
98. See H.L. Deb. vol. 479,1986,1056-59; The Salisbury Review, supra n.90, at pp.8, 10. Denning also
thought it possible that European courts of first instance would sit in England.
99. "Abstract Law and Political Reality in the Post-European-Accession British Constitution", [1987]
Denning L.J., 23, at p.41.

1. He was reported as saying that "he had shed his wig and gown for a politican's robe"; The Times, 4
November 1986.
2. The Salisbury Review, wpra n.90., at p.l3; see also The Times, supra n.97.

18



LORD DENNING AND EEC LAW

Commission for bringing those proceedings challenging the sovereignty of
our Parliament.,,3

The article is subject to some criticism, for example in the complaint that the
u.K. Parliament and not its government should have been sued, overlooking the
fact that the Commission sues Member States, represented in this case by the
government.4 The main point is, however, that Denning was here, on a temporary
issue, again prepared to defend the sovereignty of Parliament.

To sum up, Denning's views on sovereignty are not entirely consistent. But they
are indicative of a lawyer prepared to think for himself, and to address the issue of
sovereignty squarely. For a lawyer brought up on Dicey these views are radical,
and his views after he retired from the Bench especially in The Salisbury Review are
both provocative and progressive.

Interpretation of the law
In Bulmer v. Bollinger Lord Denning had some comments to make on the

interpretation ofEEC law. These comments were not revolutionary and have been
duplicated since, but they remain an early clear statement of the need to interpret
EEC law in a different way:

"it is apparent that in very many cases the English courts will interpret the
treaty themselves. They will not refer the question to the European Court at
Luxembourg. What then are the principles of interpretation to be applied?
Beyond doubt the English courts must follow the same principles as the
European Court ... They must follow the European pattern. No longer must
they examine the words in meticulous detail ... They must look to the
purpose or intent ... They must not confine themselves to the English text.
They must consider, if need be, all the authentic texts ... If they find a gap,
they must fill it as best they can."s

Over a page of the All England Report is taken up with this advice. This was surely
much needed, and because it was stated at such an early stage may well have been
influential. It was perhaps made in response to a realisation of the difficulties
which the profession faced in adjusting to the law. Probably such advice was given
with some pleasure by a judge noted for his preference for reasoning in any case by

3. The Times, 22 July 1987; see also H.L. Deb. 1986, vol. 480, col. 1090; 77leSalisblltJ'Review, sllpra
n.91.
4. See letter to The Times, 27 July 1987 by Langdon - Davies for that, and other criticisms. He is

correct in saying that the E.C.j. does not declare Acts to be "invalid", but Denning might say that that
is the effect. See also letters in The Times, 29 July 1987.
5. [1974] 2 All E.R. 1226, at pp.1236-37. Cf Application des Gaz v. Falks Veritas [1974] 3 All E.R. 51,

at pp.56-57; Schorsch Meier [1975] 1 All E.R. 152, at p.157; see also The Discipline of Lan) (1979), p.17.
The appropriate principles of interpretation to interpret the EEC Treaty were also addressed by Lord
Diploek in Heml and Darby [1980] 2 All E.R. 166, at p.196.

19



THE DENNING LAWJOURNAL

"principle".6 This is perhaps suggested by his judgment in James Buchanan,1
where he related his participation in a discussion in Luxembourg with members of
the European Court, and other colleagues of the member states. He articulated
the "European method" on interpretation, the purposive approach, and urged its
adoption on European matters, before continuing: "Even in interpreting our own
legislation, we should do well to throw aside our traditional approach and adopt a
more liberal attitude."s It has rightly been said that Viscount Dilhorne's cool
response to the suggestion that "gaps" in lcgislation could thus be filled, that our
membership of the EEC does not entail abandonment of traditional methods of
interpretation, was unduly dismissive.9 At the same time there was perhaps
insufficient stress by Dcnning on the linguistic difficulties faced by an. English
judge in interpretation, difficulties drawn attention to by Lord Mackenzie Stuart,
and by the European Court in G./.L.F./. T., and by Bingham J subsequently, 10
though he did refer to the other authentic texts in Bulmer, and considered, but
would not go by, the French text of a directive in Phonogram v. Lane. II It is
arguable of course that the differences in approach to interpretation of English law
and EEC law or international conventions are exaggerated.12 But the Renton
Committee on The Preparation of Legislation expressly cited Dcnning's remarks on
interpretation in Bulmer, having written that there are differences in drafting
technique in England and Europe, \3 and Denning himself thought it particularly
important to emphasise the attractiveness of the "European" method:

6. See also Bridge, op. cit., n.I at p.I 7, on Denning's creative outlook.
7. [1977] I All E.R., at pp.522-23.
8. He referred here in James Buchanan to an old banle over interpretation, when advocacy of a

'purposive' approach to interpretation of statutes was condemned in the House of Lords by Lord
Simonds: see Denning The Disciplille of Law, p.I 3; Bridge, op. cit, 17. The response to Lord Denning's
remarks from the House of Lords in James Buchanan was not enthusiastic: [19771 3 All E.R. 1053, at
p.1056. See also The Discipline of Law, p.22.
9. Lasok, in Vaughan (ed.), Law of the European Commlmities, vol. I, 1.47.

10. G./.L.F.l. T. [1982] E.C.R., at p.3430; Bingham J in Commissioners of Customs and Excise v. Samex
[1983] I All E.R. 1042, at pp.1055-56.; Mackenzie Stuart, The European Communities alld the Rule of
Law (1977), p.n.
11. [1981] 3 AIIE.R. 182,atp.186.
12. See Lord Wilberforce in James Buchanan v. Babco [1977] 3 All E.R., at p.1053: "the assumed and
often repeated generalisation that English methods are narrow, technical, and literal, whereas
continental methods are broad, generous and sensible, seems to me insecure at least as regards
interpretation of international conventions"; see also Collins, European Community Law ill the United
Kingdom, p.96; Dagtoglou, "The English Judges and European Community Law", at pp.77-78; and
Pescatore, Court of Justice of the European Communities: Information for lawyers, Office for Official
Publications of the European Communities (1984), p.29: "the Court's methods of interpretration ...
do not differ in principle from methods applied by any court ... but their liberal inspiration is worth
recording. The court operates in the framework of a completely new legal system which still presents
gaps and discontinuities in many respects. Under these circumstances it has to make constructive use of
the methods of legal interpretation ... " Cf Viscount Dilhorne inJames Buchanall, at p.I056; Vaughan
(ed.), Law of the European Communities, vol. I, 1.47; Lasok and Bridge, Law and IlIStitutiOlts of the
European Communities, p.87.
13. Cmnd 6053, 1975, pp.5l, 146; Denning was happy to cite this report in James Buchallan.

20



LORD DENNING AND EEC LAW

"I would now pass on to our most important task. It is the interpretation of
statutes and treaties. If you read this Treaty, if you read the regulations and
directives under it, they are all part of our law. How different they are from
ours ... The European Court ... have what they call a method of
interpretation called the 'teleological' or 'schematic' method ... It is very
different altogether from our English method of interpretation. I hope that
the European method of interpretation will pervade ours ... But I am a lone
voice in this." 14

Denning's judgments also contain advice as to the substantive content and
impact of EEC law, again going beyond perhaps what was strictly necessary for the
decision of the case before him. Thus in Re Westinghouse Elearic Corporation
Uranium Contraa Litigation MDL Docket No. 235 (No.2), he drew attention, in
what he called a "digression", to the EEC Commission's powers of investigation
and to the contrast with traditional English law:

"In making an investigation, the European Commission is armed with great
powers given by EEC Council Regulation 17/62, arts. 11 to 20. This will
come as a surprise to those of us who have been brought up in the common
law.,,15

About a page of the law report is taken up with an exposition of the powers of the
Commission.

Denning also spent some time in Shields v. Coomesl6 explaining the doctrine of
direct applicability, one of the two "twin pillars", he said, of EEC law, in an
apparent attempt to enunciate a general perspective of the new legal order. Here
again about a page and a half is taken up with explaining the new legal order.
However Denning was open to criticism in not making it sufficiently clear early on
that not all of EEC law is directly applicable, and in broad brush statements that
the treaty is "part of our law", apparently giving the impression that all of the
Treaty's provisions are, whereas he may have meant that no further Parliamentary
intervention was required for them to have effect. In 1973 he had said in The
Timesl7 that "There are several international conventions which have been
incorporated into our law by Act of Parliament and our courts have not the
slightest reluctance in applying them. They do so because Parliament has so
enacted. They will do the same with the Treaty of Rome and the regulations. So,
far from rejecting it, they will incorporate it into the body of our law." In an early
case, Application des Gaz v. Palks Veritas,18 he said:

14. 'The Incoming Tide', op.cit., at p.12.
15. [1977] 3 All E.R. 717, at p.n2.
16. [1979] 1 All E.R. 456, at p.461.
17. 2 January 1973.
18. [1974] 3 All E.R. 51, at pp.55-56.

21



THE DENNING LAW JOURNAL

" ... the European Communities Act 1972 ... said that the Treaty of Rome
was to be given legal effect in the United Kingdom ... the treaty is part of our
law. It is equal in force to any statute. It must be applied by our courts."

That broad emphasis on the effect of the Treaty of Rome is misleading, in the
sense that it could be inferred that all of the treaty has similar effect. That
inference could be corrected, since he then considered separately the question of a
remedy, with the implication that the effect in a particular case was a distinct
question, and went on to point out that, according to the jurisprudence of the
European Court, Article 85 creates rights which can be enforced directly.19 In the
Trendtex case Denning again referred to the Treaty as simply "part of the law of
England".2o This may have been intended to communicate the legal relevance of
the Treaty in an English court - or its potential relevance - in contrast to the
normal rule as to treaties. But to say that the "treaty is part of our law",
unqualified, may suggest that all its provisions are applicable directly, and the
strong word "heresy" has been levelled at the suggestion that all treaty provisions
are part of the law of England and enforceable by its courtS.21 In Bulmer he had
indeed declared that "any" rights or obligations created by the treaty are under
section 2(1) to be given effect "without further ado", which suggests again that he
was thinking of incorporation, but is less undiscriminating, though he also said,
broadly, Parliament had decreed the treaty to be "part of our law".22

In Schorsch Meie?3 he stated that the treaty was part of English law, observing
that it creates rights and obligations not only between member states but also
between member states and citizens, and between citizens (citing the European
Van Gend en Loos case), suggesting his discrimination between the different effect
of the treaty provisions. But he said in respect of Article 106 that he was applying
the Treaty of Rome in an English court for the first time, which showed its "great
effect", having brought about a "fundamental change".24 This may suggest an
uncritical approach to the different effect of provisions of the treaty, as in Miliangos
Lord Wilberforce seriously doubted whether Article 106, in question, is directly
applicable.25

In Re Westinghouse Electric Corporation Uranium Contract Litigation MDL Docket
No. 235,26 Denning further remarked that:

19. At p.58.
20. [1977] I All E.R. 881, at p.892.
21. Lasok and Bridge, Law and Institutions of the European CommUllities 4th ed., p.376.
22. [1974] 2 All E.R., at pp.l231-32.
23. [1975] I All E.R. 152, at pp.157-58.
24. Ibid., at p.158.
25. [197513 All E.R., at p.8IO; see also Lasok and Bridge, supra n.21, at p.379j Bridge, op. cit. n.18, at
20; Usher, European Court Practice, 1.69.
26. [1977] 3 All E.R. at 703, at p.711. In James Buchanan v. Babco [197711 All E.R. 518, at p.523, he
said that "In interpreting the Treaty of Rome (which is part of our law) we must certainly adopt the new
approach" (emphasis added). See also Macarthys v. Smith [19811 I All E.R. III, at p.120; Garden
COllageFoods v. M.M.B. [1982] 3 All E.R. 292, at p.294j The First Lord Fletcher Lecture (\ 979), p.12.

22



LORD DENNING AND EEC LAW

"The EEC Treaty and all its provisions are now part of the law of England:
that is clear from s.2 of the European Communities Act 1972. We have to
give effect the treaty as being incorporated, lock, stock and barrel, into our
own law here."

By virtue of the section 2 mentioned, in fact, only certain EEC rights intended
to be given effect to without further enactment shall be enforced accordingly. In
this sense, as Collins put it, the treaty is not incorporated "lock, stock and
barrel",27 and the phrase "and all its provisions" was in itself also misleading; the
context was Article 85, which Denning had decided, on the basis of a decision of
the ECJ, to have direct enforceability in Application des Gaz v. Palks Veritas,2B and
regulation 17/62, which as he said,29 is directly applicable. Perhaps he was
intending to emphasise in general the important fact that provisions of the Treaty
of Rome may be enforced in English courts, and are not "alien law", whereas
normally of course treaties and treaty provisions are not part of English law, which
the context of his remarks ("incorporated") does suggest. The point of the "lock,
stock and barrel" statement may have been that no further Parliamentary
intervention is required for the Treaty provisions to have effect. But that is perhaps
open to question also, in the sense that Community law is not in its entirety
incorporated. Sir Geoffrey Howe, who was in charge of the Second Reading of the
1972 Bill, wrote of the terms of section 2(1): "Community law ... has not been
incorporated into or made identical with our own domestic law. Our courts are
simply required to give direct effect to Community law according to its own nature,
"in accordance with the Treaties ... I do not accept in its entirety the phrase 'as
part of the law of the United Kingdom' [in the 1967 White Paper]. Community law
retains its own nature.,,30

Denning did make it clear that not all of the Treaty is directly applicable in
Shields v. E. Coomes (Holdings) Ltd,3) where, after remarking that "all the rights and
obligations arising under the treaty are to be given legal effect", he explained the
doctrine of direct applicability in some detail:

"any citizen ... can require his own courts to enforce his Treaty rights. It is
not every article which permits of 'direct applicability'. It is only those articles
which are sufficiently clear, precise and unconditional as not to require any
further measure of implementation."

27. Collins, supra n.13, at p.3S; see also Lasok and Bridge, Law and InSlillllions of lhe European
Communilies, p.376, and Bridge, supra n.l, pp.14-15.
28. [1974] 3 All E.R. 51, at p.S8.
29. [1977] 3 All E.R., at p.712.
30. "The European Communities Act 1972", 49IIlIemalionalAjjiLirs (1973) 1, at pp.4-S.
31. [1979] 1 All E.R. 4S6, at p.461. When he wrote on the European Act, in 1987, he also did make it
clear that "As 1 read section 2 of the [European Communities] Act, the only provisions of the treaty
which are certainly binding in England are those which are operative 'without further enactment''': The
Salisbury Review, April 1987, p.ll (and see I-I.L. Deb. vol. 480, 1986, col. 1089); he was, however,
contrasting directives which, he said, were binding after further enactment, whereas the European
Court had held that directives can be enforceable in an English court in the Marshall case.

23



THE DENNING LAWJOURNAL

Yet, when Denning wrote his What Next in the Law, he wrote that "The Treaty of
Rome is part of our law", and "all of the articles of the Treaty and many of its
Regulations and Directives are to be enforced directly by the English courts. ,,32
Again, the assumption in his mind may have been that constitutionally speaking
the Treaty was "incorporated". This seems to be suggested by the context of the
remarks here as well as elsewhere:33 "By an Act of Parliament ... the Treaty of
Rome is part of our law. Our courts· have to give effect to it just as if it had been
passed by our Parliament ... all of the articles ... are to be enforced . . . even
though we have no legislation upon the point passed by our own Parliament." In
1986, speaking in the House of Lords he similarly stated that, whereas in
constitutional law treaties normally are not binding in England, section 2 of the
1972 Act made it clear that "all rights, obligations, or whatever, under the treaty
are without further enactment to be given effect or used in the United Kingdom
and recognised and available in law. In other words, every right and obligation in
that Treaty of Rome was brought into our statute by Parliament by Section
2(1).,,34 Yet, in the sense mentioned, these are over-broad statements; the word
"all", in both quotations, (or "every"), together with "enforced directly", is
misleading.35 Again, the "as if it had been passed" is questionable. Sir Geoffrey
Howe explained: "Community law retains its own nature. Certainly it will take
effect here by virtue of an Act of Parliament. But not 'as if enacted' thereby. The
point I wish to underline is the provision that is made for the application within this
country of future Community law - that which is 'from time to time provided for by
or under the treaties,.,,36

So, to conclude on interpretation of the law, Lord Denning's judgments and
writings are typically vigorous and informative, pointing out the need for different
attitudes on EEC law, and communicating the general impact of EEC law - the
principles of interpretation, the investigations by the EEC Commission, and the
principles of supremacy and direct applicability. On section 2, however, there have
to be reservations about, at least, his expression of the effect of the European
Communities Act 1972, because perhaps he wished to emphasise the general
constitutional point of the relationship of treaties to u.K. law. Perhaps, leaving
Schorsch Meier aside, it can be said that these failures of expression were not
serious, but if Denning's purpose was to communicate the dramatic impact of
EEC law, he arguably over emphasised it here, and left himself open to criticism,
especially when his remarks in What Next in the Law are considered.

32. (1982), pp.293, 295; 'emphasis added'.
33. Ibid., at p.294; in The Salisbury Review, at p.ll; H.L. Deb., 1986, vol. 480, col. 1089, he drew
attention to the words "without further enactment" but he was concerned partly to contrast the effect of
directives. Article 189, he thought, envisaged further enactment.
34. H.L. Deb. vol. 480, 1986, col. 1060.
35. The context was the European Communities (Amendment) Bill.
36. "The European Communities Act 1972", supra n.30, at p.5.

24



LORD DENNING AND EEC LAW

Conclusion
In general conclusion any judgment on Denning's contribution in the field of

EEC law must seem presumptuous. Some of his contributions are open to
criticism. The general impression, however, is of a vigorous and lasting
contribution to a communication of the impact of EEC law, even if it was marred
in the loose phraseology on the effect of the Treaty of Rome and EEC law. There
was a contribution too in the establishment of guidelines on the reference of
questions of EEC law to the European Court, and in interesting, even radical, but
inconsistent thoughts on Sovereignty.

25